Showing posts with label Quebec. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Quebec. Show all posts
Wednesday, November 21, 2012
Does it count as beating a dead horse if the horse won?
I've written up my final reflections on tuition and the student boycott at Academic Matters magazine. My colleague Daniel Weinstock argues for the other side.
Wednesday, August 29, 2012
Cheap tuition and mobility
Remember what I was saying before about the problematic relationship between cheap tuition and education that enables professional mobility?
http://www.ledevoir.com/politique/elections-2012/357986/les-medecins-qui-quittent-le-quebec-doivent-rembourser-l-etat-dit-legault".>Yeah.
The system works fine if the education you offer doesn't enable high emigration to better professional opportunities. (Or if you offer sufficient professional opportunities at home-- say, by licensing doctors who want to practice in under-served Montreal.) But if you accidentally allow some part of the system to provide taxpayer-funded training to people who then emigrate in large numbers, then little things like freedom of movement become unattractive, notwithstanding (so to speak) any constitutional worries.
http://www.ledevoir.com/politique/elections-2012/357986/les-medecins-qui-quittent-le-quebec-doivent-rembourser-l-etat-dit-legault".>Yeah.
The system works fine if the education you offer doesn't enable high emigration to better professional opportunities. (Or if you offer sufficient professional opportunities at home-- say, by licensing doctors who want to practice in under-served Montreal.) But if you accidentally allow some part of the system to provide taxpayer-funded training to people who then emigrate in large numbers, then little things like freedom of movement become unattractive, notwithstanding (so to speak) any constitutional worries.
Saturday, May 26, 2012
Tuition and language politics
Maybe all of the following is obvious and widely-known; I haven't seen it discussed, though.
The "distinct society" portion of the tuition conversation has been mostly about the transfer of authority over higher education from the Catholic Church to the Quebec state in the wake of the Quiet Revolution, and the conscious commitment to work toward a social-democratic model of tuition-free higher education. But it seems to me that there's also a strong relationship with language-population politics.
The Quebec higher education system has several relevant distinct features:
1. CEGEP/ college education going to grade 13
2. Following directly from that, a 3-year university BA
3. A differentiation between tuition for in-province and out-of-province Canadian students-- standard in the US but, I believe, unique in Canada Update: not unique, I'm told in comments, but I'm having trouble coming up with general information. So far it looks to me as if Ontario, BC, Alberta, and Calgary all have uniform Canadian tuition rates, without provincial differentiation. More information, please!)
4. Very, very low in-province tuition-- not 0, but much closer to 0 than to tuition in Ontario or California.
5. Unusually high provincial levels of taxation
I treat (5) as part of higher education policy because defenders of low tuition insist that students aren't trying to avoid paying for their educations; they'll just pay for them later through taxes rather than up-front through tuition; and that this moreover prevents low tuition from being a regressive subsidy to the middle- and upper-class students who are most likely to attend university. And of course it's importantly connected to (4).
Now, the first thought I had in looking at all of this was, "anomalously low tuition and anomalously high taxes to pay for it can go together in a closed society where the same people spend their whole life cycle in the same tax-and-spend system, and the closed society is a convenient assumption for some social democratic modeling, but its empirical falseness means that the micro-level fairness story fails. You'll get people getting their cheap educations and then leaving, while others who have paid full price for a university education elsewhere, or even out-of-province tuition here, migrate here and then pay again through the tax system." Now, one unattractive feature about that from my perspective is that it creates a possible sense that people are doing something wrong, shirking their fair share of the burden for their own education, by out-migrating; I think that's an illiberal norm to run a society on. But on its face it also looks fiscally unsustainable: everyone's incentive is to get the education and then get out. And then I thought to myself, "discouraging out-migration is an important part of the preservation of The french Fact. So I'm missing something."
Separate the population into three groups, and look at how the system works for each.
1) Out-of-province students have roughly neutral incentives to come to university here, but a disincentive to come to university and stay. Out-of-province tuition is roughly comparable to tuition elsewhere in the country (though still lower than Ontario), and out-of-province students get the standard 4-year degree since they didn't go to CEGEP, so if they just come get a BA and leave again they're neither getting any special discount nor paying any special price. But if they come and stay, then they've paid 4 years of normal tuition rather than 3 years of cheap tuition, and then they spend the rest of their lives paying taxes as if they had benefitted from the discount rate. (The same is true-but-moreso for international students.)
2. In-province anglophones have an incentive to do what I described above: get a BA on the cheap by paying three years of low tuition, then migrate out to anywhere else in North America where their taxes will be lower. The incentive to stay local for the BA is very steep.
3. In-province francophones face the same financial incentives as in-province anglophones: a huge incentive to stay local for the BA, since the three-year low tuition degree is vastly cheaper than a four-year normal-tuition degree elsewhere. Then-- here's the part that puzzled me-- they have an incentive at the margin to leave when the high taxes kick in.
But exit in post-collegiate early adulthood is a lot easier for anglophones. They've got, roughly, the whole Canadian and American college-educated labor market open to them, and they enter it on an equal footing with those whose educations were anywhere else in North America.
If English is neither your first language nor the language of your university education, it's a lot harder to suddenly jump into the educated-labor market of anglophone North America at age 22 or 25. You're starting at a disadvantage in that market that doesn't apply if you stay close to home. If, by contrast, you had left home for an English-language four-year education, you'd be a lot more likely to, as it were, defect, and take advantage of the economic opportunities open to anglophone university graduates in other parts of the continent.
So the system as a whole acts as a financial disincentive to permanent in-migration from the rest of North America (and NB that French citizens pay in-province tuition rates, not international tuition rates) and as a marginal incentive to out-migration for anglophones once they've gotten their college educations. But for francophones from Quebec, it acts as a strong incentive to stay at home for university education, a moment when there might otherwise be an especially high risk of permanent out-migration, and a marginal reduction in their ability to out-migrate later.
In other words, even if some number of high-earning francophones leave (and therefore never "pay back" the cheap university educations they receive) the system broadly tends toward making francophone Quebec a more self-contained economic world in which people do spend their whole life cycles, while simultaneously subtly encouraging anglophone out-migration and discouraging anglophone in-migration.
This, perhaps oddly, makes me slightly more sympathetic to the system than I would otherwise be. (It also, of course, makes it more sustainable than it would otherwise be; it significantly retards the get-your-cheap-degree-then-get-out dynamic.) Francophone Quebec does need to be a partly self-contained economic world to be sustainable; a large steady outflow of 18-year olds who never came back could be the beginning of a downward spiral in the viability of the French Fact. (Note, too that a bloated civil service is often a part of this kind of system in postcolonial societies; it provides jobs for a surplus of locally-highly-educated workers.) Of all the possible policies to sustain the French Fact on a population basis, this tax-and-subsidize policy is on the low-coercion side. (It might, probably does, depress the overall prosperity of Quebec, and that has to go into the calculations too; in the long term, la survivance will depend on an economy that is successful, competitive, and attractive, not just one that is self-contained enough to discourage emigration.)
But-- if I'm right about all this-- I do think it's worth acknowledging the uncomfortable truths that the system operates to diminish the mobility of local francophones, indeed depends on doing so, while simultaneously greasing the slide out of town for local anglophones.
