

## PROCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL MEETING ON

October 25, 1886.

The twenty-second General Meeting was held at the Rooms of the Society of British Artists, Suffolk-street, Pall Mall, on October 25, 1886.

PROFESSOR H. SIDGWICK IN THE CHAIR.

Mr. F. W. H. Myers gave an account of a novel class of experiments—some of which he, Mr. Gurney, and Dr. A. T. Myers had lately seen and shared in—conducted by Dr. Babinski, a physician of the Salpêtrière, at Paris, and pointing to the transfer of hysterical affections from one patient to another, under the influence of a neighbouring magnet. If suggestion be excluded, the phenomenon seems clearly to be telepathic in nature; and the results which took place in the presence of the English observers, though not conclusive, were decidedly striking and suggestive. A full account of these appeared in the *Journal* for November, 1886.

## PROCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL MEETING ON

January 28, 1887.

The twenty-third General Meeting was held at the Rooms of the Society of British Artists, Suffolk-street, Pall Mall, on January 28, 1887.

PROFESSOR W. F. BARRETT IN THE CHAIR.

Part of the following paper was read:—

I.

## AUTOMATIC WRITING.—III.

BY FREDERIC W. H. MYERS.

## PHYSIOLOGICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL ANALOGIES.

I purpose here to continue a discussion which has already occupied two papers in these *Proceedings*,<sup>1</sup> and which I cannot hope to conclude in the present essay. The phenomena of *automatism*,—the indications

<sup>1</sup> See *Proceedings*, Vol. II., p. 217, and Vol. III., p. 1.

given by unwilling or unconscious action of mental processes going on within us,—offer a field for investigation whose importance is gradually beginning to be recognised. *Graphic* automatism—the topic with which these papers have more especially dealt—had hardly, so far as I know, been alluded to previously ; except, indeed, by Spiritualistic writers, to whom the merit of the first express recognition of the phenomenon undoubtedly belongs, whatever may be our opinion as to the explanation which they assign to it.

For my own part I have thus far dwelt mainly on three theses. In the first place, I tried to show that an automatic impulse, arising, so far as we can tell, wholly within the writer's own brain, may sometimes prompt him to write words or sentences whose meaning he does not discern while he is writing them,—nay, whose meaning he sometimes does not discern till after a tedious process of decipherment. In the second place, I showed that in some cases—in the case of Mr. and Mrs. Newnham especially,—the content of these automatically-written messages seemed to be derived, not from the writer's brain wholly, but, in part at least, telepathically from the unspoken and unhinted thoughts of another person. And thirdly, by a comparison of some peculiarities of automatic writing with some peculiarities of speech and script which we have some reason to suppose initiated by the *right* hemisphere of the brain, I tried to form some intelligible conception of a possible cerebral mechanism of automatic script in general. This last inquiry had a special bearing on the problems of telepathy ; since we have seen cause not unfrequently to associate telepathic impulses—both in their inception and in their reception—with the unconscious rather than with the conscious operations of the brain. We seemed, as I thought, to be getting a hint as to such operations which might be of service in more than one branch of psychical inquiry.

The discussion of automatism, even as thus far pursued, has suggested so many problems that it is not easy to say in what direction the general argument should incite us to attempt our next forward step. From one point of view, indeed, the answer to this question would be easy. If, like previous writers on this topic, already mentioned, I were to treat automatic writing from the Spiritualistic point of view alone, as affording a greater or less degree of presumption of the communication with us of departed souls, it would be my business to pass at once to an analysis of the facts contained in messages which have been automatically written. Some of the facts thus found I should be able, as my already-cited instances show, to refer to *telepathy*; to the influence of minds still in the flesh. And I should have to discuss whether any items of the messages were *not* so referable ; whether they pointed to the influence or communication of a “departed soul.”

All this will sooner or later have to be done in detail. But I am anxious rather to defer than to hasten the moment of attempting it. And I say this from no aversion from the Spiritualistic theory, a theory which, if it can be sustained, will obviously be more interesting, to say the least, than any other. Still less do I say it with any bias for any exclusive theory of my own. The surprise, indeed, would be if we were to discover that this great range of phenomena could wholly be comprised within the limits of any single hypothesis.

But in so complex a matter nothing but confusion can ensue if we attempt to decide on what I may call the advanced questions without some rather fuller knowledge of the preliminary questions than we have as yet gained. Let it be said at once that the extreme theory—the Spiritualist theory—of some of these communications is not to be dispelled with a breath. The evidence for it—though it is soon seen to be decidedly scantier than certain loose assertions would have us suppose—is, as we shall perceive, of a nature to perplex a candid inquirer. Stated nakedly, indeed, it might beget in the cautious mind nothing beyond perplexity. The canons by which it should be judged are as yet undetermined. If it is to be profitably approached, this must be after attempt shall have been made to frame such canons, or at least to turn some of the simpler cases over and over, and to try to bring them into some sort of relation with more familiar physiological or pathological facts.

In the present paper then, and in a paper with which I hope to follow it, I shall dwell mainly on two questions. The *first* of these will take us back, in one sense, to an earlier point than that which the previous papers reached. In those papers I was concerned to prove that automatic writing was really automatic,—that it was not in all cases the mere product of a half-conscious fancy,—of a hand idly wandering, and a dreamy caprice. Having now, as I trust, shown this sufficiently by an analysis of some of the messages thus received, I shall go back to a more general discussion of the significance and origin of automatic messages taken *per se*, as admitted facts, without special reference to their content.

And *secondly*, we shall find that, in order to understand the true meaning of graphic automatism, we shall have to consider other cognate automatic manifestations,—messages given by automatic speech, by other automatic movements, and even by sensory perceptions of various kinds. In this way we may perhaps get some sort of familiarity with the general type of these phenomena,—some sort of notion as to the way in which they stand related to hypnotism, to insanity, and, (if clairvoyance exists,) to clairvoyance,—which may serve as a guide when we come to deal with messages whose *content*, as well as their *mechanism*, offers matter of debate and perplexity.

I start afresh, then, with what may be termed the simple, typical form of automatic writing. The case communicated by Professor Sidgwick (*Proceedings*, Vol. III., p. 25) may serve as an example. An ordinary man, woman, or child, of normal health and intelligence, finds, either suddenly or more often after several trials, that his hand will write sentences of which he is not cognisant till they are actually written. Let us omit from consideration all those specific points in the messages on which we have already dwelt,—anagrams, telepathic information, mirror-writing, &c. Let us simply suppose (what is in fact the commonest case) that the automatist can at any time, or at least can frequently, induce insignificant messages, mainly resembling each other in handwriting and signed with the same name. And note that so long as the messages are insignificant in content, (as moralising reflections, trivial comments on passing events, and the like,) we can hardly attach importance of any kind to the signature. Sometimes, as in the case of the Messrs. Schiller, presently to be given, the signatures are merely fantastic, and illustrate the tendency (already noted) of automatic script to a grotesque puerility, quite independent of the intellectual level of the automatist. Sometimes, following another tendency of automatic script, the signatures seem designed to *meet expectation*; and the name of some deceased friend is appended to matter which conveys no internal evidence of his authorship. Again, the secret inclination which many persons feel to suppose themselves favoured above other men, special receptacles of grace, &c., externalises itself in automatic signatures of a very lofty type,—reaching in some instances to the very highest conceivable names. And here I must frankly say that I think that communications thus signed should be at once discouraged, and the process of automatic writing discontinued for the time, in just the same way as in the occasional cases where “*planchette begins to swear.*” I certainly do not suppose that there is a diabolic influence in the one case any more than a Divine influence in the other. But in either extreme there is some slight fear of injury to the writer. If oaths and rough expressions come persistently, this, (as was explained in my last paper,) may probably indicate nervous exhaustion. If “*Divine revelations*” come, there is a danger that the writer may flatter himself into the belief that he is singled out by heaven itself to convey a new message to men. Much moral teaching of a noble and suggestive kind has, indeed, been often conveyed through automatic messages. But where it has been in truth highest, it has at the same time kept clear of any irreverent assumptions.

These extravagances, however, are of rare occurrence. The general type of automatic message is entirely unobjectionable, I may even say entirely commonplace. But, nevertheless, a series of such messages will show qualities very hard to explain. There will be *persistence*, the

influence seeming to be on the watch for opportunities of communication, sometimes calling the attention of the automatist by preliminary jerks of the hand, and thrusting in its comment, so to say, when least expected. There will be a kind of *individuality*; several influences maintaining each a definite character, each, perhaps, moving the arm in a special manner, so that the automatist knows what the signature will be, before he receives the actual communication. And there will be an apparent thread of memory through the messages of the same influence; that is to say, the so-called "guide" will sometimes refer to passages in his previous messages which the automatist does not consciously remember.

All this,—as those who have witnessed such cases can attest—forms a sufficiently curious *ensemble*; nor need we wonder that in nine cases out of ten the automatist attributes his writing to some influence external to himself.

With this, then, as the problem before us, I propose now to develop in a fresh direction a suggestion made, and partly acted upon, in my last paper. I there dwelt on my conviction that if we are to understand *supernormal* phenomena—phenomena transcending, apparently, the stage of evolution at which we have admittedly arrived,—we must first compare them, as fully as possible, both with *normal* and with *abnormal* phenomena;—meaning by abnormal phenomena those which, while diverging from the ordinary standard, fall below or, at least, do not transcend it. I insisted also that we must expect that supernormal phenomena, if they occur at all, will show many points of resemblance to abnormal—nay, to positively morbid—phenomena, without therefore themselves necessarily deserving to be classed as morbid in any degree. When unfamiliar impulses arise in the organism—whether those impulses be evolutive or dissolutive in character—their readiest *paths of externalisation* are likely to be somewhat similar;—just as (to repeat a previous illustration) the same kind of ache in the gums may indicate to our sensation either the formation of an abscess or the growth of a tooth.

I cannot find that this principle is set forth in any accredited textbook. Yet I must believe that it will come to be recognised as a guiding principle in psycho-physiological inquiry; nay, that this view will be seen to have been inevitable so soon as external signs of psychological facts were grasped with a certain degree of precision. Thus far the cerebral-psychical changes which go on after the frame has once been built up have been watched by the psychologist mainly in their evolutive, by the physiologist mainly in their dissolutive aspect. The psychologist feels an interest in the life-long development of the mind of a Shakespeare or a Goethe. The physiologist, when he has surveyed his subject's advance to maturity, finds little

more to notice till senile degeneration sets in. He does not often care to note such external signs as may tell of processes of cerebral development which are still going on during adult life.

Yet such external signs there are ; and it is important for us who are concerned with one special branch of automatism to recognize how large a part is played in civilized life by automatic movements,—movements which a man does not know that he is making, or cannot avoid making, and which give expression to cerebral action of which he is partly or wholly unconscious.

In the first place, there are the movements which are known as *secondarily automatic*:—such movements as walking, speech, piano-playing, which, having been acquired by voluntary effort, become by use gradually *instinctive*, and illustrate to us in our own persons both the advantages and the disadvantages of instinct as compared with reason. The girl can remember the sonata better with her fingers than with her head ;—there is the *advantage* of an instinct which is “lapsed intelligence,” but which is more rapid and more certain than conscious intelligence can be. On the other hand, if the girl has learnt a given passage in the sonata wrongly, and played it often in that way, she will find it far more difficult to correct the mistake than it would be were the passage new to her. There is the *disadvantage* of lapsed intelligence;—the comparative fixity of the nervous and muscular synergy, when once established, makes it hard for the organism to adapt itself to slightly-changed circumstances. I repeat that the parallelism between these personally-acquired instincts of our own and the mainly-inherited instincts of the animal kingdom is very close ; and just as we find animal instincts becoming more complex and numerous as we ascend in the scale of living things, so do we find human secondary automatisms becoming more complex and numerous as we ascend in the scale of civilization.

But of course we inherit instincts as well as acquire them, and it is with inherited instincts—with *primarily* automatic acts, that I am here mainly concerned.

One important branch of this primary automatism consists of the movements which give *expression* to face and voice. And my point is that these automatic movements acquire a continually greater relative importance both in the race as it advances in culture and in the individual as he advances in cerebral development,—in middle and even in later life. The expression of benevolence, wisdom, command, is capable of being more intense and impressive in the old man's face than in the face of the youth ; and the look and accent of great men forms no small part of their power. It matters little in comparison that the adult's power over his voluntary muscles gradually declines. He can no longer compel the muscles of his legs to adapt themselves to some

new feat of gymnastic. But the muscles of his eyes and mouth—quite apart from his conscious volition—have learnt to express his central current of thought and feeling more delicately and more forcibly than in the flush of youth. This fact needs some insistence, for it is constantly obscured by a quite different phenomenon;—the power of youth to express the simpler emotions with pleasing openness. “The beautiful,” it has been said, “by the unconscious look of a moment can utter all that is in them.” What this means is that a fair young face can show love, pity, reverence, &c., in a way that stimulates the observer’s imagination; but the girl’s expression may nevertheless be in reality of a less developed, a less complex kind than the minute muscular shiftings round the eye, say, of an elderly stockbroker, as he glances down the share-list. The stockbroker’s countenance is not interesting; but what I mean is that years and knowledge have effected in him the same evolution of automatic action which they effect in the sage or statesman, and which makes the expression of the sage or statesman, if we “sit down in a cool hour” and look at him, even more interesting than the girl’s.

We see, then, that as the race, or the man, evolves, the primarily automatic actions, and the secondarily automatic actions, form a constantly more important portion of the motor outcome of his mentation.

And more than this. We see, also, that if any sudden call is made on the organism which evokes its maximum capacity, and as it were shows by a lightning-flash the next stage towards which the evolutionary process is striving, there is an immediate extension of the domain of automatic action. A man not only runs from a lion faster than he ever ran before, because the checks commonly imposed by pain and fatigue are unfelt, but also he goes on to climb up into a tree with a purposive complication of muscular movement which he would have needed to think out with conscious planning at a less excited moment. And still further; a great orator repelling extemporaneously a calumnious charge, or appealing to a deeply-moved multitude of men, will sometimes for a few moments perform with complete automatism intellectual feats which few men could rival with full time to prepare. He will be unconscious of his attitude, his gestures, his tones of voice—nay, of the words which he uses, the metaphors which he introduces, the oratorical effects of pause, reiteration, pathetic or majestic emphasis. He will be conscious of nothing beyond the torrent of indignation or patriotism which is surging within him. When automatism reaches this point, (as is said to have been sometimes the case, for instance, with M. Gambetta), it is felt to be far more impressive than conscious pains and choice. The orator is repaid for constant effort at self-expression by finding that on great occasions he can get himself expressed

*automatically*;—that he can live wholly in the stream of thought and emotion which is his essential strength, and that, meantime, his organism will utter more of what is going on inside him than if he had weighed each word to the full.

This seeming digression is really, I think, important to my argument. For it is essential that the reader should understand, (and I know of little already written which will help to such understanding), that in studying these automatic manifestations of mentation otherwise unguessed, we are not necessarily studying something morbid, retrograde, hysterical; but that it would be quite in accordance with analogy if it should turn out that thoughts and feelings thus found issue which were in some respects deeper than the subject's ordinary consciousness could reach, or his ordinary effort exhibit.

