Of the Conduct of the Understanding

Of the Conduct of the Understanding

by John Locke

Edited with General Introduction, Historical and Philosophical Notes and Critical Apparatus by Paul Schuurman

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Ter nagedachtenis aan mijn moeder
Voor mijn vader

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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ABSTRACT

The present thesis gives an edition of John Locke's *Of the Conduct of the Understanding* that is based, for the first time since 1706, on the original manuscripts, MS Locke e.1 and MS Locke c.28. The text has been provided with a text-critical apparatus and with historical and philosophical notes.

The editor's General Introduction is divided into two parts. The first part, 'Context', discusses Locke's analysis of the nature of error, the causes of error and the prevention and cure of error in the *Conduct*. His enquiry is placed in the context of his way of ideas as given in his *Essay concerning Human Understanding*. Locke's two-stage way of ideas, his occupation with our mental faculties and with method form the interrelated main ingredients of his logic of ideas. There is a complicated relation of continuity and change between the content and the structure of this new logic on the one hand and the content and structure of works by both scholastic predecessors (Du Trieu, Smith, Sanderson) and representatives of the new philosophy (Descartes, Arnauld, Malebranche) on the other hand. Once this context is taken into account, the *Conduct* can be understood as a work that has a function within the structure of Locke's informal logic of ideas that runs parallel to the function of the *De sophisticis elenchis* in the Aristotelian *Organon*.

The second part of the General Introduction, 'Text', gives a description of the relevant MSS, an overview of references to the *Conduct* in Locke's correspondence, a history of the genesis of the *Conduct* until its first publication in 1706 in the *Posthumous Works*, an analysis of the evidence provided by the MSS on how the *Conduct* grew out of the *Essay*, and a statement of the principles that underlie the present editon.

ABBREVIATIONS OF TITLES AND USE OF CALENDAR SYSTEMS

Editorial reference to passages in the *Conduct* is by the paragraph numbers as established in the present edition. Other works by Locke that are frequently cited, are abbreviated as follows:

Corr.	*The Correspondence of John Locke*, ed. E. S. de Beer. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976- . *Cited by letter number, volume and page number*.
Drafts, I	John Locke, *Drafts for the* Essay concerning Human Understanding, *and Other Philosophical Writings. Vol. I: Drafts A and B*, eds. Peter H. Nidditch and G. A. J. Rogers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
Education	John Locke, *Some Thoughts concerning Education*, eds. John W. Yolton and Jean S. Yolton. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.
Essay	John Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Peter H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. *Cited by book, chapter, section and page number*.
O-1706	*Posthumous Works of Mr. John Locke: viz. I. Of the Conduct of the Understanding. II. An Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing all Things in God. III. A Discourse of Miracles. IV Part of a Fourth Letter for Toleration. V. Memoirs relating to the Life of Anthony first Earl of Shaftesbury. To which is added, VI. His New Method of a Common-Place-Book, written Originally in French, and now translated into English*. London: A. and J. Churchill, 1706.
W-1963	John Locke, *The Works of John Locke. A New Edition, Corrected* (10 vols.). Aalen: Scientia, 1963 (repr. of W-1823).

For the abbreviations of all other (works comprising) editions of the *Conduct* see below, 'Bibliography', §1. Works by other authors are also given in abbreviated form; here are some of the most frequently cited abbreviations:

AT	René Descartes, *Œuvres de Descartes*, eds. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (11 vols.). Paris: J. Vrin, 1982-1991.
Bacon, *Works*	*The Works of Francis Bacon*, eds. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath (6 vols.). Stuttgart: Frommann, 1963 (repr. of London: Longman, 1858-1861).
CSM	Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch and (Vol. III) Anthony Kenny (3 vols.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984-1991.
Harrison/Laslett	John Harrison and Peter Laslett, *The Library of John Locke*. Oxford: Oxford Bibliographical Society, 1965.
King	Peter, Lord King, *The Life of John Locke, with Extracts from his Correspondence, Journal, and Commonplace Books* (2 vols.). Bristol: Thoemmes, 1991 (repr. of London: H. Colburn, 1830).
Logique	[Antoine Arnauld], *La Logique ou l'Art de Penser. Contenant, Outre les Regles communes, plusieurs observations nouvelles, propres à former le jugement* [=La Logique de Port-Royal]. Paris: En la Boutique de Ch. Savreux, Chez G. des Prez, 1674.
OED	J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner, eds., *The Oxford English Dictionary. Second Edition* (20 vols.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Recherche	Nicolas Malebranche, *Recherche de la vérité où l'on traite de la nature de l'esprit de l'homme et de l'usage qu'il en doit faire pour éviter l'erreur dans les sciences*, ed. Geneviève Rodis-Lewis (*Œuvres de Malebranche*, Vols. I and II). Paris: J. Vrin, 1962-1963. *Cited by Volume, Book, Part (if appropriate), Chapter, and page number.*

French and Latin designations for 'Volume', 'Book', 'Part', 'Chapter' and 'Section' are abbreviated with their English equivalent: 'Vol.', 'Bk.', 'Pt.', 'Ch.' and 'Sect.'. Translations of Latin and French quotations are by the editor, unless stated otherwise.

Dates of letters contained in Locke's correspondence are those provided by De Beer, who gives Old Style for letters written in Britain and both Old Style (first) and New Style (second) for letters produced in the Dutch Republic and France. This convention is also used in other cases. Years start on 1 January.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

CONTEXT

John Locke continued to revise his *Essay concerning Human Understanding* from its first appearance in 1689 until his death in October 1704. Even while the Third Edition was being prepared in 1695, he was already corresponding with his Irish friend William Molyneux (1656-1698) about new additions. In his letter to Molyneux of 8 March 1695 he discusses the possibility of adding something on 'Enthusiasm' and on 'P. Malbranche's [*sic*] opinion concerning seeing all things in God'.[1] In the next letter, dated 26 April 1695, he announces his intention to add 'Enthusiasm' as a separate chapter, to drop the attack on Malebranche and to add some remarks concerning the 'Connexion of Ideas'.[2] Locke expected the new additions concerning enthusiasm and the association ('connexion') of ideas to appear first in the Latin translation of the *Essay* that Molyneux was then trying to arrange. However, *De intellectu humano* did not appear until 1701 and the new chapters on enthusiasm and association would appear for the first time in the Fourth Edition of the *Essay*, which went to the press in 1699 (the Latin translation by Ezekiel Burridge would be a translation of this Fourth Edition). 'Of the Association of *Ideas*' formed Chapter xxxiii of Part II and 'Of Enthusiasm' Chapter xix of Part IV.

It was only in 1697, probably two years after he had started work on 'Enthusiasm' and 'Association', that Locke embarked on another projected addition to the Fourth Edition of the *Essay*, i.e. a chapter with the title 'Of the Conduct of the Understanding'. On 10 April of that year he wrote to Molyneux:

> I have lately got a little leisure to think of some additions to my book, against the next edition, and within a few days have fallen upon a subject that I know not how far it will lead me. I have written several pages on it, but the matter, the farther I go, opens the more upon me, and I cannot yet get sight of any end of it. The title of the chapter will be Of the Conduct of the Understanding, which, if I shall pursue, as far as I imagine it will reach, and as it deserves, will, I conclude, make the largest chapter of my Essay.[3]

1 *Corr.* 1857, V, p. 287.
2 *Corr.* 1887, V, pp. 352-353.
3 *Corr.* 2243, VI, p. 87.

On 15 May Molyneux, whose answer had been delayed because of the death of his brother-in-law, reacted with his usual enthusiasm to Locke's latest project:

> You never write to me, that you do not raise new expectations in my longing Mind of partaking your Thoughts on those Noble Subjects you are upon. Your Chapter concerning the *Conduct of the Understanding* must needs be very Sublime and Spacious.[4]

However, the *Conduct* was never finished and its author broke off mid-sentence in a paragraph that until now has remained unpublished. The *Conduct* was published by A. and J. Churchill in the *Posthumous Works* (= O-1706) in Trinity Term 1706. Using the abbreviation *Conduct* is convenient, but should not allow us to forget that at the moment of Locke's death there was only an unfinished and unpublished piece of work. The text published in O-1706 was based on MS Locke e.1 and on MS Locke c.28. All subsequent editions are derived from O-1706. The present edition, for the first time since 1706, is based on the original MSS. Both MS e.1 and MS c.28 are now shelved in the Locke Room of the Bodleian Library. The latter MS covers only a small part of the *Conduct*. The copy text for the present edition is MS e.1, but this MS is collated with MS c.28. For more detailed information on these MSS and on the editorial principles see below in 'Text'.

The century of Locke's death saw a ready dissemination of the *Conduct*, together with his other works. This popularity was maintained during the entire nineteenth century, despite Locke's allegedly diminished reputation in this period.[5] From the nineteenth century onwards the *Conduct* has been regarded primarily as a work on education. In 1839 it was printed (in an abridged version) in one volume together with *Some Thoughts concerning Education*.[6] This combination was repeated in *c.* 1881[7] and also in 1912 in an edition titled *The Educational Writings of John Locke*, by J. W. Adamson, who describes the *Conduct* as a short treatise that 'was written to serve as a manual of self-instruction'.[8] Likewise, in his 1966 edition of the *Conduct*, F. W. Garforth points to the many similarities between this work and *Education*.[9] Most recently, in 1996, the *Conduct* appeared in one volume with *Education* in an edition by R. W. Grant and N. Tarcov, who describe these works as Locke's 'two most important writings on education'.[10]

4 *Corr.* 2262, VI, p. 123.
5 Cf. Aarsleff, 'Locke's Reputation in Nineteenth-Century England', *passim*.
6 AS-1839 (for abbreviations of titles see Bibliography, §1).
7 AS-1881.
8 O-1912, p. 12.
9 C-1966, p. 14.
10 'Introduction' to O-1996, p. vii.

In the following sections I shall discuss the central theme of the *Conduct*, error, and give due attention to the educational reflections that this theme occasioned. However, I shall argue that the *Conduct* was considered by its author and by its eighteenth-century readers to be as much a work on logic as on education. I shall contend that the *Conduct* must be understood in relation to the *Essay*, of which it was originally meant to be a part, and I shall assert that both works should be placed in a context that has its roots in Aristotelian textbooks on logic. The structural relation between the *Conduct* and the *Essay* and that of both works with the products of a changing logical tradition is a largely unstudied topic. A more detailed examination of this subject throws light on the nature of the *Conduct* itself, teaches something about its great parent work and finally leads to remarkable parallels between Locke's work and his Aristotelian predecessors.

1. Locke's later years

In September 1683 Locke left England for the Dutch Republic. He felt obliged to take the same course as his patron, Anthony Ashley Cooper, first Earl of Shaftesbury, who had run into political trouble with King Charles II and fled to the Netherlands in November 1682, where he had died in January of the next year. On 15 November 1684 Charles deprived Locke of his studentship at Christ Church, Oxford. On 16 February 1685 James II succeeded his brother on the throne. On 7/17 May of the same year his agent Bevil Skelton presented a list to the Dutch States General, asking for the extradition of 84 English and Scottish refugees. The last name on the list was Locke's. However, his personal safety in the Netherlands was never seriously endangered. His involvement there in the political activities to topple James in favour of William of Orange has never been clarified but some of his noble friends in Holland took an active part in the various schemes and it is clear that he shared their hostility to the Stuart kings.[11] The ensuing enterprise in 1688, helped by a favourable eastern 'Protestant wind', was a success and allowed Locke to put an end to his exile. He returned to England in February 1689, in the party that accompanied Mary Stuart, the Princess of Orange. She and her husband were crowned joint sovereigns of England in the same year.

Locke first stayed in London but made long visits to Oates, an Essex manor house where he was invited to stay permanently by Sir Francis Masham (1645-1722), husband of his old friend Damaris, Lady Masham (1659-1708). Locke's health had started to decline and Oates proved to be more congenial to his

11 Cf. Goldie, 'John Locke's Circle', p. 562 ff.

asthmatic constitution than the air of London. From 1691 until his death in 1704, Oates was to be his chief place of residence. It was agreed that he should pay a pound a week for his and his servant's keep and a shilling a week for his horse.[12] Damaris Masham was the daughter of the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688). In 1682/1683 she and Locke had formed a romantic attachment, which had included the writing of love letters under the names of 'Philoclea' and 'Philander'. Maurice Cranston is not sure whether 'Locke wished to be Damaris Cudworth's husband as well as her loving admirer'.[13] However this may be, by the time Locke returned from his Dutch exile Damaris had married. When Locke moved to Oates, he came into a house that was already well occupied. Sir Masham had sons and a daughter from his first marriage and a son by Damaris, Francis Cudworth Masham (1686-1731). Locke took an interest in the education of this child. Francis' mother taught him Latin according to Locke's method;[14] the philosopher provided him with books,[15] introduced the French tutor Pierre Coste (1668-1747)[16] to him and at his death bequeathed him half his library. Francis may have been in Locke's mind when he was giving advice to young gentlemen in the *Conduct*.

The Masham family made Oates a place of agreeable retirement where the ageing philosopher could receive his many friends and acquaintances. One of his oldest friends was the prosperous landowner Edward Clarke (*c.* 1650-*c.* 1710), whose wife Mary Jepp (d. 1706) was related to Locke. It was not until after the Glorious Revolution that Clarke came into public life. He entered the House of Commons for Taunton in 1690 and from 1694 until 1699 he was a Commissioner of Excise. In Parliament he vented many of Locke's political and monetary opinions. His questions concerning the upbringing of his son Edward were at the root of Locke's *Some Thoughts concerning Education*.

Another important relation in Locke's later years was his second cousin Peter King (1669-1734), who was created Baron King of Ockham in 1725 and who served as Lord Chancellor from that year until 1733. King assisted Locke in his business affairs and his correspondence. He inherited the other half of Locke's library together with his cousin's manuscripts, including those of the *Conduct*. He was also entrusted with the execution of Locke's last will and was the recipient

12 Cranston, *John Locke*, p. 342.
13 Ibid. p. 218.
14 *Corr.* 1921, V, p. 406, Locke to Molyneux, 2 July 1695.
15 *Corr.* 2516, VI, pp. 517-518; ibid. 2857, VII, pp. 238-239 and ibid. 2921, VII, p. 320.
16 *Corr.* 2376, VI, p. 294; Coste produced French translations of *Some Thoughts concerning Education* (1695), *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (1696) and the *Essay* (1700).

of a letter with instructions concerning the publications of the *Conduct* and some other unfinished works. King had a keen interest in theology and he wrote *An Enquiry into the Constitution, Discipline, Unity and Worship, of the Primitive Church* (1691) and *The History of the Apostles Creed* (1702). It was probably King who took care of the First Edition of the *Conduct* in 1706.[17]

A more recent friend was Anthony Collins (1676-1729), a young Etonian with whom Locke had become acquainted as late as the Spring of 1703. Collins was to publish two tributes to Locke in 1708 and 1720. He became a deist and a freethinker and in the appendix to his *Scheme of Literal Prophecy considered* (1726) he would make a significant contribution to the development of modern biblical criticism with his arguments for the assertion that the Old Testament Book of Daniel is a forgery. Another intimate friend was the historian and political writer James Tyrell (1642-1718), with whom Locke shared much the same Whig views and with whom he had collaborated (in 1681-1683) in writing an (unfinished) pamphlet in defence of Nonconformity as opposed to religious conformity.[18] Tyrell took care of some of Locke's books during the latter's Dutch exile. Other visitors at Oates were the Deist philosopher Anthony Ashley Cooper (1671-1713), third Earl of Shaftesbury, grandson of the first Earl and Locke's former pupil, and Isaac Newton, with whom the philosopher liked to discuss such theological matters as their heterodox opinions concerning the Trinity. These meetings may have prompted the scientist to complain about his host's loquacity.[19]

Until 1689 Locke was still a relatively unknown scholar with hardly anything in print. However, in that year appeared his *Epistola de tolerantia*, the *Two Treatises of Government* and *An Essay concerning Human Understanding* (a French summary had appeared a year before). The first two works were published anonymously, but the *Essay*, unlike any of his other major works, was published under his own name and brought him swift renown. After the Glorious Revolution Locke became one of the wise old men of the Whig party. In 1689 King William offered him the post of Ambassador to the Elector of Brandenburg, an offer that Locke declined to accept on account of his fear that the cold air of the country and the 'warme drinking' of its inhabitants might be contrary to his frail constitution.[20] Another offer of high office by William in 1698, possibly that of Embassy Secretary in

17 See below, 'Text', §3 [49].

18 The pamphlet had been designed as an answer to the 'Mischief of Separation' (1680) and 'The Unreasonableness of Separation' (1681) by Edward Stillingfleet. See *Corr.* 343, I, p. 49, note, and Cranston, *John Locke*, pp. 193-194 .

19 Harrison/Laslett, p. 10.

20 *Corr.* 1116, III, pp. 573-576.

Paris, was also turned down.[21] However, in 1689 Locke had accepted the light function of Commissioner of Appeals and from 1696 until 1700, when health problems became an insurmountable barrier, he held the more substantial post of Commissioner at the Board of Trade.

In spite of his administrative duties and his bad health, Locke managed to maintain a high level of productivity during the last fifteen years of his life. He kept up a voluminous correspondence; two-thirds of the 3,648 numbered letters in De Beer's edition (containing letters of Locke but also of his correspondents) were written after 1 January 1689. In 1690 he published *A Second Letter concerning Toleration*, and in 1692 the *Third Letter* appeared. The year 1691 saw the publication of *Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and Raising the Value of Money*. In 1693 followed *Some Thoughts concerning Education*. In this period he also started to write additions for the Second Edition of the *Essay* (1694). Early criticism of the *Essay* by John Norris (1657-1711), an admirer of the philosophy of Malebranche, occasioned Locke to draft three replies: *JL Answer to Mr Norris's Reflection, Remarks upon some of Mr Norris's Books* and *An Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing All Things in God*. Eventually Locke decided against including this polemical material in the *Essay* (the *Examination* would be published in O-1706). What he did include, though, was the problem named after William Molyneux.[22] In 1695 appeared *The Reasonableness of Christianity* which, after attacks by the extreme Calvinist John Edwards (1637-1716), was followed by a *A Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity* (1695) and a *Second Vindication* (1697). In 1695 he also published his *Short Observations on a Printed Paper, Intituled, For encouraging the Coining Silver Money in England*, followed in the same year by *Further Considerations concerning Raising the Value of Money*. Finally, this year saw the publication of the Third Edition of the *Essay*, which did not contain substantial changes.

In the early Spring of 1697, recuperating at Oates from illness after a season filled with activities for the Board of Trade in London, Locke made a start with the *Conduct*. However, in this period he also had to fend off theological attacks on his *Essay* by Edward Stillingfleet (1635-1699), Bishop of Worcester. Locke acquitted himself of this task in three lengthy public letters, of which the first two were published in 1697 and the third in 1699. This last year also saw the Fourth Edition of the *Essay*, with the new chapters on 'Association' and on 'Enthusiasm'. These items formed the last additions to the *Essay* that Locke was to publish. At about this time he may also have produced the *Elements of Natural Philosophy*.

21 Cranston, *John Locke*, pp. 434-435.
22 Cf. *Conduct*, par. 79.

This elementary treatise on the contemporary state of knowledge in the various sciences was probably written for Francis Cudworth Masham and was clearly influenced by Newton.[23] In 1702 he wrote a *Discourse of Miracles* (published in O-1706) and shortly before his death he started the *Fourth Letter on Toleration* (published in part in O-1706). In his last years Locke devoted his waning energy mainly to work on his voluminous *Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul*, which would be published posthumously in 1705-1707.

Locke's public and polemical activities until 1700 and his steadily declining health may in large part account for the fact that the *Conduct* was never finished. In addition, it should not be forgotten that he never had been given to philosophy exclusively and that this discipline had always been in competition with other pursuits. Subject analysis of Locke's final library tells us that only 269 of the 3,641 titles, a mere 7.4 per cent, consisted of books on what would nowadays be called philosophy. The nature of his other interests changed in the course of his life. In the earlier catalogue that he made of his books in Oxford in 1681 (comprising not more than 288 titles), 38.8 per cent were medical, 17.4 scientific and only 6.6 per cent theological;[24] in the catalogue of his final library, medical and scientific titles had gone down to 11.1 and 6.6 per cent respectively, while the proportion of theological works had risen to 23.8 per cent.[25] On 11 December 1694 he wrote to his Dutch friend, the Remonstrant theologian Philippus van Limborch (1633-1712), that he wanted to give his mind chiefly to theological studies,[26] and in a letter of 11 September 1697 he informed William Molyneux that 'having now wholly laid by the study of physick, I know not what comes out new, or worth reading, in that faculty'.[27]

Locke had always been the kind of thinker that needs a sounding-board. It is well known that he first came to the subject matter of his *Essay* in the company of 'five or six Friends meeting at my Chamber'[28] and he continued to organize similar gatherings during his Dutch exile.[29] Molyneux was the main stimulus and recipient of Locke's mature philosophical thought and what has remained of later

23 Bourne, *Life of John Locke*, II, p. 449, n. 2 and Axtell, 'Locke, Newton', p. 238.

24 The Oxford catalogue does not list the books that Locke had in London, which means that the balance between the different categories of books listed in this catalogue may not completely reflect the proportions within the complete collection of his books in 1681.

25 Harrison/Laslett, p. 15.

26 *Corr*. 1826, V, p. 237: 'Theologiam tuam Christianam quamprimum otium nactus fuero diligentius perscrutabo, his enim jam fere studiis mihi vacandum censeo.'

27 *Corr*. 2310, VI, p. 190.

28 *Essay*, 'The Epistle to the Reader', p. 7.

29 Cranston, *John Locke*, pp. 282-283.

letters suggests that no serious successor to this role appeared after the former's death in 1698. On 15 June 1697 he had written to Molyneux:

> My health, and business that I like as little as you do those you complain of, make me know what it is to want time. I often resolve not to trouble you any more with my complaints of the distance between us, and as often impertinently break that resolution. I never have any thoughts working in my head, or any new project start in my mind, but my wishes carry me immediately to you, and I desire to lay them before you. You may justly think this carries a pretty severe reflection on my country, or my self, that in it I have not a friend to communicate my thoughts with. I cannot much complain of want of friends to other purposes. But a man with whom one can freely seek truth, without any regard to old or new, fashionable or not fashionable, but truth merely for truth's sake, is what is scarce to be found in an age, and such an one I take you to be.[30]

This effusion implies little appreciation of the intellectual endowments of his immediate surroundings, including his former 'Philoclea'. King and Collins, whose acquaintance Locke made after having written this letter, may have been able to fill something of the vacuum that was left by the demise of Molyneux, but their interests were theological rather than philosophical. The same holds true for such important correspondents in his later years as Van Limborch and the Calvinist encyclopaedist and biblical scholar Jean le Clerc (1657-1736). Locke had started his adult life with a keen interest in medicine, physics and chemistry, and he died a theologian.[31] The *Conduct* was his last sizable contribution to philosophy.[32]

2. Errors of the first and the second kind

In the introductory paragraphs to the *Conduct*, Locke stresses the importance of the understanding, its liability to errors of all kinds and the possibility of curing these errors:

> … there are a great many natural defects in the understanding capable of amendment which are over looked and wholy neglected. And it is easy to perceive that men are guilty of a great many faults in the exercise and improvement of this facultie of the minde which hinders them in their progresse and keeps them in ignorance and error all their lives.[33]

30 *Corr*. 2277, VI, pp. 142-143.

31 Cf. Coste, 'Lettre de Mr. Coste', p. 49, on Locke's last years at Oates: 'Durant cet agréable séjour, il s'attachoit sur tout à l'etude de l'Ecriture Sainte; & n'employa presque à autre chose les derniéres années de sa vie.'

32 In 1700-1704 Locke also managed to make some alterations intended for the Fifth Edition of the *Essay*. However, these were not very substantial; cf. Nidditch, 'Introduction' to *Essay*, pp. xxxi-xxxii.

33 *Conduct*, par. 5.

He then proceeds in a very loose way to describe the nature and causes of these errors and to formulate remedies. At the start of paragraph 37 he suggests that in the previous pages he has given 'the common and most general miscariages which I thinke men should avoid or rectifie in a right conduct of their understandings'. In par. 38 he announces the intention of continuing more particularly with 'several weaknesses or defects in the understanding'. This very broad division into general and particular errors is only roughly adhered to. Nevertheless, although its catalogue of errors, causes of error and remedies for error is rather bewildering in its lack of order, the *Conduct* has a clear function within the context of Locke's work.

An important step towards a delineation of the function of the *Conduct* can be made once it is appreciated that most errors discussed by Locke fall into one of two major categories. In par. 98 Locke neatly sums up both types in a single clause:

> … [1] the want of determined Ideas and [2] of Sagacity and exercise in finding out and laying in order intermediate Ideas …

This distinction should be placed in the larger framework of a parallel distinction in Locke's 'way of ideas' as presented in the *Essay*. A discussion of this complicated topic can start with two words taken from the above quotation: 'Ideas' and 'determined'. First, 'idea(s)' is the most frequently used noun in the *Essay*.[34] Since the prime subject of the *Essay* is supposed to be the understanding,[35] it might be asked why such excessive attention should be devoted to ideas. In the final paragraph of the Introduction Locke gives both an answer to this question and a definition of 'idea':

> Thus much I thought necessary to say concerning the Occasion of this Enquiry into humane Understanding. But, before I proceed on to what I have thought on this Subject, I must here in the Entrance beg pardon of my Reader, for the frequent use of the Word *Idea*, which he will find in the following Treatise. It being the Term, which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by *Phantasm, Notion, Species*, or whatever it is, which the Mind can be employ'd about in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently using it.[36]

34 According to Malpas, 'An Electronic Text of the *Essay*', p. 81, the word *Idea* occurs 1,339 times and the word *Ideas* 2,343 times. The only words which exceed the combined 3,682 are: 'a', 'and', 'be', 'in', 'is', 'it', 'of' and 'to'.

