

Small-Donor Matching Funds for New York State Elections: A Policy Analysis of the Potential Impact and Cost*

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Campaign finance will be high on the legislative agenda for the New York State Assembly and Senate in 2019. Governor Andrew Cuomo's Executive Budget in January included proposals to create a small-donor matching fund system for state elections modeled after the successful one in New York City. The proposal would also reduce the state's high contribution limits and eliminate a loophole in current law that benefits limited liability corporations (LLCs). The goal would be to combat corruption and the appearance of corruption by making the state's elected officials less dependent on large donors while at the same time heightening the connections between public officials and their less wealthy constituents. With the Majority Leaders in both chambers having sponsored similar bills in the past, the prospects for passage look higher than they have been for decades.

This report hopes to inform discussions over these proposals by analyzing some of the major effects a new law would be likely to have. The conclusions are derived from a rigorous analysis of how the key provisions in the Governor's package would have affected each of the candidates who ran in 2018. The analysis uses the reports that candidates filed with the New York State Board of Elections for the full 2018 election cycle, after the records were processed and standardized by the National Institute on Money in Politics (NIMP).

KEY FINDINGS

- Instead of a system dominated by large donors, it is likely small donors would generate more money than any other part of the fundraising whole.
- Virtually every candidate would be better off financially.
- The cost would be modest – less than one penny per day per New Yorker.
- One problem: The bill's qualifying rules for public funds would prevent many from participating and need to be rethought.

* This paper revises [one CFI published in December 2018](#). The earlier paper was based on post-election campaign finance data filed at the end of November. While the new paper's conclusions are unchanged, all of the data are new and the text has been revised.

† The Campaign Finance Institute (CFI) is a nonpartisan and rigorously objective research institute founded in 1999. In 2018 CFI became part of the equally nonpartisan and objective National Institute on Money in Politics. Michael J. Malbin was co-founder and remains the director of CFI. He is also a Professor of Political Science at the University at Albany (SUNY). Brendan Glavin is CFI's senior data analyst.

SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

The key findings to emerge from the analysis were these:

- Lowering the contribution limits and instituting a system of matching funds would substantially increase the importance of small donors to candidates across the board while decreasing their dependence on large donors.
- Virtually every candidate in the system, with only a few exceptions, would be better off financially under the new system than under the status quo.
- The cost would be modest – less than one penny per day for each New Yorker over the course of four years.
- The one major problem with the proposal as currently drafted is that the requirements to qualify for matching funds are set too high for most candidates. Without an adjustment, many would not benefit as intended. However, a simple adjustment would correct the problem.

The outline of the paper is as follows:

- The analysis begins by summarizing the governor’s most recent proposal.
- It then describes the data and methodology used.
- The first (and longest) section of the results views the proposal’s likely effects on the balance of funds candidates would receive from small and large donors.
- Next it considers whether candidates will be better or worse off financially than they were under the *status quo*. (An appendix provides this information for each major party candidate in the 2018 general election.)
- The following section will estimate the program’s cost.
- The report next describes a problem with the current proposal’s qualification requirements.
- Finally, the conclusion places the proposal in the context of other state and local public campaign finance proposals in recent years.

THE GOVERNOR’S PROPOSAL

Governor Cuomo’s most recent campaign finance proposal differs only slightly from ones he has introduced since taking office in 2011. (CFI’s analyses of these earlier bills and others may be found [here](#).) The key provisions are as follows:

- **Contribution limits:** under current law, an individual donor in 2018 was allowed to contribute up to \$8,800 in a primary and general election combined to a candidate for the Assembly, \$18,000 to a Senate candidate, and anywhere from \$51,000 to \$65,000 to a candidate for governor or other statewide office. These are the country’s highest contribution limits among the 38 states that limit individual donors. Under the proposed bill there would be different limits for candidates who choose to participate in a public matching fund system (see below)

and those who do not. For non-participants the limits for primary and general election combined would drop to \$6,000 for the Assembly, \$10,000 for the Senate, and \$25,000 for statewide office. For candidates who choose to participate, the limits would be \$4,000 for the Assembly, \$8,000 for the Senate, and \$12,000 for statewide office.

- **Public campaign financing:** Under the governor’s proposal, New York State would introduce a new, voluntary program to provide public matching funds to candidates.
 - **Matching rates:** Under this program, candidates who meet minimum qualifying threshold requirements would receive \$6 in public matching funds for every \$1 they raise, up to the first \$175 per donor. Under this formula a \$175 contribution would be worth \$1,225 to a candidate. It is the same formula New York City used for the elections of 2011 through 2017. (In 2018, the city’s voters approved a revision to the city’s charter that would increase the matching rate to eight to one.)
 - **Caps:** The governor’s proposal would not impose a spending limit on candidates, but it would place a cap on the maximum amount of public money that any one candidate could receive. The caps ranged from \$350,000 for the Assembly (primary and general election combined) and \$750,000 for the state Senate to \$18 million for governor. In the scenarios developed later in this paper, all matching fund caps were applied where appropriate.
 - **Qualification thresholds:** To qualify for public funds, candidates must raise a minimum amount of money from at least a minimum number of donors. For statewide candidates these donors must be residents of New York. For legislative candidates, qualifying donors must live in the district the candidate is seeking to represent. The qualification requirements vary by office.

DATA AND METHODS

The analysis of the proposal’s potential impact began with each candidate’s Election Board filings. We assumed that every donor who gave to a candidate in a past election would continue to give the same amount, up until the maximum amount that would be allowed under the new contribution limits. To determine how much each donor gave to each candidate in the aggregate, one must first decide which of a set of similar seeming names in fact belong to the same person. NIMP’s standardization procedures assign unique identifiers to donors, allowing us to calculate how much each donor gave in total and to each individual candidate. This donor-candidate matching procedure lets us determine how much of each donor’s aggregate contributions (if anything) the candidate would lose to a new contribution limit. It also gives us the basis for calculating how much of the donor’s contribution would be eligible for matching and, with that, how much matching money the candidate would receive as a result. This procedure was followed for each of the many thousands of donor-candidate pairs in the records. The sum of the matching funds calculated in this manner, limited by each candidate’s public funding cap, also gives us the basis for calculating the new program’s cost.

While it was straightforward to determine how much of a donor’s gift would be lost under a new contribution limit, the procedure was more complicated for limited liability corporations (LLCs). New York State lets corporations contribute a total of \$5,000 per year to all candidates combined. However, the law also lets LLCs contribute as if they were individuals, with no aggregate contribution limit. This

loophole permitted one LLC to contribute as much as \$197,700 to candidates in 2018. The proposal would restrict LLCs to the same aggregate \$5,000 limit as applies to other corporations.

To calculate how the candidates of 2018 would have fared financially under the new rules, therefore, we had to calculate how much each LLC would be like to have contributed to each candidate if the new rules had been in place. Under the current system, LLCs could make dozens of contributions aggregating to many thousands of dollars. (The three most active LLCs in 2018 each gave at least forty contributions for an average cumulative total of \$174,800.) It would have been easy, and not too far off the mark, to have treated all of the LLC contributions as if they had effectively been zeroed out. Instead, this study took each LLC's contributions to all of the 2018 candidates, calculated what portion of its total it gave to each candidate, and then proportionally allocated the new \$5,000 aggregate cap for LLCs to each of the candidates the LLC had supported. For example, if an LLC gave 10% of its total contributions to a particular candidate in 2018, we assumed the LLC would give the same candidate 10% of the \$5,000 limit under the new rules. While it is highly unlikely that LLCs would follow so complicated a procedure, we could think of no other objective way to allocate their funds under the proposed hypothetical.

When calculating the impact of the new rules on past donors and candidates, the analysis does not take into account the fact that new rules will sometimes lead donors to alter their behavior. For example, if \$175 will be worth \$1,225, a previous \$1,000 donor may decide to divide her/his money among several candidates. We expect this will happen, but there is no way to estimate the extent or direction of this kind of change in our scenario.

Similarly, the analyses will assume that every candidate chooses to participate in the voluntary public financing system. This will not occur in fact. Self-financing candidates and candidates with ready access to large contributions may prefer to opt out. However, the program's impact on candidates will be better understood by making this assumption for the purpose of projecting outcomes.

Finally, our first set of estimates calculates the impact of the proposed system on the sources of candidates' funds. Each comparison involves three scenarios. The first presents the situation as it actually existed in 2018. The second presents what the distribution would look like if all of the same donors continue to give as much as they did previously (but only up to the new contribution limit) and matching funds (with caps) are introduced. Under this scenario, we imagine no new donors coming into the system. Of course, one of the stated reasons for creating a matching fund system is to stimulate participation by new donors who give small amounts of money to their favored candidates. Therefore, we have also created a third scenario in which we estimated the outcomes if new donors participated.




It is difficult to estimate how many new donors might be drawn into the system, but there are some guidelines. For many years, candidates running for office in New York State raised their money from a lower proportion of the state's adults than in all but a handful of other states. In 2014, [only 0.5%](#) of New York's adult population gave any money at all to a state legislative or gubernatorial candidate. Spirited Democratic primary campaigns for the Senate and Governorship brought the number of small donors up in 2018, but still not up to the level that New York City achieves in a contested election year with its matching fund program. About 1.5% of the adult population contributed to mayoral and city council candidates in 2013, a year with contested mayoral primaries in both parties. While it would not be prudent to *predict* that New York State's elections will draw this number of donors immediately, it is a reasonable number to hold out as a goal for comparison. In fact, 1.5% was still below the donor participation rate of a dozen states in 2014. For the purpose of this third scenario, therefore, we assumed that (a) enough new donors would come into the system to bring the donor pool up to 1.5% of

the adult population, (b) each of the new donors would give \$50, and (c) the new donors would be distributed among the existing candidates in the same proportion as the donors of 2018.