In a word, there are *evolutive* as well as *degenerative* parallels to the strange phenomena which we shall presently encounter. We must not prejudge them in any way whatever; we must not ticket them as hysterical any more than we must ticket them as Spiritualistic.

And I may perhaps best resume my discussion of them by citing at length a typical case;—a case typical at least in its main features, and specially suitable for record on account of the care with which the phenomena were noted down as they occurred. The case was sent to us by Mr. F. C. S. Schiller, B.A., of Balliol College, Oxford, and I have myself been present at one of the experiments where Mr. F. C. S. Schiller and his brother, Mr. F. N. Schiller, of St. John's College, Cambridge, obtained some of the old French writing.

In the following account it must not be supposed that in speaking of the "spirits" of planchette under their *soi-disant* names, I intend to endorse the Spiritualist explanation, any more than I consider the reproductions of the "mediums'" latent knowledge to be conclusive in favour of any form of "unconscious-self" theory.

The experiments in question were conducted during a great part of the Long Vacation, with my brother, whom I will call F., and my sister L., as "mediums," writing conjointly at first, but afterwards separately. Of course, there could thus be no doubt as to the good faith of the "mediums," even if the course of the experiments had not afforded convincing proof that the phenomena were independent of their conscious mind. There appeared at different times no less than nine "spirits," of whom four wrote exclusively with F. and one mainly; another freely with either or both but chiefly with L., and three exclusively with L. or with F. and L. conjointly. They all wrote with a more or less distinctive style of their own, and, as far as I could judge, there was not any marked difference of style when the same spirit wrote with different mediums. Nor, on the other hand, was there sufficient evidence to justify the assertion that the style was so unmistakably similar that it must have proceeded from the same intelligence. But although the evidence was not conclusive in establishing the identity of the various "spirit" personages, there could be no doubt of their complete independence of the mediums' con-



scious will. Both F. and L. were at first entirely ignorant of what planchette was writing, and F. remained so to the end, nor did the occupations of his conscious self appear in the least to affect the progress of the writing. I have seen planchette write in the same slow and deliberate way both while he was telling an amusing anecdote in an animated way and while he was absorbed in an interesting novel; and frequently whole series of questions would be asked and answered without his knowing what had been written or thinking that anything else than unmeaning scrawls had been produced.

In L.'s case it is true that after some time she came to know what letters were being formed and was able to interpret the movements of her hand. This, of course, made it difficult to avoid, at times, a certain half-conscious influence on the writing, and makes it necessary to allow for the personal equation. But it is clear that this influence must tend to harmonise the answers of planchette with the opinions and will of the medium, and as a matter of fact I observed frequent cases, especially with L., of a conflict between her will and opinions and those of planchette. Nothing, in fact, can be more striking than the entire independence of planchette in matters of Will and Thought, or more unexpected than the answers frequently obtained. This will be exemplified by one of our earliest results. Planchette had been unable to write plainly the name of the "spirit" communicating, and so we had asked whether it was man, woman, or child. The answer was at length deciphered as "triangle." For a whole day we tried in vain to make out this enigmatical response, and were in doubt whether we should ascribe it to the unconscious cerebration of my mathematical brother, or whether we had made the acquaintance of an intelligent two-dimensional being. Next day we discovered that the "triangle" called itself "Eudora," and we, of course, asked what it had meant. "Three in one." "How then can you be both male and female?" "By mere accident." After some other questions, a doubt was raised by L. whether "Eudora" and the name of the only other "spirit" that had communicated might not be "aliases," and she asked, "Are you and Johnson one?" "Yes, one, man and wife." Here we seemed to get a clue to two sides of the "triangle," and proceeded to ask whether there was a child still. "Coming," was the unexpected reply. Next day we were informed that the baby was "never" going to be born, "because it had not been born on earth." This surprising piece of information was then explained by the assertion that it was being "spiritually evolved," and not, therefore, "born." I have told this story at some length because it was the first thing that made us think we might be in the presence of something more than ordinary unconscious cerebration, and I think it well illustrates several of the most remarkable points about this automatic writing.

It exemplifies:—

1. The unexpectedness of the answers.
  2. Its independent thought and disagreement with the conscious opinions of the mediums (for I suppose no one has ever held planchette's absurd doctrine).
  3. Its independent memory.
  4. On the moral side, its mendacity and sense of humour.
- Altogether it seemed as if this silly riddle had been propounded expressly

to pique our curiosity on the first day, with the intention of giving the solution on the next, though, of course, it is possible to maintain that "unconscious cerebration" first accidentally propounded it, and then, after working it out, produced the solution.

Of a conflict of will between planchette and the medium I will give a characteristic though trivial instance. I had agreed with L. to go for a walk after supper, and when supper was brought in we said good-bye. "Don't go." We said we must, but at length gave way and promised to return after supper. "Good." "Have you got anything to tell us?" "Yes, very important."

Of direct thought-transference such as that recorded by Mr. Newnham, we obtained but one instance, with the possible addition of a few of the card experiments.

One day when F. was reading a book and had not been attending in the least, I thought I might as well put the question mentally and wrote it down without asking it aloud. It was answered in a perfectly unequivocal manner, and this was the more striking as I had changed the subject in asking it, and reverted to a point in one of planchette's previous answers which I had before ignored. But for this and the great difficulty of supposing that this particular answer could have been an accidental shot,<sup>1</sup> one would, of course, have been inclined to ascribe it to chance, but under the circumstances it must be regarded as an instance of thought-transference at least, although I have never been able by any conscious effort to transfer impressions to F., who is a fairly good thought-reader.

It will, of course, be suggested that the question as to the nature of these phenomena could have been at once decided by obtaining information unknown to the medium and to the company.

But for several reasons this is more easily said than done. In the first place the "spirits" were extremely chary of giving information respecting their personal antecedents, and, in fact, generally made their appearance with obviously feigned names, such as "Heliod Eclblaza," "Irktomar," "Euphorbia," &c.

When pressed they used, after much ingenious fencing, either to refuse to tell anything or to utter obvious falsehoods. . . . The spirit of a "careless rhymner," after writing verses in English, French, and German, professed its ability to do so in the classical languages. And as F. said he had never read the *Iliad*, we asked the rhymner for a quotation. This he was at first unable to do, but, some hours after, he, unasked, produced the following: "Eratimoi kekaloseiai" and "Kouridion potheoumenos posin." These extraordinary tags were found to be derived from the 5th book of the *Iliad* (421, 414), and to represent ἡ ῥα τί μοι κεχολάσεται and κούριδιον ποθέουσα πόσιν. F. then remembered that he had read this very book, and this alone, a long time ago. This was certainly the incident pointing most directly at unconscious cerebration, and may, perhaps,

<sup>1</sup> The communicating "spirit" was giving a long description of the house where it had lived, and a staircase up which somebody had run "when the police came." After about half-a-dozen questions I asked mentally, "What did the police come into the house for?" The answer was, "There was some crime."

help to explain the occurrence of an entirely unknown language, namely Hindustani. A "spirit" gave his name as "Lokenadrath," and wrote in an extraordinary Oriental style, rather resembling some of Marion Crawford's rhapsodies. On introducing the words "Allah il Allah," he was asked whether he was a Mohammedan. "Hindi apkahai." I have since been informed<sup>1</sup> that these words mean "I am yours," "At your service," and that "Lokenadrath" should be "Lokendranath," and means "lord of princes"; and one or two other fragments of Hindustani were similarly inaccurate.<sup>2</sup> Now, as F. left India as a baby of eight months, and has never since, to the best of my belief, heard any Hindustani spoken, this is surely a most curious case of unconscious memory, if such it was.

As far as I can judge, the nearest approach to a verification of "spirit identity" was in the case of a French Positivist artist, who gave his address as "109 Wankhurst-road, Wandsworth." Of course this name was entirely unfamiliar to us, but on a reference to a directory we found a Wakehurst-road in Wandsworth.

But all these attempts at getting unknown information are more or less unsatisfactory, and perhaps the most striking results were afforded by some experiments with cards, which it seems at first sight difficult to explain on any "unconscious self" hypothesis.

A card was drawn at random from a pack without being looked at, held out of sight, generally beneath the table, and planchette was then asked to name it. These experiments were carried on from the beginning with F. and L. conjointly or F. alone, but failed with L. alone; but it was difficult to multiply them, as planchette strongly disliked them, and frequently wrote nonsense (*e.g.*, "elest of fordes,") or refused to answer at all. Moreover, it never professed to be able to guess them, but "would try" at the most, and constantly complained that it was "too dark." Hence it cannot be doubted that many or most of the answers were guess-work, but do not the following totals of *all* the experiments made indicate that something other than mere chance was also at work? In some of the earlier experiments the card was known to some of those present, though not of course to the medium. The result of these experiments is as follows:

Experiments.	Quite right.	Number only right.	Suit only right.	Total Failure.
11	$4\frac{1}{2}$ <sup>3</sup>	0	2	$4\frac{1}{2}$ <sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On the authority of (1) an Anglo-Indian lady; (2) a Balliol Brahmin of Bombay. [The Oriental rhapsodies have now been found to be mainly centoes of *Mr. Isaacs*, worked together so as to make sense.]

<sup>2</sup> I have now found out (December, 1886) that Lokenadrath's description of his nationality is not as totally unintelligible as I had hitherto thought it. He called himself a "Jude poerano," and I have been told that "poerano" is Romany for *gipsy*.

<sup>3</sup> In one experiment two cards were chosen by different persons—the *five of hearts* and the *seven of clubs*. The seven of clubs was guessed. This is put down approximately as  $\frac{1}{2}$ . Chance alone might be expected to give the following results:—

Experiments.	Quite right.	Number only right.	Suit only right.	Total failure.
11	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{3}{13}$	$\frac{2}{13}$	$\frac{7}{13}$

—or rather, since the actual numbers could not be fractional, the last four results would be 0, 0, 2, 8.

This result is decidedly more favourable than the results of the series where the card was unknown to any of the persons present, a fact possibly due to the action of telepathy. There is however a great difference between the conditions of these experiments and of ordinary experimental thought-transference. The latter requires great and exhausting concentration of the mind on the part both of the agent and of the percipient, while in the case of planchette-writing there is no conscious effort on the part of the agent to visualise or of the percipient to receive an impression of the card chosen. And moreover if telepathic impressions originate in the unconscious part of the mind, and if planchette be supposed to bring out the "thoughts" of this unconscious mind, it might be urged that the impressions of the medium, if he has any, should correspond with what is written by planchette. But we found that in one of these cases where the bystanders, and supposed agents, were cognisant of the card, the medium thought of the wrong card, while planchette gave it correctly; and on another occasion he thought of the right suit, while planchette got it wrong entirely. The results of the series where telepathy was excluded are as follow:—<sup>1</sup>

Experiments.	Quite right.	Number only right.	Suit only right.	Total Failure.
52	2	11	9	30
64	7	10	11	36
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116	9	21	20	66

The series of 52 experiments were made at different times, but the series of 64 were made continuously in one afternoon, and at this time the planchette was very wild, and frequently wrote before any card had been drawn at all.

Also in one case the 7 of clubs was guessed instead of the 9, but when the card was examined it was found that the two lowest pips had been accidentally covered by a piece of paper, so that it appeared like a 7. This, too, is estimated as a partial failure.

In another case, the card having been drawn in the usual manner, planchette wrote first "Spad," broke off and wrote on the line below "Hearts Queen." The card turned out to be the queen of *spades*. This was the most striking instance of a confusion between hearts and spades, which occurred several times in these experiments, and which I have also noticed in ordinary thought-transference experiments with F.

On another occasion I drew a card, placed it on the top of the pack, and handed it to F. beneath the table. In so doing I could not help catching a glimpse of the card, and saw that it was black, and, I thought, clubs. After

<sup>1</sup> In several cases more than one guess was made, but only the first has been estimated. Chance alone might be expected to give the following results:

Experiments.	Quite right.	Number only right.	Suit only right.	Total failure.
52	1	3	12	36
64	1 $\frac{2}{3}$	3 $\frac{2}{3}$	14 $\frac{1}{3}$	44 $\frac{1}{3}$
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
116	2 $\frac{2}{3}$	6 $\frac{2}{3}$	26 $\frac{1}{3}$	80 $\frac{1}{3}$

a time planchette wrote "No card turned up," and to our astonishment this turned out to be the case. I was of course as certain as possible that a card was turned up, and cannot understand to this day how it got turned down, and F. of course could have no suspicion that so vital a part of the experiment had been omitted.<sup>1</sup> This experiment has been excluded in making the estimate. In a few cases the suit was not written, but drawn.

Finally I must describe another kind of experiments, in which planchette had to spell out words on an alphabet while the "medium" was closely blind-folded. At first we used an alphabet which he had seen beforehand, and with the letters in the customary order, and on this "Heliod" succeeded in spelling out his name three times. After this another alphabet was used which had never been seen by him, and with the letters scattered at random about the paper. On this H E were spelt out correctly, but the next letter was Z, and after this planchette stopped and failed to spell any other words. A few hours afterwards, however, it spelt out its name correctly, and answered several questions, correcting slight errors on repetition. (F. had not seen the alphabet in the meantime.) Altogether we obtained intelligible combinations of nearly 60 letters. The movements of planchette on this occasion too were rather striking, as it seemed to move like a living creature, circling round the required letter, and finally concentrating itself upon it. We have never been able to get a repetition of these experiments, which, though telepathy is not, strictly speaking, excluded, for the others present were aware of the position of the letters on the alphabet, are perhaps as valuable as the card experiments. And if it be supposed that the thought of the bystanders unconsciously guided planchette, how are we to explain a correction of that thought in its answers? I had asked "Heliod" what he meant by saying he was in the "fluid state" of feeling on the day before. The answer was "Blind, Point," and on reference we saw that he had previously asserted he was at the fluid point.

Perhaps, in conclusion, I should make a note on the linguistic attainments of planchette. Of the nine "spirits," six wrote only in English, and several of them failed ignominiously with all other languages. The Hindustani of "Lokenadrath" I have already mentioned. "Irktomar," the French Positivist, gave us specimens of English, French, and Latin. Lastly, the poet "Closcar" rhymed in English, French and German, Latin and Greek, and even sometimes wrote the last of these with Greek letters. But with this exception, planchette never wrote any German, though both the mediums are perfectly familiar with it, and in their childhood probably knew it far better than English. If, then, these phenomena are a dream-like recrudescence of long-forgotten thoughts, this absence of German seems to require some explanation.<sup>2</sup> As regards the mode of writing, we were unable to distinguish any differences of handwriting between the various "spirits," except that one of F.'s wrote from right to left, mirror-writing, whether or no the left hand was used. I trust I have given an accurate account of the chief points in

<sup>1</sup> Possibly, as Mr. F. N. Schiller suggests, the sense of touch might unconsciously have informed him that the card was not turned up.