35 *Essay*, 'Epistle to the Reader', p. 6: 'the Subject of this Treatise, the UNDERSTANDING'.

36 *Essay*, I.i.8: 47.

So, since the understanding has no other object but its ideas, any discussion of the former implies scrutiny of the latter as well; 'Since *the Mind*, in all its Thoughts and Reasonings, hath no other immediate Object but its own *Ideas*, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident, that our Knowledge is only conversant about them.'[37]

Second, there is the word 'determined'; it is related to the expression 'clear and distinct'. In an addition to the 'Epistle to the Reader' that was included in the Fourth Edition of the *Essay*, Locke proposes to replace 'clear and distinct' by 'determinate' or 'determined'.[38] Yet 'clear and distinct' was allowed to remain a current expression in both the *Essay* and the *Conduct*.[39] Clearness pertains to the relation between an idea and the object or objects from which it is taken. In the *Essay* Locke states that simple ideas are clear 'when they are such as the Objects themselves, from whence they were taken, did or might, in a well-ordered Sensation or Perception, present them'.[40] Complex ideas are clear in so far as the simple ideas of which they are composed are also clear. The opposite of a clear idea is an obscure idea. Obscurity of ideas can be caused by 'dull Organs; or very slight and transient Impressions made by the Objects; or else a weakness in the Memory, not able to retain them as received'.[41] Distinctness on the other hand, is a property of the relation between one idea and all other ideas. Locke defines a distinct idea by comparing it with a clear idea: 'As a *clear Idea* is that whereof the Mind has such a full and evident perception, as it does receive from an outward Object operating duly on a well-disposed Organ, so a *distinct idea* is that wherin the Mind perceives a difference from all other …'[42] The opposite of a distinct idea is a confused idea: 'and a *confused Idea* is such an one, as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different'.[43] Strictly speaking, confusion between different ideas is impossible:

> For let any *Idea* be as it will, it can be no other but such as the Mind perceives it to be; and that very perception, sufficiently distinguishes it from all other *Ideas*, which cannot be other, *i.e.* different without being perceived to be so. No *Idea* therefore can

37 *Essay*, IV.i.1.: 525. For two short introductions to the heavily debated topic of the precise nature of Lockean ideas, cf. Yolton, 'Idea', in: *A Locke Dictionnary*, pp. 88-93 and Ayers, 'Ideas and Objective Being', pp. 1090-1094.

38 Op. cit. pp. 12-14.

39 However, for two instances of Locke actually replacing 'clear and distinct' by 'determined' see MS Locke e.1, p. 157 and p. 158 (*Conduct*, par. 65, text-critical notes). For the influence of Descartes on Locke's use of 'clear and distinct', see below, §8.

40 *Essay*, II.xxix.2: 363.

41 *Essay*, II.xxix.3: 363.

42 *Essay*, II.xxix.4: 364.

43 *Essay*, II.xxix.4: 364.

> be undistinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different, unless you would have it different from it self: for from all other, it is evidently different.[44]

However, we give names to our ideas and we should not forget that every idea, whether simple or complex, should have a precise name and every name should refer only to this idea and not to another idea. The problem is that human beings have great difficulty in adhering to this fundamental law and this opens wide scope for confusion: 'Now every *Idea* a man has, being visibly what it is, and distinct from all other *Ideas* but it self, that which makes it *confused* is, when it is such, that it may as well be called by another Name, as that which it is expressed by …'[45] So, confusion is not really a property of the relation between ideas, but rather of the relation between words on the one hand and ideas on the other.

The activity of 'discovering how far we have clear and distinct *Ideas*'[46] forms the first stage in Locke's way of ideas. The second stage consists of the subsequent reasoning based on ideas that should all be clear and distinct. Reasoning becomes necessary when we look for the intermediate idea or ideas between the two ideas that we want to connect. Reasoning results in knowledge only after we have perceived the agreement or disagreement between each pair of adjacent ideas in the chain. Locke's most substantial discussion of reasoning is given in the context of his discussion of the three degrees of knowledge: intuitive, demonstrative and sensitive. Intuitive knowledge occurs when 'the Mind perceives the Agreement or Disagreement of two *Ideas* immediately by themselves, without the intervention or any other'.[47] However, if the mind is not capable of perceiving at once the agreement or disagreement of two ideas it must reason and this results in demonstrative knowledge:

> … when the Mind cannot so bring its *Ideas* together, as by their immediate Comparison, and as it were Juxta-position, or application one to another, to perceive their Agreement or Disagreement, it is fain, by the Intervention of other *Ideas* (one or more, as it happens) to discover the Agreement or Disagreement, which it searches; and this is that which we call *Reasoning*[48]

Although clear and distinct ideas are necessary for the subsequent generation of knowledge, this is not a sufficient condition. In addition, if we want this process to be efficient, it is desirable that we do not 'dwell upon only particular Things'.[49]

44 *Essay*, II.xxix.5: 364.
45 *Essay*, II.xxix.6: 364.
46 *Essay*, IV.iii.22: 553.
47 *Essay*, IV.ii.1: 530-531.
48 *Essay*, IV.ii.2: 532.
49 *Essay*, II.xxxii.6: 385.

Rather, we should make use of abstract ideas. Abstract ideas form the elements of the abstract principles that underpin scientific and moral knowledge. In the *Conduct* Locke dedicates glowing words of praise to principles:

> There are fundamental truths that lie at the bottom as the bassis upon which a great many others rest and in which they have their consistency, these are teeming truths rich in store with which they furnish the mind, and like the lights of heaven are not only beautiful and enterteining in them selves, but give light and evidence to other things that without them could not be seen or known.[50]

However, abstract ideas are not formed at once; in the *Essay* it is pointed out that the mind has to bind its individual perceptions '… into Bundles, and rank them so into sorts, that what Knowledge it gets of any of them, it may thereby with assurance extend to all of that sort; and so advance by larger steps in that which is its great Business, Knowledge'.[51] All this means that the relation between the two stages of the way of ideas is one of a complicated interaction. On the one hand the first stage provides the building bricks, consisting of abstract ideas that are clear and distinct, for the subsequent process of reasoning in the second stage. On the other hand, the clearness and distinctness and the abstractness of these elements is not given, but the result of previous polishing by reasoning.

Parallel to the two interrelated stages of the way of ideas run two kinds of equally related errors. An error of the first kind is to accept ideas that are obscure or confused as the basis of subsequent reasoning; an error of the second kind is a defect in reasoning itself. These are the two categories that were given above in the quotation from par. 98 of the *Conduct*:

> … [1] the want of determined Ideas and [2] of Sagacity and exercise in finding out and laying in order intermediate Ideas …

In par. 10 Locke refers to a specific error of the first kind, consisting of 'a custom of takeing up with principles that are not self evident and very often not soe much as true'. In so far as principles form the basis of subsequent reasonings, having wrong principles forms a serious error of the first kind; thus Locke writes in the *Essay*: '*the way to improve our Knowledge*, is not, I am sure, blindly, and with an implicit Faith, to receive and swallow Principles; but it is, I think, *to* get and *fix in our minds clear, distinct, and complete* ideas …'[52] The error of not examining our principles looms large in the *Conduct* and has a prominent place amongst 'the common and most general miscariages which I thinke men should

50 *Conduct*, par. 84; cf. pars. 14 and 59.
51 *Essay*, II.xxxii.6: 386; cf. *Conduct*, par. 30: abstract ideas are 'Framed by the understanding'.
52 *Essay*, IV.xii.6: 642.

avoid or rectifie in a right conduct of their understandings'.[53] When discussing this error, Locke gives special attention to Aristotelian schoolmen who waste the time of their pupils with 'purely logical enquirys'[54] and to the 'zealous bigots'[55] of the various religions; both fail to analyse the principles they build on. In the *Essay* Locke clearly links this error to the theory of innate ideas. By telling their followers that the content of certain principles is innate, 'Masters and Teachers' try to dissuade their followers from inspecting these tenets.[56] Another error of the first kind is not so much that of having wrong principles, but that of starting with one-sided principles: 'that the principles from which we conclude the grounds upon which we bottom our reasoning are but a part some thing is left out which should goe into the reconing to make it just and exact'.[57] The case of erecting our opinions 'upon one single view', and the error of intellectual one-sidedness in general, is again used for a thinly veiled attack on Aristotelian logic.

Once we have taken the first hurdle of a prior examination of our principles, we have in our subsequent reasoning to take care of 'observeing the connection of Ideas and following them in train'.[58] Things go wrong at this stage when we reason either erroneously or not at all. On the whole Locke seems to be more afraid of errors of the first kind than of errors in reasoning itself. Once we have managed to get before us the basic material, clear and distinct ideas, we are not likely to make mistakes in any subsequent reasoning. Thus he writes in the *Conduct*: 'The faculty of Reasoning seldom or never deceives those who trust to it. its consequences from what it builds on are evident and certain but that, which it oftenest if not only misleads us in, is that the principles from which we conclude the grounds upon which we bottom our reasoning are but a part …'[59] This point is also borne out by a passage in the *Essay* where he gives five instances wherein reason may fail us: want of ideas, obscure and imperfect ideas, want of intermediate ideas, wrong principles and doubtful terms; with the exception of want of intermediate ideas, these are all clear instances of errors of the first kind.[60] However, in the second stage hovers the 'ill habit' of not reasoning at all.[61] So, we should be aware of error in both stages of the way of ideas, if only because errors

53 *Conduct*, par. 37.
54 *Conduct*, par. 84.
55 *Conduct*, par. 67.
56 *Essay*, I.iv.24: 101-102.
57 *Conduct*, par. 98; also: pars. 24, 44 and 49.
58 *Conduct*, par. 17.
59 *Conduct*, par. 98.
60 *Essay*, IV.xvii.9-13: 681-683.
61 *Conduct*, par. 35.

of the first kind and of the second kind have a tendency to reinforce each other. Our reasonings have no use unless they are based on correct principles and it is by reasoning that we come to the clear and distinct ideas of which these principles should consist.

3. Causes of error

What leads us to error? Why is it that we take obscure, confused or one-sided principles and why do we fail to reason as we could and should? Locke discusses two general causes of error. Some errors arise because factors from outside impede the proper functioning of our understanding. Other errors are caused by defects in the understanding itself. The main extraneous cause of our errors is an '*uneasiness* of desire', which usually takes the form of a passion, such as aversion, fear, anger, envy and shame.[62] Passions tend to blind us by interposing themselves between us and the truth.[63] Passions often determine our will, and when this happens, we are prone to error.[64] However, our mind has the power to suspend the immediate execution and satisfaction of our passions and has the capacity to examine them closely before they are allowed to influence our judgements and actions. When this happens, we are free.[65] So, our free will ultimately depends on the powers of our mind.

However, when Locke in the opening paragraph of the *Conduct* reduces the faculty of the will to that of the mind, he is primarily referring to a desirable situation. The rest of the *Conduct* is devoted to harsh reality. The desire that our opinions be true forms a great hindrance to our knowledge;[66] our 'natural tempers and passions' influence our judgement;[67] men 'espouse opinions that best comport with their power, profit or credit';[68] their partiality prompts them to 'a phantastical and wilde attributeing all knowledg to the Ancients alone or to the Modernes';[69] and passion is mentioned first when Locke gives several causes for the 'transferring' of thoughts. Transferring happens when our mind

62 *Essay*, II.xxi.39: 256-257; see also: ibid. II.xx: 229-233.

63 *Conduct*, par. 67: 'there is a correspondence in things and agreement and disagreement in Ideas discernable in very different degrees and there are eyes in men to see them if they please, only their eyes may be dimned or dazeld and the discerneing sight in them impaired or lost· Interest and passion dazels …'

64 Cf. *Essay*, IV.xx.12: 715: '*Quod volumus, facilè credimus; what suits our Wishes, is forwardly believed*, is, I suppose, what every one hath more than once experimented …'

65 *Essay*, II.xxi.47: 263.

66 *Conduct*, par. 34.

67 *Conduct*, par. 40.

68 *Conduct*, par. 41.

69 *Conduct*, par. 49.

is hindered in concentrating on the object we have chosen. One possible cause for this phenomenon is when 'Love, or Anger Fear or Greif' bring us 'under the power of an inchantment'.[70]

Much of Locke's attention for the passions as sources of error is in line with the preoccupations of other philosophers in the seventeenth century.[71] Of more interest is his discussion of the causes of error that pertain not to our passions, but to defects in our understanding itself. Here the great problem is habit or custom. It is custom that causes a 'takeing up with principles that are not self evident and very often not soe much as true'.[72] The most interesting instance of the nefarious influence of 'the empire of habit' is that of the wrong association of ideas. Although Hobbes[73] contributed at least as much to an associationist psychology as Locke, it was the latter who coined the term 'association of ideas' and it was he who would be most important for subsequent developments of the theme during the eighteenth century.[74] Locke mentioned the concept first in MS e.1, in what was projected as an addition to the Fourth Edition of the *Essay*. As was noted above, work on this subject had probably started at about April 1695, when it was mentioned to Molyneux.[75] The lines on 'Association' cover pp. 32-56 in MS e.1. However, Locke did not include all this material in the new chapter on 'Association' in the *Essay* (Bk. II, Ch. 33), but used only the part covered by pp. 32-52. It was only later that he decided to use the remaining part, covered by pp. 52-56, for the *Conduct* (pars. 76-79 of the present edition).[76] In the part that was to belong to the *Essay*, Locke points out that besides natural correspondence and connection,

> … there is an other Connexion of *Ideas* wholly owing to Chance or Custom; *Ideas* that in themselves are not at all of kin, come to be so united in some Mens Minds, that 'tis

70 *Conduct*, par. 88.
71 Cf. James, *Passion and Action*, pp. 157-182.
72 *Conduct*, par. 11.
73 See Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Pt. I, Ch. ii-iii, pp. 87-99.
74 For Hobbes and Locke on association, cf. Warren, *A History of the Association Psychology*, pp. 33-40; Kallich, *The Association of Ideas*, pp. 17-34 and Gibson, *Locke's Theory of Knowledge*, p. 236.
75 This letter of 26 April 1695, *Corr*. 1887, V, p. 353, does not betray much awareness of Hobbes's contribution to the subject: 'I think I shall make some other additions to be put into your latin translation, and particularly concerning the Connexion of Ideas, which has not, that I know, been hitherto consider'd and has, I guess, a greater influence upon our minds, than is usually taken notice of.'
76 See below, 'Text', §4 (4).

> very hard to separate them, they always keep in company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the Understanding but its Associate appears with it …[77]

Similarly, in the *Conduct*-part he remarks that 'Such unnatural connections become by custom as natural to the mind, as sun and light'.[78] In the *Essay*-part on 'Association' he gives the following cause for the growth of unnatural connections:

> Custom settles habits of Thinking in the Understanding, as well as of Determining in the Will, and of Motions in the Body; all which seems to be but Trains of Motion in the Animal Spirits, which once set a going continue on in the same steps they have been used to, which by often treading are worn into a smooth path, and the Motion in it becomes easy and as it were Natural.[79]

Like many other seventeenth-century philosophers Locke used the 'Trains of Motion in the Animal Spirits' to give a mechanical explanation for psychological and physiological phenomena.[80]

For Locke, wrong association of ideas is a very important cause of error. In the *Essay*-part of 'Association' he says 'that, perhaps, there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after' and in the *Conduct*-part he points out that it is 'as frequent a cause of mistake and error in us as perhaps any thing else that can be named'.[81] The particular danger for Locke in the wrong association of ideas is that it impedes the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our individual ideas. Another reason why he is so afraid of wrong association is that a man is prone to it in every state of mind, not only when he is 'under the power of an unruly Passion', but also 'in the steady calm course of his life';[82] and since it is 'a very hard thing to convince any one that things are not soe, and naturaly soe as they constantly appear to him',[83] it is an error difficult to eradicate. By corrupting the very basic material of our reasonings, the habit of wrong association is a powerful cause for errors of the first kind. Indeed, in the *Conduct* it is given as cause for the process by which 'loose foundations become infallible principles'.[84]

77 *Essay*, II.xxxiii.5: 395.
78 *Conduct*, par. 77.
79 *Essay*, II.xxxiii.6: 396.
80 Cf. Malebranche, *Recherche*,Vol. I, Bk. II, Pt. I, Ch. v, p. 228: '… que peu à peu les esprits animaux par leur cours continuel ouvrent & applanissent ces chemins, ensorte qu'avec le tems ils n'y trouvent plus de résistance. Or c'est dans cette facilité que les esprits animaux ont de passer dans les membres de nôtre corps, que consistent les *habitudes*'; ibid. Vol. I, Bk. II, Pt. II, Ch. ii, pp. 274-278. See also Descartes, *Les Passions de l'Ame*, Pt. I, Art. vii, AT XI, pp. 331-332.
81 *Essay*, II.xxxiii.9: 397 and *Conduct*, par. 76.
82 *Essay*, II.xxxiii.4: 395.
83 *Conduct*, par. 76.
84 *Conduct*, par. 77; cf. par. 78.

The general importance of habit as a cause of (moral) error is already prominent in Francis Bacon's *De dignate et augmentis scientiarum*.[85] Furthermore, the force of habit and custom seems to have a special relevance for the second of the 'Idols' that are presented in the 'Aphorisms' to the *Novum Organum*:

> The Idols of the Cave are the idols of the individual man. For every one (besides the errors common to human nature in general) has a cave or den of his own, which refracts and discolours the light of nature; owing either to his own proper and peculiar nature; or to his education and conversation with others; or to the reading of books, and the authority of those whom he esteems and admires; or to the differences of impressions, accordingly as they take place in a mind preoccupied and predisposed or in a mind indifferent and settled; or the like.[86]

Although the precise extent of Bacon's influence on Locke's *Essay* in general remains to be assessed,[87] there can be found clear instances in the *Conduct* where Locke seems to hark back to Bacon, not only in his discussion of habit as a cause of error, but also in his discussion of individual habits and of their remedy. Bacon is one of the few philosophers mentioned by name in the *Conduct*.[88] It may not be a matter of coincidence that we see the clearest sign of Locke reading the *Novum Organum* appearing in 1690 at the earliest, which is after the completion of the *Essay* but well before work had started on the *Conduct*.[89]

85 Op. cit. Bk. VII, Ch. iii, *Works*, I, p. 737 on Aristotle: 'Attamen, utcunque hoc se habeat, quo magis verum fuerit *tam vertutes quam vitia in habitu consistere*, eo magis ei contendendum fuerat ut normas præscriberet, quomodo hujusmodi habitus fuerint acquirendi aut amovendi.'

86 Bacon, *Novum organum*, Aph. xlii, *Works*, I, p. 164: 'Idola Specus sunt idola hominis individui. Habet enim unusquisque (præter aberrationes naturæ humanæ in genere) specum sive cavernam individuam, quæ lumen naturæ frangit et corrumpit; vel propter naturam cujusque propriam et singularem; vel propter educationem et conversationem cum aliis; vel propter lectionem librorum, et authoritates eorum quos quisque colit et miratur; vel propter differentias impressionum, prout occurunt in animo præoccupato et prædisposito aut in animo æquo et sedato, vel ejusmodi …', transl. in: Bacon, *Works*, IV, p. 54.

87 Cf. Wood, 'The Baconian Character of Locke's "Essay"', p. 82: 'In sum, the evidence is compelling that Locke is a Baconian, and that the *Essay concerning Understanding* is fundamentally Baconian, whether directly or indirectly derivative', with more wary remarks, e.g. Romanell, 'The Scientific and Medical Genealogy in Locke's "Historical, Plain Method"', pp. 480-481 and Ayers, 'Theories of Knowledge and Belief', p. 1045.

88 *Conduct*, pars. 2-3.

89 Locke's interleaved copy of Blount's *Censura Celebriorum Authorum*, London, 1690 (Harrison/Laslett, nr. 358, p. 88), contains extracts from Book I, aphorisms 65 and 67 (Locke mistakenly gives the number '68'), 105 (all opposite p. 19, 'Plato') and 67 (again) and 98 (both opposite p. 22, 'Aristotles' [*sic*]); I thank Dr. J. R. Milton for bringing this information to my attention.

4. Prevention and cure of error

In the *Conduct* Locke notes that there are 'a great many natural defects in the understanding capable of amendment'.[90] His favourite remedy for error is mental exercise or practice. The relation between errors caused by habit or custom, and remedies consisting of practice, is one of *similia similibus curantur*. Wrong habits or customs are caused by the frequent repetition of 'Trains of Motion in the Animal Spirits' (see above, §3) and wrong repetitions must be prevented or cured by right repetitions provided by practice; 'practise must setle the habit'.[91] The important role of habit or custom as both cause and remedy for error is clearly present in the case of wrong association of ideas. This wrong custom must be prevented by gradual and repetitive training. Educators should 'take heed as much as may be that in their [young pupil's] tender years Ideas that have noe natural cohesion come not to be united in their heads and that this rule be often inculcated to them …'[92] In *Education* Locke remarks that in this way 'you may turn them as you please'.[93] The mind is like the body; both can be raised to a higher pitch only by repeated actions.[94] Since 'we are of the ruminating kinde',[95] repetition corresponds well with our nature. Locke's stress on the importance of practice, the analogy between mind and body and the gradual development of our mental capabilities was not new. These themes can also be found in the works of such recent precursors as, for instance, Francis Bacon[96] or John Amos Comenius (1592-1670).[97] However, Locke used these well-known topics within the frame of the two stages of his analysis of ideas. In the first stage we often fail

90 *Conduct*, par. 5.
91 *Conduct*, par. 8.
92 *Conduct*, par. 78.
93 Op. cit. §58, p. 117.
94 *Conduct*, pars. 7, 15 and 17.
95 *Conduct*, par. 45.
96 'Of Studies', *Works*, VI, p. 497: 'They [studies] perfect nature, and are perfected by experience: for natural abilities are like natural plants, that need proyning by study; and studies themselves do give forth directions too much at large, except they be bounded in by experience'; ibid. p. 498: 'Nay there is no stond or impediment in the wit, but may be wrought out by fit studies: like as diseases of the body may have appropriate exercises'.
97 *Magna didactica*, p. 129: '… perduci ad soliditatem non posse eruditionem sine repetitionibus et exercitiis quam creberrimis et quam dexterrime institutis'; and p. 162: 'Exercitia hæc continuanda sunt, donec habitum artis inducant. Nam *Solus et artifices qui facit, usus erit*'. Quotation from Ovid, *Ars amatoria*, Bk. II, 675-676: 'Adde, quod est illis operum prudentia maior, / Solus et artifices qui facit, usus adest', 'Add this, that they have greater acquaintance with their business, and they have experience, which alone give skill, upon their side …', transl. J. H. Mozley.

to look into our own principles because this is 'a freedom which few men have the notion of in them selves and fewer are allowed the practise of by others'.[98] Second, as to reasoning, it is practice that helps us 'in finding out and laying in order intermediate Ideas'.[99]

Since Locke in the *Conduct* presents not only an analysis of error but also discusses ways to prevent and remedy errors, it is not surprising that his work has come to be regarded as a work on education. Education, mental practice included, pertains to our mental faculties. In a letter to Cary Mordaunt, Countess of Peterborough, possibly written in September or October 1697, Locke gives the following advice concerning the education of her son: 'When a man knows the termes sees the method and has got an entrance into any of the sciences, twill be time then to depend upon himself relye upon his own understanding and exercise his own faculties which is the only way to improvement and mastery.'[100] A reasonably comprehensive description of mental faculties is given in the *Essay*, Book II, Chapters ix-xi. In each instance Locke underlines the relation between faculties and ideas. First, there is the faculty of (sensory) perception, which is 'the first Operation of all our intellectual Faculties'.[101] Our capability of having ideas at all is bound up closely with the faculty of perception: 'To ask, *at what time a Man has first any* Ideas, is to ask, when he begins to perceive; having *Ideas*, and Perception being the same thing.'[102] A second faculty is that of the retention of ideas; this task is performed either by actually contemplating ideas or by storing them in our memory.[103] Next, there is the faculty of discerning and distinguishing between our ideas.[104] Other mental faculties, by which the mind operates 'about' its ideas are those of comparing, composition, enlarging and abstraction.[105] More generally, when he compares it with the will, Locke speaks about the faculty of understanding.[106] This is the 'most elevated Faculty of the Soul'.[107] The understanding is at work in both phases of the way of ideas; it takes our ideas apart until they are clear and distinct and it compares them to generate knowledge. Thus, in the *Conduct* he states that 'great care should be

98 *Conduct*, par. 77.
99 *Conduct*, par. 98.
100 *Corr.* 2320, VI, p. 212.
101 *Essay*, II.ix.15: 149.
102 *Essay*, II.i.9: 108.
103 *Essay*, II.x: 149-155.
104 *Essay*, II.xi.1-3: 155-157.
105 *Essay*, II.xi.4-9: 157-159.
106 *Essay*, II.xxi.17: 242, see also *Conduct*, par. 1.
107 *Essay*, 'Epistle to the Reader', p. 6.

taken of the understanding to conduct it right in the search of knowledge and in the judgments it makes'.[108]

The prominent place attached in the *Conduct* to practising our faculties, is connected with distinct views on the chief aim of education. Locke stresses the importance of raising pupils who take 'the pains and trouble of thinkeing and examining for themselves'.[109] It is not enough to passively cram our heads with particular facts. This results in 'noething but history'.[110] Habit is a powerful source of error, and the aim of education is teaching pupils to make an optimal and free use of their mental faculties in all directions, rather than to produce specialists who are bound by the habits that were instilled by their masters.