RESULTS: SOURCES OF FUNDS

The next three pages present a series of bar charts, with three charts per page. The top chart on the first page shows the actual sources of funds for Assembly candidates in 2018. The middle chart shows how the distribution would have looked for the same Assembly candidates with the same donors, the proposed contribution limits, and matching funds. The third (or bottom) chart shows the distribution with enough new \$50 donors to bring donor participation up to 1.5% of the adult population. In the charts that include matching fund money, the public funds are incorporated into the same bars as the donors who trigger the match. The following two pages repeat the same three charts for the 2018 Senate and Gubernatorial candidates. Similar charts for other statewide candidates and for all 2014 candidates are available on request. They are not reproduced here because their basic shapes are similar to the ones shown.




**Figure 1. 2018 NYS Assembly Candidates:
Sources of Funds Now and Under the Proposed Matching Fund Bill**



NOTES: NPO = Non-party organizations, including PACS. LLC = Limited Liability Corporation.




SOURCE: The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics

**Figure 2. 2018 NYS Senate Candidates:
Sources of Funds Now and Under the Proposed Matching Fund Bill**



NOTES: NPO = Non-party organizations, including PACS. LLC = Limited Liability Corporation.
SOURCE: The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics

**Figure 3. 2018 NYS Gubernatorial Candidates:
Sources of Funds Now and Under the Proposed Matching Fund Bill**



NOTES: NPO = Non-party organizations, including PACS. LLC = Limited Liability Corporation.
SOURCE: The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics

As these charts should make clear, the new contribution limits and small-donor matching funds would fundamentally alter the sources of financial support for New York State candidates. In 2018, Assembly candidates raised a combined 64% of their money from non-party organizations, LLCs and individuals who gave them \$1,000 or more. Only 10% came from small donors who gave \$175 or less. With matching funds, lower contribution limits, and no new donors, the small-donor portion would more than triple (to 32%) while the large-donor proportions (NPOs, LLCs and individuals who give \$1,000 or more) would be cut almost in half (33%). At this level, and with no new donors, the large donors would be roughly equal to the small donors. If one adds new donors, the small donors would become the most important donors in the system, accounting for 41% of all candidates' receipts.

The story for Senate candidates would be fundamentally the same. The three large-donor bars would shrink from 67% to 36% while the small-donor proportion would multiply by more than six (from 5% to 33%). And for the gubernatorial candidates, the large-donor portion would shrink from an astounding 92% to 49%. In all three cases, we can see that instead of being an afterthought, small donors would become the single most important component of candidates' campaign fundraising strategies.

WILL THE CANDIDATES BE BETTER OR WORSE OFF?

All of these results depend upon one crucial factor. Public financing systems must be voluntary under existing constitutional law. As a result, no system can achieve its intended effects unless candidates freely choose to join in. For some candidates, the decision might be easy. Some will participate because of the political signal it sends. Others will opt in because it relieves them from dialing for dollars or holding out their hands to collect checks in a board room. And for still others – those who do not have access to large contributions – public financing may be the lifeline that gives them a chance to compete.

But for many candidates the decision will be rooted in practicality. It will depend upon whether opting into the new system would leave them financially ahead or behind where they would stand by opting out. The following table shows the percentage of 2018 candidates who would have been ahead financially with the new system’s contribution limits and public matching funds. The table compares a matching fund system with no new donors (the middle of the previous bar charts) to the system that actually prevailed in 2018. The data *understate* the incentives for participating in two ways: (1) First, it assumes the participating candidates do nothing to recruit new donors. (2) Second, it compares participating candidates to ones who use the contribution limits that were then in effect. But the LLC loophole has already been abolished. And if the proposal becomes law, non-participating candidates will have to follow lower contribution limits than they did in 2018 (although higher than the limits for participating candidates). As a result, the financial calculations will favor opting in even more than these tables suggest.

Table 1. Number and Percentage of Candidates Who Would Have Gained or Lost under the Proposed System as Compared to the Status Quo, assuming the same donors				
	2018 Candidates			
	Net Gain		Net Loss	
	#	%	#	%
Assembly	229	94%	15	6%
Senate	107	91%	11	9%
Governor	5	83%	1	17%
Attorney General	4	57%	3	43%
Comptroller	2	67%	1	33%
Lt. Gov.	2	100%	0	0%

SOURCE: The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics

This table shows that almost all Assembly candidates, most Senate candidates, and a strong majority of the statewide candidates would be better off under the new system than under the status quo. The clear exceptions would include the sitting governor and two or three of the eleven Senate candidates who showed a significant net loss. The remaining Senate candidates would have needed only a few new donors to have come out ahead. Similarly, in the Assembly only two of the fifteen showed a significant loss. A complete list of candidates, showing how each would have fared, is attached to this report as an appendix.

HOW MUCH WOULD THE SYSTEM COST?

One frequent complaint about public financing is about how much the system supposedly costs. How much may be too much is inherently subjective. From some perspectives, the projected cost looks like a bargain.

The following table provides high estimates for the likely cost of a new system by assuming that all candidates opt in. One set of figures shows the cost with no new donors. The other assumes an optimistic 1.5% of adults giving. In both cases, we also assume that public financing will bring at least some new candidates into the system. To estimate the costs for these new candidates, we imagine that all candidates will face at least some opposition in either a primary or general election and that the new candidates will require the same amount of public money as the average non-incumbent.

Finally, we note that these calculations only cover the cost of matching funds. The system will also have significant administrative costs for rulemaking, record keeping, analysis, auditing, and other compliance functions. The Campaign Finance Institute has no basis for estimating these administrative costs, which include staff, office space, equipment, and other items. However, a New York State Senate Committee five years ago asked the New York City Campaign Finance Board (NYCCFB) to provide such an estimate for an almost identical bill. The NYCCFB did so in a letter dated June 10, 2013. (The five-page letter was made public at the time and is available from the authors upon request.) For our purposes, we assume these estimates remain valid and include them in our table. The letter estimated that the annual cost would fall somewhere between \$17.52 million and \$20.94 million. Our table uses the NYCCFB's high estimate. It is not possible to subdivide these costs across types of candidates, but the full cost is labeled and included in our totals.

Table 2. The Potential Cost of Matching Funds				
Same Donors				
	Legislature	Governor	Other Statewide	Total
ASSUMING ALL 2018 CANDIDATES HAD PARTICIPATED				
Four-year matching fund cost, same candidates	\$86,554,716	\$12,546,180	\$8,560,584	\$107,661,480
Four-year matching fund cost, new candidates	\$16,513,893			\$16,513,893
Four-year matching fund cost, total	\$103,068,609	\$12,546,180	\$8,560,584	\$124,175,373
Annual matching fund cost (average / 4 years)	\$25,767,152	\$3,136,545	\$2,140,146	\$31,043,843
Annual administrative cost				\$20,940,000
Combined annual cost				\$51,983,843
Annual cost, per New Yorker				\$2.62
New Donors (to 1.5% of Adults)				
	Legislature	Governor	Other Statewide	Total
ASSUMING ALL 2018 CANDIDATES HAD PARTICIPATED				
Four-year matching fund cost, same candidates	\$102,732,212	\$20,568,279	\$10,358,136	\$133,658,627
Four-year matching fund cost, new candidates	\$20,725,729			\$20,725,729
Four-year matching fund cost, total	\$123,457,941	\$20,568,279	\$10,358,136	\$154,384,356
Annual matching fund cost (average / 4 years)	\$30,864,485	\$5,142,070	\$2,589,534	\$38,596,089.00
Annual administrative cost				\$20,940,000
Combined annual cost				\$59,536,089
Annual cost, per New Yorker				\$3.00
SOURCE: The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics				

Table 2 shows:

- The cost of matching funds over a full four-year election cycle would be about \$124.2 million with no new donors in the system. This includes one election for the statewide offices and two sets of regular elections for the legislature.
- The cost of matching funds would go up to about \$154.4 million if 1.5% of the state's adult population made contributions.
- On a per year basis, this averages out to \$31 million per year with the same donors and \$38.6 million with new donors.
- Adding \$20.9 million in administrative costs bring the average annual total to \$52 million with the same donors and \$60 million with new donors.
- If we divide this cost by the number of people who live in New York (19.85 million in 2017), that means the cost of the program, including administrative overhead, would be \$2.62 per New Yorker per year if there were no new donors and \$3.00 with new donors.
- Either way, the cost per New Yorker would be less than a penny per day.

Finally, it should be emphasized that these are very conservative (high) estimates. They assume that every candidate participates. They also assume a generous number of new candidates will be drawn into the system. (The procedures for estimating new candidates are contained in an appendix.) And finally, they assume the upper end of the range for administrative costs. The real cost is likely to be less.

QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS SHOULD NOT BECOME BARRIERS

All of the previous tables and charts assume not only that candidates would want to participate in public financing but that they would qualify to do so. All public financing systems set some requirements before candidates can qualify to receive public money. This protects the government’s resources from being spent to underwrite frivolous campaigns. Qualifying thresholds are particularly important in jurisdictions that provide full public funding grants large enough to pay for all of a campaign’s costs. These flat-grant or “Clean Election” programs exist in Arizona, Maine, and Connecticut. Having a high threshold is somewhat less important in a matching funds system because candidates who qualify still have to raise private funds to receive a public match. Having some kind of a threshold can protect the system against non-serious adventurers, but setting the threshold too high may prevent the system from achieving its basic goals.