<sup>2</sup> Since this was written "Heliod" has shown a knowledge of German and Latin.

these experiments, and can only hope that members of the Society may be able to throw some light on the problems which they raise.

(Signed) F. C. S. SCHILLER,  
Associate S.P.R.

Balliol College, Oxford, 26th October, 1886.

#### APPENDIX.

Since writing the preceding paper the experiments have been continued with F., and I will give a short sketch of the results subsequently obtained. The first thing to be noted is that F.'s power of writing seems to have diminished sensibly, so that whereas he would formerly write on three out of every four occasions he can now only do so about once out of every three. Under these circumstances it has been impossible to repeat the card and alphabet experiments. But an interesting experiment was tried of writing with two planchettes, F. having one hand on each. I suggested this in order to elucidate the connection between left-hand writing and "mirror-writing," and fully expected that the two hands would write the same communications. To my astonishment, however, the communications, though written simultaneously, were different and proceeded from different "spirits." I regard this as conclusive proof that the phenomena have nothing to do with the medium's consciousness, for, as every one can easily experience for himself, it is quite impossible, at least without long practice, to write two *different* words at the same time.

Whenever F. wrote with two planchettes, the left hand wrote mirror-writing, which was often very hard to decipher, but we did not observe anything like a fixed rule in this respect on other occasions. For though planchette generally wrote in the ordinary way even when the left hand was used, it sometimes produced mirror-writing with the right hand also. We have also had some instructive experiments in what I may call conjoint writing. I must begin by saying that ordinarily I am quite unable to make planchette move at all. But one night I put my hand also on, after F. had failed, as on several preceding days, to make it write. Planchette soon began to move and to write intelligibly. I repeatedly took my hand off and the writing stopped at once. Similarly, whenever F. took his hand off, the writing also ceased, except that on one occasion, when he did so without my knowledge, it appears to have written two or three letters before stopping. I am inclined, therefore, to regard the phenomenon of conjoint writing, whatever may be its explanation, as genuine, i.e., that the second operator really contributes to the result.

Passing from the method to the matter of the communications, I should note that "Heliod" has shown a knowledge of German and alluded to Goethe's *Ewig Weibliche*, but that the bulk of the communications were in French and produced by "Irktoamar."

In addition to some dialectical variations which appear to be Provençal (e.g., Irktoamar n'a pas lou tems, Pour vous faire des counplimens), he produced an extraordinary jargon which he called "Romance" and ascribed to the time of "Roland" and of "Charlemagne."

Afterwards it was found to be old Norman French, and mostly quoted

from the *Chanson de Roland* of the 12th century, as will appear from the following comparison:—

“CHANSON DE ROLAND.”

1. Carles li reis, nostre emperere  
magnes.

Set auz tuz plains ad estet en  
Espaigne. (C. de R. 1-2.)

2. Ne reverrunt lur meres ne lurs  
femmes.

Necels de France ki as porz les  
atendent. (C. de R. 1402-3.)

3. Jo vus ai mult servit. (C. de R.  
3492.)

4. Passet li jurz si tarnet à la  
vesprée. (C. de R. 3560.)

PLANCHETTE.

(1st time.) Car [l] es li reis  
magnes empere [re] set auz ut plein  
estet en Espaigne.

(2nd time.) Carles li reis magnes  
emperere [re] set auz lutans estet en  
Espaigne.

2. Ne reverrunt ne peres ne  
parenz ne Charlemagne, ki as porz les  
atent.

3. Jo vous ai mult bien servit.

4. S'enfuit li jourz de bleneut la  
vesprée.

F. does not know old French at all, and cannot remember to have ever read or heard any, but, being strongly inclined towards the unconscious self theory, suggests that the passages produced may have been quoted in some magazine article, and thus met his eye.<sup>1</sup> In any case, however, these quotations throw an interesting light on the mode of thinking of the intelligence that dictated them. It will be seen that they are evidently quoted from memory, and by no means accurate. And in No. 1. the first version was nearer the original than the second; but, as quoted, the words “ut plein” made no sense, and hence “lutans,” a word which does not, I believe, occur in the *Roland*, was substituted for them to complete the sense. That is to say, the second version is no mere reproduction of an impression in the memory, but has been subjected to a process of emendation which by us would be held to imply the action of conscious thought. Yet during this time F.'s conscious mind was entirely void of any knowledge of the dialect, and *a fortiori* could not possibly have corrected what appeared to him quite meaningless. In No. 2 it is evident that only the general drift of the passage was remembered. But corresponding to the change of subject from “cels de France” to “Charlemagne,” the verb “atendent” is changed from plural to singular, which seems to imply a knowledge of the grammar of the language.

Lastly, planchette volunteered the information that “Carles fu carles li caux” (Charles was Charles the Bald), which is certainly wrong, and as certainly could not be derived from the *Roland* or any similar poem, while it is nevertheless linguistically correct. It must, therefore, I think, be admitted that the intelligence which produced it must have possessed a considerable amount of what we should call conscious knowledge of old French, and such as F. certainly does not possess.

To sum up then I will only say that the matter of the various communications (i.e., excluding the card and alphabet experiments, &c.) does not

<sup>1</sup> Neither had Mr. F. C. S. Schiller read any old French.

seem to me to afford absolute proof that the knowledge displayed could not possibly have been latent in the writer's mind, while at the same time this is extremely *improbable* in a large number of cases. Moreover, both the matter and the manner of the communications display powers beyond any at present recognised as normal.

(Signed), F. C. S. SCHILLER.

January 22nd, 1887.

This case will have to be afterwards considered from more than one point of view. The card experiments indicate thought-transference, and possibly something beyond this. The substance of the old French messages will need notice when we are dwelling on the curious deposits of memory which these psychical excavations, if I may so say, throw up to the surface. But for the present I treat the Schiller messages only in their first and superficial aspect, as writings apparently emanating from several personalities apart from the writer's own; personalities, moreover, which showed a kind of persistence; which seemed to lie in wait, and to be ready at any hour to emerge into characteristic activity. Each of these personalities had a distinctive character, and apparently a clear memory of its previous manifestations; that memory being, in one recorded instance at least, more accurate than was the automatist's conscious recollection. Each personality seems, too, to have a will of its own; they sometimes refuse to come when called for; and one *persona*—the so-called Johnson—disappears altogether in a huff.

All this, of course, would be to the last degree childish, if looked upon as a mere amusement; to the last degree lamentable, if looked upon as indicating the kind of occupations reserved for ourselves, after quitting the body. But as a psychological puzzle it is interesting from one end to the other; and the very puerility of the automatic jokes is not the least curious element in the problem.

And I would ask the reader to remember that messages more or less resembling these are no rarities; that perhaps one in every three or four families who have given the thing a trial have actually obtained them. And where were the recipients of such messages to go for any sort of discussion as to their true nature? What recognition, even, could they find of the bare fact that such messages were possible, except the recognition offered by Spiritualists, coupled, of course, with what seemed after all the most obvious explanation? Those who sneer at Spiritualists as the mere dupes of vulgar impostors can hardly have realised how much evidence that at least *seemed* to make for Spiritualism has actually been attained by many a family group of perfectly honest inquirers. Some attempt to *explain* automatic messages should surely have preceded the sneer at those who could hardly, without previous knowledge of a special kind, have judged these messages otherwise than as they did.



For my own part, (while I would still avoid any general statement until many more cases have been discussed), I hold that the apparent uniqueness of such a phenomenon as the Schiller messages, —the apparent *externality* of the dictating intelligence, — do undoubtedly grow fainter and more questionable as we pass under review a number of more or less analogous cases which can be adduced ;—cases where two or more psychical currents have manifested themselves, alternately or coincidentally, in the life-history of the same man. I believe that the tendency to a severance of this sort may be detected in more forms than is commonly supposed. I believe that whenever there is any habitual alteration, physiological or pathological, of the threshold of consciousness we shall find an incipient formation of a secondary chain of memories, linking together those periods of altered consciousness into a series of their own. And when once a second mnemonic chain is woven, the emergence of a second personality is only a matter of degree. For any difference in memory involves a certain difference in character, and in proportion as the two memories are *co-exclusive*, (which they may be in very differing degrees), the moral and intellectual habits founded on the differing memories will be likely themselves to diverge. The first analogy which I shall offer is derived from the phenomena of *dream*.

There are two main ways in which dreams afford a parallel to the automatism which we are considering. In the first place—and this is the most important—there is the dramatisation of dream-characters ; their seeming independence of our own personality, from which yet they are undoubtedly derived. But this topic I shall defer until we come to deal with inward voices—"the dæmon of Socrates," and the like. In the second place—and this is what we must now consider—there is a tendency to the creation of a secondary dream-memory of our own, so that we recollect a first dream while we are dreaming a second more fully than during the waking interval. I do not mean to suggest that the great bulk of our dreams attach themselves in any discernible way to a secondary personality. Rather, I conceive that most of our dreams represent little more than that tumult of fragmentary images which I believe to be perpetually proceeding within us, beneath the level of anything which can be called an identity. If we doze for a moment, we feel this tumult going on ; and the dreams which emerge into waking memory are for the most part a mere jumble of this kind—the mere *disjecta membra* or raw material of a self.

Sometimes, however, there is a faint continuous current through this tossing whirlpool of dream. There are certain patterns into which the confusion tends to shape itself, and when one of these patterns recurs, we remember in our dream its previous presentation. The *flying* sensation, for instance, which most dreamers have experienced, often

brings with it a vivid recollection of previous flights. And the case is similar with dreams not distinctly derived from the attitude or sensations of the sleeper. Many of us know a dream-house, a dream-landscape, which does not reproduce any scene familiar to our waking life, but which, each time that we revisit it in dream, appears familiar and seems to remind us of previous visits. Here, as it seems to me, is a first trace of that tendency which sometimes in hypnotised subjects revives spontaneously in a fresh trance the hallucination which has been suggested to them in a previous trance.<sup>1</sup> These dream-scenes are more or less remembered in waking hours; but, (in my own experience at least), it is difficult to retain any distinct image beyond the few minutes after awakening,—which are in some ways analogous to the period during which a post-hypnotic hallucination persists after the trance is removed.

By the nature of the case it is almost impossible definitely to prove that in a second dream we really have recollected something of a first dream which our waking thought could not recall. The following account from Mr. J. G. Keulemans (dated December 6th, 1886) comes perhaps as near as can be expected to such a demonstration.

Some six months ago, I dreamt I had travelled to New York, by sailing ship. On my arrival I found that the voyage had been made in just two hours time. I had five hours to spare for business and other occupations, (then I intended to return to London the same day) and I thought of going through a new part of the town. There I found everything new: houses in course of construction, and a newly laid-out park was at some distance. I found myself on a boulevard with rows of pyramid-shaped trees. I did many other things, but could not remember afterwards. In fact, I knew my dream from beginning to end when I woke up, but the remaining portion faded from my memory just at the moment I was relating the dream to my wife.

This happened about 10 minutes after waking from my dream. I think dream-consciousness had, by this time, made room for waking-consciousness—the latter supervening on account of my wife's interruption which caused me to reflect upon other matters.

But on Thursday—the night of 25-26 November—I was again dreaming of New York, and was at about the same place where I landed in my first dream. I knew the place. I was under the impression of having resided some time in that town. I recollected that I had been *dreaming* of it before. Although in my dream-consciousness it seemed that I enjoyed my *waking* state of reasoning, and even considered my dream as something very silly because there was no such thing as a new suburb near the landing-place; in fact, I dreamt that I was not dreaming but had dreamt of it previously, yet, after reconsidering my dream in my dream, it at once struck me that it might have been no dream after all, but a reality. I began to doubt whether I had not been there long ago. The locality which I had visited might have

<sup>1</sup> See for instance, Binet and Féré's *Le Magnétisme Animal*, p. 165; Gilles de la Tourette's *L'Hypnotisme*, p. 314.

changed or grown older, or might be farther away. I began to force my memory to get hold of past times, and then, suddenly, I was again in that particular part where the houses were being built, where I saw the park and the boulevard—there they were, the trees, too. I looked at them carefully, and now discovered them to be young specimens of *Wellingtonia gigantea*—they had grown considerably since my previous visit.

When I had come thus far, all the incidents of my previous dream recurred, and there were many places I visited now for the second time which I remembered were there on my first visit. It would be tedious and unimportant to relate the whole of my nocturnal expeditions. The only remarkable fact is that I knew and remembered, in dream-life, what I had forgotten in my waking-state. I was certain I was not dreaming on the last occasion, and then came to the conviction that the dream I dreamt of was a reality also, but belonging to the forgotten past.

Of course when we get to developed accesses of *somnambulism*, this continuity of memory between one access and another is admitted, just as much as in hypnotism itself. I need not argue these points here. My object is rather to show that the sleep-waking state, natural or induced, does not stand *alone* in its tendency to generate a secondary memory, a secondary manifestation of the Self, but that this tendency shows itself wherever there is any habitual shaking-up of those elements. To look at life through the hypnotic trance, some persons might say, is like looking at it through a *prism*. Of course you get the same effects repeated each time that you do so. Well, I am here arguing that to look at life through dreams is like looking at it through a *kaleidoscope*,—a poor and broken one,—but that, nevertheless, random though the results may seem, there is a certain tendency here, too, to a repetition of the same effects. In fact, I may generalise and say, “Whatever mode of disturbance be applied to the psychical elements, there will be a certain congruity between the results of each application of each special disturbing agency, and every recurrence of such congruity will tend to the formation of a mnemonic chain.”

Let us turn now to another form of psychical disturbance,—that caused by drugs. Here, too, we know that in such cases as De Quincey's the visionary scenes which opium summons up resemble each other,—and seem to the patient to be connected by a thread of memory. I do not, however, know of any definite case where a man who did some deed under the influence of opium remembered it when under opium again, and not in the intervening period.

More familiar to English experience is the case of alcoholic intoxication. And here the similarity of the stages through which any given man passes—of the remarks which he makes—in each successive fit of drunkenness—is obvious enough. Could we persuade some correspondent to write us a letter each time that he was in (say) the maudlin phase of drunkenness, the series of letters would resemble a

series of planchette-messages in several ways. In the first place, they would express a character differing from his normal character, but congruous with itself. In the second place, the handwriting would be larger and laxer than his ordinary script. And in the third place, our correspondent, when sober, might very probably know nothing of the contents of the epistles, and might even contest their authenticity.

I do not doubt that, with more careful experimentation, we might go further than this, and find frequent cases where a drunken man recollects an act done in a previous drunken fit, but lost to memory during the sober interval. One such story—too trite to repeat here—has done duty in many a treatise since the days of Macnish and Abercrombie. I am glad that a communication which Mr. Keulemans has kindly sent me enables me to give another, and more detailed, example.