> The businesse of Education (…) is not as I thinke to make them ['the yonge'] perfect in any one of the sciences but soe to open and dispose their mindes as may best make them capable of any, when they shall apply themselves to it. If men are for a long time accustomd only to one sort or method of thoughts, theyr mindes grow stif in it and doe not readily turne to an other. Tis therefor to give them this freedom that I thinke they should be made looke into all sorts of knowledg and exercise their understandings in soe wide a variety. But I doe not propose it as a variety and stock of knowledg but a varietie and freedom of thinkeing as an increase of the powers and activity of the minde, not as an enlargment of its possessions'.[111]

Locke's educational programme can be seen as a plea for formal practice. This practice is formal in contradistinction to the material content of knowledge itself. Locke's preference for education as 'an increase of the powers and activity of the minde' instead of education as 'an enlargment of its possessions' is exemplified in what he has to say about principles. As principles to be scrutinized he mentions material principles, such as the 'principles in this or that science'[112] or 'principles of The Dogmatists, Methodists or Chymists'.[113] However, the aim of education is not that of replacing false material principles with true material principles. Rather, we must learn how to put principles to the test, and for this we must develop the general capacity of making a maximal and free use of our mental faculties, first of all our understanding: 'This and this only is well principleing, and not the instilling a reverence and veneration for certain dogmas under the specious title of principles …'[114] Our 'natural reason' is a 'touch stone', but it does

108 *Conduct*, par. 1.
109 *Conduct*, par. 98.
110 *Conduct*, par. 39.
111 *Conduct*, par. 44.
112 *Conduct*, par. 47.
113 *Conduct*, par. 68.
114 *Conduct*, par. 37.

not provide us with material principles; rather, it is a formal faculty that needs training and guidance and that must be used to put these material principles to the test.[115]

Locke's predilection for a formal practice of the faculties very well matched the needs of the audience that he targeted with the *Conduct*. The work was not written for specialized scholars but for a general public of gentlemen, for 'the ingenuous part of man kind whose condition allows them leisure and letters',[116] or more bluntly, for 'men of little businesse and great leisure'.[117] Locke's pedagogical advice in the *Conduct* is in line with a tradition of courtly education in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The general aim was to produce individuals who were fit to govern in peace and to serve in war. The members of the ruling classes did not need specialized forms of learning and, as Locke was keen to point out, they could do without scholastic training in particular.[118] Rather, they were to be trained with a mixture consisting of moral, religious, intellectual and physical elements that were meant to further personal integrity, intellectual proficiency, physical preparedness, and a civilized style of living.[119] The services that Locke had rendered to the Shaftesbury family had made him well acquainted with the educational needs of the upper classes. The clearest connection between these needs and the importance of a formal exercise of our faculties is made not in the *Conduct*, but in *Education*:

> The great Work of a *Governour* is to fashion the Carriage, and form the Mind; to settle in his Pupil good Habits, and the Principles of Vertue and Wisdom; to give him by little and little a view of Mankind; and work him into a love and imitation of what is Excellent and Praise-worthy; and in the Prosecution of it to give him Vigour, Activity, and Industry. The Studies which he sets him upon, are but as it were the Exercises of his Faculties, and Imployment of his Time, to keep him from Sauntering and Idleness, to teach him Application, and accustom him to take Pains, and to give him some little taste of what his own industry must perfect.[120]

115 *Conduct*, par. 98.

116 *Conduct*, par. 78.

117 *Conduct*, par. 44.

118 Cf. Feingold, 'The Humanities', p. 239: '… he [Locke] shrewdly appropriated the language employed by the humanists in their ideal of education only to strip it of the substantial scholarly content they had invested in it'.

119 Cf. Locke, 'Some Thoughts concerning Reading and Study', p. 398: 'he who would be universally knowing must acquaint himself with the objects of all sciences. But this is not necessary to a gentleman, whose proper calling is the service of his country, and so is most properly concerned in moral and political knowledge'. See also Stephens, *The Courtly Tradition*, pp. 320-336.

120 *Education*, §94, p. 156; see also ibid. §134, p. 194: 'That which every Gentleman (that takes care of his Education) desires for his Son, besides the Estate he leaves him, is contain'd (I

Since the pedagogic advice given in the *Conduct* is destined for young gentlemen rather than for small children, Locke cannot limit himself to advice concerning the prevention of error. In addition, he feels obliged to tell something about the removal of errors that have accumulated in earlier years by wrong habits, instilled by a defective education. Once things have gone wrong in this respect, it is not easy to administer effective cures. However, when he concludes a discussion of the prevention of error he does try to suggest a cure: 'This is for caution against this evil before it be throughly rivited by custom in the understanding, but he that would cure it when habit has establishd it, must nicely observe the very quick and almost imperceptible motions of the minde in its habitual actions.'[121] He refers here to the 'Trains of Motion in the Animal Spirits' that he regards as the mechanical causes for habitual errors. So, in cases where the damage is already done, the first requirement for cure is an appreciation of the workings of our own mind. This is indeed the central subject of the *Essay*, as is witnessed by the opening sentence of the first chapter: 'Since it is the *Understanding* that sets Man above the rest of sensible Beings, and gives him all the Advantage and Dominion, which he has over them; it is certainly a Subject, even for its Nobleness, worth our Labor to enquire into.'[122] Locke promises many practical advantages from this study and its relevance for the central theme of the *Conduct*, that of error, is already very eloquently formulated in his early essay 'Of Study' (1677):

> It will be of no hindrance at all to our studies if we sometimes study ourselves, i.e. our own abilities and defects. There are peculiar endowments and natural fitnesses, as well as defects and weaknesses, almost in every man's mind. When we have considered and made ourselves acquainted with them, we shall not only be the better enabled to find out remedies for the infirmities, but we shall know the better how to turn ourselves to those things which we are best fitted to deal with, and so to apply ourselves in the course of our studies as we may be able to make the greatest advantage.[123]

In order to cure the errors of our understanding, we should study it; which poses the question by means of what method we should embark on this inquiry.

suppose) in these four Things: *Virtue, Wisdom, Breeding*, and *Learning*'. Virtue, not learning, is accorded the first place; ibid. §135, p. 195: 'I place *Vertue* as the first and most necessary of those Endowments, that belong to a Man or a Gentleman; as absolutely requisite to make him valued and beloved by others, acceptable or tolerable to himself'. Also: ibid. §147, p. 207 and ibid. §200, p. 255.

121 *Conduct*, par. 79.

122 *Essay*, I.i.1: 43.

123 Op. cit. p. 421.

5. Two methods

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw a substantial growth in the attention to methodological questions. One reason for this phenomenon was a growing discontent with the methods of scholastic philosophy, which were perceived to block further advances in learning. Another motive was provided by sceptical tendencies that had gained force from the sixteenth century onwards. This development not only drew attention to the errors of our mental faculties, but also contributed towards the development of new methods that were meant to stem the pyrrhonist tide. Method is a vital subject in the *Essay*. The subject continued to intrigue Locke after the appearence of the First Edition in 1689. Method has a prominent place in 'Enthusiasm', in 'Association' and in the *Conduct*, which are all (projected) additions to the *Essay*. A connection between at least one of these additions and the subject of method is borne out by MS Locke c.28 fols. 115-116, 'Understanding A', dated *c.* 1694 by P. Long,[124] in which a fragment titled 'Method' is preceded by the heading (not followed by any text) 'Enthusiasm'.

In the *Essay*, Locke did not prescribe one single philosophical or scientific method, to be applied to all branches of knowledge. His point is rather that our method should depend on the kind of objects that we are dealing with. These objects are ideas.[125] Two kinds of ideas are of special relevance here. Firstly, there are modes, 'such complex *Ideas*, which however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves'.[126] The absence of this supposition implies that there is no difference between the nominal essence and real essence of these ideas; we can have completely adequate ideas of an ellipse or a triangle. An important category of modes is formed by the abstract ideas of mathematics, and the method suited for the study of modes is that of Euclid's geometrical demonstration.[127] Locke, in accordance with most of his contemporaries, is an admirer of this method and points out that it can also be used in ethics, provided we give precise definitions of basic concepts like 'property' or 'injustice'.[128] There is no limit to our knowledge of the relations between these ideas.

Secondly, Locke remarks that we are less fortunate with regard to our ideas of substances. Substances can be material or spiritual and the last category can be subdivided into finite (human minds) and infinite (God). The problem with substances is that since we have no knowledge of their real essence, we are in

124 Long, *A Summary Catalogue*, p. 29.
125 Cf. *Essay*, IV.xii.7: 643.
126 *Essay*, II.xii.4: 165.
127 *Essay*, IV.xii.7: 643.
128 *Essay*, IV.iii.xviii: 549-550.

the dark about the necessary coexistence of the diverse qualities that follow from this essence. More particularly, our ignorance concerning matter springs from the fact that we have no knowledge of its micro-structure. We can obtain knowledge of particular qualities of material substances one by one, but we cannot 'from a Discovery of their real Essences, grasp at a time whole Sheaves'.[129] Corpuscular physics was freshly revived in Locke's time and getting enthusiastic attention by mechanistic philosophers. Locke accepted the 'corpuscularian Hypothesis' as being more likely than other accounts of material substances.[130] His collaboration in Oxford with Robert Boyle, whom he had first met in 1660, had given him first-hand knowledge of corpuscular theories. However, given the difficulties in observing corpuscles and in describing their mutual relations, atomism for Locke seems to figure more as a confirmation of our limited capabilities than as a promising prospect for future scientific research. This view may have caused him to neglect contemporary developments in microscopy.[131] The method to be followed concerning material substances is that of experience and history of macro-objects, which have the advantage of being readily apprehended by our bare senses. This method will not yield general knowledge, but can nevertheless be of great practical use in our daily life:

> This *way* of getting, and *improving our Knowledge in Substances only by Experience* and History, which is all that the weakness of our Faculties in this State of *Mediocrity*, which we are in in this World, can attain to, makes me suspect, that natural Philosophy is not capable of being made a Science. (…) Experiments and Historical Observations we may have, from which we may draw Advantages of Ease and Health, and thereby increase our stock of Conveniences for this Life: but beyond this, I fear our Talents reach not, nor are our Faculties, as I guess, able to advance.[132]

When inquiring into human understanding, Locke's preferred method is rather the one prescribed for material substances than the one associated with modes. In the introduction to the *Essay*, he declares that he wants to consider our mental faculties according to a 'Historical, plain Method'.[133] This well-known phrase can be broken down into three main aspects.[134] First, there is the importance of experience. In the case of material substances, as opposed to modes, 'the want of *Ideas* of their real *Essences* sends us from our Thoughts to the things themselves, as

129 *Essay*, IV.xii.12: 647, cf. *Essay*, IV.iii.26: 556-557.
130 *Essay*, IV.iii.16: 547 and *Education*, §193, pp. 247-248.
131 Cf. Wilson, *The Invisible World*, pp. 230-244.
132 *Essay*, IV.xii.10: 645.
133 *Essay*, I.i.2: 44.
134 For a somewhat different treatment of the subject cf. Romanell, 'The Scientific and Medical Genealogy of Locke's "Historical, Plain Method"', *passim*.

they exist'.[135] In the same way, if we want to give a history of human knowledge, we must appeal to experience and observation, and '… examine Things as really they are, and not to conclude they are, as we fancy our selves, or have been taught by others to imagine'.[136] In the early modern era, philosophers as diverse as Bacon,[137] Digby,[138] Comenius[139] and Malebranche[140] can frequently be seen to use expressions like 'Things as really they are' in contradistinction to 'words', which places these terms in an anti-Scholastic context that is also present in the following passage in *Education*, where Locke discusses traditional rhetoric and logic: 'Truth is to be found and supported by a mature and due Consideration of Things themselves, and not by artificial Terms and Ways of Arguing …'[141] However, Locke's 'progressive' anti-scholastic predilection for things themselves instead of words goes hand in hand with his 'conservative' preference for readily observable macro-objects rather than the investigation of micro-objects. When he delimits 'the discerning Faculties of a Man' in the introduction to his *Essay* as the object of his investigation, he utters clear aversion to prying into the physical micro-structure of our mental faculties:

> I shall not at present meddle with the Physical Consideration of the Mind; or trouble my self to examine, wherein its Essence consists, or by what Motions of our Spirits, or Alterations of our Bodies, we come to have any Sensation by our Organs, or any *Ideas* in our Understandings; and whether those *Ideas* do in their Formation, any, or all of them, depend on Matter, or no.[142]

The objects of Locke's *plain* historical method are those that are readily accessible to our experience. This is the case for both material macro-objects and for our mental faculties.

Second, Locke's method is *historical*. Like other contemporaries, he uses the term 'history' in both a general and a particular way. The general way is consistent with the primary connotation of the Greek word ἱστορία, meaning enquiry or

135 *Essay*, IV.xii.9: 644.
136 *Essay*, II.xii.15: 162. Cf. *Conduct*, par. 63. See also Yolton, *Locke and the Compass of Human Understanding*, pp. 16-43.
137 'Præfatio', *Instauratio Magna*, in: *Works*, I, p. 131.
138 *Two Treatises*, p. 2.
139 *Magna Didactica*, p. 154.
140 *Recherche*, Vol. II, Bk. IV, Ch. vii, p. 59.
141 Op. cit. §189, p. 241.
142 *Essay*, I.i.2: 43.

investigation, or the report containing the results of such an enquiry.[143] These meanings are present in his introductory statement of the aim of the *Essay*:

> It shall suffice to my present Purpose, to consider the discerning Faculties of a Man, as they are employ'd about the Objects, which they have to do with: and I shall imagine I have not wholly misimploy'd my self in the Thoughts I shall have on this Occasion, if, in this Historical, plain Method, I can give any Account of the Ways, whereby our Understandings come to attain those Notions of Things we have, and can set down any Measures of the Certainty of our Knowledge, or the Grounds of those Perswasions, which are to be found amongst Men, so various, different and wholly contradictory …[144]

In addition, Locke uses the word 'history' in the more limited meaning of events happening in time, or the result of an inquiry into these events. The previous quotation suggests this meaning as well, but it is present more clearly in the following contention, made later on in Book II: 'And thus I have given a short, and, I think, true *History of the first beginnings of Humane Knowledge*; whence the Mind has its first Objects, and by what steps it makes its Progress to the laying in, and storing up those *Ideas*, out of which is to be framed all the Knowledge it is capable of …'[145] The diachronic nature of the object of Locke's enquiry is matched by the step-by-step method by which he tries to investigate it; the operations of our understanding are like material substances in that they cannot be grasped at a time by 'whole Sheaves'.

Third, although Locke's step-by-step history of our mental faculties has a limited scope of generalization, this is compensated by the fact that it can have great practical value in our daily life. Here we encounter another aspect of Locke's pervasive polemic against the 'useless Imagination of the Schools'.[146] Also, there is again a parallel with material substances, of which we cannot have more than a narrowly circumscribed knowledge either, which however may give us great 'Advantages of Ease and Health'. In a similar way it may be of great practical use to know the limits of our understanding: 'If we can find out, how far the Understanding can extend its view; how far it has Faculties to attain Certainty; and in what Cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content our selves with what is attainable by us in this State.'[147] The parallels between Locke's method for the investigation of material substances and of mental substances

143 For the use of 'history' by Locke and some predecessors, cf. Buickerood, 'The Natural History of the Understanding', p. 157, n. 4.

144 *Essay*, I.i.2: 43-44.

145 *Essay*, II.xii.15: 162.

146 *Essay*, IV.vi.8: 582.

147 *Essay*, I.i.4: 45.

are a reflection of his view that both form a part of one and the same nature, created by God. This ontological relation between nature and our natural faculties guarantees an epistemological fit between natural object and natural subject. Provided our understanding is properly trained, we are able both to perceive the natural connections between our ideas and to see the difference between natural and unnatural connections and associations. Whether this basic trust was justified is of course open to discussion, but it explains much of Locke's impatience with philosophical scepticism, which he has been noted to treat 'in a cavalier fashion'.[148] He fails to see the practical point of scepticism in our present state:

> That *the certainty of* Things existing *in rerum Naturâ*, when we have *the testimony of our Senses* for it, is not only *as great* as our frame can attain to, but *as our Condition needs*. For our Faculties being suited not to the full extent of Being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive Knowledge of things free from all doubt and scruple; but to the preservation of us, in whom they are; and accommodated to the use of Life: they serve to our purpose well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of those Things, which are convenient or inconvenient to us.[149]

The mental faculties that God has given us come 'exceeding short of the vast Extent of Things'.[150] The topic of the narrow cognitive limits which God has conferred on us in our 'present state' is stressed repeatedly in the *Essay*, especially in Book IV.[151] However, God has given men 'Light enough to lead them to the Knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own Duties'.[152] In general, our natural faculties tell us what things are good and thus to be pursued and what things are bad and thus to be avoided, and this makes them suitable enough for our present state. Provided that they are guided by a historical method, our natural faculties can supply us with valuable knowledge about material substances or about these faculties themselves, and in so far as this is the case, sceptical doubts are largely irrelevant. Locke's methodological interest was rooted more in a desire to further practical knowledge than in a wish to silence pyrrhonism.

Locke's historical method is largely in accordance with the empirical tenets embraced by Bacon and the Royal Society. However, it may be possible to detect a more specific early influence that occurred well before he started work on even the

148 Yolton, *Locke and the Compass*, p. 12; cf. Rogers, 'Locke and the Sceptical Challenge', esp. pp. 38-42.

149 *Essay*, IV.xi.8: 634.

150 *Essay*, I.i.5: 45.

151 *Essay*, IV.iii.6: 539-543; ibid. IV.iii.22: 553; ibid. IV.iv.14: 570; ibid. IV.xi.8: 634-635; ibid. IV.xii.10: 645; ibid. IV.xiv.2: 652 and ibid. IV.xvi.4: 659-661; see also 'Of Study', p. 419.

152 *Essay*, I.i.5: 45.

first Draft of his *Essay*. In 1667 he left Oxford to join the household of Anthony Ashley Cooper (Earl of Shaftesbury in 1672) in London. An interesting aspect of Locke's years in the capital was his friendship with Thomas Sydenham (1624-1689), the famous physician and author of the *Methodus Curandi Febres Propriis Observationibus Superstructura* (1666). Locke worked together with Sydenham, largely as a junior partner, on a practical and theoretical level. There are two manuscripts, both kept in the Public Record Office in London, that are a fruit of this co-operation. *Anatomia*,[153] dated 1668, is in Locke's handwriting, except for the opening sentence, which is in Sydenham's hand. *De arte medica*,[154] dated 1669, is entirely in Locke's handwriting. These works can be used as indicators for the degree to which Locke was immersed in Sydenham's medical methodology.[155]

In *De arte medica* a method is defended that combines a maximum of patient, step-by-step observation of particular cases of illness with a minimum of theoretical constructions. Strong aversion is uttered against the 'speculative theorems' of scholastic philosophers, which are contrasted with 'useful arts' which have all 'sprung from industry & observacion'.[156] In the same vein, *Anatomia* stresses the importance of the 'history & the advantage of a diligent observation of these diseases, of their beginning progresse & ways of cure'.[157] While *De arte medica* is fairly middle-of-the-road in its anti-scholastic purport, the *Anatomia* is more remarkable in what it has to say about the limitations of anatomy. In this work it is maintained that 'removeing the pains & maladys of mankind' is hampered by the fact that anatomy is not able to show us the causes of diseases. The reason why it fails to do this, is that 'though we cut into the inside we see but the outside of things'.[158] Anatomy considers organs on a macro-level, whereas the causes for diseases are situated on a micro-level, consisting of particles that are 'too small & too subtile for the observation of our senses'.[159] An anatomist who on a macro-level knows everything about the part of the body where a 'virulent gonorrhaea' can be found 'is as far from knowing the cause of y^{e} yellownesse or acrimony of the seed at that time as he that has never seen any more of a testicle,

153 PRO 30/24/47/2 fols. 31-8.
154 PRO 30/24/47/2 fols.47-56.
155 On *Anatomia* and *De arte medica* cf. Walmsley, *John Locke's Natural Philosophy*, pp. 110-122 and pp. 123-128 respectively.
156 Op. cit. fol. 52r. Quotations from *Anatomia* and *De arte medica* are taken from the transcription by Walmsley, *John Locke's Natural Philosophy*, pp. 272-285 and pp. 286-295 respectively, reference is to the fol. nos. of the MSS.
157 *Anatomia*, fol. 31v.
158 Op. cit. fol. 33r.
159 Op. cit. fol. 34r.

than a dish lambstones fried & served up to a table'.[160] So, most elements of the historical method that Locke used in writing the *Essay*, including a preference for the experience of 'things themselves' on a macro-level, accompanied with an acute sense of the limitations of this level, can be found already in the *Anatomia* and in *De arte medica*; and it has been noted that much of Locke's subsequent influence followed from his application of this method of natural philosophy to the study of the human mind in the *Essay*.[161]

The methodological themes of *De arte medica* and of the *Anatomia* can be found already in the drafts for the *Essay*. Drafts A and B are both dated 1671, which is the year that Locke hit on the subject of the *Essay*. It is doubtful whether these documents contain Locke's first thoughts on the matter, but they form the earliest extant material.[162] The short Draft A does not yet contain a clear reference to Locke's historical method, but in the longer Draft B, §2, there is the following passage:

> It shall suffise to my present purpose to consider the discerning facultys of a man as they are imploid about the objects which they have to doe with & I shall have on this occasion if I can give any account of the ways whereby we come to atteine the knowledge of things & set downe any measures of the certainty of our knowledg or the grounds of those perswasions which are to be found amongst men soe various different & wholy contradictory …[163]

This passage was repeated almost literally in the introductory chapter to the *Essay* (see quotation above, second aspect of historical method). The only difference is that the passage in Draft B does not yet contain the phrase 'Historical, plain Method'. However, in Draft C (written in 1685) we see appearing at the parallel place 'historical plain method'.[164]

The subject of method in general occupies a central place in the *Conduct*. The problem of how to prevent and cure the errors of our understanding is of a methodological nature. However, our choice of method itself is as liable to the nefarious forces of habit and custom as anything else: 'If men are for a long time accustomd only to one sort or method of thoughts, theyr mindes grow stif in it and doe not readily turne to an other.'[165] Thus it is imperative that a

160 Op. cit. fol. 35r.
161 Aarslef, 'Locke's Influence', p. 255.
162 Rogers, 'Introduction' to *Drafts*, I, p. xiii.
163 *Drafts*, I, p. 102.
164 Op. cit. Bk. I, Ch. 1, Sect. 2, fol. 2. I thank Prof. G. A. J. Rogers for his permission to use his transcription of Draft C. Reference is to the fol. nos. of the MS.
165 *Conduct*, par. 44, cf. par. 63.

man should actively 'seek out methods of improveing his mind'.[166] Locke uses the plural form when he speaks about 'methods of enquiry'[167] and 'methods of learning'.[168] Indeed, the *Conduct* contains reiterations of the point made earlier in the *Essay*, i.e. that our method should depend on the kind of objects that we are dealing with: a man should 'pursue his thoughts in that method which will be most agreeable to the nature of the thing'.[169]

When Locke in the *Conduct* stresses the importance of experience of things themselves, his historical method again plays an important role: 'For example were it my Businesse to understand physick would not the safer and readier way be to consult nature her self and informe my self in the history of diseases and their cures than espouseing the principles of The Dogmatists, Methodists or Chymists engage in …'[170] Even more interesting is his use of the historical method in writing the *Conduct* itself. His approach here is very much in line with the prescriptions in *Anatomia* and *De arte medica*. We have noted Locke's *penchant* in the *Conduct* for comparisons between our mind and our body (above, §4). The central theme of the *Conduct*, that of error, its causes and its remedies, is frequently expressed in terms analogical to that of bodily diseases and their cures:

> There are several weaknesses or defects in the understanding either from the natural temper of the minde or ill habits taken up which hinder it in its progresse to knowledge. Of these there are as many possibly to be found if the minde were throughly studyd as there are diseases of the body, each wherof clogs and disables the understanding to some degree and therefor deserve to be looked after and cured.[171]

More light on the importance of this frequently used analogy is thrown by Locke's last letter to Peter King, dated 4 and 25 October 1704, where he informed his cousin about his wishes concerning MSS that contained unfinished work. Locke stresses that these papers amount to

> very little more than extemporary views, layd down in suddain and imperfect draughts, which though intended to be revised and farther looked into afterwards, yet by the intervention of business, or preferable enquiries happend to be thrust aside and so lay neglected and sometimes quite forgotten.[172]

166 *Conduct*, par. 16.
167 *Conduct*, par. 44.
168 *Conduct*, par. 63.
169 *Conduct*, par. 70.
170 *Conduct*, par. 68.
171 *Conduct*, par. 38; cf. pars. 76 and 90.
172 *Corr*. 3647, VIII, p. 412. Cf. a similar remark to E. Clarke on 22 December 1684 / 1 January 1685, *Corr*. 801, II, p. 671, about Draft C of the *Essay*, which was, until the isolation of a winter in Utrecht, 'a subject which I had for a good while backwards thought on by catches

One of these unfinished works was the *Conduct*, and on the first page of MS e.1 he had indeed written: 'Mem: That these following discourses are to be writ out under their several heads into distinct Chapters, and then to be numberd and ranged according to their natural order.' Now, what the ailing philosopher has to say on the *Conduct* in the farewell letter to his cousin, seems first of all to confirm the unfinished character of this work: '… what I have done in it is very far from a just treatise. All that I have done has been, as any miscariage in that point has accidentaly come into my minde, to set it downe, with those remedies for it that I could think of.' However, Locke then continues: 'This method though it makes not that hast to the end which one would wish, is yet perhaps the onely one can be followed in the case, it being here as in physick impossible for a physitian to describe a disease or seek remedies for it till he comes to meet with it.'[173] So, the disparate step-by-step discussion of errors and their cures in the *Conduct* is not just a symptom of haste and imperfection; it is at the same time an application of the historical method as formulated in the early medical manuscripts on a range of diseases — the disease in this case being not of a physical but of a mental nature.

