THE COUNCIL OF TEN:
MINUTES OF MEETINGS JANUARY 12 TO FEBRUARY 14, 1919

Note Concerning the Minutes of the Meetings of the Council of Ten

The minutes of meetings of the Council of Ten in the English language were prepared in mimeographed form and distributed by the British delegation. The British designation for the minutes in this series was IC (International Conference), while the American designation was BC (Bureau Conference). The copies used by the American delegation omitted the first mimeographed sheet received from the British and substituted a new first sheet with a number in the BC series. At the end of the last sheet of each set of mimeographed minutes received from the British appeared the words "Villa Majestic" (headquarters of the British secretariat) and the date. It became the practice of the American secretariat to restencil the last sheet containing these words or to efface them with a hand stamp, but this was not invariably done. In the present publication these words appear or not according to their appearance in the Department's file copy.

For the meetings of the Council of Ten from January 12 through January 22, 1919, an additional set of minutes seems to have been prepared by the American delegation. Inasmuch as this version often gives an account of the meeting in a slightly different form from, or contains some material in addition to, that contained in the version circulated jointly by the American and British delegations, these alternate versions have been published for the meetings for which they exist. They appear in the present publication immediately adjacent to the joint versions of the meetings to which they relate. The numbers of minutes in the BC series appear at the upper right at the beginning of each set of minutes. In the case of the alternate versions the numbers of the corresponding meetings of the BC series are given in brackets. In some cases the minutes in the alternate version combine in one report proceedings which are given as of two meetings in the BC series. Thus the proceedings of the first two meetings, which appear as BC–A and BC–A1 in the BC series are combined in the report given in the alternate version under the heading "Notes of a Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held at Quai d'Orsay at 2:30 on January 12, 1919," which in this publication is given the designation "[BC–A and BC–A1]", *post*, page 495.

Certain of the meetings of the Council of Ten were also meetings of the Supreme War Council, and the minutes of such meetings may be designated by both the symbols BC and SWC with the respective numbers in each series.

The BC series extends from BC–A of January 12, 1919, through BC–63 of July 5, 1919. The present volume ends with BC–32; BC–33 through BC–62 will be found in volume IV. The last of the series (BC–63) represents, however, a meeting of the Heads of Delegations on July 5 and is to be found with the minutes of that body in a later volume.

THE COUNCIL OF TEN: MINUTES OF MEETINGS JANUARY 12 TO FEBRUARY 14, 1919

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/1

BC–A
[SWC–1]

Procès-verbal of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Sunday, January 12, 1919, at 2: 30 p. m.

PRESENT

FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN	ITALY	UNITED STATES
M. Clemenceau	The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George	Signor Orlando	President Wilson
M. Pichon	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour	Baron Sonnino	Mr. R. Lansing
M. Clementel	Gen. Sir H. H. Wilson	Count Aldrovandi	Gen. T. H. Bliss
M. Loucheur	Lieut.-Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey	Major A. Jones	Mr. A. H. Frazier
M. Leygues			
Marshal Foch			
Gen. Weygand			
M. Dutasta			
M. Berthelot			
M. Bearn			
Capt. A. Portier			

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux

1. Marshal Foch's Report on the Carrying Out of the Armistice

M. PICHON proposed to begin by inviting Marshal Foch to give an account of the progress made in the execution of the Armistice by Germany.[1]

MARSHAL FOCH said that the Armistice, as renewed on the 13th December [2] and expiring on the 17th January, had been satisfied in a certain measure as regards the surrender of material; 5,000 guns and 25,000 machine guns had been handed over, with the exception of a few hundred guns which were expected shortly, and 300 trench mortars, in regard to which he had no exact information. We might be assured, therefore, that the whole of the war material involved would be in our hands within a few days.

As to railway material, on the 9th January we had 1,967 locomotives out of the 5,000 to be surrendered. Hence, important surrenders of locomotives had still to be made. There had, however, been a marked improvement in the second, as compared with the first month. In the first month the enemy had surrendered less than 500, and in the second month about 1,500. As regards trucks and wagons, on the

[1] For terms of the Armistice with Germany, signed November 11, 1918, see vol. II, p. 1.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

9th January 61,560 had been surrendered out of a total of 150,000. In regard to motor lorries the situation was better. On the 9th January we had received 4,422 out of a total of 5,000. The whole of the aircraft as provided in the Armistice had been surrendered, namely, 1,700. What we had now to press for was the completion of the railway material.

On the 8th January 458,355 French prisoners had been returned. This left 28,000 still in Germany. On the question of prisoners we had many observations to make on such points as their treatment, the miserable state in which they were found, more especially the sick, and the sufferings to which they had been exposed. A certain number had even been killed. We had asked for justifications, and received none from the German Government.

2. Prisoners of War

MR. LANSING asked if they had been deliberately killed.

MARSHAL FOCH replied in the affirmative. They had been killed by firearms in camp.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had never heard of those cases. He asked if Marshal Foch meant that German guards had fired on Allied prisoners and killed them.

MARSHAL FOCH replied "Yes".

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that we must obtain justice for this.

GENERAL WEYGAND then read an extract from a Report by the French General Nudon (?) [*Nudant*], the President of the Spa Commission. The General said that every time he brought forward observations in regard to prisoners, the state of their food, and the care for them, the Germans asked for definite facts. When these were brought forward, they tried to evade their responsibility by entrenching themselves behind the state of anarchy in Germany, the lack of authority, and the excesses of the Soviets.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if there was any definite case in these reports of men being killed.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked General Weygand to turn to that part of the Report and read it.

GENERAL WEYGAND then read a long extract in French. At President Wilson's request, only a few sample cases were translated from this extract. One referred to an instance at Mannheim on the 22nd November, 1918, when, according to the German version, some French prisoners had thrown stones towards the German sentry, shouting "Dirty Boche". The German sentry had then fired, and three of the prisoners were killed. The Germans said that the sentry had suffered badly from shell shock. Another case occurred on 27th November, 1918. A number of workers had come back to one of the camps,

and it had been necessary to utilise the camp theatre as barracks. This had caused trouble among the prisoners, who had indulged in pillage and destruction. The German guards had come up from both sides of the barbed wire and fired as much in the air as anything else. Nine French, three British, two Italians, and one Russian had been killed. Thirteen French, three British, one Italian, and two Russian prisoners had been wounded, and had all died. The German report spoke of the danger of rebellion among prisoners who were badly fed.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that these cases were quite sufficient.

M. CLEMENCEAU promised to send copies of the Report to President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, and Signor Orlando.

MARSHAL FOCH said that this was the situation in which we had to renew the Armistice.

3. Poland and the Armistice

The question now arose whether we ought to include in the new terms of the Armistice other problems, such as that of Poland. He handed in a Note on Poland (Appendix I).

M. PICHON invited any observations on Marshal Foch's Note.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that it might be unwise to discuss a proposal of this sort on its individual merits, since it formed part of the much larger question of checking the advance of Bolshevism to the Westward. There was room for great doubt as to whether this advance could be checked by arms at all. Hence he felt doubtful whether it would be wise to take the kind of action proposed by Marshal Foch until we had agreed on a general policy as to how to meet the social danger of Bolshevism.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was in general accord with President Wilson. He had serious doubts as to Marshal Foch's proposition. He was certain, however, that we could not support his proposals, having regard to our general policy towards Bolshevism. This was a question we ought to discuss at the earliest possible moment. As yet the Allies had no general policy on the subject, and Marshal Foch's proposals were subsidiary to our general reply.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, like President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George, he considered the question had certainly better be postponed until we examined the whole question of Bolshevism. It must be remembered, however, that Marshal Foch was face to face with a renewal of the Armistice. In doing this would it not be wise to reserve the right to use the route from Dantzig to Thorn if we desired it?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that all the powers required were covered by clause 16 of the Armistice, which was quoted in Marshal Foch's Memorandum.

MARSHAL FOCH agreed that the necessary powers were conveyed by clause 16.

M. PICHON summed up the opinion of those present to be that it would be better to refer to the terms of the Armistice without insisting on additional conditions. The question as to whether we should put the powers in operation was reserved until the Allies had discussed their general policy in Russia.

MARSHAL FOCH handed in a Memorandum on this subject (Appendix II).

4. Russian Prisoners Detained in Germany

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that this question formed also part of the general Russian problem. He was informed that there were still 1,200,000 Russian prisoners in Germany who had not been handed over, and that when prisoners crossed the frontier the Bolshevists told them that they might choose between becoming Bolshevists and starving. The question had been put to him whether we ought not to deliver these prisoners in the Ukraine to General Denikin [3] or to Admiral Kolchak [4] in Siberia or in North Russia, instead of sending them across the frontier. This was all part of the larger Russian problem. If we decided to fight Bolshevism, this would be one of the methods available. At any rate, we ought to concert our policy and act together, and act efficiently, which we had not done up to the present.

M. ORLANDO said he was in accord with Mr. Lloyd George.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he simply wished to draw attention to the condition of the Russian prisoners, and all he proposed for the moment was that the Allied Commission dealing with the question in Berlin should utilise all their resources to relieve these prisoners.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the first part of Marshal Foch's memorandum was a question of relief, which might be dealt with by the Relief Commission, and the second part was really a Red Cross matter.

MR. BALFOUR said that everyone would be in agreement in regard to this, and that there was as yet no necessity to decide on the question of repatriation.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the difficulty was that repatriation involved sending the Russians to their own country, which was ruled under conditions that we did not like. There was no question of repatriating Russians to Allied countries as part of the Armistice. Hence we must solve the question of repatriation in some other way.

M. SONNINO said that the terms of the Armistice gave us sufficient

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[3] Gen. Anton Ivanovich Denikin, commander in chief of the Armed Forces of South Russia.

[4] Admiral Alexander Vasilevich Kolchak, proclaimed Supreme Governor of Russia at Omsk on November 18, 1918.

power for relieving the prisoners, but they did not give us sufficient power to enable us to send them to some other country.

MARSHAL FOCH said this was not his proposal. All that he asked was that we should allow all the means of transport at Berlin to be operated by the Allied Commission at Spa, for the relief of the Russian prisoners.

M. ORLANDO approved this proposal.

PRESIDENT WILSON also approved.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE approved, while laying stress on no condition being attached, that the Russian prisoners, when released, were to join any particular Russian force.

M. PICHON summed up by saying that Marshal Foch's proposal was agreed to, namely, that all the means of transport in the hands of the Allies at Berlin should be operated by the Allied Commission at Spa, for the relief of Russian prisoners.

MR. BALFOUR reverted to a point which had been mentioned by M. Sonnino, namely, that we ought to put some clause into the Armistice to enable us to send Russian prisoners elsewhere than across the line into Russia. If we did not reserve our rights in the terms of the Armistice we should not be able so to divert them if we wished.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he wished to limit any reserves we made to what we could do and to what did not raise controversial questions.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that Marshal Foch should be asked to formulate a clause giving to the Allies the right to lay down to which parts of Russia Russians should be sent.

This was agreed to.

5. Technical Advisers in the Armistice Negotiations

M. PICHON said that he had received messages from Colonel House and the Italian Ambassador asking for American and Italian technical advisers respectively to take part in the discussions for the renewal of the Armistice.

MARSHAL FOCH said that, following the procedure adopted up to the present, technical advisers could hardly appear in the discussion with the German Representatives. His practice was to consult with technical advisers beforehand, but when he met the German Representatives he was accompanied only by Admiral Wemyss, who had been nominated by the Allied Governments to a position in regard to naval matters corresponding to his own position in regard to military matters. In fact, he acted as a plenipotentiary of the Government, and there would be no room for technical advisers in the present procedure.

M. SONNINO stated that he had received communications, first from M. Klotz and then from Colonel House, respecting the intention to add clauses to the Armistice conditions on financial questions, such as the gold supply, the printing of paper money, &c. Colonel House had told him that he had sent a note to M. Pichon saying that the United States Government intended to send four special delegates to Marshal Foch for financial and economic subjects raised in the renewal of the Armistice. As soon as he heard of this he asked to send representatives also.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if it was not a question of military technical advisers, then it was all right.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it was not a question of sending additional plenipotentiaries, but only advisers.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the British had any expert advisers.

MARSHAL FOCH said they had not, with the exception of Admiral Wemyss, who had been nominated by the Governments to a position similar to his own.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that all four nations should be entitled to send technical advisers.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.

M. CLEMENCEAU said there were already some experts at Spa, but that if any nations wished to send additional experts they should certainly be permitted to do so.

M. SONNINO said that there were certain military gentlemen at Spa who had been consulted, but they had not really any expert knowledge as to technical, economic, financial and commercial questions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he knew there were French economic experts.

(It was agreed that any of the Allies represented at the Supreme War Council should have the right to send technical advisory delegates to Spa.)

M. LEYGUES said that the Naval Commission established in London to supervise the execution of the naval clauses of the Armistice had, after an inspection in German ports, extending from the 3rd December to the 20th December, established the presence of—

6. Naval Conditions of the Armistice

65 submarines complete in German ports capable of being towed.
125 submarines capable of completion in German yards.
30 submarines were also estimated to be at Dantzig, and in other ports which the Commission had not had time to visit.

The Commission had accordingly made the following proposals for inclusion in the renewed Armistice:—

1. All submarines capable of being towed should be sent to England.
2. All submarines in German shipyards and on the stocks should be destroyed.
3. Construction work on all warships in German ports should cease.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if these were additional to the submarines that had already been handed over.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE explained that the figure of 160 had been chosen because the Germans had insisted that it was all they had. Now it seemed from the investigations of the Naval Commission that there were more. His personal view was that these pests ought to be disposed of.

MARSHAL FOCH read the text of a clause which he proposed to include in the Armistice, stipulating that all submarines were to be handed over.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked why we should demand their delivery in this formal manner. Why should we not demand the execution of the original agreement, namely, that all the submarines should be delivered? He asked what was the text of the original Armistice conditions.

M. PICHON read the text of clause 22, which is as follows:—

"Delivery to the Allies and United States of all the submarines (including submarine cruisers and all mine layers) which are at present in existence, with their complete armament and equipment, at the ports specified by the Allies and United States. Those that cannot put to sea will be disarmed and their crews disbanded, and must remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States. The submarines which are ready to put to sea shall be prepared to leave German ports immediately on receipt of wireless orders to sail to the ports specified for their delivery, the remainder to follow as soon as possible. The terms of this Article shall be carried out within a period of fourteen days after the signature of the Armistice."

PRESIDENT WILSON said that all we had to do was not to add additional conditions to the Armistice, but merely to insist that the terms of the original Armistice should be carried out.

M. SONNINO said he understood the view of the Commission to be that something more was required, since submarines not completed were not specifically included. Thus Germany, by this interpretation of the terms of the Armistice, could undo the intention of the Armistice. By not handing over the submarines remaining in her

ports, and by completing those that were building, she would produce a new fleet of submarines.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the question seemed to come to this: whether a submarine that was not completed was nevertheless a submarine.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that we should support the Naval Commission by insisting on a proper interpretation of the term "submarine", which should include those building.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he wanted to avoid seeming to add conditions to the Armistice. He wanted a complete fulfilment in the spirit, as well as in the letter, of the terms of the Armistice.

M. PICHON pointed out that the only difference between the original terms of the Armistice and what was not [*now*] proposed was that, in the original terms, those that could not put to sea would remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States. This supervision would end with the Armistice, and the enemy would still retain their submarines. He understood now, however, that it was agreed that these should be destroyed.

(The Supreme War Council agreed that clause 22 of the original Armistice with Germany should be so interpreted as to enable the submarines under construction to be destroyed and the remainder handed over.)

7. Naval Aircraft

M. LEYGUES said that the same Commission had established that the quantity of aircraft material in the German naval bases was very considerable, and the measures taken were insufficient. The result would be that by adding a few additional parts a large number of aircraft could be assembled within a few hours. The Commission had come unanimously to the opinion that there were no less than 800 aircraft, together with eleven Zeppelins of large size. The Commission advised the surrender of these, including the dirigibles.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE intervened at this point to say that he had not understood that this was the kind of question to be discussed to-day. From M. Clemenceau's communication he had understood that the present meeting had been summoned to discuss questions preliminary to the more formal Conferences on peace. If the formal Conference was to meet to-morrow and the present discussions were to continue, there would be absolutely no preliminary understanding on the subjects which would be raised. He did not dispute that these were very important details; but they were details,—and the present assembly had not been called together for this purpose. He had had no warning, and had brought no technical advisers, and these were questions that he could not discuss in their absence.

M. Clemenceau said he agreed, but Marshal Foch had to settle the terms of the Armistice, and what was he to do?

President Wilson said that this was really a meeting of the Supreme War Council.

Mr. Lloyd George said that there might be a very good reason for a meeting of the Supreme War Council to-morrow. Today, however, he had no technical advisers with him, and had received no warning in advance that these questions were to be raised. He suggested that, if the present Conference was sitting as the Supreme War Council, it should now adjourn until a later date, and that previous to its re-assembly the technical experts should assemble and discuss these questions, in order to clear the way for their rapid disposal at a meeting of the Supreme War Council on the morrow.

M. Clemenceau agreed, and suggested that the Prime Ministers, with their Foreign Secretaries, should now discuss questions connected with the Peace Conference, and before dissolving their meeting should agree as to the date and time of the meeting of the Supreme War Council.

(At the subsequent meeting it was agreed that the technical experts should meet at 10 a. m. at the Quai d'Orsay on Monday, the 13th January, to prepare the decisions for the consideration of the Supreme War Council, which should meet at 2.30 P. M. on the 13th January at the Quai d'Orsay. M. Clemenceau undertook to communicate on the same evening the subjects for discussion by the technical conference.)

Villa Majestic, Paris, January 12, 1919.

Appendix I

Commandant en Chef
Des Armées Alliées
(Etat-Major General)
No. 555 bis

(Translation)
G. Q. G. A., January 11, 1919.

Note on the Situation in Poland

At the moment when the Armistice is about to be renewed, it is necessary to profit by the German Plenipotentiaries being assembled to ensure the settlement of a most highly important question: namely, the situation on the Eastern frontiers of Germany.

As a matter of fact, hostilities have never altogether ceased there, owing either to the Bolsheviks or to the Germans. The disturbances which exist in those regions are a danger for the whole of Europe; the situation of the Polish populations is not in bearing with the promises made by the Allies in regard to Poland.

This situation must be altered without delay.

It is therefore absolutely necessary to organize the Polish Army as quickly as possible and to ensure its transportation.

This transportation can be undertaken, under the most secure and rapid conditions, by the sea-route and by the use of the rail- and river-route of Dantzig-Thorn, of which it is therefore necessary to take possession in the first place.

The possession of this route can only be sufficiently secure if it is held by Allied troops.

To obtain these results, the practical execution of clause 16 of the Armistice should be entered upon; the said clause runs thus:—

"The Allies will be allowed free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on the Eastern frontier, either by Dantzig or by the Vistula, so as to be able to furnish supplies to the populations and also so as to be able to maintain order."

The application of these plans entails the transport to Dantzig, by Allied tonnage, of about two Allied divisions, whose duty it will be to secure the Dantzig base, the Dantzig-Thorn line, and to ensure the general protection of the line of communication.

In order to prove the disinterestedness of this occupation—until the Peace Congress takes a final decision in regard to the regions which are to be held—it would be advantageous to entrust the holding of these territories to an American command, and to give American troops a prominent part in the composition of the occupying force.

The Occupation Corps could therefore be composed as follows:—

Americans	:	1 Division.
French	:	1 Regiment.
British	:	1 Regiment.
Italians	:	1 Regiment.

If the Allied Governments agreed on these fundamental lines, they could result in the insertion of the attached clause in the Convention which will have to be established for the prolongation of the Armistice.

F. Foch

Commandement en Chef
Des Armées Alliées
(Etat-Major General)

Au G. Q. G. A., le 11 Janvier 1919.
(Translation)

Proposed Text of Clause for Renewal of Armistice

With a view to enable the Entente Powers to bring home the Polish troops which are at present in France and Italy, to ensure Poland's being furnished with supplies, and to help that country in the task of re-establishing order on its territory, the Allies decide to

put into immediate execution the clauses of Article XVI of the Armistice Convention, dated November 11, 1919.

To this effect, they reserve their right—

1. To occupy and operate the Dantzig Base and the Dantzig-Thorn railway and waterway;
2. To cover this line of communication by occupying with Allied troops, such territory as they will deem necessary.

Moreover, and in order to enable the operating of railway lines and inland waterways in the above-mentioned area of occupation, as well as in the part of Poland which used to be Russian territory, Germany must refit the corresponding railways and river systems with such equipment as will be decided on by the Armistice Commission, and which will be estimated according to the needs of normal operations.

Appendix II

C.-IN-C., ALLIED ARMIES
General Staff G. Q. G. A., January 11, 1919.
No. 321 bis

Memorandum on the Russian Prisoners Detained in Germany

The Russian officers and men prisoners of war in Germany are now in true distress.

The fact is confirmed by all available information.

In the camps the situation is appalling. The prisoners are short of clothing, half-starved, and receive no attention of any kind.

Furthermore, if they are sent back to the East, they incur the risk—

Either of being shot as suspects,
Or of being incorporated by force in the Red Army.

It is for the Entente a duty of humanity to save the lives of soldiers who fought for her.

It is also her interest to keep them away from Bolshevism, and to prevent the Red Army from being reinforced with their contingents.

She has two means of realising this objective:—

1. By improving the material and moral situation of Russian Prisoners.
2. By sending them back to provinces which are free from the Soviets' regime.

1. Improvement of the Prisoners' Material and Moral Situation.

The improvement can and must be looked for by immediate measures aiming at—

Supplying prisoners with food.
Giving to the sick necessary attention.
Making their accommodation satisfactory.

A first part of the food supply to be delivered by the Entente to Germany will be reserved for Russian prisoners.

Until then, Germany ought to be called upon to—

Provide for their need in food, clothing, &c.;
Give to the sick the attention they need;
Arrange the prisoners' camps so as to make them sanitary.

An Allied control of food supply and sanitary arrangements ought to be organized without delay.

2. Return of Prisoners.

This return must be considered carefully, taking into account the available transport, the previous evacuation of Serbian, Greek, and Roumanian prisoners, which is now taking place, and with due regard to the internal situation of Russia and also to the prisoners' inclinations.

It is therefore an operation which cannot be realised without delay, and which, for the time being, can be only prepared.

On account of the above-mentioned dangers, the direct return eastwards ought to be avoided.

The only provinces towards which transport of prisoners might be prepared are therefore—

On the first hand, Poland;
On the other, Southern Russia; *

and we must be content with forwarding towards these areas cases not suspect of Bolshevism and able there to reinforce parties faithful to our cause.

The organisation of these two foreseen streams of returning prisoners renders it necessary to make a selection between prisoners and to divide them between camps echelonned along the lines of communication to be used.

Thus, Allied intervention in favour of Russian prisoners implies—

Immediate measures:
Improvement of their existing conditions, making preparations for their return.
Measures to be realised later:
Carrying out the transport of repatriated prisoners.

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* Siberia is too far.
Northern Russia (Archangel and Murmansk) is inaccessible during winter.
The Baltic Provinces are threatened with falling soon into the hands of the Reds. [Footnote in the original.]

The essential conditions for the successful and speedy realisation of this programme is the organisation at Berlin of an Executive Committee, which might be constituted on the spot, with military representatives already detached by the Allied Powers for taking care of their own prisoners of war.

This Committee ought to be provided with the necessary means, receive additional personnel, military and civil, interpreters, medical attendance, etc., and be duly empowered to—

Direct and co-ordinate the activity of the Red Cross Societies and other charitable institutions.

Notify in the name of the Entente, to the German Services concerned, all instructions concerning camp accommodation, food supply, the grouping of prisoners and their return.

If the Allied Governments approved of the above arrangements, instructions to that effect would be forwarded to the Armistice Commission at Spa.

FOCH

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay on Sunday, January 12, at 4 p. m.

PRESENT

FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN	ITALY	UNITED STATES
M. Clemenceau.	The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George.	Signor Orlando	President Wilson
M. Pichon.		Baron Sonnino	Mr. R. Lansing
M. Dutasta.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.	Count Aldrovandi	Mr. A. H. Frazier
M. Berthelot.	Lt.-Col. Sir Maurice Hankey.	Major A. Jones.	
M. Bearn.			
Capt. Portier.			

Interpreter: M. Mantoux.

(NOTE: This meeting was a continuation of a meeting of the Supreme War Council commenced earlier in the afternoon, procès-verbal of which has been prepared separately.)

1. The Procedure of the Peace Discussions

M. PICHON said the first question to examine was the general procedure in regard to the Peace discussions. The French Government had circulated a proposal on the subject to the Associated Governments (Appendix A). If any other document on the same lines had been prepared, a decision would have to be taken as to which proposal should form the basis of discussion.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether this was not a question for discussion at the larger Conference to be held to-morrow.

M. PICHON said that there were many questions in regard to procedure which the larger Conference would have to decide itself. But there were certain subjects which must be discussed before the formal Conference, such as the number of Delegates, and how they were to be summoned, etc.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had studied the French document. He would have some suggestions to make when it was discussed in detail. He considered, however, that the general outlines of the proposal were well arranged, and that it formed a good basis for discussion.

M. PICHON asked whether it was agreed that there should be five Plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he agreed to this. But he had something to say as regards the next proposal, that there should be three Representatives of each of the smaller belligerent Powers. If this number

was decided on, it would involve an enormous gathering. Two would seem quite enough.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that one Representative was sufficient for Siam; two for Belgium, Greece, &c.; while Brazil, as a larger country, should have three.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that at previous meetings Belgium had always been satisfied with one Representative. If there were more than one apiece, the Conference would become very unwieldly. There was a second point that he would have to press, namely, in regard to the representation of the British self-governing Dominions and India. They would not be present at all the discussions, but in matters which concerned them they ought to be properly represented.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether this could not be effected by making the members of the British Delegation interchangeable.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the British Dominions were entirely autonomous, and that the British Government could not have induced them to send a single unit without their own consent. His proposal would be to reduce the representation of the smaller belligerent Powers to two apiece and place the Dominions and India on the same scale, with the sole exception of Newfoundland, which, being a small Dominion, would be content with one Representative.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this question of representation was largely one of sentiment and psychology. If the Dominions were given this additional representation, the impression amongst those who did not know the full facts would be that they were merely additional British Representatives. This impression would be especially strong among the small Powers. The Great Powers, to put the matter brutally, would appear to be running the Peace Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that they had run the war.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he wished to convey a more comfortable impression. If the British Government could form their Delegation, whatever its size, by including as many of their Dominion Representatives as they liked, they would relieve the difficulty.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that one reason for which this plan would not meet the case was owing to questions like that of the Colonies. This question of the Colonies was in some cases of less importance to the British Empire as a whole than to particular Dominions, which had a point of view quite apart from the purely British one. If five of the Dominion Representatives were included in the British Delegation, Great Britain would have no representation at all. In his opinion, the smaller Powers ought to be satisfied with one Representative apiece. In this case, he asked for the same representation for

the Dominions and India. Take Australia, for example. They had sent more men to the war than Belgium or Serbia or Roumania. They had proved the most magnificent fighters, and had, he believed actually lost more dead than the United States of America. They said that they were entitled to separate representation. It was no good saying that the British Government represented them, because, in fact, on many questions they could not. He asked, therefore, that they should be on the same footing as the smaller belligerent Powers, that is to say, that they should have the same representation, and should be invited to attend on all questions in which they had a special interest.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that, if the British Delegation did not represent the Dominions, at least they were their friends. Probably they would back them up at the meetings. Consequently, in every question affecting the Dominions which might also affect the rest of the world (and he pointed out that the question of the German Colonies was of interest to the rest of the world as well as to the Dominions), Great Britain and the Dominions between them would have 10 or 12 votes.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that there would be no votes.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in his view the British Delegation would ask the Representatives of the Dominions and India to present their own case on many points, particularly where they had a special point of view.

MR. LANSING suggested that there might be five technical delegates of the Dominions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that, as President Wilson had said, sentiment was of great importance, and this would rule out this proposal.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that Canada had no special interests. For example, they had no special interest in the German Colonies. When we discussed German South-West Africa, there would be, according to his plan, say, four British and one South African Representative.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that in addition to discussions on particular Colonies, there would be general discussions on the disposal of the Colonies. Canada would certainly be interested in these. Canada was also specially interested in President Wilson's third point dealing with economic questions.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that of course their views would be invited but, according to his idea, this could be done by the adoption of the panel system.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that, apart from the Dominions, India had made very great sacrifices and efforts in the war, and should also be fully represented.

M. PICHON said that if Mr. Lloyd George's proposal as to numbers were accepted, there was no doubt that there would be great disappointment amongst such Powers as Greece, Serbia, etc., who had taken a considerable part in the War and sustained great losses. But the great objection of those minor belligerent Allies would be that they were placed on the same footing as countries which had declared war without taking any part in hostilities, or had merely broken off diplomatic negotiations [*relations?*]. He suggested, therefore, that if three Representatives were too many, these Powers should, at any rate, have two Delegates.

M. SONNINO wished to know whether Montenegro was to have two Representatives or one.

M. PICHON said that at present the question as to whether certain categories of Powers were to have one or two or three Representatives, was only being discussed as one of principle.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that there was another method of distinguishing between the status given to the different Powers, namely, the frequency of the occasions on which they would be brought into the discussions. For example, on the question of the League of Nations all the smaller States ought to be consulted, but countries such as Serbia and Belgium, which were concerned in territorial adjustments, would be called in more frequently than others.

MR. LANSING asked whether the Dominions would be brought into the discussions on the European arrangements.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that they had as much right to such representation as any American or extra-European nation. They had sacrificed several hundred thousands of their men in Europe, and were entitled to some say in the arrangements for the future peace of the world.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had a sentimental feeling as regards Roumania and Serbia. He was quite willing that they should be represented out of proportion to any principle.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the part which they had taken in the struggle should have some influence on the question. The Dominions and India claimed the same representation as Powers which had made the same contribution as they to the victory. He did not mind whether this representation was by one or two members.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he did not see why Siam should be in the list.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed.

M. PICHON suggested that they should examine the various States one by one.

He suggested—

2 for Belgium
2 for Greece
2 for Serbia
1 for Portugal
1 for Siam
2 for Roumania

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that Portugal had employed troops in Africa as well as in France, and asked that his dissent from the proposed limitation of Portugal's representation might be recorded.

M. PICHON urged that Roumania should have two Delegates. She had had a Treaty, and after being forced out of the war had again become an Ally.

MR. BALFOUR said he had no objection to Roumania being treated on this footing for purposes of representation, but he did not wish thereby to renew every clause of the treaty which Roumania had broken by going out of the War. He did not wish to put her [in] exactly the same position as she was before she went out of the War.

M. SONNINO said there were two questions:—

1. That of representation. For what Roumania had suffered, and for the part she had taken, she should have proper representation.
2. The question of her Treaty rights. This was a distinct question, which he agreed ought to be reserved.

M. SONNINO's proposal was accepted.

M. PICHON suggested:

2 representatives for China
2 for Brazil.

These were agreed to.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, as regards the Dominions and India, the only claim which he put in was that they should be called in on questions which affected them, in the same way as Belgium, Serbia, etc. He proposed that each of the Dominions should have two Representatives and Newfoundland one.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that other States would have no backers and sponsors like the British Dominions. Great Britain had a full representation as a Great Power. Consequently, the Dominions would be supported by five Representatives in the most powerful section of the Conference. It would be open to misconstruction if the British Government insisted, in addition, on two Representa-

tives of each of the Dominions. He himself was quite willing to concede one.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if there was any reluctance to accept his proposal, he would like to suspend the discussion in order to give him an opportunity of discussing the matter with his colleagues in the Imperial War Cabinet.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed to this procedure, and said that he hoped Mr. Lloyd George would not leave on the minds of the Dominions Representatives the impression that there was the least jealousy.

(The discussion on the representation of the British Dominions was then adjourned.)

M. PICHON's proposal that Poland and the Czecho-Slovak State should each have two Representatives was agreed to, as well as the proposal for one Representative each of the small Powers, theoretically belligerent, of those that had broken off diplomatic negotiations, of neutral States, and of States in process of formation.

2. Representation of Montenegro

M. PICHON said that the French Government had received communications from Serbia to the effect that Montenegro had become a part of the State under the rule of the Karageorgivich monarchy. At the same time a message had been received from Podgoritza to the effect that a Constituent Assembly had agreed that Montenegro should be absorbed by Serbia. The King of Montenegro, however, stated that the decision of the Constituent Assembly was invalid and negligible; hence it would seem that a decision could not be taken before the Conference met. This was the point of view of the French Government. The question arose in consequence as to whether Montenegro was to be regarded as a separate State entitled to separate representation at the Conference or as part of the Serbian representation.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the action of Serbia in regard to Montenegro had gone somewhat towards prejudicing him against the Government of Serbia. To act with force like this was contrary to the principle of self-determination. Although he had no precise knowledge, he would not be surprised to learn that the King of Montenegro was right and that the Constituent Assembly at Podgoritza had not been properly constituted. Serbia had had no right to send her troops into Montenegro. The events of the last few months had almost made him a partisan of Montenegro. Hence he was strongly in favour of taking no notice of the Serbian claims and of giving Montenegro separate representation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was not sure of the facts, but he felt that Montenegro ought to have the right to state her case before its being determined whether she was entitled to separate representation. He was not anti-Serbian in this matter, but he felt that we ought to ascertain the facts.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he was anti-Serbian in this case, because no country had the right to take the self-determination of another country into her own hands. He asked who was to select the Montenegrin Representatives. The *de facto* Government was clearly under Serbian control, and was not qualified to state the opposite point of view. The King, who was in Paris, could hardly present more than his personal side of the question. Hence, though he was clear that Montenegro ought to be represented, he was not clear how that representation should be settled.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had no clear idea as to when and how the invasion of Montenegro had taken place.

M. SONNINO said that it had occurred immediately after the Armistice. The Serbians had penetrated Montenegro and had opposed any contemporaneous action on Italy's part. In order to avoid fighting between Allies, the Italians had kept away from Cettinje. The movement for inclusion in Serbia was made under Serbian auspices. There was, however, a contrary party which desired to form part of the Yugo-Slav State, but as an autonomous unit in that State. For his part, he could not support a Government which had taken such action. There would always be Representatives of the opposite side in the Serbian delegation, so that if the King of Montenegro nominated Delegates, the other side would nevertheless be fully represented at the Conference. There had been considerable disturbances in Montenegro as a re-action against the Serbian action, and help was being invited. It was a very bad beginning to the new regime to follow the War.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that it should be agreed that Montenegro was to have representation, but that no decision should be taken as to how it was to be settled.

M. PICHON asked to whom the invitation to the Conference should be addressed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that Montenegro should be treated as a State in process of formation. M. Sonnino had presented the case for Montenegro.

(M. Sonnino demurred to this.)

Somebody, Mr. Lloyd George continued, must have presented the case to M. Sonnino. Montenegro ought to be given an opportunity of presenting its case, and it would not be necessary to scrutinise too closely the credentials of the person who represented it.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought it would be important to make sure that the case was represented by somebody who really was entitled to represent Montenegro.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that the question ought not to be decided apart from the question of how the Yugo Slav State was to be represented. The two cases were on all fours.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that Montenegro was an older State than Serbia. She could therefore be separate from Yugo-Slavia. Some of the other units of Yugo-Slavia were saying the same thing, namely, that Serbia was trying to put them under her own domination rather than to associate them with her. Since the meetings were not going to take place at once, and events were occurring all the time which might influence the ultimate decision, he thought it would be quite unnecessary to do more than decide in principle that Montenegro was to be represented.

MR. LANSING said that America recognized the Government of the King of Montenegro.

M. SONNINO said that no one had stated the case to him. What he had said had been from his own knowledge. He pointed out that Montenegro was a very much older State than Serbia. She alone had resisted for centuries the domination of the Turks. She took part in the War in order to help Serbia and to preserve her own future independence. A good many Montenegrins had continued fighting. They had wanted the Italians to form a separate battalion of them, and some had been sent to Salonika for incorporation in Serbian units. He agreed with President Wilson's view that Montenegro should be represented. He suggested that in the meantime the United States of America should send a representative to discover how things were in that country. No news was allowed to percolate out of Montenegro and no Allied troops were allowed to go there.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that if President Wilson wishes to send someone to enquire, he could do so without any authority from the Powers associated with him.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he was quite willing to send someone, but not an official representative on behalf of this Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE entirely agreed with this view. He pointed out that it would be extremely offensive to an Ally that any nation should give expression at this Conference, formally or informally, that there ought to be any inquiry.

Conclusion:—It was decided in principle that Montenegro should be represented at the Conference, but the decision was left open as to how her Representatives should be chosen.

(The Conference then had a short adjournment.)

After the adjournment:

Renewal of the Armistice with Germany

M. CLEMENCEAU raised the question, which had been discussed earlier in the afternoon at the meeting of the Supreme War Council, as to when Marshal Foch was to receive his instructions as to the renewal of the Armistice.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked for a list of the questions involved in this discussion.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he could not give a complete list, but among the questions was one relating to coke, another relating to the surrender of Germany's merchant fleet, and a third relating to the Reichsbank.

After a short discussion it was agreed that technical Representatives of the various Powers should meet in conference at the Quai d'Orsay at 10 A. M. on Monday, the 13th January, in order to prepare decisions for the consideration of the Supreme War Council, which should meet at the Quai d'Orsay at 2:30 on Monday, the 13th January.

M. CLEMENCEAU undertook to give instructions for a list of the questions for consideration to be circulated on the same evening.

M. SONNINO said that the whole question of Bolshevism was involved.

The Representation of Russia at the Conference

M. PICHON did not agree. He pointed out that there were various representatives of Russian opinion in Paris—for example, M. Sazonoff,[1] Prince Lvoff[2] and others, including Socialists, who represented every shade of opinion. These asked to be represented. His opinion was that this could not be done. We should first have to acknowledge the Omsk Government, whom they came to represent. At present it seemed impossible to recognise this Government as the Government of Russia. It was not strong enough to be regarded as representative of Russia as a whole. But this was no reason why these personalities should not be allowed to put their views unofficially. His suggestion, then, was that Russia as a State should have no representation, but that the Conference should be allowed to hear such persons as he had mentioned.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this had to be dealt with in one way or another, because at present the Allies had got themselves in a fix for the reason that they had no definite policy in Russia. They ought to decide whether to withdraw their troops or to reinforce

[1] Sergei D. Sazonoff, Tsarist Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1910–1916; Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Volunteer Army of Denikin and later for Kolchak; representative of both governments at Paris.

[2] Prince George E. Lvoff, Russian Prime Minister from March to July 1917; at this time head of the Russian Political Bureau in Paris.

them. Unless reinforced, they were of no use whatsoever. He had nothing to say against these people, Prince Lvoff, &c. We were told they represented every shade of opinion. As a matter of fact, they represented every opinion except the prevalent opinion in Russia.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out it was prevalent in some respects.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he feared the fact that it was prevalent must be accepted. The peasants accepted Bolshevism for the same reason as the peasants had accepted it in the French Revolution, namely, that it gave them land. The Bolshevists were the *de facto* Government. We had formally recognised the Czar's Government, although at the time we knew it to be absolutely rotten. Our reason had been that it was the *de facto* Government. We recognised the Don Government, the Archangel Government and the Omsk Government, although none of them were good, but we refused to recognise the Bolshevists. To say that we ourselves should pick the representatives of a great people was contrary to every principle for which we had fought. It was possible that the Bolshevists did not represent Russia. But certainly Prince Lvoff did not; neither did Savinkoff,[3] although he was a good man. The British Government made exactly the same mistake when they said that the *émigrés* represented France. This led them into a war which lasted about twenty-five years. The Russian peasants probably felt towards Trotsky[4] much as the French peasants did towards Robespierre. This question must now be settled. He hoped that the Allies would not separate and announce that they had made perpetual peace when Siberia, which formed about half Asia, and Russia, which formed about half Europe, were still at war. He, himself, would make proposals in due course, but, in the meantime, he wishes to protest against an attempt to select representatives for some hundred million people.

M. PICHON quite agreed that the persons he had named should not be admitted as representatives of Russia. He only wished to take advantage of their presence to hear what they had to bring forward.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that to do so would give the public the impression that we considered they represented Russia. The fact that they had been seen by the Conference would be known. If we wished to hear their views, we could obtain a memorandum from them or have a private conversation.

M. PICHON agreed.

Conclusion:—It was agreed that Russia should not be represented at the Conference, but that the persons named by M. Pichon and others could be interviewed personally or asked to supply memoranda.

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[3] Boris Savinkoff, Executive Minister of War under Kerensky, August 7 to August 25, 1918; at this time a representative of the Kolchak government at Paris.

[4] Leon D. Trotsky, Soviet Commissar for Military Affairs.

M. PICHON then read Section II of the French Memorandum, on which no comments were offered.

M. PICHON then commenced to read Section III.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he did not see how the Allies could work on a programme such as was now proposed. He asked how the Nations could be represented as had been proposed in these discussions. Surely, they must have full representation or none at all. He quoted instances in which Powers which would only be represented part of the time would, in fact, have a great interest in general questions, to the discussion of which they would not normally be invited.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that this system had been adopted with success at the Supreme War Council, when Greece, Serbia, Japan, Belgium and other countries had been invited.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that this was only in the War. The present Conference was to settle the world for a long time to come. He did not like to give even the appearance of only consulting Nations when the Great Powers considered that they were concerned.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if this was not reality. Were not the Great Powers, in fact, settling the questions?

PRESIDENT WILSON said this was why he maintained that we ought to have no formal Conferences, but only conversations. The moment the formal Conferences were entered into these difficulties arose. He felt that this would not satisfy the smaller nations, and satisfaction was an essential part of the Peace settlement.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he did not see why they should not be satisfied. The questions to be decided in the War were just as difficult as those to be decided in the Peace.

MR. BALFOUR asked why there should not be a number of informal conversations with informal conclusions. These conclusions, labelled as informal and preliminary suggestions, would then be sent to the small Powers for their consideration and returned by them with their remarks, which would be discussed at further informal Conferences.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether he was to understand that no decision could be taken without Costa Rica and Honduras being consulted. If so, he could not agree. It was evident that in European questions the danger was not so great for Costa Rica or Nicaragua as for European Powers. But there were many questions of vital importance to the latter. He had always understood that the four Great Powers would meet and settle these questions, admitting the co-operation of the other Powers. They were not bound to decide the question that evening, but there were certain considerations which ought to be taken into account before the decision was taken. There was the great demand for publicity of the proceedings of the Con-

ference, more especially in France. But to solve the questions in private conversation would render any publicity impossible. This would create the utmost disappointment and the belief that things were not right. He insisted that public opinion should be taken into account. He quite agreed in the principle that the small countries were as much concerned as the great, and that nothing ought to be done to wound the susceptibilities of the small countries. But these countries were not in the same position towards the greater problems as the larger Powers. Already Japan had been admitted to the Conference and was to have five delegates, although Japan had not done very much in the War, and what she had done had been mainly in her own interests. He proposed, therefore, that the meeting should adjourn in order to reflect upon the proposals of President Wilson and Mr. Balfour, but that in their reflections all should remember that we must avoid doing anything likely to create distrust in public opinion.

MR. BALFOUR asked what were M. Clemenceau's ideas on the question of publicity.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that in his scheme there would be partial publicity, according as the Allied Governments may think fit.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that, apart from the Armistice, nothing had been discussed to-day but the question of representation at the Conference. He asked what he should say when approached by the Press. What was the Conference to which the discussions on representation related?

M. CLEMENCEAU said they were the preliminary Peace Conferences which all the world was awaiting. He contemplated two Conferences, a preliminary Conference of the Allied Powers, followed by the regular Peace Congress. There were altogether three kinds of Conferences:—

1. Informal conversations, about which nothing would be announced;
2. The formal preliminary Peace Conference; and
3. The Peace Congress.

(After some discussion, it was agreed that the press should be informed that after a meeting of the Supreme War Council, which had been concerned with questions relating to the renewal of the Armistice, the Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries had had an exchange of views as to the method and procedure at the Conference for formulating in a preliminary way the terms of Peace.)

Technical Advisers

M. PICHON pointed out that Technical Advisers would be necessary on many questions—for example, on financial questions. He suggested that when required they should take the place of one of the Delegates at the Conference.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he did not require Technical Delegates, but only Technical Advisers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that Technical Advisers should sit behind their Delegates without being reckoned as additional Delegates. If it was necessary for them to make an explanation on a technical point, the head of the Delegation would ask the President if this could be permitted.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that any formal process which was adopted must not exclude any informal process.

(It was agreed that Technical Advisers should not sit at the table, but should sit behind the Delegates at the Conference.)

Japanese Representation at the Informal Conversations

(It was agreed that the Japanese Ambassador in Paris should be permitted to attend future conversations.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, January 12, 1919.

Appendix (A) to IC-104 [BC-A1]

(Translation)

Plan of the Preliminary Conversations Between the Allied Ministers

[Here follows text of the plan, printed in volume I, page 386].

Notes of a Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held at Quai d'Orsay at 2: 30 on January 12, 1919

Were present:

UNITED STATES:	The President
	The Hon. Robert Lansing
	General Bliss
	Mr. Frazier
FRANCE:	M. Clemenceau
	M. Pichon
	Marshal Foch
	General Weygand
	M. Clementel
	M. Leygues
	M. Klotz
	M. Loucheur
	M. Dutasta
	M. Berthelot
	Comte de Bearn
GREAT BRITAIN:	Mr. Lloyd George
	Mr. Balfour
	Sir Henry Wilson
	Sir Maurice Hankey
ITALY:	Signor Orlando
	Baron Sonnino
	Comte Aldrovandi

M. PICHON, who was the Chairman, opened the session by calling upon Marshal Foch to give an account of the fulfilment of the terms of the armistice with Germany, an armistice which had been extended from December 17 [*13*] to January 17 and which was to be extended again.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the terms of the armistice had only been partially fulfilled, especially as far as the delivery of railway material was concerned. The delivery of war material was nearly complete: 5000 guns and 25,000 machine guns having already been delivered; there were still a certain number of heavy guns not yet delivered and also a number of *minenwerfer*. In general, however, he could say that the material of war would soon be delivered. Up to the 9th of January, 1967 locomotives out of 5000 had been delivered. Of 150,000 freight cars, up to January 9, 1919, only 61560 had been delivered. Nearly all of the motor trucks had been delivered, to be exact: 4422 out of 5000. All of the aeroplanes had been received, 1700 in all. On January 8th the total number of French prisoners repatriated was 458,355, the remainder still in

Germany amounted only to 28,000. Marshal Foch stated that he had many observations to make regarding the treatment of French prisoners, the state of misery in which they had been found and especially the sufferings which they had endured in the last few weeks. A number of soldiers had been deliberately killed by being shot at in the camps.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE inquired whether the sentinels had actually fired at the prisoners.

MARSHAL FOCH stated that this was the case, that they had repeatedly demanded that the guilty should be tried and suffer the penalty, but nothing had been done.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE again expressed surprise and stated that he had never heard of this matter. He asked whether evidence of specific cases existed. Marshal Foch thereupon called upon General Weygand to read out the depositions of eye-witnesses who had been present when German sentinels fired upon French prisoners. General Weygand then read out several depositions.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether there were any new conditions to be added to the extension of the armistice. Marshal Foch replied that in the extension of the armistice they should include problems relating to the Polish situation. (Annexure No. 1.)[1]

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that perhaps it might be unwise to express an opinion on this subject by itself because it would form a part of a much vaster problem; there was great doubt in his mind as to whether Bolshevism could be checked by arms, therefore it seemed to him unwise to take action in a military form before the Powers were agreed upon a course of action for checking Bolshevism as a social and political danger.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE was in entire agreement with President Wilson upon this point. He thought the Polish problem could not be treated apart from the general situation; he felt that at the earliest possible moment the problem should be studied and a general policy adopted.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he believed that a decision in this case may better be postponed until the whole question of Bolshevism could be dealt with at one time.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether this contingency was not provided for in clause 16 of the armistice.

M. PICHON then read out clause 16 which, in the opinion of the meeting conferred sufficiently wide powers. M. Pichon stated that it was necessary to consider the question of the Russian prisoners of war.

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[1] See Appendix I to BC-A, p. 477.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE believed that there were 1,200,000 of such prisoners in a state of liberty who were now crossing the frontier; they were asked by Bolshevists either to join their party or to have their throats cut. He thought the treatment of these prisoners was a part of the whole general problem; it was not merely a question of feeding them. The great question was whether the Allies could move them to Ukraine or to any other part of Russia. Signor Orlando was entirely in accord with Mr. Lloyd George.

MARSHAL FOCH called the attention of the Council to conditions which he proposed, namely that a Commission should be formed at Berlin, composed of Delegates of all the Powers and that they might occupy themselves with the question of the prisoners under the general supervision of the I. A. Committee at Spa.

BARON SONNINO asked whether the clauses of the armistice conferred upon the Allies the right of directing prisoners to any particular part of Russia. He wished to know whether they had sufficient powers to do this.

MARSHAL FOCH was of the opinion that there was nothing in the armistice which gave them such authority.

MR. BALFOUR thought it was unnecessary to come to any decision yet upon the question of repatriation.

The PRESIDENT felt that Russia itself was in a condition which the Allies did not like and could not control. Russia being in the condition in which she was, he did not believe it possible to introduce such a decision into the terms of an armistice.

BARON SONNINO believed that in the clauses of the armistice there was sufficient authority to provide for the feeding of the prisoners, but nothing to decide where such prisoners were to be sent to.

MARSHAL FOCH did not believe that was the question at issue. He wished to know whether the Governments were agreed that an I. A. Commission should be formed at Berlin under the general supervision of the Committee at Spa to do everything necessary for revictualling the prisoners without any conditions being attached.

M. PICHON found that the meeting agreed in approving the suggestions of Marshal Foch.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether anything should be introduced into the armistice giving the Allies the liberty to deal with the future destinies of the Russians.

The PRESIDENT believed that Marshal Foch should in the meantime be asked to formulate a decision giving the Allies the right to send the prisoners to any part of Russia which they thought fit.

M. PICHON stated that for the renewal of the armistice he had received suggestions from Colonel House and from Comte Bonin[2]

[2] Count Bonin Longare, Italian Ambassador to France.

suggesting that certain technical advisors be named to confer with Marshal Foch in the deliberations preceding the renewal of the armistice.

MARSHAL FOCH stated that there would be no technical advisors practically speaking when the armistice was renewed. He conferred with the technical advisors before talking to the Germans; he and Admiral Wemyss were the only plenipotentiaries who addressed the Germans. He recalled that when hostilities were interrupted he had received full powers from the Supreme War Council to sign for the Governments. It was the plenipotentiaries, not the technical advisors who signed. If it were thought well to choose other plenipotentiaries, then another question was raised.

BARON SONNINO said that he had a communication from M. Klotz concerning financial matters, gold, etc.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was after all not a question of military advisors.

The PRESIDENT said he did not understand that it was a question of having plenipotentiaries, but a question of having advisors for the plenipotentiaries.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that all four Great Powers send their technical advisors.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that if questions other than military questions were to be discussed, there should certainly be other experts at Spa. Marshal Foch thought that the experts were already there; if there were not enough of them he entirely approved of sending others.

BARON SONNINO thought that there were only a few military gentlemen at Spa, but, to his knowledge, no technical advisors. It was true there were a few French experts, but no British or Americans.

M. CLEMENCEAU was all for sending whatever technical experts were required.

M. PICHON then asked the Minister of Marine, M. Leygues, for a report upon the naval conditions of the armistice.

M. LEYGUES stated that the I. A. Naval Council in its investigation of the German ports had discovered that 65 German submarines were complete and capable of being towed, and 125 submarines in course of construction. 30 additional ones were at Dantzig or in the Baltic. He proposed as a new condition to the Naval armistice that all the submarines fit to take the sea should be towed to some point in Great Britain, that those in the process of construction should be destroyed, and that no further work should be permitted to take place upon ships of war in German shipyards.

The PRESIDENT asked whether these submarines were in addition to the 160 submarines stipulated.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that they were in addition; he said that they had only asked for 160, because they thought that Germany had no more; he thought that these pests should be destroyed.

The PRESIDENT asked why this clause was to be added in such a formal manner instead of demanding the fulfilment of the original armistice; he thought it would produce a bad impression if new clauses were added and more demands made than had been originally contemplated. President Wilson then requested to hear the terms of the original armistice; after hearing them read, the President was of the opinion that it was not necessary to do anything further than to prescribe an interpretation of the existing clauses.

BARON SONNINO drew attention to the artfulness of the Germans; he pointed out that to the German mind submarines not completed were not submarines; he thought therefore that they would claim it was not necessary to deliver them.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that they say this was the interpretation which they placed upon the terms of the Naval armistice and to insist upon it. What he wished to avoid was, because of mistakes made, to seem to add new conditions.

BARON SONNINO thought that this precaution would be maintained up to the signing of Peace. After that, the Germans would do what they liked with any submarine which remained to them.

The MINISTER OF MARINE stated that in addition to the submarines, there were also 800 hydroplanes and 11 zeppelins; he expressed the desire that these airships and hydroplanes be delivered to the Allies or else rendered inutilizable.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE objected that he did not think that they had met to discuss such matters; he thought that they were going to have some sort of agreement between themselves before the formal meetings took place; he thought they were going to have a confidential talk upon important matters. Marshal Foch departed the day after to-morrow and needed instructions to extend the armistice.

The PRESIDENT thought that it was not necessary to have a formal meeting on the following day but they could decide subsequently what would be the best day for such meeting.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE quite agreed that the lengthier conferences could be put off until later.

It was finally agreed that Marshal Foch should furnish the three Governments with a memorandum stating what technical subjects were to be discussed and that the four Governments should then appoint their technical advisors to meet at 10 o'clock on the following day at the Palais d'Orsay. After reaching a decision these technical advisors were to report to the Supreme War Council, which would sit again at 2:30 on the same day. He then decided that the

meeting should continue without the military men who thereupon withdrew.

M. PICHON thought that it was in order for the meeting to consider the procedure of the Conference. The French Government had already submitted a draft of such procedure.[3] If any other Government had submitted a draft they would be glad to consider it; otherwise, he thought the French document might be taken as a basis.

The PRESIDENT asked whether this subject was not for the more general conference.

M. PICHON stated that there were many things in the procedure which could not be decided without the presence of the delegates, but they should at least decide upon the number of delegates.

LLOYD GEORGE had seen the document, and also [*although?*] he had a few suggestions to make, he thought that the draft was well considered and formed a good basis for discussion.

M. PICHON said they proposed that there should be 5 delegates for each of the great powers.

BARON SONNINO enquired whether they were to be interchangeable.

M. PICHON thought that this was another question which could be raised when the technical advisors were named.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE could not see the object of three delegates for each of the smaller belligerent powers. He thought that for Belgium and Serbia two delegates would be enough and for Siam one. Belgium had been represented at several of the Meetings of the Supreme War Council by one delegate only and she had also found that sufficient. If they increased the number of delegates, there would be a tremendous crowd. He was afraid he would have to press for representation of the Dominions and the Colonies.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether that could not be provided for by making the delegates interchangeable.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied that they were independent nations and that they had given the British Empire one million of their best troops.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that it was rather a psychological matter, that the impression would gain ground that such an addition would be an increase in the representation of Great Britain, the Great Powers would thus be running the Peace Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that they had run the war.

The PRESIDENT thought that if they restricted themselves to 5 they would remove the impression that they were overloading the top.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that they consider the question of South Africa. They had conquered their enemy; they formed a

[3] Vol. I, p. 386.

league amongst themselves which was quite independent of the British Empire; they had a point of view quite different from theirs. What he wished to say was that as Belgium had been satisfied with one representative they consult the small powers only when they wanted them. Australia had furnished more men than either Belgium or Servia; she had had more men killed than the United States. The Colonies had a point of view different from that of the British Empire.

The PRESIDENT requested Mr. Lloyd George to see how it would work out: while Great Britain did not represent her colonies, they were still her friends, so that in all questions affecting the Dominions Great Britain and her Dominions would have 10 votes.

M. CLEMENCEAU objected that there would be no voting, except by countries.

MR. LANSING suggested that Great Britain had 5 technical advisors in addition to her regular delegates.

THE PRESIDENT felt that the Colonies would have ample opportunities to state their views.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE insisted that the contribution of the colonies to the war had been tremendous.

MR. LANSING found it unjust that those South American Republics which had actually gone to war with Germany should have no better representation than those Republics which had merely broken off relations.

M. PICHON thought that to give Belgium, Serbia and Greece and Roumania the same votes and no more than the South American countries, which had done nothing in the war, would be a great injustice.

MR. SONNINO then inquired what would be the fate of Montenegro. MR. CLEMENCEAU replied that he preferred to take up one subject at a time.

MR. PICHON said it was necessary to decide the question whether the smaller powers which had taken part in the war should have three or two delegates.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that there seemed to him to be another method of distinguishing between those nations which had taken part in the war and those which had not; that the privilege of frequent attendance should be given to powers which had taken part, and those which had not taken part might be called in less frequently. He was afraid of getting a sort of public meeting.

MR. LANSING inquired whether the Dominions would have a voice in discussing the question of the disputed boundaries. MR. LLOYD GEORGE answered that they really have a blood interest in France and Belgium.

The PRESIDENT interposed by saying that he believed that everything which affected the world's peace was the world's business. He said he had a sentimental feeling for Belgium, Roumania and Serbia which was affecting his thought, and that he would like to give them a greater proportional representation, if possible.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the part which they had taken in the struggle should count. The PRESIDENT asked why should Siam have a vote.

MR. PICHON believed that the meeting should name the powers and their representation in sequence. It was thereupon decided that Belgium should have two (2), Greece two (2), Serbia two (2), Portugal one (1), Siam one (1) and Roumania two (2).

MR. BALFOUR said he was the champion of Portugal and he wished to call attention to the fact that she had troops in France and had incurred debts.

MR. PICHON pointed out that Roumania had treaties with France, Italy and Great Britain which she had made before entering the war.

MR. BALFOUR did not mind Roumania being treated as an ally for the purpose of representation, but he did not want to put Roumania in the same position in which she would have been if she had fought successfully to the end. "I think Roumania ought to get a part of Russia."

BARON SONNINO thought that these were two distinct questions He thought that they all agreed that Roumania deserved two (2) representatives for what she suffered, but that the question of whether the treaty rights were to be restored or not should be held in reserve.

MR. PICHON then went on with the representation. China was allotted two (2) and Brazil two (2).

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then said that he proposed an amendment about the Dominions. He called attention to the second paragraph of clause two of the French document and suggested that wherever questions arose which interested the Dominions they should have two representatives for each Dominion.

THE PRESIDENT begged to make the suggestion that other states had no backers for their Dominions. It is not, he said, as though they were isolated. They would, undoubtedly, welcome advice, but it seemed to him that with five representatives for Great Britain they could interchange their representation. It seemed to him that allowing each Dominion two representatives in addition to the five allowed Great Britain in these International Councils might be open to misconstruction. He suggested that each Dominion have one representative.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that if there were any feeling against the Dominions having two representatives he preferred to have the

matter suspended, rather than decided. The PRESIDENT hoped that Mr. Lloyd George did not get the impression that there was the slightest jealousy in his remark.

MR. LANSING inquired how many Dominions there were. If Newfoundland, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa and India were included, that would mean five additional representatives.

MR. PICHON then asked the conference to consider the representation of Poland and the Czecho-Slovaks. It was suggested that Poland should have two (2) and Bohemia two (2).

It was decided that the question of the Dominions would be postponed until the following day.

MR. PICHON then described the situation in Montenegro at length showing that there were two factions, one claiming that Montenegro desired to be amalgamated with the Greater Serbia, and the other, the party of the King, insisting that the meeting at Podgoritza did not actually reflect the sentiment of the country.

The PRESIDENT said that the action of Serbia toward Montenegro had gone some way toward prejudicing his mind against Serbia. It was absolutely against all principle that the processes of self-government should be forced, and "I consider it likely that the meeting at Podgoritza was an extra constitutional assembly, and called together under conditions which could not be considered legal." He knew of no reason for the presence of Serbian troops in Montenegro, and the circumstances of the last few months had made him a partisan of the rights of that country.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that Montenegro ought to have the right to state her own case, and we should hear the case before determining it. He said he was not anti-Serbian.

The PRESIDENT disclaimed any anti-Serbian feeling, except in this case. He did not very well see who was to select the Montenegrin representative. The *de facto* government was under Serbian domination and the King was in exile. While he feels that Montenegro ought to be represented, he did not see how the representative should be chosen.

MR. BALFOUR was not quite clear as to what had happened there. BARON SONNINO explained that what happened there had taken place after the armistice, and although according to the terms of the armistice Montenegro was to have been occupied by French troops, no armed forces were sent there except the Servian troops. He argued that as the Serbs and Montenegrins were practically one race, that if the King were allowed to have one representative, the other element would certainly have a representation in the Serbian delegates.

The PRESIDENT suggested that Montenegro be accorded a representative, and that the problem of how to find him be deferred.

MR. PICHON remarked that at any rate they ought to know who to inform that the state was entitled to representation.

BARON SONNINO said it comes to this: "That we must ask for a Montenegrin representative through the King of Montenegro."

The PRESIDENT thought that it was desirable that the meeting should show itself that the man who represented Montenegro actually represented her. He suggested that a representative be assigned to Montenegro, and that the conference reserve its right to examine his credentials. He remarked that Montenegro was as old a political entity as Serbia, and has handsome political history behind it. MR. LANSING asked, "Do you recognize the King of Montenegro?" He answered, "We do". MR. BALFOUR said, "We pay for him".

MR. PICHON thought they were engaging in a theoretical discussion of conditions in Montenegro. He thought they should decide that Montenegro should have a delegate, and that they should in the meantime endeavor to ascertain the real state of affairs in the country.

BARON SONNINO suggested that American troops be sent there to find out exactly what is going on. MR. CLEMENCEAU remarked that precisely similar conditions existed in other places. The PRESIDENT said he was perfectly willing to send a representative to ascertain the conditions, but he did not think it should be an official representative.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that he did not think that if an agent was sent that the fact should be recorded. It might create a painful impression if an agent were despatched to an allied Government to investigate conditions.

MR. PICHON stated that it was very difficult to determine the question of Russian representation without discussing the whole question of Bolshevism. He said that there were different groups of Russians in Paris; namely, Prince Lvoff's, Sazonoff's, Tchaikowski's[4] parties, the latter the party of Savinkoff. He said these various representatives will be called in to give their views at the conference. He did not believe that they should apply to the Government of Omsk to send representatives, as the French Government did not believe it really representative of the people.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that they should agree upon a policy and should decide whether troops should still be kept there, whether the existing troops should be reinforced, or whether they should be withdrawn. While he did not greatly admire the Bolshevik Gov-

[4] N. V. Tschaikowski, President of the Russian Government of the Northern Region (Archangel).

ernment it was, nevertheless, a *de facto* government recognized by about two-thirds of the people. He hoped that the conference would carefully consider what their attitude should be toward the present Russian Government. He added that to pretend to make a permanent, endurable peace when Siberia and Russia were in a state of civil war would be mockery. In the meantime he protested strongly against the conference choosing representatives for one hundred million Russians.

The PRESIDENT argued that the various Russian leaders in Paris should not be admitted as representatives, but merely be heard.

MR. PICHON then stated that they would then have to consider the representation of the great powers. It was understood that the enemy powers should not be represented until the Allied powers had reached an [agreement].[5]

(A remark by the President). MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that at the Supreme War Council the smaller nations were only consulted when their intentions were involved. The PRESIDENT said he did not like the appearance of consulting nations that we are protecting unless they were interested. MR. LANSING remarked that if they followed that procedure they would be imitating the Council of Vienna. The PRESIDENT was in favor of holding informal conversations amongst the great powers, but believed that they must have an organization of all the nations, otherwise they would run the risk of having a small number of nations regulate the affairs of the world, and the other nations might not be satisfied.

MR. BALFOUR proposed that they have private talks to reach formal conclusions, and then put these conclusions before the smaller nations for their examination and admit them to the conference to hear their observations.

MR. CLEMENCEAU then spoke at some length: "Am I to understand from the statement of President Wilson that there can be no question however important it may be for France, England, Italy or America upon which the representative of Honduras or of Cuba shall not be called upon to express his opinion? I have hitherto always been of the opinion that it was agreed that the five great Powers should reach their decisions upon important questions before entering the halls of the Congress to Negotiate Peace. If a new war should take place, Germany would not throw all her forces upon Cuba or upon Honduras, but upon France; it would always be upon France. I request then that we stand by the proposals which have been made, proposals to the effect that meetings be held in which the representatives of the five countries mentioned shall participate, to reach decisions upon the important questions, and that the study of secondary

[5] This word supplied from copy in Woodrow Wilson papers.

questions be turned over to the commissions and the committees before the reunion of the conference. We are not convened to reach a decision upon this subject this evening, and I readily concede that we take into consideration all that President Wilson has just stated. But there is a point that must not be lost to view, I refer to the making public of our deliberations. There is a general expectation on the part of the public which desires that everything occurring in the course of our deliberations, all the subjects that are discussed, shall be made known. If we limit ourselves in our publications to conversations invested with an official character, how can we keep the public informed? Would it not be believed that we are concealing something important? On the contrary, in my judgment, it is of the utmost importance for us to show to the public the results of our labors. Unquestionably the smaller Powers are quite as much interested in the conclusion of a peace as are the great Powers. France, England, the United States and Italy have a great past behind them. Upon them devolves the responsibility for the conclusion of peace and in the negotiations their preponderating roles should be recognized. Unquestionably the smaller Powers have the same moral rights as have the great Powers, but it is impossible to permit the small Powers to render decisions on questions which do not directly concern them in any way. We are ready to do everything that is possible to defend their rights and their interests, but it is not possible to say that all the Powers are upon the same footing when they approach the settlement of the controversies raised by the war.

We have agreed that Japan should have five delegates like the Great Powers. Japan participated in the war in the Far East, but who can say that in the war she played a part that can be compared for instance to that of France? Japan defended its interests in the Far East, but when she was requested to intervene in Europe, everyone knows what the answer of Japan was. The account that has to be settled is not one alone of money; there is an account for the blood shed that has to be settled also; the blood which France has shed gives to France an indisputable right to raise her voice and to insist upon her point of view in those questions which are exclusively her [concern. If this way of looking at the matter is][6] not accepted by all, I could not retain the honor of representing France in the Peace Conference. The question is so important that I propose that we do adjourn its solution until tomorrow, to reflect upon the suggestions which have been made by President Wilson, and upon the remarks which I have just formulated."

This proposal was then adopted by the Assembly.

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[6] These words supplied from copy in Woodrow Wilson papers.

Before those present separated PRESIDENT WILSON raised the question as to what should be stated to the representatives of the press as to what had been done in the course of the deliberations this day. (The PRESIDENT stated that his only suggestion was that they had better not begin the conference until they were in substantial agreement amongst themselves, otherwise the conference would become a debating society.)

It was thereupon proposed and approved by the Assembly that the following statement should be made to the press:

"After the meeting of the Supreme War Council authorized to study the necessary conditions for the renewal of the Armistice, the representatives of the Powers took up the examination of the procedure and the methods to be followed in the conversations to settle the preliminaries of the peace."

(This proposition was approved by the meeting.)

M. PICHON requested the representatives present to settle the question of the selection of the technical delegates to the Peace Conference, and to decide if these delegates are to be interchangeable.

PRESIDENT WILSON remarked that if the delegates of the Powers have need of technical advisors, at all events it is not necessary to admit these technical advisors to sit in the conference. MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the opinion that the delegates of the Powers should be selected and named once for all, and that it is their right to be surrounded by all the counsellors they may need without, however, according to these counsellors a vote in the conference.

He proposed however that the Assembly should reserve to itself the right of conceding to these delegates the right to address the conference whenever they should hold it desirable to permit them to do so.

This proposition was approved and the session was adjourned at thirty-five minutes past six.

Procès-verbal of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council, Held at M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, January 13, 1919, at 14 Hours 30

Present

France

M. Clemenceau, President of the Council and Minister for War.
M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
M. Clementel, Minister of Commerce.
M. Loucheur, Minister of Munitions.
M. Leygues, Minister of Marine.
M. Klotz, Minister of Finance.
Marshal Foch, Generalissimo, Allied Armies on the Western Front.
General Weygand.
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. de Lasteyrie.
Captain A. Portier.

Italy

His Excellency Baron Sonnino, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Count Aldrovandi.
General di Robilant.
Major A. Jones.

Great Britain

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister.
The Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons.
General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C. B., D. S. O., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
Major-General The Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C. M. G., British Military Representative.
Lieutenent-Colonel Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B., Secretary, War Cabinet.
Admiral Sir M. Browning.
Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.

United States

President Wilson.
Mr. R. Lansing.
Mr. Hoover.
Mr. Hurley.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
General Tasker H. Bliss, American Military Representative.
Admiral Benson.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux

Renewal of Armistice With Germany

M. Pichon said that the question to be discussed that afternoon related to the conditions of the renewal of the Armistice.

1. Financial Clauses

Marshal Foch said that the amendments to be introduced into the financial, naval, and economic clauses of the armistice with Germany had been agreed upon that morning, and, if approved, they could be inserted, as far as possible, in the new armistice.

M. KLOTZ said that the following resolution had been drawn up at that morning's meeting to give effect to the views expressed by Mr. Bonar Law and the representative of the United States of America:—

"Technical delegates of the Allied Governments and of Germany will be required to report how far it would be desirable, to force the German Government to undertake the necessary measures for the protection of the gold reserve in the Reichsbank, and of the machinery required for the issue of bank-notes. Marshal Foch is therefore authorised to demand the insertion of a special clause in the armistice to give effect to this decision at the time of the renewal of the armistice."

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired what were the exact terms of the clause to be introduced into the armistice.

M. KLOTZ replied that the instructions to the delegates were that they should, in conjunction with the German Government, take steps to ensure the safety of the cash deposits and of the machinery used for the emission of notes. It was only after the experts had arrived at an agreement that Marshal Foch would be able definitely to draft the clause required.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the question under discussion was not a military one, and, though he had full confidence in Marshal Foch as regards the carrying out of the terms of the armistice, he did not think the question under consideration was one which should be left to the military authorities for Marshal Foch to decide.

MR. BONAR LAW agreed that this was not a military question. All he proposed to do was to ask their experts to report on the possibility and desirability of doing what had been suggested. It was even possible that the German Government itself might wish that this should be done, in order to prevent the gold and the presses from falling into the hands of the Spartacus Group.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he wished to avoid the impression that, as an afterthought, they now wished to impound the German gold and the presses used for the emission of paper money. It seemed to him that this procedure would be introducing a novel clause into the armistice. By all means let the envoys look into the facts and form an opinion. They should then submit the matter to the German delegates, and, in co-operation with the Germans, endeavour to arrive at a plan which the Germans themselves might welcome. But they did not wish to introduce new conditions into the armistice.

M. KLOTZ made the following suggestion, which he thought might embody President Wilson's proposals:—

He would suggest that, after agreement had been reached by the technical delegates on the lines suggested in the first paragraph of the above text, Marshal Foch should be authorised to add the following clause to the armistice:—

"Germany shall forthwith take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of the gold deposits in the Reichsbank and of the machinery required for the issue of bank-notes."

This would mean that the necessary action would be taken in consultation with the German Government, and that it is left to it to take steps to give effect to this decision.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether it would not be sufficient to authorise Marshal Foch, in the event of our own and the German delegates being in accord, to take steps to help the Germans to ensure the safety of the gold.

MR. BONAR LAW thought that if the German Government itself said to our delegates that it would be in a better position to do this if it were made a condition of the armistice, Marshal Foch should not be prevented from doing this.

M. KLOTZ urged that the clause should be kept secret. If made public it might lead to serious trouble, and bring about the very danger it was desired to avoid.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed, but said that that did not prevent their arriving at an agreement with the German Government on this question. Should the German Government prefer that the clause be entered in the armistice, he quite agreed that this should be done.

MR. BONAR LAW suggested that the German Government might, in the future, find itself in difficulties if it were discovered that they had willingly agreed to the removal of the gold without the stimulus of its being a condition of the armistice.

M. KLOTZ thought that the clause, as now amended, met all requirements. It was first suggested that the Allied and German experts must be agreed that action is necessary. It was then left to Marshal Foch to take action.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed, provided that it was quite understood that no clause be inserted in the armistice terms except at the wish of the German Government.

The following text was accepted:—

"Germany must take as soon as possible all measures to ensure the safety of the gold deposits in the Reichsbank, and of the machinery required for the issue of bank-notes. Marshal Foch is therefore authorised to take the necessary measures to give effect to the recommendation of the experts, either by the insertion of a clause in the armistice or otherwise."

2. Naval Clauses

M. LEYGUES said that the technical advisers had agreed on the following amendments to Article XXII of the armistice:—

"All submarines which can proceed to sea or be towed are to be surrendered and are to proceed forthwith to Allied ports. These

are to include submarine cruisers and mine-layers, and submarine lifting vessels and docks. Those submarines which cannot be so surrendered are to be totally destroyed. Submarine building is to cease forthwith, and those submarines which are now under construction are to be broken up."

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had understood that these conditions could be included in the existing clauses of the armistice. He enquired how far the clause as now drafted added to the original text of the armistice.

M. LEYGUES replied that in Clause 22 as originally drafted there was no mention of destroying ships.

MR. BONAR LAW said there was no question that the original intention was that all submarines should be given up, and that this had not been done.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired why they should not merely insist on the execution of the clause; a few words would be sufficient to give effect to that desideratum.

M. LEYGUES pointed out that action was being taken "as a penalty". That was the view accepted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE insisted that the Germans must accept these terms as a condition of the renewal of the armistice. In the original clause of the armistice they had said "all submarines". It was not a penalty that they now proposed to impose, it was merely a question of the correct interpretation of the original clause.

M. PICHON proposed the substitution of the following words:—

"In order to insure the complete execution of Clause 22 of the armistice, it is laid down . . . ."

PRESIDENT WILSON—

"that what follows is insisted upon as an interpretation of that clause."

M. CLEMENCEAU said that a period of time should be given within which these terms should be carried out.

M. LEYGUES suggested that they might introduce the word "immediately".

(The clause as amended was agreed to:—

"In order to insure the complete execution of Clause 22 of the armistice, it is laid down that what follows is insisted upon as an interpretation of that clause:—

"All submarines which can proceed to sea or be towed are to be surrendered immediately, and are to proceed forthwith to Allied ports. These are to include submarine cruisers and mine-layers, and submarine lifting vessels and docks. Those submarines which cannot be so surrendered are to be totally destroyed. Submarine build-

ing is to cease forthwith, and those submarines which are now under construction are to be broken up.")

M. LEYGUES said that they proposed to add the following sentence at the end of Article XXIII of the armistice:—

Article XXIII of Armistice

"To ensure this being carried out, the German Commission are to furnish the Allied Naval Armistice Commission with a complete list of all surface craft, both built and building (either launched or on the stocks), giving estimated dates of completion."

(This was accepted without discussion.)

M. CLEMENTEL said that the Food Council had considered the question of food supplies for Germany, and had submitted their suggestions to the naval experts in order to see how the German mercantile fleet could best be made use of by the Allied Governments. As a result the following clauses had been proposed by the Allied Naval Council:—

3. Economic Clauses

"I. The whole of the German merchant fleet (including all passenger and cargo boats, other than those excepted by a committee to be set up by the Allies) to be placed immediately at the disposal of the Allies and of the United States, with a view to increasing the world-tonnage from which the tonnage required for the supply of foodstuffs to Europe, including Germany, can be drawn.

"The Allies and the United States will take over the administration of this fleet for the use of the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council or of any other organisation which they may create or set up for this purpose.

"II. The German merchant ships shall be put at the disposal of the Allies and of the United States in the ports and under the conditions laid down by the Allies and the United States. They shall be handed over completely fitted out both as regards crews and stores.

"III. In the case of those boats which, being in neutral countries, cannot get to the designated ports, unaided, owing either to lack of personnel or any other cause, Germany shall hand over these in the ports where they are at present, after previously notifying this handing over to the neutral Governments concerned.

"IV. German merchant ships shall put to sea flying a flag or flags of the Allied nations.

"V. The Allies and the United States may take such measures as they may deem advisable to assure the internal protection of the boats, the safety of navigation, and the supervision of the crews. They may, if necessary, place armed guards on board. The law applicable to these boats shall be that of the Nation which shall have taken charge of them in the name of the Allies and the United States.

"VI. The Allies and the United States may proceed with the partial or total replacement of the crews. German officers and crews who are thus discharged shall be repatriated to Germany.

"VII. All German merchant ships shall be handed over to the Allies and the United States within a period to be fixed later.

"The condition of boats which are unable to put to sea at the expiry of the period to be fixed shall be confirmed by a Commission of the Allies and the United States.

"VIII. The above clauses shall apply only to the use of boats during the armistice period, and for such later period as shall be determined by the Allied and Associated Governments.

"The above agreements shall not prejudice the ultimate disposal of these boats."

MR. BALFOUR said that he had been desired by Lord Reading[1] to put his views before the Conference. He had objected very strongly to any new conditions being added to the armistice, and he considered that the proposals now under discussion made an important addition to the armistice, and that this should be avoided. Lord Reading agreed that it was necessary to obtain the use of these ships, but he thought that this could be done by bargaining, and not by adding new conditions to the armistice. He would say to the Germans: "If you want food you must hand over your ships. If you hand over your ships we would give you sufficient food for a certain number of months." In this way the weapon of food would still be left in our hands. If Germany agreed to these terms the Allies would help to feed them. The inducement to the Germans would be that a certain quantity of food would be handed over to them in return for the use of a certain number of ships. That policy appeared to be different from the policy now set forth in the proposals under consideration.

M. CLEMENTEL said that Mr. Hoover was, according to his own statement, required to solve the following question: namely, the supply of 200,000 tons of corn and 70,000 tons of meat per month to meet the requirements of Germany, and this implied a total of from 800,000 to 900,000 tons of shipping. Germany had some 2,700,000 tons of shipping lying idle. The Allies were compelled to furnish supplies to the whole of Europe. It was necessary, therefore to make Germany give up these ships temporarily for the good of Europe. Otherwise Germany would say that she would only give up sufficient shipping to transport supplies required by herself. On the other hand, unless they insisted on the setting free of all the available tonnage, it was impossible to furnish supplies to Europe. Negotiations had been carried on for some considerable time without results. They were forced, therefore, to the conclusion that these demands should form part of the armistice conditions, so that the Germans would be bound to reply within a given period of time.

[1] British representative on the Inter-Allied Relief Commission.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether it would not be sufficient to issue instructions to our delegates forthwith to arrive at an agreement on these lines.

MR. BONAR LAW pointed out that during the last two months endeavours had been made to obtain the use of these ships, but without success: and unless this were made a condition of the armistice the ships would not be obtained. He did not think it would be necessary for the whole of these clauses to be introduced into the armistice, but a clause should be inserted to the effect that an agreement would have to be arrived at in order to set free the German merchant ships. The Germans should be told that, unless these ships are given up, food would not be supplied. The balance of shipping beyond the tonnage required for Germany's food supplies would be used for payment of food supplied.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed that it was not only a question of feeding Germany; the whole of Europe had to be fed. Over two months had already been wasted in bargaining, and, if further discussion was to take place, more time would be lost. Whatever text was adopted, they must so act as to make Germany yield the shipping required without further delay.

PRESIDENT WILSON then pointed out that the only other means available, except force, was to withhold food, and to that he agreed.

MR. BONAR LAW pointed out that a meeting of the delegates would take place on Wednesday next. The delegates should be given to understand that they would be supported in any steps which they might consider it necessary to take in order to obtain the use of this shipping.

MARSHAL FOCH said that on the 13th December last this question had been considered. At the suggestion of Mr. Hoover, transmitted to him through General Pershing, he had told M. Erzberger [2] that 2,800,000 tons of German shipping should be pooled for the Allies to be used for the supply of food. M. Erzberger had agreed to this proposal, on the condition that the ships and the crews remained German. He had not refused, but had merely made a condition. As that question had not been settled nothing had been done.

MR. BONAR LAW thought they were all agreed that the armistice should be used to bring pressure to bear on the Germans. If the Germans did not agree, they should instruct their delegates to refer the matter back to the Supreme War Council for decision.

M. KLOTZ enquired whether the Council accepted the condition made by M. Erzberger that the ships should remain under the German flag.

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[2] Matthias Erzberger, German Secretary of State without Portfolio; President of the German Armistice Commission.

MR. BONAR LAW said that the Council had decided that the ships should sail under our own flag. In this connection he would invite attention to Paragraph IV of the clauses under consideration.

M. LEYGUES pointed out that the Council had agreed to make use of German crews under certain conditions.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether any reply had been made to M. Erzberger's condition.

As no reply had been made, they were parties to the delay. He then suggested that the delegates should be authorised to sign without delay an agreement with the Germans on the lines proposed in the clauses under consideration, and he would add that, if the Germans refused to sign such an agreement, Marshal Foch should at once be informed so that it may be made a condition of the renewal of the armistice.

(This proposal was accepted.)

4. Supply of Food to Germany

M. CLEMENTEL said that the next question to be considered related to the supply of food to Germany. Disagreement had arisen between the British, American, and French financial authorities as to the manner in which payment was to be made.

MR. BONAR LAW asked permission to explain the views held by the British authorities. It would be admitted that each of the Allies had got his own debts, but it was now proposed deliberately to add to these debts in order to supply food to Germany. Consequently, this additional debt, in his opinion, ought to be treated as one of the first charges, to be discharged at once. The supply of food was a necessity. It was therefore a necessity that it should be paid for. If payment was not made immediately, the outstanding debts would be proportionately increased.

M. CLEMENTEL pointed out that the expenditure to be incurred amounted to 4,500,000,000 fr., which was equivalent to 12,000,000£ sterling a month.

M. KLOTZ said he fully recognised Mr. Bonar Law's point of view. He also fully recognised the privileged position of the expenditure contemplated. But, in the absence of any Belgian representative, he could not admit that this expenditure should be given priority, that is, the first place above all other. He was, however, quite prepared to give it a privileged position, leaving it to the Peace Conference to decide the order of priority to be given to the various debts incurred by Germany. As a result of the discussion which had taken place that morning, he now wished to submit the following proposal:—

"That this question should be referred to a Conference of representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, who should be required to submit their recommendations within the period of one week."

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that any further delay in this matter might be fatal, as it meant the dissolution of order and government. They were discussing an absolute and immediate necessity. So long as hunger continued to gnaw, the foundations of government would continue to crumble. Therefore, food should be supplied immediately, not only to our friends, but also to those parts of the world where it was to our interest to maintain a stable Government. He thought they were bound to accept the concerted counsel of a number of men who had been devoting the whole of their time and thought to this question. He trusted the French Finance Department would withdraw their objection, as they were faced with the great problems of Bolshevism and the forces of dissolution which now threatened society.

M. KLOTZ said he would gladly meet President Wilson's wishes. But it was not altogether a question of food supplies. They were all fully agreed as to the necessity of feeding the Germans, but he would appeal to President Wilson to consider also the question of justice. He was quite willing to admit that German foreign securities should be earmarked for this purpose. But they were creating a new German debt. There were other German debts which were just as honourable and noble. Therefore, he would ask, as a matter of justice, why Germany should pay for food in preference to paying off debts incurred for the restoration and for the reparation of damage committed elsewhere. Why should exclusive priority be given to such a debt? As a solution of the difficulty he would agree that payment for this food should be made in foreign securities and values. But he would add that "these assets shall be pooled and distribution shall be made by the Allies, taking into account such privileged claims as the Peace Conference would admit".

He would merely point out that it was not a question of food supply, it was purely a financial question, and no delay need therefore occur in the supply of food.

PRESIDENT WILSON urged that, unless a solution for the immediate situation could be found, none of these debts would be paid. The want of food would lead to a crash in Germany. The great point, however, was this—that the Associated Governments have no money to pay for these supplies; therefore Germany must pay for them. But if they were not paid for and supplied immediately there would be no Germany to pay anything.

MR. BONAR LAW pointed out that, in calculating the sums, they had been going on the assumption that the supply of food would last for one year. He did not think that it would need to last more than a few months, or, say, up to the harvesting of the next crop. The suggestion had also been made that the German merchant ships to be

requisitioned would yield funds for the payment of a portion of the sum in question.

M. KLOTZ proposed that they should accept for a period of two months the text as it stood. At the end of that period the Peace Conference would be able to come to a decision on the whole question of policy.

MR. BONAR LAW considered that if sanction for two months' payment only were obtained the food supplies could only last for two months.

M. KLOTZ thought that this showed some confusion of ideas. It was not a question of supplying food for two months. Food supplies could continue. The question to be settled during the course of the two months was merely as to the priority to be given to the payments to be made by Germany. It would be admitted that foreign securities must be considered as gilt-edged securities.

MR. BONAR LAW thought they were arguing in a circle. The first question to be settled was whether a new debt which they had no necessity to incur should be added to previous debts.

M. KLOTZ agreed, but suggested that at the end of the two months a priority list could be prepared.

M. PICHON said he thought that an agreement had now been reached. Everyone was agreed that payment had to be made. The proposal could therefore be accepted. But the Conference could reconsider the question later on should they wish to do so.

(This was agreed to.)

M. LOUCHEUR said that the return of machinery removed by Germany from the occupied territory was one of the points in the armistice. So far the Germans had refused to do this. It had been proposed, therefore, to add a new proviso to the armistice, making it obligatory for the Germans to return at once all machinery that had been removed to Germany. He proposed the following text:—

5. Article XIX of Armistice

"I. As the restoration of material taken from French and Belgian territory is indispensable for industrial reconstruction, the following measures will be enforced:—

"II. Machinery, parts of machinery, industrial or agricultural plant, accessories of every kind, and, generally, all kinds of material appertaining to industry or agriculture which have been removed from the territories occupied by enemy armies on the Western front, under any pretext whatsoever, whether by military or civil authority or by private individuals, shall be held at the disposal of the Allies, to be returned to their original positions if the French and Belgian Governments so desire.

"No alteration shall be made or damage done to this material.

"III. In preparation for this restoration the German Government shall forthwith put before the Armistice Commission all official or

private transactions relative to this material, or contracts of sale or hire, or other contracts, all correspondence relative thereto, all declarations and evidence which will throw light on the existence, origin, transfer, present condition, and whereabouts of this material.

"IV. Delegates from the French and Belgian Governments shall proceed into Germany to make enquiries and personally examine into the condition of the material reported.

"V. The restoration shall be carried out in accordance with the detailed instructions issued by the French and Belgian authorities.

"VI. In particular, with a view to the immediate restoration of driving belts, electric motors or parts of motors, and factory apparatus taken from France, Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Alsace, or Lorraine, all depots of this material, whether in parks, or on railways or ships, or in factories, shall be immediately made known.

"VII. The information to be given as laid down in Paragraphs III and VI shall be submitted, commencing within eight days of the 20th January, 1919, and shall be furnished in its entirety before the 15th February, 1919."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired which clause of the armistice related to this question.

M. PICHON replied that it came under Clause 19, which read: "Reparation for damage done".

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether this was the interpretation of the clause.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he wished to enquire how these things were to be found in the present disordered state of Germany. The authority under which the machinery had been collected and transported no longer existed. How were these things going to be identified? It might be possible to get similar material, but it would be difficult to obtain the same.

M. LOUCHEUR stated that a "pillage corps" had been formed by the Germans, which had worked methodically and systematically. Full records of all machinery stolen, requisitioned, or removed, had been kept, and these papers were available. Everything was known.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that at Lille textile machinery had been taken away, and asked if that could be followed up now.

M. LOUCHEUR said that in most cases they knew where the machinery was. For instance, the machinery for the construction of waggons taken from Douai was now at Essen; they knew exactly where to find it.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Conference which formulated the terms of the armistice agreed that they should confine themselves to military conditions, and merely affirm other matters, in principle, in general terms, without entering into details.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that during the Armistice Conference a question had arisen as to whether Germany should be required to

make reparation in kind or in money. The Conference had, for obvious reasons, replied in the negative to the question concerning the supply of machinery. But the question of returning stolen machinery was quite a different one.

M. Loucheur agreed that the French point of view was wholly opposed to payment in kind, but he insisted on the return of stolen goods.

President Wilson said that he accepted the proposals now before the meeting on the understanding that only the things that could be identified were to be asked for.

Marshal Foch enquired whether this clause was to be made a condition of the armistice. Should it not be accepted, was the armistice to be broken?

(It was agreed to accept the text proposed by M. Loucheur.)

Admiral Browning said that the original obligation of the German Government was to deliver the interned and prize ships by the 17th December. This they had failed to do, and a considerable number of vessels had not yet left Germany. A strong protest should be made as to the failure of Germany to carry out this obligation, and an explanation should be demanded. Immediate compliance with the unfulfilled portion of this article should be required, and it should be understood that any further extension of the armistice would not be allowed to form the basis of a claim to delay the completion of the process of delivering ships until the end of the extended term.

6. Article XXX of Armistice

With regard to the protest of the German Commission (G. W. 1726/A1 of the 15th December, 1918), repudiating liability for the reconditioning of ships in Great Britain if they were not allowed to complete the work in Germany, and to the subsequent telegraphic protest against our refusal to allow the German surveyors to act in their interests at the surveys of those vessels held there, it should be emphasised that these repudiations of liability were not accepted, and, adequate arrangements having been made for the interests of the German Government to be watched by the classification societies in which ships are severally classed, no repudiation of claims for damage or reconditioning on either of the above grounds can be admitted.

Mr. Bonar Law enquired whether it was necessary to bring this question into the armistice, and whether it could not be settled otherwise.

Mr. Balfour also asked why this special question was singled out when many other cases where delays had occurred were not brought forward.

M. LEYGUES explained that the British naval authorities had pointed out that Clause 30 of the armistice was not being carried out, and as a result tonnage required by the Allies was being withheld from them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that it would be sufficient if this question were brought to the notice of the German authorities when the renewal of the armistice took place. A promise should then be exacted from the German delegates that these conditions would be fulfilled without further delay.

(Mr. Lloyd George's proposal was accepted.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, January 13, 1919.

The Following Conclusions Were Reached by the Supreme War Council at a Meeting Held in Paris on Monday, January 13, 1919, at 14:30 O'clock (2:30 p. m.)

1. The Supreme War Council agreed that—

Gold Deposits at Reichsbank and Machinery for Issue of Notes

Germany must take as soon as possible all measures to ensure the safety of the gold deposits in the Reichsbank and of the machinery required for the issue of bank-notes.

Marshal Foch is therefore authorized to take the necessary measures to give effect to the recommendation of the experts, either by the insertion of a clause in the Armistice, or otherwise.

2. The Supreme War Council agreed that—

Submarines (Article XXII of Armistice)

In order to ensure the complete execution of clause XXII of the Armistice, it is laid down that the following shall be taken as the interpretation of that clause:—

"All submarines which can proceed to sea or be towed are to be surrendered immediately, and are to proceed forthwith to Allied ports. These are to include submarine-cruisers and minelayers, and submarine-lifting vessels and docks. Those submarines which cannot be so surrendered are to be totally destroyed. Submarine building is to cease forthwith, and those submarines which are now under construction are to be broken up."

3. The Supreme War Council approved of the following sentence being added to Article XXIII of the Armistice:—

Surface Warships (Article XXIII of Armistice)

"To ensure this being carried out, the German Commission are to furnish the Allied Naval Armistice Commission with a complete list of all surface craft, both built and building (either launched or on the stocks), giving estimated dates of completion."

4. The Supreme War Council decided to authorise the delegates to sign without delay an agreement on the lines given below, with the proviso that, should the Germans refuse, Marshal Foch shall be informed, so that the signing of this agreement may be made a condition of the renewal of the Armistice:

German Mercantile Fleet

"I. The whole of the German merchant fleet (including all passenger and cargo boats, other than those excepted by a Committee to

be set up by the Allies) to be placed immediately at the disposal of the Allies and of the United States, with a view to increasing the world-tonnage, from which the tonnage required for the supply of foodstuffs to Europe, including Germany, can be drawn.

"The Allies and the United States will take over the administration of this fleet through the agency of the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council, or of any other organisation which they may create or set up for this purpose.

"II. The German merchant ships shall be put at the disposal of the Allies and of the United States in the ports and under the conditions laid down by the Allies and the United States. They shall be handed over completely fitted out both as regards crews and stores.

"III. In the case of those vessels which, being in neutral countries, cannot get to the designated ports unaided, owing either to lack of personnel or any other cause, Germany shall hand over these in the ports where they are at present, after previously notifying this delivery to the neutral Governments concerned.

"IV. German merchant ships shall put to sea flying one or more Allied flags.

"V. The Allies and the United States may take such measures as they may deem advisable to ensure the internal protection of the ships, the safety of navigation, and the supervision of the crews. They may if necessary, place armed guards on board. The law applicable to these ships shall be that of the nation which takes charge of them in the name of the Allies and the United States.

"VI. The Allies and the United States may proceed with the partial or total replacement of the crews. German officers and crews who may be thus discharged shall be repatriated to Germany.

"VII. All German merchant ships shall be handed over to the Allies and the United States within a period to be fixed later.

"The condition of ships which are unable to put to sea at the expiry of the period to be fixed shall be verified by a Commission appointed by the Allies and the United States.

"VIII. The above clauses shall apply only to the use of vessels during the Armistice period and for such later period as shall be determined by the Allied and Associated Governments.

"The above agreements shall not prejudice the ultimate disposal of these ships."

5. The Supreme War Council decided to accept the recommendations contained in the following report submitted by the Allied Food Council:—

Food Supply to Germany, Payment for

1. The Council has had under consideration the measures already in progress for the relief of the Allied, liberated and neutral territories, and is taking steps to provide and expand such relief.

2. The Council has formed the opinion, upon the material already in its possession (which is necessarily incomplete), that additional supplies of food will be required in Germany before the next harvest is gathered.

For the purpose of obtaining more precise information the Council is making further investigation.

3. The Council recommends to the Supreme War Council that, if the German cargo and passenger fleet is placed at the disposal of the Associated Governments, the Associated Governments should permit Germany to import a prescribed quantity of foodstuffs, so limited as not to interfere in any way with the priority of supply which must be assured to Allied, liberated and neutral countries.

4. Under the conditions indicated, the Council would recommend that in the first instance the following supply should be permitted:— 200,000 tons of breadstuffs, and 70,000 tons of pork products.

5. The Council recommends that the Commanders-in-Chief of the Belgian, French, British, American, and Italian armies should each appoint an officer of experience so as to form a Commission to supervise the distribution of foodstuffs in Germany, acting on behalf of the armies of the Associated Governments and of this Council, and should take instructions from and report direct to this Council.

For the assistance of the Commission, this Council will provide it with an expert civilian staff.

6. It must be a condition precedent to any supply that satisfactory arrangements are made by Germany for providing the necessary payment.

The Council recommends that the representatives of the Treasuries of the Associated Governments be given full discretion to discuss the method of payment with the German representatives, and to arrange for the utilisation of the German credits abroad in preference to other resources, failing which the representatives should make recommendations to the Council and to their respective Treasuries.

It is reserved to the Peace Conference to revise the method of payment so arranged.

6. The Supreme War Council approved the following resolution:—

Restoration of Machinery, etc. (Article XIX of Armistice)

"I. As the restoration of material taken from French and Belgian territory is indispensable for industrial reconstruction, the following measures will be enforced:—

"II. Machinery, parts of machinery, industrial or agricultural plant, accessories of every kind, and, generally, all kinds of material appertaining to industry or agriculture which have been removed from the territories occupied by the enemy armies on the Western front, under any pretext whatever, whether by military or civil authority, or by private individuals, shall be held at the disposal of the Allies to be returned to their original position if the French and Belgian Governments so desire.

"No alteration shall be made or damage done to this material.

"III. In preparation for this restoration, the German Government shall forthwith put before the Armistice Commission all official or private records of transactions relative to this material, or contracts of sale or hire, or other contracts, all correspondence relative thereto, all declarations and evidence which will throw light on the existence, origin, adaptation, present condition and whereabouts of this material.

"IV. Delegates from the French and Belgian Governments shall cause to be undertaken in Germany enquiries and local investigations into the condition of the material reported.

"V. The restoration shall be carried out in accordance with the special instructions isssued by the French and Belgian authorities as these may decide.

"VI. In particular, with a view to the immediate restoration of driving belts, electric motors or parts of motors, and factory gear, taken from France, Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Alsace, or Lorraine, all depots of this material, whether in parks, or on the railway, on ships, or in factories, shall be immediately made known.

"VII. The information to be given as laid down in paragraphs III and VI shall be submitted, commencing within eight days from the 20th January, 1919, and shall be furnished in its entirety before the 15th February, 1919."

7. The Supreme War Council considered a report regarding delay in the return of interned and prize ships by the German Government:—

Surrender of Interned and Prize Ships. (Article XXX of Armistice)

It was decided that the question should be brought to the notice of the German authorities when the renewal of the Armistice took place, and that a promise should then be exacted from the German delegates that those conditions would be fulfilled without further delay.

Notes on the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held at the Quai d'Orsay, at 2: 30 p. m., January 13, 1919

The following were present:

UNITED STATES:	The President
	Mr. Lansing
	General Bliss
	Admiral Benson
	Mr. Hoover
	Mr. Hurley
	Mr. Davis
	Mr. Baruch
	Lt. Gilbert White
	Mr. Frazier
	Mr. Harrison
FRANCE:	M. Clemenceau
	M. Pichon
	Marshal Foch
	M. Clementel
	M. Leygues
	M. Klotz
	M. Loucheur
	M. Dutasta
	M. Berthelot
	Prince de Bearn
GREAT BRITAIN:	Mr. Lloyd George
	Mr. Balfour
	Mr. Bonar Law
	Sir Henry Wilson
	Admiral Sinclair
	General [Sackville-West]
	Sir Maurice Hankey
	Major [Caccia]
ITALY:	Baron Sonnino
	General [di Robilant]
	Comte [Aldrovandi]
JAPAN:	Viscount Chinda
	Mr. Matsui

M. PICHON opened the session by calling upon Marshal Foch to report the decisions reached by the technical advisors at their meeting of 10 o'clock.

I

MARSHAL FOCH submitted the text of a new clause to be added to the terms of the Armistice, requiring the German Government to take the steps necessary to insure the safety of the funds in the possession of the Reichsbank and the material necessary for the issuance of bank notes. (See Annex A) [1]

[1] There are no annexes attached to the minutes; for text of the clause here mentioned, see p. 510.

PRESIDENT WILSON questioned the desirability of presenting the matter in the form of a demand on Germany.

MR. BONAR LAW explained the purpose of the clause and the fact that the Germans were required by the terms of the Armistice to safeguard their assets.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that instead of imposing such a clause on the Germans it would be preferable to persuade them to agree to take the necessary steps in the matter.

He, therefore, suggested that the Allied Financial Experts who were to accompany Marshal Foch to Spa, should be instructed to discuss the matter with the German representatives and endeavor to determine what was necessary and most desirable. The German representatives would have to decide whether the agreement should be in the form of an addition to the Armistice or a separate understanding. He thought, however, that it would be far preferable to have the agreement in the form of a separate understanding.

It was agreed that Marshal Foch was authorized to accept whatever plan was recommended by the Allied Financial Experts.

II

MARSHAL FOCH presented the text of a clause modifying Article XXII of the Armistice. (Annex B)[2]

It was proposed "As a penalty for delay in surrendering submarines," to demand that all submarines fit to take to sea should be delivered to the Allies as well as all submarine cruisers, mine layers, etc. Those which were still incompleted, should be destroyed.

M. LEYGUES explained the purpose of the proposal and the reasons therefor.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought it unwise to make this requirement an addition to the terms of the Armistice.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it most desirable that the Allied delegates should require the Germans to deliver the submarines, etc., but that they should insist on this as a proper compliance with the terms of the Armistice.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether any time limit had been set. He proposed the addition of the word "immediately".

It was agreed that the wording of the clause should be changed to read as follows:

"In order to insure the execution of Article XXII of the Armistice, all submarines fit to take the sea, shall be towed, immediately, etc."

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[2] There are no annexes attached to the minutes; for text of this clause, see pp. 510-511.

III

MARSHAL FOCH proposed that a new clause be inserted in the Armistice to the effect that the German passenger and cargo fleet be placed at the disposition of the Associated Governments and that Germany be required to furnish a complete list of all ships already constructed or in course of completion. These ships were to be controlled and operated by the Allied Maritime Transport Council. In this way German tonnage would be made available for the supply not only of Germany but of Europe.

MR. BALFOUR stated that although he was not fully cognizant of the matter, he desired to make certain comments on the proposal now before the Council, in accordance with a request which Lord Reading had made of him just before the meeting.

Mr. Balfour explained that it was Lord Reading's earnest conviction that this procedure should not be adopted. He recommended that every method should be employed to secure their ships without making use of force. He urged, as a matter of policy, that the transaction should be a voluntary one and that the matter should be placed before the German delegates in this way: "If you want food, then turn over your ships." Lord Reading thought that it would be most unwise to add a new provision to the Armistice.

M. CLEMENTEL advanced various arguments to show the absolute necessity for the Allies to secure German tonnage if they were to carry through any comprehensive plan for World Relief.

MR. BONAR LAW stated that Mr. Hoover estimated that 200,000 tons of corn and 70,000 tons of meat should be delivered to Germany every month. It was estimated that this would require 800,000 tons of shipping, which the Associated Governments did not have available for the purpose. According to our present advices, there were now some two and a half million tons of German shipping which were not in use. Therefore, he proposed that the Associated Governments should ask the German Government to accord them the power to administer and use the German tonnage so as to be in a position not only to feed Germany but the rest of Europe as well.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that a convention for this purpose be immediately negotiated with Germany.

MR. BONAR LAW remarked that the Allies had already tried to do so, but had failed. Consequently, the Associated Governments had no alternative but to make use of the renewal of the Armistice as a means to secure German compliance with their wishes.

MARSHAL FOCH recalled that on December 13th he had discussed the question of the use of German ships with Erzberger, who had given his consent, provided the ships and their crews remained Ger-

man. It was explained that the matter had gone no further at that time. It was out of the question to permit the German flag upon the seas until after Peace was signed.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it only just that the Germans should be forced to comply with the wishes of the Allies.

M. CLEMENTEL observed that Austria-Hungary was required to turn over her ships to the Associated Governments.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that the Germans had sunk fifteen million tons of British shipping, and it was only just that they should be required to make their tonnage available to the Allies.

PRESIDENT WILSON proposed that the technical experts be directed to make every effort to conclude a satisfactory arrangement for the use of German shipping with the German representatives direct. But, if the Germans do not agree, the technical experts should advise Marshal Foch, who is authorized to make the arrangement a condition of the renewal of the Armistice.

IV

M. KLOTZ submitted suggestions regarding the method of payment for supplies and recommended that the debt which Germany would incur, should be carried as part of the general indemnity which Germany would have to pay.

MR. BONAR LAW gave it as his opinion that the debt should not be considered as an addition to a general indemnity, but that it should be made a just charge to be paid right away.

In reply to an inquiry as to the probable amount of this debt, M. Clementel stated that it was estimated, taking Mr. Hoover's figures as regards requirements as a basis, that it would amount to four and one half billion francs per year, or as Mr. Bonar Law stated, twelve million sterling per month.

M. CLEMENTEL explained that he fully appreciated Mr. Bonar Law's point of view. But he thought it his duty, especially in the absence of a Belgian representative, to point out that there might be other debts which Germany should be called upon to pay before she was permitted to make use of her existing resources for the payment for food. He, therefore, suggested that the Associated Governments should come to some special agreement in this regard within a week and decide the question.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that "So long as hunger gnaws, foundations of governments crumble." Consequently, he believed that it was imperative to act now. A decision could not be delayed. It was more than a question of feeding Germany or a question of how she would pay; it was a question of Bolshevism.

M. KLOTZ stated that he did not think it right that the Germans should be permitted to pay for their food with money which they already owed for the reparation of the damages to France and Belgium.

THE PRESIDENT observed that the Allies did not expect to pay for the food which they now proposed to send to Germany. Germany must pay, not only for the food, but also for the damages which she has inflicted on the Allies. If the Allies, however, did not feed Germany, she would be unable to pay any indemnity at all.

M. KLOTZ suggested limiting the arrangement to a period of two months.

MR. BONAR LAW pointed out that, in essence, it was a question of principle, and that the Council had now to decide whether or not this new debt of Germany should have priority.

It was finally agreed that the new debt should be considered as having priority, and any arrangement with the Germans regarding food supplies was to continue for two months, when any one of the Associated Governments should have the right to reopen the matter.

V

MARSHAL FOCH submitted a clause to be inserted in the Armistice regarding the restitution of material stolen from French or Belgian territory. The Germans were to be required not only to restore machines and parts of machines, but also to furnish all the necessary information, papers, etc., to enable French and Belgian inspectors to locate this material in Germany. The information was to be furnished by February 15, 1919.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE understood that this new clause was to be considered as an interpretation of Article XIX of the Armistice.

PRESIDENT WILSON considered that this was a very hopeful Article and inquired how this material was to be found and how identified.

M. CLEMENTEL explained that the French Government knew that the Germans had kept a careful record of every machine they had stolen and he mentioned certain large machine tools which had been taken from Lille and which were now in a certain shop in the works at Essen. He did not think that there would be any difficulty in locating the material in question.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE inquired whether it was the intention of the French Government to demand a reparation in kind.

M. CLEMENTEL stated that France did not desire reparation in kind. France desired reparation in cash, and would herself restore the damage or use the cash for the purchase of the material necessary for restoration in Allied countries.

PRESIDENT WILSON saw no objection to the proposed demand on the German Government or the understanding that they should be required to restore only such machines, etc., as could be identified.

VI

It was pointed out that Germany had failed to execute the obligation to deliver certain ships (Article XXX of the Armistice). About 35 had not yet left Germany. Reference was also made to the claims advanced by the Germans that they were to supervise the repairs to these ships. It was not considered advisable to admit this claim.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that Marshal Foch should call the attention of the German delegates to their failure to observe the terms of the Armistice in this respect, and press them for the delivery of the ships. Mr. Lloyd George believed that the Marshal could extract a definite promise from the Germans in this regard.

The Council concurred in this suggestion and Marshal Foch was instructed accordingly.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay on Monday, January 13, 1919, at 4 p. m.

Present

France	Great Britain	Italy
M. Clemenceau.	Mr. Lloyd George.	Baron Sonnino.
M. Pichon.	Mr. Balfour.	Count Aldrovandi.
M. Dutasta.	Lieut. Col. Hankey.	Capt. Jones.
M. Berthelot.	Major Caccia.	
Capt. A. Portier.		

United States of America	Japan
President Wilson.	M. Matsui.
Mr. R. Lansing.	Viscount Chinda.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.	

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

(This Meeting was a continuation of a Meeting of the Supreme War Council commenced earlier in the afternoon, procès-verbal of which has been prepared separately.)

Procedure of the Peace Discussions

M. Pichon said that it was proposed to continue the discussion of the Draft (see Appendix (A) of I. C.–104)[1] submitted by the French Government on the general procedure in regard to the Peace Discussions.

1. Representation of British Dominions and India

Mr. Lloyd George said that he wished in the first place to return to a question which had been postponed the previous evening in order to enable him to discuss it with the Dominion Premiers. The latter were disappointed at the smallness of the representation allotted to them. They had not even received the same representation as had been granted to Belgium and Serbia, though they had supplied a larger number of troops and their losses had been greater. He had explained quite frankly to them the reasons which had guided President Wilson in his desire not to accord a larger representation, as it would have had the appearance of an over-representation of England, regarding

[1] Plan of the Preliminary Conversations between the Allied Ministers, vol. I, p. 386.

her as a unit. He had informed them that they would be treated like the smaller States, and that one Representative would be present whenever any question which affected them came under consideration. He had also agreed to add from time to time one or two of the Dominion Representatives to the British panel of five.

A second question had been raised at the conference of the British Imperial War Cabinet held that morning in connection with the representation of India. The native States of India, which represented a population of 70,000,000 to 80,000,000 men, and had furnished some 180,000 men to the army, had a right, he thought, to be represented. He had promised to put forward their claims.

PRESIDENT WILSON wished to remove any impression that he personally had any objection to the British Dominions being separately represented. He fully admitted that their claims were great. He had merely been guided by the desire to remove any cause of jealousy on the part of the other smaller States. He now understood the proposal to be that from time to time one or two of the Dominion Premiers should be admitted among the five National Representatives, and that, besides these five, there should be one Representative from each of the Dominions whenever any subject of interest to them came under discussion.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, in connection with this matter, he wished to quote a remark made to him that day by Sir Robert Borden. He had pointed out that, if he returned to Canada and confessed that Canada was getting merely half the number of representatives that had been allotted to Serbia or Roumania or Belgium, there would be a feeling that they were being badly treated, especially when it was known that the Canadian losses during the war had been greater than those of Belgium. Nevertheless, if it were thought that a greater representation of the Dominions would create a bad feeling outside, he did not wish to press the question.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether Mr. Lloyd George would feel satisfied to give Canada two Representatives, South Africa two Representatives, Australia two Representatives, and New Zealand one Representative. He was trying to find a basis for general application.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that such an allotment would be fair. But he would not care himself to make that proposal to the Conference.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he himself would submit the proposal and enquired whether Mr. Lloyd George would be satisfied if one Representative was allotted to British India and one to the native States of India.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE accepted this number, and explained that, naturally, these Representatives would only be present when questions affecting them came up for discussion.

(It was agreed that the British Dominions and India should have the right to be represented by the following number of Delegates:—

Canada	2
Australia	2
South Africa	2
New Zealand	1
India, including native States of India	2
Total	9

(For Newfoundland it was decided that, though it would not be given separate representation, a Representative from that country could be included in the British Delegation.)

2. Representation of Russia

M. PICHON expressed the view that all questions connected with the representation of the great Allied and Associated Powers, the smaller Powers, Russia, and Montenegro, had been settled at yesterday's meeting.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there was some misapprehension as regards Russia. They had decided that representatives of sections in Russia, such as Prince Lvof and M. Savinkof, should not be admitted. But the question of the general representation of Russia had never been discussed.

(It was agreed that the question of the representation of Russia should be postponed until the question of general policy of Russia had been examined).

3. Representation of Brazil

PRESIDENT WILSON said that, in connection with the questions settled at yesterday's meetings, he wished again to refer to Brazil. Brazil was the only considerable Latin-American State containing a population of over 30,000,000. She had been more subject to German influence than any other of the South American States. Many of the States which went to constitute Brazil were controlled by the German elements in the population, and in another generation this country might have become wholly Germanised. He was therefore interested in attempting to divorce her from Germany. He thought if she were given an exceptional position—for instance, if three Delegates were allotted to her—she would be attached to our own interests, and so be of use to the Allies as one of the great States of South America.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE felt some doubt in accepting this proposal. He thought that the representation should bear some reference to the sacrifices made by each country. Brazil had certainly sent two or three torpedo-boats, but beyond that she had made no effort at all.

He thought it would be invidious if she were to get three Representatives, as compared with the two Representatives allotted to Belgium, Greece and Serbia.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed. His heart bled for Belgium and Serbia; but they had not made a voluntary sacrifice.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that Greece had.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the argument that he urged concerned the future. It was a political argument. He believed that if they did not carry out this [*his*] proposal, Germany would at once regain her grip on Brazil.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he did not wish to resist his [*this*] proposal; he merely wondered what the outside public would think. On the other hand he did not wish to arrest the progress of the meeting by resisting further.

BARON SONNINO said that he would agree to three Representatives being given to Brazil, provided three were also given to Belgium. He thought it was impossible to give Brazil more Representatives than Belgium.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that if three Representatives were given to Belgium and to each of the other small countries, Brazil would no longer hold a preponderating position, and President Wilson's argument would therefore fall to the ground, as they would all be on the same footing.

(It was agreed to give three Representatives to Brazil, the remaining smaller belligerent Powers retaining the number of Representatives previously agreed upon.)

4. Representation of Costa Rica

PRESIDENT WILSON asked permission to raise a purely American question concerning the relations of America and Costa Rica. When he (President Wilson) first became President, revolutions had been fomented in Central America by people desirous of supplying arms and munitions, and anxious to obtain concesssions. He had then issued a Note [3] to the effect that the United States of America would not accept any Government formed for the purpose of furthering the ambitions of an individual. An example of this had occurred in Mexico, and for that reason America had refused to recognise Carranza. Later on, a similar instance had occurred in Costa Rica and the United States of America had refused to recognise the new ruler of that country. Costa Rica had made many attempts, without success, to renew relations with the United States of America. With this object in view, she had first offered to declare war on Germany and, finally, receiving no reply to these overtures, had actually declared war in order to force the United States of America to recognise her. In these

[3] *Foreign Relations*, 1913, p. 7.

circumstances he could not bring himself to sit at the same table as a Representative of Costa Rica. Naturally, if any question directly affecting Costa Rica should come up for discussion he would be prepared to reconsider his decision, but under present conditions he proposed that Costa Rica should not be represented at the Peace Conference.

(This was agreed to.)

5. Representation of Neutral States and Small States Who had Broken Off Relations With the Enemy

(It was agreed that each of these should have one Representative.)

6. Attendance of Delegates

M. PICHON then read clauses contained in paragraph 2 of the French Draft Proposals relating to the attendance of Delegates.

(These were accepted without discussion.)

MR. BALFOUR said he wished to raise the question as to who should be responsible for summoning the small and neutral States. He presumed that France would be.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE and M. PICHON agreed that this would be done by all the five Great Powers.

(This was agreed to.)

7. Representation of Enemy Powers

Paragraph 3 of the French draft note, relating to representation of enemy Powers, was read by M. Pichon and agreed to.

8. Technical Advisers

M. PICHON then read paragraph 4 of the note relating to Technical Delegates.

M. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to the last sentence of the paragraph. He wished it to be quite clear that this sentence should not in any way preclude the adoption of the panel system by the various Powers in selecting the Plenipotentiaries for meetings of the Conference.

(Paragraph 4 was agreed to on this understanding.)

M. PICHON then proposed consideration of Part II of the French draft note relating to the principles and methods of conducting the Peace Conference. He explained that the proposals therein contained had been drafted on the basis of the principles put forth by President Wilson in his speech of the 8th January, 1918,[4] and in his speech of the 27th September, 1918,[5] and also on the answers which the Allies had drawn up on the 5th November 1918.[6]

9. Peace Conference Principles and Methods

PRESIDENT WILSON proposed, as a practical consideration, that a number of questions should be referred to the Delegates of the five Great Powers, so that they could discover their differences and points

[4] *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 12.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 316.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 468.

of agreement before going into the Conference. For instance, if the League of Nations was to serve as the medium of treatment for any particular question, then they should begin by discussing a League of Nations. Therefore he could not now agree on a sequence or order of discussion. For example, some of the points, such as the publicity to be given to Treaties, could not be decided until they knew what was meant. He did not mean by this that there should not be confidential conversations between countries, but that no Treaty should come into force until it had been published. That was a subject for general discussion. It was proposed that that should be referred to the national Delegates. The same conclusion applied to other questions, such as the treatment of Russia, which called for immediate decision. It was necessary to remove quicksands before they could begin to walk. Therefore, the order of discussion should be settled from time to time. A list of subjects to be discussed could be prepared, but not the order of sequence.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed his entire agreement. He thought they must first take Russia and the League of Nations, and there might be other questions which were ripe for immediate settlement, and could be got out of the way.

MR. BALFOUR said that they must not put off too long the discussion of boundaries. The new countries would be in a state of perpetual disturbance until they knew where they were.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the question should be discussed from the point of view of its effect on demobilisation.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed that demobilisation stood in relation to the condition of Russia, Germany, &c.

PRESIDENT WILSON wished to make a suggestion, namely, that each of the following questions be referred to the National Peace Delegates, with a request that they should submit their recommendations as concisely and as soon as possible:—

1. League of Nations.
2. Reparation.
3. New States.
4. Frontiers and territorial changes.
5. Colonies.

These subjects could then be discussed by the present Conference in the order given.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested adding, "The responsibility of the authors of the war."

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this question need not be referred to a Committee, since it could be settled forthwith by themselves.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that President Wilson proposed that certain questions should be referred to the five National Peace Delegates,

who would report to this Conference. This Conference was merely a Supreme War Council. As such it had no power to discuss such questions. Nothing could be done until the Peace Conference was brought together. He would therefore propose that an official meeting of the Peace Conference should be called together forthwith. Nothing of importance need be discussed, but the work could be distributed and questions could be referred to the Committees, as suggested by President Wilson. The day afterwards the Delegates of the five Great Powers could meet to examine questions ready for solution, such as Russia, and at the same time the National Delegates could be drawing up their recommendations.

PRESIDENT WILSON explained that his idea was a very simple one. He thought that the five Powers should hold a Conference to find out their own minds before they entered into the process of the Peace Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that President Wilson's proposal came to this: that they intended to arrive at a complete understanding before the Peace Conference could meet. That would take some months, and would be a great disappointment to the public. They had trumpeted abroad that the Conference was going to meet forthwith, and the Delegates had been appointed and had arrived. He fully agreed that the five Powers should first come to a decision amongst themselves; but it was necessary first to hold an initial meeting of the Peace Conference and give the Delegates a mandate to start work. After that the heads of the Associated Powers could meet together.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that no great difference existed between the two proposals. He fully agreed with President Wilson that they should exchange views in order to discover their differences and concentrate their efforts on these. But he also agreed with M. Clemenceau that a meeting of the Peace Conference should be called forthwith.

M. PICHON said that President Wilson's proposal was then accepted, with the amendment suggested by M. Clemenceau.

(This was agreed to.)

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed that the meeting of the Peace Conference should be held on Thursday, the 16th January, 1919, at 14:30 o'clock.

BARON SONNINO pointed out that the Italian Delegates had not yet been appointed, and that Signor Orlando had left for Italy. The Italian Delegates could be appointed in a day or two, but they would then have to get to Paris. He proposed, therefore, that the Conference should be postponed to a later date.

MR. BALFOUR enquired how many of the important Delegates were now present in Paris.

M. PICHON replied that most of the Delegates had already arrived in Paris.

M. CLEMENCEAU insisted that no further delay should occur in holding the meeting. Two months had passed since the Armistice had been signed, and nothing had been done. He therefore urged that the meeting should be held on Thursday next.

BARON SONNINO said that he would regret the absence of his colleagues, but would withdraw any further objection. On the other hand, he wished to point out that if the object of the Conference was to pass President Wilson's proposal, it would, in his opinion, be found impossible to get twenty States to hand over to five Powers all questions relating to the drawing up of the Peace Treaty.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the question might be disposed of as follows: The first Peace Conference would be opened by a speech by President Poincare; then M. Clemenceau would take the chair, and he would invite the small States to put forward their claims, and to submit these to the Great Powers for their consideration.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the small Powers should send their proposals to the Secretary of the Conference, in order to remove the impression that the big Powers were acting independently. M. Clemenceau would impress on these small States that the Great Powers wished to have their views, and, as far as possible, to be guided by them.

M. PICHON said that he understood that all the small Powers should be invited to attend the first meeting.

BARON SONNINO proposed that the first meeting should be postponed until Saturday, in order to give time for Signor Orlando and the Italian Delegates to attend.

M. CLEMENCEAU accepted this suggestion, and said that meanwhile other subjects could be brought under discussion. He suggested that a meeting should be held on Wednesday, the 15th instant, to settle the draft regulations of the Conference and to discuss the situation in Russia.

(It was agreed that the First Allied Peace Conference should be held on Saturday, the 18th January, 1919, at 14:30 o'clock, and that a meeting of the Supreme War Council should be held on Wednesday, the 15th January, 1919, at 10:30 o'clock.)

10. Announcement in Press of Meeting of Peace Conference

(It was also decided that an announcement should be published in the press to the effect that the formal Conferences would open on the following Saturday, the 18th January, 1919.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, January 13, 1919.

Notes on Conversation Held in the Office of M. Pichon at the Quai d'Orsay on January 13, 1919

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:	President Wilson
	Mr. Lansing
	Mr. Frazier
	Mr. Harrison
FRANCE:	M. Clemenceau
	M. Pichon
	M. Dutasta
	M. Berthelot
	Capt. Portier
GREAT BRITAIN:	Mr. Lloyd George
	Mr. Balfour
	Lt. Col. Hankey
	Major Caccia
ITALY:	M. Sonnino
	Count Aldrovandi
	Capt. Jones
JAPAN:	Viscount Chinda
	Mr. Matsui

Interpreter: M. Mantoux.

(Continuation of Meeting of January 12, 1919.)

DISCUSSION OF THE PROCEDURE OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE referred to the question of the representation of the Dominions,—a question which had been suspended and not decided at the first meeting. He stated that he had discussed the matter with the Dominion Premiers and felt that each Dominion should be allowed to have a representative present when questions came up which concerned it. He had also promised to allow the Dominions representation in the British panel of five.

Mr. Lloyd George also stated that he thought it just that the Independent Indian Principalities should be represented at the Conference. He pointed out that the population of these states amounted to some 70 million and that they had furnished 150,000 troops. Their relationship to the Empire was established by Treaties of Peace.

PRESIDENT WILSON wished to make it clear that he personally had no objection to the Dominions being represented at the Conference. He then asked whether Mr. Lloyd George considered the following an equitable allotment: Canada, two representatives; Newfoundland. one; South Africa, two; Australia, two; New Zealand, one.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it only right that Canada, Australia and New Zealand should be properly represented as they had done so much in the War.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that Newfoundland be given a place in the British Panel.

PRESIDENT WILSON, therefore, proposed that Canada, Australia and South Africa be given two representatives each, and New Zealand, British India and Independent India one representative each, on the understanding that they were to be present only when matters which concerned them were under discussion. The proposal was approved.

2. It was decided that the individuals who are at present in Paris representing certain sections of Russia, should not be admitted as delegates to the conference. It was agreed that a final decision as to Russian representation at the Conference should be postponed until the whole Russian question shall have been discussed and a policy determined.

3. PRESIDENT WILSON presented arguments in support of a larger representation for Brazil. He pointed out that Brazil had lent certain assistance in the War; that there were 30 million people in Brazil, and that it was important for the Allies to attach Brazil firmly to their interests. President Wilson mentioned also the large number of German emigrants in Southern Brazil. MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that Brazil had sent but two or three torpedo boats and no troops. PRESIDENT WILSON stated that he was considering the matter from the point of view of the future and not of the past.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he merely wished to point out the possible effect it might have on other countries such as Greece, Serbia and Belgium. However, he did not wish to delay the proceedings of the meeting, and would not resist the President's proposal. BARON SONNINO suggested that Belgium be likewise given three delegates.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that should this be done, the effect of giving three to Brazil would be entirely lost.

It was agreed to give three delegates to Brazil.

4. PRESIDENT WILSON referred to the matter of having a delegate from Costa Rica present at the Conference. He gave a short history of the events which led up to the existing condition of affairs in Costa Rica, pointed out that he had not recognized the present Government, that the Government of Gen. Tinoco had hastened to declare War on Germany after the United States had done so for the sole purpose of obtaining recognition, and that he felt that he could not afford to associate with a representative of Costa Rica at the Peace Conference. For these reasons, he proposed that Costa Rica should not be represented at the Peace Conference. This was agreed to.

5. It was agreed that small states theoretically belligerent should have one delegate.

6. It was agreed that those states which had broken relations with the enemy should be assimilated to neutrals, and should have one delegate who should be present at the Conferences in which questions concerning them might be discussed.

7. M. PICHON suggested that a committee be formed to settle details regarding the representation of small states and neutral states. PRESIDENT WILSON named Mr. Frazier as his representative.

8. The suggestions contained in the French plan [1] under subheading 2 of Section I regarding Terms of Participation were accepted, and it was agreed that the five powers whose representatives were then present should "summon" the Neutrals and states in the process of formation in the manner set out in the last paragraph of the section under consideration.

9. The first two paragraphs of subheading 3, of Section I, Representation of Enemy Powers, were accepted. The questions contained in the remaining paragraphs were postponed for the present.

10. MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that he had no objection to the suggestion regarding the attendance of Technical Experts at the Peace Conference provided this did not affect the understanding regarding the use of the panel system.

This was agreed to.

11. M. PICHON explained that the messages and notes of President Wilson had been taken as a basis for the order of the debates in Section II.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated that he was going to propose that certain questions be referred to those present with a view to determine their organic connection. He hoped that those present would not agree on any fixed order of discussion. For instance, he believed it more important at the moment that those present should consider the whole question of treatment of Russia rather than the publicity of Treaties.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE endorsed the suggestion.

MR. BALFOUR thought that the question of Boundaries was of importance.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that what was needed was a "list" and not an "order" of subjects to be discussed.

PRESIDENT WILSON submitted a list of subjects which he suggested should be referred to each Delegation with a request that they be prepared to state their views on each:

League of Nations
Reparation
New States
Boundaries
Colonies.

[1] Vol. I, p. 386.

12. This proposal precipitated a general discussion of the necessity for fixing a date for a General Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that there had already been a month's delay and that the public had been greatly disappointed. He therefore suggested that Thursday next be fixed for the first formal Conference.

BARON SONNINO explained that it would be impossible for M. Orlando to return by that date and suggested that the first meeting take place on Saturday, January 18th.

This proposal was accepted.

It was agreed that M. Poincare would deliver the opening address.

It was further agreed that the list of subjects for discussion submitted by President Wilson should be communicated to the delegates of the other belligerent states, with a request that they communicate their views on the subjects named to the Great Powers, whose desire it was to meet the wishes of the smaller belligerent states as far as possible.

It was decided that the next meeting to continue the discussion of the Plan of Procedure should take place at 10:30 a. m., January 15, 1919.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, on Wednesday, January 15, 1919, at 10:30 a. m.

PRESENT

FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN	ITALY
M. Clemenceau.	The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George.	Baron Sonnino.
M. Pichon.	The Right Hon. A. J. Balfour.	Count Aldrovandi.
M. Dutasta.	Lieutenant-Colonel Sir M. P. A. Hankey.	Major A. Jones.
M. Berthelot.	Major A. M. Caccia.	
Captain A. Portier.		

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	JAPAN
President Wilson.	M. Matsui.
Mr. R. Lansing.	Viscount Chinda.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.	

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. Publications in Press

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there were two preliminary questions which he wished to raise. He had been under the impression that an agreement was always to be reached as to what was to be published in the Press. It was very important that the Press of one country should not give more information than that published by any of the others. There were two things published in the French Press to which he wished to draw particular attention. Firstly, it had been agreed that nothing should be published regarding the placing of Germany's gold reserve in a safe place. It had been recognized that any publicity on this question would be tantamount to giving notice of our intentions to the Germans and Bolshevists. This was the very thing it had been desired to avoid. Secondly, he himself had enquired at the last meeting whether anything should be published on the subject of the number of delegates apportioned to the British Dominions and the smaller Powers. It had been agreed to say nothing until the list had been accepted in its final form. Now, this information had been published in the French Press. As a result, he himself had received numerous enquiries from the Representatives of the British Dominions, to which he could only reply that nothing definite had been settled.

He fully admitted that this publication was no doubt due to inadvertence. But steps were necessary to prevent a repetition of such occurrences.

M. PICHON explained that the reason for the publication of this information in the French Press was that the French correspondents had learnt that the facts mentioned by Mr. Lloyd George had been cabled to the United Kingdom and to the United States of America. And as there was no censorship in those countries, it was feared that this information would get into the British and American papers, and the French correspondents were anxious not to be forestalled by the Foreign Press.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that if M. Pichon's statement gave a correct interpretation of the case, there could be no safety. As regards Great Britain, one man had been appointed on behalf of the Press, who received all matter for publication in the Press. In the two cases under consideration nothing had been communicated to the British Press and nothing had appeared in that Press. Unfortunately, the information which he complained of had the drawback of being accurate.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed that immediate steps should be taken to prevent such things appearing in the French Press. The mere fact that French journalists might or might not be forestalled by journalists of other countries could not be accepted as an excuse. Henceforth they must prevent the occurrence of any leakage of this nature.