Whilst travelling in Africa, I had a negro who used to indulge in over-doses of brandy. One evening on coming into my tent, I found him busy moving my instruments. Some moments after I discovered he was drunk. After turning him out, I went to sleep. Next morning I missed a scalpel and a pair of pincers. Remembering that my negro had moved them the evening before, I interrogated him as to what he had done with the instruments. He swore he had never touched them. (Negroes as a rule swear to anything, but my man was an exception to this rule.) I made him look, and searched myself, but in vain. Two days later he was again slightly intoxicated, though sober enough to understand me. I mentioned the loss of the instruments. He began to reflect, but brandy was gaining on his mind, and he went away to his hut. Later in the evening another negro returned the instruments to me, saying he had taken them out of my servant's hands, fearing he would do harm to himself or to others whilst drunk. I then learnt that he had been watched taking them from a box belonging to a friend of mine. My friend told me that the negro went straight for the box and took the instruments away, without seeming to notice my friend or discovering that he was noticed going to the box, and that he was requested to state what he wanted. The next morning he knew nothing of what had occurred. All he did recollect was that he had been very drunk, and had gone to sleep. The distance from my rooms to those of my friend was about thirty yards. Although in the same house, my drunken negro had to go round several corners, descend two staircases and mount another—all this in pitch darkness. On his way to and fro he passed several servants, but did not appear to notice their presence.

I may briefly cite here a well-known case of Dr. Dufay's,<sup>1</sup> which affords a precise *somnambulic* parallel to this revival of drunken memory in a second intoxication:—

A respectable servant girl was accused by her mistress of having stolen certain objects of value, which were missed from their usual

<sup>1</sup> *Revue Scientifique*, December 1st, 1885, p. 703.

place. She was committed for trial, protesting her innocence; but could make no suggestion whatever as to where the valuables could be. Fortunately for her, Dr. Dufay, who was then physician to the prison at Blois, recognised her as a girl who had previously been in the service of Dr. Sirault, who had frequently hypnotised her. He asked the girl whether she thought that she ever walked in her sleep? but she knew nothing of doing so. The nurse, however, told Dr. Dufay that the girl *did* in fact walk about every night in the dormitory.

Dr. Dufay took the hint and hypnotised her—and the girl then at once told him where the objects were. She had put them in a fresh place, during a somnambulatory access, for greater safety. When she did so she had of course meant to tell her mistress; not knowing that when she next saw her mistress she would have awaked from her trance, and would know nothing of what she had done.

All was now put right. The objects were found; the girl was released; the mistress apologised;—and probably, though we are not told so, locked the young woman into her bedroom at night henceforth, to avoid suffering from her somnambulatory zeal.<sup>1</sup>

I have suggested that whatever mode we may choose of modifying the arrangement of our psychical elements we shall find that each several disturbance tends to a certain congruity of result on each repetition. If in dreams we shuffle the mosaic of our psychical fabric as in a kaleidoscope, we may perhaps say that in drunkenness we look at it through a superincumbent layer of semi-transparent liquid. Well, the result of pouring this liquid will not be only to *dull* the original picture,—there will be phenomena of *refraction*, as we look at the picture through the liquid, which will be congruous among themselves. Such is the similarity of successive drunken fits, tending here also to the creation of a new mnemonic chain.

Now let us disturb our psychical mosaic in a still more violent way. Let us explode a mine under it; let us assume, that is, an attack of epilepsy. Now, as regards epilepsy, my contention will be readily admitted up to a certain point; but beyond that point the evidence will be found as yet very scanty.

Both as regards pre-epileptic and post-epileptic states, it will be admitted that on successive occasions these states are apt to be *congruous* in the same patient. The “psychical aura” or “dreamy state” will be much the same before each of his attacks. And where there are post-epileptic hallucinations involving more than mere confusion, the same type of hallucination generally recurs pretty regularly for any given patient. It is hard to say how far in one such access

<sup>1</sup> Observe in this case the homogeneity of the spontaneous and the induced somnambulism. It is probable that many spontaneous somnambulists would, if hypnotised, be able to tell what they had done in their nocturnal excursions.

the patient remembers the feelings of the previous access ; but I should conjecture that further inquiry might show traces of the gradual formation of a new chain of memory,—turbid, indeed, and confused,—but existing separately from, and parallel with, the memory of normal life.

On this view, for instance, I should rather expect that in cases of *definite cure* of epilepsy some of the features of the aura, as previously experienced and recollected, might altogether fade from recollection. I know not how far this has been noticed hitherto. But I observe a recent case where frequent attacks of epilepsy were precluded by the vision of a bright red light and followed by hallucinations “Singularly enough, since his recovery the patient has forgotten all about either the lights or the hallucinations, and is now unable to recall their nature, although formerly he described them with some accuracy.”<sup>1</sup>

I should infer from a case like this that there was an incipient formation of a separate mnemonic chain ;—that is to say, that the pre- and post-epileptic hallucinations, like hypnagogic and post-hypnotic hallucinations, tended to form a separate epileptic—like the separate hypnotic—memory ; and consequently dropped out of normal memory when the latent possibility of their epileptic revival disappeared.

And I have one case—cataleptic, as it would seem, rather than epileptic in character,—which, distant and imperfectly reported though it is, illustrates this view with singular vividness.

The case was sent to Professor Barrett, in 1876, by a clergyman, then vicar of a London parish, and father of the subject. He did not choose to give further particulars or to allow his name to be published.

My son was, in his 17th year, attacked by what was said to be cataleptic hysteria. At their first commencement they were little more than prolonged fainting fits ; afterwards, each attack began by his passing in an instant into a state of complete rigidity. Occasionally he would remain for five minutes to a quarter of an hour in that state, retaining the attitude in which he was when attacked, as if made of marble, with his eyes open and fixed and perfectly unconscious. After a time he would rise with a sigh, move about, and speak without the slightest hesitation or incoherency, and thence continue for hours or days, leading an entirely separate existence, not recognising friends or relations or even the way to his own bedroom, and taking no notice if addressed by his own name, writing letters with another signature, always imagining himself to have arrived at middle-age, and alluding to incidents of his imaginary youth which teemed with echoes of his past reading ; he was most courteous and pleasant in his manner,

<sup>1</sup> Case of epilepsy of six years' duration : complete recovery after surgical operation on the skull and brain. Hughes-Bennett and Gould, *British Medical Journal*, January 1st, 1887.

excepting when any doubt was implied as to the accuracy of any statement which he made.

At times all his faculties were in a most excited state. He would continue for hours playing games of skill with almost preternatural dexterity ; he would repeat to the air pages of poetry ; and he would play and sing in a wild and original manner, of which he was incapable at other times, quite unconscious of the presence of others and impervious to any interruptions. In this state he has continued for a week at a time, going out with us to dine with old friends, whom, however, he never recognised, but treated as new acquaintances. He always spoke of his parents as far off in some distant Eastern country, in which he himself had been born, and spoke to us (his father and mother) as kind hosts and friends whom he was soon to leave. Suddenly he would fall to the ground, roll about in convulsive agony with loud groans, and, a little water being poured into his lips, would get up and go on talking upon the subject of conversation on which he had been engaged at the time of his seizure, and without the slightest remembrance of anything that had passed meanwhile. These attacks continued every few days for more than two years, during which he was forbidden all kinds of study. At the age of 19 we were advised to send him on a voyage, and accordingly he paid a visit to an uncle, a military officer at Madras ; from thence he returned in six or seven months, quite cured, went up to the University of Cambridge, where he went out in honours, and is now at the bar. These attacks never came upon him whilst actually employed, but generally at church, in bed, or during quiet conversation ; they were often induced by anything that vexed or startled him. He has since told me that he might have resisted them, but that they came upon him with a sensation of pleasant drowsiness that fascinated him. Certainly he was the worse for any display of sympathy. I may add that he suffers now at times from some defect in the circulation which prevents great bodily exertion and which produces pain in his heart and head ; in all other respects he is hale and hearty.

This clergyman and his wife are now dead, and the publication of the name was not permitted. A lady, who also objected to the publication of her name, and who also is now dead, wrote at about the same date to Professor Barrett as to this case.

I have known from infancy the son of a respected clergyman in London (also known as an author and artist), who, being overworked some few years ago in competing for a scholarship at Cambridge, became subject to fits resembling epilepsy for a period of several months. After one of these he would apparently recover ; be perfectly quiet, kind, and courteous, and a thorough gentleman in every respect. But in this condition he did not recognise any of his friends, and on one occasion he explained to me " the extraordinary fact that the lady who had just left the room was under the delusion that she was his mother, and that excellent old clergyman called himself his father." At such times his habits and tastes were very different from his ordinary ones, and his father told me that his powers were heightened to an extraordinary degree, especially in the classics, of which (at 16) he seemed a master, and in music. In his normal condition he was a fair classic, good for his age, and he could play an easy accompani-

ment by ear,—just a few chords,—but in this secondary state he played the most difficult music of Mendelssohn and Beethoven with perfect execution and extraordinary taste.<sup>1</sup> Another fit would restore him to his normal state, when he knew nothing of the other; and for several months he thus lived a life of double identity, taking up each unconsciously just where it was broken off.

It is much to be regretted that there is no medical report of this case; but the account given shows that it must have been in some ways intermediate between ordinary instances of post-epileptic hallucination and the alternating personalities on which Krishaber, Ribot, &c., have dwelt. The exaltation of faculty during the secondary state deserves especial notice in relation to some similar exaltations which we shall find accompanying automatic action.

An interesting connecting link, again, is afforded by the accounts of *possession* which have come down to us from the "Ages of Faith." I take as an example the recently-published autobiography of Sœur Jeanne des Anges.<sup>2</sup> Sœur Jeanne was the Superior of the Ursulines of Loudun, about 1630-1665, and was one of the most ardent admirers, afterwards one of the fiercest enemies, of the unfortunate Urbain Grandier, who was burnt alive in 1634, on the charge of having bewitched the Ursuline nuns. Her manuscript autobiography has fallen into the hands of editors of a type which she can hardly have foreseen, Drs. Gabriel Legué and Gilles de la Tourette. These physicians have carefully analysed the symptoms which she narrates, and have shown that her affliction may be classed as a well-developed case of hysterio-epilepsy, of the kind now so often described by the Salpêtrière school.

Our present interest lies in the *personalities* which she gives to the demons whom she supposes to possess her,—who are in reality mere objectifications of different series of hysterical attacks.

Just as the automatic writer has a group of *soi-disant* guides or "controls," who take it in turns to direct his hand, and each of whom maintains a specific character of his own,—even so does Sœur Jeanne describe Asmodeus, Leviathan, Behemoth, Isacaaron, Balaam, Gresil, and Aman, whose diverse presence she apparently recognised mainly by the special train of undesirable emotion which each inspired, but partly also by their words and writings. A facsimile of a letter of Asmodeus is given by the learned editors, but the writing does not perceptibly differ from Sœur Jeanne's own script.

And Dr. Gilles de la Tourette informs me that there are letters,

<sup>1</sup> This seems to be only an exaggerated report of the father's more probable statement that "he would play in a wild and original manner."

<sup>2</sup> *Bibliothèque Diabolique* (Collection Bourneville). Paris: Aux Bureaux du Progrès Médical, 1886.



also in Sœur Jeanne's own handwriting, which profess to come from the other demons too—such letters being habitually written by the Sister during the process of exorcism, which usually brought on a hysterio-epileptic attack. The substance of the letters reflected, no doubt, the foulness and malignity of the Sister's own mind; but, nevertheless, the modern hysteriologists who have discussed the whole affair do not suppose that the Sister *consciously simulated* the writing or speech of devils through herself. Her diabolic script and utterance were probably (though not certainly) purely automatic.<sup>1</sup>

It must be remembered that Sœur Jeanne was perfectly sane during these years of possession, sane at least in the sense that she governed her community, plotted savagely against her enemies, and made religious capital out of her real or fictitious stigmata; but that, nevertheless there is no doubt whatever that she *believed* in these possessing demons—who, as I say, were in reality the incarnations of hysterio-epileptic attacks.

Now, I certainly do not mean to trace any moral analogy between these distressing products of Sœur Jeanne's imagination and the "guides" of the planchette-writer—which, as I have said, so far as I have seen, are almost always harmless, generally even sermonising entities. So far as my experience goes I do not see that planchette-writing has any connection with disease of mind or body, or any tendency to evil of any kind, except in a few cases of great credulity on the writer's part, a credulity which such discussions as these may render—it is to be hoped—somewhat less common. Rather is Sœur Jeanne's case parallel in another way; as showing the tendency of the individuality to split itself up into various co-ordinate and alternating trains of personality, each of which may seem for a time to be dominant and obsessing, while yet the habitual sense of the ordinary self may persist through all these invasions.

We have briefly noted the incipient rearrangements of personality which follow on the kaleidoscopic shiftings of dream, the blurring refractions of narcotism, the explosive scatterings of epilepsy.

And we know, moreover, that there are a few instances where the change in the personality, perhaps suddenly induced, is profounder and more permanent than in any of the above-cited cases,—where it presents a readjustment apparently including nearly all the old elements, and shaping them, so to say, into a new person, in some ways, perhaps, superior to the old. Changes like those of Félicité X. (so often already alluded to), of course *include* my present subject; for they involve a series of actions which, though conscious from the point of view

<sup>1</sup> See Dr. Legué's *Urbain Grandier et les Possédés de Loudun*. Paris: Baschet.

of one of the two personalities, are automatic from the point of view of the other. But they involve so much *beyond* what I am here concerned with that it would only confuse my argument were I to treat of them here.

There is, however, one case of this kind to which I must briefly refer, since an actual experiment in automatic writing was made, which curiously illustrates some of those with which we shall have to deal.

Dr. Mesnet<sup>1</sup> records the case of a soldier, F——, who received a gunshot wound in the head at Sedan, and was afterwards subject to periodical attacks, lasting for about a day in each month, of a kind of somnambulism, during which he hears, tastes, and smells nothing; and hardly sees at all except when the sense of touch calls his attention to objects, which he can then, as it seems, see distinctly.

During these accesses his actions seem purely automatic, and are for the most part an exact repetition of his every-day mode of life at the hospital. But by tactile suggestion the memory can be made to go back to an earlier epoch.

Thus if a cane is put into his hand in a way which suggests a rifle, he goes through the movements, and utters the brief cries, of battle: "Henri!" "There they are! at least a score of them!" "We must try and settle this between us!" &c.

Now let us see in what way the act of writing revived past experience. I abridge Dr. Mesnet's account (p. 18 *sqq.*) which contains several points to which we shall hereafter have to refer. "He passed his hands over the table; felt the handle of a drawer; opened it and took out a pen, which at once excited in him the idea of writing. He felt in the drawer, and took out some sheets of paper and an ink-bottle. These he placed on the table, sat down, and began a letter addressed to his general, urging his own good conduct and courage, and asking his general to endeavour to procure for him the military medal.

"The faults of spelling, &c., in the letter were neither more nor less numerous than was habitual with the subject in his normal state. The facility with which he wrote, keeping to the true lines, showed that he saw what he was doing. To test this, we repeatedly placed a sheet of iron between his eyes and hand. He continued to write a few words illegibly, then ceased to write, without showing impatience. When the obstacle was removed he finished the imperfect line, and began another. The sense of sight was therefore needful to the written expression of the subject's thought.