We have noticed the paradigmatic role accorded to mathematics by Locke in relation to modes in the *Essay*. A final remark should be made on the methodological role accorded to this discipline in the *Conduct*, where he pays ample tribute to the importance of mathematics in the formal training of our mind. Mathematics settles in the minde 'an habit of reasoning closely and in train'.[174] It performs the task of teaching how to 'reason well',[175] and in this respect it is a viable alternative to scholastic logic.[176] This aim can be accomplished without it being necessary that men should try to become 'deep mathematicians, but that haveing got the way of reasoning which that study necessarily brings the minde to they might be able to transfer it to other parts of knowledg …'[177] The importance that Locke ascribed to mathematics in the *Conduct* is thus of a predominantly didactic character. In this context Locke has little interest in the more technical

and set downe without method severall thoughts upon as they had at distinct times and on severell occasions come in my way and which I was now willing in this retreat to forme into a lesse confused and coherent discourse …'

173 *Corr*. 3647, VIII, p. 413.

174 *Conduct*, par. 21.

175 *Conduct*, par. 17.

176 On mathematics as an alternative for logic in Locke, cf. Feingold, 'The Mathematical Sciences', pp. 367-368.

177 *Conduct*, par. 21; cf. par 17.

aspects of mathematics, and when he embarks on one of his many attacks against methodological one-sidedness, he does not forget to deride men who have 'soe used their heads to mathematical figures that giveing a preference to the methods of that Science they introduce lines and diagrams into their study of divinity or politique enquirys as if noe thing could be known without them …'[178] The evaluation of mathematics in the *Conduct* was summed up elegantly by Voltaire, who in his *Lettres philosophiques* would write about Locke: 'He had never been able to submit himself either to the drudgery of calculations or to the aridity of mathematical truths, which at first offer nothing to the mind that is appreciable; and no one proved better than he that one can have a geometrical mind without the help of geometry.'[179] In the *Conduct* mathematics has the propaedeutic and formal function of exercising our mind; this implies repetition by pupils of what is already known, without adding much to the content of human knowledge.[180]

In the *Essay* on the other hand, mathematics is not merely presented as a predominantly didactic instrument, but linked to a promising kind of new knowledge that is a goal in itself and that is exemplified by 'Mr. *Newton*', who 'in his never enough to be admired Book, has demonstrated several Propositions, which are so many new Truths, before unknown to the World, and are farther Advances in Mathematical Knowledge …'[181] New knowledge is very much the result of 'the discovering, and finding out of proofs';[182] and this means discovering intermediate ideas. Thus, from each of Newton's new propositions it can be said that it rests on 'that admirable Chain of intermediate *Ideas*, whereby he at first discovered it to be true'.[183] When Locke stresses the success of mathematics in finding intermediate ideas, he especially mentions algebra.[184] Algebra is capable of finding the proofs that are exposed in a geometrical demonstration: 'Till *Algebra*, that great Instrument and Instance of Humane Sagacity, was discovered, Men, with Amazement, looked on several of the Demonstrations of ancient

178 *Conduct*, par. 49.

179 Op. cit. 'Treizième lettre. Sur M. Locke', p. 88: 'Il n'avait jamais pu se soumettre à la fatigue des calculs ni à la sécheresse des vérités mathématiques, qui ne présente d'abord rien de sensible à l'esprit; et personne n'a mieux prouvé que lui qu'on pouvait avoir l'esprit géomètre sans le secours de la géométrie.'

180 Cf. *Education*, §94, p. 156: 'For who expects, that under a *Tutor* a young Gentleman should be an accomplished Critick, Orator, or Logician? Go to the bottom of Metaphysicks, Natural Philsophy or Mathematicks?'

181 *Essay*, IV.lxxiv: 599; cf. *Essay*, IV.xii.15: 649; *Education*, §194, p. 248; and 'Second Reply to the Bishop of Worcester', in: W-1963, IV, pp. 427-428.

182 *Essay*, IV.xvii.3: 669-670.

183 *Essay*, IV.i.9: 530.

184 *Essay*, IV.iii.18: 549 and IV.xii.15: 649.

Mathematiciens, and could scarce forbear to think the finding several of those Proofs to be something more than humane.'[185] Locke is probably referring here to Descartes's new analytical geometry that, by reducing geometrical lines to algebraical symbols, had opened up new vistas in the search for the intermediate ideas that are required for mathematical proofs.[186] However, in the *Conduct* Locke hardly discusses the discovery of intermediate ideas or the important role that algebra can play in this process.[187] Here he mentions mathematics in a context that does not go much beyond 'teaching it [Science] to others as far as it is advanced', while in the *Essay* it is related to a 'Method of raising any Science'.[188]

6. An anti-scholastic logic of ideas

Locke's two stage analysis of ideas should be understood within the context of a reaction against what he saw as the predominant features of scholastic logic. From the late sixteenth century onwards syllogisms had held a place of eminence in the study of valid inference.[189] They formed the principle butt of Locke's attacks on Aristotelian 'Masters of Logick'.[190] As we have noted, the first stage of his way of ideas implies a careful inspection of the clarity and distinctness of our ideas. However, Locke's problem with syllogisms is that they are used, and can be used correctly, without this prior inspection. Syllogisms merely consist of words, and for a syllogism to be correct, its words do not have to correspond with clear and distinct ideas. This makes syllogisms eminently suited for senseless disputations.

As to the second stage: Locke is confident about the capability of our natural faculties in tracing the natural connections between our ideas. His point about syllogisms is that their order is not natural, but very artificial. This makes them superfluous to say the least; God has provided mankind with 'a Mind that can reason without being instructed in Methods of Syllogizing: The Understanding is not taught to reason by these Rules; it has a native Faculty to perceive the Coherence, or Incoherence of its *Ideas*, and can range them right, without any such perplexing Repetitions'.[191] If syllogisms have any use at all in 'the Schools', it

185 *Essay*, IV.xvii.11: 682.

186 See Descartes, *La Géométrie*, AT VI, p. 371: 'Mais souuent on n'a pas besoin de tracer ainsi ces lignes sur le papier & il suffist de les designer par quelques lettres, chascune par vne seule.'

187 For a short remark on algebra in the *Conduct*, see par. 25.

188 *Essay*, IV.vii.4: 599.

189 Ashworth, 'Traditional Logic', p. 164.

190 *Essay*, III.vi.32: 459. Locke's most comprehensive discussion of syllogisms is in *Essay*, IV.xvii.4-8: 670-681.

191 *Essay*, IV.xvii.4: 671.

is that they allow their members 'without Shame to deny the Agreement of *Ideas*, that do manifestly agree …'[192] Also, syllogisms can be used for the exposition of existing knowledge, but are of no use for the generation of new knowledge. This is produced by the discovery of intermediary ideas, and we have seen him giving praise to the method used by mathematicians. The order of syllogisms is the product of a previous quest for intermediary ideas, not their source: 'A man knows first, and then he is able to prove syllogistically. So that *Syllogism* comes after Knowledge, and then a Man has little or no need for it.'[193]

Locke's distinction between errors of the first and the second kind, and the relevance of this distinction for the specific weaknesses of Aristotelian logicians, is graphically illustrated by his distinction between madness and foolishness. In the *Essay* he points out that madmen are especially prone to errors of the first kind: 'having joined together some *Ideas* very wrongly, they mistake them for Truths; and they err as Men do, that argue from wrong Principles. For by the violence of their Imaginations, having taken their Fancies for Realities, they make right deductions from them'.[194] Wrong association of ideas is a major cause of errors of the first kind, and wrong association is indeed described as a 'sort of Madness'.[195] On the other hand, idiots or 'Naturals' are easy victims to errors of the second kind, not in the sense that they reason wrongly but because they do not reason at all: 'In fine, the defect in *Naturals* seems to proceed from want of quickness, activity, and motion, in the intellectual Faculties, whereby they are deprived of Reason …'[196] In King's *The Life of John Locke* there is a passage taken from Locke's MSS on 'Error' that makes a similar distinction between errors of the first and the second kind by ascribing the first to madmen and the second to fools: 'where a man argues right upon wrong notions or terms, he does like a madman; where he makes wrong consequences, he does like a fool …'[197] On the same page, Locke again intimates that madness is a graver defect than foolishness. Here his motivation for this choice is clearly connected to his assault on scholastic logic: 'For in the discursive faculty of the mind, I do not find that men are so apt to err; but it avails little that their syllogisms are right, if their terms be insignificant and obscure, or confused and indetermined, or that in their internal discourse deduction be regular, if their notions be wrong.' Scholastic logicians

192 *Essay*, IV.xvii.4: 675.
193 *Essay*, IV.xvii.6: 679.
194 *Essay*, II.xi.13: 161.
195 *Essay*, II.xxxiii.3: 395.
196 *Essay*, II.xi.13: 160-161.
197 King, II, p. 175.

reason, sometimes even brilliantly, on notions and principles that they have not looked into; this makes them comparable to madmen.

The purport of the *Conduct* is just as anti-scholastic as that of its parent work. In the introductory paragraphs Locke launches an attack against Aristotelian logic with a quotation from Bacon's preface to the *Instauratio Magna*, in which the Lord Chancellor complains that traditional logic '*has served to confirme and establish errors rather than to open a way to truth*'.[198] Other parts of the *Conduct* contain variations on Locke's disparaging introductory remarks: it is a mistake that a 'few rules of Logick'[199] are of help against the neglect of our understanding and the old logic tries to show 'where in right reasoning consists', without thereby producing 'a strict reasoner'.[200] Finally, there is the anti-scholastic contribution in the *Conduct* to Locke's theory of 'probability'. His enquiry into our understanding comprises not only knowledge (which is always certain), but faith and opinion (which is not certain) as well. One of the eminently important aspects of his *Essay* is that he gives a separate and respectable status to probable knowledge by a detailed examination of 'the Reasons and Degrees of *Assent*'.[201] In the fourth part of his *Essay* he tries to give precise criteria for the acceptability of various degrees of probable knowledge.[202] (Since according to Locke all knowledge is certain, 'probable knowledge' is strictly speaking a contradiction in terms; his own preferred expression is 'probability'.)[203] One of Locke's points in the *Conduct* is that when we enquire into probability it is not enough to analyse one argument to its source. Instead, we will have to analyse and then to weigh different chains of argument against each other.[204] He stresses that the old logic does not provide the instruments that are needed for such an analysis, so that on this subject

198 *Conduct*, pars. 2 and 3.

199 *Conduct*, par. 5.

200 *Conduct*, par. 8.

201 *Essay*, I.i.3: 44. For Locke on 'probable truths' see also: 'Miscellaneous Papers' in King, II, p. 153. Cf. Daston, Probability and Evidence', p. 1128-1129. A very interesting topic is that of the interplay between probabilistic notions developed in theological writings and in other fields, as well as the importance of Locke's writings for this interaction, cf. Shapiro, *Probability and Certainty*, p. 268: 'The ultimate spokesman of this generation was John Locke, who voiced the shared concerns of scientists, theologians, historians, and lawyers. (…) For Englishmen, the central intellectual phenomenon of the second half of the seventeenth century was the peculiar interaction between efforts to establish a rational basis for an historically based, nondogmatic, Protestant Christianity and comparable efforts to achieve a probabilistic basis for the factual assertions of scientists, historians, and lawyers.'

202 *Essay*, esp. IV.xvi.1-14: 657-668.

203 *Essay*, IV.xv.3: 655.

204 *Conduct*, pars. 21 and 22.

its adherents are led completely astray: 'nor is it to be wonderd since the way of disputeing in the schools leads them quite away from it [truth] by insisting on one topical argument by the successe of which the truth or falsehood of the question is to be determind …'[205] According to Locke, instead of comparing different chains of arguments, as should be done in the case of probable knowledge, scholastic logicians ignore the arguments that do not fit in with their pre-conceived theses.

The *Essay* not only contains a massive assault on scholastic logicians, it provides us with an alternative as well. The separate elements of this new logic have been discussed in the previous sections and can now be summarized. Firstly, there is his two stage way of ideas. In the first stage we must make sure that we start with clear and distinct ideas. The second stage consists of the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two clear and distinct ideas. In reasoning this activity is repeated, resulting in a chain of ideas that connects two ideas between which a connection was not at first perceived. We are naturally capable of perceiving the agreement or disagreement of ideas. For reasoning well, we do not need cumbersome syllogisms. Secondly, instead of focusing on the formalization of reasonings, the new logic concentrates on a prior inspection of the mental faculties. Ideas and faculties are closely connected. Thanks to our faculties we are furnished with ideas and capable of processing these ideas; and ideas are the objects which our faculties have 'to do with'. Thirdly, there is a preoccupation with method that is intimately connected with both ideas and faculties. The problem of method comes down to the question of how we can best use our faculties in our pursuit of either certain or probable knowledge. The kind of method to be used depends on the kind of ideas that are presented to our mental faculties. In the case of modes the paradigmatic method is that of mathematics and in the case of ideas of material substances or of our own understanding, the preferred approach is the plain historical method of Sydenhamian medicine. The result is a logic that is less formal, that is more subject-oriented and that is focused more on epistemological and psychological questions than on what Locke in his *Conduct* described as the 'Logic now in use'.[206] His logic is a 'logic of ideas'.[207]

205 *Conduct*, par. 23.

206 *Conduct*, par. 2.

207 For the term 'logic of ideas', cf. Yolton, 'Locke and the Seventeenth-Century Logic of Ideas', *passim*. Cf. Buickerood, 'The Natural History of the Understanding', *passim*, who instead uses the term 'facultive logic', which is plausible, given the close connection between ideas and faculties. However, in Locke's logic the accent is rather on the former than on the latter. For an exemple of what with more justice could be called a 'facultative logic' see below, §9, in my discussion of Malebranche.

The *Conduct* forms an integral part of Locke's logic of ideas. It presents a discussion of the nature of the two kinds of error that are relevant to the two phases of his logic and gives causes for these errors and suggestions for prevention and remedy. Now that the *Conduct* is presented as part of Locke's logic, we must come back to the undeniable presence of pedagogical aspects in this work. The new logic possessed some features that caused a blurring of the line by which it was separated from strictly pedagogical treatises. In its protest against the syllogistic subtleties of scholastic logicians it was informal to an aggressive degree. As a result it lost most of the technical characteristics that had set it apart from other disciplines. Moreover, Locke's eminently practical outlook did not allow him to confine himself to an analysis of the nature and causes of errors. He felt obliged to continue with advice on how to prevent and cure them. He was not only interested in understanding the understanding but also in how to conduct it. This caused him to cover subjects in the *Conduct* that he had already treated more fully in his more exclusively pedagogical *Education*. However, in this respect the *Conduct* is not unique. In the *Essay* a similar reflex had made him cross the thin line between his new logic and pedagogy. When he describes the dangerous phenomenon of wrong association of ideas he continues with the exhortation 'that those who have Children, or the charge of their Education, would think it worth their while diligently to watch, and carefully to prevent the undue Connexion of *Ideas* in the Minds of young People'.[208] Most of Locke's manifold pedagogical thoughts were not original. Classical authors, especially Aristotle, and later writers as Montaigne and Comenius, Englishmen such as Francis Bacon, George Puttenham (*c.* 1529-1590), Richard Mulcaster (*c.* 1530-1611), Samuel Hartlib (*c.* 1600-1662) and John Milton (1608-1674), as well as French authors who were Locke's contemporaries, have all been suggested as sources of influence.[209] However, in the *Essay* and the *Conduct*, much more than in *Education*, Locke's educational views, whether original or not, are presented in the specific context of his logic of ideas. This logic was not developed *de novo*. In the next section Locke's logic of ideas in general and the *Conduct* in particular will be placed in the even wider context of the content and structure of works by both Aristotelian and Cartesian predecessors.

208 *Essay*, II.xxxiii.8: 397.

209 Cf. Smith, 'Some Ideas on Education before Locke', *passim*; Mason, 'The Literary Sources of John Locke's Educational Thoughts', *passim*; Yolton, 'Introduction' to *Education, passim*; and Stone, review of this Yolton-edition, *passim*.

7. Aristotelian textbook writers

Locke's years as student and tutor in Oxford had offered him ample opportunity to become acquainted with Aristotelian logic. However, his repeatedly evoked spectre of the old logic (like that of innate ideas) is partly a caricature of his own making. At the beginning of the seventeenth century key disciplines in the Aristotelian tradition such as logic, physics and metaphysics, had already ceased to be the chief studies at Oxford (and at Cambridge as well). Nor was reading confined to commentators on Aristotle. Rather, the curriculum had acquired a distinctly humanistic tincture that showed especially in the attention given to language and literature. In the English Renaissance Thomas Elyot (*c.* 1490-1546), Roger Ascham (1515-1568) and Puttenham had given new actuality to the rhetorical works of Cicero and Quintilian.[210] Logic was still an important element of the undergraduate curriculum at Oxford, but had to share this role with the other parts of the trivium (rhetoric and grammar) and also with moral philosophy, political philosophy, geometry and music. A large influx of upper-class students, who mostly felt no need to graduate, had prompted educators to include many subjects in the undergraduate curriculum. The inclusion of a wide range of topics in this programme had partly been made possible by a transformation in the grammar schools. These had started to produce students who were well versed in Latin and Greek and who had often already received a grounding in logic and rhetoric before they went up to Oxford or Cambridge.

Humanist attacks on the highly specialized and technical character of traditional logic were not only matched by a change in its relative weight *vis-à-vis* the other parts of the trivium, but also by changes in its perceived function. Its value for generating new truths from given truths was under increasing attack, especially in the freshly developing field of natural philosophy; this was the point of Bacon in his preface to the *Instauratio Magna* in the passage quoted by Locke in the *Conduct* (pars. 2-3). Bacon attacked traditional logic because it 'comes very far short of the subtilty in the reall performances of nature'.[211] However, in the same passage he still gives it a function 'in civil affairs and the Arts which consisted in talke and opinion'. Whereas many scholastic philosophers had valued logic as a science that was capable of generating new knowledge, many scholars with a humanistic background tended to regard logic as an instrumental art that helped

210 On the role of rhetoric in Renaissance Britain, cf. Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes*, pp. 19-211.

211 Cf. Tyacke, 'Introduction', to *The History of the University of Oxford, Vol. IV*, p. 9: 'that the attacks on logic by seventeenth-century contemporaries were largely confined to the realm of natural philosophy'.

pupils in directing their minds and in organising knowledge they had already acquired by other means. Although logic thus gained a new relevance due to its perceived capability of forming the minds of the young, it had to share this role with mathematics. Given their role of propaedeutic studies which should foster the primary mental skills of young students, it is not surprising that both logic and mathematics were placed in the first years of the curriculum.[212]

This short sketch shows that the term 'Aristotelian logic' refers to a discipline that was rather more adaptable than Locke himself was prepared to acknowledge. His educational aims, especially that of a formal training of our mental faculties, were already announced by what by then was perceived as the function of logic in seventeenth-century Oxford: that of training the minds of young students. For most contemporaries of Locke (and also for many of his successors) there was no conflict between the contribution of traditional Aristotelian logic and that of the freshly reinvigorated discipline of mathematics towards this same instrumental goal. For example, although Thomas Sprat (1635-1713), founding member of the Royal Society, denied the usefulness of Aristotelian logic in the generation of new knowledge, he at the same time acknowledged that disputing, a favourite activity of traditional logicians, 'is a very good instrument, to sharpen mens wits, and to make them versatil, and wary defenders of the Principles, which they already know …'[213] If Locke showed more aggression here, this was because he wanted to supplant Aristotelian logic with his own logic.

The Bodleian Library MS Locke f.11, fols. 7v.-57, gives us some information about the Peripatetic works on logic that Locke is likely to have been acquainted with. It is a small booklet with accounts of money received from and disbursed for his pupils from 1661 to 1666, when he was Tutor at Christ Church. Amongst items such as shoes, stockings, wood and chamber pots, Locke also entered the authors of the books that were bought for the students under his supervision. He gives three specific references to works on logic: 'Du Trieu's Logick', 'Sandersons Logick' and 'Smith's Logic'.[214] In addition he gives some names of authors that are known to have written works on logic, without mentioning, however, the title of these works: Martin Smiglecki (1564-1618),[215] John Flavell (1596-1617),[216]

212 Cf. Feingold, 'The Humanities', *passim*.
213 Sprat, *History of the Royal-Society*, p. 18.
214 MS Locke f.11, resp. fol. 8r, 10v and again 10v.
215 MS Locke f.11, fol. 8r and again fol. 10v. Smiglecius, *Logica*.
216 MS Locke f.11, fol. 10v. Flavel, *Tractatus de demonstratione methodicus et polemicus*.

Griffith Powell (1561-1620)[217] and, most famous, Jacobus Zabarella (1532-1589).[218] My discussion will concentrate on Du Trieu, Sanderson and Smith; their works are mentioned by name and in addition these are works on logic in general, which is important if we want to gain insight in structural developments. The names entered by Locke in his booklet reflect the then common preponderance in Oxford of contemporary authors of textbooks over the works of mediaeval logicians or Aristotle's *Organon* itself. The use of compendia was the consequence of the limited role of logic in an undergraduate curriculum that was filled with many other subjects. These compendia can be seen as answers, often quite apt, to changed curricular circumstances and their authors should not necessarily be considered 'second-rate or worse'.[219]

By the seventeenth century Aristotelian textbooks had become imbued with numerous mediaeval and some stoic elements. However, their basic content and structure was still largely in accordance with Aristotle's logic itself. The order of his logical works as it has come down to posterity is probably based on editorial interventions by Andronicus of Rhodes (b. First Century BC),[220] while the collective name *Organon* ('instrument' of science) has been used since about 200 AD.[221] The first book of the *Organon* is the *Categories*, which treats of simple terms: subjects and predicates. In *De interpretatione* the core subject is that of the propositions which are formed by these terms. Propositions in their turn form the elements of syllogisms, which are treated in both *Analytics*. The *Analytica priora* gives a formal analysis of the structure of syllogisms in general. The *Analytica posteriora* is about the type of syllogisms that are used for a demonstration or scientific proof, and discusses themes related to the philosophy of science and to scientific method (e.g. the question of how we can find the first principles of the different sciences). The *Topica* is on dialectics, and deals with the practice of reasoning on probable rather than scientific or certain premises. Finally there is *De sophisticis elenchis*, which has the same theme as the *Conduct*, namely that of error. Sophistical arguments have the appearance of being good dialectical arguments, but in fact their premises or the deductions based on these premises are wrong. So, Aristotle's logic is structured into three levels: terms (subjects and predicates),

217 MS Locke f.11, fol. 10v. Powel, *Analysis lib. Aristotelis De sophisticis* and id., *Analysis analyticorum posteriorum sive librorum Aristotelis de Demonstratione*.

218 MS Locke f.11, fol. 11r (more on Zabarella below).

219 Milton, 'The Scholastic Background to Locke's Thought', p. 31: 'Most of the [scholastic] authors whom Locke read were second-rate or worse.'

220 Barnes, 'Life and Work', pp. 10-15.

221 E. S. Forster, 'Introduction' to Aristotle, *On Sophistical Refutations*, p. 3.

propositions and syllogisms. Syllogisms can be demonstrative (certain), dialectical (probable) or sophistical (contentious).

Philippe du Trieu's (1580-1645) *Manuductio ad logicam, sive dialectica, studiosæ iuventuti ad logicam præparandæ* is a textbook that was wide-spread and that went through at least 44 editions.[222] The Jesuit Du Trieu taught philosophy in the French town of Anzin (near Valenciennes). Locke owned a copy of the *Manuductio* himself.[223] In addition, the Bodleian collection of Locke's manuscripts contains a notebook that is partly filled with notes on the *Manuductio*. However, it is uncertain whether these notes are in Locke's own hand.[224] Du Trieu never forgets that he is writing for propaedeutic students and tries to give a simple introduction to logic.[225] The structure of his work faithfully mirrors that of the *Organon*:[226]

I. De termino simplici
II. De enuntiatione
III. De syllogismo
IV. De locis

This division reflects the tripartite structure of Aristotle's logic: term (*terminus*) — proposition (*enuntiatio*) — syllogism. The third treatise discusses demonstrative syllogisms and the fourth treats of dialectical and sophistical syllogisms. Du Trieu's treatment of error follows the basic division made by Aristotle in *De sophisticis elenchis*,[227] between refutations that depend on speech and refutations that are independent of speech. This holds true also for the subsequent subdivisions.[228] However, all this does not imply that Du Trieu gives something like a direct summary of the *Organon*; his *Manuductio* is the product of a scholastic tradition in which, for example, his skipping methodological problems was not at all unusual.