This is all back-of-the-envelope modeling, and I'm entirely open to correction and instruction in the comments. See also: Kymlicka and Patten, eds., Language Rights and Political Theory; and an article of mine defending the compatibility of ethnocultural federalism geared with an emphasis on preserving the national minority's culture with liberalism.
The "distinct society" portion of the tuition conversation has been mostly about the transfer of authority over higher education from the Catholic Church to the Quebec state in the wake of the Quiet Revolution, and the conscious commitment to work toward a social-democratic model of tuition-free higher education. But it seems to me that there's also a strong relationship with language-population politics.
The Quebec higher education system has several relevant distinct features:
1. CEGEP/ college education going to grade 13
2. Following directly from that, a 3-year university BA
3. A differentiation between tuition for in-province and out-of-province Canadian students-- standard in the US but, I believe, unique in Canada Update: not unique, I'm told in comments, but I'm having trouble coming up with general information. So far it looks to me as if Ontario, BC, Alberta, and Calgary all have uniform Canadian tuition rates, without provincial differentiation. More information, please!)
4. Very, very low in-province tuition-- not 0, but much closer to 0 than to tuition in Ontario or California.
5. Unusually high provincial levels of taxation
I treat (5) as part of higher education policy because defenders of low tuition insist that students aren't trying to avoid paying for their educations; they'll just pay for them later through taxes rather than up-front through tuition; and that this moreover prevents low tuition from being a regressive subsidy to the middle- and upper-class students who are most likely to attend university. And of course it's importantly connected to (4).
Now, the first thought I had in looking at all of this was, "anomalously low tuition and anomalously high taxes to pay for it can go together in a closed society where the same people spend their whole life cycle in the same tax-and-spend system, and the closed society is a convenient assumption for some social democratic modeling, but its empirical falseness means that the micro-level fairness story fails. You'll get people getting their cheap educations and then leaving, while others who have paid full price for a university education elsewhere, or even out-of-province tuition here, migrate here and then pay again through the tax system." Now, one unattractive feature about that from my perspective is that it creates a possible sense that people are doing something wrong, shirking their fair share of the burden for their own education, by out-migrating; I think that's an illiberal norm to run a society on. But on its face it also looks fiscally unsustainable: everyone's incentive is to get the education and then get out. And then I thought to myself, "discouraging out-migration is an important part of the preservation of The french Fact. So I'm missing something."
Separate the population into three groups, and look at how the system works for each.
1) Out-of-province students have roughly neutral incentives to come to university here, but a disincentive to come to university and stay. Out-of-province tuition is roughly comparable to tuition elsewhere in the country (though still lower than Ontario), and out-of-province students get the standard 4-year degree since they didn't go to CEGEP, so if they just come get a BA and leave again they're neither getting any special discount nor paying any special price. But if they come and stay, then they've paid 4 years of normal tuition rather than 3 years of cheap tuition, and then they spend the rest of their lives paying taxes as if they had benefitted from the discount rate. (The same is true-but-moreso for international students.)
2. In-province anglophones have an incentive to do what I described above: get a BA on the cheap by paying three years of low tuition, then migrate out to anywhere else in North America where their taxes will be lower. The incentive to stay local for the BA is very steep.
3. In-province francophones face the same financial incentives as in-province anglophones: a huge incentive to stay local for the BA, since the three-year low tuition degree is vastly cheaper than a four-year normal-tuition degree elsewhere. Then-- here's the part that puzzled me-- they have an incentive at the margin to leave when the high taxes kick in.
But exit in post-collegiate early adulthood is a lot easier for anglophones. They've got, roughly, the whole Canadian and American college-educated labor market open to them, and they enter it on an equal footing with those whose educations were anywhere else in North America.
If English is neither your first language nor the language of your university education, it's a lot harder to suddenly jump into the educated-labor market of anglophone North America at age 22 or 25. You're starting at a disadvantage in that market that doesn't apply if you stay close to home. If, by contrast, you had left home for an English-language four-year education, you'd be a lot more likely to, as it were, defect, and take advantage of the economic opportunities open to anglophone university graduates in other parts of the continent.
So the system as a whole acts as a financial disincentive to permanent in-migration from the rest of North America (and NB that French citizens pay in-province tuition rates, not international tuition rates) and as a marginal incentive to out-migration for anglophones once they've gotten their college educations. But for francophones from Quebec, it acts as a strong incentive to stay at home for university education, a moment when there might otherwise be an especially high risk of permanent out-migration, and a marginal reduction in their ability to out-migrate later.
In other words, even if some number of high-earning francophones leave (and therefore never "pay back" the cheap university educations they receive) the system broadly tends toward making francophone Quebec a more self-contained economic world in which people do spend their whole life cycles, while simultaneously subtly encouraging anglophone out-migration and discouraging anglophone in-migration.
This, perhaps oddly, makes me slightly more sympathetic to the system than I would otherwise be. (It also, of course, makes it more sustainable than it would otherwise be; it significantly retards the get-your-cheap-degree-then-get-out dynamic.) Francophone Quebec does need to be a partly self-contained economic world to be sustainable; a large steady outflow of 18-year olds who never came back could be the beginning of a downward spiral in the viability of the French Fact. (Note, too that a bloated civil service is often a part of this kind of system in postcolonial societies; it provides jobs for a surplus of locally-highly-educated workers.) Of all the possible policies to sustain the French Fact on a population basis, this tax-and-subsidize policy is on the low-coercion side. (It might, probably does, depress the overall prosperity of Quebec, and that has to go into the calculations too; in the long term, la survivance will depend on an economy that is successful, competitive, and attractive, not just one that is self-contained enough to discourage emigration.)
But-- if I'm right about all this-- I do think it's worth acknowledging the uncomfortable truths that the system operates to diminish the mobility of local francophones, indeed depends on doing so, while simultaneously greasing the slide out of town for local anglophones.
This is all back-of-the-envelope modeling, and I'm entirely open to correction and instruction in the comments. See also: Kymlicka and Patten, eds., Language Rights and Political Theory; and an article of mine defending the compatibility of ethnocultural federalism geared with an emphasis on preserving the national minority's culture with liberalism.
Friday, May 18, 2012
Banana republicanism
"Special law" is every bit the contradiction in terms that "student strike" is. Emergency decrees and bills of attainder aren't laws, and I won't be referring to Bill 78 as a law except in scare quotes.
On the other hand, my patience for playing along with the phrase "student strike" ran out as of the UQAM protests this week, when the protesters prevented students and professors from meeting together for educational purposes, screaming "scab" at the students who wanted to attend class. Calling it a strike means calling the students who want to attend class scabs, and calling their attempts to attend class illegitimate, so I won't be doing that either.
So, that said, some first impressions of the proposed decree.
1. Section III is entirely illegitimate. I don't know whether it passes Charter review; I am not a Canadian lawyer. But it is an absurdly draconian violation of freedom of assembly and indeed freedom of movement. It's police state stuff, unworthy of a free society.
2. Section V.29 multiplies the reach of every other punitive and prohibitionist part of the act, so much so that it renders Sections III IV, and V as wholes illegitimate. It amounts to the category of conspiracy-by-omission. It means that not only anyone who talks to student protesters or protest leaders over the next several months is vulnerable to prosecution, but that even avoiding them won't keep you safe. Again, police state stuff.