"The ink in his inkstand was then replaced by water. He perceived the faintness of the letters traced, wiped his pen again and again, but

<sup>1</sup> *De l'Automatisme de la Mémoire, &c.* Par le Dr. Ernest Mesnet. Paris, 1874.

never looked at the ink-bottle. His field of vision, it seemed, was awakened by touch alone, and was limited to objects with which he was actually in contact.

"He was writing on a sheet of paper which lay on a pile of about ten similar sheets. We quickly drew this top sheet away, and his pen continued to write on the second sheet. When he had written about ten words on the second sheet we snatched this also away, and he continued his phrase at exactly the same point on the third sheet. This process was repeated, and on the fifth sheet there was nothing but his signature at the bottom. Nevertheless, he read over and corrected his letter on this blank fifth sheet, scattering stops and corrections over the empty page, each of which corresponded to mistakes made on the co-ordinate points of the pages which had been snatched away from him."

On a later occasion (p. 23) pens were put in his way again; and as soon as he touched them he sat down and began a letter to a friend, this time making an appointment for the evening, after a concert at the *café* of the Champs Elysées, at which (as he supposed) he had to sing. Some slight change in the surroundings had carried his automatic reminiscence back to this other phase of his past career.

Here, then, we have automatic writings appearing to proceed from the writer's known personality, but projected backwards to an earlier point of time. And I wished to cite them here for purposes of comparison with writings professing to emanate from a personality other than the writer's, but at the present moment of time. We shall find, I think, that this is not necessarily a deep-seated distinction; rather that the automatic writing, while representing some dislocation or rearrangement—some "allotropic form," as I have elsewhere suggested—of the writer's personality, yet may sometimes take its superficial colour from some almost accidental circumstance, some suggestion round which the flow of more or less incoherent mentation crystallises into definite shape.

In this strange case of Dr. Mesnet's we have noted an experimental analogy to the spontaneous automatic writing which forms our special topic. But that experiment was practically irreproducible; it depended on a cerebral lesion which may never again be observed in just the same form. Can we not find any easier, commoner form of experiment which may give graphic results comparable with our automatic cases? What of hypnotism? the reader may ask. Cannot hypnotic subjects, in an alert or somnambulant state, be made to write? and what is the nature of messages thus written?

This, indeed, will be a specially close analogy. For in cases of automatic writing, quite apart from hypnotism, we often see the writer fall spontaneously into a state resembling the hypnotic trance, during which state the writing is sometimes continued, sometimes interrupted

by a profounder stage of apparent lethargy. I have repeatedly witnessed this phenomenon in automatists personally known to me; and it constitutes one of the points urged by Spiritualists as showing the possession of the writer by an influence from without. "He is mesmerised," they say, "by a spirit." It is plain, therefore, that, whatever may be the true explanation of this intermixture of trance-states with automatic writing, it at least recalls *prima facie* the known effects of hypnotism.<sup>1</sup>

What experiments, then, have been made on the writing of hypnotised subjects? There have been MM. Binet and Féré's experiments as to the influence of a magnet in reversing the direction of the script—experiments which English observation, so far as I know, has not yet confirmed. And there have been the experiments of MM. Richet, Héricourt, Ferrari, de Rochas, &c., on the modifications of handwriting which ensue on a suggestion made to the subject that he is (say) Napoleon, or an aged man, or a young child. These experiments are easy to repeat, and they will be found of considerable importance when we come to consider the significance of changes in the character of our automatic script.

But beyond this, little notice has been taken of the writings of the hypnotised,—probably because communication with them can with less trouble be conducted verbally. Nevertheless, I have known of one or two subjects who could write, but not speak, in the trance; and I think that, whenever a hypnotised person refuses to speak, an effort should be made to induce him to write. It was reserved, however, for M. Pierre Janet to discover a method by which, in an exceptionally sensitive subject, hypnotic writing, prolonged by suggestion into the normal state, could be made a means of communication with the hypnotic self, coincidentally with ordinary verbal intercourse with the waking self.

The case of which I must now give a summary may be said to mark the highest degree yet attained of proof of the origination of automatic writing in the recesses of the writer's own identity. It will be seen that in this case a secondary self was first created,—or rather, I should say, artificially detached from the complex of cerebration,—

<sup>1</sup> As this paper passes through the press, Mr. Hugh Wingfield, of Caius College, Cambridge, has described to me an experiment which additionally illustrates the kinship between automatic writing and hypnotic suggestion. Mr. Wingfield is a powerful hypnotiser, and can often impress commands on subjects in the waking state. He suddenly ordered a friend (whom he had never hypnotised) to look at him, and to *write*. The friend wrote coherent sentences in several languages,—especially in Servian, which he had at one time habitually spoken,—without having any notion as to what he had written. So soon as the hypnotiser's will and gaze were removed, the writing stopped.

and that then automatic writing was found to be its best mode of manifesting itself,—a path of externalisation which could be maintained throughout the full apparent activity of the primary self.

The case is Professor Pierre Janet's ; and I abridge his account as given in the *Revue Philosophique* for December, 1886.

The subject was a girl of 19 (M. Janet calls her L.—say *Louise*, to avoid confusion from too frequent use of initials in these cases), who was highly hysterical, having attacks daily of several hours' duration. She was also devoid of the sense of pain, or the sense of contact, so that she "lost her legs in bed," as she put it. I may begin by saying that M. Janet and Dr. Powilewicz completely cured her, mainly by hypnotic suggestion, so that the phenomena which I am about to describe,—though morbid in the sense that they occurred in a morbid person,—were healthy in the sense that they were incidental to a process of cure. The physical *indicia* of the different stages of the hypnotic trance satisfied the observers of its reality.

In the first place, Louise offered the usual phenomena of a good hypnotic subject. Post-hypnotic suggestion succeeded easily ;—that is, the subject could be ordered, when in the trance, to perform some act after waking, or to fall asleep again at a given signal ; and after being awoke she would execute the act, or fall asleep at the signal,—without, of course, *remembering* in her waking state the hypnotic command. At first, however, it was necessary that Louise's own will should accept the command ; or, to speak more accurately, that the hypnotised subject should *assent* when she was told to do something on awakening. When the command was an unwelcome one she would say *no* instead of *yes*, and would not fulfil it on awaking.

On her fifth hypnotisation, however, Louise underwent a kind of brief catalepsy, after which she returned to the somnambulant state ; but that state was deeper than before. She no longer made any sign, whether of assent or refusal, when she received the hypnotic commands ; but she executed them infallibly, whether they were to take effect immediately, or after awaking. Moreover, there was a singular development of a phenomenon on whose importance I have often dwelt in these pages. The state of the awakened subject while he executes a deferred suggestion is never a perfectly normal one ; the suggested action is accomplished in an abstracted way, and seldom remains clearly in the normal memory, belonging rather to the secondary memory of the hypnotic state, of which state, indeed, the action is itself a fragmentary prolongation.<sup>1</sup> In Louise's case this went further, and the suggested actions became absolutely a portion of the trance-life. She executed them

<sup>1</sup> This applies to isolated suggestions. If a habitual course of action (as diligence in study) or a habitual physical desire or aversion, (as appetite for

without, apparently, knowing what she was doing. If, for instance, in her waking state, she was told (in the tone which in her hypnotic state signified command) to get up and walk about, she walked about, but, to judge from her conversation, she supposed herself to be still sitting quiet. She would weep violently when commanded, but while she wept she continued to talk as gaily and unconcernedly as if the tears had been turned on by a stop-cock. One day M. Janet begged Louise, in her waking state, to *resist* his next command. She said that she was not aware that she had ever obeyed him, and would certainly resist now. The command was given, and she executed it unconsciously, while still protesting that she would certainly resist.

Here, then, was an indication of a new partition of the identity;—not merely that partition which is habitually established between the hypnotic trance and the waking state. For this new partition subsisted equally in both states, and the dividing boundary was no obvious gulf, but a line as imaginary as the Equator. For the line was merely this,—that any suggestion uttered by M. Janet in a brusque tone of command reached the unconscious self alone; any other remark reached the subject—awake or somnambulant—in the ordinary way.

The next step was to test the intelligence of this hidden “slave of the lamp,” if I may so term it—this sub-conscious and indifferent executor of all that it was bidden. How far was its attention alert? How far was it capable of reasoning and judgment? M. Janet began with a simple experiment. “When I shall have clapped my hands together 12 times,” he said to the entranced subject before awakening her, “you will go to sleep again.” There was no sign that the sleeper heard or understood; and when she was awakened the events of the trance were blank to her, as usual. She began talking to other persons. M. Janet, at some little distance, clapped his hands feebly together five times. Seeing that she did not seem to be attending to him he went up to her and said, “Did you hear what I did just now?” “No, what?” “Do you hear *this*?” and he clapped his hands once more. “Yes, you clapped your hands.” “How often?” “Once.” M. Janet again withdrew, and now clapped his hands six times gently, with pauses between the claps. Louise paid no apparent attention; but when the sixth clap of this second series—making the 12th altogether—was reached, she fell instantly into the trance again.

meat, distaste for spirits,) be hypnotically inspired, the habit may become a second nature, and the only trace, perhaps, of the extraneous origin of the impulse will be a tendency to sudden reversion to the earlier characters. The subject's state may then be compared to that of the negro child taken from his savage kin and reared in civilisation, who may still relapse into a barbarism impossible to his white schoolfellow. In other words, hypnotic moralisation is *par excellence* education, not heredity.

It seemed, then, that the "slave of the lamp" had counted the claps through all, and had obeyed the order, much as a clock strikes after a certain number of swings of the pendulum, however often you stop it between hour and hour. M. Janet varied the conditions; ordering that the girl should fall asleep when he should mention the same letter of the alphabet twice in succession; or when the sum of the digits which he mentioned should reach 10. The result showed that the "slave of the lamp" could successfully attend and obey so long as the problem was a simple one, but that when the problem became too complex, confusion ensued.

These experiments, as M. Janet remarks, throw much light on the mechanism of "deferred suggestion." It seems plain that when a command is given which is to be executed at a distance of some months, we need not suppose that the impulsion thus given works itself out absolutely without further reinforcement. Rather it resembles a bill drawn on the unconscious self at a certain date, but the unconscious self, watching the efflux of time, prepares for its maturation.<sup>1</sup>

Thus far, however, the knowledge gained as to the unconscious element in Louise was not *direct* but inferential. The nature of the commands which it could execute showed it to be capable of attention and memory; but there was no way of learning its own conception of itself, if such existed, nor of determining its relation to other phenomena of Louise's trance. And here it is that automatic writing was successfully invoked; here we have, as I may say, the first-fruits in France of the new attention directed to this seldom-trodden field. M. Janet began by the following simple command: "When I clap my hands you will write *Bonjour*." This was done, in the usual loose and scrawling script of automatism, and Louise, though fully awake, was not aware that she had written anything at all.

This adit, then, was in the possession of the subterranean occupant of the psychical citadel. As yet this occupant was nameless. It was ordered to write a letter, which it did in a commonplace style, and signed "Louise." But Louise was unconscious of the letter-writing, and when the epistle was shown to her she pronounced it a forgery. The unconscious hand was again bidden to write a letter; it wrote word for word the same letter as before, as if it were a musical-box wound up to repeat a particular tune.

By means of a simple artifice, however, it was found possible to do more than this. M. Janet simply ordered the entranced girl to write answers to all questions of his after her awakening. The command thus given had a persistent effect, and while the awakened Louise continued to chatter as usual with other persons, her unconscious self wrote brief

<sup>1</sup> See on this and cognate points the instructive series of experiments independently undertaken by Mr. Gurney, and recorded below, pp. 290 and 309 *et seq.*

and scrawling responses to M. Janet's questions. This was the moment at which in many cases a new and separate invading personality is assumed;—and if Louise had believed in possession by devils—as so many similarly-constituted subjects in old times believed—we can hardly doubt that the energy now writing through her hand would have assumed the style and title of a “familiar spirit.” Or if, again, she had been a modern Spiritualist, it is probable that the signature of some deceased friend would have appeared at the foot of these communications. But here the “communicating intelligence” was of so obviously *artificial* a kind that it could scarcely venture to pretend to be either a devil or Louise's grandmother. A singular conversation gave to this limited creation, this *statutory intelligence*, an identity sufficient for practical convenience. “Do you hear me?” asked Professor Janet. Answer (by writing), “No.” “But in order to answer one must hear?” “Certainly.” “Then how do you manage?” “I don't know.” “There must be somebody who hears me?” “Yes.” “Who is it?” “Not Louise.” “Oh, someone else? Shall we call her Blanche?” “Yes, Blanche.” “Well then, Blanche, do you hear me?” “Yes.” This name, however, had to be changed, for the following reason:—The name Blanche happened to have very disagreeable associations in Louise's mind; and when Louise was shown the paper with the name Blanche which she had unconsciously written she was angry, and wanted to tear it up. Another name had to be chosen. “What name will you have?” “No name.” “You must—it will be more convenient.” “Well, then, Adrienne.” Never, perhaps, has a personality had less spontaneity about it.

Yet Adrienne was in some respects *deeper down* than Louise. She could get at the genesis of certain psychical manifestations of which Louise experienced only the results. A striking instance of this was afforded by the phenomena of the hystero-epileptic attacks to which this patient was subject.

In cases of this sort it often happens that the patient's imagination during the attack is excited by the reminiscence of some scene of terror which perhaps first set on foot this nervous disturbance. On a smaller scale this recurrence to a still dominant moment of past fear may be familiar to some of my readers. I know a lady who was much frightened in childhood by a large dog which sprang out on her; and who still, in moments of alarm or agitation, seems to see the creature spring at her again. Well, Louise's special terror, which recurred in wild exclamation in her hysterical fits, was somehow connected with *hidden men*. She could not, however, recollect the incident to which her cries referred; she only knew that she had had a severe fright at seven years old, and an illness in consequence. Now during these “*crises*” Louise (except, presumably, in the periods of unconsciousness which



form a pretty constant element in such attacks) could hear what Professor Janet said to her. Adrienne, on the contrary, was hard to get at; could no longer obey orders, and if she wrote, wrote only, *J'ai peur, j'ai peur*.

M. Janet, however, waited till the attack was over, and then questioned Adrienne as to the true meaning of the agitated scene. Adrienne was able to describe to him the terrifying incident in her childish life which had originated the confused hallucinations which recurred during the attack. She could not explain the recrudescence of the hallucinations; but she knew what Louise saw and why she saw it: nay, indeed, it was Adrienne rather than Louise to whom the hallucinations were directly visible.

The situation is a complex one. I will try and explain it by citing a curious dream of my own; hoping that the petty personal details which will be unavoidable may be excused by the singular parallelism of the two cases.