MR. LANSING complained that, as a matter of fact, the French censorship was stopping messages addressed to America. The Americans had no censor of their own, but Mr. Baker had been appointed to give to the American newspaper correspondents such information as might be published.

M. PICHON explained that a Committee had met yesterday and agreed on the text of the information to be communicated to the Press. He now proposed that this Committee, consisting of an American, British, French and Italian representative, should meet daily and that the information so supplied should alone be published. Everything else would come under censorship and be refused publication.

(It was agreed, as regards the proceedings of these Conferences, that messages should be published as might be communicated officially to the Press by the Secretariat.)

BARON SONNINO said that it would be advisable to add that the opinions expressed by a particular Power on any question discussed should not be published, as if this were done it would undoubtedly interfere with the absolute freedom of discussion desired.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed. It was particularly important that the Press should not give prominence to views expressed by one Power which were not in complete accord with the views of other Powers. In carrying out these discussions they frequently had to fight a question out, but eventually ended in agreement. If the Press jumped in before agreement had been reached, it led to the difference becoming stereotyped. As an instance of this, he would mention the publication of M. Pichon's reply to the British Government in the "Humanité". He fully recognized that the French Government regretted this publication. But, unfortunately, the French Press continued to argue as if there was a difference of opinion between Great Britain and France on this subject. That was very bad. He fully realized that certain of the newspapers could not be influenced, but in so far as it was possible to influence the Press, steps should be taken to prevent their discussing such controversies as might from time to time arise between one country and another. Thus, as regards the question of Russia, Great Britain and France had never even exchanged views. But it made it very difficult if the Press of the place where the Conference was actually meeting began an attack on the Delegates of another country. The "Echo de Paris", for instance, continued to attack the British view without having seen the British Note. He could naturally sanction the British document being published. That would hardly be fair, but he might be forced to do so if the controversy continued in the Press.

(It was agreed that the Press should be prevented, as far as possible, from discussing controversial matters as between the Great Powers represented.)

M. PICHON said they would now take under consideration the draft scheme of procedure in regard to the Peace Conference. As a result of the work done the day before, the following Draft Regulations had been drawn up:—

2. Procedure of the Peace Discussions

I. The Conference assembled to fix the conditions of peace, first as regards the preliminaries of peace, and then the definite treaty of peace, shall include the representatives of the belligerent Allied and Associated Powers.

The belligerent Powers with general interests (the United States of America, British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan) shall take part in all sittings and Commissions.

The belligerent Powers with special interests (Belgium, Brazil, China, the British Dominions and India, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Serbia, the Czecho-Slovak Republic, and the States of Latin-America) shall take part in the sittings at which questions concerning them are discussed.

The Powers in a state of diplomatic rupture with the enemy Powers, Neutral Powers and States in process of formation shall be heard either orally or in writing when summoned by the Powers with general interests, at sittings devoted especially to the examination of

questions directly concerning them, but only so far as these questions are concerned.

The conditions of the representation of Russia shall be fixed by the Conference at the moment when the business concerning Russia is examined.

II. The Powers shall be represented by plenipotentiary delegates to the number of— 5 for the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan; 3 for Brazil; 2 for Belgium, China, Greece, Roumania, Serbia, Poland and the Czecho-Slovak Republic; 1 for Portugal and Siam; 1 for Cuba, Guatemala, Hayti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, and Panama.

The British Dominions and India shall be represented as follows: 2 delegates each for Australia, Canada, South Africa and India (including the Native States); 1 delegate for New Zealand. The representation of the Dominions (including Newfoundland) shall, besides, be included in the representation of the British Empire by the panel system.

Montenegro shall be represented by one Delegate, but the rules concerning the designation of this Delegate shall not be fixed until the moment when the political situation of this country shall have been cleared up.

III. Each delegation of Plenipotentiaries may be accompanied by Technical Delegates properly accredited, and by two stenographers. The Technical Delegates may be present at the sittings for the purpose of furnishing information which may be asked of them. They shall be allowed to speak for the purpose of giving any desired explanations.

He wished to enquire whether these Regulations were accepted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that the words "may be" should be substituted for "shall be" in the second paragraph of Article II. The use of the words "shall be" made the clause mandatory. There was no necessity for this.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed to Mr. Lloyd George's proposal, but claimed the same concession for all other Powers. He suggested adding the following sentence:—

"It is understood that each Delegation shall have the right to avail itself of the panel system."

BARON SONNINO said that he understood that it had been agreed that any Power could change its Representatives from time to time.

M. PICHON said that as regards the numbers of Delegates for each Power (Article II. of the above Draft Regulations), the fact that only two Representatives had been apportioned to Belgium, China, Greece, and Serbia had given rise to bitter complaints. He wished to suggest, therefore, that all Powers who had been in the war since the beginning should be given three representatives and that three representatives should also be allotted to the British Dominions.

MR. BALFOUR asked permission to repeat his protest on behalf of a small country, namely, Portugal. This country really had a case.

Putting out of consideration all questions of prejudice, the fact remained that Portugal had sent some 60,000 troops to the Western Front. At a critical stage of the war they had given all the field guns which had been supplied to them by the French. They had, in addition, sent troops to the Colonies. Under these circumstances, they were justified in thinking that it was monstrous that they should be classed with Siam. Was it not an outrage that Brazil, a former part of the Portuguese Empire, should receive three representatives whilst Portugal had only one? Portugal knew that it had no supporters, and had turned to its most ancient ally, Great Britain, to support their case. He (Mr. Balfour) honestly thought that they ought to have two Representatives. If, now, three Representatives were given to China, and Portugal retained only one, a serious injustice would be done. . . .

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that China had sent labourers to Europe.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied that Portugal had done so too. The labour contribution of Portugal had been as great as that of China.

M. PICHON stated that, in a protest sent in by China yesterday, she asked for five delegates. China based her claim on the importance of her territory, her population, the natural resources of the country and the part it played in the world.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the same arguments would apply to India.

BARON SONNINO said he saw no reason why Portugal should be given an exceptionally low position. She had been one of the belligerent powers, and she had done her best. She had supplied some 100,000 men and had lost some 15,000 dead in battle. He thought that Portugal should be placed in the same position as the other small States. She must not be put in a position different to Belgium, Greece, Roumania, or Serbia. Therefore, each must have either two or three Representatives.

M. PICHON enquired whether it was agreed that Belgium and Serbia, who had fought throughout the War, should receive three Representatives and Portugal and Greece two Representatives each.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he could not accept this proposal. The Great Powers, America, Great Britain and France, each with a population, all told, of some 100 million souls, were only to have five Representatives. Clearly Belgium, which at the height of its power only put some 150,000 men in the field, could not have three Delegates. There was no sense of proportion in such a proposal and no point in it. After all, the Delegates were only there to present their case and their case could be presented just as well by two Representatives as by three and perhaps better still by one only.

He thought if they agreed to give two Representatives all round there would be no room for jealousy. Each Power had done its best, including Portugal. There were also the Portuguese Colonies to be considered, Portugal being one of the chief Colonial Powers. Therefore he would propose that two Representatives should be granted all round.

(It was agreed to accept the Rule given above, Article II. being amended to read as follows:—

"II. The Powers shall be represented by Plenipotentiary Delegates to the number of— 5 for the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan; 3 for Brazil; 2 for Belgium, China, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Serbia, and the Czecho-Slovak Republic; 1 for Cuba, Guatemala, Hayti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, and Siam.

"The British Dominions and India shall be represented as follows:—2 Delegates each for Australia, Canada, South Africa and India (including the Native States); 1 Delegate for New Zealand. The representation of the Dominions (including Newfoundland) and India may, besides, be included in the representation of the British Empire by the panel system. It is understood that each Delegation shall have the right to avail itself of the panel system.

"Montenegro shall be represented by one Delegate, but the rules concerning the designation of this Delegate shall not be fixed until the moment when the political situation of this country shall have been cleared up.")

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that some publication should be issued in order to remove any misapprehension. He thought that the Powers might think that each of the Delegates had a vote, and that the number of Delegates would affect the number of votes. That misapprehension should be removed. The newspapers should be put in a position to explain that the number of Delegates did not represent a certain number of votes. Each country was merely put in a position to explain its case and in addition each Power was at liberty to change its Representatives from time to time.

(It was agreed that some publication should be made in newspapers in order to remove any misapprehension which might exist about the functions of the Delegates appointed to the Conference as regards the numbers accredited.)

M. PICHON said they could not [*now*] proceed with the consideration of the remaining articles of the Note submitted by the French Government (see Appendix "A" of I. C. 104).[1] Article III. stated that the delegates should take precedence according to the alphabetical order of the list of Powers (in French).

Article III. Order of Precedence of Delegates

[1] Vol. I, p. 386; the articles here referred to are those of section VI, beginning on p. 392.

(It was agreed that the Great Powers should take precedence in the following order:

Amérique, États-Unis d'.
Empire Britannique.
France.
Italie.
Japon.)

M. PICHON then read Article IV. as follows:—

Article IV. Authentication of Mandates of Delegates

"The Conference to be declared open by the President of the Republic; immediately after the President of the French Council of Ministers to be invested for the time being with the Chairmanship. A Committee, composed of the chief Plenipotentiary of each Allied or Associated Power shall proceed at once to the verification of the credentials of all members present."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that it would not be necessary for the Committee to be composed of the "chief" Plenipotentiary of each Allied Power. He thought that any one of the Delegates could perform this duty.

BARON SONNINO suggested that this duty could be carried out by one of the Plenipotentiaries of each of the five Great Powers only.

(It was agreed that Article IV. should read as follows:—

"The Conference to be declared open by the President of the Republic; immediately after the President of the French Council of Ministers to be invested for the time being with the Chairmanship. A Committee composed of one Plenipotentiary of each Allied or Associated Great Power shall proceed at once to the verification of the credentials of all members present."

M. PICHON then read Article V., as follows:—

Article V. Appointment of President and Vice-Presidents

"After the aforesaid verification, the Conference shall at once appoint a permanent President and four Vice-Presidents, chosen according to alphabetical order."

M. PICHON pointed out that a Vice-President would be required to take the place of the President in his absence.

(This clause was accepted without amendment.)

M. PICHON then read Article VI., as follows:—

Article VI. Secretariat

"A Secretariat, appointed outside the Delegation proper, to be submitted to the agreement of the Plenipotentiaries by the President, who will have the control of and responsibility for it.

"This Secretariat to be entrusted with the task of arranging for the procedure of the sittings, of classifying the records, of looking after the administrative organisation of the Conferences and, gen-

erally, of assuring the regular and punctual working of all services ascribed to it.

"The head of the Secretariat to be in charge of and responsible for all protocols and records.

"The records to be open at all times to the members of the Conference."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the interpretation to be given to this clause was that the Secretariat should be organised on exactly the same lines as had been followed in the case of the Supreme War Council. The same organisation should be continued. That organisation had always worked very well.

(This was agreed to.)

M. MATSUI asked that the Japanese Representatives should be authorised to appoint a Secretary.

M. PICHON replied that it was intended that each of the five Great Powers should appoint Secretaries.

(It was agreed that each of the five Great Powers should be empowered to appoint Secretaries.)

M. PICHON then read Article VII. as follows:—

Article VII. Communications to Press Concerning Proceedings of the Conference

"The work of the Conferences to be made public by means of daily official bulletins prepared by the Secretariat and issued every day at the same hour. The bulletins to be previously submitted to the members of the Conference for examination two hours at least before publication.

"Any member of the Conferences to have the right to request an alteration in the text of the bulletin. If a difference should arise, the point to be settled at the beginning of the next sitting.

"The Powers here represented and their Delegates expressly renounce all other communications concerning the proceedings of the Conferences."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this clause dealt with a very important point. Representatives of the Press had enquired from him whether they were entitled to go to any of the delegates and ask for information. He had replied, "Certainly not." This was undoubtedly the view held by his colleagues.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether there was any serious objection in the case of the large Conferences to having members of the Press present. He asked this question because leaks were absolutely certain to occur in such large Conferences, where a number of channels existed. In these large Conferences nothing of an embarrassing nature would be discussed. Important and delicate questions would have been discussed beforehand and only such questions as had been digested in various ways would be placed before these Conferences. Thus, questions such as those of Poland, Russia, etc., would never be dis-

cussed in public in the large Conferences. He himself would favour complete publicity rather than the publication of incorrect information through leakage.

MR. BALFOUR thought that President Wilson's proposals were open to the prima facie assumption that all the work of the big Conferences would be formal; that is to say, that merely agreed propositions would come before those Conferences. As a matter of fact, many other questions, such as those relating to the creation of new States, were bound to come under discussion. If Press representatives were admitted at these big Conferences, all questions would have to be thrashed out separately and it would be found necessary to bring into the small Conferences Czecho-Slovaks, Arabs, and others, in order that an agreement might be reached beforehand. It would end in these representatives of small States taking part in the discussions of the Great Powers.

PRESIDENT WILSON replied that his comment on that was, that it would not be possible in a big Conference to discuss such questions. The Representatives of the small States had, as a matter of fact, already stated their case in documents which had been published. They could say no more. It would, however, give them satisfaction to publish their views abroad. But, on the other hand, it would not be necessary for us to state our case in public. Written documents could be issued.

M. PICHON thought if President Wilson's proposals were accepted they would provoke unending discussions. If the Representatives of the smaller States knew that their speeches would be reported *in extenso* in the newspapers, they would feel bound to enter fully into all discussions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE hoped that President Wilson would not press the case until it had been further considered. There was a great deal to say in favour of President Wilson's idea as regards the publicity to be given to the large Conferences, but he feared there would be no end to these Conferences if reporters were there. One Delegate would get up and put forward all his case, so that it could be published in his native land and, as there were some twenty native lands, once they began that sort of business there would be no end to it. Again, someone would have to reply and he was not sure whether in the end this might not lead to unpleasant disputes in the Conference Room.

M. PICHON said there was another point of view which should be considered. During the study of the Peace Preliminaries it would be dangerous to let Germany know our difficulties. It was not desired to make a present to her of arguments which might divide the Allies

and so enable her to escape the necessity of accepting the conditions of the Preliminary Peace.

M. CLEMENCEAU said there was another point also to be considered. They had agreed that all decisions reached by the five Great Powers should be unanimous. In order to obtain this unanimity he would himself be prepared to give way on some points, and when these questions finally came before the large Conferences he would accept the decision so reached in silence. But if the Press were admitted to these Conferences, and the question came under discussion, he would be bound to take part in the debate. He could not let it be said that he had refused to speak on a question about which he held decided views. It would, however, clearly be seen that if he then expressed his opinion it would raise great confusion at the meetings.

BARON SONNINO expressed his complete agreement with Mr. Balfour. If the Press were admitted, not only would the small Powers put the whole of their case before the Conference, but the Great Powers would be compelled to do the same. Each Power would, therefore, be obliged to put forward the whole of its case—the public would expect that. As a result, the Conferences would never end.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether they could really avoid, in any case, the difficulties mentioned by Baron Sonnino. He did not think they were going to escape a syllable and they would still be obliged to give their answers even if the Conferences were held in private.

BARON SONNINO said a compromise might frequently be arrived at between two small States in private. At a large Conference, if held in private, the grounds upon which this decision had been reached need not be given. But if the Press were admitted, the parties to the compromise would feel compelled to put forward the whole of their case for the benefit of their countrymen.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether, even if the Press were excluded, any method could be found to prevent the leakage of information regarding the discussions that took place in the Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the only way to prevent leakage was not to give information. In the case of the Supreme War Council it had been found quite possible to maintain the desired secrecy.

BARON SONNINO held the view that a leakage of information was in many cases preferable to publicity.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had merely raised the point for discussion and he did not wish to press the question, but there certainly were two big sides to it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that all he wished was to press that for the moment the case should not be decided.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that, whatever decision was arrived at, it would be necessary to give information to the public of the various countries as a block, giving no advantage to one country over another.

(It was decided that the question should receive further consideration at a later date.)

M. PICHON next read Article VIII. of the Note, as follows:—

Article VIII

"The French language is acknowledged as official for the discussions and resolutions of the Conferences.

"The Delegates to be entitled to present observations or verbal communications in any language they may wish to use, on condition that a French translation be thereafter immediately provided. In this case, if the initiator so desires, the original foreign text may be appended to the official report."

M. PICHON said he would give the interpretation of this Article. It would be possible for each of the Delegates to speak in his own language, but there could only be one official text of the proceedings. It would be admitted that even translations could not express the exact shade of meaning of the original. It would therefore be necessary to have one text to which it might be possible to refer as the official version. In recent times French had always been accepted as the diplomatic language. It had been accepted as the official language at the Conferences which had been held when the Treaties of Paris, of Berlin, of Peking and of Algeciras had been drawn up. Again, at the Hague Conferences all the conventions and proceedings had, by agreement, been drawn up in French. The Article now under consideration had, indeed, been taken almost textually from that which had been accepted by agreement for the Hague Conferences. Naturally, each of the Delegates had full right to the use of his own language, but only one text could be the official one. It was proposed that for the official text the French language should be used. This would not prevent the use of the English language, which was perhaps more widely spread and more widely known than any other language. Again, a French and an English text of all documents could be published. But should a dispute arise as to the correct interpretation to be given to a particular statement, the French text should be recognised as the official text.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE regretted that he could not accept the Article as at present drafted. He assured his French colleagues that he was in no way prejudiced on the subject of the French language. It was one of his greatest regrets that he was not better acquainted with it. But, for the first time in history, there would appear at a Conference of this class the representatives of the United States of

America, with a population of 100 million people, whose official language was English, and of the British Empire, with a total population of 350 millions, of which from 60 to 70 millions naturally spoke the English language. In other words, the official language of 160 to 170 million people to be represented at the Conference was English. He fully recognised that no attempt had been made to preclude the English language from being used at the Conference. But in the event of a dispute arising as to the interpretation of a given statement, the French language alone would be accepted. The British Empire had some experience on this question. In South Africa, Dutch and English were both recognised as official languages. Again, in Canada, French and English were the recognised official languages. In both cases the two texts were printed side by side and each was regarded as an official text. There had never been any practical difficulties, even though the test had been a far more severe one, since, in the case of legal documents, shades of interpretation, fine and subtle differences in words were of great importance, whereas in the case of the interpretation of Treaties, difficulties always arose on broad questions. He did not intend that the language employed by the majority of the people in the Alliance should be preferred to the French language, but he did propose that the English language should be used side by side with the French in the official documents of the Conference. He proposed, therefore, that the first paragraph of Article VIII should be amended to read:—

"The French and English languages are acknowledged as official for the discussions and resolutions of the Conference."

Baron Sonnino said that, in a general way, he would prefer that only one language should be accepted as the authoritative language; but if two languages were to be admitted, it became very difficult to preclude the use also of the Italian language. French and Italian citizens were numerically equal. If only one language was to be admitted, he would agree to the use of French, because, historically, French had been recognised as the official language. But if the historic rule was to be changed, then Italian should also be admitted. Otherwise it would look as if Italy was being treated as an inferior by being excluded.

President Wilson agreed that they all recognised the historic claim of the French language. There were very few languages that excelled it in precision and delicacy of shading. But leaving this question out of consideration, he would invite attention to the fact that English was the diplomatic language of the Pacific. Negotiations, for instance, between Japan and China were conducted in English. All diplomatic transactions on that side of the globe were

in English. Further, there was an example of the use of three official languages in Switzerland, where French, Italian and German were used.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether this was really the case.

PRESIDENT WILSON continuing, said that the question under consideration was not really a matter for discrimination, but a question of general use. English was comprehended by a larger population than the language of any other of the peoples represented at the Conference. Therefore, it seemed to him that the language which was the official language of the greater part of the world was the most suitable language for a Conference of this nature. But he did not wish to propose that English should be the only official language. His proposal was that both French and English should be accepted as such. He fully recognised the claims of the Italians, both on account of the beauty of their language and on sentimental and other grounds. But it was so plainly the fact that English was now the language used by the great majority of the peoples represented at the Conference that it justified discrimination as against Italian.

BARON SONNINO pointed out that at Versailles, though the procès-verbaux of the Supreme War Council were printed only in English and French, the conclusions reached were printed in three languages. Was there any objection to the resolutions of the Peace Conference being given in three languages.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that in that case they should also be given in Japanese. He thought the question could only refer to the adoption of two languages or one language.

BARON SONNINO thought that, in the case of disputes, a decision as to the correct interpretation to be given would be easier if three languages were given, especially as it should be remembered that only a slight difference existed between nuances of the French and Italian languages.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he wished to draw attention to the second paragraph of this Article, which apparently entitled Delegates to submit observations in any language they chose, provided a translation in French was provided. It would obviously be a great burden to supply a French translation of every document and this part of the Article should not be retained.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was greatly embarrassed. He fully admitted that the English language was a most widely spread language and had brought with it great activity and liberal institutions. Now, in ancient times, Latin had admittedly been the official language and French had followed it. The French language possessed the great advantage of extreme precision, which was useful in the case of

official documents. Mr. Lloyd George had said that in South Africa and Canada the use of two languages had caused no trouble. He had also said that the interpretation of legal documents gave rise to greater troubles than the interpretation of Treaties. As a matter of fact, differences of opinion in the interpretation of Treaties led to the most serious upheavals. This fact had been fully recognised at the Hague and even at the Berlin Conferences, where it had been agreed to accept the French language. Still, he was prepared to admit that other languages (English and Italian) had claims and he was fully prepared to recognise those claims. He proposed, therefore, that they should retain perfect liberty to use the English, Italian and French languages at the Conferences, without the necessity of supplying French translations. Each of the texts, whether in English, French, or Italian, would be treated as the standard text. But if any difficulties or differences arose as to the correct interpretation, the French text would be recognised as the official text. In other words the three languages received complete recognition, but, in case of dispute, the French text would be accepted as the correct one. To give effect to his views he would make the following proposal:—

"The English, French, and Italian languages will be recognised as the official languages of the Conference, the French version holding good in case of dispute."

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether the procès-verbaux should be kept in three languages.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied in the affirmative.

MR. BALFOUR thought that in reality there was no difference between the procedure proposed by M. Clemenceau and that given in the original text, since French was still to be the official language, which was to be accepted in case of dispute.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would prefer to leave the case until the afternoon, in order that it might be given further consideration.

(The Meeting then adjourned, to meet again in the afternoon at 2.30 p. m.)

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, January 15, 1919, at 14:30 O'clock

PRESENT

FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN	ITALY
M. Clemenceau.	The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George.	Baron Sonnino.
M. Pichon.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.	Count Aldrovandi.
M. Dutasta.	Lt.-Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	Major A. Jones.
M. Fromageot.	Captain E. Abraham.	
M. Berthelot.		
Captain A. Portier.		

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	JAPAN
President Wilson.	M. Matsui.
Mr. R. Lansing.	Viscount Chinda.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.	

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. The Official Language of the Conference

M. PICHON said that the question of languages remained to be settled. He asked whether the text proposed by M. Clemenceau was accepted by the Meeting. This text was to the effect that the English, French, and Italian languages would be recognized as official languages at the Conference, the French version holding good in case of dispute.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he wished to present one of the aspects of this matter. Undoubtedly, French had been the language of European diplomacy in the past, but we were now dealing with a new case. This case did not affect only Europe: the rest of the world had come into the arena. A new Great Power was now concerned in the business of world diplomacy. He referred to the United States, whose language was English. The precedent in favour of the French language in diplomacy was only a European precedent. The language of diplomacy on the other side of the globe was English. There were, therefore, two precedents. Neither could be followed exclusively, as this was a Congress of the whole world. A very large part of the people affected by the settlements we hope to make use the English language. It was doubtful whether Americans, if they had before them a French document, could ever feel quite sure that it accurately represented their thoughts. The same

doubtless was the case with a Frenchman, if confronted with a document in English. He felt, therefore, that there should be two official languages. He made this proposal without intending any disrespect for the Italian language, the literature of which was justly admired throughout the world. The Italian language, however, would be known only to a small part of the representatives constituting the Congress. If the language of a minority were to be given official status, this principle would have to extend to the languages of other minorities. Harmony could be attained as between the languages by the Permanent Secretariat, the creation of which was contemplated. The officials on this Secretariat would, doubtless, have a perfect knowledge both of French and of English. Such knowledge of a greater number of languages would be hard to obtain. He therefore advocated the adoption of a bi-lingual scheme with great earnestness, as what we were about to do was to affect the future of the world, and all needless difficulties should be avoided. He therefore proposed that French and English should be the official languages.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then suggested that the English and French languages should be recognized as the official languages of the Conference, and that in any case of dispute the referee should be the League of Nations.

M. PICHON said that he wished to make certain observations. He wished to point out that this was not the first time that the nations of America were represented in an international diplomatic Conference in Europe. He would instance the two Hague Conferences. In both cases French had been adopted unanimously as the official language. At these Conferences, not only had the United States been represented, but also Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, and the Argentine. That very morning President Wilson had recognized that French had an historical privilege in this matter. He therefore appealed to him in order that, at the end of a War in which France had suffered so heavily, she should not find herself by the very first act of the Conference deprived of this ancient prerogative. M. Clemenceau, in a conciliatory spirit, had agreed that there should be two other official languages in addition to French, only reserving for the last the text which might be appealed to in exceptional cases of disputed interpretation.

BARON SONNINO said that he was satisfied with M. Clemenceau's formula, which recognized three languages as equally official, and, as a matter of convenience, reserved one for reference in case of contest. This was a departure from precedent. If a departure from precedent was to be made, he urged most strongly that Italian should

not be excluded. Italy had put four to five million soldiers in the field, and that should be taken into account.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that if he listened only to his sentiment he would yield at once to M. Pichon's appeal. He and the people of the United States felt nothing but admiration and affection for France, but he felt obliged in this matter to omit sentiment. The work of this Conference concerned the future and not the past. The documents prepared by it were not merely to be useful to historians, but were to be the basis of the life and of the action of Governments in the future. Amongst the peoples to be affected by these documents were a very considerable number whose speech would be English. He had constantly to remind himself that the task in hand was a practical one and not a sentimental one. He was not concerned with the respective merits of various languages, but only with the case of interpretation in the future furnished by any one of them. He would be greatly distressed if it were thought that he felt any disrespect for any language. He wished the future to think that this Conference had done its best in a practical spirit, and placed in the hands of posterity the most useful instruments that could be devised.

M. PICHON drew attention to the procedure followed by the Joint Secretariat of the Supreme War Council at Versailles. He read the note appended to the procès-verbaux by the Joint Secretariat, which is as follows:—

"The French text of the Minutes was prepared in the French Section, and has been approved by the Joint Secretariat. The English text was prepared in advance in the English Section for the benefit of the British Government. It differs in no essential from the French, but the latter is the official text."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that when this had been decided the case lay between two European Powers. There was now another Power whose language was English and, moreover, the affairs of the Congress concerned the whole world. He, further, would point out that, when the Supreme War Council met in London, the official language was English. It was only French when the meetings took place in France. In addition to North America, the population of India should be considered. It might safely be said that English was the language of some 500,000,000 or 600,000,000 people. He had no desire to minimise the importance of The Hague Conferences which had been referred to, but there was no doubt that the public had been at that time apathetic, and had taken very little interest in what was debated there. Such was not the case now. Practical considerations, therefore, inclined him to support President Wilson.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that there was, perhaps, more agreement than appeared on the surface. He, for one, would never forget that, but for the intervention of English-speaking peoples, not only from America but from the British Empire, France would have been lost. He also, like President Wilson, wished to make a new world and to do new things, but (it was perhaps a trite observation) the future was attached to the past, and had its root in it. The English would remain English and the French French. This war had been a European war. Peoples had come to it from all parts of the world, but it had occurred in France. He agreed that it was indispensable to pay a tribute to the people who had come from so far and in so generous a spirit, but he would point out that in this matter something new was being done. He himself, a French statesman, had proposed that the official documents which an Englishman or an American would get should be in English. That was a novelty, but some care must be taken. If, in the archives at The Hague, for instance, a document in the French language were kept, which in quite exceptional circumstances might be required by a tribunal for the correct interpretation of a text, in what way could this offend any nation? In respect to Italian, he was opposed to its exclusion. Italian was spoken in Italy, in Asia Minor, in the Argentine. We were endeavouring to give a status to small Nations. Why should we therefore limit the official languages of Great Powers? He felt that as each nation matured it would acquire a right to a text in its own language. But, nevertheless, there must at all times be one final text to which to appeal. He therefore held to the proposal he had made that morning.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that we need not for the moment decide whether there should be two or three official languages. The point under consideration was whether one should have the position of a final standard, for this language would in effect be the official language. If French were adopted for this purpose, it would be the duty of all concerned to scrutinize the text very carefully. He, for his part, did not feel competent of his ability to detect the shades of meaning in a French text. He would therefore revert to his proposal that when difficulties of interpretation arose the case should be referred to the League of Nations. There was a precedent for this in Canada, where laws and enactments were promulgated in two tongues. When the Court declared that the texts were different the matter was referred to Parliament, which then decided what the meaning should be. He made these observations without prejudice to the question of whether Italian should be an official language or not, though he felt that perhaps one Latin and one Anglo-Saxon language would suffice.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that all Treaties between France

and the United States had been drawn up in the two languages; the English version was submitted to the American Senate for confirmation. Should any difference of opinion arise in the interpretation of the agreement between the two countries, the only solution could be a friendly meeting between representatives. Neither language in this case could be the standard.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if arbitration occurred the arbiter would have to decide on the French text. He further pointed out that the Treaty of Versailles,[1] which concerned America, had been drawn up in French.

PRESIDENT WILSON retorted that at the time of that Treaty America had no Constitution requiring reference of Treaties to the Senate. He further pointed out that the Bryan Treaty [2] had been drawn up in two languages, and a special official status had not been granted to either.

M. PICHON said that that was the first time that French had been challenged as the language of diplomacy throughout the world. Even such as related to customs, telegraphs, cables, treaties of commerce, &c., were made in French. Even Bismarck, who was no friend of France, had raised no objection to the use of French in the Treaty of Berlin.

MR. BALFOUR said that Great Britain had always accepted the tradition of French as the diplomatic language. As between France and England, the French text would undoubtedly have been appealed to in any case of dispute; but as in the United States it was the Senate that had authority to conclude treaties, it was clear that that body must ask for an English text.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he adhered to his proposal, and did not feel that he could make any further concession.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the subject should be postponed and reconsidered at a later date.

M. PICHON read Article 9.[3]

2. Scheme of Regulations. Article 9

After some discussion it was decided to amend this article as follows:—

"Every document which is to be included in the official proceedings shall be presented in writing by the Plenipotentiaries who have brought it forward.

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[1] Apparently a reference to the Declarations for Suspension of Arms and Cessation of Hostilities, signed at Versailles January 20, 1783; see Hunter Miller (ed.), *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America* (Washington, 1931), vol. 2, p. 108.

[2] Treaty of September 15, 1914, between the United States and France for the advancement of general peace; English and French texts in Treaty Series No. 609; English text in *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 380.

[3] Of section VI of the French plan of procedure printed in vol. I. p. 386.

"No document or proposal may be brought forward save by one of the Plenipotentiaries and in the name of the Power which he represents."

The question of language in the original text of this Article was reserved for future discussion.

M. PICHON read Article 10 which, on President Wilson's suggestion, was amended as follows:—

Article 10

"A Plenipotentiary wishing to make a proposal unconnected with questions on the agenda or not arising from the discussion should give notice thereof twenty-four hours in advance, in order to facilitate discussion. This rule, however, applies only to original motions, not to amendments or subsidiary questions."

M. PICHON then read Article 11.

Article 11

After some discussion, this Article was amended, on Baron Sonnino's proposal, to read as follows, with the object of restricting the circulation of certain documents concerning only the Great Powers:—

"Petitions, memoranda, observations, or documents forwarded to the Conference by any person other than Plenipotentiaries should be received and filed by the Secretariat. Such of these communications as are of political interest will be summarized in a list to be distributed to all the Plenipotentiaries. This list will be kept up to date as occasion requires. All such documents will be deposited in the Archives."

Article 12

Article 12 was read by M. Pichon and accepted without amendment.

Article 13

Article 13 was read by M. Pichon and accepted without amendment.

Article 14

Article 14, on the Proposal of President Wilson, was suppressed.

Article 15

Article 15 was read and accepted without modification.

Article 16

Article 16 was read by M. Pichon. After some discussion, it was agreed that the drafting of resolutions should be left to the General Secretariat of the Conference.

The article therefore reads:—

"It will be the duty of the General Secretariat to draft the Resolutions adopted by the Conference."

3. Censorship of Cables

M. PICHON said that the decision that only official communiqués should be given to the Press required to be reinforced by certain measures. It was necessary to be able to check the despatch of telegrams to the Press in other countries. He therefore suggested that each Power should dele-

gate a Representative [to join a representative] [4] of the French Government and act with him for this purpose.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this proposal caused him some embarrassment. Not long before he had left America the Government had taken over the cables. It had then been suggested that this was done because he was coming to Europe, and meant to prevent the forwarding of any message unfavourable to himself. He had repudiated this insinuation, but if he now agreed to the censorship he would be convicting himself. In effect, he did not believe that anything was sent to America apart from the official communiqués, save what the American journalists obtained from the local Press. There were some eighty American journalists engaged in sending cables. The censorship of all their messages would involve a great deal of work and would entail great delay. He was of opinion that this matter could be set right if great care were taken by all concerned in the Conferences themselves. He also pointed out that France, if she so desired, could refuse any messages returning from America.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was not certain that if information went to America it would not on its return find its way into the British Press. It would certainly cause great discontent if the British Press obtained its information in this roundabout fashion. It was not possible to allow one half of the world to obtain news while depriving the other half.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that up to date nothing had been done in America to set the world on fire. He thought we could afford during the initial stage, when nothing of a very inflammatory nature was being discussed, to put the Press on trial. The British Government and the United States Government, and perhaps other Governments, dealt with one man, who acted as liaison between them and the Press. That person could be asked to assemble the pressmen and obtain a pledge from them to do nothing which might hamper the success of the Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU doubted whether this method would be successful in France.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE was of the same opinion with regard to Great Britain, but was willing to give this method a trial.

Mr. Lloyd George drew attention to Regulation No. 7, which he felt was not practicable. He felt that it would be impossible for the Secretariat to furnish bulletins in the time specified. He therefore suggested the following alternative:—

Article 7

"The Conference to give general directions to the Secretariat as to what should be published, and what should not be published. If

[4] These words appear in the British print but were omitted, apparently by typographical error, from the American print.

the Secretariat were in agreement on the text, publication would follow at once. If not, reference should be made to the heads of Delegations, or to any nominee acting on their behalf."

(This proposal was adopted.)

M. PICHON asked what the feeling of the meeting was concerning the meeting of the Peace Conference on the following Saturday.

4. Attendance at First General Meeting of Peace Conference

Should only belligerent States be summoned to attend, or also those who had severed diplomatic relations with Germany? As this was the first meeting, he himself was of opinion that both categories of States should be asked to attend.

(This was agreed to.)

M. PICHON further stated that he proposed to send the invitations to the Ambassadors or Ministers representing the various States, because he was as yet unaware of the exact identity of the various Plenipotentiaries. The invitation to the British Dominions and India would likewise be sent to the British Embassy.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether the session on Saturday was to be a public one.

M. PICHON returned a negative answer.

VISCOUNT CHINDA enquired whether Technical Representatives would be present.

M. PICHON again answered in the negative.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the question of Russia should be resumed on the following morning.

5. Russia

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, but added the proviso that no communication of this intention should be given to the Press, as it was most unlikely that any conclusion would be reached on this subject, either on the following day or even the day after. This might lead the Press to suppose that there was disagreement. He would, therefore, suggest that memoranda should be prepared by each Power concerning Russia, giving the actual information at their disposal in regard to the present situation both in Russia and Siberia.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that such memoranda could not be ready for the following day.

(It was understood that these memoranda would be prepared as soon as possible.)

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether it would be advisable to obtain from the General Conference an endorsement of the regulations now agreed upon.

6. Acceptance of Regulations by the General Conference

M. PICHON was of opinion that if all these regulations were submitted to the Conference, there would be a protracted debate, especially on the subject of the numbers of Delegates. The

small Powers were well aware that these regulations were being prepared by the Great Powers. No protest had as yet been made.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether there was any objection to the communication to the Press by the Secretariat of all the conclusions reached that day.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that a short communication should be prepared containing items of such interest as the numbers of Delegates, the panel system, that there was no question of voting by Delegates, but that each Delegation, whatever its size, would be regarded as one.

(It was decided that the next Meeting should take place at 10:30 a. m. on the following day.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, January 15, 1919.

Notes on the Conversations Held in the Office of M. Pichon at the Quai d'Orsay on January 15, 1919

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:	President Wilson
	Mr. Lansing
	Mr. Frazier
	Mr. Harrison
BRITISH EMPIRE:	Mr. Lloyd George
	Mr. Balfour
	Lt. Col. Hankey
	Major Abraham
FRANCE:	M. Clemenceau
	M. Pichon
	M. Dutasta
	M. Berthelot
	Prince de Bearn
ITALY:	M. Sonnino
	Count Aldrovandi
	Capt. Jones
JAPAN:	Viscount Chinda
	M. Matsui.

Interpreter: M. Mantoux.

I

MR. LLOYD GEORGE referred to the agreement that no information regarding what took place at the meetings should be given out other than that issued by the Secretariat. He wished to point out that he had noticed that the French Press had published the clause regarding the proposed demands on the German Government to deliver its gold reserve, etc.

M. PICHON explained that while it was true that it had been published here, this was due to the fact that the French journalist[s] knew that it was known to British and American journalists, and that it would appear in their papers, as there was no British or American censorship of the Press.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that if this were true, their whole system was faulty. He referred to the fact that the British Delegation had a man in Paris especially for the purpose of handling the Press, and stated that he was quite certain that the information had not been obtained from this representative.

M. PICHON agreed that it was quite possible that the information had not been communicated officially to the British Press.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that it did not really matter how the leak had occurred. The question to be decided was whether there should be a censorship, and whether information should be suppressed. M. Clemenceau asked if the American Delegation had a man to handle the Press, as the British had.

MR. WILSON answered in the affirmative and stated this official's name to be Ray Stannard Baker.

M. PICHON proposed that the same Secretariat that met yesterday should meet every day and decide on what should be given to the Press and that all else should be censored.

M. SONNINO understood that nothing should be given out regarding the respective views of the Delegates.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE laid stress on the importance of not having the Press give prominence to views of the representatives of any power which should not be in accord with the others. He called attention to the fact that the French Press were arguing the publication in *L'Humanité*, as if there were a difference between Great Britain and France. This was very bad. He thought it desirable that insofar as possible every effort should be made to influence the Press against discussing matters of supposed or actual controversy between one government and another.

II

MR. LLOYD GEORGE referred to the wording of the clause providing for the representation of the Dominions and India at the Conference and suggested that the word "may" be substituted for the word "shall".

The proposal was accepted.

M. PICHON informed the delegates that complaints had been received from the representatives of small powers like Belgium, China and Greece, that they had only two representatives, while Brazil had three.

He proposed, therefore, that the representations of small powers who have taken an active part in the War be raised to three.

MR. BALFOUR, in this connection, spoke on behalf of Portugal, who had sent 60,000 troops to the war, had supplied the field guns they had just obtained from the French, and had furnished a certain number of troops in her Colonies. If Siam has two representatives and Brazil, which is a daughter country of Portugal, has three, he thought Portugal should be allowed two. . . .

MR. WILSON proposed that Portugal be given two delegates.

MR. LANSING called attention to the fact that China had furnished 200,000 men.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE admitted this, but observed that they were all laborers.

M. PICHON stated that China has been very insistent for five delegates, basing her argument on the size of her population, her wealth, and the extent of her territory.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that India had 300,000,000, if China has 400,000,000.

M. PICHON inquired whether his proposition was accepted.

M. SONNINO suggested that no exception be made in the case of Portugal, and that she be permitted the same representation as the other small powers.

M. PICHON proposed that an exception be made in the cases of Belgium and Serbia, that they be given three delegates each, and that two delegates each be allowed to Portugal and Greece.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that some sense of proportion should be shown. He remarked that there was no point in giving Belgium three when the Great Powers had only five.

MR. WILSON inquired whether it would not be wise to have some statement issued to remove the apparent misapprehension regarding this question of the number of delegates. He remarked that we were now speaking only of votes, whereas the question was one of delegates, and not the number of votes; and he pointed out that each power was at liberty to use the Panel System, and could change its representatives.

It was decided to give Portugal two delegates instead of one.

CONTINUATION OF THE CONSIDERATION OF THE PROPOSED PROCEDURE

(See Section VI of the plan for the first conversations between the Allied Ministers submitted by the French Government, pages 12, et seq.)[1]

III

M. PICHON proposed, and it was agreed, that precedence of the Great Powers should be in the following French alphabetical order:

United States of America
British Empire
France
Italy
Japan.

Section 4 was approved.

Section 5 was approved.

[1] Vol. I, p. 392.

Section 6 was approved. M. PICHON suggested a Joint Secretariat composed of the representatives of the Great Powers then present.

Section 7. MR. LLOYD GEORGE considered this section very important. The Press had asked him whether they were entitled to go to the other delegates for information, and he had replied in the negative.

MR. WILSON asked whether there would be any objection, owing to the likelihood of leaks, to having the representatives of the Press present at the Peace Conferences, as practically nothing would be discussed in the large sessions, at which any statement would be little more than a public statement of what had been decided beforehand. For his part, he would prefer complete publicity, rather than publicity by leak.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the suggestion that the Press should be present at the Conferences was open to this prima facie objection, viz.: that if this were carried out, the meeting would become purely formal. Moreover, should the Press be present at the large conferences, it would then be necessary to bring the other powers, say the Czecho-Slovaks, into the small conferences.

MR. WILSON assumed that it would hardly be possible to discuss cases such as this in the large conferences. Moreover, the Czecho-Slovak representatives could hardly do more than repeat at the large conferences what they have already given to the World. The determination as to what would be proposed by the Great Powers at the large conferences would be decided by the Great Powers beforehand.

M. PICHON remarked that should the Press be admitted to the conferences, there would be no end of speaking.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the hope that President Wilson would not press the suggestion. He feared that there would be no end to the conferences if reporters were present. Small nations would want to speak at great length. Moreover, as Mr. Balfour had pointed out, this might result in very unpleasant incidents, for instance, between Serbia and Montenegro.

M. PICHON observed that in the study of the preliminaries of Peace, it would be dangerous to give the enemy too much information on the points on which there was any difficulty or particular discussion between the Great Powers. The enemy would immediately make use of that information to endeavor to sow discord among those present.

M. CLEMENCEAU spoke at some length on this point, saying among other things: "We must be unanimous; there will be much that I will accept to maintain our unanimity. I will make sacrifices. If I go to the Conference I will say nothing that might tend to divide it,

but if one small power that has not been here in our conversation, asks how France has come to accept a certain provision, I will have to reply, and do not forget that this will then be made before the public."

M. SONNINO observed that the small powers would be obliged to make great speeches.

MR. WILSON thought that the gentlemen present seemed to be more hopeful than he was that long arguments could be avoided at the Conference.

M. SONNINO submitted the following supposititious case: "Suppose a great and a small power agree to compromise. The small power is not obliged to give all the information to the public, but if the Conferences are open, then the small power will be forced to ventilate all her case."

MR. WILSON observed that he had raised the point for discussion, but that he did not press it.

M. CLEMENCEAU insisted that the Great Powers go before the public as a block. He suggested that this matter be brought up again.

Section 8. M. PICHON pointed out that French has invariably been used as the language for the standard texts of treaties. The proposal that French be the official language, did not mean that delegates should not have the right to use their own language. The particular reason for having one language as the official language is that there may be assured but one document containing the standard text. There has been no exception to the use of French for that purpose. M. Pichon referred particularly to the last Conference at The Hague. Moreover, this requirement would not affect the right of delegates to use their own language such as English, which has the widest circulation in the world.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that he was very sorry not to be able to accept the text proposed for this section. He wished to say that it was not a matter of prejudice, but for the first time we now had the case of the United States taking part in a European Peace and this made with the British Empire a majority of the Associated Governments having English as their official language. He thought M. Pichon's point about a single document a good one, but it was interesting to recall that both English and Dutch are used side by side in South Africa, and English and French in Canada. In both countries all documents are published in both languages, and both hold. This is more important than in the case of treaties, where differences arise on questions of principle, rather than shades of meaning. In these instances, questions come up in connection with the interpretation of legal documents, and he knew of no case where any difficulty had arisen. Consequently, inasmuch as the majority of the

Alliance use the English language, he proposed an amendment to Section VIII, making English as well as French an official language of the Conference.

M. SONNINO stated that he preferred that one language be used, for if two languages were chosen, the Italian language would appear to be placed in an inferior position.

MR. WILSON observed that all recognized the historical claim for French to be made the official language, but there were some circumstances which he believed should not be overlooked. For instance, the official language of the East is English, and diplomatic documents are in that language. This is not a matter of discrimination, as M. Sonnino has said, but a matter of generality of use. It seemed to him that a language which is the official language of the greater part of the world should be the official language of the Conference. He did not, however, propose that French be excluded. He only asked that it be considered in a preferential manner, as compared with Italian.

M. PICHON referred to the fact that the resolutions of the Versailles Conference were in French.

M. CLEMENCEAU admitted that he was considerably embarrassed. He saw the justice of the claim that the English language was the language most commonly spoken throughout the world, and that it has carried civilization and liberal institutions wherever it has penetrated, but he would point out that French has taken the place of Latin, which, in its time, was the official language of the world, and moreover, it has the advantage of extreme precision. Nevertheless, he had the greatest desire to give each language its full right. Consequently, if English is admitted, it would not be right to exclude Italian.

He therefore proposed that there should be three official languages, and if a question of interpretation should ever arise, the French text would rule.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that this would make French the official language, or as Mr. Wilson suggested, the standard language.

MR. WILSON inquired whether the official minutes would then be kept in all three languages.

MR. BALFOUR requested that M. Clemenceau be good enough to submit his proposal in writing, so that he might see the actual wording of the clause, and that this should be presented for consideration at the afternoon meeting.

The conversations were resumed at 2:30 p. m.

M. PICHON submitted a new text for Article VIII, proposed by M. Clemenceau: (English, French and Italian to be the official languages—French the standard text).

MR. WILSON asked permission to present the following aspects of the matter: French has been the language of European diplomacy, but we have now reached the beginning of a new era, and enter upon world diplomacy. It is hardly decisive to follow European precedence which gives the French language this position. The language of the other side of the Globe is English, and this is a congress of the world. Moreover, the greater part of the people represented in this congress use the English language. He sincerely doubted whether any American when looking at this document in French would be satisfied that it was an exact expression of the decision of the Conference.

As regards the arguments for the Italian language, he would venture to point out that it was spoken by a limited part of what might be called the constituency of the Conference.

If English and French were placed on a parity there would be a perfect concurrence of mind of those who understood the French version with those who used the English version.

Mr. Wilson also pointed out that it was proposed to have a permanent Secretariat for the Conference, and this was one more reason why the documents of this Secretariat should be in both languages. Moreover, should another minority language be admitted, others would have to be included also.

He ventured again to lay stress upon the fact that a new element has been introduced in the diplomacy of the world by the entrance of a new power speaking English. For these reasons, he urged that both English and French be made the official languages of the Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE submitted a proposal providing for the use of French and English as the official languages of the Conference, and for the reference to the League of Nations for decision of any question of interpretation that may arise.

M. PICHON remarked that this was not the first time that the United States and other states of both North and South America had adopted French as the official language. He referred to the conferences at The Hague where according to precedent, French had been adopted as the official language by all those present.

In answer to the contention that The Hague Conferences had served no purpose and had been disregarded, M. Pichon replied that it was not the fault of France that this had occurred.

In conclusion he referred to President Wilson's statement that France in this matter had an historical privilege. He believed that President Wilson would be the last not to recognize that privilege. In view of what France had gone through, and in view of all her

sufferings, he thought it strange that the first act of this Conference should be to withdraw from her that right. He pointed out that M. Clemenceau had suggested a formula which seemed to meet the desires of the President, and still left France her privilege.

M. SONNINO pointed out that while it was true that Italy had not a majority of population, nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that she had contributed her full share to the War, and had put into the Field from four to five million soldiers. He repeated that if an exception were to be made to the historical rule, and Italy were left out, it would be a distinct slight against her. He wished to support M. Clemenceau's proposal. MR. WILSON spoke as follows:

"My sentiments would respond at once to M. Pichon's appeal, not only my own, but also those of all the people of the United States, but I felt obliged to leave sentiment out, by views of practical effects. The look of this Conference is to the future. We are trying to draw now together to do away with contest. These documents which we are to draw up and sign will be the basis and life of government all over the world. The interpretation of them will affect situations which are to come, and in such interpretations a preponderance of the peoples of the world will use the English text. I cannot refrain from reminding myself that we are engaged in a practical business, and I am bound to lay matters of conscience aside. What will be the languages in time to come, which will be easiest to interpret? French and English. The world will find it easier to interpret French and English texts, far easier than any other. Let me say that it is not in my heart to show disrespect. Let us so act that the future generations will say: 'These men had hard common sense, and put practical interests to the front.'"

After some general discussion the Chairman read the text of Article VIII, and put the question as to whether it was approved. He referred to the fact that French had been the official language of the Versailles Conferences of the Inter-Allied High Commission.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that when the Commission sat in London, English had been the official text. He reverted again to his former argument that English was the official language of a great section of the world. He laid stress on the point that the forthcoming Conference was to lay out a new era, and inasmuch as it was now necessary to deal with realities, he gave his support to President Wilson's appeal, although he found it most difficult to resist the appeal of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

M. CLEMENCEAU believed that those present were more in accord than it appeared. Mr. Wilson had mentioned the part taken in the War by English-speaking people[s]. This is true. He frankly recognized the debt which France owed to the men who speak English. Like Mr. Wilson, he was ready to face new problems. It was

not only necessary to try, but also to succeed. This War, however, took place in France. It should not be forgotten that his proposal was that the official text shall be English, French and Italian, and he, a Frenchman, had proposed it. If it was now argued that the English speaking people must be able to read the text, he admitted it, and has proposed English, French and Italian. The mere fact that a small text is hidden away in the archives at The Hague, will not make any difference if it is in the French language. As regards Italian I believe that not only now, but in the future, it will be necessary to have many more officially stamped texts, but from the merely practical point of view there should be but one text in the hands of the judge. There should be but one standard to refer to.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that the question now under consideration was whether there shall be but one text, not two or three. If the French text is the standard for scrutinization, the British Delegate would have to examine it very carefully. Why would it not be well to have two or three official languages, and if there is a dispute, instead of referring it to a text, why not leave it to the League to decide? In Canada if the judge says that the texts are different, the matter is referred to Parliament. Such cases will undoubtedly arise, and it would be appropriate and preferable to have the matter referred to the League rather than to a text. Why could not the French language, so to speak, serve for all Latin peoples, and the English text represent the others? He suggested, therefore, that it would be better to proceed to the consideration of the amendment first proposed, that is to say, that there be two official texts, English and French. If that be accepted Baron Sonnino's proposal might then be taken into consideration.

MR. WILSON thought it of interest to remind those present that in treaties between the United States and France the text is in English and French. The Senate of the United States approves the English text. Therefore, so far as the United States is concerned, the English text would rule. Should there be a disagreement, the matter would be discussed, and an agreement reached between the two governments.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the Versailles Treaty [2] was in French alone. Mr. WILSON thought that this treaty had lapsed.

M. PICHON repeated that in all international agreements the French text ruled. Even at the Congress of Berlin, French was used. Mr. WILSON pointed out that he did not dispute the fact that French has been the standard, but as to the Congress of Berlin, he would observe that America was not represented. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he could not go further than the amendment he had proposed.

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[2] See footnote 1, p. 561.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that if that were to be the case it would be better to have no official text, and each country would only understand the text which its representatives signed.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that if so much importance were attached to such small matters, it was truly a bad beginning for the society of the League of Nations.

Mr. WILSON observed that he was extremely sorry that this aspect had been given to the question. He did not like to leave a question of this sort where it then rested, and suggested that the delegates think the matter over, sleep on it, and take it up at the next meeting.

Section 9. MR. WILSON proposed that the provisions of the first sentence should be changed as follows: "And shall be presented in writing by the Plenipotentiaries who have brought them forward," instead of "read by the Plenipotentiaries, etc." Also that the second sentence should be stricken out. This proposal was accepted.

Section 10. MR. WILSON proposed that the words "or twenty-four hours beforehand" be inserted after the words "at the preceding session." This proposal was accepted.

Section 11. M. SONNINO suggested that the documents presented to the Conference should go to all the delegates but that the papers and minutes presented at the small meetings should not be circulated. He also proposed the addition of the words "to the Conference" after the word "presented" in the first line. His proposals were accepted.

Section 12 was accepted.

Section 13 was accepted.

Section 14. MR. WILSON inquired whether those present were ready to adopt such a rule. Would it not enable a small minority to hold up the proceedings? He also pointed out that this would be a body of sovereign powers, and as they could not be bound by such a regulation, why not omit the whole section? His proposal was accepted.

Section 15 was accepted.

Section 16. Instead of a drafting committee, Mr. Wilson suggested that the formulation of action should be taken by the Secretariat, and that the Article be changed accordingly. This was accepted.

IV

M. PICHON referred to the decision taken at the morning session to the effect that communications to the Press would be made by the Secretariat only. To make this effective, it would be necessary to stop any communications by cable, and he suggested that each Government appoint a representative to discuss this matter, and take the necessary steps.

MR. WILSON referred to the taking over of the cables by the United States Government. This action on his part had furnished an opportunity to his political opponents to criticize him, claiming that he had taken this action for the purpose of censorship of information regarding his actions in Europe. He had, of course, repudiated the idea. Therefore, should he now try to put a censorship in force, it would afford an opportunity to his opponents to further embarrass him. He felt confident that if those present were thoughtful regarding what they stated to the Press, censorship would be unnecessary.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that if there were no censorship in the United States, and censorship in Europe, half the world would know what was going on, and the other half would be left in ignorance.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the British people would have something to say if all the news came from America.

MR. WILSON thought that what had transpired so far in these private sessions, would not set the world on fire, even if it became public. He suggested that it might be advisable to have the representative of each delegation in charge of the Press, assemble his journalists, and inform them that those present had entered into a gentlemen's agreement not to discuss on the outside what was said during the conversation.

It was agreed that all those present place themselves under bond not to say to any journalist anything not contained in the official communiqué.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the daily official communiqué should be issued on the responsibility of the Secretariat, and would not be referred to the delegates unless there was a disagreement on some point between the secretaries. In that case the matter would be referred to the head of the delegation or his representative.

V

M. PICHON inquired whether he was expected to send invitations to those countries which had broken diplomatic relations with Germany.

It was agreed that invitations should be sent to the representatives of those Governments in Paris.

VI

MR. WILSON reverted again to the question of having the Press present at the opening Conference. It seemed to be the consensus of opinion that the Press would not be present.

VII

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that the question of Russia be considered at the next meeting, and suggested that each delegation be prepared to submit a brief memorandum containing the information in its possession regarding the existing condition of affairs in Russia, with special reference to the Bolsheviki.

Mr. Lloyd George thought it very important that no intimation should be given the Press that this subject was to be taken up at the next meeting.

The next meeting was fixed for 10:30 a. m., January 16th, 1919.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay on Thursday, January 16, 1919, at 10:30 a. m.

PRESENT

FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN	ITALY
M. Clemenceau.	The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George.	Baron Sonnino.
M. Pichon.	The Right Hon. A. J. Balfour.	Count Aldrovandi.
M. Dutasta.	Lieutenant-Colonel Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	Major A. Jones.
M. Berthelot.	Captain E. Abraham.	
Captain A. Portier.		

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	JAPAN
President Wilson.	M. Matsui.
Mr. R. Lansing.	Viscount Chinda.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.	

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

M. PICHON, in opening the meeting, said that M. Clemenceau would like to make an observation before the business of the day began.

1. Publications in Press

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was in doubt whether the question of the Press had been settled in a practical manner. The censorship was being maintained in France. It had been discontinued in America, and was to be discontinued in Great Britain. Hence, news both true and false would be produced freely in some countries and not in others. He gave as an example a despatch produced in the *New York Tribune* attributing to President Wilson a threat of withdrawing all his troops from Europe unless the European Allies agreed to some of his desiderata. The statement was absurd, but it was sure to return to France and Great Britain and no obstacle would be placed to its return in the United States. Hence an absurd situation, certain to cause trouble. He therefore suggested that in addition to the Drafting Committee there should be a political Committee, composed of one representative from the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and France, to correct false news and guide public opinion in the right direction.

BARON SONNINO pointed out that such a Committee would not be able to put a stop to pure inventions like that of the *Tribune*.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the Committee could at least correct it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that it would be quite impossible to put a complete check on inventions of this kind. There were opposition papers in all countries anxious to discredit their Governments by backing the Plenipotentiaries of other countries against their own. It was impossible, nevertheless, to have complete publicity, especially in regard to the proceedings of the small Conference, in which it was public knowledge that the bulk of the business would be transacted.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether the protest from the Press addressed to himself and to the British Government did not refer only to the larger Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the protest really referred to the proceedings of the smaller Conference. He was of opinion that a general warning issued to the whole of the Press against believing unauthorised communications might serve to guide public belief and to protect the freedom of the Committee's deliberations.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought this warning might have effect if it were signed by President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, the Italian representative, and himself.

PRESIDENT WILSON doubted whether anything less than complete publicity would satisfy the American public.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that the French censorship was mainly engaged in preventing such mischief, for instance, as attacks on President Wilson in the *Echo de Paris*. The only thing he desired to stop was the pitting of one Allied country against another. This he regarded as extremely dangerous, and he believed that the Press must not be allowed to attribute any given opinion to a particular statesman and a controversial view to another.

BARON SONNINO agreed that it was highly desirable that responsibility for all decisions should appear to be joint, but he did not know how this result could be achieved. If the suggested Committee were to attend meetings the numbers present at these gatherings would be too great. If, on the other hand, the Committee did not attend the meetings it would not be in a position to refute false news. There would always be inventions concerning the proceedings of the smaller Conference. False reports would be invented with the deliberate object of obtaining denials. Moreover, if the reports so invented happened to hit the mark, how could they be denied?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would issue a general caution to the public indicating that these Conferences were held with the object of reaching agreement. The process of reaching agreement necessarily involved debate and a statement of differing views. The differences were transitory, and were eliminated after debate, when the

common agreement was reached. It was the agreement that mattered to the public, and not the stages in the discussion.

PRESIDENT WILSON drew attention to another aspect of the case. All the members of the Committee were responsible representatives of their peoples. If it were given out that there was unanimous agreement on any point, their respective Parliaments and peoples would certainly enquire how they had come to consent. They were all responsible to public opinion in their own countries, and the public had a right to know what they had said.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that in the end each would have to defend himself, but if the defence must be undertaken from day to day as the discussion proceeded, work would be greatly hampered and the Conference would never reach any conclusions at all. He himself believed that the public as a whole meant to allow the Delegates fair play. Some of the newspapers, no doubt, were more concerned with their own tactics. He believed that if the kind of appeal he had suggested were made to the public, newspaper reports unauthorised by the Conference would be largely discredited by them.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that this appeared to be the best way. There was a well-known dodge in the American Press by which, after trying falsehood after falsehood and obtaining denial after denial, the seeker after information narrowed down the alternatives to the only possible residuum. He therefore suggested that each Government should through its deputy in liaison with the Press inform the reporters that the purpose of these meetings was to reach agreement, and that temporary disagreement was an ingredient in the process. He suggested that the reporters should be summoned together and asked to suggest their own means of dealing with this situation.

(It was therefore decided that a summons should be issued by each Government to the Pressmen of their own country to assemble that afternoon at 5 p. m. at the Club of the Foreign Press, No. 80 Avenue des Champs Élysées, in order to learn from the Press delegates attached to each Government the difficulty experienced in giving information of debates before their conclusion.

The delegates should inform the meeting that the Governments desired to keep the Press fully informed of the results achieved, and should enquire from the representatives of the Press what means suggested themselves as the best to carry out this intention.)

2. Representation of Siam

M. PICHON said that the French Government had received a protest from Siam against the attribution of only one Delegate to Siam at the Peace Conference. It was pointed out that Siam had not only declared war, but had also given assistance to the Alliance in many ways, by preventing Siam from becoming a base for enemy propaganda and

for trade after the War, by interning enemy subjects and liquidating enemy firms, by handing over interned enemy ships to the Allies, and by sending a corps of airmen and motor transport to France. The communication ended by expressing the hope that the Press report was incorrect. M. Pichon enquired of the meeting whether there was consent to the representation of Siam by two Delegates instead of one.

(It was agreed that the Royal Government of Siam should be represented at the Peace Conference by two Delegates.)

3. Russia

Mr. Lloyd George said that the plan put forward by the British Government had been misunderstood in many quarters. It had never been suggested that the Bolshevik Government should be recognized to the extent of offering them a seat at the Peace Conference. It was only proposed that a truce among the various warring factions in Russia should be suggested. When this truce had been made, representatives of the various Governments should be invited to come to Paris to explain their position and receive from the Allies, if possible, some suggestions for the accommodation of their differences. The British Government was in complete accord with the French Government that the Russians could not be put on the same footing as Belgium, for instance, and M. Pichon had been misled if he thought that the British Government meant to offer them membership in the Conference. He made this proposal for the following reasons:—

(*a*) We did not know the facts about Russia. Differing reports were received from our representatives in Russia, and often reports from the same representative varied from day to day. It was clear that, unless we knew the facts, we should not be in a position to form a correct judgment.

(*b*) On one subject there could certainly be complete agreement, to wit, that the condition of Russia was extremely bad. There was misgovernment and starvation, and all the suffering resulting from both. It was impossible to know which party was gaining the upper hand, but our hopes that the Bolshevik Government would collapse had certainly been disappointed. Bolshevism appeared to be stronger than ever. Mr. Lloyd George quoted a report from the British Military Authorities in Russia, who could not be suspected of leanings towards Bolshevism, to the effect that the Bolshevik Government was stronger now than it had been some months previously. The peasants feared that all other parties would, if successful, restore the ancient regime and deprive them of the land which the Revolution had put into their hands.

(*c*) As to the Ukraine, where we had supposed a firm Government had been established, our information was that an adventurer with a few thousand men had overturned it with the greatest ease. This insurrection had a Bolshevik character, and its success made it clear that the Ukraine was not the stronghold against Bolshevism that we had imagined. The same movement was therefore beginning in the

Ukraine which had been completed in Great Russia. The former Government of the Ukraine had been a Government of big landlords only maintained in power by German help. Now that the Germans had withdrawn, the peasants had seized their opportunity. Were we going to spend our resources in order to back a minority of big landlords against an immense majority of peasants? There were three policies from which to choose.

(i) We could say that Bolshevism was a movement as dangerous to civilization as German militarism had been, and that we must therefore destroy it. Did anyone seriously put forward this policy? Was anyone prepared to carry it out? He believed that no one could be found to do so. The Germans, at the time when they needed every available man to reinforce their attack on the Western front, had been forced to keep about a million men to garrison a few provinces of Russia which were a mere fringe of the whole country; and, moreover, at that moment Bolshevism was weak and disorganized. Now it was strong and had a formidable army. Was anyone of the Western Allies prepared to send a million men into Russia? He doubted whether a thousand would be willing to go. All reports tended to show that the Allied troops in Siberia and in Northern Russia were most unwilling to continue the campaign and determined to return to their homes. To set Russia in order by force was a task which he for one would not undertake on behalf of Great Britain, and he questioned whether any other Power would undertake it.

(ii) The second policy was a policy of insulation, the policy known as "cordon sanitaire." This policy meant the siege of Bolshevik Russia, that is to say, the Russia that had no corn, but a large famished population. These people were dying by thousands, if not by hundreds of thousands, of famine. Petrograd had been reduced from the proportions of a great city to those of a moderate town. Our blockade of Russia would lead to the killing, not of the ruffians enlisted by the Bolsheviks, but of the ordinary population, with whom we wish to be friends. This was a policy which, if only on grounds of humanity, we could not support. It might be suggested that the continuance of this policy in Russia would lead to the overthrow of the Bolsheviks; but who in Russia was able to overthrow them? General Knox[1] reported that the Czecho-Slovaks were tainted with Bolshevism and could not be trusted, neither could the Russian troops of Kolchak. He had just seen a map revealing the area held by Denikin. He occupied with an effective force of perhaps 40,000 men what might be described as a little backyard near the Black Sea. Denikin was said to have recognized Kolchak, but he was quite unable to get into touch with him, as an immense Bolshevik area intervened between them. Kolchak, moreover, appeared to pursue the revival of the old regime in Russia; hence the lukewarmness of the Czecho-Slovaks in his cause. They were unwilling to fight in order to set up another Tzarist regime. So also were the British. This would not be helping to create a new world.

[1] Maj. Gen. Alfred W. F. Knox, in command of the British forces in Siberia.

(iii) The only other way he could think of was the plan he had proposed—that of asking representatives of the various Russian Governments to meet in Paris after a truce among themselves. The name of M. Sazonoff had been mentioned as representing the Government at Omsk. M. Sazonoff had been long out of Great Russia. It was questionable whether he knew anything of the conditions at Omsk. He was a strong partisan, and might as well be consulted on the present temper of Russia as the *New York Tribune* on the opinions of Mr. Wilson. We could not leave Paris at the conclusion of the Peace Conference congratulating ourselves on having made a better world, if at that moment half of Europe and half of Asia were in flames. It had been alleged that if Bolshevik emissaries came to France and England they would proselytise the French and British peoples. It was possible that Bolshevism might gain ground in these countries, but it would not be as a consequence of the visit of a few Russian emissaries. He himself had no fears on this score. Moreover, conditions could be imposed on the delegates, and if they failed to observe them they could be sent back to Russia. With this threat over them it was most likely that they would avoid giving offense as they would be anxious to explain their case.

M. PICHON asked whether the meeting would care to hear M. Noulens, the French Ambassador in Russia, who had just returned from Archangel. If so, M. Noulens could attend the meeting on the following day, and would be able to give very interesting information concerning Bolshevism.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that in his mind there was no possible answer to the view expressed by Mr. Lloyd George. This view corresponded exactly with the information received from Russia by the United States Government. There was certainly a latent force behind Bolshevism which attracted as much sympathy as its more brutal aspects caused general disgust. There was throughout the world a feeling of revolt against the large vested interests which influenced the world both in the economic and in the political sphere. The way to cure this domination was in his opinion, constant discussion and a slow process of reform; but the world at large had grown impatient of delay. There were men in the United States of the finest temper, if not of the finest judgment, who were in sympathy with Bolshevism, because it appeared to them to offer that regime of opportunity to the individual which they desired to bring about. In America considerable progress had been made in checking the control of capital over the lives of men and over Government; yet, even there, labor and capital were not friends. The vast majority who worked and produced were convinced that the privileged minority would never yield them their rights. Unless some sort of partnership between these two interests could be obtained society would crumble. Bolshevism was

therefore vital because of these genuine grievances. The seeds of Bolshevism could not flourish without a soil ready to receive them. If this soil did not exist, Bolshevism could be neglected. British and American troops were unwilling to fight in Russia because they feared their efforts might lead to the restoration of the old order, which was even more disastrous than the present one. He recollected making a casual reference of sympathy to the distressed people in Russia, in a speech mainly dealing with other topics, to a wealthy audience in America. The enthusiasm evinced by this remark had surprised him, especially as coming from such an audience, and this incident remained in his mind as an index of the world's sympathies. These sympathies were against any restoration of the old regime. We should be fighting against the current of the times if we tried to prevent Russia from finding her own path in freedom. Part of the strength of the Bolshevik leaders was doubtless the threat of foreign intervention. With the help of this threat they gathered the people round them. The reports of the American representatives in Russia were to this effect. He thought, therefore, that the British proposal contained the only suggestion that led anywhere. If the Bolsheviks refrained from invading Lithuania, Poland, Finland, &c., he thought we should be well advised to allow as many groups as desired to do so to send representatives to Paris. We should then try to reconcile them, both mutually and with the rest of the world.

M. PICHON again suggested that before coming to a decision the meeting should hear M. Noulens, whose news from Russia was fresh.

BARON SONNINO suggested that M. de Scavenius, who had been Danish Minister in Petrograd and was now in Paris, could also give very valuable information.

(It was decided that M. Noulens and M. de Scavenius should be invited to attend the meeting on the following day at 10.30 a. m.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, January 16, 1919.

Notes on Conversations Held in the Office of M. Pichon at the Quai d'Orsay, on January 16, 1919

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:	President Wilson
	Mr. Lansing
	Mr. Frazier
	Mr. Harrison
BRITISH EMPIRE:	Mr. Lloyd George
	Mr. Balfour
	Lt. Col. Hankey
	Major Abraham—Major Caccia
FRANCE:	M. Clemenceau
	M. Pichon
	M. Dutasta
	M. Berthelot
	Prince de Bearn
ITALY:	M. Sonnino
	Count Aldrovandi
	Capt. Jones
JAPAN:	Viscount Chinda
	M. Matsui

Interpreter: M. Mantoux.

I

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he did not think that the solution arrived at regarding the Press was practical. He pointed out that there was no censorship of the Press in the United States or in England, while there was a French censorship in operation. Consequently, this was manifestly unfair, as false news could be sent from here to the United States or England and come back via America. Coming from America, it would be impossible to stop it. He also referred to the story carried in the *New York Tribune* which practically threatens the Allied Governments with withdrawal of U. S. Forces in Europe. It would seem desirable to have either total secrecy on all sides, which is absolutely impossible, or complete publicity. Would it be well to create a Committee of Communication to the Press, which would give out news and reply to false news, also do what they could to remove false impressions?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that there were papers in each of the Allied countries which were opposed to the government, and that these papers would make use of any information which they might obtain from the delegates of one government to discredit the dele-

gates of another. There were several English papers which he knew were determined to discredit the plans of the British Government.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested complete publicity of all that happened.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought this inadvisable, as regards the small meetings. PRESIDENT WILSON inquired whether publicity were not practicable in the case of the large conferences.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE seemed to think this a small matter,—that what the Press wanted was publicity regarding what took place at the small meetings.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether the protest of the Press which he had received the previous evening did not refer only to the great conferences.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that this might be the case, and that the wording of the protest might give that impression. He did not think, however, that the protest was meant to refer only to the great conferences. He felt sure that the Press want to be able to publish anything that they can pick up regarding the small conferences.

BARON SONNINO remarked that the Press can always invent things.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that it was just for this reason that it was desirable to take steps to prevent it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether it would not be well to have a general warning issued to the Press of all countries.

M. CLEMENCEAU inquired if this proposal meant a statement signed by President Wilson, Lloyd George, Orlando and himself.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that the public of the United States wanted open sessions.

M. CLEMENCEAU laid stress on the view that if there was to be no censorship of general news, it was most important to avoid by all possible means the efforts which would undoubtedly be made to sow discord among the delegates of the Great Powers. They must be unanimous.

BARON SONNINO agreed with M. Clemenceau, and pointed out that the responsibility of an amendment to a unanimous decision on any question should be the responsibility of all. As regards the suggestion for the formation of a committee to deny false stories and rumors, he did not see how the committee could refute false stories regarding alleged happenings at the small meetings, unless the members of the committee were present at these meetings. Moreover, if stories are denied, news will be invented by the Press for the purpose of obtaining a denial, and thus the point will be slowly narrowed down until the actual information is obtained.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that the issuance of some kind of statement explaining the danger of giving out information from day to day before a final decision on any one question was reached, appealed strongly to him. He thought it would be well to issue an appeal to the public not to pay too much attention to unauthorized news which might be entirely untrue, or consist of a part only of the facts, or give a false impression of the question. He believed that a majority of the public would understand such an appeal, and would discredit the news.

PRESIDENT WILSON inquired whether those present saw any virtue in the suggestion that Sir George Riddell,[1] Mr. Baker[2] and the representatives of the Italian and French delegates meet the newspaper correspondents, tell them frankly that the object of these conversations is to come to an understanding, and that if news were to be given out from moment to moment, a false impression would be made.

M. CLEMENCEAU did not think that this would stop the man who wanted to send false news from doing so.

PRESIDENT WILSON did not see how he could be stopped in any case. He thought that his proposal would be the most efficacious way of handling the matter, as regards small conferences, and suggested that meanwhile those present resolve that the large conferences shall be open to the Press.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that the Press once let in could never be excluded.

BARON SONNINO, referring to the suggestion of the creation of a committee, pointed out that when a certain piece of news was not completely false the committee would be unable to deny it.

MR. BALFOUR inquired whether the company present had carefully considered what would be the function of the great conferences, if they were made entirely open to the Press. Would it not result in their becoming purely a matter of form?

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it would be impossible without danger to reduce the part to be played by the great conferences. He called attention to the fact that all those present had named several delegates, because their presence was desired. It was true that certain questions should be discussed only in the small meetings, which perhaps it would not be well to discuss at the great meetings. Nevertheless, many questions will have to be discussed openly at the great meetings.

MR. BALFOUR referred to the fact that it had been decided that the small powers should be present only when questions came up which

[1] Sir George Riddell, British press representative at the Peace Conference.
[2] Ray Stannard Baker, director of the press bureau of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace.

concerned them. He mentioned the cases of Danzig and Poland generally. He did not think it would be wise to hold the discussion of both of these cases in public. If that were true, the great conferences would become simply formal and practically would be called together only to hear a decision.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that it was hardly conceivable that the big conferences would be obliged to accept the decisions of those present if the principle of: one nation, one vote, were adopted.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that surely the President did not propose to permit the Great Powers to be out-voted by the small powers.

M. PICHON pointed out that when such questions as those of Danzig and Poland were discussed, it would be necessary to have others present, because the Polish questions touched on the Czecho-Slovak questions and Baltic provinces, and in fact, the whole Russian problem.

BARON SONNINO suggested that all groups of questions should be examined in the small conferences, and then brought to the great conferences, and that general questions should be discussed at all conferences.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE again urged that the discussion revert to President Wilson's suggestion about a talk to the Press. He supported the suggestion and thought it most desirable to have the representatives of the delegates obtain the views of the Press by the following day. He asked President Wilson to be good enough to repeat his suggestion.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated that the three representatives should call the representatives of the Press and explain the difficulties with which the delegates were faced with regard to the question of giving out information and inform them that the delegates did not think it would facilitate results if the details of the present discussions were outlined in public. The three representatives should also make it clear to the Press that it was the desire of the delegates to tell them as fully and freely as possible of the determination taken at these conferences. In conclusion, the three representatives should ask the Press to express their views as to what they considered the best method for carrying out the desires of the delegates.

It was suggested that the three representatives arrange to meet the Press at the Hotel Dufayel at five o'clock.

II

M. PICHON read a protest received from the Siamese Government against the assignment to it of but one delegate. M. Pichon read the arguments of the Siamese Government. It was claimed that Siam had done all that she could to help; that she had eliminated German propaganda of which she was a center; had destroyed German trade;

had deported enemy subjects, and had placed enemy ships at the disposal of the Allies.

It was decided to give Siam two delegates.

III

Preliminary Discussion Regarding the Situation in Russia

Mr. Lloyd George commenced his statement setting forth the information in the possession of the British Government regarding the Russian situation, by referring to the matter which had been exposed recently in *L'Humanité*. He stated that he wished to point out that there had been a serious misconception on the part of the French Government as to the character of the proposal of the British Government. The British proposal did not contemplate in any sense whatsoever, a recognition of the Bolsheviki Government, nor a suggestion that Bolshevik delegates be invited to attend the Conference. The British proposal was to invite all of the different governments now at war within what used to be the Russian Empire, to a truce of God, to stop reprisals and outrages and to send men here to give, so to speak, an account of themselves. The Great Powers would then try to find a way to bring some order out of chaos. These men were not to be delegates to the Peace Conference, and he agreed with the French Government entirely that they should not be made members of the Conference.

Mr. Lloyd George then proceeded to set forth briefly the reasons which had led the British Government to make this proposal. They were as follows:

Firstly, the real facts are not known;

Secondly, if it is impossible to get the facts, the only way is to adjudicate the question; and

Thirdly, conditions in Russia are very bad; there is general misgovernment and starvation. It is not known who is obtaining the upper hand, but the hope that the Bolshevik Government would collapse has not been realized. In fact, there is one report that the Bolsheviki are stronger than ever, that their internal position is strong, and that their hold on the people is stronger. Take, for instance, the case of the Ukraine. Some adventurer raises a few men and overthrows the government. The government is incapable of overthrowing him. It is also reported that the peasants are becoming Bolsheviki. It is hardly the business of the Great Powers to intervene either in lending financial support to one side or the other, or in sending munitions to either side.

Mr. Lloyd George stated that there seemed to be three possible policies:

1. Military intervention. It is true that the Bolsheviki movement is as dangerous to civilization as German militarism, but as to putting

it down by the sword, is there anyone who proposes it? It would mean holding a certain number of vast provinces in Russia. The Germans with one million men on their Eastern Front only held the fringe of this territory. If he now proposed to send a thousand British troops to Russia for that purpose, the armies would mutiny. The same applies to U. S. troops in Siberia; also to Canadians and French as well. The mere idea of crushing Bolshevism by a military force is pure madness. Even admitting that it is done, who is to occupy Russia? No one can conceive or undertake to bring about order by force.

2. A cordon. The second suggestion is to besiege Bolshevik Russia. Mr. Lloyd George wondered if those present realized what this would mean. From the information furnished him Bolshevik Russia has no corn, but within this teritory there are 150,000,000 men, women and children. There is now starvation in Petrograd and Moscow. This is not a health cordon; it is a death cordon. Moreover, as a matter of fact, the people who would die are just the people that the Allies desire to protect. It would not result in the starvation of the Bolsheviki; it would simply mean the death of our friends. The cordon policy is a policy which, as humane people, those present could not consider.

Mr. Lloyd George asked, who was there to overthrow the Bolsheviki? He had been told there were three men, Denikin, Kolchak and Knox. In considering the chances of these people to overthrow the Bolsheviki, he pointed out that he had received information that the Czecho-Slovaks now refused to fight; that the Russian Army was not to be trusted, and that while it was true that a Bolshevik Army had recently gone over to Kolchak it was never certain that just the reverse of this did not take place. If the Allies counted on any of these men, he believed they were building on quick-sand. He had heard a lot of talk about Denikin, but when he looked on the map he found that Denikin was occupying a little backyard near the Black Sea. Then he had been told that Denikin had recognized Kolchak, but when he looked on the map there was a great solid block of territory between Denikin and Kolchak. Moreover, from information received it would appear that Kolchak has been collecting members of the old regime around him, and would seem to be at heart a monarchist. It appeared that the Czecho-Slovaks were finding this out. The sympathies of the Czecho-Slovaks are very democratic, and they are not at all prepared to fight for the restoration of the old conditions in Russia.

Mr. Lloyd George stated that he was informed that at the present time two-thirds of Bolshevik Russia was starving.

Institutions of Bolsheviki are institutions of old Czarist regime. This is not what one would call creating a new world.

3. The third alternative was contained in the British proposal, which was to summon these people to Paris to appear before those present, somewhat in the way that the Roman Empire summoned chiefs of outlying tributary states to render an account of their actions.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out the fact that the argument might be used that there were already here certain representatives of these

Governments; but take, for instance, the case of Sassonoff, who claims to represent the Government of Omsk. As a matter of fact, Sassonoff cannot speak from personal observation. He is nothing but a partisan, like all the rest. He has never been in contact, and is not now in direct contact with the Government at Omsk.

It would be manifestly absurd for those who are responsible for bringing about the Peace Conference, to come to any agreement and leave Paris when one-half of Europe and one-half of Asia is still in flames. Those present must settle this question or make fools of themselves.

Mr. Lloyd George referred to the objection that had been raised to permitting Bolshevik delegates to come to Paris. It had been claimed that they would convert France and England to Bolshevism. If England becomes Bolshevist, it will not be because a single Bolshevist representative is permitted to enter England. On the other hand, if a military enterprise were started against the Bolsheviki, that would make England Bolshevist, and there would be a Soviet in London. For his part, Mr. Lloyd George was not afraid of Bolshevism if the facts are known in England and the United States. The same applies to Germany. He was convinced that an educated democracy can be always trusted to turn down Bolshevism.

Under all the circumstances, Mr. Lloyd George saw no better way out than to follow the third alternative. Let the Great Powers impose their conditions and summon these people to Paris to give an account of themselves to the Great Powers, not to the Peace Conference.

M. Pichon suggested that it might be well to ask M. Noulens, the French Ambassador to Russia, who had just returned to France, to appear before the meeting tomorrow morning, and give those present his views on the Russian situation.

President Wilson stated that he did not see how it was possible to controvert the statement of Mr. Lloyd George. He thought that there was a force behind his discussion which was no doubt in his mind, but which it might be desirable to bring out a little more definitely. He did not believe that there would be sympathy anywhere with the brutal aspect of Bolshevism. If it were not for the fact of the domination of large vested interests in the political and economic world, while it might be true that this evil was in process of discussion and slow reform, it must be admitted, that the general body of men have grown impatient at the failure to bring about the necessary reform. He stated that there were many men who represented large vested interests in the United States who saw the necessity for these reforms and desired something which should be worked out at the Peace Conference, namely, the establishment of some

machinery to provide for the opportunity of the individuals greater than the world has ever known. Capital and labor in the United States are not friends. Still they are not enemies in the sense that they are thinking of resorting to physical force to settle their differences. But they are distrustful, each of the other. Society cannot go on on that plane. On the one hand, there is a minority possessing capital and brains; on the other, a majority consisting of the great bodies of workers who are essential to the minority, but do not trust the minority, and feel that the minority will never render them their rights. A way must be found to put trust and cooperation between these two.

President Wilson pointed out that the whole world was disturbed by this question before the Bolsheviki came into power. Seeds need soil, and the Bolsheviki seeds found the soil already prepared for them.

President Wilson stated that he would not be surprised to find that the reason why British and United States troops would not be ready to enter Russia to fight the Bolsheviki was explained by the fact that the troops were not at all sure that if they put down Bolshevism they would not bring about a re-establishment of the ancient order. For example, in making a speech recently, to a well-dressed audience in New York City who were not to be expected to show such feeling, Mr. Wilson had referred casually to Russia, stating that the United States would do its utmost to aid her suppressed people. The audience exhibited the greatest enthusiasm, and this had remained in the President's mind as an index to where the sympathies of the New World are.

President Wilson believed that those present would be playing against the principle of free spirit of the world if they did not give Russia a chance to find herself along the lines of utter freedom. He concurred with Mr. Lloyd George's view and supported his recommendations that the third line of procedure be adopted.

President Wilson stated that he had also, like Mr. Lloyd George, received a memorandum from his experts which agreed substantially with the information which Mr. Lloyd George had received. There was one point which he thought particularly worthy of notice, and that was the report that the strength of the Bolshevik leaders lay in the argument that if they were not supported by the people of Russia, there would be foreign intervention, and the Bolsheviki were the only thing that stood between the Russians and foreign military control. It might well be that if the Bolsheviki were assured that they were safe from foreign aggression, they might lose support of their own movement.

President Wilson further stated that he understood that the danger of destruction of all hope in the Baltic provinces was immediate, and that it should be made very clear if the British proposal were adopted, that the Bolsheviki would have to withdraw entirely from Lithuania and Poland. If they would agree to this to refrain from reprisals and outrages, he, for his part, would be prepared to receive representatives from as many groups and centers of action, as chose to come, and endeavor to assist them to reach a solution of their problem.

He thought that the British proposal contained the only suggestions that led anywhere. It might lead nowhere. But this could at least be found out.

M. PICHON referred again to the suggestion that Ambassador Noulens be called before the meeting.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that it might be well to call the Dutch Consul, lately in Petrograd, if it was the desire of those present to hear the anti-Bolshevik side.

BARON SONNINO suggested that M. Scavenius, Minister of Denmark, recently in Russia, would be able to give interesting data on the Russian situation.

Those present seemed to think that it might be desirable to hear what these gentlemen might have to say.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, January 17, 1919, at 10:30 a. m.

Present

France	Great Britain	Italy
M. Clemenceau.	The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George.	Baron Sonnino.
M. Pichon.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.	Count Aldrovandi.
M. Dutasta.	Lt.-Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	Major A. Jones.
M. Berthelot.	Captain E. Abraham.	
M. Fromageot.*		
Captain A. Portier.		

United States of America	Japan
President Wilson.	M. Matsui.
Mr. R. Lansing.	Viscount Chinda.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.	
Mr. L. Harrison.*	

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. Acceptance of Armistice Clauses

M. Clemenceau said that before beginning the business of the meeting, he wished to inform the Conference that Marshal Foch had obtained the signature of the Germans to the Armistice clauses drawn up on the previous Monday, concerning finance, Russian prisoners, the occupation of a bridgehead east of Strasburg, the delivery of the German commercial fleet, and, in fact, of all the clauses which had been proposed.

2. Publications in Press

Mr. Lloyd George, referring to the anxiety of the Press to attend the meetings of the Peace Conference, said that two classes of general conference might be distinguished. Firstly, there was the kind of conference to which all were admitted. Such conferences would be of a formal nature and little business would be transacted in them. Secondly, there would be conferences of the Great Powers with two or three of the smaller Powers, or young nations, such as Yugo-Slavs, the Poles, and Czecho-Slovaks associated with them. If publicity could safely be given to the first class, he asked whether it should be held to extend to the second. The second class of conference would be dealing with highly contentious questions, and he felt that their business would be much hampered by publicity.

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* These were present at the two previous meetings. [Footnote in the original.]

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the reporters could be told that admission would be confined to conferences held in the large room at Quai d'Orsay. Conferences of the second class mentioned by Mr. Lloyd George could be held in the small room, and the Press could be thereby excluded from hearing the discussion.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, apart from this question, it must be clearly stated that no publicity would be granted to the kind of conference now sitting. He suggested that the Press should be definitely informed of this, and that there should be a unanimous vote to that effect.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that what took place on these occasions could correctly be termed conversations, but not conferences. He pointed out that all the Delegates of the Powers represented were not present, but only two. These meetings, therefore, were in no sense conferences.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he wished to issue a communiqué to the Press telling them clearly in what cases publicity would be allowed, and in what cases it would be refused.

PRESIDENT WILSON, quoting the resolutions of the Special Committee appointed by the delegates of the Allied and American Press, observed that they asked for "full publicity for the peace negotiations." The proceedings now going on were not peace negotiations. The peace negotiations would, doubtless, be undertaken only in the big conferences. The second point asked for was that the official communiqué should be as complete as possible. The third was that, in addition to communiqués, full summaries of the day's proceedings should be issued for the guidance of the members of the Press, "who would maintain full freedom of comment." The fourth was that free intercourse should be allowed between Delegates and responsible journalists.

M. MANTOUX, who attended the meeting of the Press, stated that their demands related to the small as well as the big conferences.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the full summaries requested by the Press, in addition to communiqués, meant an account of the speeches made in the conferences. If this was so, he was opposed to the granting of such summaries. The procès-verbaux of the meetings could not be made public, otherwise business would become impossible. The Conference would tend to resemble the Council of Trent, whose labours were terminated in forty-three years after the death of all the original members.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the matter should be approached from the other end. He suggested that representatives of the Press be admitted to conferences held in the large room.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired how the representatives were to be selected.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that it would be enough to fix a number and leave it to the pressmen to elect their own delegates.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if the decision was that the pressmen should not enter the smaller conferences, it was necessary to state this clearly.

BARON SONNINO suggested that their attendance should be limited to plenary conferences. He did not think a discrimination could be based upon the size of the room. Summaries of the smaller conferences would be furnished. He quite agreed that no pressmen could be allowed to attend the private conversations of the Great Powers.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the only plenary conferences would be those dealing with subjects in which all nations were concerned. It had been laid down that the small nations should only be present to watch their special interests. Hence, the range of subjects for plenary conferences was very limited. The question of the League of Nations might be instanced as one, and possibly there were financial questions concerning all nations. In any case, the subjects requiring plenary conferences would be very few. Hence, though the privilege granted to the Press might appear great, in practice it would be found insignificant.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether a plenary conference could not be held to mean a conference attended by all those interested in any given question. If, for instance, there were a question in which only the Great Powers were concerned, there would be a plenary conference when their entire Delegations were present.

MR. BALFOUR said that on this definition a subject like the territorial adjustment of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia or Yugo-Slavia, which required the presence of the Delegates of these peoples together with those of the Great Powers, would give rise to a plenary conference. Even if such a conference were held in the smaller room, we should be bound to admit the Press. He considered this very alarming.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it was, then, perhaps wiser to mention the room instead of defining the nature of the conference.

BARON SONNINO said that in his view a plenary conference was not one held to decide a particular interest even should all those concerned in it be present. A plenary conference would be one dealing with a group of questions, or one held to give final sanction to a group of decisions. For instance, reparation due to a damaged country would not be a question for a plenary conference, but the whole principle of reparation and its distribution over the whole of the damaged countries would be a subject for a plenary conference.

Further, if general rules were laid down, it would be necessary to obtain sanction to them from a plenary conference.

M. Pichon said that he wished to make an observation which, in his opinion, had an important bearing on this subject. We were only considering Allied and Associated Nations, but there were also enemy nations, and this should not be overlooked. It had been decided that those nations should not be admitted to the Conference until the Allies had agreed among themselves. Were the Allies then to inform them in advance of their decisions and of all the discussions undertaken in the process of reaching these decisions? This would be in effect admitting them to the Conference, from which it had been decided to exclude them. He could not but regard this as extremely dangerous.

President Wilson said that the question under discussion was not so much a question of publicity or no publicity, as one of useful as opposed to perverted publicity. Publicity as such could not be avoided. It had not been avoided in reference to the meetings held hitherto. The only problem, therefore, was to obtain correct publicity.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he did not feel quite sure that this was so. There was a great difference between conjectural reports and official summaries. The authority of the latter was infinitely greater than that of the former. If questions were put in Parliament regarding the former, it was always possible to reply that they were incorrect or incomplete. This answer was not possible in regard to the latter. If at every state of the discussion public and parliamentary agitation had to be pacified the discussion might be prolonged ad infinitum. What he wished to avoid was a Peace settled by public clamour. He had just had the experience of an election in England, during which the public was beginning to ask embarrassing questions concerning peace. Had the election lasted longer he might have come to the Conference with his hands tied by pledges, and deprived of his freedom of action. He wished to remain free to be convinced. If there were daily reports of the discussions as soon as the representative of any country yielded on a point that he had maintained on the previous day there would be headlines in the Press: "Great Britain is betrayed," or "France is betrayed." He therefore, on the whole, agreed with M. Pichon. He felt great misgiving concerning the view taken by Baron Sonnino that all final decisions on big questions should go to the plenary conference. There were numerous subjects concerning which premature publicity would render it impossible for any statesman to sign any treaty at all. He instanced the question of Syria and of indemnities. At a later stage it would be possible to show to the public that, if this or that had been conceded, other advantages had

been obtained. He was not afraid of facing the Press, as he did not believe their demands were backed by the public. The Press was well aware that it was excluded from proceedings of Cabinets. This was a Cabinet of the nations. Furthermore, the enemy must not know beforehand what our decisions were, and still less what our differences were. Dangerous agitations might be aroused even in our own countries by premature publication of news, and he pointed out that in France and Italy the elections had not yet taken place.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he might agree with all Mr. Lloyd George had said and yet feel that the difficulty had not been met. He gave as an instance certain conversations which had occurred in the house in which he lived, and had been reported shortly after in the Press with a considerable degree of accuracy. The subject discussed was one of great concern to a large group of nations. Leakages, he felt sure, could not be prevented. The Press would always either find out what had happened or make very accurate guesses.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE gave as an instance of a well-kept secret the debate on the language of the Conference, which had lasted some hours in that room, and had not been divulged in any newspaper, as far as he was aware. He thought that we should stand in the main on the line we had already taken up. What occurred in M. Pichon's room should be treated as conversations held with a purpose of reaching agreement. The Press should be given the result of each day's work. No summary should be given, as he wished to be able to say on one day what he thought, but on the morrow, if he had changed his mind after hearing his colleagues, to be free to do so. As to the Conference on Saturday, he proposed that the Press should be informed that 15 of their number should be admitted, and this without prejudice to the question of their admission at other conferences hereafter.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested a text in the following sense:—

"The widest publicity will be given to accurate reports of both plenary and partial sittings."

MR. BALFOUR suggested that the word "general" should be substituted for the word "plenary." He deprecated the offer of any information concerning partial conferences.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that in the communication to the Press there should be a full and considerate explanation of the reasons for refusing the admission of reporters to the conversations. It might be added that those reasons did not apply with the same force to sessions of the general Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would not like to pledge himself to admitting the Press constantly to the general Conference. He saw difficulties ahead. Extreme views might be uttered in open meetings

which it might not be convenient to refute there and then. He would prefer to offer the Press an invitation for Saturday only, without reference to the future.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that in addition to an explanation concerning the conversations, it might be said that even the general Conferences might find it necessary to enter into what was called in America "Executive Session." He suggested that Mr. Lloyd George should draft the message to the Press on the lines explained by him so persuasively in the Meeting.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE undertook to do so and present the draft at the afternoon's Meeting.

3. Indiscretions in the American Press

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he felt bound regretfully to draw attention again to certain mischievous statements in the American Press. He drew special attention to a despatch published in the *New York Tribune*.

PRESIDENT WILSON undertook to send a protest to the editor of the newspaper.

M. CLEMENCEAU also pointed out that it was stated in the American Press that the French censorship prevented telegrams from going to America.

(It was agreed that M. Clemenceau should deny this.)

4. Representation of The Hedjaz

MR. BALFOUR observed that, in the list drawn up concerning the representation of small belligerent countries the representation of the kingdom of The Hedjaz had been overlooked. He felt that all would recognize that The Hedjaz was entitled to representation as having taken an effective part in one of the most successful of the subsidiary campaigns of the war. He believed that the meeting would be unanimous in favour of rectifying the omission.

M. PICHON pointed out that the case was met by the clause guaranteeing one Representative to each State in process of formation.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether the Hedjaz could be represented at the Conference on Saturday.

M. PICHON thought that The Hedjaz should be in the same category as Yugo-Slavia.

MR. BALFOUR observed that The Hedjaz was a constituted State, and should be represented as such. It had been recognised by France and Great Britain.

M. PICHON pointed out that it had not been as yet recognised by Italy, by the United States, or by Japan.

(After consulting the Representatives of the last-named Powers, it was decided that The Hedjaz should be represented at the Conference by two Delegates).

PRESIDENT WILSON drew attention to the representation of States, such as Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Uruguay. He had understood that these States attended the Conference as of right when they were concerned in the subjects under discussion. In the Regulations, however, they were placed on the same footing as neutral Powers, attending meetings only when summoned. He, therefore suggested that the Regulations should be amended.

5. Representation of States Having Broken Off Diplomatic Relations With the Enemy

The Regulations were accordingly amended as follows:—

"Article I, paragraph 3. The Powers in a state of diplomatic rupture with the enemy Powers (Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay) shall take part in the sessions at which questions concerning them are discussed".

The last paragraph of Article I will read:—

"Neutral Powers and States in process of formation shall be heard either orally or in writing, when summoned by the Powers with general interests, at sessions devoted especially to the examination of questions directly concerning them, but only in so far as those questions are concerned."

The last clause of the first paragraph of Article II will read:—

"One for Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Hayti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay."

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed that, at the afternoon meeting, an agenda should be fixed for the opening session of the Peace Conference on Saturday. He thought it was most important that discussions at the big conferences should not stray beyond the agenda. This agenda should, in all cases, be prepared in the small committee. This was specially necessary for the first occasion. He did not wish the gathering to be of a merely formal nature. Certain points should be laid down as questions for study. These would be referred, according to President Wilson's suggestion, to the various Delegations, and the public would infer that the Congress meant to work. The public would further understand that another sitting could not follow at once, as time would be required for the completion of the study of the various points enumerated.

6. Agenda for Opening Session of Peace Conference

(It was agreed that proposals should be made for this agenda in the afternoon.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, January 17, 1919.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, on Friday, January 17, 1919, at 15 O'clock (3 p. m.)

PRESENT

FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN	ITALY
M. Clemenceau.	The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George.	Baron Sonnino.
M. Pichon.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.	Count Aldrovandi.
M. Dutasta.	Lt.-Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey.	Major A. Jones.
M. Berthelot.	Major A. M. Caccia.	
M. Fromageot.		
Captain A. Portier.		

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	JAPAN
President Wilson.	Viscount Chinda.
Mr. R. Lansing.	M. Matsui.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.	
Mr. L. Harrison.	

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. Representation of the States

M. PICHON said he wished to bring to the notice of the meeting that he had received two formal protests regarding the representation allotted to Belgium and Serbia. The Belgian Government had written to him in the following terms: "The Belgian Council of Ministers had decided to protest against the number of delegates allotted to Belgium. The decision of the Great Powers to give only two seats at the Conference table was inacceptable." It was left, therefore, to Baron de Gaiffier [1] to decide whether he would accept the invitation received from the Great Powers to attend the Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it would be unwise to accept a challenge of this nature. Belgium had only put 250,000 men in the field, compared with the millions supplied by the Great Powers. From the point of view of contributions to the war, as well as from the point of view of the total population of the country, he did not think it was possible to increase the number of Representatives for Belgium.

MR. LANSING argued that the point to be considered was that both Belgium and Serbia had suffered invasions from the very commencement of the war and this, in the case of Belgium, was the reason why she had not been able to put a larger force into the field.

[1] Baron de Gaiffier d'Hestroy, Belgian Minister at Paris.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE held that they must be guided by some standard of representation. He thought, in this connection, that they should consider the influence which the country exercised in the world, its contribution to the war, or the total population of the country.

MR. LANSING suggested that the sacrifices which the country had made must also be considered.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the sacrifices made could only be taken into account in determining the compensations and indemnities to be received.

MR. BALFOUR wished to put forward a practical consideration. He would like to do honour to Belgium and Serbia, but if they were going on sentimental grounds the Conference would find itself occupied forever in attempting to assess the relative claims of all the Powers concerned. The Conference had already devoted much time to all this. The sentimental claims, no doubt, were very great, but, if they were granted, endless discussions would be involved. If extra representation gave more power in voting there would be something substantial in these claims.

BARON SONNINO said that these countries admitted that voting had nothing to do with the question. Two great parties existed in Belgium—the Clerical party and the Socialist party—and if a sufficient number of Representatives was refused, it would put the Government in a political difficulty in attempting to satisfy the claims of the various parties.

MR. LANSING insisted that the losses incurred by Belgium and the interest they had in obtaining full indemnity for these losses must be given due weight.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he must insist on saying a word for Belgium and Serbia. Belgium and Serbia both found themselves in a most tragic situation. Belgium could have done as Roumania did later. She could have said that the country was sure to be overrun and that she could not resist. She could have given way like Luxembourg. The King of the Belgians, especially, might very well have abandoned his country. But he had set a noble and inspiring example which had impressed all the countries of Europe and, he felt sure he could say, America also. Again, the sufferings of Serbia had been terrible. She had suffered enormous losses; her manhood had been destroyed wholesale. Yet she had fought on without counting her losses. He agreed with President Wilson that it was extremely awkward to find themselves placed in such a situation and to be faced with such a document. But would it not be even more awkward to be compelled at to-morrow's meeting to refuse to accede to Belgium's demands? Further, should Belgium persist in her refusal to attend the meeting, the Great Powers would find themselves in an awkward position and

it would be a bad beginning to the Conferences. That morning they had decided to grant two Delegates to the King of the Hedjaz and he himself had agreed to that proposal. He begged his colleagues, therefore, to consider very carefully the remarks which he had just made regarding Belgium and Serbia. He was ready to accept any decision, but he was also particularly anxious to avoid a bad start.

BARON SONNINO drew attention to the fact that Serbia would probably very soon be entitled to additional Representatives, as soon as the new Yugo-Slav State was recognised.

M. PICHON said that the question of Yugo-Slavia was not involved. The protest which he had received was from the Serbian Minister, M. Vesnitch, who had notified him that he did not write as the Representative of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, but as the Representative of Serbia. He would point out that it had been decided to leave the question of the recognition of the Yugo-Slav State to the Conference. Meanwhile, they merely had to deal with Serbia. M. Vesnitch, in his letter, regretted both the smallness of the representation allotted to Serbia and also the fact that the Great Powers had taken this decision without any reference to his Government. He concluded his letter by saying that he reserved to himself the right to raise this question at the first meeting of the Conference. In conclusion, M. Pichon asked the meeting whether they would agree to accord three Representatives to Belgium and three to Serbia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether this was the end of it. He thought that, if they were to occupy their time in making decisions and reversing them and altering them, the Conference would never come to an end. Tomorrow, when it was discovered that Belgium and Serbia had been given three Representatives apiece, Greece, Roumania and even China, with her population of 400 millions, would undoubtedly protest. But if they were going to chop and change constantly, when would they come to the end of it? If he felt sure that this was the last case to be considered, he would not resist. But he felt that if they now changed this number, the representation question would never be closed.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the Belgian Government in their protest had merely said that the number allotted to them was not acceptable. How did this meeting know that three would be acceptable? Had the Belgians themselves suggested this number?

M. PICHON replied in the affirmative. He explained that three Delegates were required, in order to represent each of the political parties, namely:—

M. Hymans, the Foreign Minister, as President.
M. Vandervelde, as representing the Socialist Party.
M. Van den Heuvel, as representing the Catholic Party.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it would be best to accept this proposal, on the understanding that they would refuse ever to re-open the question again.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, provided it was understood that it would definitely put an end to the question.

(It was agreed that Belgium and Serbia should have three Representatives apiece.)

(It was also agreed that the question of the number of Delegates apportioned to each country must now be regarded as finally closed.)

2. Agenda of First Preliminary Conference

M. PICHON said that the next question to consider would be the drafting of the Agenda for the first Preliminary Conference. As regards the subjects to be entered on the Agenda, he suggested the list of questions proposed by President Wilson at a previous meeting, namely:—

1. League of Nations.
2. Reparations.
3. New States.
4. Frontiers and territorial changes.
5. Colonies.

These subjects to be discussed in the order given.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that that list had really been put forward to form the basis of discussion at the small meetings and not for the large Conference.

MR. BALFOUR wished respectfully to put the following point to the meeting. He agreed that questions such as the League of Nations and Reparation were eminently suitable for discussion at a full Conference, but when it came to discussing the creation of new States, frontiers and territorial changes, and Colonial possessions, he dreaded the position in which they might find themselves. If these questions were to be put to the Delegates sitting at the full Conference, they would also have to be debated in full Conference. He asked his colleagues to imagine what would be the state of the full Conference if all these explosive subjects, full of difficulties and likely to lead to violent disputes, came up for discussion in this manner.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether the following proposal would be preferable. The presiding officer at the Conference would appoint Committees on such and such subjects (large and small Committees), each consisting of a chosen number of Delegates who would be required to report to the Great Powers. The Great Powers would then decide on each question whether it should be sent back to the full Conference or not.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that a suggestion had occurred to him. No regular resolution should be proposed to the Conference, but a state-

ment should be made by M. Clemenceau, as Chairman of the Conference, giving the general headings under which they would be prepared to study the various questions to be taken up by the Conference and he would invite each of the Delegations to submit to the Secretariat their views on such questions as might concern them. It would not be necessary to ask each of the Delegations to submit their views on every question. For instance, the Hedjaz need not be asked to give its views on Poland. But each of the Delegations should be invited to send their views to the Secretariat on subjects which concerned them. This would meet the wishes of people such as M. Veniselos, who were anxious to present their case to the Great Powers before any decision was reached by these. As soon as these reports were received, the Great Powers could direct their advisers to examine these documents and to extract irrelevant matter. It was very important that each country should have an opportunity of presenting its case, particularly as regards boundaries which it might covet. This would give the Delegation something to do—a very important matter. It would also give a reality to the Conference on the next day. It would not make the Conference formal and it would give the Delegates an opportunity of putting questions affecting themselves.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that if Mr. Lloyd George's proposals were accepted, the large Conference, having nothing to discuss, would die of inanition. M. Clemenceau had said that his proposal would set the machinery working and he agreed that the Great Powers might be able to draw therefrom the work required by them. What they wanted was to give the members something real to do connected with the work of the Conference and not merely the appearance of work.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that if a large number of committees was set up, a machinery would be created which it would be impossible for them to control, especially if the small Powers were represented on each of these small committees. Dozens of subjects would have to be considered and it would be impossible for the small States to be adequately represented on all. On the other hand, each Delegation could prepare reports which would assure their interests being duly considered. The resolution which Mr. Clemenceau had proposed was intended as a guide for the meeting of the Great Powers. When extended to a large Conference of thirty Powers, it was, in his opinion, quite inapplicable, whereas, if the Chairman made a speech asking the Delegations to put forward their views on any subjects included in the approved list which might concern them,

the best results would be obtained. The Delegations themselves could decide what were the subjects of interest to them.

M. PICHON said that the Secretariat would receive all the reports and would make a digest of them.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired what would happen to these reports after they had been dealt with by the Secretariat.

MR. BALFOUR thought that if these reports were then transmitted to the Great Powers, that would be a satisfactory arrangement, but if they were referred back to the big Conference, it would be extremely dangerous.

PRESIDENT WILSON proposed that the reports so received by the Secretariat should be submitted "for such reference as the Chairman may determine."

MR. BALFOUR suggested as an amendment that the reports should be forwarded to the Secretariat, "who will transmit the same to the Great Powers."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that that was exactly what the small Powers wanted. The small Powers all wished that the Great Powers should receive and give due consideration to their views.

M. CLEMENCEAU said they would adopt Mr. Lloyd George's proposal, but he wished to add to it something of his own which would to some extent include the proposal originally made by President Wilson. Mr. Balfour had admitted that certain questions, such as the League of Nations and Reparations, could at once be referred to the big Conference. If they agreed to take these two subjects only, that alone would give enormous work to do. On the other hand, President Wilson had asked that the consideration of the League of Nations should be deferred till the second meeting of the Conference. There remained the question of Reparations—a most important one. Why should not that be placed before the Conference on the next day? Why should not a large committee, with financial experts, be appointed to consider that question?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was altogether in favour of that suggestion, but he hoped it would not be discussed on the next day. He hoped that the question of Reparations would first be discussed here and that, after discussion, a commission would be appointed to deal with the whole question. With this reservation, he would support M. Clemenceau's proposal. He was of the opinion that each of the Delegations should be asked to send their views on all subjects of interest to them, including the question of a League of Nations.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE wished to suggest one more subject to be entered on the list, if the list was to be complete, namely, "Punishment of those guilty of offences against the Law of Nations."

M. PICHON wished to invite attention to the list included in the Note of Procedure,[8] which would be found to be more complete than President Wilson's. This list included the following:—

1. League of Nations.
2. Polish affairs.
3. Russian affairs.
4. Baltic Nationalities.
5. States formed from the late Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.
6. Balkan affairs.
7. Eastern affairs.
8. Affairs of the Far East and of the Pacific.
9. Jewish affairs.
10. International river navigation (Rhine, Danube, Elbe, Scheldt and Vistula).
11. International railways (45th parallel, Adriatic to Baltic, Bagdad railways, African railways, Cape to Cairo and Cape to Algiers).
12. Public legislation ensuring to the peoples their self-determination, combined with the right of ethnical and religious minorities.
13. International legislation on labour.
14. International legislation, patents and trade marks.
15. Penalties against crimes committed during the war.
16. Economic system.
17. Reparation.
18. Financial questions.

It would be noticed that Mr. Lloyd George's proposal regarding penalties against crimes committed during the war was included.

PRESIDENT WILSON held that subjects such as those included in items 10 and 13 could not be brought under discussion at the Conference. Special technical committees would have to be appointed to draft the necessary regulations.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that two or three questions only might be suggested for submission to the first Conference.

M. PICHON suggested that in submitting the list to the Delegations special attention should be drawn to the question of the "Responsibility of the authors of the war".

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked that they should add to that, "International legislation on labour".

MR. BALFOUR enquired what elasticity was given to the Great Powers to add subjects to the list. He thought the Chairman should be authorised to add any subjects which might at some future date require consideration.

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[8] Vol. I, p. 390.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the five Great Powers should decide what subjects were to be placed on the list. As Chairman he could not take upon himself the responsibility of deciding this question.

BARON SONNINO agreed that the Chairman should be the mandatory of the five Powers, but any Delegate could present an additional subject, which the Chairman would refer to the five Powers, who would give their decision as to its inclusion in the approved list.

MR. BALFOUR wished to raise one point of great importance. President Wilson, the Prime Minister and M. Clemenceau had pointed out how important it was to settle as soon as possible all questions which would facilitate demobilisation. Therefore it would be necessary to indicate the order in which the Delegates should settle the various questions entered on the list. This order would not be settled to-morrow, but they would reserve to themselves later on the right of settling the order of precedence.

BARON SONNINO thought that if they put off fixing the order of precedence the Delegates would not know what subjects to study and would do nothing.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that demobilisation could not take place before their work had been completed. Demobilisation up to a certain point was taking place at present and could go on as at present. But could they hasten the final demobilisation except by making peace?

BARON SONNINO thought that if all questions which would facilitate demobilisation were to be considered first, the territorial questions should take precedence of all others.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed with President Wilson that peace alone could settle the question of demobilisation.

To sum up, he understood that the Delegations would be invited to submit reports on all questions which might interest them. These reports would be sent to the Secretariat for transmission to the five Great Powers.

The attention of the Delegations would be specially invited to two of these questions namely:—

1. Responsibility of the authors of the war and penalties for crimes committed during the war.
2. International legislation on labour.

BARON SONNINO: The Delegations should be at liberty to suggest subjects for addition to the list. The Chairman would transmit these suggestions to the five Great Powers for decision regarding their inclusion in the approved list.

M. CLEMENCEAU, continuing said he would add that the Great Powers would, in due course, fix the date of the second Conference.

BARON SONNINO made it clear that no other subject outside those entered on the Agenda would be considered to-morrow.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that if another Power, either great or small, wished to propose any question to the Conference, due notice should be given in order that time should be available for it to receive full consideration.

M. PICHON pointed out that this had already been provided for in the Rules, copies of which would be supplied to each of the Delegations.

BARON SONNINO enquired whether he was correct in thinking that, as regards the organisation of the Secretariat, the Chairman would nominate the Head of the Secretariat, and that each of the Delegations or Governments would retain the power of appointing one representative to the Secretariat.

(It was agreed that the President of the French Council of Ministers, as provisional Chairman of the Conference, should invite the Delegations present to forward to the Secretariat of the Peace Conference reports setting forth their views on any question in which they may be directly interested. Such reports shall be transmitted by the Secretariat to the five Great Powers for their consideration. The Chairman shall invite special attention to the following two subjects as requiring immediate consideration:—

1. Responsibility of the authors of the war and penalties for crimes committed during the war.
2. International legislation on labour.

Delegations wishing to suggest additional subjects for consideration are entitled to submit them to the Chairman for transmission to the five Great Powers, who will decide as to the inclusion in the list of subjects.)

3. Communication to the Press

MR. LLOYD GEORGE distributed a draft note to be issued to the Press for publication, drawn up in accordance with a resolution adopted at that morning's meeting.[4]

PRESIDENT WILSON wished to preface what he was going to say by the statement that he did not know how it would be possible for him to defend privacy for the meetings of the full Conference except on unusual occasions. The argument for privacy in these conversations between the Great Powers was conclusive. He wished to draw a distinction between the two. He would therefore suggest certain amendments in order to allow full publicity for the full Conference proceedings. He could not defend entire secrecy for the big Conferences. He felt compelled to draw a distinction between the two.

(President Wilson then read the text as amended by him in order to give effect to his proposals. Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour proposed minor amendments in the wording of certain sentences.)

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[4] For text of this draft, see p. 620.

The following text was then unanimously accepted:—

The Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers have given earnest consideration to the question of publicity for the proceedings of the Peace Conference. They are anxious that the public, through the Press, should have the fullest information compatible with safeguarding the supreme interest of all, which is that a just and honourable settlement should be arrived at with the minimum of delay. It is, however, obvious that publicity, for the preliminary conversations now proceeding must be subject to the limitations necessarily imposed by the difficult and delicate nature of their task.

The conversations of the great Peace Conference are far more analogous to the meetings of a Cabinet than to those of a Legislature. Nobody has ever suggested that Cabinet meetings should be held in public, and if they were so held the work of the government would become impossible. One reason why Cabinets are held in private is in order that differences may be reconciled and agreement reached before the stage of publicity is begun. The essence of democratic method is not that deliberations of a Government should be conducted in public, but that its conclusions should be subject to the consideration of a popular Chamber, and to free and open discussion on the platform and in the Press.

The representatives of the Associated Powers are holding conversations in order to solve questions which affect the vital interests of many nations, and upon which they may at present hold many diverse views. These deliberations cannot proceed by the method of a majority vote. No nation can be committed except by the free vote of its own Delegates. The conclusions arrived at at these consultations, therefore, can only be formed by the difficult process of reaching agreement among all. This vital process would only be hindered if the discussion of every disputed question were to open by a public declaration by each Delegation of its own national point of view. Such a declaration would in many cases be followed by a premature public controversy. This would be serious enough if it were confined to controversy between parties within each State. It might be extremely dangerous if, as would often be inevitable, it resulted in controversy between nations. Moreover, such public declarations would render that give and take on the part of the Delegates themselves which is essential to a successful negotiation a matter of infinitely greater difficulty.

It is also extremely important that the settlement should be not only just but speedy. Every belligerent Power is anxious for the early conclusion of peace, in order that its armies may be demobilised and that it may return once more to the ways of peace. If premature publicity is given to the negotiations, the proceedings of the Peace Conference would be interminably protracted, and the Delegates would be forced to speak not only to the business before the Conference, but to concern themselves with the controversies which had been raised by the account of their proceedings outside.

Finally, there will often be very strong reasons against announcing the conclusions of the conversations as they are arrived at. Representatives of a nation may be willing to give their assent on one point only provided they receive a concession on another point which

has not yet been discussed. It will not be possible to judge of the wisdom and justice of the Peace settlement until it can be viewed as a whole, and premature announcements might lead to misapprehensions and anxiety as to the ultimate results for which there was no real foundation.

In calling attention, however, to this necessary limitation on publicity, the representatives of the Powers do not underrate the importance of carrying public opinion with them in the vast task by which they are confronted. They recognise that unless public opinion approves of the results of their labours they will be nugatory. This reasoning applies with conclusive force to the present conversations between the representatives of the Great Powers.

(With regard to the full Conferences, the following rule was adopted: "Representatives of the Press shall be admitted to the meetings of the full Conference, but upon necessary occasions the deliberations of the Conference may be held in camera".)

M. CLEMENCEAU communicated to the meeting the substance of a telephone message received from Marshal Foch, to the effect that the German Delegates had agreed to sign an agreement relating to the German mercantile fleet in accordance with the conclusion reached by the Supreme War Council at the meeting held in Paris on Monday, 13th January, 1919. (See I. C.–105.)[5]

4. Renewal of Armistice With Germany

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, January 17, 1919.

[5] BC–1, Minute 3, p. 512.

Notes on Conversations Held in the Office of M. Pichon at the Quai d'Orsay, at 10:30 a. m., January 17, 1919

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:	President Wilson
	Mr. Lansing
	Mr. Frazier
	Mr. Harrison
BRITISH EMPIRE:	Mr. Lloyd George
	Mr. Balfour
	Lt. Col. Hankey
	Maj. Abraham—Maj. Caccia
FRANCE:	M. Clemenceau
	M. Pichon
	M. Dutasta
	M. Berthelot
	Prince de Bearn
ITALY:	M. Sonnino
	Count Aldrovandi
	Capt. Jones
JAPAN:	Viscount Chinda
	M. Matsui

Interpreter: M. Mantoux.

I

The Chairman read a telegram from Marshal Foch stating that the Armistice had been signed, and that all the provisions drafted at the meeting of the Supreme War Council before his departure for Spa, had been accepted by the German Government, including the important clause regarding the use of the German Commercial Fleet.

II

M. PICHON referred to the demands of the Press, that their representatives be present at all the Conferences.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated that he assumed that they referred to the Peace Conferences, and not to the small conferences now taking place.

M. MANTOUX stated that he had been present when the matter was discussed with the Press, and that he understood they had insisted on being present at the small conferences.

MR. LANSING remarked that he understood from Mr. Swope[1] of the New York *World*, that the Press did not demand to be present at those conversations, but what they resented was the fact that they had been denied access to those persons there present.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that if full summaries of the proceedings should be issued, as demanded by the Press, there would be no end to the Conference, and it would last some thirty years, as was the case in the Council of Trent.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the matter be considered from the other end, and proposed that representatives of the Press be admitted to the conferences which would be held in the larger room.

M. PICHON observed that the larger room was too small to hold all the representatives of the Press.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the Press select a certain number of representatives.

PRESIDENT WILSON proposed that those present name the limit of the number of Press representatives who could attend the conferences in the larger room, and then have the Press select from amongst themselves those who should be present.

BARON SONNINO proposed that a limited number of Press men be admitted to the plenary conferences, that this should be announced, and that the Press be informed that they could not attend the private conversations.

MR. BALFOUR reminded those present that in accordance with their own decision plenary conferences would be held only when subjects which concerned all the delegates were considered.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed some doubt as to whether this was a final analysis. Surely a plenary conference would be a conference where all those who were interested in the subject under discussion were present.

MR. BALFOUR thought it very alarming if this were true, for it would be, in his opinion, inadvisable to have the Press present at conferences in which territorial relations between the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Roumanians and Yugo-Slavs were discussed, that is to say, at conferences where the delegates of the Great Powers and delegates of certain other powers would be present.

PRESIDENT WILSON granted this point, but observed that Baron Sonnino had proposed the plenary idea, while he had proposed the room.

M. PICHON desired to point out that if the Press were present at those conferences where the Associated Governments would have to

[1] Herbert B. Swope, chief correspondent for the New York *World* at the Peace Conference.

decide on the terms to be handed Germany, it would be extremely dangerous as the Press might well furnish the enemy with valuable information.

PRESIDENT WILSON remarked that as it would seem to be impossible to work out a plan by which publicity would be avoided, the problem in hand was to work out a method to insure correct publicity.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE was not quite sure that this was the case. He referred to the fact that when questions were asked in Parliament as to the accuracy of a certain report, it was always possible to deny the truth of the report, unless it were absolutely correct. He thought that if he were now asked in Parliament questions concerning the decision taken in the conferences, he would be supported, if he were to refuse to make any statement, should he say that it would be against the best interests of the country to do so. He thought that he would be supported in such an attitude, as it would be readily understood that it would be impossible to give out the provisions of any treaty piecemeal. A treaty is always published as an entire completed document.

In his opinion the whole point of the discussion was whether things were to be decided by public clamor. He referred to the fact that just before the last elections in England the public were beginning to ask embarrassing questions about Peace terms, and if it had gone on his hands would have been tied. Consequently, he was in the main, in sympathy with M. Pichon's observations. For his part, however, he was not afraid to face the Press. He did not believe that the public would support these demands of the Press. He observed that the small meetings might be compared to a cabinet of our nations and it was manifestly absurd to think that the Press should be present at a Cabinet meeting. If everything were public beforehand, how could the Associated Governments ever meet the enemy?

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that he might agree with what Mr. Lloyd George had just said, if it were not for the fact that he still thought that leaks were bound to occur of what transpired in the small conversations, because recently a private conversation which he had held in his own house regarding the solution of the Adriatic question was reported a day or so thereafter with a considerable degree of accuracy in the *Daily Mail*. He was afraid that the Press would be able to find out or divine what transpired at the private conversations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE did not think that the publication of information of that kind had the same effect as if it had been an accurate statement from an official source.

M. PICHON again asked for some decision from those present, as to what sort of publicity shall be given the various types of conferences.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that it would be well to stand in the main on the position already taken, namely, that as regards these conversations, there be given to the Press an official announcement containing the decisions arrived at each day; that no summary of the discussions be given to the press, as he might change his mind from day to day on a certain subject in the light of arguments advanced, and that he did not wish to confine himself to any line of action; that it be decided that fifteen or any other definite number of Press representatives might attend the first conference, and that it be not now decided that they should always be present.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that it might be advisable to issue an explanation to the Press explaining the necessity for making reservations with regard to publicity, etc., and that restrictions did not apply to the presence of the Press at the general sittings, although it might be necessary sometime to go into executive session, or say, in camera.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE preferred not to commit himself regarding the President's last suggestion as yet. He was looking ahead, and thought it preferable simply to decide to let the Press be present on Saturday, without prejudice.

BARON SONNINO pointed out that it would be very difficult to withdraw the permission after it had once been given.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that Mr. Lloyd George draft a statement to be issued to the Press, explaining the reasons for their decisions in the matter.

M. CLEMENCEAU called President Wilson's attention to an article carried in the *New York Tribune*, which, like many others, had been very severe to France. In this article it was claimed that the President did not deny certain things.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that this was the most abominable form of lying, and pointed out that of course he had not denied things which they claimed he would not deny, as he had never been asked about them. The President assured M. Clemenceau that he would telegraph to the editor of the *New York Tribune* about the matter.

MR. BALFOUR inquired whether anything would be gained by asking American newspaper owners to come over here.

PRESIDENT WILSON replied that there were usually quite a number of owners of American papers, and in many cases the owners' control was occasional and indirect.

III

MR. BALFOUR called attention to an apparently inadvertent omission from the list of small belligerent Allied states who were to receive representation at the Peace Conference, namely the Hedjaz. The King of Hedjaz had been acknowledged as a belligerent by France, Great Britain and Italy, and as matter of fact, had pulled off one of the most successful side shows or subsidiary operations during the war.

M. PICHON thought that the case of the King of Hedjaz was covered in the section containing the proposal regarding representation of states under process of formation.

MR. BALFOUR observed that he thought there was a distinct difference between the Hedjaz and the Yugo-Slavs.

It was agreed that the Hedjaz receive two representatives.

IV

PRESIDENT WILSON called attention to the fact that the South American states who had broken relations were, according to his understanding, to be placed in the category of those who were to be present as of right. He inquired whether these states had received invitations.

M. PICHON answered in the affirmative.

PRESIDENT WILSON remarked that he thought the matter should be made clear and suggested a small amendment to the paragraphs of the procedure which was accepted.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that there be an afternoon meeting to fix the order for the business of the meeting on Saturday, and to draw up an agenda. He felt very strongly that the agenda for any meeting must always be fixed between those present, and nothing was to be discussed, but what should be in the agenda.

M. Clemenceau's proposal was accepted, and it was agreed to reconvene at three o'clock.

V

M. PICHON stated that he had received two emphatic protests, one from Belgium and the other from Serbia, against the number of delegates that had been assigned to them. The Belgian Council of Ministers had decided that resolutions to give Belgium only two seats are inacceptable, and had informed Baron Gaiffier, that he was himself to decide whether he would accept the invitation from the French Government to attend the Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that this action on the part of Belgium was monstrous, and that it was absurd to give Belgium more than

two votes, as against the five for the United States and France, when she had put only from 150,000 to 200,000 troops in the field.

MR. LANSING pointed out that both Belgium and Serbia were invaded countries, and that their sacrifices had been just as great as if they had entered the War of their own accord.

MR. BALFOUR observed that he personally would like to do any honor possible to Belgium. If these two countries were given three delegates on account of their sentimental claim he feared that it would open the door to many complaints. If they were to obtain more power in voting, he might agree, but he did not understand that that would be the case.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed regret that the protest had come in a form which might lead to an impasse.

BARON SONNINO explained that the Belgian Government was faced with the difficulty of finding places for representatives of the two parties, namely, the Catholic and Socialist Parties.

M. CLEMENCEAU spoke a word for Belgium, whose king had played a great part in a certain moment of history, and had given a fine example not only to Europe, but to America; as for Serbia, she had been most valiant, and had suffered great losses. He proposed that both countries be given three delegates.

BARON SONNINO observed that Serbia was likely to have more delegates when the Yugo-Slavs were recognized.

M. PICHON stated that he had received a notification from Mr. Vesnitch of the formation of a state composed of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The Foreign Office had replied to the notification by stating that the decision regarding the recognition of this kingdom would be made by the Conference. Vesnitch then made it clear that if an answer were not given, the Serbian delegates would present the matter at the first meeting of the Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that there had been too many reversals of decisions taken. He might not resist, if this were to be the end of it. He feared that if Belgium and Serbia were given three delegates, Greece would have something to say, also Roumania, as soon as the information became public. If he were assured that this were the end of the matter, he would not resist.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the Belgian Government had stated in its protest that two delegates were not acceptable. Would they accept three?

M. PICHON explained that they would undoubtedly accept three, as they had already named their Minister for Foreign Affairs, and a representative of each of the two political parties.

It was decided to give three delegates each to Belgium and Serbia.

VI

M. PICHON suggested that President Wilson's proposal regarding a list of subjects to be discussed, should be used as the basis for the program of the work of the Conference, and that he would ask each delegation to submit their recommendations regarding the five following subjects, to the Conference:

1. League of Nations
2. Reparations
3. New States
4. Territorial Boundaries
5. Colonial Possessions.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that he had merely intended this list for the discussions at the conversations.

MR. BALFOUR thought that if this list were submitted to the full Conference many a burning question would immediately arise.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the presiding officer of the Conference should appoint committees on different subjects, then have the different delegations submit their reports on the different subjects to these committees, who will initiate in order the channels of distribution.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE preferred that this matter be not arranged in the form of a resolution, but rather explained to the Conference by M. Clemenceau who could state at the same time the general headings under which the subject would have to be examined, and then invite the delegates to send to the Secretariat their views on questions which might concern them.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked what would happen, supposing someone at the first session arose and made another motion.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that if committees were set up a machinery might be created which it would be impossible to control. He thought it necessary to confine the action to reports on matters which concerned the delegations individually. These reports would then go to the Secretariat, and be submitted by the President to the Great Powers for their information.

This procedure was agreed upon.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE hoped that one of the questions that the delegates would be asked to report on, would be the question of the punishment of those who had been guilty of infringement of the Law of Nations.

M. PICHON read Section III of the Plan of Procedure proposed by the Foreign Office.[3]

[3] Vol. I, p. 389.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the delegates also be asked to report their views on the question of the responsibility of the authors of the War, and particularly on international legislation for labor.

MR. BALFOUR inquired as to how elastic this proposal for procedure was, and suggested that the President of the Conference be authorized to add any matters to the list he thought desirable.

M. CLEMENCEAU explained that he considered himself the mandatory of those present. He preferred not to accept responsibility for extending or limiting the subject.

M. Clemenceau explained that he would invite all the delegations to submit views on all the questions mentioned in Section III of the French Plan of Procedure, and they would then be passed on by the Secretariat for the information of the Great Powers.

BARON SONNINO referred to the constitution of the Secretariat of the Conference. He understood that the President of the Conference was to name the Secretary of the Conference, to be assisted by representatives of and appointed by each delegation.

VII

PRESIDENT WILSON read the draft of the statement to be issued by those present to the Press. He stated that he did not know how to defend the privacy of the meeting of the large conference, except on special occasions. He thought that the arguments for the privacy of the small conferences were conclusive. For this reason, it was necessary to distinguish between the great conferences and the private conferences, and suggested that this be made clear all through the statement to the Press.