3. If one were to detach V.29, Section IV and the rest of Section V start to look more complicated. They skirt awfully close to the line of being a bill of attainder; they're certainly not a normal case of lawful governance. But the boycott has created a legally strange situation. The boycotters, calling what they're doing a "strike," assert a collective democratic right to prevent students and professors from carrying on classes. But the concept of a student strike is unknown to Quebec law. That doesn't mean that it's illegal; it's not prohibited, and in a a free society that which is not prohibited is allowed. But striking is not only a refusal to do something; it is also an assertion of the authority to prevent others-- "scabs"-- from doing it. That makes it less like "assembly" and "speech" and more like "contract" or "will," come the moment when the beneficiary of a contract or a will seeks to take possession. In order to maintain peace and keep clear on what everyone's rights are, we normally rule out self-help and don't treat "contract" or "will" as things that one can just be left alone to do. They're powers partly constituted by law, exercisable in ways described and prescribed by law.
If I say that you and I had a contract, but it was oral and unwitnessed, and I try to seize the goods to which our supposed contract entitled me, you call the police to protect yourself and your goods. To that, it is insufficient on my part to say "unwitnessed oral contracts aren't prohibited." What I say is true, but it's also true that an unwitnessed oral promise does not rise to the level of "contract" that legitimizes coerced performance. Your right to carry on unmolested by me is something about which the law can't just be agnostic.
In a strike-as-constituted-by-the-labour-code, employers and would-be replacement workers have their freedom of action limited. The strike isn't just an action by the workers; it's an authorized limitation on others. The student unions, purporting to strike, have tried to self-help their way into that same ability to limit the actions of others. The law can't just be agnostic about whether students who don't wish to boycott may attend class unmolested, whether universities may protect their classrooms from disruption and protect access to them. And since this is not a legally-constituted strike, the legal answer is that those who wish to carry on with their educational activities are free to do so. Injunctions to protect their access, like legal action to prevent me from carrying off your stuff that I say you promised me, look aggressive but are legally defensive, defending the legal freedom of those the protesters want to characterize as "scabs" but who are not in a legal position like the would-be replacement workers during a labour strike.
The injunctions have been flouted; and protesters have repeatedly created situations where police have to choose between not protecting the rights of universities, professors, and dissenting students or trying to coerce large determined crowds of protesters. When they opt for the latter, they use the ugly and abusive tools of riot control against people who were not rioting but who were obstructing the legal rights of others, en masse. There is no peaceful way to move hundreds or thousands of people who do not wish to be moved. And there is also no rule that whatever hundreds or thousands of people together want to do must be legitimate. This has been the paradoxical situation of the last several weeks in particular. The police have been first to use violence, at least large-scale violence, over and over again; but that doesn't mean that the injunction-flouting protests were legitimate.
I don't know enough about Canadian civil procedure to know why contempt of court proceedings couldn't be used to do what Section IV of the emergency decree tries to do: coerce the unions through crippling financial penalties in order to try to stop having to violently coerce the bodies of protesters. That would be preferable to this kind of legislative action. But some attempt to hold unions responsible for protests that flout injunctions and disrupt the legal freedom of others does seem legitimate, and preferable to constant situations that can be resolved only through police violence or through abandoning the freedom of third parties to the whims of the protesters. The unions are creatures of Quebec law, with power granted by law to compel dues payment from students; but they have helped themselves to an authority that isn't granted by the law that creates them, and when others have ignored that supposed authority have freely encouraged lawless response. It's awfully late in the day for their leaders to discover that "social peace" is at risk. Their attitude toward injunctions and toward the rights of universities, professors, and dissenting students has been one of "contempt for the rule of law," as Bernard Amyot, former president of the Canadian Bar Association put it. That doesn't excuse the government from blame for its own abandonment of the rule of law in the new emergency decree.
As with the ban on masks, illegitimate behavior by the protesters is going to met by an illegitimate response, deeply restricting what should be protected freedom of expression. Section III and Section V.29, like the ban on masks, are opportunistic expansions of state and police power far beyond what is needed, or what is compatible with liberal freedom. And Section V.29's multiplier effect on the rest of the act pushes all of Sections IV and V into that category. But for the student unions to suddenly appeal to the rule of law and freedom of assembly when they've scorned those for everyone else is a bit much. The upshot is a lot of damage all around to Quebec's ability to function as a free society.
Update: While I was writing this post, the Montreal city council unsurprisingly passed the awful ban on masks. Kafka-esque question-begging of the day:
On the other hand, my patience for playing along with the phrase "student strike" ran out as of the UQAM protests this week, when the protesters prevented students and professors from meeting together for educational purposes, screaming "scab" at the students who wanted to attend class. Calling it a strike means calling the students who want to attend class scabs, and calling their attempts to attend class illegitimate, so I won't be doing that either.
So, that said, some first impressions of the proposed decree.
1. Section III is entirely illegitimate. I don't know whether it passes Charter review; I am not a Canadian lawyer. But it is an absurdly draconian violation of freedom of assembly and indeed freedom of movement. It's police state stuff, unworthy of a free society.
2. Section V.29 multiplies the reach of every other punitive and prohibitionist part of the act, so much so that it renders Sections III IV, and V as wholes illegitimate. It amounts to the category of conspiracy-by-omission. It means that not only anyone who talks to student protesters or protest leaders over the next several months is vulnerable to prosecution, but that even avoiding them won't keep you safe. Again, police state stuff.
3. If one were to detach V.29, Section IV and the rest of Section V start to look more complicated. They skirt awfully close to the line of being a bill of attainder; they're certainly not a normal case of lawful governance. But the boycott has created a legally strange situation. The boycotters, calling what they're doing a "strike," assert a collective democratic right to prevent students and professors from carrying on classes. But the concept of a student strike is unknown to Quebec law. That doesn't mean that it's illegal; it's not prohibited, and in a a free society that which is not prohibited is allowed. But striking is not only a refusal to do something; it is also an assertion of the authority to prevent others-- "scabs"-- from doing it. That makes it less like "assembly" and "speech" and more like "contract" or "will," come the moment when the beneficiary of a contract or a will seeks to take possession. In order to maintain peace and keep clear on what everyone's rights are, we normally rule out self-help and don't treat "contract" or "will" as things that one can just be left alone to do. They're powers partly constituted by law, exercisable in ways described and prescribed by law.
If I say that you and I had a contract, but it was oral and unwitnessed, and I try to seize the goods to which our supposed contract entitled me, you call the police to protect yourself and your goods. To that, it is insufficient on my part to say "unwitnessed oral contracts aren't prohibited." What I say is true, but it's also true that an unwitnessed oral promise does not rise to the level of "contract" that legitimizes coerced performance. Your right to carry on unmolested by me is something about which the law can't just be agnostic.
In a strike-as-constituted-by-the-labour-code, employers and would-be replacement workers have their freedom of action limited. The strike isn't just an action by the workers; it's an authorized limitation on others. The student unions, purporting to strike, have tried to self-help their way into that same ability to limit the actions of others. The law can't just be agnostic about whether students who don't wish to boycott may attend class unmolested, whether universities may protect their classrooms from disruption and protect access to them. And since this is not a legally-constituted strike, the legal answer is that those who wish to carry on with their educational activities are free to do so. Injunctions to protect their access, like legal action to prevent me from carrying off your stuff that I say you promised me, look aggressive but are legally defensive, defending the legal freedom of those the protesters want to characterize as "scabs" but who are not in a legal position like the would-be replacement workers during a labour strike.