When policy makers set threshold requirements, they often are flying blind with little to guide their instincts. This has been true in most jurisdictions. Fortunately, the methods used to create the estimates in this study also provide a firmer basis for estimating the effects of these requirements. For this study, we asked how many of the 2018 candidates would have qualified for public matching funds under three different sets of requirements. The first is the proposal Governor Cuomo has put forward. The second and third are hypotheticals with easier requirements. The proposals are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3. Three Sets of Qualifying Thresholds		
	Total Amount Required	Other requirements
GOVERNOR’S PROPOSAL		
Assembly	\$10,000	At least 100 in-district donors whose contributions to the candidate aggregate to \$10-\$175.
Senate	\$20,000	At least 200 in-district donors whose contributions to the candidate aggregate to \$10-\$175.
Governor	\$650,000	At least 6,500 in-state donors whose contributions to the candidate aggregate to \$10-\$175.
THRESHOLDS WITH LOWER TOTALS, FEWER CONTRIBUTIONS NEEDED, MUST BE IN-DISTRICT, AND MUST BE BETWEEN \$10-175.		
Assembly	\$5,000	At least 50 in-district donors whose contributions to the candidate aggregate to \$10-\$175.
Senate	\$10,000	At least 100 in-district donors whose contributions to the candidate aggregate to \$10-\$175.
Governor	\$400,000	At least 2,000 in-state donors whose contributions to the candidate aggregate to \$10-\$175.
THRESHOLDS WITH LOWER TOTALS, FEWER CONTRIBUTIONS NEEDED, MUST BE IN-DISTRICT, IN ANY MATCHABLE AMOUNT		
Assembly	\$5,000	At least 50 in-district donors giving any matchable amount
Senate	\$10,000	At least 100 in-district donors giving any matchable amount
Governor	\$400,000	At least 2,000 in-state donors giving any matchable amount

As the above table shows, the thresholds vary in three ways: the total amount of money each candidate has to raise from “qualifying” contributions; the number of donors who must make qualifying contributions to each candidate; and whether one can count toward the qualification requirements any donors whose matchable contributions to a candidate exceed \$175.

The next table shows the percentage of 2018 candidates running for each office who would have qualified for matching funds under these three sets of requirements. Only candidates who filed financial reports with the Board of Elections are counted. Because we have not had the time to geo-code the donors by their legislative districts, we counted all in-state donors to Assembly and Senate candidates as if they counted toward qualification. As a result, even fewer legislative candidates would have qualified than these numbers suggest.

The results are shown in two columns. The column on the right shows the percentage of candidates who would have qualified by the end of the full two-year cycle, based on all contributions during the cycle. However, candidates must receive matching funds *during* the campaign for the money to be useful. Therefore, the middle column shows the percentage who would have qualified by September 1.

Table 4. Percentage of 2018 Candidates Who Would Have Qualified for Matching Funds Under Four Different Qualifying Thresholds, Assuming the Same Donors Only		
	By September 1	Over the full Two-Year Cycle
GOVERNOR'S PROPOSAL		
Assembly	28%	37%
Senate	29%	39%
Governor	17%	17%
THRESHOLDS WITH LOWER TOTALS, FEWER CONTRIBUTIONS NEEDED, MUST BE IN-DISTRICT, AND MUST BE BETWEEN \$10-175.		
Assembly	53%	62%
Senate	46%	59%
Governor	33%	50%
THRESHOLDS WITH LOWER TOTALS, FEWER CONTRIBUTIONS NEEDED, MUST BE IN-DISTRICT, IN ANY MATCHABLE AMOUNT		
Assembly	69%	74%
Senate	65%	72%
Governor	50%	67%

These tables make it clear that it would be tough for most candidates to qualify for matching funds under the governor's proposal. Less than 30% would have qualified by September 1; less than 40% by the end of the year. We did not present categories of candidates in the table, but this is a problem that would plague incumbents from both major parties as well as challengers.

Even with easier requirements, many candidates will have to change their behavior to qualify. Of course, the goal is precisely to persuade the candidates to change. It is to give them a good reason to look for small donors from their districts. But the goal must be within reach for the candidates to bother trying. If they do not, the system will have failed. At the same time, the potential risk from setting the threshold too low seems minimal. Therefore, the sponsors would be well advised to revise the qualification requirements downward as they perfect a new bill.

CONCLUSION

Gov. Cuomo has proposed public matching fund programs since he took office in 2011, but the proposals have foundered in the Senate. The political situation has now changed. After the 2018 election put Democrats in a clear majority in both chambers, the Assembly and Senate will each have as its leader someone who has been on record as a sponsor of small-donor matching funds. While nothing can ever be certain, the odds clearly have changed.

In 2010, as is well known, the U.S. Supreme Court in *Citizen United v. FEC* paved the way for mega-donors to underwrite independent spending. In that same year, in a decision that dealt a setback to one specific feature of Clean Elections-style systems, the Supreme Court upheld public financing more broadly. Since these cases local governments in Washington DC, Baltimore (Maryland), Montgomery County (Maryland), Howard County (Maryland), Prince George's County (Maryland), Suffolk County (New York), Seattle (Washington), and Denver (Colorado) have taken steps to enact or implement new matching fund or voucher systems. New York City and Los Angeles have upgraded theirs. Washington State narrowly turned back a referendum for vouchers in 2016. South Dakota adopted a voucher referendum in 2016 only to have it reversed by the legislature in 2017. Despite all of this action, no *state* has adopted and successfully implemented a public financing system for gubernatorial and legislative elections since Connecticut in 2006. New York's would be the first new system statewide since *Citizens United*. If adopted, it would surely be taken as a signpost by others.

APPENDIX A

ESTIMATING THE NUMBER OF NEW CANDIDATES AND THE COST FOR THEIR MATCHING FUNDS

Table 2 of this paper estimates the potential cost of matching funds. Much of the paper relies on estimates based on the candidates who actually ran in 2018 and the first line of Table 2 does the same. In doing so, it captures all candidates who raised or spent enough money to file campaign finance reports. However, it seems likely that a new matching fund system would encourage more candidates to run, particularly for the Assembly and Senate. (The statewide races were already contested.) The question when estimating costs is how to get a handle on how many would run over four years.

To do so, we considered the pool of candidates in 2016 as well as 2018. For the sake of this cost estimate, we wanted to be generous with respect to the number of candidates, and more candidates ran in 2016 than 2018. We then made different assumptions for primaries than general elections.

Primary Elections: There were only 39 challengers who ran and lost Senate or Assembly primary election campaigns in 2016 and 2018 combined. For the purpose of reaching a conservative (high) estimate of the cost, we assumed that *four times* that number would run under the new system. We also assumed for the “no new donors” scenario that each new candidate would raise the same amount and have the same donor profile as the candidates who did run and lose. The average matching fund cost for these was \$46,000 for Assembly candidates and \$89,000 per Senate candidate. We then applied the same averages per candidate to the new candidate pool to arrive at the estimated matching fund cost for the new candidates in the primaries. The total cost for new candidates in the primaries would be \$6.5 million with the same donors and \$8.8 million with new donors.

General Elections: For the general election, we used a somewhat more complicated method. Slightly more than half of the districts already had two major party general election candidates in 2016 and 2018. The challenge was to estimate how many new candidates would run in the other districts. In the Assembly, there were 96 such districts in 2016 and 91 in 2018. In the Senate, there were 31 in 2016 and 30 in 2018. We did not want to assume that every district would have two major-party candidates running in the general election because too many of the state’s districts fall within parts of New York City with few Republican voters. However, we did want to assure enough public funding for at least one primary or general election challenger in every district. Quadrupling the number of losing primary candidates statewide should be enough to cover all of the districts in the city. Outside the city, we assumed at least one general election challenger in every district. This added 82 Assembly and 18 Senate candidates over four years. We also assumed, as we did in the primaries, that each of the new emergent candidates would qualify for the same amount of matching funds, on average, as the ones who did run. These are both very generous assumptions. The estimate added 87 Assembly candidates over the two cycles at \$62,000 each. It added 18 Senate candidates at \$255,000 each. The total for new general election candidates would be \$10 million with the same donors and \$11.9 million with new donors.

Combined cost for new candidates: \$16.5 million with the same donors; \$20.7 million with new donors.

APPENDIX B

HOW EACH OF THE CANDIDATES WHO RAN IN 2018 WOULD HAVE FARED FINANCIALLY UNDER THE PROPOSED SYSTEM

The following pages show how each of the major party general election candidates in 2018 would have fared under the proposed system's contribution limits and matching funds. The table contains the following information: the candidate's name, district, party, incumbency status, whether the candidate won or lost, and then three pieces of financial information assuming the same donors or new donors: how much the candidate actually raised in 2018; how much we estimate the candidate would have raised under the proposed system, and the net gain or loss.

One caveat should be expressed. A number of candidates show little increase in receipts from an increased donor pool. This stems from the way we made the estimates and is not meant to be predictive. There would have to be an 83% increase in the number of donors for 1.5% of the state's adults to contribute. We therefore decided to increase each candidate's small-donor dollars by 83% over the actual small-donor receipts in 2018. This is plausible for estimating in the aggregate but less so for individuals. A candidate who raised little money from small donors would not get much by boosting a small number by 83%. But for some, it would not take a great effort to triple their money (or more) from these sources. On the individual level, we therefore believe that the results understate the potential benefits for candidates who relied mostly on large donations in 2018.

Appendix B1: 2018 Statewide Candidates Under Governor Cuomo's Public Funding Proposal - Major Party General Election Candidates

Notes: The first comparison shows how candidates would fare with their actual 2018 donor pool. The second comparison shows how they would fare if the proposal brought more small donors into the system. The amount of small donors added is based on increasing donor participation to 1.5% of the voting age population, across legislative and gubernatorial elections. This is done by increasing small donors, each giving \$50. If candidates did not already have any small matchable donors (\$100), no new ones are added.

The table includes some candidates who were on the ballot, but have no reported receipts.