The President then proposed certain alterations in the draft statement, submitted by Mr. Lloyd George. The amended statement was read in English, translated into French, and accepted by those present.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that it was therefore understood that the conferences between those present and the representatives of the small powers were to be considered in the category of private conversations.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated that he understood that that was the decision.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the distinction was then to be one of rooms: conferences in the large room were to be open to the Press, except in cases where it was desirable to consider a certain subject in camera; all conferences in the small room were to be private.

PRESIDENT WILSON confirmed this as his understanding of the matter, and remarked that in the slang of today it would now be possible for them to know just "where they were at".

The draft statement proposed by Mr. Lloyd George reads as follows:

"The representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers have given earnest consideration to the question of publicity for the proceedings of the Peace Conference. They are anxious that the public, through the Press should have the fullest information compatible with safeguarding the supreme interest of all, which is that a just and honourable settlement should be arrived at with the minimum of delay. It is, however, obvious that the publicity for the Conference proceedings must be subject to the limitations necessarily imposed by the difficult and delicate nature of their task.

"The proceedings of a Peace Conference are far more analogous to those of a Cabinet than to those of a Parliament. Nobody has ever suggested that Cabinet Meetings should be held in public, and if they were so held, the work of government would become impossible. Cabinets are held in private in order that differences may be reconciled [and] agreement reached before the stage of publicity is begun. The essence of democratic method is not that deliberations of a Government should be conducted in public, but that its conclusions should be subject to the revision of a popular Chamber and to free and open discussion on the platform and in the Press before they are binding upon the people.

"The representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers have met in order to solve questions which affect the vital interests of many nations, and upon which at present they hold the most diverse views. The Conference cannot proceed by the method of a majority vote. No nation can be committed except by the free vote of its own delegates. The conclusions of the Conference therefore can only be formed by the difficult process of reaching agreement among all. This vital process would only be hindered if the discussion of every disputed question were to open by a public declaration by each Delegation of its own national point of view. Such a declaration would in many cases be followed by a public controversy. This would be serious enough if it were confined to controversy between parties within each State. It might be extremely dangerous if, as would often be inevitable, it resulted in controversy between nations. Moreover, such public declarations would make that give and take on the part of the delegates themselves, which is essential to a successful negotiation, a matter of infinitely greater difficulty.

"It is also extremely important that the settlement should be not only just but speedy. Every belligerent Power is anxious for the early conclusion of Peace, in order that its armies may be demobilized and that it may return once more to the ways of peace. If premature publicity is given to the negotiations, the proceedings of the Peace Conference would be interminably protracted, and the delegates would be forced to speak not only to the business before the Conference, but to concern themselves with the controversies which had been raised by the account of their proceedings outside.

"Finally, there will often be very strong reasons against announcing the conclusions of the Conference as they are arrived at. Representatives of a nation may be willing to give their assent on one point only provided they receive a concession on another point which has

not yet been discussed. It will not be possible to judge of the wisdom and justice of the Peace settlement until it can be viewed as a whole, and premature announcements might lead to misapprehensions and anxiety as to the ultimate results for which there was no real foundation.

"In calling attention, however, to this necessary limitation on publicity the representatives of the Powers do not underrate the importance of carrying public opinion with them in the vast task by which they are confronted. They recognize that unless public opinion approved of the results of their labours they will be nugatory. They cannot forget that the conclusions at which they arrive can only become operative after they have received the free and unfettered assent of the representatives of the people. Communiqués as full as is compatible with the public interest will be issued regularly, and representatives of the Press will be invited to attend the proceedings whenever possible."

The text of the statement, as amended by President Wilson, reads as follows:

"The representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers have given earnest consideration to the question of publicity for the proceedings of the Peace Conference. They are anxious that the public, through the Press, should have the fullest information compatible with safe-guarding the supreme interest of all, which is that a just and honourable settlement should be arrived at with the minimum of delay. It is, however, obvious that publicity with regard to the preliminary conversations now proceeding must be subject to the limitations necessarily imposed by the difficult and delicate nature of their object.

"The proceedings of a Peace Conference are far more analogous to those of a Cabinet than to those of a legislature. Nobody has ever suggested that Cabinet Meetings should be held in public, and if they were so held, the work of government would become impossible. One reason why Cabinets are held in private is in order that differences may be reconciled and agreement reached before the stage of publicity is begun. The essence of democratic method is not that deliberations of a Government should be conducted in public, but that its conclusions should be subject to the consideration of a popular Chamber and to free and open discussion on the platform and in the Press.

"The representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers are holding conversations in order to solve questions which affect the vital interests of many nations and upon which they may at present hold many diverse views. These deliberations cannot proceed by the method of a majority vote. No nation can be committed except by the free vote of its own delegates. The conclusions arrived at at these consultations, therefore, can only be formed by the difficult process of reaching agreement among all. This vital process would only be hindered if the discussion of every disputed question were to open by a public declaration by each Delegation of its own national point of view. Such a declaration would in many cases be followed by premature public controversy. This would be serious

enough if it were confined to controversy between parties within each State. It might be extremely dangerous if, as would often be inevitable, it resulted in controversy between nations. Moreover such public declarations would render that give and take on the part of the delegates themselves, which is essential to a successful negotiation, a matter of infinitely greater difficulty.

"It is also extremely important that the settlement should be not only just but speedy. Every belligerent Power is anxious for the early conclusion of peace, in order that its armies may be demobilized and that it may return once more to the ways of peace. If premature publicity is given to the negotiations, the proceedings of the Peace Conference would be interminably protracted, and the delegates would be forced to speak not only to the business before the Conference, but to concern themselves with the controversies which had been raised by the account of their proceedings outside.

"Finally, there will often be very strong reasons against announcing the conclusions of the conversations as they are arrived at. Representatives of a nation may be willing to give their assent on one point only provided they receive a concession on another point which has not yet been discussed. It will not be possible to judge of the wisdom and justice of the Peace settlement until it can be viewed as a whole, and premature announcements might lead to misapprehensions and anxiety as to the ultimate results for which there was no real foundation.

"In calling attention, however, to these necessary limitations on publicity, the representatives of the Powers do not underrate the importance of carrying public opinion with them in the vast task by which they are confronted. They recognize that unless public opinion approved of the results of their labours they will be nugatory.

"This reasoning applies with conclusive force to the present conversations between the representatives of the Great Powers.

"With regard to the full conferences the following rule was adopted:

"Representatives of the Press will be admitted to the meetings of the full Conference but upon necessary occasions the deliberations of the Conference may be held *in camera*."

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, on Monday, January 20, 1919, at 10: 30 a. m.

Present

America, United States of	British Empire	France
President Wilson. Mr. R. Lansing. Mr. A. H. Frazier. Colonel U. S. Grant. Mr. L. Harrison.	The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister. The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B., Secretary, War Cabinet. Mr. H. Norman. Capt. E. Abraham.	M. Clemenceau, President of the Council and Minister of War. M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs. M. Dutasta. M. Berthelot. Capt. A. Portier.

Italy	Japan
His Excellency Baron Sonnino, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Count Aldrovandi. Major A. Jones.	Baron Makino. His Excellency M. Matsui. M. Saburi.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

(M. Noulens, French Ambassador in Russia, also attended by invitation.)

1. Allied Attitude to Russia

M. Clemenceau said that he proposed to ask M. Noulens to make a statement to the Conference concerning Bolshevism in Russia.

M. Noulens said that he would confine himself to statements of facts. He would also present a few brief documents. Before our victory over Germany we had had a policy in Russia. He was quite aware of the gravity of the present situation, and perfectly ready to alter his own views in order to meet that situation. He would not, in the remarks he was about to make, allow himself to be influenced by any narrow sense of national interest. He felt that in order to save true democracy nothing was more requisite than close cohesion among the Allies. He felt that what he was about to say to the Conference would be backed by all the representatives of the Allied Powers at present in Archangel. The British, American, and Italian Ambassadors had witnessed the same facts, and had been brought into contact with the same doctrines, and they had all drawn the same conclusion. Everybody knew that the advent of Bolshevism had been followed by anarchy both in town and country. Though

food existed in Russia, famine ensued. This much was common knowledge. He proposed to say nothing about the confiscation of private property, deposits in the banks, and the repudiation of State debts. What he wished to lay stress on was the extent to which persecution had affected large classes of the Russian people. Those classes might not be a majority of the inhabitants, but they were a considerable minority, comprising all the character and intellect in the country.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether it must be understood that all but the intellectual minority were with the Bolsheviks.

M. NOULENS said that what he wished to convey was that all the well-to-do classes, including the richer peasants and working men, were against the Bolsheviks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired when M. Noulens had left Petrograd.

M. NOULENS replied that he had left Petrograd on the 27th February, 1918. Since then he had been at Vologda until the 26th July, after which he had been at Archangel. He and his colleagues had met witnesses of the facts he was going to relate, coming from all parts of Russia. The well-to-do and intellectual classes throughout Bolshevik Russia were odiously ill-treated. They were reduced to the most servile and repulsive occupations. Their quarters were commandeered and placed at the disposal of the Bolsheviks, and even their clothes were taken from them. These things were done not as a result of random pillage, but by deliberate official order. Even before he left Petrograd, that is, before the signature of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk,[1] while the Soviet Government was technically in a state of war with Germany, even at that time, naval officers had been handed over to the tender mercies of their crews. They were often tied to the masts of their ships, and in that posture made to direct the navigation. They were denied the exclusive use of their cabins. They were rated with the intellectual classes, and with them placed outside the law. He had with him the text of the Constitution laid down by the Soviet, published in the *Isvestia* on 19th July, 1917 [*1918*].[2] The phrase constantly used in this document was "Dictatorship of the Proletariat." He read from this document a paragraph requiring local Soviets to guarantee the absolute power of the labouring population, and to prevent by all means the restoration to any influence of the exploiting classes. To further this end, the working classes were to be armed and all other classes disarmed. A Red Army of workmen and peasants was to be formed to maintain this regime. As a consequence, M. Noulens said, all working men

[1] *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, p. 442.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 587.

in all the towns he had visited were armed with rifles and other weapons, whereas if a bourgeois were found in possession of a revolver he would incontinently be shot.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked M. Noulens what, in his estimation, the strength of the Red Army might be.

M. NOULENS replied that he had no exact figures.

The figure of one million had been mentioned in the Press. This figure was certainly an absurd exaggeration. In any case, this Army was not composed of real soldiers, but of men driven by famine to take service. They did not want to fight, and they would certainly dissolve if faced by regular troops.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether there had not been fighting with the Red Army on the Archangel front.

M. NOULENS replied that Archangel had been occupied by a French battalion, 872 strong, on the 1st August, 1918. The town was then held by 5,000 or 6,000 Red Guards. This force had not waited to be attacked, and had retired in one movement 125 versts. The town of Archangel had been kept in order by 100 men, though its population numbered about 100,000. The remaining 700 had gone in pursuit of the retiring Red Guards. The Red Guards had never turned on their pursuers; but the latter were not reinforced, the Bolsheviks had cut all the bridges behind them, the rainy season had supervened rendering the country impassable, and the pursuing troops had therefore been forced to retire. With 10,000 men at that time it would have been possible to march to Vologda and Viatka. At the present time General Ironside had only 10,000 men at Archangel. There were also 10,000 at Murmansk. If the Bolsheviks really had an army of 1,000,000, they could easily detach a force to wipe out General Ironside's command; in fact, they only had about 15,000 to 20,000 men against him, who made no attempt to attack.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the figures supplied to him by the British Staff were 16,000 Allied troops at Archangel, faced by 5,000 Bolsheviks.

M. NOULENS said that he believed the Bolsheviks to be really more numerous on that front, but if there were only 5,000, this fact reinforced his contention that they certainly had not under their orders an army of 1,000,000 men.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, according to figures supplied to him, there were 15,000 Allied troops at Murmansk, faced by no more than 3,000 Bolsheviks. He believed these figures must be correct, as a British commander was in charge of the whole force, and the figures were supplied to him by the British Staff.

M. NOULENS said that if the Allies had been unable to attack hitherto, and were still unable to do so, it was by reason of the marshy

soil. The country furnished no material for the repair of the broken bridges, but he understood that General Ironside proposed to repair them and to make a move in the winter.

From all the evidence available to him, he had formed the opinion that the Bolshevik troops would not fight the Allies.

He now wished to return to the subject of the treatment of the bourgeoisie. In the elections for the Constituent Assembly the Bolsheviks had exercised the utmost pressure on the electorate. Nevertheless, they had not secured a majority in the Assembly. In consequence they had broken up the Assembly and set up in its place a government of Soviets. What might be regarded as the present Parliament of Russia had been constituted in July 1918 by delegations from the local Soviets. According to the Constitution framed by that body, a number of classes of persons were disfranchised. He quoted article 65, which enacted that all persons profiting by the results of other men's labour; all living on private income or trading for private interests; monks; spiritual servants of the Church; agents of the former police and constabulary; and members of the reigning house of Russia, were, even if otherwise eligible, debarred from voting or being elected. This, in fact, put all these classes outside the law.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the electorate in Russia was purely an electorate of peasants and workmen.

M. NOULENS said that even such peasants as employed labourers or servants and did not do the whole of their work with their own hands were disfranchised.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the bulk of the peasantry of Russia did not do all their work themselves.

M. NOULENS said that a great many employed as many as two or three labourers. Properties in Russia were of considerable extent, and since the confiscation of the larger properties a great deal of land had gone out of cultivation. Not only was this form of persecution resorted to, but all Press organs representing moderate or even Socialistic opinion not acceptable to the Bolsheviks were ruthlessly suppressed. He quoted the *Pravda*, which, on grounds of national security, demanded the complete obliteration of all hostile factions, and rejoiced at the suppression of all but the Bolshevik Press. Hence it could fairly be said that the Bolshevik Government set up inequality as a principle. This principle could not be accepted by the Allied Governments, which had fought for freedom and equality. It might be asked how such a regime was able to persist at all. The answer was, by terror alone. The majority of the people were both disarmed and torpid. Without the protection of Lettish and Chinese mercenaries and highly-paid Red Guards the commissaries of the people

would disappear. He proposed to cite a few cases of outrages which might fairly be described as systematic and official.

Last January Trotsky had threatened that, unless the people accepted the Soviet Government, that Government would be enforced by a terror unexampled in history. Mere denunciation of anyone as a member of the middle class or as an ex-officer was enough to warrant his imprisonment. Persons of these classes filled the prisons in Petrograd, Moscow, and Vologda, and they were fed with a little bread and an occasional herring. Many died of privation, and their bodies were often left among the living. At their own caprice the guards would shoot a dozen or so to make room for more. No form of trial was considered requisite. There were, in addition, exceptional occasions on which very considerable massacres were indulged in. He cited the case of Ouritsky, Minister of the Interior and President of the Commission for the Repression of the Anti-Revolutionary Movement. He was remarkable for his cruelty. He was assassinated by a student. The assassin was caught, and 500 officers were seized and despatched to Kronstadt, where they were either drowned or shot as a reprisal for the murder of Ouritsky. The assassin was still imprisoned and undergoing torture. His finger-nails and toe-nails were torn out in order to induce the betrayal of his comrades. He had so far refused to betray them and was therefore kept alive undergoing fresh torture. This was not an isolated case. At the fortress of Peter and Paul a company of professional torturers was maintained. He quoted a telegram received on the previous day from Commandant Boyard, Consul at Ekaterinberg, describing the devastated condition of the town and the miserable state of the population. On triumphal arches erected to celebrate the anniversary of the accession of the Bolsheviks to power were inscriptions reading: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat." In fact, no man could work unless he employed himself in Bolshevik interests. He wished to remind the meeting that not only Russians were the victims in these excesses, but also Allied citizens. He instanced the case of Mr. Darcy,[3] who died of cold and hunger in prison; and that of Captain Cromie,[4] the circumstances of whose death were doubtless known to all present. Finally, he wished to point out that the Bolshevik Government was definitely imperialist. It meant to conquer the world, and to make peace with no Governments save Governments representing only the labouring classes. It stated openly that the only legitimate war was civil war. It would respect no League of Nations. Should we even be weak enough to

[3] Pierre Darcy, French commercial attaché at Petrograd.
[4] British naval attaché at Petrograd.

undertake any agreements with such a Government, they would, on the very next day, send among us propagandists, money, and explosives. According to their open professions they intended to spread revolution by every means.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked M. Noulens whether it was Lenin or Trotsky who really ran the Government.

M. NOULENS replied that Lenin was the more popular of the two. He was the pontiff of the creed and Trotsky was the man of action.

(The meeting adjourned at mid-day).

(It was agreed that the next meeting should take place on the following day at 10:30 a. m.).

Notes on Conversations Held in the Office of M. Pichon at the Quai d'Orsay, at 10:30 a. m., January 20, 1919

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:	President Wilson
	Mr. Lansing
	Mr. Frazier
	Mr. Harrison
	Col. Grant
BRITISH EMPIRE:	Mr. Lloyd George
	Mr. Balfour
	Lt. Col. Hankey
	Mr. Norman
	Major Caccia
	Capt. Abraham
FRANCE:	M. Clemenceau
	M. Pichon
	M. Dutasta
	M. Berthelot
	Prince de Bearn
ITALY:	M. Sonnino
	Count Aldrovandi
	Capt. Jones
JAPAN:	Viscount Chinda
	M. Matsui

Interpreter: M. Mantoux.

I

M. CLEMENCEAU, who was in the chair, stated that M. Noulens, the French Ambassador to Russia, would give an account of conditions in that country. M. Clemenceau then introduced M. Noulens to those present.

M. NOULENS stated that he would try to present a certain number of facts and read and submit a few short documents. He explained that he realized that the situation had changed since the victory of the Allies, and that a new policy was required. For his part, he had no selfish preoccupation to influence those present to adopt the views of his own country. He fully realized that what was now necessary was the adoption of a single policy which would be supported by all. He was satisfied that what he would say would be confirmed by others.

At the present time it may be said that famine exists everywhere in Russia, in spite of the great resources of the country. This is largely due to the policy pursued by the Bolsheviki, which has been

one of confiscation of private property, nationalization of the banks, and persecution of private citizens, particularly those of the intellectual classes who form, if not the majority, then an important minority.

PRESIDENT WILSON inquired whether the Ambassador meant that all classes were opposed to the Bolsheviki.

M. NOULENS replied that while it could not be stated that the majority were opposed to the Bolsheviki, it could be asserted that the best people of the country were opposed to their doctrine.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked when the Ambassador had left Russia. M. NOULENS answered that he had left Petrograd on February 22nd [*27th?*], 1918, Vologda on July 6th [*25th?*], 1918, had arrived in Archangel in August, and had left there about the middle of December last.

Returning to his subject, the Ambassador stated that all those belonging to the well-to-do classes and the intellectuals had been subjected to the most hideous tyranny. Not only had they been forced to pay exorbitant taxes, but their personal safety had been attacked. They had been forced to perform the most disgusting labors; their houses had been thrown open to the Bolsheviks, and even their clothes had been requisitioned. All such acts had been done pursuant to official orders and decrees of the Bolshevik Government. In this connection, and as an instance of this policy of the Bolsheviki to oppress the better classes, he stated that the officers of ships coming to Petrograd were subjected to the orders of their crews; that they had been tied to the masts and forced to navigate their ships in that condition, and had not been permitted the use of their own quarters. This they had been forced to endure as members of the bourgeois class.

M. Noulens read certain articles of the Constitution of the Soviet Government to prove that the deliberate policy of the Bolsheviki was a policy of tyranny worse than any that had ever existed.

In reply to a question of Mr. Lloyd George as to how this Constitution from which he was reading had been adopted, he explained that he was reading from the official paper of July 19th, 1918 *The Isvestia.* The Bolshevik Government, he said, was in fact a *dictateur* of the proletariat, the ruling of one class over all others. He read a certain article from this constitution granting absolute power to the laboring classes, and also a decree providing for the arming of the working classes and the formation of a Red Army, while at the same time decreeing the complete disarmament of the well-to-do class. Should the latter be found with arms in their possession, they were shot without trial.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE inquired whether M. Noulens had any information on the size of the Bolshevik Army.

M. NOULENS replied that the general statement was that the army consisted of one million men. For his part, he thought this inexact and a gross exaggeration,—that even if it were exact, he would point out that a large portion of the Bolshevik Army consisted of men who had been forced to enlist in order to provide themselves with some means of livelihood, and also to secure food for their families. These men would not fight.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE inquired whether there had not been fighting at Archangel.

M. NOULENS replied that the Bolshevik Army was more a rabble than an army, and as an instance, referred to the fact that the Allied troops consisting of but 172 men [1] had entered Archangel in August, and that their appearance was enough to force some five or six thousand Red Guards to withdraw from Archangel some 125 versts. The town consisting of some 100,000 inhabitants had been left in the care of a garrison of 100 men. The remaining 72 [1] went forward to pursue the Bolsheviki, but they never reached the enemy, as the latter had destroyed the bridges, and the winter weather set in, which made it impossible to pursue them further.

M. Noulens gave as his opinion that if there had been 10,000 men available last summer it would have been easy for them to have reached Vologda. It was his opinion that if the Bolsheviki had, in fact, an army of a million men, they could have easily destroyed the 10,000 at Archangel and the 10,000 at Murmansk, but they have never even tried to attack.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that according to the figures furnished him there were 16,000 Allied troops at Archangel, and 15,425 at Murmansk; that in front of those at Archangel there were now only 5,000 Bolsheviks, and in front of those in Murmansk there were no more than 3,000 Bolsheviks. M. NOULENS stated that he had obtained his figures shortly before his departure from Archangel from General Ironside.

Returning to his subject he stated that when the foreign representatives were at Vologda, the Bolsheviki had placed Lettish Guards around their residences, ostensibly to protect them. These soldiers stated that they would never fight against the Allies.

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[1] Somewhat different figures appear in the account of M. Noulens' remarks given in the alternate version of the minutes of this meeting *ante*, p. 623.

Concerning the numbers of troops involved in the occupation of Archangel, see also *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, pp. 505 and 513.

M. Noulens then gave a brief history of the establishment of the Bolshevik Government. He recalled the fact that last year when the constituent assembly had elected a majority against the Bolsheviki, the latter had seized a number of representatives, shot them, and established the Soviet system by force. He read Article LXV of the Constitution of the Soviet Government of July, 1918, in which was set forth the categories of those who might not vote or be elected. The principal classes were those who might be said to live off the labor of others; those owning capital or property, tradesmen and private agents of commerce, priests, agents of the police, *gendarmerie* corps, and members of the House of Romanoff.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that this was purely a working class electory. He asked M. Noulens if the peasants were included in the list. M. Noulens answered that only those peasants could vote who had no one in their employ. He explained that there was a great number of peasants who were helped by two or three men, and that if this were the case they would not be permitted to vote.

As regards the attitude of the Bolsheviki towards the Press, the bourgeois Press and the greater part of the Socialist Press had been absolutely suppressed.

Could the Allies, as defenders of liberty, recognize the existence of such a regime, a regime which exists solely by terror? If it were true that it was not only the property classes but the majority who were opposed to the Bolsheviki, why did they not rise? The answer was that they were disarmed, and that the whole country was in a state of prostration. If the Bolsheviki had not deliberately adopted the policy of engaging highly paid mercenaries consisting of Lettish, Chinese and Red Guards, the majority would have overthrown them long ago.

M. Noulens spoke at some length regarding the reign of terror which had been instituted by Trotsky's orders. He spoke of the summary executions of officers, and those of the middle classes. He stated that the fortresses were full of prisoners who were dying of starvation; that it was a regular thing for the Guards to take from ten to twelve of these poor prisoners every day and shoot them so as to make room for more. In this connection, he spoke of the assassination of the Minister of the Interior who was shot by a student. In reprisal, the Bolsheviki had taken some 500 officers at Kronstadt whom they had drowned or shot, while the student had been placed in the fortress of Peter and Paul where he was being slowly tortured.

The Ambassador read a telegram from Commander Boyard of Ekaterinburg, who had just arrived at Perm. The shops had been sacked and the town was dead. It was pitiful to see the yellow faces and the haggard eyes of the inhabitants. There was a general feeling

of terror. The Bourgeoisie, that is to say, all who were not Bolshevik or in the employ of the Bolshevik, had only been allowed three ounces of bread per day, and all children over one year had died. On the arches of triumph erected by the Bolsheviki was written: "The man who does not work does not eat", that is to say: "If you are not Bolshevik, then you receive no food". Not only men but women had been shot,—there had been atrocities, drownings, the cutting off of noses and tongues, mutilations, burials alive, mock shootings, rape and pillage everywhere.

But it was not only the Russians who had been the victims. There have been many cases of harmless foreigners who had suffered, and not only members of the well-to-do classes, but workmen also. He mentioned the case of M. D'arcy, the Chairman of the French Residence of Petrograd, who had no relations with the Russians, except in connection with charitable work, who had been seized and imprisoned, and who had died of hunger and cold. Then there was also the case of Captain Cromie, the British Naval Attaché who had been killed in defense of the British Embassy, and whose body had been exposed for three days in the window of the Embassy.

But the Bolsheviki Government did not confine itself to the dissemination of its policy throughout Russia. The Bolshevik Government was an imperial[ist] government. The Bolsheviki desired to impose their regime on the whole world. The only peace that they will make is a peace with the laboring classes. For them there is one legitimate war only,—that is the war of classes, which they say must take place everywhere. They say there can be no peaceful settlement with the better classes. In a word, the foundation of their doctrine is: "No agreement with governments which do not represent the working classes". They consider themselves the enemies of all other states. Should, therefore, the Associated Governments ever come to terms with the Bolsheviki, the Ambassador was convinced that they would use it for propaganda purposes only. They would flood the Allied countries with money, and they would use all means to overthrow the existing governments.

Mr. Lloyd George asked the Ambassador who was really in control of the Bolshevik Government. Was it Lenin or Trotsky?

M. Noulens explained that Lenin was more popular than Trotsky, but that Trotsky was the more energetic character, and had not hesitated to use force to achieve his ends.

After it was agreed to meet the following morning at 10:30, the meeting came to an end, to enable some of those present to attend the luncheon given by the French Senate to President Wilson.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, January 21, 1919, at 10 Hours 30

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
President Wilson.	The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister.	M. Clemenceau, President of the Council and Minister for War.
Mr. R. Lansing.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.	M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.	Lieut.-Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B., Secretary, War Cabinet.	M. Dutasta.
Col. U. S. Grant.	Mr. H. Norman.	M. Berthelot.
Mr. L. Harrison.	Capt. E. Abraham.	Capt. A. Portier.

ITALY	JAPAN
Signor Orlando, President of the Council.	Baron Makino.
His Excellency Baron Sonnino, Minister for Foreign Affairs.	His Excellency M. Matsui.
Count Aldrovandi.	M. Saburi.
Major A. Jones.	

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

M. de Scavenius, Danish Minister in Russia, also attended by invitation.

1. Social Forces Backing Bolshevism

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would ask M. de Scavenius, the Danish Minister in Russia, to make a statement concerning Bolshevism.

M. DE SCAVENIUS said that in Russia there were two classes—one Bolshevik, and one opposed to Bolshevism. He would begin by describing the former. When the Bolsheviks overthrew Kerensky[1] they had behind them the soldiers and most of the peasants and workmen; the soldiers backed them because they wanted peace at any price, the peasants because they wanted land, the workmen because they desired privileges for themselves. At the present time the original soldiers had been demobilized and had become peasants. The peasants were neither Bolshevik, Socialist, nor Monarchist. All they desired was land. They now had it. Their present requirement was order, which would enable them to cultivate their holdings.

As to the workmen: there was among workmen a considerable amount of discontent. Though they had become the privileged class,

[1] Alexander F. Kerensky, Prime Minister of Russia, July to November 1917.

they were in straits for food, and felt that Bolshevism had not kept its promises. Consequently it might safely be said that the Bolsheviks could only depend on about half the workmen of Russia, whose total numbers might be put at 2,000,000.

2. The Red Army

The nucleus of the Red Army was composed of foreigners—Letts, Hungarians, Germans, and Chinese. Some Russians, no doubt, had been collected by Trotsky around this nucleus, but the best fighting elements in the force were foreigners, especially the Hungarians and the Chinese.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired how many Chinese there might be in the Red Army.

M. DE SCAVENIUS estimated their number at 20,000 or 30,000. He explained that before the revolution half a million Chinese had been brought into Russia to supply the deficiency of labour on the land. After the revolution these men were out of work, and had taken service to avoid famine. He himself had been for a time in charge of Chinese interests in Russia. He had tried to keep these people out of the Red Army, but the Chinese Government had not sent him enough money to maintain them; for instance, they had sent him 10,000 roubles to support 6,000 Chinese in Petrograd alone. Consequently, he had been unable to save them from enlistment in the Red Army. He thought that the Red Army numbered in all about 300,000 men. A vast number of these men were not Bolshevik in sentiment at all, but men who had either enlisted for the same reasons as the Chinese, or had been forced into the ranks. He had seen the mobilization in Petrograd. Many of the men enrolled were bourgeois. The Red Army, therefore, was not a serious force, except when considered in relation to the famished and disarmed population of Russia itself.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the Red Army had not fought the forces of Denikin and Kolchak.

M. DE SCAVENIUS replied that they had encountered those forces, but Denikin had been able to check them, and if Denikin's troops had not for some months made any advance, the reason was that the Cossacks were only willing to defend their own country and not ready to go further north. This applied likewise to Krasnoff's[2] Cossacks.

3. Revolutionary Socialists

At the time when the Bolsheviks overthrew the Government of Kerensky, the Constituent Assembly was almost solely composed of Revolutionary Socialists. That party, however, lost prestige, and finally disappeared, because it showed itself incapable of defending Kerensky or saving the Constituent

[2] Gen. Peter Nikolaevich Krasnoff, ataman of the Don Cossacks.

Assembly. It had failed to raise an army in the Urals. When Kazan was besieged by the Bolsheviks only 2,000 volunteers and one regiment of Czecho-Slovaks opposed them; the latter were ordered to retire, and the town was defended for two days by 2,000 volunteers only. The [defenders of?] Samara also bolted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the Revolutionary Socialists were Savinkoff's party.

M. DE SCAVENIUS said that Savinkoff at that time belonged to that party. He had since joined a new party called the Radical Republicans, who had taken the place of the Revolutionary Socialists. This party was chiefly recruited in Siberia and the Urals. The peasants in Siberia were more advanced than those in Great Russia. They had been Revolutionary Socialists, but were now Radical Republicans. Before the fall of Kazan the Revolutionary Socialists were supreme at the Conference of Ufa which represented the united Governments of Omsk, Ufa, and Samara. After the fall of Samara this party was discredited, and Kolchak was able to bring off his *coup d'état*. Since that time the party had disappeared, and Kolchak's Government contained no Revolutionary Socialists.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired what Kolchak's opinions were.

M. DE SCAVENIUS said that Kolchak had been an admiral and an explorer. He called himself a Republican, though some people doubted whether he really held Republican views. After overturning the Government at Harbin he had proceeded to repeat the achievement at Omsk.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked who were the men associated with him since the overthrow of the Revolutionary Socialists.

M. DE SCAVENIUS said that they were Radical Republicans. He had the support of Savinkoff, who all his life had been a Revolutionary Socialist. The Kolchak Government was in relations with that of Ekaterinodar in the Kuban district. Both these Governments were represented in Paris by M. Sazonoff.

5. Monarchists

The Monarchists were recruited from the upper middle classes, the landed proprietors and the officers. They were especially strong in Southern Russia. The Radical Republicans were inclined to come to terms with them, and did not fear them because the troops on which they relied were chiefly Cossacks whose local institutions had always approximated rather to Republicanism. The Monarchists, on their side, were also willing to work with the Radical Republicans, as they did not wish at present to raise the question of regime.

6. Anti-Bolshevik Forces

The military forces at the disposal of the adversaries of Bolshevism were:—

(*a*) The voluntary army of Denikin, which on paper numbered 80,000 men, but in reality hardly amounted to more than 50,000 as a fighting force.

(*b*) The Cossacks of Krasnoff, amounting to 50,000 or 60,000.

(*c*) The Siberian Army, with Czecho-Slovaks, nominally 250,000 men, with a fighting force of about 100,000.

In all perhaps 200,000 or 210,000 fighting men at the outside.

The Ukrainian Army had never existed except on paper. Petliura [3] had encountered no resistance, and had easily turned out the Hetman, who had fled.

Those people in Allied Countries who opposed intervention in Russia did so on the ground that it was impossible to send to Russia troops tired after four years of war, and also impossible for democratically governed countries to help to suppress a democracy. The answer to these objections was that intervention must be carried out by volunteer troops, and that Bolshevism was not a democracy. A movement which had suppressed Parliamentary Government and the right of free speech and meeting could not be called a democracy. If intervention was undertaken, it must be undertaken at once. The longer it was delayed the more Russians would be forced by famine to enlist in the Red Army. So long as Bolshevism remained in power, anarchy and ruin would increase, and, finding no resistance, the Bolshevik bands would devastate wider and wider regions.

7. Intervention

Mr. Lloyd George enquired whether M. de Scavenius advocated immediate intervention.

M. de Scavenius replied in the affirmative. Intervention would already be a more difficult matter than it would have been three months ago, because, whereas at that time the Baltic provinces and the Ukraine were free from Bolshevism, the former were now under Bolshevik domination, and the latter under that of Petliura, whose troops were largely Bolsheviks. The Polish situation was also worse, the Bolsheviks having taken Vilna and being on their way to Warsaw. Meanwhile, Lenin and his supporters were exploiting the patriotism of the lower middle classes by saying that the Allies were Imperialists who wanted to turn Russia into a colony and restore the Monarchy; in fact, that their aims were indistinguishable from those of the Germans. To counteract this propaganda the Allies could reply that their only object in intervening was to permit the convo-

[3] Simon Petliura, leader of the nationalists in the Ukraine.

cation of a Constituent Assembly, in order that Russia might be in a position to decide her own fate. The Russians were, in fact, complaining that their right to do this had been taken from them by a violent minority. It was also to be remembered that a famine was absolutely certain to occur in the present year, the peasants having refused to sow more than enough grain for their own requirements, because the Soviet Government had sent all over the country battalions of Red Guards with orders to requisition existing stocks. It would be a great mistake to intervene by means of small forces, as had hitherto been attempted, because, as in the case of the Germans, the troops sent would become contaminated with Bolshevism in a few months. The proper policy was to destroy the centres of Bolshevism by capturing Petrograd and Moscow. To accomplish this troops should enter Russia from Finland, which would be easy, because the port of Helsingfors was free from ice, while the Finnish Government would be glad to send troops against Petrograd in order to prevent the spread of Bolshevism into their country. To enlist the aid of the Finnish Government it would, however, be necessary for the Allies to recognize them. By this means from 30,000 to 40,000 troops could quickly be moved to Petrograd. Meanwhile the Allied troops at Archangel and Murmansk could advance to Vologda and Zvanka respectively, join the Czechs, and thus ensure the supply of the Siberian force. There were 100,000 good troops in Poland, but they were without arms or uniforms. He understood that the Poles were sending a Mission to Paris to ask for these. The Polish troops should be sent against Moscow via Vilna and Smolensk. Denikin's volunteer army would also march on Moscow through Kursk if they knew that they were assured of the support of foreign troops.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether M. de Scavenius meant to convey that Russian troops could not be depended upon without the support of foreign armies.

M. DE SCAVENIUS replied that this was his opinion. Without making any claim to military knowledge, he had explained to the best of his ability the methods by which he thought intervention should be undertaken. He thought that a stiffening of 100,000, or at the utmost 150,000, volunteers from the Allied countries would be sufficient to reinforce the Russian armies he had already enumerated, and to ensure success.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had understood from M. de Scavenius' remarks that Denikin's forces were unwilling to go to Moscow.

M. DE SCAVENIUS said that this would be the case if they felt that they had to do all the fighting.

M. DE SCAVENIUS said that he had been asked to make some observations on the subject of Bolshevik propaganda. The Bolshevik doctrine implied a declaration of war on all constituted governments, because Bolshevism in Russia could not survive unless the rest of the world was Bolshevised. They had reduced propaganda to a fine art. The chief propagandist was Radek—a former Austrian subject. This man was a genius at propaganda. He had formed in Moscow an International Confederation with representatives of all the nations of Europe, and even of some in Asia. There was, for instance, a French group of about twenty persons. It published in Moscow a newspaper called "The Third International," and issued pamphlets which were smuggled into France through Switzerland, and especially through Belgium. There were English and American groups working on the same lines. The English group paid particular attention to India, which they regarded as the most vulnerable part of the British Empire. A delegation of Hindus had been specially coached and sent back to India with proclamations. A school of Indian languages had been set up in Moscow for the benefit of special agitators. The English group was also busy with Ireland, which they regarded as good soil for Bolshevism because of the feeling against landowners existing there.

8. Propaganda

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that this was little to the credit of their judgment. Nearly all land in Ireland was in the hands of peasants. If all Bolshevik propaganda fell as far short of the mark as this he was not afraid of it.

M. DE SCAVENIUS said that the subject could be well studied in Germany. The old Imperial Government had not been afraid of Bolshevism, which it had regarded as a disease only attacking conquered peoples. It had neglected Bolshevik propaganda in the conviction that Germany was invincible. Radek had made no concealment of his work in Germany. In conversation with M. de Scavenius he had told him that he employed 400 agitators in Germany with the greatest success. The result had justified his boast.

9. Bolshevism in Germany

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that the Bolsheviks in Germany had nevertheless suffered a severe defeat.

M. DE SCAVENIUS was of opinion that this defeat was not a final one. The German revolution was following the course of the Russian revolution step by step. It was now at the stage that Russia had reached in July, 1917, when the Bolsheviks were defeated by Kerensky. He was convinced that Scheidemann and Ebert had no real support.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked M. de Scavenius whether he did not think that it was impossible to compare a population in which 80 per cent. were illiterate, as in Russia, with a highly educated population such as that of Germany.

M. DE SCAVENIUS did not attribute much importance to that consideration. He thought that the habit of expecting orders, so ingrained in the German people was of greater moment. It was always the case that 4 or 5 per cent. of the population led the way. The rest were a mere flock always ready to be driven. It was a matter of general surprise that a nation which had fought so well for four years, and, before the war, had had so high a reputation for organisation, should have collapsed so suddenly and so completely. The explanation of this was that their leading classes had been largely destroyed but their place would, in time, be taken by another small percentage of energetic men. These, he believed, would be Bolsheviks. If so, their first act would be to form a close alliance with the Bolsheviks in Russia. In that event, it would be difficult to obtain a real peace in the world, or to impose on the world the decisions of this Conference. There would be a great German and Russian army ready to fight the Allies everywhere. There would be a flood of propaganda, all the more to be feared inasmuch as the Germans were better organisers than the Russians. Bolshevism, he believed, was a world danger. He therefore advocated its speedy destruction.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked for information about the situation in the Ukraine.

10. Ukraine

M. DE SCAVENIUS said that Petliura had conquered almost all the Ukraine because he had encountered no resistance, the Hetman's army existing only on paper. Petliura was in the neighborhood of Kieff as much as two months ago, and could have entered it had he wished. He had told the local Danish Consul that the Allies, who had refused to recognize him, would now be obliged to do so, and were, in fact, already in unofficial negotiations with him. Bolsheviks tolerated Petliura because the troops supporting him were largely Bolshevik. The result of his rule had been identical with that of Bolshevik rule in Great Russia. Proprietors had been expelled from their estates, and acts of violence had been committed. Petliura represented the national movement. He reproached the Hetman with the intention of merging the Ukraine in Russia. He desired autonomy for the Ukraine, although he would be willing to join a Russian Federation on some such terms as Bavaria in the German Confederation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, before putting any question to M. de Scavenius, he would like to express, on behalf of the British Gov-

ernment, his gratitude to him for his active protection of British subjects in Russia, and most particularly for saving the body of a particularly brave public servant—Captain Cromie—from the outrages of the mob.

M. CLEMENCEAU, speaking on behalf of France, said that he wished to associate himself with Mr. Lloyd George's words.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked M. de Scavenius when he had left Petrograd.

M. DE SCAVENIUS replied that he was last in Petrograd on the 15th of December. Since then he had received reports as late as the 29th December; and he promised to furnish certain extracts from Russian newspapers of about that date, which contained violent abuse of the Allies.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether conscription was working at the time when M. de Scavenius left Petrograd.

M. DE SCAVENIUS said that it had begun at that time. There had been three mobilisations in Petrograd. 13,000 soldiers had been raised there, but owing to lack of food had been removed elsewhere.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired what the effect of capturing Moscow would be.

M. DE SCAVENIUS replied that Bolshevism would cease to exist. He did not suggest that the Constituent Assembly could be called together at once, but the elements, at present helpless, would gather round the Allies, and in time would call forth the Constituent Assembly.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this amounted to the setting up of a provisional government by the Allies.

M. DE SCAVENIUS agreed that this would be necessary, but it need not be apparent. In a few weeks the parties would be able to meet, talk over the situation, and set up a government.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE presumed that the election would be by universal suffrage, and asked what M. de Scavenius would propose to do if the Bolsheviks obtained a majority.

M. DE SCAVENIUS replied that such a result was impossible; but that, if it came, it must of course be accepted.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether M. de Scavenius assumed that if the Allies appeared in Moscow they would be able to gather round them an effective Russian force. As a matter of fact, a similar experiment had already been tried, for instance in Siberia and at Archangel, which were areas of considerable extent. In both instances, the moment when foreign support had been withdrawn the native forces had dissolved. The Russians appeared incapable of forming an independent force, and could only lean on foreign troops.

M. DE SCAVENIUS said that the mistake hitherto committed had been that of employing too small forces.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the British Government had recently received a report that the Mensheviks and the Revolutionary Socialists had been driven by Allied intervention to act with the Bolsheviks.

M. DE SCAVENIUS said that, as he had before remarked, the Bolsheviks were appealing to the patriotism of the lower middle class, and persuading them that the Allies were Imperialists who intended to exploit Russia as the Germans had done. Such propaganda as this would have the effect to which Mr. Lloyd George had alluded.

M. de Scavenius then withdrew.

11. Message From the King of Montenegro to His People

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he wished to draw attention to the request made to him by the King of Montenegro. The King of Montenegro wished to send by telegraph a message to his people. The message was in the following terms:

"To my people—

I implore you to return quietly to your homes and not to combat with arms the forces which are seeking to obtain control of our country. I have received the highest assurances that early and ample opportunity will be given to the people of Montenegro to decide upon the political form of their future government.

And by this decision, so far as it concerns me, I will gladly abide.

Nicholas."

President Wilson enquired whether there was any sufficient reason for stopping this message.

(It was generally agreed that there was none, and that the message should be forwarded. The French Government undertook to do this.)

12. Assistance to the Poles

PRESIDENT WILSON read a letter addressed to him by M. Paderewski. The letter concluded by suggesting that the Allies should send a collective Note to the Ukrainian Directorate at Kieff ordering them to withdraw from Galicia and to cease interference in Polish territory. He further suggested that an Allied Commission be sent to Warsaw to gauge the situation, and that the Polish Government be supplied with artillery and German rifle ammunition.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE questioned whether it was safe to admit that Galicia was Polish territory. Any summons to Kieff should be accompanied by a similar summons to the Poles to abstain from entering disputed territory such as Eastern Galicia.

(It was agreed that a French translation of this letter should be made, and that it should be discussed at the afternoon meeting.)

PRESIDENT WILSON read to the meeting the telegraphic report annexed (Annex "A") from Mr. Butler [*Buckler*],[5] who had interviewed Litvinoff [6] in Stockholm.

13. Bolshevik Overtures

(It was agreed that this letter should also be translated and discussed at the afternoon meeting.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there was a small matter which he wished to bring to the notice of the meeting. The British Government had at their disposal a number of German submarines.

14. German Submarines

It had been suggested that these submarines should be sunk, but the Controller of the Ministry of Shipping and the Director of Contracts had been consulted, and all agreed that the ex-German submarines had considerable commercial value. The Director of Contracts considered he could dispose of forty or fifty within a month, the condition of sale being that they would be broken up and the proceeds of the sale divided amongst the Allies on a scale to be subsequently settled. It was, therefore, suggested that all surrendered submarines in excess of eighty be disposed of by sale on these conditions.

(It was agreed that this course should be followed.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, January 21, 1919.

Annex "A" to IC-113 [BC-6]

I [7]

Report, Dated January 18, 1919, of Agent who Held Confidential Conversations With Litvinoff on January 14, 15, and 16

Litvinoff stated that the Soviet Government are anxious for a permanent peace, and fully endorse the telegram which he sent to President Wilson the 24th December.[8] They detest the military preparations and costly campaigns which are now forced upon Russia after four years of exhausting war, and wish to ascertain whether the United States and the Allies have a desire for peace.

If such is the case, peace can easily be negotiated, for, according to Litvinoff, the Soviet Government are prepared to compromise on all points, including protection to existing foreign enterprises, the granting of new concessions in Russia, and the Russian foreign debt. It is

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[5] William H. Buckler, special assistant in the Embassy in Great Britain; for his mission, see *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, pp. 15–18.

[6] M. M. Litvinov, Assistant Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

[7] For text of this report as received by the Commission to Negotiate Peace, see telegram No. 116 from the Chargé in Denmark, January 18, 1919, 11 p. m., *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, p. 15.

[8] Not found in Department files. For extracts, see *ibid.*, pp. 138–139.

impossible now to give the details as to possible compromises, because Litvinoff has no idea of the claims which will be presented by the Allies, nor of the resources which will be available to Russia for the satisfaction of those claims. The particulars in all phases can be worked out by experts when the data mentioned above are available. The Soviet Government's conciliatory attitude is unquestionable.

Litvinoff showed me an open wireless message which he had just received from Tchitcherine affirming the willingness of the Government to be conciliatory with reference to the question of the foreign debt. Litvinoff and his associates realize fully that Russia will need, for a long time, expert assistance and advice, particularly in financial and technical matters, and that she cannot get on without manufactured imports, including, especially, foreign machinery.

Russian Bolshevist propaganda in foreign countries would cease at once if peace were made. That revolutionary propaganda was called forth by the declaration of war on Russia by the Allies, as a measure of retaliation, which also produced violence and terror. These activities will all cease as soon as the war stops. Propaganda has been freely employed against Germany, but until recently militarist Germany was the most dangerous enemy of Russia, and, notwithstanding the nominal peace of Brest-Litovsk, really remained at war with her. While Litvinoff was Russian representative—a period of eight months—he conducted political propaganda designed to defend his Government against attack. Everything which he issued was published in England. The Foreign Office, which seized all his papers can confirm this.

It is realized by Russians that conditions are not favorable for a revolution of the Russian type in certain Western countries. No amount of propaganda could produce such a result.

If it were possible for Russia to make peace with the Allies, these results would immediately follow:—

First.—An amnesty would be extended to the Russians who have been hostile to the Soviet Government, and bitterness against them would soon disappear. As such persons are not numerous they would, if they chose, be permitted to leave Russia.

Second.—The intrinsic weakness of the forces in South Russia, Siberia, and Archangel, which are opposed to the Soviet Government, would at once be revealed. Those forces represent only a minority in each district, and their local successes have been solely the result of Allied support.

Third.—The hostility which at present exists towards Russia on the part of Finland and other countries which need Russian products would speedily vanish. Russians have no imperialistic designs on Finland, Ukraine, or Poland, and desire only to give these peoples full rights of self-determination. However, Litvinoff said, so long as foreign powers support the capitalist classes in these countries Russia feels justified in supporting the working classes.

Litvinoff makes no denial of the many Soviet blunders, but says that the system has worked well when there are taken into consideration the enormous difficulties which had been faced during the past year. He asserts that its efficiency is constantly improving. The distribution of food is now being managed well by the peasant cooperatives, who are working with the Soviet. More anarchy and starvation must ensue if this new system should now be overthrown. In so far as the League of Nations can prevent war without encouraging reaction, it can count on the support of the Soviet Government.

The foregoing is the substance of the interview with Litvinoff.

Arthur Ransome, Correspondent of the London *Daily News*, who left Moscow last August, but has kept in constant contact with Bolsheviks in Stockholm and has an intimate knowledge of their views, believes that they would compromise as to the Ural and other frontiers. I pressed Litvinoff on this point, but beyond a claim that all Siberia must be Russian received no definite answer.

Ransome believes also that continued intervention by the Entente can smash the Soviet power in time. However, when this has once been accomplished, intervention must continue on a still larger scale for an indefinite period in order to cure the inevitable anarchy. The Soviet Government is the only one which shows the capacity of holding the Russian people and, without military support, no successor to it could exist. A large class of Bolsheviks who oppose Tchitcherine's and Litvinoff's plans for compromise, and who hope for more active Allied intervention, fully appreciate this fact, on [*no*] less than the discontent certain to be caused in Entente Countries by such prolonged and military effort. The continuance of such intervention plays into the hands of these extremists, whereas a policy of agreement with the Soviet Government will counteract their influence, will strengthen the Moderates, and by reviving trade and industry will procure prosperity, the best of all antidotes for Bolshevism.

If it were desired to bring Ransome to Paris, he could give information almost as well as Litvinoff relative to the attitude of the Soviet Government on any question.

For a month Litvinoff has been deprived of mail and of wireless cypher; consequently no effective negotiations can begin until the Allies arrange with Sweden and Finland, that he may communicate confidentially with his Government. Since he fears expulsion from Sweden at any moment this should be arranged without delay if negotiation is contemplated.

As the only possible channel for such negotiation is through Litvinoff, it may appear to you that the Legation at Stockholm is not a

suitable intermediary as the journey from Copenhagen to Paris requires three-and-a-half days. I am waiting your instructions at Copenhagen in case you should wish me to return to Stockholm. Please instruct me as promptly as possible if you desire me to come on to Paris.

II[9]

The Agent in question submits the following estimate of the situation based on information obtained by him.

Military intervention and occupation of Russia, even if ultimately successful, can only succeed at an indefinite date in the future, meanwhile war conditions following Bolshevism there and elsewhere will continue.

It is possible for an agreement with Russia to be made at once, thus obviating conquest and policing, and reviving normal conditions as a counteracting agency against Bolshevism.

In spite of the guarded language used by Litvinoff, I feel convinced that we can make a fair bargain regarding foreign interests and the foreign debt if we do not greatly curtail Russian territory. If Siberia and the coal and oil fields should be lost to Russia the terms granted relative to the debt will be proportionately less good.

If the Allies boldly say, "We are now convinced that the Soviet Government has a firm hold on the Russian people, and will recognize it upon conditions, but we shall not drive a Brest-Litovsk bargain, we contemplate generous treatment and expect the same in return:" such an attitude will be of value both in the course of events and immediately, by strengthening the Moderates, such as Tchitcherine and Litvinoff; moreover, it will drag the Soviet Government to the right, and keep in power men who see that foreign capital and industry must be fairly treated.

To embitter Russia by a repetition of German territorial rapacity would mean less advantageous terms for Allied interests there.

The account in the *Times*, January 10, page 9, of the increasing strength and efficiency of the Soviet Government is fully confirmed by Dr. Davidsohn, Major Wardwell's former assistant,[10] who left Moscow only last November.

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[9] For text of this report as received by the Commission to Negotiate Peace, see telegram No. 118 from the Chargé in Denmark, January 19, 1919, 6 p. m., *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, p. 17.

[10] Major Allen Wardwell in May 1918 succeeded Col. Raymond Robins as head of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, January 21, 1919, at 15 Hours

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
President Wilson.	The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George.	M. Clemenceau.
Mr. R. Lansing.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.	M. Pichon.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.	Lt.-Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	M. Dutasta.
Colonel U. S. Grant.	Mr. E. Phipps.	M. Berthelot.
Mr. L. Harrison.	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.	Captain A. Portier.

ITALY	JAPAN
Signor Orlando.	Baron Makino.
His Excellency Baron Sonnino.	His Excellency M. Matsui.
Count Aldrovandi.	M. Saburi.
Major A. Jones.	

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. Situation in Russia

M. CLEMENCEAU said they had met together to decide what could be done in Russia under present circumstances.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that in order to have something definite to discuss, he wished to take advantage of a suggestion made by Mr. Lloyd George and to propose a modification of the British proposal. He wished to suggest that the various organised groups in Russia should be asked to send representatives, not to Paris, but to some other place, such as Salonica, convenient of approach, there to meet such representatives as might be appointed by the Allies, in order to see whether they could draw up a programme upon which agreement could be reached.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the advantage of this would be that they could be brought straight there from Russia through the Black Sea without passing through other countries.

M. SONNINO said that some of the representatives of the various Governments were already here in Paris, for example, M. Sazonoff. Why should these not be heard?

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that the various parties should not be heard separately. It would be very desirable to get

all these representatives in one place, and still better, all in one room, in order to obtain a close comparison of views.

MR. BALFOUR said that a further objection to M. Sonnino's plan was that if M. Sazonoff was heard in Paris, it would be difficult to refuse to hear the others in Paris also, and M. Clemenceau objected strongly to having some of these representatives in Paris.

M. SONNINO explained that all the Russian parties had some representatives here, except the Soviets, whom they did not wish to hear.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that the Bolsheviks were the very people some of them wished to hear.

M. SONNINO continuing, said that they had heard M. Litvinoff's statements that morning. The Allies were now fighting against the Bolsheviks, who were their enemies, and therefore they were not obliged to hear them with the others.

M. BALFOUR remarked that the essence of President Wilson's proposal was that the parties must all be heard at one and the same time.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that the acceptance of M. Sonnino's proposals would amount to their hearing a string of people, all of whom held the same opinion, and all of whom would strike the same note. But they would not hear the people who at the present moment were actually controlling European Russia. In deference to M. Clemenceau's views, they had put forward this new proposal. He thought it would be quite safe to bring the Bolshevik representatives to Salonica, or perhaps to Lemnos. It was absolutely necessary to endeavour to make peace. The report read by President Wilson that morning went to show that the Bolsheviks were not convinced of the error of their ways, but they apparently realised the folly of their present methods. Therefore they were endeavouring to come to terms.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked to be permitted to urge one aspect of the case. As M. Sonnino had implied, they were all repelled by Bolshevism, and for that reason they had placed armed men in opposition to them. One of the things that was clear in the Russian situation was that by opposing Bolshevism with arms they were in reality serving the cause of Bolshevism. The Allies were making it possible for Bolsheviks to argue that Imperialistic and Capitalistic Governments were endeavouring to exploit the country and to give the land back to the landlords, and so bring about a reaction. If it could be shown that this was not true and that the Allies were prepared to deal with the rulers of Russia, much of the moral forces of this argument would disappear. The allegation that the Allies were against the people and wanted to control their affairs provided the argument which enabled them to raise armies. If, on the other hand, the Allies could swallow their pride and the natural repulsion which they felt

for the Bolsheviks, and see the representatives of all organised groups in one place, he thought it would bring about a marked reaction against Bolshevism.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, in principle, he did not favour conversation with the Bolsheviks; not because they were criminals, but because we would be raising them to our level by saying that they were worthy of entering into conversation with us. The Bolshevik danger was very great at the present moment. Bolshevism was spreading. It had invaded the Baltic Provinces and Poland, and that very morning they had received very bad news regarding its spread to Budapest and Vienna. Italy, also, was in danger. The danger was probably greater there than in France. If Bolshevism, after spreading in Germany, were to traverse Austria and Hungary and so reach Italy, Europe would be faced with a very great danger. Therefore, something must be done against Bolshevism. When listening to the document presented by President Wilson that morning, he had been struck by the cleverness with which the Bolsheviks were attempting to lay a trap for the Allies. When the Bolsheviks first came into power, a breach was made with the Capitalist Governments on questions of principle, but now they offered funds and concessions as a basis for treating with them. He need not say how valueless their promises were, but if they were listened to, the Bolsheviks would go back to their people and say: "We offered them great principles of justice, and the Allies would have nothing to do with us. Now we offer money, and they are ready to make peace."

He admitted his remarks did not offer a solution. The great misfortune was that the Allies were in need of a speedy solution. After four years of war, and the losses and sufferings they had incurred, their populations could stand no more. Russia also was in need of immediate peace. But its necessary evolution must take time. The signing of the world peace could not await Russia's final avatar. Had time been available, he would suggest waiting, for eventually sound men representing common sense would come to the top. But when would that be? He would make no forecast. Therefore they must press for an early solution.

To sum up, had he been acting by himself, he would temporise and erect barriers to prevent Bolshevism from spreading. But he was not alone, and in the presence of his colleagues he felt compelled to make some concessions, as it was essential that there should not be even the appearance of disagreement amongst them. The concession came easier after having heard President Wilson's suggestion. He thought that they should make a clear and convincing appeal to all reasonable peoples, emphatically stating that they did not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia, and especially that they had

no intention of restoring Czardom. The object of the Allies being to hasten the creation of a strong Government, they proposed to call together representatives of all parties to a conference. He would beg President Wilson to draft a paper, fully explaining the position of the Allies to the whole world, including the Russians and the Germans.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, and gave notice that he wished to withdraw his own motion in favour of President Wilson's.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood that all these people were to be asked on an equality. On these terms he thought the Bolsheviks would refuse, and by their refusal they would put themselves in a very bad position.

M. SONNINO said that he did not agree that the Bolsheviks would not come. He thought they would be the first to come, because they would be eager to put themselves on an equality with the others. He would remind his colleagues that, before the Peace of Brest-Litovsk was signed, the Bolsheviks promised all sorts of things, such as to refrain from propaganda, but since that peace had been concluded they had broken all their promises, their one idea being to spread revolution in all other countries. His idea was to collect together all the anti-Bolshevik parties and help them to make a strong Government, provided they pledged themselves not to serve the forces of reaction and especially not to touch the land question thereby depriving the Bolsheviks of their strongest argument. Should they take these pledges he would be prepared to help them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired how this help would be given.

M. SONNINO replied that help would be given with soldiers to a reasonable degree or by supplying arms, food, and money. For instance, Poland asked for weapons and munitions; the Ukraine asked for weapons. All the Allies wanted was to establish a strong Government. The reason that no strong Government at present existed was that no party could risk taking the offensive against Bolshevism without the assistance of the Allies. He would enquire how the parties of order could possibly succeed without the help of the Allies. President Wilson had said that they should put aside all pride in the matter. He would point out that, for Italy, and probably for France also, as M. Clemenceau had stated, it was in reality a question of self-defence. He thought that even a partial recognition of the Bolsheviks would strengthen their position, and, speaking for himself, he thought that Bolshevism was already a serious danger in his country.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he wished to put one or two practical questions to M. Sonnino. The British Empire now had some 15,000 to 20.000 men in Russia. M. de Scavenius had estimated that some 150,000 additional men would be required, in order to keep the anti-

Bolshevik Governments from dissolution. And General Franchet d'Esperey also insisted on the necessity of Allied assistance. Now Canada had decided to withdraw her troops, because the Canadian soldiers would not agree to stay and fight against the Russians. Similar trouble had also occurred amongst the other Allied troops. And he felt certain that, if the British tried to send any more troops there, there would be mutiny.

M. SONNINO suggested that volunteers might be called for.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that it would be impossible to raise 150,000 men in that way. He asked, however, what contributions America, Italy and France would make towards the raising of this army.

PRESIDENT WILSON and M. CLEMENCEAU each said none.

M. ORLANDO agreed that Italy could make no further contributions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Bolsheviks had an army of 300,000 men and would, before long, be good soldiers, and to fight them at least 400,000 Russian soldiers would be required. Who would feed, equip and pay them? Would Italy, or America, or France, do so? If they were unable to do that, what would be the good of fighting Bolshevism? It could not be crushed by speeches. He sincerely trusted that they would accept President Wilson's proposal as it now stood.

M. ORLANDO agreed that the question was a very difficult one for the reasons that had been fully given. He agreed that Bolshevism constituted a grave danger to all Europe. To prevent a contagious epidemic from spreading the sanitarians set up a *cordon sanitaire.* If similar measures could be taken against Bolshevism, in order to prevent its spreading, it might be overcome, since to isolate it meant vanquishing it. Italy was now passing through a period of depression, due to war weariness. But Bolsheviks could never triumph there, unless they found a favourable medium, such as might be produced either by profound patriotic disappointment in their expectations as to the rewards of the war, or by an economic crisis. Either might lead to revolution, which was equivalent to Bolshevism. Therefore, he would insist that all possible measures should be taken to set up this cordon. Next, he suggested the consideration of repressive measures. He thought two methods were possible—either the use of physical force or the use of moral force. He thought Mr. Lloyd George's objection to the use of physical force unanswerable. The occupation of Russia meant the employment of large numbers of troops for an indefinite period of time. This meant an apparent prolongation of the war. There remained the use of moral force. He agreed with M. Clemenceau that no country could continue in anarchy, and that an end must eventually come; but they could not

wait; they could not proceed to make peace and ignore Russia. Therefore, Mr. Lloyd George's proposal, with the modifications introduced after careful consideration by President Wilson and M. Clemenceau, gave a possible solution. It did not involve entering into negotiations with the Bolsheviks; the proposal was merely an attempt to bring together all the parties in Russia with a view of finding a way out of the present difficulty. He was prepared, therefore, to support it.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked for the views of his Japanese colleagues.

BARON MAKINO said that, after carefully considering the various points of view put forward, he had no objections to make regarding the conclusion reached. He thought that was the best solution under the circumstances. He wished, however, to enquire what attitude would be taken by the representatives of the Allied Powers if the Bolsheviks accepted the invitation to the meeting and there insisted upon their principles. He thought they should under no circumstances countenance Bolshevik ideas. The conditions in Siberia east of the Baikal had greatly improved. The objects which had necessitated the despatch of troops to that region had been attained. Bolshevism was no longer aggressive, though it might still persist in a latent form. In conclusion, he wished to support the proposal before the meeting.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that the emissaries of the Allied Powers should not be authorised to adopt any definite attitude towards Bolshevism. They should merely report back to their Governments the conditions found.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked that that question be further considered. He thought the emissaries of the Allied Powers should be able to establish an agreement if they were able to find a solution. For instance, if they succeeded in reaching an agreement on the subject of the organisation of a Constituent Assembly, they should be authorised to accept such a compromise without the delay of a reference to the Governments.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the emissaries might be furnished with a body of instructions.

MR. BALFOUR expressed the view that abstention from hostile action against their neighbours should be made a condition of their sending representatives to this meeting.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the manifesto to the Russian parties should be based solely on humanitarian grounds. They should say to the Russians: "You are threatened by famine. We are prompted by humanitarian feelings; we are making peace; we do not want people to die. We are prepared to see what can be done to remove

the menace of starvation." He thought the Russians would at once prick up their ears and be prepared to hear what the Allies had to say. They would add that food cannot be sent unless peace and order were established. It should, in fact, be made quite clear that the representatives of all parties would merely be brought together for purely humane reasons.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in this connection he wished to invite attention to a doubt expressed by certain of the delegates of the British Dominions, namely, whether there would be enough food and credit to go round should an attempt be made to feed all Allied countries, and enemy countries, and Russia also. The export of so much food would inevitably have the effect of raising food prices in Allied countries and so create discontent and Bolshevism. As regards grain, Russia had always been an exporting country, and there was evidence to show that plenty of food at present existed in the Ukraine.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that his information was that enough food existed in Russia, but, either on account of its being hoarded or on account of difficulties of transportation, it could not be made available.

(It was agreed that President Wilson should draft a proclamation, for consideration at the next meeting, inviting all organised parties in Russia to attend a meeting to be held at some selected place, such as Salonica or Lemnos, in order to discuss with the representatives of the Allied and Associated Great Powers the means of restoring order and peace in Russia. Participation in the meeting should be conditional on a cessation of hostilities.)

M. CLEMENCEAU considered it to be most urgent that the delegates should be set to work. He understood that President Wilson would be ready to put on the table at the next full Conference proposals relating to the creation of a League of Nations. He was anxious to add a second question, which would be studied immediately, namely, reparation of damages. He thought the meeting should consider how the work should be organised in order to give effect to this suggestion.

2. Peace Conference

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he agreed that these questions should be studied forthwith. He would suggest that, in the first place, the League of Nations should be considered; and that, after the framing of the principles, an international committee of experts be set to work out its constitution in detail. The same remark applied also to the question of indemnities and reparation. He thought that a Committee should also be appointed as soon as possible to consider International Labour Legislation.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that he had himself drawn up a constitution of a League of Nations. He could not claim that it was

wholly his own creation. Its generation was as follows: He had received the Phillimore Report,[1] which had been amended by Colonel House[2] and re-written by himself.[3] He had again revised it[4] after having received General Smuts' and Lord Robert Cecil's reports.[5] It was therefore a compound of the various suggestions. During the week he had seen M. Bourgeois,[6] with whom he found himself to be in substantial accord on principles. A few days ago he had discussed his draft with Lord Robert Cecil and General Smuts, and they had found themselves very near together.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that President Wilson's draft should be submitted to the Committee as a basis for discussion.

PRESIDENT WILSON further suggested that the question should be referred as far as possible to the men who had been studying it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed his complete agreement. He thought they themselves should, in the first place, agree on the fundamental principles, and then refer the matter to the Committee. When that Committee met they could take President Wilson's proposals as the basis of discussion.

(It was agreed that the question of appointing an International Committee, consisting of two members from each of the five Great Powers, to whom would be referred President Wilson's draft, with certain basic principles to guide them, should be considered at the next meeting.)

3. Poland

M. PICHON called attention to the necessity for replying to the demand addressed by M. Paderewski to Colonel House, which had been read by President Wilson that morning, and asked that Marshal Foch should be present.

It was agreed that this question should be discussed at the next meeting.

4. Disarmament

MR. BALFOUR called attention to the urgency of the question of disarmament, and said that he would shortly propose that a committee should be appointed to consider this question.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, January 21, 1919.

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[1] David Hunter Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant* (New York, 1928), vol. II, p. 3.

[2] *Foreign Relations:* The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. I, p. 497.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 501.

[4] Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. II, pp. 65–93.

[5] For General Smuts' plan, see *ibid.*, p. 23; for Lord Cecil's memorandum, see Miller, *My Diary*, vol. III, p. 85.

[6] Léon Bourgeois, former French President of the Council of Ministers and former Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Notes on Conversations Held in the Office of M. Pichon at the Quai d'Orsay, at 10: 30 a. m., January 21, 1919

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:	President Wilson
	Mr. Lansing
	Mr. Frazier
	Mr. Harrison
	Col. Grant
BRITISH EMPIRE:	Mr. Lloyd George
	Mr. Balfour
	Mr. Norman
	Lt. Col. Hankey
	Capt. Abraham
FRANCE:	M. Clemenceau
	M. Pichon
	M. Dutasta
	M. Berthelot
	Prince de Bearn
ITALY:	M. Sonnino
	Count Aldrovandi
	Capt. Jones
JAPAN:	M. Matsui
	M. Makino

Interpreter: M. Mantoux.

I

THE CHAIRMAN introduced Mr. Scavenius, lately Danish Minister to Russia, who had come by request to give information regarding the present situation in Russia.

MR. SCAVENIUS explained that when the Bolsheviki overthrew the provisional government they were supported by the soldiers, who wanted peace at any price, by the peasants who desired the division of the land, and by the workingmen who desired the advantages they would obtain by becoming a privileged class.

At the present time, however, the Bolsheviki are not supported by the soldiers, as the soldiers no longer exist. They had now become peasants. The peasants had obtained a division of the land, and all they want now are guarantees to enable them to hold and develop the land. As a matter of fact, the peasants are neither monarchists nor socialists. As regards the workingmen, while it is true that they have become the privileged class, there is considerable discontent amongst them, because the Bolsheviki have not been able to furnish

them enough food. At the present time the Bolsheviki cannot count on those who were formerly soldiers, nor on the peasants, nor on a great part of the workingmen. Indeed, the Bolsheviki are now supported by a Red Army composed of Letts, Hungarians, Germans and Chinese, and these mercenary troops form a foreign nucleus around which there are a certain number of Russian forces. The best elements of this foreign nucleus are the Hungarians and Chinese.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE inquired how many Chinese there were in the Red Army.

MR. SCAVENIUS estimated that there were about 20,000 or 30,000. He explained that he knew something about them, as he had been in charge of Chinese interests, and had had in his care about a million Chinese workers who had been imported into Russia during the war. These poor people had been left destitute by their government, and to ameliorate their condition he had endeavored to organize co-operative assistance. He had asked the help of the Chinese Government, and had been furnished 10,000 rubles as a fund for this purpose. Of course this has been entirely inadequate, and the result has been that a considerable number of these Chinese have been forced to enlist in the Red Army.

Mr. Scavenius estimated that there are some 300,000 men in the Red Army, but said that a large part of these are Russians of the bourgeois class. The Red Army did not constitute a real force that would be of much use against foreign troops, but they did constitute a real force under present conditions in Russia, as they had nothing opposed to them but an unarmed and famished population.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if the Red Army were not fighting the forces led by Denikin and Kolchak.

MR. SCAVENIUS replied that this was true, that the forces of Denikin had been able to stop the advances of the Bolsheviki, but had not proceeded north against them. This has been the general attitude of Cossack troops, as well as of the forces of General Krasnov, who are quite satisfied to defend their own country, but are not prepared to attack the Bolsheviki.

As regards the different adversaries with whom the Bolsheviki had to contend, Mr. Scavenius stated that the principal opponents of the Bolsheviki had first been the members of the Socialist Revolutionary party. At the time of Kerensky, the Socialist Revolutionary party had an overwhelming majority in the constituent assembly. But since the overthrow of the assembly by the Bolsheviki, this party has almost entirely disappeared, having completely lost the confidence of the public. They had failed to defend the constitution of the national assembly; they had been unable to support Kerensky against the Bolsheviki, and they had not been able to raise an army to fight the

Bolsheviki. For instance, the failure of the party to defend Samara was an excellent example, and in the case of the defense of Kazan, all the army had fled except some two or three thousand volunteers composed principally of Czecho-Slovaks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE inquired whether Mr. Savinkov belonged to the Socialist Revolutionary party.

MR. SCAVENIUS replied that he had been a member of that party, but was now a member of the Radical Republican party, which had become the successor, so to speak, of the Socialist Revolutionary party. For instance, after the fall of Samara, Kolchak had forced out the Socialist Revolutionary leaders and had formed this new party called the Radical Republican party.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked Mr. Scavenius to state exactly who Kolchak was.

MR. SCAVENIUS replied that he was an admiral; that he had been in command of certain forces at Harbin, that he had been moved to Moscow, and that he now called himself a Radical Republican.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked who were with him now, since he had thrown out the Social Revolutionists. MR. SCAVENIUS answered that his followers are now Radical Republicans, amongst them being some of the old Social Revolutionists who had joined them. Also amongst them is this man Savinkov. Kolchak had also got control of the government at Ekaterinodar which is represented in Paris by Mr. Sazonov.

The other party opposing the Bolsheviki at this time is the Monarchist party composed of the higher middle class, landed proprietors and ex-officers of the former army. The Monarchist party is especially strong in South Russia at Kuban. The Radical Republican party had come to an understanding with the Monarchist party, and had been able to defend this by saying that while the officers might be Monarchists, the soldiers are really Republicans, and particularly that the Cossacks are Republicans. The Radical Republican party further defended its action by claiming that at this time it would not be desirable to raise the question as to whether there should be a monarchy or a republic in Russia. Their whole effort was to oppose the Bolsheviki and leave that decision until later.

As regards the numbers of the Monarchists, Mr. Scavenius estimated that there were some 80,000 troops in the Denikin Army, which probably meant that its fighting strength was 50,000. He understood that there were about 50,000 or 60,000 Cossacks with Krasnov, and that the Russian Army in Siberia, including the Czecho-Slovaks, though it was said to amount to 250,000 men, probably did not have a fighting strength of over 100,000. To sum up, therefore, the forces opposed to the Bolsheviki totalled some 200,000 or 210,000 men.

It was impossible to count on many forces in the Ukraine Army, as the army of the Hetmann of the Ukraine had been proved to exist principally on paper. This had been shown by the easy way in which Petlura had been able to overthrow the Hetmann.

Mr. Scavenius then took up the question of intervention in Russia. There are those, he said, who do not wish to intervene, and base their attitude on the fact that their soldiers are tired of the war, and that they could not undertake to suppress a democracy, as they themselves are a democracy.

Mr. Scavenius thought that their objections might be answered in two ways: First, by a voluntary army, and second, by the fact that the Bolsheviki are not a democracy. The Bolsheviki, on the contrary, had suppressed the only parliament that they had, and had denied the franchise to a large part of the Russian people.

Mr. Lloyd George remarked that all those present admitted that the Bolsheviki were not a democracy, and that this was not even contended by the labor party in England.

Mr. Scavenius expressed his personal opinion, that if there is to be intervention it must come about quickly. He pointed out that famine is forcing many to become Bolsheviki, the formation of the Red Army being in fact due entirely to the famine conditions, starvation being its best recruiting sergeant. Moreover, if let alone the extension of anarchy will continue. As the Bolsheviki do not find opposition, they will desire to exploit further territories and anarchy will spread. As far as intervention is concerned, it would have been far more profitable three months ago than now. Within the last three months the Baltic provinces had been lost, Petlura had obtained the upper hand in Ukraine and the Bolsheviki had taken Vilna, and they are now within a few days' march of Warsaw.

In addition to their military operations, Mr. Scavenius pointed out, the Bolsheviki are carrying on a most energetic propaganda amongst the lower middle class. They claim, and Lenin is forcing the argument home, that the Allies will do to Russia just what the Germans wanted to do; that they will exploit Russia as a colony, and will restore the monarchy. This propaganda, however, could be met by saying that the purpose of intervention is not to restore the monarchy, but to restore the constituent assembly and to permit Russians to decide their own fate, for it should not be forgotten that the Russians now complain that the right to decide their own fate had been forcibly taken from them by a small and violent minority.

As still another point in support of the theory of intervention, Mr. Scavenius added that the peasants are now refusing to sow more than is necessary for their own needs. Consequently, next year there will be a famine. This attitude of the peasants was brought about by the

presence of Bolshevik troops who had been sent to requisition their supplies. The net result is that the peasants have no intention of producing more than what they themselves actually need.

He would recommend, if he might be permitted to do so, being a [*no?*] military man, that if anything were done in the way of intervention, it be done on a big scale. Small expeditions had proved entirely useless; the troops composing these expeditions had simply been Bolshevized. In his opinion, it would be absolutely necessary to take the Bolsheviki centers, viz., Petrograd and Moscow, if anything is to be accomplished. This could be done via Finland, and the Finns would even go so far as to send troops themselves, if the Allies would recognize the Finnish Government. He felt convinced that the Finns would be able to put in the field some 30,000 troops, and these, together with the Allied troops now in Archangel and Murmansk, would be able to take not only Petrograd, but Vologda, whence they could obtain supplies from the Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia. He thought that there are probably some 100,000 troops available in Poland, but they were without ammunition and had no uniforms. He would point out, however, that there is a Polish delegation now in Paris asking for help. This help should be supplied, and the Poles used to drive back the Bolsheviki, who are now near Warsaw. Vilna should be taken and the southwestern route to Moscow opened up. At the same time, the forces under Denikin should march northwards, and he felt certain the Cossacks would be prepared to undertake an offensive against the Bolsheviki if they knew that there were other foreign forces in the country.

In reply to an inquiry of Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Scavenius stated that he thought that at least 100,000 or perhaps 150,000 foreign forces would be necessary to stiffen the forces from Finland, Poland, Siberia and Southern Russia. He proposed that this foreign force should be composed of volunteers from amongst the Allied nations.

Mr. Scavenius then spoke at length about the importance of the Bolsheviki propaganda. When the Bolsheviki declared war against all governments they found that they could not exist unless others were Bolshevized, and for this purpose they established a Bolshevik propaganda with its principal seat at Moscow. An international confederation had been formed with representatives not only from the countries in Europe, but also from other parts of the world. There were some twenty men in the French group, and a French paper was published called "The Third International", which was sent to France via Switzerland and especially via Belgium. There were also Anglo-Americans on this committee. The committee had made special efforts to disseminate their propaganda throughout India, and had set up a school for teaching the languages

of India in connection with their propaganda. They were also working on the Irish question. The case of Germany afforded a striking illustration of what the Bolsheviki propaganda could accomplish. The former German Government had claimed that Bolshevism would only attack a vanquished foe; therefore they had done nothing to combat Bolshevism in Germany.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that the Bolsheviki had lost Germany.

MR. SCAVENIUS feared that the same would take place as had taken place in Russia, and pointed out that the sequence of events seemed to be very similar.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether Mr. Scavenius did not think that conditions were different, inasmuch as the Germans are an educated people, while the vast majority of Russians are illiterate. MR. SCAVENIUS agreed with this statement, but wished to call particular attention to the fact that it was a small minority, perhaps only five per cent of the German people, who had been really organizers of Germany; that this small minority no longer existed, and that those who remained, that is, the vast majority or 95 per cent, were like sheep. Moreover, their training had been such, and their psychology is such, that a small well-organized party like that led by Liebknecht[1] appealed strongly to the German people. If, therefore, the Bolsheviki should succeed in Germany, Mr. Scavenius believed that their first step would be to form an alliance with Russia, their second to organize a great army, and their third to carry on an intensive propaganda within the Allied and neutral countries. In view of what is now taking place in Germany, Bolshevism is becoming from day to day a greater threat against civilization. How would it be possible, should an alliance between Bolshevik Russia and Germany take place, to make any peace agreement possible or lasting?

MR. SCAVENIUS stated in all earnestness that he believed that Bolshevism presented a definite danger to the whole world, and that in his opinion there is but one thing to do, and that is to do away with it as soon as possible.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether Mr. Scavenius could state in more detailed form just what had taken place in the Ukraine.

MR. SCAVENIUS explained that Petlura's success had been due to the fact that he found no resistance; that the army of Hetmann had existed only on paper, and that when the Germans withdrew and no Allies came to take their place, Petlura had found the way open to march on Kiev. The Danish Consul had met Petlura outside Kiev and Petlura had assured him that he could take Kiev whenever he wanted to. As a matter of fact, negotiations were opened between

[1] Karl Liebknecht, leader of the Spartacist movement in Germany.

Petlura and the Hetmann, and are still going on. But the important thing to note is that Petlura was supported by the Bolsheviki, and they had supported him because they desired to make use of him and his army to get their men into the Ukraine. Already the landed proprietors are being forced out, and Bolshevik doctrines are finding favor.

M. PICHON asked why Petlura had started his movement.

MR. SCAVENIUS explained that Petlura represented a national movement. He reproached the Hetmann with being in accord with the Allies, and particularly for having declared that in his opinion the Ukraine should return to greater Russia. Petlura and his adherents do not wish to have Ukraine lose her autonomy. They oppose the return of Ukraine to greater Russia, but do not oppose the Ukraine under the federation of Russian states.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE took advantage of the opportunity to thank Mr. Scavenius personally for protecting British subjects, and particularly for having saved the body of the valiant Captain Cromie from desecration at the hands of the Bolsheviki. He asked when Mr. Scavenius had left Russia.

MR. SCAVENIUS replied that he had left Russia on September 15th, but had received reports up to the 29th of December.

Mr. Scavenius read extracts from certain Bolshevik newspapers in which the Allies were branded as brigands.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that he hoped that the Allies would not have to prove to be so. He also asked Mr. Scavenius if he knew the system in force for recruiting the Red Army.

MR. SCAVENIUS stated that there had been three mobilizations, but, as a matter of fact, the greater part of the army is composed of the well-to-do classes, who could not be considered as reliable Bolshevik soldiers. He had heard that many of the Bolshevik troops had never reached the front.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that he understood Mr. Scavenius to argue that no purpose would be gained by organizing various armies in Russia, unless 100,000 or 150,000 foreign troops were sent to support them. He also asked what would be the purpose in taking Moscow.

MR. SCAVENIUS replied that should the plan that he had suggested work out, and Moscow be taken, he thought that the death blow to Bolshevism would be delivered. The principal purpose in taking Moscow would be to issue two or three weeks after its capture, a call for a constituent assembly.

MR. BALFOUR asked why the same would not happen in Moscow as had occurred in Archangel, namely, that intervention would simply tend to crystallize opposition to the foreign forces.

MR. SCAVENIUS answered that, in his opinion, the reason for the failure in Archangel and Murmansk and at other points, had been because the intervention had been on a small scale. What is necessary is intervention on a large scale, if intervention is to take place at all.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that his information is to the effect that the Menchiviks [*Mensheviks?*] and the remainder of the Social Revolutionists had determined to side with the Bolsheviki through fear of Allied intervention. In other words, the argument now advanced by the Bolsheviki with their opponents in Russia, is based on the threat of foreign intervention to reestablish a monarchy and restore the landed proprietors.

MR. SCAVENIUS recalled the point he had already made, that it should be made entirely clear to all that the Allies would intervene not to restore the monarchy or the conditions existing at the time of the monarchy, but to ensure a free expression of the will of the people, and to afford an immediate opportunity for the convening of a constituent assembly, through which they could express freely their desires as to the form of government they wished to set up; in a word, offered an opportunity for the establishment of a true democracy in Russia.

THE CHAIRMAN expressed the thanks of the representatives of the Allied Governments and of the United States, and Mr. Scavenius withdrew.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated that he had received a letter from the King of Montenegro inquiring whether he might be permitted to send a telegram to his people asking them to return to their homes, to cease hostilities, and to assure them that they would be afforded an early opportunity to decide as to the form of government they desired to establish in Montenegro. The King would add also, that he, for his part, would abide by their decision.

It was agreed to permit the King of Montenegro to send a telegram to that effect.

PRESIDENT WILSON read a letter which had been addressed by Mr. Paderewski to Colonel House, in which the former, among other things, stated that the Poles were nowhere the aggressive party, asked for certain assistance in the way of artillery, rifles and ammunition, and requested the Allies to insist on the withdrawal of the Yugo-Slavs from Western Galicia.

It was agreed that the whole Polish question should be taken up, and some line of action decided upon, after some decision had been reached with regard to the Bolshevik question.

President Wilson read two telegraphic reports from Mr. Buckler,[1a] regarding his conversations with Litvinoff. At the request of the

[1a] *Ante*, p. 643.

Chairman, he promised to furnish paraphrases of the telegrams in question.

It was agreed to continue the discussion of the Bolshevik question at the afternoon session, which was to begin at 3:00 o'clock.

THE CHAIRMAN opened the meeting in the afternoon at 3:00 o'clock.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that Mr. Lloyd George's proposal to summon representatives of the several governments in Russia to Paris, to give an account of themselves to the representatives of the Great Powers, might be amended in the sense that they should be asked to send representatives to a place other than Paris, say Saloniki. In that way, M. Clemenceau's original objection to inviting the Bolshevik representatives to Paris might be overcome.

M. SONNINO pointed out that there are representatives of several of the Russian states already in Paris, such as Sazonov.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that should these representatives be heard separately, it would be going into a circle. He thought it most desirable that they should be heard all in one room. This method would afford them an opportunity for a comparison of views, and if possible, a settlement upon some plan.

MR. BALFOUR supported President Wilson's suggestion.

M. SONNINO suggested that the meeting hear Sazonov, as they had heard Scavenius and Noulens.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the document which President Wilson had read in the morning session from Litvinoff was remarkable, not that it showed that the Bolsheviki were converted to a realization of the error of their ways, but that it showed that they had at last seen that their plan would not do, and that they were in the mood to come to terms. He pointed out that in hearing Sazonov and others like him, the same side of the arguments would always be heard. He thought it most necessary to hear from the representatives of the different governments in Russia, including the Bolsheviki. If Saloniki did not serve, why then another place might do, such as the Island of Lemnos.

PRESIDENT WILSON ventured to think that what was back of Baron Sonnino's suggestion was an antipathy to the Bolsheviki, and a natural repulsion against their acts. He would observe, however, that by opposing the Bolsheviki by armies, the cause of the Bolsheviki was being served by the Allies. They were being given a case. They could say to their followers that the imperialistic and capitalistic governments were desirous of destroying Russia. They would represent the Allies as the advocates and supporters of reaction. If the Allies could make it appear that this was not true, most of the moral

influence of the Bolsheviki would break down, as their case would be gone. They could no longer allege that it was the purpose of the Allies and the United States to enslave the Russian people and to take charge of their affairs. It was therefore desirable that the Allies show that they are ready to hear the representatives of any organized group in Russia, provided they are willing and ready to come to one place, to put all their cards on the table, and see if they could not come to an understanding. He ventured to think that such a line of action, if adopted, would bring about more reaction against the cause of the Bolsheviki than anything else the Allies could do.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that in principle he was not favorable to holding conversations with the Bolsheviki, as he considered them to be criminals. He objected principally for the reason that it would raise them to the level of the Allies and give them great prestige.

But sometimes in politics it is necessary to hold conversations with criminals. Moreover, things were going from bad to worse. Recently, the Baltic provinces had been overrun by the Bolsheviki, Poland is in danger, and he had just received word that Budapest is about to pass under their control. Should they once be established in Vienna, the danger of Bolshevism would be great in Italy. Therefore, it would become the same in France, should Central Europe be contaminated by this evil.

Referring to the Litvinoff conversation, he wished to call the attention of those present to the skill with which the matter had been presented. At first, the attitude of the Bolsheviki had been one of refusal to compromise with the foreign governments. They claimed that they could not have anything to do with those governments who were making a war of capital. They then proposed peace, and when they were not heard they accused the Allied Governments of being capitalists and imperialists. But today they have changed their tune. They now say: "We will give you money", and this was very clever, because, should the Allies show any signs of treating with them they would immediately say their former accusation, that the Allies were capitalists, was true, and that the only thing they thought of was getting money out of Russia.

He would point out further that the Bolsheviki never keep their plighted word.

But this, M. Clemenceau observed, did not find any solution to the problem. The question presses, and a speedy solution is necessary. The situation is growing worse from day to day. He could not say that the Russians were not anxious to see an end to present chaotic conditions, but if left to themselves, this change would not come within a short time, and certainly would not come quickly enough for the

Allies, who were about to make peace, which would be an absurdity as long as half of Europe was in flames.

A conclusion must therefore be reached. If he were alone, and had the decision to make for himself only, he would do nothing. He would set up a form of barrage between himself and the Bolsheviki, and let Bolshevism work out itself. But he was not alone. He had to think of his Allies and as he had already pointed out, he thought it of the most vital importance that at the beginning of these conferences the Allies stand together. They must be unanimous, and as President Wilson's proposal had opened new vistas and a new perspective, he was prepared to associate himself with President Wilson's proposal.

He therefore suggested that it would be well to issue a short, clear, substantial paper in which it would be explained once and for all, that it is not the wish of the Allies to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia; that they do not desire to lend their help to any one faction, and that their one wish is to see the establishment of some representative government with whom they could deal. He asked President Wilson to draw up such a paper, and requested him to bear in mind that in such a statement the Allies were speaking also to the Germans. Let the announcement be made to all countries in Europe, and let them be invited to state what they want, and come to terms with each other.

Mr. Lloyd George withdrew his proposal in favor of President Wilson's suggestion.

Mr. Balfour wished to say that he thought that if anyone would refuse to accept such an invitation it would be the Bolsheviki.

Baron Sonnino begged to disagree, and stated that for his part he thought that the Bolsheviki would be the first to come. He recalled their anxiety to enter upon some discussion with the Germans, and their efforts at the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to secure means by which they could sow their seeds of dissension in Germany. He also pointed out again that they did not know what faith meant, and that they would make certain pledges with the fixed intention of breaking them. He feared that the Allies were now about to play their game.

He therefore suggested that Sazonov should be heard as well as the representatives of the other factions opposing the Bolsheviki, that they should be told clearly that if they should unite and give assurances that they would not endeavor to bring about reaction, the return of the monarchy and the re-establishment of the land again as it was before the Revolution, they would then be assisted by the Allies to form a strong government.

Mr. Lloyd George asked how this could be done. The only answer was by furnishing the arms, munitions and food, and it had been

shown that the Allies were not in a position to furnish these factions with military support. For his part, he thought it unwise to let any question of *amour propre* affect the question. Moreover, it was necessary to consider the attitude of the people of Great Britain and of the Dominions, if some solution were not quickly found. In speaking that morning with Sir Robert Gordon [*Borden*], he had learned that Canada was going to withdraw her troops from Vladivostok, because the Canadians refused to remain longer. The same applied to the American forces in Archangel. If Great Britain tried to send troops to Russia there would be a mutiny. As regards volunteers, a few might be obtained, but he would ask what contribution Italy would make. Would Italy be prepared to intervene? He did not think so. Moreover, he would call attention to the fact that the Bolshevik Army was improving, as had been pointed out that morning by Mr. Scavenius. Mr. Scavenius had stated that if the Allies waited a few months longer, the Bolsheviki would have some 300,000 men, forming a fairly effective force, and it would require some 500,000 men to oppose them.

In addition, who was going to pay for military intervention in Russia? The people of the Allies would not stand for it; he was certain that the people of Great Britain would not stand for it.

While President Wilson's proposal did not go as far as he had proposed, it did meet the objections to his proposal advanced by M. Clemenceau, and he hoped that it might receive the unanimous approval of those present.

SIGNOR ORLANDO remarked that it was unnecessary to repeat how grave the danger is for all Europe. When a new sickness develops the first act is to endeavor to isolate it. This, in a word, is the proposal advanced by M. Clemenceau, and it is well worth considering. He referred to the statement that had been made that Italy was subject to the Bolsheviki disease. For his part, he did not believe that Bolshevism could become supreme in Italy, unless it found special conditions there. These conditions might be brought about by a depression of the morale of the people through one or two causes, either the disappointment following a failure to attain national aims, or an economic crisis. He asked that those present bear this statement in mind.

The second method of extinguishing the epidemic was to use material force, but there were many insurmountable objections to this. While it might be true that Italian troops could be sent to Russia, should they form a part of an international expedition, such an expedition would be a costly and long drawn out matter, as the forces would probably have to occupy permanently a large part of Russia. The only remaining solution would be what might be called the ideal solution or the use of moral forces. This is the proposal now under

consideration. It is not a question of treating with the Bolsheviki; it is a matter of offering them an opportunity along with others, to find some way out of the difficult situation existing in Russia.

For his part, he indorsed the proposal.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked for an expression of the views of the Japanese delegates.

BARON MAKINO stated that he had heard and carefully considered all points of view. Not only did he have no objection to make, but he thought it to be the only step that could be taken. He would, however, make one inquiry, and he would ask what would be the attitude of those present should the Bolsheviki still stick to the principles enunciated in their constitution. He thought it absolutely necessary to avoid any appearance of countenancing their point of view.

According to the latest information which had reached him, it might be said that the situation, as regards the spread of Bolshevism in Siberia east of Lake Bikac [*Baikal*], had improved. He thought that the object of the Allied military expedition into Siberia had been attained. Bolshevism might be latent, but it certainly is not aggressive.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated that he thought that the emissaries of the Great Powers who were to meet the representatives of the different Russian factions including the Bolsheviki, should not be authorized to take any position regarding Bolshevism, but should simply report back to the Conference what they found in the way of accommodations of views and possibilities of the representatives of the different factions in Russia reaching some understanding.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the emissaries should, nevertheless, endeavor to persuade the Russian representatives to agree to refer their differences to a constituent assembly.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the exact wishes of those present be incorporated in the instructions to be issued to their emissaries.

MR. BALFOUR thought it important to decide whether the abstention from hostile actions against surrounding nations should be made a condition precedent to the Conference idea.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated that he had already made a note of this, and in his draft would incorporate a statement to the effect that the troops of the different factions should refrain from aggressive action outside their own territory.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that it might also be desirable to incorporate in the draft statement, a reference to the fact that the whole of Russia is menaced by famine, and to point out that the Allies were humanitarian and would consider the question of furnishing supplies to Russia. He thought that it would be found that the Bolsheviki

would be anxious to listen, and that this would constitute an excellent point to start from.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed some doubt as to whether there is sufficient food to supply the countries of the Allies, if Russia were to be supplied also. Should prices go up in France and England due to an effort to furnish supplies to Russia, he thought that this would constitute a real danger. Moreover, Russia had always been an exporting, not an importing country, as far as food went, and he thought that there would be a sufficient supply obtained in the Ukraine.

It was agreed that President Wilson should draw up a statement and submit it for consideration the following morning at 11:00 o'clock.

II

THE CHAIRMAN thought it very desirable that the different delegations be put to work as soon as possible. He understood that President Wilson would submit the question of a League of Nations at the next meeting. If so, he suggested that it would be well to proceed to consider the question of reparation of damages.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that he agreed to this, and suggested that the question of the League of Nations be taken up at the next meeting, and that those present lay down the general principles, and then appoint an international committee to work on the constitution of the League. It would be desirable to follow this by the consideration of the question of indemnity and reparation which should also be referred to a committee, and the same with regard to international labor questions.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether Mr. Lloyd George contemplated a committee formed of delegates.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE answered that he thought it would be desirable to have qualified persons on the committee. President Wilson then explained for the information of those present, how he had gone about drawing up a constitution. He stated that he had taken the Phillimore report,[2] and had asked Colonel House to re-write it.[3] He had then re-written Colonel House's constitution to suit his own ideas.[4] Subsequently he had studied the plans prepared by General Smuts and Lord Edward [*Robert*] Cecil,[5] and then he had re-written the constitution once more.[6] Finally he had a talk with Mr. Bourgeois, and he was glad to say that he had found his ideas in substantial

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[2] Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. II, p. 3.
[3] *Foreign Relations:* The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. I, p. 497.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 501.
[5] For General Smuts' plan, see Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. II, p. 23; for Lord Cecil's memorandum, see Miller, *My Diary*, vol. III, p. 85.
[6] Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. II, pp. 65–93.

accord with Mr. Bourgeois, General Smuts and Lord Edward [*Robert*] Cecil.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that the President's draft be referred to the committee. President Wilson thought it well that the committee be formed of those men who had already studied the question. Mr. Lloyd George agreed to this, and as he would like to have both General Smuts and Lord Edward [*Robert*] Cecil on the committee, he suggested that the committee be composed of two persons appointed by each of the delegations of the Great Powers.

III

M. PICHON desired to remind those present of the questions raised in Mr. Paderewski's letter to Colonel House which had been read by President Wilson at the morning session. It was most desirable that an answer be sent as soon as possible.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that Marshal Foch had already suggested the sending of the Polish Legion with the French Army to Poland via Danzig. He proposed that Marshal Foch be requested to attend the next meeting, and that the Polish question be discussed at that time. His proposal was accepted.

IV

MR. BALFOUR referred to the fact that it seemed to be agreed that a committee should be formed to consider the League of Nations, the question of indemnity, and international labor questions, and stated that he would like to suggest a fourth, namely, disarmament, which was so closely related to the question of strategic frontier. He pointed out that if the League of Nations is to be practical, the delegates must make up their minds as soon as possible regarding the question of disarmament. It was most important in this connection, to come to some agreement as to what arms Germany was to be allowed to have. It is evident that a League of Nations would be a sham if there is no disarmament.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that those present compare their views on this matter before referring it to a committee.

Procès-verbal of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council, Held at M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, on Wednesday, January 22, 1919, at 11 Hours

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

President Wilson.
Mr. R. Lansing.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Colonel U. S. Grant.
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
Maj.-Gen. P. P. de B. Radcliffe, C. B., D. S. O.
Lt.-Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.
Mr. H. Norman,
Captain E. Abraham.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
Marshal Foch.
M. Pichon.
Gen. Weygand.
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
Captain A. Portier.

ITALY

His Excellency M. Orlando.
His Excellency Baron Sonnino.
Count Aldrovandi.
Major A. Jones.

JAPAN

Baron Makino.
His Excellency M. Matsui.
M. Saburi.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. Policy in Poland

M. CLEMENCEAU, in opening the meeting proposed that the plan suggested by Marshal Foch of sending Polish troops from France to Poland via Dantzig and Thorn should be discussed. He had received a telegram that morning stating that the British Government had agreed to this operation.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he was without advice from his military counsellors. The proposal, as he understood it, was that the Polish troops now under French command should be shipped to Dantzig, and that to facilitate their arrival in Poland an Allied control of the railway from that port to Thorn should be established. He asked by whom this control would be exercised, and whether the object of the expedition was exclusively to protect the Poles against external enemies.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Marshal Foch would give the requisite explanation.

MARSHAL FOCH said that there were in France a number of Polish troops ready to start. One division was quite ready; another was forming; and a third was in an early stage of formation, but could

count on 20,000 men. He thought they would be ready to embark as soon as transport could be assembled to convey them to Dantzig.

M. ORLANDO asked whether Marshal Foch was taking into account the Poles in Italy.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that, taking these into account, there was a fourth possible division.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired whether Italy agreed to the incorporation of the Poles in that country.

M. ORLANDO said he agreed.

MARSHAL FOCH (resuming) said that the troops therefore existed. The next question was ships to take them to Dantzig. Thenceforward these troops must use the Dantzig-Thorn railway line. This line, according to the terms of the Armistice, was at our disposal. But the Poles said that the Germans would not allow them to land at Dantzig or to use the railway to Thorn. They therefore suggested that the line should be held by Allied troops.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Marshal Foch to state his own opinion as to whether the Germans would resist the passage of Polish forces, and to give an estimate of the strength of the resistance, should it take place.

MARSHAL FOCH said that, in his view, as long as the Polish programme remained as indeterminate as it now was, there would undoubtedly be German resistance. The Germans certainly intended to dispute the possession of Posen, and still more, of Dantzig. Possibly German consent to the passage of Polish troops might be obtained if the Poles agreed to a restricted programme. For instance, that these troops should only go to Russian Poland to defend it against the Bolsheviks, and that the Polish authorities should undertake not to occupy any debatable ground. The Germans had eighteen divisions near their eastern frontier. He therefore thought that the Polish army could only be safely sent to Poland under cover either of a definite policy which obtained consent of the Germans or of Allied troops in occupation of the railway. To occupy this line effectually two Allied divisions would be required.

In order to give a firmer basis to the contemplated operation, it would be necessary that all the Allied Missions in Poland should be reorganised. There was at present a British Military Mission under Colonel Wade attached to M. Paderewski at Posen; there was a French Mission under General Barthélemy at Lemberg; there were other Missions elsewhere. Their information and views varied. It was desirable to have a unified Mission to study in particular the means of landing forces and of conveying them to Poland.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the policy of uniting all the Missions in order to obtain their collective advice would involve delay. If it

were true that Poland was threatened by an imminent Bolshevik attack, this delay might be disastrous. He would like to know whether, in Marshal Foch's opinion, a Bolshevik attack was really to be feared.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he thought it was important to gather the scattered Missions into one, and to get the Poles to have a definite policy. Their actions at present were divergent and eccentric. They were facing the Bolsheviks on the east, invading Posen on the west, and Galicia in the south. Some of these actions were not in any way forced upon them. The result was that they were wasting their energies and would not be able to succeed anywhere.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired how much time would elapse, according to the Marshal's programme, before the Poles from the west landed in Poland.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that all his proposals could be carried out concurrently. The Missions could be unified; the Poles could be prevailed on to amend their policy; and the despatch of the troops could be prepared at the same time. If all these problems were tackled at once he thought the troops might begin to arrive in three weeks or a month.

MR. BALFOUR expressed the opinion that among the many difficulties the greatest would be to get the Poles to accept a restricted programme. He felt that this would have to be imposed upon them. The Poles were using the interval between the cessation of war and the decisions of the Peace Congress to make good their claims to districts outside Russian Poland, to which in many cases they had little right, although in others their claims were amply justified. To Posen, no doubt, they were entitled. The case of Dantzig was of peculiar difficulty. Eastern Galicia, according to all the information at his disposal, did not desire to be Polish. He suggested that the Polish representatives should be gathered here and told that they must limit their actions to the protection of indisputable Polish territory against invasion from without. The ultimate frontiers of Poland should be left to the Peace Congress. He proposed that M. Clemenceau, President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George and M. Orlando should tell them, in the name of the Powers exactly what their line of conduct should be before the final decision. Meanwhile, the Polish forces in France could be organised, transport could be made ready in Great Britain, and the missions in Poland could be unified.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this policy raised many grave doubts in his mind. It would involve the Allies in very complicated matters. It was proposed not only to send Polish contingents from France, but also two Allied divisions to hold the railway against five German divisions. These Allied troops would be employed for a purpose

that might be highly offensive to the German Government, which would undoubtedly raise objections. These objections might have to be admitted. Dantzig must remain an open question, yet its occupation was suggested. With the object of sending Polish troops into Poland we were going to prejudge the whole Polish question. This question, moreover, should not, he thought, be isolated from all others. Many other questions resembled it. The Roumanians, for instance, were taking action of a similar kind. The Serbians also were behaving towards Montenegro in what appeared to him to be a questionable manner. The Hungarians also were trying to bring about a *fait accompli* before the termination of the Peace Congress. If we were to say to the Poles, "You must hold your hand," the same must be said to the rest. They must all be told that they prejudiced their case by premature action. If you had to take a thing by force, the inference was that it did not belong to you. It would not, therefore, be fair to segregate this case entirely. Further, it had previously been agreed upon in the case of Russia that, on condition all parties held their hand, the Allies would meet them. This alone would put an end to the threatened Bolshevik attack on Poland. M. Paderewski, in his letter, only suggested that the Allies should supply him with weapons. He said that he had at his disposal from 600,000 to 800,000 men ready to fight if they could obtain ammunition. If this were the case, why should the Allies do what the Poles could do for themselves? The question was whether, since the Armistice, the Allies had enough German rifles and ammunition to equip the Poles. These stores could be sent to them via the Dantzig-Thorn railway, the use of which was guaranteed by the Armistice.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he had no objection to this proposal. He was unable to check M. Paderewski's estimate of his forces, but he thought it was fair to assume that they had not a high military value. The supplies for these troops must go by the Dantzig-Thorn route, the free use of which could not be guaranteed. We must be able to explain the purpose of these arms. Failing that, the Germans might stop them. Paderewski's programme was a vague one. He therefore suggested that the Allied Missions should get into touch with the Poles and arrange an agreement ensuring the passage of the supplies.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that M. Paderewski, in his letter, had undertaken not to surprise the Powers by a *fait accompli*, or attempt to obtain one in Dantzig.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had come to the meeting with certain views, but admitted that he was much shaken by the opinions expressed by President Wilson. His impression was that we did not know enough about the facts of the situation in Poland. Action undertaken

without further knowledge might lead to a mess. What Marshal Foch had said had great force, and was not inconsistent with the President's remarks. He could not see any great difference between conveying armed men and conveying arms over the Dantzig-Thorn railway. We could not expect the Germans to allow arms to go through if they were to equip a Polish army to attack them. This would be asking more than was laid down in the Armistice. Fairness was due even to the enemy. He was not prepared at the present moment to make any declaration concerning the rights to Posen, which the Poles were attempting to conquer by force, and thereby to prejudge what the Congress was assembled to do. He pointed out that, although the Roumanians were doing the same thing, they were not asking the Allies to assist them. The Poles, on the other hand, were asking for all kinds of help—transport, supplies, rifles, ammunition.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that M. Paderewski asked for this help specifically for defence against the Bolsheviks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied that he had no doubt of the honourable character of M. Paderewski. But the Poles were not all united, and M. Paderewski was unlikely to maintain complete control of the situation. The arms might pass into other hands. He felt that the representatives of the Powers should see the Poles, or appoint a Committee to meet them in Paris.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that in sending Polish troops to Poland we should not only be sending armed men, but strong partisans on Polish questions. These were burning questions, and great caution should be exercised in dealing with them.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he wished again to draw attention to the danger that Poland might be suffocated before its birth. It had no bases, no outlets, no communications, no supplies, no army. The Poles were fighting the Bolsheviks who might be attacking them, the Ukrainians whom they chose to attack, and the Germans from whom they wished to wrest Posen. From a military point of view, the policy they were pursuing was likely to be fatal to them.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that the British Government could not settle the question of sea transport without reference to London. He wished, however, to draw attention to the suggestions made by M. Paderewski that an International Commission should be sent to Warsaw to report to the Congress on conditions in Poland. The Military Missions already in Poland might be utilised as a nucleus, and additional representatives might be deputed by the Supreme War Council.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he supported this proposal. He would suggest, however, that the Commission should not be entirely military, but that it should be fortified by a political element. There was an

ancient quarrel in Poland between the feudal elements and the peasants. We should not take sides in this contest blindly. Men of political experience should therefore be sent with the Commission to enquire into the matter.

BARON SONNINO said that the Commission should try and induce the Poles to confine their activities to resisting the Bolsheviks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, provided that under this pretence they did not attempt to push their conquest eastwards and face the Congress with the capture of Kovno or Grodno.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the names of the delegates should be brought forward at the meeting on the following day. He asked the Japanese Representatives whether they desired to send delegates to this Commission.

BARON MAKINO replied that the Japanese Government did not desire to do so.

(It was decided that two Commissions should be appointed by the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Italy.)

(It was further decided that the question of furnishing sea transport should be investigated in London, in case Marshal Foch's scheme were adopted.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, January 22, 1919.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, January 22, 1919, at 15 Hours 15

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

President Wilson.
Mr. R. Lansing.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Colonel U. S. Grant.
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George.
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Mr. E. Phipps.
Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
Captain A. Portier.

ITALY

His Excellency M. Orlando.
His Excellency Baron Sonnino.
Count Aldrovandi.
Major A. Jones.

JAPAN

Baron Makino.
His Excellency M. Matsui.
M. Saburi.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

PRESIDENT WILSON read a draft proclamation which he had prepared for the consideration of his colleagues, in accordance with the decision reached at yesterday's meeting.

1. Situation in Russia. Issue of Proclamation to Russian Groups

After a discussion the following text was adopted, to be publicly transmitted to parties invited:—

The single object the representatives of the associated Powers have had in mind in their discussions of the course they should pursue with regard to Russia has been to help the Russian people, not to hinder them, or to interfere in any manner with their right to settle their own affairs in their own way. They regard the Russian people as their friends not their enemies, and are willing to help them in any way they are willing to be helped. It is clear to them that the troubles and distresses of the Russian people will steadily increase, hunger and privation of every kind become more and more acute, more and more widespread, and more and more impossible to relieve, unless order is restored, and normal conditions of labour, trade and transportation once more created, and they are seeking some way in which to assist the Russian people to establish order.

They recognise the absolute right of the Russian people to direct their own affairs without dictation or direction of any kind from outside. They do not wish to exploit or make use of Russia in any way. They recognise the revolution without reservation, and will in no way, and in no circumstances, aid or give countenance to any attempt at a counter-revolution. It is not their wish or purpose

to favour or assist any one of those organized groups now contending for the leadership and guidance of Russia as against the others. Their sole and sincere purpose is to do what they can to bring Russia peace and an opportunity to find her way out of her present troubles.

The associated Powers are now engaged in the solemn and responsible work of establishing the peace of Europe and of the world, and they are keenly alive to the fact that Europe and the world cannot be at peace if Russia is not. They recognise and accept it as their duty, therefore, to serve Russia in this matter as generously, as unselfishly, as thoughtfully, as ungrudgingly as they would serve every other friend and ally. And they are ready to render this service in the way that is most acceptable to the Russian people.

In this spirit and with this purpose, they have taken the following action: They invite every organised group that is now exercising, or attempting to exercise, political authority or military control anywhere in Siberia, or within the boundaries of European Russia as they stood before the war just concluded (except in Finland) to send representatives, not exceeding three representatives for each group, to the Princes Islands, Sea of Marmora, where they will be met by representatives of the associated Powers, provided, in the meantime, there is a truce of arms amongst the parties invited, and that all armed forces anywhere sent or directed against any people or territory outside the boundaries of European Russia as they stood before the war, or against Finland, or against any people or territory whose autonomous action is in contemplation in the fourteen articles upon which the present negotiations are based, shall be meanwhile withdrawn, and aggressive military action cease. These representatives are invited to confer with the representatives of the Associated Powers in the freest and frankest way, with a view to ascertaining the wishes of all sections of the Russian people, and bringing about, if possible, some understanding and agreement by which Russia may work out her own purposes and happy co-operative relations be established between her people and the other peoples of the world.

A prompt reply to this invitation is requested. Every facility for the journey of the representatives, including transport across the Black Sea, will be given by the Allies, and all the parties concerned are expected to give the same facilities. The representative[s] will be expected at the place appointed by the 15th February, 1919.

2. League of Nations

Mr. Lloyd George read a draft of preliminary resolutions for a League of Nations. This document was intended primarily for the guidance of a special Committee to be appointed to draw up the constitution of the League of Nations.

After a discussion, the following text was adopted:—

The Conference having considered the proposals for the creation of a League of Nations, resolves that:

(*a*) It is essential to the maintenance of the world settlement, which the associated nations are now met to establish, that a League of Nations be created to promote international co-opera-

tion, to ensure the fulfillment of accepted international obligations, and to provide safeguards against war.

(*b*) This League should be created as an integral part of the general treaty of peace, and should be open to every civilised nation which can be relied on to promote its object.

(*c*) The members of the League should periodically meet for international Conference, and should have a permanent organisation and secretariat to carry on the business of the League in the intervals between the Conferences.

The Conference therefore appoints a Committee representative of the associated Governments to work out the details of the constitution and functions of the League.

BARON MAKINO wished to explain the position of Japan in connection with the subject of the League of Nations. In the first place, his country was sincerely desirous of co-operating with the Great Powers in this work of great importance, which had for its object the future welfare of mankind, but on account of the great distance and the lack of sufficient preparation, he was not prepared to bind his Government to the above resolutions or to any other definite action until he had received the instructions of his Government. As the work was of such very great importance his Government expected to have the opportunity of studying and understanding the duties and obligations of the new organisation before accepting it. If the work of the Committee was to be preparatory, and opportunity for further scrutiny was to be accorded to his Government, his work would be greatly facilitated. He did not wish to introduce any discordant note, but he simply desired to make matters quite clear. As regards the principles of the League of Nations, he noticed that in clause (*b*) of the preliminary resolutions, the stipulation was made that the League was to be treated as an integral part of the general treaty of peace. He wished to make it quite clear that his observations applied to that point as well.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired whether Baron Makino had any objection to his observations being published.

BARON MAKINO replied that he would ask that his observations be kept confidential.

PRESIDENT WILSON invited attention to the fact that these preliminary resolutions contained nothing new. The League of Nations had been accepted by the Supreme War Council as a basis for the armistice and for the peace treaty. He wished therefore to enquire whether Japan had not been represented on that Council.

M. MATSUI stated that he had participated in the meetings of the Supreme War Council: but the fourteen points had not then been discussed.

PRESIDENT WILSON, continuing, said that at any rate the Supreme War Council had accepted the League of Nations as a basis for the armistice. Therefore he would like to enquire from Baron Makino whether he wished it to be understood that his Government reserved its decision with regard to the basis already accepted by the other Governments.

BARON MAKINO replied that his Government had given a general assent to the agreements reached up to the time of the signing of the armistice, but they made reservations as to future detailed developments.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the interpretation to be given to Baron Makino's statement was that Japan did not wish to be represented, even without prejudice, on the Committee to be appointed.

BARON MAKINO replied that, on the contrary, he wished to be represented on that Committee.

(It was agreed to adopt the text of preliminary resolutions for a League of Nations given above, the reservations made by Japan being duly noted.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that each of the Great Powers should appoint two representatives to form a drafting Committee, and that the Great Powers should in addition nominate two or more delegates to represent the whole of the small Powers. A plenary Conference should be summoned, so that these proposals could be laid before it. The names of the representatives of the small Powers nominated by the Great Powers would also be communicated.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had an amendment to propose. He thought the initial draft should first be drawn up by the delegates of the Great Powers alone. On completion of their report it would be submitted to a larger Committee, on which all the small Powers would be represented. That is to say, the small Powers would not form part of the drafting Committee, but of a criticising Committee, which would follow.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the League of Nations, however important it might be to the Great Powers, must be even more important to the small Powers, since, if efficacious, it would constitute their shield and protection. For this reason he thought the latter should be represented on the drafting Committee. Still, he saw the force of the objection made by President Wilson. He would therefore propose that the Great Powers should nominate their representatives to form a Committee, which would be authorised to add to their numbers representatives of the small Powers.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he would rather see a more elastic arrangement. He thought the opinion of the most thoughtful and

experienced men of the small Powers should be sought. He had expected that their Committee of ten would call in men like M. Veniselos from time to time, and put to them those features of the scheme that were most likely to affect the small Powers. In this way a considerable number of the representatives of the small Powers would from time to time be consulted as friends and advisers. Advice drawn from men who did not form part of the drafting Committee would be better than that given by men who could put in a caveat. In this way he thought they would avoid the difficulty of seeming to pick out representatives among people who were anxious to appoint their own representatives.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it was his most earnest desire that the work of the small Powers should, as far as possible, be linked up with that of the Great Powers. In his opinion it was very important that this should be done to please the public; otherwise it would be said that they had agreed to publicity and yet worked in private. He agreed to the proposal that the Great Powers should nominate ten representatives, but he would leave it to the small Powers to nominate their five representatives. He was firmly convinced that on these Committees the small Powers would merely follow the lead of the Great Powers, but it was necessary to give them the idea that they were being consulted. He was anxious to call them together and to ask them to select five representatives to act on this Committee.

M. SONNINO enquired whether both neutrals and belligerents were included amongst the small Powers.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that at present the belligerent Powers alone should be summoned.

MR. BALFOUR thought that if an attempt were made to hold an election at a full Conference, serious trouble might arise. They had no apparatus for voting.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not think it would be necessary for the small Powers to vote. They should merely be asked to meet anywhere they liked and select five representatives.

M. SONNINO thought that if they gave the small belligerent Powers five delegates, they would find themselves in a great difficulty, because each of the more important small Powers—Belgium, Serbia, Roumania, Greece, Portugal—would want to be represented. He thought it would be more practicable if the delegates appointed by the Great Powers received a mandate to make proposals, a large number of the representatives of the small Powers being called in subsequently to consider the same.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that it would be impossible for so large a Committee to draft any instrument. But, as soon as some sort of a draft had been prepared, it should be shown to as many of the

representatives of the small Powers as possible, and their impressions and opinions taken. This procedure would greatly shorten the process of drafting. A public man, who had not previously made a careful study of the question, would necessarily require to see the proposals in a concrete form before expressing an opinion.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the procedure now suggested would not bring in the small Powers, who were beginning to complain bitterly at their exclusion. They were here in Paris, and they were doing nothing. They felt they were locked out, and they ought to be brought into the making of the peace. He thought there would be no difficulty in including a certain number of the representatives of the small Powers on the Committee to be formed, because there was a draft ready. This draft had been thought out very carefully. He favoured a process of a select Committee, without reporters, to go through the draft, and to make the necessary amendments. On such a Committee a large number of representatives could be included. He thought that was very important. It was immaterial whether they asked the smaller Powers themselves to select their five representatives or whether the representatives were nominated by the Great Powers. He would propose, therefore, that they should in the first place meet all the Powers at a full Conference in order to ask them to accept the principles set forth in the resolutions for a League of Nations. The Conference would then be informed that the Great Powers had selected their delegates, and the small Powers would be asked to meet together and select their delegates.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that at a previous meeting it had been agreed that there should be no voting. Was an exception to be made in this case? This would be setting a precedent which should be seriously considered.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied that the delegations would not be asked to vote. The small Powers would only be entitled to record their dissent. The Great Powers need merely say that they would take note of any suggestions or dissent and consider it later. The Great Powers must reserve the great decisions to themselves.

M. CLEMENCEAU, summing up, said that he understood the sense of the meeting to be that the above resolutions should be submitted for discussion to a full Peace Conference to meet on Saturday. The small Powers would then be invited to meet separately and to select five delegates to be added to the ten representatives of the Great Powers. The text of the preliminary resolutions for a League of Nations would not be communicated to the Press before the meeting on Saturday next, but it would be circulated forthwith to the various delegations.

As regards the selection of the delegates to be nominated by the small Powers, it was understood that the principle of one nation, one vote, would apply.

(It was agreed that the above resolutions should be submitted for discussion to a full Peace Conference to meet on Saturday afternoon, the 25th January, 1919. The small Powers would then be invited to meet separately and to select five delegates to be added to the ten representatives of the Great Powers. The text of the preliminary resolutions for a League of Nations would not be communicated to the Press before the meeting on Saturday next; but it would be circulated forthwith to the various delegations.)

3. Labour Legislation

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed the following resolution:—

"That a Commission composed of two representatives apiece from the five Great Powers, and five representatives to be elected by the smaller Powers, be appointed to consider the establishment of a permanent organisation for concerting joint legislation in regard to industrial and labour questions between the States."

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether it was contemplated that the acceptance of the recommendations of that Committee would involve something being put in the peace treaty. He thought that a proposal of this kind was pertinent to the League of Nations, and the agreement reached should not be included in the peace treaty. He enquired whether it would not be better to redraft the resolution in order to make this point quite clear.

(This suggestion was accepted, and Mr. Lloyd George agreed to prepare a fresh draft, embodying this point, for discussion at the next meeting.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that a Commission be appointed, with three representatives apiece for each of the five Great Powers and Belgium and Serbia, to examine and report on the

4. Reparations

question of the amount of the sum for reparation and indemnity which the enemy countries should pay or are capable of paying, and the form in which payment should be made.

PRESIDENT WILSON proposed that the word "indemnity" should be omitted. He thought the word "reparation" would meet the case. Bodies of working people all over the world had protested against indemnities, and he thought the expression "reparations" would be sufficiently inclusive.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE accepted the proposal, provided the word "reparations" was taken in its widest terms.

(This proposal was accepted.)

M. PICHON drew attention to the fact that Greece had been given no representation.

MR. BALFOUR said that Russian Poland had suffered more than any country, and almost as badly as Belgium.

M. SONNINO also mentioned Roumania.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the small Powers should be invited to select five delegates.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that Belgium, Serbia, Greece and Roumania might be given two representatives apiece.

M. PICHON said that Poland had two representatives at the Peace Conference, and should also be included.

(It was agreed that a new draft should be prepared by Mr. Lloyd George and submitted for consideration at the next meeting.)

(The meeting then adjourned, to meet again at 10 hours 30 the next day.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, January 22, 1919.

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Notes on Conversations Held in the Office of M. Pichon at the Quai d'Orsay, at 11 a. m., January 22, 1919

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:	President Wilson
	Mr. Lansing
	Mr. Frazier
	Mr. Harrison
	Col. Grant
BRITISH EMPIRE:	Mr. Lloyd George
	Mr. Balfour
	Lt. Col. Hankey
	Mr. Norman
	Capt. Abraham
FRANCE:	M. Clemenceau
	M. Pichon
	M. Dutasta
	M. Berthelot
	Prince de Bearn
ITALY:	Baron Sonnino
	Count Aldrovandi
	Captain Jones
JAPAN:	Baron Makino
	M. Matsui

Interpreter: M. Mantoux.

I

At the invitation of the Chairman, Marshal Foch, his aide, General Weygand, and General Radcliffe attended the meeting.

MARSHAL FOCH presented his view that the Polish divisions with the French and Italian Armies should be sent to Poland for the purpose of stiffening Polish resistance against the Bolsheviki. It would be necessary, he said, for those divisions to disembark at Danzig, and to proceed to Warsaw via the Danzig-Thorn Railroad. He pointed out that the Poles, claiming that the Germans would prevent this, had requested that the railroad line should be occupied by Allied troops, which might be done under the terms of the Armistice.

Marshal Foch agreed that the Germans would oppose the transportation of Polish troops across their territory to Poland, unless the Polish question were settled and a precise program imposed on the Poles. They might be required to agree that these troops be used only in Russian-Poland, and not used to seize German territory in advance of the decisions of the Peace Conference. Under the circum-

stances, he did not think that these troops could be sent to Poland unless: First, a limited political program were imposed on the Poles and accepted by the Germans; and Second, the railway line be held by Allied troops. He thought this could be done with two divisions. The Germans had eighteen divisions in that territory.

The Marshal further thought it would be necessary to re-organize various Allied missions now in Poland. At the present time the Allies are receiving different information and diverse views. The Allies should have the benefit of the opinion of a unified mission as to the necessity of sending troops to Poland.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the unification of the Allied missions might take time, and he doubted whether the Allies could afford to delay in this matter, if it be true that the Bolsheviki attack against Warsaw is imminent. He pointed out also that there would be considerable difficulty in getting a restricted program accepted by the Poles, who seemed to be determined to take the present opportunity not only to secure Poland, but to make good their claims on districts outside Russian-Poland, especially in Eastern Galicia, Posen and Danzig.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated that the Marshal's proposal aroused many doubts in his mind. Should the proposal be accepted, the Allies would, he thought, be involved in an extraordinary step, because they were now at this stage, for a purpose of a different kind, about to decide one of the most difficult questions that had come before the Peace Conference. The Allies would, in fact, be isolating the Polish question from others which were much the same, namely, the Roumanian question, the Serbian question in Montenegro, and the Hungarian question. If we impose a restricted program on Poland, why would it not be wise to do the same to the others?

President Wilson called attention also to the fact that all that Mr. Paderewski had asked for in his letter to Colonel House was to be supplied with German rifles and ammunition with which to equip the 800,000 men he said he had available.

The President asked Marshal Foch whether the Allies possessed a sufficient number of rifles and ammunition to supply these unarmed Poles.

MARSHAL FOCH had nothing to say against the suggestion, but he doubted whether Paderewski's forces were of much value. Moreover, it really depended upon the Germans whether the arms and ammunition would be permitted to reach the Poles. It was clear that the Germans would object, unless the Allies were in a position to state the exact object for which such armament would be used. He referred again to the desirability of uniting the missions in Poland and obtaining from them precise information on the situation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated he was somewhat shaken by President Wilson's argument, of which he saw the force, and he agreed that it would be well first to find out exactly what is going on in Poland before sending any troops.

MARSHAL FOCH insisted that the Polish situation is bad from a military standpoint, and observed that by the policy Poland is now pursuing, she is running the risk of being killed before she is born.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that Paderewski's proposal to Colonel House, that the Allies send a mission to Warsaw, be accepted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE supported this proposal, but thought that the mission should not be purely military, but should have civilians on it, as there would be an important political side to the mission.

BARON SONNINO understood that the mission would propose to the Poles that they defend themselves against the Bolsheviki, and that they do not extend their boundaries.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether Japan desired to have representatives on the mission.

BARON MAKINO replied in the negative.

MR. BALFOUR proposed that the United States, England, France and Italy each appoint two representatives, one military and one civilian, and that the mission proceed with its work as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the British Government would study the question of transportation.

Marshal Foch and his aides then withdrew.

II

PRESIDENT WILSON read a draft of a statement prepared by him to be issued to the warring factions in Russia.

It was decided to have the statement translated and considered at the afternoon session.

I

THE CHAIRMAN opened the afternoon session at 3:00 p m.

The President's draft statement was carefully considered, amended in one or two particulars, and accepted by all.

(Copy of the statement is attached hereto.) [1]

II

MR. LLOYD GEORGE read certain resolutions regarding the League of Nations, and they were accepted with certain amendments proposed by President Wilson. (Copies attached.) [2]

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[1] *Post*, p. 691.
[2] *Post*, p. 692.

BARON MAKINO requested permission to make a statement in regard to the subject of the League of Nations. He desired to point out Japan's position in this matter. He explained that it was better that he should state this before the proceedings should take a definite form. In the first place, he desired to say that Japan was sincerely desirous of co-operating with the Great Powers in this work, having for its object the future welfare of mankind. However, on account of the great distance and lack of preparation on the part of Japan, he could not give a definite opinion on the binding principles of the League of Nations, without first receiving instructions from his Government. For his part, and he might say also for that of his Government, he expected to have an opportunity to study and understand the new organizations. If, therefore, the underlying principles should go to the committee, not signifying definite settlement, and leave an opportunity and occasion to express final opinions on the part of his Government, this would be acceptable.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that Mr. Lloyd George's proposal included nothing that was not in contemplation when the Peace Conference was called, and that the principles of the League of Nations had been accepted at the time the Armistice was made. He therefore asked whether Baron Makino wished it to be understood that the Japanese Government reserved its decision with regard to the bases which other powers had already accepted.

BARON MAKINO thought that the present proposal was much more concrete.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the Japanese Government wished to be represented on the committee.

BARON MAKINO stated that it did.

The proposal was agreed to by all, and adopted with the reserve stated by Baron Makino.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the Committee consist of two representatives to be appointed by each of the five Great Powers, and two to be nominated by the Great Powers to represent the small powers. He thought it desirable to proceed to name these two and then submit these names to the approval of the small powers at the next plenary session of the Conference, which might be called immediately.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that as a practical matter he would suggest that an initial draft for the League of Nations be made by a commission appointed by the Great Powers. This draft could then be submitted to a larger commission on which all the small powers would be represented. In a word, the drafting would be done by the Great Powers, and the result submitted to the criticism of the small powers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that inasmuch as the League of Nations is to be, in fact, a sort of shield of the small powers, they should be represented on the drafting committee. Perhaps it might be better to have the Great Powers nominate their own representatives, and also name the small powers who should likewise have representatives on the commission.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated he would prefer to see a more elastic arrangement, and thought it most desirable that the opinion of the thoughtful men representing the small powers should be sought. Would it not be well to have the commission of ten to be appointed by the Great Powers authorized to call in any one they choose, and discuss with representatives of the small powers those features of the scheme most likely to affect the latter? Moreover, they need not confine themselves to a few. It seemed to him that it was most advisable to proceed in this way. Much more would be gotten out of the small powers, if they were called in as friends and advisors. Furthermore, in that way, the Great Powers would avoid the difficulty of seeming to pick out men whom the small powers should themselves choose.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the work was as much for the Great Powers as it was for the small powers. He thought it most desirable that the great and small powers should get together, and that their work should be intimately connected. It was important to let the public feel that their work was connected. He suggested that the Great Powers name two representatives apiece and the small powers name five. He thought they would be only too glad to follow the advice of the representatives of the Great Powers. He proposed that the Bureau ask the small powers to get together and name five. The responsibility would then be theirs. He spoke, of course, of belligerents only, and not of neutrals. He was most anxious the work should begin as soon as possible, and he hoped the commission would be appointed at once.

MR. BALFOUR feared the bureau would get into great trouble if the small powers were asked to vote on the question at the Great Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU explained that his intention was not to ask them to vote at the Conference, but to ask them to get together and name five representatives.

BARON SONNINO thought there might be some difficulty attending the proposal to ask the small powers to name but five representatives. For instance, Belgium, Serbia, Roumania, Greece and Portugal would each desire to name at least one representative on the committee, and there might be others also. This mode of procedure

would place the small powers in a difficult position. It would be more practical, he believed, if the ten representatives appointed by the Great Powers should form the committee, receive a mandate to make proposals, and then invite the representatives of all the smaller powers to discuss these proposals with them.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that it was impossible to draft an instrument on a large committee. It would be far more practical to appoint a manageable drafting committee, letting this small committee of a few men prepare and submit a draft to the others, and obtain their impressions and opinions.

MR. BALFOUR understood it was intended that the committee should from time to time consult the members of the Great Powers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it well to remember that the small powers were becoming very restive, and felt they had been locked out, so to speak. Why not let President Wilson prepare a draft for immediate consideration by the commission? He did not think it would be impossible to have a commission of fifteen representatives. As to the fear that the assignment of only five to represent all the small powers might cause some embarrassment to their delegates, he saw no reason why the matter should not be put up to them, letting them discuss and fight over the question of who should represent them.

M. CLEMENCEAU repeated that he thought it most necessary that the Great Powers should make the Conference feel that they wanted the smaller powers, and ask all to come in with them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that it was therefore understood that a plenary conference was to be called to pass upon the principles set forth in the resolution they had just adopted.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that it had been agreed that there would be no vote. Was it now the suggestion to ask them to vote?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE explained that they would simply be asked to record their objections.