The injunctions have been flouted; and protesters have repeatedly created situations where police have to choose between not protecting the rights of universities, professors, and dissenting students or trying to coerce large determined crowds of protesters. When they opt for the latter, they use the ugly and abusive tools of riot control against people who were not rioting but who were obstructing the legal rights of others, en masse. There is no peaceful way to move hundreds or thousands of people who do not wish to be moved. And there is also no rule that whatever hundreds or thousands of people together want to do must be legitimate. This has been the paradoxical situation of the last several weeks in particular. The police have been first to use violence, at least large-scale violence, over and over again; but that doesn't mean that the injunction-flouting protests were legitimate.
I don't know enough about Canadian civil procedure to know why contempt of court proceedings couldn't be used to do what Section IV of the emergency decree tries to do: coerce the unions through crippling financial penalties in order to try to stop having to violently coerce the bodies of protesters. That would be preferable to this kind of legislative action. But some attempt to hold unions responsible for protests that flout injunctions and disrupt the legal freedom of others does seem legitimate, and preferable to constant situations that can be resolved only through police violence or through abandoning the freedom of third parties to the whims of the protesters. The unions are creatures of Quebec law, with power granted by law to compel dues payment from students; but they have helped themselves to an authority that isn't granted by the law that creates them, and when others have ignored that supposed authority have freely encouraged lawless response. It's awfully late in the day for their leaders to discover that "social peace" is at risk. Their attitude toward injunctions and toward the rights of universities, professors, and dissenting students has been one of "contempt for the rule of law," as Bernard Amyot, former president of the Canadian Bar Association put it. That doesn't excuse the government from blame for its own abandonment of the rule of law in the new emergency decree.
As with the ban on masks, illegitimate behavior by the protesters is going to met by an illegitimate response, deeply restricting what should be protected freedom of expression. Section III and Section V.29, like the ban on masks, are opportunistic expansions of state and police power far beyond what is needed, or what is compatible with liberal freedom. And Section V.29's multiplier effect on the rest of the act pushes all of Sections IV and V into that category. But for the student unions to suddenly appeal to the rule of law and freedom of assembly when they've scorned those for everyone else is a bit much. The upshot is a lot of damage all around to Quebec's ability to function as a free society.
Update: While I was writing this post, the Montreal city council unsurprisingly passed the awful ban on masks. Kafka-esque question-begging of the day:
The leader of one of the city's opposition parties, Louise Harel, asked for clarification on whether scarves or bandanas worn by protesters protecting themselves against chemical irritants or tear gas would be included in the ban.
A lawyer for the police insisted those scarves are considered masks under the bylaw. The reasoning is, according to the lawyer, that if tear gas is being deployed, the demonstration has already been declared illegal.
Monday, May 07, 2012
Masks
I talked with CBC Radio One about the problems with banning masks during protests. I think there are exceptional cases in which such bans can be temporarily and locally legitimate; but they need to be constructed a lot more narrowly and carefully than either the proposed Montreal or the Canadian federal bans have been.
I managed to avoid talking about masked characters in comics, whether The Avengers (though that might have boosted my ratings) or V for Vendetta.
Update: See also this CTV clip.
Monday, April 18, 2011
The Tory-PQ Alliance
The Parti Quebecois is riding high in the polls at the moment, though a provincial election is a long way off. And it seems to be filled with enthusiasm and vigor at the moment, coming off its convention this weekend-- though I can't say that I find the 93% vote in support of Pauline Marois to be quite so impressive as it's being made out to be. It sends the signal "in the face of a possible victory in the medium-term future, we are capable of acting as a basically unified and functional organization and not undermining our leader for no good reason." That's better than the PQ has sometimes done in the past, but it's not a dazzling accomplishment.
I fear that the real boost to the PQ's fortunes right now is coming from elsewhere: the Harper campaign.
To a first approximation, the median Quebec voter wants recognition as a distinct society, an advantageous fiscal relationship with Ottawa, and *not* to secede, have a vote on secession, or back into secession by a forced confrontation. That translates into a preference for voting for the Bloc as a substitute for voting for the PQ. The Bloc and the PQ are allies, of course-- but they are also rivals, in that the Bloc's success in extracting concessions at the center undermines the PQ's claim of urgency within the province. Voting for the Bloc thus becomes the safety valve, releasing nationalist-secessionist pressure and dampening fervor for the PQ and for secession.
As far as I'm concerned, this is a healthy dynamic. I don't like the Bloc; but I view them as a desirable feature of the Canadian political system, keeping pressure on the center to accommodate Quebec, and thereby keeping federation tolerable for Quebec.
But that dynamic only works if the Bloc is perceived to carry some weight in Ottawa. A Harper majority, and especially a Harper majority won on the basis of a nationwide attack on Quebec secessionist sentiment as manifested in support for the Bloc, will leave the average francophone Quebec voter with a sense of not having a voice, of having the desire to be maitres chez nous delegitimized in Canadian politics. Even if Harper doesn't win his majority, he's contributed to that delegitimation by making the thought of a de facto coalition with the Bloc anathema.
That can only be good for the PQ, two years out.
The Parti Quebecois is riding high in the polls at the moment, though a provincial election is a long way off. And it seems to be filled with enthusiasm and vigor at the moment, coming off its convention this weekend-- though I can't say that I find the 93% vote in support of Pauline Marois to be quite so impressive as it's being made out to be. It sends the signal "in the face of a possible victory in the medium-term future, we are capable of acting as a basically unified and functional organization and not undermining our leader for no good reason." That's better than the PQ has sometimes done in the past, but it's not a dazzling accomplishment.
I fear that the real boost to the PQ's fortunes right now is coming from elsewhere: the Harper campaign.
To a first approximation, the median Quebec voter wants recognition as a distinct society, an advantageous fiscal relationship with Ottawa, and *not* to secede, have a vote on secession, or back into secession by a forced confrontation. That translates into a preference for voting for the Bloc as a substitute for voting for the PQ. The Bloc and the PQ are allies, of course-- but they are also rivals, in that the Bloc's success in extracting concessions at the center undermines the PQ's claim of urgency within the province. Voting for the Bloc thus becomes the safety valve, releasing nationalist-secessionist pressure and dampening fervor for the PQ and for secession.
As far as I'm concerned, this is a healthy dynamic. I don't like the Bloc; but I view them as a desirable feature of the Canadian political system, keeping pressure on the center to accommodate Quebec, and thereby keeping federation tolerable for Quebec.
But that dynamic only works if the Bloc is perceived to carry some weight in Ottawa. A Harper majority, and especially a Harper majority won on the basis of a nationwide attack on Quebec secessionist sentiment as manifested in support for the Bloc, will leave the average francophone Quebec voter with a sense of not having a voice, of having the desire to be maitres chez nous delegitimized in Canadian politics. Even if Harper doesn't win his majority, he's contributed to that delegitimation by making the thought of a de facto coalition with the Bloc anathema.
That can only be good for the PQ, two years out.
Tuesday, February 02, 2010
Study at Quebec universities to offer fast-track to Canadian citizenship
The lead story in the Chronicle this afternoon:
The lead story in the Chronicle this afternoon:
Quebec Offers Fast-Tracked Canadian Citizenship to Foreign Students
By Karen Birchard
Quebec is playing the citizenship card in a bid to recruit to Canada foreign students who might otherwise be tempted to study in Australia, Britain, or the United States.