Candidate	Party	ICO*	Status	Comparing 2018 Candidates (Same Donors) v. Status Quo			Comparing 2018 Candidates (w/New Donors) v. Status Quo		
				Actual Total Receipts (less Self-Funding)	Projected Adjusted Total Receipts	Net Gain/Loss From Status Quo for Participating Candidates	Actual Total Receipts (less Self-Funding)	Projected Adjusted Total Receipts	Net Gain/Loss From Status Quo for Participating Candidates
Governor									
CUOMO, ANDREW M	DEM	I	Won-General	\$36,805,338	\$19,575,189	-\$17,230,149	\$36,805,338	\$19,900,521	-\$16,904,817
MOLINARO, MARCUS (MARC)	REP	C	Lost-General	\$2,266,214	\$4,347,673	\$2,081,459	\$2,266,214	\$5,380,067	\$3,113,853
Attorney General									
JAMES, LETITIA (TISH)	DEM	O	Won-General	\$3,754,876	\$3,607,375	-\$147,501	\$3,754,876	\$3,911,539	\$156,663
WOFFORD, KEITH H	REP	O	Lost-General	\$1,951,553	\$1,639,463	-\$312,090	\$1,951,553	\$1,693,391	-\$258,162
Comptroller									
DINAPOLI, THOMAS P	DEM	I	Won-General	\$4,285,159	\$3,133,460	-\$1,151,699	\$4,285,159	\$3,324,520	-\$960,639
TRICHTER, JONATHAN	REP	C	Lost-General	\$254,021	\$279,737	\$25,716	\$254,021	\$293,099	\$39,078
Lt. Governor									
HOCHUL, KATHLEEN COURTNEY (KATHY)	DEM	I	Won-General	\$2,235,493	\$2,598,429	\$362,936	\$2,235,493	\$2,687,644	\$452,150
KILLIAN, JULIE	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0

* ICO stands for (I) Incumbent; (C) Challenger, (O) Open Seat

Appendix B2: 2018 Senate Candidates Under Governor Cuomo's Public Funding Proposal - Major Party General Election Candidates

Notes: The first comparison shows how candidates would fare with their actual 2018 donor pool. The second comparison shows how they would fare if the proposal brought more small donors into the system. The amount of small donors added is based on increasing donor participation to 1.5% of the voting age population, across legislative and gubernatorial elections. This is done by increasing small donors, each giving \$50. If candidates did not already have any small matchable donors (\$100), no new ones are added.

The table includes some candidates who were on the ballot, but have no reported receipts.

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					Actual Total Receipts (less Self-Funding)	Projected Adjusted Total Receipts	Net Gain/Loss From Status Quo for Participating Candidates	Actual Total Receipts (less Self-Funding)	Projected Adjusted Total Receipts	Net Gain/Loss From Status Quo for Participating Candidates
LAVALLE, KENNETH P	1	REP	I	Won-General	\$175,460	\$258,245	\$82,785	\$175,460	\$265,805	\$90,345
FISCHER, GREG	1	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
FLANAGAN JR, JOHN J	2	REP	I	Won-General	\$1,203,069	\$973,511	-\$229,558	\$1,203,069	\$980,063	-\$223,006
CLEARY, KATHLEEN BRADBURY	2	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$57,667	\$134,553	\$76,886	\$57,667	\$167,218	\$109,552
MURRAY, DEAN	3	REP	O	Lost-General	\$783,166	\$850,569	\$67,403	\$783,166	\$875,108	\$91,942
MARTINEZ, MONICA	3	DEM	O	Won-General	\$581,406	\$713,082	\$131,676	\$581,406	\$819,678	\$238,272
BOYLE, PHILIP M	4	REP	I	Won-General	\$270,538	\$330,050	\$59,512	\$270,538	\$349,265	\$78,727
DAMARO, LOU	4	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$239,644	\$283,734	\$44,090	\$239,644	\$296,989	\$57,345
GAUGHRAN, JAMES	5	DEM	C	Won-General	\$1,221,360	\$1,413,517	\$192,157	\$1,221,360	\$1,413,517	\$192,157
MARCELLINO, CARL L	5	REP	I	Lost-General	\$1,245,146	\$1,283,967	\$38,821	\$1,245,146	\$1,296,063	\$50,917
HANNON, KEMP	6	REP	I	Lost-General	\$463,613	\$473,844	\$10,231	\$463,613	\$479,199	\$15,586
THOMAS, KEVIN	6	DEM	C	Won-General	\$118,439	\$282,575	\$164,136	\$118,439	\$347,875	\$229,436
PHILLIPS, ELAINE R	7	REP	I	Lost-General	\$1,315,596	\$1,481,414	\$165,818	\$1,315,596	\$1,504,157	\$188,561
KAPLAN, ANNA MONAHEMI	7	DEM	C	Won-General	\$799,621	\$1,055,100	\$255,479	\$799,621	\$1,055,100	\$255,479
BROOKS, JOHN E	8	DEM	I	Won-General	\$1,202,362	\$1,193,585	-\$8,777	\$1,202,362	\$1,228,928	\$26,566
PRAVATO, JEFFREY	8	REP	C	Lost-General	\$1,054,416	\$1,239,386	\$184,970	\$1,054,416	\$1,255,262	\$200,846
KAMINSKY, TODD D	9	DEM	I	Won-General	\$1,337,421	\$1,368,360	\$30,939	\$1,337,421	\$1,409,310	\$71,889
BECKER JR, FRANCIS	9	REP	C	Lost-General	\$48,833	\$135,613	\$86,780	\$48,833	\$173,444	\$124,612
SANDERS JR, JAMES	10	DEM	I	Won-General	\$53,569	\$80,241	\$26,672	\$53,569	\$89,565	\$35,996
LIU, JOHN	11	DEM	O	Won-General	\$498,556	\$558,824	\$60,268	\$498,556	\$808,808	\$310,252
RAMOS, JESSICA	13	DEM	C	Won-General	\$437,750	\$960,212	\$522,462	\$437,750	\$969,302	\$531,552
COMRIE JR, LEROY	14	DEM	I	Won-General	\$80,939	\$136,473	\$55,534	\$80,939	\$169,737	\$88,798
SULLIVAN, THOMAS	15	REP	C	Lost-General	\$94,450	\$203,666	\$109,216	\$94,450	\$251,798	\$157,348
STAVISKY, TOBY ANN	16	DEM	I	Won-General	\$175,044	\$226,100	\$51,056	\$175,044	\$228,116	\$53,072
SALAZAR, JULIA	18	DEM	O	Won-General	\$276,017	\$778,182	\$502,165	\$276,017	\$789,210	\$513,193
PERSAUD, ROXANNE J	19	DEM	I	Won-General	\$57,225	\$111,973	\$54,748	\$57,225	\$121,045	\$63,820
FERRETTI, JEFFREY J	19	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
PARKER, KEVIN S	21	DEM	I	Won-General	\$376,720	\$535,841	\$159,121	\$376,720	\$574,208	\$197,488
SAVINO, DIANE J	23	DEM	I	Won-General	\$343,630	\$346,702	\$3,072	\$343,630	\$360,373	\$16,743
KRAINERT, DAVID	23	REP	C	Lost-General	\$1,053	\$7,371	\$6,318	\$1,053	\$10,647	\$9,594
LANZA, ANDREW J	24	REP	I	Won-General	\$284,035	\$340,271	\$56,236	\$284,035	\$355,895	\$71,860
KAVANAGH, BRIAN P	26	DEM	I	Won-General	\$109,378	\$136,246	\$26,868	\$109,378	\$151,429	\$42,051
ARIAS, ANTHONY	26	REP	C	Lost-General	\$13,307	\$25,327	\$12,020	\$13,307	\$30,115	\$16,808
HOYLMAN, BRAD M	27	DEM	I	Won-General	\$309,159	\$533,683	\$224,524	\$309,159	\$571,539	\$262,381
KRUEGER, LIZ	28	DEM	I	Won-General	\$102,075	\$106,325	\$4,250	\$102,075	\$110,861	\$8,786
HOLMBERG, PETER	28	REP	C	Lost-General	\$20,098	\$62,548	\$42,450	\$20,098	\$83,968	\$63,870
COLON, JOSE A	29	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0

Appendix B2: 2018 Senate Candidates Under Governor Cuomo's Public Funding Proposal - Major Party General Election Candidates

Notes: The first comparison shows how candidates would fare with their actual 2018 donor pool. The second comparison shows how they would fare if the proposal brought more small donors into the system. The amount of small donors added is based on increasing donor participation to 1.5% of the voting age population, across legislative and gubernatorial elections. This is done by increasing small donors, each giving \$50. If candidates did not already have any small matchable donors (\$100), no new ones are added.

The table includes some candidates who were on the ballot, but have no reported receipts.