BARON SONNINO inquired what would be done should the representatives of the small powers ask permission to name ten representatives.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought the Chairman might say that the Bureau would consider it. His view was that the Great Powers should always reserve the important decisions for themselves.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether the resolution was to be given out in the Official Communiqué, to be issued at the close of the meeting.

MR. BALFOUR suggested it be stated that the League of Nations had been discussed at the meeting and that it was proposed to bring the matter before the next meeting of the Great Conference.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether it would not be desirable to inform the small powers of the decisions of those present, in advance of publicity. Why not inform them that this resolution had been adopted by the Great Powers, and would be submitted for discussion at the Great Conference Saturday next?

MR. BALFOUR suggested that perhaps the small powers might prefer to have the resolution sent them in private.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that they were about to create a precedent, and that it seemed to him that it would be well to decide on a consistent course to be pursued on all occasions.

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed, therefore, that a plenary session of the Conference be called for Saturday next, January 25th; that the resolution containing the principles for the League of Nations be submitted thereat for discussion, and that the small powers be invited to appoint their five delegates. It was suggested that the text of the resolution be not published until Saturday, and that, in the meanwhile, copies be sent to the representatives of the smaller powers for their confidential information.

III

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed the appointment of a similar commission to consider the question of reparation and indemnity.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested it might be well to omit the word "indemnity".

BARON SONNINO suggested the substitution of "reparation and restitution".

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated he was quite prepared to accept the one word "reparation", provided it was understood that this included "restitution". He proposed, therefore, that a commission consisting of three representatives apiece for the Great Powers, and two representatives apiece for Belgium and Serbia, be named to examine and report on the amount of the sum that should be paid by Germany, the amount of the sum that Germany is capable of paying, and the form which the payment should take.

M. PICHON observed that Greece would certainly wish to be represented on such a commission.

MR. BALFOUR thought that Russian-Poland would also desire to be represented.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that, under the circumstances, it would seem desirable to assign two delegates apiece for Belgium, Serbia, Greece, Roumania and Poland.

[Annex 1]

Statement Drafted by President Wilson to be Issued to the Warring Factions in Russia

The single object the representatives of the associated powers have had in mind in their discussions of the course they should pursue with regard to Russia has been to help the Russian people, not to hinder them, or to interfere, in any manner, with their right to settle their own affairs in their own way. They regard the Russian people as their friends, not their enemies, and are willing to help them in any way they are willing to be helped. It is clear to them that the troubles and distresses of the Russian people will steadily increase, hunger and privation of every kind become more and more acute, more and more widespread, and more and more impossible to relieve, unless order is restored, and normal conditions of labour, trade, and transportation once more created, and they are seeking some way in which to assist the Russian people to establish order.

They recognize the absolute right of the Russian people to direct their own affairs without dictation or direction of any kind from outside. They do not wish to exploit, or make use of Russia in any way. They recognize the revolution without reservation, and will, in no way, and in no circumstances, aid or give countenance to any attempt at a counter-revolution. It is not their wish or purpose to favor or assist any one of the organized groups now contending for the leadership and guidance of Russia as against the others. Their sole and sincere purpose is to do what they can to bring Russia peace, and an opportunity to find her way out of her present troubles.

The associated powers are now engaged in the solemn and responsible work of establishing the peace of Europe, and of the world, and they are keenly alive to the fact that Europe and the world cannot be at peace if Russia is not. They recognize and accept it as their duty, therefore, to serve Russia in this great matter as generously, as unselfishly, as thoughtfully, and ungrudgingly as they would serve every other friend and ally. And they are ready to render this service in the way that is most acceptable to the Russian people.

In this spirit and with this purpose, they have taken the following action: They invite every organized group that is now exercising or attempting to exercise political authority or military control anywhere in Siberia, or within the boundaries of European Russia as they stood before the war just concluded (except in Finland) to send representatives, not exceeding three representatives for each group, to the Prince's Islands, Sea of Marmora, where they will be

met by representatives of the associated powers provided, in the meantime there is a truce of arms amongst the parties invited, and that all armed forces anywhere sent or directed against any people or territory outside the boundaries of European Russia as they stood before the war, or against Finland, or against any people or territory whose autonomous action is in contemplation in the fourteen articles upon which the present peace negotiations are based, shall be meanwhile withdrawn, and aggressive military action cease. These representatives are invited to confer with the representatives of the associated powers in the freest and frankest way, with a view to ascertaining the wishes of all sections of the Russian people, and bringing about, if possible, some understanding and agreement by which Russia may work out her own purposes and happy co-operative relations be established between her people and the other peoples of the world.

A prompt reply to this invitation is requested. Every facility for the journey of the representatives, including transport across the Black Sea, will be given by the Allies, and all parties concerned are expected to give the same facilities. The representatives will be expected at the place appointed by the fifteenth of February, 1919.

[Annex 2]

Draft Preliminary Resolutions for a League of Nations

The Conference having considered the proposals for the creation of a League of Nations, resolves that:

(*a*) It is essential to the maintenance of the world settlement, which the Associated Nations are now met to establish, that a League of Nations be created to promote international co-operation to ensure the fulfillment of accepted international obligations, and to provide safeguards against war.

(*b*) This League should be created as an integral part of the general treaty of peace, and should be open to every civilized nation which can be relied on to promote its objects.

(*c*) The members of the League should periodically meet in international conference, and should have a permanent organization and secretariat to carry on the business of the League in the intervals between the Conferences.

The Conference therefore appoints a Committee representative of the Associated Governments to work out the details of the constitution and functions of the League.

PARIS, January 15, 1919.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay on Thursday, January 23, 1919, at 10:30 O'clock a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

President Wilson.
Mr. R. Lansing.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Colonel U. S. Grant.
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
Lt-Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.
Captain E. Abraham.
Mr. C. J. B. Hurst.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. Fromageot.
Captain A. Portier.

ITALY

H. E. M. Orlando.
H. E. Baron Sonnino.
Count Aldrovandi.
Major A. Jones.

JAPAN

Baron Makino.
H. E. M. Matsui.
M. Saburi.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

Commission for Poland

1. M. CLEMENCEAU, in opening the meeting, asked whether the Representatives had nominated their Commissioners to proceed to Poland.

PRESIDENT WILSON said on behalf of the United States that General Kernan and Mr. Lord would be the American delegates.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, on behalf of Great Britain, agreed to nominate the British delegates in the afternoon.

M. CLEMENCEAU, on behalf of France, nominated General Niessel and M. Velten.

M. ORLANDO said that he would nominate the Italian delegates in the afternoon.

Commission for the Russian Conference

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had nominated, as the French delegates to proceed to Prince's Island, M. Conti and General Rampont.

BARON MAKINO said that he would nominate delegates on behalf of Japan and would furnish the names as soon as possible.

The other Powers agreed to supply the names of their nominees in the afternoon.

3. The following names were given:—

Commission for the League of Nations

France.	M. Léon Bourgeois.
	M. Larnaude.
United States.	President Wilson.
	Colonel House.
Great Britain.	Lord Robert Cecil.
	General Smuts.
Italy.	Senator Scialoja.
	M. Ricci-Busatti.
Japan.	Viscount Chinda.
	M. Otchiai.

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said the next subject to be dealt with was that of the reduction of armaments, concerning which a draft had been proposed by Mr. Lloyd George. (See Appendix "A".)

Disarmament

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the draft contained two distinct proposals. The first dealt with the immediate situation. A decision on this point was, for Great Britain, a matter of very grave moment. Unless the enemy's forces were immediately reduced, the British Government might be forced to maintain compulsory service. He did not know what might be the political result of such a decision. In another month's time, the renewal of the Armistice would be considered. He felt that at that time we should demand a drastic reduction of the armed forces of Germany to a fixed quotum, such as might suffice to maintain internal order. It would also be necessary to place a limit on the armaments and munitions available for these forces; the surplus could be placed under Allied guard. If the Germans maintained armaments and munitions sufficient for an army of two or three million men, their demobilization would be nugatory. He was informed by the British War Office that to fulfil Marshal Foch's requirements, a British Army of 1,700,000 men must be kept with the colours. This was a very serious demand which would not be readily accepted by the country. He would, therefore, urge that the first clause in the draft be proceeded with at once. The second could be reserved for a future date.

PRESIDENT WILSON, commenting on the terms of the draft, suggested the elimination of the words "and drastic", as conveying the impression of a threat.

M. SONNINO suggested, as an alternative, the words "prompt reduction."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the text was not intended for communication to the enemy but only as a guidance to the Allied Commission that was to be set up to consider it. What he wished to convey to the Committee was that the enemy's forces should be

reduced to the minimum necessary for the maintenance of internal order.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether this could be done without consultation with the Germans and whether it ought not to be taken up by the Armistice Commission, so as to give the Germans a chance to state the numbers they actually needed.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, if there was no objection he would propose to summon Marshal Foch.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would not be able to accept Marshal Foch's opinion unsupported by British military experts on subject of such political moment to Great Britain. Marshal Foch had forwarded a demand for British troops which it would be extremely difficult for the country to honour. It was for this reason that he had suggested as an alternative to increasing the Allied forces the reduction of the enemy's troops. It would be necessary for British members to be present on the Committee when dealing with this subject.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had no objection whatever to the presence of British, American or other representatives on the Commission. He fully understood the reasons which prompted Mr. Lloyd George's remarks. The question, however, was more difficult to solve than might appear. He, himself, had been asked in the Chamber of Deputies why Marshal Foch had not included in the Armistice an article requiring the demobilization of the German Army. Marshal Foch had explained that he had made no provision for this, as he did not wish to put any clause in the Armistice, the execution of which he would be unable to control.

Present Situation in Germany

5. The situation in Germany had grown worse during the last few days. He had brought telegrams with him which he proposed to show to the Meeting. It appeared that, since the defeat of the Spartacus party, German officers were resuming their arrogant attitude and were considerably harder to deal with than before. Moreover, German troops were being massed against the Poles. The "Frankfurt Gazette" made mention of a large concentration on the Eastern frontier. He was very much afraid that the Poles might be so imprudent as to attack the Germans, and, in connection with the Allied Mission that was going to Poland, he had intended to suggest that it be instructed to forbid the Poles from engaging in any such adventure. The Allies would always be considered the supporters of Poland and they could not at the same time support the Poles in attacking Germany and ask the Germans to disarm.

Maintenance of Allied Troops on the Western Front

6. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had felt bound to give notice to the Allied and Associated Governments that he was not able to undertake to maintain the forces demanded by Marshal Foch.

M. ORLANDO said that he would like to raise a point of procedure. He fully understood Mr. Lloyd George's reasons. He also understood M. Clemenceau's anxiety. He wished to suggest that the question of immediate reduction of the enemy's forces was not a Peace Conference but an Armistice matter. The question of form often had a close relation to substance. He thought that we could obtain prompt demobilisation of the German armies more effectually by dealing with it as a condition of the renewal of the Armistice through the agency of Marshal Foch and the Allied Military Advisers, than by treating it as a question for the Peace Conference. He thought it would be a mistake to consult on a question of this kind all the Small Powers collected at the Peace Conference, which had no concern with the military commitments on the Western Front.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he also fully understood Mr. Lloyd George's point. Mr. Lloyd George had been bound to make it, but the military front must be maintained. He was not aware of the demands addressed by Marshal Foch to the British Government. He would therefore suggest that a British, a French, an American and an Italian General should meet and report to the meeting what military forces it was necessary for the Allies to maintain.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he had thought the question was still under discussion. He also was deeply interested in the question of maintaining American troops in Europe. What [*When*] he had last met Marshal Foch, final figures had not been given him, but only approximations. He had therefore concluded that the matter was still being considered. He thought that this was a question for the Supreme War Council and suggested that the Military Advisors should be heard on the subject.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that on the following day the British Secretary of State for War would be in Paris and could be present at the Meeting.

M. ORLANDO said that General Diaz would also be present.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that a Meeting of the Supreme War Council would take place at 10 hrs. 30 in M. Pichon's room on the following day.

(It was agreed that Marshal Foch and the Military Experts of the Governments of the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Italy be invited to advise the Supreme War Council on

the following day as to the size of the armies to be maintained by the Allied and Associated Powers on the Western Front, and more particularly as to the possibility of an immediate and drastic reduction in the armed forces of the enemy.)

7. M. CLEMENCEAU read a draft resolution proposed by Mr. Lloyd George. (See Appendix "B")

International Legislation on Industrial and Labour Questions

M. ORLANDO asked if this text would be submitted to voting in the full Conference on Saturday.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it would be discussed but not voted on. There was to be no voting in the Conference. It would be included in the Agenda for Saturday.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that for the word "joint" in the eight[h] line, the word "common" should be substituted. Joint action would rarely be possible.

(This amendment was accepted)

MR. LANSING proposed certain other alterations in the draft and the following final text was adopted:—

That a Commission composed of two representatives apiece from the five Great Powers, and five representatives to be elected by the other Powers represented at the Peace Conference be appointed to enquire into the conditions of employment from the international aspect, and to consider the international means necessary to secure common action on matters affecting conditions of employment and to recommend the form of a permanent agency to continue such enquiry in co-operation with and under the direction of the League of Nations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would like to have the opinion of the Conference concerning the kind of delegates that should be appointed to this Commission. As there were to be only two, he asked whether it would not be desirable that one should be an employer, and the other a representative of the working classes. In the alternative, one could be an official. He thought it desirable that the representatives of all the Powers should have the same character.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that uniformity might not be feasible. For instance, American officials might not be easy to obtain.

M. SONNINO pointed out that as the smaller Powers among them only found 5 delegates, the same composition could not apply to their membership.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that an American employer might be hard to get.

Mr. BALFOUR said that the countries in which conditions of employment were bad were the only countries that need feel much anxiety about their representation on this Commission. America, for instance, where conditions of employment were exceptionally

good, need feel no anxiety on this score. There might be countries, however, in which the impression would be formed that they could only compete with such favoured countries as the United States or Canada by keeping down wages. Those countries must have an employer among their representatives, otherwise the employers of labour in those countries would think that wages were being raised in order to render competition with their rivals in other countries impossible. It is therefore, in his opinion, unnecessary to insist on an identical form of representation for all.

BARON MAKINO said that he entirely agreed with Mr. Balfour, and the case last cited was that of Japan.

M. SONNINO thought that this discussion somewhat anticipated the probable course of events. The means of procuring full and adequate representation could be dealt with at a later stage. The question was for the time being in the stage of study. This study could be adequately undertaken by officials, such, for instance, as the Italian officials serving on the Emigration Committee. After receiving their advice, further decisions could be taken. He thought it would be unfortunate to establish a precedent for a permanent organization not yet formed by insisting on one delegate from the employers and one from the workmen.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed with M. Sonnino. The Governments were now asked to nominate two delegates each. He for himself proposed to nominate two officials. The Commission was to report on the best means of getting all the interests concerned represented. The delegates would doubtless for their own work consult the various interests in their own countries.

(It was therefore decided that each of the Great Powers should appoint two delegates.)

8. M. CLEMENCEAU read a draft resolution proposed by Mr. Lloyd George. (See Appendix "C".)

Reparation

M. PICHON pointed out that Poland, which had suffered perhaps as much as any other country from devastation, had been omitted.

(It was agreed that Poland should be included).

BARON MAKINO suggested that instead of three representatives apiece, the Great Powers should be asked to supply not more than three each.

(This was agreed to).

MR. LANSING proposed certain alterations, which were included in the final text.

(The following text was then adopted:—

That a Commission be appointed with not more than three representatives apiece from each of the five Great Powers, and not more

than two representatives apiece from Belgium, Greece, Poland, Roumania, and Serbia, to examine and report, first on the amount for reparation which the enemy countries ought to pay, secondly on what they are capable of paying, and thirdly on the method, form and time in which payment should be made).

9. M. CLEMENCEAU read a draft resolution submitted by Mr. Lloyd George (Appendix "D").

Breaches of Laws of War

M. SONNINO called attention to the expression in paragraph 3, "highly placed individuals". He thought that responsibility should not be confined to highly placed individuals.

(After discussion, it was decided to read the sentence as follows:— "All other individuals, however highly placed")

(The following final text was adopted:—

That a Commission, composed of two representatives apiece from the five Great Powers, and five representatives to be elected by the other Powers, be appointed to inquire and report upon the following:—

(1) The responsibility of the authors of the war.

(2) The facts as to breaches of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and their allies on land, on sea, and in the air during the present war;

(3) The degree of responsibility for these offences attaching to particular members of the enemy forces, including members of the General Staffs, or other individuals, however highly placed;

(4) The Constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate to the trial of these offences;

(5) Any other matters cognate or ancillary to the above which may arise in the course of the inquiry, and which the Commission finds it useful and relevant to take into consideration.)

10. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Agenda for Saturday would be composed of the resolutions accepted at this Meeting and on the previous day.

Agenda for Plenary Conference on Saturday

(This was agreed to)

MR. LANSING pointed out that according to the rules, they should be in the hands of the delegates 24 hours before the meeting.

(The Secretary-General undertook to fulfill this regulation).

11. M. CLEMENCEAU said that a number of territorial and colonial questions remained to be discussed. Of these the territorial were the most delicate problems.

Territorial and Colonial Questions

Doubtless each power would feel inclined to put off their discussion, but it must be undertaken. Before discussion these questions required classification. He would there-

fore beg the Governments to think of this, and at a later meeting to bring with them a classification.

M. SONNINO asked whether the most practical means would not be to fix a time by which each Delegation should present their wishes. The meeting would then have a notion of the ground to be covered. This applied to the Great Powers and to the smaller countries alike. A complete picture of the whole problem would then be available.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that considerable delay might be involved in waiting for the completion of all this work. European questions were so complicated that it would take a long time for such peoples as the Czecho-Slovaks and Poles to set forth a reasoned case. On the other hand Oriental questions and Colonial questions were less involved and to economize time he suggested that these matters might be tackled at once.

M. SONNINO pointed out that Mr. Lloyd George's proposal was not in contradiction with his. It was a question of the order in which problems were examined. Mr. Lloyd George proposed one subject to be discussed first. He agreed with him but before long questions would arise which concerned a great number of interests and then it would be necessary before settling them to have a statement from all the Delegations concerned.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would agree then to begin with the Colonial questions.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that the world's unrest arose from the unsettled condition of Europe, not from the state of affairs in the East, or in the Colonies, and that the postponement of these questions would only increase the pressure on the Delegates of the Peace Conference. He would therefore prefer to set in process immediately all that was required to hasten a solution of European questions. He entirely approved of utilizing intervals for the discussion of less important matters.

M. CLEMENCEAU summing up, said that he understood Mr. Lloyd George to propose giving precedence to Oriental and Colonial questions, while President Wilson preferred to begin with European ones.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he entirely agreed with the President in his estimate of the relative importance of these matters, and that he had only suggested dealing with the East and with the Colonies in order to save time while the various delegations were preparing their case.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that a date be fixed by which all Delegations should be requested to state their cases in writing.

(It was then decided that the Secretary General should ask all Delegations representing Powers with Territorial claims to send to the Secretariat their written statements within 10 days).

12. M. CLEMENCEAU read a resolution proposed by Mr. Lloyd [George] concerning the international regulation of Ports, Water-ways & Railways (Appendix "E").

International Regime of Ports, Waterways, & Railways

After discussion the following resolution was adopted:—

"That a Commission composed of two representatives apiece from the five Great Powers and five representatives to be elected by the other Powers represented at the Peace Conference, be appointed to inquire into the Question of the international regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways."

13. M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that many complicated financial questions required settlement.

Financial Questions

M. SONNINO said that the questions of Public Debts and paper money were especially difficult.

PRESIDENT WILSON questioned whether these problems could be isolated from territorial problems.

MR. BALFOUR thought that even in so complex a case as that of the previous Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, some general principles of financial obligation should be laid down.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that these questions varied so much that their settlement should not be subjected to any general rule.

M. SONNINO said that on certain definite questions a common principle could be found, for instance, to what extent were new States responsible for the debts of the older States they replaced? At what date did the State in process of dissolution cease to be responsible for the paper money it issued? Who was responsible for the money now circulating throughout the former Dual Monarchy? These questions related to phenomena of common occurrence and some principle could be laid down to deal with them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE added the instance of the Turkish Empire, a large part of which would be parceled out. What part, if any, of the Ottoman debt must be taken over with each portion? Who the Mandatories would be was not yet settled, but what their relations would be to the monetary obligations of the Turkish Empire was a difficult problem. Would they, for instance, be compelled to take over the debt at par or at the present value? Was Palestine to bear a share of the burden, and Syria, the Armenians and the peoples of the Caucasus?

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that these problems be drafted in the form of resolutions on which the representatives could take action.

M. SONNINO said that an expert committee would be [appointed] to frame these questions in appropriate terms.

(It was therefore decided that the Great Powers should appoint a Committee of five, composed of one member from each, to frame and set in order the financial questions requiring solution)

14. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that one of the problems requiring solution was whether claims for reparation should take precedence of the national debt in enemy countries.

Status of Claims for Reparation

(It was agreed that this was one of the problems that should be referred to the Committee above mentioned)

(The meeting then adjourned)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 23 January, 1919.

Appendix "A"

Draft Resolution in Regard to the Reduction of Forces and Armaments

For Presentation to the Peace Conference

That a Commission be appointed with two representatives apiece from each of the five Great Powers, and five representatives to be elected by the other Powers represented at the Conference:—

1. to advise on an immediate and drastic reduction in the armed forces of the enemy;
2. to prepare a plan in connection with the League of Nations for a permanent reduction in the burden of military, naval and aerial forces and armaments.

Appendix "B"

Draft Resolution in Regard to International Legislation on Industrial and Labour Questions

For Presentation to the Peace Conference

That a Commission, composed of two representatives apiece from the five Great Powers, and five representatives to be elected by the other Powers represented at the Peace Conference, be appointed to enquire into the question of the international adjustment of conditions of employment, and to consider what forms of permanent international machinery should be established to enable the several countries to secure joint action on matters affecting conditions of employment, and to recommend what steps should be taken to set up an appropriate organization for the above purposes in connection with the League of Nations.

Appendix "C"

Draft Resolution in Regard to Reparation

For Presentation to the Peace Conference

That a Commission be appointed with three representatives apiece from each of the five Great Powers and two representatives apiece from Belgium, Greece, Roumania and Serbia, to examine and report on the question of the amount of the sum for reparation which the enemy countries should pay, and are capable of paying, as well as the form in which payment should be made.

Appendix "D"

Draft Resolution in Regard to Breaches of the Laws of War

For Presentation to the Peace Conference

That a Commission, composed of two representatives apiece from the five Great Powers, and five representatives to be elected by the smaller Powers, be appointed to inquire and report upon the following:—

(1) The responsibility of the authors of the war.
(2) The facts as to breaches of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and their allies on land, on sea, and in the air during the present war.
(3) The degree of responsibility for these offences attaching to particular members of the enemy forces, including members of the General Staffs, or other highly placed individuals.
(4) The Constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate to the trial of these offences.
(5) Any other matters cognate or ancillary to the above which may arise in the course of the enquiry, and which the Commission finds it useful and relevant to take into consideration.

Appendix "E"

Draft Resolution in Regard to Ports, Waterways and Railways

For Presentation to the Peace Conference

That a Commission, composed of two representatives apiece from the five Great Powers, and five representatives to be elected by the other Powers represented at the Peace Conference, be appointed to enquire into the question of the international regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways.

Procès-verbal of the Twelfth Session of the Supreme War Council Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, January 24, 1919, at 10 Hours 30

Present

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.

GREAT BRITAIN

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P., Prime Minister.
The Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

ITALY

His Excellency M. Orlando.
His Excellency Baron Sonnino.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.
Mr. R. Lansing.

JAPAN

Baron Makino.
His Excellency M. Matsui.
M. Saburi.

The following also attended:

FRANCE

M. Loucheur.
Marshal Foch.
General Weygand.
General Belin.
Major Lacombe.
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.

GREAT BRITAIN

The Right Hon. W. S. Churchill, M. P., Secretary of State for War.
Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, K. T., G. C. B., G. C. V. O., K. C. I. E., Commander-in-Chief, British Armies in France.
General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C. B., D. S. O., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
Lieutenant-General Sir G. M. MacDonogh, K. C. M. G., C. B., Adjutant-General to the Forces.
Major-General Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C. M. G., Permanent Military Representative.
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B., Secretary, War Cabinet.
Mr. H. Norman.

ITALY

General Diaz.
General di Robilant.
Count Aldrovandi.
General Cavallero.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

General Tasker H. Bliss.
General J. J. Pershing.
Brigadier-General Fox Connor.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Mr. L. Harrison.

Secretariat

FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN
Captain A. Portier.	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
ITALY	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Major A. Jones.	Colonel U. S. Grant.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. ALLIED ARMY OF OCCUPATION

M. CLEMENCEAU having declared the meeting open, said they were met together to consider Mr. Lloyd George's proposal to fix the strength of the forces to be maintained by the Allied and Associated Powers on the Western front during the period of the armistice.

MARSHAL FOCH then read the following memorandum:—

"From the demobilisation or re-embarkment schemes, which the various Allied Governments seem to have settled, each for their own account, it appears that the following forces will be available on the 31st March in the Franco-Belgian zone:—

French armies. . .	46	inf. div. and	6 cav. div.
British armies. . .	18	" "	2 "
American armies. .	15	"	(and 5 in base ports).
Belgian armies . .	6	"	

(Total, 85 to 90 inf. div. and 8 cav. div.)

"In his memorandum No. 52, P. C. L., dated the 24th December, the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the allied armies stated that it was necessary to keep in arms, opposite Germany, until the signature of the preliminaries of peace, a total of 120 to 140 Allied infantry divisions.

"Since that date the German demobilisation has followed its course. From the information given on the 13th January by General von Winterfeldt[1] at Spa, and on the 15th January by M. Erzberger at Treves, the German forces still included, during the first fortnight in January, the following organised great units:—

"37 divisions on the western front;

"Between 15 and 18 divisions on the eastern front; that is, a total of 52 to 55 divisions.

"The same information stated that the German figures included at the same time, as under the colours, the two classes of 1898 and 1899, 200,000 men by class; that is, 400,000 men and 'several' hundred thousand men, kept in active service, either as volunteers or as out of work. Therefore it follows that the actual numbers of the German army may be estimated at 600,000 to 700,000 men.

[1] Military representative on the German Armistice Commission.

"As the correctness of this information cannot be confirmed, we must, in consideration of their source, look upon the figures above given as a minimum.

"Taking into account these remarks, the number of 120 to 140 Allied divisions given on the 24th December as necessary to be maintained in front of Germany, may be reduced to 100.

"Therefore the figure of 80 to 90 Allied divisions mentioned in the first lines of this memorandum appears as an extreme minimum, under which it would be dangerous to fall as long as the preliminaries of peace are not signed. And yet this figure can only be agreed to on the express condition that these units, the number of their men, and the degree of their efficiency, will be kept up so that they may go back in action without any delay.

"As long as the preliminaries of peace are not signed, it is therefore impossible to proceed further with the schemes of demobilisation, and to let the number of divisions which are being kept up fall below the above-mentioned figures.

"Or else it will not be victorious armies which will come forward in front of the defeated German forces—armies able to renew the fight, if peace is not signed—but armies which are being demobilised or moved, already for the greater part demobilised, will appear on our side, both being powerless for military action. To sum up, the debate will start on the base of an equal military situation, and then how shall we be able to speak of compensation, important indemnities? How shall we be able to impose any terms on the enemy?"

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired whether the number of men corresponding to the number of divisions quoted could be given.

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that, taking an average of 20,000 men per British, Italian, and French division, and 30,000 men per American division, the following very approximate totals would be obtained:—

	Men
France	900,000
Great Britain.	350,000
America	450,000
Belgium	120,000
Approximate total	1,820,000

This figure included cavalry divisions.

MARSHAL FOCH laid stress on the fact that the above figures included combatants only. This total was in accordance with the programme at present accepted by the Allied Governments, and he pressed that no alterations should be made before the 31st March next.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had nothing to say regarding the figures given by Marshal Foch. His first comment, however, would relate to the number of German divisions, as obviously the number of troops to be kept under arms by the Allies would have

to bear a direct reference to the number of German troops. Marshal Foch made no proposals for the reduction of the number of German divisions. The Germans were supposed to have thirty-seven divisions on the Western front, in addition to two classes with a total of 400,000 men, plus fifteen to eighteen divisions on the Eastern front. Why should the Germans keep all these troops under arms? There was nothing in Marshal Foch's document about calling on the Germans further to demobilise. He would like to propose that when the armistice should be renewed in three weeks' time, the Germans should be asked to explain why they wished to keep all these troops. They could offer no real resistance. Therefore, we should refuse to renew the armistice unless further demobilisation were carried out. The Allies should fix a definite number for the Germans, adequate for the maintenance of internal order. They must have a sufficient number of troops to police, in order to put down Spartacists and other revolutionary parties. Naturally, the Germans should not be permitted to maintain any forces to carry on warfare against the Poles. On the other hand, the Allies must undertake to keep the Poles within their frontiers. The Allies should refuse to give the Poles arms or assistance so as to enable them to take the law into their own hands, and so attempt to settle their own frontiers. That should obviously be a question for the Peace Conference. He (Mr. Lloyd George) firmly believed that the Germans would like us to put forward proposals of this kind. The German soldiers were not under control, and were merely hanging around the depôts in order to get food and housing.

It must be clearly understood that the figures given in Marshal Foch's memorandum did not represent the total number of men which would have to be maintained under arms. Together with the British quota of 350,000 divisional troops prescribed, hundreds of thousands additional men would have to be kept for other purposes, which would probably represent a total of 700,000 to 800,000 men in France alone. He proposed, therefore, that they should consider the question of imposing, as a condition of the renewal of the armistice, a reduction of the German forces, which would permit of a corresponding reduction of our own. In addition, he would insist on the delivery of arms and of the machinery for the construction of arms, e. g., at Essen, Minden, and elsewhere, until peace should be signed.

MARSHAL FOCH said that if he correctly understood Mr. Lloyd George's proposal, it meant that an effective demobilisation should be imposed on Germany. There would be no difficulty in adding such a clause to the armistice. The Germans would no doubt accept it, but it would be extremely difficult to ensure its execution. In a

country like Germany it would be very easy for the people to take up arms again. Should a real leader arise, it would not be difficult for him to reconstruct the armies—trained men, officers, staffs, and a skeleton organisation existed. In a short time it would be possible to have a good army, in splendid fighting trim. In his opinion, therefore, such a clause could no doubt be included in the armistice, but it would be ineffective.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that a control could be exercised.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that the controlling parties would only be allowed to see what the Germans wished them to see. Undoubtedly, guarantees could be taken by seizing arms, but it was doubtful whether they would give them all up. In addition, munition factories could be taken over, but it would be quite impossible to occupy them all. Our own line of action could not be based on the estimate of the military situation existing in Germany at any given time, because it would be impossible to say what the actual military strength of Germany at the time really was. Therefore, conditions might be made, but in reality there was no guarantee that they would be adhered to. He would not take up time in referring to the clauses entered by Napoleon in the Treaty of Tilsit,[2] limiting the Prussian forces to 40,000 men. It was well known how Prussia, notwithstanding these conditions, had been able to prepare for a levy en masse in 1813. Herr Erzberger, on the 14th January last, at Trèves, had said, "The German army has ceased to exist." Nevertheless, over seventy divisions still existed. Von Winterfeldt, at the same meeting, had also maintained that it was not incumbent on the Germans to supply figures relating to their demobilisation; but since false and exaggerated statements had appeared in the British press, he had supplied the figures which had been quoted in his (Marshal Foch's memorandum). To sum up, he maintained that clauses relating to demobilisation, including the surrender of arms and the seizure of munition factories, could be entered in the armistice, but it would be very dangerous to base our policy on the assumption that these conditions would be fulfilled. He urged, therefore, that the Allied Governments should make no reductions in the agreed strengths of the armies of occupation, at all events before the 31st March next.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked that the following aspect of this matter be considered before coming to a conclusion. It had been stated that the officers of the German army had no control over their men. Consequently, even if remobilisation were ordered, it probably could not be carried out. They had also been told that the men were

[2] Treaty of Peace between France and Prussia, July 9, 1807, G. F. de Martens, *Recueil des principaux traités d'alliance, de paix, de trève*, etc., 2d ed., vol. 8, p. 661.

merely hanging round the depôts in order to be fed. It was admitted that it would be very difficult for Germany to establish any credit until she could resume her economic life. Obviously this was difficult under present conditions; meanwhile, the number of unemployed must increase, and would still further increase if demobilisation were hastened. The increase of unemployment would widen the soil for the seeds of Bolshevism, and so create a Germany with which it would be impossible to deal at all. Moreover, sooner or later the Allies would be compelled to trust Germany to keep her promises. When peace would be signed, should we still be compelled to maintain a great army of occupation to make sure that Germany would keep her promises? In the Peace Treaty, Germany might agree to maintain a smaller army; should we be compelled to keep an army on her border to ensure the fulfilment of this promise? The real solution of the question lay in an early peace. Peace would bring with it a settlement of the many questions which were troubling Europe, which now consisted of a seething body of an uncertain and fearful people who did not know what fate awaited them. He put forward these considerations, though he realised they did not lead to a definite conclusion.

Mr. Lloyd George agreed with President Wilson that the only satisfactory solution of the difficulty would be the making of peace. But they, in Great Britain, were compelled to face the problem of demobilisation at once. It was a very serious problem. Great Britain was not a military nation like France, and the people were not disciplined. Therefore, he felt compelled at once to say that he was doubtful whether Great Britain could contribute the troops asked for. At any rate, he could give no undertaking. He would, without further delay, have to discuss the question with his advisers in order to arrive at an immediate conclusion. He admitted that it might be best to put off the decision until the signing of the Peace Treaty; but they could not do that in Great Britain. Some means must, therefore, be devised for reducing their effort.

Marshal Foch's argument really meant that Germany could never be trusted, and, therefore, that the armies of occupation could never be materially reduced. On the other hand, he thought they had in food, raw material, and the seizure of arms, better means of controlling the situation in Germany. As long as it was a question of fighting, they had had no difficulty with the British troops. But, now that the soldiers were standing to their arms, whilst many of their comrades were being demobilised and were able to obtain good employment at high rates of pay, the feelings of discontent were bound to arise, which made matters extremely difficult. Therefore, he would still press that they should make an effort to reduce the

German armies, using food, raw material, and the surrender of arms as levers. The Germans had already surrendered most of their cannon, and, without cannon, men alone constituted a small danger.

General Bliss expressed the view that the problem that confronted the United States of America was different from that which Great Britain had to solve. The two, however, were the same in this respect: that behind the Government were the people, who might at any moment take matters into their own hands. Consequently, in drawing up their plans, that fact had to be taken into consideration. As regards the United States, taking the rate at which troops could be shipped to America, it did not appear that the numbers could be reduced to the figures requested by Marshal Foch before next summer. Consequently, as peace would doubtless be concluded before then, the problem became one of little moment as far as America was concerned.

Looking at the question from a broader point of view, he wished to support Mr. Lloyd George's proposal that they should do all they could to reduce the armies and to reduce the output of armament and munitions in Germany. While complete disarmament might be impossible of attainment, much could be done on those lines to improve the situation. On the other hand, he was of the opinion that these limitating conditions should be included in the Treaty of Peace and not in the armistice. In the Treaty of Peace it would be possible to lay down any conditions they liked relating to the reduction of the armies, the dismantling of factories, the output of munitions, &c. Therefore he urged his colleagues to hasten the conclusion of peace.

General Pershing said that in his opinion the position of Germany to-day was such that it would be impossible for her to resume offensive operations with any possible chance of holding her own. Demobilisation had proceeded so far that possibly not more than 1,000,000 men were now under arms, and these were not in a state of discipline or efficiency such as to cause alarm. They were at rest or scattered about, and not in any sense an organised body of troops well in hand. Food conditions were such that she could be prevented from carrying on military operations. Her ports were all open to the British Navy, and her rivers could be ascended with facility. The Allies controlled the Rhine and its commerce. They also occupied a large part of her territory. As regards armaments, she had surrendered such an amount that what was left would not permit her resuming hostilities. Therefore the situation did not require the Allies to fix the numbers of troops they should retain and, with the prospects of early peace, he could see an early settlement of these questions. Under these conditions he thought that the demobilisation

of all the armies might proceed without bothering much about it. The demobilisation of the American troops depended on the quantity of shipping available; but if their calculations held good, they would be able to reduce their troops by April next to the numbers prescribed by Marshal Foch.

SIR DOUGLAS HAIG said that he could add no fresh arguments, but he could state his opinion. General Pershing had stated that Germany would be unable to offer any marked resistance, in which view he differed somewhat from the opinion expressed by Marshal Foch. In his own opinion, Germany was still in a position to cause a great deal of trouble. Therefore, until peace was signed, the Governments ought to maintain their forces up to the strength prescribed by Marshal Foch. Unless they could obtain guarantees that arms would be surrendered and munition factories destroyed, they must maintain the forces laid down by Marshal Foch. These forces were, in his opinion, not excessive.

GENERAL SIR HENRY WILSON agreed that they ought to do what Mr. Lloyd George had said to get the German army reduced. But, until they saw that this had been done, they could not reduce their own forces. Until they had sufficient guarantees, they ought to be careful what they did. The Germans were a martial people, magnificent soldiers, and a proud people, and, if the opportunity came, they would certainly be able to do as well as the Bolsheviks. The Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, wished to discuss with Marshal Haig, Mr. Winston Churchill, and himself the question of the strength of the Army of Occupation to be maintained by Great Britain, so that he was obliged to reserve his decision. But he would point out that Great Britain had large commitments elsewhere, including the maintenance of the navy, which might militate against her keeping in France the forces asked for.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the destruction of the machinery at Krupp's and Minden would not be sufficient guarantees.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that the Germans had had another factory at Mayence which the Allies had now seized. But there might be many other factories, and a full list of these was not in their possession.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had had considerable experience of munitions. In his opinion, in every country two or three factories alone were absolutely essential, and when these went the others would prove inadequate. Guns, for instance, could only be manufactured in one or two places.

GENERAL PERSHING remarked that it was largely a question of the supply of material, and a large percentage of the necessary material was already controlled by the Allies.

GENERAL DIAZ said that they were discussing a question which greatly affected Italy. They had so far demobilised 13 divisions, and the balance of 38 divisions were kept under arms merely to satisfy the requirements of the Alliance. For instance, one division was kept at Innsbruck merely with the object of acting with the Allies against Germany if necessary. In many parts of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire there was a tendency to increase the number of troops, using these as nuclei to form large armies. In a word, the authorities in those regions were carrying out the principle adopted by Prussia in 1806. This, he thought, constituted a grave danger. On the other hand, he agreed that they could not indefinitely remain mobilised on a war footing, and a way out of the difficulty must be found. In his opinion, they should take action against Germany and Austria by removing all the artillery, by destroying munition factories, and by regulating the output of mines. In other words, the Allies should hold in their hands all the sources from which engines of destruction were produced. Without artillery the Central Powers would have no means of carrying out a successful war. Therefore, he would insist that the Allies should take essential guarantees, otherwise the difficulty would never be solved.

GENERAL PERSHING said that he would approve of any steps being taken to reduce Germany's means of producing war material.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he did not think the German people would be willing to take up arms again, nor that Germany could in her present condition possibly carry out an organised war against organised Governments. He would ask that a draft resolution be drawn up embodying in explicit terms the proposals made by Mr. Lloyd George. This resolution could then be submitted to the meeting, and brought under discussion. He thought they should at the same time study a scheme to relieve unemployment in Germany. In his opinion, Bolshevism was the greatest danger, and the only real protection against it was food and industry. Consequently, whilst demobilising the German Army, they should take steps to protect themselves against the greater danger of Bolshevism.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that following what President Wilson had said, the question of immediate disarmament was important, because it was understood that the German troops were selling their machine-guns, rifles, &c., and it was possible that these were being sold to Bolshevik agents. In his opinion, that danger added to the argument in favour of disarmament. Again, whatever figures were put down on paper, it was evident that the Allied Armies would become less

efficient as time went on. Germany would then be more formidable in proportion to ourselves, unless she were disarmed. He quite agreed with President Wilson's suggestion that they should have a definite proposal placed before them. He would suggest, therefore, that a small committee, including some member with a knowledge of manufactories, should be appointed to consider and put forward proposals as to the best manner of disarming Germany.

(This proposal was agreed to.)

M. LOUCHEUR, who at this stage entered the Council Chamber, said, in reply to a question put to him by M. Clemenceau, that all the production of Germany depended on the basin of Westphalia, and if Essen and its neighbourhood were seized, Germany could under no circumstances go on fighting. As regards the surrender of artillery, he felt convinced that Germany would be effectually disarmed only if machine guns were included.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Mr. Lloyd George's proposal had been accepted: it remained to nominate the members of the Committee. He, himself, would nominate M. Loucheur.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE nominated Mr. Winston Churchill.

PRESIDENT WILSON nominated General Bliss.

M. ORLANDO nominated General Diaz.

(It was agreed that a Special Committee, composed of Mr. Churchill, M. Loucheur, Marshal Foch, General Bliss, and General Diaz should be appointed to consider and report on:—

1. The strength of the armies to be maintained by the Allied and Associated Powers on the Western Front during the period of the armistice.

2. The demobilisation of the German Army and the guarantees (e. g., surrender of arms, seizure of munition factories, &c.) necessary to ensure the fulfilment of the conditions imposed.)

2. STRENGTH RETURNS OF ARMIES OF OCCUPATION

MARSHAL FOCH asked permission to take this opportunity of suggesting that the chiefs of the Allied armies should meet together to devise a means of keeping each other informed regarding the process of demobilisation. In his opinion, it was very necessary for them to have advance information regarding the number of troops under arms at given dates.

M. ORLANDO proposed that these plans of demobilisation should also include data relating to the small Powers. He thought that was most important. In the old Austro-Hungarian Empire it would be found that some of the States, instead of demobilising, were calling men under arms. He thought that the scheme prepared should include both maximum and minimum figures.

(As this matter did not require action by the Supreme War Council, it was decided that Marshal Foch should assemble the Allied Commanders-in-Chief, and arrange to obtain from them the required data relating to the programme of demobilisation.)

Allied War Medals

Marshal Foch then read the following proposal:—

"I have the honour to propose to the Supreme Council of the Allies that those who have fought in the great war, of all the Allied nations alike, should receive one identic commemorative medal. This glorious emblem, worn by them in all parts of the world, would help to maintain among them the feeling of close fellowship which, after fortifying our armies on the battlefield, will assure during peace, by the bond of common memories, the greatness of the associated nations."

President Wilson, in approving the idea, enquired whether the intention was that each individual Government should strike a medal of the same kind.

Marshal Foch replied that each individual Government should agree to issue to their troops the same medal and the same ribbon.

(The Supreme War Council agreed to recommend for the approval of the Governments concerned, the issue of an identic medal and ribbon to all the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers who had fought in the war.)

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay on Friday, January 24, 1919, at 12:15 O'clock p. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
President Wilson	The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.	M. Clemenceau
Mr. R. Lansing	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.	M. Pichon
Mr. A. H. Frazier	Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	M. Dutasta
Mr. L. Harrison	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.	M. Berthelot
Col. U. S. Grant	Mr. H. Norman	Capt. Portier

ITALY	JAPAN
M. Orlando	Baron Makino
Baron Sonnino	H. E. M. Matsui
Count Aldrovandi	M. Saburi
Major Jones	

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux

1. PRESIDENT WILSON read the following communication, which he suggested should be published and transmitted by wireless telegraphy to all parts of the world:—

Warning To Be Issued to Belligerents

"The Governments now associated in conference to effect a lasting peace among the nations are deeply disturbed by the news which comes to them of the many instances in which armed force is being made use of, in many parts of Europe and the East, to gain possession of territory, the rightful claim to which the Peace Conference is to be asked to determine. They deem it their duty to utter a solemn warning that possession gained by force will seriously prejudice the claims of those who use such means. It will create the presumption that those who employ force doubt the justice and validity of their claim and purpose to substitute possession for proof of right and set up sovereignty by coercion rather than by racial or national preference and natural historical association. They thus put a cloud upon every evidence of title they may afterwards allege and indicate their distrust of the Conference itself. Nothing but the most unfortunate results can ensue. If they expect justice, they must refrain from force and place their claims in unclouded good faith in the hands of the Conference of Peace."

(This was agreed to.)

The meeting adjourned until 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

24 JANUARY 1919.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay on Friday, January 24, 1919, at 3 p. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
President Wilson	The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George	M. Clemenceau
Mr. R. Lansing	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour	M. Pichon
Mr. A. H. Frazier	The Rt. Hon. Sir R. L. Borden	M. Dutasta
Colonel U. S. Grant	The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes	M. Berthelot
Mr. L. Harrison	The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey	Captain A. Portier
	Lieut. Gen. The Rt. Hon. J. C. Smuts	
	Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	
	Captain E. Abraham	
	Mr. E. Phipps	

ITALY	JAPAN
H. E. Orlando	Baron Makino
H. E. Baron Sonnino	H. E. M. Matsui
Count Aldrovandi	M. Saburi
Major A. Jones	

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

Commission for Poland

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that, before inviting the Dominion Prime Ministers to come in, he wished to obtain a decision on one or two urgent matters. The first question was that of nominating Commissioners to go to Poland. He asked whether the Powers had each nominated their delegates.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that General Botha, designated by the British Government, had not yet formally accepted.

With this exception, it was understood that the members of the Commission had already been nominated.

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed the opinion that the Commission should not start without receiving instructions in writing from the Council.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that someone be designated to draw up draft instructions, copies of which should be circulated.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would ask M. Pichon to prepare this draft and submit it to the Council before being issued to the Commission.

M. SONNINO said that one of the Italian nominees was the Italian Minister at Christiania. He asked whether it was necessary to summon him to Paris, in order to receive his instructions.

(It was agreed that this should be left to the discretion of the Italian Government, and that M. Pichon should prepare draft instructions for the approval of the Council.)

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he heard through Sir George Riddell that the Press were very anxious to send two pressmen from each nation to accompany the Commission to Poland.

Press Delegation To Accompany the Commission

M. SONNINO expressed the opinion that this would not assist the labours of the Commission.

M. CLEMENCEAU was of the same opinion.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the Press were clearly entitled to send a Mission independently.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, but thought that the pressmen would not be able to reach their destination save under the aegis of the official Mission. Dantzig was in enemy country and the railway from that port was in German hands.

M. SONNINO thought that the introduction of irresponsible politics into the labours of the Mission would be highly embarrassing.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that English and American pressmen had no special views on Polish politics. They would merely report events as they saw them.

M. CLEMENCEAU was of the opinion that they would undoubtedly send telegrams and attempt to exercise a control over the Delegates.

M. PICHON strongly supported this view.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that, as far as the American Press was concerned, the pressmen would not represent individual papers but News Associations without any particular bias. They would send bare news without any colouring. Unfortunately, there were in America three such News Associations and the choice of two delegates might be difficult.

M. PICHON pointed out that the same was the case in France, where there were three News Agencies.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then proposed that there should be only one press delegate from each nation, and that the choice of the delegate should be left to the Press.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed, provided that it be well understood that the delegates sent only news and not views.

(It was accordingly agreed upon that one Press delegate from each of the five Powers, chosen by the Press, should be allowed to proceed to Poland with the Commission on the express understanding that he should only transmit news and not expressions of opinion.)

3. M. CLEMENCEAU said that most of the questions submitted to the Council had been distributed to Commissions. Financial and economic questions, however, remained. He proposed that Commissions of two members from each Power should be set up to classify and frame in suitable language all questions coming under these categories. The work of these Commissions would be to submit to the Council a questionnaire. In this manner, the whole work of the Conference would be distributed.

Financial and Economic Questions

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that with regard to the framing of financial questions, this had already been decided on.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that time should be given for further consideration of these matters.

(It was agreed that the question should be discussed on the following day.)

At this stage the Dominion Prime Ministers entered the room.

4. M. CLEMENCEAU welcomed the Prime Ministers of the British Dominions.

Disposal of German Colonies: Claims of British Dominions

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he thought it best that each of the Dominions should present its case separately. As far as the British Empire was concerned, most of the Colonies captured had been taken by Dominion troops. This even applied to German East Africa, where a considerable contingent of home troops had been employed. All he would like to say on behalf of the British Empire as a whole was that he would be very much opposed to the return to Germany of any of these Colonies. His reasons for saying so had been put in writing, and he was prepared, if necessary, to circulate the document to the Council. In many cases the Germans had treated the native populations very badly. For instance, in South-West Africa, they had deliberately pursued a policy of extermination. In other parts of Africa they had been very harsh, and they had raised native troops and encouraged these troops to behave in a manner that would even disgrace the Bolsheviks. The French and British, doubtless, had also raised native troops, but they had controlled them better.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he thought all were agreed to oppose the restoration of the German Colonies.

M. ORLANDO, on behalf of Italy, and BARON MAKINO, on behalf of Japan, agreed.

(There was no dissentient and this principle was adopted. It was agreed that no public announcement of this policy should at present be made.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the second question, therefore, was to decide in what manner these territories should be dealt with.

The Mandatory System

There were two or three methods proposed. The first was internationalisation or control by the League of Nations. It was generally agreed that these territories could not be directly administered internationally. Therefore, it was suggested that some one nation should undertake the trusteeship on behalf of the League as mandatory. The conditions of the trust would doubtless include a stipulation that the territory should be administered, not in the interests of the mandatory, but in the interests of all the nations in the League. There must be equal economic opportunity for all, and, further, there must be a guarantee that the natives would not be exploited either commercially or militarily for the benefit of the mandatory. There would also, no doubt, be a right of appeal to the League of Nations if any of the conditions of the trust were broken. For instance, if the missionaries or concessionaires of any nation complained of unfair treatment. He did not suggest that this was an exhaustive account of the conditions, and if his account were in any way inaccurate, it would, no doubt, be set right hereafter.

He would like to state at once that the definition he had just attempted to give did not differ materially from the method in which the British Empire dealt with its Colonies. In all British Colonies there was free trade. He did not think there was such a thing as a preferential tariff in any. Germans or Americans could trade throughout the British Colonies on the same terms as British subjects. In fact, in British East Africa, most of the commerce was done by a German firm and Germany subsidized a shipping line which carried the bulk of the trade. No troops, save for police purposes, were raised in the British Colonies. British coaling stations were as free to foreign as to British ships, and German battleships coaled in them as freely as British battleships. As far as Great Britain was concerned, therefore, he saw no objection to the mandatory system.

The next alternative was frank annexation. The German colonies conquered by Australia, New Zealand and South Africa would be dealt with in detail by the Ministers representing these Dominions.

Annexation

German South West Africa was contiguous to the territories of the Union. There was no real natural boundary and unless the Dutch and British population of South Africa undertook the colonisation of this area it would remain a wilderness. If the Union were given charge of German South West Africa in the capacity of a Mandatory there would be in a territory, geographically one, two

forms of administration. It was questionable whether any advantage would be derived from this division capable of outweighing its practical difficulties.

In the case of New Guinea, one-third of the island was already under direct Australian administration, another third had now been conquered from Germany. It was manifest that to draw a customs barrier between one portion of the island and the other presented disadvantages. Yet, if Australia were the Mandatory of the League of Nations for the administration of what had been German New Guinea, it might have to administer this portion of the island on different lines to those followed in its previous possessions.

Samoa also would be best administered directly by New Zealand. He pointed out that the task of administering Colonies was an expensive one. The British Colonial Budget was steadily increasing. Unless money were to be spent upon them colonies should be dropped. The Dominion of New Zealand had a population of little more than one million souls. It had put 100,000 men into the field, had incurred a war debt of £100,000,000 sterling, had suffered 60,000 casualties and lost 16,000 killed. New Zealand had taken Samoa and fully realized that money would have to be spent upon it if the island was to be retained. It might not think it worth while to undertake the task of administration only as a Mandatory.

To sum up, he would like the Conference to treat the territories enumerated as part of the Dominions which had captured them rather than as areas to be administered under the control of an organisation established in Europe which might find it difficult to contribute even the smallest financial assistance to their administration.

MR. HUGHES said that the Prime Minister of Great Britain has dealt with the question as a whole. He would beg leave to present the particular case for Australia. Pointing to a map, he indicated the intimate geographical relations of Australia to the Pacific. The Pacific was not only greater than any other sea, it was a world in itself, to which the construction of the Panama Canal had given added importance. Strategically the Pacific Islands encompassed Australia like fortresses. New Guinea was the biggest island in the whole world save Australia itself, and was only 82 miles from the mainland. South-east of it was a string of islands suitable for coaling and submarine bases, from which Australia could be attacked. The value of the islands in themselves he made no mention of. Australia had enough land not merely for its present population but for 100,000,000 men. It was obvious that 5 million people could not hold, against powerful enemies, a

Australian Claims to New Guinea

country larger than the United States, with a coast-line as long as the distance between Australia and England. If there were at the very door of Australia a potential or actual enemy Australia could not feel safe. The islands were as necessary to Australia as water to a city. If they were in the hands of a superior power there would be no peace for Australia. He proposed to explain shortly how the Germans came to possess a part of New Guinea. Australia's claim to the Island was not a new one. It had been advanced in 1867, but not supported by the British Government. It had been raised again in 1871 and 1873 when Captain Moresby had provisionally annexed part of the country, but the annexation had not been ratified by the Imperial Government. In 1875 Sir John Robertson had put forward a proposal for the annexation of the country, and in 1877 Queensland had despatched an expedition to New Guinea and had been responsible for order until 1884 in all the non-Dutch portion of the Island. At that time Germany had asked for a friendly consultation to deal with this subject and had taken possession without waiting for British consent and established her stations in the Island. Germany had done little or nothing to develop the Islands she possessed in the Southern Pacific. She had regarded them from the strategic aspect only. In 1914, when this war broke out, Australia had sent troops to New Guinea and had captured the country. Australia had been in occupation ever since. The other Islands had also been seized, as they were, in the hands of the Germans, a direct menace to Australia.

As to internationalisation, he would endeavor to show why this principle should not be applied in this particular case. As Mr. Lloyd George had pointed out, part of the country was under Australian administration and Australian laws were current there. Control by the League of Nations would lead to confusion of authority, which could only be harmful. If the Mandatory were to exercise real authority, its policy would have to be directed presumably by the League of Nations. In this case the Mandatory would be so overwhelmingly superior in power to Australia that Australian authority would be completely overshadowed. The Mandatory, as it were, would be living in a mansion and Australia in a cottage. Any strong power controlling New Guinea controlled Australia. He questioned whether any country represented at the meeting would consent to be overshadowed in such a way, even by an international authority. The policies of nations were liable to change, and history showed that friends in one war were not always friends in the next. From this point of view he was prepared to say that in the Mandatory Power established in New Guinea under international control, Australia

would see a potential enemy. It was reasonable and fair that the rights of the natives should be insisted upon. Australia was ready to agree to such requirements, but Australia also had a right to claim freedom from the menace of any enemy such as had weighed upon her before this war. The security of Australia would threaten no one. No state would suffer if Australia were safe, Australia alone would suffer if she were not. Australia had suffered 90,000 casualties in this war and lost 60,000 killed. Her troops everywhere had fought well. Her war debt alone amounted to £300,000,000 sterling exclusive of another £100,000,000 for the repatriation and pensioning of her troops. Australia did not wish to be left to stagger under this load and not to feel safe.

GENERAL SMUTS said that the Union of South Africa was putting forward a claim to the German territory in South-West Africa. The map would show that the two countries were geographically one. The reason why South-West Africa had not been annexed to the Union was the dilatoriness of the Imperial Government. The Imperial Government had regarded the country as a desert and had taken no action. In 1884 any possible action on their part had been suddenly forestalled by Bismarck. As to the subsequent history of the country its administration under the Germans had been a failure. The country was only fit for ranching. The Germans had not colonised it. They had done little else than exterminate the natives. It must be remembered that, at the outbreak of this war, there had been a rebellion in the Union, very largely fomented by the Germans in South-West Africa. Some of the officers of the Defence Force had been seduced, and General Botha, after his victory had found German telegrams offering to recognize the independence of South Africa if the rebellion succeeded. The rebellion had been very formidable, and its suppression had employed 40,000 troops. It was only after this that the Union had been able to conquer German South-West Africa.

Union of South Africa and German South-West Africa

The question to be decided was whether the Union of South Africa should absorb this country, or should be appointed mandatory for its administration. He would point out that this territory was not in the same category as other German possessions in Africa. The Cameroons, Togo-Land and East Africa were all tropical and valuable possessions; South-West Africa was a desert country without any product of great value and only suitable for pastoralists. It could, therefore, only be developed from within the Union itself. He thought, therefore, that, although there might be a good case for the administration of the other German possessions in Africa by a

mandatory, there was not, in this instance, a strong case. It was on this ground that South Africa claimed the country. A white community in South Africa had been established there for two or three centuries. It had done its best to give a form of self-government to three million natives, and its policy had been tested and found good. It was suited as much to the whites as to the natives, and this policy should be applied to the natives in South-West Africa. The fiscal system, he also thought, should be the same. It would be impossible to set up police posts along many hundred miles of desert frontier.

Another very serious ground for the claim made was that in the rebellion General Botha had gone a very long way to do his duty to the British Empire in fighting his own people. There was at that time a great issue at stake in South Africa. The Dutch people, to whom General Botha and he himself belonged together with many who were of German descent, wished to be neutral in this war. Their position, however, was such that they could not legally or constitutionally remain neutral. If the territory in question were not ceded to the Union, the result would be the overthrow of General Botha and of all his policy. Apart from the interest of the British Empire, it was to the interest of South Africa that the two white peoples inhabiting it should live in harmony. He would greatly deprecate that this Conference should adopt any form of settlement that would justify the rebellion of 1914. This would render the position in South Africa most deplorable. On these grounds he would press very strongly that, whatever might be decided in respect to the valuable African Colonies in other parts of the Continent, this desert country, so closely connected with South Africa, should be included in the Union. The community to which he belonged had been in South Africa since 1650. They had established a white civilization in a savage continent and had become a great cultural agency all over South Africa. Their wish was that one of the effects of the great settlement now to be made should be to strengthen their position and to consolidate the union of the white races in South Africa. The Boer pastoralists were always looking for uninhabited country in which to settle. He was quite sure that if German South-West Africa were given by the Conference to the Union, its work in this respect would be good.

In conclusion, he would like to add that the Union had made great sacrifices. He did not wish to stress them particularly as all had made great sacrifices; but he believed that the effort made by South Africa, sometimes with a divided heart, would prove on examination to be second to none among the small States that had partaken in the war.

MR. MASSEY said that he wished to thank the President of the Council for the opportunity given to him to state the case on behalf of New Zealand. New Zealand was particularly concerned with Samoa. In the first instance, he would like to call the attention of the President of the Council to New Zealand as it appeared on the map. The point he wished to make was that New Zealand was much more important than its size on the map would seem to indicate. The area of New Zealand was as nearly as possible the same as that of the United Kingdom. The race occupying New Zealand was exactly the same kind of race as that which occupied the United Kingdom today. They were just as enterprising and just as virile as they were in the United Kingdom, and he hoped and believed in time to come New Zealand would be as useful to humanity in the Southern Hemisphere as the United Kingdom had been to humanity in the Northern Hemisphere. It was necessary for him to refer, as previous speakers had done to past history and this he would do very briefly. He would like to go back to the events which took place in the seventies, when the attention of European nations first began to be directed to the potentialities of the islands in the Pacific, and particularly to Samoa and New Guinea. There was a genuine impression that the natives of Samoa were, or had been not many years ago, savages. That impression was not correct. The Samoans, so far as records went, were never savages. It was true they had no written language, but they had had, during the years we had been acquainted with them, and for many years before, a form of local government which was sufficient for their own requirements. In the seventies the leading natives of Samoa became alarmed at what was likely to take place. They heard the intentions of Germany, of the intentions of the other European Powers, and they formed a big deputation which journeyed to Fiji to interview the High Commissioner of the Pacific, who at that time was also Governor of Fiji, in order to ask Queen Victoria either to annex the Samoan islands, or to establish a protectorate, and so to preserve and protect them in the future. But so far as Samoa was concerned nothing was ever done. Matters went on quietly and without anything serious happening for some years, until a number of Germans appeared in the Pacific, and settled there. The Samoan group of islands had a population even today—and it had not decreased for a long time past—of about 35,000 people. Civil war broke out among the natives themselves and it was said that this was the result of interference by the Germans. The attention of the Government of the United States was called to this; Germany of course was taking notice; Great Britain was taking notice. Germany

New Zealand's Claim to Samoa

sent a fleet of three warships to Samoa in 1889; the United States of America sent a fleet of three warships to meet the German fleet, and Great Britain sent one smart, second-class cruiser. All those present would remember the immense hurricane that happened. The three German warships were driven ashore and the three American warships were in trouble. The British ship alone had a chance of escape by steaming right out to the open sea. She did so and was saved. The natives were religious or superstitious enough to think that the hurricane's interference was providential. However, what happened was this: A sort of Protectorate was established of the three nations—Germany, The United States and Great Britain. To say the least, the result was by no means satisfactory. Germany was given the larger and much more important of the Islands; the United States of America were given a small portion with a very good harbour. He did not wish to find fault with that. Great Britain was given some rights in other Islands. Germany, then became established there. He was delighted to notice the decision practically arrived at by the Council against German occupation of these Islands in the future. He was inclined to believe that we had not reached the last war. History has a knack of repeating itself and nations, just as unscrupulous as Germany had proved herself to be during the last few years, might make war. What took place in the triple Protectorate was that Germany was allowed to establish great trading stations all over the Pacific; great financial and commercial companies came along and settled there, and a strong squadron of German warships was sent to the Pacific and there established a huge wireless station. That was the position New Zealand had to face when war broke out. Then, for the first time, New Zealand appeared on the scene. New Zealand had a population of very nearly 1,200,000 which included 50,000 natives, who were treated exactly as all other citizens. As an instance of this he mentioned that there were six native Members in the New Zealand Parliament today. It could not be said that the native race was going out of existence; it was merging into the European population.

Immediately on the declaration of war they received a request to send a military force to take possession of German Samoa, whose harbours were offering shelter to raiders on our commerce. In fact, the headquarters of the German Fleet were there. Within ten days of the outbreak of war, 2,000 New Zealanders sailed out of Wellington to take possession of German Samoa. This was a great risk, the extent of which very few realised. At Noumea they were met by the battle cruiser "Australia" and also a French ship—the "Montcalm". On reaching their destination they called upon the Germans

to surrender, which they did, and German Samoa was occupied by New Zealand troops and had been occupied by them ever since. That was the position at the present time.

And now he would like to make one or two remarks in regard to the hardships New Zealand had suffered from the presence of the Germans in Samoa. The Germans had a strong squadron of warships in the Pacific. The British Government sent a number of ships into the Pacific to look after the interests of New Zealand. The result was a sea-fight, in which our ships were outclassed and outranged by those of the Germans and we sustained a loss of 2 cruisers and 1,600 British seamen. However, there was some consolation in the fact that the victorious German ships met their fate off the Falkland Islands not very long afterwards. Had it not been, however, for the presence of the *Australia* with the battle cruisers, the Germans would most certainly have bombarded the New Zealand coastal towns, and much shipping would have been sunk, especially ships trading between New Zealand and Great Britain. Fortunately they had not been troubled with the submarine difficulty. The Pacific was too far away. Nevertheless, as he had previously said, the Germans got raiders into the Pacific, which had reached the New Zealand coast, sunk several of their ships, and laid minefields. That was the sort of experience they had had from the Germans, and it was needless for him to say that they did not want the Germans ever to appear in the Pacific again. New Zealand was endeavouring, and not unsuccessfully, to build up a British nation in the Pacific. They were doing their best for civilization in that part of the world. They did not want to be confronted with a menace such as Germany had been to the nations of Europe for the last hundred years. They in New Zealand were not fighting for themselves, but for those who would come after them. Samoa was of great strategic importance, and the key to the Pacific.

He would like to call attention to the position taken up by the Natives under British control in the South Sea Islands during the years of the war. When they asked for volunteers in the early days of the war, 2,000 natives had come forward and many others had volunteered since. Many Maoris had been accepted as first grade fighting-men. Besides these there were the natives of Rarotanga who had volunteered and a contingent of them had been sent to Palestine where they had done good work. Natives of Niue, which was a comparatively small island, had also volunteered; further, the natives of Fiji had rendered most useful service in the Great War. Contrast this with the natives under the rule of Germany; he did not think there was a single case where any natives had volunteered to fight for Germany. He had received most pathetic letters from people of the

native races begging that never again should they be allowed to be placed under German rule. These were merely illustrations of the argument which he would put forward presently. Everyone knew what Germany would have done if she had been victorious in this war; most of them had read German publications on the subject. Direct references had been made by prominent German statesmen to various parts of the British Empire. Dr. Solf[1] himself had taken a very prominent part in German public affairs; at one time he was Governor of Fiji [*Samoa*]. Dr. Solf had stated publicly that when Germany became victorious he was quite certain that she would occupy some of the British Colonies. He (Mr. Massey) did not suggest that we should do what Germany would have done, as we were not out for territorial aggrandisement. We had been forced into this war, and it was up to us to prevent anything of the sort happening in the future.

With regard to the League of Nations, which had not yet been established, he hoped that it would be established and that it would be very successful. He would like to remind those present that we had had experiences in the past, which had sometimes been sad experiences, of joint control of native races. Mr. Massey mentioned the case of the New Hebrides. We were the best of friends today with the citizens of France and the Government of France, and he hoped and believed that that very satisfactory state of things would continue for all time. But he thought it would be admitted, not only by the people of France, but by others, that our joint control of the New Hebrides had been an ignominious failure. Egypt, too, had not been a success under joint control, neither had Samoa. He was very sceptical in regard to the success of any joint arrangement in regard to the German Colonies.

New Zealand had sent over 100,000 men to the war; 16,456 had been killed, and 41,404 had been wounded. That was a big record for a small country with a small population. They did not regret it because they believed it was their duty. The men went out to fight for the great cause of civilisation. He believed they would do the same thing again in similar circumstances.

In conclusion, on behalf of his fellow-citizens, and on behalf of the people in the Islands of the South Pacific, for the sake of the native races, and for the sake of humanity, he most strongly urged that the claim he was making in regard to Samoa should be granted by the Congress, and that the island should be allowed to remain under British control.

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[1] Wilhelm Solf, Former German Secretary of State of the Colonial Office; Secretary of State of the Foreign Office in the Cabinet of Prince Max of Baden.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN said that the Dominion he represented had no territorial claims to advance. There was one thought, however, that he would like to present to the Council on behalf of the claims put forward by the other Dominions. Those Dominions were autonomous nations within an Empire which might more properly be called itself a League of Nations. He realised that the British Empire occupied a large part of the world, but the prejudice raised by the word Empire might be dispelled by considering the matter from the angle he had just suggested. All the cases advanced rested upon the plea of security, and he considered that the arguments put forward deserved the closest attention of the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU thanked the Dominion Ministers for the statements they had made. The Council had listened to them with the greatest attention, and he begged to assure them that no decisions would be taken without full consideration of all they had said, with regard both to the interests of each and to the interests of all.

25 JANUARY, 1919.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, January 27, 1919, at 10 hrs. 30

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
President Wilson.	The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.	M. Clemenceau.
Mr. R. Lansing.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.	M. Pichon.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.	Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	M. Dutasta.
Mr. L. Harrison.	Captain E. Abraham.	M. Berthelot.
Col. R. H. Williams.	Mr. H. Phipps.	Capt. Portier.

ITALY	JAPAN
M. Orlando.	Baron Makino.
Baron Sonnino.	H. E. M. Matsui.
Major Jones.	M. Saburi.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

M. CLEMENCEAU, in opening the meeting, said that there were several small questions requiring solution before beginning the main business of the day.

Chairmanship of Meeting of Small Powers for the Election of Delegates to Commissions

1. M. Clemenceau said that the Small Powers were meeting in the afternoon to elect their delegates. It was necessary to find a Chairman for this meeting, and he suggested M. Jules Cambon.

(This proposal was accepted unanimously.)

Protests From Belgium and Portugal

2. M. Clemenceau said that up to the present time he had received only two formal protests against the arrangements made for the Conference; one was from Belgium and the other was from Portugal. He intended to answer these protests, but suggested that a delay of some days should be allowed to elapse before he replied.

(This was agreed to.)

Terms of Reference to Commission on Reparation

3. M. Clemenceau said that he had received a proposal from M. Klotz, French Minister of Finance, that the word "guarantees" should be included in the terms of reference to the Commission set up on the subject of reparation. (I. C. 117, paragraph 8.)[1]

(This proposal was agreed to.)

[1] BC–8, p. 698.

(The terms of reference as amended therefore read:—

That a Commission be appointed with not more than three representatives apiece from each of the five Great Powers, and not more than two representatives apiece from Belgium, Greece, Poland, Roumania and Serbia, to examine and report, first on the amount for reparation which the enemy countries ought to pay, secondly on what they are capable of paying, thirdly on the method, form and time in which payment should be made, and fourthly on the guarantees that should be obtained for payment.)

4. M. Clemenceau said that the second proposal put forward by M. Klotz was that there should be a financial section of the League of Nations. (I. C. 117, paragraph 13.)[2]

Financial Section for the League of Nations

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that this proposal should be sent to the Drafting Committee on Financial Questions.

(This proposal was agreed to.)

5. M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that each of the five Powers had agreed to nominate one member for the Financial Drafting Committee. He asked whether the members had yet been nominated by all concerned. On behalf of France, he nominated M. Klotz.

Designation of Members of Financial Committee

On behalf of Great Britain, Italy and Japan respectively, Mr. Montagu, M. Salandra and M. Mori were designated. It was agreed that the American nominee should be appointed very shortly.

6. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he proposed to nominate a similar Commission to deal with Economic Questions. This Commission should frame in appropriate language questions arising under the following suggested headings:—

Commission on Economic Questions

Revictualling.
Raw Materials.
Industrial Re-constitution.
Privileges that should be granted to the devastated regions for their revictualling in raw materials and for the sale of their manufactured products. (President Wilson's suggestion.)
Customs Regulations.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he thought a distinction should be maintained between the questions of immediate moment to the Allied and Associated Powers and those which should form a part of the peace settlement proper. Certain questions related merely to co-operation between ourselves; others required consideration from the point of view of conferring with the enemy and with neutral Powers. These two categories should not be confused.

[2] BC-8, p. 701.

M. PICHON suggested that the Committee might be charged with the task of discriminating between those two classes of problems.

PRESIDENT WILSON gave, as an illustration of his meaning, the revictualling and re-starting of industries in devastated regions. This would call for co-operation between the Allied and Associated Powers in respect to shipping, priority of supply, etc. This question was one strictly confined to the Allies and not one connected with making peace with the enemy.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the question of preferential dealing in the matter of raw material appeared to involve both kinds of interest. The re-constitution of Belgian and French manufacturing industries was hard to separate from the re-construction of German industries. Germany could not pay for the re-building of the former unless herself assisted to re-start manufacturing. Priority of supplies, therefore, had a direct bearing on the Peace Treaty as well as on the arrangements to be made between the Allies.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that it was quite true that Germany could not make reparation unless she had the means therefor. Unless German industries were reconstituted, it was clear that Germany could not pay. The means of obtaining reparation from Germany was obviously a question to be considered by the Commission on reparation. He could see ahead certain difficulties in connection with this matter. If he were to carry back to America a treaty in which economic arrangements with America's friends were included in the settlement made with her enemies, the Senate might raise objections. Congress was jealous of being forestalled in commitments on economic matters. He could see no objection to the proposal under consideration provided it were not tied up with other matters in which the constraint of making peace was involved.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he also anticipated considerable difficulty in dealing with matters of this sort. Much of the raw material that would be required by Germany could only be found in the British Empire. France also, by the acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine would dispose of more raw material than she did before. This would be still more the case were she to acquire the Saar Valley. Germany, therefore, could not start her industrial life again save at the good pleasure of the Allies. There would be in England parliamentary difficulties similar to those alluded to by President Wilson in the United States. It was clear that Germany would be entitled to ask what her economic future was going to be. It would be very difficult to obtain her consent to a Peace Treaty which took from her all her colonies and left the victorious Powers in exclusive possession of a number of raw materials which she required. Unless we were prepared beforehand, we should be met by a series of questions on these

subjects to confront our territorial demands and we might be at a loss to answer them. He felt that we ought to be prepared to meet this situation, and, therefore, supported the proposal that a Committee be set up to investigate these questions without, in any way, committing the Allied Powers.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether the questions enumerated above by M. Clemenceau were the only questions the Committee was to deal with.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that other questions might be added if occasion arose.

M. ORLANDO stipulated that the Committee should only be asked to frame the questions and not to offer solutions.

PRESIDENT WILSON remarked that every time a report was received on any questions, territorial or otherwise, problems of this nature were bound to arise. The Committee, therefore, would be dealing with conjectures. It could not know exactly what questions would arise. It might be preferable to deal with them only as they came up for solution in conjunction with other problems.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that the investigations of the Committee might influence the judgment of the Council on territorial questions.

MR. BALFOUR wished it to be recorded that the Committee should be entitled to add questions not included in the list given above.

(It was, therefore, agreed that each of the five Powers should nominate one member to form a Committee to investigate and to formulate economic questions having a direct bearing on the peace negotiations, and requiring solution by the Allied and Associated Powers before conferring with the enemy.)

On behalf of France and Great Britain respectively, M. Clementel and Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith were nominated as members of the Committee. It was agreed that the names of the American, Italian and Japanese members should be given on the following day.

7. M. CLEMENCEAU proposed that a Commission should be established to consider the following subjects:—

Commission on Questions of Private and Maritime Law

Reestablishment of the conventional regime of the treaties.

Settlement of private claims.

Enemy ships seized at the beginning of the War, in Allied Ports (Hague Convention 1907).[3]

Goods on enemy ships that have taken shelter and remained in neutral ports.

Restoration of illegal prizes.

Goods which have been stopped without being captured. (O. C. March 11th, 1915.)[4]

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[3] *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1247.

[4] *Ibid.*, 1915, supp., p. 144.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE was of the opinion that a very big issue was raised by this proposal, but he did not think that all these questions could be settled in the Peace Treaty with the enemy. The whole subject appeared to him to be more suitable for the League of Nations. These matters, moreover, could be discussed in a more favourable atmosphere in the League of Nations than in debate with Germany. It would be far more difficult for himself to make concessions in dealing with the enemy than in treating on behalf of Great Britain with the League of Nations.

M. SONNINO agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that four-fifths of these subjects would be better dealt with by the League of Nations. They referred not so much to the consequences of this war, as to the future conditions of the world. There were, however, among the subjects proposed, some such as the disposal of enemy ships and the restoration of illegal prizes, which were strictly suitable for inclusion in the Peace Treaty with the enemy.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed on this point with Baron Sonnino.

PRESIDENT WILSON also expressed the view that the cases cited were matters for immediate disposal, but felt with Mr. Lloyd George that questions of principle should be referred to the League of Nations.

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed that the list should be divided into two.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the special cases alluded to in the list should be referred to the Commission on Reparation, while the question of general principles should be reserved for the League of Nations.

(This proposal was adopted.)

8. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received a despatch from M. Bratiano, who wished it to be laid down that Bessarabia was not to send delegates to Prinkipo.

Question of Bessarabian Representation at Prince's Island

M. PICHON explained that according to M. Bratiano, Poland and Finland had been expressly excepted, whereas Bessarabia had not been mentioned. Bessarabia had willingly joined Roumania, and should therefore not be affected by the invitation to the various Governments of Russia.

M. PICHON was of opinion that it should be left to the Bessarabians themselves to decide whether or not they wished to go to Prinkipo. He himself felt convinced that they would not go.

(It was decided that no reply was immediately necessary, and that the question should stand over until the question of the meeting at Prinkipo came up for discussion.)

9. MR. BALFOUR said that he wished to raise a point which he thought had been settled, but of which he could find no record in the Minutes. He wished to know whether those elements of Old Russia which, we hoped, would succeed in forming se[parate states?] such as Esthonia, Georgia, possibly Russian Armenia and Daghestan, were invited to the meeting on Prince's Island.

Representation at Prince's Island of the Small States in Formation, Whose Territories Previously Belonged to the Russian Empire

(It was decided (See I. C. 116(1)):[6] that all such elements, unless expressly excluded, were invited to attend.)

10. MR. BALFOUR said that the British Government had been asked by the French Government to recognize Finland. The British Government hitherto had been friendly to Finland, but had stopped short of official recognition. At the present moment the Finns were behaving well, and he was inclined to agree. But as recognition of the Finnish Government would add one or possibly two delegates to the Peace Conference, he felt that the matter was not one which could be settled simply between the French and British Foreign Offices.

Recognition of Finland

M. PICHON agreed that it was necessary to consult the Conference, but he had made the communication in question to the British Government, because both France and Great Britain had been concerned in dealings with General Mannerheim;[7] he also pointed out that Finland figured not as a belligerent in the Conference, but as a neutral.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he saw no objection to recognizing Finland. Even Mr. Sazonoff did not propose its incorporation in Russia. Poland had been recognized, and Finland had far clearer boundaries than Poland.

M. PICHON said that France was all the more disposed to agree, as she had previously recognized Finland, and had only withdrawn her recognition when the Finns had displayed obvious pro-German leanings. This had now been amended.

BARON SONNINO thought that the Finnish question was too closely bound up with the Russian question as a whole to be prejudged at the present time. Any decision concerning the frontiers of Finland might be regarded as a settlement hostile to Russia, if made without hearing the Russians.

Finland was pro-Ally now, but a short time ago she had chosen for herself a German Prince. These alternations of conduct seemed to recommend caution and delay on the part of the Powers.

M. PICHON said that there was one advantage in avoiding delay, which was that General Mannerheim's Government might be overthrown if it failed to obtain recognition. He would, however, ask

[6] BC-7+, p. 676.
[7] Gen. Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, Regent of Finland.

that, if a decision were not taken there and then, it should not be too long delayed.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he agreed with Baron Sonnino.

M. SONNINO proposed that the Finnish question should be taken up again when the question of the meeting on Prince's Island came up for discussion.

M. PICHON pointed out that the Powers had given a mark of confidence to the Finns by excluding them from the invitation.

(It was, therefore, decided that the question of recognizing Finland should be taken up in connection with the general problem of Russia.)

Instructions for the Polish Commission

11. (It was decided that the instructions drafted by M. Pichon for the Commission to proceed to Poland should be discussed on the following day.)

Procedure for the Reception of Delegates of the Small Powers by the Council

12. MR. BALFOUR said that he wished to draw attention to a matter which was rather of form than of substance. On the previous Friday the representatives of the British Dominions had been here. No discussions had followed on the statements they had made. Their position might appear somewhat ambiguous. According to the regulations, smaller belligerent powers with particular interests were entitled to participate in the Conference, while matters concerning them were discussed. It had originally been intended to deal with Colonial questions at this meeting, but other urgent matters came up for discussion. He would therefore suggest that in all such cases the meeting should be devoted primarily to the discussion of matters in which representatives of the Smaller States were interested, and at which they should be present throughout. At such meetings no other questions should be given precedence.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the opinion that this proposal was fair, but he would like to ask that the representatives of powers with special interests be required by the Chairman to confine their attention to the subject for which their attendance had been requested.

(The Chairman undertook to do this.)

Presentation of the Japanese Case

13. President Wilson, referring to the discussion on the previous Friday (I. C. 120),[8] asked whether it was wise to deal with the Pacific piecemeal. He asked whether the Japanese case should not be heard before any partial decision was taken. If ready, he suggested that it should be heard first.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that, as Australia and New Zealand held views on these subjects which in some respects might not be

[8] BC-10, p. 718.

the views of the British Government, these Dominions be present at the statement of the Japanese case.

M. CLEMENCEAU said, that as the Dominions had been heard it appeared to him reasonable to hear Japan and then, after the statement had been heard, to open the discussion with the representatives of the Dominions in the room.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that Japan had been represented when Australia and New Zealand had been heard.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that Japan had a seat among the five Powers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE was of the opinion that Chinese as well as Australian and New Zealand Delegates should be present at the Japanese statement.

14. MR. BALFOUR thought that if his Japanese colleagues would agree, the case of the Japanese acquisitions in this war would fall into two categories—first, the Pacific Islands, second, those parts of China conquered from the Germans. In the first Australia and New Zealand were concerned. In the latter they were not at all concerned. He hoped, therefore, that the two cases would be dealt with separately.

Mandatory Principle

BARON MAKINO said that he had no objection to the presence of the Dominion representatives, but he had prepared a statement including both Kiaochow and the Pacific Islands, as the capture of both had been the result of one campaign. He would therefore not be able, in his statement, to follow the distinction laid down by Mr. Balfour. He again stated that he had no objection to the presence of any interested Power.

MR. BALFOUR thought that great difficulties would be encountered if the discussion on China and the Pacific Islands was treated as one.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that even if the case for both were presented at one time and in one document the discussion might afterwards be held separately on each question.

BARON MAKINO asked whether the question would be discussed at once after his presentation of the Japanese case, or whether all statements of Colonial claims would be awaited.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that France had no claim to advance in the Pacific. He was therefore prepared to deal with this question first in isolation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that South Africa had raised a question which had no connection with the Pacific, namely, that of German South West Africa. Were we going to discuss the whole question of the Colonies or only some portion?

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the case as a whole interested many Powers. The effect of dealing with each portion of the subject

in the presence of the Powers specially interested in it would be kaleidoscopic. There would be a number of partial discussions followed by a general discussion with all parties previously heard present. This would be both a lengthy and unwieldly procedure.

MR. BALFOUR said that underlying the whole discussion was the question of the mandatory principle. He asked when this was to be discussed.

PRESIDENT WILSON then suggested that the question [of] the Pacific should first be taken up and a decision reached as to whether the mandatory principle should, or should not, apply in that area. The discussion might then move to another quarter and investigate whether or not the principle was applicable there. This would avoid very large conferences and very long discussions. He therefore proposed that the Japanese case should be heard in the presence of the Chinese delegates and that after the statement, that part of the case concerning the Pacific should be discussed in the presence of the Dominion delegates. At a later meeting the other portion might be taken up in the presence of the Chinese delegates.

BARON MAKINO said that the mandatory system mentioned by Mr. Balfour was not the only principle underlying the Colonial question. There were others. He therefore urged that the discussions to be undertaken should, for the time being, only have a provisional character.

15. Baron Makino said that he had another point to make. The presentation of the Japanese case concerning Kiaochow would be made with reference to Germany only. Japanese relations with China on these questions were on a different footing. The claim he would put forward was addressed to Germany alone, not to China. He did not wish to discuss in the presence of the Chinese delegates Japanese relations with Germany.

Question of Kiaochow

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he did not understand Baron Makino to contend that the disposition of Kiaochow did not affect China.

BARON MAKINO said that he was not very well versed in the procedure of the Conference. He asked whether he was to conclude that third Powers interested were to join in the discussion.

It was pointed out by the Chairman that this had been so decided in the regulations.

It was therefore decided that the Japanese statement should be heard both by the Chinese and the Dominions delegates:

and

That in the discussion to follow, the Dominions delegates should participate with regard to the Pacific Islands, and the Chinese delegates with regard to Kiaochow.

27 JANUARY, 1919.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday Afternoon, January 27, 1919, at 3 O'clock

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
President Wilson	The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.	M. Clemenceau
Mr. Robert Lansing	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.	M. Pichon
Dr. G. L. Beer	The Rt. Hon. Sir R. L. Borden, G. C. M. G.	M. Dutasta
Prof. E. T. Williams	The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes	M. Berthelot
Mr. A. H. Frazier	Gen. The Rt. Hon. L. Botha	Capt. Portier
Mr. L. Harrison	The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey	
Col. U. S. Grant	Lt.-Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	
	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.	
	Mr. H. Norman	

ITALY	JAPAN	CHINA
M. Orlando	Baron Makino	Dr. C. Thomas Wang
M. Sonnino	H. E. M. Matsui	Dr. K. Wellington Koo
Count Aldrovandi	M. Saburi	Mr. W. P. Chao
Major A. Jones		

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

M. CLEMENCEAU having declared the meeting opened, said that he would call on the Japanese representative, Baron Makino to put forward the views of the Japanese Government on the question of the Pacific, with special reference to the German Pacific Islands. It has been decided to take into consideration the question of Kiaochow at a subsequent meeting.

Disposal of German Colonies

BARON MAKINO then read the following statements:—

"The Japanese Government feels justified in claiming from the German Government the unconditional cession of:

(a) Japanese Claims to Pacific Islands and Kiaochow

(*a*) The leased territory of Kiaochow together with the railways, and other rights possessed by Germany in respect of Shantung province.

(*b*) All of the Islands in German possession in the Pacific Ocean North of the Equator together with the rights and properties in connection therewith.

At the outbreak of the war, the German military and naval base at Kiaochow constituted a serious menace to the international trade and shipping, jeopardising the peace in the Extreme Orient. The Japanese Government in consultation with the British Government conformably with the agreement of 1911,[1] gave notice to the German Government to surrender the leased territory of Kiaochow with a view to its restoration to China. The German Government failing to make reply within the specified time limit, no other course was left to Japan but to proceed to reduce the German base by recourse to arms. The Japanese forces have, in conjunction with the British contingents, succeeded in taking the leased territory as well as the railway line connecting Tsingtau with Chinanfu, which the Germans used for military purposes. Japan has since continued in possession of the rights then enjoyed by Germany. By the reduction of the German stronghold, the base of her military as well as political offensive in the Extreme Orient has been completely destroyed, thereby re-establishing the uninterrupted course of trade, commerce, and communication in these regions.

Now that the primary object for which Japan entered the war and which was clearly set forth in her Declaration of war against Germany, has been successfully achieved, Japan cannot view with equanimity anything that may tend to revive German activities in the Far East to the undoing of all that has been achieved at no small sacrifice, and is compelled to advance the claims under item A.

Subsequently to the fall of Kiaochow it became a matter of urgent necessity to clear the Indian and Pacific Oceans, including the Australian routes, of the enemy ships and to keep these waters free and secure from enemy raids; and for carrying out this object, the Japanese navy extended its sphere of activities in co-ordination with those of the British navy. The enemy ships had been planning to escape from the superior Japanese and British naval forces, and the Japanese squadron, upon arrival at Panope, of the East Caroline group, found that they had just left. From the objects and materials left behind, it was abundantly clear that a full preparation for further raids was being made, using the harbour as their naval base. The circumstances demanded that the German South Sea Islands should forthwith be taken possession of in order to defeat the enemy's object, and the German possessions North of the Equator have since remained under Japanese occupation and control. The inhabitants of these Islands are being given employment so as to ensure livelihood for them, besides being provided with schools for their instructions, and they are fully contented under the present Regime. The total area of these Islands is about two thousand five hundred square kilometres with the population of some fifty thousand in all, composed of many different tribes. These tribes have each its own peculiar language, unable to understand one another without resorting to the medium of interpretation; and being on the whole still in a primitive state, they are not in a position to organize themselves politically, economically, or socially, in the modern sense. Japan being in actual possession and having regard to the circumstances which led to such

[1] *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CIV, p. 173.

occupation and to the present conditions above alluded to, and further, in view of the public opinion of Japan which is unanimous in this connection, she claims the definite possession of these Islands where she may continue to protect the inhabitants and to endeavour to better their conditions.

In conclusion, it may be stated that, in view of the extent of their efforts and achievements in destroying German base[s] in the Extreme Orient and the South Seas, and in safeguarding the important routes on the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the Mediterranean waters, to say nothing of their contribution in other respects, the Japanese Government feels confident that the claims above advanced would be regarded as only just and fair".

Baron Makino added that a documentary statement setting forth the Japanese claims in full would be handed in by him at a later date.

DR. C. THOMAS WANG said that the question was of such vital interest to China that he hoped the Great Powers would reserve decision until the views of China had been heard.

(This was agreed to)

PRESIDENT WILSON said that in order that the field of discussion should be defined as clearly as possible perhaps it would be better to begin with a clear statement of what was the mind of those who proposed a trusteeship by the League of Nations through the appointment of mandatories. The basis of this idea was the feeling which had sprung up all over the world against further annexation. Yet, if the Colonies were not to be returned to Germany (as all were agreed), some other basis must be found to develop them and to take care of the inhabitants of these backward territories. It was with this object that the idea of administration through mandatories acting on behalf of the League of Nations arose. This idea would be most distinctly illustrated by an example. The case of the South West Africa would be found a most favourable instance to make a clear picture. South West Africa had very few inhabitants, and those had been so maltreated, and their numbers had been so reduced under German administration, that the whole area was open to development that could not yet be determined. Therefore, either it must be attached to its nearest neighbour and so establish what would seem a natural union with South Africa, or some institution must be found to carry out the ideas all had in mind, namely, the development of the country for the benefit of those already in it, and for the advantage of those who would live there later.

(b) Application of Mandatory System

This he assumed to be the principle: it was not intended to exploit any people; it was not intended to exercise arbitrary sovereignty over any people.

The purpose was to serve the people in undeveloped parts, to safeguard them against abuses such as had occurred under German administration and such as might be found under other administrations. Further, where people and territories were undeveloped, to assure their development so that, when the time came, their own interests, as they saw them might qualify them to express a wish as to their ultimate relations—perhaps lead them to desire their union with the mandatory power.

Should the Union of South Africa be the mandatory of the League of Nations for South West Africa, the mandate would operate as follows:—In the first place, the League of Nations would lay down certain general principles in the mandate, namely, that districts be administered primarily with a view to the betterment of the conditions of the inhabitants. Secondly that there should be no discrimination against the members of the League of Nations, so as to restrict economic access to the resources of the district. With this limitation, the Union of South Africa would extend such of its laws as were applicable to South West Africa and administer it as an annex to the Union so far as consistent with the interest of the inhabitants. The expense of its administration would be met by fiscal arrangements, which, if they involved customs duties, would be the same for all nations trading with South West Africa; all countries would pay the same duties, all would have the same right of access.

Mr. Lloyd George stated that South Africa under present arrangements gave a preference to Great Britain of 3 per cent. He enquired whether that preference would extend to South West Africa under the scheme proposed by President Wilson.

President Wilson replied in the negative. Preference as far as South-West Africa was concerned, would be excluded under the circumstances, but, with the elimination of that exception, there would be no administrative difference between his scheme and annexation.

It was in the mind of many people that the mandatory power might be subject to constant irritation and constant interference by the League of Nations. In his opinion, that would not be so, as long as the mandatory performed his duties satisfactorily. In so far as the administration by the mandatory power became a financial burden, it was clearly proper that the League of Nations should bear a proportion of the expense. The fundamental idea would be that the world was acting as trustee through a mandatory, and would be in charge of the whole administration until the day when the true wishes of the inhabitants could be ascertained. It was up to the Union of South Africa to make it so attractive that South West Africa

would come into the Union of their own free will. Should that not be the case, the fault would lie with the mandatory.

He would ask: Was this merely camouflage: a means of bringing about the willingness of the people to be united with the Union, to which the Great Powers were not now willing to consent. He would answer, No, as under the Mandatory the administration would be so much in the view of the world that unfair processes could not be successfully attempted. If successful administration by a mandatory should lead to union with the mandatory, he would be the last to object. Therefore, the only difficulty which might arise would be that associated with the dangers of aggression. In this connection he was reminded of a story he had recently heard: In the United States a man bought an inordinate amount of real estate. When asked by a friend when this process would stop, he replied that he would never be satisfied so long as anyone owned any land adjoining his own.

With all respect, it seemed to him that this was the difficulty in the mind of the representative of Australia. If the present conditions in regard to annexation were permanently to continue, he would himself feel inclined to agree with the representative of Australia. But this position was based on a fundamental lack of faith in the League of Nations.

If any nation could annex territory which was previously a German Colony, it would be challenging the whole idea of the League of Nations. Under the League of Nations they were seeking to lay down a law which would rally the whole world against an outlaw, as it had rallied against Germany during the last war. Should a nation attempt to take from a mandatory the country entrusted to it, such nation would become an outlaw. When any nation became an outlaw, all nations should rise up against it, and treat it as such. If they had any confidence in the League of Nations there was not the slightest danger that anyone else except the mandatory power could take possession of any colony entrusted to it, such as New Guinea, because all the other nations would be pledged, with the United States in the lead, to take up arms for the mandatory.

Therefore, all danger of bad neighbours was past, and the only question remaining was whether administration by a mandatory would not be as useful as direct Australian administration. If the League of Nations did not prove adequate to its task, general chaos and confusion would arise in all parts of the world. Therefore, the League of Nations must succeed, and if all the delegates in this room decided that it must succeed, it would succeed.

As regards who should be the mandatory in New Guinea, his mind was absolutely open. It was perhaps so near to Australia that no

other alternative was possible. This reminded him of a story he had read in regard to the annexation of Mexico by the United States of America. Someone had asked whether America would annex that country. The reply was that the country was so contagious that America might be forced to take it whether it wanted to do so or not. Now, New Guinea might be so contagious that Australia would be obliged to take it whether it desired to do so or not. But this was in the lap of the gods.

If the process of annexation went on, the League of Nations would be discredited from the beginning. Many false rumours had been set about regarding the Peace Conference. Those who were hostile to it said that its purpose was merely to divide up the spoils. If they justified that statement in any degree, that would discredit the Conference. The attitude of the people on this point had been quite clearly expressed. Therefore he would say, "Let us have a frank interchange of views on this question", and he would put two questions:—

Assuming the League of Nations existed (and it was born on Saturday), was it necessary, from the point of view of protection to have annexation? If not, what was there in the principle of a mandatory that would make its adoption objectionable?

GENERAL BOTHA said that he did not wish to go over the ground which had been traversed by his colleagues last week. German South West Africa, as everybody knew, was part and parcel of South Africa. It was a piece of land cut out of the Union. The Eastern and Southern frontiers of German South West Africa were merely lines drawn on a map. The only good port on the West Coast was Walfish Bay, which belonged to the Union of South Africa. Walfish Bay had always been under the administration of the Union of South Africa. German South West Africa was a desert. It had been occupied by Germany for 30 or 40 years; but it had never been used for colonising purposes. There were no white people, with the exception of a few pensioned soldiers, who had been given grants of land as an inducement to remain. The only real settlements consisted of immigrants from the Union of South Africa. But these settlers were extremely few in numbers on account of the disabilities to which they had been subjected by the Germans. The Germans used the country only as a military station. The natives were utterly miserable; they were merely slaves of the Germans. On the other hand, these people must be given protection because the country was still full of wild bushmen, and for this purpose a big force would have to be maintained. The country had been very peaceful since its occupation by the Union of South Africa, and the people were quite happy. As already stated

(c) Claims of Union of South Africa to German South West Africa

the Germans never had any idea of settling the country. It was merely used as a military station. A large wireless station had been set up in direct communication with Berlin and it was also connected with other wireless installations 50 miles to the North. At present, under its constitution, the Union of South Africa enjoyed certain free rights. If a mandatory were now appointed to administer German South-West Africa, the trade relations of that territory with the Union would necessarily undergo a great change, and the Union would be compelled to protect itself economically, and to place customs houses round the frontiers. That naturally implied a large expenditure.

The Union of South Africa had suffered greatly from animal diseases, which invariably came from the North. Nothing was being done in the North of Africa to stop these diseases, and the South was compelled to take the necessary measures. If a mandatory were placed there, and if it did not spend money to stop these diseases, the Union would be obliged to do so. In his opinion, there was therefore only one solution, namely, complete union between the two territories.

The few German colonies still remaining in German South-West Africa had recently passed a resolution proclaiming a republic. Should a mandatory be appointed, would it be obliged to respect that decision? This demand for a republic had been merely put forward in order to favour the Germans, and, should it be granted, the Union would be the only sufferers. The League of Nations was a long way off, and could not possibly know the true requirements of the country. Had there been a large population in German South-West Africa, he would have concurred in President Wilson's proposal. He would ask that the point of view of the Union should not be lost sight of. For the sake of peace, in order to satisfy the peoples of South Africa, German South-West Africa must be incorporated in the Union. Should this not be done, then there would be constant agitation. The small German population would continue to foment trouble in order to get back to Germany, and those troubles might extend to the Union. It must be recollected that in South Africa there had been two republics (Transvaal and Orange Free State) and two British Colonies (The Cape and Natal). In the past there had been a great struggle between the two. It was no use to talk about the past, but the struggle still existed, and the danger of an uncertain frontier might re-open the sore. The Union consisted of two peoples—the English and the Dutch. He had spent his life in an endeavour to get those two races to understand each other. It was necessary that they should co-operate for their own

good and for their own future and, unless their requirements were fully understood, grave trouble might at any moment arise.

He himself was a great enthusiast for the League of Nations, and realized that all must be ready to make great sacrifices to attain that high ideal. But they must not be too hasty in settling these questions, lest the burden prove to be too heavy in the beginning. Therefore, they should settle each case on its merits, and let the League of Nations start with a clean sheet.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN enquired whether both races—the Dutch and British—in South Africa were agreed on this question.

GENERAL BOTHA replied in the affirmative.

(d) Australian Representative's Views on the Application of the Mandatory Principle to New Guinea

MR. HUGHES said he would, in the first place, direct himself to the general principle of mandatories before applying the principle to Australia. The mandatory principle, although generally applied to the management of estates and private affairs, but [*had*] never been applied to countries. He would, to begin with, ask the question: Was the mandatory principle *per se* desirable? If contrasted with the direct control, which every country exercised over its own territories, the answer must be in the negative. Consequently, the mandatory principle was merely a compromise suggested by the circumstances in which the Allies now found themselves. It was not suggested that either the United States of America or Great Britain, or France should be governed through a Mandatory State. It was only suggested that the mandatory system should be applied to the territories previously under German Dominion. He was not personally, in principle, opposed to the idea of a mandatory, but he thought it would be necessary to prove the necessity for making use of this machinery in each case separately. If it were asked what was the best form of Government: clearly the most direct form would be the best, and the most indirect form the worst. Therefore, as a general principle, the mandatory system would have to give way, and direct Government would be given the preference. This being the case, he would ask: Why have a mandatory? The President replied: Because the world was against annexations. To that, he would reply: Was it proposed then, to adopt that principle to all questions to be dealt with by the Peace Conference? Was it proposed to appoint mandatories to the New States to be created in Europe? It was proposed to take away the Pacific Islands from Germany because she had not governed them well. But why should the mandatory principle be applied to any of the territories taken by the Dominions? It was for those who wished to apply the principle to prove their case. They all desired to do what was right; but what advantage was to be gained by the

appointment of a mandatory for New Guinea in preference to handing it over to Australia? Geographically, and by virtue of its action during the war, Australia had a just claim. President Wilson had said that Australia should accept the mandatory system as she would thereby obtain greater security. Australia owned, at present, governed, and had for many years governed, parts of New Guinea. Australia possessed a good Government; the people were very critical and censorious, and had shown that they were capable of taking over responsibilities. Consequently, that Government which had been governing adjoining territories for centuries had the best claims. To sum up: Australia had governed New Guinea; New Guinea was essential to the safety of Australia; Australia was a democracy; the Australians were on the spot; Australia knew what New Guinea wanted far better than any League of Nations. Australia actually at the present moment represented the Nations, and if the claims of Australia were not now accepted, what more attention would it in future receive from the League of Nations? Were this mandatory principle applied to Great Britain, to America, to France, it would not work. As Ireland is to the United Kingdom, as Mexico is to the United States of America, as Alsace-Lorraine is to France, so was New Guinea to Australia; but it was said that the taking over of Alsace-Lorraine by France merely meant a restoration. The mandatory system could never be as satisfactory for New Guinea as the direct system. It is said that the World favours the mandatory system because it is against annexations; but annexation was only bad when it made for Imperialism. The Australians had fought to govern themselves in their own way, and New Guinea was the outward and visible sign of the World's recognition that they were worthy to be entrusted with the Government of that country. Next, it would be asked, what assurances could Australia give for its good behaviour? Australia would be a member of the League of Nations. The League would control their members, and if necessary outlaw them. He would point out, however, that progress had not been made by the World in general, but by peoples in particular. France and England and America were examples of this. They had now reached their present stage not because the World had put them there, but because they had worked out their own salvation. Australia was a democracy, not unworthy of comparison with any other. The people of Australia would never tolerate the ill-treatment of other peoples. They had fought against militarism and for the liberty of the people. The choice between annexation and the mandatory system was a narrow one. There was nothing to be gained by the mandatory system that could not be got by direct Government, except that the World was said to dread annexations. But he was positive that no one

dreaded the annexation of New Guinea by Australia. The world only dreaded annexation for Imperialistic purposes or for the purpose of exploiting other peoples. But Australia was a democracy and responsible for its actions to its people. He would readily admit that the mandatory system would be applicable to other parts; but it could never apply to New Guinea.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that before examining particular cases he thought the meeting should have an opportunity of considering the practical application of the mandatory system. This was the first time they had heard an exposition of the principle. As far as the principle was concerned, apart from certain particular cases, he had no objections to make; but its practical application required careful consideration and he would like to consult his experts and discuss with them the proposals put forward in President Wilson's speech. He saw a practical difficulty, for instance, as regards the expenditure of money. Colonies, as far as Great Britain was concerned, did not mean a division of spoils, but rather the incurring of expenditure. Great Britain had no Colony from which a contribution towards the national expenditure was obtained. He thought the same consideration would present itself were the mandatory system applied to Mesopotamia, Syria, and other parts of the Turkish Empire. Whoever took Mesopotamia would have to spend enormous sums of money for works which would only be of profit to future generations. It might pay in the future, but who was to pay at present? Was the League of Nations to pay? How would it be possible to raise sufficient money to carry out all the necessary works for the development of these countries from which no returns could be expected for many decades? Consequently, if a country was to be merely a mandatory, it would be necessary to have a levy from all members of the League of Nations in order to make good the annual deficit. But would countries be able to raise money by taxation in order to enable, say, France to develop the Cameroons? Take again the protection of the shores. Where would the League of Nations come in with reference to all these questions? Therefore, he thought each of those present at this meeting should consult their advisers purely on the practical application of the principles of the mandatory power, as laid down by President Wilson in his speech.

(e) Practical Application of Mandatory System

MR. MASSEY enquired whether, if the meeting were adjourned, he would have an opportunity of putting forward his case when debate was resumed.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied in the affirmative.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that experts could give opinions only on subjects in which they were experienced. Undoubtedly, their training

was such that they had experience only in what they had been accustomed to; but a new regime was now about to be established. It had been said that the British Colonies had cost Great Britain a large amount. But he preferred to say that Great Britain had carried the burden of their development up to the point where they were prepared for independence and self-Government. They were then admitted to a little family of nations. It was just this burden which he wanted the League of Nations to take up, and it was not inconceivable that an assessment might be made against the members. General Smuts, in his pamphlet, had rightly compared the British Empire to a League of Nations. Undoubtedly, the obligation of defending the territory would rest upon the mandatory but part of the expense of the defence, if too heavy, would be borne by the League of Nations.

Mr. Lloyd George repeated that a new principle had been put before them and he would like to have it examined, before its application to particular cases came under consideration. He was not afraid of the principle, because in the British Crown Colonies they did not differentiate between nationals as regards the grant of concessions; but he would like to have time carefully to examine the scheme proposed.

(Mr. Lloyd George's proposal was accepted, and the Meeting adjourned until 11 o'clock next morning.)

Villa Majestic, Paris, 28 January, 1919.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, January 28, 1919, at 11 O'clock a. m.

[PRESENT]

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
President Wilson	The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.	M. Clemenceau
Mr. R. Lansing	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.	M. Pichon
Mr. A. H. Frazier	The Rt. Hon. Sir R. L. Borden	M. Dutasta
Mr. L. Harrison	The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes	M. Berthelot
Col. Williams	Gen. The Rt. Hon. L. Botha	Capt. Portier
Dr. G. L. Beer	The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey	
Professor E. T. Williams	Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey	
	Captain E. Abraham	
	Mr. E. Phipps	

ITALY	JAPAN	CHINA
M. Orlando	Baron Makino	Dr. C. Thomas Wang
M. Sonnino	H. E. M. Matsui	Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo
Count Aldrovandi	Viscount Chinda	M. W. P. Shao
Major Jones	General Nara	
	M. Yamakawa	
	M. Saburi	

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux

Mandatory System: (a) Attitude of the British Empire

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that on the previous evening he had had an opportunity to consult his Colonial experts. All that he was, for the moment, prepared to say was that in so far as the territories conquered by troops from the United Kingdom (in distinction from those conquered by Dominion troops) were concerned, he saw no insuperable difficulty in reconciling the views of Great Britain with those expressed by President Wilson. There certainly were practical difficulties, but there were always practical difficulties in attempting to realize any ideal. He was trying to formulate a plan which would overcome those difficulties, and he had good hope of success. The Dominions case, however, was a special case, and he hoped that President Wilson would look into it again. He did not think that

a special exception in favor of the Dominions would spoil the whole case, possibly the reverse might be true. A scheme might more readily be wrecked by courting resistance than by avoiding difficulties. The contiguity of the territories in question to the Dominions claiming them suggested that they should form an integral part of those countries, more especially as it would be from them that emigration would take place. Another point he would like to put to the Allied Powers, including France, was that there was no large difference between the mandatory principle and the principles laid down by the Berlin Conference, under which Great Britain, France, and Germany held many of their colonies. This Conference had framed conditions about the open door, the prohibition of the arms and liquor traffic, which resembled those President Wilson had in view in many respects, except that no external machinery had been provided for their enforcement. It followed, therefore, that by adopting the mandatory principle wherever possible Great Britain would not be altering her Colonial regime to any appreciable extent. He would be very glad to hear the French view, as France was as much concerned in the question as Great Britain.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the French Minister for the Colonies would be ready to make a statement on the following day.

M. PICHON said that on the points raised by Mr. Lloyd George he thought there would be no differences between France and Great Britain.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that there were certain Franco-British conventions relating to the German colonies; for instance Togoland.[1] He asked whether these conventions should be produced before the Council.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE was of the opinion that any arrangements made during the war should be placed before the meeting.

M. CLEMENCEAU undertook to produce them, and asked whether the Japanese delegates would do likewise.

BARON MAKINO said that he had no objection to doing so, and would send all such agreements to the Chairman. He would point out, however, that the Japanese conventions were in the form of an exchange of ideas rather than formal conventions.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether Baron Makino alluded to the agreement reached in 1917.[2]

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[1] The text of the Togoland agreement made in August 1914 is given in "Rapport au Ministre des Colonies sur l'administration des territoires occupés du Togo, de la conquête au 1er juillet 1921", *Journal Officiel de la République francaise*, August 25, 1921, p. 9873.

[2] H. W. V. Temperley (ed.), *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (London, 1924), vol. VI, p. 634.

BARON MAKINO replied that this was the agreement to which he referred. M. ORLANDO said that Italy also had a convention with France and Great Britain concerning German colonies.

M. PICHON asked if M. Orlando referred to the Pact of London.[3]

M. ORLANDO replied in the affirmative.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked that if drafts were submitted to the Council, no sense of finality should be attached to them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE entirely agreed. He was much influenced by what the President had said on former occasions, and quite agreed that any proposal submitted should be provisional.

MR. MASSEY said that he had not much to add to the two speeches made on the previous day. He wished, however, to assure President Wilson that though he did not quite take his point of view, he would speak in no spirit of opposition to the idea of the League of Nations. He could not, however, help recalling the precedents of history. Similar attempts had been made before. The most notable instance was that of the Congress of Vienna, where all the nations of Europe had been gathered in order to frame universal peace. The results of its labors had been a failure. He hoped that this Congress would not end in the same way, but it was well to remember that history repeated itself.

(b) Attitude of New Zealand

He wished to point out that New Zealand and Australia were, so to speak, in the same boat. If Australia were invaded by an enemy power, New Zealand must fall, as her communications would be cut. The converse applied with equal force. The danger to both would doubtless grow less in course of time as the populations of these countries increased.

Samoa was of vital importance to New Zealand. It was situated on the main water route to the South Pacific from the Panama Canal. If, by any chance, Samoa were in hostile hands, New Zealand would be strangled. This eventuality, therefore, was a cause of anxiety to the country he represented, and on this point, despite other differences, all its inhabitants were of one mind. He hoped that he would be able to induce President Wilson to see the question from their standpoint.

One of the main purposes laid down by President Wilson for the mandatory system was the betterment of the inhabitants. He felt he could claim that New Zealand had done in this respect as well as any mandatory power was ever likely to do. New Zealand was not only composed of the two islands generally attributed to her. She also governed the Cook Archipelago, which had been assigned to New

[3] Great Britain, Cmd. 671, Misc. No. 7 (1920): *Agreement Between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, Signed at London, April 26, 1915.*

Zealand twenty years ago. The experiment made by New Zealand in administering this territory had been highly successful. Schools had been instituted in all the larger islands; agricultural experts had been sent to train the populations, which had now become industrious and productive; hospitals had been set up at Rarotonga, which was the seat of the New Zealand Commissioner and of his staff. The same system had been applied to the natives there as since the treaty of 1840 [4] had been applied to the Maoris. The Maoris of New Zealand were highly respected by the whites, and every trade and profession was open to them. One of his own colleagues in the government, Dr. Pomare, was a Maori. His great knowledge of the Polynesian races had suggested that he should come to the Peace Conference, and, but for the expense of sending an additional minister from New Zealand, he thought that he would have been a most suitable delegate.

When Samoa was taken over at the beginning of the war, the same policy of education and improvement was started there, and had been satisfactory. The Cook Islanders and Samoans were related, and spoke dialects of the same language. If a change were to be made, the inhabitants of Samoa would be dissatisfied.

The difference between the mandatory principle and that instituted by New Zealand was that between leasehold and freehold tenure. No individual would put the same energy into a leasehold as into a freehold. It would be the same with governments.

President Wilson had suggested improvements. He agreed it was necessary to increase production, but certain financing would have to be done. On the credit of a government like Australia, loans could be raised for the development of New Guinea, which, before it could support a civilised population, would require docks, roads, telegraphs, and a number of other improvements. The country itself, when developed, would afford ample security for further loans. Could this process be as successfully set in motion by a mandatory power?

Though it might not be the time to discuss what should be done with the German Empire, he held that Germany was an outlaw among nations, and should be treated as such. Unless broken up, it would become a danger again, and future generations must be safeguarded against its pernicious activities.

Unless these territories were annexed to some strong state, the Germans would attempt to get them back. All knew what German intrigue and peaceful penetration meant. It had occurred even in New Zealand.

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[4] *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xxix, p. 1111.

The phrase "division of spoils" had been used. He begged to point out that New Zealand would not obtain much spoil. Her financial burdens incurred during this war were very heavy. At a time when New Zealand was not half developed, it had been called upon to send volunteers immense distances to take the field in Europe. It had done so willingly, and not only lost a valuable portion of its population, but had also incurred 100 millions of debt. There was little prospect of any recoupment of such losses. The financial value of Samoa was a mere trifle in comparison. He appealed to the President to look at the whole question from the New Zealand point of view. He would ask him to recall the period immediately after the American War of Independence. What would Washington have done had it been suggested to him that a mandatory power, or even the colonists themselves as mandatories of a League of Nations, should be given charge of the vast territories in North America not at that time colonised? There was little doubt that the American settlers would have protested at this offer, and rightly so, for, had this taken place, the United States would not have grown into one of the greatest Powers of the World. New Zealand had only fought to protect the citizens of the South Pacific and all decent citizens of the world from future wars.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that for the sake of keeping history straight, he would make a passing comment on one of the remarks just heard. He would not admit that there was any historical precedent for the work now in hand; least of all should the Congress of Vienna be cited as such. The Holy Alliance of that time existed professedly to extend the system of monarchical and arbitrary government in the World. Such, he hoped, was not the purpose of the present conference. It was the Holy Alliance which had provoked in the Western Hemisphere the Monroe Doctrine, which was a protest against the system brought about by the Congress of Vienna. Great Britain had soon dissociated herself from the Holy Alliance and supported the Monroe Doctrine.

The present enterprise was very different from that undertaken at Vienna a century ago, and he hoped that even by reference no odor of Vienna would again be brought into its proceedings.

As to Samoa, he had one remark to make. There was another Power present in the Samoan Islands which was not unfriendly either to Great Britain or to New Zealand. This power had not played the same part as New Zealand in the war in the Southern Pacific, because it was not then at war with Germany. The Power in question was the United States of America. He dared assert, however, that under the regime of the League of Nations there was

little chance that any Power would be able to play in Samoa the part played by Germany without attracting the attention of the United States.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this part of the discussion was now adjourned. The Council would proceed to discuss the question of the German possessions in the Far East, together with the Chinese delegates.

As the question of restitution of the fortress had been raised, he thought it useful to read the words of the Japanese ultimatum to Germany, because it had a bearing on the purpose in hand:—

"Considering it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East, and to safeguard the general interests contemplated by the agreement of the Alliance between Japan and Great Britain in order to secure a firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, the establishment of which is the aim of the said agreement—the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believe it their duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions:

(1) To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm, at once, those which cannot be withdrawn.

(2) To deliver on a date not later than the 15th September, 1914, to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition and compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiauchow, with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China."

Since the occupation of Kiauchow, Japan has been in actual possession. In view of all that had passed between the Governments of China and Japan, Baron Makino thought that China fully realized the import of Japanese occupation. The friendly interchange of views on this subject had been entered into, and Japan had agreed to restore Kiauchow as soon as Japan had free disposal of the place. Agreements had also been reached with regard to the (leased) railway.

As notes had been exchanged, he thought that a statement of these engagements [5] might be worth the consideration of the members of the Council.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked Baron Makino whether he proposed to lay these notes before the Council.

BARON MAKINO said that he did not think the Japanese Government would raise any objection, but as the request was an unexpected one he would be compelled to ask its permission.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked on behalf of China if Mr. Koo would do likewise.

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[5] For the text of these notes and the engagements entered into, see *Foreign Relations*, 1915, pp. 177 and 198

MR. KOO said that the Chinese Government has no objection to raise.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked both the Japanese and Chinese Delegates to state whether they would make known to the Council the conditions of the restoration agreed between them.

BARON MAKINO said that he would do so, provided his Government would make no objection. He did not think it would. If it were within his own power, he would produce these documents as soon as possible. There was, however, one point he wished to make clear. Japan was in actual possession of the territory under consideration. It had taken it by conquest from Germany. Before disposing of it to a third party it was necessary that Japan should obtain the right of free disposal from Germany.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the Council was dealing with territories and cessions previously German without consulting Germany at all.

BARON MAKINO said that the work now in hand was one of preparation for the presentment of the case to Germany. It followed therefore that the cession of Kiauchow would have to be agreed upon by Germany before it was carried out. What should take place thereafter had already been the subject of an interchange of views with China.

MR. KOO said that he was very glad, on behalf of China, to have the opportunity of putting the case of his country. He had heard with interest the Dominion speakers, who spoke on behalf of a few million people. He felt his own responsibility was enhanced by the fact that he was the spokesman of 400 millions, one quarter of the human race. The Chinese delegation would ask the Peace Conference for the restoration to China of the Leased Territory of Kiauchow, the railway in Shantung, and all other rights Germany possessed in that province before the war. He would confine himself to broad principles in order not to employ too much of the Council's time. Technical details would be explained in full in a memorandum which he proposed to submit. The territories in question were an integral part of China. There [*they?*] were part of a province containing 3 million inhabitants, of Chinese in race, language and religion. The history of the lease to Germany was doubtless familiar. The lease had been extorted by force. The German fleet had occupied the coast of Shantung and landing parties had penetrated into the interior. The lease had been extorted as a price for the withdrawal of the expedition. The pretext of this proceeding was the accidental killing of two missionaries in the interior of the country in a manner quite beyond the control of the Chinese Gov-

German Leasehold Rights in China

ernment. On the principles of nationality and of territorial integrity principles accepted by this Conference, China had a right to the restoration of these territories. The Chinese delegation would feel that this was one of the conditions of a just peace. If, on the other hand, the Congress were to take a different view and were to transfer these territories to any other Power, it would, in the eyes of the Chinese Delegation, be adding one wrong to another. The Shantung province, in which Kiauchow and the railway to Chinanfu were situated, was the cradle of Chinese civilisation, the birthplace of Confucius and Mencius, and a Holy Land for the Chinese. This province had always played a very important part in the development of China. Economically, it was a densely populated country, with 36 million people in an area of only 35,000 square miles. The density of the population produced an intense competition and rendered the country quite unsuitable for colonisation. The introduction of a Foreign Power could only lead to the exploitation of the inhabitants, and not to genuine colonisation. Strategically, Kiauchow commanded one of the main gateways of North China. It controlled one of the shortest approaches from the sea to Pekin, namely, the railway to Chinanfu which, at its junction with the railway from Tientsing, led straight to the capital. In the interest of Chinese national defence which in time would be organised, the Chinese Delegation would be unable to admit that any Foreign Power had claims to so vital a point. China was fully cognisant of the services rendered to her by the heroic Army and Navy of Japan in rooting out German power from Shantung. China was also deeply indebted to Great Britain for helping in this task at a time of great peril to herself in Europe. China also was not forgetful of the services rendered her by the troops of the other Allies in Europe, which had held in check an enemy who might otherwise have easily sent reinforcements to the Far East and thereby prolonged hostilities there. China appreciated these services all the more because the people in Shantung had also suffered and sacrificed in connection with the military operations for the capture of Kiauchow, especially in regard to requisitions for labour and supplies of all kinds. But, grateful as they were, the Chinese Delegation felt that they would be false to their duty to China and to the world if they did not object to paying their debts of gratitude by selling the birthright of their countrymen, and thereby sowing the seeds of discord for the future. The Chinese Delegation therefore trusted that the Conference, in considering the disposal of the leased territory and other rights held by Germany in Shantung, would give full weight to the fundamental and transcendent rights of China, the rights of political sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Baron Makino said that he had listened with great attention to

what had fallen from his Chinese colleague concerning the direct restitution of Kiauchow to China. In the statement put forward on the previous day, he had explained the reasons for which the Japanese Government had undertaken the reduction of this German stronghold.

MR. KOO said that the Chinese Delegation did not adopt quite the same view as Baron Makino. He was well aware that Japan after her undertaking in 1914—which he was glad to note had just been renewed by Baron Makino—would not retain the territory.

But there was a choice between direct and indirect restitution. Of the two China would prefer the first. It was always easier to take one step than two if it led to the same place. They had always considered all the Conventions made with Japan as provisional and subject to revision by the Peace Conference. Before becoming a belligerent China had agreed to accept all the conditions made to Germany by Japan.

China's entry into the war, however, had completely altered her status. None of the previous arrangements precluded China either from declaring war on Germany, or from being represented at the Peace Conference. Nor could they preclude her now from demanding from Germany direct restitution of her rights. China's belligerency had in itself put an end to the leases obtained by Germany in Chinese territory. Furthermore, there was a clause in the lease to the effect that Germany could not transfer her rights to another power.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, 28 January, 1919, at 4:00 p. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
President Wilson.	The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.	M. Clemenceau.
Mr. R. Lansing.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.	M. Pichon.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.	The Rt. Hon. Sir R. L. Borden.	M. Dutasta.
Mr. L. Harrison.	The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes.	M. Berthelot.
Dr. G. L. Beer.	Gen. The Rt. Hon. L. Botha.	Captain Portier.
Professor E. T. Williams.	The Rt. Hon W. F. Massey.	
Colonel U. S. Grant.	Lt-Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey.	
	Major A. M. Caccia.	
	Mr. H. Norman.	

ITALY	JAPAN
M. Orlando.	Baron Makino.
Baron Sonnino.	Viscount Chinda.
M. Salvago-Raggi.	H. E. M. Matsui.
Count Aldrovandi.	M. Saburi.
Major Jones.	

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

M. Simon, the French Minister for the Colonies, also attended for part of the proceedings.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU, after declaring the meeting opened, said he would ask M. Simon, the French Minister for the Colonies, to submit the French case on the African question.

Disposal of German Colonies: (a) French Claims to Cameroons & Togoland

M. SIMON said that as it had been decided that the German Colonies should not be given back to Germany, the two questions to be decided were: To whom should these Colonies be given, and what should their form of government be? He would place before them the French point of view. In the first place he would read two letters exchanged between M. Cambon and Sir Edward Grey during the war, dealing with the provisional division of Togoland and the Cameroons.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he did not think it would serve any useful purpose to read these documents just then. Other agreements

would have to be put before the meeting also, and the delegates could take a note of the complete file. They were only concerned that afternoon with the French point of view.

M. SIMON said these agreements were merely temporary. They were to be submitted to the Peace Conference, who would decide whether they should be considered as definite agreements or not. There was also a similar agreement in Article XIII of the Pact of London, under which possible rectifications of frontiers in Africa, in favour of Italy, France and Great Britain, subject to certain territorial compensations, were considered.

France at once had declared that she was not concerned in the German East and West African Colonies, but on the other hand she wished to state her claims to the Cameroons and Togoland. For what reasons did France claim those territories? She claimed them for the same reasons that had been used by the Dominions in putting forward their claims. They had had to take account of the sacrifices which they had been forced to make to conquer these territories from Germany, who, in spite of her undertakings, had violated the acknowledged neutrality of these regions.

Historically, the French also had certain claims. They had been the first to explore these territories; they had also been the first to sign agreements or treaties with the native races. There had been a signed agreement with Togoland since 1892, and some years later they had signed one also with the Cameroons. The treaty with Malimba,[1] which gave Duala to France, would also be recalled. He would lay stress upon this point, because allusion to this treaty had been made when difficulties occurred with England about the possession of Duala.

They would consider the treaties signed with Germany as abrogated. Furthermore, certain of these treaties had been signed under the pressure of political events. He would refer in particular to the Treaties of 1895 and 1897 in regard to Togoland,[2] and to that of 1911 in regard to the Cameroons.[3]

They would now have to consider certain political considerations. Ever since they had occupied these territories the tribes had been happy, and they had asked to remain under French control. He would refer in particular to the requests made by Garua and Marua, in the name of the inhabitants, that the Cameroons should be united to France.

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[1] French treaty with Malimba of April 19, 1883, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXV, p. 340.

[2] Franco-German treaty with regard to Togoland of July 23, 1897, *ibid.*, vol. LXXXIX, p. 584.

[3] Franco-German convention concerning Equatorial Africa, November 4, 1911, *ibid.*, vol. CIV, p. 956.

Then there were also the questions of economic and geographical contiguity, as had been set forth by Mr. Hughes in respect to New Guinea.

Geographically, Togoland was an integral part of Dahomey, which was rather closely wedged in between Nigeria and the Gold Coast. Togoland and Dahomey were inhabited by the same tribes, possessing the same traditions.

The same reasons of contiguity existed between the French Congo and the Cameroons. The policy of Germany, which ended in the agreement of 1911, had been to cut the French possessions off from the sea, so as to smother the French economically later on. The large sea coast of the Cameroons, and the port of Duala were required for the development of French Equatorial Africa.

It now remained for them to consider the question of the Government to be given to these territories, which had become ownerless.

There were three possible solutions:

1. Internationalisation, pure and simple.
2. A mandate given to one of the Powers by the League of Nations.
3. Annexation, pure and simple, by a sovereign power.

Mr. Lloyd George had frankly condemned the first system in the course of the conversation of 24th January,[4] when he had said that it could not be adopted in regard to backward countries—that it would lead to disorder, and that the high ideals for which such a system would be established could not be reached.

He would agree with this view for humanitarian reasons. Similar experiments tried in the past had failed ignominiously. He would only mention the dual control over Samoa, against which the American President himself had spoken, and that of the New Hebrides, which, he hoped, would not be allowed to continue, where, under British control, a tribunal composed of a Spanish judge and a Dutchman, etc. existed.

What was not possible for small territories, was all the less possible for large regions.

The second system consisted in the appointment of a mandatory by the League of Nations. The Dominions had made very strong objections to this system, and these objections were supported by France also. When, in two territories inhabited by the same population, two different systems of government were created, difficulties would ensue and the very opposite of what was desired would result.

The mandatory system consisted of empowering one nation to act

[4] See BC-10, p. 719.

on behalf of another. Every mandate was revocable, and there would therefore be no guarantee for its continuance. There would thus be little inducement for the investment of capital and for colonisation in a country whose future was unknown. The mandatory would be content to live quietly without trying to develop the colony or to improve the conditions of life of the natives, and the desired ideal would not be attained by this means.

Another question occurs. Who would be the mandatory? Would it be a little nation, without colonising traditions, capital, or men? Or, would the mandatory be a large nation whose presence would be a danger and compel the adjoining nations to organize for defence, as Mr. Hughes said in regard to New Guinea? This same remark applied to the Cameroons and to the Congo. It would also be necessary to take into account the uncertainty of alliances, which were always liable to be changed.

He (M. Simon) could not, therefore, favour the system of a mandate to be given to one Power by the League of Nations.

The third system still remained to be considered—that of annexation, pure and simple, which he had come to support that day. It was the only one which would accomplish the double object of every colonial government worthy of the name, namely, the development of the country and the effective protection of the natives during the period required for their development towards a higher plane of civilization.

He would ask his hearers to consider the objections that could be raised against a policy of annexation. Annexation might be said to lead to the exploitation of the country for the benefit of the individual; it might be said to lead to the ill-treatment of the natives; it might permit of the setting up of the economic policy of the "closed door".

All these points were part of a theory which was today quite obsolete and condemned by all. France had higher aspirations, and the Colonies were no longer considered as a kind of close preserve for the exploitation and benefit of the individual.

Higher moral principles now guided the nations. All the great Powers worthy of the name, considered their colonies as wards entrusted to them by the world. They accepted this guardianship and the duties connected therewith, duly appreciating their duties in regard to the maintenance of peace, their duties in regard to the protection of the people either by the limitation of the sale of alcohol, the prevention of gun-running, etc., and their duties in regard to the provision of social education. Only a great nation, in possession of trained administrative services, and with men and money

at its disposal could undertake and carry through such an enterprise. The work of civilization could only be carried out under the auspices of the sovereignty of a country.

If France were to receive the territories under consideration, she would be prepared to give assurances to those who might still harbour fears. The French formally announced that day that their policy in regard to the territories formerly German would entail the application of a liberal system, practically open to everybody, the "Open Door" system, without differential tariffs. Everybody would be able to enter and to trade in Togoland and the Cameroons without let or hindrance. France henceforth renounced all economic protective measures. She accepted what she had always done for the protection of the natives, the limitation of alcohol, the stoppage of traffic in arms, etc. She would not attempt to enforce any policy which might appear to be directed against the natives, for she had always co-operated with them. The French had always desired that the natives should take part in the management of their own territory. He had enunciated the general principles which guided the French. These principles were such that they were bound to satisfy all those interested in the moral development and liberties of the population.

President Wilson's fifth point in his message of the 8th January [5] read as follows:—

"A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty, the interests of the populations concerned have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined."

As regards this clause, he had already stated how, in his opinion, the interests of the population in question would be protected. He had also explained the just claims of France. As to the claims of France, these were based on sacrifices made by them in the course of past centuries in Northern Africa. And now that work would appear to be concluded, for their old Colonies formed part of the old country. The inhabitants had equal rights, they had their representatives in the French Chamber, their system of local government was exactly the same as that of the French, and the natives enjoyed the same rights as French citizens.

For centuries past France had used all her strength for the purpose of exploring and developing the territories of Northern Africa; and the whole world had been able to enjoy the benefits to be derived therefrom.

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[5] *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 12.

France has spent 9 milliards of francs on the Mediterranean coast, 626 millions on West Africa, and 272 millions on equatorial Africa. When the efforts made by France for the civilization of Northern Africa were considered they would feel fully confident that she would be able to carry out the same programme in Equatorial Africa. That was his reply to President Wilson's third condition.

France relied on these facts that day, in asking to be allowed to continue her work of civilization in tropical Africa, and he hoped the delegates would give her the means of doing so by recognizing her right to sovereignty in those regions, subject to the assurances he had outlined.