The *Aditus ad logicam in usum eorum qui primò Academiam Salutant* (1613) by Samuel Smith (1587-1620) of Magdalen College, Oxford, presents a more

222 Risse, *Logik*, I, p. 421, n. 804. Inspected copy is from 1628.
223 Harrison/Laslett, nr. 2982, p. 252.
224 MS Locke f.33, fols. 8-25, covers the *Manuductio* from the start up to and including Tract. II, Pt. I, Capt. iii, Art. i; cf. Kenney, *John Locke and the Oxford Training*, pp. 32-34 and Milton, 'The Scholastic Background to Locke's Thought', p. 30.
225 Op. cit. 'Ad lectorem', fol. 3v: 'memor me tironibus scribere'
226 Du Trieu, *Manuductio*, 'Ad lectorem', fol. 4r: 'Ordinem Aristotelis ferè sequor'
227 Op. cit. 4 165b23-166b27.
228 *Manuductio*, Tract. IV, Pars Post., Ch. 1 'De fallaciis in dictione', pp. 227-233, discusses 'fallacia Æquiuocationis, Amphiboliæ, Compositionis & Diuisionis, Accentus, Figuræ dictionis'; ibid. Ch. 2 'De fallaciis extra dictionem', pp. 233-238, treats of 'fallacia accidentis, Dicti secundùm quid & dicti simpliciter, Ignorationis elenchi, Consequentis, Petitionis principij, Non causæ ut causæ, Plurium interrogationum ut vnius'.

interesting case.[229] Its division into three books (all without titles) is conventional enough: I. terms (*voces simplices*); II. propositions (*voces complexæ*); III. syllogisms (including demonstrative, topical and sophistic syllogisms). The discussion of sophisms is along the lines of the conventional distinction between fallacies within speech and fallacies that are independent of speech. However, the *Aditus* gives attention to a subject that is absent in the *Manuductio*: that of method. The last part of Book III contains a brief section on order. The subject of order is presented as a natural sequel to that of syllogistic reasoning; both are a part of discourse, although they present different levels:

> In the same way as syllogistic discourse teaches how to demonstrate one thing by means of another, discourse that is concerned with order shows how the definitions, divisions and other parts of any art or science are properly connected one with the other, so that some precede and others follow.[230]

'Order' can also be called 'method'; in Smith's rendering both terms refer more to the arranging of existing knowledge than to the generation of new knowledge. He continues the above quotation:

> This is commonly called order or method; indeed we use both names indiscriminately where things are thereby arranged in such a way that we become acquainted with them more easily.[231]

The process of ordering can proceed in two different directions. The first is synthetical or compositive and goes from principles to conclusions. The second is analytical or resolutive and goes backward from conclusions to the principles from which these have been inferred.[232] The subject of method with the logical text as its locus had been revived in the sixteenth century by Petrus Ramus (1515-1572) and Zabarella. Ramus had ended his *Libri Scholarum dialecticarum* with a book on method, which for him consisted mainly in a (dichotomous) ordering of existing bodies of knowledge; thus the book on method is called aptly 'de Elenchis dispositionis'.[233] However, in Zabarella's *De methodis libri quatuor* we

229 Copy examined is from 1639.

230 Op. cit. Bk. III, Sec. iii, p. 199: 'Sicut discursus illativus aliud ex alio probare docet, ita ordinativus ostendit, quomodo definitiones, divisiones, & reliquæ partes cujuslibet artis aut scientiæ rectè inter se connectantur, ut aliæ præcedant, aliæ consequantur.'

231 Op. cit. Bk. III, Sec. iii, p. 199: 'Hic vulgò ordo aut Methodus vocatur: ambo enim vocabula nos promiscuè usurpamus, quatenus per illa res disponuntur, ut facilius eas cognoscamus'; cf. ibid. Bk. III, Sec. i, Ch. 1, p. 92-93: 'Ordinans est cum intellectus humanus ab una parte doctrinæ ad aliam procedit, adminiculo præceptorum Ordinis & Methodi'.

232 Op. cit. Bk. III, Ch. i, p. 202-203.

233 Op. cit. Bk. XX, Ch. i, in: *Scholæ in liberales artes*, col. 588. On Ramus' preference for dichotomous keying, cf. Jardine, 'Humanistic logic', p. 185-186.

find, in addition to a discussion of the disposition of entire bodies of existing knowledge, an examination of methods for finding and proving the answers for individual new problems by *methodus demonstrativa* and *methodus resolutiva*.[234] Smith's concern for order shows the influence of Ramus and his distinction between compositive and resolutive that of Zabarella.

A second point of interest in the *Aditus* is that it provides us with an early glimpse of a subject-oriented understanding of this discipline. This is how Smith opens the first section of his third book:

> In the first book we discussed simple terms and in the second book complex terms, where the former guide the first and the latter guide the second operation of the mind; what remains is the third part of logic, which guides the third operation of the mind and is called discourse.[235]

However, not too much should be made of Smith's division of logic into three acts of the mind. It did not change the established division of logic into terms, propositions and syllogisms. The possibility of building this division around our *intellectus operationes* had been discussed already in the sixteenth century by Zabarella in his *De natura logicæ*.[236] In the case of Smith, the sporadic mentioning of this principle of organisation does not have any consequences for the traditional content of his Aristotelian logic.

Thirdly, the *Aditus* might be taken to pay an early tribute to what was to be another important theme in Locke's logic of ideas, that of probable knowledge. Smith defines logic as 'the science of discoursing probably and closely on any subject'.[237] However, his reason for giving this definition is anything but forward looking. Logic is the art of disputation; and about things that are certain, there can be no disputes, so logic must be about things that can only be probable.[238] Yet Smith does not seem to take this argument very seriously himself. When he starts his discussion of demonstrative reasoning in the second section of Book III,

234 Op. cit. Bk. III, Ch. ii, col. 225: 'Ordo totam scientiam respicit, methodus verò problemata singula'.

235 Op. cit. p. 92: 'In primo libro de vocibus simplicibus, in secundo de complexis egimus, quatenus per illas prima, per has secunda mentis operatio dirigitur; restat jam tertia Logicæ pars tertiam mentis operationem dirigens, quæ vocatur Discursus.'

236 Op. cit. Bk. II, Ch. ii, in: *Opera logica*, col. 54; for earlier instances see Ashworth, 'Introduction' to Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, pp. xli-xlii.

237 Op. cit. Bk. I, Ch. i, p. 1: 'Logica est Scientia de quovis themate probabiliter, & angustè disserendi.'

238 Op. cit. Bk. I, Ch. i, pp. 2-3.

he immediately points out that it has a necessary or apodictic — and thus not a probable — character.[239]

The *Logicæ Artis Compendium* (1615)[240] by Robert Sanderson (1587-1663), Bishop of Lincoln (1660-1663), was the most popular textbook on logic in seventeenth-century England.[241] Locke mentions Sanderson in a letter to W. Molyneux as someone who owed his mastery of Latin to repeated readings of Cicero.[242] Locke owned a copy of the *Compendium* and also two other works[243] by the same author. He had probably known Sanderson personally. The Bishop was an important source of influence on Locke's early *Essays on the Law of Nature* (written shortly after 1660).[244] As is the case with Du Trieu and Smith, Sanderson's logic remains firmly within Peripatetic bounds, and in the first appendix the author gives generous praise to the medium that was to be mercilessly attacked by Locke: that of the disputation.[245] The *Compendium* is organized according to the familiar tripartite division of terms–propositions–syllogisms:

I. De Simplicibus Terminis
II. De Propositionibus
III. De Discursu

The last part comprises a discussion of demonstrative, topical and sophistical syllogisms. The discussion of the last category is again according to the Aristotelian division into fallacies that are dependent on speech and fallacies that are not. The third part ends with some cursory remarks on '*Ordo* seu *Methodus*'. Sanderson remarks that some authors assign to method a function that is distinct from ordering: that of inferring. However, for him (like Smith) this point is of little interest. According to Sanderson, method is a device for ordering rather than for generating new knowledge.[246]

239 Op. cit. Bk. III, Sect. II, Ch. i, p. 122; also: ibid. Bk. III, Sect. II, Ch. iii, p. 131.
240 Inspected copy is from 1618.
241 Ashworth, 'Introduction' to Sanderson's *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. xvi. Locke's entry 'Sandersons Logick' is ambiguous, in so far as there circulated in England a text on logic by another Sanderson, whose first name was John: the *Institutionum dialecticarum libri quatuor* (1589). However, this book was less well known than the work by Robert Sanderson, and it does not have the word 'logic' in the title.
242 *Corr*. 1921, V, p. 405, 2 July 1695.
243 *De juramenti promissorii obligatione prælectiones septem* and *De obligatione Conscientiæ*, nos. 2547 and 2548 in Harrison/Laslett, p. 225.
244 von Leyden, 'Introduction' to Locke, *Essays on the Law of Nature*, pp. 30-34.
245 Op. cit. 'Appendix Prima', Ch. 3, pp. 40-41 (a new sequence of page numbers starts from the first appendix onwards).
246 Op. cit. Pt. III, Ch. 30, pp. 225-226: 'Qui accuratiùs ista [Ordo seu Methodus] distinguunt, *Ordinem* volunt esse integræ alicujus disciplinæ, *Methodus* etiam particularium conclu-

Sanderson shows humanist influences in his definition of logic; it is not a science but an 'instrumental art that guides our mind in becoming acquainted with everything intelligible'.[247] Corresponding to this view of logic as an instrument in directing our minds is his likening of the three principal parts of logic to the three principal activities of the mind: the conception of simple terms; the composition and division of propositions; and argumentation and method, the instruments of discourse. However, as is the case with Smith, for Sanderson this appreciation of a psychological side of logic has no consequences for its conventional content nor for its equally conventional division into three parts. At least, this holds true for the main text of the *Compendium*. The second appendix is more interesting, since its first chapter comes closer to an attention for the faculties of the mind in a logical context than anything that can be found in either Du Trieu or Smith. The title of this chapter is 'De Quinque Habitibus mentis', 'On the five states of the mind'. Different disciplines require different mental states[248] and it is important to have a knowledge of these states, of which there are five: knowledge of principles (*intellectus principiorum*), pertaining to philosophical knowledge; science (*scientia*); wisdom (*sapientia*), all needed for forms of speculative knowledge; prudence (*prudencia*); and art (*ars*), both required for forms of practical knowledge. The first state is required for the knowledge of causes while the remaining four are required for the knowledge of different kinds of consequences.

Sanderson draws consequences from his explicit attention to mental states as a factor in the acquisition of knowledge that we have encountered already much more extensively in Locke's logic of ideas. First, Sanderson points to the importance of repetitive exercise when he declares that mental states are qualities that must be acquired by 'many actions'.[249] Second, there is the acknowledgement that in this context errors are not to be sought in the reasonings of adversaries, but in the workings of our own mind. He points out that error itself is a mental state: 'Error is a state by which the mind is inclined to assent without fear of

sionum; atque *Ordinem* disponere, *Methodum* etiam inferre: Nos vtrumque habemus pro eodem. Est autem Ordo, seu Methodus, *ratio ita disponendi partis alicuis Disciplinæ vel Tractationis ut facillimè à nobis integra discatur*'.

247 Op. cit. Pt. I, Ch. 1, p. 1: 'ars instrumentalis, dirigens mentem nostram in cognitionem omnium intelligibilium'; also: 'Appendix Prima', p. 67; and 'Appendix Posterior', p. 102: '*Logica* rationem dirigit, & ordinatur ad intellectum perficiendum …' Cf. Smith, above, who defines logic not as an art but as a science.

248 Op. cit. 'Appendix posterior', pp. 89-90: 'Nulla potest tractatio ritè institui, nisi ad propriam suam Disciplinam revocetur; nec Disciplinæ dextrè distingui ab invicem, nisi priùs constet ad quem habitum mentis quæque sit referenda.'

249 Op. cit. 'Appendix posterior', p. 90: 'Est autem Habitus mentis, qualitas actionibus acquisita, per quam intellectus proximè disponitur ad assentiendum alicui veritati infallibiliter.'

what is false'.[250] Thus he seems to present an important argument for the use of a logic that examines our mental states. However, at the beginning of the chapter Sanderson declares that his remarks on mental states do not belong to logic proper. The chapter is part of an appendix that has been given the extremely noncommittal title of 'Miscella'. In addition, it is telling that for his enumeration of five mental states he does not draw on Aristotle's *Organon*, but on a passage in the *Ethica nicomachea*.[251] Still, the fact remains that Sanderson includes this subject in a textbook on logic, if only in an appendix. He hopes that although this general subject does not belong to logic proper, it may be of use to young students.[252] This may be an expression of his opinion concerning the instrumental function of logic as a general art that is supposed to direct and order the intellect. Sanderson was influenced by the trend of a growing attention to psychological and epistemological aspects within logic, but had not yet reached a verdict on the best place for these subjects within the frame of an Aristotelian textbook on logic.

To summarize, the logics of Du Trieu, Smith and Sanderson have a tripartite structure that reflects the main levels in Aristotle's logic: those of terms, propositions and syllogisms. The content of their works remains largely conventional, but some elements, such as a casual treatment of methodological problems, a passing glance at probable knowledge and a limited interest in a more subject oriented logic, point to future developments. Finally, Sanderson's treatment of mental states in an appendix entitled 'Miscella' calls attention to a problem that was to gain increasing relevance: that of the relation between traditional structure and novel content.

250 Op. cit. 'Appendix posterior', p. 97: 'Error est *habitus, quo mens inclinatur ad assentiendum sine formidine falsitati.*'

251 Op. cit. 6.3. 1139b14-18: "Αρξάμενοι οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγωμεν. ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι, πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις σοφία νοῦς· ὑπολῆψει γὰρ καὶ δόξῃ ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι', 'Let us begin, then, from the beginning, and discuss these states once more. Let it be assumed that the states by virtue of which the soul possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial are five in number, i.e. art, knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, comprehension; for belief and opinion may be mistaken', transl. Barnes, II, p. 1799.

252 Op. cit. 'Appendix posterior', p. 89: 'Appendicem hanc Miscella quædam generalia complectentem (illa quidem pleraque non propriè Logica, sed quæ tamen juvenibus studiosis speramus fore nec invtilia prosùs, nec ingrata) visum fuit præsenti opusculo comitem adjungere …'

8. Cartesian logic

The logical textbooks that Locke had first prescribed, and later came to vilify, foreshadow some elements of his informal logic. Moreover, these scholastic works provided both context and point of departure for subsequent *structural* changes. However, we must turn to Descartes as the most influential philosopher in developing each of the main characteristics of the *content* of the new logic. In her letter of 12 January 1705, containing biographical information about Locke that Jean le Clerc was to use for his 'Eloge', Damaris Masham wrote:

> The first Books (as *Mr Locke* himself has told me) which gave him a relish of Philosophical Studys were those of *Descartes* He was rejoyced in reading of these because tho' he very often differ'd in Opinion from this Writer, he yet found that what he said was very intelligible: from whence he was incourag'd to think That his not haveing understood others, had, possibly, not proceeded altogether from a defect in his Understanding[253]

Locke possessed the principal works of Descartes as well as an edition of his correspondence.[254] During his stay in France he had made a detailed list of the Frenchman's works in his Journal (8 August 1677).[255] On 7 March 1678, between two observations about a female patient suffering from 'a violent loosnesse', he even entered a more comprehensive 'Methode pour bien etudier la doctrine de Mr de Cartes', advising readers to start with the *Discours de la méthode* while also giving the works of some well-known Cartesian philosophers.[256] Locke was not only indebted to Descartes for much of the positive part of his logic, but also for the *pars destruens*. The privileged position of the syllogism had been under fierce attack ever since the Renaissance, and its most prominent critics before Locke had been Francis Bacon and Descartes. Locke's point that syllogisms are based merely on words and that the Aristotelians fail to check the correspondence between words and things, had already been made by Bacon.[257] Furthermore, the assertion that the syllogism is first of all an expository device that does not add much in the way of finding new knowledge was already put forward by both Bacon and Descartes.[258] Next, we have seen Locke making the explicit charge of

253 Amsterdam University Library, MS R.K., J 57a (no page numbers).

254 Harrison/Laslett, nos. 601a-609, pp. 101-102.

255 MS Locke f.2, pp. 226-227.

256 MS Locke f.3, pp. 49-60; transcribed in: Locke, *An Early Draft*, pp. 105-111.

257 *De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum*, V, ii, in: *Works*, I, p. 621: 'Nam syllogismi ex propositionibus consistunt; propositiones ex verbis; verba notionum tesseræ sunt; quare si notiones ipsæ (quæ verborum animæ sunt) male et varie a rebus abstrahuntur, tota fabrica corruit'; cf. *Novum Organum*, Aph. xiii and xiv, in: *Works*, I, p. 158.

258 Bacon, *De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum*, V, ii, in: *Works*, I, p. 621-633; Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, Pt. II, AT VI, p. 17: 'ie pris garde que, pour la Logique, ses syllogismes & la

the circular character of syllogisms; if they do not give rise to new knowledge, this is because they are not the source but only the product of new knowledge. The same complaint is made by Descartes in his *Regulae ad directionem ingenii* (of which the very title prefigures *Of the Conduct of the Understanding*).[259] Finally, Locke echoes Descartes in his way of deriding the unnecessary artificial character of syllogisms. However, this last point is explained best when we look at the influence of Descartes on the positive side of Locke's logic of ideas.

The trend towards a deeper interest in the epistemological and psychological aspects of human cognition that had announced itself in some of the logical textbooks that Locke had prescribed, was developed more forcefully in the novel systems of decidedly anti-scholastic thinkers in the seventeenth century. In his *Regulæ* Descartes writes about the importance of surveying our instruments of knowledge as an important step in the development of his new method.[260] The most important of these instruments is the intellect, to which are added imagination, sense-perception and memory.[261] In what has been dubbed his 'facultative model',[262] the laws of logic are dictated by the laws of thought, rather than the other way round. This orientation forms the background for Descartes's attack on the artificial character of Aristotelian logic. According to Descartes, the main weakness of Aristotelian formal logic was its inability to reflect the natural powers of our mental faculties, which left to themselves are quite able to make a correct inference. This is thanks to what he called our *lumen naturale* or *intuitus*, by which he did not understand

> … the fluctuating testimony of the senses or the deceptive judgement of the imagination as it botches things together, but the conception of a clear and attentive mind, which is so easy and distinct that there can be no room for doubt about what we are understanding.

pluspart de ses autres instructions seruent plutost a expliquer a autruy les choses qu'on sçait, ou mesme, comme l'art de Lulle, a parler, sans iugement, de celles qu'on ignore, qu'a les apprendre'.

259 Op. cit. Rule X, AT X, p. 406: 'nullum posse Dialecticos syllogismum arte formare, qui verum concludat, nisi priùs ejusdem materiam habuerint, id est, nisi eandem veritatem, quæ in illo deducitur, jam antè cognoverint'. The *Regulæ* were not published in the Latin version in which they were originally written until 1701, but during the time that Locke was working on his *Essay*, its contents may very well have been available to him; manuscript copies are known to have circulated in the Netherlands and France, a Dutch translation was published in 1684 (Locke was able to read Dutch), and the Second Edition (and subsequent editions) of the *Logique* of Port-Royal (1664) contained substantial passages based on this work. Cf. 'Avertissement' to the *Regulæ*, AT X, pp. 351-353 and Bonno, *Les Relations intellectuelles*, p. 236.

260 Descartes, *Regulæ*, Regula VIII, AT X, p. 398.

261 Descartes, *Regulæ*, Regula XII, AT X, p. 411.

262 Gaukroger, *Cartesian Logic*, p. 130.

> Alternatively, and this comes to the same thing, intuition is the indubitable conception of a clear and attentive mind which proceeds solely from the light of reason. Because it is simpler, it is more certain than deduction, though deduction, as we noted above, is not something a man can perform wrongly.[263]

It is thanks to this *intuitus* that he knows that he exists, that he thinks and that a triangle is bound by just three sides and a sphere by a single surface.[264] Locke has much the same confidence in our 'native rustick Reason'.[265] He seems to be echoing Descartes when he writes about intuition: 'This part of Knowledge is irresistible, and like the bright Sun-shine, forces it self immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever the Mind turns its view that way; and leaves no room for Hesitation, Doubt, or Examination, but the Mind is presently filled with the clear Light of it.'[266] It is thanks to this natural ease by which the process of inference can be accomplished that errors of the second kind, concerning inference, are to be feared less than errors of the first kind, concerning the basis of inference, i.e. our ideas. The important place of intuition is an instance of the trend towards a more subject oriented logic. Instead of trying to convince others by discursive means, the goal of the logic of ideas was personal assurance.[267]

The use of 'idea' in the seventeenth century, the key concept in the logic of ideas, can in most cases be traced back to its (re)introduction by Descartes.[268] Rather than making a comprehensive comparison between the ways in which this term was used by Descartes and Locke, I shall focus on one vital aspect: that of clearness and distinctness. Descartes had stressed the importance of starting our reasonings with concepts that are analysed to such a degree that they are clear

263 Descartes, *Regulæ*, Regula III, AT X, p. 368: 'Per *intuitum* intelligo, non fluctuantem sensuum fidem, vel malè componentis imaginationis judicium fallax; sed mentis puræ & attentæ tam facilem distinctumque conceptum, vt de eo, quod intelligimus, nulla prorsus dubitatio relinquatur; seu, quod idem est, mentis puræ et attentæ non dubium conceptum, qui à solâ rationis luce nascitur, & ipsâmet deductione certior est, quia simplicior, quam tamen etiam ab homine malè fieri non posse suprà notavimus', transl. CSM, I, p. 14.

264 Descartes, *Regulæ*, Regula III, AT X, p. 368.

265 *Essay*, IV.xvii.6: 679.

266 *Essay*, IV.ii.1: 531.

267 Cf. Gaukroger, *Cartesian logic*, p. 127-128 and Kennedy, 'The Alliance between Puritanism and Cartesian Logic', p. 563-564.

268 Cf. Nuchelmans, 'Logic in the Seventeenth Century', p. 109. The use of ideas in a theory of language, as a third element together with words and things existing outside us, was by no means new. Many scholastic authors used a similar triad consisting of words, concepts and things. However, their opinions tended to diverge about the exact relation between these elements; cf. Ashworth, '"Do Words Signify Ideas or Things?"', pp. 322-324. The triad of words, concepts and things is not mentioned in Du Trieu's *Manuductio* and only very briefly in Smith's *Aditus*, Bk. I, Ch. 2, p. 4 and Sanderson's *Compendium*, Pt. I, Ch. 7, p. 22.

and distinct, and we have already addressed the same point in Locke's philosophy (above, §2). However, Descartes and Locke give different thrusts to the criterion of clarity and distinctness. Descartes's prime objective is to chase away the spectre of scepticism. Clear and distinct ideas have the vital function of bridging the gap between what we think and what exists outside our mind. Thus, at the start of the Third of his *Meditationes* Descartes thinks that he can '… lay it down as a general rule that whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true'.[269] Clearness and distinctness is here doing a job that cannot be left to the senses. This point is made in the quoted definition of *intuitus*; instead of setting his stakes on 'the fluctuating testimony of the senses', Descartes confides in clear and distinct ideas that proceed 'solely from the light of reason'.

Against this, Locke does not think that the clarity and distinctness of ideas can be used as a bridge to the existence of things, nor does he think that he needs such a link. For him this function is performed by the senses, and we have noted his testiness concerning scepticism about the relation between our ideas and their sensory cause (see above, §5).[270] When speaking about the intuition of clear and distinct ideas, Locke is primarily interested in another relation, that between an idea and another idea; knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. For Locke the relevance of intuition is not that it is a power that gives us knowledge about the existence of things. For him intuition is first of all a faculty that enables us to see that different ideas are not the same and that the same ideas are not different and thus '… that *White* is not *Black*, That a *Circle* is not a *Triangle*, That *Three* are more than *Two*, and equal to *One* and *Two*'.[271] Thus, in so far as clarity pertains to the relation between ideas and things and distinctness to the relation between ideas (but see above, §2), it can be said that for Descartes the most relevant dimension of intuition is clarity while for Locke this is distinctness.

Another aspect of Locke's logic of ideas is its preoccupation with method. Locke formulated, as noted earlier, two different methods, depending on the kind of ideas he surveyed: a demonstrative method very much inspired by mathematics for modes and his plain historical method coloured by his medical background for material and mental substances. Descartes also espoused two methods, also

269 Op. cit. AT VII, p. 35: 'ac proinde jam videor pro regulâ generali posse statuere, illud omne esse verum, quod valde clare & distincte percipio'.

270 For the empiricist background to Locke's concept of intuitive knowledge, cf. Ayers, review of Chappell, *The Cambridge Companion to Locke* in *The Locke Newsletter*, 28 (1997) pp. 182-183.

271 See *Essay*, IV.ii.1: 531. For the different opinions of Descartes and Locke on the problem of scepticsm, cf. Rogers, 'Descartes and the Mind of Locke', *passim*.

depending on the objects under scrutiny. This may seem a surprising statement, given the emphasis that Descartes puts on the unity of all knowledge. In the preface to the French translation of his *Principia philosophiæ* he makes the well-known comparison of his philosophic system with a tree, its roots forming his metaphysics, its trunk his general physics and its branches individual disciplines: medicine, mechanics and ethics.[272]

When speaking about his system as a whole, Descartes indeed stresses its mathematical certainty. When he gives his famous four methodical rules in the second part of his *Discours* he not only points out that they are modelled on the 'long chains of reasonings' of mathematicians, but also that these rules can provide us with certainty about 'all things that can fall under the knowledge of human beings'.[273] The Cartesian vision is that of one science, a *mathesis universalis*, with one method.[274] Whitin this general mathematical method, that was supposed to have use outside the field of mathematics itself, Descartes made the Zabarellian distinction between analytical and synthetical reasonings. In the Second Replies to the *Meditationes*, Descartes explains that we can proceed either synthetically, and start with general axioms from which we can deduce conclusions about particular truths, or analytically and start with particular problems until we have arrived at their constituent clear and distinct ideas.[275] The first direction is most suited for the proof of truths that we have already obtained and was used most typically in traditional geometry. The second direction is especially apt for the discovery of new truths and used with great success in Descartes's analytical algebra. Locke did not make an explicit distinction between analysis and synthesis, but he was well aware of the difference in using our reason in discovering proofs and in proving them (see above, §5).[276]

272 Op. cit. AT IX-B, p. 14: 'Ainsi toute la Philosophie est comme vn arbre, dont les racines sont la Metaphysique, le tronc est la Physique, & les branches qui sortent de ce tronc sont toutes les autres sciences, qui se reduisent à trois principales, à sçavoir la Medicine, la Mechanique & la Morale, j'entens la plus haute & la plus parfaite Morale, qui, presupposant vne entiere connoissance des autres sciences, est le dernier degré de la Sagesse.'