Candidate	District	Party	ICO*	Status	Comparing 2018 Candidates (Same Donors) v. Status Quo			Comparing 2018 Candidates (w/New Donors) v. Status Quo		
					Actual Total Receipts (less Self-Funding)	Projected Adjusted Total Receipts	Net Gain/Loss From Status Quo for Participating Candidates	Actual Total Receipts (less Self-Funding)	Projected Adjusted Total Receipts	Net Gain/Loss From Status Quo for Participating Candidates
CRUMP, MELINDA	31	REP	C	Lost-General	\$1,500	\$2,550	\$1,050	\$1,500	\$2,550	\$1,050
SEPULVEDA, LUIS R	32	DEM	I	Won-General	\$198,833	\$213,973	\$15,140	\$198,833	\$246,922	\$48,089
DELICES, PATRICK	32	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
DENIS, MIGDALIA	32	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
RIVERA, J GUSTAVO	33	DEM	I	Won-General	\$322,490	\$349,271	\$26,781	\$322,490	\$353,807	\$31,317
BIAGGI, ALESSANDRA	34	DEM	C	Won-General	\$650,337	\$896,234	\$245,897	\$650,337	\$896,234	\$245,897
RIBUSTELLO, RICHARD A	34	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
STEWART-COUSINS, ANDREA	35	DEM	I	Won-General	\$1,021,623	\$1,056,948	\$35,325	\$1,021,623	\$1,154,472	\$132,849
BAILEY, JAMAAL T	36	DEM	I	Won-General	\$189,574	\$193,840	\$4,266	\$189,574	\$208,834	\$19,260
MAYER, SHELLEY B	37	DEM	I	Won-General	\$999,474	\$962,963	-\$36,511	\$999,474	\$962,963	-\$36,511
CARLUCCI, DAVID S	38	DEM	I	Won-General	\$571,717	\$569,596	-\$2,121	\$571,717	\$600,756	\$29,039
SKOUFIS, JAMES G	39	DEM	O	Won-General	\$1,579,906	\$1,683,390	\$103,484	\$1,579,906	\$1,683,390	\$103,484
MURPHY, TERENCE P	40	REP	I	Lost-General	\$800,918	\$857,601	\$56,683	\$800,918	\$900,945	\$100,027
SMYTHE, KAREN STRAIN	41	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$697,805	\$970,705	\$272,900	\$697,805	\$970,705	\$272,900
SERINO, SUSAN J	41	REP	I	Won-General	\$442,172	\$588,671	\$146,499	\$442,172	\$627,731	\$185,559
RABBITT, ANN	42	REP	O	Lost-General	\$276,363	\$377,260	\$100,897	\$276,363	\$437,236	\$160,873
JORDAN, DAPHNE	43	REP	O	Won-General	\$583,290	\$662,902	\$79,612	\$583,290	\$710,782	\$127,492
GLADD, AARON	43	DEM	O	Lost-General	\$541,654	\$750,724	\$209,070	\$541,654	\$750,724	\$209,070
LITTLE, ELIZABETH O C (BETTY)	45	REP	I	Won-General	\$353,949	\$552,448	\$198,499	\$353,949	\$607,982	\$254,034
MARTZ, EMILY	45	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$75,234	\$271,050	\$195,816	\$75,234	\$337,320	\$262,086
AMEDORE JR, GEORGE A	46	REP	I	Won-General	\$385,683	\$442,531	\$56,848	\$385,683	\$462,250	\$76,567
GRIFFO, JOSEPH A	47	REP	I	Won-General	\$300,609	\$429,924	\$129,315	\$300,609	\$508,705	\$208,097
OSTRELICH, MICHELLE	49	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$205,299	\$544,499	\$339,200	\$205,299	\$544,499	\$339,200
TEDISCO II, JAMES N	49	REP	I	Won-General	\$215,528	\$361,273	\$145,745	\$215,528	\$460,322	\$244,794
MANNION, JOHN	50	DEM	O	Lost-General	\$484,821	\$699,718	\$214,897	\$484,821	\$789,634	\$304,813
SEWARD, JAMES L	51	REP	I	Won-General	\$559,181	\$690,326	\$131,145	\$559,181	\$740,474	\$181,293
ST GEORGE, JOYCE	51	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$88,758	\$177,506	\$88,748	\$88,758	\$234,773	\$146,015
AKSHAR II, FREDERICK J	52	REP	I	Won-General	\$493,213	\$647,374	\$154,161	\$493,213	\$704,181	\$210,968
MAY, RACHEL	53	DEM	C	Won-General	\$270,167	\$519,784	\$249,617	\$270,167	\$801,268	\$531,101
HELMING, PAMELA A	54	REP	I	Won-General	\$177,327	\$211,793	\$34,466	\$177,327	\$231,216	\$53,889
BALDRIDGE, KENAN	54	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$16,463	\$60,941	\$44,478	\$16,463	\$81,605	\$65,142
FUNKE, RICH	55	REP	I	Won-General	\$466,424	\$468,087	\$1,663	\$466,424	\$473,221	\$6,798
LUNSFORD, JENNIFER	55	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$117,459	\$364,914	\$247,455	\$117,459	\$476,664	\$359,205
COONEY, JEREMY	56	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$206,798	\$487,674	\$280,876	\$206,798	\$551,298	\$344,500
YOUNG, CATHARINE M	57	REP	I	Won-General	\$564,015	\$627,135	\$63,120	\$564,015	\$663,076	\$99,062
OMARA, THOMAS F (TOM)	58	REP	I	Won-General	\$248,094	\$406,555	\$158,461	\$248,094	\$419,338	\$171,244
KIRCHGESSNER, AMANDA	58	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$51,859	\$165,625	\$113,766	\$51,859	\$243,966	\$192,107

Appendix B2: 2018 Senate Candidates Under Governor Cuomo's Public Funding Proposal - Major Party General Election Candidates

Notes: The first comparison shows how candidates would fare with their actual 2018 donor pool. The second comparison shows how they would fare if the proposal brought more small donors into the system. The amount of small donors added is based on increasing donor participation to 1.5% of the voting age population, across legislative and gubernatorial elections. This is done by increasing small donors, each giving \$50. If candidates did not already have any small matchable donors (\$100), no new ones are added.

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					Actual Total Receipts (less Self-Funding)	Projected Adjusted Total Receipts	Net Gain/Loss From Status Quo for Participating Candidates	Actual Total Receipts (less Self-Funding)	Projected Adjusted Total Receipts	Net Gain/Loss From Status Quo for Participating Candidates
GALLIVAN, PATRICK M	59	REP	I	Won-General	\$268,701	\$491,578	\$222,877	\$268,701	\$548,782	\$280,081
JACOBS, CHRISTOPHER L	60	REP	I	Won-General	\$468,738	\$717,454	\$248,716	\$468,738	\$772,957	\$304,219
EL BEHAIRY, CARIMA	60	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$65,754	\$163,135	\$97,381	\$65,754	\$210,076	\$144,322
RANZENHOFER, MICHAEL H	61	REP	I	Won-General	\$623,762	\$734,363	\$110,601	\$623,762	\$753,263	\$129,501
SEAMANS, JOAN	61	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$112,700	\$239,485	\$126,785	\$112,700	\$315,558	\$202,858
ORTT, ROBERT G	62	REP	I	Won-General	\$227,383	\$431,599	\$204,216	\$227,383	\$549,774	\$322,391
KENNEDY, TIMOTHY M	63	DEM	I	Won-General	\$1,045,554	\$1,143,360	\$97,806	\$1,045,554	\$1,262,291	\$216,737

* ICO stands for (I) Incumbent; (C) Challenger, (O) Open Seat

Appendix B3: 2018 Assembly Candidates Under Governor Cuomo's Public Funding Proposal - Major Party General Election Candidates

Notes: The first comparison shows how candidates would fare with their actual 2018 donor pool. The second comparison shows how they would fare if the proposal brought more small donors into the system. The amount of small donors added is based on increasing donor participation to 1.5% of the voting age population, across legislative and gubernatorial elections. This is done by increasing small donors, each giving \$50. If candidates did not already have any small matchable donors (\$100), no new ones are added.

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					Actual Total Receipts (less Self-Funding)	Projected Adjusted Total Receipts	Net Gain/Loss From Status Quo for Participating Candidates	Actual Total Receipts (less Self-Funding)	Projected Adjusted Total Receipts	Net Gain/Loss From Status Quo for Participating Candidates
THIELE JR, FRED W	1	DEM	I	Won-General	\$22,825	\$46,375	\$23,550	\$22,825	\$54,691	\$31,866
OCONNOR, PATRICK	1	REP	C	Lost-General	\$250	\$250	\$0	\$250	\$250	\$0
PALUMBO, ANTHONY H	2	REP	I	Won-General	\$36,674	\$59,283	\$22,609	\$36,674	\$68,254	\$31,580
SMITH, RONA	2	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$34,103	\$77,390	\$43,287	\$34,103	\$91,754	\$57,651
DESTEPHANO, JOSEPH	3	REP	O	Won-General	\$36,797	\$92,117	\$55,320	\$36,797	\$109,253	\$72,456
PARKER, CLYDE	3	DEM	O	Lost-General	\$24,425	\$82,109	\$57,684	\$24,425	\$93,197	\$68,772
ENGLBRIGHT, STEVEN	4	DEM	I	Won-General	\$53,199	\$106,404	\$53,205	\$53,199	\$127,698	\$74,499
KALINOWSKI, CHRISTIAN	4	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
SMITH, DOUG	5	REP	I	Won-General	\$54,444	\$216,844	\$162,400	\$54,444	\$216,844	\$162,400
HALL, TIMOTHY	5	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
RAMOS, PHILIP R	6	DEM	I	Won-General	\$109,905	\$173,354	\$63,449	\$109,905	\$183,182	\$73,277
GARBARINO, ANDREW R	7	REP	I	Won-General	\$112,476	\$206,344	\$93,868	\$112,476	\$231,387	\$118,911
MURRAY, TOM	7	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$2,921	\$12,071	\$9,150	\$2,921	\$15,095	\$12,174
FITZPATRICK, MICHAEL J	8	REP	I	Won-General	\$50,250	\$87,050	\$36,800	\$50,250	\$92,090	\$41,840
MORRISSEY, DAVE	8	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
PELLEGRINO, CHRISTINE	9	DEM	I	Lost-General	\$482,579	\$529,362	\$46,783	\$482,579	\$529,362	\$46,783
LIPETRI, MICHAEL	9	REP	C	Won-General	\$62,043	\$172,851	\$110,808	\$62,043	\$198,555	\$136,512
STERN, STEVE	10	DEM	I	Won-General	\$101,028	\$173,490	\$72,462	\$101,028	\$195,502	\$94,474
WILLIAMS, JEREMY	10	REP	C	Lost-General	\$5,486	\$29,852	\$24,366	\$5,486	\$39,428	\$33,942
JEAN-PIERRE, KIMBERLY	11	DEM	I	Won-General	\$69,899	\$111,963	\$42,064	\$69,899	\$125,319	\$55,420
SABELLA, KEVIN	11	REP	C	Lost-General	\$3,678	\$9,972	\$6,294	\$3,678	\$14,823	\$11,145
RAIA, ANDREW	12	REP	I	Won-General	\$115,744	\$232,095	\$116,351	\$115,744	\$258,681	\$142,937
ROSEN, AVRUM J	12	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$29,511	\$50,779	\$21,268	\$29,511	\$58,276	\$28,765
LAVINE, CHARLES D	13	DEM	I	Won-General	\$53,524	\$137,838	\$84,314	\$53,524	\$157,223	\$103,699
MONTELEONE, ANDREW	13	REP	C	Lost-General	\$14,812	\$40,768	\$25,956	\$14,812	\$42,532	\$27,720
MCDONOUGH, DAVID G	14	REP	I	Won-General	\$48,274	\$85,818	\$37,544	\$48,274	\$93,378	\$45,104
REID, MICHAEL F	14	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$2,477	\$14,189	\$11,712	\$2,477	\$18,851	\$16,374
MONTESANO, MICHAEL A	15	REP	I	Won-General	\$58,425	\$104,393	\$45,968	\$58,425	\$112,709	\$54,284
FOLEY, ALLEN	15	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$53,573	\$88,979	\$35,406	\$53,573	\$116,019	\$62,446
DURSO, ANTHONY	16	DEM	I	Won-General	\$106,022	\$225,298	\$119,276	\$106,022	\$242,591	\$136,570
DIVINS JR, BYRON	16	REP	C	Lost-General	\$70,581	\$119,171	\$48,590	\$70,581	\$134,543	\$63,962
MIKULIN, JOHN	17	REP	I	Won-General	\$29,795	\$243,143	\$213,348	\$29,795	\$266,831	\$237,036
SNOW, KIMBERLY L	17	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
RAYNOR, TAYLOR	18	DEM	O	Won-General	\$144,405	\$200,595	\$56,190	\$144,405	\$228,037	\$83,633
LAMARRE, JAMES	18	REP	O	Lost-General	\$5,350	\$18,250	\$12,900	\$5,350	\$24,550	\$19,200
RA, EDWARD P	19	REP	I	Won-General	\$150,604	\$294,524	\$143,920	\$150,604	\$297,044	\$146,440
CARR, WILLIAM	19	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$19,720	\$48,200	\$28,480	\$19,720	\$62,564	\$42,844