(M. Simon then withdrew.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that after having heard M. Simon's statement, he proposed that they should now return to the question of the claims put forward by the British Dominions to certain German Colonies. He trusted the discussion would be completed that day.

The Principle of Mandatories

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that it would be better in the first place to come to a decision on the general principle without reference to particular cases. Were annexations to be permitted? Or was some other method to be adopted?

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that the discussion so far had been, in essence, a negation in detail—one case at a time—of the whole principle of mandatories. The discussion had been brought to a point where it looked as if their roads diverged. He thought it would be wise to discontinue this discussion for a few hours, say until the next day, as he feared it might lead to a point where it would otherwise appear as though they had reached a serious disagreement, and this he particularly wished to avoid.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether it was not true that whilst a good deal of thought had been given to the League of Nations, very little thought had been given to the position of a Mandatory Power. The British Delegates did not reject the idea of a Mandatory Power. On the contrary, broadly speaking, as far as the greater part of the areas conquered by British arms and managed from London were concerned, they regarded that idea with favour.

The objections so far raised had been made, not as regards areas under the direct control of the Capital of the Empire, but as regards the areas conquered by the self-governing Dominions within that empire. Therefore, it might be said that the Delegates of the British Empire were not antagonistic to the principle of the Mandatory.

He, (Mr. Balfour), was strongly in favour of the principle. But he was conscious that it had not been worked out. He knew of no

paper or speech in which the practical difficulties which they had to face had been worked out in detail. For instance, with reference to the financial question, it had been stated yesterday that should the Mandatory require funds, it would be for the League of Nations to supply the same. That might be a good plan, but he was faced with insuperable difficulties. He agreed that these were not essential to the application of the principle, though they were undoubtedly important points for consideration.

No conclusion had been reached, and no authoritative statement had been made regarding another point, namely, should the tenure of the Mandatory be made temporarily or not? If the tenure were merely temporary, difficulties would arise and there would be perpetual intrigues and agitation. For instance, if a German population were left in one of the German Colonies who could hamper the mandatory and promote a sense of grievance in the minds of the natives by raising expectations of some elysium to come, that might lead to a change in the Mandatory by the League of Nations. In his opinion, the thing could only work, firstly, by the appointment of an honest and competent mandatory, and secondly, by securing his tenure of office. He would like to think these questions over. Further, it appeared to him that exactly the same conditions of trusteeship would not be applicable everywhere, and there were several other similar questions which deserved critical attention. Should not, therefore, those interested carefully consider together what the difficulties were? Any decision come to now would be premature. As regards the general principle, however, the British Empire Delegates favoured it. Moreover the Delegates of the United Kingdom were prepared to go further, and for the areas which fell to them they were prepared to accept the idea. In conclusion he said that he only spoke for himself. He had not consulted the Prime Minister.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he had some discussion about mandatories with the representatives of the British Colonial Department, who raised no difficulties. They thought the difficulties were more imaginary than real. He had been greatly struck by the fact that M. Simon, in his speech, had in the beginning appeared to be bitterly opposed to the whole idea, but in the end he had detailed as acceptable to France the whole list of conditions proposed for a mandatory, except the name. As far as the British Empire was concerned, most of the conquests had been accomplished by British troops, and as far as those territories were concerned Great Britain would be prepared to administer them under such conditions as might be laid down by the League of Nations. He could see no difficulties except perhaps difficulties of definition. Exceptions might have to be made; but then every rule had an exception. He could see no reason why any

difficulties should arise in laying down general principles. He was afraid the delegates might, when confronted by a difficulty, get into the habit of putting it off. He himself could not stay here indefinitely, therefore he would ask his colleagues to face the difficulty and to come to a decision. There would be special applications to be thrashed out, but until the principle had been adopted no conclusion on the details could be come to.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed with Mr. Balfour that there were many points to be cleared up. He admitted that the idea was a new one, and it was not to be expected that it would be found developed in any records or statements. He agreed with what Mr. Lloyd George said were the views of his Colonial Department, viz., that the difficulties were more imaginary than real. In the first place, the composition of the League of Nations, whenever spoken of heretofore, had left the lead to the Great Powers.

Taking the case mentioned by Mr. Balfour where an area contained a German population inclined to intrigue, the mandatory would certainly not be a friend of Germany's; and even if the latter should eventually qualify and be admitted to the League of Nations, at least during a generation her disposition and efforts would be so well known that no responsible man would be misled by them.

He wished that he could agree with Mr. Lloyd George that there was no great difference between the mandatory system and M. Simon's plan. The former assumed trusteeship on the part of the League of Nations; the latter implied definite sovereignty, exercised in the same spirit and under the same conditions as might be imposed upon a mandatory. The two ideas were radically different, and he was bound to assume that the French Colonial Office could not see its way to accept the idea of the mandatory.

He pointed out that Australia claimed sovereignty over German New Guinea; the Union of South Africa over German South West Africa, and Japan over the leased territory of Shantung and the Caroline Islands; while France claimed a modified sovereignty over the Cameroons and Togoland under certain terms. Here they were at this stage when the only acceptance had been on the part of the Imperial British Government with respect to the area taken from Germany by troops under the direct authority of the Government in London. This was an important exception in which he rejoiced, but it appeared to be the only exception to the rejection of the idea of trusteeship on the part of the League of Nations.

They must consider how this treaty would look to the world, for as it looked to the world it would be, since the world would not wait for explanations. The world would say that the Great Powers first portioned out the helpless parts of the world, and then formed a

League of Nations. The crude fact would be that each of these parts of the world had been assigned to one of the Great Powers.

He wished to point out, in all frankness, that the world would not accept such action; it would make the League of Nations impossible, and they would have to return to the system of competitive armaments with accumulating debts and the burden of great armies. There must be a League of Nations, and they could not return to the *Status quo ante*. The League of Nations would be a laughing stock if it were not invested with this quality of trusteeship. He felt this so intensely that he hoped that those present would not think that he had any personal antagonism. To secure it no sacrifice would be too great. It was unfortunate that the United States could not make any sacrifice in this particular case as she held none of the territories in dispute. But her people would feel that their sacrifices in coming into the war had been in vain, if the men returning home only came back to be trained in arms and to bear the increased burden of competitive armaments. In that case the United States would have to have a greatly increased navy and maintain a large standing army. This would be so intolerable to the thought of Europe, that they would see this great wave from the East which would involve the very existence of society, gather fresh volume, because the people of the world would not permit the parcelling out among the Great Powers of the helpless countries conquered from Germany. He felt this so solemnly that he urged them to give it careful thought.

He desired the acceptance of the genuine idea of trusteeship. He regarded this as a test of their labours, and he thought the world would so consider it. He thought it would be most unfortunate if they were, in the instance, to give the world its initial cold bath of disappointment. Sacrifices which seemed critical would have to be made, but if they were not made, they would have to face constant intolerable burdens. He believed that it was from this point of view that the question should be approached and examined. He appreciated the difficulties mentioned by Mr. Balfour, but he believed they were soluble. However, they could not be solved by discussion until they arose in concrete form. They must agree on the principle and leave its application to the League of Nations.

Sir Robert Borden enquired from President Wilson, purely for his information, with a view to the removal of the difficulty in case it became acute, whether the nomination of a mandatory need be postponed until the League of Nations was constituted. Under the scheme for the creation of a League of Nations, he understood that the five Great Powers would form a Council controlling the work of the League. Therefore the difference between making the decision

now or leaving it to the Council of the League of Nations was not great. He would, therefore, ask whether President Wilson would take that suggestion into consideration.

PRESIDENT WILSON replied that he had himself, informally, made that suggestion.

M. ORLANDO said that as regards Colonial questions, the Italian point of view was extremely simple. Italy would readily accept whatever principles might be adopted, provided they were equitably applied and also provided that she could participate in the work of civilization. He did not wish to make the slightest allusion to article 13 of the Pact of London[6] because, even if that agreement had not existed, its principles were so just that they would be applied as a matter of course. The question they were considering was one of extreme gravity, and the consequences of their decision might be even more serious. Therefore, he thought that perhaps a short adjournment might be advisable. He fully understood Mr. Lloyd George's contention that an adjournment would not of itself lead to a solution of the difficulty, whilst an indefinite adjournment would naturally be a confession of impotence. But President Wilson had proposed that a short adjournment should take place in order that the delegates might have time to reflect and, perhaps, to consider and understand the practical aspect of the question. Under these circumstances he felt inclined to ask one or two questions. Was it the intention of President Wilson that all questions relating to the disposal of conquered territories should, without discussion, be referred to the League of Nations? The consequences of such a procedure would be extremely grave, because the world would think that this Conference had done nothing, and a confession of impotence would be even more serious than disagreement amongst the delegates. He thought that the Conference should lay down general principles, whilst leaving to the League of Nations the practical application of these principles to special cases. There were a number of questions that might well be considered during a short period of adjournment. For instance, should all the German Colonies, without exception, be confided to the League of Nations? In other words, was the rule to admit of no exceptions? As was well known, exceptions proved the rule. He agreed that no exceptions could be made for purely private reasons. But if exceptions were made, based on concrete reasons, then such exceptions would not weaken the rule, but strengthen it. Again, if adjoining territories craved for union on the same grounds that union had been fought for by peoples in Europe, should no exception be made? For instance, if part of a

[6] Great Britain, Cmd. 671, Misc. No. 7 (1920): *Agreement Between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, Signed at London, April 26, 1915.*

Colony lately under German sovereignty could be joined to an existing colony of which, ethnographically, it formed a part, he thought that an exception should be made and such a decision would be in accordance with President Wilson's ideas on the subject, the rights of peoples to self-determination.

Another point he wished to raise was, how far should the power of a mandatory extend? He thought this trusteeship need not be purely transitory. The difference in the powers accorded to trustees were extreme. In some cases, the trusteeship meant nothing, whereas in other cases it practically meant ownership.

The attributes of the mandatory might well be camouflaged by hypocrisy. Therefore he thought that the powers of the mandatory should be properly graduated to meet the requirements of each case, and in his opinion it was necessary from the very commencement to define the powers to be attributed to mandatories. For instance, South Africa had claimed the right to extend its laws to German South West Africa; but such action would obviously mean the exercise of the powers of sovereignty by a mandatory.

In conclusion he thought the whole question required very careful consideration. He himself was disposed to make every sacrifice to avoid disagreement; but the various issues of the question should be very clearly defined. Personally, he hoped that the general principles would be accepted.

M. CLEMENCEAU wished, in the first place, to say that Mr. Lloyd George had interpreted M. Simon's speech better than President Wilson. The French Colonial Office had expressed its views, but that did not mean that he himself was not ready to make concessions if reasonable proposals were put forward. All his sentiments were in agreement with those of President Wilson. He agreed with him as to the gravity of the decision to be taken, and the seriousness of the situation that would result therefrom. There was danger in refusing a means of salvation; but there was greater danger in adopting the wrong means of salvation. The League of Nations, he thought, was to be a League of Defence to ensure the peace of the world. But it appeared they had now gone beyond that limit when they proposed to create a League of Nations with governmental functions to interfere in internal affairs, with trustees in various places sending reports to—he did not know whom. Throughout the world, even in Europe, and perhaps in the Adriatic, a control would be set up. President Wilson himself had said so, and, as a result, appeals would be heard from all parts of the world. Who would deal with those appeals? It had been said that an International Legislature and some sort of executive power, about which he knew nothing, would have to be created, without any power to

administer penalties, since this question had never been raised. The idea of an unknown mandatory acting through an undetermined tribunal gave him some anxiety. He did not regret the discussions which had taken place on the subject, since these discussions had impressed him with the justness of the claims of the Dominions. However, since Mr. Lloyd George was prepared to accept the mandate of a League of Nations he would not dissent from the general agreement, merely for the sake of the Cameroons and Togoland. But, when President Wilson asked that every question should be referred to the League of Nations, he felt a little nervous, and feared that the remedy might be worse than the disease. President Wilson had said that the opinion of the world would rise up against them and that savagery was ready to flow over the world from the East to the West. That might be, but he was not in full agreement with President Wilson when the latter said that they had to choose between a League of Nations with legislative initiative, as he had already dealt with that question. He would at once take up the question of a League for the preservation of Peace. He greatly favoured such a League, and he was prepared to make all sacrifices to attain that object. If insisted upon, he would assent to a League with full powers to initiate laws, but he would ask that his objections be recorded, as he had no confidence in such a scheme. He might be too conservative—that being a fault of age. In a speech which he had made to the Chamber of Deputies a few days ago he had stated that if, before the war, the Great Powers had made an alliance pledging themselves to take up arms in defence of any one of them who might be attacked, there would have been no war. Today they had not only five nations in agreement but practically the whole world. If the nations pledged themselves not to attack any one without the consent of the members of the League, and to defend any one of them who might be attacked, the peace of the world would be assured. Such an alliance might well be termed a League of Nations. Such procedures, and tribunals, as might be thought necessary could be added. He would accept all these. If Mr. Lloyd George were to promise that he would accept these two conditions, the League of Nations would be created in less than three days.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he agreed with M. Clemenceau that if the League of Nations were made an executive for purposes of governing, and charged with functions which it would be unable to perform, it would be destroyed from the beginning. But he had not so interpreted the mandatory principle when he had accepted it.

President Wilson said he too had not so interpreted it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that he regarded the system merely as a general trusteeship upon defined conditions. Only when those conditions were scandalously abused would the League of Nations have the right to interfere and to call on the mandatory for an explanation. For instance, should a mandatory allow foul liquor to swamp the territories entrusted to it, the League of Nations would have the right to insist on a remedy of the abuse. The Powers now exercised this right by diplomatic correspondence, resulting in the giving of assurances, but frequently nothing was done. He would, however, make an appeal to President Wilson to consider the following point of view. He trusted the President would not insist on postponing the selection of mandatories until after the League of Nations had been established. That was a serious matter, for, as long as all these questions were unsettled, everything would be unsettled. People were unsettled all over the world, not only the labourers and the soldiers, but also the employers. Great Britain now occupied territories where they had no intention of remaining even if the League of Nations asked them to stay. For instance British troops occupied Russian Armenia and Serbia [*Syria*]. They did not wish to be there, but some one had got to be there. Was Great Britain to be compelled to keep its troops there until the League of Nations was a going concern? Again, as regards German East Africa, if Great Britain was not to be the mandatory, it had a big force there now which it would not wish to keep there. Therefore, they must know what their position was to be, and they would not settle down to their own business until these questions were decided. During the past week, the question of the renewal of the Military Service Act in the United Kingdom had come under consideration. It appeared they were now maintaining large forces—over 170,000 British troops alone in Syria, Caucasus, East Africa, and other out-of-the-way places. These troops must sooner or later be withdrawn, but they could not do that without knowing who would take their place. They could not withdraw and leave the people to massacre each other. They would be compelled to hand the country to some one. Therefore, he would leave the settlement to this tribunal, and an early solution was urgently needed. As Sir Robert Borden had stated, this Council was practically the League of Nations, which was born on Saturday. In conclusion, he asked whether he had correctly interpreted M. Clemenceau's views to the effect that he was prepared to accept trusteeship.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that although he did not approve of it, he would be guided by the judgment of his colleagues.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether this meeting would, under those conditions, be prepared to accept the principle of trusteeship.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that the difficulty about troops mentioned by Mr. Lloyd George applied equally well to the 371,000 troops on the Western front. He also observed that the question of deciding the disposition of the German Colonies was not vital to the life of the world in any respect. It was the determination of the pressing European questions which was all-important. They could address themselves to the solution of those European questions while waiting for a solution of the Colonial questions.

As to what Mr. Lloyd George was so kind as to call an appeal, of course he appreciated its weight; but his difficulty was to prevent the assignment of mandatories, if they were to be the Great Powers, from appearing to the world as a mere distribution of the spoils.

MR. HUGHES expressed the view that "trustee" was a better word to employ than "mandatory".

MR. MASSEY agreed that the public did not know what was meant by the word "mandatory".

BARON MAKINO enquired whether the principle of a mandatory had been accepted.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied in the negative, and added that the question had merely been adjourned.

(The Meeting adjourned until 11 a. m. on the following day.)

29 JANUARY, 1919.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 29 January, 1919, at 11 a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
President Wilson	Mr. A. J. Balfour	M. Clemenceau
Mr. R. Lansing	General Botha	M. Pichon
Dr. Lord (Mission to Poland)	Sir Esme Howard	M. Dutasta
Dr. Bowman (Polish Expert)	Mr. E. Phipps	M. Berthelot
Mr. A. H. Frazier	Captain G. Brebner	Captain Portier
Mr. L. Harrison		
Col. Williams		

ITALY	JAPAN	POLAND
M. Orlando	Baron Makino	M. Dmowski
Baron Sonnino	Viscount Chinda	M. Piltz
Count Aldrovandi	H. E. M. Matsui	
Major A. Jones	M. Saburi	
	M. Kimura	

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

Instructions for the Mission to Poland

1. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that they had met this morning to examine the instructions for the Commission that was proceeding to Poland. M. Pichon had prepared a text of these instructions and the British Government had suggested certain amendments thereupon. This document, however, proved to be too long, and Mr. Balfour had looked into the matter and curtailed it considerably, and reproduced a further draft instruction which was submitted to the meeting. This draft instruction contained the contents both of the original draft instruction of M. Pichon as well as the amendments made by the British Government.

(The draft instruction as finally drawn up was then read.)

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the last paragraph of the draft instruction was not suitable, and Mr. Balfour agreed.

(Consequently, it was agreed that the last paragraph should be omitted. For text as finally adopted see Appendix "A.")

BARON SONNINO said that Italy had some Polish prisoners ready to go to Poland and wished to know whether Italy should await the report of this Commission before the soldiers should proceed.

M. CLEMENCEAU was of opinion that they should wait, particularly as the decision would depend upon what was going to be done with the Polish soldiers in France.

2. Thereupon M. Dmowski, accompanied by M. Erasme Piltz were called in in order to enlighten the meeting as to the position in Poland.

Statement by M. Dmowski

M. DMOWSKI wished to know on what particular point he should first attempt to speak, or what points the meeting specially desired information upon.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that it would perhaps be best that he should say whatever he might have to say so as to place the meeting in a position to consider the question as a whole. It would be possible later on to take the various points in rotation.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated that he was anxious to know the whole case, but that the present object of the Allies was to assist Poland, as far as the Allies could, and they were certain that his views on that subject would be most interesting.

M. DMOWSKI then proceeded to state that the Poles had not been protected to any large extent by the Armistice, but two things did have reference to the situation in Poland. By Article 12 of the Armistice the Germans were obliged to occupy the Eastern Frontier until such time as the Allies should request them to withdraw their troops. And, secondly, Article 16 provided that access should be given the Allies to Poland via the Dantzig-Thorn railway. If the German troops had remained, under the terms of the Armistice, in the Eastern Provinces, their presence would have protected the Poles against the Bolsheviks; and if the route through Dantzig had remained open Poland would have been able to have obtained all the arms and ammunition and supplies that she might require. The revolution in Germany had prevented the carrying out of the terms of the Armistice, and the German troops withdrew in a disorderly manner before the Allies had requested them to do so. On their way they were guilty of committing crimes, and they carried away supplies and railway material with them as they went. Dantzig was situated within German territory and was in German possession after the signing of the Armistice. The railway from Dantzig to the Frontier of Poland (a distance of some 100 miles) ran through German territory, and since the conclusion of the Armistice the Germans had shown more and more hostility towards the Poles. Secondly, Article 16 was altogether a dead-letter. In order to make it effective it was absolutely necessary to occupy Dantzig and the railway line running to the Polish Frontier so as to allow of arms, ammunition and supplies being forwarded to Poland. Unless this was done, both Articles would remain a dead-letter.

3. Dmowski next turned to the situation in German Poland specifically. He stated that, according to German statistics, there were four million Poles in Eastern Posen, Eastern Prussia, Western Prussia and Upper Silesia; but, according to the Polish estimate, this number was five million. These Poles were some of the most educated and highly cultured of the nation, with a strong sense of nationality and men of progressive ideas. Even according to the German statement, in these Provinces it was admitted that the Polish farmers and merchants were of a higher standing than the German ones. As soon as the opportunity offered itself to organise themselves, these Poles established a Government by pacific means and then waited until the Peace Conference should have decided upon the status of Poland. All they desired was that Germany should not put anything in the way of their joining up with the other Polish Provinces. But this movement, as showing the aim of the Poles, rather frightened the Germans who immediately proceeded to take steps to suppress it and organised a special corps, known as the "Heimatschutz Ost", consisting largely of officers, with the idea of crushing this political movement. Troops had been concentrated in the Eastern Provinces waiting for the opportunity to attack. When M. Paderewski came to Posen, he was most enthusiastically received by the population, which remained quite pacific. But the Germans attacked them with machine guns. In consequence an armed conflict arose and fighting took place in the streets of Posen. The Poles were victorious and occupied the city and the fortress. Once that conflict had begun it was bound to spread, and it spread throughout the whole of the Province until the Germans were practically pushed out of the district. The Poles established a civic government which kept order without doing harm to the inhabitants: conduct very different from that of the Germans, possibly because the Poles were at home, or the Germans were in a foreign territory to them. Further, he reminded the meeting that the Conference had issued a declaration with regard to disputable territory. (see I. C. 119).[1] The Poles in Posen would understand that this declaration and this warning was addressed to them as well, and as it is their desire to stand well with the Allies, they will certainly respect it and it will make a great impression on them. But the Germans certainly will not respect it, but are continuing their organisation against Poland. The result will be that unless the Allies stop both sides (the Germans as well as the Poles), Poland inevitably must be crushed. The Germans have a great respect for the power of the Allies, and M. Dmowski felt

Situation in German Poland

[1] BC-9, p. 715.

that if they received a similar order to cease fighting the possibility was they would accept the same.

M. Dmowski added that German Poland had as much in the way of supplies as she wanted, in fact more than she required, as the German soldiers, on their return, had requisitioned food along the way to carry themselves on. But the other Polish provinces were starving for want of food. He compared Germany to the god Janus. Germany had one face towards the West, where she had made peace, and the other face towards the East, where she was organising for war. Her troops there were concentrated and out for war. She might have given up the West, but she had not given up her plan for extending her Empire to the East. As regards German Poland, he made one proposition only, and that was that both sides should discontinue fighting, and should be ordered to stay where they were. The Poles were extremely anxious to keep the rolling stock at present at Posen which the Germans were threatening to take away as they themselves were short of rolling stock.

4. Russian Poland found itself, after the Armistice, in a most difficult position. The nucleus of the Government, which the Germans had established in 1916, continued until the Armistice, but once the Armistice was concluded it could not stand, on the one hand because it had been established by the Germans, and on the other hand, because it was too conservative. The Government was then handed over to General Pilsudski, a member of the Socialist Party, who had become very popular as he had fought against Russia in the beginning of the war and afterwards had been imprisoned by the Germans. It was perhaps the safest thing for Poland that she now had a Socialist Government, because she had no arms or army to protect herself. On the one side there was a Socialistic Revolutionary Government, and on the other, a Democratic Government, which had established a revolution in Germany. Had this not been the case, the Socialistic Government of Pilsudski could not have lasted. As it was, his Government was in great difficulties, as there was a majority against them even in Russian Poland, but more particularly in German Poland and also in Austrian Poland, the two latter provinces being much better organised and more advanced than Russian Poland. But the greatest weakness of all was that the Pilsudski Government had no money. Inevitably, therefore, attempts were made to overthrow his Government, and even the National Council of the Poles in Paris was approached to aid in this object. The National Council refused because it felt that a Socialistic Government, situated between two extreme Socialistic Governments, was necessary for the safety of

Russian Poland

Poland at the time, and it concentrated its efforts on arranging a compromise with the Socialists. Consequently, the National Council sent M. Paderewski to Poland in order to establish a Government by compromise, his strong point being that he had so far taken no part in party politics. He was successful and formed a Government representing all portions of the provinces of Poland and also the main parties. We [*They?*] had, perhaps, taken too long to come to this compromise, but the reason was that Socialistic Governments were, from their very nature, not given much to compromise.

External Situation Generally

5. As already mentioned the German soldiers on returning from the Eastern front committed many crimes, but their worst crime of all was the fact that they assisted the Bolsheviks by leaving them their arms and ammunition, and also by allowing them to follow the Germans up in close succession. At the same time the German General at Vilna refused passage to the Polish troops. In this way the Germans were advancing the aim of Bolshevism to get into touch with German territory and so to join hands and make common cause with the Spartacist group inside Germany. Today the Bolshevik troops were threatening Poland and were about 150 miles from Warsaw. The difficulty of Poland was not the lack of men; she had enough to defend herself, but her difficulty was that she had no arms to arm them with or ammunition with which to fight. As evidence of the shortage of ammunition, he stated that the inhabitants of Poland had sent 8 million rounds of cartridges to Warsaw in order to assist in defending the country.

Ukraine and Eastern Galicia

6. The Austrian troops on their return from Eastern Galicia distributed their arms amongst the people, and, at the same time, were guilty of atrocious massacres, particularly of landowners. It was estimated that some 2,000 landowners with their families were murdered in this fashion. In Eastern Galicia, Ukrainian bands actually took Lemberg and held it for a few days, and even though they had been driven out, they were not far from the town.

Summary

M. Dmowski summed up the position by stating that Poland was threatened on three sides; first by the Bolsheviks on the East, second by the Ukrainian bands on the South-East and by the Germans on the North-West. The problem to settle was not the question of supplying Poland with men, but with arms and ammunition and assistance to organise their army. This object could only be attained by using the railway running from Dantzig to the Polish frontier. It was impossible to use the Austro-Hungarian railway system, as that system was not extensive enough

and it would take too long, and the question of assistance was extremely urgent. He suggested the temporary occupation by Allied troops of Dantzig and of the railway line between Dantzig and Poland. He further suggested that some agreement should be made with the Germans whereby arms, ammunition and troops could be sent along this railway line and the railway line be occupied by Polish troops. In his opinion it would be much better for the Allies to occupy this line in agreement with the Germans, as if the Poles were to do so the Germans might regard this as an aggressive act by Poland. If Poland could not be assisted and assisted quickly, she must be crushed and submerged by Bolshevism. The only way was to open a means of rapid and sure communication and the only sure and rapid route was that between Dantzig and Thorn. He expressed the opinion that there was not much fear of Bolshevism extending to German and Austrian Poland because those provinces were well organised and politically sound. In his opinion Bolshevism really was the rule of a despotic organisation representing a well organised class in a country where all other classes were passive and disorganised. In a country where the various classes were politically organised and enlightened, Bolshevism in the true sense of the word was not a serious danger. It was only possible where a country was passive and disorganised.

7. The province of Teschen in Silesia is occupied partly by Czechs and partly by Poles, the latter of whom are in a great majority. It was accordingly agreed in November, 1918,[2] that that portion of the country where the majority of the inhabitants are Poles should be regarded as the Polish sphere, and that portion which is inhabited by the Czechs as the majority, should be the Czech sphere. This agreement, which had been concluded by the local organisations, was approved by the Polish Government, but not by the Czecho-Slovak Government and recently Czech troops had entered this disputed territory. This act was not only one of violence but it was a dangerous act because if the Czech troops continue to remain there bloodshed inevitably must follow and much more harm might be done to the ultimate settlement of this dispute. M. Dmowski urged that the only settlement was that these Czech troops should be withdrawn to the territory as arranged in the terms of the agreement of the 5th November, pending a settlement by the Peace Conference.

Upper Silesia (Teschen)

[2] For text of agreement of November 5, 1918, see Commission polonaise des travaux préparatoires au Congrès de la Paix, *Mémoire concernant la délimitation des frontières entre les états polonais et tchéco-slovaque en Silésie de Cieszyn, Orawa et Spisz*, annexe B 4, pp. 27–31. (Paris Peace Conf. 186.3114/5)

8. M. Dmowski proceeded to direct attention to the anti-Polish policy of the Germans and referred to their anti-Polish laws, their prohibition of the use of the Polish language in the schools and their confiscation of the property of Poles. He quoted the special and powerful company which had been erected for the special purpose of colonising portions of Poland with German settlers and in that connection quoted von Bülow's remarks that the whole of Poland is an enemy and pointed out that Germany had employed means to influence both Austria and Russia to adopt the same line of policy. During the war there were two policies, one of annexation of Poland, but this plan was given up because there had been so much difficulty with the five million Poles in the German Eastern provinces, that it was felt to increase the number of recalcitrant subjects would only make matters more difficult. So the other programme was adopted of establishing a small kingdom consisting of some twelve million inhabitants and round it to place two other small states, Lithuania and Ukrainia. The latter two, in case of a German victory, would be completely under German domination, as neither Lithuania nor Ukrainia could, strictly speaking, be said to have reached the stage of nationhood. The national movement in Lithuania was not older than 40 years, and, although the movement had shewn great activity, the Lithuanians had not advanced so far yet as to entitle themselves to be called a nation fit to protect themselves and to accept the responsibilities and duties of the state. The same remarks applied to Ukrainia. The aim of this arrangement of establishing two small states was to split up Russia and Poland, both of whom were enemies. The whole idea dominating this programme was that by this means Poland would ultimately be strangled and submerged.

German Policy Towards Poland

9. M. Dmowski suggested that in reaching the settlement of the territory to belong to Poland, we should start from the date 1772, before the first partition. This did not mean that she must be reconstituted on the same boundaries as then existed, but this must be the point of departure and the boundaries should be rectified according to present conditions. France, Italy, Great Britain and similar countries owing to the statistics they kept, and to their well-defined boundaries, were able to state immediately what their territory was, and what their people were. But not so with Poland. In settling the boundaries of Poland, the principle of including within those boundaries those territories where the Poles were in a large majority, must not be accepted altogether. In the West, Poland could not be satisfied with the historical boundaries of 1772. For instance, Silesia was lost in the 14th Century, but today 90% of the population, owing to the national revival, had kept its language and was strongly Polish. For instance, 15 years ago,

Territorial Claims

Silesia sent a Polish representative to the Austrian Reichsrat. Furthermore, geographically speaking, Silesia falls within the whole territory of Poland.

(The Meeting adjourned until 3.30 p. m. in the afternoon.)

29 JANUARY, 1919.

PB-10

Appendix

Draft of Instruction for the Delegates of the Allied Governments in Poland

It will be the business of the Delegates of the Allied Governments to convey as early as possible information to their Governments on the present situation in Poland. The Military question and the Food question are the most urgent, but reports on the political and social conditions of the country should be sent without unnecessary delay.

The Polish Government should be warned against adopting a policy of an aggressive character. Any appearance of attempting to prejudge the decisions of the Conference will have the worst possible effect. The Delegates should invite the most earnest consideration of the Polish Government to the declaration recently made on this subject by the representatives of the Powers at Paris.

Every effort should be made to bring to an end the hostilities which are now taking place between the Poles and neighbouring peoples. Armistices should be arranged wherever possible and the Delegates should use their good offices to bring them about.

In this connection it should be noted that the invasion by the Poles of German territory tends to restore the German military spirit and to delay the breakup of the German army; and it has the further disadvantage of complicating the arrangements for German disarmament which the Allies desire to carry out with the least possible delay.

The Delegates should enquire how far the Polish Government possess the means to maintain order within their existing territory and of preserving it from external aggression whether carried out by Bolshevists or any other forces and they should study and report on the measures necessary to supply any deficiencies which may be found to exist.

The food question will require their earnest attention and they should co-operate with the Mission about to be despatched to Poland by the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief. In order to secure this co-operation the principal Delegates of the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief should be attached to the Delegation whenever questions of food supply have to be dealt with.

JANUARY 29, 1919.

307088—43—vol. III——50

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 29 January, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.

[PRESENT]

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

President Wilson.
Mr. R. Lansing.
Dr. Lord (Mission to Poland).
Dr. Bowman (Polish Expert).
General Kernan.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Mr. L. Harrison.
Col. U. S. Grant.
Capt. Ewell.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.
Gen. The Rt. Hon. Louis Botha.
Sir Esme Howard.
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey.
Mr. E. Phipps.
Major A. M. Caccia.
Captain G. Brebner.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
Captain Portier.

ITALY

M. Orlando.
Baron Sonnino.
M. Montagna.
General Romei.
Count Aldrovandi.
Major Jones.

JAPAN

Baron Makino.
Viscount Chinda.
H. E. M. Matsui.
M. Saburi.
M. Kimura.

CZECHO SLOVAKIA

Dr. Kramartz.
Dr. Benes.

POLAND

M. Dmowski.
M. Piltz.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

Territorial Claims

1. M. DMOWSKI, resuming his statement, stated furthermore that the whole territory of Eastern Germany was not naturally German but was Germanised, and quoted Von Bülow as saying what Germany had lost in the West as a result of the break up of the Empire of Charlemagne, she had gained in the East. He quoted Dantzig as an illustration, saying that though, according to the German statistics, only 3 percent of the inhabitants were Poles, he felt certain that at least 40 percent belonged to that nationality. As the Poles were mostly employees, they would be afraid of stating that their nationality was Polish for fear of being dismissed, and he referred to the fact that soon after the Armistice a protest meeting had been held by the Germans against Dantzig being incorporated in Poland. When the petition which had been drawn up at that meeting was circulated for signa-

ture, only 16 signatories were to be found, and of those 14 were those of officials. Ethnographically, the limits of Poland were irregular, and pointed to the fact that some wrong would have to be done East Prussia. Either a small island of German[s] must be left in the midst of Polish territory, or the large Polish population must remain under Germany. His suggestion was that the small island of German people should be made a republic with its capital at Königsberg. He maintained that it would be more just to expose a small Germanised country to infiltration by Poles, than to deprive all Poland of economic independence and to expose it to German aggression. Summing up the question of what is, or what is not, Polish territory, he said that a rough definition would be that such territory as had been oppressed by anti-Polish laws was Polish territory. From the point of view of the preservation of peace, it was evident that if the coast belonged to one nation and the land to another, there would be mutual tendency to conquest. This had been fully appreciated by the Germans with the result [that] was apparent in their policy, which had aimed at the gradual absorption of Polish lands, and pointed out the colonisation schemes not only in German Poland but also in Russian Poland, and in this connection he quoted Herr Bobel, the Socialist Democrat in his work *Die Frau:* "Our task is not to colonise Africa, but to colonise the Vistula." It could not be expected that this idea of absorbing Poland would die amongst the Germans. Therefore, he urged that the frontiers should be so arranged that Poland should no longer be exposed to this danger.

2. Polish land reached to the Dnieper and the Dwina when the union of the colonies of Poland and Lithuania took place in the 13th and 14th centuries, but to-day the bulk of the population of Lithuania was not Polish, though the Lithuanians were closely allied, so he conceded that the Eastern Frontiers of Poland should be curtailed and a large portion remain under Russia. Both Lithuania and Ukrania he excluded, and did not lay claim to these countries as part of Poland.

Eastern Frontiers of Poland

Finally, he suggested that the subject of Poland should be viewed from the standpoint of a League of Nations and he defined a nation as a race of men capable of so organising itself as to be able to express collective will and of organising its affairs both externally and internally. In a word, it must be able to govern itself and to oppose oppression. Tested by this test Russia, strictly speaking, was not fit for admission to a League of Nations, nor were the Lithuanians advanced far enough in national unity or ideals to be included amongst the nations. The Ukrainian State at present was really organised anarchy and the Ukrainians were not so far advanced

as the Lithuanians on the road to nationality. The great need in Eastern Europe was to have established Governments, able to assure order and to express their will in foreign and in internal policy. It was too early to think of Lithuania or Ukrainia as independent States. Therefore, it would be best that, if organized as separate states they should be united in some other state, and as the Lithuanians were closely allied to the Poles, he suggested Poland as the best state to which they should be united. All that remained East of Poland, he feared, would remain for a long time subject to anarchy. He expressed the opinion that in Russia there would be a despotism for some time to come, because the masses were too indolent and passive. They were able to be ruled but not fit to rule. The red despotism of Bolshevism would last for some time but the reaction would come and a possible return to Czardom with all its vices. In Poland they were afraid to [*of?*] the anarchy prevalent in the Eastern districts of old historical Poland and, therefore, they were satisfied to renounce these districts for the sake of preserving peace and order within their own borders.

3. Eastern Galicia was, he admitted, a disputed territory, but he claimed that they were unable to organize a Government and pointed to the fact that in the intellectual professions, excluding small farmers and clergy, there were 400,000 Poles and only 16,000 Ruthenes. They might be entitled to home rule but they were unable to create a separate state.

Eastern Galicia

M. ERASME PILTZ wished to associate himself with M. Dmowski as to the danger threatened from the Bolsheviks, and expressed the fear that if troops were sent they would arrive too late. The point he wished to express most forcibly was the urgency of sending help to Poland as soon as possible.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that the first portion of M. Dmowski's statement dealt with the immediate and pressing question of the Polish situation. The latter part dealt with territorial questions which would have to be discussed later on by the Conference. To-day they were only concerned with the first question.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Czecho-Slovak representatives were there to deal with the Teschen question, which is disputed territory.

(It was decided that the Czecho-Slovak representatives should be admitted).

4. DR. BENES, on behalf of Czecho-Slovakia, proceeded to make a statement as to the position of Bohemia, Moravia, and Eastern Silesia.

Claims of Czecho-Slovakia to Teschen Province

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was sorry to intervene to point out that the meeting was not dealing with the whole question of Czecho-Slovakia to-day,

but would have to enter into that whole question at a later date. They were dealing to-day with one narrow point, and that was the territory in dispute between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Poles.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he thought it was necessary to have the whole case of the Czechs as the meeting had had the whole case of Poland.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the only question which was the business of the day was information as to the position in Eastern Silesia between the Poles and the Czecho-Slovaks, and suggested that the statement should be confined to that point only.

M. CLEMENCEAU then requested Dr. Benes to confine himself to the dispute between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Poles.

DR. BENES proceeded to deal with this question at length [on] statistical, ethnological, historical and economic grounds.

(Full details are available in the Pamphlet entitled "The Problem of Teschen Silesia" submitted by the Czecho-Slovak delegation. Copies of this pamphlet are obtainable at the office of the Secretary-General.)

DR. BENES added, as regards the ethnological question, that his government disputed the correctness of Austrian statistics. For instance in the case of the town of Richvaldt the Austrian statistics gave as the population in 1900: 4,500 Poles against 11 Czechs; and in 1910, 2,900 Czechs against 3,000 Poles. This gives a clear idea of the manner in which Austrian statistics are compiled.

DR. KRAMARTZ asked to be allowed to emphasise certain points made by Dr. Benes and stated that he had always thought that the points of difference between the Poles and the Czecho-Slovaks would be settled by mutual agreement. To his surprise, the Poles invaded this territory, mobilized the male population, and even went so far as to fix an election day, and settled that the Courts should fall under the Court of Cracow. On representations being made to him by the population of that quarter, his reply was that the Peace Conference must decide the question of disputed territory, and that he had been informed by France and Great Britain that the Czecho-Slovaks were entitled to occupy the historical boundaries of the old Czech Kingdom. He had protested to the Polish Government, and has sent a second protest; but no reply was forthcoming. He was told that if this present condition continued, it was very likely the Bolshevist activity would follow, and therefore he had acted carefully so as to avoid bloodshed.

The second point he emphasised was the fact that the Czecho-Slovak Republic could not exist without the large coal area which was within the disputed area.

In conclusion, he stated that they had always endeavored to arrive at a private agreement with Poland, but this had failed. Therefore,

they now desired to place themselves entirely in the hands of the Peace Conference, in the full confidence that the Great Powers would not forget the great sacrifices which they had made in their cause during the war, and that they would not lose sight of the economic requirements of the country upon which the whole prosperity of the Czecho-Slovak Republic depended.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that the representatives of Poland and of the Czecho-Slovaks should meet the members of the Commission appointed by the Peace Conference to investigate Polish questions the following morning at 10 o'clock, so that they could commence that work of pacification and arrangements could be made in Paris immediately.

(This was agreed to.)

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed the wish to hear what M. Dmowski had to say on this subject.

M. DMOWSKI in a short reply, regretted that apparently the Czecho-Slovak Government had not been fully informed as to what was taking place in Silesia, and stated that it was not the Poles that had invaded Teschen, but the inhabitants had organised themselves militarily; not a single soldier had been sent from Poland. He suggested that any further movement of the Czecho-Slovak Army should be stopped, pending the decision of the Conference.

5. MR. BALFOUR suggested that the Commission which would meet on the morrow should also consider the question of supplying arms and munitions to Poland.

Polish Commission to Enquire Into the Teschen Dispute

M. CLEMENCEAU, in summing up, stated that the delegates would meet the representatives of Poland and of Czecho-Slovakia the following morning, Thursday, the 30th January, at 10 o'clock, at the Quai d'Orsay, and would report on the Teschen dispute as well as on the supply of arms and munitions to Poland.

(This was agreed to, and the meeting adjourned until 11 o'clock on Thursday, January 30th).

29 JANUARY, 1919.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held at Mr. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, January 30, 1919, at 11 a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

President Wilson
Mr. R. Lansing
Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. L. Harrison
Col. R. H. Williams
Mr. G. L. Beer
Prof. E. T. Williams
Mr. D. H. Miller

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes
Gen. The Rt. Hon. L. Botha
The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey
Mr. C. J. B. Hurst
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey
Major A. M. Caccia
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon
M. Simon
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
Captain Portier

ITALY

M. Orlando
Baron Sonnino
M. Salvago-Raggi
Count Aldrovandi
Major Jones

JAPAN

Baron Makino
Viscount Chinda
H. E. M. Matsui
M. Saburi
M. Kimura

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was intended that morning to continue the exchange of views on the question of the disposal of the German Colonies.

Resolution Regarding the Application of the Mandatory System

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had circulated a document (see Annexure A) to each of the representatives of the Great Powers. That document did not represent the real views of the Colonies; but it had been accepted by them as an attempt at a compromise. Great Britain had deliberately decided to accept the principle of a mandatory; but that decision had not been wholly accepted by the Dominions. The Dominions, however, were prepared to accept the conclusions reached in the document as a compromise, because they fully realized that there could be no greater catastrophe than for the delegates to separate without having come to a definite decision. It had been decided to accept the doctrine of a mandatory for all conquests in the late Turkish Empire and in the German Colonies.

But three classes of mandates would have to be recognized, namely:—

Firstly: Mandates applicable to countries where the population was civilized but not yet organized—where a century might elapse before the people could be properly organized. For example, Arabia. In such cases it would be impossible to give full self-government and at the same time prevent the various tribes or units from fighting each other. It was obvious that the system to be applied to these territories must be different from that which would have to be applied to cannibal colonies, where people were eating each other.

Secondly: Mandates applicable to tropical Colonies situated a long way from the country of the possible mandatory. In other words, territories which did not form an integral part of any particular mandatory country. For example, New Guinea. In these Colonies the full principle of a mandatory would be applied, including the "open door."

Thirdly: Mandates applicable to countries which formed almost a part of the organization of an adjoining power, who would have to be appointed the mandatory.

Finally, he wished to emphasize the fact that the memorandum was intended to deal only with those parts of the Turkish Empire and of the German Empire, which had actually been conquered. Districts such as Smyrna, Adalia, the North of Anatolia were purposely excluded. Such territories would have to be considered separately on their merits.

MR. HUGHES said that the Prime Minister of Great Britain had accurately set out the position taken up by the Dominions. The members of the Conference had already heard his own views and they knew that Australia desired direct control. But, Australia fully recognized that grave interests, involving the fate of humanity were at stake, and, therefore, he did not feel justified in opposing the views of President Wilson and those of Mr. Lloyd George, beyond the point which would reasonably safeguard the interests of Australia. He had indicated to the Conference substantially the position as it stood, because his Government had desired him to emphasize its position and its attitude towards it, and it had asked him to press for direct control. As soon as his Government had heard that the mandatory principle was to be imposed, it had asked for full details and for an opportunity of considering those details. His colleagues were to meet for this purpose that afternoon and he felt compelled, therefore, to withhold his assent until they had communicated their decision.

2. PRESIDENT WILSON said that, first of all, in unaffected good humor, he wished to refer to a question of privilege. Each morning in the Paris press, printed in English, appeared a great deal more information regarding the meetings than was given in the official communiqués. He re-

Press Reports of Conversations

ferred especially to the comments on President Wilson's idealistic views. It was stated, for instance, that, as regards President Wilson's ideals, he (President Wilson) did not know how his ideals would work. If these articles continued to appear, he would find himself compelled to publish his own views. So far he had only spoken to people in that room and to the members of the American Delegation, so that nothing had been communicated to the Press regarding President Wilson's views, either by himself or by his associates. He and his colleagues had been extremely scrupulous that nothing should come from them that implied that there were divergencies of view. For example, the Press had disclosed that morning that there was, apparently a Dominion point of view, and that the United States of America was in some way or another standing out against that view. If these articles continued to appear a public discussion would become inevitable, and such a public discussion would be fatal at this juncture. He himself was greatly distressed at these occurrences, but he did not know how they could be prevented. Nevertheless the time might come when he would be compelled against his own wishes to make a full public exposé of his views.

3. Next, to take the document circulated by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, he considered it to be a very gratifying paper. It made a long stride towards the composition of their differences, bringing them to within an easy stage of final agreement. On the other hand he did not think they could have a final decision immediately. Mr. Hughes, for instance, wished to discuss the question with his colleagues, who were anxious to know just what it all would mean. Mr. Hughes was not in a position to answer that question, neither could anyone else answer it. He could say that President Wilson said that a mandatory would work in a certain manner, but President Wilson's views had not been adopted. There were obviously other views but he could not say what they were. He (President Wilson) had in his possession a separate paper showing how the scheme would work in connection with the League of Nations, but that scheme had not yet been accepted. He had discussed it with Lord Robert Cecil and Mr. Balfour, and that day he would discuss it with M. Orlando. So far these were merely the exchange of general views in an attempt to arrive at a decision.

Constitution of League of Nations in Reference to Appointment of Mandatories

Furthermore, the difficulty with which they were faced was not to satisfy the Powers in that Room (France, the United Kingdom, Italy and America), but to satisfy the disturbed communities of the world, mostly on the other side of the Rhine. It would be difficult to harness these communities to any kind of arrangement. It would be impossible to drive them tandem; they must be driven abreast.

Mr. Lloyd George was disturbed with regard to the number of troops which had to be maintained in different parts of the world—troops which could not be withdrawn until Peace was signed. Even if an understanding could be reached with another country to replace these troops, the world would ask "Are you exchanging territories before peace is made?" For instance, it had been suggested that America should act as a mandatory. The people of America would be most disinclined to do so. He himself had succeeded in getting the people of America to do many things, and he might succeed in getting them to accept this burden also. But even if it was suggested that American troops should occupy Constantinople, or Mesopotamia, it was evident that they could not do so as they were not at war with Turkey. Therefore, it would, in his opinion, be extremely unwise to accept any form of mandate until they knew how it was intended to work.

To return to the immediate subject, could they take a clean sheet, and say that Australia, for example, would accept a mandate about New Guinea? How would that mandate be exercised? What would it involve? No one could give an answer to Australia. He could say that he himself had proposed various forms of mandate. He surmised that the character of the mandate would be left in the hands of an executive of the League of Nations, consisting of the Great Powers with a minority representation of the Smaller Powers. He imagined, also, that no action could be taken by that Council in the face of three negative votes. Should that system be adopted it would be impossible for any harmful conditions to be imposed upon the mandatory state. But that arrangement had not yet been adopted; no agreement had as yet been reached. He had been accused of being a hopeless Idealist, but as a matter of fact he never accepted an ideal until he could see its practical application. The practical application was always the more difficult. Mandatories might work unsatisfactorily under one programme, whilst they might work well under another. Therefore no one should accept the scheme unless it was shown how it was going to work. The mandatory system was not intended to satisfy merely the interests of the mandatory Power but to care for, protect and develop the people for whom it was intended. Consequently to hand over distinguishable people to a mandatory in perpetuity and to say: "You never shall have a voice in your future; you are finally disposed of", would be contrary to the principles of that Conference and contrary to the principles of self-determination accepted by it. For instance, if South Africa managed South-West Africa as well as she had managed her own country, then she would be married to South West Africa. Further, it would be necessary to define the methods of self-expression of the ward or people under tutelage. There must be a responsible body which would be in a

position to hear that self-expression and not be carried away by its sympathies. As had already been stated, in many parts of the world hitherto German, strong German influences might remain; but they were familiar with German methods and the body proposed would be most familiar with the German nature. However, his was merely a personal proposal and he could give no assurances that it would be accepted. But, whilst accepting the paper of Mr. Lloyd George as a precursor of agreement, it did not constitute a rock foundation, as the League of Nations had not yet been fixed, on which this superstructure would rest.

Therefore, he thought that the whole idea on which this principle depended should be put forward and then the Nations would know where they stood. Meanwhile, he would accelerate discussion of all these disturbing questions of the world which prevented Europe from settling down to normal life. The Great Powers had agreed that the League of Nations should form an integral part of the Peace Treaty. Therefore, it would not be accepted by itself, and to make the document presented by Mr. Lloyd George valid, they were bound to complete a preliminary peace. He thought that could be done in a few weeks. Disinterested students had been studying territorial questions on documentary evidence of every kind, working like scholars and basing their conclusions on acknowledged facts as far as they were ascertainable. If a map of Europe were produced showing the limits of the territories to be created, based on historical, racial and economic facts, the Great Powers could then sit down to consider these suggestions and give weight to those points of view, such as expediency, natural antagonisms, etc., which played no part in scholarly wisdom. They could then arrive at a conclusion quickly and be able to conclude the preliminary peace, and the League of Nations would thereby be established without the haunting element of conjecture. In every instance the mandate should fit the case as the glove fits the hand. In conclusion, accepting the document presented by Mr. Lloyd George as practically clearing away all prospects of serious differences he thought they should build upon this agreement the solid foundations which would carry this superstructure.

Mr. Lloyd George remarked that, with all due deference to President Wilson, he could not help saying that the statement to which they had just listened filled him with despair. Should that attitude be taken about each question, no agreement would ever be reached. If the delegates said that they could not agree to problem (*a*) until agreement had been reached regarding questions (*b*), (*c*), (*d*), (*e*) and (*f*), the result would be disastrous. Each of them had his questions (*b*), (*c*), (*d*) and (*e*) which he considered more important than

any other. Further, he would point out that it was only with the greatest difficulty that the representatives of the Dominions had been prevailed upon to accept the draft submitted, even provisionally. These gentlemen were not enamoured of the mandatory system: they represented real democracies and the people were solid behind them on this question. He had reminded them that they were not only members of a particular democracy but also members of a Conference which had met to settle the peace of the world. Consequently, they had accepted his proposals, but only as a compromise. Now, President Wilson had expressed the view that the mandatory business should not be trusted until more was known about it, that was to say, until the League of Nations was definitely set forth on paper. To this, the representatives of the Dominions would obviously reply that they wished to see it working and not on paper. President Wilson had suggested that they should leave the Colonial questions for the moment and take up those relating to Europe. There, again, they would be met with difficulties which would have to be settled by the League of Nations, so that the proposal really meant a 15 days' adjournment until a paper League of Nations was produced. He felt confident that what had been done last Saturday[1] in giving birth to a League of Nations was a reality. It had really been born. That he treated as a fact. Therefore, he begged them to accept it as such and to get to business. The suggestion that the constitution of the League of Nations would be completed by the end of next week, he considered rather sanguine, as it meant formulating the constitution of the whole world. How long did it take to lay the foundations of the 13 original states of the United States of America? How long did it take to produce the constitution of the Federation of the states of Australia? To think that a federation of the whole world could be produced in 9 or 10 days would be ideal. However, he was only pleading for immediate peace. It was not across the Rhine that his Government had to keep their eyes, but at home. At the present moment, the British Empire was maintaining 1,084,000 troops, including 300,000 British troops, in the Turkish Empire alone, and the settlement of that part of the world was, therefore, important. In conclusion he felt that if the delegates continued to adjourn questions, because they were not as important as others, no final decision would ever be reached. He sincerely hoped, therefore, that his colleagues would provisionally adopt the resolutions he had submitted (see appendix "A"), subject to such reconsideration as might be required when the complete scheme of the League of Nations was formulated.

[1] See Protocol No. 2, Plenary Session of January 25, 1919, p. 176.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that he had said nothing which need justify discouragement. He was willing to accept Mr. Lloyd George's proposals, subject to reconsideration when the full scheme of the League of Nations was drawn up. He suggested that the resolutions be accepted as an immediate settlement, and, if the premise added by Mr. Lloyd George were added, it would prevent any misunderstanding. Mr. Lloyd George said that the League of Nations had already been accepted, and that it would [be] necessary to turn to it for the settlement of various questions. In his opinion, that view emphasised the necessity to know the instrumentality which was to deal with these questions. It would be impossible to refer to an undefined instrument. He did not wish to delay any decision and he was ready to accept any provisional arrangement.

Yesterday they had listened to a discussion between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Poles, but it was inconclusive because there was nothing on the table saying what was to be discussed. M. Dmowski had said that Poland must be a barrier between Russia and Germany. Did that mean a barrier based on armaments? Obviously not, because Germany would be disarmed and if Germany was disarmed Poland could not be allowed to arm except for police purposes. To carry out such disarmament the necessary instrumentality for superintendence would have to be set up. That was the gist of the question. Therefore, he would urge his colleagues to press on the drafting of the League of Nations in a definite form.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the actual constitution itself of the League of Nations would have to be settled before the meeting of the delegates could discuss the Italian, French or Polish question.

PRESIDENT WILSON replied in the negative and added that in future only definite propositions should be discussed and meanwhile the drafting of the constitution of the League of Nations should be pressed forward. Yesterday, they had been unable to confine the discussion within proper limits because they did not discuss anything in particular, therefore he would urge that they should formulate the League of Nations as a final court of appeal. In conclusion he expressed his readiness to accept as a provisional arrangement the resolutions proposed by Mr. Lloyd George.

4. M. ORLANDO expressed his pleasure at the agreement reached. He fully understood the difficulties of the question and he raised no objection provided everyone was willing to accept the proposals, but he would like to clearly understand the situation. If Mr. Lloyd George's resolutions were accepted it would mean that all territories of Austria, Turkey, and the late German territories of Africa and in the Pacific, would be reserved to the League of Nations. He thought that was agreed.

Temporary Mandates

The League of Nations would administer these territories through mandatories which would reserve to themselves the choice of the mandatories, as well as the terms of the mandate, which would differ in each case until the League of Nations was constituted and able to give its decision. These countries would remain under a provisional *status quo* which was equivalent to saying that during the period between the decision reached on that day and the final decision to be given by the League of Nations, temporary mandatories would be established, subject to future changes, if so desired by the League of Nations. Was that agreed or was the *status quo* to be maintained, namely, a military occupation in virtue of the armistice, by troops (Chiefly British), occupying the territories in the name of the Allied and associated powers in accordance with the terms of the Armistice. In that case he had only one observation to make from the point of view of the particular interests of Italy. As he had already stated on previous occasions, Italy had only one simple and perfectly just desire, namely, that a proper proportion between the Allies should be maintained in respect of the occupation of these territories. Consequently whether a temporary mandatory were appointed or the *status quo* maintained, he would ask, and he trusted this would not be considered excessive, that Italy obtain its share of mandates or territories to be militarily occupied.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired what subject should next be placed on the agenda now that Mr. Lloyd George's resolutions had been accepted. From what had been said it would appear that everything depended on a decision being reached regarding the constitution of the League of Nations, consequently, the meeting would be bound to wait until the League of Nations had been established, and it would be obviously useless to discuss the claims of the Roumanians, Yugo-Slavs and others. If he had correctly interpreted what had been said that morning he felt compelled to make serious formal reservations. In his opinion it would be impossible to establish a League of Nations which was not to be a common organism of defence, but an organism to deal with all the world. Furthermore, if this new constitution for the whole world was to be produced in eight days he was bound to feel some anxiety.

5. BARON MAKINO expressed his satisfaction that a provisional agreement had been reached on the question of mandatories. As regards the League of Nations, he wished to state that as the matter was so important his Government was quite ready to associate itself with the work of this very important organization. Frankly there were difficulties, and his Government was not quite certain how it would work. But, seeing that it was a matter which was being very

Japan's Acceptance of Mandatory System

earnestly considered by the Great Powers it was quite ready to associate itself with this great work. Although so far his Government was not in possession of any official plan of the organization, he had had the privilege a few days ago of receiving President Wilson's exposition, and yesterday he had received the more concrete plans of Mr. Lloyd George. Yesterday he had telegraphed both documents to Tokio, and he had added that it was desirable that his Government should favorably consider the proposition suggested by Mr. Lloyd George. Naturally no reply could yet have been received; but since he had already asked for instructions his duty was to wait for the receipt of his Government's reply before giving his definite adherence. Meanwhile all he could do was to adhere to the resolutions *ad referendum.*

Australia's Reservations Regarding Application of Mandatory System

6. MR. HUGHES asked to be permitted to say one word on the matter as the question had now taken a new aspect since hearing President Wilson's statement. When the British Empire Delegates had discussed the question yesterday, they had agreed to the proposals of Mr. Lloyd George as a compromise. But the basis of the proposals had now been disturbed by what President Wilson had said that morning. He thought President Wilson had set out the case for Australia better than he himself could do. President Wilson had said things which he (Mr. Hughes) had been afraid to say; they were things which agitated the minds of the Colonies. It was proposed really to govern the fate of people by declaring that a certain principle should apply, but to what extent that principle should apply, or by whom that principle should be applied, or when it should be applied, no one knew. For that reason President Wilson had pointed out that the acceptance of Mr. Lloyd George's resolutions would not settle anything until the League of Nations had been created and clothed with authority and with certain powers, duties and functions. Meanwhile he was faced with a great difficulty, for he would have to say to the people of Australia not what he thought, but what he was permitted to say. For Australia the War had been a question of life and death, and still remained so. Now he would have to tell the people of Australia how the whole matter was to be settled, and they would ask, how? His reply would be that the mandatory principle was to apply but he did not know how except that the arrangements would be such that the scheme would fit like a glove to the hand. Having lived all his life in Australia and knowing the Australian temperament, he thought it would be impossible to expect them to accept a principle the nature of which was not known. A definite decision could only be expressed when they knew what it all meant. In conclusion, he enquired whether they should

wait the acceptance of the League of Nations by the Conference and by the world whilst they were waiting for a decision. Was not the *de facto* League of Nations already in existence in that room? He suggested that they as a League of Nations should act as the executive of the future League of Nations and settle the various problems which awaited settlement. This League should say who were to be the mandates outside the Polish question and impose their will on Germany. No League of Nations could be superior to the members of that Conference. Those that came after could only have one-tenth of the power. The world looked to them for decisions, and the world would breathe more freely if those decisions were made.

Canadian Views on Mandatory System

7. SIR ROBERT BORDEN expressed his pleasure at the fact that an agreement, if only provisional, had been reached. He was one of those who most earnestly desired the establishment of the League of Nations. He agreed that the future destinies of the world depended largely on it because there were forces in Russia which would manifest themselves unless some proposal of that kind could be accepted. The success of the League of Nations would not depend upon the machinery that might be created, but on something behind it, namely, public opinion, which would give it the power; the same power which steam or electricity gave to the machinery of a factory. He would beg them to be careful not to impose too heavy a burden on it in the first instance. Born as an infant it might develop as a giant, but whilst an infant too much should not be imposed on it. He had carefully studied the organisation of the British Empire, which was not unlike the proposed organization of the League of Nations, and he knew that the British Empire depended only on public opinion. Not one of the Dominions could have been forced to send a single man to the war; they joined in the war because of the cause involved, and because of public opinion. The League of Nations would have to depend on the same considerations. Therefore as far as possible, he hoped that the Conference would come to a conclusion on all proper matters with as little delay as possible. It would be for the representatives to decide forthwith whether they would themselves settle this question or whether they would constitute themselves into machinery to settle such questions at some future date. At any rate it was essential that the organisation of the League of Nations should be determined without imposing too much on it at once. It was well known that no democratic country attempted to enforce every law to its fullest extent as that would be impossible. Government by convention and goodwill founded on public opinion was the only Government possible; and the working of the League of Nations would depend on similar foundations. Therefore he hoped the mat-

ter under consideration would be determined as speedily as might be possible because the world was looking to the proceedings of the Conference and might become tired in face of any delay.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that M. Orlando had raised a very important question that would have to be discussed later on. He suggested that further discussion of the question should be postponed until the afternoon meeting.

(This was agreed to.)

The Meeting then adjourned until 3.30 p. m. in the afternoon.

Appendix

PB–11

Draft Resolutions in Reference to Mandatories

1. Having regard to the record of the German administration in the colonies formerly part of the German Empire, and to the menace which the possession by Germany of submarine bases in many parts of the world would necessarily constitute to the freedom and security of all nations, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that in no circumstances should any of the German Colonies be restored to Germany.

2. For similar reasons, and more particularly because of the historical mis-government by the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabia must be completely severed from the Turkish Empire. This is without prejudice to the settlement of other parts of the Turkish Empire.

3. The Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that advantage should be taken of the opportunity afforded by the necessity of disposing of these colonies and territories formerly belonging to Germany and Turkey which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, to apply to those territories the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the constitution of the League of Nations.

4. After careful study they are satisfied that the best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League of Nations.

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5. The Allied and Associated Powers are of opinion that the character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

6. They consider that certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory power.

7. They further consider that other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory subject to conditions which will guarantee the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the military training of the natives for other than police purposes, and the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League of Nations.

8. Finally they consider that there are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the Islands in the South Pacific, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the mandatory state, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the mandatory state as integral portions thereof, subject to the safeguards above-mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

In every case of mandate, the mandatory state shall render to the League of Nations an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

JANUARY 29, 1919.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, January 30, 1919, at 15 Hours 30 [1]

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

President Wilson.
Mr. R. Lansing.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Mr. L. Harrison.
Col. R. H. Williams.
Mr. G. L. Beer.
Prof. E. T. Williams.
Mr. D. H. Miller

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Sir R. L. Borden.
The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes.
Gen. The Rt. Hon. L. Botha.
The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey.
Mr. C. J. B. Hurst.
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey.
Major A. M. Caccia.
Mr. H. Norman.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.
M. Simon.
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
Captain Portier.

ITALY

M. Orlando.
Baron Sonnino.
M. Salvago-Raggi.
Count Aldrovandi.
Major Jones.

JAPAN

Baron Makino.
Viscount Chinda.
H. E. M. Matsui.
M. Saburi.
M. Kimura.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU, having declared the meeting open, called on Mr. Massey to address the Meeting.

Views of New Zealand on the Mandatory System

MR. MASSEY said that he found it necessary to say just a few words, because he had expected some fairly clear and definite statement from President Wilson with regard to the proposals contained in Clause 8 of the document which they had been discussing.[2] In that expectation he had been disappointed, and he need hardly tell the members of the Council, or remind his colleagues from the Dominions, that the matters referred to in

[1] These minutes bear the penciled notation "Substituted for Revised Copy." The text of the latter may be found printed in Miller, *My Diary*, vol. XIV, pp. 87–119; also in Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. II, pp. 204–228.

[2] Appendix to BC–17, *supra*.

Clause 8 were matters of the utmost importance to the people whom they represented there. They had repeatedly expressed to him that it was a matter of life and death to many of them. He would like to say that he had not gone back in the very slightest on the opinions that he had expressed on the first occasion when he addressed the Council. He knew the very serious, important and urgent matters that were waiting to be dealt with as soon as that Council and Conference could find it convenient to do so, and on that account he did not want to waste any more time than he could possibly help, or place any more difficulties in the way of a settlement. He was still prepared, as far as the Dominions were concerned, to accept the suggestions contained in Clause 8, which had been inserted there to meet the cases of Australia, South Africa and New Zealand. He would like to quote the last three lines of the Clause, which were intended to meet the cases of the Dominions, whose—"geographical contiguity to the mandatory state, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the mandatory State as integral portions thereof, subject to the safeguards above-mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population." The safeguards were as follows:—The prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic, the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the military training of the natives for other than police purposes. Those were the conditions, and, so far as he was concerned—and he thought he could speak for his colleagues in these respects—they were prepared to accept them. They were prepared to accept them right away, but they had not yet had any definite opinion or statement from President Wilson that he was willing to accept them. If President Wilson would say he was willing to accept them, he thought it would clear the ground sufficiently to enable them to proceed, and in saying that he was not suggesting in the very slightest degree any delay so far as he was concerned. The sooner they came to a conclusion on these matters the better for all concerned. He believed, as he had already indicated, in the principle of direct annexation, because direct annexation would enable them to proceed very much more quickly with the deevlopment of the territories concerned. He believed it would be better for the European races, and also better for the native races. They would be able to proceed with the education of the native races, not only in secular matters, but also in the principles of Christianity, which he believed were necessary for the welfare of all nations.

There was just one other point to which he would like to make some reference. It had been said by some of the previous speakers that the Dominions entered into this war because they knew it was

right to do so—because it was a good cause. That was only one reason. They went into this war because the Empire, of which they were a part, was fighting for a great cause—fighting for its honour—for humanity—for civilisation, and in order to keep faith with its Allies, and fighting for the defence of the smaller nations. There was also another reason why the Dominions entered this war—because they had confidence in the leaders of the Empire and their judgment—in their discretion—and, in saying that, he hoped that if it ever became necessary for Great Britain again to go to war, the Dominions would be officially represented as never before in the Council of the Empire. He would like to say that he supported the proposal of a League of Nations. He hoped and believed it would be a good thing; he believed it would do much to prevent war in the future. Members of that Conference had a tremendous responsibility so far as the prevention of war in the future was concerned. He believed that if war was not to be renewed in the near future—he meant from 25 to 50 years hence, which was a very short period in the life of a nation—they had not only to see that justice was given on the one hand to those who had suffered in this war—and there were many—but to those who had broken the laws of civilisation during the last 4½ years. He believed that would do more to prevent war than anything else. So far as he was concerned, he was responsible to his constituents, and he was prepared to shoulder that responsibility.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if he was to understand that New Zealand and Australia had presented an ultimatum to the Conference. They had come there and presented their cases for annexation of New Guinea and Samoa. After discussion among themselves, they agreed to present to the Conference that proposal. Was he now to understand that that was the minimum of their concession? That their agreement upon a plan depended upon that concession? And that if they could not get that definitely now, they proposed to do what they could to stop the whole agreement?

MR. MASSEY said: "No"—but he thought he had made himself perfectly clear. Of course he could speak for his colleague from Australia.

MR. HUGHES said he did not know how he could put it better than he had done that morning. He would like to say that Clause 8 of that proposal——

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired if Mr. Hughes had heard his question.

MR. HUGHES replied in the negative.

PRESIDENT WILSON then said he wanted to know if they were to understand that Australia and New Zealand were presenting an ultimatum to that Conference, and that finding the Conference

probably disinclined to agree upon the annexation of New Guinea by Australia and Samoa by New Zealand, they had reluctantly agreed to the modification of Clause 8; and that was the minimum of what they would concede, and if that was not conceded definitely now, they could not take part in the agreement at all.

MR. HUGHES replied that President Wilson had put it fairly well, that that was their attitude subject to the reservation which he had stated that morning. Like his colleagues from New Zealand and South Africa they were in favour of direct control. They found the Conference (as President Wilson had remarked) not in accord with their views. The Dominions had fallen in with the suggestion put forward by the Prime Minister of Great Britain. For the present that represented the maximum of their concession in that direction, but he would like to say: that he had put the position, as he understood it, for his colleagues, and if they were prepared to go further he would offer no objection. He thought it would be agreed that because they were unable to put any definite concrete proposal before the Conference, at least they should be asked to be clothed with those plenary powers giving them discretion to accept whatever that Conference was able to accord to them. Speaking for himself, with great reluctance, he agreed to the proposal in Clause 8. Beyond that he felt that he ought not to go.

GENERAL BOTHA asked that he might be allowed to address a few words to the conference. As everybody knew he was not a British subject of very long-standing and therefore his English was not so good as it might be. He would like to say that he heartily supported President Wilson with regard to what was in the papers that morning. When he saw the paper he had thrown it away. What had appeared in those papers was being sent by cable all over the world. It would upset the people of South Africa, as they did not understand the position. That afternoon he hoped to have a peaceful lunch, but in the middle of it he received a cable to return at once. They were there as gentlemen and they must keep those things out of the newspapers or it would be impossible for other people to remain there. He was of opinion that such an article ought to be investigated to see whence it came, and have a stop put to it. It would create a great deal of mischief.

He would like to tell President Wilson that he had understood that in the speeches which had been delivered that morning there was no threat. He observed that the Prime Minister of Great Britain had met the Dominion representatives and had discussed the question with them and he (General Botha) could assure President Wilson that it was only after very serious discussion, worry and trouble and through the influence of Mr. Lloyd George, that the resolution

had been handed in that morning. He was one of those who would give up everything to reach the highest ideal. Therefore he supported Mr. Lloyd George but he sincerely trusted that President Wilson would also agree. Do not let them stop at small things. If they could gain that bigger and higher ideal, then smaller versions of it ought not to stand in the way. He remembered that after the war in his own country, which was on a smaller scale than the present, but which was just as bloody and miserable, they got self-government; but he saw at once that four different self governing bodies in that country must lead to war. He was one of the original promoters of the Union of South Africa. He had his ideals and they were very high indeed. When he assembled all the leading statesmen he found then that the other people held views from which it would be impossible to persuade them. He had then personally investigated these and had come to the conclusion that these were smaller things. On that occasion he asked his colleagues to stick to one thing, to aspire to the higher ideal, and that was the Union of South Africa. They must give way on the smaller things. He would like to say the same on this occasion. They must give way now and get their higher ideal, get a better understanding and bring the people together, and through that they would gain eventually all the things that they wanted to get. It was a small thing on which he had given way after the war in his own country, but unless they had done so they would have been in a very miserable condition to-day.

He appreciated the ideals of President Wilson. They were the ideals of the people of the world, and they would succeed if they all accepted them in the same spirit and supported them in the manner in which they were intended. If they departed in an indifferent spirit it would not have the success that they would all wish it should have. Therefore, to his own mind, if they differed it was not a threat because at the back of everybody's heart there was only one idea,—that of attaining a better world understanding. Mankind looked upon them for support to do away with all future wars. He felt that by conceding smaller things they made the higher ideal more acceptable, and it would have the hearty support of the whole world. They must remember that their various peoples did not understand everything from the same point. In that light therefore they must guide them to the bigger ideal. Personally he felt very strongly about the question of German South-West Africa. He thought that it differed entirely from any question that they had to decide in this conference, but he would be prepared to say that he was a supporter of the document handed in that morning, because he knew that, if the idea fructified, the League of Nations would

consist mostly of the same people who were present there that day, who understood the position and who would not make it impossible for any mandatory to govern the country. That was why he said he would accept it. He hoped that the second document there was entirely unnecessary because the first document that was handed in that morning, was an entirely provisional one. They could not accept anything by resolution now on hard and fast lines; everything depended on the ultimate resolution. That was how he understood the matter, and he hoped that they would try in a spirit of co-operation, and by giving way on smaller things, to meet the difficulties and make the bigger ideal more possible.

MR. MASSEY said that the representatives of Australia and New Zealand had been asked a direct question by President Wilson. Mr. Hughes had answered for Australia and he (Mr. Massey) would answer for New Zealand. The position of Mr. Hughes and himself was practically on all fours up to a certain point. It was on all fours so far as the desire of their people was concerned for what they considered direct control—"annexation" to put it bluntly; but perhaps it was not on all fours after that, because Mr. Hughes had been communicated with by the acting Prime Minister in Australia. He (Mr. Massey) had not been communicated with by his Government and he had not communicated with it. Therefore he was prepared to take the responsibility of supporting the proposals contained in Clause 8. He wanted to emphasise that again. He wanted to assure President Wilson that if he (President Wilson) imagined that any threat was intended he had quite misunderstood the matter so far as both he and Mr. Hughes were concerned. As a public man he never used threats and he did not accept threats from any one if he could possibly meet them. However, he had made that point perfectly clear and he might go as far as the proposals of Clause 8 without consulting his own Government. He was prepared to go so far because he could not get what his Government wanted and in that case he was prepared to accept the next best proposal. If he found it necessary he would communicate with his Government and explain the position; but he was prepared to accept and support the provisional proposal put forward by Mr. Lloyd George.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would like to suggest, after everybody had made his position quite clear and when nobody was under any illusions as to Mr. Hughes' position, or General Botha's position, or Mr. Massey's or anybody else's, that they take that as a provisional decision subject to revision when either they found the League of Nations unsatisfactory, or that there was some other reason for revising it.

SIR R. BORDEN proposed some slight alteration in one of the clauses in order to prevent misunderstanding. Was the proposal in clause 7 to encourage the establishment of military or naval fortifications?

PRESIDENT WILSON said it was intended to prevent them.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN observed that at present it might mean otherwise. Therefore he would read the clause as he proposed it should read, subject to the opinion of the conference, as follows:—

"They further consider that other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory subject to conditions which will guarantee the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of the military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League of Nations."

PRESIDENT WILSON said that made it clearer.

(This was agreed to.)

M. PICHON said that France could not renounce the right of raising volunteers in the countries under her administration, whatever they might be. The Germans had recognised the importance of the support France had received from her Colonies. Before powerful American troops came to her aid, they had resisted with their own forces for a long time, together with the British Armies, and it was certain, but for the help they had received from their Colonial Possessions, the situation would have been very critical. It was necessary for them to be able to recruit not conscripts but volunteers from all colonial territories under French control. This was absolutely necessary for the future security of the French territory.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired if this referred to the territories controlled as mandatory states as well as the present.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the French were the nearest neighbours of Germany, and could be at all times, and had been in the past, suddenly attacked. He did not know whether it was possible to disarm Germany, but they would try. They knew Great Britain had responsibilities in all parts of the world, and could not have the whole of her strength concentrated at one point at a moment's time. America was far away, and could not come at once to the assistance of France. If the League of Nations and the peace of the world were to be established, it must not begin by putting France in a position of peril which would be much more dangerous for them than for any other Power. America was protected by the whole breadth of the ocean, and Great Britain by her fleet. If the French could not find any territories for which they would have to take the responsibility,

and on which they would have to spend money in improving;—if they could not raise volunteers without compulsion—then they felt that the people of France would resent this very much, and would have a grievance against the Government.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was thinking of what the position was in the French and British Colonies at the beginning of this war. Great Britain had native forces in Uganda and Nigeria and other places, and the French also had forces in Senegal and other territories.

Algeria and Morocco were in a different position. He was thinking of the tropical colonies. The only forces Great Britain had there were forces for the defence of those territories. That was equally true of France. France had not raised and armed and equipped great forces for any offensive purposes outside.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that they were free to do it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there was nothing in the clause under review to prevent that. The words used there were: "for other than police purposes and the defence of territory". He really thought that those words would cover the case of France. There was nothing in the document which would prevent their doing exactly the same thing as they had done before. What it did prevent was the kind of thing the Germans were likely to do, namely, organise great black armies in Africa, which they could use for the purpose of clearing everybody else out of that country. That was their proclaimed policy, and if that was encouraged amongst the other nations even though they might not have wars in Europe, they would have the sort of thing that happened in the 17th and 18th century in India when France and Great Britain were at war in India, whilst being fairly good friends in Europe. Then they were always raising great native armies against each other. That must now be stopped. There was nothing in this document which prevented France doing what she did before. The defence of the territory was provided for.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if he could raise troops, that was all he wanted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied that he had exactly the same power as previously. It only prevented any country drilling the natives and raising great armies.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not want to do that. All that he wished was that the matter should be made quite plain, and he did not want anybody to come and tell him afterwards that he had broken away from the agreement. If this clause meant that he had a right of raising troops in case of general war, he was satisfied.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that so long as M. Clemenceau did not train big nigger armies for the purposes of aggression, that was all the clause was intended to guard against.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not want to do that. He therefore understood that Mr. Lloyd George's interpretation was adopted.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Mr. Lloyd George's interpretation was consistent with the phraseology.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was quite satisfied.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would like to move an amendment to his own document. He said that he was sorry that he had left out one country in Turkey which ought to have been inserted. He did not realise that it was separate. He thought Mesopotamia or Armenia would cover it, but he was now informed that it did not. He referred to Kurdestan, which was between Mesopotamia and Armenia. Therefore, if there was no objection, he proposed to insert the words: "and Kurdestan".

(This was agreed to.)

M. ORLANDO said that the question he put was: With regard to the situation concerning the German Colonies, was it to be considered as the continuation of occupation *de facto*, or was it to be, after they had passed that resolution, a system of provisional mandate—German or Turkish? After having heard the discussion, M. Orlando said that he had come to the conclusion that the solution was to give provisional mandates. If that were so, he asked whether those mandates would be distributed by a further resolution of the conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied that the resolution did not deal with the distribution of mandates at all, but only laid down the general principles.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that was accepted. The question put by M. Orlando was then discussed.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he had a suggestion to offer. The maintenance of the *status quo* involved the difficulties which the Prime Minister of Great Britain had pointed out about the maintenance of large forces of troops. It ought to be possible by agreement among the Allies. He said that, because the United States could not participate at present, as they had not declared war against Turkey. By agreement with the Allies, the military control of those several parts of the Turkish Empire could be arranged as they pleased by substitution. Would not that be better than going through the difficult form of provisional mandate?

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that they were to discuss M. Orlando's proposal. His proposal was that as France, England and her Dominions had had their share, Italy wanted to have her own share. That was what he understood.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought the problem put by M. Orlando was one that they would have to face. M. ORLANDO said, either they

could leave things as they were—leave the mandatories to be settled by the League of Nations and the occupation go on exactly as at the present moment—or they could have a provisional mandate, leaving the definite final thing to be settled by the League of Nations; or they could now say they were the League of Nations and settle the business finally. Those were the three points and he would say quite frankly that he would rather face them at once, as he could not see that there would be any greater light thrown on the subject when the League of Nations came to deal with it or that there would even be a different tribunal—they would be exactly the same people; as a matter of fact, there would be this difference, perhaps—they might not then be able to have the advantage of the presence of the President of the United States at the League of Nations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that they could not accept the *status quo*. He wanted to put the British position again. The German Colonies did not matter very much, although the maintenance of troops in German East Africa was a very considerable burden. He could not say exactly how many troops they had in that theatre, but he knew it was a very considerable number. Coming to the Turkish Empire, he had handed some figures to the President of the United States and to M. Clemenceau, and he had also told M. Orlando that they had 1,084,000 men there. It was true that only between 250,000 and 300,000 were British troops, but they had to maintain the lot, and it was an enormous expense. The difficulty was to keep all these various tribes in some sort of peace with each other. If they kept them there until they had made peace with Turkey, and until the League of Nations had been constituted and had started business, and until it was able to dispose of this question, the expense would be something enormous, and they really could not face it, especially as they had not the slightest intention of being mandatories of a considerable number of territories they now occupied, such as Syria and parts of Armenia. He thought the same thing applied to Kurdestan and the Caucasus, although they had rich oil-wells. He did not think that they had the slightest intention of being mandatories even for the oil-wells of Baku, but somebody had to be there to protect the Armenians and to keep the tribes and sects in Lebanon from cutting each other's throats and attacking the French or Turks, or whoever also might be there. Therefore, he was afraid that they must insist (he was not using that word in a military sense but, from the point of view of those who had to pay taxes in the United Kingdom, and to propose it to Parliament). He was afraid however that Parliament would want to know:—Why should they keep 1,084,000 men there? Did they really mean to occupy the country? Why should they do so when they had no intention of having a perma-

nent garrison there? This question specially affected them, and unless the Conference was prepared to relieve them of that responsibility, he would really have to press very hard for a definite appointment of the mandatories, which he should have thought was the most satisfactory way of dealing with it. Then they could clear out, and leave the mandatory to undertake the job.

As to the remark made by President Wilson in regard to Turkey, Mr. Lloyd George said that he did not think that was a conclusive reason. Matters could easily be arranged with Turkey. It would not be regarded as a hostile act by the Turk. He knew he was not going to Armenia and Syria, and he also knew that that was going to be taken away from him, and the Turk would not object to the United States going there instead of the British; in fact, he might object much less, for the reason that the United States had not been fighting him for the last four or five years, whereas the British had.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated what seemed to him to stand in the way of a permanent designation.

Many of these mandates would constitute a burden—by no means a privilege—and a very serious burden, but while he should not be disinclined to see the United States get any advantage out of this war, he should be equally disinclined to see her shirk any burden or duty. But he could think of nothing the people of the United States would be less inclined to accept than military responsibility in Asia. If the United States of America, therefore, was to be asked to share a burden of mandates, the request would have to be postponed until he could explain the whole matter to them, and try to bring them to the point of view which he desired them to assume. That, if the United States was to be included in the request, would lead to permanent assignments. He would therefore like to make a suggestion. The question in the meantime was chiefly a military question, and he wished to suggest that the military advisers of the Supreme War Council should have this question of the military occupation and control of these various regions referred to them for recommendation to that Council as to the distribution of the burden, so that they should have something definite for the military authorities to consider.

(There was no objection to this.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this would clarify the question. The Secretary of State for War would be there the following day, so that he, Mr. Lloyd George, would be quite prepared to have it examined, say, on Saturday.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that his advisers were already there.

M. CLEMENCEAU said everything depended on the situation in Russia. The French had troops in the East, the British had troops in the Caucasus, the French had troops in Odessa, as also had the

British and the Italians. As long as they did not know exactly what they would do with Russia, he doubted if they could do anything at all. It was very difficult to recall troops.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that it was a question of redistribution and substitution.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that supposing the British agreed to withdraw from Syria altogether, he would like to know the attitude of the military authorities. This was a point put to him by Mr. Balfour.

PRESIDENT WILSON said "Or from Mesopotamia."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE added "Or Kurdestan."

He also said that they had troops in Persia.

Mr. Lloyd George, in answer to M. Clemenceau, said that he was prepared, so far as the British delegates were concerned, to examine the matter on Saturday with his military experts and that they would have them there.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether it would not be better for someone to formulate the question in writing for the military men to discuss, and present a memorandum to that meeting. If they brought their military experts there it would probably lead to a long discussion.

MR. HUGHES said there was one small point to which he would like to call the attention of the President. He did not like the wording "principle afforded by the necessity of disposing of these Colonies and territories." He did not think that that was the best way of expressing it. It seemed to be opposed to the principle. Therefore he suggested that it should be made to read "apply to" or "dealing with". It was a small thing, but it seemed to be against the general spirit of the clause, which did not mean the disposing of people at all. Perhaps, therefore, this alteration might be made.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the meaning would be the same.

Continuing, President Wilson said they had not yet adopted the instructions to the Polish delegates.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that they were going to have the reports of the people who were now considering the question.

In regard to the Czecho-Slovaks, there would be a paragraph to introduce into the instructions.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if those present were willing to hear the Belgian representatives in regard to the Congo.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Congo was not a German conquest. He did not know on what point the Belgians wished to make themselves heard. No doubt there were many other Powers who would like to be heard. There was the question of the Portuguese Colonies, about which General Botha would probably like to say a

good deal. There was a good deal that he himself would like to say about the Congo which would be very useful, but not at that Conference.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that they had got a big enough job already, and that if they went into history by mending the actions of previous Conferences, they would have a very difficult business.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that it was a little harsh to say they would not hear them.

M. PICHON observed that the Belgians had some claims to certain parts of the German Colonies.

(At this point the Belgian representatives entered.)

M. ORST said that the participation of Belgium in the discussion on the fate of the German Colonies in Africa was justified by the importance of the political and economic interests of Belgium in that part of the world, and by the fact that the Belgian Colonies in Africa were neighbours both of the Cameroons and of German East Africa. Also it should be mentioned that the Belgian troops took a considerable part in the fighting that took place in those districts.

He would like to say a few words about the international régime under which the Belgian Congo has been living. An exceptional system had been established between the two oceans by the Berlin Act of 1885,[3] in what was called the Conventional basin of the Congo river. There were two clauses which must be specifically recalled. Article X of that Act stipulated that perpetual neutrality should exist in that part, and the Belgian Congo State in execution of this has declared itself to be perpetually neutral.

Article XI gave the faculty to all the colonies of that hemisphere that belong to those parts to be declared by their owners neutral in the event of a general war.

So, when war broke out, Belgium had a colony and a régime of neutrality, which, by the way, was on a different basis from that of the Mother Country. They decided to observe that neutrality, and instructions were sent to the Belgian authorities which were defensive instructions. On the other hand, Belgium decided to act upon Clause 11 of the Treaty, that was to use the faculty of declaring territories of that area neutral all round. Belgium was ready to make a proposal in that direction to Germany, i. e. for the neutrality of all the territories of the conventional basin of the Congo River. But war broke out instantaneously there. As a matter of fact, the Germans fought in many parts, and very soon the

[3] *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXVI, p. 4.

fighting extended to the borders of East Africa and the Cameroons and on both sides of the Congo State. Very soon the fighting extended throughout the Congo State.

On the 15th August, 1914, Belgian positions were attacked. This was merely a proof that Belgium had no responsibility in the matter and that a state of war already existed in that part of the world, although she had done everything to maintain peace in Central Africa, as provided for in the Act of Berlin and that all these sacrifices had to be made on account of the hostilities in Africa which were begun by the hostile action of Germany.

The dangers to the Belgian Congo were great, because the Belgian Congo was not prepared for war. Belgium at once applied to the two Great Powers which were most concerned in these matters—Great Britain and France—and on the 19th September, 1914, they received a formal declaration from Great Britain, which was immediately supported by France, giving them an assurance of the integrity of the Congo territory. Another declaration repeating and emphasising this first one was issued by the French Government on the 28th [*29th*] April, 1916.[4]

The part the Belgian troops had taken in the war in that part of the world could be divided into three different actions. They had gone up the valley of the Skumbi [*Sanga?*] to the heart of the Cameroons until the end of that campaign. Then, with the French troops, they had occupied the capital of the German Cameroons. They had sent other troops to help in the defence of North-Eastern Rhodesia. On their Eastern borders, on the frontier of German East Africa, they had kept troops for 18 months, which had prevented the Germans from invading that colony. They had then advanced into German East Africa, co-operating with the British troops, and the Belgian troops were partly responsible for the taking of Tabora, the main town inland.

The question seemed to be settled at that time, but six months later the Germans came back and another campaign ensued, in which Belgian troops helped the British troops and drove the enemy across the frontier into Portuguese territory.

The effort there had been considerable. If they considered that while the British troops had been fighting in that part of the world the whole of Belgium was invaded and their effort in that direction appeared very much more important. The Allies fully recognised the value of the importance [*assistance?*] given by Belgium in that direction. What Belgium had been fighting for in Africa was the

[4] M. Paul Fauchille, *La Guerre de 1914, Recueil de documents intéressant le droit international*, vol. II, p. 112.

territorial integrity of her Colony. They knew that the Colony was threatened by the German schemes, which were fairly well known, but better known since the war had taken place. The Germans, not only by their enterprise but also by propaganda, prepared their way into that part of Central Africa. Their propaganda tended to show that Belgium was incapable of the administration of such a large Colony. They also said they had done more, when, after the incidents which everyone remembered between France and Germany in 1911, a Treaty had been signed which bargained for a Moroccan concession against some territories in the Congo region.[5] Germany asked France to surrender to her two "feelers" as they were called—two long strips of territory reaching from the Congo on the point where the Lobi river and the Sanga river joined the main river of the Congo. These two feelers were a direct threat to the Belgian Congo and it was now absolutely clear from the map that Germany contemplated the complete satisfaction of her ambitions by joining her colonies in West Africa with her colonies in East Africa through the Belgian Congo.

The French Government, more than any other Government, knew what the ambitions of Germany were in that part of the world. There was an incident which took place before the war between Herr Mogo (?) [*Von Jagow*][6] and the French Ambassador in Berlin, and which is recorded in the Yellow [*Grey?*] Book.[7] Herr Mogo [*Von Jagow*] made no mystery of the fact that it was Germany's intention to take the whole of the Belgian Colony when opportunity offered. The Germans in Africa had always been the enemy of Belgium and of the Belgian Colonial policy. During the war the intentions of Germany were not concealed. It was made clear when they thought they were going to win, by speeches, by articles in the newspapers and reviews, that the Belgian Congo was to become a basis of the future of the German Empire in Central Africa. At the present time the question for Belgium was the question of security. A feeling of security was necessary for further enterprise in those regions. They wished first of all that the Germans should no longer be their Western neighbours and especially that the points driven through French territory to the River Congo should disappear, so as to re-establish that vicinity with the French

[5] See Franco-German Convention of November 4, 1911, concerning Morocco, Great Britain, Cd. 6010, Morocco No. 4 (1911), and Franco-German Convention of November 4, 1911, on Equatorial Africa, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CIV, p. 956.

[6] Gottlieb E. G. von Jagow, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

[7] Document No. 2, *The Second Belgian Grey Book*, printed in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War* (New York), 1916, pt. 1, p. 420.

Government, whom they had always found in those parts of the world to be good and friendly neighbours.

In regard to East Africa the Belgians had made a provisional agreement with the British authorities by which an important part of that country was provisionally under Belgian administration. That country was of considerable value. It was geographically different from the Belgian Congo though the population was of the same family. The comparatively high altitude of the country made it possible to colonise part of it by white settlers. There were fertile valleys, good pasture lands and cattle, and all sorts of facilities for rearing cattle to be sent to the Congo valley afterwards in order to maintain the stock. Also it would be very valuable for the Congo State to have access to the great Victorian (?) range, which was a central attraction for the railways from the coast, and thus enabled the great central basin of the Congo to be within easy communication with the Indian Ocean. The natives have been very friendly since the occupation and there would be no difficulty with them. They seemed to be satisfied with the present administration. They were a superior race to that in the lower valley and he thought that they would be quite satisfied to remain under the existing authorities.

The claims of Belgium might be summarised as follows:—They wished that the former conquests made by the Germans and the points of the Cameroons towards the Congo should disappear and the same on the Eastern side. They had no desire for conquest, but they thought it would be only fair in view of all the losses they had sustained, and it would complete the Congo Colony in many respects, if they could be allowed to retain permanently under their administration the territories in East Africa which they now provisionally occupied. Belgium accepted the 14 points as laid down by President Wilson, and especially point number 5 dealing with colonial claims and with the legitimate interests of those concerned in that question, which was the title upon which they had based their present claim.

M. Pichon said that Portugal had asked to be heard during the last few days. The Portuguese Minister had been to see him at the beginning of the Conferences and said that Portugal would have something to say about the settlement of all those regions when the time came.

Mr. Lloyd George said that Belgium asked for something that they had not yet started to discuss, namely, who should be the mandatory. They were making out a case that they should be the mandatory in respect of those territories, a question which had not yet been reached.

President Wilson added: "to divide up East Africa".

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said Belgium asked for the most fertile portion of East Africa whereas they had not made good use of what they had on the Western side.

MR. BALFOUR stated that Portugal wanted to say the same thing. The Portuguese Ambassador had often been to see him in London, and among other grievances he had tried to bring before his notice, was the question that Portugal would like to have some part of German East Africa, and would also like to have a large British loan in order to enable them to exploit and develop the side they have had for centuries. He did not know whether all those points should be discussed there. He thought not.

(The question was reserved.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Roumanians wished to be present the next day.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that raised the question of the agenda and he thought it was very important that some sort of agenda should be formulated. He was not complaining. But he did not know that the Belgians were coming there that afternoon and they were putting up a claim which very specially affected the British and he found himself without experts on this question and without maps, etc.

In regard to Roumania, Mr. Lloyd George enquired if that meant that they were beginning the following day with the discussion of the territorial questions in Europe. He thought the discussion on Czecho-Slovakia and Poland the other day was absolutely wrong. He would not use the term "a waste of time" because that was a very provocative one, and he could already see the glare in the President's eye! At the same time he thought it was not quite the best method of dealing with the business. If they were going to begin to hear them in part, let them each make their statements before the matter had been broached at that Conference. Unless they began business with Roumania and considered her claims the next day, he did not think the Roumanian representatives ought to be present. If they came without intending to do business, it would be a waste of time.

M. SONNINO thought that the question of the Czechs and the Poles could not be considered as a waste of time. They knew that the Poles and Czechs were fighting and they wanted to stop that, consequently they had decided to send a Mission to Warsaw. It was their duty to hear the Czechs and the Poles with the least possible delay, instead of sending a Mission which would take a fortnight. If the Poles put out all their aspirations, that was another question.

MR. BALFOUR said that was their fault.

M. SONNINO thought that the talk with the Czechs and the Poles was very useful and if, as a consequence of that conversation, they

could decide how to put a stop to the fighting, they would have gained and not lost time.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that those present did not always share the same views. President Wilson had proposed that they should begin to deal with territorial questions. They began with the Pacific, then passed to Africa. Now they had come to Europe, beginning with Poland, because there was a pressing necessity and fighting was taking place there. If it were decided not to hear the Roumanian case the following day, well, let it be so; but they must have courage to begin with those questions one day or other. If Mr. Lloyd George wished to have another agenda, of course he (M. Clemenceau) was ready to accept his suggestion, but he only wished that suggestions should be other than negative ones. If it was suggested that they should leave out the Colonial question, that they should not deal further with Poland, that they should not hear the Roumanian case, then that would lead them to a *cul de sac.* President Wilson had given very important reasons why the discussion of the Colonial questions should be postponed for the moment. They had reached an agreement on the proposal made by Mr. Lloyd George that morning, and President Wilson had said he wished to stop at that stage for the present. Now, if they did not courageously deal with the European questions, what else was there for them to do? M. Clemenceau said that he expected to receive a report from the Committee on the Czecho-Polish dispute the following day, and it would be ready for issue the same afternoon.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was afraid he had not made himself very clear but did not object to Roumania being taken. What he said was that if they took Roumania they must examine the territorial question. That was what he meant. If Roumania was to be taken as a serious examination of the problem, he had not a word to say. If the Roumanian and Serbian delegates had come there for the conference to hear what they had to say, then he had not the slightest objection to Roumania being taken the following day, so long as it was with a view to serious discussion.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he had a suggestion to make, which at least looked practical. Discussions such as they had heard on the previous day he admitted were most instructive. His only objection was that they did not bear upon a single point that was in doubt in their minds. Now he wanted to hear the full Roumanian case and it was probable that an opportunity could not be found the next day. His suggestion was that the British students of the subject, and the Americans, French, Italians, and Japanese if they had a body of students conversant with those things, should take up any one of

those questions and find how near they were in agreement upon it, and then submit to the conference for discussion their conclusions as to what, for example, the territory of Roumania should be. Then they should submit their conclusions to the Roumanians for their opinion. By this means they would eliminate from the discussion everything in which they were in agreement.

Continuing, President Wilson said that he had on his desk the recommendations of the American students on all those questions, in a digested form, so that he would not be laying them before the conference as American proposals, but as a basis of discussion.

MR. BALFOUR said that the only observation he had to make was that he was quite sure that the President was right in thinking that a discussion among the experts who had studied those questions would be most valuable, and that it would tend to eliminate a great many agreed points, and therefore enable them to concentrate their attention on points upon which agreement had not been reached. He was not sure that it would not be wise to allow those people to have their day to explain their case. He thought they would be much happier, although he admitted it took up a great deal of time. He thought it would make a great difference to them if they came there and said that they would put their whole case before the conference.

The second part of his suggestion was that they should have representative experts there.

Mr. Balfour, continuing, said that with regard to the suggestion for allowing each of these groups to have it out before the conference with their experts, he thought that the discussions would be more fruitful, and they would know exactly what these people were thinking in their own minds. The Americans had done most of their work in America. The British had done their work in England and France. They had had books but more than that they had seen the representatives of these countries. If they could come face to face with the actual living feelings of the people concerned, he thought it would be beneficial. That is why he suggested they should have the Roumanians there the following day.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE added that Serbia must also be present.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then drew attention to a paragraph which had appeared in the "Daily Mail" published that morning. He said that it was really a very monstrous report, and one might have thought that there was a battle going on between them. President Wilson had called his attention to it that morning. In the afternoon he had obtained a copy, and he thought the language of the Presi-

dent had been very restrained and very moderate, and he was not at all sure that it was adequate having regard to the seriousness of the article.

PRESIDENT WILSON replied that he had left his profane vocabulary at home.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this article gave the impression of a royal row between America, Japan, Great Britain and her Dominions, France, and everybody else, with quotations from the speeches of some of the delegates which appeared in inverted commas, and which were correct. General Botha had already told them that he had received a number of telegrams of a serious nature from South Africa. They would get some in from Great Britain, and would have to give an explanation. It was a grossly inaccurate account, and yet one could see that it was accurate enough to have been supplied by somebody who either directly or indirectly had inside knowledge. That must be stopped.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he did not see how that Conference could be conducted at all if such statements were allowed to continue. In that case they would have to have public séances with speeches, which meant that they would never settle the Peace of Europe or of the Pacific either, because there would be no Pacific. What he wanted was a clear understanding that whatever communiqué was issued, it should be the only communiqué. The next thing that he wanted to know was what the communiqué should be. He hoped for the moment that it would give the impression of an agreement being arrived at so as not to excite further the disturbed state of the people in all those countries, because that was the way to Bolshevism, if the peoples thought that they in that Conference were wrangling and tearing each others' eyes out. They could say what was absolutely true, that they had arrived at a satisfactory provisional agreement and were examining the question later on.

MR. HUGHES enquired if they were going to put their decisions into the communiqué.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied in the negative.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that they should say that they had arrived at a satisfactory provisional arrangement with regard to dealing with the German and Turkish territory outside Europe. Then they should say that they had heard the Belgians with regard to the Congo, and that the military advisers of the Supreme War Council should make a report to the Conference as to the best and most advisable disposition of troops to take care of the Turkish territories that are now outside Europe and were now being occupied.

(This was agreed to.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then read the draft terms of reference to the Supreme War Council on the Turkish question:—

"The Military Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Versailles are directed to meet at once and to present a report as to the most equitable and economical distribution among these Powers of the burden of supplying military forces for the purpose of maintaining order in the Turkish Empire,[8] pending the decisions of the Peace Conference concerning the Government of Turkish territory."

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 31 January, 1919.

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[8] A correction issued on February 1, 1919, reads as follows:

After "Turkish Empire" insert "Trans-Caucasia."

NOTE:—This addition has been agreed to between President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau and M. Orlando.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, 31 January, 1919, at 3 p. m.

Present

America, United States of	British Empire	France
President Wilson	Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George	M. Clemenceau
Mr. R. Lansing	Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour	M. Pichon
Mr. Miller	Mr. H. Norman	M. Dutasta
Mr. A. H. Frazier	Lt. Col. Sir Maurice Hankey	M. Berthelot
Col. U. S. Grant	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.	M. de Bearn
Mr. C. L. Swem		Capt. Portier

Italy	Japan
M. Orlando	Baron Makino
Baron Sonnino	Viscount Chinda
Count Aldrovandi	H. E. M. Matsui
Major Jones	M. Saburi
	M. Kimura

Present During Discussion of Polish Question

America, United States of	British Empire	France	Italy
Major Gen. F. J. Kernan	General Botha	M. Noulens	M. de Martino
Mr. Lord	Sir Edward [*Esme*] Howard	Gen. Niessel	
Capt. Ewell	Captain Brebner		

Present During Discussion of Banat Question

America, United States of	British Empire	Roumania	Serbia
Prof. C. Day	Mr. H. Nicolson	M. J. Bratiano	M. Pachitch
M. C. Seymour	M. A. Leeper	M. N. Misu	M. Trumbitch
			M. Vesnitch

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

Poland and Czecho-Slovak Contention

1. M. Clemenceau introduced M. Noulens, the Chairman of the Committee appointed by the Great Powers to proceed to Poland, and called on him to submit to the Council the conclusions which had been reached.

M. Noulens said that the Council was well acquainted with the reasons which had led to the appointment of the Commission on Poland. That Commission had been requested to examine and report on the situation in the Teschen District, which

had led to serious conflicts between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Poles. It appeared that the Czecho-Slovaks, contrary to the agreement made by their local authorities with the local authorities of the Polish nation, had entered the territory of Teschen in question and had seized the railroad from Teschen to Jablunkau. As a result of these operations, the Czecho-Slovak troops had occupied the mining region and made prisoners of various Polish citizens: they had even arrested certain Polish delegates, who were on their way to Paris. The Czecho-Slovak delegates had been asked to explain the reasons which had led to the aggressive operations. The Czecho-Slovak delegates had explained that the Teschen District in reality formed part of Czecho-Slovakia for ethnological, geographical, historical and economic reasons, but in addition their Government had been forced to occupy this territory to prevent the spread of Bolshevism, which was rampant in the Polish provinces. The commission on Poland had at once set aside historical and ethnological reasons, and had endeavoured to arrive at a provisional solution, which would put a stop to the conflict between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Poles. The Czecho-Slovaks had been asked whether they would consent to the immediate withdrawal of their troops from the railroad, leaving the final settlement of the question to the Peace Conference in accordance with the proclamation recently issued by the Great Powers here and in accordance with the agreement entered into by the local Czech and Polish authorities. The Czech delegates maintained that the authority of Mr. Masaryk and Mr. Kramarcz would be compromised by the acceptance of this proposal, which would be in opposition to the popular will. The Czech delegates had also maintained that the Poles were incapable of maintaining order in the mining districts, and that as a result Bolshevism would spread into Czecho-Slovakia. Therefore, whilst declining to accede to an unconditional withdrawal of their troops, the Czecho-Slovak delegates had expressed their readiness to agree to the withdrawal of both the Polish and Czech troops provided the contested districts were occupied by three Allied battalions. This was considered to be a sufficient force for the maintenance of order.

The commission on Poland had expressed no views on this latter suggestion, feeling that the proposal should be submitted to the Great Powers for discussion.

The Commission had then proposed that the Czecho-Slovak troops should occupy the mining regions and the railroad north of Teschen, while the Poles should occupy the southern part of Teschen, adjoining Galicia. In other particulars, until the final decision was reached by the Peace Conference, the *status quo* would be maintained, in accordance with the agreement of the local authorities of the 25th [*5th?*] of November, 1918. These proposals could only be ac-

cepted with serious reservations by the Czecho-Slovak delegates. They feared that as a result of the direct contact of the troops of the two nations along the railroad, disturbances were bound to occur, and they made the counter proposal that Teschen should be occupied by one battalion of Inter-Allied troops with a view to separating the two contestants.

Summing up, Mr. Noulens held that if the Allies occupied the contested territory with three battalions, the whole difficulty would be solved; even if only one Allied battalion could be spared for the occupation of Teschen, a satisfactory solution would have been attained. If, on the other hand, neither of these solutions were practicable, he thought perhaps the Czecho-Slovak and Polish delegates might still be brought to agree to the arrangement above proposed for the occupation of defined areas by the Poles and Czechs respectively. There was, however, another solution, which he felt was worthy of consideration, namely, that an Inter-Allied commission be sent to Teschen, to remain there permanently until the final settlement of the question by the Peace Conference. This Commission would be required to supervise the execution of this agreement, and to study the statistics and data which would form the basis of the ultimate decision. This proposal had been suggested by Mr. Piltz of the Polish delegation. This Inter-Allied Commission should also be charged with the duty of controlling the exploitation of the mining region, and of insuring a sufficient supply of mining products to the Polish people. The Czecho-Slovak and Polish delegates had both accepted this proposal, and it was agreed that the Czecho-Slovaks, having control of the mining region, should furnish coal and a proportion of their manufactures, especially munitions and arms for the campaign against the Bolshevists, to Poland. The Czecho-Slovak Government should be requested to allow the free passage by rail to Poland through this territory of arms and munitions.

Finally, the Czecho-Slovak delegates had declared that orders had been issued to stop the further advance of their troops in the Teschen district and for the immediate release of all Polish prisoners recently taken.

(M. Noulens then submitted the text of the recommendations made by the Commission, which read as follows:—

"The undersigned Delegates representing the Great Powers deem it their duty first of all to recall that the nationalities who have undertaken the engagement to submit the territorial questions which concern them to the Peace Conference are, pending its decision, to refrain from taking as a pawn or occupying the territories to which they lay claim.

"The Delegates take note of the engagement by which the representatives of the Czech Nation have declared that they were definitely stopping their troops on the line of the railway which runs from Oderberg to Teschen-Doblowkas [*Jablunkau?*]. They similarly note that the representatives of the Czech and Polish Nations have agreed to admit that, pending the decisions of the Peace Conference as to the definite assignment of territory the railway line and mining regions which are at the present moment in the hands of the Czechs shall be handed over to Inter-Allied troops representing a force of three battalions, if the Associated Governments so decide.

"In case this solution be not adopted and always remembering that this is a provisional arrangement, the part of the railway lines to the north of Teschen and the mining region would remain in the occupation of the Czech troops while the southern section of the line starting from and including Teschen down to Jablunkau and Dublowkas [*sic*] would be entrusted to the military control of the Poles. In this case it would be desirable that the city of Teschen should be occupied by an Inter-Allied battalion.

"The undersigned consider it indispensable that a Commission of Control should be immediately sent to the spot to avoid a conflict between the Czechs and Poles in the region of Teschen. This Commission, apart from the measures that it will have to prescribe, will conduct the investigation on the basis of which the Peace Conference may form its decision in fixing definitely the respective frontiers of the Czechs and Poles in the contested zone.

"In order to seal the Entente between two friendly nations which should follow a policy in full accord with that of the Great Powers, the Delegates register the promise of the Czech representatives that their country will put at the disposition of the Poles all its available resources in war material and will grant to them every facility for the transit of arms and ammunition.

"The exploitation of the mines of the Karwin-Ostrawa district will be carried out in such a way as to avoid all infraction of private property while reserving any police measures which the situation may require. The Commission of Control will be empowered to supervise this and if necessary to secure to the Poles that part of the output which may be equitably claimed by them.

"It is understood that the local administration will continue to function in accordance with the conditions of the pact of the 5th November, 1918, and that the rights of minorities will be strictly respected.

"Pending the decision of the Peace Congress, political elections and military conscription will be suspended in the principality of Teschen.

"No measure implying annexation of all or of a part of the said Principality either to the territory of Poland or of Czecho-Slovakia taken by interested parties shall have binding force.

"The Delegates of the Czech Nation engage to release immediately with their arms and baggage the Polish prisoners taken during the recent conflict.")

President Wilson enquired whether the Czecho-Slovaks had consented to the furnishing of a proportion of coal and manufactures

to Poland, and to the free passage by rail of ammunition and war material for Poland.

M. NOULENS replied in the affirmative.

GENERAL BOTHA stated that whilst the Czecho-Slovaks had been producing 1,400 tons a day from their mines, the Poles were only getting 1,200 tons a day. The former claimed that Bolshevism had made such progress among the Polish mining population that it had appreciably raised the price of labour and reduced the output.

M. CLEMENCEAU, after consulting the representatives of the Great Powers, said that the third proposal was accepted. This proposal meant the sending of a commission to Teschen, to maintain order and to control the distribution of coal, etc.

(It was agreed:—

(1) That the part of the railway lines to the North of Teschen and the mining region would remain in the occupation of the Czech troops, while the southern section of the line starting from and including Teschen down to Jablunkau-Dublowkas [*sic*] would be entrusted to the military control of the Poles.

(2) That a Commission of Control should be immediately sent to Teschen for the purposes set forth in the recommendations submitted by the Commission for Poland.)

(The Members of the Commission for Poland then withdrew.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU then introduced the members of the Roumanian and Serbian delegations, who would present their cases in regard to the question of the Banat.

The Question of Banat

M. BRATIANO read the paper presenting the claims of Roumania to the Banat (See Annexure "A").

M. VESNITCH stated that he had not a written memorandum to present, because he had only been informed of this meeting at eleven o'clock that morning. He had heard, with regret, that the Roumanian delegation based their country's claim in part on the secret treaty of 1916.[1] When this treaty was being negotiated, Serbia was fighting on the side of the Allies, without asking for any assurances, in the firm belief that after the war settlement would be made on the principles of justice, on the principles of the self-determination of nationalities, and in accordance with the promises of the Allies.

As in the past, so at the present, and in the future, Serbia desired to live in amicable relations with her neighbours, the Roumanians. Roumania and Serbia had existed side by side for ten centuries and no serious difficulties had arisen. As regards the Banat the Serbs

[1] Treaty of Alliance of August 17, 1916, between the Allies and Roumania; for French text, see Italy, R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, *Trattati e convenzioni fra il regno d'Italia e gli altri stati*, vol. 23, p. 412.

based their claims solely on the principles recognised and proclaimed by all the Allies, and confirmed by the last nation to enter the war, the great democracy of America.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was not aware that the Treaty of 1916 had been secret.

M. VESNITCH replied that not only had the treaty never been published, but that as a representative of a power fighting with the Allies, he had several times asked here in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to know terms of the Treaty. He had been told that the contents of the Treaty could not be divulged.

M. BRATIANO stated that the discussion of the claims of Roumania had been begun in London in 1916, and had then been transferred to Petrograd, as a place where the examination of Eastern questions could be more conveniently carried on, especially in regard to Serbia.

M. PICHON then read the last paragraph of the Treaty, which required the maintenance of its secrecy to the end of the war.

M. VESNITCH continuing, said that Serbia had no pretentions to the whole of the Banat. Serbia merely claimed that part to which she had a right on ethnological grounds, where their race had a majority over the Germans and Hungarians, and an absolute majority over the Roumanians. He did not mean to offend his Roumanian friends when he said that Germany and Hungary had always shown greater favour to the Roumanians than to the Serbians, and the Roumanians had been allied to the Central Powers for nearly thirty years.

Under the Hapsburgs this very part of Hungary had occupied a peculiar position. The boundaries of military districts had been arranged according to nationalities. The regiments raised in those districts had been recruited by nationalities, but no exact statistics were available. Moreover, while both Serbians and Roumanians belonged to the Orthodox Church, the Hapsburgs had insisted on their religious administration being carried out by nationality, and though this classification had been made by strangers the results showed the justice of the Serbian contention.

Furthermore, for forty years there had been Parliamentary elections in the Banat. These elections had always led to political contests between the Serbs and the Magyars; but there had never been any contests between the Roumanians and the Magyars.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether any Serbian members had ever been returned to Parliament, and for what districts?

M. VESNITCH replied in the affirmative to the first question and mentioned Werschetz, Temesvar, Pancsova, Weisskirchen, Kikinda, Banat Komlos, as electoral districts represented by Serbs at Buda-Pest at

the outbreak of the war. He added that in latter years the artificial means used by the Magyars to manipulate the elections had brought about a diminution in the Serbian representation.

MR. LANSING asked whether the Roumanians had returned any delegates.

M. BRATIANO replied that violent political struggles had always occurred during the elections in the Banat in which the Roumanians had been involved, but he lacked any definite records as to the numbers of Roumanian deputies returned. He thought, however, three million Roumanians were represented at Buda-Pest by five Deputies, while the Servians had only three. The violence of the Roumanian political struggles could not be reassured [*measured?*] by the number of Deputies sent to Buda-Pest, but by the number of Roumanian candidates in the prisons.

M. VESNITCH continuing, said that as regards the violence of the political struggles they were in complete agreement. M. Bratiano's remarks applied equally to the Serbs and the Roumanians.

Since the Middle Ages the portion of the Banat claimed by Serbia had always been closely connected with the Serbian people. The manners, customs, aspirations, and traditions of the Serbs of the Banat and of the Serbs of Serbia were the same. At critical periods they had helped one another. When, in 1848, the Serbs had endeavoured to free themselves by siding with the Hapsburgs against the Magyars, the Hapsburgs had rewarded the Serbs by declaring the autonomy of a part of the Banat. A Voivoidia had been created with its own elected Voivod. As usual, the promises of the Hapsburgs had not been kept, but the territorial limits of the Voivoidia had been fixed, and the territory then demarcated was exactly the same as that which the Serbs now claimed. Historically, as the Isle of France was to France, and Tuscany to Italy, so was the Banat to Serbia. Serbian Renaissance had taken root in the Banat in the 17th Century; there Serb literature, art, theatre, etc., had reappeared; there the great Serbian ideal had been conceived. He, himself, entered political life there. In 1881 the young Serbians met there to discuss their new aspirations. The Banat had given birth to many Serbian leaders who had rendered service to the Allies, and carried their cause to a happy conclusion. He would merely mention such well known names as Pirdrik, Pashek, the greatest authority on financial questions, Nicholvitch, Porpish [*Pupin?*] of Columbia University, and the present Rector of the University of Belgrade. As a further proof of the close attachment between the Serbians of Serbia and the Banat, he called attention to the fact that the Royal Family, when exiled, had found an asylum there.

He submitted in addition two supplementary arguments. In his country, lying on the border land between Christendom and Islam, the monasteries played a prominent part as a civilising agency, all of which were Serbian. Further, all real estates were still to this day in the hands of the Serbians, in spite of the efforts made by the Germans and Hungarians to dispossess them.

So far, he had presented merely the Serbian point of view, and he had not referred to the question of the frontiers. In dealing with this question both the interests of Serbia and the general interest must be considered. He was glad to say that from the Serbian point of view the two questions were identic. During the war the Serbian General Staff had realised that a successful offensive could only be made along the valley of the Morawa. As long as the Austrians had failed to attack along this line, the Serbians were able to resist successfully. But finally when the German General Staff assumed the leadership, and attacked down the Valley of the Morawa, further defence became impossible.

In conclusion he thought that if guarantees for future peace were required the proper protection of this feeble strategic point must be assured. He felt sure the Conference would consider favourably the just claims and aspirations of the Serbs, and coordinate these aspirations with the general interests of the world, and of civilisation, with which he felt confident they would be found to agree.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether the Serbian Representatives were in a position to give any figures. So far, only a general statement had been made but no statistics of populations by nationalities had been given.

M. VESNITCH replied that he was quite ready to supply the figures, but had not brought them with him.

M. PASHITCH asked permission to lay on the table an official map dated 1853, prepared at the time when the Banat Voivoidia had been created. This map clearly showed the parts then belonging to Serbia and to Roumania. It would be seen that in the eastern portion, the population was chiefly Roumanian, whereas in the western part the Serbians were predominant. Between the two, the population was very mixed, because it had always been the policy of Austria to prevent the expression of national feeling by the introduction of emigrants. Notwithstanding this, it was extremely easy to find, between these two territories, the just line of demarcation, based on grounds of nationality. In conclusion, he would add that a paper setting forth the Serbian case had been prepared and would be submitted in due course.

M. BRATIANO invited attention to the fact that though sentimental reasons, such as the statement that some great men had left one coun-

try to settle in another, deserved some recognition, it would, as a rule, be extremely unwise for statesmen to be influenced by such facts. It was with some emotion that he had heard the statement that the Royal Karageorgevitch family had taken refuge in the Temesvar. He thought that that hardly constituted a claim to the acquisition of that territory by Serbia, otherwise the whole of Roumania might as well be claimed by Serbia, since many of the members of the Royal families of Obrenovitch and Karageorgevitch had taken refuge in Roumania, and even M. Pashitch himself, when the situation in Serbia was somewhat dangerous, had made his home in Roumania. Furthermore, the convent question could establish no right, since the fact that many of the convents in the Banat were inhabited by Serbs was due to the religious leanings of the Slavs as a race. Thus, even in Roumania itself, many of the convents would be found to be occupied by more Serbs than Roumanians. Further, he wished to point out that the provisional partition of the Banat in 1848 by the granting of autonomy to the Voivoidia lasted theoretically for a period of ten years only. Moreover, Roumania had also taken part in the struggles for independence, but the tendency of the Hapsburg Government had always been to favour the Yugo-Slavs because they had stood by them in their wars against the Magyars.

Stress had been laid upon the secret character of the treaty of 1916. Though the treaty may have been secret, its consequences were not secret, since that treaty had permitted the maintenance at Salonika of an army of occupation, which had led to the results known by all.

M. TRUMBITCH asked permission to add a few words to M. Vesnitch's statement. As regards the secret treaty he wished to declare most emphatically in the name of Serbia, as well as in the name of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, that the treaty had been negotiated without Serbia's knowledge, and consequently Serbia refused to recognise it. Therefore, the problem must be discussed on another basis. In the first place, it was essential to define the objects of the discussion. Obviously there existed a territory which was in dispute between the Roumanians and the Serbo-Croat-Slovenes, namely, the Banat. M. Bratiano had talked about the whole of the Banat which included three comitats:—Torontal, Temesvar, and Krasnow (?) [*Krassó-Szörény*]. Now, the Serbians did not claim all three comitats: they merely claimed Torontal in the West of the Banat, Temesvar in the centre, and a small part of the Krasnow [*Krassó-Szörény*] comitat. They were prepared to admit that all the Eastern part of the Banat was Roumanian. Therefore, he had nothing to say about that territory. The Serbs recognised Roumania's claims to that territory, which was inhabited by Roumanians, so that

the principle of nationality could be applied. Consequently the question only dealt with two comitats, the claims of which were based on population and territory. As regards the population, everyone would agree that in those two comitats the inhabitants did not all belong to one nationality. There were Magyars, Germans, Serbs and Roumanians. The Magyars and Germans were enemies. The Germans were colonists living far from their own country and consequently they could possess no sovereign claims. Consequently it could positively be stated that the Germans must remain under the Sovereignty of the country that would own that territory. The Magyars who inhabited the Banat were separated from Magyaria, and the Serbs and the Roumanians possessed the same rights and claims to ownership. In addition, he fully admitted that the wishes of all the people should be considered, not only those of the Serbs and Roumanians, but those of others also; because the question of future peace was involved and it was essential to ensure contentment to all the peoples. The Serbs thought that they were justified in claiming the two comitats not only on account of nationality, but also because the population itself would be pleased to form part of their State. The reason for this would also be made apparent by a study of the topographical situation. The Germans and the Magyars would obviously prefer to belong to a State which was situated along the Danube, whose Capital was on the Danube, and towards which river the people gravitated. Their economic and social interests were such that the Germans and the Magyars who were very numerous, would prefer to belong to Serbia, consequently the Serbs rested their claims not only on nationality, but also on the will of the people. Should the Great Powers decide to have a referendum on this question, Serbia would certainly agree.

The two comitats were bounded on the North by the River Maros, on the West by the River Theiss, on the South by the Danube and on the West [*East*] by a line east of Temesvar and Werschetz. Hungarian statistics, which were never favourable to the Serbs, gave the following figures of population in the two comitats:—

Roumanians	266,000
Germans	328,560
Magyars	251,000
Serbs	272,000

These were official statistics and they showed that the four nationalities were equally represented. The Serbs, however, were in the majority in the South and West, that is to say, in the territories of the Theiss, Danube and Maros. The above figures showed no great preponderance in favour of any nationality. Consequently the problem must be solved on other grounds than those of the principle

of nationality. For this purpose he thought in the first place the will and wishes of the people themselves should be considered, because the people were always fully alive to their own interests and were prepared to give them their full value.

The whole of the valley from the Maros to the Danube constituted the natural continuation of Serbia. That would explain why, in history, Serbs, when unhappy in Serbia, especially during the period of Turkish misrule, emigrated to the Banat and there created a new Serb centre of civilisation. When the Serbs began their struggle for independence it was the Serbs of the Banat who first fought for the cause of the first Karageorge; and in 1849, when the Magyars attempted to crush the Serbs in the Banat, the Serbs of Serbia rushed to their rescue and they fought side by side, just as they had done in the last war. Though the Danube divided the territories into two, it did not divide the nationality, the civilisation, or the traditions of the Serbs on either side, and they could not now when victory had been achieved, after a struggle lasting so many centuries, abandon their brothers on the other side of the Danube.

The Serbs were anxious to establish good relations with the Roumanians. With the exception of the Banat problem, for which a solution must be found, the two countries had no differences. If the Roumanians wanted the Danube and the Theiss as their frontiers no agreement could possibly be reached. During this war of liberation Roumania had suffered bitterly, but it must not be forgotten that Serbia in particular and Yugo-Slavia in general, had also suffered heavy losses. And for this reason the Serbs insisted on the recognition of their claims to the two comitats. These claims meant no injustice to Roumania, for the Banat was a continuation of Serbia and Yugo-Slavia, whilst between Roumania and the Banat claimed by Serbia, stretched a chain of mountains the importance of which in the settlement of this question could not be overlooked.

M. Bratiano apologised for having to address the meeting a third time. He was compelled to do so as the Roumanians had only two representatives to pit against the three representatives of Serbia. M. Trumbitch had explained the situation of the population in the Banat, and he had proposed to divide the territory into two parts, giving the mountainous portion with its mines and forests to Roumania, whilst allotting to the Serbs the industrial areas of Temesvar and the agricultural districts of Torontal. As regards the figures relating to the two comitats, given by M. Trumbitch, it would be remembered that the Germans and Magyars were twice as numerous as either the Serbs or Roumanians. The only possibility of applying the ethnical test was to consider the Banat as a whole, because on ethnical grounds it would be impossible to justify the placing of

580,000 Germans and Magyars under the control of 272,000 Serbs. Therefore, the Banat could not be divided into two for ethnical reasons. Similarly it would be easy to say that economically it would be unsound to separate the mines and forests from the commercial, industrial and agricultural regions. In the course of history the frontiers of the Banat had never been changed except on the Roumanian side because on that side no real frontier existed between the Banat and Wallachia. On the other frontiers no changes had ever occurred except during the ten years which covered the period of the existence in theory of the Voivoidia. Consequently, politically the Banat formed part of Roumania. Furthermore, the idea of separating the two fertile districts of the Banat from the mountainous one, where the population would be left without food resources, would be impossible, since the population of the latter would thereby be compelled to emigrate.

To sum up, for the populations inhabiting those regions, the work which the Conference was now called upon to carry out could be compared with that of an Inter-Allied Commission (had such a Commission then been possible) appointed in the time of Charlemagne to adjudicate on the question of the Rhine. Had the Commission at that time decided that the Rhine should form the boundary between Germany and France, what untold benefits might have been conferred on the world, what influence such a decision might have had on the events leading up to the present war. That Conference was now in the same way settling the future of Eastern Europe. The use of the Danube was essential for the development of civilisation. The Danube could alone form the only real boundary of everlasting friendship. That being his conviction he would, in conclusion, invite the attention of the Great Powers to the dangerous situation now existing in the Banat which called for immediate action. The Serbian troops occupying the Banat were in open strife with the Roumanian population, and if the real wishes of the peoples must be known, the first step must be the removal of the Serbian troops and their replacement by Allied troops who could hold the scales evenly between the various peoples. This course was urgent, as serious developments might otherwise take place.

M. Clemenceau enquired from M. Bratiano whether he would agree to the general principle of the referendum.

M. Bratiano replied that he considered the question already settled. He had insisted on the Banat being dealt with as a whole, and he could not agree to any partition of the area. If a referendum were insisted on, he would require time for consideration, although at the moment he would not oppose the proposal.

M. VESNITCH expressed his regret that M. Bratiano had thought it necessary to raise the question of the actual occupation of the Banat by Serbian troops. If the French Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in the East had ordered the Serbian troops to occupy that territory, the welcome that Army had received was sufficient proof that the decision taken had been a good one. At any rate, Serbia was not to blame if Roumania had not entered the Banat either now or in 1916.

(The Roumanian and Serbian Delegates then withdrew.)

The meeting adjourned until Saturday, 1st February, at 3–0 p. m.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 1 February, 1919.

Annexure to IC–129 [BC–19]

[*Statement by M. J. Bratiano, of the Roumanian Delegation*]

THE QUESTION OF THE BANAT

The task of setting forth Roumania's rights to the Banat is greatly facilitated by the fact that this question was considered by our three great European Allies during the weighty discussions which took place before the Treaty of Alliance of 17th August, 1916, and that this Treaty, which was signed by them, recognises the validity of our claim.

We have complete confidence in the support which the said signatory Powers will grant in demonstrating our just claim to the two great non-European Powers who took no part in the examination of this question in 1916 and who may, therefore, be ignorant of the principles thereof.

These claims are based on the principle of ethnology, and are put forward in virtue of our right to national unity.

This principle should, however, be in accordance with other requirements of national life, which it is impossible to dissociate from the territorial conditions amongst which a nation has evolved.

Those desirous of assuring the future of Eastern Europe must face the problem of uniting these two principles. Our claims with regard to the Banat are based on the solution of this problem.

THE QUESTION OF THE BANAT OF TEMESVAR

Nobody can think of denying Roumania the right to claim political union with a territory which has been inhabited for many centuries by Roumanians and where they number 600,000, as against less than 400,000 Germans, who settled in the district in the 18th century, and

rather more than 300,000 Serbs, who immigrated in the 15th and especially in the 18th centuries, to mention only the ethnical units of most importance.

But it has been imagined that a distinction might be drawn in the Banat between the districts where the Roumanian population is absolutely in the majority and those in which it constitutes only a relative majority or an important minority; it has been thought that it might be possible to trace a State frontier line across the plain of the Banat between the Roumanians on the East, who would be re-united to the Kingdom of Roumania, and the non-Roumanians on the West, who would become subjects of the Serbian State; the Roumanian Government considers this a dangerous error.

The Banat is not a geographical term, it is a reality, a real geographical region and also a real political province forming at the present day, as it has done throughout the ages, a complete and indivisible whole. It is, in fact, difficult to conceive that any State can claim or accept one portion only of the country, and still more difficult to expect that, once in possession of that portion, it would be able to withstand the necessity of soon claiming the whole country.

The waterways which surround the Banat on three sides (the Maros, Theiss and Danube) form a natural frontier which bounds a region of plains on the West and a mountainous district to the East, which are closely interconnected. It is the plain of the Banat which yields the necessary food supplies for the inhabitants of the mountains; whilst the people of the hill country send the plain dwellers their wealth of timber and minerals. The rich plains, which are comparatively sparsely populated, draw their indispensable supplies of labour and settlers from the mountains; the plain and the mountains cannot exist apart from one another.

All the systems of communication, whether by road, rail, or water, are organised in the Banat for the whole province, and if a State frontier were drawn which would cut them asunder, all efforts made in this region since the 18th century to establish the means of communication indispensable to economic welfare, would be rendered ineffective.

The navigable rivers and canals traversing the plain carry the heavy produce of the mountains on the East to the Theiss and the Danube; a division of the Banat would leave the Roumanians the upper courses of the rivers and give the Serbs the lower reaches and the canals, which would result in ruining the very advantages of the natural situation of the Banat between its three waterways, by cutting off one entire part of the country from free access to the Danube and the Theiss.

Transylvania itself, where the Maros is the one great waterway intersecting the country and penetrating into the heart of its mountains, would be deprived of one of its most necessary outlets. The produce of its forests and mines normally descends the Maros and Theiss to the Danube and thence to the sea, but a Serbo-Roumanian frontier would stop its course below the Lower Maros.

No useful purpose would be served by solemnly affirming, or even guaranteeing *de facto*, freedom of navigation on all the waterways, streams, rivers and canals. Navigation requires something more than this—i. e. technical organisation, depôts and warehouses, mechanical, commercial, and industrial installations—in order to preserve, manufacture, distribute, work up or convert the produce at the most suitable points and under the most favourable conditions.

The river trade of Transylvania and the Banat would naturally find all those advantages on the Roumanian banks of the Theiss and Danube; it would be useless to expect them from a foreign State for the products of another State.

But if, notwithstanding everything, the Banat were to be cut in two by a frontier on imaginary ethnographical lines, this would be impossible except by disturbing the necessary balance in every direction.

Even in the region where the Serbs are numerous, large groups of Roumanians are interspersed among them, as well as German colonies which cannot be reunited politically to any other State of the same nationality, but which there is no reason to join to Serbia and which could not, in any event, be annexed to that State because of their distribution throughout the centre of the Banat. These Germans (Suabians), so soon as they are at liberty to give public expression to wishes which are already known, will moreover refuse to allow their national numbers to be diminished by a division between Serbia and Roumania, and they will rally round the latter State.