273 Op. cit. AT VI, p. 19: 'Ces longues chaisnes de raisons, toutes simples & faciles, dont les Geometres ont coustume de se seruir, pour paruenir a leurs plus difficiles demonstrations, m'auoient donné occasion de m'imaginer que toutes les choses, qui peuuent tomber sous la connoissance des hommes, s'entresuiuent en mesme façon …'

274 Descartes, *Regulæ*, Rule IV, AT X, p. 378.

275 Op. cit. AT VII, pp. 155-159.

276 Cf. the difference between the first and the second degree of reasoning, made in *Essay*, IV.xvii.3: 669.

Although Descartes boasts that his philosophy contains no explanation 'that is not mathematical and evident',[277] the reality of his system belies the vision. There is a rift running right through the middle of the Cartesian system, and this has far-reaching methodological consequences. These can be appreciated by first having a closer look at Descartes's system as it was exposed in the *Principia philosophiæ* (1644). In Part I he starts with the Archimedean point of his *cogito*. The existence of his own spirit subsequently gives him assurances of the existence of God thanks to whom we know that we are not deceived in the truth of our clear and distinct ideas of immaterial things. From the metaphysical principles of the existence of an immutable God, Descartes then deduces in Part II the general principles of his mechanistic physics of matter in motion, comprising his three Laws of Nature and the statement that nature has a corpuscular structure.[278] The exact way in which he deduces his Laws of Nature from God's immutability need not detain us here; the main point is that this deduction has an *a priori* character, in the sense that it goes from cause (metaphysical principle) to effect (physical principles) and that Descartes here completely omits sensory knowledge. Ideally, Descartes would like to continue this, according to him, certain deduction by deducing the explanation of 'other things' from his physical principles. However, here his project grinds to a halt; the reason for this is given most clearly not in the *Principia*, but in the *Discours*:

> But I must also admit that the power of nature is so ample and so vast, and these principles so simple and so general, that I notice hardly any particular effect of which I do not know at once that it can be deduced from the principles in many different ways; and my greatest difficulty is usually to discover in which of these ways it depends on them. I know no other means to discover this than by seeking further observations whose outcomes vary according to which of these ways provides the correct explanation.[279]

277 Letter to Plempius, 3 October 1637, AT I, p. 421: 'nempè, quod eo philosophandi genere vtar, in quo nulla ratio est, quæ non sit mathematica & euidens …'

278 Laws of Nature: *Principia*, II, xxxvii, xxxix, xl, AT VIII-A, pp. 62-65; corpuscularism: ibid. II, xxxiv, AT VIII-A, pp. 59-60.

279 *Discours*, AT VI, pp. 64-65: 'Mais il faut aussy que i'avouë, que la puissance de la Nature est si ample & si vaste, & que ces Principes sont si simples & si generaux, que ie ne remarque quasi plus aucun effect particulier, que d'abord ie ne connoisse qu'il peut en estre deduit en plusieurs diuerses façons, & que ma plus grande difficulté est d'ordinaire de trouuer en laquelle de ces façons il en depend. Car a cela ie ne sçay point d'autre expedient, que de chercher derechef quelques experiences, qui soient telles, que leur euenement ne soit pas le mesme, si c'est en l'vne de ses façons qu'on doit l'expliquer, que si c'est en l'autre', transl. in CSM, I, p. 144. For the contrast between ideal and reality in Cartesian method cf. Rogers, 'Descartes and the Method of English Science', pp. 238-244.

Descartes's physical principles are so wide that it is possible to deduce more than one explanation for each of the different physical phenomena. On this level of his physics, the ideal method of geometrical *a priori* demonstration has to be supplemented with a method that is *a posteriori* and that goes from effect to cause with the help of sensual experience. On this level of the explanation of the individual physical phenomena, treated in parts III and IV of the *Principia*, Descartes uses theoretical models, which consist of hypotheses about the corpuscular micro-structure of nature that are illustrated by mechanical analogies with objects on a visible macro-level. These models form part of a larger theory formed by his Laws of Nature and are presented not as certain knowledge but as merely plausible accounts of reality.[280] On this level of the explanation of phenomena, Descartes makes extensive use of sensory experience. This at least is the method that he pretends to follow; in a letter to Huygens he even goes so far as saying that he has checked his physical explanations with as many 'experiences' as there are rules in his writings.[281]

So, Locke's interest in method, and the choice of two kinds of methods, depending on two main categories of objects, are present already in Descartes. Descartes's ideal of a geometrical demonstration, which he thought he had brought into practice on the level of metaphysical and physical principles, is to a large extent the method that Locke propounded for the analysis of modes. Moreover, the importance of sensory experiences in Descartes's 'way of models' is at the heart of Locke's historical method. However, the resemblances stop here. Descartes wanted to use experiences as a means of testing the plausibility of the hypotheses of his physical models. With these hypotheses he tried to bridge the gap between the visible world and the invisible micro-structures of his corpuscular physics. Much of the polemic thrust in Locke's historical method is directed exactly against such ventures into the invisible. They form the background of his dislike for hypotheses; in a letter to William Molyneux of 15 June 1697 he wrote: 'I have always thought, that laying down, and building upon hypotheses, has been one of the great hindrances of natural knowledge …'[282] By insisting that we stick to the level of the immediately observable, Locke's historical method remains

280 Cf. Schuurman, *Principia en præcognita*, pp. 35-43.

281 Letter of June 1645, AT IV, pp. 224-225: 'Car i'admire que, nonobstant que i'aye demonstré, en particulier, presque autant d'experiences qu'il y a de lignes en mes écrits, & qu'ayant generalement rendu raison, dans mes Principes, de tous les Phainomenes de la nature, i'aye expliqué, par mesme moyen, toutes les experiences qui peuuent estre faites touchant les cors inanimez, & qu'au contraire on n'en ait iamais bien expliqué aucune par les principes de la Philosophie vulgaire, ceux qui la suiuent ne laissent pas de m'obiecter le défaut d'experiences.'

282 *Corr.* 2277, VI, p. 144.

much more in line with the common sense character of Aristotelian philosophy than is the case with Descartes's abstract physics of corpuscular matter in motion. Another difference is that in practice Descartes, and even more so his followers, emphasized his first method, while in practice Locke stressed his own second method.

The two methods of both Descartes and Locke reflect a bipartition of the two kinds of objects to which these methods were supposed to belong. Their divisions are however not the same. Descartes's bipartition runs, remarkably enough, right through his physics. On one side of the line are the abstract principles of his physics and on the other side are his explanations for the different phenomena in nature. Locke's division is more straightforward in the sense that the study of modes is confined to the field of mathematics and to ethics, i.e. disciplines that do not posit the existence of things outside us that correspond to the ideas we have of them, while on the other hand this correspondence is assumed for ideas of substances, which comprise the entire field of physics, without a distinction between principles and phenomena. For Descartes, there is no fundamental difference between the principles of physics and those of mathematics.[283] For Locke on the other hand, physics is an object of empirical investigation while mathematics are not.

To sum up, it can be said that the main aspects of Locke's logic of ideas share vital characteristics with Descartes's philosophy. Of course, Locke used his analysis of our faculties and the way these faculties generated ideas, as an argument against forms of innate knowledge:

> For I imagine any one will easily grant, That it would be impertinent to suppose, the *Ideas* of Colours innate in a Creature, to whom God hath given Sight, and a Power to receive them by the Eyes from external Objects: and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several Truths, to the Impressions of Nature, and innate Characters, when we may observe in our selves Faculties, fit to attain as easie and certain Knowledge of them, as if they were Originally imprinted on the mind.[284]

And Descartes and the Cartesians are generally taken to be the principle butt of this attack. Nevertheless, Locke shared with Descartes some fundamental preconceptions that formed a logic wide enough to accommodate either innate knowledge or empirical knowledge. These similarities include the central place

283 *Principia*, II, lxiv, AT VIII-A, p. 78 (in margin): 'Non alia principia in Physicâ, quàm in Geometricâ, vel in Mathesi abstractâ, à me admitti, nec optari …'; cf. Conversation with Burman, AT V, p. 160.

284 *Essay*, I.ii.1: 48.

given to clear and distinct ideas, a subject-oriented approach that is focussed on our mental faculties, and the first of their two methods.

9. The structure of Cartesian logic: Arnauld and Malebranche

The main points in Descartes's logic of ideas were never brought together under the name of 'logic' by the philosopher himself. He left that to his successors, to some of whom we will turn now. *La logique ou l'art de penser* (1662), better known as the *Logique de Port-Royal*, occupies in many ways an intermediary position between Locke and his Aristotelian predecessors. It was written by Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694) and some collaborators, including Pierre Nicole (1625-1695). During his second stay in France (1675-1679), Locke had read numerous French philosophers, including works by Arnauld and Nicole.[285] Locke owned various editions of Nicole's *Essais de morale*.[286] Although this work, by its attention to the force of passions and habits covers partly the same ground as the *Conduct*, there is, typical enough in the case of Locke, little evidence for any direct borrowing by the Englishman. Locke nevertheless produced a partial translation of this work that he offered to Margaret, Countess of Shaftesbury, as 'a new French production, in a dress of my own making'.[287]

In France Locke bought a copy of the *Logique*.[288] In the list of Cartesian philosophers that he entered in his Journal on 7 March 1678 (see above, §8), he describes the *Logique* (in far from impeccable French) as 'un ouvrage les plus accompli qui ait encore paru en ce genre'.[289] The *Logique* proved indeed to be a very successful work and it was frequently reprinted right from it first appearance in 1662. The author used these occasions to answer his critics by numerous additions and changes, generally resulting in a softening of the bolder statements in the First Edition.[290] I use the edition of which Locke had a copy in his library, i.e. the Paris 1674 re-issue of the Fourth Edition of 1671.[291] The *Logique* is divided into four parts:

> I. Containing reflections on ideas, or the first action of the mind, which is called conceiving.
> II. Containing reflections people have made about their judgements.

285 Bonno, *Les relations intellectuelles*, pp. 225-226 and Rogers, 'The Writing of Locke's Essay', p. 13.
286 Harrison/Laslett, nr. 2085a, p. 195.
287 Nicole, *Discourses*, p. xxiii.
288 Locke's Journal of 1678, MS Locke f.3, p. 178: 'L'Art de penser 12°'.
289 MS Locke f.3, p. 52.
290 von Freytag Löringhoff, 'Préface' to [Arnauld], *L'Art de Penser*, Vol. I, p. vii.
291 Harrison/Laslett, nr. 1803, p. 178.

III. On Reasoning
IV. On Method[292]

The subject matter of the first three parts coincides roughly with each of the three parts of the logic as treated in Aristotelian textbooks. However, some significant developments can be detected. In the case of Smith and Sanderson, the three main levels of logic were compared to three acts of the mind, without any consequences for the content of the three corresponding books or parts. The *Logique* on the other hand, while maintaining the format and much of the content of an Aristotelian textbook, makes much larger strides towards a 'facultative' logic. The title of each of the four books points to an operation of the mind: conceiving, judging, reasoning and ordering. A novel orientation is already announced by the subtitle of the work itself: *l'art de penser*. Logic is not the science of syllogisms but an art meant to develop our mind by means of a better understanding of this faculty. The aim of logic should not consist in teaching us technical tricks, 'but in reflecting on what nature makes us do',[293] i.e. on what we are already capable of without a prior immersion in Aristotelian logic. Mental activities can be executed as well, and sometimes even better, by those who have not learnt any rule of logic.[294] The reflections that Arnauld proposes instead enable us, 'by the natural light of reason alone', to discover and understand errors and faults in our understanding.[295]

The first activity of the mind is that of conceiving. The direct individual objects of this activity are not terms, but ideas. There is a revolutionary substitution of words by Cartesian ideas as the basic element of logic within the format of a logical textbook immediately at the start of Part I: 'As we can have no knowledge of what is outside us except by means of the ideas in us, the reflections we can make on our ideas are perhaps the most important part of logic, since they

292 'I. Contenant les Reflexions sur les idées, ou sur la premiere action de l'esprit, qui s'appelle concevoir. II. Contentenant les reflexions que les hommes on faites sur leur jugemens. III. Du Raisonnement. IV. De la Methode.' English translations of quotations from the *Logique* are taken from Jill Vance Buroker, whose translation of the Fifth Edition (1683) matches with the quotations presented here from the Fourth Edition.

293 Op. cit. p. 40: 'Ainsi cét art ne consiste pas à trouuer le moyen de faire ces operations, puisque la Nature seule nous le fournit en nous donnant la raison: mais à faire des reflexions sur ce que la nature nous fait faire …', transl. J. V. Buroker, p. 23.

294 Op. cit. p. 40: 'Tout cela se fait naturellement, & quelque-fois mieux par ceux qui n'ont appris aucune regle de Logique, que par ceux qui les ont apprises', transl. J. V. Buroker, p. 23.

295 Op. cit. p. 40: 'Car il arrive souvent que l'on découvre par la seule lumiere naturelle qu'un raisonnement est faux …', transl. J. V. Buroker, p. 23.

are the foundation of everything else.'[296] Although Arnauld does not explicitly make clearness and distinctness a criterion of truth, he stresses the importance of having clear and distinct ideas and of knowing which are and which are not fulfilling this criterion.[297] His prescription later on in the *Logique* of establishing principles on clear and evident principles amounts to the first stage of a logic of ideas, while that of giving subsequent proofs that are orderly and based only upon these principles intimates the second stage.[298] However, after the first part on ideas, Arnauld does not continue with a second part on the combinations of ideas. Rather, he continues with a conventional second part on propositions and an equally conventional third part on syllogisms. Since propositions were supposed to consist of terms and not of ideas, a second part on propositions does not form a plausible continuation. Arnauld does not show much awareness of this problem.[299] Rather than giving a solution to the problem of the compatibility of ideas as the principal element of a newer logic and that of words as the central element in the older logic, he simply stops talking about ideas after the first paragraph of the second part and continues with words as the elements for propositions (and propositions as elements for syllogisms in the third part). This procedure confirms the transitory character of his *Logique*.

Like Descartes and unlike Locke, Arnauld denies that all ideas can be directly or indirectly derived from the senses.[300] For instance, our ideas of being and of thinking have a non-sensory origin.[301] Arnauld targets the senses as a major, if not the only source of error.[302] Error is indeed an important subject in the *Logique*. In the first of the two introductory 'Discours', lack of attention, lack of application, and wrongly used words are listed among the causes of error.[303] Arnauld, in accordance with the new logic of ideas, makes a distinction between errors of the first kind and errors of the second kind. As is the case with Locke, he thinks that errors of the first kind are the most serious: 'The majority of people's errors, as we have already said elsewhere, are caused rather by reasoning

296 Op. cit. Pt. I, p. 42: 'Comme nous ne pouvons avoir aucune connoissance de ce qui est hors de nous, que par l'entremise des idées qui sont en nous, les reflexions que l'on peut faire sur nos idées, sont peut-être ce qu'il y a de plus important dans la Logique, parce que c'est le fondement de tout le reste', transl. J. V. Buroker, p. 25.

297 Op. cit. Pt. I, Ch. viii, p. 87.

298 Op. cit. Pt. IV, Ch. iii, p. 403.

299 Locke's solution for this problem would be to distinguish not only verbal but also mental propositions; see below, §10.

300 Cf. Arnauld's *Des vrayes et des fausses idées*, Ch. xxvii, 'De l'origine des idées', pp. 298-316.

301 Op. cit. Pt. I, Ch. i, pp. 49-53.

302 Op. cit. 'Premier Discours', p. 7.

303 Op. cit. 'Premier Discours', p. 9-22.

based on false principles, than by reasoning incorrectly from their principles.'[304] The most extensive discussion of error is given at the place where it was also discussed by Du Trieu, Smith and Sanderson: at the end of Part III. Chapter xviii is called 'Different ways of reasoning badly, which are called sophisms'[305] and contains much that can be traced back to Aristotle's *De sophisticis elenchis*. However, Arnauld is not very interested in the subject and does not bother to discuss the full Aristotelian catalogue of sophistical errors, '… since some are so obvious that they are not worth mentioning'.[306] Rather, he adds another long chapter, the last of Part III, where he concentrates not so much on the errors by which we try to fool others, as on faults by which we lead ourselves astray: 'Fallacies committed in everyday life and in ordinary discourse'.[307] Some of the errors that Arnauld gives here are of the kind that we have encountered already in the *Conduct*, such as the role of our passions in causing our errors and the fatal influence of believing on force of authority (although Arnauld is careful to except the authority of the Catholic Church).[308] As to the chapters in the third part that precede his discussion of error, Arnauld's critique of Aristotelian syllogisms echoes Descartes and anticipates Locke: the old logic only proves what we have come to know by other means already.[309] However, Arnauld's critique is less one-sided than it had been in Descartes and would be in Locke. Syllogisms are given a positive role in the exercise of our mind and in forestalling errors that are made by inattentive minds.[310]

The fourth part of the *Logique* is on method. Whereas the topic of method was not discussed at all by Du Trieu and very summarily by Smith and Sanderson at the end or after the third part of their logic, it is deemed important enough by Arnauld to give it a separate part. Arnauld presents method as a natural sequel to the triad word/idea–proposition–syllogism. A syllogism forms one *raisonnement*, and method is concerned with demonstration, which consists of various *raisonnements*

304 Op. cit. Pt. III, p. 215: 'La pluspart des erreurs des hommes, comme nous avons déja dit ailleurs, viennent bien plus de ce qu'ils raissonnent sur de faux principes, que non pas de ce qu'ils raisonnent mal suivant leurs principes' (cf. ibid. 'Premier Discours', p. 15), transl. is after J. V. Buroker, p. 135.

305 Op. cit. 'Des diverses especes de mal raisonner, que l'on appelle sophismes', transl. J. V. Buroker, p. 189.

306 Op. cit. Pt. III, Ch. xviii, pp. 304-305: '… y en ayant quelques-vns de si grossiers qu'ils ne meritent pas d'estre remarquez', transl. J. V. Buroker, p. 189.

307 Op. cit. 'Des mauvais raisonnements que l'on commet dans la vie civile & dans les discours ordinaires', transl. J. V. Buroker, p. 203.

308 Op. cit. Pt. III, Ch. xix, resp. pp. 333-353 and pp. 364-368.

309 Op. cit. Pt. I, Ch. iii, p. 62.

310 Op. cit. Pt. III, pp. 215-216.

(a similar point had been made by Smith). The Port-Royal decision to include a fourth part on method is in line with a trend that is present in other seventeenth-century texts, in which the methodological tenets of Ramus and Zabarella can be found in various degrees.[311] A similar pattern is also followed by Thomas Hobbes in the 'Logica' of his *De Corpore* (1655)[312] and by Pierre Gassendi in his *Institutio Logica in Quator Partes Distributa* (1658).[313]

Arnauld's conception of method is heavily influenced by the paradigmatic role given to mathematics by Descartes and also by Blaise Pascal. Arnauld was well versed in mathematics and amongst his many publications there is a long treatise on geometry, *Nouveaux éléments de géometrie, contentant des moyens de faire voir quelle lignes sont incommensurables*,[314] and a shorter essay on magic squares.[315] However, in the *Logique* mathematics is given the more general instrumental role that it was to play in Locke's *Conduct*. Arnauld quotes the four well-known methodical rules that were given in the second part of Descartes's *Discours*, but stresses that analysis 'consists more in judgment and mental skill than in particular rules'.[316] The capacity of our mind should be developed by slowly accustoming it to mathematics and other things that are difficult.[317] Finally, another noteworthy feature in the part on method is the uncartesian attention to probability that governs the field of 'human and contingent events'.[318] In the case of probable propositions we cannot take recourse to geometrical methods. Rather we must carefully investigate the circumstances to which the propositions refer.[319]

311 Cf. Dear, 'Method and the Study of Nature', p. 147-150.

312 Op. cit. 1. De Philosophia; 2. De Vocabulis; 3. De Propositione; 4. De Syllogismo; 5. De erratione, Falsitate, & Captionibus; 6. De Methodo.

313 Op. cit. I. De Simplici Imaginatione; II. De Propositione; III. De Syllogismo; IV. De Methodo.

314 Op. cit. in: *Œuvres*, Vol. XLII, pp. 1-342.

315 'Solution d'un des plus célebres et des plus difficiles problèmes d'arithmatique', in: *Œuvres*, Vol. XLII, pp. 343-356.

316 Op. cit. Pt. IV, Ch. ii, p. 401: 'Voilà ce qu'on peut dire generalement de l'analyse, qui consiste plus dans le iugement & dans l'adresse de l'esprit, que dans des regles particulières', transl. J. V. Buroker, p. 238.

317 Op. cit. 'Premier Discours', p. 17: 'La capacité de l'esprit s'étend & se resserre par accoûtumance, & c'est à quoy servent principalement les Mathematiques, & generalement toutes les choses difficiles, comme celles dont nous parlons. Car elles donnent une certaine étenduë a l'esprit, & elles l'exercent à s'appliquer davantage, & à se tenir plus ferme dans ce qu'il connoist.'

318 Op. cit. Pt. IV, Ch. xii, p. 450: 'les évenemens humains contingens', transl. J. V. Buroker, p. 263.

319 Op. cit. Pt. IV, Ch. xii, p. 451-452. Cf. Pascal, *Pensées*, Série XXII, 512-513, in: *Œuvres Complètes*, p. 576, on the difference between 'esprit de géométrie' and 'esprit de finesse'.

Arnauld's substitution of terms by ideas in Part I and his stress on the methodological value of mathematics in Part IV on the one hand and his largely conventional treatment of propositions in Part II and syllogisms in Part III on the other, give the *Logique* a hybrid character. If Arnauld can be called a Cartesian, this should not be done without caution. He himself might have liked to qualify this epithet; as the author of the Fourth Set of Objections against Descartes's *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, he was one of the first to have pointed to a circular element in Descartes's proof of God.[320] Nevertheless, it is clear that Arnauld's predilections went in the direction of the more novel elements of his logic. When comparing the fourth part of the *Logique* with the third part he states that it is more important to order our thoughts than to know the rules of syllogism.[321] In the 'Premiers Discours' to the *Logique* he also gives a place of honour to the fourth part when he admits that in this part he has included subjects that he might have discussed in the second or third parts as well:

> But we did this on purpose because we thought it useful to see everything required for perfecting knowledge in one place, which is the main point of the work on method treated in Part IV. This is why we reserved the discussion of axioms and demonstrations for that section.[322]

While Arnauld is so mild as to give here, in the Fourth Edition, only a practical reason for the weight given to the fourth part, his motivation for this predilection on the parallel place in the First Edition (which has only one 'Discours') had been more drastic and coloured by doubt about an essential structural feature of Aristotelian textbooks on logic:

> But we did this on purpose, as much because we thought it useful to see everything required for perfecting knowledge in one place, as because we thought that there would be many persons who can be satisfied with the first and last parts of this work, since there are few things in the other two parts that good sense could not supply, without having to make a special study of them.[323]

320 Op. cit. AT VII, p. 214.

321 Op. cit. Pt. IV, p. 377: 'que le tout est de bien arranger ses pensées, en se servant de celles qui sont claires & évidentes, pour penetrer dans ce qui paroissoit plus caché'.

322 Op. cit. p. 21: 'Mais on l'a fait à dessein, parce qu'on a jugé qu'il estoit utile de voir en un mesme lieu tout ce qui estoit necessaire pour rendre une science parfaite, ce qui est le plus grand ouvrage de la methode dont on traitte dans la quatriéme partie. Et c'est pour cette raison qu'on a reservé de parler en ce lieu là des Axiomes, et des demonstrations', transl. J. V. Buroker, p. 13.

323 Op. cit. (edition von Freytag Löringhoff), 'Discours', p. 22: 'Mais on l'a fait à dessein, tant parce qu'on a jugé qu'il estoit vtile de voir en vn mesme lieu tout ce qui estoit necessaire pour rendre vne science parfaite, que parce qu'on a crû qu'il auroit beaucoup de personnes qui se pouvoient contenter de la premiere & de la derniere parti de cét Ouvrage, y ayant

This is an ominous remark indeed. While Aristotelian logicians had structured their textbooks in at least three parts (terms–propositions–syllogisms), which could be followed by some remarks on method, we see Arnauld drawing here structural conclusions from the content of a new logic of ideas that consists of only two stages that consequently can be discussed in only two parts: one about individual ideas (Part I of his *Logique*) and another about *raisonnements* that are based on these ideas (Part IV).