Appendix B3: 2018 Assembly Candidates Under Governor Cuomo's Public Funding Proposal - Major Party General Election Candidates

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MILLER, MELISSA L	20	REP	I	Won-General	\$78,008	\$177,893	\$99,885	\$78,008	\$195,659	\$117,651
VIDES, JUAN	20	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$8,113	\$43,741	\$35,628	\$8,113	\$80,048	\$71,935
GRIFFIN, JUDY	21	DEM	C	Won-General	\$100,312	\$220,644	\$120,332	\$100,312	\$262,432	\$162,120
CURRAN, BRIAN F	21	REP	I	Lost-General	\$61,393	\$223,371	\$161,978	\$61,393	\$235,393	\$174,000
SOLAGES, MICHAELLE C	22	DEM	I	Won-General	\$44,580	\$50,686	\$6,106	\$44,580	\$54,718	\$10,138
MONCION, GONALD	22	REP	C	Lost-General	\$3,740	\$15,830	\$12,090	\$3,740	\$20,114	\$16,374
PHEFFER AMATO, STACEY G	23	DEM	I	Won-General	\$115,696	\$185,426	\$69,730	\$115,696	\$197,522	\$81,826
PECORINO, MATTHEW	23	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
WEPRIN, DAVID I	24	DEM	I	Won-General	\$221,073	\$369,278	\$148,205	\$221,073	\$369,278	\$148,205
ROZIC, NILY D	25	DEM	I	Won-General	\$51,735	\$96,511	\$44,776	\$51,735	\$117,427	\$65,692
BRAUNSTEIN, EDWARD C	26	DEM	I	Won-General	\$107,791	\$205,280	\$97,489	\$107,791	\$218,636	\$110,845
BRESSLER, DAVID L	26	REP	C	Lost-General	\$23,624	\$111,662	\$88,038	\$23,624	\$146,627	\$123,003
ROSENTHAL, DANIEL A	27	DEM	I	Won-General	\$60,277	\$104,673	\$44,396	\$60,277	\$111,729	\$51,452
HEVESI, ANDREW D	28	DEM	I	Won-General	\$62,897	\$64,984	\$2,087	\$62,897	\$67,819	\$4,922
MAIO, DANNIEL	28	REP	C	Lost-General	-\$452	-\$452	\$0	-\$452	-\$452	\$0
HYNDMAN, ALICIA L	29	DEM	I	Won-General	\$78,846	\$167,636	\$88,790	\$78,846	\$205,688	\$126,842
BARNWELL, BRIAN	30	DEM	I	Won-General	\$92,130	\$164,700	\$72,570	\$92,130	\$200,106	\$107,976
BUTKIEWICZ, ERIC	30	REP	C	Lost-General	\$5,363	\$33,527	\$28,164	\$5,363	\$52,421	\$47,058
TITUS, MICHELE R	31	DEM	I	Won-General	\$21,800	\$21,700	-\$100	\$21,800	\$22,960	\$1,160
COOK, VIVIAN E	32	DEM	I	Won-General	\$500	\$500	\$0	\$500	\$500	\$0
VANEL, CLYDE	33	DEM	I	Won-General	\$27,693	\$55,286	\$27,593	\$27,693	\$65,114	\$37,421
ETWAROO, LALITA	33	REP	C	Lost-General	\$500	\$1,550	\$1,050	\$500	\$1,550	\$1,050
DENDEKKER, MICHAEL G	34	DEM	I	Won-General	\$113,485	\$145,149	\$31,664	\$113,485	\$157,497	\$44,012
AUBRY, JEFFRION	35	DEM	I	Won-General	\$29,955	\$42,485	\$12,530	\$29,955	\$49,888	\$19,933
SIMOTAS, ARAVELLA	36	DEM	I	Won-General	\$80,400	\$130,750	\$50,350	\$80,400	\$132,514	\$52,114
NOLAN, CATHERINE T	37	DEM	I	Won-General	\$108,999	\$175,734	\$66,735	\$108,999	\$195,390	\$86,391
MILLER, MICHAEL G	38	DEM	I	Won-General	\$38,661	\$75,077	\$36,416	\$38,661	\$85,913	\$47,252
CRUZ, CATALINA	39	DEM	C	Won-General	\$229,539	\$576,334	\$346,795	\$229,539	\$576,334	\$346,795
KIM, RONALD T	40	DEM	I	Won-General	\$66,920	\$117,502	\$50,582	\$66,920	\$120,526	\$53,606
WEINSTEIN, HELENE E	41	DEM	I	Won-General	\$106,700	\$104,033	-\$2,667	\$106,700	\$104,537	-\$2,163
BICHOTTE, RODNEYSE	42	DEM	I	Won-General	\$252,831	\$425,263	\$172,432	\$252,831	\$446,431	\$193,600
WILLIAMS, MATTHEW	42	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
RICHARDSON, DIANA	43	DEM	I	Won-General	\$3,749	\$5,309	\$1,560	\$3,749	\$6,569	\$2,820
CARROLL, ROBERT C	44	DEM	I	Won-General	\$101,633	\$270,825	\$169,192	\$101,633	\$270,825	\$169,192
GOLDBERG, YEVGENY	44	REP	C	Lost-General	\$623	\$1,811	\$1,188	\$623	\$2,095	\$1,472
CYMBROWITZ, STEVEN	45	DEM	I	Won-General	\$258,271	\$284,144	\$25,873	\$258,271	\$286,412	\$28,141
FRONTUS, MATHYLDE	46	DEM	O	Won-General	\$84,221	\$201,203	\$116,982	\$84,221	\$253,115	\$168,894

Appendix B3: 2018 Assembly Candidates Under Governor Cuomo's Public Funding Proposal - Major Party General Election Candidates

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SAPERSTEIN, STEVEN	46	REP	O	Lost-General	\$73,222	\$136,320	\$63,098	\$73,222	\$160,764	\$87,542
COLTON, WILLIAM	47	DEM	I	Won-General	\$136,002	\$291,042	\$155,040	\$136,002	\$291,042	\$155,040
LASALLE, FLORENCE	47	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
EICHENSTEIN, SIMCHA	48	DEM	O	Won-General	\$259,935	\$335,184	\$75,249	\$259,935	\$351,816	\$91,881
ABBATE JR, PETER J	49	DEM	I	Won-General	\$285,845	\$358,538	\$72,693	\$285,845	\$380,179	\$94,334
LENTOL, JOSEPH R	50	DEM	I	Won-General	\$108,418	\$132,068	\$23,650	\$108,418	\$132,824	\$24,406
ORTIZ, FELIX W	51	DEM	I	Won-General	\$10,400	\$8,000	-\$2,400	\$10,400	\$8,000	-\$2,400
SIMON, JO ANNE	52	DEM	I	Won-General	\$35,824	\$130,874	\$95,050	\$35,824	\$153,806	\$117,982
RAMOS, DANIEL	52	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
DAVILA, MARITZA	53	DEM	I	Won-General	\$129,897	\$164,394	\$34,497	\$129,897	\$169,182	\$39,285
DILAN, ERIK MARTIN	54	DEM	I	Won-General	\$83,804	\$135,661	\$51,857	\$83,804	\$138,685	\$54,881
CHOWDHURY, KHORSHED	54	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
WALKER, LATRICE MONIQUE	55	DEM	I	Won-General	\$49,075	\$44,403	-\$4,672	\$49,075	\$45,663	-\$3,412
JACKSON, BERNEDA	55	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
WRIGHT, TREMAINE S	56	DEM	I	Won-General	\$18,165	\$87,705	\$69,540	\$18,165	\$140,562	\$122,397
MOSLEY III, WALTER T	57	DEM	I	Won-General	\$131,149	\$245,860	\$114,711	\$131,149	\$270,745	\$139,596
PERRY, N NICK	58	DEM	I	Won-General	\$193,880	\$410,395	\$216,515	\$193,880	\$427,255	\$233,375
WILLIAMS, JAIME R	59	DEM	I	Won-General	\$56,340	\$110,240	\$53,900	\$56,340	\$122,084	\$65,744
WASHINGTON, BRANDON	59	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
BARRON, CHARLES	60	DEM	I	Won-General	\$18,764	\$56,704	\$37,940	\$18,764	\$80,140	\$61,376
BATES, LEROY	60	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
FALL, CHARLES	61	DEM	O	Won-General	\$120,995	\$282,423	\$161,428	\$120,995	\$313,923	\$192,928
REILLY, MICHAEL	62	REP	O	Won-General	\$61,497	\$233,937	\$172,440	\$61,497	\$304,371	\$242,874
CUSICK, MICHAEL J	63	DEM	I	Won-General	\$170,757	\$276,007	\$105,250	\$170,757	\$300,703	\$129,946
MALLIOTAKIS, NICOLE	64	REP	I	Won-General	\$60,847	\$151,717	\$90,870	\$60,847	\$169,861	\$109,014
BAUMEL, ADAM	64	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$15,952	\$42,178	\$26,226	\$15,952	\$69,394	\$53,442
NIOU, YUH-LINE	65	DEM	I	Won-General	\$115,343	\$226,023	\$110,680	\$115,343	\$251,223	\$135,880
GLICK, DEBORAH J	66	DEM	I	Won-General	\$153,219	\$265,105	\$111,886	\$153,219	\$284,635	\$131,416
ROSENTHAL, LINDA B	67	DEM	I	Won-General	\$84,346	\$144,276	\$59,930	\$84,346	\$155,679	\$71,333
RODRIGUEZ, ROBERT J	68	DEM	I	Won-General	\$134,259	\$182,144	\$47,885	\$134,259	\$189,792	\$55,533
CARRERAS, DABY	68	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
ODONNELL, DANIEL J	69	DEM	I	Won-General	\$43,080	\$79,560	\$36,480	\$43,080	\$86,333	\$43,253
COTENESCU, CORINA	69	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
DICKENS, INEZ E	70	DEM	I	Won-General	\$143,035	\$281,546	\$138,511	\$143,035	\$288,350	\$145,315
TAYLOR, ALFRED (AL)	71	DEM	I	Won-General	\$62,094	\$126,142	\$64,048	\$62,094	\$157,219	\$95,126
DE LA ROSA, CARMEN N	72	DEM	I	Won-General	\$122,744	\$231,310	\$108,566	\$122,744	\$272,890	\$150,146
GOODMAN, RONNY	72	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0

