In 48 dispiriting hours David Cameron has tried out two positions on cabinet unity in the European renegotiation. First, he indicated that he would sack ministers who did not back him. Then he indicated that he would not. He looks weak and uncertain at a time and on an issue on which it is essential that he looks strong and decisive.
Last week, in his first speech in the House of Commons since returning as an MP, Boris Johnson argued that “if you are going to go into a difficult international negotiation . . . then you have got to be prepared to walk away if you don’t get the result that you want”. This may have been construed as unhelpful by No 10 but it was an important reminder of basic negotiating strategy. The moment one party senses that the other is unwilling to follow words with actions if necessary, the more timid of the two has lost.
What applies to Mr Cameron’s negotiations with Europe applies equally to his negotiations with his cabinet and backbenchers. Indeed, all are intimately linked. Conservative Eurosceptics are weighing the risks of defying their prime minister precisely because they fear a fix in Brussels and that he is ready to accept whatever paltry concessions may be offered by Jean-Claude Juncker and other European leaders without the application of real negotiating pressure.
This is doubly dismaying because Britain’s position is strong and a significant repatriation of powers is eminently achievable. This country is an integral and substantial part of Europe’s single market of 500 million consumers. It runs a substantial current account deficit of well over 5 per cent of GDP, primarily because of its adverse trade balance with the eurozone. Other European governments want Britain within the EU on grounds of self-interest and because the policies of openness, deregulation and flexible labour mar- kets that Britain presses for are what the EU needs.
Mr Cameron was asked on Sunday whether he had ruled out the precedent of Harold Wilson’s government in 1975, at the time of the previous European referendum. Mr Wilson allowed members of the government to campaign on either side of the issue. Mr Cameron replied that “everyone” in his government was signed up to his programme. It was an injudicious choice of phrase, and it was compounded by Mr Cameron’s insistence that he had been “very clear”. It was not clear at all what his answer meant for the position of ministers in the referendum campaign. Hence the prime minister’s aides’ assertion yesterday that he had been “overinterpreted” — a problem that would not have arisen if he had been clear in the first place.
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There is only one possible silver lining to the cloud of indecision hanging over the renegotiation. It is that the prime minister might be able to use the organised presence of Eurosceptics to his right to jolt the rest of Europe into contemplating “Brexit” as a real possibility and not merely theoretical.
The best tactic is for Mr Cameron to go to Brussels with ambitious demands to get as much as he can from other European leaders. He should make it clear that if his demands are not met he is willing to recommend to the British people that they should vote to leave the European Union. By not acting tough, he has signalled that he wants to remain inside the EU even if his demands are rebuffed. It is not an auspicious start.