The province's premier, Jean Charest, who is leading a delegation of university heads on a visit to India, told a packed meeting at the University of Mumbai on Monday that, starting on February 14, foreign students who graduated from universities in Quebec would get "a certificate of selection" that would put them on a fast track to Canadian citizenship.
"Any student who secures a bachelor's, master's, or doctoral degree from any university in Quebec will obtain a certificate of selection to become a citizen of Canada ," said Mr. Charest, according to The Times of India. "We have the right to select our own citizens. We are doing this because we have a shortage of skilled labor."
Mr. Charest said that once foreign students had the certificate, the federal government would then carry out security and health checks before awarding citizenship.
Monday, December 21, 2009
Unsettling news on higher education in Quebec
Via Inside Higher Ed, a Globe and Mail poll revealed significant gaps between francophone and anglophone Canadians on the value of higher education:
Via Inside Higher Ed, a Globe and Mail poll revealed significant gaps between francophone and anglophone Canadians on the value of higher education:
Canada's two solitudes endure in the value placed on higher education, with English-speaking young adults twice as likely as their francophone peers to see a university degree as the key to success, according to a new national poll.
[...]
The poll, conducted last month for the group by Leger Marketing and released exclusively to The Globe and Mail, asked 1,500 Canadians in all parts of the country if they thought a university degree was now a minimum requirement for success. What it found was a wide gap in views when the respondents' first language was taken into account - a gap that only increased when results of the youngest of those surveyed were broken out.
Fewer than 20 per cent of 18- to 24-year-old French speakers said a university degree was required, compared with 40 per cent of the English group. That difference increased even more when compared with those whose first language is neither English or French - generally first- or second-generation Canadians. More than two-thirds of young people in this group agreed a degree is needed to be successful, a result that is in keeping with the high percentage of new Canadians who go on to higher education.
Friday, September 11, 2009
On nationalism and federalism
Via Matt Yglesias, I see that Lawrence Martin is in the Globe and Mail making the following interesting point.
The idea that secessionist politics could be a stabilizing force in a multinational federation figures prominently in Wayne Norman's Negotiating Nationalism (see especially ch. 6) as well as in my own "Federalism, Liberalism, and the Separation of Loyalties," which adds to Norman's arguments an account of how the federal structure of the rest of constitution affects the outcomes of secessionist politics in one culturally distinct province. Three years after his book and two years after my article, I still think we're right, but it's a claim that makes Canadian audiences look at me funny. Interesting to see it start to go mainstream.
Via Matt Yglesias, I see that Lawrence Martin is in the Globe and Mail making the following interesting point.
Since its debut election campaign in 1993, the Bloc has never been beaten by a federalist party. Not in six elections. The demise of the Bloquistes is often predicted. It never happens. They are entrenched. In the next campaign, they are on course to rout the Liberals and Conservatives in Quebec again. [...]
The coddling of the BQ sees Canadian taxpayers subsidize the separatist party to the tune of millions of dollars to run its election campaigns. In that they have to campaign in only one province, the system absurdly favours it over federalist parties. The Bloc is allowed to participate in the English-language debates while running no candidates outside Quebec. Again, nothing is done. We wouldn't want to risk offending their delicate sensibilities.
But, for all its inroads, the Bloc has no reason to celebrate.
There's a great paradox at work here, a rollout of unintended consequences. The Bloc successes have bred failure. The better the BQ does, the further it gets from its goal of sovereignty. The separatists were closest to realizing that ambition in the early-to-mid-nineties, shortly after the Bloc arrived on the scene. Since that time, support for the sovereignty option, despite all the Bloc victories, has consistently been in decline.
The Bloc, it can be mischievously argued, has served the cause of a united Canada. Rarely over the past half-century has Canadian unity been as solid as it is today. It may well be that the Bloc, with its imposing fed-baiting presence in Ottawa, suffices for many Quebeckers as their instrument of sovereignty. It gives vent to pride, to autonomist passions. It wins concessions for the franchise.
If we were to take away the Bloc, if only Canada-minded federalist parties represented Quebeckers in Ottawa, a different scenario is easily imaginable. Conditions could well exist for a more spirited and fractious separatist movement.
Benefiting from the shrewd leadership of Gilles Duceppe and a smart, disciplined caucus, the Bloc has been able to address many of Quebec's grievances. But its steady progress now sees it scraping the barrel in search of meaningful injustices to fortify its underlying pathology (witness its current election advertising planning).
The idea that secessionist politics could be a stabilizing force in a multinational federation figures prominently in Wayne Norman's Negotiating Nationalism (see especially ch. 6) as well as in my own "Federalism, Liberalism, and the Separation of Loyalties," which adds to Norman's arguments an account of how the federal structure of the rest of constitution affects the outcomes of secessionist politics in one culturally distinct province. Three years after his book and two years after my article, I still think we're right, but it's a claim that makes Canadian audiences look at me funny. Interesting to see it start to go mainstream.
Sunday, June 28, 2009
Visions of Canadian identity: 10 equal provinces, 33 million equal citizens, or multiple nations
Interesting poll here.
Interesting poll here.
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
The holiday season
I liked this series enough last year that I'm going to rerun it.
Bonne fete nationale!
And a good Jean-Baptiste. This kicks off the holiday season: Jean-Baptiste, Canada Day, and the Fourth of July in the space of 10 days (along with the Jazz Festival, of course). Viewing recommendations for the national holiday of Quebec: I am not a Canadian (if you don't know what it's a reference to, see here); and just to throw something more interesting and more francophone, if less directly thematic, into the mix, my favorite Montreal movie, Le Golem de Montreal.
Update: I seem to have forgotten to rerun it. Click on the "holiday season" tag to read last year's entries.
I liked this series enough last year that I'm going to rerun it.
Bonne fete nationale!
And a good Jean-Baptiste. This kicks off the holiday season: Jean-Baptiste, Canada Day, and the Fourth of July in the space of 10 days (along with the Jazz Festival, of course). Viewing recommendations for the national holiday of Quebec: I am not a Canadian (if you don't know what it's a reference to, see here); and just to throw something more interesting and more francophone, if less directly thematic, into the mix, my favorite Montreal movie, Le Golem de Montreal.
Update: I seem to have forgotten to rerun it. Click on the "holiday season" tag to read last year's entries.
Tuesday, May 12, 2009
Sunday, December 14, 2008
Free Will and Canadian Politics
I make my bloggingheads debut (and obviously need a better-quality webcam if I'm going to keep doing this) on Will Wilkinson's "Free Will" show, discussing recent Canadian politics.
If you're clicking over here from bloggingheads, browse around the Canada, Quebec, or federalism tags to see more about the stuff Will and I discussed. For my academic writing on federalism, Quebec, and ethnocultural loyalties, see especially this article, "Federalism, Liberalism, and the Separation of Loyalties," APSR.
Updates: I think I did not-bad by the standard of people who've only lived in a country for 30 months, but various commentators at Will's blog and at the BHTV link above note some corrections and supplements to things that I said. One faithful reader e-mailed me with several related objections that I'll put in comments below this post.
I make my bloggingheads debut (and obviously need a better-quality webcam if I'm going to keep doing this) on Will Wilkinson's "Free Will" show, discussing recent Canadian politics.