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QUART, DAN	73	DEM	I	Won-General	\$310,847	\$450,628	\$139,781	\$310,847	\$450,628	\$139,781
ASCHERMAN, JEFF	73	REP	C	Lost-General	\$59,750	\$129,056	\$69,306	\$59,750	\$143,420	\$83,670
EPSTEIN, HARVEY	74	DEM	I	Won-General	\$176,365	\$508,289	\$331,924	\$176,365	\$508,289	\$331,924
COOPER, BRYAN	74	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
GOTTFRIED, RICHARD N	75	DEM	I	Won-General	\$104,989	\$165,149	\$60,160	\$104,989	\$188,837	\$83,848
SEAWRIGHT, REBECCA A	76	DEM	I	Won-General	\$212,239	\$349,509	\$137,270	\$212,239	\$349,509	\$137,270
JOYNER, LATOYA	77	DEM	I	Won-General	\$37,250	\$36,400	-\$850	\$37,250	\$36,400	-\$850
CARMICHAEL, TANYA	77	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
RIVERA, JOSE	78	DEM	I	Won-General	\$13,250	\$14,728	\$1,478	\$13,250	\$14,728	\$1,478
WALTERS, MICHAEL E	78	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
BLAKE, MICHAEL A	79	DEM	I	Won-General	\$300,764	\$434,514	\$133,750	\$300,764	\$434,514	\$133,750
TORRES, GREGORY	79	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
FERNANDEZ, NATHALIA	80	DEM	I	Won-General	\$128,050	\$198,976	\$70,926	\$128,050	\$198,976	\$70,926
PERRI, LOUIS	80	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
DINOWITZ, JEFFREY	81	DEM	I	Won-General	\$126,841	\$227,633	\$100,792	\$126,841	\$246,785	\$119,944
REED, ALAN H	81	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
BENEDETTO, MICHAEL R	82	DEM	I	Won-General	\$93,795	\$117,992	\$24,197	\$93,795	\$122,276	\$28,481
ENGLISH, ELIZABETH	82	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
HEASTIE, CARL E	83	DEM	I	Won-General	\$699,674	\$657,283	-\$42,391	\$699,674	\$659,299	-\$40,375
LEE, ASTON	83	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
ARROYO, CARMEN E	84	DEM	I	Won-General	\$81,300	\$152,670	\$71,370	\$81,300	\$165,270	\$83,970
NIEVES, ROSALINE	84	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
CRESPO, MARCOS A	85	DEM	I	Won-General	\$378,887	\$366,085	-\$12,802	\$378,887	\$368,101	-\$10,786
LENNON, SHONDE	85	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
PICHARDO, VICTOR M	86	DEM	I	Won-General	\$152,375	\$145,250	-\$7,125	\$152,375	\$145,754	-\$6,621
RIVERA-DIAZ, ARIEL	86	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
REYES, KARINES	87	DEM	O	Won-General	\$141,082	\$187,344	\$46,262	\$141,082	\$211,284	\$70,202
MARCUS, ALPHEAUS	87	REP	O	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
PAULIN, AMY R	88	DEM	I	Won-General	\$167,760	\$256,251	\$88,491	\$167,760	\$268,032	\$100,272
PRETLOW, JAMES GARY (GARY)	89	DEM	I	Won-General	\$52,801	\$51,202	-\$1,599	\$52,801	\$51,454	-\$1,347
SAYEGH, NADER	90	DEM	O	Won-General	\$118,358	\$228,051	\$109,693	\$118,358	\$244,935	\$126,577
PINION, JOE	90	REP	O	Lost-General	\$14,071	\$47,976	\$33,905	\$14,071	\$60,621	\$46,549
OTIS, STEVEN	91	DEM	I	Won-General	\$26,000	\$26,000	\$0	\$26,000	\$26,567	\$567
ABINANTI, THOMAS J	92	DEM	I	Won-General	\$33,975	\$92,505	\$58,530	\$33,975	\$110,996	\$77,021
BUCHWALD, DAVID	93	DEM	I	Won-General	\$125,085	\$333,936	\$208,851	\$125,085	\$374,286	\$249,201
NUCULOVIC, JOHN	93	REP	C	Lost-General	\$12,920	\$51,370	\$38,450	\$12,920	\$60,159	\$47,239
GASHI, VEDAT	94	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$249,824	\$354,374	\$104,550	\$249,824	\$354,374	\$104,550

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BYRNE, KEVIN M	94	REP	I	Won-General	\$65,450	\$223,877	\$158,427	\$65,450	\$239,049	\$173,599
GALEF, SANDRA R	95	DEM	I	Won-General	\$7,580	\$13,460	\$5,880	\$7,580	\$14,720	\$7,140
CHIULLI, LAWRENCE	95	REP	C	Lost-General	\$5,975	\$21,575	\$15,600	\$5,975	\$28,631	\$22,656
ZEBROWSKI JR, KENNETH P	96	DEM	I	Won-General	\$77,114	\$147,440	\$70,326	\$77,114	\$192,857	\$115,743
JAFFEE, ELLEN C	97	DEM	I	Won-General	\$59,497	\$141,636	\$82,139	\$59,497	\$163,434	\$103,937
PRESTI JR, ROSARIO	97	REP	C	Lost-General	\$47	\$329	\$282	\$47	\$581	\$534
BRABENEC, KARL A	98	REP	I	Won-General	\$92,419	\$204,917	\$112,498	\$92,419	\$246,617	\$154,198
MARTENS, SCOTT	98	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$26,769	\$125,721	\$98,952	\$26,769	\$169,078	\$142,309
RETTIG, MATTHEW	99	DEM	O	Lost-General	\$251,389	\$328,613	\$77,224	\$251,389	\$363,389	\$112,000
SCHMITT, COLIN J	99	REP	O	Won-General	\$110,072	\$209,324	\$99,252	\$110,072	\$251,723	\$141,651
GUNTHER, AILEEN M	100	DEM	I	Won-General	\$84,825	\$134,729	\$49,904	\$84,825	\$139,769	\$54,944
MCEVOY, CHAD	101	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$87,616	\$250,032	\$162,416	\$87,616	\$250,032	\$162,416
MILLER, BRIAN D	101	REP	I	Won-General	\$17,999	\$64,163	\$46,164	\$17,999	\$87,347	\$69,348
TAGUE, CHRISTOPHER	102	REP	I	Won-General	\$71,572	\$211,326	\$139,754	\$71,572	\$228,772	\$157,200
OCONNOR JR, AIDAN	102	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$61,960	\$190,094	\$128,134	\$61,960	\$231,857	\$169,897
CAHILL, KEVIN A	103	DEM	I	Won-General	\$156,431	\$174,629	\$18,198	\$156,431	\$186,202	\$29,771
JACOBSON, JONATHAN	104	DEM	O	Won-General	\$28,880	\$66,436	\$37,556	\$28,880	\$79,099	\$50,219
MANLEY, SCOTT	104	REP	O	Lost-General	\$41,764	\$124,038	\$82,274	\$41,764	\$145,962	\$104,198
GIARDINO, LAURETTE	105	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$8,094	\$37,608	\$29,514	\$8,094	\$55,658	\$47,564
LALOR, KIERAN MICHAEL	105	REP	I	Won-General	\$5,640	\$21,180	\$15,540	\$5,640	\$32,331	\$26,691
BARRETT, DIDI	106	DEM	I	Won-General	\$567,696	\$837,846	\$270,150	\$567,696	\$888,372	\$320,676
TRUITT, WILLIAM	106	REP	C	Lost-General	\$42,422	\$92,294	\$49,872	\$42,422	\$119,743	\$77,321
HOUGHTLING, TISTRYA	107	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$269,147	\$440,719	\$171,572	\$269,147	\$440,719	\$171,572
ASHBY, JACOB C	107	REP	I	Won-General	\$56,762	\$231,562	\$174,800	\$56,762	\$231,562	\$174,800
MCDONALD III, JOHN T	108	DEM	I	Won-General	\$114,513	\$219,448	\$104,935	\$114,513	\$270,566	\$156,053
FAHY, PATRICIA A	109	DEM	I	Won-General	\$103,639	\$271,221	\$167,582	\$103,639	\$272,161	\$168,522
PORTER, ROBERT	109	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
STECK, PHILLIP G	110	DEM	I	Won-General	\$101,918	\$220,994	\$119,076	\$101,918	\$261,333	\$159,415
CAREY, CHRISTOPHER	110	REP	C	Lost-General	\$15,385	\$40,245	\$24,860	\$15,385	\$51,585	\$36,200
SANTABARBARA, ANGELO L	111	DEM	I	Won-General	\$125,319	\$170,262	\$44,943	\$125,319	\$195,890	\$70,571
MCGARRY, BRIAN	111	REP	C	Lost-General	\$61,360	\$175,804	\$114,444	\$61,360	\$231,811	\$170,451
WALSH, MARY BETH	112	REP	I	Won-General	\$49,206	\$122,541	\$73,335	\$49,206	\$134,637	\$85,431
WOERNER, CARRIE	113	DEM	I	Won-General	\$135,117	\$242,123	\$107,006	\$135,117	\$269,433	\$134,317
ZEGERS, MORGAN	113	REP	C	Lost-General	\$28,484	\$100,658	\$72,174	\$28,484	\$145,250	\$116,765
STEC, DANIEL G	114	REP	I	Won-General	\$58,038	\$118,627	\$60,589	\$58,038	\$129,967	\$71,929
JONES, D BILLY	115	DEM	I	Won-General	\$55,397	\$111,867	\$56,470	\$55,397	\$125,979	\$70,582
JENNE RUSSELL, ADDIE	116	DEM	I	Lost-General	\$257,457	\$256,631	-\$826	\$257,457	\$265,350	\$7,893

Appendix B3: 2018 Assembly Candidates Under Governor Cuomo's Public Funding Proposal - Major Party General Election Candidates

Notes: The first comparison shows how candidates would fare with their actual 2018 donor pool. The second comparison shows how they would fare if the proposal brought more small donors into the system. The amount of small donors added is based on increasing donor participation to 1.5% of the voting age population, across legislative and gubernatorial elections. This is done by increasing small donors, each giving \$50. If candidates did not already have any small matchable donors (\$100), no new ones are added.