I must first explain that I have long thought that we are too indolent in regard to our dreams; that we neglect precious occasions of experiment for want of a little resolute direction of the will. I do not only mean that we ought to try to remember our dreams, and to analyse them, and that we may get strange hints, from the dream's very grotesqueness, of subterranean processes going on within us. I mean much more than this; namely, that we ought to accustom ourselves to look on each dream, not only as a psychological *observation*, but as an observation which may be transformed into an *experiment*. We should constantly represent to ourselves what points we should like to notice and test in dream; and then when going to sleep we should impress upon our minds that we are going to try an experiment;—that we are going to carry into our dreams enough of our waking self to tell us that they *are* dreams, and to prompt us to psychological inquiry.

I need not say that, as dreamers, we are very unequally gifted by nature. My own endowments are very poor; but by mere painstaking effort I have succeeded three times—on three nights only out of nearly 3,000—in realising that I was dreaming, and in attempting some scanty and hurried experimentation. The dream which I shall cite was the most recent of these. As it was not written down immediately on waking, it would not be evidence for any phenomenon otherwise difficult to credit. But it will be seen that it is only a slight idiosyncratic development of a class of dream which many of my readers have probably shared; and its paltry commonplaceness may perhaps avert the suspicion that it has been touched up for recital.

I was, I thought, standing in my study; but I observed that the furniture had not its usual distinctness—that everything was blurred

and somehow evaded a direct gaze. It struck me that this must be because I was *dreaming*. This was a great delight to me, as giving the opportunity of experimentation. I made a strong effort to keep calm, knowing the risk of waking. I wanted most of all to see and speak to somebody, to see whether they were like the real persons, and how they behaved. I remembered that my wife and children were away at the time (which was true), and I did not reason to the effect that they might be present in a dream, though absent from home in reality. I therefore wished to see one of the servants; but I was afraid to ring the bell, lest the shock should wake me. I very cautiously walked downstairs—after calculating that I should be more sure to find someone in pantry or kitchen than in a workroom, where I first thought of going. As I walked downstairs I looked carefully at the stair-carpet, to see whether I could visualise better in dream than in waking life. I found that this was *not* so; the dream-carpet was not like what I knew it in truth to be; rather, it was a thin, ragged carpet, apparently vaguely generalised from memories of seaside lodgings. I reached the pantry door, and here again I had to stop and calm myself. The door opened and a servant appeared,—quite unlike any of my own. This is all I can say, for the excitement of perceiving that I had created a new personage woke me with a shock. The dream was very clear in my mind; I was thoroughly awake; I perceived its great interest to me, and I stamped it on my mind—I venture to say—almost exactly as I tell it here.

It seems to me, then,—so far as any value can be attached to the memory,—that there were here three layers of my personality which present some analogy with three layers of Louise's personality, during (say) the apparently unconscious period of a hysterio-epileptic attack. In the first place, in each case the habitual every-day personality was for the time in abeyance,—asleep, or hysterically distracted. In the second place, my dream-personality corresponded in a certain way to Adrienne. Each of these had a knowledge of the ordinary self, but apparently not a *complete* knowledge. Each was apparently behind, but not co-extensive with, the ordinary identity; was in one sense deeper than that identity, yet existed only with reference thereto, with no separate desires of its own. And in the third place, there was in each instance a kind of psychical phantasmagoria behind and beneath both identities; a background of scenery which seemed created by some organic necessity. In my case this consisted of a mere commonplace reproduction of every-day scenes; in Louise's case it was the appalling resurgence of an ancient terror.

It was neither my waking self nor my conscious dream-self which created the ragged stair-carpet, &c. And it was neither Louise's consciousness nor Adrienne's consciousness which evoked the horrifying

picture of the men hidden in the garden. In each case the phantasmal images arise from depths below either of the alternating consciousnesses. Would it have been possible, one wonders, to have got deeper still? Could the girl's divided spirit have been raised into a state of lucidity in which she could have discerned, as from aloof and from afar, at once the phantasmagoric images gathering, and the helpless and hidden Adrienne scrawling, "*J'ai peur, j'ai peur,*" and Louise's body—*πολλῶν ὀνομάτων μορφή μία*—stretched in contortions on the ground? Conditions such as this have in fact been described by mystical writers. It is possible that there may be some reality in their accounts of successive transitions—of journeyings inwards which were journeyings upwards too. But such writers, instead of endeavouring to attach their own case to the ordinary lot, have too often tried to detach it thence. They have forgotten that a man who claims to have climbed a virgin peak must first explain to us the steps of his ascent before he can expect us to believe the extent of his prospect.

To return, however, to Louise and Adrienne. I have spoken of Adrienne as being in a sense more deeply involved than Louise in the hysterical attacks. But it must not be therefore supposed that Adrienne represented a necessarily *morbid* aspect of the complex identity. And the experiment showed that her plane of existence lay *beneath* some of the superficial evils from which Louise suffered.

Louise, it will be remembered, was a hysterical patient, very seriously amiss. One conspicuous symptom was an almost absolute defect of sensibility whether to pain, to heat, or to contact, which persisted both when she was awake and when entranced. There was, as already mentioned, an entire defect of the muscular sense also, so that when her eyes were shut she did not know the position of her limbs. Nevertheless, it was remarked as an anomaly that when she was thrown into the cataleptic state, not only did the movements impressed on her continue to be made, but the corresponding or complementary movements, the corresponding facial expression, followed just as they usually follow in such experiments. Thus, if M. Janet clenched her fist in the cataleptic stage, her arm began to deal blows, and her face assumed a look of anger. The suggestion given *through the so-called muscular sense* had operated on a subject in whom the muscular sense, as tested in other ways, had seemed to be wholly lacking. As soon as Adrienne could be communicated with it was possible to get somewhat nearer to a solution of this puzzle. Louise was thrown into catalepsy; then M. Janet clenched her left hand (she began at once to strike out), put a pencil in her right hand, and said, "Adrienne, what are you doing?" The left hand continued to strike, and the face to bear the look of rage, while the right hand wrote, "I am furious." "With whom?" "With F." "Why?" "I don't know, but I am very angry."

M. Janet then unclenched the subject's left hand and put it gently to her lips. It began to "blow kisses," and the face smiled. "Adrienne, are you still angry?" "No, that's over." "And now?" "Oh! I am happy." "And Louise?" "She knows nothing, she is asleep."

Now, so far as I know, this is absolutely the first glimpse that has yet been obtained into the subjective being of the subject in the *cataleptic* state. We have thus far only been able to conjecture whether there was or was not any psychical concomitant of the cataleptic gestures of anger or satisfaction. "Il n'y a que le cataleptique," say MM. Binet and Féré,<sup>1</sup> "qui mérite le nom d'automate . . . On a dit avec raison que le cataleptique n'a point une personnalité à lui, qu'il n'existe pas de *moi cataleptique*." Yet the key of automatic writing has unlocked this closely-barred chamber, and has shown us that the clenched fist, which strikes out at our suggestion as if it were moved by a spring, does in fact imply a corresponding emotion of anger, which (in Louise's case at least) is definite enough to select its own *object*, although it cannot explain to us its own *origin*.

If even *these* actions prove to have been accompanied by a kind of consciousness,—to be capable of entering into a kind of memory ;—of what actions can we ever venture to assert that they are absolutely unconscious, absolutely unrememberable? Dr. Richer has observed that the respiration of a cataleptized subject is not often strongly affected by suggestions of terror, &c.,—is much less affected than in the somnambulant state. (*La Grande Hystérie*, pp. 680 sqq.) *La réaction sur l'être intime*, he says, *est nulle ou presque nulle* ;—but we have seen that the *être intime* and its feelings are by no means easy to come at.

The peculiar condition of Louise when awake adds a further interest to this experiment. When awake, she suffered, as I have explained, from a grave sensory disturbance,—an entire absence of the so-called muscular sense. But here we find this new personality possessed of that sense,—responding to muscular stimuli in a way which showed normal sensibility. Adrienne's intelligence, indeed, showed little *verve* or spontaneity ; but she might claim that if she were beneath the level of Louise's waking intellect she was—in another sense—beneath the level of Louise's sensory disturbances as well :—somewhat as deep-sea denizens are beneath not the sunlight only but the storm. This was, in fact, a culminant example of the disappearance, in hypnotic trance, of functional nervous derangements. The inabilities which result from organic lesion subsist, of course, though they may lose their painful character ; but the inabilities which, for want of a better name, we call hysterical may any of them, in any phase of hypnotism, change, diminish, or disappear.

<sup>1</sup> Binet et Féré, *Le Magnétisme Animal*, p. 105.

And here I must repeat my protest,—a protest which the writings of the school of the Salpêtrière seem to me to render constantly needful,—against the assumption that hypnotism itself, and its attendant phenomena, have of necessity anything *morbid* about them. Hypnotism has grave incidental dangers of its own, and it is often witnessed in high perfection on morbid subjects ; but to call hypnotism a *névrose* seems to me about as reasonable as to call the act of dreaming a *névrose*, or the habit of hard study.

Phenomena whose psychical side is so important as here must not be considered from a clinical point of view alone,—as if their only upshot could be to take a man into hospital, or to get him out of it. In this case which we are at present studying,—as in Félicité X.'s case, in Dr. Dufay's case, &c.,—the secondary or induced state was in some respects *less* morbid than the habitual state,—free from the nervous troubles which crippled the patient's waking life. Unless "morbid" is to become a word as question-begging as the word "natural" long has been, we must be as careful *not* to call these novel states morbid as we should be *not* to describe these operations of Nature as unnatural.

In Louise's case indeed these odd manifestations were—as the pure experimentalist might say—only too sanative, only too rapidly tending to normality. M. Janet accompanied his psychological inquiries with therapeutic suggestion ;—telling Adrienne not only to go to sleep when he clapped his hands, or to answer his questions in writing, but to cease having headaches, to cease having convulsive attacks, to recover normal sensibility, and so on. Adrienne obeyed ; and even as she obeyed the rational command, her own Undine-like identity vanished away. The day came when M. Janet called on Adrienne,—and Louise laughed and asked him whom he was talking to. Louise was now a healthy young woman ; but Adrienne, who had risen out of the Unconscious, had sunk into the Unconscious again,—must I say ?—for evermore.

Few lives so brief have taught so many lessons. For us who are busied with automatic writing the main lesson is very clear. We have here *demonstrably* what we can find in other cases only *inferentially* ;—an intelligence manifesting itself continuously by written answers, of purport quite outside the normal subject's conscious mind, while yet that intelligence was but a part, a fraction, an aspect, of the normal subject's own identity.

We must bear this ascertained fact—for it is as near to an ascertained fact as anything which this perplexing inquiry can bring us—steadily in mind while we deal with future cases. And we must remember that Adrienne,—while she was, if I may so say, the unconscious self reduced to its simplest expression,—did, nevertheless, manifest certain differences from Louise, which, if slightly exaggerated, might

have been very perplexing. Her handwriting was slightly different,—though only in the loose and scrawling character so frequent in automatic script. Suppose the handwriting had been rather *more* different? and had vaguely resembled that of some deceased member of the family? It is easy to understand what inferences might have been based on such a fact. Again, Adrienne remembered certain incidents in Louise's childhood which Louise had wholly forgotten. These events occurred at a grandmother's house. Suppose that the sentence recording them had been signed with the *grandmother's* name, instead of with the merely arbitrary name selected for the convenience of a cool observer? Here too, it is easy to imagine the confidence—in one sense the well-grounded confidence—with which any knowledge on Louise's own part of those long past events would have been disclaimed.

Once more;—and this last suggestion points to positive, rather than to negative, conclusions:—Adrienne possessed a faculty—the muscular sense—of which Louise was devoid. I am anxious that this point especially should be firmly grasped; for I wish the reader's mind to be perfectly open as regards the relative faculties of the conscious and of the unconscious self. In Mr. Newnham's case we have had the unconscious self (as I interpret that story) superior to the conscious self in faculty of one kind; here we find it superior in faculty of another kind. It is plain that we must be on the watch for completion, for evolution, as well as for partition, for dissolution, of the corporate being.

Since the above words were written Professor Pierre Janet has been kind enough to send me a manuscript account, which he allows me here to translate and publish, of another series of experiments, analogous to the above, which he has tried upon Madame B., who has been already introduced to readers of these *Proceedings* in my paper on "Telepathic Hypnotism" in Part X. I will translate the account almost at full length; for the experiments seem to me extremely significant; and the very fact that the subject had never learnt to *write* renders the series a most fitting introduction to the discussion of automatic movement and gesture, which my next paper must contain.

"After concluding my experiments," says Professor Janet, "on the hypnotic sleep of the young woman whom I have called L., I resolved to try whether I could obtain analogous phenomena with a very different subject,—namely, with Madame B., the honest peasant-woman whom you saw at Havre. I did not try for mental suggestion; I sought only to discover whether ordinary suggestions worked themselves out for Madame B. in the same manner as for L.

"It must be remembered that Madame B.'s trance is very different from L.'s—far deeper and far more complex. With L. the trance was

induced by a single gesture; it continued for the most part unchanged, and ended in a moment at my bidding. It was 'the lesser hypnotism,' if you choose so to call it. Madame B.'s trance, on the other hand, needed some minutes to become deep, and divided itself spontaneously into a certain number of phases, which seemed to represent different stages of profundity.<sup>1</sup> Her awakening was difficult and needed at least ten minutes to effect. This was 'the greater hypnotism,' or 'magnetism,' if you choose so to call it. This difference between the two forms of trance prevented me from repeating my experiments in precisely the same way. As you know, I made the suggestions to L. during the trance, and then woke her some time afterwards to see her execute them in the waking state. I would then put her to sleep again and make another suggestion,—sometimes entrancing and awakening her ten times at one sitting. This could not be done with Madame B., who when once asleep was unwilling to be awakened till some hours had elapsed. I was obliged to make my experiments with her, not in her waking but in her somnambulant state; and this fact led to some novel details which may have interest for you.

"Among the various phases, elsewhere described, of Madame B.'s trance, two alone were of importance for our present inquiry. The first of these was the state of *lethargic somnambulism*, as I have termed it, during which the sleep was profound, the muscles relaxed, the subject motionless, speechless, and apparently deaf to my questions. This state, however, was not a complete lethargy, for the characteristic contractures produced in that stage of hypnotism by deep-seated excitation of the muscles, could not be evoked. The second state here necessary to describe was that which I have termed 'lucid somnambulism'; attaching no occult sense to the epithet, but using it simply to signify that the subject's intelligence and freedom of action seemed almost intact. In this stage the subject looked, listened, talked, and acted with gay spontaneity, resembling a waking person in all respects except two, that her eyes were shut and could not be opened without inducing a change of state, and that the hypnotiser could easily provoke contractures by lightly touching the skin.

"Let us consider the degree of susceptibility to suggestion existing in each of these phases. If, during the second phase—that of lucid somnambulism—I interrupt a conversation with Madame B. by some sudden *order*, she hears me perfectly well, but does not obey. If I insist, she laughs, asks me why I want her to raise her arms, or the like, and simply refuses to do so. One may gradually persuade her to obey by argument, but there is no real hypnotic suggestion. Occasion-

<sup>1</sup> See "Les phases intermédiaires de l'hypnotisme," *Revue Scientifique*, May 8th, 1886.

ally, indeed, by strong insistence for some minutes, one can provoke a simple movement or a hallucination,—but more commonly the subject's resistance is so strong that she will throw herself into a state of general contracture rather than obey.