If you're clicking over here from bloggingheads, browse around the Canada, Quebec, or federalism tags to see more about the stuff Will and I discussed. For my academic writing on federalism, Quebec, and ethnocultural loyalties, see especially this article, "Federalism, Liberalism, and the Separation of Loyalties," APSR.
Updates: I think I did not-bad by the standard of people who've only lived in a country for 30 months, but various commentators at Will's blog and at the BHTV link above note some corrections and supplements to things that I said. One faithful reader e-mailed me with several related objections that I'll put in comments below this post.
Wednesday, December 03, 2008
Fun and games continues
The dependence of the proposed coalition government on Bloc support looks like it's becoming the issue on which Conservatives will rely as they try to save their Government. There had been some attempts to use Dion's criticisms of the NDP, and to say that a grave economic crisis was a bad time to bring socialists into government (which, y'know, yeah); but that didn't seem to get much traction. The Bloc issues is where thre Tories will make their stand.
That's one odd "highest principle," and seems incompatible with the federalist view that Quebec nationalists are "Canadian people." (It's the nationalists who deny that.) But Harper believes that the strength of the no-Bloc taboo may be strong enough to save the government-- and from what I hear about popular responses in the ROC, he may be right.
Of course, this won't help the Bloc be any less anathema to federalist anglos.
The dependence of the proposed coalition government on Bloc support looks like it's becoming the issue on which Conservatives will rely as they try to save their Government. There had been some attempts to use Dion's criticisms of the NDP, and to say that a grave economic crisis was a bad time to bring socialists into government (which, y'know, yeah); but that didn't seem to get much traction. The Bloc issues is where thre Tories will make their stand.
The key attack line from the Tories is that the Liberals are betraying their federalist principles by agreeing to demands from the Bloc.
"This deal that the leader of the Liberal Party has made with the separatists is a betrayal of the voters of this country, a betrayal of the best interests of our economy, a betrayal of the best interests of our country, and we will fight it with every means we have," Harper said in the House of Commons.
"The highest principle of Canadian democracy is that if one wants to be prime minister, one gets one's mandate from the Canadian people and not from Quebec separatists."
That's one odd "highest principle," and seems incompatible with the federalist view that Quebec nationalists are "Canadian people." (It's the nationalists who deny that.) But Harper believes that the strength of the no-Bloc taboo may be strong enough to save the government-- and from what I hear about popular responses in the ROC, he may be right.
Of course, this won't help the Bloc be any less anathema to federalist anglos.
And neither will this.
Former Parti Québécois leader Jacques Parizeau says he’s delighted and very satisfied with the Bloc Québécois’ decision to join a coalition that could form the next federal government in Ottawa.
The political crisis in Ottawa is yet another sign that Canada is not governable and the only solution for Quebec is to get out, Parti Québécois leader Pauline Marois said Tuesday morning.
Tuesday, December 02, 2008
Two thoughts...
on the current state of play in Ottawa.
1) This "reversing the verdict of the election/ overturning the popular will" gambit isn't going to fly. The rules of the game in a US Presidential Election are: the one to get a majority in the Electoral College wins. The rules of the game in a newly-elected Parliament are: the one who can put together a government that has the confidence of the House of Commons wins. Harper doesn't represent The General Will. He leads a plurality-but-minority party. The Voice of The People didn't make him Prime Minister and reject Dion; a bunch of people voted for a bunch of different outcomes. Lo and behold, a parliament split among four parties is prone to some ormanipulation by those willing to build coalitions.
That said, it's no doubt weird that this happens now. This coalition was possible any time during the last Parliament. What's changed between then and now is an intervening election wherein Harper increased his party's share of seats and Dion took a drubbing. So, yes, for that to have the upshot "Prime Minister Dion" is unusual. But it doesn't overturn the election-- the three opposition parties were elected to their various numbers of seats, too, and those are real seats in Parliament.
2) Taboos break down. It's interesting to see the Bloc evolve into a party that's taking active responsibility for outcomes in (though not yet for governing) a country it wishes to see taken apart. There's real power that's been sitting there taking up seats year after year, not doing anything. But now-- well, a system of responsible party government makes it awfully hard for a party to refuse responsibility forever. But that's a big step for the Bloc-- it points the way toward being a party of Quebec interests rather than a party of Quebec secession. Could the Bloc someday become Shas-- the perpetual coalition-making swing party, just selling its coalition participation to the highest bidder, where the bids are goodies for Quebec? Doesn't seem impossible to me. The PQ is in a different position-- it doesn't face the same kind of pressure to change its agenda. But for the Bloc to sit in Ottawa year after year not able to do anything has been anomalous.
It's not just the Bloc's taboos getting broken, though. Working with the separatists isn't something the Liberal Party can be happy about at some fundamental level. And many parliamentary systems do effectively have some outcast party that's deemed not to count for purposes of counting heads... until, someday, it does count. Israeli governments always aim for a "Jewish majority;" it's considered unacceptable for a government's survival to depend on the participation of Arab parties. Post-totalitarian parties-- the post-fascists in Italy, the post-Communists in Germany-- are sometimes in the same position. But as I recall the post-fascists finally did count, when Berlusconi needed them to assemble his first right/ center-right coalition (along with the secessionist Northern League!). And the PDS in Germany has been part of some state-level coalitions (IIRC), even if it's still taboo in the Bundestag. The UK hasn't needed a coalition to govern in a very long time, but Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party are both traditionally outside polite Westminster society-- and it would be a very strange thing if some future Lib-Lab coalition depended on, say, the SNP to reach a majority.
The current Spanish government depends on the passive cooperation of the Catalan and Basque nationalist parties-- they abstain from confidence votes, allowing the plurality socialists to retain power.
Update: Mario Dumont, leader of the "autonomist" (but not secessionist) Quebec party ADQ, is trying to make hay in the Quebec election of the Bloc getting into bed with Dion.
[Note to non-locals: the Bloc Quebecois is a party that runs for federal Parliament, the Parti Quebecois is a party that runs for the government of Quebec; they're closely allied but not identical. The ADQ doesn't have any particular federal counterpart, but is broadly more right-wing than the PQ/BQ.]
On occasion Dumont can be very effective with an attack issue. He hasn't found one yet this campaign-- but maybe this is the one.
on the current state of play in Ottawa.
1) This "reversing the verdict of the election/ overturning the popular will" gambit isn't going to fly. The rules of the game in a US Presidential Election are: the one to get a majority in the Electoral College wins. The rules of the game in a newly-elected Parliament are: the one who can put together a government that has the confidence of the House of Commons wins. Harper doesn't represent The General Will. He leads a plurality-but-minority party. The Voice of The People didn't make him Prime Minister and reject Dion; a bunch of people voted for a bunch of different outcomes. Lo and behold, a parliament split among four parties is prone to some ormanipulation by those willing to build coalitions.
That said, it's no doubt weird that this happens now. This coalition was possible any time during the last Parliament. What's changed between then and now is an intervening election wherein Harper increased his party's share of seats and Dion took a drubbing. So, yes, for that to have the upshot "Prime Minister Dion" is unusual. But it doesn't overturn the election-- the three opposition parties were elected to their various numbers of seats, too, and those are real seats in Parliament.