The intermixture of these various nationalities in the West of the Banat is such that, in order to detach from Roumania the 200,000 Serbians inhabiting such region, it would be necessary, at the same time, to annex to Serbia double the number of non-Serbs, Germans, Magyars and Roumanians. And thus new hotbeds of Irredentism would be created.

In order that at least the south-western portion of the Banat might be wrested from Roumania, it is probable that the necessity for giving Belgrade a protective zone may be brought forward. The lessons of the last year of the war have resulted in an extraordinary diminution in the belief in the utility of such protection, and consequently of the importance of its corresponding argument.

Furthermore, Roumania replied to this contention in 1916, by inserting in her agreement with the Allied Powers a clause undertaking to leave a zone opposite the present capital of Serbia without military works or garrison.

This is a sufficient guarantee from the defensive point of view. But the creation, on the left bank of the Danube, of a protective zone in the nature of a Serbian political and military possession, would be a veritable bridgehead, or a military organisation less defensive than offensive.

Ever since the Serbian and the Roumanian States have adjoined each other on the Danube, history has furnished proofs of their active intercourse from the point of view of trade and civilisation, but has never had to record disagreements between them. The pacific feeling of both peoples has been greatly assisted by the fact that the Danube formed a well-defined and certain boundary between them, both as regards geography and interests.

The Roumanian Government has always been so persuaded of the Danube's importance as a peace-maintaining frontier, that it has never cast its eyes beyond this river, nor considered the possibility of uniting to that part of Roumania watered by the Northern Danube the many Roumanians settled in Serbia between the Timok and the Morava valleys.

It is persuaded that once the Danube is crossed, once a bridgehead is established on the further bank, yet wider territorial extensions in this direction will become of ever-increasing political and economic urgency. There would then be no end to the unappeasable disputes connected with more or less conventional frontiers. And these disputes, which Roumania has steadfastly refused to tolerate on the right bank of the Danube, could not fail to arise on its left bank with regard to a frontier line drawn across the plain of the Banat, for no nice adjustment could make it anything but ill-defined and inequitable.

Thus, the only results of allowing Serbia to cross the Danube in order to ensure that State a supposed ethnographical boundary, in the hope of finding in such concessions a guarantee for the organisation of international peace, would be economic disorganisation, arrested development of a whole region, and the certainty of future disputes.

It is hardly necessary to add that Roumania will ensure to all Serbs who may remain within her territory all the rights and guarantees ensured to Roumanian subjects by the Serbian State, in conformity with the principles which may be laid down by the League of Nations in the case of minorities.

Such were the general outlines of the arguments put forward by Roumania before the war, in order to justify the validity of her

claims to the Banat. The part played by Roumania in the war cannot fail to confirm such rights.

In order to appreciate what Roumania has done, without even calling to mind the conditions under which she was obliged to begin and continue her military action, one has only to remember the fact that the losses of the Roumanian army alone, not including even greater losses among the civilian population amount to a total of 335,000 men, and to trace on the map appended hereto [2] the proofs of the influence of Roumania's military action on the general conduct of the war.

[2] Map not filed with the minutes.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 1 February, 1919, at 3 p. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
President Wilson	Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George	M. Clemenceau
Mr. R. Lansing	Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour	M. Pichon
Mr. A. H. Frazier	Gen. the Rt. Hon. Louis Botha	M. Dutasta
Col. U. S. Grant	Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey	M. Berthelot
Mr. L. Harrison	Major A. M. Caccia	M. de Bearn
	Mr. E. Phipps	M. Guerin
		Capt. Portier

ITALY	JAPAN
M. Orlando	Baron Makino
Baron Sonnino	H. E. M. Matsui
Count Aldrovandi	M. Saburi
Major Jones.	

PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION OF ROUMANIAN QUESTION

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	ROUMANIA
Major Stephen Bonsal	Mr. H. Nicolson	M. Bratiano
		M. Nicolas Misu
		M. Al. Laperdatu
		M. Constantin Bratiano

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

Meeting of Russian Representatives at Prinkipo

1. PRESIDENT WILSON asked permission to communicate to the Conference the gist of a telegram, which he had received from M. Tchicherin, the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the Bolshevik Government. In this telegram M. Tchicherin said that he had seen in the Press some reference to the summoning of a Conference of Russian Delegates at Prinkipo, and he asked for an official invitation.[1] He, (President Wilson), wished to know what action should be taken. To send an official communication would be tantamount to a recognition of the Bolshevik Government.

[1] A telegram dated February 4, 1919, but answering this description, sent by M. Chicherin to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, p. 39.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that M. Tchicherin had received his notice like everybody else.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that a notification had been made to the Press and not in a direct manner. He was quite willing to ignore M. Tchicherin's request, but the Great Powers were anxious to get these delegates together, and perhaps an answer should be sent to take away the excuse that they had received no invitation to attend the meeting. Apparently M. Tchicherin wanted a personal invitation.

(It was decided to adjourn the question for further consideration).

2. M. CLEMENCEAU handed in the following document representing the final agreement reached between the Czechs and the Poles regarding the occupation of the Principality of Teschen:

Agreement Between Czecho-Slovaks and Poles Regarding Teschen

"The Representatives of the Great Powers, having been informed of the conflict which has arisen between the Czechs and Poles in the Principality of Teschen, in consequence of which the mining district of Ostrawa-Karwin and the railway from Oderberg to Teschen and Jablunkau has been occupied by the Czechs, have declared as follows:

In the first instance they think it necessary to remind the nationalities who have engaged to submit the territorial questions which concern them to the Peace Conference, that they are, pending its decision, to refrain from taking as a pawn or from occupying the territories to which they lay claim.

The representatives take note of the engagement by which the Czech Delegates have declared that they were definitely stopping their troops on the line of the railway which runs from Oderberg to Teschen–Jablunkau.

Pending the decisions of the Peace Conference Congress as to the definitive assignment of the territories that part of the railway line to the North of Teschen and the mining regions will remain in the occupation of Czech troops while the southern section of the line starting from and including the town of Teschen down to Jablunkau will be entrusted to the military supervision of the Poles.

The undersigned consider it indispensable that a Commission of Control should be immediately sent to the spot to avoid any conflict between the Czechs and Poles in the region of Teschen. This Commission, apart from the measures that it will have to prescribe, will proceed to an enquiry on the basis of which the Peace Conference may form its decision in fixing definitely the respective frontiers of the Czechs and Poles in the contested zone. The seat of this Commission will be situated in the town of Teschen.

In order to seal the Entente between two friendly nations which should follow a policy in full accord with that of the Allied and Associated Powers, the representatives of the Great Powers register the promise of the Czech representatives that their country will put at the disposition of the Poles all its available resources in war material and will grant to them every facility for the transit of arms and ammunition.

The exploitation of the mines of the Karwin-Ostrawa district will be carried out in such a way as to avoid all infraction of private prop-

erty while reserving any police measures which the situation may require. The Commission of Control will be empowered to supervise this and if necessary to secure to the Poles that part of the output which may be equitably claimed by them to meet their wants.

It is understood that the local administration will continue to function in accordance with the conditions of the pact of the 5th November, 1918, and that the rights of minorities will be strictly respected.

Pending the decision of the Peace Congress, political elections and military conscription will be suspended in the Principality of Teschen.

No measure implying annexation of all or of a part of the said Principality either to the territory of Poland or of Czecho-Slovakia taken by interested parties shall have binding force.

The Delegates of the Czech Nation engage to release immediately with their arms and baggage the Polish prisoners taken during the recent conflict."

On the proposal of Mr. Lloyd George and General Botha—

It was agreed that the document should first be signed by the representatives of the Great Powers and subsequently by the Czech and Pole delegates and by the members of the Commission for Poland.

Allied Troops of Occupation in Turkish Territory and Trans-Caucasia

3. M. CLEMENCEAU read the following reply received from the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council, Versailles, with reference to the Resolution passed by the Delegates of the Five Great Powers at the Conversation held at the Quai d'Orsay on the 30th January, 1919, (see I. C. 128)[2] on the subject of the proper distribution of the Allied Military forces required for the maintenance of order in the Turkish Empire and in Trans-Caucasia:—

The Military Representatives consider it necessary for them to be further advised on the three following subjects:

1. The territories to be occupied in view of the fact that certain parts of the Ottoman Empire are not at the present time occupied.

2. The total number of troops required to maintain order in these territories as estimated by the local military commanders.

3. Whether a joint occupation of these territories is intended, or whether definite zones are to be attributed to the interested Powers, who would be designated by the Great Powers.

M. Clemenceau said that the Conference had put certain definite questions to the Military Representatives, who had merely asked the same questions in reply.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that it was the duty of the Military Representatives to reply to the questions set to them. The first question put by the Military Representatives was perhaps only partly a military question, but the second was wholly a military one. It was one of the very questions the Military Representatives themselves had been asked, and, in his opinion, they should certainly

[2] BC-18, p. 817.

give an answer. The third question was one which the Conference could perhaps, and, indeed, ought to answer.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the answer to the last question would be that definite zones would be allotted to particular Powers, and there would be no joint occupation.

After some further discussion, it was agreed to transmit the following reply to the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles through the Secretaries:

1. The Conference does not contemplate a joint occupation of any territories.
2. The Conference did not contemplate the military occupation of any territories other than those already occupied, unless the Military Representatives think that the occupation of additional territory is desirable.
3. The Military Representatives should themselves obtain and submit estimates regarding the number of troops required for the maintenance of order in the occupied territories.
4. The Minutes of the Meeting of the 30th January, 1919, relating to the question under reference, shall be supplied to the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles.

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would next ask the Conference to give their formal approval to the Instructions for the Delegates of the Allied Governments to Poland.

Instructions To Be Issued to the Commission for Poland

On the proposal of President Wilson it was agreed, after some discussion, that the following clause should be added to the Instructions for the Delegates of the Allied Governments to Poland:

"Marshal Foch is requested to inform the German military authorities that the Associated Powers are sending to Poland a commission which is fully empowered to compose all disturbances there so far as possible, and instructed, for that purpose, to insist that the Polish authorities refrain from all use of force against the German forces, and the Marshal is requested to convey to the German authorities in German Poland the demand of the Associated Powers that they altogether refrain from the further use of force in that province and from interference with the life of the people there pending the conclusion of the Peace Conference."

GENERAL BOTHA then proposed the addition of the following final clause to the Instructions:

"Where matters within the scope of these instructions require the making of special arrangements for their immediate disposition, the delegates are authorised and empowered to make such necessary and provisional arrangements, which shall be binding upon all parties concerned unless and until disapproved by the four Powers concerned."

(This was agreed to.)

GENERAL BOTHA pointed out that the Delegates would have to deal with the neighbours of Poland. One of these neighbours would be the Bolsheviks. He enquired whether the Delegates were authorised to enter into negotiations with the Bolshevik representatives.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that it was almost an inevitable part of their duties as Commissioners to endeavour to bring about an armistice between the Poles and the Bolsheviks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there would be no objection to the Delegates seeing the leaders of the Bolshevik Armies. But it would obviously not be necessary for them to meet either M. Trotski or M. Lenin.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought the sense of the meeting would be that the Delegates could meet whoever they liked, provided they did not ask for definite permission to meet particular individuals to be named.

(The following text of Final Instructions for the Delegates of the Allied Governments in Poland was then formally accepted:

"It will be the business of the Delegates of the Allied Governments to convey as early as possible information to their Governments on the present situation in Poland. The Military question and the Food question are the most urgent, but reports on the political and social conditions of the country should be sent without unnecessary delay.

The Polish Government should be warned against adopting a policy of an aggressive character. Any appearance of attempting to prejudge the decisions of the Conference will have the worst possible effect. The Delegates should invite the most earnest consideration of the Polish Government to the declaration recently made on this subject by the representatives of the Powers at Paris.

Every effort should be made to bring to an end the hostilities which are now taking place between the Poles and neighbouring peoples. Armistices should be arranged wherever possible and the Delegates should use their good offices to bring them about.

In this connection it should be noted that the invasion by the Poles of German territory tends to restore the German military spirit and to delay the breakup of the German Army; and it has the further disadvantage of complicating the arrangements for German disarmament which the Allies desire to carry out with the least possible delay.

The Delegates should enquire how far the Polish Government possess the means to maintain order within their existing territory and of preserving it from external aggression whether carried out by Bolshevists or any other forces and they should study and report on the measures necessary to supply any deficiencies which may be found to exist.

The food question will require their earnest attention and they should co-operate with the Mission about to be despatched to Poland by the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief. In order to secure this cooperation the principal Delegates of the Supreme Council of

Supply and Relief should be attached to the Delegation whenever questions of food supply have to be dealt with.

Marshal Foch is requested to inform the German military authorities that the Associated Powers are sending to Poland a Commission which is fully empowered to compose all disturbances there so far as possible, and instructed, for that purpose, to insist that the Polish authorities refrain from all use of force against the German forces, and the Marshal is requested to convey to the German authorities in German Poland the demand of the Associated Powers that they altogether refrain from the further use of force in that province and from interference with the life of the people there pending the conclusion of the Peace Conference.

Where matters within the scope of these instructions require the making of special arrangements for their immediate disposition, the Delegates are authorised and empowered to make such necessary and provisional arrangements, which shall be binding upon all parties concerned unless and until disapproved by the four Powers concerned.")

Procedure

5. M. ORLANDO invited attention to the fact that the period granted for the submission of documents relating to territorial claims would expire on that date. He wished to enquire whether this period was to be rigidly applied. He had been informed by M. Dutasta that, up to yesterday, no documents had been received by the Secretariat General, except a part of the Greek case and a report by the Czecho-Slovak Delegates.

MR. BALFOUR expressed the view that a time limit having been granted, the Conference could now proceed with their business. Should any of the Delegations object, the obvious reply would be that the Delegations themselves were to blame for not having submitted their reports in due time. On the other hand, the Conference should not refuse to accept any documents which might be sent in hereafter.

Nomination of Members of Commission for Teschen

6. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the members of the Commission for Teschen would have to be nominated. France would appoint M. Veltel, one of the Members for the Commission for Poland.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the members of the Teschen Commission should be military or civil.

(It was agreed that the Members of the Commission for Teschen might be either military or civil, and that their names should be handed in Monday morning, 3rd February, 1919.)

Roumanian Territorial Claims

7. At this stage M. Bratiano and M. Misu, members of the Roumanian Delegation to the Peace Conference, accompanied by their experts, MM. A. Laperdatu and Constantin Bratiano, were admitted to the Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Bratiano to put forward the Roumanian case.

M. BRATIANO then read the following report on the situation in Roumania:

M. Bratiano said that the Balkan War, into which Roumania entered at the appeal of the Serbs and Greeks, who had been attacked by the Bulgars, bore witness to the strength and moral ascendancy of her people in that region of Europe. Far-reaching democratic reforms of a social and political nature were being carried out. The last sixty years of Peace made it possible to profit fully by the productivity of her soil, which had been constantly ravaged for centuries. It was in this phase of productive labour and of great political and economic prosperity, that the world-war broke upon Roumania. But, from the very outbreak of hostilities, Roumania, although bound to the Central Powers by a defensive alliance, refused to follow the aggressors in their action, which was contrary to her feelings and opposed to her interests.

(a) Roumania's Attitude During the War

During the course of the war she never ceased to emphasise the benevolent nature of her neutrality with respect to the Entente. Thus, contrary to her own most important economic interests, she restricted such of her exports as might benefit the Central Powers, and only let them have an indispensable minimum as compensation for the supply of necessary arms and equipment to the Roumanian army, which she was, at that time, unable to obtain elsewhere.

Roumania facilitated the passage of arms for Serbia and prevented the transit of any war material for Turkey—just at the time when the question of Constantinople appeared to be of paramount interest. The importance of the services thus rendered to the Entente, which drew down upon Roumania the unfriendly feeling and threats of Germany, was expressly recognised by the Entente Governments and gave rise to a formal undertaking on the part of Russia defining the territories in Austria-Hungary claimed by Roumania, which had, moreover, been recognised in principle by the Russian Government at the outset of war in consideration of the benevolent neutrality of Roumania. (Agreement of 1st October, 1914).[3]

At the request of the Entente Governments, Roumania declared herself ready to give effective support by her army to a cause which she already considered her own. She accordingly notified London of the conditions on which she could take effective military action and which would assure victory, at the same time appealing to the great

[3] For a description of this agreement, see the telegram of September 20/October 3, 1914, from the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Sazonov) to the Russian Ambassador at Bucharest (Poklevsky), French translation in *Documents diplomatiques secrets russes, 1914–1917, d'après les archives du ministère des affaires étrangères à Pétrograd* (Paris, 1928), p. 179.

principles of justice, and stating the conditions necessary for the national development of the Roumanian people.

The Roumanian point of view, summarised in the reply made by the Roumanian Government to the Entente in the Spring of 1916. was determined by the necessity:

1. Of defining the position of Italy, whose intentions certain of the Allies at that time appeared to doubt, although the Roumanian Government knew them to be quite favourable;
2. Of defining on the map the claims which had already been admitted in the former undertaking by Russia, in order to obviate any discussion at a later date, which is always to be deprecated;
3. Of ensuring the supply of arms and munitions for the Roumanian army;
4. Of ensuring the position of Roumania against Bulgarian aggression by political and military conditions, and to guarantee her against a war on two fronts which her geographical position would not allow her to wage successfully.

After various delays, the causes of which it is unnecessary to explain, but which did not emanate from the Roumanian Government, whose attitude never varied, the Entente Powers finally recognised the justice of the Roumanian demands and undertook, by a Treaty of Alliance[4] and a Military Convention,[5] to give effect thereto. These two documents were intended, on the one hand, to ensure the ability of Roumania to assist the common cause by effective military action, and at the same time to guarantee, after victory, the claims which had been recognised as legitimate and necessary for the development of the Roumanian nation.

Roumania was conscious that, without allowing herself to be discouraged by the worst disappointments, which did not always come from the side of the enemy, she loyally fulfilled her duty to the great cause which she had espoused, to the extreme limits of possibility and in the supreme hope that, no matter what her sacrifices might cost, they might be in proportion to the services she rendered.

Neither the Bulgarian attack, nor the possibility accorded to Germany by quiet on the other fronts of concentrating her efforts against Roumania, nor the inactivity of the neighbouring Allies, who did not meet in Transylvania as arranged, nor the delay in the Russian assistance which might have covered Bucharest and Wallachia, nor that which from the material and moral points of view represented the loss of two-thirds of the country, including the capital,

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[4] Treaty of Alliance of August 17, 1916, between the Allies and Roumania; for French text, see Italy, R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, *Trattati e convenzioni fra il regno d'Italia e gli altri stati*, vol. 23, p. 412.

[5] Military convention of August 17, 1916, between the Allies and Roumania; French text, *ibid.*, p. 415.

shook the loyalty and devotion of the Roumanians to the cause they had made their own.

Aided by the French Mission, the Roumanians, who had lost more than half their army, continued the fight, and at Marasesti inflicted a defeat upon Marshal Mackensen's best troops and made the invasion of Russia from the south impossible.

Unfortunately, Russia collapsed at this time, and the Roumanian army found itself surrounded by the enemy, with whom its Russian Ally was openly treating. Neither this situation nor the Bolshevik example and propaganda succeeded in demoralising the Roumanian army and nation. Although enveloped and penetrated on all sides by these elements of disorder, not a single Roumanian company, not a single platoon deserted.

The armistice concluded on the Roumanian front was the result, not of Roumanian discouragement, but of the condition demanded by the Ukrainian command, which at that time was the last hope of the Allies in Russia, who saw in this measure the sole possibility of re-forming a Russian front capable of carrying on the struggle. This possibility was far from being realised. Bolshevism continued to complete its work of dissolution on the Russian front in Moldavia and began open hostilities with the Ukrainian command which the representatives of the Allies attempted to constitute on the Roumanian front.

At the demand of the representatives of the Entente, who declared in writing that this operation was the last military co-operation that they were entitled to expect from Roumania, the Roumanian army commenced open hostilities with the Bolshevist troops which then occupied the whole territory of Moldavia and Bessarabia. It was thought that this supreme effort would at least ensure the existence of an Ukraine friendly to the Allies.

In spite of all the risk involved in an operation of this nature, when Roumania had the enemy army before her and no possibility of obtaining supplies, she did not hesitate to provoke the hostility of the million Russians who were in occupation of her territory, thus giving her Allies a last proof of her spirit of sacrifice in their cause and affording them, since they thought it possible, an opportunity in which she herself did not believe.

Whilst desultory warfare was being waged on Roumanian territory with her Allies of yesterday, the peace of Brest-Litovsk was concluded. The Ukraine threw off its mask, openly negotiating and signing the peace with the Germans, who occupied its territory and descended the Dniester, threatening the rear and cutting off the retreat of the Roumanian Army.

As the representatives of the Allies admitted, military action on the part of Roumania was no longer possible at that period of the war.

The only thing that remained for the King of Roumania and his Government to do, was to attempt to maintain the Roumanian Army at sufficient strength to enable it to resume active operations so soon as more favourable conditions should render this possible. This resolve—which was immediately communicated to the Allied Governments—gave its right interpretation to the so-called "Treaty of Bucharest"—[6] i. e. that of a lull in a conflict which was to be resumed.

The peace negotiations were only entered into in order to gain time and not to separate the King from his Army. The peace was merely a means of awaiting events.

Neither legally, practically, nor morally, were the Roumanians ever really at peace with the enemy.

The Treaty of Bucharest, passed by a Parliament elected under the German occupation, when the Moldavian refugees were not allowed to return to their homes and all electoral manifestos were subject to German censorship, was never sanctioned or ratified by the King.

The character of the military occupation continued the same; 8 German divisions, having to maintain Germanic order in Roumania, were prevented from returning to other fronts; 40,000 Roumanian prisoners were still in Germany. The burden of requisitions increased even after the signature of the general armistice. The restrictions imposed on persons and property continued arbitrary and violent; Roumanian institutions such as the Appeal Court and the large government offices refused, with the consent of the King, to continue their functions at Bucharest, in fact both individuals and property were subjected to the same reign of iniquity and violence which inaugurated the occupation by the enemy.

In their hearts, neither King, Army, nor people, had ever ceased longing for the day when they could once more take action. The military and civil representatives of the Allies at Jassy continued to co-operate in expectation of that moment.

Therefore it was without a day's delay that Roumania responded to the call of the Allies when they thought it once more possible for Roumania to resume operations, and on the same day that General Berthelot's[7] army crossed the Danube, the Roumanian troops crossed the line of trenches which had never ceased, during the Peace of Bucharest, to form a fortified line between two enemy nations.

It is thus that the position and action of Roumania developed during the war. Having espoused a great and noble cause, she had

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[6] Treaty of Peace between Roumania and the Central Powers, May 7, 1918, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 771.

[7] Gen. Henri Mathias Berthelot, of the French Army, commander in chief of the Army of the Danube.

served it with loyal devotion, and had achieved even more in the common interests than was imposed by her treaty conditions.

The occupation of two-thirds of her territory, the pillage and exhaustion of the whole country, the decimation of her population by epidemic disease, casualties in her army amounting to over 335,000 men, such in broad outline were the sacrifices borne by Roumania. She did not grudge them for a single instant, being convinced that they were entailed by the service she was rendering to the Allies and that they were at the same time assuring the realisation of her national ideals, as guaranteed by the Treaty signed with the Allies and by the sense of justice of those whose cause she had joined. Roumania had an unshakeable trust in that sense of justice, which she found faithfully expressed in the noble words of President Wilson, who in his speech on the 27th September, 1918,[8] stated "That solutions * have arisen from the very nature and circumstances of the war; the most that statesmen or assemblies can do is to carry them out or be false to them".

In very truth, the question of Roumania arose from its "very nature" on the day when the principles of justice, independence and liberty for the peoples were proclaimed; it also arose from "the circumstances of the war" when, by the treaty of 16th [*17th*] August, 1916, the Allies undertook to ensure the national unity of Roumania.

The claims of Roumania, as recognised by her treaty of alliance had never been of an imperialistic character. Her claims had only represented the manifestation of the national aspirations of the people and the desire of the Roumanians to be once more united on the ethnical territory assigned to them by history.

(b) Roumania's Claims to Transylvania

A reference to the map would show in this corner of the world a mountainous district forming the central portion of Transylvania. This elevated region on the one side gradually sloped down to the rich plains of the Danube and the Dniester, whilst on the North it was bordered by the Carpathians and Galicia, and so constituted a well defined geographical area from every point of view. It was in this territory that the Roumanian nation had been constituted and formed; and all its aspirations for centuries had tended towards the political union of that territory.

At the outbreak of War, Hungary, with the Banat, constituted what might be called Transylvania, because from the political point of view Transylvania occupied the exact centre of the whole of that region.

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[8] *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 316.

* In the "Times" of September 28th, 1918, President Wilson is quoted as follows: "It (the war) has positive and well defined purposes, which we did not determine and cannot alter—no statesman or assembly created them . . . they have arisen from the 'very nature' etc. . . . [Footnote in the original.]

But in order to avoid mentioning different parts of that territory at every turn, in the term "Transylvania" would be included not only the Banat but all the countries extending as far as the Galician Carpathians and as far as the Theiss; the whole of that region having formed part of the late kingdom of Hungary.

According to Hungarian statistics, (the nature of which were such that they could not be taken as basis for an accurate estimate), the Roumanians represented 55% and the Magyars 23% of the population.

M. ORLANDO enquired how many Hungarians there were in this district.

M. BRATIANO replied that, according to these same statistics, there were 1,000,000 Hungarians and 2,500,000 Roumanians in Transylvania, not including the Banat. It was, moreover, certain that these statistics were inaccurate. As a matter of fact, if one considers the increase in the Roumanian population according to these statistics, one finds fanciful figures, varying according to the political situation and the degree of acuteness of political struggles. Whilst the Roumanian population on the other side of the Carpathians had tripled and quadrupled, the Roumanian population of Transylvania remained stationary, according to the Hungarian statistics. If an exact census could be taken, 2,900,000 Roumanians and 687,000 Magyars or 72% and 15% respectively of the population would be found to be the exact figures. Whilst the Roumanian population represented 23% of the population of the towns and 72% of that of the villages, the Magyars only represented 40% of the urban population and 13% of that of the villages. The Magyars were chiefly officials and soldiers, but from the ethnical point of view they were far from representing the ethnical proportion that they claimed for themselves. The Magyar population formed a dominating class which had lived in the midst of the Roumanian population.

Transylvania also included, near the Moldavian frontier, a race related to the Hungarians and a Saxon population: the former numbering 450,000 and the latter 260,000.

On the whole, the great ethnical majority of the population was therefore Roumanian. There was one region that Roumania did not claim, although it included some Roumanian villages, namely the district of Debreczyn; but, in order to maintain the ethnical character of their claims, the Roumanians did not claim such an active Hungarian centre as this town constituted for the adjacent district.

At the beginning of the armistice, the German colonies on the Wallachian and Moldavian frontiers joined Roumania, and the union of Roumania was accomplished with the greatest ease. The Saxon colonies even concluded a formal deed of union with the Kingdom

of Roumania. The Roumanians of Transylvania immediately held a great meeting and constituted themselves into an Assembly, 150,000 men meeting for this purpose from all parts of the region; Roumania had already admitted into its Government three Ministers representing Transylvania and the Roumanian countries in Hungary.

(c) Roumanian Claims to Bukovina

As regards the Roumanian claims in the Bukovina, this was a Moldavian province, annexed 140 years ago by Austria. The policy of Austria with regard to this province was quite different to that of Hungary. Hungary tried to suppress the ethnical character of the populations by means of violence. The programme of Austria, on the contrary, was peaceful penetration. Thus, for example, she encouraged Ruthenian immigration. In the Bukovina there are about 200,000 inhabitants of various races who had rallied to the Roumanian rule. The Bukovina had constituted an autonomous government since Austria collapsed, thus annulling the annexation by Austria in 1775.

In 1916, Roumania had claimed the whole of the Bukovina, but Russia had not wished the Roumanians to cross the river.

The Bukovina, by its reunion with Bessarabia and Moldavia on the Dniester, had become once more what it originally was, and it would be inconsistent, both politically and geographically, not to leave to Roumania the Bukovina in its present form. 500,000 inhabitants out of 800,000 were represented at the proclamation of the union of the Bukovina with Roumania.

(d) Roumania's Claim to Bessarabia

As regards Bessarabia, there were at the present moment 500,000 Roumanians on the other side of the Dniester, more than 100,000 in Bulgaria, more than 300,000 in Serbia, and several hundred thousand in Macedonia, but they did not form groups sufficiently compact for Roumania to be able to claim them at present. It was otherwise in Bessarabia, which was severed from Moldavia in 1812. Part of the province was restored to Roumania after the Crimean War, but after the war of 1878, Russia took back this province, although admitting the integrity of Roumania by a formal treaty.

The Roumanian claims had always extended to Bessarabia, but they would probably not have been allowed if a great political event had not occurred; Tsarist Russia collapsed and Bessarabia constituted itself an autonomous Republic, recognised by the Russian Government under the presidency of M. Kerensky. The Bolshevist disturbances created a serious situation in Bessarabia, and the Government then applied to Roumania for help in maintaining order. Roumania had refused until she had received similar requests from the Ukrainian Government and the representatives of the Allies at

Jassy. The military occupation of Bessarabia by Roumanian troops only took place, therefore, with the consent of the local Government and at the request of the Ukraine and the representatives of the Entente. Subsequently, Bessarabia separated itself completely from Russia and, later, the Bessarabian Government declared its desire to unite with Roumania, and united itself once more to Moldavia, from which it had been severed in 1812.

Such was the history of the reunion of Bessarabia and Roumania. A great injustice had thus been righted. More than 72% of the inhabitants are Roumanians, the remainder are Slavs, Bulgars, or Germans, and they did not represent even 15% of the populations; therefore from every point of view Bessarabia was a Roumanian country.

The incorporation of Bessarabia with Russia was an anachronism which could no longer be allowed to exist. Whatever may be the fate of Russia, she could and must no longer exercise supremacy in the Balkans. This dream was perhaps cherished by the Russian Government at the beginning of the 19th century, and the occupation of Bessarabia was doubtless a first step towards the occupation of Moldavia, Bulgaria and Constantinople, but it was a false political move. Bessarabia was, moreover, of no importance to Russia, for there was scarcely a Russian in the country. But after having once seized the country, it was difficult for Russia to restore it. As soon as circumstances allowed, it returned to Roumania who was able to prevent the work of destruction which the Bolsheviks had begun. It was far more advantageous to have a friendly country as neighbour than a country foreign in her ideas and ways of life. Now Bessarabia would possess community of ideas with Roumanian national consciousness.

For all these reasons, Roumania believed that the Peace Conference would not question the justification of the union of Bessarabia with Roumania.

(e) Present Constitutional Arrangements in Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the national assemblies formed in these three countries, Transylvania, the Bukovina and Bessarabia had demanded their return to Roumania and whether they had laid down any conditions?

MR. BRATIANO said that the three countries had made different constitutional arrangements. In Transylvania, the Roumanian representatives formed themselves into a National Assembly, which the representatives of the Saxon population joined: But the Hungarian population had refused to do so.

For the Bukovina all nationalities, except the Ruthenians, elected a government, which had proclaimed the union of the Bukovina with Roumania.

In Bessarabia, elections had taken place under the Russian Republican Government, and the Assembly thus elected had proclaimed the union with Roumania, subject to certain reservations which the Assembly had since withdrawn, on condition that it should be granted a special Agrarian Law.

Transylvania had proclaimed complete union, but with provisional autonomy, in order to settle the legal conditions under which effect would finally be given to such union. Transylvania had, as a matter of fact, different laws from those in force in Roumania and her representatives wished to study these specially important questions and to refer the decision reached to the people before signing the final act of union.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether Roumania was asking the representatives of the Powers purely and simply to proclaim the annexation of these different territories, or was she asking the Conference to declare that in these various regions regularly constituted assemblies shall have power definitely to declare for union and to settle the conditions? When the union of Scotland with England had taken place, that union was only effected after certain conditions imposed by Scotland had been carried out.

MR. BRATIANO said that Roumania asked for the recognition of the union of these provinces with Roumania, for that union had already been proclaimed and the latter had already sent three Ministers to the Roumanian Cabinet. A Statute had even been arranged. The same remarks applied to the Bukovina.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had reason to believe that certain minorities had not taken part in the elections. It was important that the decision should be made by assemblies representing the whole population.

MR. BRATIANO said he could not quite follow the question put by the Prime Minister of England. Roumania had fought in order to impose her national will on the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. It was certain, therefore, that if the Hungarians were asked to vote in favour of union with Roumania, they could hardly be expected to do so. He did not think a fresh election should be held at the present time. As regards the situation created in Transylvania by the armistice, he considered that the question of principle had been decided by the war, and that these territories must be restored to Roumania. In their future political life, the rights of the minorities would assuredly be respected and they would be granted the greatest possible freedom. But the vanquished could not now be expected willingly to unite themselves to a country, which for a thousand years they had sought to dominate.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that the majority must be the final arbiters: but it was essential that the wrongs which had been imposed under Hungarian domination should not be perpetuated. It must not be possible for the minorities to be treated in future as were the Roumanians in the Hungarian State, who were deprived of their language, their traditions and their own life.

M. BRATIANO expressed complete agreement on that point. In the Deed of Union with Transylvania it had been stipulated that the religious and political liberty of all the nationalities in Transylvania would be recognised, and that was the reason why the Saxon population had associated itself with the Union. The principle involved was one of general application, to be extended to all annexed countries without exception. But it would be an act fraught with serious consequences if the union with Transylvania were not to be declared now, at a time when her late masters were convinced that their cause was lost. There had been too much delay already; occupation of the territories must take place under the most favourable conditions, in the very interests of the nations who were to live together. For instance, the conditions were most satisfactory in the districts bordering on the Roumanian frontier which had been occupied before the signing of the armistice, even though Roumanians there actually formed the minority of the population, on the other hand, in the territories not occupied by Roumania, although Roumanians were in the majority, conditions were very serious owing to the enemy having organised a violent agitation on Bolshevik lines. The division of wealth and the abolition of rank had been promised: Wilson's policy had been proclaimed to be nothing but a capitalist policy; people had been told to kill officers and to do away with the governing classes. This propaganda had caused 100,000 workpeople to strike and the news received from Transylvania was very disquieting. This state of affairs was largely due to the uncertainty of the future. Therefore, he would beg the Commission to come to an immediate decision on the practical questions arising out of the war, and to authorise Roumania to occupy these territories immediately. The Roumanian Government might still be able, without bloodshed, to make relations between the various nations possible and even fraternal. But if the present situation were allowed to drag on, a new animosity would be created and blood would flow once more. Roumania was in a condition of great exhaustion due to the trials she had undergone and to the Bolshevik propaganda which had spread from the Ukraine through Bessarabia. Roumania was in need of the moral support of the Allies, if she was to remain what she had been hitherto—a rallying point for Europe against

(f) Roumania Asks Authorization to Occupy Immediately All Territories Claimed by Her

Bolshevism. He did not know what decisions would be reached by the Conference with regard to Bolshevism; but it was not a political doctrine; it was a serious and contagious disease that must be fought. Roumania asked to be placed in a position to resist it. She asked this not only in her own interests, but in those of the whole of Europe and, without exaggeration, of the civilisation of the world.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what troops were at present occupying Transylvania.

M. BRATIANO replied that the small tract bordering on the Roumanian frontier had been occupied by the Roumanians and that the remainder of the country, not being under any occupation, was a prey to anarchy. The Bukovina had been occupied by the Roumanians.

Yesterday, at the close of the meeting with the Serbian representatives, he had ventured to request that the Banat should be evacuated by Serbian troops, and that these should be replaced by the Allied troops at present in that neighborhood. In consideration of the nature and purpose of the meeting, he did not wish to enlarge upon the acts of violence which the Serbian Army were committing against the peoples of the Banat, and which might sow regrettable seeds of enmity. Whatever might be the decision of the Conference, it was most desirable that such occupation should be effected by Allied and not by Serbian troops. The question was an urgent one. The same applied to the Dobruja, where, by reason of the armistice conditions, the Roumanian State was not yet able to exercise its full authority. Whatever decision the Conference might reach, it surely could have no desire to wrest a portion of territory from an Allied State, without such State having consented to an alteration of the frontier line; and justice demanded that Roumania should remain mistress of the Dobruja.

(f) Roumania Asks for Occupation of Banat & Dobruja by Allied Troops

(g) Situation in Dobruja

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that the question of the Banat could not be discussed in the absence of the Serbs.

M. CLEMENCEAU thanked M. Bratiano for his statement with regard to Roumania's claims.

(The Roumanian delegates then withdrew.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, speaking for himself and for many of those whom he had been able to consult, it was extremely difficult to decide questions of boundaries on statements, however lucid, made in the course of a Conversation. He wished, therefore, to propose that in the first place experts of the five Great Powers should examine such questions, and, if possible, make a unanimous recommendation. It is quite possible that on many of the questions to be considered, the experts would agree. Naturally, these experts

could not decide the problem, but they could clear the ground, and, in cases of disagreement, the representatives of the Great Powers would be compelled to argue out the case there in that Council Chamber. But there were many questions regarding which the Great Powers were perfectly impartial. For instance, they were quite impartial regarding the Roumanian claims on Hungary, to an exposé of which they had listened that day. He thought, therefore, that if a preliminary investigation was carried out by experts, it would greatly assist. He fully admitted that this procedure could not be introduced as a permanent arrangement, or be accepted as a precedent for universal application; but in the particular case of the Roumanian claims, in order to arrive at a decision, he hoped the experts would be allowed to examine the ground in the first instance, and the representatives of the Great Powers would eventually decide the question. He wished, therefore, to move the following Resolution:—

"It is agreed that the questions raised in M. Bratiano's statement on the Roumanian territorial interests in the Peace Settlement shall be referred for examination in the first instance by an expert Committee composed of two representatives each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Italy.

It shall be the duty of the Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits, and to make recommendations for a just settlement.

The Committee is authorised to consult the representatives of the peoples concerned."

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view, which he felt sure was shared by the mover of the Resolution, that only those aspects of the question, which did not touch the purely political side of the problem, should be examined by the experts. All other questions requiring the exercise of tact and compromise must necessarily be reserved to the representatives of the Great Powers, including the protection of minorities, etc. The experts, therefore, should merely consider the territorial and racial aspects of the case.

MR. BALFOUR thought that strategical questions might also be considered by the experts.

M. ORLANDO said he had a statement to make in reference to a matter of individual conscience, which he did not wish to force on his colleagues. But he felt himself bound to Roumania by a Treaty. In his opinion, the laws relating to public and civil rights only became valid after their promulgation. He did not wish to defend secret treaties which, indeed, were now out of fashion; but a treaty having been signed by Italy, France and Great Britain, he could made no distinction between a secret treaty and a public treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAU drew the attention of M. Orlando to the fact that the Roumanian Treaty had, by the common assent of the representatives of the Great Powers there in that room, been cancelled. It had been agreed that Roumania should, for reasons given, have proper representation at the Peace Conference; but, it was distinctly understood that the grant of representation would not renew every clause of the Treaty, which she had broken by going out of the war. (I. C. 104.) [9]

MR. LLOYD GEORGE also pointed out that Roumania was now claiming more than she had been granted by the secret treaty.

M. ORLANDO said he had no recollection of the incident quoted. But, in any case, the treaty of 1916 between Roumania and the Allies having been signed, did that fact tend to invalidate the Peace Treaty subsequently signed by Roumania with the Central Powers at Bucarest? If so, the previous treaty with the Allies was *ipso facto* annulled. In his opinion, Roumania was forced to sign the Peace Treaty with the Central Powers, and she had not been a free agent. Consequently, he did not consider the latter treaty to be valid, no more than he would consider himself bound by an agreement signed whilst a pistol was being held at his head.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that he did not think such an argument really helped the case of the Roumanians.

M. ORLANDO said that, at any rate, he had given expression to a matter which had lain on his conscience. He turned now to Mr. Lloyd George's proposal and was glad to find that it was not to form a precedent. Therefore, some of his objections would fall to the ground. But, as regards the application of the proposal to the case under consideration, the decisive question to be settled was wholly and solely a political one. Being exclusively political, the whole responsibility for the settlement must rest with the representatives of the Great Powers.

Mr. Lloyd George's resolution said that specialists would be appointed. What kind of specialists? If it was intended to appoint specialists on the Roumanian question, he himself had none; and they would be difficult to find. But even then, he would ask: What branch of the Roumanian question should those specialists represent? Should they be geographical, historical, strategical or ethnographical specialists? The question was a very complex and mixed one, and its various aspects could not be separately examined. Consequently, the specialists who might be appointed though knowing their particular subject could not give good assistance in the final solution of the problem. Further, the resolution said that the Committee would

[9] BC-A1, p. 486.

consult the representatives of the people concerned. The experts would thus, in fact, become examining magistrates. Mr. Lloyd George's proposal thus became a very serious one, since the experts would constitute the Court of First Instance and the delegates of the Great Powers, the Final Court of Appeal. He failed to see how such a procedure would expedite matters. In his opinion, it necessarily meant delay, especially if the experts decided that the enquiry must take place *in situ*. His proposals might not be acceptable to his colleagues: but he had felt obliged to put forward his views though he did not wish to press them. In his opinion, the procedure proposed by Mr. Lloyd George in this case had great inconveniences, and, if accepted, he noted with pleasure that it would not form a precedent.

M. SONNINO expressed the view that the experts might find themselves compelled to go to the spot to consult the representatives of the people concerned.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE explained that the experts would carry out their work in exactly the same manner as their Committee on Teschen had done.

M. SONNINO replied that unfortunately in the case of the Roumanian claims, the representatives of the minorities, (Hungarians, Ukrainians, Bolshevists), would have to be consulted, and they had no representatives here in Paris. He did not see why the representatives of the Great Powers themselves should not first discuss the question with their own experts, and afterwards consult the delegates of the countries concerned, who could give the most expert information available.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that perhaps it might be wise to omit the clause of the resolution which authorised the experts to consult the representatives of the people concerned. Ever since the United States of America had entered the war, he had had a body of scholars continuously studying such questions of fact as racial aspects, historical antecedents, and economic and commercial elements: the two latter being of very great importance in many of the questions under dispute, as had been realised in the case of the Banat. Furthermore, it must be remembered that however complete their confidence might be in the delegates of Roumania, Serbia, and other countries, who would present claims; these delegates were merely advocates, and they made opposite claims as to the right inferences to be drawn from facts. They did not represent their facts in the same way, and there would always be something that was not quite clear. As the United States of America were not bound by any of the treaties in question, they were quite ready to approve a settlement on a basis of facts. But the claimants did not always restrict themselves even to the

limits set by Treaties and their claims frequently exceeded what was justified by the Treaties.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, in this connection, drew attention to the Roumanian claims on the Banat. The Roumanians now claimed the whole of the Banat, whereas the Treaty only gave them a part.

PRESIDENT WILSON, continuing, said that he was seeking enlightenment, and this would no doubt be afforded by a convincing presentation by the experts. If the resolution proposed by Mr. Lloyd George did not receive acceptance, he would find himself compelled to fight the question merely on the views expressed by the American experts; but he would prefer that these conclusions should be corrected by the views of the French, British and Italian experts.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired from M. Orlando whether he still objected to the resolution.

M. ORLANDO said that he had already expressed his willingness to accept the resolution, provided it was not to create a precedent.

(It was agreed that the questions raised in M. Bratiano's statement on the Roumanian territorial interests in the Peace settlement should be referred for examination in the first instance by an expert committee, composed of two representatives each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Italy.

It shall be the duty of this Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits, and to make recommendations for a just settlement.

The Committee is authorised to consult the representatives of the peoples concerned.)

Naval Peace Terms Committee

8. It was decided that the Naval Peace Terms Committee should forthwith meet to draft the Naval clauses to be introduced in the Peace Treaty with Germany.

(The Meeting adjourned to 11 o'clock on Monday, the 3rd February, 1919).

2 FEBRUARY, 1919.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 3 February, 1919, at 11 a. m.

[PRESENT]

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
President Wilson
Mr. R. Lansing
Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. L. Harrison
Lieut. Burden

BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.
Gen. The Rt. Hon. Louis Botha
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey
Major A. M. Caccia
Mr. E. Phipps

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
Capt. Portier
M. de Bearn

ITALY
M. Orlando
Baron Sonnino
Count Aldrovandi
Major Jones

JAPAN
Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui
M. Saburi
M. Kimura

PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION OF GREEK QUESTION

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Mr. C. Day

BRITISH EMPIRE
Mr. H. Nicolson
Mr. A. Leeper

GREECE
M. Venizelos
M. Politis
M. Speranza
M. Rentis

ITALY
M. de Martino
Colonel Castoldi

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

Appointment of Delegates to Commission for Teschen

1. M. CLEMENCEAU informed the meeting that M. Velten, one of the members of the Commission for Poland had been appointed to represent France. He asked the representatives of the Great Powers to name their delegates.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had consulted the British military authorities yesterday as it had been agreed that the British delegate should be a military man. It was expedient that he should be of the same rank as the French representative, M. Velten, he had decided to appoint an officer of the ranks of Colonel.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the American delegate had not yet been found: there were so few available Americans on this side of the water.

M. ORLANDO said that the Italian representative would be named to-morrow.

2. M. CLEMENCEAU announced that the following experts had been appointed for the examination in the first instance, of the questions raised in M. Bratiano's statement on the Rumanian territorial interests in the peace settlement, in accordance with the resolution passed at a conversation held in M. Pichon's room at the Quai d'Orsay on Saturday, February 1st, 1919 (I. C. 130).[1]

Appointment of Delegates for Commission to Rumania

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE
Mr. C. Day	Sir E. Crowe
Mr. Seymour	Mr. A. Leeper
FRANCE	ITALY
M. Tardieu	M. de Martino
M. Laroche	Count Vannutelli

3. M. CLEMENCEAU said he wished to raise the question of the appointment of additional delegates to represent the Small Powers on the various committees. The number of delegates to form part of each of these committees had been duly agreed upon and were already appointed; but he thought they should if possible, endeavour to meet the special wishes of the Smaller Powers, treating each case on its merits.

Delegates for Committee on League of Nations

First as regards the League of Nations. The Conference had decided that each of the Great Powers should appoint two delegates, and that 5 delegates should be elected to represent the whole of the Smaller Powers.

The Smaller Powers had nominated delegates from Belgium, Serbia, Brazil, China, and Portugal, but they now asked that an additional delegate should be appointed by each of the following countries, namely, Poland, Greece, Czecho-Slovakia, and Rumania.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that the proposal would have the effect of constituting a very large committee, and the representation of the Smaller Powers would thereby become equal to the representation of the Great Powers. The League of Nations committee, however, was to meet that afternoon, and he proposed that he should be empowered to put the question to the Drafting committee for decision.

[1] BC-20, *supra*.

(It was agreed that the question of appointing additional delegates to represent Poland, Greece, Czecho-Slovakia, and Rumania, on the League of Nations Committee should be referred by President Wilson to that Committee for decision.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said the Conference had agreed that this committee should consist of 2 delegates for each of the Great Powers, and 5 delegates to represent the whole of the Smaller Powers. The 5 representatives of the Smaller Powers included members of the delegations for Belgium, China, Serbia, Greece, and Uruguay. The Smaller Powers now asked for 4 supplementary delegates to be appointed, selected from the Powers in the order of the votes recorded at the election of delegates, namely, Rumania, Portugal, Czecho-Slovakia, and Poland. Rumania on account of its special interests in the Danube, had good reasons to be represented, and he thought that satisfaction would be given to all the Smaller Powers if their request for 4 additional delegates were granted.

Commission on International Regime for Ports, Waterways & Railways

(It was agreed to refer the question of the appointment of supplementary delegates to represent the Smaller Powers on the Inter-Allied Commission on the International Regime for Ports, Waterways, and Railways, to that Committee for decision.)

5. M. CLEMENCEAU continuing said the Conference had agreed that each of the Great Powers should have 3 representatives on this Committee, and that 10 seats should be reserved for the Smaller Powers. Accordingly two representatives of each of the following Small Powers, Poland, Rumania, Serbia, Greece, and Belgium had been appointed. Czecho-Slovakia now also asked to appoint a representative on account of its paramount economic and financial interests in connection with the final liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, especially as they had agreed to take over part of the Austrian debt. If Czecho-Slovakia were admitted, all the Powers interested in the liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire would be represented, as Poland, Rumania, and Serbia, were duly represented.

Inter-Allied Commission on Reparation

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that Czecho-Slovakia had a good case and should be represented.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that Portugal had also put forward claims to a seat.

(After further discussion it was agreed that two additional seats should be granted to Czecho-Slovakia on the Inter-Allied Commission on Reparation).

6. MR. LLOYD GEORGE informed the meeting that the British Representatives on this Commission would be:—

Inter-Allied Commission on Breaches of the Laws of War

(1) The Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon Hewart, Attorney-General, and
(2) Sir Ernest Pollock, K. C., Solicitor-General.

It was proposed that these two representatives should form a panel.

(This was agreed to.)

7. It was also agreed that when any one delegate was unable to attend a Committee Meeting, a substitute could be appointed.

Panel System of Representation to Apply to all Committees

8. (At this stage M. Venizelos and M. Politis, members of the Greek Delegation to the Peace Conference, accompanied by their experts M. Speranza and M. Rentis were admitted to the Conference.)

Greek Territorial Claims

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Venizelos to explain the territorial claims of Greece.

M. VENIZELOS said that he came there at the invitation of the Great Powers to put forward the territorial claims of Greece, and he proposed to divide the subject into the following chapters:—

N. Epirus;	Thrace;
The Isles;	Asia Minor.

He would first deal with Epirus and the Isles, partly because one of the Great Powers was greatly interested in the settlement of these questions. Conversations had actually taken place between Italy and Greece with a view to arriving at an agreement and to prepare the way to a settlement without binding the Conference. He need hardly point out that it was to Greece's interest to maintain good relations with Italy and with all the Mediterranean Powers, in the same way as it had always been to her interest to maintain good relations with the other Western Powers. Greece was a small Power whereas Italy was a Great Power; but it was in the common interest of both to reach an amicable agreement.

M. ORLANDO asked permission to say that Italy was animated by the same spirit and desire to come to a sound and friendly agreement with Greece on territorial questions. He only disagreed with M. Venizelos when he referred to Greece as a small Power. It was a noble country, entitled to maintain an honoured place in the world.

M. VENIZELOS expressed his gratification at the words spoken by M. Orlando. He would first discuss the Greek claims in N. Epirus. In Northern Epirus Greece claimed a population majority. There were 120,000 Greeks as compared with

(a) Claims in N. Epirus

80,000 Albanians. He fully admitted that many of these Greeks did not speak the Greek language; they only spoke Albanian. When Albania was created as an Independent State, two Commissions had been appointed—one for Northern Albania—the other for Southern Albania. The Commission for Southern Albania had proposed to carry out a plebiscite, but this proposal was not accepted and a census was held on the basis of the language spoken in each house. Albanian-speaking families were recorded as Albanians: the language test being accepted as proof of nationality.

After the experience gained in this war, neither race, nor language, nor skull, could be taken by itself as determining nationality: national conscience alone must decide. Thus Christians and Mohammedans inhabited Albania and, whilst the latter had, during the course of Turkish domination, accepted the Turkish Government and become real Turks, the Christians of Southern Albania had always remained attached to Greece. Over 300,000 of these Christians of Southern Albania had emigrated southward into Greece in order to protect themselves from the persecution of the Mohammedans. These 300,000 Albanians had become Hellenised both in manners and customs, whilst retaining the Albanian language, and they now played an important part in the economic life of Greece. Over two-thirds of the Greek Fleet was at present manned by men of Albanian origin. It might be interesting to mention that the Vice-President of the Council of Ministers in Greece—M. Repoulis; the Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Armies—General Danglis; the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces in Greece—Admiral Coundouriotis, were Albanians. Again Albania had, during the war of Greek Independence, furnished many of the leaders of the revolution.

In conclusion, he drew attention to the fact that since the time of the declaration of the independence of Greece, the Christians of Albania had always considered themselves to be Greeks, and the Albanian movement only began 2 or 3 years ago. The Albanian situation should not be compared with the Irish question as regards the relations between the Orthodox Mohammedans and the Christians; for whilst in Ireland no civil war had occurred, in Albania, civil war had raged for over three centuries.

At Korytza, during Turkish rule, Greek schools had been established, supported by the residents of Korytza, and these were attended by 2,400 scholars. These schools had been closed during the war. When reopened in September last the attendance immediately numbered 2,300 scholars, but only 200 children attended the Albanian school which was extremely good, being under the direction of an American master. He thought that incident would supply perhaps the best evidence of the true sentiments and feelings of the people.

Tukan Pasha, the President of the Albanian Committee, who was in Paris at the present moment to put forward the Albanian claims, had said that the Greek schools in Albania had been particularly favoured by the Turks, and that this fact accounted for the large attendance of scholars. This statement was obviously quite incorrect, as the Albanian Mohammedans had, until the last 2 or 3 years, never entertained any national feelings: they had always considered themselves to be Turks.

He did not propose to discuss the question of N. Albania: Greece put forward no claims to any part of that territory. The northern boundaries of the territories of N. Epirus claimed by Greece were demarcated by a line passing through Cimarra, N. of Tepeleni, W. of Moskhopolis, to Lake Prespa, where it joined the former frontiers of Greece.

Next, as regards the question of the Isles, all these were without exception Greek. The population was Greek, more especially in the Dodecanese, where there were 110,000 Greeks as compared with 12,000 persons of other nationalities.

(b) Greek Claims to the Isles

He drew attention to an album published in Italy. The illustrations of this book showed the degree of development of civilisation in these small inlands. No doubt some remnants of Latin domination still remained, especially in the architecture, due to the passage of the Crusaders. But this domination had had no influence whatever on the ethnic position of the islands, and at the present moment only the principle of nationality could be taken into consideration. Greece claimed not only the islands of the Dodecanese, but all the Aegean islands, including those which for strategic reasons owing to their situation at the entrance to the Straits, had not been attributed to Greece by the Conference of London after the Balkan War.

It might be asked why no specific claim had been put forward to the island of Cyprus. He had not done so for various reasons, the most important of these being that he was convinced that the British Government, who, 50 years ago, was the first to increase the Grecian Kingdom by the grant of the Ionian Islands, and who during the war had offered Cyprus to Constantine, would at the end of the war be sufficiently magnanimous to surrender Cyprus to Greece.

To sum up, Greece claimed all the islands of the Western [*Eastern*] Mediterranean, including the Dodecanese, Imbros, Tenedos, Kastelorizo, Rhodes and Cyprus.

Thrace contained a population of 730,000 Greeks and 112,000 Bulgarians. He fully realised the difficulty of getting reliable statistics, as in those parts religion played such an important part in the preparation of all statistics. He was,

(c) Greek Claims to Thrace

however, in a position to give definite proof that the Greeks numbered seven times more than the Bulgarians. This fact had been so well recognised by the Bulgarians that when, in 1912, the Bulgarians found themselves compelled to combine during the elections to resist the programme of the Committee of Union and Progress, it had been agreed between the Greek Patriarch and the Bulgarian Exarch to divide the representation between themselves in such a way as to give seven Greek and one Bulgarian deputies. Further, it was agreed that if the one Bulgarian failed to be elected, one Greek delegate would retire in his favour. The principle of nationality must therefore be applied to Thrace, and Bulgaria must cede the Western portion of Thrace to Greece.

Undoubtedly, this would entail for Bulgaria loss of access to the Aegean Sea. That was inevitable. But he was prepared to suggest a solution to meet the economic requirements of the Bulgarians, thus deprived of direct access to the Aegean. Although Bulgaria already possessed magnificent harbours in the Black Sea, which, as a result of the Straits becoming internationalised, would become a free and open sea, Greece would be prepared to grant to her a commercial outlet either at Kavalla or at Salonika on the same conditions and with the same international guarantees that would be granted to the other Powers of Central Europe similarly situated, namely, Hungary, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, etc. He drew attention to the fact that after the Balkan War Greece had made a formal Treaty with Serbia, allowing her the free use for trade purposes of the port of Salonika, and of the railways giving access thereto. In this way Bulgaria would not only have her own Black Sea ports, but also the free Aegean ports. Bulgarian interests would thus be fully satisfied. But on grounds of nationality, Thrace must form part of Greece, to enable her to redeem the two and three quarter million Greeks inhabiting that territory. The frontiers of Thrace claimed by Greece were the following:— From the summit of Koula, on the present North-East Greco-Bulgarian frontier, the line followed the course of the Arda up [*down?*] to its junction with the Maritza and thence along the Turco-Bulgarian frontier of 1913 to Cape Iniada on the Black Sea. It was a curious fact that the proposed frontier corresponded very nearly to the Southern frontiers of Bulgaria as laid down by the St. Stefano treaty of 1878,[2] which had been superseded by the Treaty of Berlin.[3] This Treaty was intended to make every allowance to Bulgarian pretensions. Consequently, no injustice would be done to Bulgaria if those frontiers were now accepted. The portion of Thrace, claimed by Greece, had

[2] *Foreign Relations*, 1878, p. 866.
[3] Treaty of July 13, 1878, *ibid.*, p. 895.

sometimes been likened to a narrow corridor, which would afford a vulnerable strategic boundary. His reply to that argument would be, firstly, that this corridor had a width of 80 kilometres from the sea; and, secondly, that it had been used by Turkey itself for 40 years as the only passage between Thrace and the rest of the Turkish Empire in Europe; and it would still have been in Turkish possession, but for her own misdeeds. Consequently, it would not constitute such a bad frontier after all. The Maritza cuts Thrace into two parts: Eastern Thrace and Western Thrace. Western Thrace contained a population of:—

35,000 Bulgars,
81,000 Greeks,
229,000 Turks.

In this territory Turkish Mohammedans preponderated, but the Greeks were more than double the Bulgars in numbers.

In Eastern Thrace, excluding Constantinople, there were:

35,000 Bulgars,
267,000 Greeks,
213,000 Turks.

In this region the Greeks had a larger population than the Turks.

Mr. Lloyd George enquired whether Eastern Thrace, as defined by M. Venizelos, included Adrianople.

M. Venizelos replied in the affirmative. It had been said that the Balkan War had been continued in order to hand Adrianople over to the Bulgarians, and that negotiations with Turkey had on that account been broken off. The question of population in the town of Adrianople deserved attention. In the town of Adrianople there were:—

25,000 Turks,
25,900 Greeks,
9,500 Jews,
3,500 Armenians,
300 Bulgarians.

This actually meant a Greek majority in Adrianople. Again, as regards the various counties of Adrianople the following figures might prove of interest:—

(1) Kaza of Adrianople	41,000 Greeks, 44,500 Turks, 7,000 Bulgarians, 3,500 Armenians, 9,500 Jews.
(2) Kaza of Harsa [*Hafsa*]	9,000 Greeks, 8,000 Turks, 7,000 Bulgarians;

(3) Kaza of Mustapha Pasha	7,000 Greeks, 13,000 Bulgarians, 10,000 Turks.

He drew attention, however, to the fact that this Kaza was not claimed by the Greeks; they agreed it should, as at present, remain a part of Bulgaria.

(4) Kaza of Ortakeui	14,500 Greeks, 15,000 Turks, 4,000 Bulgarians.
(5) Kaza of Ouzoun Keple	19,000 Greeks, 10,000 Turks, 5,000 Bulgarians.

Taking the two parts of Thrace actually claimed by Greece, excluding the parts granted to Bulgaria after the Balkan War, as well as Constantinople, and other outlying parts, the total population would be:—

348,000 Greeks,
442,000 Turks,
70,000 Bulgarians.

The Turks thus had a slight majority, but this majority only existed in the Western part, which, as a matter of fact, was no longer in the hands of the Turks. In the parts at present held by Greece the Turks were in a decided minority. Admitting the fact that these territories should not under any circumstances be occupied by Turkey, he himself was quite willing that the inhabitants of Western Thrace should be consulted whether they would prefer union with Greece or Bulgaria. He prophesied with confidence that the inhabitants of Western Thrace, including the Mahommedans who had during the last War fought on the side of the Bulgarians, would decide in favour of Greece.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked M. Venizelos how he proposed to ascertain the wishes of the Mahommedan population.

M. VENIZELOS said that he had intended his suggestion to apply only to Western Thrace: Eastern Thrace had never known Bulgarian domination. He suggested that some unannounced representative of the Great Powers at present in Sofia should be asked to ascertain confidentially the views of the Deputies, representing the Mahommedans of Eastern Thrace. Naturally, those Deputies would prefer union with Turkey; but if this were precluded, he felt confident they would elect to form part of Greece.

At the beginning of his speech he had said that Thrace contained 730,000 Greeks. In the detailed figures he had last given, the Greek population was stated to be 348,000. The difference was due to the fact that the borderlands along the Bulgarian frontier, inhabited by a large number of Greeks, were not claimed by Greece. Con-

stantinople also had a population of 360,000 Greeks, but he put forward no claims to Constantinople. In reality Constantinople was a Greek town, but there were so many great international interests connected with the place that a special régime was undoubtedly indicated. The town, together with sufficient hinterland, should be placed under the League of Nations with a mandatory. The mere fact, however, that Greece had waived her claims to Constantinople only enhanced her rightful claims to the rest of Thrace. Speaking, however, on behalf of the whole Greek people, including the 350,000 Greeks in Constantinople, he expressed his firm conviction that in the general interests of the world, the Turkish Government together with the Sultan, should be made to leave Constantinople, and establish the new Capital of a new Ottoman State either at Konia or Brusa. As long as the Sultan remained at Constantinople even without the title of Calif, he would retain considerable prestige, which would permit him to exercise important influence over the Mussulman world and to cause trouble to all the Great Powers, including France and Great Britain. It had always been said, and he himself had always thought so, that Constantinople was a purely Turkish town. That however was not the case. It would actually be found that the Mohammedans of Constantinople were in a minority as compared with the Christians. Consequently, if the definition given in the 12th of President Wilson's 14 points, were accepted, it would be admitted that Constantinople need not be included in the Ottoman Empire. For the future security of the world, a small Turkish state with its own Capital should be constituted in Asia.

Mr. Lloyd George enquired whether M. Venizelos proposed that Constantinople and environs should be internationalised, including Skutari and the opposite shores of the Bosphorus.

M. Venizelos replied in the affirmative, and suggested that the following localities should be internationalised—namely:—the vilayet of Constantinople: the sanjaks of Ismid, of Gallipoli, of Biga, and part of Brusa.

A certain Greek population would be included in this territory but Greece was prepared to accept the arrangement, as they felt certain that the population would receive fair treatment.

In conclusion it might be thought that he was dealing severely with the Bulgarians. People might say to him: "Why were you during the Balkan war, prepared to cede everything to Bulgaria, and now you are so irreconcilable?" He would reply that all he did at that time was done in the hope of forming a federation of Balkan people. He had been an idealist, and it had been a dream without reality. Again, during the last European war, he had agreed to make further sacrifices in order to bring the war to an end.

Surely these sacrifices, which he had then been prepared to make, could not now be brought up against him. On the contrary, all these would-be sacrifices only strengthened his present claims. As a matter of fact, Bulgarian ambitions never could be satisfied. Whatever concessions might be made would be useless, for Bulgaria would never rest until the whole of the Balkans were handed over to her. Bulgaria claimed complete hegemony over the whole of the Peninsula, and she would seize every opportunity to fulfil her ambitions. Bulgaria represented in the Balkans the Prussia of Western Europe. She would always attempt to impose her militarism on the Balkans, just as Prussia had attempted to do in Western Europe. He wished to be strictly just to Bulgaria, but he had no wish to temper justice with benevolence. Bulgaria laid claim to a population of 4,900,000. He thought this figure excessive: his own estimate would be 4,500,000. But, whatever their population might be, it gave the Bulgars no right to rule over Greeks. Bulgaria now possessed a territory and a population which fully represented her ethnic rights. Should the claims of Greece now be fully admitted, Bulgaria would still remain in a better situation than Greece as regards the ratio between population and territory.

(It was decided that M. Venizelos should put forward the claims of Greece to Asia Minor on the following day).

(The meeting adjourned to 11 o'clock on Tuesday, the 4th February, 1919).

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 3 February, 1919.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, 4 February, 1919, at 11 O'clock a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
President Wilson	The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.	M. Clemenceau
Mr. R. Lansing	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.	M. Pichon
Mr. A. H. Frazier	Gen. The Rt. Hon. Louis Botha	M. Dutasta
Mr. L. Harrison	Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey	M. Berthelot
Lieut. Burden	Major A. M. Caccia	Capt. Portier
	Mr. E. Phipps	M. de Bearn

ITALY	JAPAN
M. Orlando	Baron Makino
Baron Sonnino	H. E. M. Matsui
Count Aldrovandi	M. Saburi
Major Jones	M. Kimura

PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION OF GREEK QUESTION

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE
Mr. C. Day	Mr. H. Nicolson
Mr. Westermann	Mr. A. Leeper

GREECE	ITALY
M. Venizelos	M. de Martino
M. Politis	M. Galli
M. Speranza	Colonel Castoldi
M. Rentis	

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

Press Communiqués Relating to Committee Meetings

1. MR. LANSING said he wished to bring a matter to the notice of the Conference, which, if left unsettled, might lead to considerable confusion. He referred to the supply of information to the Press regarding the proceedings of Committee Meetings. Recently the Secretariat-General had issued to the Press a Communiqué relating to the proceedings of the Committee on Breaches of the Laws of War. That Committee had already prepared a communiqué of their own, and he

thought the Secretariat-General should avoid taking up such matters, especially as they did not really know what took place at such meetings, except through the procès-verbaux. He wished to propose, therefore, that the Secretariat-General should give to the Press no information relating to Committees.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed that in future the Committees should issue their own communiqués, and the Secretariat-General would take no action in the matter.

M. SONNINO enquired whether, as a matter of principle, each Committee should not send its communiqués to the Secretariat-General for communication to the Press.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought this procedure though, strictly speaking, correct would lead to a considerable loss of time.

(It was agreed that Committees would in future issue their own communiqués to the Press).

2. M. VENIZELOS said he would next deal with the claims of Greece to Western Asia-Minor. Article 12 of President Wilson's programme, which he had already cited, also governed the solution of the problem of Asia-Minor. Article 12 read as follows:—

Greek Territorial Claims in Western Asia Minor (i) Claims Based on President Wilson's 12th Point

"The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolute unmolested opportunity of autonomous development."

Now, what should be the correct interpretation of that Article? What regions should, according to the principle therein laid down, be submitted to Turkish sovereignty? A broad and generous interpretation must be given to the principles contained in President Wilson's 12th Article, if Turkey was to retain as large a territory as possible, whilst admitting the grant of autonomy to all suppressed nationalities. Unless this procedure were followed, it would, for instance, be impossible to solve the Armenian question and so put a stop to the sufferings of those people, who had lost through massacres over one million people during the course of the war. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, a wide latitude of action was admissible, because Turkey had signed the Armistice without conditions. Again, when the Emperor of Austria had announced on the 7th October, 1918,[1] his willingness to apply the autonomous principle to the various parts of his Empire, President Wilson had replied [2] that he was no more free to accept simply the autonomy of those peoples as a

[1] See note No. 4978, October 7, 1918, from the Swedish Minister, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 341.
[2] See *ibid.*, p. 368.

basis of peace and he insisted that it was they, and not he, who ought to judge what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government would give satisfaction to their aspirations, and to their conception of their rights and their future as members of the League of Nations. The same principle must obviously be applied to the Ottoman Empire. He did not know whether his views were shared by the Conference, but he would explicitly state that the claims of Greece to Western Asia-Minor were based on the principle that no territory previously belonging to Turkey could remain a part of the future Ottoman Empire unless it contained an absolute majority of Turks.

(ii) Geography & Geology of Western Asia Minor

Now, applying this test, it would be evident that on a population basis, the western part of Asia Minor, west of a line running between Kastelorizo and the Sea of Marmora could not form part of the Turkish Empire and must be allotted to Greece. From that territory, however, he would exclude a portion of the Dardanelles sandjak, which should form part of the Internationalised Area. The western territory of Asia Minor claimed by Greece could be separated from the rest of Asia Minor not only for ethnic reasons, but also because geographically and historically it formed a specially distinct and separate region.

This particular region of Asia Minor had been described as follows by the German geographer Philipson in his work "Reisen und Ferchungen [*Forschungen*] im Westlichen Kleinasien", of which the fifth and last part had appeared during the war of 1915:—

"The Asia-Minor Peninsula shows a great geographical contrast which explains the part it played in History as a hyphen between the Asiatic and the Helleno-European Civilisations.

The central part of the large and moderately levelled country surrounded from the N. S. and E. by high mountains is formed of homogeneous and partly dry wide plateaus, divided into sections by a few ranges. On the contrary, the western portion, from S. of Constantinople shows a remarkably varied formation. Ranges in every direction, of varied area, formation and shape, are divided by deep valleys ravine-like or basin-like, which extend themselves from East to West from the central plateaus to the multiform coast which gives their outlet to rather important rivers.

These valleys have on the orographical formation of western Asia-Minor a greater influence than that of the interior ranges, because they provide it with rich and useful land and easy means of communications.

This compact morcellation of the country and the useful variety of the coast-line, which is a consequence of it, as well as of the general slope brought on by the last geological periods, show common features between Western Asia-Minor and Greece proper, to the

extent that we may consider both as one geographical entity—the Ægeide—.

To this contrast between Central and Western Asia-Minor, in shape and formation, corresponds an equally important contrast between their respective climates and vegetation. In the Centre surrounded by high ranges, prevails the lack of rainfall and the cold winter of the steppes. On the contrary, the open western position is provided by the sea breeze with ample rainfall, so that the warm summer alone is dry. Therefore, the essential feature of Western Asia-Minor is the most genuine Mediterranean climate and vegetation. Thus one great natural barrier divides Asia-Minor: on one side a secluded plateau of a practically Asiatic nature; on the other, an Ægean country with all the features of Greece proper and reciprocal relations both in history and in nature with the sea and overseas with Greece. Therefore, we meet in the Centre the Asiatic civilisation, and the Greek civilisation on the Western coast both in the past and in present time."

(iii) Population of Peninsula of Asia Minor

Turning next to the numeration of the population inhabiting this region, no official statistics had ever been issued. Each nationality had, from time to time, issued separate statistics, but these, when compared, gave fantastic results. The statistics which he would now quote had been obtained by the Greek Patriarchate, and he could guarantee their accuracy. These estimates gave a total population of 1,700,000 Greeks for the whole of the peninsula. A proof of the correctness of these estimates was contained in a pamphlet published in 1915 in Berlin by a Mr. Dietrich. The Turkish persecutions in Asia Minor had always been directed from Berlin. Still, the Germans were a practical people and they were anxious to have correct statistics, and so Mr. Dietrich had been commissioned to make a census, with the result that he arrived at the figure of 1,600,000 Greeks. This result, which was based on the population existing after the persecutions of 1915, fully corroborated his own estimate of 1,700,000. The handbooks of geography used in the high schools of Turkey proper gave the figure of 1,300,000 as the Greek population of Asia Minor. There was a considerable difference between this figure and the one previously quoted by himself, but the difference was not greater than could be expected under the circumstances.

(iv) Population of Western Asia-Minor

Turning now to the portion of Western Asia Minor, claimed by Greece, including the vilayets of Aidin and Broussa, and the independent Sandjaks of the Dardanelles and Ischmid, the Greek population amounted to 1,081,000. If, to the above territory, were added the islands, adjoining the mainland, between Kastelorizo and Mytilene, a total of 1,450,000 Greeks would be obtained. Though the islands of Khios, Mytilene and Samos had been incorporated in Greece at the end of the

last Balkan war, the Turkish Government had never recognised the allegiance of the inhabitants of those islands to Greece. The islands were strictly connected economically with the mainland, and many of the landowners of the islands also possessed holdings on the mainland. There had been a rapid increase in the Greek population everywhere, whilst the Turkish population had continuously decreased. Thus, for example, Cyprus, at the present moment, had a population of 300,000. According to the "Almanach de Gotha" the population in 1879 had been only 135,000. That is, in 40 years, the Greek population had almost doubled, whilst during the same period the Turkish population had only very slightly increased. Again, in Crete, in 1830, when the first census was taken, 70,000 Mussulmans and 70,000 Greeks were enumerated; the two nationalities being equal. In 1881, after 50 years, the population was returned at 207,000 Greeks and 72,000 Turks, clearly showing that whilst the Turkish population had been practically stationary, the Greek population had increased three-fold, in spite of the fact that the former represented the dominating power and the latter the persecuted and subservient race. Finally, the Greek population in 1900 was 273,000 and in 1910 330,000, whilst during this period the Turkish population had diminished through emigration. Exactly the same thing had occurred at Mytilene, Khios and Samos. These facts clearly exhibited the vitality and vigour of the Greek element as compared to the Ottoman element.

The total population of Western Asia Minor, including the adjoining islands, had been given as equal to 1,480,000. The whole of the territories inhabited by these Greeks, however, was not claimed by Greece: certain outlying portions, including the territory round Constantinople, containing a total population of 319,000 Greeks, should be excluded. This gave a total population of 1,132,000 Greeks in the whole of the area claimed by Greece. Within this same territory the corresponding Mussulman population was 943,000, including Mahommedans of all races, though Turks were in greater numbers. The Greek population, however, had a majority of 189,000, and this was sufficient to show that it could not be considered to form "a part of the Turkish portion of the Ottoman Empire". The Turkish minority of 943,000 would be still further reduced after the 100,000 Jews and Armenians and other Christians were added to the Greek, thus raising the total to 1,250,000 non-Mussulmans, as compared to 943,000 Mussulmans.

(v) Population of Western Portion of Asia Minor Claimed by Greece

The more Eastern portions of the territory claimed by Greece was more thickly inhabited by Turks. Consequently, by the exclusion of certain portions of the Eastern Sanjaks, a territory more compactly

occupied by Greeks could be obtained. But economic reasons would militate against such procedure and, in his opinion, the same principle should apply as for Bohemia, Bohemia formed a geographical entity having on its North-Western border a fringe of Germans, who, for economic reasons, could not be excluded. It was argued that Bohemia should therefore be incorporated as a whole in Czecho-Slovakia, the Czech population being in the majority, for if the Germans were excluded, the economic life of the country would become impossible. This principle being accepted for Bohemia, where the various populations had all reached the same degree of civilisation, it must be the more readily accepted in the case of Asia Minor, which was inhabited by two races differing so greatly; the one representing an old and advanced civilisation, the other unable to establish a Government acceptable to foreign races. The Turks were good workers, honest in their relations, and a good people as subjects. But as rulers they were insupportable and a disgrace to civilisation, as was proved by their having exterminated over a million Armenians and 300,000 Greeks during the last four years.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether the figures relating to the Mahomedan population had been obtained from the Greek Patriarchate, or from official Turkish sources. He thought the latter figures were always too small, as taxation was involved.

M. VENIZELOS replied that the figures had been supplied by the Greek Ecclesiastical Authorities, but he thought they had been originally derived from official Turkish statistics.

(vi) Greek Population in Turkish Government of Central Asia Minor

Outside the area of Western Asia Minor, claimed by Greece, some 922,000 Greeks, perfectly organised and maintaining 1,400 schools, with 100,000 scholars, would still remain under the Turkish Government of Central Asia Minor. For this evil there was only one possible remedy. Under the Peace Treaty, the Turkish Government should undertake to purchase the real estate and house property belonging to such of the Greeks inhabiting Turkish territory as might desire to emigrate into Greek Asia Minor. The Greek Government should adopt the same policy in regard to property and real estate belonging to Turkish Asia Minor. There would thus be set up a current of mutual and voluntary migrations, thanks to which it might be hoped that in the course of a few years the people remaining in the Turkish State would be composed exclusively of Mahomedans; whilst the Greek element would become overwhelming.

(vii) Trebizond

In reply to an enquiry which had been addressed to him by President Wilson, he explained that Trebizond, containing a population of 360,000 Greeks, had claimed to be formed into a small Republic. He did not favour this proposal as

he thought it would be very undesirable to create a large number of small States, especially as the country surrounding the town comprised a very large number of Turks. In his opinion the vilayet of Trebizond should form part of the State of Armenia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether M. Venizelos had any idea as to what should constitute the Armenian State.

(viii) Armenia

M. VENIZELOS said that in his opinion the Armenian State should include the six Armenian vilayets, together with Russian Armenia and the vilayets of Trebizond and Adana.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether Cilicia would be included in the Armenian State.

M. VENIZELOS replied in the affirmative and said that Armenia would contain all the territories around Mount Ararat.

PRESIDENT WILSON remarked that the whole question was mixed up with humane considerations. The American missionaries had said that the Turks had also treated the Turks very badly at the time they were ill-treating the Armenians. He enquired if M. Venizelos could throw any light on this report.

M. VENIZELOS said that no Turks had been ill-treated; but Mahomedans, such as Arabs, Kurds, etc. had certainly been persecuted, and that was quite natural.

It might with justice be asked whether conditions in the interior would be rendered extremely difficult by the surrender of Western Armenia [*Anatolia*] to Greece. He thought that question could be answered in the negative, for, on the South side, as well as on the North side, Anatolia would have free outlets to the sea. Furthermore, he would strongly favour the creation of a Free Port, with international guarantees, on the Western coast of Asia Minor for the import and export of the commerce of the interior. This would be to the mutual benefit of the two nations and especially to Greece, who was a commercial maritime nation.

(ix) Free Ports in Asia Minor

Statistics showed that Western Asia Minor had a majority of Greeks. It was therefore entitled to the grant of autonomy, and since the principle of autonomy naturally involved the right of union, the new autonomous State of Western Asia Minor would thereby be entitled to union with Greece, if the inhabitants so preferred. Can it be said that Asia Minor would prefer to join Greece rather than to form a separate unit? In the present day the spirit and feeling of nationality in all countries was so strong that the desire of these peoples would not be to form an independent Greek State, but to unite with their Greek brothers.

Again it might be asked whether the acquirement of this new territory would not place too heavy a responsibility on Greece, both from a military and administrative point of view. The military situation would present no difficulties, for Greece, unlike Roumania, who was ringed about on all sides by her enemies, had only to guard against the Bulgarians. Greece was already allied to Serbia and Roumania, and she possessed a numerical superiority over the Turks. Moreover, the guarantees of the League of Nations would constitute a further protection. The Administrative responsibility would no doubt be heavy, but it would not exceed her powers. During the last twenty years the Greek element had played a considerable part in the administration of Turkish territories. Moreover, the Greek nation had a special capacity and genius for co-operating with the Turks whenever political conflicts ceased. A large number of the Turkish populations was of Greek origin and, therefore, as soon as religious and political troubles ceased, it was easy for them to live together in perfect amity.

(x) Anticipated Military & Administrative Responsibilities of Greece in W. Asia Minor

A reference to the map would show that new Greece would have the singular appearance of a State formed around a sea. That certainly was an inconvenience. But for thirty centuries Greeks had lived under these conditions, and had been able to surmount great catastrophes, to prosper and to increase.

In conclusion, he realised that Greece did not appear before the Peace Conference with the full titles she would have possessed, but for the betrayal of a King. Still he had a right to ask that a people should not be held responsible for the acts of their King. The people had not supported the King's actions, but they had striven to bring about a reaction by electoral strikes and revolutions and, in spite of German propaganda which had been carried on for many years, the country had succeeded at a critical moment to right itself. It had been faced with a sort of Bolshevism, but it had been able to recover. At the commencement of the war he had offered to side with the Great Powers. He had proposed intervention when the Allies had appeared in the Dardanelles. He had never asked for any reward. Indeed, when he had first suggested an alliance with the Great Powers, neither Turkey or Bulgaria had entered the war, so that it would have been impossible for Greece to have obtained compensations. At the time when he himself had gone to Salonika and ordered mobilisation, the situation was such that Greece could not possibly have hoped for any benefit. At that time he had suggested to Mr. Lloyd George that Turkey should be allowed to retain Asia Minor as well as her

(xi) Greek Territorial Claims & Greece's Action During War

European possessions as an inducement for her to negotiate a separate peace. Greece was a small country, and her greatest strength lay in her honesty. It was in full confidence that he left the future of the country to the Conference.

M. ORLANDO said he wished to repeat his expression of sympathy for M. Venizelos and for Greece. He sincerely hoped that the small differences existing between Italy and Greece would be readjusted to the satisfaction of both countries.

(M. Venizelos, M. Politis, and the experts who had been present during the discussion of the Greek question then withdrew).

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked permission to make a proposal. The statement of M. Venizelos had raised so many questions, both statistical and geographical, that he proposed the same course should be followed as had already been taken in the case of Roumania. That is to say, that experts be appointed to co-ordinate all the facts and the Conference would then decide questions of policy when the reports of the experts were received.

(xii) Resolution Regarding Greek Territorial Claims

It was agreed:—

"That the questions raised in the statement by M. Venizelos on the Greek territorial interests in the Peace Settlement shall be referred for examination in the first instance to an expert committee composed of two representatives each of the United States of America, The British Empire, France and Italy.

It shall be the duty of this Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits and make recommendations for a just settlement.

The Committee is authorised to consult representatives of the peoples concerned."

(The meeting adjourned to 3 p. m. tomorrow, 5th February, 1919).

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 5 February, 1919, at 3 p. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
President Wilson	The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.	M. Clemenceau
Mr. R. Lansing	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.	M. Pichon
Mr. A. H. Frazier	Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey	M. Dutasta
Mr. L. Harrison	Captain E. Abraham	M. Berthelot
Lieut. Burden	Mr. E. Phipps	M. de Bearn
		Capt. Portier

ITALY	JAPAN
M. Orlando	Baron Makino
Baron Sonnino	H. E. M. Matsui
Count Aldrovandi	M. Saburi
Major Jones	

PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION OF CZECHO-SLOVAK QUESTION

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE
Major Bonsal	Mr. H. Nicolson
Mr. Dulles	Mr. A. Leeper
Mr. Seymour	
CZECHO-SLOVAKIA	ITALY
M. Benes	Count Vannutelli
M. Kramartz	

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU, in opening the meeting, asked for the names of the delegates appointed by the various Powers to serve on the Greek Committee.

Nominees for Greek Committee

The following names were given:—

United States of America	Mr Westermann. Mr. Day.
British Empire	Sir Robert Borden. Sir Eyre Crowe.
France	M. Jules Cambon. M. Gout.
Italy	M. de Martino. Colonel Castoldi.

(At this stage Dr. Kramartz and M. Benes and the technical advisers entered the room).

2. M. BENES said that, before beginning to expound the Czecho-Slovak problem, he would like to declare what were the principles guiding Czecho-Slovak policy. The movement culminating in the formation of an independent Czecho-Slovak State had begun 3½ years ago. The agitation had been carried on by scattered exiles in the various Allied countries. There was, at that time, no Government and no organised political body. In 3 years these exiles had succeeded, with the help of the population remaining at home, in putting up a Central Government and a political organisation which was vital, and, with the help of the Allies, three armies in the field.

Czecho-Slovak Territorial Claims

Before dealing with the question of the future frontiers of this new State, he would like to recall that the Czecho-Slovak people had shown a practical sense of politics which had won for them the recognition of the Allies. He would also like to recall that, in all these years, the Nation had been entirely united. It had never hesitated to side with the Allies in the interests of democracy. It had not fought for territory, but for the same principles as the Allied Nations. It had risen against a mediæval Dynasty backed by bureaucracy, militarism, the Roman Catholic Church, and, to some extent, by high finance. The Nation had plunged into this struggle without asking for any guarantees or weighing the probabilities of success. All the Nation wanted was to control its own destinies. The Nation felt itself to be a European Nation and a member of the Society of the Western States.

In seeking now to shape the Czecho-Slovak State, the very same principles would be their guide. They would adopt the European and human point of view, and base their claims on the very principles the Conference was assembled to establish.

The Nation, after 300 years of servitude and vicissitudes which had almost led to its extermination, felt that it must be prudent, reasonable and just to its neighbours; and that it must avoid provoking jealousy and renewed struggles which might again plunge it into similar danger. It was in this spirit that he wished to explain the territorial problem.

M. Benes, continuing, said that the first territorial question was that of the four provinces, Bohemia, Moravia, Austrian Silesia and Slovakia. These territories were claimed for ethnographical reasons. They contained 10 millions of the Nation.

(i) The Four Provinces of Czecho-Slovakia

The first three had been one State from the sixth Century. The Czech Dynasty had lasted until 1747, when a unitary form of government had prevailed against federalist and national tendencies. In 1526, the Hapsburgs had been elected Kings of Bohemia, and, though, up to the present time they had *de jure* recognized Czech Institutions, they had begun from that date to centralize power. Czech independence might be said to have lasted until 1747. Since then, though the Juridical existence of the State continued to be acknowledged, it had no practical significance. Hence the Czech Insurrection in 1848 and that which had coincided with the beginning of this war.

(ii) Historical Considerations

Historical considerations, though not the predominant factor at the present time, must be accorded some weight, in as much as they very deeply affected public opinion. It was these old historical causes that armed the Czech people against the Germanic masses around them. Three times the Czech people had rebelled, not merely against Germanism but against a system of aristocratic and Roman Catholic privilege; three times the nation had been overwhelmed by the superior numbers of the German peoples. At the end of the 17th Century, after the great battle of the White Mountain, the Czech people had practically ceased to exist. It was reanimated only at the end of the 18th Century by the French Revolution. Since then the Nation had worked so hard that, at the beginning of the 20th century, it was industrially, intellectually and politically, the most developed community in Central Europe. Throughout the 19th Century whenever the Czech people had attempted to free themselves it was always the appeal to history that had inspired them.

M. Benes said that he must draw attention to the exposed situation of the Czecho-Slovak nation. It was the advanced guard of the Slav world in the West, and therefore constantly threatened by German expansion. The Germanic mass, now numbering some 80 millions, could not push westwards as its road was blocked on that side by highly developed nations. It was, therefore, always seeking outlets to the south and to the east. In this movement it found the Poles and the Czechs in its path. Hence the special importance of the Czecho-Slovak frontiers in Central Europe. It might be hoped that the Germans would not again attempt forcible invasions, but they had done so in the past so often that the Czechs had always felt they had a special mission to resist the Teutonic flood. Hence the fanatical devotion of the Czechs which had been noticed by all in this war. It was due to the constant feeling of the Czechs that they were the protectors of democracy against Germanism, and that it was their duty at all times to fight the Germans.

(iii) Exposed Situation of Czecho-Slovakia

The first territorial claim of the Czechs was to Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia, which formed a geographical and ethnographical whole. However, there were some 2,400,000 Germans in Bohemia according to Austrian official statistics. The presence of these Germans was the result of centuries of infiltration and colonisation. The statistics, however, were official statistics drawn up with a deliberate political purpose. It was easy to prove their mendacity. The Czech figures showed that the Austrian census exaggerated the number of Germans in Bohemia by 800,000 or a million. The Czech statistics had been very carefully made. When the Austrian census in 1910 was under preparation, State and Municipal authorities sent to each village in the mixed districts warnings that the census would be established on the lines of spoken language not of mother tongue. If, therefore, a workman conversed in German with his employer, he was set down as a German, under pain of losing his employment and of being evicted from his home. The same method had been employed in the territories of other mixed populations in the Austro-Hungarian Kingdom. According to Czech calculations there were about 1,500,000 Germans in Bohemia.

(iv) German Element in Bohemia

Mr. Lloyd George asked when the previous census had taken place.

M. Benes replied that it had been in 1900, and that the same methods had been employed and the same results obtained.

President Wilson asked how many Czechs there were in Bohemia.

M. Benes replied that in Bohemia itself there were 4,500,000.

He wished to add that in the Bohemian territory represented as German there was also an autochthonous Czech population representing about one-third of the whole. To this must be added the fluctuations of the industrial population. He explained by the help of a map the progress of the German encroachments on Bohemia. Four distinct spheres could be distinguished, and it was noticeable that the greatest German advance had always taken place after the defeat of the Czech nation. The most notable encroachment had occurred at the end of the 17th and during the 18th Centuries. The progress had been checked in the 19th Century and in the 20th a beginning of the reversal of the process had been noticeable. It was on these considerations that the Czechs founded their claim to the restoration of the land taken from them.

The best argument, however, on which to establish the rights of the Czechs was of an economic order. The Czecho-German parts of Bohemia contained nearly the whole of the industries of the country. Bohemia as a whole was the strongest industrial portion of Austria-Hungary. It possessed 93% of the

(v) Economic Arguments

sugar industry (it was the fourth sugar producing country in the world). The whole of the glass works of Austria-Hungary were on Czecho-Slovak territory. It possessed 70% of the textile industry, 70% of the metal industry, 55% of the brewing, and 60% of the alcohol production. Nearly all these industries were on the confines of Bohemia in the mixed territory. Without the peripheral areas Bohemia could not live. The centre of the country was agricultural, and the two parts were so interdependent that neither could exist without the other. If the Germans were to be given the outer rim of Bohemia they would also possess the hinterland. Most of the workmen on which these industries depended were of Czech nationality. In particular, the mining regions attracted large numbers of Czechs. The whole country was really homogeneous, and must remain united.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired what the reasons might be which led to the concentration of industries on the edges of the country.

M. BENES replied, that the presence of water-power, coal and minerals explained it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the population engaged in these industries was German or Czech.

M. BENES replied that the majority was Czech, but that the employers were chiefly German. However, since the educational movement in Bohemia, the professional and middle classes among the Czechs were rising in importance and had begun to compete with the Germans as employers of labour.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired at what date the educational movement among the Czechs had begun.

M. BENES replied that it began in 1880.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether the majority of the employers was still German.

M. BENES replied that this was so, but that the majority was diminishing. It was the economic aspect of the Czech national movement which had most alarmed the Germans and Magyars. They saw that this movement would be irresistible, and this consideration had precipitated the war.

He would add one more point. The Bohemian Germans fully understood their position. Whether they were bourgeois, workmen or peasants, they all realised that they must remain in Bohemia. They said freely in their Chambers of Commerce that they would be ruined if they were enclosed in Germany. The competition of the great German industries was such that they could not possibly survive. They were prevented from making open declaration of this feeling because they were terrorised by a small number of Pan-German agitators from Vienna. It was not the Germans of Germany proper

that exercised any pressure on them, but only the Germans of Austria, for it had always been a deliberate policy of the Austrians to set German and Czech against one another.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the area in question had been represented in the Reichsrat by German deputies.

M. BENES replied in the affirmative, and explained that the voting areas were so contrived as to give the Germans a majority. Nevertheless, in two such districts, the Czechs had put up candidates of their own who obtained substantial minorities in their favour.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the inhabitants of these districts, if offered the choice, would vote for exclusion from the Czecho-Slovak State or for inclusion.

M. BENES replied that they would vote for exclusion, chiefly through the influence of the Social Democratic Party, which thought that the Germans would henceforth have a Social Democratic regime. The Czech Government was a coalition Government, and was regarded by them as bourgeois. It would be for reasons of this kind and for nationalist reasons, rather than for economic reasons, that the German Bohemians would be likely to adhere to their fellow-countrymen outside Bohemia.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the German manufacturers in Bohemia were protected by tariffs against the competition of German manufacturers in Germany.

DR. KRAMARTZ replied that this was so, and that without such protection they could not have resisted the competition at all. He added that the Germans would be very pleased to have this territory added to theirs, as it would afford them an outlet for their products, which in many parts of the world would for a long time be denied them.

M. BENES said that to close the question of the German Bohemians, he wished to lay down that the Czecho-Slovak Government had no intention to oppress them. It was intended to grant them full minority rights, and it was fully realised that it would be political folly not to do so. All necessary guarantees would be accorded to this minority.

(vi) Teschen

M. BENES said that on the subject of Teschen he would be brief, as the problem had been previously dealt with. He had then stated the problem from its economic side. He would like to add that the Czech argument was strong on ethnographical grounds, also. Austrian official statistics were false, and for political reasons favoured both Poles and Germans at the expense of Czechs. The reason for this was that since 1848, and especially since 1867, the whole Czecho-Slovak population had always been in opposition to the Government. The Germans and the Poles, who

in Austria had been far better treated than in Germany or Russia, had been supporters of the Government. In consequence, the census exaggerated the numbers of Poles to the detriment of the Czechs. 50 years ago official life in Teschen had been Czech. When the industrial exploitation of the country began, cheap labour, mostly Polish, had been introduced. Of the 230,000 Poles set down in the Census as living in the country, at least 50,000 were really domiciled in Galicia. If these were deducted, the Poles were a minority as opposed to 115,000 Czechs and 80,000 Germans. The territory was not Polish. Teschen itself was a German town, and the industrial and mining parts of the country were really occupied by a Czech population. The inhabitants of the mountains in the South spoke a half Czech and half Polish patois. North of them the people were German. Still further North they declared themselves to be Silesians. The people as a whole, if given the choice, would elect to join the Czecho-Slovaks rather than the Polish state, as being the richer of the two, and the one which offered the greater likelihood of order and freedom. This certainly applied to all the Germans and Jews in the country.

MR. LANSING asked whether this was the locality concerning which President Masaryk had said that the population was not ready for a plebiscite.

M. BENES said that he had no information about any such statement. He thought it unlikely, as in his opinion a plebiscite would certainly result in favour of the Czechs. He also wished to point out that the coal in Teschen was absolutely essential to the development of Czecho-Slovak industry. Bohemia before the war had bought 470 million Kroners worth of coal from German Silesia. Teschen supplied the coal most suitable for Czech industries. By losing this region the Czecho-Slovak State would lose one of the essential things on which its life depended. The whole Teschen area was one geological whole. The coal-field had not been entirely explored. It extended across the Vistula, and the Czecho-Slovak State claimed the whole basin. Nothing less could ensure its industrial revival, and this claim could not be given up.

Moreover, the only important railway linking up Bohemia, Moravia and Northern Slovakia passed through Teschen. Slovakia was economically backward, and could only be developed by means of this railway. This territory also contained the only pass through the mountains affording connection between Silesia, Moravia and Slovakia.

M. BENES said that certain alterations in the existing frontiers

were required, mostly for economic reasons, but also with the object of including outlying Czech towns within the State, and in particular he wished to mention the district of Ratibor, in Prussian Silesia. Ethnographically the Czechs spread beyond the frontier of Austria into Prussian Silesia. The people called themselves Moravians, but it was for economic reasons that this district was claimed. It was a continuation of the Teschen coal-fields. The town of Ratibor was populated in the proportion of 60 per cent by Germans, and the regulation of their status would be a subject for the Committee.

(vii) Rectification of Present Frontiers of Bohemia, Moravia & Silesia

Ratibor District

The next subject was that of the County of Glatz, which intruded into the corner of the Czecho-Slovak territory. Some wished to annex the whole of this territory, and some only a part of it. Historically, it was Czech, and had been yielded by Austria to Germany in 1867. He did not wish to be uncompromising about this area, but for national and economic reasons some portion of it should be included in the Czecho-Slovak State.

County of Glatz

M. Benes said that Slovakia had at one time formed part of the Czecho-Slovak State. It had been over-run by the Magyars at the beginning of the 10th Century. The conquerors had attempted without success to magyarise the country. The population still felt Czech, and wished to belong to the new state. There was never any suggestion of separatism in Slovakia. The same language, the same ideas and the same religion prevailed. Slovak national enthusiasm had been bred by antagonism to the Magyars.

(viii) Slovakia

The Northern frontier of the Slovaks was formed by the Carpathians; their Southern frontier by the Danube. From the southward bend of the Danube to the River Theiss the frontier was partly natural and partly artificial. It was bound to include many Magyars, and this constituted a problem which must be solved by the Conference.

Mr. Lloyd George expressed the opinion that no doubt existed about the claim to Slovakia proper. If this were so, he would suggest that Dr. Benes should confine his remarks to the doubtful points.

(It was generally agreed that the claim to Slovakia presented no difficulties, and that the only points requiring elucidation referred to the frontiers with Hungary.)

M. Benes, resuming, said that the Danube frontier was claimed as a matter of principle. Slovakia was a Danubian country. At the time of the Magyar invasion the Slovaks had occupied the whole of Pannonia. The Magyars had

(ix) Danube Frontier

thrust the Slovak populations into the mountains, and after clearing them from the right bank of the Danube had come into contact with the Germans. On the left bank the Slav population had not been exterminated. They had remained on the land, though they had become more or less magyarised. The deepest strata of the population in the villages on the Northern side were Slovak. Only the upper strata artificially superposed were Hungarian.

There was also a very cogent economic reason for the Danube frontier. The Czecho-Slovak State would have no direct access to the sea. It was surrounded on three sides by Germans and on the fourth by Magyars. It was an industrial country, and absolutely required some access to the sea. The Danube internationalised would afford them this access. It would become the base of the economic life of the State. This was a geographical necessity, and the new State could not survive without it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what percentage of Slovaks inhabited the Danubian regions.

M. BENES replied that in taking over this region the Czecho-Slovak State would be including some 350,000 Magyars. He again pointed out that the country had been forcibly magyarised. These figures applied to the area between Pressburg and Vaitzen. He would add that on the other side of the river there were many scattered communities of Slovaks. For instance in the region of Budapest there were as many as 150,000. These would be abandoned in compensation for the Hungarians absorbed.

M. SONNINO asked what proportion the Slovaks represented as opposed to the Hungarians.

M. BENES replied that this varied according to the district. The districts on which statistics were based had been traced from North to South and thus made to comprise strong Magyar majorities. He estimated that in the districts to which he referred the Slovak population represented 60 per cent but it was difficult to make a trustworthy estimate, as these areas had never been used as districts for census purposes.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether communal statistics could be obtained and whether it was a fact that the Slovak population only touched the Danube at Pressburg.

M. BENES replied that it reached the Danube also North of Budapest, but he admitted that the greater part of the riverain population was Magyar.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the rivers passing through Slovakia were navigable.

M. BENES replied that only the Vah was navigable, but only half way up its course.

M. KRAMARTZ said that an attempt was being made to render the Morava navigable and a great development of canal communication was in project, which would connect the North Sea through the Elbe with the Black Sea through the Danube. These communications would pass through Czecho-Slovak territory.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether, if the territories claimed declared themselves Magyar, free access to the internationalised route of the Danube through the rivers of Slovakia would satisfy M. Benes.

M. BENES replied that these rivers were not at present navigable, with the exception of the Vah. The whole of Slovakia would be cut off from the Danube.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether, if Czecho-Slovakia obtained access by railway to fixed points on the Danube, this would satisfy them.

M. BENES replied that the valley and the uplands were so interdependent that great disorganisation would ensue on their separation. These territories lived by the exchange of industrial and agricultural necessaries. The uplands of Slovakia were industrial and the valley was agricultural.

M. BENES said that the claim for this frontier was dictated by railway communications. The mountains ran from North to South and there was little communication from East to West.

(x) Frontier Between Danube and Ung

It was therefore necessary to include the only railway offering lateral communication. He admitted that a considerable Hungarian population would thus be brought in to the Czecho-Slovak State, but he would point out that the Hungarian census was even worse than the Austrian. As a whole, 250,000 Magyars would be included, while 350,000 Slovaks would be left out. In all, 650,000 Hungarians would become subjects of the new State, while 450,000 Czecho-Slovaks would remain within Hungary. Racial confusion in Hungary owing to the savage persecutions of the past, was very great.

The Slovaks had been particularly oppressed, and even Kossuth had said that the Slovaks could not be granted the franchise. Magyars freely said that the Slovaks were not men. Out of 2,300 officials in Slovakia only 17 had been Slovaks. Out of 1,700 judges only one had been Slovak, and out of 2,500 Collectors of Taxes only 10 had been Slovaks. In consequence nearly one third of the Slovak population had emigrated to the United States of America. Others had left their homes and settled in places in Hungary where it was easier to make a living, which accounted for the 90,000 Slovaks found near Budapest, and the 80,000 round Debreczin.

M. Benes said that it remained for him to draw attention of the conference to certain suggestions which were not to be considered claims made on behalf of Czecho-Slovakia.

(xi) Ruthenes in Hungary

The first of these suggestions related to the Ruthenes in Hungary. Next to the Slovaks and to the East of them, was a territory inhabited by Ruthenes.

These Ruthenes were the same stock as the Ruthenes of Eastern Galicia, from whom they were divided by the Carpathians. They were close neighbours to the Slovaks, socially and economically similar to them, and there were even transitional dialects between their language and that of Slovakia. They did not wish to remain under Hungarian control and proposed to form an autonomous state in close federation with Czecho-Slovakia. They numbered about 450,000. It would be unjust to leave them to the tender mercies of the Magyars, and though Czecho-Slovakia made no claim on their behalf, he had undertaken to put their case before the Conference. If Eastern Galicia became Russian it would be dangerous to bring Russia South of the Carpathians. If Eastern Galicia became Polish, the Poles themselves would not wish to include this population. It followed therefore that this people must either be Hungarian or autonomous. If the latter, they wished to be federated to the Czecho-Slovak State. This would impose a burden on Czecho-Slovakia, but would afford them the advantage of a common frontier with the Roumanians.

A similar problem was that of the Serbs of Lusatia numbering from 150,000 to 160,000. These people were the remnant of the Slav population which at one time extended as far as Lübeck. With the exception of this group, that population had been germanised. These Serbs lived independently in the Spreewald. They were nearest to the Czechs, and had begged him to present their problem to the Conference. These Serbs desired to be autonomous under Czech protection, but the Czechs made no claim on this subject, and even thought it might be dangerous for them to undertake this mission. He thought, however, that the Conference should examine the problem. It was a moral rather than a political matter. The country had once belonged to Bohemia, and had become German territory in 1867. It was situated only 6 kilometres from the Bohemian frontier.

(xii) Serbs of Lusatia

M. Benes said that in order to free itself from the grip of the Germans and Magyars the Czecho-Slovak State wished to establish close relations with the Yugo-Slavs and with Italy. The nearest sea to the Czecho-Slovak territory was the Adriatic. He thought that by means of a small territory either under the Czech or Yugo-Slav Government, or under the

(xiii) Communication With the Adriatic

League of Nations, means of communication would be best established. A railway line alone, with territory on either side of it would, he thought, be insufficient. He would suggest that this territory should be marked out on the confines of the Germans and the Magyars. It would thus furnish a corridor between Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-Slavia.

This was merely a suggestion put forward for consideration with reference to the general principle adopted by the Conference.

The Czecho-Slovak Government had no wish to hamper the purposes of the Conference. They wished to do all in their power to assist a just and durable peace.

(The following resolution was then adopted:—

That the questions raised in the statement by M. Benes on the Czecho-Slovak territorial interests in the Peace Settlement shall be referred for examination in the first instance to an expert Committee composed of two representatives each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Italy.

It shall be the duty of this Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits and make recommendations for a just settlement.

The Committee is authorised to consult representatives of the peoples concerned.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 6 February, 1919.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, 6 February, 1919, at 3 p. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
President Wilson	The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.	M. Clemenceau
Mr. R. Lansing	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.	M. Pichon
Mr. L. Harrison	Gen. The Rt. Hon. Louis Botha	M. Dutasta
Colonel U. S. Grant	Captain E. Abraham	M. Berthelot
	Mr. H. Norman	M. de Bearn
		Capt. Portier

ITALY	JAPAN
M. Orlando	Baron Makino
Baron Sonnino	H. E. M. Matsui
Count Aldrovandi	M. Saburi
Major Jones	

PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION OF ARAB QUESTION

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE
Major Bonsal	Mr. Montagu
Mr. Westermann	Sir A. Hirtzel
	Sir Mark Sykes
	Mr. Toynbee

FRANCE	HEDJAZ	ITALY
M. Gout	Emir Feisal	M. de Martino
M. de Caix	Colonel Lawrence	M. Galli
M. Coulondre	Rustum Haider	M. Piacentini
Ben Ghabrit	Amir Abdul Hadi	
	Nuri Said	

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

Destruction of Submarines

1. M. CLEMENCEAU, in opening the meeting, said that before beginning the business of the day he wished to make mention of a matter previously decided. He referred to the destruction of German submarines. He had understood that the decision had been that only submarines under construction should be destroyed. On referring to the Minutes, however, he saw that destruction of those handed over complete was also

included. This decision was not that which he thought had been reached. He would, therefore, advise that before this decision was carried out, the advice of the Naval Commission concerning the fate of all the captured ships in Allied hands, should be awaited.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that it would be better to destroy as many of these pests as possible.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that some had been assigned to France and some to Italy. He thought it was wrong that some should be destroyed while others were given away.

BARON MAKINO said that seven had been given to Japan.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood M. Clemenceau to desire a uniform policy.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that that was exactly his meaning.

(It was agreed that further information as to what steps had been taken, should be obtained, and that the question should be decided later.)

2. (At this stage the Delegates for the Hedjaz and their technical advisers entered the room.)

Statement for the Hedjaz (a) General

EMIR FEISAL said that

In his memorandum of January 29th to the Peace Conference,[1] he had asked for the independence of all the Arabic speaking peoples in Asia, from the line Alexandretta-Diarbekir southward.

He based his request on the following points:—

(i) This area was once the home of important civilisations, and its people still have the capacity to play their part in the world.

(ii) All its inhabitants speak one language—Arabic.

(iii) The area has natural frontiers which ensure its unity and its future.

(iv) Its inhabitants are of one stock—the Semitic. Foreigners do not number 1% among them.

(v) Socially and economically it forms a unit. With each improvement of the means of communication its unity becomes more evident. There are few nations in the world as homogeneous as this.

(vi) The Arabic speaking peoples fought on the side of the Allies in their time of greatest stress, and fulfilled their promises.

(vii) At the end of the war the Allies promised them independence. The Allies had now won the war, and the Arabic speaking peoples thought themselves entitled to independence and worthy of it. It was in accord with the principles laid down by President Wilson and accepted by all the Allies.

(viii) The Arab army fought to win its freedom. It lost heavily: some 20,000 men were killed. Allenby acknowledged its services in his despatches. The army was representative of Arab ideals and was composed of young Syrians, Lebanese, Hejazis, Mesopotamians, Palestinians, and Yemenis.

[1] Miller, *My Diary*, vol. IV, p. 300.

(ix) The blood of Arab soldiers, the massacres among the civil populations, the economic ruin of the country in the war, deserved recognition.

(x) In Damascus, Beyrout, Tripoli, Aleppo, Latakia, and the other districts of Syria, the civil population declared their independence and hoisted the Arab flag before the Allied troops arrived. The Allied Commander in Chief afterwards insisted that the flag be lowered to install temporary Military Governors. This he explained to the Arabs was provisional, till the Peace Conference settled the future of the country. Had the Arabs known it was in compliance with a secret treaty they would not have permitted it.

(xi) The Syrians who joined the Northern Army were recognised by the Allies as Belligerents. They demand through this delegation their independence.

His Father did not risk his life and his Kingdom by joining in the war at its most critical time to further any personal ambitions. He was not looking for an Empire. He rose up to free all the Arabic provinces from their Turkish Masters. He did not wish to extend the boundaries of the Hedjaz Kingdom a single inch.

His ideal was the ideal of all Arabic patriots. He could not believe that the Allies would run counter to their wishes. If they did so the consequences would be grave. The Arabs were most grateful to England and France for the help given them to free their country. The Arabs now asked them to fulfil their promises of November 1918. It was a momentous decision the Conference had to take, since on it depended the life of a nation inhabiting a country of great strategic importance between Europe and Asia.

(b) Syria

The greatest difficulty would be over Syria. Syria claimed her unity and her independence, and the rest of the Arabic liberated areas wished Syria to take her natural place in the future confederation of liberated Arabic speaking Asia, the object of all Arab hopes and fears.

(c) Lebanon

Some of the people of the present province of Lebanon were asking for French guarantees. Some of them did not wish to sever their connection with Syria. He was willing to admit their independence, but thought it essential to maintain some form of economic union in the interest of mutual development. He hoped nothing would be done now to render the admission of the Lebanon to the future confederation impossible, if it desired admission.

For the moment also the inhabitants of the rest of Syria hoped that the Lebanon people would of their own accord decide for federal union with themselves in Syria.

The Arabs realised how much their country lacked development. They wanted it to be the link between the East and West, to hand on Western civilisation to Asia. They did not wish to close their doors to civilised people; on the contrary, as rulers of their own country, in their zeal for their country's betterment, they wanted to seek help from everyone who wished them well; but they could not sacrifice for this help any of the independence for which they had fought, since they regard it as a necessary basis of future prosperity. They must also guard their economic interests, as part of their duty as Governors. He hoped no Power imagined that it had the right to limit the independence of a people because it had material interests in their country.

(d) Economic Interests

Arab religious differences were being exploited. These had been triumphed over in the Hedjaz army, in which all creeds co-operated to free their country. The first efforts of the Arab Government would be to maintain this welding of the faiths, in their common service of the principle of nationality.

(e) Religious Differences

Palestine, for its universal character, he left on one side for the mutual consideration of all parties interested. With this exception he asked for the independence of the Arabic areas enumerated in his memorandum.

(f) Palestine

When this principle was admitted, he asked that the various Provinces, on the principle of self-determination, should be allowed to indicate to the League of Nations the nature of the assistance they required. If the indications before the Conference in any one case were not conclusive as to their wishes for their complete independence or for their mandatory power, he suggested that an international inquiry, made in the area concerned, might be a quick, easy, sure and just way of determining their wishes.

(g) International Enquiry as to Desires of the People

3. Mr. Lloyd George asked how many troops the Hedjaz had put into the field.

Emir Feisal replied that it was impossible to give the exact figure; but, including the Hedjaz Army, the Arabs had put about 100,000 men into the field. There was, in addition, a considerable number of Irregulars who were not on his registers. He thought he could assert that every man of fighting age in possession of a rifle between Mecca and Aleppo had joined the Arab standards. How many that might have been it was difficult to say, as he had no figures of the population. There remained four Divisions of Regulars as the standing army: the Irregulars had dispersed to their own homes.

Arab Military Effort

He wished to explain that the Arab Government had been organised, as it were, in the firing line. It had been born after the outbreak of war and was not yet regularly constituted. Hence the dif-

ficulty of producing exact figures. Medina had only surrendered a few days ago.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the Arab troops had taken any part on the Mesopotamian front.

EMIR FEISAL replied that all their operations outside the Hedjaz had been in Syria. In Mesopotamia there had been no need for an independent Arab movement and no scope for one in that region. Five of his Commanding Officers, however, and many of his men came from Mesopotamia. They had fought in his army to vindicate their rights to self-government.

4. PRESIDENT WILSON asked the Emir whether, seeing that the plan of mandatories on behalf of the League of Nations had been adopted, he would prefer for his people a single mandatory, or several.

Question of Mandatory

EMIR FEISAL said that he would not like to assume towards his people the responsibility of giving an answer to this question. It must be for the Arab people to declare their wishes in respect to a mandatory authority. Neither he, nor his father, nor, he thought, any person now living, would be ready to assume the responsibility of deciding this question on behalf of the people. He was here to ask for the independence of his people and for their right to choose their own mandatory.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he understood this perfectly, but would like to know the Emir's personal opinion.

EMIR FEISAL said that personally he was afraid of partition. His principle was Arab unity. It was for this that the Arabs had fought. Any other solution would be regarded by the Arabs in the light of a division of spoils after a battle. The Arabs had fought a hard fight to achieve unity. He hoped the Conference would regard them as an oppressed nation which had risen against its masters. The Arabs asked for freedom only and would take nothing less. He thought the Conference would be of the opinion that the Arab revolt had been as well conducted as any rebellion of an oppressed people in recent memory. The Arabs were an ancient people, civilised and organised at a time when the nations represented in this room were unformed. They had suffered centuries of slavery and had now seized the chance of emancipation. He hoped that the Conference would not thrust them back into the condition from which they had now emerged. The Arabs had tasted slavery: none of the nations gathered in the room knew what that meant. For 400 years the Arabs had suffered under a violent military oppression, and as long as life remained in them, they meant never to return to it.

5. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would like the Emir to give a

short account of the services rendered by the Arab forces in the defeat of the Turkish Armies.

Arab Military Operations

EMIR FEISAL said, when his father rebelled against the Turks, he was hereditary Governor of Mecca—a position held by the family for 800 years. He had no arms, machine-guns, guns, ammunition or supplies, and only took Mecca with difficulty. He was unable to take Medina. The Turks then sent 35,000 men to retake Mecca. God helped the Arabs, and the English also sent them material assistance. Officers and volunteers from the old Turkish army joined them and formed the nucleus of a regular force. In 14 months the Arab forces advanced 800 miles to the North and cut the Hedjaz railway South of Maan. This was an important military achievement as the Turkish army at Medina threatened the rear of the Arab forces. He had then attacked Maan by a frontal attack without any hope of success, in order to cover General Allenby's preparations and to prevent a Turkish concentration. He had placed his army voluntarily under General Allenby's command and did this to co-operate with him. General Allenby then asked the Arab forces to attack the three railways at Derat. The Arab army did its duty and cut these lines two days before General Allenby's attack which eventually led him to Damascus. The Arab army entered Damascus together with General Allenby's forces. From that point the Arab revolt spread like a flame and in one bound reached Latakia, which was entered by the Arabs the day before the French entered Beyrout. His forces were the first to enter Aleppo. Throughout these operations the Arab plan had been subordinated to General Allenby's. They had abandoned all ambition to shine by themselves, or to do anything spectacular. They took 40,000 prisoners, who were delivered to the Allies. He need add nothing to the praise bestowed on the Arab troops in General Allenby's despatches.

M. PICHON asked whether the French had taken any part in the Arab operations on this front, and asked Emir Feisal to describe it.

EMIR FEISAL said that with him there had been a French contingent with four 65 mm. guns and two 85 mm. guns. This contingent had done wonderful work, and the help rendered by the French detachment placed upon the Arabs a debt of perpetual gratitude. There had also been with him a British detachment to whom he was equally grateful. He did not wish to praise them as their actions were beyond praise, as were those of his own troops which he had also abstained from praising.

Besides the military effort made by the Arabs, he wished to draw attention to the civil losses incurred. The Allied Officers who had witnessed the destroyed villages of Tafaz and Ahwali, could testify to the extent of the massacres perpetrated on the Arab population.

6. MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the Emir could say whether there was any Arab population in Turkey outside Arabia and Syria: for instance in Anatolia.

Arab Populations Outside Arabia and Syria

EMIR FEISAL replied that there were a few in the Adana district; a few in the Tarsus and Mersina area; but none in Anatolia. In all these regions they were a small minority and the Arabs were not claiming minority rights anywhere. Part of the population in the Diarbekir area spoke Arabic. There were also Arabs living across the Persian border. But no other considerable portions of the Arab population lived in isolated enclaves at a distance from the bulk of the race.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether there was any affinity between the Arabs and the Kurds.

EMIR FEISAL said that he would be delighted to claim all the Kurds as Arabs; but he felt he would ruin his case if he made even one questionable statement.

Finally he begged that he should not be penalised because he only spoke Arabic, an ancient and honourable tongue and the language of an ancient and honourable people.

(The Emir Feisal then retired and the meeting adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 7 February, 1919.

Minutes of the 1st Meeting of the 13th Session of the Supreme War Council, Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, February 7, 1919, at 3: 30 p. m.

Present

America, United States of	British Empire	France
President Wilson	Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.	M. Clemenceau
Hon. R. Lansing	Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G.	M. Pichon
Mr. A. H. Frazier	Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	M. Leygues
Mr. L. Harrison		M. Dutasta
		M. Berthelot
		M. de Bearn

Italy	Japan
H. E. M. Orlando	Baron Makino
H. E. Baron Sonnino	H. E. M. Matsui
Count Aldrovandi	

Also Present During First Part of Meeting

America, United States of	British Empire	France
Gen. John J. Pershing, Commanding A. E. F.	Admiral Sir R. Wemyss, G. C. B., C. M. G., M. V. O., 1st Sea Lord & Chief of the Naval Staff.	M. Loucheur
Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, Military Representative.	Maj. Gen. W. T. Thwaites, C. B. Director of Military Intelligence.	Marshal Foch, O. M., G. C. B.
Admiral W. S. Benson, Naval Adviser.	Maj. Gen. The Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C. M. G., Permanent Military Representative.	Gen. Weygand, K. C. B.
Capt. F. H. Schofield, U. S. N.	Maj. Gen. Sir F. H. Sykes, K. C. B., C. M. G., Chief of the Air Staff.	Gen. Belin
Com. A. F. Carter, U. S. N.		Admiral De Bon
		Colonel Mercier
		Major Lacombe
		Capt. [*Lt.?*] Odend'hal
		Captain Levavasseur

Italy	Japan
H. E. Gen. Diaz	Admiral Takeshita
Gen. Cavallero	General Tanaka
H. E. Admiral Thaon di Revel	Colonel Sato
Admiral Grassi	Commandant [*Captain?*] Nomura
Commander Ruspoli	Commandant [*Captain?*] Yamamoto

Secretariat

America, United States of	British Empire	France
Colonel U. S. Grant.	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.	Captain A. Portier.

ITALY	JAPAN
Major A. Jones.	M. Saburi.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

Renewal of Armistice With Germany: Proposed Amendments to Military Clauses: (a) Statement by Marshal Foch

1. M. CLEMENCEAU, having declared the meeting opened, stated that the question of the occupation of the enemy's territory by the forces of the Allied and Associated Powers had been studied by a Committee, with M. Loucheur as Chairman, and by Marshal Foch. Their reports were now ready, and he asked Marshal Foch to make a statement in this regard.

MARSHAL FOCH read the following note:—

"The meeting of the Commanders in Chief at Marshal Foch's, which was ordained by the Supreme Council of the Allies on January 24th,[1] was held on January 26th. The object of this meeting was to determine, with the greatest possible accuracy, the situation of the Allied Armies on March 31st, 1919, such as will result from the measures taken by each Government for demobilisation and repatriation, and also to consider what further provisions could be made, given these measures.

The French Army, on April 5th, will still have under the colours 2,257,000 men, of which 1,350,000 in the Armies of the North and North-East. It will comprise a minimum of 46 divisions, each with 4 regiments up to fighting strength, (and sufficient men in reserve for their maintenance during 3 to 4 months of operations) and 6 Cavalry Divisions.

No measure has yet been decided upon to be carried out after this date (April 5).

The British Army, according to the measures decided upon by the British Government on January 23rd, will comprise 900,000 men for the whole of the Empire.

The arrangements made will render it possible to have in France, on April 1st, 10 strong divisions and 2 cavalry divisions, (Infantry divisions up to 10 battalions of 900 men). To this should be added, for an indefinite period, 2 or 3 divisions from the Dominions.

These forces in France amount to a total of 552,000 men, the fighting force of which will be 212,000 men.

It will be possible to maintain this situation for a period of several months.

The American Army, on April 1st, will have in France:

10 Divisions in the zone of the Armies,
5 Divisions near the embarkation ports.

These forces amount from 1,380,000 to 1,400,000 men, with a fighting strength of 680,000.

On May 1st, the American Army in France will comprise:

10 Divisions in the zone of the Armies,
5 Divisions near the embarkation ports.

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[1] See BC-A9, p. 704.

If, on this date, the Peace Preliminaries are not signed, the American Command considers, but without making any definite agreement on the subject, that during May and June sufficient troops and war material will be left in France to provide for home transportation, and this without encroaching upon the above mentioned 10 divisions, in such a way that on July 1st, there may remain in France 10 divisions amounting to 380,000 men.

The Italian Army has actually, in the war zone in Italy, 1,540,000, with a fighting strength of 1,020,000 men. Up to April 1st, four classes (each of 100,000 men) will probably be mustered out, that is to say a total of 400,000 men, 225,000 of which from the war zone, 1,315,000 men will therefore remain in the war zone.

On April 1st, the Italian Army will comprise:

31 Divisions (including those of Dalmatia, but exclusive of the two divisions forming the 2nd Army Corps),
3 divisions in Albania,
1 division in the Balkans.

The table, given in Appendix "A" summarizes the situation of the Allied Armies facing Germany on April 1st.

This situation shows that there are sufficient resources to oppose Germany up to April 1st on the Western Front.

It also shows that after this date, and if the Peace Preliminaries are not signed, the Future can only be ensured by maintaining the above mentioned resources in stopping the process of demobilization."

(b) Report of M. Loucheur's Committee

M. Loucheur then gave a summary of the report of the Commission appointed by the Supreme War Council at the meeting of the 24th January, 1919. (For full text of report, see Appendix "B", with its annexures 1 to 5 inclusive).

M. Loucheur added that his Committee considered that the control over the manufacture of arms and munitions in Germany could be easily established with a force of 200 officers, and that this control could be in operation by the end of March, provided the proposed new Armistice clauses were duly signed on 20th February next, on which date the present Armistice period would expire. Moreover, by April 5th, sufficient material would have been surrendered to justify the continuance of demobilisation, if Germany carried out her agreement with sufficient good-will. According to Marshal Foch's estimate, there would still be 51 Divisions and 10 cavalry divisions in the French Army.

President Wilson said that he understood the proposal to contemplate very serious and extensive additions to the original armistice conditions. Whenever this was attempted it was always possible that the armistice would not be renewed, and if renewed, that the Allies would [not?] be prepared to enforce the new conditions. He would like to ask Marshal Foch two questions, namely, whether in

the latter's opinion these new conditions would be accepted, and, if so, whether it would be necessary to undertake any serious measures to ensure their enforcement.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that he did not think the Germans would accept the new conditions without pressure. When he met the German delegates he would say: "Accept those conditions or the armistice will be broken". He could not enter into negotiations with the Germans.

As to the second question, it would evidently be necessary to take measures to insure fulfillment of the new condition, and to establish control. Whether the control proposed would be effective he did not know; but it did not guarantee anything. The officers who went to Germany would only see what they were allowed to see, and if later they discovered that the terms of the armistice had been violated they would so report; but meanwhile demobilisation would have progressed. The demobilisation was to progress on the assurance given by this control, and if the terms agreed to were violated, it would then be too late to do anything about it. He, therefore, thought it futile to base the demobilisation plans on promises of this kind, fulfilment of which could not be insured.

M. CLEMENCEAU then inquired if Marshal Foch could suggest any more effective method of control.

MARSHAL FOCH said they might occupy all the factories, but he considered that to be an impracticable solution. Or, they might occupy one or two factories, such as Essen; but to occupy Essen alone it was estimated seven divisions would be required, so that the burden to be borne would be enhanced thereby rather than diminished. The hoped-for relief would in reality merely mean an additional burden.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether Marshal Foch had any other suggestion to make.

MARSHAL FOCH replied in the negative. It would be impossible to prevent a country like Germany from doing what she wished at home. She would always be able to manufacture arms. The Allies could not stop all their industries.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed his appreciation of the clear and frank reply made by Marshal Foch, and he called attention to the fact that what was desired was to find means for reducing the Allied forces; while it seemed that the occupation of the factories might call for a further increase.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the application of that part of M. Loucheur's report which demanded the surrender of guns, rifles and machine guns, would not make Germany impotent, at least during the duration of the armistice.

MARSHAL FOCH agreed that it would weaken Germany, but by how much and for how long he did not know; nor did he know how long the armistice would last.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that it would take a certain period of time to replace all the equipment Germany was to be asked to surrender, and he enquired from M. Loucheur whether he could say what that period would probably be.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that with all her available resources it would take Germany at least two years.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE next enquired whether Germany could manufacture all those arms unless the Allies allowed the necessary raw material to go through to Germany.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that the producing power of Germany in iron and steel had already been reduced 40% by the occupation of Alsace-Lorraine by Allied troops.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it would therefore take Germany more than two years to turn out the immense armament proposed to be surrendered; and he certainly did not think that it could be manufactured without the knowledge of the Allies' inspecting officers who would be present in the country.

M. LOUCHEUR agreed that this would be quite impossible, and he was prepared to take full responsibility for this statement.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that if Germany were told that unless she assented to these terms, the supply of raw materials and needed food would be refused, that she would undoubtedly consent. It would also be advantageous to Germany to reduce her army to the maximum [*minimum?*] figure required for the maintenance of order, if by so doing she assured a proportionate reduction of the armies of the allies.

M. LOUCHEUR and MARSHAL FOCH agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said: "Supposing the disarmament of Germany were made one of the conditions of peace", (and he could not conceive the omission of such a condition), "would it be easier to impose this condition at that time, say in July, rather than now?"

MARSHAL FOCH did not know what peace conditions would be imposed; but the question now before the Conference relating to the surrender of the armament still possessed by Germany was so vague and indeterminate that the experts themselves had never been able to agree on the number of guns Germany still possessed. The experts had only been able to say that Germany should surrender various items of war material in excess of certain given figures.

M. LOUCHEUR said that his Committee had in their report adopted the figures supplied by the Intelligence Services of the different armies, and it had called for the surrender of three-fourths of the total number given.

MARSHAL FOCH interposed that he could not assume any responsibility for those figures—they were necessarily unreliable.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked what the Allies would do if Germany promised the surrender of these materials and did not give them up. How would they get them?

MARSHAL FOCH replied that there would be only one way, viz: "By War". But, instead of pursuing a question so indeterminate as the size of Germany's armaments, which could never be accurately known, there were other methods of exercising pressure, which should be considered. Besides the resumption of hostilities by means of the Armies of Occupation, there were the maintenance of the blockade and the stoppage of supplies. Germany needed food and raw materials, and if those three instruments (Armies of Occupation, supplies, blockade), were centralised under a single military control, with powers to open and close the channels of supply according to the observance of Germany, he thought that the fulfilment of the conditions which it was proposed to impose could be attained.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether Marshal Foch could doubt that, if the surrender of these guns were made a condition for the renewal of the armistice, Germany would not do so rather than renew hostilities.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that he did not know, but, if the proposition were made and refused, the armistice would have to be broken.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the Germans would face a continuance of the blockade rather than surrender their guns, which after all were not of the slightest use to them except for offensive purposes.

MARSHAL FOCH thought it would be unwise to speculate on the answer to that question.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked M. Loucheur if, in his opinion, it would be necessary to occupy all the factories. On a previous occasion he (M. Loucheur) had stated that there were two or three essential factories, which, if taken over, would practically mean the disarmament of Germany.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that if the factories in the area of Westphalia, such as Essen, Bochum up to Duisburg were held, it would mean a diminution of 75% of the effective means of production of Germany.

(At this stage the military, naval and technical advisers withdrew.)

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the last time the armistice conditions had been discussed, he had thought it his duty to oppose any addition to the armistice terms. He thought that the council should have known what it was doing when the armistice was drawn up, and that it was not sportsmanlike to attempt to correct now the errors that had then been made. It was quite clear to him that the Allies were running a grave risk of bringing about a situation when, having made a threat, they might be challenged to carry it out. He understood that the Allies already controlled in the occupied districts of Germany 26,000,000 out of 32,000,000 tons of the iron production of Germany. He was afraid that the control of the factories by officers, as proposed, would prove insufficient, and that it would become necessary to occupy more territory, with the result that the military commanders would require more troops. It had already been suggested by Mr. Lloyd George that, as Germany was paying for the Army of Occupation, it would clearly be to her interest to reduce this burden. It must also be remembered that if the demobilisation of the German Army were imposed on a large scale, Germany would have forced on her a large body of unemployed, who would add to the element of unrest and be a danger to Germany and to the Allies. It was, therefore, to the interest of the latter to give Germany the means of renewing her economic life, not only for the purpose of reducing the number of unemployed, but also to enable her to pay the reparations which the Allies had a right to expect. He, therefore, proposed the institution of a civil commission to meet a similar German commission, to negotiate with them and to say—that if Germany would reduce her forces and yield a proper proportion of her mischievous equipment, the Allies would reduce their army of occupation, reducing the charges therefor; they would at the same time relax the blockade to allow the passage of sufficient raw materials, except for armaments, to enable her to renew her economic life.