“During the phase of lethargic somnambulism, on the other hand, suggestion was easy; I had but to make the subject attend to me, by holding her hand, touching her forehead, and giving the order distinctly. The suggestion was not executed at once; for the trance continued without apparent modification; but when the subject woke up into the second state—that of lucid somnambulism—she executed the order without making any resistance. It thus seemed that the somnambulant trance itself was composed of two phases—a phase of waking and a phase of sleep. During its waking phase suggestion was hardly possible; but suggestions made during its phase of sleep realised themselves during its waking phase; just as post-hypnotic suggestions realise themselves when the hypnotic trance is over.

“The acts thus executed possessed this striking characteristic,—that Madame B. was unaware of them at the moment when she was performing them. If during the lethargic somnambulism I had ordered her to walk, to move her arms or legs, &c., she did so in the lucid somnambulism automatically,—while she talked about something else. If one drew her attention to the movement—as by asking her where her arms were—she lowered the arms at once—as though to look at them—and the movement ceased; but she retained no recollection of having moved. Similarly if I had suggested a hallucination she saw it when she woke into the lucid state, felt the pleasure or the fear which it was calculated to inspire; and then, the hallucination over, recollected nothing of it.

“Was there not here a kind of duplication of psychological phenomena analogous to that which I had observed in L. ? The following experiments seem to point in that direction. During the lucid state,—in which direct suggestion, as will be remembered, was impossible,—I asked a friend to talk to Madame B. in such a way as wholly to distract her attention from me. When her attention was completely held by my friend I suddenly said, ‘Faites un pied de nez.’ (Spread your thumb and fingers from your nose.) Her hands went up at once and the *pied de nez* was executed,—Madame B. continuing her conversation meantime with unbroken vivacity. Without interrupting her, or addressing myself to her directly, I added: ‘When I have clapped my hands five times you will rise and walk round the room.’ I clapped my hands twice and asked, ‘Did you hear me?’—taking her hand and obliging her to listen. ‘Why, you said nothing,’ she replied, and turned away to talk to my friend. I clapped my hands again three times, and



Madame B. got up automatically and walked round the room, without interrupting her conversation.<sup>1</sup>

"Madame B. has never learnt to write ; which was unfortunate, as otherwise I might have repeated the experiments on automatic writing made with L. But I was able to procure something closely analogous. Speaking to Madame B. in the same manner,—that is, so that she should not *directly* listen to me,—I said, 'You will raise your hand to signify Yes ; you will shake it to signify No.' I thus managed to hold a conversation with her—of course of a very simple kind—while she talked eagerly with another person, and was quite unaware of the second dialogue which her *hand* was carrying on all the time.

"Thus the suggestions which it was so difficult to effect during the lucid somnambulism, while Madame B. was listening attentively, became perfectly easy, and could be carried out in a complex manner, while she was talking to another person and not listening to me. In this case it was not her expectant attention, but the *distraction* of her attention, which effected her compliance with the command.

"I could never succeed in getting these automatic acts to enter the subject's consciousness in her lucid state. They seem quite separated from her personality. But, through a chain of circumstances which need not here be detailed, I succeeded in developing in the same subject a new somnambulant condition, which can be induced by a long series of passes made before her face. In this phase the face is pale, and the limbs paralysed and insensible ; but it differs from the lethargic somnambulism already described, insomuch that in this new state the subject hears and answers my questions, though she only hears me when I actually touch her, and only answers in a low voice, after herself repeating the question.

"The state is a curious one, and I hope some day to describe it further. The point at present interesting is that I questioned her one day in this new state as to the acts which she had just been accomplishing automatically in the state of lucid somnambulism which had preceded—acts of which the subject had never before, in any phase, manifested the least recollection. Now, however, she recited these acts with ease: 'You made me rise ; you made me take up an engraving,' &c. And to this she added, '*The other one* was talking while I got up from my seat ; she is so stupid that she knew nothing about it.' In short, this new somnambulant phase had brought to light a new personality, which

<sup>1</sup> Observe that the point is that Madame B., in the lucid state, would obey no order unless she had previously been told in the lethargic state that she would obey it on waking into the lucid state. And, by a kind of parity of impression, these new orders, so uttered as not to reach the lucid consciousness, did in fact reach the specific personality of the lethargic state, underlying that of the lucid state.—[F. W. H. M.]

assumed as its own all the acts unconsciously performed during the state of lucid somnambulism. Suggestions made in this new condition were either acted out at once and consciously, or were acted out in the state of lucid somnambulism, but automatically, and while Madame B. talked of other things.

“I may add that Madame B. is susceptible of catalepsy, and that the acts performed in the cataleptic condition have always remained unconscious,—not entering Madame B.’s memory at any stage. But in the new state the new personality retained recollection of the acts performed in catalepsy, along with the automatic acts of the lucid somnambulism. It seemed as though this newly-evoked personality consisted of the synthesis of all the psychological phenomena of which the primary personality was unconscious.

“It would seem, at any rate, that in Madame B., as in L., the psychological phenomena were synthetised into two groups, which groups produced two distinct conceptions of the self. One of these selves,—the completer,—say Madame B., talked with me in lucid somnambulism, and refused to obey my orders if she heard them with direct attention. The other self—let us call her Madame X.—obeyed my orders at once, if they were given during Madame B.’s sleep, or during her lucidity, if she was not attending to me. And by inducing one special phase of profound trance I could cause Madame B. to disappear altogether, and address myself to Madame X. alone, who then retained the memory of the acts previously performed by her, unknown to Madame B.

“Complicated though this description may seem, the reality was more complex still. Remember that all which I have related took place during various phases of somnambulism; and that outside all this lay the true state of waking, after the trance had been wholly dispelled. You know already that Madame B. when awake is by no means the same person as Madame B. even in the lucid phase of her somnambulism. You know that, when once awakened, she retains no recollection of any act performed during somnambulism—whether by Madame B. or Madame X. Her ordinary waking state is therefore practically a *third* personality. And when you reflect that it is possible to make either to Madame B. or to Madame X. post-hypnotic suggestions which will be worked out in the waking state, you will realise how strangely intermingled are the phenomena of the subject’s psychical life.

“We have here that *dissociation of the phenomena of consciousness* which seems to me to be the essential fact of somnambulism, of suggestion, of automatic writing, of hysteria itself, and of many other nervous phenomena. But this purely psychical dissociation may be pushed to a greater or less degree, and may form two, three, or

four groups according to circumstances,—or even many more in certain stages of dementia. In somnambulism this dissociation leads to the existence of several degrees of unconscious action, of several personalities encased, if I may so term it, the one in the other. The knowledge of this fact may throw much light on many of these apparently inexplicable phenomena.”

I will conclude this series with a case which, though of a less unusual type than the last, shows in a clear and striking way how deeply post-hypnotic suggestion may modify the self-supposed personality and, incidentally, the handwriting of the subject. I shall abbreviate the case, but shall keep, as far as I can, the phraseology of the Com-mandant de Rochas, to whom it is due.<sup>1</sup>

“*Subject.* Benoit ; 18 years old ; clerk in an office ; intelligent and healthy ; trained for some months to post-hypnotic suggestion.

“*Suggestion.* ‘Beginning with to-morrow, Thursday, you will come to my house for three days running at 5.30. When you enter my room you will believe that you are my son Henri ; when you leave the house you will be Benoit again.’

“*Effect.* On Thursday at 5.30 Benoit arrives ; he enters the house without ringing, runs upstairs and sits down in my study in Henri’s place, saying, ‘I have just had a good long walk,’ which is not true, since he has just come from his office. ‘With whom did you walk?’ ‘With M.’—a friend of my son’s whom he barely knows—‘he has lent me this book.’ ‘Have you seen Benoit?’ ‘No, not for three months.’ ‘Well, I shall try some experiments on you then.’ ‘It will be no use, papa, you know that you can’t do anything with me.’ I make him rigid, insensible to pain, &c., which surprises him greatly. I read him the notes of my experiments with Benoit ; he remembers some of them (those at which Henri was present), is sorry to have missed others. I make him write a sentence, and his writing resembles my son’s (which is not the case with his normal writing), and this, although he does not know my son’s writing, or has only seen it long ago and by chance. I then impose upon him various personalities and make him write in each case ; and thus obtain a series of handwritings differing one from the other.”

This, it will be seen, is the important point for us. A handwriting supposed to be unknown, or at least unfamiliar, to the subject, is reproduced tolerably when the subject believes himself to be that Henri whose script he presumably could not have imitated in the normal state.<sup>2</sup> A few more details will be of interest, as showing the way in which the personality is kept up,—the evasive answers resorted to when puzzling questions are proposed. Note, also, Benoit’s ready familiarity with the family circle of which he supposes himself to be a member, which may remind us of the affectionate manners of certain

<sup>1</sup> *Revue Philosophique*, March, 1887, p. 330.

<sup>2</sup> I have seen facsimiles of the writings, and have also, through M. de Rochas’ kindness, myself witnessed similar experiments with Benoit at Blois.

“communicating spirits,” which, nevertheless, are liable to sad blunders as to their relations’ names.

“We pass into the adjoining room, where my family are assembled. He sits down by the fire, talks with his ‘mamma,’ with his sister, with his little brother, *tutoyant* them all. Seeing that I am standing, he jumps up and offers me his seat with, ‘I beg your pardon, papa.’

“As soon as we have crossed the threshold of the house he becomes Benoit again, calls me ‘mon commandant,’ and tells me that he has passed the day at his office desk.

“Next day Benoit comes in again without knocking, sits down by the fire, and begins to read. I question him on his studies of the day; he becomes confused, and answers that his head is stupid, and he cannot remember. . . . On Saturday at 5.30 I see Benoit from the window, running bare-headed through the street; I go to meet him and find him in the vestibule, puzzling himself as to what he can have done with his hat. When he had come in, he says, and wanted to hang it up, he found it was not there.

“I take him out into the garden (where he becomes Benoit again) and ask him what he has done with his hat; he tells me that his chief at the office had tried to prevent him from leaving, and had hidden his hat to keep him, but that he felt that I wanted him, and ran off without his hat, so as not to be late. We re-enter the house, and at once he begins to puzzle himself again as to what on earth he has done with his hat.

“We enter my study, and I show him the sentences which he wrote the day before; he has no recollection of them, and is astonished to find that he has become as good a subject as Benoit. He is insensible to pinches or pricks, but feels heat and cold. I try to destroy the suggestion by placing my hand on his head, ‘en hétéronome’; the only result which I obtain is to make him think of Benoit. I pass a voltaic current through his neck; the thought of Benoit recurs more strongly; I tell him that I was trying to make him think that he *was* Benoit. ‘Oh, you won’t get quite as far as that!’ he replies with a laugh. We go to dinner; he had never sat at my table before. He sits down in an easy way; I remark that that is not his usual place. ‘True! what was I thinking of?’ He criticises the food and orders the servants about. Suddenly I put him to sleep again, and say, ‘You are no longer Henri; you are Benoit; you will remember that you have been dining here.’ I wake him; he shakes his head; opens his eyes wide; rises timidly and confusedly, thanks me and takes his leave.”

This case, strange though it sounds, is but a well-developed specimen of the post-hypnotic suggestions which during these last few years have been inspired in so many subjects, in more and more complex forms. But it deserves to be remembered when we come to consider the relative value of the various items—similarity of style, demeanour, handwriting, knowledge, which go to make up the evidence that an apparent personality is really what it assumes to be.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I may add here another anecdote of Benoit, which M. de Rochas has not included in his book, but has sent to me, with permission to publish it in

We have now made a survey—rapid, indeed, and imperfect—of a wide range of phenomena. Let us briefly realise what light they have thrown on our primary problem—the origin of such messages as those written by Mr. Schiller's hand. The first impression, as I have said, of an automatic writer of such messages is generally that they proceed from some intelligence external to himself. And apart from all discussion (which we are avowedly postponing) as to facts contained in the messages and unknown to the writer, he will be likely to base this presumption of externality on the following considerations.

1. He is in normal health, and there is no trace of morbid or hysterical disturbance in his psychical being.

English. It is much to our purpose—as showing hypnotic moralisation effected by the agency of recurrent dream. I slightly abridge M. de Rochas' account, dated March 25th, 1887.

“Benoit is a young fellow 18 years old, employed in the prefecture of Loir et Cher. He is the son of an honest artisan family; but has been somewhat led astray by foolish companions,—somewhat puffed up by the notice taken of him in connection with my hypnotic experiments. His parents complained to me that he had not been behaving well towards them, and asked me to use my influence to modify his conduct. This was not easy, for Benoit could tell very well, by pinching himself, whether he was under the influence of a suggestion,—and if he were so, he could dispel the suggestion by rubbing his forehead.

“I had recourse, therefore, to a subterfuge. I put him to sleep by surprise, in the middle of an ordinary conversation, and I then read to him the following suggestion, which I had written down in order to give it without hesitation.

“‘You will dream for three nights running that you are married, that you have a grown-up son, that you and your wife have denied yourselves the necessities of life in order to educate him. Now that this son—thanks to your sacrifices—has gained a certain little position, he thinks himself a great man, never enters your house except for meals, and spends all he earns with good-for-nothing friends. In your dream you will be greatly distressed at this; you will try to remonstrate with him, but he will run off whenever you begin to talk. When you wake you will remember your dream and will act accordingly. You will not remember that I gave you this suggestion, and you will not be able to remove it.’ Having read this to Benoit, I woke him by the word ‘Wake!’ and continued the conversation as if nothing had happened. Benoit was not aware that he had been sent to sleep.

“Two days later he came to tell me that he was troubled by terrible nightmares, which he begged me to remove. I asked him for details, and he narrated to me part of the story which I had inspired, passing lightly over the points which most humiliated him. I pointed out to him that the story was somewhat like his own;—and that perhaps his nervous system, excited by hypnotism, was giving a striking embodiment to the secret voice of conscience. If he acted as the dream suggested, it would doubtless disappear;—and, moreover, I would now hypnotise him and suggest that his sleep should be tranquil. The dream vanished, and from that day onwards—it is now two months ago—his conduct has been entirely changed, and his parents are astounded at the improvement which has taken place in him.”

2. The messages are connected with one another in a continuous series.

3. They are written while he is conscious in the usual way,—perhaps talking on some quite different topic.

4. They are, themselves, entirely outside his consciousness. Neither at the time nor afterwards is he aware of their origination.

On all these points the analogous cases which have been cited in this paper may throw some illumination.

1. In the first place I have tried to show that automatism affords no real presumption of the existence of any *morbid* action whatever. My contention is that each case of apparent automatism should be considered simply on its own merits, without being supposed to imply either disease or inspiration.