2) Taboos break down. It's interesting to see the Bloc evolve into a party that's taking active responsibility for outcomes in (though not yet for governing) a country it wishes to see taken apart. There's real power that's been sitting there taking up seats year after year, not doing anything. But now-- well, a system of responsible party government makes it awfully hard for a party to refuse responsibility forever. But that's a big step for the Bloc-- it points the way toward being a party of Quebec interests rather than a party of Quebec secession. Could the Bloc someday become Shas-- the perpetual coalition-making swing party, just selling its coalition participation to the highest bidder, where the bids are goodies for Quebec? Doesn't seem impossible to me. The PQ is in a different position-- it doesn't face the same kind of pressure to change its agenda. But for the Bloc to sit in Ottawa year after year not able to do anything has been anomalous.
It's not just the Bloc's taboos getting broken, though. Working with the separatists isn't something the Liberal Party can be happy about at some fundamental level. And many parliamentary systems do effectively have some outcast party that's deemed not to count for purposes of counting heads... until, someday, it does count. Israeli governments always aim for a "Jewish majority;" it's considered unacceptable for a government's survival to depend on the participation of Arab parties. Post-totalitarian parties-- the post-fascists in Italy, the post-Communists in Germany-- are sometimes in the same position. But as I recall the post-fascists finally did count, when Berlusconi needed them to assemble his first right/ center-right coalition (along with the secessionist Northern League!). And the PDS in Germany has been part of some state-level coalitions (IIRC), even if it's still taboo in the Bundestag. The UK hasn't needed a coalition to govern in a very long time, but Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party are both traditionally outside polite Westminster society-- and it would be a very strange thing if some future Lib-Lab coalition depended on, say, the SNP to reach a majority.
The current Spanish government depends on the passive cooperation of the Catalan and Basque nationalist parties-- they abstain from confidence votes, allowing the plurality socialists to retain power.
Update: Mario Dumont, leader of the "autonomist" (but not secessionist) Quebec party ADQ, is trying to make hay in the Quebec election of the Bloc getting into bed with Dion.
Mario Dumont turned his guns on Parti Québécois leader Pauline Marois Tuesday, accusing her of working against Quebec’s interests by supporting a plan in Ottawa that would make Stéphane Dion prime minister.
Dumont, leader of the Action démocratique du Québec, charged that Bloc Quebecois leader Gilles Duceppe, supported by Marois, had made “an unbelievable gaffe” in supporting a Liberal-NDP coalition government to replace the Conservative government.
Dumont, campaigning for Monday’s provincial election, called on Marois to force Duceppe to abandon the coalition agreement.
The “Duceppe-Marois gaffe” would lead to either Dion becoming prime minister or a federal election. Quebecers want neither option and both are contrary to Quebec’s interests, he said.
“(Marois) called on Quebecers to vote for the Bloc Québécois, she forgot to tell them they would be getting Stéphane Dion as prime minister a few weeks later,” Dumont said after a speech to the Board of Trade of Metropolitan Montreal.
[Note to non-locals: the Bloc Quebecois is a party that runs for federal Parliament, the Parti Quebecois is a party that runs for the government of Quebec; they're closely allied but not identical. The ADQ doesn't have any particular federal counterpart, but is broadly more right-wing than the PQ/BQ.]
On occasion Dumont can be very effective with an attack issue. He hasn't found one yet this campaign-- but maybe this is the one.
Saturday, November 29, 2008
Fascinating.
Canada may be on the verge of a constitutional and political showdown, and the secessionist Bloc Quebecois is the kingmaker.
Prime Minister Stephen Harper, leading a conservative minority government, proposed to abolish government funding for political parties-- a move that would hurt his own part much less than the opposition parties, as the government subsidy makes up most of their budgets.
I've joked several times in this space about the apparent inability of Canadian parties to learn the word "coalition," but mortal threats concentrate the mind wonderfully, and the Liberal and NDP parties finally seemed to reach a willingness to join forces.
Problem: even combined, they have fewer MPs than the Tories. The balance of power is held by the Bloc, which has never entered into coalition or federal government since, after all, its raison d'etre is to free Quebec from the Canadian yoke.
Second problem: if the Tories lose a vote of confidence, the normal response is for the PM to ask the Governor General to dissolve Parliament and hold a new election-- but the last election was a matter of weeks ago.
So one question is: what does the GG do, if the PM is asking for a new election while Stephan Dion asks for the right to form a new government in the existing Parliament? And another question is: to grant Dion's request, what kind of participation would the GG demand from the Bloc? Passive support seems insufficient; active participation would be anathema both to the Bloc and to huge swaths of Liberal Anglophone Canada.
And it's worth noting just how topsy-turvy the world is in which the Bloc makes Stephane Dion Prime Minister. Dion has for two decades been one of the champions of Canadian unity and federalism within the Quebec debate, and has been a hate-figure for nationalists; Bernard Landry called him "le politicien le plus détesté de l'histoire du Québec." It would come as a serious surprise to me if either Bloc voters were happy that the Bloc installed Dion, or if Liberal voters were happy about any collaboration with the Bloc.
Harper has now backed down from the political party subsidy proposal. But the thing about political learning is that newly-learned lessons aren't quickly unlearned. The Liberals and NDP have finally learned, under mortal threat, that a coalition is thinkable-- and then they learned that they could terrify Harper, which they've proven unable to do for years. So they could still decide to vote no-confidence next week and bring the government down-- apparently throwing Canada's immediate political future into the hands of the GG, which is constitutionally unsettling in one way (Governors General, like the British monarch for whom they stand in, aren't really supposed to have political choices to make in our modern constitutional monarchies)-- and into the hands of the Bloc, which is constitutionally unsettling in another way.
A big week ahead. Fruits and votes is my recommendation for a blog on which to follow the action.
Canada may be on the verge of a constitutional and political showdown, and the secessionist Bloc Quebecois is the kingmaker.
Prime Minister Stephen Harper, leading a conservative minority government, proposed to abolish government funding for political parties-- a move that would hurt his own part much less than the opposition parties, as the government subsidy makes up most of their budgets.
I've joked several times in this space about the apparent inability of Canadian parties to learn the word "coalition," but mortal threats concentrate the mind wonderfully, and the Liberal and NDP parties finally seemed to reach a willingness to join forces.
Problem: even combined, they have fewer MPs than the Tories. The balance of power is held by the Bloc, which has never entered into coalition or federal government since, after all, its raison d'etre is to free Quebec from the Canadian yoke.
Second problem: if the Tories lose a vote of confidence, the normal response is for the PM to ask the Governor General to dissolve Parliament and hold a new election-- but the last election was a matter of weeks ago.
So one question is: what does the GG do, if the PM is asking for a new election while Stephan Dion asks for the right to form a new government in the existing Parliament? And another question is: to grant Dion's request, what kind of participation would the GG demand from the Bloc? Passive support seems insufficient; active participation would be anathema both to the Bloc and to huge swaths of Liberal Anglophone Canada.
And it's worth noting just how topsy-turvy the world is in which the Bloc makes Stephane Dion Prime Minister. Dion has for two decades been one of the champions of Canadian unity and federalism within the Quebec debate, and has been a hate-figure for nationalists; Bernard Landry called him "le politicien le plus détesté de l'histoire du Québec." It would come as a serious surprise to me if either Bloc voters were happy that the Bloc installed Dion, or if Liberal voters were happy about any collaboration with the Bloc.