(c) President Wilson's Proposal to Appoint a Civil Commission To Negotiate Disarmament Terms

He thought in that way the Allies would avoid doing the improper thing of exacting terms, without running the risk of renewing war and of bringing about an intolerable state of affairs.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he did not think they were necessarily bound either as an obligation of honour, or as sportsmen, to renew the Armistice for ever or on exactly the same terms. He did not know how long the Armistice would last, but he felt that he and his colleagues were under obligation to the world and to their people to protect them against a renewal of hostilities. The terms of the Armistice did not contain any undertaking either to feed Germany or to furnish raw materials; but these things were now being considered. The alterations were not, therefore, all on one side; and

if the terms could be changed in favour of the Germans, they could also be changed in favour of their own people. He had been very much impressed by a conversation he had held with Sir Douglas Haig. Field Marshal Haig had expressed views similar to those held by President Wilson, namely, that the number of infantry did not matter. But he had also called attention to the fact that Germany still had the materiel and armament, which would enable her within a short period of time to call back three or four million men, fully equipped for war. By that time most of the American and British troops would have gone home and be out of reach, and the French would have scattered over the country. If Germany should therefore mean mischief, she could call together millions of well-trained men, with full complement of officers and non-commissioned officers, thousands of the best guns in the world, and fifty thousand machine guns. A fit of anger might come over her. It was impossible to say how long the present government would last, and a change of government might mean a change of policy. A tailor named Ebhardt [*Ebert*] was Chancellor, Scheidemann was one of the leaders; but neither were men of real power. It was impossible to say who would be on top in six weeks' time. Germany herself was being endangered by having this temptation left at her door. Consequently, nothing unfair would be done by imposing the proposed conditions. The only question to be settled was how those conditions should be imposed. It might be fair to do this on the lines suggested by President Wilson by making clear that the Allies would not help Germany unless these conditions were accepted. Nothing with reference to the supply of food or raw materials appeared in the Armistice. Consequently, they were fully entitled to refuse to supply these things to Germany. He thought there was a good deal to be said in favour of appointing a civilian commission; but the question would have to be settled at the time of the renewal of the Armistice. This arrangement would be best both for the Germans and for the Allies.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that the Allies were under no moral obligations to furnish food. He was proud as a moral man that on humane grounds it was not intended to let the people of Germany starve. There was also no obligation to furnish raw materials, and the price which the Allies had in their mind to exact for these concessions was not extravagant. But, if they were prepared to assist Germany to renew her commercial life, they had a right to ask guarantees for their own safety: and it would be both honourable and reasonable to impose such conditions. He thought that there would be a great moral advantage in approaching the German delegates through a civilian commission, which would not threaten them. He would also like to see the negotiations begun immediately so as to be completed before the date fixed for the renewal of the Armistice.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that he had forgotten to mention one most important point. According to Marshal Foch's report, the Allied forces would by April next be very greatly reduced. At the present moment sufficient men were available and, therefore, the question should, he thought, be discussed at once before further demobilisation took place.

M. CLEMENCEAU regretted that he was not in accord with President Wilson in this matter. France would be placed in a position of great danger if a firm attitude were not adopted. When the terms of the Armistice had been discussed he had said that only what was necessary should be inserted, in order not to risk a refusal of the terms. But, each time it had been agreed to renew the Armistice for a period of one month only, and this was done with the express object of having an opportunity of imposing new terms, adapted to the changing situation. The right to impose new terms, or new conditions, could not therefore be contested either on juridical or any other grounds; and the Germans themselves had made no objection to the occupation of Kehl and other places. But he had one other thing to say. The present moment was decisive, not because it was a question of winning the war, but because there was danger of losing the fruits of victory. It was essential to act quickly. The forces at the call of the Allies had not yet diminished appreciably. In the last few weeks the Germans had become insolent, and recently an incident had occurred. Marshal Foch had been forced to use constraint to bring the German delegates to a meeting. If now ambassadors were to be sent and negotiations were to be begun, much valuable time would be lost; and April would come and find our forces partially scattered. The American and Australian troops would have returned to their homes, and France and Great Britain would be left alone to face the Germans, who, seeing the Allies always giving way, would in turn become more arrogant. He knew the German people well. They became ferocious when any one retires before them. Was it forgotten that they were still at war; that the Armistice was a status of war? The Germans had not forgotten it. He called attention to the case of Poland. The Poles had stopped the further advance of their troops at the request of the Allies; but the Germans had treated a similar request with a blank refusal. The terms of the refusal were well-known.[2] The Allies would be exposed to great danger unless they menaced the Germans now. There was need of a strong Poland. Furthermore, President Wilson had, as one

[2] A correction issued on February 11 reads as follows:

For "The terms of the refusal were well known", substitute "The terms of the refusal are given in Appendix 'C'." [For Appendix "C," see p. 924.]

of his fourteen points, assumed the obligation of reconstituting Poland. The League of Nations was a very fine conception, but it could not be constituted without nations. As one of the nations concerned, Poland was most necessary as a buffer on the East just as France formed a buffer on the West. If the Germans were formally told that any attack by them on the East would mean an advance by the Allies on the West, he knew that such language would be understood by the Germans and would command immediate compliance. Instead of this, it was proposed to buy the good will of the Germans by offering them food and raw materials. A state of war still existed, and any appearance of yielding would be construed as an evidence of weakness. At any rate, personally he could not accept President Wilson's proposition. He did not wish to starve the Germans, but the blockade must be maintained. If he so far forgot the interests of his country and of Europe as to consent to this proposal, the Chamber would undoubtedly dismiss him, and it would be acting right in doing so.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had never suggested raising the blockade. It had but [*been?*] agreed to let some food through, and the question of permitting the passage of some raw materials was being considered. But it would not be to the interest of the Allies to starve Germany, or to have Germany completely unemployed—a pool breeding infection throughout Europe. He therefore proposed the following resolution.

(d) Mr. Lloyd George's First Draft Resolution Regarding Appointment of a Civilian Commission To Enforce Conditions Contained in M. Loucheur's Report

"The Supreme War Council agree—

(1) That a Civilian Commission shall be appointed at once to negotiate an agreement with the Germans on the following lines:—that food and raw materials, other than those required for the manufacture of material of war, shall be allowed to enter Germany on the following conditions: (M. Loucheur's Committee to insert the conditions in their report.)

(2) That the Commission shall be instructed to complete the negotiations before the next renewal of the Armistice in order that if necessary, Marshal Foch may put pressure on the enemy to comply as a condition of the renewal of the Armistice.

(3) That the Commission be authorized by Marshal Foch to commence the negotiations at once and to complete them before the next renewal of the Armistice in order that, if necessary, Marshal Foch may put pressure on the enemy to secure compliance.["]

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed his inability to accept this proposal. He objected to it after long reflection. He had no objection to offer to civilians being attached to Marshal Foch's Commission; but he felt convinced that as long as a state of war existed it was for soldiers

to confer with soldiers. He proposed that a new clause should be drafted to be included in the Armistice, reversing the sequence of ideas contained in Mr. Lloyd George's proposal. Their demands should, in the first place, be stated, followed if necessary by a statement to the effect that the Allies would be ready, as an act of grace, to consider the question of relaxing the blockade with a view to the supply of certain quantities of food and raw materials.

PRESIDENT WILSON wished respectfully to submit that M. Clemenceau's proposal was open to strong objection. A demand was first put forward, and then followed an offer of concession. He thought, the concession would nullify the threat. M. Clemenceau had said that Germans could be handled only by threats, and he might be right. But, if what they wanted could be got by negotiations, with the idea in the mind of the Germans that a threat might follow, threats could still ultimately be resorted to. But if they began with threats and then offered concessions, the force of the threat would be reduced.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had tried in drafting his resolution to reconcile the ideas of President Wilson and M. Clemenceau. As a matter of fact, his sympathies were entirely with M. Clemenceau. It would be impossible to reduce the allied forces until the conditions now proposed had been accepted. On the other hand, the Allies could not continue to maintain their big forces until peace was signed.

PRESIDENT WILSON reminded his colleagues that as far as Marshal Foch's opinion was concerned, it would not be possible before April to know whether the conditions, if accepted, were being carried out, and, there would be no safety in reducing the Allied forces between now and April. No Government was going to reduce its forces below the point of safety. Certainly the United States would not do so. If he saw any good prospect of bringing about a reduction of forces by the proposals made, he would be more impressed by them, but it seemed to be Marshal Foch's opinion that these forces could not safely be reduced until peace was signed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he saw no safety even then, unless the Germans were compelled to surrender these thousands of guns. The situation on the signing of peace would be the same as now.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Marshal Foch was not a military Pope; he was sometimes mistaken. He was a great General and all were prepared to do him honour as such; but as a matter of fact he had always been opposed to the idea of imposing disarmament on Germany. When asked what means could be taken to enforce disarmament he had proposed strengthening the blockade. In this he was directly opposed by President Wilson. He (M. Clemenceau) was as deeply impressed as anyone by the seriousness of the situation,

and dreaded as much as anyone a renewal of the war. But he knew the Germans; and today they must be spoken to firmly. The German people wanted economic advantages, and he did not object to their being eventually granted. But it was a *sine qua non* that they should in the first place accept the Allies' demand as a matter of right. He would not consent to Ambassadors being sent to Germany to negotiate with offers of concessions when the Allies had a right to demand. He felt confident this was wholly a psychological question. He would merely ask the Council to consider the Germans' reply to the Allies' request for a cessation of hostilities against the Poles. The German reply would have to be answered. Should the answer be: "If you stop attacking Poland, we will give you bread, sugar and other supplies?" No. The Germans must be told that if they attacked the Poles, the Allied troops would march into Germany. That argument would appeal to the Germans and, after due compliance with the Allies' demands, sugar, butter and supplies could then be granted.

Baron Sonnino thought that Marshal Foch's statement had not been quite correctly interpreted. The Marshal had concurred in the opinion that the disarmament of Germany would be advantageous. He merely did not consider that disarmament would by itself give complete assurance of safety.

M. Orlando thought that Marshal Foch had a basic idea, which explained any inconsistencies in his statements. He wanted to have at his disposal the greatest number of troops he could get. His idea was a sound one, for he could count on the troops under his orders, but he could make no certain estimate of the strength of the enemy's forces. On the other hand, civilians were obliged to consider things in a more complicated manner. This question of demobilisation was a difficult one. President Wilson had said, that should the necessity arise American troops would be retained, and Italy, no doubt, would be prepared to do the same. But demobilisation once begun was very difficult to stop. Italy's soldiers had now been under arms for four years and were tired. The progress of demobilisation could be slowed down, but it could not be stopped. It is for that political reason that it would be impossible to count on being able to stop demobilisation. It could be done; but it would be most undesirable to have to do so. At a previous meeting it had been decided that it would be more difficult to stop demobilisation than to insist upon a reduction in the enemies' force. The present proposal was a consequence of the decision then taken.

In regard to President Wilson's contention that they were under an obligation not to insert new conditions on renewal of the armistice, he thought that M. Clemenceau's point was just, namely, that

the armistice had deliberately been made renewable at given intervals of time so that new conditions might be made, if necessary. The Allies had signed two important armistices—one with Austria which was for an indefinite period; the other with Germany which provided periodic renewals, and so implied the possibility of changes and additions. As far as the psychological question was concerned, he begged President Wilson to believe that he also knew the Germans well. If the Allies were willing to accept less than was contained in M. Loucheur's report, let them reduce their demands; but whatever was wanted must be demanded in the form of an order and in a loud tone of voice. If a German thought that the one having the mastery showed any signs of hesitation, or failed to look him straight in the eyes, he would concede nothing. The victors must speak to the Germans as to the vanquished. It would be undesirable to have to face a refusal. Therefore, if necessary, the conditions might be reduced, but whatever was agreed to must be demanded as an order.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the present moment was particularly favourable because there was practically no government in Germany now. In three months' time the situation might be quite different and unfavourable to the Allies.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was anxious for a unanimous decision. All he wanted was to get the guns away from the Germans, so that it might not be necessary to maintain huge armies. He did not contemplate making Europe an armed camp for ever, and the way to prevent this was to disarm Germany. If it was possible to blend President Wilson's suggestions with the French proposals and get the guns, concerted action might become possible. With this object in view he offered the following draft resolution:—

(e) Mr. Lloyd George's 2nd Draft Resolution Regarding Appointment of a Civilian Commission To Enforce Demands Contained in M. Loucheur's Report

The Supreme War Council agree:

(1) That a Civilian Commission of the Allied and Associated Powers shall be attached to Marshal Foch on the occasion of the next renewal of the Armistice and in connection with the Marshal's negotiations shall endeavor to arrange with the Germans that controlled quantities of food and raw materials other than those required for the manufacture of material of war shall be allowed to reach Germany. That it shall be an essential part of the above arrangement that the demands set forth in M. Loucheur's Report be complied with.

M. CLEMENCEAU regretted that he could not accept this resolution. He had two objections to it. First, he could not take any obligation in the matter of supplies without having consulted his experts.

Secondly, this proposal had the vice of first discussing the reward, while in his opinion the demand should be made first. Otherwise, there would be endless discussion about the kinds and classes of supplies required. The discussions would last for months and the favourable moment would be lost. He wanted the military conditions agreed to first, and the diplomatic negotiations might then follow.

PRESIDENT WILSON considered the recommendations contained in the Loucheur report to be a panic programme. The report not only called for the surrender of big guns, which in his opinion should be given up, but it also went into details of aircraft and factory production. He was in favour of controlling factories by regulating the raw material that went to them; but he thought that if officers were sent there they would get into trouble and would have to be supported by military forces.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, but thought that the output of factories must be supervised.

M. SONNINO thought that the Allies' demands could be reduced to three or four important items, such as big guns and machine guns.

LORD MILNER agreed. In his opinion if the demands were reduced as suggested by M. Sonnino, and a certain number of factories were watched, the desired result would be obtained.

(f) Mr. Lloyd George's Proposal Regarding Appointment of a Committee To Decide on Equipment To Be Surrendered by Germany

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that a Committee be appointed consisting of one member representing each of the Great Powers having armies on the Western Front, to examine and determine the items of war material to be surrendered by Germany with a view to her disarmament.

This was agreed to. The following representatives were nominated:—

United States of America	Mr. Lansing
Great Britain	Lord Milner
France	M. Tardieu

It was further agreed that the report should be submitted at the next meeting to be held on Saturday, February 8th, at 3.30 p. m.

PARIS, 8 February, 1919.

Appendix "A" [3]

ALLIED FORCES STILL CONFRONTING GERMANY AT COMBAT STRENGTH ON APRIL 1, 1919

Belgium	United States			France			Great Britain			Total	
Number of Divisions	Number Div.	Combatants	Total Effectives	Number Div.	Combatants	Total Effectives	Number Div.	Combatants	Total Effectives	Of Divs.	Of Combatants Not Including the Belgians
12	* 15 D. I.	337,000	1,340,000	51 D. I. 6 D. C.	1,050,000	† 1,350,000	‡ 10 D. I. 2 D. C.	212,000	552,000	88	1,639,000
				Of which there are in the Rhineland							
4 D. I.	8 D. I.			19 D. I. 3 D. C.			10 D. I. 2 D. C.			41 5 D. C.	

Italian Army

Number of Divisions	31.
Combatants	990,000 men.
Total Effectives	1,400,000 men.

* Besides 5 in the region of the ports of embarkation.
† Not including 575,000 men in the interior and the forces in the Orient and North Africa.
‡ Not including 2 to 3 Divisions from the Dominions.

[3] Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

Appendix B

1557

Report by the Committee Appointed by the Supreme War Council at the Meeting of the 24th January, 1919 (morning)

The Committee consisting of

Monsieur Loucheur	as President	(France)
Marshal Foch	Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces.	
General Bliss		(America)
General Sir Henry Wilson (Acting for Mr. Winston Churchill)		(Great Britain)
General Sir Frederick Sykes		(Royal Air Force)
H. E. General Diaz	Chief of the Staff, Italian Army,	

assembled on the 27th January, 2nd and 5th February.

From an examination of the Reports [4] made by the sub-Committees and from the discussion which followed it appeared that—

1. There is some uncertainty regarding the strength of the existing German Army, and the resources in war material of all kinds at its disposal, but both are still considerable.

2. There is similar uncertainty regarding the war material and stocks of munitions in the interior of Germany, both in proof and in course of manufacture, also regarding the means of production of such materials, but these stocks and the means of production also are certainly still considerable in quantity.

Any serious reduction in the effective strength of the Allied Army of Occupation must depend on the carrying out of certain necessary measures, the execution of which must be controlled. To this end the Committee recommends the following arrangements:—

War material actually in possession of the German Armies.

An approximate estimate of such war material is set forth in Annex No. 1.

The Committee therefore considers that the Allied Governments should fix definitely the number of troops and the amount of war material of certain categories to be left in the hands of the German Armies, which it proposes should be reduced to a strength of 25 Infantry Divisions and 5 Cavalry Divisions, and recommends that all material in excess should be handed over.

All the war material to be surrendered by the Germans, all stock of asphyxiating gas and gas masks, must be given up at places selected by agreement, to Committees of Allied officers who will carry out the removal, or the destruction, or the putting out of action of the surrendered war material, according to circumstances.

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[4] See annexes I and II, *infra*.

As regards destruction and putting out of action, certain detailed measures have been considered; these will be carried out by the above-mentioned Allied officers if the general principles are accepted.

Manufacture of War Material.

Similarly it is necessary that the German Government should pledge itself not to continue the manufacture of war material during the period of the armistice, in order that she may not re-arm in secrecy.

The most certain method of ensuring the correct execution of the above undertaking would consist in controlling certain German munition factories but not necessarily all of them and in removing or destroying special machinery as indicated in the Report of the Technical Sub-Committee (Annex 2). This control could be exercised by a comparatively small number of Allied experts.

It is, however, necessary to provide for the possibility that, after the Allies have reduced the Army of occupation, Germany may put obstacles in the way of such control and resume the production of war material.

The Committee, therefore, calls attention to the fact that a form of guarantee less comprehensive, but sufficiently efficacious, provided that the delivery of existing material has taken place, could be found in the establishment of absolute control by military occupation of the area extending to the east of the Rhine for an average depth of about 50 kilometres from Cologne to 15 kilometres to the north of Duisburg, in such a way as to embrace Essen and the principal Krupp establishments, the greater part of the Rheinish-Westphalian coalfields and the metallic industries which depend on these. A map has been sent to Marshal Foch showing this zone.

The importance of this region from the point of view of war in industries is so great that it would be practically impossible for Germany once disarmed to take up arms if she had not free disposal of it.

Further, the prevention of exportation to the unoccupied German territories of the general products of this area, would have the most serious consequences from an economic point of view. If the general munition control is interfered with or if unauthorised production is found to be going on, trade between the occupied territory and the unoccupied territory would be prohibited.

These results can be looked for as a consequence of negotiating with the enemy, or they can be enforced upon him as a condition of the renewal of the armistice. In the latter case the text of the agreement might be that of the appended draft.

General Bliss has drawn up a Note (Annex 3) dealing with certain reservations he wishes to make on the subject matter of the above paragraphs.

General Diaz brought to notice the importance, in case German Austria should be joined to Germany, of foreseeing the necessity of taking analogous measures as regards factories in which war material is manufactured in that region, where there are many of importance.

(Attached is an additional clause to the Armistice conditions compiled in accordance with the above mentioned idea).

To this Report are annexed the following documents:—

Annex 1. Report dated 1st February, 1919 of the Military Sub-Committees.
Annex 2. Report dated 2nd February 1919 of the Technical Sub-Committee.
Annex 3. Memorandum by General Bliss, United States Army.
Annex 4. Paper by General Groves [5] devoted to aeronautics.
Annex 5. Normal allowance of arms for German units.

Additional Clause to the Armistice Conditions

1. It is hereby agreed that provided Germany renounces definitely any intention to resume hostilities and carries out the following conditions as a guarantee of such renunciation, the Allied and Associated Governments will reduce the financial burden imposed upon Germany by the Allied occupation.

2. The reduction of the burden of occupation must be preceded by the adoption of the measures mentioned below, the execution of which will show clearly the wish of Germany not to resume hostilities and to cease the manufacture of war material.

3. Germany undertakes to reduce the effective personnel of her Armies to such numbers as are strictly necessary for the garrison of their frontier and the maintenance of order in the interior, that is to say

25 Divisions*
5 Cavalry Divisions*

4. Germany consequently undertakes to reduce the quantity of war material to be maintained to the following figures:—

NOTE General Weygand wishes to give further consideration to these figures before accepting them.

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[5] Brig. Gen. Robert M. Groves, Deputy Chief of the British Air Staff.

* The establishment of a Division is shown in Annex 5. [Footnote in the original.]

Heavy Guns	1,000
Field Guns	1,575
Machine Guns	3,825
Automatic Rifles	4,500
Rifles	412,500
Aeroplanes	See para: 5 bis.
Trench Mortars	1,400

5. Consequently all war material of the above natures in excess of these figures will be delivered at places to be fixed by agreement, either in occupied or non-occupied portions of Germany or outside Germany, to Commissions of Allied officers who will be appointed for this purpose. These surrenders will apply to the whole of the war material existing either with the Armies or in the interior in parks, depots, factories, etc., whether finished, under proof or in course of construction or repair. The Allied officers will carry out according to circumstances the removal or the destruction or the putting out of action of the war material so surrendered.

5. bis. Aircraft. With regard to aircraft, Germany to surrender the following:—

(*a*) 5,000 engines of types to be selected by the Allies.
(*b*) 450 German marine aircraft (i. e. Aeroplanes, seaplanes and flying boats) to be selected by the Allies.
(*c*) 15 Airships to be selected by the Allies.
(*d*) All aircraft will be complete with all war equipment and armament and to be flown by German personnel to places to be specified by the Allies before a date to be fixed by the Allies.
(*e*) 6 rigid airship sheds over 800 feet long, with the complete hydrogen-producing plant for each of the airship-sheds, will also be surrendered in an efficient condition.

> NOTE It is considered important that the question of the ultimate destination or destruction of all aircraft and aircraft material surrendered by Germany shall be settled by the Supreme War Council when a decision as to the amount to be delivered has been arrived at.

6. All tanks, (all gas masks) and stocks of mustard and arsenical gases with projectors and cylinders will be surrendered.

7. Germany will, in addition, bind herself expressly to stop all manufacture of war material of every kind, except that strictly necessary for the upkeep of material of which the existence is authorised.

8. To ensure the loyal and complete execution of the pledges undertaken by Germany as laid down in paras. 1, 3, 4, 5, 5 bis, 6 and 7, the Allied Governments will maintain in Germany a Mission of technical experts and officers who will control the factories, workshops and building yards engaged in the manufacture of the classes of war

material mentioned in pars. 4, 5 bis, and 6 and munition parks and magazines of all kinds.

This mission shall be authorised to inspect factories and to remove or destroy such specialised machinery engaged in the production of the above mentioned claims of war material as they may consider necessary to ensure the cessation of output as aforesaid.

The civil and military German authorities will supply these experts with the whole of the information which they will need to carry out their mission and will furnish them with all the necessary material means, and all the necessary authorisations to complete it, without allowing any obstacle to be placed in their way.

9. In the event of Germany not agreeing to the foregoing proposals, or in the event of her not carrying them out after having agreed to them the Allied Governments will proceed to the military occupation of the Westphalian basin on the right bank of the Rhine, the territory painted red on the map which is annexed.[6]

General . . . . .[7]
C. I. G. S.

MILITARY SECTION, BRITISH DELEGATION, 5 February 1919.

ANNEX I

(Translation)

General Weygand's Report

NOTES ON THE ESTIMATES OF RESOURCES IN MEN AND MATERIALS IN THE GERMAN ARMY ON FEBRUARY 1, 1919

General Thwaites, of the British Army,
General Nolan, of the American Army &
General Weygand, of the French Army,
having assembled the actual resources in men and material in the German Army during Conferences held on the 29th January and 1st February, compared papers produced on this subject by the British, American and French Armies.

Having examined together the information from various sources in their possession, and having estimated the respective value of each of them, these General Officers are in agreement on the average figures which it is useful to adopt to estimate the military forces of Germany at the present time.

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[6] No map accompanies the minutes.
[7] No signature indicated on file copy.

These figures are as follows:—(the accuracy of these estimates should be taken with reserve).

(1) Personnel serving with the Colours of the German Army at the end of January:
From 600,000 to 700,000 men (at least).

(2) Various war materials existing with the fighting troops: (exclusive of material in depots, factories, & arsenals).

(*a*) *Machine guns of all types:*
50,000 (A minimum).

(*b*) *Field guns* (including anti-aircraft guns):
8,000

(*c*) *Heavy guns* (including super-heavy artillery):
2,500 of which nearly all is good modern material.

(*d*) *Trench Mortars.*
The estimates vary between 4,000 (the figure furnished by the English Army) and 6,000 (the figure furnished by the American and French Armies).

(*e*) *Rifles.*
1,300,000 for the fighting line troops (according to British and American information), 3,500,000 to 4,000,000 (for the total existing at the Front, in the Interior and in Arsenals).

(*f*) *Aviation.*
It is very difficult to estimate the value of Aviation material remaining in the hands of the Germans. The Squadrons stationed on the different Fronts at the time of the Armistice contained about 3,000 machines (not including those in Army Parks and on lines of communication, nor those of the Fleet), but on account of the intensity of production, and of the necessity for frequently replacing service aeroplanes, this number only represents a fraction of the machines existing in Germany, (just as in France there were from 10,000 to 12,000 aeroplanes for 3,000 in service).

It follows that, although Germany has surrendered a large part of the machines belonging to Squadrons at the Front, she may have made up since then her air force: we do not know the number and the position of the aircraft factories which have continued to function since the 11th November.

The Naval aircraft (estimated by the British as amounting to 450 machines), is still intact; and so are the dirigibles. Nearly all the engines are produced at 3 Factories, namely, the Benz, the Mercedes and the Maybach.

In the above estimates no account has been taken of the material taken from the Allied Armies on the Western Front during the whole war, nor of the considerable quantity of Russian material which remains in German hands, which would constitute an important augmentation of these estimates.

ANNEX II

Report to Main Committee

CONCLUSIONS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON THE LIMITATION OF GERMAN ARMAMENTS (NAVAL ARMAMENTS EXCLUDED)

The Technical Sub-Committee was constituted as follows:—

United States.	Brigadier-General Rice.
Great Britain.	Major-General Thwaites.
	Mr. Layton.
France.	Colonel Mercier.
	Commandant Aron.
Italy.	Colonel Malvani.

The Sub-Committee met on the 27th January, 1919, at 3 p. m. on the 31st January, 1919, at 3 p. m. and on the 1st February, 1919, at 2:15 p. m., to decide on the terms of the procès verbal. The conclusions arrived at by the Committee are as follows:—

Object. To prevent the German Government from being in the possession of a number of guns, machine guns, etc., greater than those decided on.

The Sub-Committee considers that it will be necessary first for the Military Authorities to fix the quantity of the following items of war material which Germany will be allowed to maintain:

Heavy Guns,
Field Guns,
Machine Guns, Automatic Rifles & Rifles,
Aircraft (including airships),
Tanks,
Asphyxiating Gas,
Gas Masks.

The Sub-Committee does not consider it necessary to extend the limitations to other articles, a resumption of hostilities being impossible provided that the total supply of the arms above mentioned remains insufficient.

As regards explosives, the Sub-Committee considers that as set forth hereafter, supervision to a certain extent is desirable.

Means of Execution.

The limited quantities having been fixed under each category, it is necessary in the first place to take steps to ensure that the materials in excess existing in Germany should be made useless. On this point the Committee wish to emphasize the fact that by the words "material in excess" are understood not only the completed material existing in the armies, in the parks or in the depots, but also the materials

existing with the manufacturers or in course of fabrication. The measures hereafter mentioned should be applied to all the materials. To control the execution of these measures it is agreed that technical experts, English, American and French, should assess the amount of materials manufactured or in course of fabrication now existing on the enemy's country.

With this object the Sub-Committee suggests that:—

The German Government should be told to furnish on its own responsibility all the information necessary regarding all the materials mentioned below.

Artillery Material.

All the material in excess must be delivered at place to be designated to officers who will be instructed to take delivery.

These officers will be required to ensure the rendering useless, or better still the destruction, or the removal of these materials. The removal of breech blocks and of sights is insufficient; only destruction by blow-pipes or by explosion can be considered efficacious.

Machine Guns and Automatic Rifles.

The excess arms will be given up to officers of the Allies as mentioned above.

Rifles.

These will be treated in the same way as machine guns.

Aircraft.

Machines in excess will be given up as mentioned above.

Tanks.

Tanks to be handed over if considered necessary.

Gas Masks.

To be handed over (owing to the resulting moral effect which will be thereby produced in the German armies).

Limitation of Fabrication.

As regards all the materials enumerated above, the Committee considers that Germany should be placed in such condition as to make a resumption of manufacture on a large scale impossible. To this end, the Committee considers that it will suffice to control the items enumerated below.

As the penalties fixed by such control can only be enforced by the judicious employment of the troops of occupation, the Committee considers that the period during which the measures should be applied should be the same as that of the military occupation of Germany by the Allies.

Generally speaking, as regards all the special gear which could not be used by Germany for work unconnected with war, the Allied experts of whom mention will be made later, will carry out its removal, or its destruction, unless they consider that control over its use by periodical inspection would suffice.

Heavy Guns.

Control should be limited to the two operations of rifling and of shrinking. As regards rifling and boring machines the experts sent for the purpose will specify what machines or parts of machines are to be disposed of as above.

Field Guns.

Control will be limited to the factories where gun tubes are made.

Machine Guns, Automatic Rifles and Rifles.

Control will be limited to the principal assembling plants. The delivery also will be demanded of all the gauges and jigs and fixtures used for their manufacture.

Explosives.

On the understanding that control over manufacture in Germany will only last for a limited period (under eight months) the Sub-Committee considers that it would be of no particular advantage to control explosive factories owing to the large stocks which exist. But in case control should last more than eight months, as an additional guarantee, the Sub-Committee considers that it would be necessary to control all the fabrication of synthetic ammonia in Germany, whether it is made by the Haber or by the Cyanamide process.

Aircraft.

The sub-committee considers that all aircraft, for whatever purpose built, can be easily turned into military machines. Therefore if it is decided to limit the number of German military aeroplanes, the Sub-Committee considers that it would be indispensable to control the whole of the factories in which aircraft are made, but excluding factories where engines, magnetos, etc. are manufactured.

Tanks.

All manufacture of tanks to be stopped. Control to be applied to assembling works.

Asphyxiating Gas.

Control will on principle be limited to the production of yperite and to arsenical gas, but might be extended to every other product of which Germany may be understood to be studying the employment. With this object, a periodical control of gas manufactories will be made.

Organization of Control.

The Sub-Committee considers that the whole organisation of control, both in the occupied and unoccupied portions of Germany could with advantage be entrusted to an inter-Allied Committee, composed of experts appointed for the purpose.

This Committee would appoint sub-Committees in the principal industrial centres in unoccupied Germany.

Every sub-committee would be charged with the control of a district as determined by the parent Committee.

Every sub-committee would send out experts allotted to them for this purpose, to carry out tours of inspection of the factories mentioned below, and such other factories as may be considered important.

The British and French representatives suggest that in case the German authorities, either official or industrial refuse to afford to the experts of the Allies the facilities which are necessary, or should the orders given by the control officers not be obeyed, a strong measure of coercion would be provided by the military occupation of the bridgehead of Duisburg, to include the whole of the Krupp factories at Essen, and the greatest part possible of the mining district, owing to the industrial importance of this region.

The American and Italian representatives consider that this question is beyond the scope of the sub-Committee.

Naval Armaments having been dealt with by the Naval Armistice Commission, the subject has not been considered here, for which reason the sub-committee has added the following words to the title of the procès verbal: "Naval Armaments Excluded".

List of Principal Factories To Be Controlled

Guns and Munitions
- Spandau
- Essen (Westphalia)
- Stieburg
- Deutz (Cologne)
- Magdeburg-Buckau
- Yolstadt [*Ingolstadt*]
- Oberndorf sur Neckar
- Düsseldorf
- Dantzig
- Dresden

Small Arms
- Spandau
- Erfurt
- Danzig
- Amberg

Machine Guns
- Berlin
- Nuremburg
- Sömmerda
- Spandau
- Erfurt
- Suhl

Explosive Factories
- Spandau
- Gneschwitz
- Hanau
- Ingolstadt

ANNEX III

[*Memorandum by General Bliss, United States Army*]

The report of the Committee is based on the assumption that any serious reduction in the effective strength of the Allied Army of Occupation calls for:

1. The fixing of the strength of the German Army.
2. The surrender of all war materials in Germany not required by the German Army whose size is thus regulated.
3. The control of all factories, shops, building yards, engaged in the manufacture of war material.

Under (1) the strength recommended for the German Army is 25 divisions of infantry and 5 cavalry divisions, it being assumed that these divisions are sufficient for the garrisoning of the frontiers and the maintenance of order in the interior. The infantry and cavalry divisions would be organised and armed as at present. The total arms needed for this force is given as:

Heavy guns	1,000
Field guns	1,575
Machine guns	3,825
Automatic rifles	4,500
Rifles	412,000

Under (2) it is proposed that Germany turn over to the Allies everything in excess of the war material listed in the above paragraph. Subtracting the above amounts from the material listed in the report of the sub-committee, it would appear that the following would be turned over to the Allies:

Heavy Guns	1,500
Field Guns	6,425
Machine Guns	41,675
Rifles	838,000

In addition to the above the report calls for the surrender of all war material in the interior of Germany both in proof and in course of manufacture, including all stocks of asphyxiating gas and gas masks. The amount of this material is unknown, but it is believed to be considerable in amount.

Under (3) it is proposed that the Allies maintain in Germany technical experts and officers who will control the factories, workshops, and building yards engaged in the making of the war material discussed above.

It is proposed in the new armistice terms (para. 9) "in the event of Germany not agreeing to the foregoing proposals or in the event of her not carrying them out after having agreed to them, the Allies will proceed to the military occupation of the Westphalian Basin on the right bank of the Rhine."

The paragraph quoted above (para. 9) negatives in a large degree the idea that the Allies by negotiation reach an agreement with Germany in regard to the above demands.

Previous to the negotiation of the original armistice with Germany my position was that Germany should be required to completely demobilise except such forces as were needed for the maintenance of order and to surrender her arms. These terms were at the time considered too harsh, and milder terms were offered Germany which she accepted in the original armistice conditions. I do not find it consistent with my sense of right to go beyond the terms of the original armistice agreement except as a penalty for Germany's wilful failure to comply with these conditions. To my mind to proceed now to a military occupation of the Westphalian basin on the right bank of the Rhine in the event of Germany not agreeing to the foregoing new proposals would be on the part of the Allies and the United States a breaking of the Armistice agreement. If it did not lead to a resumption of hostilities the Allies could be readily accused of violating their own agreement and justly so. If it led to the grave consequence of the resumption of the war due to this act the responsibility would belong to the Allied Governments and the Government of the United States.

I regret that I find myself unable to agree to the report of this Committee to the Supreme War Council recommending the addition of clauses to the original armistice agreement which are based on the threat of forcible occupation of further German territory unless our proposals are agreed to.

ANNEX IV

[*Paper by General Groves, Deputy Chief of the British Air Staff*]

MATTERS WHICH ARE OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE IN REGARD TO THE FUTURE AIR POWER OF THE ENEMY NATIONS

1.

1. As to both Sea and Land Air Services it would be desirable that the proper authority in each enemy country should be forced to supply complete lists giving full particulars of all the various types (including experimental types) of seaplanes (which terms shall include flying boats) aeroplanes and engines in existence or under construction at the time of signing Peace, from which the Allied Governments will signify the numbers in the various types of seaplanes, aeroplanes and engines respectively required to be handed over to the Allies. The particulars desired to include:—

(*a*) Name of manufacturer.
(*b*) Number and type of seaplane or aeroplane.
(*c*) Number, type, horse-power and revolutions of engines fitted to such aeroplane or seaplane.
(*d*) Number, type, horse-power and revolutions of each engine not fitted to a seaplane or aeroplane.
(*e*) Number of each type of seaplane, aeroplane or engine available at the date of signing the Armistice, and the number produced per week since that date.
(*f*) Location of each seaplane, aeroplane or engine at the date of signing the Armistice and the location at the date of signing Peace.
(*g*) Photographs of the seaplane, aeroplane or engine taken from at least two positions to enable subsequent identification to be made.

2. All fittings and equipment of a purely military value except such as in the opinion of the Allies may be reasonably necessary for police purposes and internal defence shall be handed over to the Allies in a complete and efficient condition. These would include, for example, bomb gears, bomb sights, machine guns, aircraft torpedoes, aircraft ammunition and bombs.

NOTE. The following details are applicable to Germany only, but it is assumed that the Powers more immediately interested will deal with Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey, to whom the same principles should be applied.

2. GERMAN AIR SERVICE (SEA)

1. The following numbers of machines of the types collected by the Allies from the lists of seaplanes and aeroplanes referred to in para. 4 (1), complete with all equipment, including engines, armament, bomb or torpedo carriers or release gears, wireless equipment, full

navigational instruments etc., in an efficient condition, should be flown to places to be specified and before a date to be fixed by the Allies and handed over to the Allies:

2. A minimum total of 450 seaplanes and aeroplanes of the various types, the numbers in each type to be selected by the Allies.

3. In addition a number of seaplanes and aeroplanes of these types, not less in the aggregate than 50 per month from the 11th November 1918 up to the date of signing Peace.

3. GERMAN AIR SERVICE (LAND)

1. The following numbers of engines of the types selected by the Allies from the list of engines referred to in paragraph 1 (1) complete and in an efficient condition should be handed over to the Allies at a place to be specified and before a date to be fixed by the Allies:

2. A minimum total of 5,000 engines of various types, the numbers in each type to be selected by the Allies.

3. In addition a number of engines of these types not less in the aggregate than 600 engines per month from the 11th November 1918 up to the date of signing Peace.

> NOTE. In view of the fact that the aeroplanes so far handed over to the Allies have not, with the exception of single seater fighters, been of their latest types, it is desirable that a certain number of the latter should be called for.

4. AIRSHIPS

1. All rigid airships in existence and under construction at the time of signing Peace, complete with all equipment and armament to be delivered in flying condition to Air Stations designated by the Allies. Those which cannot be made capable of flying to be destroyed in Germany under the supervision of the Allies within three months of the signature of the Peace Treaty.

2. Six rigid airship sheds over 800 feet long, with the complete hydrogen-producing plant for each of the airship sheds, should also be surrendered in an efficient condition.

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ANNEX V

Normal Allowance of Arms for German Units

Infantry Division.
12,000 Rifles.*
108 Heavy Machine Guns.
144 Light Machine Guns.
45 Trench Mortars.
48 Field Guns and field howitzers.
332 Heavy guns.

Cavalry Division.
6,000 Rifles or Carbines.
72 Heavy Machine Guns.
12 Field Guns.

NOTE. In the calculations pencilled in para. 4 [8] 25% has been added in the case of every category of war material e. g.

25×12000 rifles=	300,000
5× 6000 " =	30,000
Total	330,000
Add 25%	82,500
	412,500

Appendix "C" to SWC-3

No. 956. From ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, February 3, 1919.

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, to the President of the Council, Minister for War

In continuation of the letter from the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference, dated February 1st, which you transmitted to me in Schedule No. 1561.D., and received by me on February 2nd at Noon, I have the honour to inform you that I have addressed to General Nudant, President of the International Armistice Commission, the following telegram:

"Please to make the following communication without delay, to the High German Command:

"Marshal Foch informs the German Military Authorities that the Associated Powers are sending to Poland a Commission which has full powers to allay all disorders there in so far as is possible. For this purpose the Commission has been instructed to urge the Polish

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* General Weygand desires to reserve these figures. [Footnote in the original.]
[8] Of the proposed "Additional Clause to the Armistice Conditions," p. 912.

Authorities to abstain altogether from the use of force against the German forces. The Marshal is communicating to the German Authorities in German Poland the injunction of the Associated Powers that they should henceforward abstain from any use of force in that province and from all interference in its public life, pending the completion of the labours of the Peace Conference."

I enclose herein copy of the telegram which I have received on this subject from General Nudant.

FOCH

[Enclosure]

Telegram From General Nudant to Marshal Foch, February 3rd, 1919, 2.45 p. m.

No. 431.PG.

(1) I communicated this morning to the German Commission telegram No. 934 of February 2nd, in regard to the despatch of an Inter-Allied Commission to Poland.

(2) The President of the German Commission immediately asserted the absolute right of the German Government to ensure the protection of their subjects within their own territory. He added that present events necessitated a rapid intervention so as to re-establish order in view of the assassination of German subjects and of Pogroms against the Jews. This point of view will undoubtedly be confirmed to me shortly by the German delegates.

Minutes of the 2nd Meeting of the 13th Session of the Supreme War Council, Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, February 8, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Present

America, United States of	British Empire	France
President Wilson	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	M. Clemenceau
Hon. R. Lansing	Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G.	M. Pichon
Mr. A. H. Frazier	Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	M. Dutasta
Mr. L. Harrison		M. Berthelot
		M. de Bearn

Italy	Japan
H. E. M. Orlando	Baron Makino
H. E. Baron Sonnino	H. E. M. Matsui
Count Aldrovandi	

Also Present

America, United States of	British Empire	France
Admiral W. S. Benson, Naval Adviser	The Rt. Hon. Lord R. Cecil, K. C., M. P.	M. Klotz
Com. A. F. Carter, U. S. N.	Admiral Sir R. Wemyss, G. C. B., C. M. G., M. V. O. 1st Sea Lord & Chief of the Naval Staff	M. Loucheur
Mr. Hoover	Maj. Gen. W. T. Thwaites, C. B., Director of Military Intelligence.	M. Clémentel
Mr. McCormick	Maj. Gen. The Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C. M. G., Permanent Military Representative.	M. Leygues
Mr. Davis	Maj. Gen. Sir F. H. Sykes, K. C. B., C. M. G., Chief of the Air Staff.	M. Tardieu
	Brig. Gen. H. Studd, C. B., D. S. O.	M. de Lasteyrie
		Marshal Foch, O. M., G. C. B.
		Gen. Weygand, K. C. B.
		Admiral de Bon
		Major Lacombe
		Captain [*Lt.?*] Odend'hal
		Capt. Levavasseur

Italy	Japan
H. E. Gen. Diaz	Admiral Takeshita
Gen. Cavallero	General Tanaka
H. E. Admiral Thaon di Revel	Colonel Sato
Admiral Grassi	Commandant [*Captain?*] Nomura
Commander Ruspoli	Commandant [*Captain?*] Yamamoto

Secretariat

America, United States of	British Empire	France
Colonel U. S. Grant	Capt. E. Abraham	Captain A. Portier

ITALY	JAPAN
Major A. Jones	M. Saburi

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

M. CLEMENCEAU, in opening the Meeting, said that before continuing the discussion of the previous day which had remained incomplete, he proposed to settle two small matters:

One—relating to the demand of the German National Assembly at Weimar for greater postal facilities in the occupied regions;

The other—relating to a demand of the Germans for the repatriation of their prisoners.

(This was agreed to).

1. M. CLEMENCEAU read the request made on behalf of the German National Assembly at Weimar and Marshal Foch's suggested reply, (see Appendix "A").

Postal & Telegraphic Facilities in Occupied Regions

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether the formula "All liberties compatible with a state of war" offered the Weimar Assembly any considerable facilities as compared with the present conditions.

MARSHAL FOCH stated that the German demand was for full liberty, and the reply offered a conditional freedom.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he did not wish to grant the Germans any freedom which it was not safe to give them, but it was clearly desirable to assist the Germans in the formation of some authority with which the Allies could deal. It was therefore important to assist the Weimar Assembly. It was clearly undesirable that their letters should take as long as three weeks and their telegrams as long as seven days for delivery.

MR. BALFOUR said that, in his opinion, Marshal Foch's answer was the right one. It might, however, be possible, without touching any question of principle, to ask the administration to hasten the process.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the delays alleged were probably exaggerated.

MARSHAL FOCH concurred.

PRESIDENT WILSON then proposed that the Council express the hope to Marshal Foch that communications should be hastened as far as possible.

(It was therefore decided to ask Marshal Foch to expedite the delivery of letters and telegrams as far as possible.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU read the correspondence which had taken place between Herr Erzberger[1] and Marshal Foch on this subject, (see Appendix "B").

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[1] Matthias Erzberger, Secretary of State without Portfolio, President of the German Armistice Commission.

Repatriation of German Prisoners

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether he was to understand that Marshal Foch was in favour of the repatriation of German prisoners.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the demand had been presented to him in a manner which suggested that certain categories of prisoners deserved favourable consideration. For instance, the wounded, the unfit, and fathers of large families. He had undertaken to forward to his Government and to support the demand made in regard to certain categories of prisoners.

M. CLEMENCEAU, referring to the demand made by Herr Erzberger, pointed out that his request concerned all German prisoners, and, in a subsidiary manner, asked that special treatment should be accorded to the severely wounded, the sick, those who had been long in captivity, fathers of large families and all civilians. He asked Marshal Foch whether he had supported the entire demand, or only a portion of it.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that, in his letter, he had referred only to certain special categories. The Allies would, themselves, determine which of these categories deserved consideration.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it would not be possible for the Governments to give an answer to this request without hearing the competent Ministers. For instance, in the case of France, the Minister answerable for the restoration of the devasted districts. The question had an economic side to it. He, therefore, proposed that an answer should be sent to Herr Erzberger through Marshal Foch that the Governments were examining the question and would give him a reply as soon as possible. As to the fathers of large families, he, personally, would resist this demand very strongly.

M. SONNINO suggested that the Powers might yield at once concerning certain classes, such as the wounded, the sick, the old and civilian prisoners, whose retention had no economic value. There was no doubt in these cases and good will could be shown without any risk.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he had done no more than transmit a request and his support in respect to certain classes which might be considered to deserve special consideration.

(Marshal Foch and General Weygand then withdrew).

MR. BALFOUR said that he agreed that the competent authorities should be consulted before a decision was reached on this subject. He would like to point out that Great Britain, after France, possessed the greatest number of German prisoners and he would suggest that the British authorities should also be consulted. The British Minister dealing with German prisoners might be put in touch with the

French Minister mentioned by M. Clemenceau, and a joint report might be obtained from them.

(It was therefore decided that no reply should be given to Herr Erzberger's request for the repatriation of German prisoners until a joint report had been received from the Competent French and British Authorities.)

3. M. TARDIEU read and explained the solution proposed by the Committee on this subject (See Appendix "C"). The committee had aimed at the simplification of the proposals made on the previous day. It had not thought it right to lay down the number of Divisions Germany was to be authorised to keep. The Committee had left this matter for the decision of the Council. The first request was that the German Government should furnish the full figures of machine guns, field guns, heavy guns, aeroplane motors and seaplanes. An allotment of each would be made for the Divisions the Germans were to keep up. All the surplus would be yielded to the Allies according to Article 2 of the Report. As, however, the enumeration by the Germans might be a lengthy operation, it was proposed under Article 3 that they should yield at once certain quantities of the equipment mentioned.

Reduction of German Armaments

PRESIDENT WILSON said that his first impression on looking at the document was that the third point was the only one which gave a determinate proposal. He had expected that the result of the Committee's deliberations would be the formulation of a definite demand from Germany in the form of Article 3. Article 2, however, introduced an indeterminate demand. We left it to the Germans to calculate the surplus over and above the equipment of the Divisions we allowed them to maintain. If we did not trust their calculations we should have to verify them. It might be extremely awkward and difficult to achieve this. This was the very sort of difficulty which he wished to avoid. He had hoped that we should be able to make a final demand once and for all in fixed numbers. After that he would like to make a fresh statement to the Germans, not by way of inducement or bargain, but in order to indicate to them our whole temper and the plan we proposed to follow, to the effect that after the surrender of the arms and equipment required of them we should relax the blockade, not only in respect of food but also in respect of raw materials. This we could not do unless assured that the latter would not be used for the disturbance of the peace. We must be certain that in the period elapsing between the renewal of the Armistice and the preliminaries of Peace—a period which he hoped would not exceed six months—the Germans would be unable to set up a stock of big guns and ammunition. He thought it was both

wise and fair that Germany should know what we intended to do after imposing these new terms upon them. Much of the irritation caused by the imposition of these terms would, he thought, be removed by proceeding in this manner. He quite saw the necessity of stating the number of divisions Germany should maintain for the preservation of internal order, but he felt that the uncertainty introduced into the demands by Article 2 should be eliminated.

MR. LANSING said that he would like to make an explanation concerning Articles 2 and 3. He had only just seen the English version of the Resolution. The Committee had discussed both an immediate minimum and a final minimum, that is to say, a minimum for immediate delivery and a minimum for ultimate delivery. He had understood that only the former would be specified.

LORD MILNER said that he did not at all disagree with the additional proposal made by the President of the United States. He thought, however, that any such proposal was outside the scope of the Committee's reference. The Committee was appointed to simplify the demands to be made on Germany. It seemed to him that it had succeeded in doing so. It was now apparently considered that the Committee's proposal was itself complicated. To his mind it appeared simple. We began by fixing the strength of the German Army. We then allotted to it a fixed number of machine guns, field guns, heavy guns and aeroplanes. We then said to the Germans: "Surrender everything you have of these categories over and above this allotment." This constituted not an indefinite but a definite demand. As, however, its execution would take time, we demanded the immediate cession of certain fixed quantities.

M. TARDIEU said that he agreed with Lord Milner. Article 2 was not really indefinite, because our object was to ensure that no arms or material remained in Germany which would enable her rapidly to equip more forces than we allowed her to maintain.

PRESIDENT WILSON quoted from a report furnished on the previous day, giving an estimate of all the equipment now in Germany over and above the requirements of 30 divisions.[2] He pointed out that the figures were not round figures, but had the appearance of exact statistics. The figures were:—

Heavy guns	1,500
Field guns	6,425
Machine guns	41,675

Now the demand for immediate delivery made in Article 2 of the Committee's report was for:—

[2] See BC-25, appendix B, annex III, p. 920.

Heavy guns	1,000
Field guns	4,000
Machine guns	20,000

We therefore left the Germans, even after this demand, an excess of:—

21,675 Machine Guns
2,425 Field Guns
and 500 Heavy Guns.

over the requirements of the divisions we permitted them to equip. He had understood that the intention had been to demand the surrender of sufficient arms to render the Allies safe. If the figures could be trusted, we were leaving the Germans enough to equip in a short time 60 divisions, rather than 30. If we really knew what quantities they possessed, we could make an exact demand.

M. Loucheur said that if definite quantities were to be demanded, a great deal more should be required than the Committee had put down. The figures given on the previous day represented what was in possession of the German Armies. The figures took no account of what was in the arsenals and in the factories. If these were added, the figures should be doubled. Since November 1st the Germans had completed the construction of armaments then in process of fabrication. France had done likewise. If definite figures were therefore to be fixed, they must be far bigger than those given.

President Wilson said he wished to recall that when the Armistice Terms were sent to America, the people regarded them as the terms rather of a surrender than of an armistice. Now M. Loucheur would demand of the Germans in addition the cession of 82,000 machine guns, 12,000 field guns and 3,000 heavy guns, as in his opinion the numbers given on the previous day should be doubled. If this request were sent to America, people would say that the original figures of the Armistice must have shown astonishing ignorance of the situation in Germany, if the demand then made was so insufficient that an almost equivalent demand must be made now, three months later.

It was very important that the Allies should make a good impression on the world. These continual aggravations of the armistice put the Allies to a moral disadvantage. As far as the interests of safety were concerned, he would be content for himself to leave the Germans in possession of what they had. The Germans were beaten, and they knew it. Their spirit was broken, and they would not renew the struggle.

M. Tardieu said that Article 2 saved us from the appearance of making extravagant demands. It affirmed the principle that no more armaments should exist in Germany than were required for the

maintenance of 30 divisions. If the margin were suppressed, we should be forced to raise the figures.

M. LOUCHEUR said that in the last three months, according to the normal rate of production, the Germans were in a position to have completed 50 field guns per day, 15 heavy guns, and 200 heavy machine guns, without counting lighter machine guns. It was therefore not surprising if their stock had been greatly increased since November 11th. France was in the same position.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that at the time of the Armistice the experts had worked on hypothetical figures. The same was the case at the present time. He thought the finding of the Committee was a reasonable one and secured the safety of the Allies.

LORD MILNER added that the proposal had a sort of finality about it. We should not be saying month by month to the Germans, "Give us more and yet more than we previously demanded." The proposal did contain a settlement of the question, at least until the preliminaries of peace. The demands, moreover, were simplified in that they were confined to certain categories of equipment.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the demand was not susceptible of successful administration. He had made this point on the previous day, and had been supported in this by so competent a military authority as Marshal Foch. He had a strong distaste for the practice of making reiterated demands. He thought it was fair, however, for the victor to demand information from the vanquished concerning military equipment in his possession. This demand could be made through Marshal Foch before the renewal of the Armistice. Definite figures would then be at hand and the vagueness he complained of would be eliminated. M. Loucheur assumed that German factories had continued turning out armaments at the same rate as before the Armistice. Possibly M. Loucheur had certain knowledge on this subject. If he had not, it appeared very unlikely that this process should have gone on. It was quite likely that little more armament existed in Germany than that with the Armies. The figures for this equipment had been given. He would therefore suggest that Marshal Foch should obtain statistics from the Germans.

LORD MILNER said that this was the demand formulated in Article 1 of the Report.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that it was suggested as one of the terms of the Armistice. He proposed to make the demand immediately as a preliminary to the renewal of the Armistice.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the refusal of the Germans to cease hostilities with the Poles afforded the Allies a good pretext for making this demand.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.

M. CLEMENCEAU then asked President Wilson to draft a text combining his own views with the suggestion just made concerning Poland.

Should it be impossible to obtain the German reply before February 17th, the next renewal of the Armistice might be for a shorter period than one month.

(The following draft was then read by President Wilson, and adopted:—

"It is agreed that an immediate demand shall be made of the Germans that they supply us with all the information now in their hands as to the number of machine guns, of field guns, of heavy guns, of aeroplane motors and of naval aircraft now in their Depots and factories. That they be informed that their refusal to desist from hostilities in Poland, notwithstanding the fact that the Polish authorities have agreed to desist from the use of force against the Germans in Poland, makes this demand for information immediately imperative with a view to determining the terms which shall be exacted when the time comes for the renewal of the armistice.")

4. (See Appendix "D").

Report of Committee on Naval Peace Terms

ADMIRAL WEMYSS said that the naval questions to be solved were simpler than military questions. The Admirals knew exactly what the conditions were, exactly what they wanted, and what they could get. Delay, however, would render the situation more difficult. The condition of the German Fleet was not as chaotic as it had been at the time of the Armistice. The Allied Admirals had come to the conclusion that they could now fix what should be the state of the German Fleet in time of peace. They could obtain its reduction to that extent at the present time. The Associated Navies had no power of inflicting any damage on Germany to enforce the carrying out of the terms of the Armistice. When the Germans failed to carry out any of the terms, the Navies had to request their colleagues on land to put pressure on them. All this could be stopped by telling the Germans immediately that our requests were not provisional but final. It was possible to lay down at once how many ships Germany should keep; what should be the fate of her naval fortifications, arsenals, etc. How the Allies should dispose of the surrendered ships was a question which concerned the Allies alone and not Germany, and he did not propose to enter into this question at all. The continuance of the blockade was a matter which affected the Navies very materially. It deprived the Fleets of their freedom of action and hampered demobilisation. If final terms could be fixed at once, the Navies would no longer be tied down to their present employment as instruments of the blockade. The spirit of unrest in the world did not leave the Naval Services untouched. A very calming influence on

sea-faring folk as a whole would be effected by the settlement of naval peace terms at the next renewal of the Armistice.

M. LEYGUES said that he had no objection to raise as long as the question of the distribution of German ships was left out of account.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that he wished to support Admiral Wemyss. He would specially emphasise the fact that the blockade was depended on to make Germany amenable. It would soon be impossible to carry out this blockade by reason of the demobilisation of the Naval Forces. The most practical way of solving the present difficulties of the Associated Navies was to lay down at once the general principles which should form the preliminaries of peace. He would suggest that other Departments of the Governments concerned should do likewise. This would ease the general unrest in the world.

MR. BALFOUR said that on reading the proposals made by the Admirals, he noticed that a number of subjects were introduced, such as the question of Heligoland, the Kiel Canal, the German Colonies, and other territorial questions. These were very important matters concerning which the Council had not been consulted and though he sympathised very much with the trouble experienced by the Associated Navies in continuing the blockade he felt that such subjects could not be introduced into the naval terms of an Armistice.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed with Mr. Balfour that it was not possible to anticipate the conditions of peace in the renewal of an Armistice. The present Assembly was not concluding peace terms. He would give most careful and friendly study to the document but he thought it quite impossible that many of its provisions should form any part of the Armistice.

ADMIRAL WEMYSS explained what was the naval bearing of all the questions entered into. The question was then adjourned.

(It was decided that:—

The Blockade of Germany should be discussed on the following Monday.)

8[*5?*]. PRESIDENT WILSON read the following draft:—

"(1) Under present conditions many questions not primarily of military character which are arising daily and which are bound to become of increasing importance as time passes should be dealt with on behalf of the United States and the Allies by civilian representatives of these Governments experienced in such questions as finance, food, blockade control, shipping and raw materials.

Formation of the Supreme Economic Council

(2) To accomplish this there shall be constituted at Paris a Supreme Economic Council to deal with such matters for the period of the Armistice. The council shall absorb or replace such other existing interallied bodies and their powers as it may determine from time to time. The Economic Council shall consist of not more than five representatives of each interested Government.

(3) There shall be added to the present International Permanent Armistice Commission two civilian representatives of each associated Government, who shall consult with the Allied High Command, but who may report direct to the Supreme Economic Council."

This Resolution was adopted.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he understood that he was authorised by the Council to send to Marshal Foch, for communication to the Germans, the proposal relating to the disarmament adopted in paragraph 3.

This was agreed to.

The Meeting then adjourned.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 9 February, 1919.

Appendix "A"

(1) German Demand on the Subject of Assembly at Weimar

No. A. A. I.–763

The Representative of the German Government to the President of the Inter-Allied Commission of the Armistice.

As the National Assembly is to meet on February 6th in Weimar, it is of an urgent necessity that the members of the National Assembly should be free, without any obstacle whatever, in their personal and postal intercourse with their constituents.

At the present time, the forwarding of letters takes as much as three weeks, and telegrams require sometimes 7 days.

In the name of the German Government, I request that the necessary steps should be taken in order that the deputies of the occupied territories may be assured that they will be able to have unrestricted telegraphic and postal intercourse from Weimar with their constituents.

SPA, February 3rd, 1919.

(2) Suggested Reply by Marshal Foch

Marshal Foch to General Nudant, Spa.

Reply to request No. A.A.I.–763 of the German Commission of Armistice forwarded on February 3rd, number 3.186.

As has been already stated by the High Command of the Allies all liberties compatible with the state of war will be granted to allow as far as possible the relations between the German National Assembly and the occupied territories.

But there cannot be any question of the Allies allowing a free and unrestricted exchange of correspondence, and consequently of their giving the assurance asked for on that point by the German Government.

Appendix "B" to IC-136 [BC-26]

(Translation)

[Correspondence Between Herr Erzberger and Marshal Foch]

I

To:—Marshal Foch.

SIR, By your letter of January 16th you expressed, in a way which deserves our gratitude, the intention of using your credit with the Allied Governments in favour of the repatriation of German prisoners of war, special consideration being given to the most deserving categories.

This promise has awakened in the whole German nation eager and joyful hopes with regard to the return of our brave men.

The German National Assembly which is to meet in a few days at Weimar and of which I have the honour to be a member, will first of all consider the question of the fate of German prisoners of war. The deep emotion produced in the whole nation by the feeling of uncertainty which has hitherto prevailed on their account, will be powerfully and unanimously echoed in the Constituent Assembly of the German people.

The representatives of the nation are sure to ask the Government—and such an inquiry will be fully justified—what they have done to secure the immediate return of our sons. The Government should be in a position to supply the nation with precise and unequivocal information.

I therefore beg you, Sir, kindly to let me know in a few days the result of the intervention to which you had allowed us to look forward. I cannot believe that the Allied Governments have refused to listen favourably to the Marshal to whom they have confidently entrusted the Supreme Command of all their military forces and who conducts the Armistice negotiations in their joint names.

Pray accept, Sir, the assurances of my most distinguished and highest consideration.

ERZBERGER
Secretary of State

BERLIN, February 3rd, 1919.

II

Marshal Foch

To:—H. E. Herr Erzberger, Secretary of State, President of the German Armistice Commission, Trèves.

Mr. Secretary, I quite understand the concern which Germany has as regards the repatriation of prisoners of war now in the hands of the Allied Governments. It is my intention to forward to these Governments your request asking in particular for the early repatriation of the most deserving cases, and to support it.

As regards relations between the occupied regions and those regions not occupied, I am disposed to allow intercourse so far as is compatible with the security of the Armies, with a view to avoiding any unemployment and subsequent disturbances.

Foch

Appendix "C" [3]

[*Proposal by Committee on the Reduction of German Armaments*]

1. The German Government will report on its own responsibility, within a period of two weeks, the quantities of war material of the following categories, remaining on February 17, 1919, in possession of its combat troops, and in its depots, arsenals, and factories:

machine guns,
field guns,
heavy guns,
aeroplane engines,
machines for naval aviation.

2. All material of these various categories in excess of the equipment necessary for . . . . . will be delivered to the Allies before March 17.

3. Without waiting to fulfill the preceding clauses, the German Government will deliver to the Allies, before March 1, the following minimum numbers of the materials mentioned:

machine guns	20,000
field guns	4,000
heavy guns	1,000
aeroplane engines	5,000
machines for naval aviation	250

4. The said quantities will be furnished out of German material, beginning with the most modern types, and, as regards heavy guns, in the following order:

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[3] Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

mobile short guns
long-range short guns
mobile long guns
long-range long guns

5. After the carrying out of the provisions outlined under 1. and 2., all material concealed and brought to light, which is in excess of the figures furnished by the German Government, will be rightfully seized and destroyed.

Appendix "D"

NAVAL PEACE TERMS

Joint Note From the Admirals of the Allied and Associated Powers [4]

(Translation from the French Text)

After having received authority from their Governments, the Admirals representing the Admiralties of America, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan held a meeting to study the Peace conditions which it is considered advisable to impose on the enemy at the Peace Conference.

The existing situation was first examined into and may be summed up as follows:—

Germany has not yet fulfilled the clauses of the Armistice concerning the handing-over of submarines and merchant ships.

According to authentic information the spirit of anarchy which existed in the Fleet is tending to disappear, and the enemy is re-establishing and re-organising himself.

During this time demobilisation is weakening the Allies' powers of action on land as well as on sea. The continuation of the blockade is weighing exceedingly heavily on all the nations, and it is desirable to set them free from it as soon as possible.

Moreover, the present situation leaves the world in great uncertainty, the effects of which are considerable in every branch of human life. This cannot continue much longer without causing the gravest difficulties.

As regards Austria-Hungary, the difficulties are no less great.

In making the conclusion of Peace dependent on the programme which the Conference has arranged, we have exposed ourselves to an indefinite prolongation of the state of Armistice, in which for nearly three months we have lived in a state of continual discomfort.

For these reasons the Admirals consider that they should ask their

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[4] Bears the notation "Advanced copy without appendices."

Governments that the Peace Conference may examine and decide as soon as possible the definite naval and military conditions to be inserted in the Peace Preliminaries which should be imposed on the enemy Powers. They accordingly submit their proposals on the subject of those conditions.

The other Ministerial Departments might, no doubt, do the same.

If this is so, on the date when the Armistice with Germany is to be prolonged or, in any case, within as short a period as possible, all the enemy Governments might be informed of the conditions to be imposed upon them as preliminaries of peace, these conditions replacing those of the Armistice.

Signed by	For
Admiral Benson.	America.
Vice-Admiral de Bon.	France.
Admiral Wemyss.	Great Britain.
Admiral di Revel.	Italy.
Vice-Admiral Takeshita	Japan.

Paris, 7 February, 1919.

Naval Clauses for Insertion in the Preliminary Peace Terms With Germany

I. Submarines

(*a*) All German submarines, without exception, submarine salvage vessels and docks for submarines (including the Kiel tubular dock) are surrendered to the Allies and the United States of America. Those which can proceed under their own power or be towed shall be taken into Allied ports within a maximum period of fifteen days, to be there sunk or broken-up.

(*b*) The German submarines which cannot be delivered thus, as well as those which are in course of construction, shall be completely broken-up by the Germans, under the supervision of the Allied Commissioners.

The destruction of these submarines shall be completed within a maximum period of three months after the signature of the preliminaries of Peace.

(*c*) The materials arising from these submarines may be used, but solely for industrial and commercial purposes. It is forbidden to make use of these materials for works having a warlike object.

Additional clause containing an agreement between the Allies and not for insertion in the Terms with Germany:—

(*d*) All the German submarines, submarine salvage-vessels and docks for submarines, which are surrendered to the Allies, shall be sunk or broken-up under the supervision of the Allies or the United States of America.

The materials arising from the above vessels may be used, but solely for industrial and commercial purposes. It is forbidden to make use of these materials for works having a warlike object.

A maximum period of three months is allowed for the removal of the material and the destruction of the submarines. In the particular case of Japan this period shall not, in any case, be less than 180 days after arrival in Japan.

II. Surface Vessels

All the German surface warships now interned in Allied or neutral ports, in conformity with the terms of the Armistice, cease to belong to Germany; they are definitely surrendered to the Allies and the United States of America.

The ships shall be sunk or broken-up in the shortest possible time.

III

The German warships named below shall be delivered to the Allies and the United States of America, at ports to be designated by them, within a period of one month for the purpose of being sunk or broken-up. These vessels should be in condition to proceed under their own power to the places decided on by the Allies; the guns and torpedo material must remain intact.

With these reservations the German Government may remove from these ships, before their surrender, such material as has a commercial value.

These vessels are:—

BATTLESHIPS

Oldenburg	Posen
Thüringen	Westfalen
Ostfriesland	Rheinland
Heligoland	Nassau

LIGHT CRUISERS

Pillau	Strassburg
Graudenz	Augsburg
Regensburg	Kohlberg
Stralsund	Stuttgart

Forty-two modern destroyers
Fifty modern torpedo boats

IV. Construction of Warships

Germany shall stop the construction of all warships now on the slips. These vessels shall be broken up under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America. The materials arising from the breaking-up of these vessels may be used by Germany on condition that they are used for commercial purposes and on no account for warlike purposes.

Until the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace Germany shall not undertake any new construction of warships, submarines included.

V. Heligoland

The fortifications, military establishments, and harbours of Heligoland shall be destroyed under the supervision of the Allies, by German labour and at the expense of Germany, within a period to be determined by the Commissioners of the Allied Powers.

The final disposal of the island of Heligoland remains to be decided by the Peace Conference.

VI. Routes of Access Into the Baltic

In order to secure free access into the Baltic to all nations, Germany shall not erect any fortifications in the area comprised between the latitudes 55°27′ N. and 54°00′ N. and longitudes 9°00′ and 16°00′ E. of the meridian of Greenwich, nor install any guns commanding the maritime routes between the North Sea and the Baltic.

The fortifications now existing shall be demolished and the guns removed under the supervision of the Allies.

VII. Kiel Canal

The Kiel Canal shall be open at all times to all war or commercial vessels of every nation. No nation shall benefit by specially favourable treatment, and no class of vessel shall be excluded from the Canal.

VIII. German Colonies

The German Colonies shall not be returned to Germany.

IX. Submarine Cables

The German Cables enumerated below shall not be returned to their previous owners.

The final allocation of these cables will be determined by the decisions of the Prize Courts of the Allies concerned.

Emden–Vigo.
Emden–Brest.
Emden–Teneriffe.
Emden–Azores (two cables)
Azores–New York (two cables)
Teneriffe–Monrovia.
Monrovia–Pernambuco.
Monrovia–Lome.
Lome–Duala.
Constantinople–Constanza.
Chifu–Tsingtau–Shanghai.
Yap–Shanghai.
Yap–Guam.
Yap–Menado (Celebes)

X

German auxiliary cruisers, whether in German or Austrian ports, or interned in neutral ports, and Fleet auxiliaries which could be rapidly turned to commercial purposes or which are converted merchant vessels, shall be treated as are other merchant vessels.

The vessels affected by this clause are enumerated in the attached list. (Appendix I.).[5]

XI

All Allied or neutral merchant vessels which have been captured, brought into port and condemned by the German Prize Court, shall be included in the number of the German merchant vessels which will be surrendered under the heading of Reparation.

XII

Having in view:—

(1) The reiterated and flagrant violations of the Laws of Nations committed at sea by the Germans;

(2) The extensive damage of all sorts caused to the merchant navies of the world by the systematic destruction of merchant vessels carrying passengers and cargoes;

(3) The impossibility, in the greater number of cases, of exactly determining the circumstances to which the losses of vessels are due, the reparation required from Germany (for merchant vessels sunk) will be fixed according to the total number of vessels destroyed by the Germans, whatever the means used for their destruction.

XIII. Minesweeping

Germany shall sweep up all mines in the areas which have been assigned to her in the agreement already entered into between the Allies and the United States of America.

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[5] See footnote 4, p. 938.

In accordance with this agreement, Germany shall be responsible for sweeping in the following areas:—

(1) That portion of the North Sea which lies to the eastward of longitude 4°00′ E. from Greenwich—

(*a*) between the parallels of latitude 53°00′ N. and 59°00′ N.
(*b*) to the northward of latitude 60°30′ N.

(2) The Baltic Sea, excluding Russian waters. In regard to these waters further details will be given as soon as the Russian question is determined.

XIV. Aircraft

The Admirals support the proposals made by the inter-Allied Committee which has dealt with this subject.

XV. Wireless Telegraphy

(1) The German high-power W/T stations at

Nauen,
Hanover, and
Berlin

shall not be used for the naval, military or political purposes of Germany, or of any State which has been allied to Germany in the war, without the assent of the Allied Powers and the United States of America, which will not be given until they are satisfied that the naval and military stipulations of the Treaty of Peace have been fully carried out. During the intervening period these stations may be used for commercial purposes, but only under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America, who will decide the wavelengths to be used.

(2) Germany shall not build any more high-power W/T stations in her own territory or that of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, or Turkey, until the naval and military stipulations of the Treaty of Peace have been fully carried out.

(3) In the event of Germany violating the provisions of the Treaty of Peace or disregarding the decisions of the International Radio-Telegraphic Conference, the Allies and the United States of America shall be at liberty to withhold the services of their W/T stations from German stations.

(4) Germany shall have only one vote at the next International Radio-Telegraphic Conference, irrespective of the number of independent or Semi-independent States into which Germany may be divided.

Naval Clauses for Insertion in the Preliminary Peace Terms With Austria-Hungary

I. Submarines and Surface Warships

All Austro-Hungarian warships, including submarines and the Danube flotillas, shall be broken-up or sunk as soon as possible by the Allies and United States of America.

A list is given in Appendix —.[6]

II. Warships Under Construction

The construction of all Austro-Hungarian warships (including submarines) actually on the slips shall cease. These vessels shall be broken-up under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America; and no new warship construction shall be undertaken by Austria-Hungary before the final Peace is signed.

The material arising from the breaking-up of these vessels may be utilised, but only for commercial purposes.

III. Merchant Cruisers and Fleet Auxiliaries

Austro-Hungarian merchant cruisers and Fleet auxiliaries which can be readily adapted for commercial purposes (or which have been converted from merchant vessels) shall be dealt with as merchant vessels.

The vessels affected are given in Appendix —.[6]

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[6] See footnote 4, p. 938.

Minutes of the 3rd Meeting of the 13th Session of the Supreme War Council, Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, February 10, 1919, at 3 p. m.

Present

America, United States of	British Empire	France
President Wilson. Hon. R. Lansing.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P. Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G.	M. Clemenceau. M. Pichon.
Secretaries	*Secretary*	*Secretaries*
Mr. A. H. Frazier. Mr. L. Harrison.	Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	M. Dutasta. M. Berthelot. M. de Bearn.

Italy	Japan
H. E. M. Orlando. H. E. Baron Sonnino.	Baron Makino. H. E. M. Matsui.
Secretary	
Count Aldrovandi.	

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	British Empire	France
Colonel U. S. Grant.	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O. Mr. H. Norman.	Capt. A. Portier.

Italy	Japan
Major A. Jones.	M. Saburi.

Also Present

America, United States of	British Empire	France
Mr. Baruch, Mr. Davis, Mr. McCormick, Gen. T. H. Bliss.	Maj.-Gen. The Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C. M. G. Maj.-Gen. W. T. Thwaites, C. B. The Rt. Hon. Lord Robert Cecil, K. C., M. P. Rear Admiral G. P. W. Hope, C. B. Capt. C. T. M. Fuller, C. M. G., D. S. O., R. N. Mr. J. M. Keynes, C. B. Sir John Beale, K. B. E.	Marshal Foch, General Weygand, General Belin, M. Klotz, M. Loucheur, M. Clementel, M. Leygues, M. de Lasteyrie.

ITALY	JAPAN
General Diaz.	General Nara.
General Cavallero.	Colonel Nagai.
Admiral Grassi.	Capt. Fujioka.
H. E., M. Crespi.	M. Matsumura.
	M. Yamamoto.
	M. Anno

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

Renewal of Armistice: (a) Financial clauses

1. M. CLEMENCEAU called upon M. Klotz to explain the conclusions reached by the Inter-Allied Commission on the subject of the Financial Clauses to be added to the Armistice when next renewed.

M. KLOTZ said that since the last renewal of the Armistice the Germans had sought to elude the financial clauses of the Armistice, or have executed them with the greatest ill-will:—

(1) They had only handed over an insignificant quantity of bonds and securities stolen by them and deposited in Germany in the *Kriegs Kassen* and public banks.

(2) They had prevented the operation of the financial control over their foreign securities and only nominated the Commissioners, who were to be put into touch with the Allies, a few days ago.

(3) They had refused, contrary to their undertaking made in the same protocol, to examine, together with the Allies, measures tending to the restitution of property sequestered by them to the detriment of Allied subjects.

(4) The attitude adopted by them in the Financial Commission at Spa, and the tone in which their notes to the Allies were framed, were deliberately aggressive and should not be tolerated.

Taking these facts into consideration, the Inter-Allied Financial Commission had proposed that the following clauses should be added to the Armistice when next renewed:—

(1) The German Government will, for the restitution of the property taken from the nationals of the Allied nations, follow, in all its conditions, the provisions which have been made by a common agreement by the Allied Delegations at the Financial Sub-Committee of the Spa Armistice Commission, and which will be notified by the Commander-in-Chief.

(2) This will also apply to the carrying-out of the obligations referred to in paragraph 3 of the Trèves financial clauses of December 13th, 1918.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked that the terms of the financial clauses referred to might be read.

M. KLOTZ then read paragraphs III and IV of the Financial Clauses of the Agreement for the prolongation of the Armistice, dated Trèves, December 13th, 1918, as follows:—

"III. The German Government binds itself to pay at maturity and in conformity with current legislation to the natives of Alsace-Lorraine (Alsaciens-Lorrains) all debts or bills of exchange which have fallen due or which may fall due during the armistice and connected with German public funds, such as Treasury Bonds, bills of exchange, money or other orders, transfers, acceptances, etc., the corresponding transactions not being limited to those enumerated in the above recital.

The German Government binds itself not to place any special obstacle in the way of free disposal and enjoyment by Alsace-Lorrainers of all property, securities, shares and monies belonging to them and situate or being in Germany.

IV. The German Government binds itself to consider, in agreement with the Allied Governments, the steps to be taken for the speedy restitution of property sequestrated to the prejudice of nationals of the Allied countries".

PRESIDENT WILSON said that on Friday [*Saturday?*] last an Inter-Allied Economic Commission had been formed to report on all financial and economic matters.[1] He suggested, therefore, that this question should be referred to that Commission.

M. KLOTZ stated that a unanimous decision had been arrived at by the Inter-Allied financial experts, sitting at Spa, on the question now before the Council. He did not think, therefore, that any useful purpose would be served by again referring the matter to a similar Inter-Allied body.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that although the proposed resolution had been agreed to by the Inter-Allied Financial Commission, the manner of ensuring its enforcement had not yet been considered, and he suggested that that question be referred to the Inter-Allied Economic Commission.

MR. BALFOUR said he had no objections to oppose to the question of the enforcement of the financial clauses of the Armistice being referred to the Inter-Allied Economic Commission. But he wished to suggest that the manner in which the Germans could be compelled to carry out all the agreed conditions of the Armistice should also be referred to that Commission. He had that day received a report from the Inter-Allied Naval Armistice Commission, sitting in London, to the effect that the Germans had not as yet carried out their engagements relating to the surrender of submarines and mercantile shipping. Furthermore, there were no signs that they intended to surrender the latter. Consequently, if the Armistice were renewed, it would be essential in the first place to see that the conditions already accepted were duly being complied with. He thought, therefore, that a body was required to decide how the Germans could be compelled to comply with the accepted terms of the

[1] See BC-26, p. 934.

Armistice. He could express no definite opinion in regard to the financial question, but in regard to the Naval terms he felt that a very serious situation had arisen. The Germans had promised things, but had failed to carry them out even when in a position to do so.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed his entire agreement with Mr. Balfour, but he thought it would be necessary to have expert advice in each case. For instance, he understood that some difference of opinion existed between the Allied experts in regard to the correct interpretation of certain of the financial clauses. Therefore, he thought it was a proper question to be referred to the Inter-Allied Economic Commission. He did not know whether the Naval experts had expressed any views as to how the Naval clauses could be enforced.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would have agreed, without hesitation, to accept President Wilson's proposal, were it not for the fact that Admiral Hope had expressed the view that no further means were available for the enforcement of the Naval conditions of the Armistice. Therefore, the Army should come to the aid of the Navy to exert the necessary pressure.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that the employment of force would mean the end of the Armistice.

MR. BALFOUR explained that he had meant to suggest the use of threats and not the actual employment of force.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked Admiral Hope to say what sort of military action would, in his opinion, be necessary and practicable.

ADMIRAL HOPE said that his instructions were that no suitable naval penalties existed. Consequently, the penalties to be imposed must be of a military character, and for this reason it had been agreed that the question should be referred to the Supreme War Council. The Naval Authorities offered no suggestions.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether Admiral Hope could, as an individual, suggest any line of action.

ADMIRAL HOPE replied in the negative.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he would put a hypothetical case to Admiral Hope. On the supposition that the Germans refused to surrender the submarines under construction, would it be Admiral Hope's idea that the military should go and seize them?

ADMIRAL HOPE replied that this would mean the occupation of dockyards and some of the larger ports such as Bremen, Hamburg, etc., which would not be possible. He thought that the naval authorities had in view the employment of some other form of pressure.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that two questions were being discussed, namely, a financial question and a Naval question. He sug-

gested that the former question should first be settled, and asked M. Klotz to reply to the statement which President Wilson had made to the effect that disagreement existed between the French and American experts on the interpretation of the financial clauses.

M. KLOTZ admitted that there had been some disagreement as to the interpretation of Clause 1 of the Armistice of the 13th December, 1918, but in regard to Clauses 3 and 4 there had been complete unanimity, and all the financial experts had subscribed to the resolution which he had placed before the Council. Therefore, whilst he agreed that Clause 1 should be referred to the Inter-Allied Economic Commission, he thought that the resolution which referred to Clauses 3 and 4 should be accepted without further reference.

PRESIDENT WILSON held that this Council was not competent to decide the means of enforcing the clauses of the Armistice, and he urged that that question be referred to the Inter-Allied Economic Commission for report.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that whilst it was quite true that no two questions were more different than a Naval and a financial question, yet the method of enforcing the conditions agreed on would probably be the same in each case. He did not think that a Financial Council was the best body to decide the method of enforcing the clauses of the Armistice. In his opinion, the military would be the best body for the purpose.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Germans required means of purchasing in foreign countries. There was, therefore, an economic method as well as a military method of exerting pressure. He did not ask the Economic Commission to recommend the military means but the economic means; the latter were manifold and could be applied gradually.

MR. BALFOUR agreed, and suggested that the Inter-Allied Economic Commission should be asked to report also on the economic means of enforcing acceptance of the Naval Clauses. He thought it was essential that the Germans should be made to carry out their promises, and he fully believed that the economic method would probably be found to be the best, and he concurred in the view that the Economic Commission would be the best body to decide what kind of economic pressure should be brought to bear.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he accepted the proposal, provided immediate action were taken. The matter, in his opinion, was a very serious one. The Germans were getting very haughty, and had given insolent replies to the Allies' demands. For instance, in the case of Poland, they had refused to comply with the Allies' request to stop their attacks. From the Allies' point of view the Weimar Assembly had selected the very worst candidate as President, and the same

remark applied to the newly appointed Chancellor, M. Rantzau. "Deutschland über Alles" had been sung at the conclusion of the last Meeting of the Constitutional Assembly. Consequently, he fully agreed with President Wilson's view that economic pressure should be applied, but a decision should be reached without delay, as the Armistice would expire on the 17th of this month.

MARSHAL FOCH said that, as a matter of fact, the Armistice would have to be signed on the 16th. The negotiations would therefore have to be begun on the 14th and completed on the 15th.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed that a conclusion would have to be reached by the 14th, and proposed that each of the Great Powers should appoint one expert, either naval, economic or financial, to report in two days' time on the best methods of applying pressure on Germany to obtain compliance with the conditions of the Armistice, already accepted. Should the Commission report that economic means would give the desired result, so much the better.

PRESIDENT WILSON declared himself ready to act on any plan that would throw sufficient light on the subject. But he was also aware that the Allies were about to take a very serious decision, because they found themselves confronted by a momentous situation which might force them to a renewal of the war, since a refusal to renew the Armistice meant a renewal of war. The work done would have to be done over again, and he wondered what would be the reaction in the minds of the people of the world. Their choice on Wednesday would be very serious and solemn. No nation of the world would forgive them if hostilities were renewed for any but the most imperative reasons. It could not be foreseen what might be brought upon them by an insufficiently considered action. He could not help feeling that if, on Wednesday, they were not perfectly clear as to the steps they were going to take, it would be better to renew the Armistice on its present terms for a very short period, say one or two weeks, until they could reach a well-considered decision.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether Marshal Foch had any statement to make on President Wilson's proposal.

MARSHAL FOCH agreed that a very grave decision had to be taken, for if the Armistice were not renewed, it would mean war. The heavier, the more important and the more precise the new conditions to be inserted in the Armistice, the more likely would the enemy be to hesitate and to show disinclination to accept. But, not knowing the whole of the new conditions to be imposed on the enemy, it was impossible for him to say what was the chance of their being accepted. On the other hand, the non-execution of the clauses already agreed on gave serious cause for reflection, and on this

account he was inclined to favour the idea of renewing the Armistice for a short period only.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he did not wish to delay matters, but it might have a very important effect on the enemy if the Armistice were renewed only for two weeks, the enemy being told that the reasons which rendered this necessary were that the Allies were considering the action to be taken in order to enforce compliance with their conditions. The Germans would doubtless employ the short period of time so accorded to them in profitable thinking.

MR. BALFOUR thought that President Wilson's warning would no doubt be most impressive. He wished, however, to suggest a procedure which did not possess all the gravity of a refusal to renew the Armistice. It was open to the Allies to tell the German[s] at any time that they were not fulfilling their engagements, and that any further failure to do so would result in serious economic measures being taken which would entail serious consequences. He thought that in the economic blockade the Allies possessed a weapon which was conceded by the Armistice and yet did not involve war.

M. PICHON expressed the view that it might be dangerous to renew the Armistice, even for a short period, as long as the Germans failed to fulfil the conditions already agreed to. He did not think the Germans would be likely to fulfil, during the short period of extension, the conditions which they had refused to fulfil during the period of the Armistice, especially when they realised that at the end of the extended period additional serious conditions would be imposed. He thought that the proposal merely meant a temporary postponement of their difficulties. The Germans would realise that the Allies hesitated to give orders, and they would thereby be encouraged to further resistance.

PRESIDENT WILSON admitted that M. Pichon's remarks were very just, but the right solution had still to be found. M. Pichon was concerned with the effect the action contemplated would have on the German mind, but the effect which a renewal of the war would have on the minds of the Allied peoples must not be lost sight of. In his opinion, a renewal of the war would require the most extraordinary justification.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the further consideration of the question be adjourned to Wednesday morning next (February 12th). No decision would have to be reached before Wednesday evening next, so that, if necessary, two meetings could be held that day. Furthermore, by Wednesday next the promised report on the situation in Poland would have been received, and that might assist them in arriving at a decision. He agreed that nothing hasty or

precipitate should be done. By an adjournment, 36 hours for thought would be obtained, and by then more information bearing on the problem would have been received.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed, on the understanding that during the interval the question would be referred to a Committee consisting of a military and an economic adviser representing each of the four Great Powers, who would report on Wednesday next as to the wise and practical means of bringing pressure to bear on the enemy for the enforcement of the clauses of the Armistice.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked that the Committee be instructed to submit their report on Wednesday morning next and that the Commanders of the Allied Armies be invited to attend the Meeting on that date.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Commanders of the Allied Armies should not be the military advisers on President Wilson's Committee: They should merely be present at Wednesday's meeting to assist in the consideration of the whole question.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed, and suggested that Marshal Foch should be asked to call together the Chiefs of the Allied Armies on Tuesday next in order to have a preliminary discussion of the whole question.

(It was agreed that a Committee consisting of a Military and an Economic adviser representing each of the four Great Powers should be appointed, to report on Wednesday next as to the wise and practical means of bringing pressure to bear on the enemy for the enforcement of the clauses of the Armistice. It was also agreed that the Chiefs of the Allied Armies should meet on Tuesday next, under the Presidency of Marshal Foch, for a preliminary discussion, and that they should attend the meeting on Wednesday next to assist in the consideration of the whole question).

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether it would be possible for the Governments forthwith to nominate the representatives to serve on the Committee.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the Meeting should be adjourned for five minutes in order to carry out President Wilson's suggestion.

(When the Meeting resumed, the following names were announced:—

America	Mr. Norman Davis and General Bliss.
British Empire	Lord Robert Cecil and General Thwaites.
France	M. Clementel and General Degoutte.
Italy	M. Crespi and General Cavallero.

It was decided that the Delegates should hold their first meeting at 6 p. m. that evening at 4 bis Boulevard des Invalides).

Renewal of the Armistice: Request of the Poles

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that since the discussion of the Armistice had been adjourned, he thought that the question relating to the insertion of additional clauses relating to Poland should also be postponed.

(This was agreed to.)

The Arrest of Enemy Persons Guilty of Breaches of the Laws of War

3. MR. BALFOUR said that the suggestions he had to make arose from a discussion he had had with the British Solicitor-General, who was making up the case of inhumane breaches of international law. Many of the members of the Committee were in favour of its being made a condition of the Armistice that all those against whom a prima facie case could be made should be given up. In the clause of the Armistice dealing with this question, no names would be given, but a condition would be entered to the effect that any person asked for would in due course be surrendered. It was felt that if this were not done, there would be no use in setting up a tribunal, because when the names of the guilty people became known, they would have disappeared. He himself thought that the question was important, but that it might not be right to make it a condition of the Armistice. The question, however, required careful consideration. He understood that Mr. Lansing did not think this was a proper question to put into the Armistice, and he himself did not dissent from that view. He would even go further and say that were this clause to be put into the Armistice, no great advance would have been made. The clause would merely state that the Germans should give up a number of people whose names would be communicated at a later date. The Germans would already know who the people were, and they would resent these men being taken away to be tried before a foreign tribunal. The Germans would express their willingness to deal with criminals and to try them themselves. Consequently, he was in some doubt whether the method suggested would prove effective in the long run, and he saw no reason for introducing anything so novel into the Armistice. But by what other means could these guilty people be brought to justice? It would obviously be very lamentable, after all the expectations raised in the public mind, if when the time came, after the tribunal had been established, none of the criminals could really be brought to trial. Whether his proposal was relevant or not to the renewal of the Armistice, he had felt it his duty to bring this question to the notice of the assembly. He had no definite proposal to make, and he personally felt profoundly perplexed.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that the proposal would be futile at present. When the terms of peace were made it would be possible to know the names of the guilty people, and a demand could then be made for their surrender. Meanwhile the criminals might endeavour to conceal themselves, but it was not likely that they would even try to leave Germany. Consequently, the difficulty would be no greater then than at the present moment. On the contrary it would be less, because the names of the people wanted would then be known.

(It was decided to postpone the further consideration of this question.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council had agreed to refer all questions relating to the Blockade to the Inter-Allied Economic Commission. M. Klotz had no objections to offer, but he wished to discuss a document which revealed the fact that the Germans had drawn up a systematic plan for the destruction of French industries in the occupied territories.

Blockade: Introduction of Raw Material Into Germany

M. KLOTZ said that the Conference had referred to a technical Committee all questions relating to finance, blockade and raw materials. But these questions frequently had a direct bearing on the general policy affecting the renewal of the Armistice. The question of food supplies concerned the general policy of the Armistice just as the question of the supply of raw materials concerned the general policy of the Peace Terms. Since a Commission had been formed to consider the best means of bringing economic pressure to bear on the enemy, he would confine himself merely to the question of the supply of raw materials, which had not yet been brought under discussion. The Allies had never agreed to supply raw materials to Germany. The devastated countries would never agree to raw materials being supplied to Germany, where the factories were still intact, until their own industries had been re-established. To do so would be contrary to President Wilson's third point, which prescribed "the removal so far as possible of all economic barriers, and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all nations consenting to the Peace and associating themselves for its maintenance." In order to bear out his contention, he would read some extracts from a German pamphlet which had been published in Munich by the German General Staff in February, 1916, at the time when the Verdun offensive was being launched.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired what was the object M. Klotz had in view.

M. KLOTZ replied that the pamphlet in question would afford evidence of the premeditated and systematic character of the destruction of industries in France by the German official authorities.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that this evidence might no doubt affect their frame of mind, but what effect would it have on their plans?

M. KLOTZ said that in his opinion it would not in fairness be possible to consider the supply of raw materials to Germany, unless the facts contained in this document were given due weight. The Inter-Allied Economic Commission would study the question from a purely technical point of view, but there was also a political aspect of the case, which could not be ignored by the Conference. It was the latter point which he wished to bring forward.

(M. Klotz then read extracts from the work entitled "Die Industrie in Besetzten Frankreich", published in Munich under the direction and by order of the German Great General Staff in February, 1916. Copies of this publication may be obtained from the Secretariat-General.)

M. KLOTZ, in conclusion, expressed the view that a Technical Committee having been appointed to deal with the supply of raw materials, it was its bounden duty in the first place to consider and to give an absolute priority to the needs of the industries of the occupied territories, which had been destroyed by the enemy during the course of the war. To do otherwise would be to permit the aggressor to gain what he had hoped for at the expense of the victim. Subject to these observations, he had no objections to offer to the whole question being referred to the Inter-Allied Economic Commission.

5. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the next question to consider was the report submitted by the Military Representatives at Versailles.

Occupation of Territories in the Turkish Empire and Trans-Caucasia

LORD MILNER remarked that he came new to the question. There might, therefore, be arguments which would account for a report which, at first sight, had somewhat surprised him. As he understood the case, the reason for the reference to the Military Representatives was that there was a desire to discover whether the military forces occupying the Turkish Empire were not excessive and whether they could not be reduced. In his opinion, that was quite a proper question to remit to the Military Representatives, namely: the amount of force required to occupy those territories. But not only had a most startling reduction in forces been proposed, but the report went on to specify the particular nature of the forces. It did not merely say that so many forces were required to hold Palestine, or Syria, or Trans-Caucasia, but it went on to show that the forces holding each of those places should be either British, or French, or Italian, as the case might be. In his opinion that was a big political question and not a military one, and very large issues had thereby been raised. For instance: he thought that the suggestion that Italy should occupy the

Caucasus not only implied very serious operations, but raised the question very directly of the future political problem of this country, a problem which had not yet been before this Conference. Consequently, it was a question which he might have thought should not be discussed before the audience there present. In one word, it was not a question for the Supreme War Council, but for the Peace Conference.

PRESIDENT WILSON explained that it was only fair to the Military Representatives to say that they had not gone further than they had been authorized to go. Mr. Lloyd George had expressed anxiety as to the number of forces the British Empire was compelled to keep in these territories and the Military Representatives had been asked to estimate the number of troops actually needed and to advise on an equitable distribution of the burden amongst the Allies, it being understood that this distribution would not prejudice any arrangement that the Peace Conference might subsequently make. Mr. Lloyd George had, at the same time, expressed the hope that the United States of America would share the burden. He (President Wilson) had replied that whilst agreeing with this sentiment, he doubted his authority to order American troops into the territory of a country with which the United States was not at war. He agreed with Lord Milner that the recommendation made by the Military Representatives tied in so closely with the possible future of these areas that it was not a matter for the Supreme War Council but for the Peace Conference to decide.

LORD MILNER, whilst disclaiming any intention of criticising the action of the Military Representatives, desired to maintain his contention that the decision of the question appertained more to the Peace Conference than to the Supreme War Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the solution was a simple one. The representatives of the Great Powers need only convert themselves into a Peace Conference today. Otherwise, the question could be adjourned to the following day.

(It was agreed to adjourn the further consideration of the question to the following day.

It was also decided to place the following questions on the Agenda Paper of the meeting to be held on Tuesday, the 11th February, 1919, at 3 p. m.:—

1.—Belgian territorial claims.
2.—Occupation of territories in the Turkish Empire and Trans-Caucasia.)

11 FEBRUARY, 1919.

Minutes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, 11 February, 1919, at 3 p. m.

Present

America, United States of	British Empire	France
President Wilson	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	M. Clemenceau
Hon. R. Lansing	The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G.	M. Pichon
Secretaries		
Mr. A. H. Frazier	Lt. Col. M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	M. Dutasta
Mr. L. Harrison	Mr. H. Norman	M. Berthelot
		M. de Bearn

Italy	Japan
H. E. M. Orlando.	Baron Makino.
H. E. Baron Sonnino.	H. E. M. Matsui.
Secretaries	
Count Aldrovandi.	
M. Bertele.	

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	British Empire	France
Lieut. Burden	Captain E. Abraham	Capt. A. Portier

Italy	Japan
Major A. Jones.	M. Saburi.

Also Present

America, United States of	British Empire	France
Professor Haskins	Sir Eyre Crowe	General Belin.
	Lt. Col. Cornwall	

Italy	Belgium
M. Piacentini	M. Hymans
Major Rugiu	M. Van den Heuvel
	M. Vandervelde
	M. Rolin-Jaequemyns
	M. Bourquin

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

M. Clemenceau opened the meeting by asking M. Hymans to make his statement of Belgian territorial claims.

1. M. HYMANS said that the general statement of the Belgian peace problem might be summarised in one comprehensive demand: the revision of the Treaty of 19th April 1839. There were in reality three Treaties of the 19th April 1839 which together formed one whole. The first [1] was drawn up between the five Great Powers of the period—France, Great Britain, Prussia, Austria and Russia on the one hand, and Holland on the other hand. By this Treaty Holland undertook to transform into a final Treaty with Belgium the Provisional Treaty known as the 'Treaty of the 24 Articles' made on the 15th November 1831. The second Treaty of the 19th April 1839 [2] registered the agreement of Belgium and Holland to the 24 Articles. The third Treaty of the same date [3] recorded the guarantee to Belgium by the five Great Powers that the clauses of the Treaty should be executed. This Treaty fixed the territorial status of Belgium, the regime of the Rivers—especially the Scheldt, and set up the permanent neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the five Powers. This Treaty as between Belgium and Holland was not the result of free negotiations between the two contracting parties; it was dictated to these two countries by the five Great Powers.

Belgian Territorial Claims

2. Fifteen years before the Belgian Revolution, the Congress of Vienna in 1815 added Belgium to Holland [4] in order to create a buffer against France. The revolution of 1830 freed Belgium from Dutch rule and shook the foundations of the Treaties of 1815. The Conference of London sought by other arrangements to achieve the same ends as had been pursued at the Congress of Vienna. It sought to reconcile Belgian independence with the stipulations of the Treaties, with the interests of the Powers, and with the preservation of the balance of power in Europe.

Historical Retrospect

While deliberations were going on in London, Holland attacked Belgium. The latter was newly born and unprepared for war; she was vanquished and the Treaty recorded the result of her defeat. The five Powers, when fixing the frontiers of Belgium, deprived her of part of Limburg and Luxemburg, but in compensation decided that Belgium should be perpetually neutral and guaranteed her this neutrality. The whole political situation of Belgium therefore rested on this guaranteed neutrality. The present war destroyed it. Of the five Great Powers only two—France and Great Britain—loyally fulfilled their obligations. Two others—Germany and Austria—violated their undertaking; and Russia latterly had failed.

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[1] *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. XXVII, p. 990.
[2] *Ibid.*, vol. XXXVII, p. 1320.
[3] *Ibid.*, vol. XXVII, p. 1000.
[4] Treaty of May 31, 1815, concerning formation of Netherlands by union of Holland and Belgium, *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 136.

It was the violation of the Treaty of 1839 which brought about the state of war between Belgium and Germany. The regime of neutrality was therefore broken and could not be revived. Neutrality depended on the balance between the five Great Powers. This balance was now upset. It rested on the equal confidence on the part of Belgium towards the five Great Powers, a confidence which could not now exist. The war had destroyed the foundations of Belgium's political status, and economically had ruined the country.

3. The Belgians therefore asked the Allied and Associated Powers, at whose side they had fought, and in particular the two Powers—signatories to and guarantors of the Treaties of 1839—to help them to set up a strong and prosperous Belgium, restored to full and complete political and economic sovereignty. This demand was in accord with the seventh point of President Wilson's Declaration to Congress on the 8th January 1918.[5] The Belgians were asking the Great Powers to furnish them with conditions of stability which might enable them to encounter new dangers. Belgium was at the sensitive point of Western Europe, protecting the coast of the North Sea, and consequently Great Britain and the Northern frontier of France. The security of Belgium was therefore in the hands of France and Great Britain and the interests of all three Powers were bound up together.

Claims to Complete Sovereignty

4. The regime of the Scheldt and the Eastern frontier of the country were for Belgium obvious causes of weakness. The Scheldt was the vital artery of Belgium, connecting Antwerp with the sea. This River almost exclusively served Belgian interests, and yet Belgium did not control it. Both shores of the Western estuary of the Scheldt belonged to Holland. On the left bank, close to the mouth, Holland possessed a thinly populated tongue of land cut out of Belgian territory. This area was conquered by the United Provinces when they freed themselves from Spain in the sixteenth century, and kept it to give them control of the River. In 1648 the Treaty of Münster assigned this territory to Holland. This enabled her to close the Scheldt and to bring about the death of Antwerp for two centuries. In 1795 the French proclaimed the liberation of the Scheldt and attached this tongue of territory to the Department of the Scheldt, that is to say to Belgian territory. At the present time Holland was sovereign over the mouth of the River. She possessed only one port on the western bank—Ter Neuzen—the work and activity of which were purely Belgian. This Dutch sov-

Question of the Western Mouth of the Scheldt
A. Historical

[5] *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 12.

ereignty over the mouth of the River was only limited by a few servitudes in favour of Belgium, which servitudes had been created by the Treaty of 1839.

The dangers of this situation for Belgium were great in time of war. Holland, being absolute mistress of the mouth of the Scheldt, had in 1914, as soon as war was declared, closed the River for all military traffic. The Belgians had been unable to send military supplies to Antwerp during the siege, and this had hastened its fall and, in addition, driven nearly 30,000 Belgian troops to take refuge in Holland and to suffer internment. Had the Scheldt been free for military purposes and had Great Britain been able to use it to land war stores, the whole course of the war would doubtless have been modified; at the very least the fall of Antwerp would have been delayed.

B. Disadvantages in Time of War

Economically too, in time of war, this state of things was dangerous to Belgium. The war-time regulation of buoys was established by the Dutch. They extinguished navigation lights and thereby almost put an end to all navigation. Should Holland, at any time, be engaged in a war in which Belgium remained neutral, the Dutch would be in a position to close the stream, or Holland's enemy could block its mouth. In both cases the result would be disastrous for Antwerp.

M. Hymans said that he would like to explain the disadvantages of the conventional régime of the Scheldt in time of peace. The Treaty of 1839 had subjected pilotage, buoying, and the preservation of channels, to the common action of the two countries. All measures considered requisite by Belgium for the upkeep and management of the River required joint agreement and Dutch consent. The Belgians could, therefore, do nothing if Holland exercised her right of veto. Holland had little interest in the development of navigation in the Western Scheldt; on the contrary she was interested in checking this development in favour of Rotterdam. History showed that the naval policy of Holland had always aimed throughout the centuries at the ruin of the Port of Antwerp. Even when Holland consented to the undertaking of works for the upkeep of the River, it was Belgium that paid for them, even should they be carried out on Dutch territory and the Dutch executed the works without Belgian co-operation. Each time the Belgians had asked for authority to carry out works they had been met with delays and administrative procrastination which led to long and difficult diplomatic conversations between Brussels and The Hague. Further, the Treaty of 1839 only took into consideration the preservation of the channels, and made no provision for improvements,

C. Disadvantages in Time of Peace

enlargements, or alterations. In future, in order to maintain Antwerp up to the level of its technical needs, it would be necessary to alter and deepen the channels to permit of the access of modern ships. The Belgian technical departments had already undertaken an extensive study of these questions. Belgium, therefore, was exposed to great risk in the future, seeing that Holland, on the basis of the Treaty of 1839, could refuse to permit these works in order to save Rotterdam from competition.

M. Hymans said that he would like to draw the attention of the meeting to two other striking anomalies. Holland, in respect to piloting, the establishment of buoys, etc., had on the completely Belgian portion of the stream, the same rights as Belgium on the Dutch portion, although Holland had no interest whatever in the matter. Consequently, as mistress of the Lower Scheldt, Holland could undertake any works she pleased without consulting Belgium, even should these works be detrimental to Belgian interests. The regime of the Scheldt therefore might safely be characterised as unreasonable and unjust, and M. Hymans thought that all were agreed in recognizing this.

D. Demand for Sovereignty Over the Western Scheldt

Belgium asked for the free disposal of the river and absolute sovereignty over the western Scheldt as far as the Sea, both in time of peace and time of war. This stream, on the banks of which there was only one Dutch port, must belong entirely to Belgium; it must be free to execute all necessary works appertaining to it. The security of Belgium in the future port of Antwerp required no less. This, moreover, was in accordance with Belgian national sentiment and in particular with the unanimous desire of Naval circles in the country.

Canal From Ghent to Ter Neuzen

5. M. Hymans said that he wished to explain the question of the canal linking Ghent to the Scheldt and the sea. In this case too the shape of the land brought about serious difficulties which had been brought to notice in 1830 by the Belgian plenipotentiaries at the London Conference. This canal first crossed Belgian territory, then entered Dutch grounds on the bank of the Scheldt which it reached at Ter Neuzen. Holland was, therefore, mistress of the Northern part of this canal and the port of Ter Neuzen. This port in reality only served Belgium's interest and had been constructed at Belgium's expense. It was the fore port of Ghent which had now become the third naval port of Belgium.

The Treaty of 1839 only considered the free use of this canal by both countries. The Belgians had widened the canal in Belgian territory in order that ships of deep draft would be able to go up

as far as Ghent, but they had failed to get the Dutch to make similar improvements on their part of the canal. The Dutch had also refused to establish buoys and navigation lights. This refusal on the part of the Dutch had given rise to a number of negotiations which had often been most difficult to conduct. Questions of compensation, completely divorced from the question of the canal had even at times been raised.

Belgium, therefore, claimed both absolute sovereignty over this canal and free disposal of the port of Ter Neuzen. M. Hymans said he wished also to draw attention to the military aspect of this question. The war had shown that the real centre of existence for Belgium was not Antwerp but that part of Flanders limited by the Scheldt and the sea. This being so, the Dutch ownership of the western bank gave Holland a bridge-head which might enable her to turn the line of the Scheldt.

A. Claim to Sovereignty Over the Canal and Port of Ter Neuzen

6. PRESIDENT WILSON said that he was deeply interested in the statement made by M. Hymans whose argument had been convincing. He would like to know his opinion, however, and to discover in what way Holland might be approached seeing that she had remained neutral during the war, and had no representative at the Conference. In what way could Holland be brought to discuss the question?

Method of Negotiating With Holland

M. HYMANS replied that Holland was one of the signatories of the Treaty of 1839 in common with France and Great Britain. He asked the two Great Powers, the only survivors of the European Concert of 1836 to 1839, and the Allied and Associated Powers by whose side Belgium had fought, to establish in principle that the revision of that treaty was necessary and to summon Holland, one of the signatories, to collaborate in this revision. Belgium was in no way hostile to Holland but wished to live in good relationship with her, but it had not been concealed from the Dutch that the Belgians had important problems to discuss and solve with them. If these problems remained unsolved, the future relationship of the two countries might be embittered. He, therefore, asked that Holland should be summoned to negotiate with Belgium the revision of the Treaty of 1839 which was signed by her, and he begged the Great Powers to assist Belgium in these negotiations.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he could see quite well [how] a modification of the regime of the river could be negotiated with Holland, but the radical solution resulting from the account given by M. Hymans was the restoration to Belgium of the left bank—how could Holland be brought to agree to this?

M. HYMANS said that he had thought it right to place before the meeting, all the elements of the problem, but left it to the Conference to find the solution. He would point out, however, that Holland had shown latterly that she was disposed to discuss these questions; the recent speech from the throne had been quite explicit in this respect as it had regarded the neutrality of Belgium to be dead, and the revision of the Treaty of 1839 to be necessary. The solutions of these problems would have to be considered with Holland. What he was asking the Great Powers to do was to support Belgium in the discussion.

MR. BALFOUR said the real difficulty consisted in that a neutral country was to be asked to modify a treaty and to surrender territory without any offer of compensation.

M. HYMANS said that he would at a later stage make a suggestion on the subject of compensation but would like first to speak on the subject of Limburg as this matter was closely connected with the question of the Scheldt.

7. MR. HYMANS said he proposed to show the close connection of this question with that of the Scheldt and Antwerp. The Treaty of 1839 had taken from Belgium a part of Limburg as a territorial indemnity due to the King and Grand Duke, in exchange for a portion of Luxemburg which had been attributed to Belgium. The Treaty said "The King and Grand Duke shall possess either in his capacity of Grand Duke of Luxemburg or to be united to Holland the following territories." The King and Grand Duke furthermore was to obtain an agreement with the German Confederation for the application of these clauses. The portion of Limburg yielded by Belgium remained attached to the Germanic Federation until its dissolution in 1867, and Maestricht was for a long time a Federal Fortress.

The Limburg Question: (a) The Historical Aspect

Dutch Limburg yielded by Belgium made a long salient on the bank of the Meuse between Belgian Limburg and Germany. Holland possessed the whole of the right bank of the stream and the bridge-head of Maestricht on the left bank.

(b) The Geographical Aspect

Mr. Hymans said that he had previously pointed out the necessity for Belgian sovereignty over the Scheldt in order to ensure the development of Antwerp. It was equally necessary to ensure direct water communication between Antwerp and the Meuse, and thence between the Meuse and the Rhine. These communications could only be established by passing through Dutch Limburg.

(c) Water Communication Between Antwerp, the Meuse & the Rhine

MR. BALFOUR asked what were the reasons preventing access to the Rhine south of Limburg.

MR. HYMANS replied that the reasons were of a geological order. Belgian technical experts had been studying this question long before the war. At present communication with the Meuse was very imperfect. It was effected through a canal which left the Meuse at Liege and crossed the Dutch enclave of Maestricht, (whence it drew water from the Meuse) ending at Antwerp after crossing the Belgian carpine [*Campine?*]. Passage through this Dutch enclave, only 5 miles broad, engendered all kinds of difficulties, and involved no less than four examinations by the Customs. Further, in Dutch territory the canal was extremely narrow. This produced such a congestion of traffic that this part of the trip took from three days to 1 month. The Belgians were unable to widen this canal in Dutch territory, and therefore could not improve it in their own territory. They could not increase the flow of water in it, though very insufficient, as the supply was derived from Dutch ground.

Belgian water communications with the Rhine are also most important. It was necessary to have a canal connecting Antwerp with the Rhine. This question had been studied for a long time. Many routes had been proposed, all for technical reasons passing close to Ruremonde and reaching the Rhine in the region of Duisburg. Here again it was necessary to pass through Dutch Limburg. The Treaty of 1839 gave Belgium a right of passage but when some 30 years ago Belgium built the Gladbach railway line, Holland declared that Belgian rights were exhausted. This means of communication was now quite inadequate and a waterway was now required to facilitate relations between Antwerp and Alsace Lorraine, and Switzerland. It was indispensable that this waterway should be subject to Belgian sovereignty.

(d) Military Importance of Limburg

From the military point of view the shape of Limburg yielded to the Dutch was such that both the Belgian and Dutch frontiers were equally indefensible. This was proved during the war. Holland made no attempt to defend this territory. In 1914 Belgium had been particularly alarmed at the thought that Germany, by invading Dutch Limburg, could cut the Belgian forces off from Antwerp and Liege, and thus cause the line of the Meuse to fall. In 1919 [*1918*] when the German Armies were defeated, the Dutch allowed 75/100,000 German troops, with all their transport and spoil, to cross Dutch Limburg. This led to a formal protest by the French, British and Belgian Governments. Belgian Limburg was therefore an open door seriously threatening the line of the Meuse.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the canal between the Rhine and the Scheldt would compete with any Dutch waterway.

M. HYMANS replied that this was quite likely to be true, and that Holland would not regard the project favourably if it tended to diminish the importance of Rotterdam. The Germans, moreover, by way of reprisal against Belgium, would certainly seek to divert commercial traffic towards Holland and Rotterdam.

Method of Negotiation With Holland

8. M. Hymans said that he would now return to the question put by President Wilson:—How were these territorial problems to be settled by negotiation with the Dutch? Holland had remained neutral, and was not represented at the Conference. He had himself the best feelings towards the Dutch but he thought that their neutrality should not permit them to refuse to negotiate. Neutral countries had to some extent been the profiteers of the war. They had not suffered like the invaded countries, and Holland, more than any other had grown rich, especially by supplying Germany. She had accorded a most generous welcome to Belgian refugees, but it must not be forgotten that by defending her own independence, Belgium had preserved the independence of Holland. Holland would have been the first victim. It was possible to say to the Dutch that the Treaty of 1839 signed with them had now collapsed and that its revision must be discussed. Belgium had intended only to apply to France and Great Britain, the loyal and faithful custodians of the Treaty, but the negotiation would be a hard one to conduct. Belgium could not afford to remain isolated and had preferred to place the question immediately before all the Great Allied and Associated Nations which now represented the new international order.

Possible Compensations for Holland

9. The question of compensation to Holland had been raised by Mr. Balfour with great justification. It was true that Belgium had nothing to offer but there were possibly other solutions which might satisfy Holland. Economic or Colonial compensations had been thought of. But, in close proximity to Holland there was a chance of compensation which might be more attractive to that country. Prussian Guelderland was inhabited by a population with close affinities to the Dutch, and still speaking a Dutch dialect. He would also draw attention to another territory strategically and economically of far greater importance, namely, Eastern Friesland, and the County of Bentheim, stretching between Guelderland and Emden. These territories lost their independence in the 18th Century, when they were conquered by Prussia. The Frisian race inhabiting them was the same as that of Northern Holland, and a Frisian Nationalist movement in this area had latterly become manifest. A modification of frontier in this direction would give Holland a very strong defensive line,

the Ems. The threat to Holland constituted by the pocket of Bentheim would disappear. This pocket would allow a German attack to reach the banks of the Zuyder Zee in 24 hours and thus to cut Holland in two. From the economic point of view also, this solution would be advantageous to Holland. It would cancel the danger of the diversion of the traffic for Rotterdam to the port of Emden. The Germans had a project for linking Emden to the Rhine by canal. The realisation of this project would be disastrous for Rotterdam. Further, Holland would gain a useful port at Emden protected by a belt of islands, the principal of which was Borkhum, of which the Germans meant to make a new Heligoland, and which served them during the war as a submarine base. There was also another projected canal which was to link Emden to the mouths of the Weser, of the Elbe and even to the Kiel Canal. This project was a powerful conception once favoured by Bismarck. On the 5th May, 1895, when receiving a Delegation of German shipbuilders, Bismarck declared that he had always thought that the Baltic Canal should be continued up to the Gulf of Jade and thence to the Gulf of Dollart, thence to Emden. This would be child's play in comparison with what had been done in Holstein. The German fleet would be three times more powerful if it could emerge from these ports and from Kiel as well as from Emden.

In 1912 Dr. Groh, a German engineer, in a book concerning Maritime Canals entitled "Holland a Federal German State: an easy technical conquest" said that communication between the Rhine and the Ems would enable the German fleet to cross Holland and come out in front of the English Channel. "Then," he said, "We shall take England by the throat."

M. Hymans said, that the proposal he made appeared to him to offer numerous military and economic advantages, not only to Holland, but also to the Allies. He had therefore taken an opportunity of submitting it to the consideration of the Conference.

The Luxemburg Question: (a) Historical Considerations

10. M. HYMANS said that the whole history of Luxemburg linked up to Belgium, with which it had been associated for centuries. In 1815, the territory had been constituted a Grand Duchy and given to the Nassau family in compensation for the property taken from them and given to Prussia. At the same time Luxemburg was attached to the Germanic Confederation. Nevertheless it continued to form a part of the Belgian provinces in all respects. Deputies from Luxemburg sat at The Hague and were considered to belong to the 55 Belgian Deputies. When the revolution broke out in 1830, it spread in Luxemburg at the same time as in Belgium. Deputies from Luxemburg continued to sit with Belgian Deputies until 1839. The treaty signed

that year cut Luxemburg into two parts, and was considered to be a mutilation. It provoked among the people of Luxemburg the most emphatic and moving protests, comparable to those of the Alsatians and Lorrainers in 1871. In the years that followed, many appeals were made to King Leopold and the Great Powers. The status of Luxemburg was finally fixed in 1867. Luxemburg then became a neutral unarmed state, containing only 200,000 souls. It seemed specially designed to become the ground for a concentration of German Armies against Belgium and the natural corridor for an invasion of France, as was shown in 1914. The maintenance of such a state of things meant a permanent peril for Belgium and France.

(b) Economic Considerations

Economically, Luxemburg was closely attached to Germany. In 1842, Luxemburg entered the Zollverein. In 1872, Germany got possession of the Luxemburg railways. Lastly, a German dynasty gained possession of the Grand Ducal throne. The favour this dynasty showed to Germany during this war was well known. Since the Armistice, however, Luxemburg had severed its economic connection with the Zollverein and regained the free disposal of its railways.

(c) Belgian Proposal Concerning Luxemburg

It was a political danger for Europe to maintain this political condition. Detached from the Zollverein, Luxemburg was too small to survive alone, and must lean on one of its neighbours. He would, therefore, say to the Powers that it was the Belgian solution that was the just one, as it corresponded with past history and rested on natural affinities and sympathies. He thought he was entitled to say that France did not claim Luxemburg. He would, therefore, ask the Conference to facilitate the *rapprochement* of the two countries, Belgium and Luxemburg. There was no desire on the part of Belgium to do violence to Luxemburg. All that was asked was a friendly *rapprochement* by free consent. At the present moment, there was anarchy in Luxemburg. The Grand Duchess had abdicated in favour of her sister, Charlotte, whom the Governments had not yet recognised and who, to gain recognition, wished to appeal to a referendum. Solicited by various forms of propaganda, the natives of Luxemburg were perplexed and did not know which way to turn. M. Hymans thought that this condition of things would last until the people knew how the Powers were disposed towards them. He would like the Allied and Associated Powers to indicate to the Luxemburg Government that they were not disposed to recognise the new Grand Duchess and that they suggested a conversation with the Belgian Government, with the object of seeking, without any constraint, the means of bringing the two countries into closer relations. He felt sure that, as soon as Luxemburg realised that the country was not going to

France, it would turn to Belgium quite naturally. Belgium, on her side, eagerly desired this *rapprochement* and hoped that the Powers would help to bring it about. The failure of this aspiration would provoke the deepest disappointment in Belgium.

M. VANDERVELDE said that there was no difference of opinion on this subject.

MR. LANSING asked whether Belgium would be favourable to a referendum of the population of Luxemburg.

(d) Question of Referendum

M. HYMANS said that the Grand Ducal Government was now suggesting a referendum on the dynastic question alone and not on the eventual union of the country with France or Belgium. Under present conditions, he thought that the referendum would not obtain a considered view of the people. Public opinion was uncertain and would be influenced by interested propaganda. He disclaimed any idea of violence and the solution he had proposed was in accordance with this union. Should the Great Powers urge the Luxemburg Government to enter into conversation with the Belgian Government in order to discover in common whether a *rapprochement* was possible and under what conditions, M. Hymans thought that the freedom of the Luxemburg people would be safeguarded. If the conversation led to no solution, the Luxemburg Government would be free to seek some other.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked with what authority in Luxemburg M. Hymans would propose to converse, seeing that the present Government was not recognised.

M. HYMANS replied that the Grand Duchess was not recognised. The Government of Luxemburg was the same as before. It still had a majority in the Chamber. The present Grand Ducal Government might organise a referendum in favour of the maintenance of a political constitution dangerous to European public order, but a people could not be permitted to neglect its international obligations. There were, in his opinion, three solutions:—

(1) The maintenance of the present dynasty, which would be contrary to European order.
(2) Union with Belgium.
(3) Union with France.

Since France did not claim union, only the Belgian solution remained.

11. M. Hymans said he would like to make mention of certain Walloons Cantons taken from Belgium in 1815 by Prussia. He specially mentioned that of Malmedy, where French was spoken, the newspapers were printed in French and pro-Belgian manifestations of an undoubted character had recently taken place.

Walloons Cantons

There was also the small neutral territory of Moresnet which should be united to Belgium.

12. M. Hymans said that if the questions of the Rhine were to be raised at the Conference, he reserved the right of defending Belgium's political and economic interests.

Rhine Questions

In concluding, M. Hymans said that he wished to observe that the Treaties of 1815, 1831 and 1839 had also served Prussian policy in its thrust towards the Meuse. He hoped he had succeeded in convincing the meeting that these treaties must be revised and that the Belgian claims were legitimate. Belgium had demanded no guarantees when she took up arms. She had done her whole duty, but she had suffered grievously and was still suffering. Her industry was ruined and could not revive for many months. Belgium was not asking for the price of her services, and was animated by no spirit of conquest or imperialist ambitions. All Belgium asked from the Great Allied and Associated Powers was the conditions necessary to ensure the future and prosperity of the country.

Conclusions

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

12 FEBRUARY, 1919.

Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council at 11:00 a. m., Wednesday, February 12, 1919, Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris

Present

America, United States of	British Empire	France
President Wilson	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	M. Clemenceau
Mr. R. Lansing	The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G.	M. Pichon.
Secretaries		
Mr. A. H. Frazier	Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	M. Dutasta
Mr. L. Harrison	Mr. E. Phipps	M. Berthelot
		M. de Bearn

Italy	Japan
H. E. M. Orlando	Baron Makino
H. E. Baron Sonnino	H. E. M. Matsui
Secretaries	
Count Aldrovandi	
M. Bertele	

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	British Empire	France
Col. U. S. Grant	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.	Capt. A. Portier.

Italy	Japan
Major A. Jones	M. Saburi

Also Present

America, United States of	British Empire	France
Gen. Tasker H. Bliss	Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, K. T.	M. Klotz
Admiral Benson	Lieut. Gen. The Hon. Sir Henry [*Herbert?*] Lawrence, K. C. B.	M. Loucheur
Maj. Gen. McAndrew	Maj. Gen. the Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C. M. G.	M. Clémentel
Lt. Comdr. Carter	Maj. Gen. Thwaites, C. B.	M. Leygues
Captain de Marenches	Rear Admiral Hope, C. B.	Marshal Foch
	Capt. Fuller, R. N., C. B., D. S. O.	Marshal Petain
	Mr. Keynes, C. B.	Gen. Degoutte
		Gen. Belin
		Admiral de Bon
		Lt. Odend'hal
		M. de Lasteyrie
		Gen. Weygand

ITALY	JAPAN
H. E. M. Crespi	General Nara
H. E. General Diaz	Colonel Nagai
General Cavallero	Captain Fujioka
Admiral Grassi	Capt. de Vaisseau Nomura
	Capt. de Vaisseau Yamamoto

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

Terms for Renewal of the Armistice With Germany: (a) Conclusions of Committee Assembled in Accordance With the Decision of Supreme War Council Dated 10th, Feb. 1919

1. M. CLEMENCEAU having declared the meeting opened, called for the report of the Committee which had assembled at Marshal Foch's Headquarters in accordance with the decision of the Supreme War Council, dated 10th February, 1919.[1]

(GENERAL WEYGAND then read the conclusions of the Committee assembled in accordance with the decision of the Supreme War Council of the 10th February, 1919. For full text, see Annexure "A".)

M. CLEMENCEAU inquired whether it was thought advisable by the Conference to discuss the report at once.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought the sooner this was done, the better.

(It was agreed that the report should be discussed forthwith).

M. ORLANDO expressed the desire to ask a question in regard to the report just read. The concluding paragraph of the Committee's report contained the following declaration: "The members of the Committee are of the opinion that naval and military terms of peace should be drawn up immediately by a Commission appointed for the purpose, and shall be imposed on the enemy." He understood that "the naval and military terms of peace" therein referred to were not the same as the conditions contained in the body of the report, which were purely provisional. The two sets of conditions constituted, in fact, two entirely separate propositions.

MR. BALFOUR agreed that there were evidently two quite different questions to be decided, namely:—First, how should the execution by the Germans of the unfulfilled promises be assured. Second, what was to be the future policy of the Associated Governments in regard to the renewal of the Armistice: should the Armistice constantly be renewed, with new clauses and new conditions, or were the final Naval and Military Terms to be drawn up immediately and imposed on the enemy? The two questions should be kept quite distinct.

(b) Mr. Balfour's Suggestion for Naval & Military Terms of Peace To Be Imposed on Germans

M. ORLANDO remarked that that was exactly the distinction he had meant to emphasise.

M. CLEMENCEAU held that the final peace terms must not now be discussed. The Committee had certainly made that suggestion; but

[1] BC-27, p. 952.

this report contained no indication as to what the naval or military terms of peace should be. The question would no doubt eventually have to be referred to the Committee for advice. But the Council was not in a position that day to discuss peace terms. On the other hand, the first of Mr. Balfour's two points, namely, the enforcement of the conditions already accepted by the Germans, called for an immediate decision, as Marshal Foch would have to confer with the Germans almost immediately for the renewal of the Armistice.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that the armistice would expire at 5.0 a. m. on the 17th February next, and the renewal would have to be signed on the 16th. He would therefore be obliged to leave Paris on the 14th or 15th.

M. CLEMENCEAU resuming said that only two days would therefore be available for a decision to be reached. Obviously, more than two days would be required to decide the final naval and military clauses to be included in the Treaty of Peace. Consequently, the consideration of that question would have to be postponed, but the conditions for a renewal of the armistice must at once be decided.

MR. BALFOUR agreed that it was impossible to discuss then and there the final peace terms; but the general policy which should govern their arrangements in regard to the renewal of the armistice, in view of arriving at the final peace terms was quite another question. Doubts had been expressed as to the advisability of using the renewal of the armistice each month as a means of getting new terms out of the Germans. From time to time some slight modifications might be desirable and necessary. For instance, the question of Poland was one which called for immediate action, but many of the members of the Council held the view that it was inexpedient to introduce new terms every time the armistice was renewed. No satisfactory end could, however, be put to that method of procedure until the conditions of the final peace terms had been decided, and, he agreed, that a decision on that question could not be reached on that day. His proposal, therefore, was that only inevitably small changes, or no changes whatever, should be made in the armistice until the Allies were prepared to say to Germany: "These are the final naval and military terms of peace, which you must accept in order to enable Europe to demobilise and so to resume its life on a peace footing and re-establish its industries."

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Mr. Balfour's proposal for the first time seemed to suggest to him a satisfactory solution. All along his difficulty had been that little and irritating secondary demands were continually being added to the armistice conditions whilst at the same time reports were being received to the effect that the previously accepted terms had not been fulfilled. Each time he had

asked the question "What will be the result of adding these new conditions? How can the enforcement of the unfulfilled conditions be secured?" And he had been conscious of the fact that either might involve a renewal of hostilities. He was perfectly prepared to renew the war if the Germans refused to accept the final terms of peace, decided upon by the Allies. But he was not prepared to renew hostilities because the Germans might refuse to accept some little portion of the eventual peace terms. Each time something was asked for which, if not accepted, meant the renewal of the war; but each condition by itself was not worth the renewal of the war. On the other hand, a refusal to accept the Allies' final terms of peace would be worth renewing the war, and ultimately the Allies would have to insist on the acceptance of their peace terms. Moreover, renewal of the armistice, with certain small additional conditions merely meant a repetition and a continuance of endless debates with the Germans as to the reason why they had been unable to comply with the accepted conditions, close technical distinctions being raised in regard to the meaning of those conditions. It seemed to him that this procedure placed the Allied Governments in the undignified position of debating with the Germans, while conscious all the time that a stop could be put to the debate by a renewal of hostilities. There could be no desire to debate with the Germans and, therefore, the final conditions to be imposed must be decided upon. That was business, as compared with the present policy which meant asking for things that formed only a part of the programme and not the whole programme. Personally he was deeply interested in the fulfilment of the entire programme, and he was ready to employ the whole strength of the American army to obtain the acceptance of the whole of the naval and military terms of peace: but he was not prepared to make use of that Army for the little pieces. It was reported that Germany had failed to fulfil part of the terms of the Armistice. What was to be done? It was suggested that more conditions should be imposed on the enemy at the next renewal of the Armistice. The enforcement of the new conditions would, however, inevitably lead to more debates and further discussions with the Germans. Would it not be better, as had been suggested, to go to Spa and to say to the Germans: "The present situation is altogether unsatisfactory. You have failed to keep your promises. You have failed to carry out the terms of the Armistice. The Armistice will be renewed, on the present terms, for a period which will be terminated on a few days' notice. Meanwhile the final Military and Naval terms of peace will be drawn up and presented to you for acceptance on the understanding that non-acceptance of the whole

of the terms would mean an immediate resumption of hostilities."

The proposal he had just made had been suggested to him that morning and it appeared to him as a thoroughly sound and statesmanlike idea.

M. CLEMENCEAU protested that yet once more, in his long career, he felt compelled with great regret to state that his views differed very considerably from those he had just heard. It had been stated that the Germans had not carried out the terms of the Armistice, but that it would merely be irritating to the Germans if difficulties were constantly raised about the non-fulfilment of secondary demands.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that M. Clemenceau should have said: "future secondary demands."

M. CLEMENCEAU accepted the correction and said that he had a great many remarks to make on that point. He proposed to begin his argument at the end, by referring to the proposals put forward by the Economic and Military Committee.

According to President Wilson's proposal, the Allies would condescend to explain to the Germans that the Naval and Military terms of peace would be drawn up and presented to them for acceptance as soon as possible. But the military terms depended largely on the other terms. If the differences existing between the thirty odd nations represented at the Conference were settled; if the creation of the League of Nations gave the guarantees that were expected from it, the military terms would be different from what they would be if no agreement were reached on these various points. Consequently, he believed the military terms could not be separated from the political, economic and financial terms.