A more undilutedly Cartesian specimen of the new logic of ideas is given in the *Recherche de la vérité où l'on traite de la nature de l'esprit de l'homme et de l'usage qu'il en doit faire pour éviter l'erreur dans les sciences* (1674-1675) by Père Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715). An entry in one of his notebooks indicates that Locke bought the two volumes of the *Recherche* in March 1676,[324] but it is not until 1 March 1685 that some brief notes in his Journal on the teaching of mathematics give clear proof of his actual reading of the work.[325] In the years that preceded the production of the *Conduct*, Locke had produced his critical *Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing All Things in God*, which eventually he decided not to publish, 'For I love not controversies, and have a personal kindness for the author'.[326] However, there are no clear indications that during his years in France he ever met Malebranche.[327] The *Recherche* gives a prominent place to our mental faculties, to the clarity and distinctness of ideas, to method in general and the importance of mathematics in particular. I shall focus on two remarkable and closely interconnected aspects of the *Recherche* that are relevant for the context of the *Conduct*: its discussion of error and its structure. Error and prevention of error is the core topic of the *Recherche* (see the full title), which opens with the following grand statement:

peu de choses dans les deux autres que le bon sens ne puisse suppleer, sans avoir besoin d'en faire vne estude particuliere', transl. J. V. Buroker, p. 13, note c.

324 MS Locke f.14, p. 15. Later he bought other editions; see Harrison/Laslett, nos. 1875-1883a, pp. 182-183.

325 MS Locke f.8, p. 264.

326 Letter to W. Molyneux, 26 April 1695, *Corr*. 1887, V, p. 352-353.

327 Lough, *Locke's Travels in France*, p. xxxix. See however a letter from Nicolas Toinard to Locke, 18/28 March 1688, *Corr*. 1031, III, p. 417: 'Je n'oublieray pas à vous dire que l'un des exemplaires sera aussi donné au P. M.'

> Error is the cause of men's misery; it is the sinister principle that has produced the evil in the world; it generates and maintains in our soul all the evils that afflict us, and we may hope for sound and genuine happiness only by seriously laboring to avoid it.[328]

The scope and sophistication of Malebranche's subsequent taxonomy of error is unsurpassed by any other seventeenth-century text, including Bacon's *Novum organum* with its four *idola mentis*. Malebranche's analysis of error exemplifies the subject oriented approach of the new logic. For him the relevant dichotomy is not so much that between truth and falsity outside us, as that between truth and error in the workings of our own understanding.[329]

When Malebranche gives his rules for the search of truth in the sixth and last book of the *Recherche*, he hints at a two-stage analysis of error by stressing the importance of starting with clear and distinct ideas as the basis of subsequent reasonings.[330] There can be no doubt about the central place of ideas in the *Recherche*. The immediate object of our perception is not the sun, but our idea of the sun.[331] However, the remarkable thing in Malebranche's investigation into the causes and nature of error, is that it is not structured around ideas but around the faculties that provide us with these ideas. Our mental faculties can be divided into those of the understanding and those of the will. The faculty of the understanding can be subdivided into the faculties of the senses, of the imagination and of pure understanding. Perceptions of the pure understanding can be made without the mind forming corporeal images; thanks to this faculty we apprehend things that we cannot perceive with the faculty of imagination, such as spiritual beings or figures with thousand sides.[332] Malebranche's rationalism consists in the fact that according to him pure understanding can furnish us with ideas that are in no way, either directly or indirectly, dependent on our senses. The pure intellect does not function thanks to the mind's union with the body, but because of its

328 Op. cit. Vol. I, Bk. I, Ch. i, p. 39: 'L'erreur est la cause de la misere des hommes; c'est le mauvais principe qui a produit le mal dans le monde; c'est elle qui fait naître & qui entretient dans nôtre ame tous les maux qui nous affligent, et nous ne devons point esperer de bonheur solide & veritable, qu'en travaillant serieusement à l'éviter', transl. Lennon/Olscamp, p. 1.

329 Cf. Risse, *Logik*, II, pp. 108-109.

330 Op. cit. Vol. II, Bk. VI, Pt. II, Ch. i, p. 296: 'que les principes les plus clairs & les plus simples sont les plus féconds'; ibid. '*que nous ne devons raisonner que sur des choses dont nous avons des idées claires*'

331 Op. cit. Vol. I, Bk. III, Pt. II, Ch. i, pp. 413-414: '& l'objet immédiat de nôtre esprit, lorsqu'il voit le Soleil par exemple, n'est pas le Soleil, mais quelque chose qui est intimement unie à nôtre âme; & c'est ce que j'appelle *idée*. Ainsi par ce mot *idée*, je n'entends ici autre chose, que ce qui est l'objet immédiat, ou le plus proche de l'esprit, quand il apperçoit quelque objet, c'est-à-dire ce qui touche & modifie l'esprit de la perception qu'il a d'un objet'.

332 Op. cit. Vol. I, Bk. I, Ch. iv, p. 66.

union with God; strictly speaking its ideas are not in our mind at all, but in God's mind. The other main faculty, that of the will, consists of our inclinations and our passions. All the perceptions of all the faculties of our understanding form as many occasions for error, but the primary cause for every error lies in making a wrong use of our will by giving a precipitous consent to a wrong judgement.[333]

Given the close relationship between faculties and ideas, Malebranche's attention to senses, imagination, pure understanding, inclinations and passions, does not amount to much more than a shift in accent in the logic of ideas in so far as matters of content are concerned. However, he dares to give huge structural consequences to his predilections. The *Recherche* is the first of the works on logic we have encountered so far that is not built according to the basic structure of words/ideas–propositions–syllogisms–(method). Rather, the errors of the senses, imagination, pure understanding, inclinations and passions are accorded one book each (followed by a last book on method that is largely inspired by Descartes). Whereas Locke gives a vertical discussion, first of ideas and subsequently of reasoning that is based on these ideas, Malebranche presents a horizontal review of each of our mental faculties.

Can it still be maintained that the *Recherche* is a work of logic at all once it is admitted that Malebranche completely brushes aside the traditional structure of logical text books? After all, he does not explicitly call his work a logic. Yet the main elements of the *Recherche*, the attention to the errors of our faculties included, clearly belong to the new logic of ideas. We have seen that these elements were announced already in Peripatetic works on logic and were developed further by Arnauld in a work that was still called a 'logic'. Malebranche takes the development one step further, by giving the new logic a structure that is in accordance with the novel emphasis on the mental faculties and that allows him to bypass the technical subject of propositions and syllogisms. We have already seen that the two latter subjects were not at the heart of Arnauld's interests. Finally, in the sixth and last book of the *Recherche*, Malebranche explicitly presents his Cartesian method as an alternative to 'the ordinary sorts' of scholastic logic:

> … the whole art of making the mind more extensive and more penetrating consists … in using its powers and its capacity sparingly, and not using it inappropriately on matters unnecessary for the discovery of the truth it is seeking — and this is a point that should be well noted. This alone shows that the ordinary sorts of logic are more suited for diminishing rather than increasing the mind's capacity, because clearly, if in the search after a given truth one wishes to use the rules these logics give us, the mind's

333 Op. cit. Vol. I, Bk. I, Ch. v, p. 77, cf. Descartes, *Meditationes*, AT VII, p. 60.

> capacity will be so divided up that it will have less capacity for carefully understanding the full extent of the subject under examination.[334]

10. The structure of Locke's logic

Peripatetic works on logic were tenacious enough to dictate their structure to such outspoken enemies of Aristotelianism as Hobbes and Gassendi. However, friction between old structure and new content was inevitable. Given the central place of ideas and the mental faculties by which these were apprehended and manipulated, there were roughly two ways of giving structural consequences to the content of the new logic. One possibility was to build it around the faculties. An eminent example of this model was given by Malebranche, whose logic of the facilitates completely broke with the existing structure. Another strategy, slightly less radical, was intimated by Arnauld, when he pointed out in the First Edition of his *Logique* that for most readers the novel first part on ideas and the fourth part on method will be more interesting than the second part on propositions and the third part on syllogisms. This approach, resulting in a two-level structure, was brought to a conclusion by Locke. When he embarks on his historical inquiry into the human understanding in the *Essay*, he presents the following agenda:

> *First*, I shall enquire into the *Original* of those *Ideas*, Notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a Man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his Mind; and the ways whereby the Understanding comes to be furnished with them.
>
> *Secondly*, I shall endeavour to shew, what *Knowledge* the Understanding hath by those *Ideas*; and the Certainty, Evidence, and Extent of it.
>
> *Thirdly*, I shall make some Enquiry into the Nature and Grounds of *Faith*, or *Opinion*: whereby I mean that Assent, which we give to any Proposition as true, of whose Truth yet we have no certain Knowledge: And here we shall have Occasion to examine the Reasons and Degrees of *Assent*.[335]

334 Op. cit. Vol. I, Bk. III, Pt. I, Ch. iii, p. 402: 'De sorte que toute l'adresse qu'il y a pour le [l'esprit] rendre plus pénétrant & plus étendu, consiste comme nous l'expliquerons ailleurs, à bien ménager ses forces & sa capacité, ne l'emploïant pas mal à propos à des choses qui ne lui sont point nécessaires pour découvrir la vérité qu'il cherche: & c'est ce qu'il faut bien remarquer. Car cela seul fait bien voir que les Logiques ordinaires sont plus propres pour diminuer la capacité de l'esprit que pour l'augmenter …', transl. Lennon/Olscamp, pp. 209-210; cf. Vol. II, Bk. VI, Pt. II, Ch. i, p. 295: 'Car l'expérience fait assez connoître, que la Logique d'Aristote n'est pas de grand usage, à cause qu'elle occupe trop l'esprit, & qu'elle le détourne de l'attention qu'il devroit apporter aux sujets qu'il examine.'

335 *Essay*, I.i.3: 44.

These essential points were already given in much the same words in Drafts B and C for the *Essay* and are present in a more implicit way in Draft A.[336] The first point runs roughly parallel to the first stage of his logic of ideas. The second and the third points form the two main elements of the second stage: certain knowledge and probable knowledge. Indeed, this two-stage division is reflected in the basically bipartite structure of the *Essay* itself. If this fundamental point has not received much attention in secondary literature,[337] this may be due to the simple fact that the *Essay* consists not of two but of four books:

I. Of Innate Notions
II. Of Ideas
III. Of Words
IV. Of Knowledge and Opinion

However, in Book II of the *Essay* Locke discusses all that is essential to stage one of his logic (by giving his analysis and taxonomy of separate ideas) and in Book IV he treats of the second stage (reasoning that is based on these ideas and that terminates in knowledge or opinion). These two stages imply a simplification compared with the more elaborate structure of the reasoning process as described in Aristotelian textbooks. Here we first start with terms, which at a second level are combined into propositions which on their turn are combined into syllogisms; it is only at this third level that we reason and are able to draw conclusions. Locke's logic of ideas implies that in reasoning we can dispense with words, and also with propositions and syllogisms which consist of words. Reasoning is a process that is limited to ideas; '*Illation* or *Inference*'

> … consists in nothing but the Perception of the connexion there is between the *Ideas*, in each step of the deduction, whereby the Mind comes to see, either the certain Agreement or Disagreement of any two *Ideas*, as in Demonstration, in which it arrives

336 Draft B: §3, *Drafts*, I, pp. 102-103; Draft C: Bk. 1, Ch. 1, Sect. 3, fol. 3; Draft A abounds with discussions of the the first point (on individual ideas); on the second and third point (knowledge and opinion) see esp. §32, *Drafts*, I, p. 62: '… I shall come now haveing (as I thinke) found out the bounds of humane knowledg, in the next place to consider the severall degrees & grounds of Probability & Assent. or Faith.'

337 See however, Martinak, *Zur Logik Lockes*, p. 3: 'Von dieser [Lockes Fassung des Begriffes der Logik] nun — dies sei vorausgeschickt — kann ich hier nur einen Theil bringen, (der etwa den I. Haupttheil einer Logik Lockes bilden würde), — die Lehre von den Vorstellungen. Einen II. Theil, enthaltend die Lehre von Urtheil im weitesten Sinne, war ich vorläufig außer stande auszuarbeiten'; see also Kenney, *John Locke and the Oxford Training*, p. 88.

> at Knowledge; or their probable connexion, on which it gives or with-holds its Assent, as in Opinion.[338]

The separate levels of propositions and of syllogisms collapse into the second stage of the logic of ideas. If one were to take an Aristotelian work on logic, for instance Samuel Smith's *Aditus ad logicam*, and replace its analysis of terms by that of ideas, omit the part on propositions entirely, and replace a discussion of demonstrative syllogisms and dialectical syllogisms by respectively an analysis of certain knowledge and probable knowledge based on ideas instead of words, one is left with a structure and content that correspond with Books II and IV of the *Essay*. The main difference concerns method, not only in content but also in structure. We have seen separate sections being assigned to this topic at the end of both Aristotelian and non-Aristotelian textbooks. In the *Essay* its main discussion is also at the end, that is to say, in Book IV; however, instead of dealing with one method at the very end of this book, Locke discusses his two methods at different places in Book IV in their separate contexts of certain and probable knowledge.

So much about Books II and IV; but what about Books I and III? Book I contains Locke's polemic against innate ideas. In the discussion of Descartes (above, §8) I already observed that views pro or contra the innateness of ideas are strictly speaking not essential for the development of a logic of ideas. There is some evidence that Locke himself might have agreed with this view. First, in Draft A he had started right away with the positive side of his views on the origin of our ideas: 'I imagin that all knowledg is founded on and ultimately derives its self from sense, or something analogous to it …'[339] Not until the last sections of this draft does it occur to him to discuss some arguments of those who attack this view and who believe in innate ideas instead.[340] Only from Draft B onwards does he turn the tables on his adversaries by switching from a defence against innatist attacks to the offensive himself and by placing this attack at the start of his treatise.[341] Not until Draft C do we see the discussion of innate knowledge being accorded the separate position of Book I (even though this first book has not yet been given a title). There is more that points to a relatively ephemeral position of Book I in the structure of the *Essay*. Locke prepared an 'Epitome' of

338 *Essay*, IV.xvii.2: 669; cf. 'Of Study', p. 419: 'Words without doubt are the great and almost only way of conveyance of one man's thoughts to another man's understanding; but when a man thinks, reasons, and discourses within himself, I see not what need he has of them'.

339 *Drafts*, I, §1, p. 1.

340 In *Drafts*, §43, I, pp. 74-78, he turns against the opinion that we have 'certain Ideas or principles' in general and in ibid. §44-45, pp. 78-82, he deals with the supposition that we have a positive, and thus an innate, idea of infinity in particular.

341 Op. cit. §§4-16, pp. 103-128.

the *Essay* that would be translated into French by Jean le Clerc and published in 1688, shortly before the First Edition of the *Essay* itself.[342] In this 'Epitome' Locke decided to skip Book I, declaring that it contained no more than a 'preliminary debate':

> In the thoughts I have had concerning the understanding I have endeavourd to prove that the minde is at first rasa tabula. But that being only to remove the prejudice that lies in some mens mindes I thinke it best in this short view I designe here of my principles to passe by all that preliminary debate which makes the first book …[343]

The Oxford scholar John Wynne (*c.* 1665-1743), who in 1696 published an abridgement of the *Essay* that was approved by Locke, suppressed the first book on similar grounds.[344]

In Book III Locke's principal target was scholastic rather than Cartesian. Some of the topics discussed here had been addressed in a disparate way already in Drafts A and B. It was only later that he decided to devote a separate book to words. He admits as much at the very end of Book II. Having discussed separate ideas (the first stage of his logic of ideas), he admits that the most logical next step would be to proceed at once with knowledge (the second stage of his logic):

> This was that, which, in the first general view I had of this Subject, was all that I thought I should have to do: but upon a nearer approach, I find, that there is so close a connexion between *Ideas* and Words; and our abstract *Ideas*, and general Words, have so constant a relation one to another, that it is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our Knowledge, which all consists in Propositions, without considering, first, the Nature, Use, and Signification of Language; which therefore must be the business of the next Book.[345]

The use of the term 'proposition' in this quotation in no way implies a priority of words over ideas. For Locke, propositions do not have to consist of words. A proposition consists of signs that are joined or separated. These signs can be words that form verbal propositions, or ideas that form mental propositions.[346] What the quotation does imply, however, is that words should be carefully scrutinized and upon this task he embarks in Book III. His critical discussion of the instru-

342 The French translation of the 'Epitome', 'Extrait d'un Livre Anglois que n'est pas encore publié, intitulé Essai Philosophique', was first published as an article in the *Bibliotheque Universelle & Historique* and later in the same year published separately, *Abrégé d'un ouvrage intitulé Essai philosophique*. The dedication in the *Essay* to the Earl of Pembroke is still absent in both the 'Epitome' and the 'Extrait', but is included in the *Abrégé*.

343 MS Locke c.28, fol. 52r. I thank Prof. G. A. J. Rogers for permission to use his transcription.

344 Wynne, *An Abridgement*, pp. iv-v.

345 *Essay*, II.xxxiii.19: 401.

346 Cf. *Essay*, IV.v.1-11: 574-579 and IV.i.1-2: 525.

ments that scholastic logicians forged out of words, i.e. verbal propositions and syllogisms, is subsequently continued in Book IV. Rather than detracting from the bipartite structure presented by Books II and IV, Books I and III are additions whose substantially polemical purport was meant to smooth the transition to Locke's logic of ideas. Book III has proved to be of eminent importance for future developments in the philosophy of language. However, considered from the structural perspective of the shift from a tripartite Aristotelian logic towards a bipartite logic of ideas, this book is a mere side-show.

Now that the structure of the *Essay* has been defined more sharply, it is possible to be more precise about the place of the *Conduct* within this structure. Although the *Conduct* was conceived in 1697 as an additional chapter (No. xx) to Book IV of the Fourth Edition of the *Essay*, Locke at some moment changed his mind and ceased to consider it as part of the *Essay*.[347] However, there is no reason to assume that this was because of radically changed views about the relation between the content of the two works. In the *Conduct* Locke certainly concentrates more on errors and on their remedies than he did elsewhere in the *Essay*, but as we shall soon see these topics had already been addressed in the latter work as well. Moreover, as has been shown previously, the kinds of error discussed in the *Conduct* fit in the logical context provided by the *Essay*. The reasons for not including the *Conduct* were probably of a practical nature. We are sure that it was not finished by the time the Fourth Edition of the *Essay* was issued in 1700, since it was not even finished when Locke died in 1704. The large size of the *Conduct* may also have counted against including it as a chapter in the *Essay*. This would not have been the only case in which practical deliberations influenced a decision on whether or not to incorporate a new passage in the *Essay*.[348] So, there is no reason to assume that when Locke decided against including the *Conduct* in the *Essay*, he ceased to consider the former as part of his logic of ideas.

Locke ends each of the last three books of his *Essay* with a discussion of errors that are relevant to the subject at hand. In Book II, the last five chapters are devoted to errors of which we can be guilty in respect of individual ideas:[349]

347 See below, 'Text', §4.

348 See above, §9, on Locke's decision not to publish the *Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion*.

349 Locke clearly sets apart this discussion of errors from the previous chapters of Book II, by starting Chapter xxix thus: 'Having shewn the Original of our *Ideas*, and taken a view of their several sorts; considered the difference between the simple and the complex; and observed how the complex one are divided into those of Modes, Substances, and Relations, all which, I think, is necessary to be done by any one, who would acquaint himself throughly with the progress of the Mind, in its Apprehension and Knowledge of Things, it will, perhaps, be

xxix. Of Clear and Distinct, Obscure and Confused Ideas;
xxx. Of Real and Fantastical Ideas;
xxxi. Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas;
xxxii. Of true and false Ideas;

and finally the new chapter, added in the Fourth Edition:

xxxiii. Of the Association of Ideas.

Book III ends with two chapter on errors concerning words and language in general:

ix. Of the Imperfection of Words;
x. Of the Abuse of Words;

followed by remedies:

xi. Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuses.

The last chapter of Book IV contains Locke's general 'Division of the Sciences', which however is immediately preceded by two chapters on aberrations that keep us from knowledge or from justified assent. The chapter

xix. Of Enthusiasm

was newly added in the Fourth Edition and part of it (without the chapter number it was to receive in the *Essay*) can be found in the same MS e.1 that also contains other additions for this edition (including 'Association' and the *Conduct*). 'Of Enthusiasm' is followed by

xx. Of wrong Assent, or Errour,

which covers some of the ground that would also be discussed in the *Conduct*, however with special attention for 'Wrong Measures of Probability'.

The inclusion of the *Conduct* as Chapter xx would have placed it at the end of Book IV, after the last chapter on error (and only before the last chapter on the Division of the Sciences), assuming that Locke had not yet discounted the inclusion of the other addition, on 'Enthusiasm', in the numbers of the chapters. Given the fact that the main subject of the *Conduct* is error, and given the fact that the chapters on error are placed at the end of each of the three last books, the projected place of the *Conduct* is plausible. However, why did Locke intend to place the *Conduct* at the end of Book IV and not at the end of another book? Since the oldest part of what would become the *Conduct* is probably on association,

thought I have dwelt long enough upon the examination of *Ideas*. I must, nevertheless, crave leave to offer some few other Considerations concerning them', *Essay*, II.xxix.1: 362-363.

and since this part was originally a continuation of the part on association that became the last chapter of Book II of the *Essay*, the inclusion of the rest of the *Conduct* at the end of this book might seem a plausible possibility. However, the analysis of error in the *Conduct* is of a general character, it gives attention to aberrations that are relevant for both phases of Locke's logic of ideas, and thus it cannot be confined to any one of the books of the *Essay*. His point in wanting to place the *Conduct* at the end of Book IV was not so much that it was of special importance to this particular book, as that he wanted to give it a place at the end of the *Essay* as a whole, thereby stressing the general character of the analysis of error in the *Conduct*. Since the *Conduct* covers the whole range of Locke's logic, it was inevitable that sometimes there are overlapping passages between the *Conduct* and the *Essay*. Sometimes he stops embarking on a subject in the *Conduct* because he has treated it already in the *Essay*, as some of his references in the former work to the latter clearly indicate; this is done at least three times concerning the abuse of words,[350] a subject which, after its extensive treatment in Book III of the *Essay* (including remedies) remains indeed largely untouched in the *Conduct*.

Apart from being plausible, the projected place of the *Conduct* in the *Essay* fits in with a long logical tradition. On the one hand, it should be admitted that there are fundamental differences between the *content* of the analysis of error in the Aristotelian *Organon* and in Locke's logic of ideas. At the start of *De sophisticis elenchis* Aristotle announces his attention to treat 'of arguments used in competitions and contests'.[351] The context of the subsequent discussion of error is polemical itself; it is concerned with 'fighting contentious persons'[352] and 'how we are to prove that our opponent is saying something false and make him utter paradoxes'.[353] It is difficult not to read these passages as early announcements of scholastic disputations. By contrast, Locke's logic of ideas tried to turn disputants away from their presumed adversaries to their own faculties. He was not interested in analysing the fallacies by which others try to deceive us (and we might deceive others), but in the errors by which we fool ourselves. One of the constantly recurring expressions in the *Conduct* is that of 'imposing on ourselves'.[354] This is a very dangerous tendency; it is present all the time and we confront it with less criticism than attempts by others to fool us: 'The disposition to put any cheat

350 *Conduct*, pars. 10, 30, 63.

351 Op. cit. 2 165b10-11: 'περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγωνιστικῶν καὶ ἐριστικῶν …', transl. in Barnes, I, p. 279.

352 Op. cit. 17 175a33-34: 'πρὸς τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς μαχετέον', transl. in Barnes, I, p. 298.

353 Op. cit. 34 183a28-29: 'πῶς δείξομέν τε ψευδόμενεν καὶ παράδοξα λέγειν ποιήσομεν', transl. in Barnes, I, p. 313.

354 *Conduct*, pars. 13, 36, 51, 59 and 80.

upon our selves works constantly and we are pleasd with it but are impatient of being banterd or mislead by others.'[355]

On the other hand, however, a change in logical *content* is only one aspect of this story. *Structure* proved to be rather more resilient. We have already compared the place of knowledge and opinion in the structure of the *Essay* with that of demonstrative and dialectical syllogisms in an Aristotelian work on logic by for example Samuel Smith. We can now press the analogy further. When Smith ended his *Aditus* with a discussion of sophistical fallacies, he did so in accordance with a long logical tradition. There are clear indications that Aristotle considered his work on error, *De sophisticis elenchis*, if not as an appendix to his whole logical work, then at least as an appendage to his *Topics*.[356] And whatever his own views may have been, *De sophisticis elenchis* would be transmitted to posterity as the final treatise of his *Organon*. In the same way as this final treatise gave an analysis of errors that are relevant for Aristotelian logic in general and dialectic in particular, it had been Locke's intention to place the *Conduct*, containing a discussion of the errors that are relevant for his logic of ideas, at the end of the *Essay*.[357]

11. The appreciation of the Essay and the Conduct as texts on logic

We have seen Malebranche presenting his *Recherche de la vérité* as an alternative to scholastic works on logic, although he refrained from giving it the explicit name of 'logic'. Locke's *Essay* and *Conduct* provide us with a similar case. In the seventeenth century 'logic' was Aristotelian logic. In the *Essay*, Locke uses the word 'logic' or 'logician' most frequently in Bk. II, Ch. xvii 'Of Reason', and he uses it in the clearly pejorative context of his attack against Peripatetic logicians. Other places in the *Essay* contain similar references to 'Logick and Dispute'[358] and 'logical Niceties, or curious empty Speculations'.[359] This sequence is continued in the *Conduct* with 'a logical chicanner'[360] and 'disputes on logical questions' that are equated with 'airy useless notions'.[361] Clearly, for Locke the term 'logic' was poor in positive connotations. This may explain why he did not attach the

355 *Conduct*, par. 35.
356 Dorion, 'Introduction' to Aristotle, *Les réfutations sophistique*, pp. 24-32.
357 Assuming this context, it is interesting to read in Hamblin, *Fallacies*, pp. 161-162, that Locke in his discussion of four sorts of arguments in general (*Essay*, IV.xvii.19-22: 685-687) and in his use of the term *argumentum ad hominem* in particular, is tributary to *De sophisticis elenchis*, 177b 33.
358 *Essay*, III.x.7: 494 (marginal heading).
359 *Essay*, III.10.12: 496.
360 *Conduct*, par. 99.
361 *Conduct*, par. 84.

name of 'logic' to what I have described as his 'logic of ideas', even although he did present it as an alternative to the works of Aristotelian logicians. However, a development can be traced in his views about what can be called by the name of 'logic'. In the *Essay*, after stating that cultivating our 'native rustick Reason' is more likely to generate knowledge 'than any scholastick Proceeding by the strict Rules of Mode and Figure',[362] he approvingly quotes from *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie* by the theologian Richard Hooker (1553/1554-1600) about the importance of '*the right helps of true Art and Learning*' and then continues:

> I do not pretend to have found, or discovered here any of those *right helps of Art*, this great Man of deep Thought mentions: but this is plain, that *Syllogism*, and the Logick now in Use, which were as well known in his days, can be none of those he means. It is sufficient for me, if by a Discourse, perhaps, something out of the way, I am sure as to me wholly new, and unborrowed, I shall have given Occasion to others, to cast about for new Discoveries, and to seek in their own Thoughts, for those *right Helps of Art*, which will scarce be found, I fear, by those who servilely confine themselves to the Rules and Dictates of others.[363]

In this passage Locke clearly presents his 'Discourse' as an alternative to Aristotelian logic. He speaks about 'the Logick now in Use', thus implicitly suggesting the conceivability of another logic, i.e. his logic of ideas.