2. Then again, the manifestation of a new *character*, kept up throughout a long series of these automatic writings, has been paralleled by the cases given of the origination of a new chain of memories—and character is in great measure a function of memory—under very varied circumstances of psychical commotion. The graphic automatist tells us of insurgent quasi-personalities,—not momentary, but of indefinite persistence; not co-ordinate with his whole normal personality (as in Félicité's case), but susceptible of considerable multiplication, as one new "guide" or "control" is added to another, without appreciably disturbing the ordinary current of life. But we have seen that this fissiparous multiplication of the self,—if I may so term it—is by no means so rare a phenomenon as has sometimes been supposed. We have seen that something of a subordinate personality tends to be created within us whenever any set of recurrent ideas and sensations are sufficiently isolated, by whatever cause, from the primary series with which we are accustomed to associate our personal identity.

It is impossible to find any simile which will give an adequate notion of the complexity which we must assume in processes like these. Yet the view which I wish to present stands in great need of such clearness as a concrete analogy, however imperfect, may give it. I wish to show, then, how we may conceive that subordinate personalities may manifest themselves from time to time, either coincidentally with the primary personality, or in its temporary abeyance, and may appear to be (within certain limits) distinct from that primary personality, while yet they are mere modifications in the functioning of the same individual.

Let us compare the brain, then, to a musical-box, far more complex than any musical-box actually existing. It contains thousands of barrels, many of which are always going under any circumstances. The sound made by any of the barrels can be easily muffled. My ordinary waking life is represented by a tune played by barrel A. This tune is

always proceeding : when I sleep it is muffled ; when I wake I catch it up again. As life proceeds it becomes more and more elaborate. Each fresh experience introduces variations, subsidiary barrels A', A'', &c. But the essential tune is so far the same that a competent ear can detect its persistence through all my life,—can see that at forty years of age my character is a development of my character at four. When I doze or dream confusedly, this means that the barrels A, A', A'', &c., are all muffled, but that some of the pins are imperfectly muffled, and give out scattered musical phrases, not amounting to tunes. When my dreams are distinct, that means that there are enough of these imperfectly muffled pins to make a tune of their own. This tune will be poor and incorrect ; but the pins are so disposed that certain harmonic combinations occur more readily than discords (this is the law of mental association), and that any musical phrase which has once occurred tends to repeat itself. Thus, in the slight link of memory between one dream and another dream, I have a new tune B, composed from the musical elements existing in A, A', &c., but independent of them. As soon as the new tune B exists we must suppose that by some phonographic process a new barrel is so impressed as to repeat tune B under favourable circumstances, and this in its turn becomes subject to variations B', B'', &c.

Next, suppose that I am hypnotised. The various degrees and states of hypnotisation correspond to all kinds of mufflings and slowings of the barrels A, A', &c., and even of the minor barrels a, a', a'', &c., which form the sub-conscious substratum of A, A', (regulating vaso-motor and circulatory phenomena, &c.). But I take here the special case of a hypnotically-suggested personality. I am told (say) that I am a schoolboy. The effect of this is a selective evocation of sound from all the pins which are of a particular timbre,—many of them belonging, say, to the variation-barrel of A'', which I acquired at the schoolboy period of life.

These pins produce a tune, so to say, of schoolboy quality ;—of more purely schoolboy quality than any tune which I could have produced without having the non-schoolboy pins muffled. But this schoolboy tune will not have much substance ; its effects will tend to recur, for it has not at its disposal the complex mechanism of the great barrels A, A', &c.

That is to say, if I write a schoolboy story in my normal state I have the advantage of my matured intelligence, which enables me to introduce plot and variety ; but I have the disadvantage of an adult mode of looking at things which prevents me from really reproducing the schoolboy aroma. If I am turned into a schoolboy by hypnotic suggestion, I am more truly schoolboyish in talk and manner,—I perhaps even enjoy a revival of schoolboy memories otherwise lost,—but I have

not the adult's resources of plot, &c., and soon begin to repeat my schoolboy jokes and gestures over and over again.

Each time, however, that I am hypnotised into a schoolboy I improve slightly in resource; for each tune when once set going within me tends, as already said, to imprint itself on a new barrel by some phonographic process, and then to acquire variations.

We have seen, moreover, that not only hypnotism, but also alcoholic and other narcotisms, epilepsy, and (we may of course add) some forms of insanity evoke similarly subordinate or adventitious personalities.

Now what reason is there for supposing that these are the only agents which thus detach a quasi-personality from the main current of our life? There is no such reason; on the contrary, analogy may naturally lead us to suppose that such disturbance may be idiopathic as well as incidental. It is at any rate antecedently more probable than not that there is a tendency during vigilance to all cerebral processes to which there is a tendency during sleep. And just as it seems to be what we call a *chance*—i.e., a point determined by obscure and minor agencies—whether our dream-adventures persist into waking memory—so also it may be a *chance* whether our waking dreams—the subordinate quasi-personal operations which coincide with our waking hours—do or do not manifest themselves in a way perceptible to waking consciousness.

To write a thing down automatically and then to read it is much the same as to dream a thing and then to remember it.

There would be nothing that need much surprise us were we to learn that dreams of a considerable degree of consistence were habitually occurring within us,—and that the occasional power to write automatically, like the occasional power to recollect a dream, did but give us a glimpse into a constantly functioning complex of cerebration which is habitually excluded from our primary mnemonic chain.

Our simile has led us into some remarks appropriate to the third difficulty above mentioned;—the *co-existence*, namely, of the unconscious with the conscious waking life of the automatist, which seems to differentiate his case from any of those where there is *alternation* between normal vigilance and something like a recurrent dream. It was partly to meet this difficulty that I brought forward the hypothesis of the simultaneous, but separate, action of the two cerebral hemispheres in cases like these. But waiving, for the sake of argument, any such theory of dual cerebration, I think that the whole question of the relation of consciousness to personality may now be met in a distincter manner than was possible on metaphysical grounds alone.

↓ We can no longer draw a broad line between the conscious and the unconscious, and say that what a man is conscious of is part of his true self, and that phenomena, however complex, which never enter into his



consciousness, must be considered as lying outside his true identity. We cannot say this, because the cases here cited (amongst others) have shown us that it is quite impossible to predict what acts will ultimately enter into a man's consciousness, and what will not. I use the phrase "enter into his consciousness" in order to imply that the mere fact of being recollected—of entering into the "memory of evocation"—as M. Richet has happily termed it—constitutes the only test of consciousness which we can apply. The only way in which a man can prove to us that he was conscious of any act is by describing it afterwards. And what acts he may be able, at some date or other, and in some condition or other, to describe or to show recollection of, it is—as hypnotic experiments teach us—absolutely impossible to foretell.

We do not know how deep the "memory of fixation" goes; we cannot determine, that is to say, the inferior limit, below which an excitation is too feeble to leave an impress on our nervous system capable of subsequent revival. We may, of course, say that it does not seem likely that a man should ever be able to remember, for instance, so purely vegetative an operation as the growth of his hair. But observations during recovery from fainting,<sup>1</sup> and under narcotics, shows us that when the action of the hemispheres has been wholly or partially in abeyance, we may find ourselves able to recollect nervous operations lying—as it seems—beneath the threshold of anything that can be called a sense of personality.

And if the limits of the memory of fixation are thus uncertain, equally uncertain is the relation which the memory of evocation bears thereto in each individual case. No man has ever evoked into recollection all the evocable memories within him; no man can say what condition of life or death may suddenly open to him new chambers in his own past. If we are to hazard a conjecture, the safest supposition would seem to be that at least any cortical operation whatever which had taken place in a man's brain was potentially memorable, whatever its originating source; so that we might on this view expect that we should find scattered instances where these automatic messages—whose production must have involved cortical centres—have, though at first reckoned unconscious, ultimately become a part of the writer's conscious being.

I do not mean that he will then necessarily recognise them as emanating from himself. On the contrary, it is quite possible that he may then recognise, with strong subjective conviction at least, that they proceed from some intelligence other than his own. My point is that the fact that he cannot get behind the messages—cannot realise their inception to the same degree as he realises the

<sup>1</sup> See especially Herzen's *Les Conditions Physiques de la Conscience*. Geneva, 1886.

inception of his own habitual thoughts—is absolutely no proof that they are *not* his own. If he *does* get behind them, if he realises their inception in what appears to him the same intuitive manner as when he realises the inception of his own characteristic ideas, then, indeed, I do not say that his view of them will be certainly the right one—but it will be an important element in their estimation. We shall be passing, in short, from the problems of automatism to the problems of clairvoyance and of ecstasy.

On discussions of this kind we cannot here enter. What has been said may be enough to show that instead of merely asking, with regard to a written message or any other manifestation, “Was it conscious or unconscious?” we must rather ask, with more precision: To what extent was this intellectual operation included within the series constituting normal memory? or to what extent did it form a part of any abnormal, or subsidiary, or intercurrent thread of memory? or to what extent, finally, did it remain outside all phases of memory which the subject at any time passed through?

The answer to this question will in each case be important, but will not, taken by itself, be decisive as to the character of the message;—which must be judged far more by its *content* than by the subjective aspect of its manifestation. Rather, as it seems to me, the varying circumstances, as regards immediate or postponed memory, under which messages closely analogous to each other are given, may help to teach us how much less radical a fact in our being our immediate consciousness forms than has often been supposed. Instead of treating our normal stream of consciousness as necessarily representing our true self, we shall rather be disposed to see in it a mere practical compromise, a mere prudential result of evolution. I am conscious of certain thoughts and not of other thoughts—not because the one set of thoughts is more essentially mine than the other, but because it has been helpful to my ancestors in the struggle for existence that consciousness should set that way. It has been convenient that I should come to suppose myself to be an intellectual agent of this particular kind, just as it has been convenient that I should identify the inscrutable objects around me by some staring distinction,—that I should recognise oranges as yellow and grass as green.

Now we all know that when we get a little deeper we realise the subjectivity of our sensations,—that the yellowness is in us rather than in the orange; and the subjectivity of our ideation—our thoughts being conditioned by certain categories or limitations (as time and space) which they cannot transcend. But I am here contending that we still are accustomed to take ourselves too much for granted; that we have no warrant for assuming that the “testimony of consciousness”—after all our corrections and emendations—does really cover the most

important part of the psychical operations which are going on within us.

How can we possibly tell whether it does so or not? To what confirmation can we appeal? All that we can say is, that we are conscious of most of the thoughts which conspicuously influence our voluntary movements. These movements are definitely known; they may be watched and registered by others; and we can then say what train of ideas seemed to us to prompt each movement. And this is all that is needful to make us rational agents, capable of taking part in the struggle for existence.

But we know that a great deal more than this is in fact going on within us. Multitudes of involuntary movements, both peripheral and internal—multitudes of spontaneously arising images, during both sleep and waking—testify to cerebral activities of which we are never consciously the originators.

All that we can say of these cerebral activities is that if it had been of much practical use to our ancestors to be conscious of them, they, and consequently we, would probably have become conscious of them. In this respect we may compare them to certain forms of sensibility which we perceive, in some rare examples, to be possible to the human organism, but which have not, apparently, been valuable enough to our ancestors to get themselves established among recognised human faculties. Such sensibilities may sometimes correspond to phenomena that are very important, sometimes to phenomena that are very trivial. One man feels the approach of a thunderstorm, another is sure that there is a cat under the sofa. The mere fact that neither kind of susceptibility has risen into habitual generic faculty tells us nothing whatever as to the abstract dignity or paltriness of its special subject-matter. And similarly with these centrally-initiated activities which we are now discussing. The cerebral-psychical operations of which we are unconscious may be as trifling as the fact of the presence or absence of a cat. Or they may be as important as the whole theory of electricity. We cannot tell beforehand; and we need experiments of the kind which I have been describing and advocating in order to enable us to find out. We need, in short, to apply to the very central fact of our self-consciousness the same analysis which we have applied with more or less success to almost every other "dictum of consciousness." To find out what we are we must not trust to what we seem to ourselves to be; we must resort to scientific artifice, to mechanical registration, to tortuous experiment.

And if, as I believe, *telepathy* is one of the facts within us which it has been left for artifice and experiment—rather than for common experience—to establish as truly existent, then assuredly the harvest is already a rich one.

And here, in conclusion, I may fitly call attention to what seems to me a prevalent fallacy connected with this class of observations. It has been assumed—by some with indifference, by others with horror—that this view of our personality as a complex, a shifting thing,—a unity upbuilt from multiplicity,—an empire aggregated from the fusion of disparate nationalities,—must bring with it also a presumption that there is nothing in us *beyond* this ever-changing identity, whose continuance depends but on links of perishable memory, on organic syntheses which an accident may distort or decompose.

I do not myself think that this analysis of our terrene personality—pushed even as I am pushing it now—does in reality introduce any additional difficulty whatever into the hypothesis of a transcendental Self behind the phenomena;—of what we call a human soul. The difficulties are now made more glaringly visible; but they existed for any reasonable mind already. No one, surely, supposed that the soul was *coincident* with the psychical manifestation known to us? No one doubted that it was expressed more fully at some moments than at others, in manhood rather than in infancy, in waking rather than in sleep, in sane life rather than in dementia or in delirium? On any hypothesis the soul is conceived as working *through* the body; and therefore as necessarily finding in the body an instrument of constantly varying responsiveness and power. All that is offered here is but a *development* of this admitted thesis—a further analysis of the machinery which must in any case be needed to bring transcendental operations within the purview of sense. If an immortal soul there be within us, she must be able to dispense with part of the brain's help while the brain is living, as with the whole of its help when it is dead. If the soul exist, she must exist (if I may so say) *ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nostri*; not needing that our dim consciousness should place her unbrokenly in evidence, or demonstrate by any terrene continuity an existence more abiding than that of earth.

The true lesson, as it seems to me, which these new speculations teach us, is of a more hopeful though of a vaguer kind. It is simply that we are still groping among the rudiments of a true knowledge of our psychical being. From whence it follows that at least no great question as to our nature or our destiny has as yet been even approximately decided in a sense contrary to the highest hopes of men. So far from our living, as some would tell us, in an age which has had to relinquish all hope of deeper knowledge, further light, upon the chief concerns of man, we are living in an age when fruitful methods of experiment are just becoming possible; when we have just learnt enough of easier problems to begin to interpret the faint indications which throw light on the highest problems of all.

I do not wish to exaggerate the importance of the special class of

experiment which I am advocating here. Automatic writing is not a key to all the recesses of our being. But it is a key to *something*, and it is a key that will actually turn in the lock. Automatic messages will come, if persistently tried for; they can be analysed; the result of the analysis must in any case be instructive, and *may* point towards conclusions of even startling magnitude. Again I must appeal for fresh experiment, for fresh observation. I do not, of course, venture to demand that experimenters, who may think me a mistaken interpreter, should send their results to me personally; though I can promise to study with the utmost care any records that may reach me. But if there are those who believe that these messages do demonstrably come from some intelligence exterior to themselves, and especially from the intelligence of some departed friend, then I would urge them to give, in some fashion or other, their reason for the faith that is in them—to set before the world, if they can, some further well-attested instances which point towards so momentous a conclusion. Let them not spare their utmost pains in such a cause as this. *καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἀθλοῦν καὶ ἡ ἐλπίς μεγάλη.* Worthy is that effort and great would be that hope.