Next, President Wilson had said: "I am ready to employ the whole strength of the American Army to obtain acceptance of the final conditions of peace. As to secondary questions—well, let them go. For vital questions, I am ready to renew the war, if necessary." If President Wilson would allow him to say so he thought that would be putting the question in an academic, theoretical and doctrinal light. In practice the question would present itself quite differently, for the final conditions of peace would only be settled after a large proportion of the troops had been sent home, when the Americans, the English and the Italians had gone. What would be the Allies' military situation when the present accepted demobilisation schemes had been carried out? The scheme relating to the forces to be maintained in the occupied territories until the signature of peace provided for the employment of 51 French, 10 British and 10 American divisions. After the frightful losses suffered by the French nation both materially, financially and in men, when it still had sufficient

strength to maintain 51 divisions at the front, was that the moment to say to the Germans: "If you are not in an accommodating humour, we shall start fighting again"? The final military conditions to be imposed might be extremely difficult, and it might be that the enemies, having been left free to act on the other side of the frontier, a great deal of blood would have to be shed to conquer them a second time. He thought that problem had not received sufficient consideration. In his opinion, it had been presented in too theoretical, too academic a form. But the fact must be faced that during 4 years of war the countryside of France had been devastated and subjected to the worst kind of savagery. At the end of that time, the enemy had been forced to surrender at discretion. But, left to themselves, the Germans had created order, just as the Russians had created disorder. The Germans had succeeded in forming a Government, and the first words spoken in the National Assembly had been: "Deutschland über Alles". The second thing done had been to place all power in the hands of the accomplices of William II. News had been received that morning that Scheidemann, one of William's most direct agents, was to govern Germany. Could it be imagined that he would alter his views though he might speak in favour of the League of Nations and of universal brotherhood? No, he did not think his hearers would allow themselves to be deceived. Let them read the German newspapers. It would be seen that they breathed nothing but threats. Ebert had said: "We will not accept terms which are too hard". And why was all this done? To exercise a detrimental influence on our moral[e], to frighten us, to make us fear that, if the Germans were angered, the war might begin again. Nobody was less desirous than himself of seeing the war begin again, but it must not be forgotten that we were still at war. War continued in the minds of men; the same minds that had made the war of 1914. The German nation had not suffered from invasion, its aggressive moral[e] had been preserved intact. On the other hand, the Allied Conference could not have acted differently, nor more quickly, than it had done. Vital preliminary work had to be done. It had, however, been accused of impotence by the press, and probably the Germans had come to think that the Allies were quarreling and that they were incapable of action. He would implore the Council not to confirm the Germans in that idea. The Germans must not be allowed to think that they would be able to face successfully France's 51 divisions after the Allied troops had dispersed.

Returning to his starting-point, complaints had been made that the Germans were not carrying out the armistice terms. But they must be compelled to carry them out; as to that, all were agreed.

Then it had been said, (it was the echo of a sentiment he had read in German newspapers), that there must be no fresh terms, otherwise, the Germans would get angry, would start discussions. That argument might hold good if the new conditions to be imposed were either frivolous or due to the sudden impulse of the moment. But, in reply, he need only draw attention to the Polish question, to which Mr. Balfour very rightly attached great importance, even though it was a new question, only a few days old. Now, provided the wishes of the Allies were plainly expressed, it would be impossible for the Germans to rise. Marshal Foch and Marshal Pétain would agree that the Germans could not at the present moment embark on an offensive against the Allies. Would the Polish question be worth an offensive? He thought so. But if the Germans were told that an attack on Poland would be followed by an immediate advance of the Allied troops along the entire Western front, Germany would at once comply with the Allies' conditions. He would here recite his *mea culpa*, for the matter concerned him directly. He wished to repeat what he had already said, namely, that the fortune of war had been such that neither American nor British territories had suffered, whilst the territory of France had been so ravaged that it would seem as though recovery would be impossible. The first wish of the French frontier peasants had been to get back the cattle which had been stolen from them by the hundred and by the thousand, and which they could watch grazing on the German side. These peasants kept on saying "We have been victorious, of course, but could not the Germans be asked to give us back our cattle?" Well that was not a question of world-wide importance. The world would still continue to go round, even if the unhappy peasants were not granted the means of making good—(and in how fragmentary a fashion)—the disasters caused by the war. Nevertheless Mr. Balfour would not, as a philosopher, contradict him when he said that there was such a thing as a philosophy of war, when events accumulated in the human brain and put it out of gear, destroying the balance of entire nations. The barbarians of whom history spoke took all that they found in the territories invaded by them, but destroyed nothing; they settled down to share the common existence. Now, however, the enemy had systematically destroyed everything that came in his way. As M. Klotz had said in his report, nothing had been left standing. France would be unable to compete against Germany for two years. It had been stated that Germany would be supplied with raw materials; but the industries of France had been scientifically destroyed, not for military reasons, but in order to prevent France from recovering in peace time. That was how matters stood. It

was true that Italy had also suffered a great deal, but no comparison was possible, as it was the richest districts of France that had been destroyed. France had lost 3,000,000 men, either killed or mutilated, and it is truly necessary that some compensation should be obtained.

The Conference had worked conscientiously up to the present and had dealt with questions of the highest order. The purest idealism had been represented there, as well as more material interests; but the world was waiting. The Supreme Council would meet again in a fortnight or three weeks; by that time no one must be able to say: "The Associated Governments will not make up their minds to give us that satisfaction to which we are entitled".

This state of mind must not be allowed to develop. It could not be said that the French people were concerned with material interests to the exclusion of all others. If the French people deserved any reproach it was rather for erring in the opposite direction; for they are apt to be carried away by ideas, regardless of terrestrial affairs. But the people of France were attached to the soil, they were accustomed to work on the soil, and they now implored the representatives of the Allied and Associated peoples to consider this aspect of the question. If no heed were given to such requests, a time would come when small, supposedly secondary, questions would accumulate and create a state of mind which would drive the people to insist on their demands with an amount of energy such as he should not like to see. Indefinite postponements would appear to the Germans as a proof of weakness. He was aware that President Wilson considered the Armistice to be a threat continually hanging over the heads of the Germans. But he (M. Clemenceau) knew the Germans better, and he would assure the Council that they will not take it thus. The Germans must, of course, be spoken to with moderation and equity, but also with firmness and decision; otherwise the Council would be obliged to meet again in a fortnight's time under less favourable conditions.

In speaking at such length—a proceeding justified by the importance of the question—he had not contradicted any arguments either of President Wilson or Mr. Balfour. He had merely wished to convey his own opinions which coincided with those of the entire French nation. France would suffer most from this indefinite prolongation of the Armistice. He was continually being assailed with requests for a speedy conclusion of peace, and that was the reason why he had been somewhat emphatic in his suggestions. He should like a decision to be reached as soon as possible. The Germans would be compelled to give satisfaction for the violation of the Armistice terms, described at length in General Weygand's report.

The Allies should remain firm on these points, including also the terms rendered necessary by the Polish question and such other questions that might arise, seeing that, on President Wilson's own proposal, an Economic Committee had been attached to Marshal Foch. He urged that the policy so far followed should be continued. The degree of pressure to be exerted would be made to fit each case as it arose. But the Germans must not be told: "Go on, Do as you like, Perhaps we shall some day threaten to break off relations; but just now we will not be firm". Germany would continue her preparations, and after the Allied troops had dispersed, Marshal Foch might perhaps find himself confronted by more German troops than might have been anticipated.

In conclusion he wished to apologise for having spoken at such length, but it was necessary to say these things.

MR. BALFOUR said that M. Clemenceau had made a speech which everybody would regard as most impressive, even though it must inevitably have lost by translation. He thought, however, there was a real misunderstanding, not on all, but on most of the points raised, which he hoped to remove. All were agreed that in regard to the past the Germans must be compelled to carry out the engagements. The wishes of the Allies in regard to Poland must also be complied with. M. Clemenceau had, however, been greatly moved (and not unnaturally) by the declaration made by Marshal Foch's Committee at the end of their report. That report had only been distributed in the Council Chamber that morning; and he himself had not seen it when he had drawn up his proposals.

(c) Mr. Balfour's Resolution To Impose on Germany Without Delay Final Naval and Military Terms of Peace

M. Clemenceau apparently wished to introduce into the armistice certain conditions which would compel the Germans to restore cattle, sheep, etc., which had been stolen from the unhappy peasants in the ravaged districts of France. In his opinion, that proposal belonged to the general question of reparations, which would be included in the final peace terms, and it could not be separated from similar questions, such as reparations due for the destruction of spindles and weaving machinery. But even if it were decided that the question should not be postponed until the general peace treaty came to be drawn up, such proposals should, he thought, be discussed separately with the Germans, who should be informed that the supply of raw materials would be made conditional on the return of the cattle. He need only assure M. Clemenceau that everybody felt most deeply for the general suffering which France had had to endure.

The fundamental misunderstanding which existed lay, however, in the fact that M. Clemenceau believed that the policy suggested was

one dictated by a desire to put off a decision and to yield to the Germans until such time as the British and American troops had been withdrawn from France. That was not only not the policy proposed, but the whole object of his proposal was to hasten the time when the Germans would have been compelled to demobilise their forces to such a degree as to render them helpless. Speed and thoroughness was what they were aiming at. The long succession of months spent, not in bringing about a peace, but in settling small additional conditions to the terms of the armistice, was postponing the final settlement in a dangerous manner. It was, therefore, with the object of reaching a complete and a rapid end that his proposals had been put forward. Consequently when M. Clemenceau pointed to the small number of American and British troops which would be left when the final solution would come—that was the very reason why he wished to hasten the settlement so that demobilisation of the Allied forces could be carried out without fear and misgiving, after the Germans themselves had been compelled to demobilise.

His plan might be good or it might be bad, but its object was to get over the danger which M. Clemenceau foresaw, so that Germany would no longer be able to resist, and the Allies would then be in a position to exact those reparations which might be thought to be just.

He wished, therefore, to submit the following resolution for discussion at the meeting to be held that afternoon. It embodied the general policy, which he thought did not in reality differ in substance from M. Clemenceau's, though differing in form:—

"The Supreme War Council agree that:

(1) The armistice with Germany shall be renewed on the present terms for an undefined period terminable by the Allied and Associated Powers at . . . . . days' notice.

(2) Detailed and final naval, military, and air conditions shall be drawn up at once by a Committee to be presided over by Marshal Foch and submitted for the approval of the Supreme War Council: These, when approved, will be presented for signature to the Germans.

(3) After the signature of these preliminaries of peace Germany will be permitted to receive such controlled quantities of food, and raw materials for the rehabilitation of her industry, as shall be deemed just, having regard to the prior claims of Allied countries, especially those on whose industries Germany has deliberately inflicted damage.

(4) The question of the quantities of food and raw material to be allowed to Germany after the signature of the preliminaries of peace shall be referred to the Economic Council for examination and report."

(It was agreed to adjourn the discussion until 3.0 p. m. that afternoon. The technical, Military and Naval Advisers were requested to be in attendance at 5.0 p. m.).

Annexure A

Conclusions of Committee Assembled in accordance with the Decision of Supreme War Council on 10th February, 1919

The Committee assembled at Marshal Foch's Headquarters in accordance with the decisions of the 10th February 1919 of the Supreme War Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, and consisting of:—

America	General Bliss, Mr. Norman Davis.
France	M. Clémentel, General Degoutte.
Great Britain	Lord Robert Cecil, General Thwaites.
Italy	M. Crespi, Brigadier-General Cavallero.

with whom were associated in accordance with the decision of the above Council the Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied forces.

Marshal Pétain.
General Diaz.
General McAndrew (representing General Pershing.)
Admiral Benson.
Admiral de Bon.
Admiral Hope.
Admiral Grassi.

has the honour to submit to the Supreme War Council the following report:—

I. Infringement by Germany of Successive Conventions of the Armistice and of the Protocols Annexed to the Armistice

(1) *Repatriation of Alsatians-Lorrainians still incorporated in the German Army.*

The principle of this repatriation has been formally established by article 3 of the Convention of the Armistice of November 11, 1918.

But, owing to the sluggishness, the delays and even the refusals opposed by the German Authorities, it has not been executed. The Alsatians-Lorrainians incorporated in units stationed in the interior of the German territory or in those forming part of the Armies of the East, of Ukraine and of Southern Russia, have not been repatriated.

Such is the situation *de facto*, three months after the signature of the above-mentioned Convention.

It must be further remarked that it has been impossible to obtain from the Germans any information regarding the number of Alsatians-Lorrainians remaining incorporated in the German Army.

The whole of these facts constitutes a violation well characterised of Article 3 of the Convention of November 11.

Annex No. 1 gives the analysis of the documents concerning this question.

(1) It should be mentioned, however, that after the present report was adopted, the following telegram has been received from Spa:—

"German Commission gave this morning intimation that Alsatians Lorrainians were the first on the list of repatriation of the German troops of Nikolaiewsk".

(2) *German behaviour in Poland.*

This includes on the one side:

(*a*) The organisation on the Eastern frontiers of Germany of two important military groups, one in the region of Koenigsberg, the other in the province of Posen, under the command of Field-Marshal Hindenburg.

(*b*) The obstacles brought about by the German troops returning from Ukraine against the anti-bolshevist action of the Poles in the region of Vilna-Pinsk.

This behaviour compelled the Allied and Associated Governments to send the telegram of February 2 to the German High Command, announcing the forwarding to Poland of an Inter-Allied Mission, and advising formally the said Command not to use force against the Poles.[2]

The answer of the German Government, formulated by Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, states word for word that Germany declines to execute the order of its adversaries.[3]

On the other hand, M. Dmowski, representative of the National Polish Committee, has brought the proof that the German High Command had signed with the Ukrainian Government a Convention, the clauses of which are contrary to the engagements taken by the German Government with the Allied and Associated Powers.

According to this convention, the Germans promise:

—to forbid the Poles access to the region Brest-Litovsk, Pinsk, Goloby, Kowel, Vlodava;

—to hand over this region to the Ukrainians as fast as it is evacuated by the German troops;

—not only to make no obstacle to the operations of the Ukrainians against the Poles in Galicia, but also to cover these operations;

—by this convention, the Germans formally recognise the maintenance of the Brest-Litovsk treaty.

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[2] For the content of this telegram, see appendix C to BC-25 (SWC-3), p. 924.

[3] See annex II, p. 987.

Although the copy of this document which fell in our hands does not bear any date of signature, it is nevertheless evident that it refers to the present time, since the orders mentioned in it are to be carried out from January 31.

Furthermore the Germans have continued, after November 11 to make requisitions and to order coercive measures in Poland.

The above-mentioned behaviour and this secret Convention between the Germans and the Ukrainians constitutes a violation of articles 12, 13, 14, 15 of the Armistice Convention.

(See Annex II, note from Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, and Germano-Ukrainian Military Convention).

3°) *Revictualling of Poland.*

On January 21, 1919, by telegram n° 1740/C. R., the German Government was advised, through the President of the C. I. P. A.[4] of Spa, of the measures taken by the Allied and Associated Governments to ensure, in accordance with article 16 of the Armistice Convention of November 11, the revictualling in foodstuffs of Poland.

On February 1st, the German Government gave their answer on the subject. In this document, they state that they cannot guarantee the safety of the food transports for Poland; they ask that the revictualling of the German population of the Eastern Provinces should begin at least at the same time as the transports of food for Poland: they propose in addition that the rolling stock necessary for this transport should be levied on the number of engines and railway trucks handed over by Germany to the Allies.

This reply is a violation of article 16 of the Convention of November 11, as it refuses to guarantee the safety of the food transports. It is otherwise a proof, owing to the other questions that it tries to bring up, (revictualling of Germany and handing over of railway material), of the ill-will of the German Government to execute the terms of the Convention that it signed.

(See Annex III, telegrams exchanged with C. I. P. A. and reply of the German Government concerning the revictualling of Poland).

4°) *Repatriation of Russian Prisoners of War.*

Clause 4 of the Convention of Armistice of January 16 is not executed.

(See Annex IV, telegram from General Nudant.)

5°) *Violation of Naval Conditions of Armistice.*

The Germans have failed in the following respects to comply with the terms of Armistice concluded at Trèves on 16 January, 1919:—

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[4] Abbreviation for "Commission Interalliée Permanente d'Armistice" (Interallied Permanent Armistice Commission).

(*a*) The Germans refuse to provide crews for twenty submarines, as they say the vessels are not in commission. They state that they refused to provide crews for these submarines at Trèves on 16 January, 1919. P. A. N. A. C.[5] states that the German refusal regarding these crews was not accepted and that the Germans signed an engagement to the effect that they would provide crews.

(*b*) The Germans have commenced to break up several submarines instead of surrendering them in accordance with the terms of the Armistice. The Inspection Sub-Commission are now in Germany investigating this question, and so far as the investigation has proceeded it appears that 15 boats have had their engines removed.

(*c*) The Germans now say they have insufficient tugs to transfer 21 submarines from Germany to England by 17th February, 1919, although they signed an engagement to transfer the submarines by that date when at Trèves on 16 January, 1919.

(For further details, *vide* attached Annex V).

6°) *Questions relating to the surrender of the Mercantile Marine.*

While the German authorities have sought to reopen certain questions for discussion and have interpreted differently from ourselves certain possibly ambiguous phrases in the agreement, the Committee cannot say on the evidence now before them that the Germans have yet committed any act which can be construed as an infringement of their engagements under the Armistice. They have in fact handed over, or are about to hand over, a substantial amount both of freight and passenger tonnage.

7) *Financial Clauses.*

The German authorities, as set forth below, have not completely executed certain of their engagements under the Armistice, whether by reason of their practical difficulties or by wilful default.

(*a*) Whereas the German Government undertook under the Armistice to restore immediately all documents, cash and securities taken by them, they have in fact delivered so far only an insignificant quantity alleging by way of excuse that the political crisis at home and transport difficulties have rendered more rapid compliance impossible.

(*b*) Whereas under Article 1 of the Financial Protocol concluded in connection with the Armistice Renewal of December 13th, the German Government undertook not to grant authorisations for the export of securities and other valuables without the previous agreement of the Allies, such securities have in fact been allowed to leave Germany in certain cases. In justification of this the German Government plead that under the strict wording of the agreement they have done nothing contrary to it, in as much as they did not

[5] Abbreviation for "Permanent Allied Naval Armistice Commission."

agree to prohibit the export of securities and the mere refusal to grant authorisations in circumstances where the law requires no authorisation is naturally not equivalent to prohibition. This trick was protested against by the Allied Financial Representatives at the January Conference at Trèves and the German authorities then promised to submit revised proposals. These revised proposals have just been received but have not yet been examined.

(*c*) Under Article IV of the Financial Protocol of Trèves of the 13th December the German authorities undertook to examine in agreement with the Allies the question of what measures could be taken for the restoration with the least possible delay of Allied property which had been sequestered. These negotiations have not yet been initiated and the German authorities have declared that they propose to discuss at the same time the question of sequestered property, whether Allied or enemy, in invaded districts generally.

II. Means of Enforcing Compliance

As regards the means of enforcing compliance, the Committee has decided to submit separately to the Supreme War Council the conclusions of each sub-Committee, military and economic.

(A) CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE ECONOMIC SUB-COMMITTEE

The Committee, without expressing any opinion as to the desirability of those methods or their appropriateness to the acts to be remedied, find that the following are the methods open to the Allied and Associated Powers of putting pressure upon the German Authorities in order to compel them to fulfil their engagements under the Armistice and its renewals:—

1. *Economic Methods.*

(i) to withhold altogether pending compliance all supplies of food including those already promised.

(ii) to delay these supplies and proportion their rate of delivery to the rate at which the conditions so far infringed are complied with.

(iii) to permit the first consignments of food already promised, but to intimate that Germany cannot expect any further supplies unless and until she mends her behaviour.

(iv) to impose, subject to any engagements which may have been entered into with neutral governments, a strict and absolute blockade upon trade to and from Germany in the Baltic. But the Committee doubt if this last method would practically produce much effect upon Germany. There has been very little relaxation of the blockade since the Armistice, and to withdraw this small relaxation would

not make the blockade substantially stricter than it is at present as far as Germany is concerned, while it would produce considerable hardship on the neutrals.

While the Committee is of opinion that, assuming the conditions in Germany are as serious as some, but by no means all, observers think, very considerable and effective pressure could be exerted upon Germany by withholding supplies of food, they desire to point out that any proposal to take action on such lines requires careful consideration in conjunction with its possible reaction on the internal condition of Germany. The Committee is itself doubtful whether it would be prudent to make use of this weapon except in the event of clear, unmistakable and deliberate infringement of the armistice on points of substance and importance.

(B) CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE MILITARY SUB-COMMITTEE

The following measures are submitted for the decision of the Supreme War Council:—

(1) To impose at once upon Germany fixed conditions as regards a military and naval status, comprising,

(*a*) the limitation of personnel to a strength of 25 Infantry Divisions, of which

Admiral Benson Declares That He Is Opposed to the Inclusion in the Armistice of Clauses Dealing With the Limitation of Naval Forces

5 for the Eastern front
5 for the Western front
5 for the Southern front
10 in reserve in the interior of Germany
5 cavalry divisions.

(*b*) The limitation of armaments by land, by sea and in the air and, consequently, the putting out of action of war material in excess.

(*c*) The Control of these measures.

(*d*) The regulation of the situation in the East of Germany so as to assure the future destiny of Poland. With this object in view.

To demand of Germany the cessation of all hostile movements and to insist that both German and Polish forces should stop on either side of the line.

(Map to be produced showing above mentioned line).

The dissolution of the groups which have just been formed in the East against Poland and the limitation of the forces maintained in these regions and in Eastern Prussia to a strength of 5 divisions.

The hastening of the evacuation of Polish territory by German troops coming from the Ukraine, so that such evacuation shall be completed by the 1st. March.

To occupy and operate the base at Dantzig, and the railway Dantzig-Mlawa as well as the railway and the waterway Dantzig-Thorn (application of Article 16 of the Convention of the 11th. November.)

To transport to Poland the Polish Army in France.

If these measures are agreed to by the Allied and Associated Governments, the following clauses will be the substance of the Convention the acceptance of which will be demanded of Germany.

(The draft of this Convention will be printed separately).

If the Germans refuse to accept these conditions, the Allied plenipotentiaries will declare that negotiations are broken off, that the armistice is ended and that, in consequence on the following date . . . . . the Allies will reserve to themselves complete freedom of action.

The Allied and Associated Governments will then take the following measures.

(i) *Economic Measures.*

The blockade will be resumed with the greatest severity; therefore the measures which are now being carried out for the supply of food to Germany will cease.

(ii) *Military Measures.*

The Allied High Command will resume the unrestricted use of all its means of action.

The whole Committee decided at the conclusion of the meeting to add to their report the following declaration:—

"However, the members of the Committee desire to express this, their opinion: to obtain as rapidly as possible a final result and to put a stop to the difficulties which are constantly renewed by the Germans, the members of the Committee are of the opinion that Naval and Military terms of peace should be drawn up immediately by a Commission appointed for the purpose, and shall be imposed on the enemy."

ANNEX I

On the 12th January General Nudant reported bad faith shown by the German Armistice Commission regarding the repatriation of men of Alsace-Lorraine.

On the 16th January Marshal Foch sent General Dupont [6] a telegram telling him to organise the repatriation of men of Alsace-Lorraine with the *Kriegsministerium* and to exact the greatest diligence from the German Government.

On the 23rd January General Winterfeldt [7] declared that on the 8th January fresh instructions had been sent by the *Kriegsministerium* to the Army of the East and to the authorities in the interior, but that a reply had not yet been received.

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[6] Gen. Charles Joseph Dupont, chief of the French mission at Berlin for the repatriation of prisoners of war.

[7] Gen. H. K. A. Winterfeldt, member of the German Armistice Commission.

On the 27th January Marshal Foch asked General Nudant to obtain the repatriation of men of Alsace-Lorraine in Southern Russia, giving them priority in the repatriation scheme of German elements in that region.

On the 28th January General Dupont, replying to a question asked by General Desticker,[8] reported that, in spite of the demands sent twice a day by him to the *Kriegsministerium*, he could obtain no information about the men of Alsace-Lorraine to be repatriated, either in the armies of the East or in the interior. He shows that it is a case of flagrant bad faith on the part of the *Kriegministerium* in this matter and considers that only measures of coercion will obtain the looked for result; with this intent he proposes to retard the repatriation of the German prisoners of war.

On the 3rd February the German Commission rejected the proposal to repatriate the men of Alsace-Lorraine in Russia more rapidly than other German soldiers "as neither the means of transport nor the morale of the troops allowed of this being done."

On the 4th February, Marshal Foch insisted on his injunctions in this matter and declared that he would suppress the transports supplied for repatriation if satisfaction was not given.

ANNEX II

Cypher Telegram, General Nudant, President C. I. P. A., to Marshal Foch, Paris

No. 367/M SPA, 10 February, 1919, 1 p. m.
No. 544

The German Commission sent this morning a reply of Brockdorff-Rantzau to telegram No. 934 Guerre of the 2nd February.[9]

The Commission sent to Poland by the Associated Powers can only exercise its functions outside the limits of Germany as shown by the Convention of the Armistice. The German Government reserves to itself the formal rights of sovereignty within those limits. Germany is resolved to keep engagements made with the Poles according to Wilsonian principles, but will not tolerate such engagements being forced on them by German subjects of Polish origin.

The German Government reserves to itself the right of intervening in the case of Polish rebellions in Eastern Prussian provinces as long as all the Polish armed forces have not left territory actually

[8] Gen. Pierre Henri Desticker, Chief of Staff to Marshal Foch.
[9] For the content of this telegram, see appendix C to BC-25 (SWC-3), p. 924.

German. The ultimate nationality of these territories which Marshal Foch calls German Poland can only be settled at the treaty of Peace. Germany till then refuses to accept the injunctions of her adversaries on the subject of the attitude of her authorities in these territories.

Convention With the German General Command

A large number of German formations are now concentrated within the sector Goloby-Kovel-Pinsk-Brest-Litowsk-Wlodawa. In order to allow the German General Command to evacuate without hindrance these formations to Germany, a measure which will only be possible if the troops in the Ukraine Republic abstain from taking any action within the above sector against the Poles and also if the aforesaid sector does not fall in the course of evacuation into the hands of the Poles, the German General Command and the Command of the Republican troops of the Ukraine have agreed to sign the following Convention:—

(1) The German Command assures to the Authorities of the Assembly military control in this sector and engages itself not to allow the Poles to enter the said sector until the end of the evacuation and hands over to the authorities of the Ukraine the control and the use of the liberated territories as the German troops leave them.

(2) The operations of our troops against the Poles in the direction of Wladimir-Wolynsk-Sokal will proceed without opposition on the part of the Germans, moreover the right flank of our troops shall be made secure by the Germans according to the terms of the present Convention, in the sector occupied by them, against all attacks and surprises by the Poles.

(3) During the whole duration of the operations in the direction of Wladimir-Wolynsk-Sokal the right of using the railway lines Goloby-Kowel-Wladimir-Wolynsk for the purpose of transporting food and munitions of war is assured to the troops of the Ukraine.

(4) Free passage in the above mentioned territory as well as in the west of the Bug River is assured to the citizens of the Ukrainian Republic on the presentation of certificates issued by the Ukrainian authorities.

(5) The German and Ukrainian General Commands must from the 31st January issue orders in the sense of the aforesaid Convention.

(6) The present Convention does not deal with the future of the territory situated to the East of the River Bug which according to the terms of the Treaty signed at Brest-Litowsk on the 9th February 1918 belongs to the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Republic of the people. The present Convention bears the signature of the Command of the 21st Corps, General Gipseek, for the Germans and is countersigned by the chief of the military mission., Major Muhlheim.

ANNEX III

Telegram, Field Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies to General Nudant, President of the Permanent Inter-Allied Armistice Commission, Spa

No. 1740/C.R. G.Q.G.A., 20 January, 1919.

The Inter-Allied Supply Council is about to send to Dantzig the necessary provisions to remedy the present critical food situation in Poland. In accordance with Article 16 of the Armistice Convention of the 11th November, ask the President of the German Armistice Commission to make urgent representations to the German Government to assure the transport of at least 3,000 tons of food-stuffs daily from Dantzig to the Polish frontier.

The German Government must insure the absolute protection of this transport, the carrying out of which will be controlled by the Allied delegates.

Please report with as little delay as possible the measures taken by the German authorities.

WEYGAND

Telegram, General Nudant to Etat-Major Bacon

No. 496 From SPA, 27 January, 1919.

Reply to Telegram No. 3564/C.R.

(1) The German Government is ready in principle to allow food destined for Poland (of the Congress) to pass. But it seems doubtful whether the bad condition of the railways and the great shortage of rolling stock will permit of the flow of traffic without hindrance as far as the German-Polish frontier.

(2) Germany asks to be assured that the material supplied for the transport of these provisions shall be immediately returned.

(3) The German Commission reserves to itself the right of making other communications on this subject later on.

Telegram, Field Marshal Commander-in-Chief of Allied Armies (D.G.C.R.A.) to President C.I.P.A., Spa

No. 3790/C.R. G.Q.G.A., 31 January, 1919.

A continuation of telegram No. 3564/C.R. and in reply to telegram 496 of the 27th January.

First, the arrangements made by the German Government to allow the passage of food into Poland are noted.

Secondly, it is noted that the rolling material supplied by the Germans for the transport of these provisions shall be immediately returned.

P.O. The Director General of C.R.A.
PAYOT

Translation

Representative of the German Government to General Nudant, President of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission

In the full séance of the Armistice Commission at Spa on the 21st January 1919, General Nudant produced a note on the despatch of provisions to Poland in which the German Government was asked to ensure the transport of at least 3,000 tons of provision daily from Dantzig for the Polish frontier. Before the despatch of this note the representative of the Polish Minister had asked the management of the Dantzig railways to enter into negotiations with him on this subject. The management of the Dantzig railways refused to enter into negotiations, not having the power to do so; at the same time they accepted the request of the Polish Government. In consequence the despatch of at least 300 waggons and if possible of 500 waggons of food *per diem* had been contemplated (such food arriving at Dantzig on American ships) from Dantzig to the frontier station of Illowo and even from that station as far as the territory of Poland according to the agreement. This transport will be carried out by the Administration of the Prussian Railways. The Prussian Minister of Public works informed us of this request made by the Polish Minister of Communications. At the same time the Minister of Public Works is not without knowledge that owing to the difficulties of exploitation, resulting in the first place from the lack of means of exploitation and from the lack of coal, it was not possible to furnish the supplementary means for this transport unless the necessary locomotives and waggons were put at the disposal of the Prussian railways.

To say nothing of the difficulties regarding the transport it must also be mentioned that technically it is impossible, considering the trans-shipment installation at Dantzig and its port (quays, warehouses, stations etc.) and considering the present labour situation to trans-ship daily more than from 1000 to 1500 tons from the ships into the waggons. Even to reach this number special measures are necessary which have already been arranged for.

As daily discharge of 3000 tons would necessitate the use of 10 extra waggons and the existing organisation of the port does not allow of it, as Dantzig, a Baltic port, does not lend itself to the use of large Atlantic steamers drawing a great deal of water.

Consequent on the above and in compliance with the orders that I have received with the knowledge of the Allied Governments I am instructed also to make it known to the Allied Governments that the German Government cannot undertake the transport asked for by the Polish Government. Such transport would necessitate a superaddition of labour and means of exploitation and an expenditure of coal which in face of the existing extreme difficulties of exploitation could not be supplied.

The German Government therefore proposes that the Allies should agree that the locomotives and trucks required for this transport should be levied from the number of locomotives and trucks to be surrendered by the Germans, and should be kept for this purpose until a convenient date, a date which will be reached after the end of the carrying out of this transport.

Moreover it may be said that the Poles will not be able to give up locomotives. If there was no trans-shipment of transport at Illowo by the Poles, the German Government would be obliged, in view of the continual intervention by the Poles in the running of the German railways, above all by the retention of the material for exportation, to insist in addition that the Polish Government should supply Germany with a number of locomotives and trucks equal to the number of those entering Polish territory.

Considering the very difficult situation as regards coal in Germany the German Government wishes to state that it trusts the Allies will take into account in case this transport takes place the rise in the consumption of coal which will result from it, when the time comes to fix the extent of their demands in coal from Germany, and above all that they should authorise the transport of coal by sea from the North Sea Ports and from Stettin to the Baltic ports.

The German Government considers it understood that the expenses of transport, that is to say the cost of trans-shipment from the ships to the waggons based on local tariffs will be charged to the Allied Governments.

General Nudant has emphasised in the note mentioned at the beginning of this letter, the importance of the German Government guaranteeing the safety of this transport. Naturally the German Government will take the necessary measures to guarantee the transport from a military point of view, but I am instructed to make it known to the Allied Governments that the President of the Province of Eastern Prussia has expressed his fears that the population in this province in their excited state and suffering from hunger, will assume a hostile attitude in the case of food being transported and destined for Poland, and that it would not be possible to stop the people attacking the transports. The German Government therefore asks

the Allied Government[s] to consider whether it would not be possible simultaneously with the transport of food destined for Poland, to commence carrying out the transport of food for the German population, and particularly for Dantzig.

VON HANIEL

SPA, 1 February, 1919.

ANNEX IV

General Nudant to Marshal Foch 370/N

Telegram No. 480/P. G. 2 SENLIS, 11. 2. 19., 2: 30 p. m.

I have received a report from General Dupont of which I consider it necessary to give the substance:—

(1) The repatriation of Russian prisoners of war which the German Government promised to stop still continues by driblets. The greater part of these are enrolled in the Bolshevik Armies.
(2) The Polish repatriation which had been promised is still not being carried out.
(3) Russian Bolshevik agents circulate in Eastern Prussia and encruit [*recruit*] Russian prisoners of war on the spot.
(4) The Bolshevik campaign in Russian prisoners of war camps which General Ewart[10] tried to put a stop to, continues with a tacit agreement of the German authorities. A Russian Bolshevik Office working in Berlin which General Dupont had closed carries on a secret activity.
(5) There is no hostility between the Germans and the Bolsheviks. Numerous and reliable proofs show that these two parties are accomplices probably with a view to fighting the Poles.

All the information rests on certain proofs of which some have been brought to me by Commandant Penaucier proceeding from Berlin to Paris.

E. M. A.
2nd Bureau.

ANNEX V

German Submarines

A thorough inspection of the submarines in Germany was carried out in December by a Sub-Commission of the Allied Naval Armistice

[10] Maj. Gen. Sir Richard Ewart, Chief of the British Military Mission at Berlin; President, Inter-Allied Commission for Repatriation of Russian Prisoners of War, January–May, 1919.

Commission, and as a result the supplementary clause was inserted in the Agreement for prolongation of armistice on 16 January, 1919.

On 23 January, 1919 (one week later) Admiral Goette was directed to report by W/T details of the steps being taken to carry out Article XXII as amplified.

No reply having been received on 25 January, a minimum performance expected before a further renewal of the Armistice on 17 February was telegraphed to Germany. The demand and the German reply were:—

DEMAND

(1) 49 to be sent to Harwich forthwith, under their own power or to be towed.
3 Russians—special arrangements will be made.
Submarine dock and lifting vessels to be sent over unless required for taking to pieces submarines under construction.
(2) The hulls of not less than 50 of those under construction to be broken up.
(3) As regards remainder, all propelling and auxiliary machinery, motors, torpedo and mine tubes, periscopes, guns and mountings to be removed.

GERMAN REPLY

24 submarines have been disarmed; of these:—

21 will be escorted to England, but shortage of tugs prevents any guarantee that this can be completed by 17 February.
3 too far advanced in disarmament to be towed. Will be completely dismantled.
24

Others are accounted for as follows:—

24
1 in Norway—will probably be brought over on 1 February.
1 in Holland.
5 in Spain awaiting diplomatic negotiations.
10 late Mediterranean, transferred on 12 January.
3 late Mediterranean, with engine defects, will be towed over when tugs are available.
20 newly-built—no crews available—at disposal of A. N. A. C.
64

All remaining submarines in Germany will be disabled, and work is in progress.

Salvage vessels *Vulcan* and *Cyclops* cannot be transported during winter months. Floating docks for submarines are not arranged for oversea transport. Both salvage vessels and docks at disposal of A. N. A. C.

The proposal that the newly-built submarines should be taken to England by German seamen was refused at Trèves on 16th. January, 1919.

When above has been carried out Germany claims to have fulfilled terms of Armistice and supplementary conditions.

To this A. N. A. C. telegraphed further on 3 February:

At Trèves it was pointed out that the number which could proceed under own power or be towed was 64. Of these 16 have been surrendered, and the three Russians may be broken up, leaving 45 to be surrendered.

Germany is required to execute completely the amended Article XXII. without further discussion and to reassemble those submarines which have been wilfully rendered unfit for sea and tow them over.

Copy of Telegram to Afloat, Aberdeen, No. 926, Date 30.1.19.
Sent 1845.

926. Following intercepted from Admiral Goette to PANAC 1213 G. M. T. Reference your query timed 1220 of 23.1.19, the requirements of the Armistice Treaty and of the Trèves supplements thereto dated January 16 are being carried out as follows:

(1) Of 24 submarines, including submarine cruisers and mine layers, which have been disarmed, 21 will be escorted to a harbour to be named by you. No guarantee can be given that the ferrying over of these vessels can be carried out by February 17, as only a small number of suitable tugs (?) is at our disposal. Time and method of bringing over the individual groups will be reported. A special proposal is to follow regarding three submarines of this group which are as yet not ready for towage.

(2) *U. 757* (as received) will probably be brought over from Christiania Fjord on February 1st. Details will be reported. A special proposal follows concerning the giving up *U. B. 6* from Holland. As regards the giving up of the five submarines lying in Spain, the agreement of the Spanish Government has not yet reached us. From the German point of view there is nothing against their being handed over.

(3) Ten, formerly Mediterranean submarines, were brought over on January 12; apart from these, three submarines in an attempt to bring them over on January 12 developed engine room defects. These boats will be towed over as soon as tugs are available. Time will be reported.

(4) 20 newly built boats, which had not yet been put in commission, are lying in the stocks at your disposal.

(5) All remaining submarines lying in Germany including submarine cruisers and mine layers, will be disabled. Work is in progress. [The construction of the salvage vessels *Vulcan*] [11] and

[11] These words supplied from the copy of the text appearing in Miller, *My Diary*, VOL. XIV, p. 366.

Cyclops makes it impossible for them to be transported across the high seas during the winter months. The floating docks for submarines are not arranged for overseas transport. Both salvage vessels and submarine docks are at your disposal.

Copy of Telegram From Admiralty to Coastguard W/T Rosyth

Repeat C-in-C. G.F. Date 3 February 1919. Sent 1715.
From ANAC to C-in-C., H.S.F., for Admiral Goette.

Reference your 1213 of 30 January [12] and 1336 of 1 February,[13] the conditions upon which the Armistice was renewed at Trèves demanded the surrender of all submarines which could proceed to sea or be towed, and it was pointed out that this number was 64.

German protest was not accepted and the document was signed by the German delegates.

Of these 64, 16 have been surrendered, and the three Russian submarines may be broken up, leaving 45 to be surrendered.

You are required to completely execute the amended Article 22 of Armistice without further discussion, and to re-assemble those submarines which have been wilfully rendered unfit for sea, and to tow them over.

A report of the distinguishing numbers of the above 45 boats (see my message 1300 of 25 January) is to be furnished by W/T forthwith. You will report before midnight 6th/7th February whether you intend to comply with the above demand. If not, the Allies and United States will be informed accordingly.

(1715)

Copy of Telegram No. 955

To C-in-C., G. F. Date 1.2.19. Sent 1957

955. From Admiral Goette to PANAC. 1336 G. T. In clear German.

Your question concerning W/T 1220 of 23.1.19 is already answered by W/T 1213 of 28.1.19. On behalf of my Government I reply to your W/T 1300 of 25.1.19 as follows—

(1) My statement of 7.1 that your question of 2.1 concerning the delivery of submarines could not be replied to without more explanation has, up to now, been ignored. The German Government was compelled, therefore, to take the necessary measures for carrying

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[12] The German communication quoted in telegram No. 926, *supra*.
[13] The German communication quoted in telegram No. 955, *infra*.

out the new obligations, imposed at the meeting at Trèves on 16.1.19, with regard to Article 22 of the Armistice conditions, without your explanations. You have been informed of these measures by my W/T 1213 of 28.1.19.

(2) In the case of the three submarines mentioned in para. 1 of the above-named W/T, for which a special proposal was to be made, their disarmament has already advanced so far that it is impossible to fit them up again for towing purposes. They will be completely dismantled.

(3) All other measures, of which you were informed by W/T 1213 of 28.1.19, cannot possibly be cancelled and are being carried out. The complete dismantling of the ships which, according to the agreement at Trèves on the 16.1.19 were not to be handed over, is now proceeding rapidly. It is not proposed to restore such dismantled ships into a state in which they could steam or be towed.

(4) The proposal that the newly-built submarines should be taken across by German seamen was refused at Trèves on 16.1.19 in a written protest. As you have already been informed, there are twenty such submarines on the stocks and they are at your disposal. A list of them will be communicated to you.

(5) Time of departure of separate groups will be communicated to you.

(6) When the measures reported in W/T 1213 of 28.1.19 have been carried out, Germany will have fulfilled the obligations contained in the terms of the Armistice and the supplementary conditions. Confirmation is requested.

Dep. Note. I. D. 25 W/T 1213 of 28.1.19 should read W/T 1213 of 30.1.19.

I. D. 25

Copy.

From the Allied Naval Armistice Commission to the Secretary of the Admiralty

4 FEBRUARY 1919.

The attached messages which have passed between the Allied Naval Armistice Commission and the German Admiral Goette are forwarded for special perusal.

The Allied Naval Armistice Commission observes a distinct reluctance on the part of Germany to fulfil Art. XXII of the Terms of Armistice (*re* surrender of submarines). Also, they have been informed that the surrender of German merchant shipping is proceeding very slowly, if at all, in regard to the large and important passenger ships.

The Commission recommends that, before the Armistice is renewed (it has to be signed by p. m. 16 February), the Supreme War Council may be pleased to consider what penalty should be imposed for non-performance in regard to the two points mentioned in para. 2 above.

M. E. Browning,
Vice-Admiral.
A. Grasset,
Contre-Admiral.
S. S. Robinson,
Rear-Admiral.

Extract From Telegram, No. 153, of 5 February, From Admiralty, London, to Admiralty, Paris

The Board considered that there are no suitable naval penalties that can be applied to enforce compliance with armistice terms, and that any penalties applied must be of a military character, and that they should represent this to the Supreme War Council.

Copy of Telegram From Admiralty to C. G. W/T Rosyth and C-in-C., G.[F.]

23. 1. 19.

ANAC to C-in-C., German H.S.F. for Admiral Goette.

Report by W/T details steps that are now being taken to carry out Article XXII. of Terms of Armistice as amended on 16 January.

(1220)

Copy of Telegram

25. 1. 19.

884. From ANAC to C-in-C., H.S.F. for Admiral Goette.

Referring to my 1220 of 23 January, to which no reply has been received, the following minimum performance is expected before the Armistice is again renewed on 17 February.

Firstly, there is now a total of 49 submarines to be surrendered, which can proceed to sea under their own power or be towed (the disposal of the three Russian submarines at Kiel is under consideration). These 49 are to be sent to Harwich forthwith, the numbers in each batch sent over being reported. The submarine dock and lifting vessels are also to be sent over unless required for the taking to pieces of the hulls of submarines under construction, in which case they may be retained for a period which is to be reported.

Your attention is called to the fact that the Allied Naval Armistice Sub-Commissions report that some of the submarines in this category have been rendered unready for sea since the December inspection. These are to be reconditioned at once.

The 49 submarines mentioned above are as follows: Wilhelmshaven one U.C. Bremen Vulcan Yard two U, three U.B. Vegesack five U. Hamburg Blohm and Voss one U, ten U.C. Vulcan two U, two U.B. Cuxhaven one U.B. Heligoland two U.C. Kiel eight U, one U.B., three U.C. Germania Yard five U, three U.B.

Secondly, the hulls of not less than fifty submarines of those under construction either in the water or on the stocks are to be cut to pieces, those most advanced being selected.

Thirdly, as regards the remaining submarines, all propelling and auxiliary machinery, motors, torpedo tubes, mine tubes, periscopes, guns and mountings are to be removed.

Addressed Coastguard Wireless Rosyth.

Repeated to C-in-C., G.F. 884. (1300)

Non-compliance on the Part of Germany With the Terms of Armistice

NAVAL CLAUSES AFFECTING SUBMARINES

(*a*) *11 November, 1918.* (Original article).

XXII. The surrender at the ports specified by the Allies and the United States of all submarines at present in existence (including all submarine cruisers and minelayers), with armament and equipment complete. Those which cannot put to sea shall be denuded of crew and equipment, and shall remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States. Submarines ready to put to sea shall be prepared to leave German ports immediately on receipt of wireless order to sail to the port of surrender, the remainder to follow as early as possible. The conditions of this Article shall be completed within 14 days of the signing of the Armistice.

(*b*) *13 December, 1918.*

Breaches Committee

Naval Clauses.

XXII. Submarines *U. 80*, *U. 82*, and *U.B. 77* have still to be towed to Harwich. Five submarines in Spain, one in Norway, one in Holland, have still to be surrendered.

GERMANY'S REPLY

We do not yet know the reason for the non-internment of submarines *U. 80*, *U. 82*, and *U.B. 77*. Inquiries are being undertaken

with a view to their immediate surrender. With regard to the submarines interned in Spain, Norway, and Holland, Germany has no power to dispose of them. However, Germany will not put forward any protest on account of violation of neutrality if, on the demand of the Allies, the submarines interned in Spain, Norway and Holland, are surrendered to the Entente.

In no case can the fact that the vessels have not been surrendered be interpreted as an infringement of the Armistice conditions.

(*c*) *16 January, 1919.*

5. Naval Clauses.

Article XXII. of the Armistice Agreement of 11 November, 1918, shall be supplemented as follows:—

In order to ensure the execution of such clause, the German authorities shall be bound to carry out the following conditions, viz.,

All submarines capable of putting to sea or of being towed shall be handed over immediately and shall make for Allied ports. Such vessels shall include submarine cruisers, minelayers, relief ships and submarine docks. All submarines which cannot be surrendered shall be completely destroyed or dismantled under the supervision of the Allied Commissioners.

Submarine construction shall cease immediately, and all submarines in course of construction shall be destroyed or dismantled under the supervision of the Allied Commissioners.

Minutes of the Meeting of the Representatives of the Five Great Powers at 3 p. m., and of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council at 5 p. m., Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, February 12, 1919

Present

America, United States of	British Empire	France
President Wilson	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	M. Clemenceau
Mr. Lansing	The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.	M. Pichon
	Secretaries	
Mr. A. H. Frazier	Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K.C.B.	M. Dutasta
Mr. L. Harrison	Mr. H. Norman	M. Berthelot
		M. de Bearn

Italy	Japan
H.E. M. Orlando	Baron Makino
H.E. Baron Sonnino	H.E. M. Matsui
Secretaries	
Count Aldrovandi	
M. Bertele	

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	British Empire	France
Lieut. C. Burden	Capt. E. Abraham	Capt. A. Portier

Italy	Japan
Major A. Jones	M. Saburi

Also Present

America, United States of	British Empire	France
Gen. Tasker H. Bliss	Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, K.T.	M. Klotz
Admiral Benson	Maj. Gen. [*Lieut. Gen.?*] Sir Henry [*Herbert?*] Lawrence, K.C.B.	M. Loucheur
Maj. Gen. McAndrew	Maj. Gen. Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C.M.G.	M. Clementel
Lt. Comdr. Carter	Maj. Gen. Thwaites, C.B.	M. Leygues
Captain de Marenches	Rear Admiral Hope, C.B.	Marshal Foch
Mr. Hoover	Capt. Fuller, R.N.	Marshal Petain
Mr. Baruch		Gen. Weygand
Mr. Davis		Gen. Degoutte
Mr. McCormick		Gen. Belin
		Admiral de Bon
		Lt. de Vaisseau Odend'hal
		M. de Lasteyrie

ITALY	JAPAN
H.E. M. Crespi	Gen. Nara
H.E. Gen. Diaz	Col. Nagai
Gen. Cavallero	Capt. Fujioka
Admiral Grassi	Capt. de Vaisseau Nomura
	Capt. de Vaisseau Yamamoto

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux

1. M. CLEMENCEAU, in opening the Meeting, suggested that the discussion should be continued from the point at which it left off in the morning.[1]

Renewal of Armistice: Reduction of German forces

PRESIDENT WILSON said that after reflecting on the morning's proceedings he had come to the conclusion that the difference of opinion was reduced to one point. That point was one of great importance. Mr. Balfour had made the difficulty quite clear by saying that we should not delay until our forces were so reduced that we could not compel the Germans to accede to our demands. This was the point that he had himself sought to make clear. By reducing our forces month by month, and by renewing the armistice month by month, we might be led to a stage at which Germany could resist with some prospect of success. He wished to be sure the danger point was past before reducing the Allied forces to the extent mentioned in the morning. Should trouble arise, he would be quite willing to re-mobilise the American forces, but this might be difficult, and it would certainly be a lengthy process, as the troops would have scattered to their homes. The longer we dealt with the Germans on this plan, the longer their hopes would have to grow. This might lead them to a false sense of self-confidence, and the German Government's forces might consolidate in a way which it was not at present possible to forecast, and the ancient pride and boastfulness of Germany might gain a new lease of life. The point under discussion in the morning concerning which no agreement had been reached was the question whether the military terms of peace could be isolated from the other conditions of peace. Peace, it had been said, was one fabric with one pattern. The plan of general disarmament, which had been alluded to, seemed to render it difficult as a provisional measure to prejudge what should be the relative strengths of national forces. Disarmament contained two elements—(1) the maintenance of an adequate force for internal police; (2) the national contribution to the general force of the future League of Nations. At present we did not contemplate that Germany should make any contribution to the latter force. We need therefore not take that element into considera-

[1] See BC-29, *supra*.

tion. All we need contemplate was the amount of armed force required by Germany to maintain internal order and to keep down Bolshevism. This limit could be fixed by the military advisers. In general, he felt that until we knew what the German Government was going to be, and how the German people were going to behave, the world had a moral right to disarm Germany, and to subject her to a generation of thoughtfulness. He therefore thought it was possible to frame the terms of Germany's disarmament before settling the terms of peace. He was encouraged in this belief by the assurance that the military advisers could produce a plan in 48 hours. It might take more than 48 hours for the heads of Governments to agree on this plan. It was not his idea that the armistice should be protracted very much longer, but a definite term could not be fixed until the Governments had matured their judgment concerning the disarmament of Germany. Once this point was settled, the Germans could be given short notice to accede to our demands under pain of having the armistice broken. The main thing was to do this while our forces were so great that our will could not be resisted. The plan he proposed would make safety ante-date the peace. He thought that this brought the two views into accord as regards the purpose in the minds of both parties to the morning's debate.

Before concluding, he wished to draw M. Clemenceau's attention to a statement made by the papers that the French Government had stopped demobilisation.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this was not true.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the rumour was general throughout France, and some of his friends on their way to the front had found people much alarmed at the prospect of a renewal of the war. This feeling rendered people uneasy about re-starting their ordinary lives, and these rumours were very much to our disadvantage. He thought it important to put a stop to mischief of this kind. He was himself convinced that the rumours were unfounded but after all the world was full of accomplished liars, and he wished to spoil their game.

He regretted that he had not put his views in the morning in so complete a manner.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the purpose pursued by President Wilson was exactly the same as his own. He was therefore prepared to accept his proposal. Before doing so, however, he would like more precise information on certain points. We were to ask the experts to state as quickly as possible the conditions of the disarmament of Germany. The American experts, President Wilson had said, were ready. The French were also ready.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that the English were ready, too.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in these conditions their report could be obtained very soon. But the thought struck him that President Wilson was going away in a few days, and the date of his return was uncertain. Though the report of the experts might be received in a short time, he would not like to discuss a matter of such importance in the absence of President Wilson. Doubtless President Wilson would be away for a month. The delay therefore would be of considerable extent. There would be a further month of demobilisation, and a critical diminution of our forces. He was not discussing the question in principle, but only seeking a way out of the difficulty. At present the armistice was being renewed month by month, but the Allies had a right to break it at any moment after 48 hours' notice. There was not therefore a very great difference between the two systems, save that the one at present enforced was established for a slightly longer period. If the President had been staying, he would have raised no objection to the indeterminate prolongation of the armistice, but, as he was going, the difficulty arose, as he was quite unwilling to discuss the matter while President Wilson was away. He would therefore suggest that things should be left as they were, and that the armistice should be renewed as heretofore. This would not prevent us from giving a stern warning to the Germans at the next renewal that severer conditions would be made at the end of the month. This modification of President Wilson's proposal did not mean any disagreement. It was quite clear that the five Governments were united. In dealing with the Germans, we must be careful not only of the substance, but also of the form. The slightest appearance of hesitation would be immediately interpreted by them as a sign of weakness and an encouragement to make use of it. President Wilson's plan he again wished to repeat satisfied him completely. He only wished to get more precision as to the date.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that M. Clemenceau had paid him an undeserved compliment. In technical matters most of the brains he used were borrowed: the possessors of these brains were in Paris. He would, therefore, go away with an easy mind if he thought that his plan had been adopted in principle. He had complete confidence in the views of his military advisers. If the military experts were to certify a certain figure as furnishing a marginal safety, he would not differ from them. The only other question was to decide whether this was the right time to act. On this point, he was prepared to say yes. In another month's time, the attitude of Germany might be more uncompromising. If his plan were agreed on in principle, he would be prepared to go away and leave it to his colleagues to decide whether the programme drafted by the technical advisers was the right one. He did not wish his absence to stop so important,

essential and urgent work as the preparation of a preliminary peace. He hoped to return by the 13th or 15th March, allowing himself only a week in America. But he did not wish that, during his unavoidable absence, such questions as the territorial question and questions of compensation should be held up. He had asked Colonel House to take his place while he was away.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was completely satisfied.

M. PICHON asked whether it would not be possible to obtain the report of the experts before the departure of President Wilson.

LORD MILNER pointed out that the question had already been studied and the figure of 25 divisions had been laid down as the maximum Germany should maintain.

M. ORLANDO said that he was extremely glad of this agreement. He had felt that the difference was rather in the form than in the substance. It remained, however, to decide whether the Armistice should be renewed *sine die* or with a fixed term.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this question remained open.

M. ORLANDO said it must also be decided whether the Germans were to be given a warning that the reduction of their forces was to be imposed on them. He, himself, had asked Marshal Foch whether the reduction to 25 divisions corresponded to the maximum force which could safely be left to Germany as its final establishment. Marshal Foch had replied in the affirmative. Italy, before the war, had 25 divisions on a peace footing. Germany was a far larger country, and he was therefore inclined to think that 25 divisions must be the minimum required for internal order.

M. SONNINO asked whether there should not be in the Armistice a clause enabling the Allies to exercise some supervision over the disarmament required, and to force the Germans to accept an organisation of this kind.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the military experts appeared to have means of obtaining knowledge.

M. SONNINO said that Marshal Foch appeared to have doubt on this subject. We should be in a position to obtain week by week, or even day by day, knowledge of the measures taken by Germany to fulfil our demands.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that it might not be possible for the Governments to make a decision in 48 hours. For instance, the naval programme put up on the previous occasion contained some very "large orders." It would need very careful consideration. The Governments, therefore, could not be ready in time for the next renewal of the Armistice, but unless the Germans were told to be ready for something more drastic on the next occasion, they would think that the Allies were weakening. It would, therefore, he thought, be more

prudent to renew the Armistice indefinitely and say that final terms would be put forward at the next renewal. It might not be possible for the Governments to be ready in a month. He, therefore, advocated a renewal *sine die*, coupled with the warning suggested above. The Armistice would then be ended by the formulation of definite preliminary terms of peace on military conditions. The question of the Kiel Canal and the question of the cables, included in the naval report, would have to be dissociated from the purely naval conditions to be imposed at the close of the Armistice. These matters concerned the ultimate peace.

MR. BALFOUR said that, before lunch, he had circulated a series of resolutions which he thought might, perhaps, bring the discussion to a head and meet, perhaps, all the objections raised. Since listening to the discussion, he had re-drafted these resolutions and he proposed to read them, as amended, to the Meeting. Mr. Balfour then read the following:—

The Supreme War Council agree that:—

(1) As a condition of the renewal of the armistice Marshal Foch shall stipulate that the Germans shall desist from all offensive operations against the Poles, whether in Posen or elsewhere.

(2) The Armistice with Germany shall be renewed for a short period terminable by the Allied and Associated Powers at three days' notice.

(3) Detailed and final naval, military, and air conditions of the preliminaries of peace shall be drawn up at once by a Committee to be presided over by Marshal Foch and submitted for the approval of the Supreme War Council; these, when approved, will be presented for signature to the Germans, and the Germans shall be at once informed that this is the policy of the Associated Governments.

(4) After the signature of these preliminaries of peace, Germany will be permitted to receive such controlled quantities of food, and raw materials for the rehabilitation of her industry, as shall be deemed just, having regard to the prior claims of Allied countries, especially those on whose industries Germany had deliberately inflicted damage.

(5) The question of the quantities of food and raw material to be allowed to Germany after the signature of the preliminaries of peace shall be referred to the Economic Council for examination and report.

PRESIDENT WILSON questioned whether it would be good policy to forewarn the Germans at the next renewal of the Armistice of the intentions embodied in paragraphs (4) and (5).

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, for his part, he would be very unwilling to do so, as the Allies would seem to be offering the Germans an inducement.

MR. BALFOUR then suggested that only Clauses (1), (2) and (3) should be given to Marshal Foch for communication to the Ger-

mans; Clauses (4) & (5) could be accepted by the Governments as fixing their future policy when the military terms of a preliminary peace had been accepted by Germany.

(The above Clauses were then accepted, with the reservation that only Clauses (1), (2) and (3) should be communicated by Marshal Foch to the Germans.)

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the military advisers should be summoned and that these clauses should be communicated to them. He pointed out that it would not be sufficient to tell the Germans to reduce their forces to a fixed number of divisions. Napoleon had done this and the Prussians had passed the whole population through the formations allowed them. It was, therefore, essential that the military experts should lay down what was to be Germany's military law. It might, further, be necessary to control those operations by means of High Commissioners appointed by the Allies.

MR. BALFOUR added that a similar provision must be made concerning munitions.

(It was, therefore, decided that, after a short adjournment, the military experts should be summoned.)

2. MR. BALFOUR said that, before adjourning, he wished to draw the attention of the Meeting to two subjects, the first of which was the Commission arising out of M. Hymans' statement.[2] He had framed a draft resolution on this subject, which he proposed to read. Mr. Balfour then read the following:—

Commission on Belgian Territorial Claims

A. That an expert Commission, composed of two representatives each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, be appointed to consider and advise on the following questions arising out of the statement made at the Quai d'Orsay on February 11th., by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs on the claims of Belgium, namely:—

(1) The proposed transfer of the town and district of Malmedy to Belgium.

(2) The definite incorporation in Belgium of the town of Moresnet.

(3) The possible rectification in favour of Holland of the German-Dutch frontier on the lower Ems, as a compensation to Holland for meeting Belgian claims in regard to sovereignty over the mouth of the Scheldt and the southern part of Dutch Limburg.

B. That the question of securing for Belgium in times of peace the full rights and liberties which, according to the statement made at the Quai d'Orsay on February 11, by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, she claims in regard to:

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[2] At meeting of February 11; see BC-28, p. 957.

(*a*) the navigation and control of the waters of the Scheldt in its entire course.
(*b*) the Ghent-Terneuzen canal, and
(*c*) the communication by canals and railways between Antwerp and the Rhine and Meuse and Dutch Limburg

be referred to the Commission on the International Control of Ports, Waterways and Railways.

(This resolution was accepted without discussion.)

3. MR. BALFOUR, continuing, said that the second subject to which he wished to draw the attention of the Meeting was the method of dealing with reports sent by the Polish Commission. He proposed to institute a Committee of Experts representing the five Great Powers to follow the work of the Commission and to study the results obtained. This Committee would only send up to the Supreme Council big questions requiring their decision. If all the reports were separately sent to each of the Capitals, confusion would ensue. If all communications came direct to the Council, the Council would be overwhelmed by a quantity of unnecessary material. It was, therefore, desirable to have a Committee to sift this material, to answer the bulk of the correspondence and only refer when necessary to the Council.

Committee To Deal With Reports From Polish Commission

(The following resolution was then adopted:—

It is agreed that a Committee, composed of one representative each of the Governments of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan (?), be appointed to deal with all reports and requests for instructions from the Commission sent to Poland. On matters of high policy, the Committee will refer to the Conference of the Associated Powers.)

Notification of Names to the Secretary-General

4. It was further decided that the nominees of the various Governments should be certified to the Secretary-General as soon as possible.

(5) M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received a demand from the Poles that at the next renewal of the Armistice the Germans should be required to return agricultural implements stolen from the Poles. He felt that as a similar provision had been made in favour of the French and Belgian peasants, this request could not in fairness be refused.

Polish Demand for Return of Agricultural Implements

PRESIDENT WILSON said that, even at the risk of seeming hard-hearted, he thought it would be best not to undertake this. The Poles were technically on German territory. The Allies might have moral right on their side, but the Germans would have the law on theirs.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether it would not be possible to put pressure on the Germans outside the Armistice and say to them: "You cannot expect us to assist you as long as you keep goods stolen from our friends".

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that this should be referred to the Economic Council.

(6) M. CLEMENCEAU agreed to this provided the question of the return of French cattle should also be referred to that Council.

Return of French Cattle

(It was therefore decided that the question of the return of agricultural implements to the Poles, and the question of the return of French cattle should be referred to the Economic Council.

For recommendations on these subjects see Annexures "A" and "B").

(7) M. CLEMENCEAU said that there were now Civil Commissioners attached to Marshal Foch. He wished to know whether it was understood that these Civil Commissioners were not to meet the Germans independently. The war was not yet over, and he felt that only soldiers should have direct intercourse with the enemy. The Governments could give orders to Marshal Foch, but on technical questions it would be difficult to give orders to civilian experts.

Civil Commissioners Attached to Marshal Foch

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he would agree provided that it were well understood that Marshal Foch consulted the Civil Commissioners whenever economic questions arose.

(8) On M. Clemenceau's proposal it was agreed, without discussion, that the Allies should resume commercial relations with Turkey and Bulgaria.

Resumption of Commercial Relations With Turkey & Bulgaria

(The meeting then adjourned for a short time and was resumed on the entry of the military advisers.)

M. CLEMENCEAU read the first 3 clauses of the Resolution concerning the renewal of the Armistice.

(9) MARSHAL FOCH asked whether the first clause should not be made more definite. The expression "or elsewhere" made it difficult to put a stop to offensive operations by the Germans. They might, for instance, undertake movements not directly against the Poles, but in such a manner as to make the position held by the Poles untenable.

Line of Demarcation Between German & Polish Armies

Marshal Foch explained this with the help of a map.

(It was then agreed that Marshal Foch be authorised to settle a line of demarcation between the German and Polish Armies without prejudice to the future frontiers of Germany and Poland.)

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the Poles complained of German action against the civil population as well as against the armed forces.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this matter could not be settled by Marshal Foch and suggested that if further complaints arose the question should be reconsidered by the Council.

(This was agreed to.)

Period of Renewal of Armistice

(10) M. CLEMENCEAU explained the intentions of the Governments in connection with clause 2, and asked the military and naval experts to get to work immediately and to keep in close touch with himself.

(11) PRESIDENT WILSON proposed that the members of the Committee to advise on the disarmament of Germany should be named at once.

Nominees for Naval, Military & Air Committee

(It was decided that the Naval, Military and Air Advisers should sit together in one Committee, which should be composed, in addition to the Commanders-in-Chief, of three representatives from each of the Great Powers.)

The following nominees were then appointed:—

United States of America
General Bliss.
Admiral Benson.
General Mason N. Patrick.

British Empire
General Sir H. H. Wilson.
Admiral Wemyss.
General Sykes.
(Or their representatives)

France
General Degoutte.
Admiral de Bon.
General Duval.

Italy
General Cavallero.
Admiral Grassi.
(& a third to be nominated later)

Japan
(The Japanese delegates remain to be chosen.)

Instructions to Marshal Foch

(12) It was agreed that Marshal Foch should obtain from M. Clemenceau the text for the renewal of the Armistice, which should be presented to the Germans.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 13 February, 1919.

Annexure "A"

Demand of the Polish Government

I. Industrial and Agricultural Material

On January 16th 1919, the prolongation of Armistice up to February 17th 1919 was signed by Marshal Foch. In this agreement we find the following paragraph:—

"The machines, spare parts, industrial or agricultural tools, all kinds of accessories and, generally speaking, any industrial or agricultural implement, taken away, from the territories that had been occupied by the German armies on the Western Front, under any pretence, by the German military or civil authority, will be held at the disposal of the Allies in order to be returned to their original place".

It is essential that, for the next prolongation of Armistice, an absolutely similar article should be stipulated as regards Polish interests.

Instead of the words:

"On the Western Front"

should be written:

"On the territory of the Kingdom of Poland, created at the Congress of Vienna, as well as in the Governments of Grodno, Kowno, Wilno and Minsk".

At the end of the article, it would be desirable to stipulate:

"The material taken away will have to be sent to the Polish Government and to the places indicated by the latter".

Opinion of the Commission

After examination, the Commission have given out the following opinion:—

1. That the restitution of the material of which the Poles have been robbed by the Germans in violation of all principles of international right is, in the name of equity, fully justified.
2. That the insertion of a clause approving of this restitution in the forthcoming act of renewal of the armistice would, even if it were not carried into immediate execution, be a source of moral comfort to the Polish nation and a guarantee likely to encourage the efforts in view of the resumption of the economical activity and stay numerous Polish labourers out of work from the Bolshevist tendencies to which unemployment might incline them.

The Commission think it desirable that the proposal be inserted in the Armistice Act.

II. Rolling Stock

The Poland of the Congress possesses 11.000 freight cars instead of 34.000. Galicia 6.000 cars instead of 20.000.

To ensure the supplies of the country and enable it to start at least partially its industry, it would be necessary to ask from Germany for Poland at least 25.000 freight cars and a corresponding number of engines, in order to replace the rolling stock that Poland has been obliged to surrender.

ADVICE OF THE COMMISSION

Poland—Rolling Stock.

The Commission consider as fair, as Poland has been deprived of 40.000 cars, that at least 25.000 should be restored to her.

Financial Aid.

The financial aid which the Poles are asking for from the Entente Governments and the banking establishments comprises the sending of delegates authorised to arrange for a loan.

The Commission is in favour of waiting before they send these delegates till they have studied the situation at Warsaw and have made out the state of mind of the Polish Government.

Annexure "B"

RETURN OF FRENCH CATTLE

Paris . . . . . .

The President du Conseil, Ministre de la Guerre, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

I have the honor to inform you, in accord with the Ministers of Agriculture and of the Liberated Regions, that I deem it fitting in the next agreement concerning a renewal of the Armistice, for you to demand that the Germans take all steps toward handing over to us:

Domestic Animals

5,200 Horses:—

The enemy has taken 400,000 from the devastated regions, whereas he himself had 4,523,000 before the war. We thus claim only 1/77 of what was taken away from us, and 1/870 of what the enemy possessed in 1914.

204,000 Cattle:—

The enemy took 1,000,000 from us, and before the war he had 20,182,000. We thus claim only 1/5 of what was taken from us, and 1/10 of what the enemy possessed in 1914.

101,000 Sheep and goats:—

The enemy took 1,000,000 from us, and before the war he himself had 9,214,000. We thus claim only 1/10 of what he took away, and 1/91 of what he possessed in 1914.

345,000 Rabbits and poultry:—

The enemy took 10,000,000 from us. Before the war he had 77,103,000. 345,000 are asked for. We thus only ask for 1/29 of what he took away, and for 1/223 of what he possessed in 1914.

SEED

150,000	quintals	of spring oats.
25,000	"	of spring barley.
4,000	"	of beet-root for fodder.
4,000	"	of sugar beet.
1,000,000	"	of potato plants.
100,000	"	of gross-grained vegetable (peas, vetches etc.)
5,000	"	of garden seed.

The quantities of oats and barley above-given represent only 1/57 of the losses due to devastation, and 1/765 of the annual German production before the war (134,000,000 quintals).

As to potatoes, 1/11 of the losses are asked for, which is only 1/541 of the annual German production of before the war (541,000,000 quintals).

The Economic Commission will be empowered to fix the conditions of quality and delivery, as well as to apportion the figures stipulated above as to domestic animals according to species and age.

It will also determine the varieties and the quantities of each variety of seed and plants to be turned over.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, 13 February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Present

America, United States of	British Empire	France
President Wilson Mr. R. Lansing	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P. The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G.	M. Clemenceau M. Pichon
	Secretaries	
Mr. A. H. Frazier Mr. L. Harrison	Lt. Col. Sir. M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B. Mr. E. Phipps.	M. Dutasta M. Berthelot M. de Bearn

Italy	Japan
H. E. M. Orlando H. E. Baron Sonnino	H. E. M. Matsui
Secretaries	
Count Aldrovandi M. Bertele.	

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	British Empire	France
Col. U. S. Grant	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.	Capt. A. Portier

Italy	Japan
Major A. Jones	M. Saburi.

Also Present

America, United States of	British Empire	France
Dr. Westermann Mr. Shotwell	Maj. Gen. His Highness the Maharajah of Bikaner, G. C. V. O., etc. Major the Hon. W. Ormsby Gore Mr. A. J. Toynbee.	M. Coue Capt. Coulonge

Italy

M. Tosti
Major Mazzolini

Present during hearing of question (3) Dr. Bliss,
" " " " " (4) Dr. Bliss, M. Chekri Gamen, Chief representative of the Central Syrian Committee.[1]
Mardan Bey, Mussulman representative.
M. Chehade, Orthodox representative and an Israelite representative of the Committee.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

Appointing Members of Committees on Poland and on Belgium

1. M. CLEMENCEAU enquired whether the representatives of the Great Powers to form part of the Poland and Belgium Committees, respectively, had been appointed. The following names were communicated:—

(i) *Committee on Poland.*

Great Britain:	Sir W. Tyrrell.
France:	M. Jules Cambon.
Italy:	Count Vannutelli-Rey.
Japan:	M. Otchiai.

(ii) *Committee on Belgium.*

Great Britain:	Sir Eyre Crowe.
	Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley.
France:	M. Tardieu.
	M. Laroche.
Italy:	M. Ricci-Busatti.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he regretted that through an omission the American representatives to sit on these two Committees had not yet been chosen. But he would submit the names to the Secretariat-General during the course of the afternoon.[1a]

M. ORLANDO said that the name of the second representative to sit on the Belgian Committee would shortly be submitted.[2]

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[1] A correction issued on February 17, 1919, reads as follows:

For list of Members of the Syrian Commission substitute the following:—

M. Chekri Ganem	Chief Representative of the Central Syrian Committee.
M. Anis Schenade	Orthodox Greek.
Jamil Mardam Bey	Moslem.
Dr. Georges Samne	Greek Melchite.
Nejil Bey Maikarzel . . .	Maronite.
Dr. Tewfik Farhi	Hebrew.

[1a] Dr. Isaiah Bowman was appointed American representative to the Commission of Polish Affairs; Dr. Charles H. Haskins and Col. S. D. Embick were appointed American representatives to the Commission for Belgian and Danish Affairs.

[2] Count Vannutelli-Rey was named as the second Italian representative.

2. M. ORLANDO asked permission to make a statement in connection with the decision taken yesterday on the subject of the immediate disarmament of Germany. The import of that decision would be to anticipate the final disarmament of Germany, for it was not intended to renew the Armistice but to draw up and accept the military terms of the eventual peace treaty. The decision reached in regard to Germany raised the analogous question of Italy and Austria-Hungary, the question which was of particular importance to Italy. He quite realised that the two cases were not altogether analogous, especially as the old Austro-Hungarian Empire no longer existed and had been replaced by a number of nationalities, some friendly, and some hostile to the Allies. But, as a question of form, Italian public opinion might not passively accept the situation, which was open to the interpretation that on the Western front peace had been declared, whereas on the Italian front, a state of war still existed. He was anxious to prevent the spread of such an impression. He wished, therefore, to suggest that the Inter-Allied Military Commission, appointed to draw up the military terms of peace with Germany, should be instructed also to study the similar question as between Italy and Austria-Hungary. He did not suggest that the decision in regard to the German terms should in any way be altered or delayed; but he did ask that the Italian military advisors should be authorised to bring the question of the Austrian military terms before the Inter-Allied Military Commission.

Military Terms of Peace With Austria-Hungary

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that M. Orlando had made a reasonable and right request; the suggestion had already occurred to him and he gladly accepted M. Orlando's proposal.

(It was agreed:—

That the conditions of the Armistice with Austria-Hungary should be examined by the military Inter-Allied Committee, assembled under the Presidency of Marshal Foch, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme War Council, dated 12th February, 1919, with a view to determine what changes,[3] if any, were necessary in order to arrive at the final military terms of peace with Austria-Hungary, following the procedure adopted in the case of Germany.)

(At this stage Dr. Bliss[4] entered the Council Chamber).

3. M. CLEMENCEAU welcomed Dr. Bliss and called on him to make his statement.

Syria: Statement by Dr. Bliss

DR. BLISS then read the following statement:—

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[3] According to a correction issued later, the word "measures" should be substituted for the word "changes."

[4] Rev. Howard S. Bliss, President of the Syrian Protestant College, Beyrout, Syria.

"Mr. President, Gentlemen,

I shall not detain you long. My deep interest in the people of Syria, irrespective of race, creed or condition, bred from a long residence among them—in fact I was born on Mt. Lebanon—is my only excuse for detaining you at all.

First, a preliminary word as to the people themselves. They are intelligent, able, hospitable and lovable, but with the sure defects of a long oppressed race; timidity, love of flattery, indirectness. They also have the defects characteristic of people who are face to face with the results of civilisation without having passed through the processes of modern civilisation. They lack balance, they are easily discouraged, they lack political fairness, they do not easily recognise the limitations of their own rights. They must therefore be approached with sympathy, firmness and patience. They are capable of nobly responding to the right appeal. And they will grow into capacity for self-determination and independence.

My plea before this body on behalf of the people of Syria is this: that an Inter-Allied or a Neutral Commission, or a Mixed Commission, be sent at once to Syria in order to give an opportunity to the people of Syria—including the Lebanon—to express in a perfectly untrammelled way their political wishes and aspirations, viz: as to what form of Government they desire and as to what power, if any, should be their Mandatory Protecting Power.

My plan is based upon the ground that the 12th point of President Wilson's 14 points and the declarations made by France and Great Britain in November, 1918,[5] have committed the Allies and the United States to the granting of such an opportunity of self-expression to the people freed from the Turkish yoke to so express themselves. The declaration is as follows:—

'The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in waging in the East the war let loose upon the world by German ambition is to ensure the complete and final emancipation of all those peoples so long oppressed by Turks, and to establish national Governments and Administration which shall derive their authority from the initiative and free will of the peoples themselves. To realise this France and Great Britain are in agreement to encourage and assist the establishment of Native Governments in Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, as also in those territories for whose liberation they are striving and to recognise those Governments immediately they are effectively established. Far from wishing to impose on the peoples of these regions this or that institution they have no other care than to assure, by their support and practical aid, the normal working of such governments and administrations as the peoples shall themselves have adopted: to guarantee impartial and even justice for all, to facilitate the economic development of the

[5] Vol. II, p. 274.

country by arousing and encouraging local initiative, to foster the spread of education, to put an end to those factions too long exploited by Turkish policy—such is the part which the two Allied Governments have set themselves to play in liberated territories.'

I maintain that such an opportunity for self expression has not as yet been given. Up to the time I left Beirut, viz: January 9th, 1919, the stringency of the censorship of the Press and of the Post Office, the difficulty of holding public or private meetings for the discussion of political problems, and the great obstacles in travelling, had made it practically impossible for the people, suffering from centuries of intimidation, and now timid to a degree, to express their opinions with any sort of freedom. It is true that a Lebanese delegation has succeeded in reaching Paris and is here to-day. I know these gentlemen, several of whom are my pupils, but there are many other groups besides this particular delegation, including other groups from the Lebanon, who would have gladly been here to speak for themselves and others had they been as fortunate as this group in being able to organise themselves and to find the means of travelling hither.

The point is this. Up to January 9th (the date of my leaving) no notice of any arrangements had been published anywhere in Syria, so far as I know, looking to anything like a general poll of the people of Syria (always including the Lebanon) or even anything like an attempt had been made to secure a widespread knowledge of public sentiment. I did hear more or less of a list of names that was being made up attached to various petitions in favour of this or that programme, but although in a position to hear of any Official or thorough or systematic general plan to ascertain the wishes of the people, no such report came to my knowledge. Many interested citizens of Beirut and the Lebanon were never approached for the purpose of ascertaining their political desires.

I therefore plead that the above mentioned Commission should be sent out as soon as possible by the Peace Conference with ample powers given to them and of course with the wholehearted support granted to them by the French and British authorities now in Syria. The ascertaining of the desires of the people should proceed either without the presence of any foreign Power (and this is impracticable) or in the presence of both French and British Authorities under whom Syria has been living for the past four months.

The people are easily frightened and intimidated even where there is nothing to fear from any source; hence these precautions. The advantage of knowing what the people wish would be a boon to the power eventually becoming the Mandatory power as well as to the people of Syria. One word as to the work of the Commission. Their

task will not be an easy one. They must approach it, in my opinion, in the spirit of large sympathy, infinite patience, frankness and goodwill. In the hands of fair and openminded men, resourceful, shrewd and generous—men who can make clear their honest purpose to a timid but intelligent people—very valuable results can be secured. The result of this enquiry will be, I am convinced, the discovery of the desire for the erection of a state or states looking eventually to complete independence but at present seeking the guardianship of a Mandatory Power.

Both the state or states and the Mandatory Power should be under the control of the League of Nations. Unless in this state or states there should be an absolute separation between religion and the state, most serious results must inevitably arise. The Government on the one hand, religion on the other, can best pursue their majestic tasks apart. Surely Oriental if not general history is making that abundantly clear.

One word more. Unless the Mandatory Power working under the League of Nations approaches its great task in the spirit of lofty service, her splendid opportunity to lead an aspiring people to independence will be for ever lost. But once let the same superb spirit sustain her and the League of Nations as has animated the Allies and the United States in working together for the establishment of freedom in the world, the task, though difficult, will be accomplished."

M. Pichon asked whether Dr. Bliss' proposal applied to all the populations who had been living under Ottoman rule in the Ottoman Empire—in Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Armenia, or did these proposals apply only to Syria?

Dr. Bliss replied that he spoke only for Syria where he had been born, and where he had been living. He knew the conditions existing in that territory. He thought his remarks should apply also to other religions and to other populations; but as regards Syria he spoke from his own personal knowledge of the country.

Mr. Balfour said that M. Pichon had just referred to the case of other peoples who had been under Ottoman rule, and enquired from Dr. Bliss whether he would apply his system without qualification to Armenia also, although the Armenians were in a minority as compared with the Mussulmen, so that self-determination would probably not lead to an improvement in the conditions of the Armenian minority.

Dr. Bliss thought that the question must be examined in a large way. The Committee sent to these countries should not merely be a machine, adopting the same method everywhere in attempting to determine the wishes of the people. The Committee must use its

brains and develop some method which would do the largest justice to the various people concerned. But he wished to make his point perfectly clear that he merely spoke for Syria, because he lived there and knew what had been done there. On the other hand, he thought that the proposal should apply to all liberated areas.

MR. BALFOUR said that from the early part of Dr. Bliss' evidence, he gathered that the authorities in Syria had prevented the free use of the Posts, Telegraphs, and Communications. The authorities had also prevented all deputations, but one, from coming to Paris, and they had hampered the free communication of the wishes of the populations to the statesmen assembled at the Peace Conference. He enquired from Dr. Bliss whether he knew exactly by whom, and for what reasons, these limitations on free communications, had been imposed.

DR. BLISS replied that Syria was under military occupation and presumably a censorship was essential where military operations were being undertaken. The restriction[s] he had referred to were, therefore, necessary to safeguard the integrity of the military operations. But as a result the people had been hampered by the existence of these regulations. Regulations made for military reasons prevented anything like free interchange of political opinion, especially among the timid people of Syria. The application of the Censorship, especially in regard to Postal matter and Newspapers, combined with the difficulties placed in the way of public and private meetings were such as to render political life impossible. There were several Syrians living abroad in Egypt, France, North and South America, and in other parts, all of whom were devoted to Syria. These people had left Syria on account of the oppression of the Turks; but it was most desirable that there should be a free interchange of views between people in Syria and their sympathisers and fellow citizens abroad to enable them to formulate their desires. At the present moment that was prevented by the difficulties of travel and the Postal restrictions.

MR. BALFOUR enquired what, in Dr. Bliss' judgment, was the general character of the opinions, whose free expression had thus been prevented by military necessities.

DR. BLISS replied that he was unable to answer the question. The people had encountered great difficulties in reaching conclusions owing to the numerous restrictions imposed by the Military Authorities. The Syrians were very honest and childlike; they had suddenly found themselves in the presence of a new situation; and they wondered what they were going to get out of it. They felt the golden hour was passing away, never to return. They felt aggrieved that other nationalities had been more fortunate in being able to send

delegations to put their case before the Peace Conference; whereas, they themselves, rightly or wrongly felt that they had been hampered in giving expression to their wishes by the stringency of the censorship, the difficulty of holding public meetings and the great obstacles in travelling.

MR. BALFOUR enquired from Dr. Bliss whether, with his intimate knowledge of the population, he had been able to form any judgment as to what were their views.

DR. BLISS thought that his own personal impressions would probably not be of any great value. He would prefer to leave the question to be answered by the suggested Commission, who would carry out its enquiries on the spot.

LORD MILNER pointed out that the military censorship which apparently prevented this timid people from expressing their views was British. Were these views being suppressed because they might be unpleasant to the British?

DR. BLISS replied that the facts were that those—the bolder men among the people—who tried to express their opinions were not able to do so on account of the stringency of the censorship. Consequently, if a Commission were sent to Syria to ascertain the wishes of the people, it should pursue its work freed from the preventive force due to the censorship of press and post-office. He himself was present at that meeting simply to plead for a principle; the determination of the wishes of the people. He did not ask that his own word should be taken, or that of anybody else; but in view of the fact that no opportunity had yet been given to the people to express their views, he thought the only solution would be the appointment of an Inter-Allied Commission, whose duty it would be to find the true opinion of the people. Those who lived in Syria would gladly accept a Mandatory Power, feeling that they had thereby been given an opportunity; and they would honestly work with the Mandatory Power, whether French, American or British, in the best possible way, feeling confidence in the fact that the promise held out to the people to express themselves had been fulfilled. Otherwise, if the opportunity, which the people had a right to claim in view of President Wilson's 12th Point and the Franco-British Declaration of 1918, were not given, the probable outcome would be discontent, sullenness, resentment and even bloodshed.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that anybody reading the evidence given by Dr. Bliss would suppose that the British censorship had been exercised to prevent opinions unfavourable to Great Britain being expressed. If this was a correct interpretation of Dr. Bliss' statement an enquiry should be held. On the other hand, if the statement was incorrect, it should be contradicted.

DR. BLISS replied that the censorship of the papers published in Beirut was exercised by the French Military authorities, and he presumed that the censorship arrangements had been carried out by the local authorities with the approval of General Allenby. But the effect of the censorship was that the people did not feel that they had a free opportunity of expressing themselves and his plea was that something should be done to enable them to have that free opportunity.

LORD MILNER said that he still felt some uneasiness as to what had been said, especially as a matter of national honour was involved. The impression left in his mind was that the British censorship was being used to suppress the expression of pro-French or other non-British sympathies.

DR. BLISS replied in the negative. The censorship was being used to suppress the expression of all opinions.

LORD MILNER agreed but insisted that the point was whether he, Dr. Bliss, thought the censorship had the effect of suppressing one opinion rather than another. Great Britain was, for the moment, the predominant military power in Syria and exercised the right of censorship. Did Dr. Bliss consider that the British Military Authority had used its powers in order to influence opinion in a special pro-British direction?

DR. BLISS replied that quite the contrary was the case. The existence of the censorship, however, made it difficult for the people to give proper expression to any views.

(Dr. Bliss having completed his evidence was invited to remain in the Council Chamber during the discussion of the Syrian question.)

(The Members of the Syrian Commission:—[6]

M. Chekri Gamen	Chief Representative of the Central Syrian Committee.
Mardan Bey	Mussulman Representative.
M. Chedade	Orthodox "

and

An Israelite Representative of the Committee then entered the Council Chamber.)

(4) M. CLEMENCEAU having introduced the members of the Syrian Commission to the Conference called upon M. Chekri Ganem to make his statement.

Claims of Syrian Commission to Syria

M. CHEKRI GANEM then read the following statement:—

(This statement will be issued separately.)[7]

(It was then agreed to adjourn the further hearing of the Syrian question to a later date.)

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[6] For correction issued on February 17, 1919, see footnote 1, p. 1014.

[7] This statement appears on p. 1024.

(5) PRESIDENT WILSON asked permission to make a statement on the question of women representation. He had recently received a visit from a group of ladies, representing the suffrage associations of the Allied countries who had assembled here in Paris, under the Chairmanship of Mrs. Fawcett of Great Britain. These ladies had brought him a resolution, and had asked him to bring it to the notice of the Conference. The resolution contained a proposal to the effect that a Conference of women should be appointed to consider the conditions of children and women throughout the world.[8] He sincerely desired to give effect to the views expressed by the representatives of the Suffrage Associations of the Allied countries. He wished, therefore, to enquire whether the Conference would agree to the appointment of a Commission consisting of one representative of each of the five Great Powers and four representatives of the Smaller Powers to report on the conditions and legislation concerning women and children throughout the world, and to determine whether any international regulations should be issued. This Commission to be entitled to invite the suffrage associations of the Allied countries to nominate some of its members to attend in an advisory and consultative capacity.

Conditions & Legislation Concerning Women and Children

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired whether the question could not be referred to the existing Inter-Allied Commission on International Labour Legislation.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that M. Clemenceau's proposal would hardly give satisfaction to the Suffrage Associations, as they asked for recognition. He did not wish to urge this against the opinion of the Conference, but in his judgment recognition should be given.

MAHARAJA BIKANER expressed the view that the question raised by President Wilson would present considerable difficulties in all oriental countries, for reasons which it would be unnecessary for him to explain at the present moment.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that the enquiry should be restricted to European countries and America.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had no objections to offer to an enquiry being carried out into the conditions of woman and child labour: but he would strongly object to any enquiry being held into the political status of women.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the women were chiefly interested in the latter question.

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[8] A correction of this portion of the minutes was issued later in which the preceding sentence was omitted and the following substituted:

> The resolution contained a proposal to the effect that a commission should be appointed by the Peace Congress to enquire into and report upon the international aspect of the position of women and children throughout the world.

MR. BALFOUR said he had long been in favour of women suffrage, but he felt considerable alarm at the thought that the Peace Conference should extend its activities to a consideration of that question.

BARON MAKINO remarked that there had been a suffrage movement in Japan, but it was insignificant.

BARON SONNINO pointed out that the Inter-Allied Commission on International Labour and [*sic*] Legislation had already enquired into matters relating to women and children, with the exception of the Suffrage question. He, personally, was in favour of women suffrage, but he did not think it would be good politics to take up this question at the present moment. He thought interference by the Peace Conference would hardly lead to good results.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he did not wish to press the matter unless there was a chance of obtaining practical unanimity. Under the circumstances, therefore, he would withdraw his proposal.

(President Wilson's proposal regarding women's position in the world was withdrawn.)

Report of League of Nations Commission

(6) PRESIDENT WILSON reported that the Committee to formulate plans for the League of Nations hoped to complete their labours that night. He wished to suggest, therefore, that a call be prepared for a Plenary Conference to be held tomorrow afternoon for the submission of the scheme and in order that full explanations might be given. The conclusions reached by the Commission would very quickly become generally known, and, therefore, in his opinion, the final draft should be placed at once before the Plenary Conference. He asked, therefore, that a notice be prepared for issue on the following morning, if the Commission's report were then found to be ready for submission to the Plenary Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired whether it was not intended that the report should, in the first place, be submitted for consideration to the Conference of the Great Powers. According to President Wilson's proposal the Plenary Conference would receive the report before it had been examined by the present meeting.

PRESIDENT WILSON replied that in the ordinary course of events the best plan would perhaps have been to circulate the Commission's report in the first place to the Conference of the Great Powers. He would point out, however, that the League of Nations Commission was not a Commission of the Conference of the Great Powers but of the Plenary Conference. Consequently, the first report ought, as a matter of fact, to go to the Plenary Conference. In accordance with his proposal the Plenary Conference would be asked to receive the report, and the Chairman of the Commission would then give the necessary explanations. That is to say, the report would be sub-

mitted by himself, and some of his colleagues on the Commission would subsequently give additional explanations.

MR. BALFOUR thought that it would be a great advantage if President Wilson could explain the scheme to the Plenary Conference before he left for the United States of America. He would do this as Chairman of the League of Nations Commission and not as a member of the Conference of the Great Powers. The members of the latter Conference would not be committed to the scheme in any way. He, therefore, saw no objection to President Wilson's proposal.

M. CLEMENCEAU understood the proposal to be that the report of the League of Nations Commission would be presented to the Plenary Conference by its chairman (President Wilson), who would give certain explanations, after which the Conference would adjourn.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that this was his proposal, though he did not quite know how other members of the Plenary Conference could be stopped from making speeches if they wished to do so. But in any case no decision would be taken.

(It was agreed that a Plenary Conference should, if possible, be held at 3:30 p. m. on the afternoon of Friday, 14th February, 1919,[9] in order to place before it the report of the League of Nations Commission. It was agreed that individual notices to this effect should be issued to each of the Delegates to the Peace Conference.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 14 February, 1919.

[*Statement by M. Chekri Ganem*]

MR. CHAIRMAN AND GENTLEMEN: I beg leave to present the credentials and papers of myself and my colleagues, Messieurs Anis Schéhadé, Orthodox Greek, of Beyrout; Jamil Mardam Bey, Moslem, of Damascus, who represented that town at the Arabian Congress at Paris in 1913, on which occasion he acted as Secretary and I as Vice-Chairman; Dr. Georges Samné, Greek Melchite of Damascus; Nejil Bey Maikarzel, Maronite, of the Lebanon; Dr. Tewfik Farhi, Hebrew of Damascus; all members of the Council of the Central Syrian Committee of which I have the honour to be Chairman, which is composed of Syrians of all religions and sect, and is duly authorised to represent the Syrian and Syrio-Lebanese Committees and Associations in the United States of America, Europe, Australia and Africa (including Egypt). In the name of those I represent, whose numbers may be estimated at over one million, I have the honour

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[9] For minutes of this Plenary Session, see p. 208.

to explain to your Excellencies the situation of Syria, whose fate lies with you to decide.

Of all the countries now in process of evolution (according to the expression of the President of the United States) and striving for the natural and admitted right of every individual and every nation to liberty, that country whose cause I am not come to plead before you, but whose situation and aspirations I wish to set forth, that country is the only one which is so fortunate as to have clearly defined frontiers—the Taurus, Sinai, the desert and the Mediterranean.

Its nationality is just as clearly defined as its frontiers. The race is as distinct as it could possibly be in this theatre of invasions.

Apart from language, the factors welding this nation into one are the soil on which it has sprung up, whence it has derived similarity of physical and moral form and been inspired by the same ideals; its traditions and customs; its common fate throughout the course of centuries; and, above all perhaps, its sufferings—for common suffering is the greatest bond of union.

Now there are few small nations who have suffered so much as the people of Syria, if one accepts the theory that the capacity for pain increases in proportion to moral development.

Gentlemen, one reads and hears it said that of all the problems submitted to your consideration, the Syrian problem is one of the most involved. This is doubtless a great honour: but one of which we are not jealous. For if the question were really what it is said to be, if it really constituted a problem, we should not dare to speak, so far would our responsibility exceed our powers. We hope that it appears to you as it does to us Syrians, not so much a problem as a question that can be decided almost as soon as asked.

We therefore think we may put the question quite simply, concisely, and in all confidence.

And what is it? The members of the Conference are asked to decide, conscientiously and after due consideration of the facts:—

(1) Whether Syria can be constituted, within its natural frontiers, into a democratic State distinct from the other Arabic-speaking countries.

(2) Whether that State can be left to itself from the time of its creation, or whether it will require the external support of a highly civilized Power.

(3) What should be the nature of such support, and by what Power should it be rendered?

If the first of these three points is decided in the affirmative, it will necessitate arriving at a decision on the others—namely, whether

Syria is entitled to a free existence, and whether you will grant it to her.

It would seem, however, that there are certain conditions which a country must fulfil before it can claim its right, which, although belonging to all alike, must nevertheless be subordinated to the higher general interests and limited by law, like the liberty of individual persons.

The first condition is the material and moral capacity of the country to exercise immediate or gradual independence.

The second condition is the geographically independent situation of the country—a question of easily definable and defensible frontiers, of harbours by which a country breathes and lives, and of agricultural districts and industrial centres capable of maintaining the trade of those ports.

Syria seems to fulfil these conditions, provided she receives the assistance that she will need at the outset to enable her to recover from the centuries of darkness and oppression which culminated during the present war.

Do you desire unimpeachable testimony as to her moral capacity? It may be found, apart from the evidence of fact, in the writings of an eminent British statesman, Lord Cromer, whose authority, derived from long residence in the East, nobody will deny. In his "Modern Egypt", Part 4, Chapter 36, he says:—

"Whether from a moral, social or intellectual point of view, the Syrian stands on a distinctly high level. He is rarely corrupt. There are many gradations of Syrian society. A high-class Syrian is an accomplished gentleman, whose manners and general behaviour admit of his being treated on a footing of perfect social equality by high-class Europeans. His intellectual level is also unquestionably high. He can do more than copy the European. He can understand why the European does what he does, and he is able to discuss with acuteness whether what is done is wisely or unwisely done. He is not by any means wanting in the logical faculty. It would, in a word, be wholly incorrect to say that he merely apes civilisation. It may be said with truth that he really is civilised."

That, gentlemen, is clear and it is conclusive. The high-class Syrian may perhaps be conceded a still finer attribute (which illustrates the correctness of the opinion formed by Lord Cromer), namely, that of recognising that the majority of his compatriots, having little experience of liberty, are not yet capable of exercising it without serious danger to themselves. He has not the courage born of ignorance. Not only does his ambition confine itself modestly within the frontiers which nature has assigned to his country, without attempting even the moral domination of his less-educated neighbours, but he is wise enough to distrust himself and seek a friendly

shoulder on which to lean, and a guide in the somewhat difficult paths of liberty.

Is this not a guarantee for the Allies and their associates? Is it not a more striking proof of his moral capacity than if he straightway declared himself capable of self-government and even (as in the recent case of a valiant and amiable neighbour) of governing others.

As regards the second condition—the frontiers are visible to everyone. They have been too clearly defined by nature to admit of any real discussion, still less of dispute. Nature has traced the contours and wisely fixed the limits of our land, and if she made Syria a small country, it was doubtless to make it all the better, and above all, that nobody should be tempted to diminish it. And then, does not the League of Nations believe that it ought also to afford some protection to the setting and the background within which the nations are evolving and whose image they reflect?

Syria is so harmonious in its form! Its members are in such perfect proportion to the body, and the head, which ought to govern the members, is so well set in its place! It surmounts the body and gives it the exact finish that it needs. In making Damascus, with its desert shield, the capital of Syria, history has obeyed the laws of that faultless logician, nature, whose will it is that everything should hold together and defend itself against destruction.

As to ports, those lungs of a country, we possess sufficient to ensure our existence. Here again, nature has favoured right proportions. With a few more, we should have breathed too freely; with a few less, we should have been stifled or our life would have been precarious. Under modern management our ports would soon attain prosperity, if the agricultural districts and industrial and commercial centres, rejoicing in a sense of security hitherto unknown, were to be interconnected by roads and railways, provided always that they formed an organic whole and contributed jointly to the common weal.

There remains one condition, that of nationality. It is certainly of primary importance, and if it has not been mentioned previously, it is because the question appears to us less open to discussion than any other.

Before the upheaval which has brought about the welcome change in the status of the nations of the East, anyone who had disputed this point would have been overwhelmed by the most vigorous and unanimous protests.

We hold fast to our nationality, as to our frontiers, in the hope that at a near or distant date they may form the framework of our liberated country.

We hold to it as one clings to anything which one has defended and guarded at the cost of the greatest suffering, and we hold to it

all the more tenaciously because this nationality—which has no official existence—brought upon us all kinds of insults in the countries into which we were forced to disperse. For everywhere, gentlemen, both in our own country and elsewhere, we were regarded as strangers.

Thus we remained Syrians in spite of everything and the sub-title of Ottoman, by which we were disguised in official documents, had the same effect upon us as the title of German upon an Alsatian, or that of Austrian upon the inhabitants of the Trentino or Trieste.

Moslems, Druses, Christians of all sects, Jews—we were all Syrians.

But, during the war, currents preceding the march of Arab contingents and fanned by the wings of the victories in Palestine, have induced certain elements in the interior to await their liberation from the new Malek. The result has been a revival of that religious feeling which had so long predominated in these quarters in the past, that it found in these tendencies new and unexpected fuel for a fresh outbreak. Use was made of this pretext to maintain (arguing from the unity of language and religion) that there was no distinction between Syrian nationality and that of the Arabs. These gratuitous assertions had already been answered by the celebrated Rector of Aberdeen University, Sir George Adam Smith, in a pamphlet published last year, entitled "Syria and the Holy Land", in which he asserts insistently in several parts of the work that the Syrians are not Arabs. This intentional confusion is most regrettable and dangerous, for it threatens to revive amongst us the rift created by the Turks, fostered by rivalries under foreign influence, and which we had the right to hope had been bridged, not only by the corpses of the Syrians who were executed, and the four or five hundred thousand who died of famine and want, but by the union we had founded, and by that of the Powers who, having once been rivals, had now become friends and allies.

But we think that this foreign accretion of Arab nationalism, into which it is wished to merge the Syrian—this new factor of a solely religious character which we refuse to believe inspired or suggested—will disappear if matters are replaced in their logical order. And if the cause disappears, the effect will also vanish. For artifice cannot resist nature, and if light accentuates colours it also abolishes shades.

Unity of language—unity of religion? If the former were to determine nationality, that, Gentlemen, would carry us much too far. The new and old worlds would have to be re-divided, and one-third of Switzerland and half of Belgium joined to France. And if unity of belief had to be taken into consideration, you would have to undertake a new distribution of nations and create religious States with Popes in place of Kings and Councils in place of republican and

democratic Governments. No: neither unity of language nor unity of religion constitutes nationality, especially where a triple barrier, such as that existing between Arabia and Syria, separates two countries and two nations. A desert which places Damacus at least 1500 kilometres from Mecca forms the geographical barrier; the social barrier consists of different traditions, habits and customs; whilst education, teaching and culture form the moral barrier.

What affinities exist between the native of the Hedjaz and the Syrian, the nomad and the settler on the soil? and, apart from a similarity of language (more apparent than real) imposed by the first conquests, what reasons can be adduced for annexing, even by ties of nominal suzerainty, an educated people to a race less advanced, if one may say so, in the ways of civilisation, or a people of enlightened progress, open to every conception of liberty, to a race rooted to its primitive organisation; or even for giving the latter supremacy by installing Emirs in Syria—at Damascus and Aleppo—who would be feudatories of the King of the Hedjaz, Shereef of Mecca?

Is there any such preponderance of Arab elements in Syria as might explain or justify this idea? If there are, or have ever been any Arab infiltrations, these racial elements are quickly absorbed. They become so completely Syrianised that the only Arab domination since the conquest in 635 A. D. hardly lasted, as such, 22 years—that is to say one generation.

Mon'Aouia, Governor of Damascus, when proclaimed Kaliph founded a definitely Syrian dynasty, entered into conflict with Mecca, and crushed for ever even the religious hegemony of the Hedjaz. And when history shows that throughout the centuries and under every successive domination, Damascus always strove to place herself at the head of an independent Syrian Kingdom, it proves the identification of that town with Syria and also illustrates, by a striking and decisive example, the inviolability of Hedjaz rule in our country.

To annex Syria to Arabia would be to do violence to the very soil from which the race and its history have sprung. To annex Damascus to Arabia, with or without Aleppo, would, if we may say so, be a grave political error, involving (and this would be for us a direct and mortal wound) the mutilation of our country, the unity of which has never been denied in spite of all the vicissitudes of its sad history. And, in order to benefit interests which might be satisfied elsewhere, destruction would be brought upon the harmonious whole to which we have already referred, the beauty of which consists in its general aspect and in which the race, by assimilating successive invasions, has acquired a uniform and homogeneous character and a peculiar degree of intellectuality.

Gentlemen, other considerations of a political and moral nature, outweighing the sacrifices of our country (whose long martyrdom nevertheless deserves a better fate) are worthy of your attention. We have already alluded to them; allow us to refer to them once more.

It cannot have escaped your notice, although you may only have observed from afar the recent development of events in the East, that if an inconsiderable proportion of our Moslem population has accepted with some favour the principle of a Hedjaz Government, it has done so because it has been led to see in it the first foundations of a great Moslem (not Arabian) Empire, with the Hedjaz dynasty at the head. The separatist movement which developed in Syria in 1912 rallied Syrians of every faith around the principle of a modern Government, which would respect religions whilst not imposing itself in their name, but the events of 1918 led certain elements to desert the cause which they had so lately served.

The religious movement, profoundly felt among the invaders, but vaguely realised by the ignorant and oppressed invaded people, and repudiated on the spot by the more enlightened high-class Syrian Molsems, is nevertheless a movement which must be watched, unless we wish to see the revival of limitless hopes which, although and because they can never be realised, would create an agitation prejudicial not only to others, but to the Moslems themselves. There is no doubt that already, in certain quarters, eyes are turned in that direction and elsewhere, looking for a further extension of the Empire of Islam, towards Africa and towards India. If too much liberty is allowed to individuals or to little groups far from the centre of power, some policies recoil upon themselves and cause irreparable reaction.

Should we speak thus if it were likely that this movement might encourage progress and benefit humanity at large? Accustomed as we are to sacrifice, we should wrap ourselves in a cloak of silence explained and vouched for by our faith in the march of humanity towards the maximum of liberty and of light.

But history is there to teach us what may be expected from any kind of theocratic Government, founded on the confusion of civil and religious power.

Alas, we have not to look far back to find the story of Turkish rule and European interventions to protect minorities written in a series of capitulations, wars and protectorates. "The history of tomorrow will not differ from that of yesterday", writes an European with regard to Eastern affairs; and the Moslems of Damascus say the same thing. No, it will not differ, however strong in character and liberal-minded the heads of the régime may be. In fact, it is not a question of men, but of principles and dogmas. It is for the

Powers to say whether they wish, by pursuing in our country and that of the Arabs, the clerical policy which they prohibit in their own, and which is feared by the great mass of our people, to create afresh that old division between members of the same nation and inaugurate in the East, and perhaps elsewhere, an era of agitation, unrest, and irredentism, which sooner or later will force them again to intervene.

Syria having once been constituted a State with integrity of territory and national unity, will it be possible to leave it to itself from the outset, or will it require the support of a highly civilised foreign Power.

Gentlemen, there is not a single sincere and educated Syrian, in Syria itself or abroad, who has not already replied to the second part of this question in the affirmative. The contrary has only been maintained by a few reactionaries or by some mistaken youths, under the somewhat Bolshevist formula improvised by the Secretary of a foreign delegation, (whose august Chief and Prince—already calls us his people) of:—

"Let us massacre one another, so long as we are free. It is only by killing each other that we shall attain total independence."

We ourselves consider that there are other and less extreme means of educating a nation and that the massacres and anarchy which one might almost say are hoped for, would only result in the ruin of our country and, finally, in the subjection of the weakest, or our seizure by a watchful and enterprising neighbour.

Our apprenticeship has been hard—who denies it? The number of various religions that we profess, in each of which the disintegrating action of our oppressors has led its adherents to band together by nationalities, still engenders among the people mistrust, rivalries and dissension, all of which hinder our political unity. Even our national unity would have no chance of existing for any length of time unless under a most tactful government, respecting local autonomies. At every point when the nature of the country favoured defence against the invader, small groups, which have entirely escaped Turkish domination, have been formed. The largest is that of Mount Lebanon, which has assumed the official form of an autonomous government. The Druse Mountain and the country of the Ansariehs, although not enjoying the same privileges, are of a similar type and really possess independence in practice. The existence of these groups, far from being an obstacle to the establishment and working of a democratic government composed of autonomous provinces, would seem, on the contrary, likely to facilitate them. It carries with it solid guarantees for the future, for it con-

firms the vitality of the Syrian nation, the elements of which have been able victoriously to resist the policy of disintegration pursued by its masters. The policy of the Ottoman Government has always, sometimes with success, been to set these groups one against the other, so that they might be mutually weakened. It has never succeeded in stifling those national virtues which it is left to friendly hands to free and to unite.

We also need to be armed for the economic contest. We lack the capital, the experts, the agricultural and industrial machinery and implements, which are necessary for the development of the resources of our country. Freed from the servitude of a thousand years, we must have recourse to a protective guardianship to complete our national unity, to achieve our political education, and to reconstitute a country worthy of the Powers that honour us with their trust and, above all, worthy of the special Power that will have lent us its generous support.

For, having broken our bonds, would you refuse us the support we need for our first steps? You would not raise us up only to leave us to stumble in the wreck of our fetters?

Gentlemen, both our interests and our reason lead us to admit that we shall need foreign collaboration.

We require no other proofs than the documents, telegrams, letters, resolutions and petitions, which we now produce,[10] and the perusal of which will enlighten you as to the general opinion in Syria on this subject.

What must be the nature of this support and by whom will it be rendered?

International collaboration has been mentioned. The idea may have been discarded, in which case we should applaud the decision. Past examples are certainly not such as to persuade us to choose this course. Not to mention Crete, Tangiers, or Albania, take the experiment made in the Lebanon itself during the last half century. It has been only too conclusive. Even when reduced to a "lesser evil", as in the Lebanon, this multiple protectorate resulted in conflicts of influence, dividing the population of the over-protected country into as many parties as there were protectorates, thus lowering the moral level and enfeebling the collective energy of the people. If applied to Syria, this régime would have the same disastrous consequences, in a greater and more serious degree.

Duality of influence, even more than multiplicity of supporters, must be avoided in our case, both from humanitarian motives and in the interests of the Powers themselves. It would aggravate dis-

[10] The documents referred to do not accompany the minutes.

sensions which would but acquire more bitterness by definition, and, by preventing our country from working out its own destiny, would create that moral disintegration which precedes territorial dismemberment. In that case, it would be better to proceed with the latter at once, gentlemen, by admitting the claims of the Hedjaz and allowing its representative the right (now somewhat extensively exerted under your eyes) of treating Syria as a conquered country and committing acts of sovereignty there, a sovereignty which appears to be somewhat premature.

Is there any need to remind you, gentlemen, that the Hedjaz was but yesterday a Turkish province, whose deputy to the Parliament at Constantinople was this very Emir Feysul, and that it has already found in its independence the reward for its efforts in the war? What right, then, can he claim to play the part of master in our country? In fact, he dismisses and appoints officials, chosen with a view to making people believe he is acting under high and powerful inspiration. (He even tried at first to nominate the very Governor of the Lebanon). His soldiers attack and plunder villages, and carry away hostages as at Kaoubaba. He hoists the Hedjaz flag everywhere, counting upon its effect on the ignorant classes of the people. And he, the representative of the Hedjaz, presents himself everywhere as the mouthpiece of all those who speak Arabic, in Asia and perhaps elsewhere. He says, in the name of Syria,

"We are ready to pay for European support in cash. We cannot sacrifice in exchange for it any part of the liberty we have just gained for ourselves by force of arms."

Gentlemen, by sanctioning this state of affairs, by giving the little Arab contingent which entered Damascus the rights of the conquerors of old, by giving his flag an exaggerated importance (which might increase his prestige among the uneducated, but would rank him with the brigand bands, and we would state roundly that in our eyes he deserves better than that), by doing this, will you have solved this question in accordance with your principles?

The truth—the whole truth—is your due. And, knowing that we should speak to you face to face, we have thought it well to have recourse to none of the vain subtleties or other means by which one lowers oneself without honouring those who are addressed. The truth, moreover, cannot offend any of the Powers who are our arbitrators and our judges. The truth sheds light and you do not fear the light. You have become one single family through the blood shed in common, which sometimes creates closer ties than those of relationship itself. Gentlemen, you have brought in your train and helped to spread in Syria a ferment of discord, a crop of intes-

tine divisions and possibly of conflicts in your own family. There is still time to stop its progress through a country which has been too much tried, too much reduced to throw it off as stronger constitutions might have done.

You will not allow the question to be solved in this manner, even temporarily, nor permit us to be torn between three influences, the smallest of which is the most active and threatens, by its attitude, to compromise the greatest, most respected and most admired of the three. We have owed so much to the latter during the last few months, and we expect so much of it, sure of its loyalty, its high disinterestedness and the spirit of humanity and justice by which its government is imbued.

What we need, Gentlemen, in order that the hateful heritage Turkey has bequeathed us may disappear with its yoke, is that the territory of Syria may be placed integrally beneath the moral aegis of a single Power. Our national unit and our future depend on that unity of influence.

Is it necessary to consult the people?

It is hardly likely that, in the state of chaos following the upheaval which has broken the bonds of the people of the East, a reference of this kind would at present give conclusive results. It would in part be falsified by factors which you now know to be foreign to the true interests of the country, such as the religious exaltation of a section of the Moslem population (which unfortunately, has received a fresh impetus); the reaction of the Christian element; the partly Moslem military occupation of a country which by long custom is inclined to bow before the conqueror, even though he belongs to a notoriously inferior race.

It would be more reasonable that the Powers, in their wisdom, should appoint that one among them which appears specially qualified to carry out the noble mission of helping a small country to lift itself up and of accustoming the eyes of its inhabitants to the bright light of liberty.

Valuable aid may be obtained in arriving at this choice:—

(1) by considering that if the people had been consulted before the war, the name of one of the Powers now assembled would have received the immense majority of the votes, or even have been adopted unanimously;

(2) by referring to the documents which we have just had the honour to lay before you.

Even if the opinion of my colleagues and myself had differed from that of our mandatories, we should still have considered it our duty to execute our clear mission, which is to request your Excellencies,

in the terms of the documents submitted [11] that France may be charged with the reconstitution of an integral, independent, federated Syria.

We concur in the addition made by many groups (those of the Syrians in Egypt, for instance), namely:—A Syria completely separated from Arabia proper, and provided with a national Syrian constitutional and democratic Government, the constitutional head of which shall be vested with no religious character.

Is there any need to give the reasons for our choice and to state the claims of France to our confidence and our friendship?

It seems to us that this would be superfluous. The century-old traditions that unite our two nations, the affinities of temperament and culture which find eloquent testimony in that diffusion of the French language which has made it our second mother tongue—these are matters of common knowledge.

Apart from the American University of Beyrout, to which we owe a great number of our élite and which is entitled to very special gratitude on our part (of which we beg to assure it, and will prove should we become our own masters)—it is the French schools from which we have received our education and which have taught us to realise our own powers.

The absence of any Imperialist party in France, her relative proximity to our country, incline us to her with the more fervour. We know that France understands how to confine her activity to that of a guide or arbitrator.

She, alone, in our opinion, is competent to obtain the whole effect for which we hope. At the same time, as a Moslem Power numbering 20 to 25 millions of Moslems amongst her subjects, and as age-long protectress of the Christians of the East, she brings both Moslems and Christians the guarantee of impartiality afforded not only by her ideals of liberty and justice, but by her own position. She will be a guide speaking a language we understand, who will unite us in order to lead us towards our common destiny. She will be the arbiter before whom all mistrust will vanish and all conflict cease.

This statement, Gentlemen, draws to its close. It is for you to say whether Syria shall become an actuality. The soul of Syria exists. It depends on you whether the body which it is to animate shall be whole and vigorous.

Whatever may be the interests at work around her, you would not wish them to weigh in the scales of your justice and so heavily as her own. Have not all the Powers adopted the principle laid down by President Wilson?

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[11] The documents referred to do not accompany the minutes.

It remains to know whether France will accept this charge.

Yes, without doubt, if we invoke her traditions and when we recall not only her ancient declarations and promises, but those made more recently by M. Raymond Poincaré in 1912, when, as Prime Minister, he declared that:—"I need not say that in Syria and the Lebanon we have traditional interests which we intend shall be respected. The English Government has formally declared to us that it has no intentions or designs or political aspirations of any kind in those regions. We shall abandon none of our traditions, we shall forfeit none of the goodwill we have acquired there."

A few days later, Sir Edward Grey, then British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated in the House of Commons that he recognised the special interests of France in Syria. Then followed the declarations of M. George Leygues, Minister of Marine, M. Stephen Pichon and M. Georges Clemenceau, who connects the ancient royal France, the France of the Revolution and the Empire, to the Republican France of to-day, and who has told us that his Government intends to assure the future of Syria by its own efforts.

Such formal assurances, not to say engagements, ought to set our minds at rest. But, remembering the French policy, and having witnessed the prodigious effort made by that admirable country during the war, and the simplicity, the modesty with which she has accomplished her task, we are apprehensive lest she may show in the peace negotiations what I may call the bashfulness of her heroism in the war, and fail to use not only her sympathy, but the weight of her authority and her persuasive eloquence with her Allies in defending our little Syria from the dismemberment which menace[s] its territory, its posts, its towns in certain provinces, and from decapitation.

And if, to our misfortune, by reason of interests which may doubtless be superior, it were decided—contrary to the hopes we have placed in you all—that our country should be dismembered and handed over in part to a juvenescent neighbouring State, which, since it has been a belligerent, intends to exact the price of its belligerency from a people which thought itself protected by the rights of nations—then what shall we say, what can we do?

We are a very small nation; very weak, much tried, very unfortunate. Will our extreme weakness be our strength in your eyes? Syria will evidently be what you wish it to become. We have not four divisions in the line, not the smallest weapon in our hands. And even if we had any, the gratitude we owe you would prevent our wielding it.

But our swordless hand will point you to our dead, who, though not fallen in battle, are none the less victims of this war and of your enemies.

We have not had a hundred thousand combatants, but we can number nearly four hundred thousand dead. We have not occupied towns nor cut railways, but many among us, unknown heroes, simple and retiring like their comrades in the Legion, have fallen for the same cause as your soldiers in the Dardanelles, in Macedonia and on the Western Front. In all the Allied countries, our compatriots have enlisted in the American, Australian, Canadian, English or French ranks, thus asserting their nationality. In certain countries like Brazil, they have even formed small Legions, which have fought under your banners.

Should we have no other claim than that of a people long subject to oppression, you would still owe us justice.

But if your desire is, in any case, to help in creating a Moslem Empire, the world is vast, and there are even territories of unheard of richness which adjoin the Hedjaz and extend to the Sea. They no longer have their old rulers, and are inhabited for the most part by Moslems and Bedouins. Once more, the world is vast, and routes can be carved out towards the farthest ends of the earth and ports be secured, without necessarily reducing our country, which in itself is so small and so modestly enclosed within its frontiers.

What is it that we ask? Nothing but to be allowed to stay at home. And if we have been asked for nothing, it is because others were ready to take everything, or nearly everything, from us. With what right? Are we to be constrained to believe in the right of the strongest?

May we say one word as regards Palestine—although the subject is said to be a thorny one?

Palestine is incontestably the Southern portion of our country. The Zionists claim it. We have suffered too much from sufferings resembling theirs, not to throw open wide to them the doors of Palestine. All those among them who are oppressed in certain retrograde countries are welcome. Let them settle in Palestine, but in an autonomous Palestine, connected with Syria by the sole bond of federation. Will not a Palestine enjoying wide internal autonomy be for them a sufficient guarantee?

If they form the majority there, they will be the rulers. If they are in the minority, they will be represented in the government in proportion to their numbers.

Is it necessary, in order to establish them, to dismember Syria, to take from it its means of access and its historic safeguard against any invasion (which always took that route), and to constitute a State in the midst of a country which, as a consequence, would be hostile to them.

Agreements have also been mentioned which were concluded even before our deliverance, some cutting us in pieces and taking away our ports, Haifa and St. Jean d'Acre; others giving our capital to the Hedjaz. Whatever we may have said, we have truly the greatest and most respectful sympathy for that new kingdom and its new king, as well as for the princes, his sons. We admire their courage and we love them for what they have been led to do for us. But as they speak our language they doubtless know the proverb: "If I love thee, O my bracelet, I love my arm still more."

We beg you, Gentlemen, not to take umbrage at our language, which is doubtless hardly in accord with that usually employed at your meetings. We tender our humble and respectful apologies if we have cried out under the threat of the knife. We also regret to have taken up so much of the time which you require for so many other important and complex questions. But, once more, the complications which make our question such a simple problem—and we beg you to remember this—are only of an external nature. We ourselves can, therefore, do nothing towards solving it. You, and you alone, can do much. You can do everything. But if our hopes are not to be realised, and we are to be disintegrated and condemned (this time irremediably, since the condemnation will come from you), then we would make one last request, that we may be handed back to Turkey. She will massacre us a little more, but with her we shall at least preserve a hope of one day being able to escape.

When the indiscretions of the press acquainted us with the rough outlines of the agreements of 1916,[12] which made our hearts bleed, our compatriot, Jamil Mardam Bey, comparing our sufferings under the Turks to those which we might expect if our country were thus pieced out, reminded us of this verse:

"There was a day when I wept—
And now I weep for that day."

Gentlemen, will you, our only hope, who in our eyes represent justice, right and human mercy, will you leave us to weep for our sad and grievous past?

[12] *Current History* (March 1920), vol. XI, p. 499.

Minutes of the 14th Session of the Supreme War Council Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, February 14, 1919, at 6: 30 p. m.

Present

America, United States of	British Empire	France
President Wilson	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	M. Clemenceau
Mr. R. Lansing	The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.	M. Pichon
	Secretaries	
Mr. A. H. Frazier	Lt. Col. Sir M.P.A. Hankey, K.C.B.	M. Dutasta
Mr. L. Harrison	Sir P. Loraine, Bt.	M. Berthelot

Italy	Japan
H. E. Baron Sonnino	H.E. M. Matsui
Secretary	
Count Aldrovandi	

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	British Empire	France
Col. U. S. Grant	Captain E. Abraham	Captain A. Portier

Italy	Japan
Major A. Jones	M. Saburi

Also Present

America, United States of	British Empire	France
General Bliss	The Rt. Hon. W. S. Churchill, M.P.	General Belin
	General Sir H. H. Wilson, G.C.B., D.S.O.	General Alby
	Maj. General W. T. Thwaites, C.B.	General Le Rond

Italy

General Cavallero

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux

1. M. CLEMENCEAU declared the meeting open.

Passage of Troops and Supplies Through Dutch Territory

MR. BALFOUR said that he was sorry to be responsible for calling together a meeting at that unusual hour. He had, however, two urgent matters to put before the Council which he thought required solution before President Wilson's departure. The first related to the passage of troops and supplies through Holland.

Mr. Balfour said all his Military advisers assured him that there were no means of maintaining the British forces on the Rhine other than transit of troops and stores through Dutch territory. The reason for this was the extreme congestion of the railways in Belgium and Northern France. He did not feel, however, that Great Britain should act alone on such a question and he therefore wished to ask the Council to approve the joint action suggested in the following identic telegram:—

"The 5 allied and associated Powers consider it of vital importance to the interests of the general Peace which they are earnestly striving to conclude at the earliest possible moment, that the preliminary arrangements already entered into with the enemy to this end, shall be effectually carried out.

Those arrangements provide, among other things for the occupation of the German territories left of the Rhine by allied and associated troops, and necessarily cover all measures which are essential for the purpose of effecting and maintaining such occupation, including the actual transport of the troops and supplies to their destination.

Owing to the extreme congestion of the railways in Belgium and Northern France the most serious difficulties are being encountered in carrying out the arrangements which have been agreed upon by both parties and which cannot be allowed to fail except at the risk of gravely imperilling the early establishment of a satisfactory peace.

A ready means exists to meet this difficulty; and that is the utilisation of the communications by rail and by water across Holland.

The German Government having assented to the arrival of the troops on German territory cannot be, and in fact are not, interested in the routes to be followed in journeying to the Rhine, and no question of an infringement of any rule of neutrality therefore arises out of the transit of the troops across Dutch territory.

In these circumstances, the 5 Powers, sensible of the solemn duty which lies upon them to see that their efforts directed to the speedy conclusion of a durable peace for the benefit of the whole community of nations, call upon the Netherlands Government to co-operate with them to this end by facilitating in every way the movements of troops and supplies across Dutch territory strictly for the purposes agreed upon with the German Government under the terms of the Armistice.

The matter is so grave and so urgent that the 5 Powers must press upon the Netherlands Government the necessity of immediate action, failing which the responsibility for the state of things which may ensue and which may endanger both the general peace and the flow of food and supplies into the countries of Western Europe, will fall upon the Netherlands Government."]

GENERAL ALBY said that an agreement had been reached with the Dutch concerning the passage of food, but not, as far as he knew, to the passage of troops.

GENERAL BLISS, in reply to an enquiry from President Wilson, said that he had been trying to get into communication with General Pershing but had not succeeded. However, he had been told during the afternoon that an assistant to General Mosely who had been charged with the negotiations for General Pershing had stated that the matter had been arranged with the Dutch Government at the Hague. According to this account, permission had been obtained for the creation of an American base at Rotterdam and for the conveyance of troops and supplies on the Rhine for the use of the American Army of Occupation.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether he might be authorised to wait until the news was confirmed. He assumed that the Dutch would be ready to do for the British what they had done for the Americans.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the news was still unofficial.

MR. BALFOUR thought that if it turned out to be correct no joint action need be taken. If, on the other hand, the Dutch were still unwilling, he asked them whether the joint action proposed in the identic telegram would be approved.

SIR HENRY WILSON pointed out that the Dutch allowed troops to pass down the Rhine away from Germany, but not up towards Germany.

BARON SONNINO asked what the Allied and Associated Powers could do if the Dutch should refuse.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that means of pressure would be found.

(It was decided that the joint action proposed by Mr. Balfour should be taken if the Dutch Government had not already conceded the principle of free passage.)

2. MR. BALFOUR said that the second point to which he wished to draw the attention of the Council was that of the proposed Meeting with the various Russian Governments at Prinkipo. He only wished to introduce the subject, and he asked Mr. Winston Churchill, who had come over for the purpose, to explain the present views of the British Cabinet.

Meeting of the Russian Representatives at Prinkipo

MR. CHURCHILL said that on the previous day there had been a Cabinet Meeting in London, at which great anxiety had been manifested concerning the Russian situation, particularly in respect to the policy of the Prinkipo meeting. In view of the imminent departure of President Wilson, the Cabinet had asked him to go over and obtain some decision as to the policy on this matter. Mr. Lloyd George had expressed a wish to know whether the Allied policy

which had led to the suggestion of the meeting at Prinkipo was to be pursued or, if not, what policy was to be substituted for it. If it were possible to go on with the original policy, so much the better; but if only the Bolsheviks were to attend the Conference, it was thought that little good would come of the meeting. The military aspect of the case must be considered. Great Britain had soldiers in Russia who were being killed in action. Their families wished to know what purpose these men were serving. Were they just marking time until the Allies had decided on policy, or were they fighting in a campaign representing some common aim? The longer the delay continued, the worse would be the situation of the troops on all the Russian fronts. The Russian elements in those forces were deteriorating rapidly because of the uncertainty of the support they might expect from the victorious Allies. The Allied troops were intermingled with these Russian troops, which were weakening and quavering, and they were themselves becoming affected. If the Prinkipo meeting were not going to procure a cessation of arms, this unsatisfactory condition might last an indefinite time.

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed the opinion that a matter of such importance could not be settled at a short and unexpected meeting.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that since Mr. Churchill had come over specially to anticipate his departure, he felt that he should express what his personal thoughts on the subject were. Among the many uncertainties connected with Russia, he had a very clear opinion about two points. The first was that the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers were doing no sort of good in Russia. They did not know for whom or for what they were fighting. They were not assisting any promising common effort to establish order throughout Russia. They were assisting local movements, like, for instance, that of the Cossacks, who could not be induced to move outside their own sphere. His conclusion, therefore, was that the Allied and Associated Powers ought to withdraw their troops from all parts of Russian territory.

The second related to Prinkipo. The policy tending to a meeting at Prinkipo had been instituted in order to find out what the people in Russia were thinking and purposing to do. As far as he was concerned, he would be quite content that informal American representatives should meet representatives of the Bolsheviks. In their reply the Bolsheviks offered a number of things which had not been asked for, such as repayment of debts, concessions and territorial compensations. This answer was not only uncalled for, but might be thought insulting. What the Allies had in mind was the establishment of peace in Russia as an element of the world's peace. The

first condition of the meeting asked for by the Allies was the cessation of attacks by Russian troops on the communities outside their borders. If the other Russian Govts. would not come to Prinkipo to meet the Allies, why should the Allies not imitate Mahomet, and go to them? What we were seeking was not a *rapprochement* with the Bolsheviks, but clear information. The reports received from Russia from various official and unofficial sources were so conflicting that it was impossible to form a coherent picture of the state of the country. Some light on the situation might be obtained by meeting the Russian representatives.

MR. CHURCHILL said that complete withdrawal of all Allied troops was a logical and clear policy, but its consequence would be the destruction of all non-Bolshevik armies in Russia. These numbered at the present time about 500,000 men and though their quality was not of the best, their numbers were nevertheless increasing. Such a policy would be equivalent to pulling out the linch-pin from the whole machine. There would be no further armed resistance to the Bolsheviks in Russia, and an interminable vista of violence and misery was all that remained for the whole of Russia.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the existing forces of the Allies could not stop the Bolsheviks, and that not one of the Allies was prepared to reinforce its troops.

M. SONNINO asked whether the Allies might not continue to supply arms to the non-Bolshevik elements?

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that they made very little use of them when they had them.

MR. CHURCHILL agreed that none of the Allies could send conscript troops to Russia. He thought, however, that volunteers, technical experts, arms, munitions, tanks, aeroplanes, etc. might be furnished.

PRESIDENT WILSON understood the problem was to know what use would be made of these forces and supplies. In some areas they would certainly be assisting reactionaries. Consequently, if the Allies were asked what they were supporting in Russia they would be compelled to reply that they did not know. Conscripts could not be sent and volunteers probably could not be obtained. He himself felt guilty in that the United States had in Russia insufficient forces, but it was not possible to increase them. It was certainly a cruel dilemma. At present our soldiers were being killed in Russia, if they were removed many Russians might lose their lives. But some day or other the Allied troops would have to be withdrawn; they could not be maintained there for ever and the consequences to the Russians would only be deferred.

LORD MILNER pointed out that the only troops that could at present be removed were those in Siberia. The troops on the Archangel

Front were ice-bound and could not, for the time being, be removed. Should the Allies proceed to remove their troops immediately from Siberia there might be an overwhelming concentration of Bolsheviks on the Archangel Front.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that there were no considerable Bolshevik forces in Siberia.

MR. LANSING observed that the Bolsheviks had a large army in Eastern Russia at the point of contact with the Anti-Bolshevik Siberian Forces.

MR. CHURCHILL said that he would like to know whether the Council would approve of arming the Anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia should the Prinkipo Conference prove a failure.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he hesitated to express any definite opinion on this question. He had explained to the Council how he would act if alone. He would, however, cast in his lot with the rest.

(The meeting adjourned and it was agreed that the subject should be considered again at the conversation to be held the following afternoon).

VILLA MAJESTIC, [PARIS,] February 15, 1919.