Harper has now backed down from the political party subsidy proposal. But the thing about political learning is that newly-learned lessons aren't quickly unlearned. The Liberals and NDP have finally learned, under mortal threat, that a coalition is thinkable-- and then they learned that they could terrify Harper, which they've proven unable to do for years. So they could still decide to vote no-confidence next week and bring the government down-- apparently throwing Canada's immediate political future into the hands of the GG, which is constitutionally unsettling in one way (Governors General, like the British monarch for whom they stand in, aren't really supposed to have political choices to make in our modern constitutional monarchies)-- and into the hands of the Bloc, which is constitutionally unsettling in another way.
A big week ahead. Fruits and votes is my recommendation for a blog on which to follow the action.
Ah...
health care.
health care.
Despite a shortage of doctors across the province, the Quebec government is planning to issue fewer permits than the actual number of graduates in family medicine next year, The Gazette has learned.
A total of 238 doctors are expected to complete their residencies in family medicine and pass their board exams in 2009. However, the government is counting on issuing 220 permits, according to the Quebec Federation of General Practitioners.
The gap stems from a 5-year-old permits policy aimed at making sure young doctors start their careers in short-staffed regions across the province. In the past, the government had issued more permits than there were students in the graduating class. This gave doctors more choice about where to practice, and some regions had a hard time recruiting new doctors.
This year, however, the government has decided to keep a tight lid on permits - in particular, limiting those available in Montreal - to make sure that all regions are able to hire new doctors.
But the policy - known as Plans régionaux d'effectifs médicaux or PREMs - has actually backfired and led to an exodus of mostly anglophone, Quebec-trained doctors quitting the province for Ontario and elsewhere, critics say.
"It's absurd," said Mark Roper, a Westmount family physician and chairman of the medical manpower committee of the Regional Department of General Medicine of Montreal.
"It's almost like they're pushing young doctors out of the province."
Most new doctors prefer to practise in Montreal rather than in small rural communities. Quebec has offered doctors financial carrots to work in the Far North, but it has used the stick to get them to practise in the Mauricie, the Outaouais and other regions.
Before the PREMs, new doctors who decided to stay in Montreal were docked 30 per cent of their billings for the first three years of their careers. Most doctors toughed it out, so the government switched to the more restrictive PREM system.
Each year, the Health Department - in co-operation with the federation of GPs - decides on a certain number of positions for the 15 regions of Quebec.
Newly-graduated doctors must then apply for positions in a number of regions. Most apply to work in Montreal as their first choice, and if they don't get accepted, they are more likely to be hired by another region.
For Montreal, the government has decided to issue only 54 permits even though the city has a shortage of about 300 family doctors. If new doctors decide to stay in Montreal without a PREM position, going into solo practice, their billings will be docked by 25 per cent, not for the first three years but their entire careers.
Figures obtained by The Gazette show that recruitment was actually higher before the PREMs system went into effect in every region except Mauricie. So where have all those young doctors gone?
Quebec has been a net exporter of doctors to other provinces in the past five years, according to the Canadian Institute for Health Information.
Wednesday, October 29, 2008
Montreal and Quebec notes, October 29, 2008
A) On my way to work I saw a church that had a huge tacky banner on it from bearing the Quebec provincial logo (i.e. from some official governmental tourism agency) and the slogan "Notre patrimoine religieux, c’est sacré!"
Maybe it's been there for years, but it only registered on my eye today, and I'm dizzy with all the weirdness of it. I'm American enough to think:
1) That the government has no business telling us what's sacred, in an overtly religious setting.
2) That we don't need a tourist agency to inform us about the sacredness of houses of worship-- we can understand that just fine on our own.
3) That it's especially weird for churches to have to borrow the prestige of "patrimonie," which is what this amounts to-- trying to convince an increasingly secular population to put its old churches into the same category as the rest of the national (that is, Quebecois) inheritance and legacy and all that of which "je me souviens". The state is trying to convince us that churches are as sacred as other Quebec historical sites.
I simultaneously understand all of this and utterly fail to grok it.
B) This is not OK.
A) On my way to work I saw a church that had a huge tacky banner on it from bearing the Quebec provincial logo (i.e. from some official governmental tourism agency) and the slogan "Notre patrimoine religieux, c’est sacré!"
Maybe it's been there for years, but it only registered on my eye today, and I'm dizzy with all the weirdness of it. I'm American enough to think:
1) That the government has no business telling us what's sacred, in an overtly religious setting.
2) That we don't need a tourist agency to inform us about the sacredness of houses of worship-- we can understand that just fine on our own.
3) That it's especially weird for churches to have to borrow the prestige of "patrimonie," which is what this amounts to-- trying to convince an increasingly secular population to put its old churches into the same category as the rest of the national (that is, Quebecois) inheritance and legacy and all that of which "je me souviens". The state is trying to convince us that churches are as sacred as other Quebec historical sites.
I simultaneously understand all of this and utterly fail to grok it.
B) This is not OK.
Friday, October 17, 2008
State size follow-up
I speculated last week that the way the financial crisis swamped Iceland and seems to show the need for deep pockets and deep capital reserves within a financial system ("seems"-- I have no view about whether that's an economically true lesson to draw) probably did some damage to small-nation secessionists such as Quebec or Scottish nationalists.
From yesterday's Washington Post:
I speculated last week that the way the financial crisis swamped Iceland and seems to show the need for deep pockets and deep capital reserves within a financial system ("seems"-- I have no view about whether that's an economically true lesson to draw) probably did some damage to small-nation secessionists such as Quebec or Scottish nationalists.
From yesterday's Washington Post:
The massive bailout of banks has been widely received as welcome and necessary across the United Kingdom. But it has not been lost on Scots that the largest shareholder in Scotland's two largest banks is now the British government.
[...]
Prime Minister Gordon Brown, a native Scot but an outspoken advocate of keeping Scotland in the U.K. fold, seemed to go out of his way Tuesday to tweak advocates of independence, especially the SNP.
Brown said the $65 billion bailout of the Royal Bank of Scotland and the bank formed by the merger of Lloyds TSB and the Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) proved that the United Kingdom was "stronger together."
"We were able to act decisively with 37 billion pounds; that would not have been possible for a Scottish administration," said Brown, whose own political fortunes have been boosted by his handling of the crisis.
Others have pointed out that the bailout for eight major British banks -- including capital for banks and government loan guarantees -- is worth a total of almost $700 billion, which is about five times Scotland's annual gross domestic product.
Brown particularly seemed to taunt Alex Salmond, the SNP chief and head of the Scottish government, who has said he wants an independent Scotland to be part of an "arc of prosperity" stretching from Iceland to Ireland to Norway.
The SNP Web site speaks admiringly of Iceland as "the sixth most prosperous country in the world," words that were written before last week's massive banking and economic crash, which nearly bankrupted the country.
"We've seen the problems in Iceland; we've seen the problems in Ireland. We were able to put the whole strength of the United Kingdom's resources behind these two banks" in Scotland, Brown said, provoking an irritated response from Salmond. [...]
Wednesday, October 15, 2008
Canadian Conservatives and Quebec secession
I don't think I say anything that's not pretty obvious, but for what it's wort, I take part in a colloquy with Ilya Somin and others chez Volokh about why the Tories don't support the secession of a province thatseems so determined to keep them out of a governing majority.
I don't think I say anything that's not pretty obvious, but for what it's wort, I take part in a colloquy with Ilya Somin and others chez Volokh about why the Tories don't support the secession of a province thatseems so determined to keep them out of a governing majority.
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