The table includes some candidates who were on the ballot, but have no reported receipts.

Candidate	District	Party	ICO*	Status	Comparing 2018 Candidates (Same Donors) v. Status Quo			Comparing 2018 Candidates (w/New Donors) v. Status Quo		
					Actual Total Receipts (less Self-Funding)	Projected Adjusted Total Receipts	Net Gain/Loss From Status Quo for Participating Candidates	Actual Total Receipts (less Self-Funding)	Projected Adjusted Total Receipts	Net Gain/Loss From Status Quo for Participating Candidates
WALCZYK, MARK	116	REP	C	Won-General	\$66,222	\$101,054	\$34,832	\$66,222	\$116,930	\$50,708
BLANKENBUSH, KENNETH D	117	REP	I	Won-General	\$28,705	\$53,183	\$24,478	\$28,705	\$65,279	\$36,574
SMULLEN, ROBERT	118	REP	O	Won-General	\$28,831	\$106,309	\$77,478	\$28,831	\$150,869	\$122,038
RUBINO, KEITH	118	DEM	O	Lost-General	\$20,547	\$85,029	\$64,482	\$20,547	\$132,197	\$111,650
BUTTENSCHON, MARIANNE	119	DEM	O	Won-General	\$68,676	\$243,676	\$175,000	\$68,676	\$243,676	\$175,000
BOVA JR, DENNIS	119	REP	O	Lost-General	\$3,510	\$17,070	\$13,560	\$3,510	\$19,338	\$15,828
BARCLAY, WILLIAM A	120	REP	I	Won-General	\$103,733	\$135,048	\$31,315	\$103,733	\$153,054	\$49,320
TOSH, GAIL	120	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$7,753	\$36,397	\$28,644	\$7,753	\$58,094	\$50,341
MAGEE, BILL	121	DEM	I	Lost-General	\$132,461	\$237,097	\$104,636	\$132,461	\$306,435	\$173,974
SALKA, JOHN J	121	REP	C	Won-General	\$6,667	\$17,359	\$10,692	\$6,667	\$23,911	\$17,244
CROUCH, CLIFFORD W	122	REP	I	Won-General	\$101,149	\$242,606	\$141,457	\$101,149	\$284,601	\$183,453
LUPARDO, DONNA A	123	DEM	I	Won-General	\$111,427	\$192,224	\$80,797	\$111,427	\$239,329	\$127,902
BATROWNY, BILL	124	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$6,785	\$32,633	\$25,848	\$6,785	\$45,989	\$39,204
FRIEND, CHRISTOPHER S	124	REP	I	Won-General	\$225	\$375	\$150	\$225	\$533	\$308
LIFTON, BARBARA S	125	DEM	I	Won-General	\$21,462	\$86,404	\$64,942	\$21,462	\$124,972	\$103,511
FINCH, GARY D	126	REP	I	Won-General	\$129,496	\$289,369	\$159,873	\$129,496	\$295,883	\$166,387
BATMAN, KETIH	126	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$68,897	\$185,322	\$116,425	\$68,897	\$226,039	\$157,142
STIRPE JR, ALBERT A	127	DEM	I	Won-General	\$215,674	\$299,247	\$83,573	\$215,674	\$312,697	\$97,024
PARO, NICHOLAS	127	REP	C	Lost-General	\$39,309	\$116,799	\$77,490	\$39,309	\$135,195	\$95,886
HUNTER, PAMELA JO	128	DEM	I	Won-General	\$78,271	\$143,579	\$65,308	\$78,271	\$175,936	\$97,665
MAGNARELLI, WILLIAM	129	DEM	I	Won-General	\$117,017	\$196,926	\$79,909	\$117,017	\$213,936	\$96,919
OTT, EDWARD	129	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
COMEGYS, SCOTT	130	DEM	O	Lost-General	\$13,244	\$59,708	\$46,464	\$13,244	\$84,152	\$70,908
MANKTELOW, BRIAN	130	REP	O	Won-General	\$19,254	\$41,054	\$21,800	\$19,254	\$53,402	\$34,148
KOLB, BRIAN M	131	REP	I	Won-General	\$294,641	\$311,252	\$16,611	\$294,641	\$319,014	\$24,373
PALMESANO, PHILIP A	132	REP	I	Won-General	\$74,626	\$148,654	\$74,028	\$74,626	\$187,273	\$112,647
BYRNES, MARJORIE L	133	REP	C	Won-General	\$29,702	\$93,458	\$63,756	\$29,702	\$146,453	\$116,752
BAER, BARBARA A	133	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$8,510	\$35,270	\$26,760	\$8,510	\$44,216	\$35,706
LAWRENCE, PETER A	134	REP	I	Won-General	\$23,700	\$48,546	\$24,846	\$23,700	\$49,491	\$25,791
JOHNS, MARK C	135	REP	I	Won-General	\$37,335	\$71,955	\$34,620	\$37,335	\$78,255	\$40,920
GILCHRIST, ANDREW	135	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$5,402	\$7,650	\$2,248	\$5,402	\$9,906	\$4,503
ROMEO, JAMIE	136	DEM	O	Won-General	\$48,371	\$139,553	\$91,182	\$48,371	\$177,945	\$129,574
GANTT, DAVID F	137	DEM	I	Won-General	\$31,183	\$29,101	-\$2,082	\$31,183	\$29,857	-\$1,326
BRONSON, HARRY B	138	DEM	I	Won-General	\$222,440	\$349,546	\$127,106	\$222,440	\$349,546	\$127,106
IACOVANGELO, PATSY	138	REP	C	Lost-General	\$8,183	\$7,150	-\$1,033	\$8,183	\$8,095	-\$88
HAWLEY, STEPHEN M	139	REP	I	Won-General	\$66,695	\$184,955	\$118,260	\$66,695	\$214,313	\$147,618
SCHIMMINGER, ROBIN L	140	DEM	I	Won-General	\$116,691	\$185,876	\$69,185	\$116,691	\$224,596	\$107,905

Appendix B3: 2018 Assembly Candidates Under Governor Cuomo's Public Funding Proposal - Major Party General Election Candidates

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OHAR, ADAM	140	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
PEOPLES-STOKES, CRYSTAL	141	DEM	I	Won-General	\$211,635	\$331,265	\$119,630	\$211,635	\$346,889	\$135,254
KOSTECKY, ROSS M	141	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
BURKE, PATRICK	142	DEM	C	Won-General	\$252,882	\$390,533	\$137,651	\$252,882	\$390,533	\$137,651
BOHEN, ERIK T	142	REP	I	Lost-General	\$130,757	\$452,881	\$322,124	\$130,757	\$452,881	\$322,124
WALLACE, MONICA P	143	DEM	I	Won-General	\$125,908	\$288,708	\$162,800	\$125,908	\$288,708	\$162,800
CENTINELLO SR, DANIEL	143	REP	C	Lost-General	\$4,126	\$13,936	\$9,810	\$4,126	\$23,291	\$19,166
NORRIS, MICHAEL J	144	REP	I	Won-General	\$139,396	\$313,334	\$173,938	\$139,396	\$313,334	\$173,938
DIPASQUALE, JOSEPH	144	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$19,649	\$63,173	\$43,524	\$19,649	\$92,179	\$72,529
MORINELLO, ANGELO J	145	REP	I	Won-General	\$70,865	\$125,942	\$55,077	\$70,865	\$140,558	\$69,693
MCMAHON, KAREN	146	DEM	C	Won-General	\$542,473	\$709,691	\$167,218	\$542,473	\$709,691	\$167,218
WALTER, RAYMOND W	146	REP	I	Lost-General	\$271,317	\$438,538	\$167,221	\$271,317	\$438,538	\$167,221
WOCHENSKY, LUKE	147	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$84,579	\$255,779	\$171,200	\$84,579	\$255,779	\$171,200
DIPIETRO, DAVID J	147	REP	I	Won-General	\$37,072	\$139,540	\$102,468	\$37,072	\$177,013	\$139,940
GIGLIO, JOSEPH M	148	REP	I	Won-General	\$5,250	\$17,550	\$12,300	\$5,250	\$29,709	\$24,459
RYAN, SEAN M	149	DEM	I	Won-General	\$136,120	\$226,826	\$90,706	\$136,120	\$241,877	\$105,757
TOTARO, JOSEPH	149	REP	C	Lost-General	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
GOODELL, ANDREW	150	REP	I	Won-General	\$37,034	\$109,704	\$72,670	\$37,034	\$136,794	\$99,760
EINACH, JUDITH	150	DEM	C	Lost-General	\$12,656	\$55,442	\$42,786	\$12,656	\$83,420	\$70,764

* ICO stands for (I) Incumbent; (C) Challenger, (O) Open Seat