Next, there is the last chapter of the *Essay* (Bk. IV, Ch. xxi) with Locke's division of the sciences into φυσική, πρακτική and σημειωτική, 'or *the Doctrine of Signs*'. None of the previous divisions of the sciences in his MSS contain the same taxonomy and there is some evidence to suggest that Locke came to envisage semiotics as logic only shortly before the first publication of the *Essay* in 1689, and that he attached the chapter containing this division only after the rest of the *Essay* was largely completed.[364] Drafts A and B of the *Essay* do not contain any division of the sciences and we do not know about Draft C, since this contains only Books I and II. The interesting point in this late addition is that here Locke gives the only positive reference to logic in either the *Essay* or the *Conduct*:

> The Consideration then of *Ideas* and *Words*, as the great Instruments of Knowledge, makes no despicable part of their Contemplation, who would take a view of humane Knowledge in the whole Extent of it. And, perhaps, if they were distinctly weighed, and duly considered, they would afford us another sort of Logick and Critick, than what we have been hitherto acquainted with.[365]

362 *Essay*, IV.xvii.6: 679.
363 *Essay*, IV.xvii.7: 680.
364 Buickerood, 'The Natural History of the Understanding', pp. 170-178.
365 *Essay*, IV.xxii.4: 721.

This may very well be the point at which Locke starts to look upon his already fully developed way of ideas as a logic in its own right, that is to say: as a logic of ideas — so that here he has for the first time reason to use the word 'logic' in a positive rather than in a pejorative sense. However, consider the first sentence of the paragraph on σημειωτική:

> *Thirdly*, The Third Branch may be called σημειωτική, or *the Doctrine of Signs*, the most usual whereof being Words, it is aptly enough termed also λογική, Logick; the business whereof, is to consider the Nature of Signs, the Mind makes use of for the understanding of Things, or conveying Knowledge to others.[366]

This might suggest that Locke here gives words a bigger place than is warranted in a logic of ideas. However, what he is doing in this quotation is merely referring to both the etymological and the conventional meaning ('the most usual') of logic. He then continues with a clear statement of the importance of ideas: 'For since the Things, the Mind contemplates, are none of them, besides it self, present to the Understanding, 'tis necessary that something else, as a Sign or Representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: And these are *Ideas*.'[367] Only after this does Locke mention words, in the role of mere secondary signs, that is to say: signs of ideas.

Locke's resolve in the *Conduct* to consider his way of ideas as a logic remained at least as strong as it had been in the *Essay*. In paragraph 2 we again read critical remarks about 'The Logick now in use', which this time however are accompanied by a quotation from Bacon's 'Præfatio' to the *Instauratio Magna*. In paragraph 3 the Latin quotation is rendered in a translation of which the last sentence runs: 'That it is absolutely necessary that a better and perfecter use and imployment of the minde and understanding should be introduced.' Whereas the first paragraph of the *Conduct* is written on page 62 of the MS e.1, pars. 2 and 3 are written on pages 114-116. Locke must have attached considerable value to the quotation from Bacon that forms the content of these paragraphs, since he added the following remark to them: 'NB what here immediately follows concerning Logic is to begin this chapter of the conduct of the understanding' and this is indeed the place this fragment is given in both the later MS c.28 and in O-1706.[368] Although the overall structure of Locke's logic of ideas is not substantially Baconian, it has been noted that many individual points in the treatment of error in the *Conduct* betray the Lord Chancellor's influence (above, §3). However, there may be more; after the preface to the *Instauratio*, from which Locke quotes in the *Conduct*, Bacon

366 *Essay*, IV.xxii.4: 720.
367 *Essay*, IV.xxii.4: 720-721.
368 See also below, 'Text', §3 [37] and §6.

gives the plan of his work ('Distributio operis'). This is what he remarks about his inductive method in the preface to the *Novum Organum*, which was the second part of the *Instauratio Magna*:

> Having thus coasted past the ancient arts, the next point is to equip the intellect for passing beyond. To the second part therefore belongs the doctrine concerning the better and more perfect use of human reason in the inquisition of things, and the true helps of the understanding: that thereby (as far as the condition of mortality and humanity allows) the intellect may be raised and exalted, and made capable of overcoming the difficulties and obscurities of nature.[369]

Bacon had not only introduced 'a better and perfecter use and imployment of the minde' as an alternative for traditional texts on logic, he also held this alternative to be a logic. The old Aristotelian *Organon* was to be replaced by a *Novum Organum*. Locke's quotation from the *Instauratio* can be taken as an indication that he had come to consider the *Essay* and the *Conduct* as his way of realizing this Baconian design.

Locke's 'way of ideas' started its long and successful career as a new logic. Already in the dedicatory letter of his *Dioptrica Nova*, published 1692, we see Molyneux describing the *Essay* as the crowning achievement of a new approach that had started with Arnauld and Malebranche, i.e. two philosophers that I have marked out as Locke's predecessors in the development of a new logic:

> Logick *has put on a Countenance clearly different from what it appeared in formerly: How unlike is its shape in the* Ars Cogitandi [= Arnauld's *Logique*], Recherches de la Verite, *&c. from what it appears in* Smigletius, [sic] *and the Commentators of* Aristotle? *But to none do we owe for a greater Advancement in this Part of Philosophy, than to the incomparable* Mr. Locke, *Who, in his* Essay concerning Humane Understanding, *has rectified more received Mistakes, and delivered more profound Truths, established on Experience and Observation, for the Direction of Man's mind in the Prosecution of Knowledge*, (*which I think may be properly term'd* Logick) *than are to be met with in all the Volumes of the Antients*.[370]

Similarly, the clue that the *Essay* can be seen as a specimen of the third part in Locke's division of the sciences (logic), was not lost on John Wynne. When he wrote on 31 January 1695 to Locke with the proposition of producing an

369 Op. cit. in: *Works*, I, p. 135: 'Porro prætervecti artes veteres, intellectum humanum ad trajiciendum instruemus. Destinatur itaque parti secundæ, doctrina de meliore et perfectiore usu rationis in rerum inquisitione, et de auxiliis veris intellectus: ut per hoc (quantum conditio humanitatis ac mortalitatis patitur) exaltetur intellectus, et facultate amplificetur ad naturæ ardua et obscura superanda', transl. in: *Works*, IV, p. 23.

370 Op. cit. pp. xl-xli.

abridgement of the *Essay*, he suggested that this could be used as a textbook 'instead of those Triffling and Insignificant Books, which only serve to perplex and confound'. He then continues: 'I do not see that there is Any Thing wanting In It to compleat The Third part In your Division of science.'[371] On 26 April of the same year Locke wrote to W. Molyneux about Wynne's proposal (that was to be realized) in joyful surprise:

> The third edition of my Essay is already, or will be speedily in the press. But what perhaps will seem stranger, and possibly please you better, an abridgment is now making (if not already done) by one of the university of Oxford, for the use of young scholars, in the place of an ordinary system of logick.[372]

Locke does not protest against calling the *Essay* a work of logic. What rather surprises him is that the proposal comes from Oxford, which he had learnt to perceive as a stronghold of Aristotelianism and where he had been deprived of his Christ Church studentship:

> From the acquaintance I had of the temper of that place, I did not expect to have it [the *Essay*] get much footing there.[373]

Wynne's favourable reaction proved to be more than a mere incident and his abridgement was to contribute substantially to the dissemination of the *Essay*.[374] In a letter to Locke (*c.* 17 April 1704) James Tyrell reported about a meeting of the 'Heads of Houses' of Oxford in November 1703, where the 'great decay of Logical Exercises' was attributed to the influence of Locke's *Essay*, and the work of his admirer Jean le Clerc.[375] However, these deliberations could not impede the *Essay's* popularity as a book on logic. In the dedication of the Second Edition of his French translation of the *Essay* (1729) Pierre Coste notes that in Oxford and Cambridge this work has taken the place of Aristotle 'and his most famous

371 *Corr.* 1843, V, p. 262.
372 *Corr.* 1887, V, p. 351.
373 *Corr.* 1887, V, p. 351.
374 Rogers, 'Introduction' (no page numbers) to Wynne, *An Abridgment of Mr Locke's Essay*.
375 *Corr.* 3511, VIII, p. 269. Le Clerc's *Logica sive ars ratiocinandi* (1692) is clearly influenced by Locke's logic of ideas but has the familiar quadripartite structure of logical textbooks, although Le Clerc interchanged the third and fourth parts, resulting in a structure that consists of ideas–propositions–method–syllogisms. William Molyneux, in his letter to Locke from 22 December 1692, *Corr.* 1579, IV, p. 601, is sharply aware of the author's debt to Locke's *Essay*: 'I have Lately seen Johannis Clerici Logica, Ontologia and Pneumatologia, in all which He has little Extraordinary but what he Borrows from you; and in the Alteration he gives them he robbs them of their Native Beautys …'

commentators'.[376] Indeed, both in Oxford and in other places, the *Essay* was incorporated in the curriculum as a work on logic, and often recommended as a follow up to courses in Aristotelian logic.[377] Edward Bentham's *An Introduction to Logick* (1773) contains a list of 'Scriptores consulendi de Quæstionibus Logicis, tàm Veteres quàm Recentiores'[378] that includes both Aristotle and Locke. In 1802 there were college lectures at Cambridge for freshmen in *Locke and logic*.[379]

The history of the reception of the *Conduct* in the century following Locke's death is less well documented. In his *Historical Sketch of Logic* (1851) Robert Blakey informs us that the *Conduct* 'has often been employed as a logical textbook in some of our English universities'.[380] Similarly, in his *Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric* W. S. Howell writes that '*The Conduct of the Understanding* and its parent work, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, were without question the most popular, the most widely read, the most frequently reprinted, and the most influential, of all books of the eighteenth century.'[381] Additional information about the influence of the *Conduct* in the eighteenth century can be gauged from the sober facts of its rich printing history. It went through numerous separate editions and was also printed together with the *Essay*, with other works and in editions of the complete works (see below, 'Bibliography', §1). The 'Preface by the Editor' to the 1777-edition of the *Works* contains the following remark (in which the *Conduct* is mistakenly described as 'early'):

376 Locke, *Essai philosophique*, [p. viii]: 'Enfin, ce qui met le comble à sa gloire, adopté en quelque maniére à *Oxford* & à *Cambridge*, il y est lû & expliqué aux Jeunes gens comme le Livre le plus propre à leur former l'Esprit, à régler & étendre leurs Connoissances; de sorte que LOCKE tient à présent la place d'ARISTOTE & de ses plus célèbres Commentateurs, dans ces deux fameuses Universitez.'

377 Feingold, 'The Mathematical Sciences and New Philosophies', pp. 419-425 and Yolton, 'Schoolmen, Logic and Philosophy', pp. 565-591.

378 Op. cit. p. 104.

379 Wordsworth, *Scholæ academicæ*, p. 86.

380 Op. cit. pp. 281. The Oxford Christ Church Collection Book, 1699-1720, shelfmark li.b.1, containing reading lists that were given to individual students, gives 'Locke's Essays' on fol. 2vb (1702/1703); 'Lock' on fol. 3rb (twice, 1702/1703) and on fol. 8rb (1706/1707); 'Lock's Essay on Hum. Underst.' on 13vb (twice, c. 1712); '3d book [of the *Essay*] of Lock' on 17ra (1714) and 'Locks 1st book' on 17rb (also 1714), but does not (yet) mention the *Conduct*, although it covers the first fourteen years following the publication of O-1706. However, the Christ Church Collections of Nobleman, Gentlemen and Commoners, quoted in Bill, *Education at Christ Church Oxford*, p. 332, mentions the *Conduct* as an item on an undergraduate reading list for 1775. See also Yolton, 'Schoolmen, Logic, Philosophy', p. 570 and Ashworth, 'Oxford', p. 9.

381 Op. cit. p. 277.

> Connected in some sort with the forementioned essay, and in their way equally valuable, are his tract on *Education* and the early *Conduct of the Understanding*, both very worthy, as we apprehend, of a more careful perusal than is commonly bestowed upon them, the latter more especially, which seems to be little known, and less attended to.[382]

The 'Advertisement' to the 1782 edition of the *Conduct* contains a similar statement: 'The folowing valuable Work of Mr. LOCKE's being very little known on account of it's scarcity, it has been thought advisable to print this cheap EDITION to promote it's circulation.'[383] Neither quotation points to a very warm interest of the public in the *Conduct*. However, these remarks may very well reflect plain promotional intentions. The fact that the abundance of editions of Locke's *Works* and his *Essay* in the second half of the eighteenth century containing the *Conduct* did nothing to stop the issue of several separate editions of this work in the same period, point to its popularity. In his *Advice to a Young Student, with a Method of Study of the first four years* (1730), Daniel Waterland praises the *Conduct* as an introductory contribution to the 'true Art of *Reasoning*', as opposed to Aristotelian textbooks.[384] The *Conduct* is included in 'A Table Of the several principal Writers of Logick' in Edward Bentham's *Reflexions upon Logick* (1740), written 'To the Youth Of Oriel College and Christ Church'.[385] In 1753 an abstract of the *Conduct* 'For the Benefit of younger Scholars' was presented by a 'Mr Alexander Simm, late Schoolmaster at *Bathgate*'.[386] In addition, it became well-known on the continent. Already in 1707 Jean le Clerc published an extensive summary in French of the *Conduct* and the other items included in O-1706.[387] A complete French translation of this volume was published in 1710.[388] The *Conduct* was also studied in Germany. Syrbius, a professor of philosophy at Jena, lectured on the French translation of 1710 as early as 1712.[389] Johann Jacob Breitinger's 'IX. Discours' (written under the pseudonym 'Michael Angelo') in the first volume (1721) of his short-lived journal *Discourse der Mahlern* was manifestly influenced

382 W-1777, Vol. I, p. x. This remark was repeated in W-1794, Vol. I, p. xiii.
383 C-1782, p. iii.
384 Op. cit. pp. 19-20.
385 Op. cit. p. 56; examined copy is the Second Edition from 1755. The table also gives Descartes, Arnauld's *Logique* and Malebranche's *Recherche*.
386 AS-1753, pp. 130-146.
387 AS-1707.
388 Tr(Fr)-1710.
389 Wundt, *Die Philosophie and der Universität Jena*, p. 78.

by the *Conduct*.[390] A German translation appeared at Königsberg in 1755.[391] The eighteenth century also saw a translation of the *Conduct* in Italian.[392]

More information about the eighteenth-century development of the logic of ideas in relation to Peripatetic logic in general, and about the influence of the *Conduct* in particular, can be gained by an inspection of logical textbooks. I will briefly discuss one specimen that was used at Oxford.[393] Isaac Watts (1674-1748), who is known to posterity chiefly as the father of English hymnody, also wrote a *Logick: or, The Right Use of Reason in the Enquiry after Truth* (1725).[394] This textbook proved to be very popular and was reprinted thirty times up to 1800.[395] The general structure of the *Logick* is conventional enough:

I. Of Perception and Ideas
II. Of Judgment and Proposition
III. Of Reasoning and Syllogism
IV. Of Method

However, in the title of the first part the predominantly Lockean content of Watts's logic is already shining through. In this part Watts gives a simplified version of Locke's catalogue of ideas and analysis of language as given in Books II and III of the *Essay* respectively. Selections from the subject matter of Book IV are discussed by Watts in parts II, III and IV. Watts's discussion of method in Part IV is confined to remarks about the distinction between synthetic and analytic and to some rules 'of true Method in the Pursuit or Communication of Knowledge',[396] that have a largely though not exclusively Cartesian character.

The *Logick* bears all the marks of compromise. Watts very much admires Locke and compares '… the great Lord *Bacon, Copernicus, Descartes*, with the greater Sir *Isaac Newton*, Mr. *Locke*, and Mr. *Boyle*'.[397] He follows Locke when he declares that '*True Logick* doth not require a long Detail of hard Words to amuse Mankind, and to puff up the Mind with empty Sounds, and a Pride of false Learning'. However, he then continues: '… yet some Distinctions and Terms of Art are necessary to range every Idea in its proper Class, and to keep our Thoughts from Confusion'.[398] Watts does not choose; he gives both Locke's logic

390 Op. cit. no page numbers; the 'IX. Discours' starts on quire I.
391 Tr(Ger)-1755.
392 Tr(It)-1776, Tr(It)-1790 and Tr(It)-1794.
393 See Yolton, 'Schoolmen, Logic and Philosophy', *passim*.
394 I have consulted the Eight Edition, 1745.
395 Editor's 'Note' to Duncan, *The Elements of Logick*, no page number.
396 Op. cit. Pt. IV, Ch. ii, p. 349.
397 Op. cit. Pt. II, Ch. iii, sect. 4, p. 225.
398 Op. cit. 'Dedication', no page number.

of ideas (most of it in parts I and II, which make up the bulk of his treatise) and also a largely uncritical if not very substantial discussion of syllogisms in Part III. Whereas in the case of Arnauld we see a traditional structure being eroded from within by a freshly evolving new logic, the case of Watts's *Logick* is rather that of an attempt to put the spirit of a by then fully developed new logic of ideas back into old Peripatetic bottles. In his letter of 22 December 1692 Molyneux had advised Locke to produce a work 'by Way of Logick, something accommodated to the Usual Forms', because 'a Large Discourse in the way of a Logick would be much more taking in the Universities'.[399] Although Locke had not protested against Wynne calling his *Essay* a work on logic, he very understandably did not like Molyneux's suggestion of squeezing his work into a traditional structure. When he wrote back on 20 January 1693 he informed his friend about his aversion to the idea of 'turning my Essay into a body of logick and metaphysicks, accomodated to the usual forms'.[400] However, this kind of accommodation was exactly the underlying stratagem of Watts. In the introduction to his *The Improvement of the Mind* (1741), he refers to his *Logick* as a work '… wherein it was my constant Aim to assist the Reasoning Powers of every Rank and Order of Men, as well as to keep an Eye to the best Interest of the Schools and the Candidates of true Learning'.[401]

Watts's attempt to accommodate the new bipartite logic of ideas to the tripartite structure of an Aristotelian textbook was bound to show signs of strain. His strategy is based on Locke's distinction between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge (see above, §2). Intuitive knowledge is based on the immediate comparison of two ideas, whereas demonstrative knowledge rests on the comparison of two ideas by means of one or more intermediate ideas. Watts squares propositions with intuitive knowledge, his point being that just as we directly compare two ideas in the activity of judging, we compare subject and predicate in a proposition. He then proceeds to syllogisms, which are identified with reasoning proper and compared to demonstrative knowledge, where we have '… to compare each of them [subject and predicate] with some *third Idea*, that by seeing how far they agree or disagree with it, we may be able to judge how far they agree or disagree among themselves'.[402] Watts's solution is disputable. With 'judgment' he refers to the direct and certain knowledge that is produced by intuition, whereas Locke

399 *Corr.* 1579, IV, pp. 601, 602.

400 *Corr.* 592, IV, p. 626.

401 Op. cit. p. 4. On the relation between *The Improvement of the Mind* and the *Conduct*, cf. Blakey, *Historical Sketch of Logic*, p. 345-346.

402 Op. cit. Pt. III, Ch. i, p. 280.

in the *Essay*[403] uses 'judgment' for indirect knowledge that is merely probable. However, the relevant point here is not so much whether Watts's solution was right or wrong, but that it is a typical example of an attempt to accommodate Locke's logic within the framework of an Aristotelian textbook. This attempt was also made in other eighteenth-century works, for instance in William Duncan's *The Elements of Logick* (1748) and in Bentham's *Reflexions upon Logick* and *An Introduction to Logick*.[404]

In addition to the general influence of Locke's way of ideas, Watts's *Logick* contains specific traces of the *Conduct*. This is perhaps the case in Part II, Chapter iii on 'The Springs of False Judgment, or the Doctrine of Prejudices' and more positively in Part III, Chapter iv, which gives 'Some general Rules to direct our Reasoning'. In this chapter Watts uses a quotation from the *Conduct* (par. 17) to illustrate his point about the importance of a formal role for the 'mathematical Sciences' in education: 'Something of these Sciences should be studied by every Man who pretends to learning and that (as Mr. *Locke* expresses it) *not so much to make us Mathematicians, as to make us reasonable creatures*.'[405] The following longer passage in the same chapter, where Watts highlights the importance of the two stages of the logic of ideas ('conceiving clearly and reasoning right'), gives verbal quotations from the *Conduct*, par. 8:

> This Habit of *conceiving clearly*, and of *judging justly*, and of Reasoning well, is not to be attained merely by the Happiness of Constitution, the Brightness of Genius, the best natural Parts, or the best Collection of logical Precepts. It is *Custom* and *Practise that must form* and establish this Habit. We must apply ourselves to it till we perform all this readily, and without reflecting on Rules. A *coherent Thinker*, and a *strict Reasoner* is not to be made at once by a Set of Rules, any more than a *good Painter* or a *Musician* may be formed *extempore* by an excellent Lecture on Musick or Painting. It is of infinite Importance therefore in our younger Years to be taught both the *Value* and the *Practise* of conceiving clearly and reasoning right: For when we are grown up to the middle of Life, or past it, it is no Wonder that we should not learn good Reasoning, any more

403 Op. cit. 4.17.17: 685: '*Judgement*, is the thinking or taking two *Ideas* to agree, or disagree, by the intervention of one or more *Ideas*, whose certain Agreement, or Disagreement with them it does not perceive, but hath observed to be frequent and usual'.

404 Neither Duncan nor Bentham give much attention to error, and thus it is not surprising that their works do not show any substantial influence of the *Conduct*. Cf. Duncan, op. cit. Bk. III, Ch. V, sect. xii, p. 267: '… I hold it needless to enter upon a particular Consideration, of those several Species of false Reasoning, which Logicians distinguish by the Name of *Sophisms*. He that thoroughly understands the Form and Structure of a good Argument, will of himself readily discern every Deviation from it' (cf. Arnauld's similar lack of interest, above, §9); Bentham, *An Introduction to Logick*, Pt. III, Sect. IV, pp. 56-62, gives some limited attention to 'Irregular Syllogisms and Fallacious reasoning'.

405 Op. cit. Pt. III, Ch. iv, pp. 326-327.

> than that an *ignorant Clown* should not be able to learn fine Language, Dancing, or a courtly Behaviour, when his rustic Airs have grown up with him till the Age of Forty.[406]

Interestingly, this final chapter of Part III of the *Logick* comes immediately after a chapter on 'The Doctrine of Sophisms'. So, Watts repeats Arnauld's procedure of adding a chapter on errors that are relevant to the new logic immediately after his discussion of errors that are relevant to Aristotelian logic, at the end of a third part on syllogisms. By quoting the *Conduct* at exactly this place, he seems to assume a parallel relationship between *Conduct* and *Essay* on the one hand and between *De sophisticis elenchis* and the *Organon* on the other.

12. Conclusion

Amongst many other things, Locke's *Essay* provides an alternative for the logic presented in Aristotelian textbooks. There are indications that he considered his *Essay* to be offering a logic and there is unmistakable evidence that it was perceived as such by contemporaries and eighteenth-century readers. The objects of his logic are not words but ideas. The comparison of ideas results in either certain or probable knowledge. In Locke's logic there is no use for the formalization of reasoning and it concentrates rather on a prior inspection of the mental faculties thanks to which we are furnished with ideas. He discusses method as a means of furnishing answers to the question of how we can best use our faculties in our pursuit of certain or probable knowledge. The kind of method to be used is determined by the kind of ideas that are presented to our mental faculties. Ideas, faculties and method are thus the interrelated main elements of Locke's logic of ideas.

In the *Conduct* Locke discusses the errors that are relevant to his logic. Errors of the first kind pertain to the individual ideas that form the basis of subsequent reasoning. Errors of the second kind relate to aberrations in reasoning itself. According to Locke, Aristotelian logicians were especially liable to errors of the first kind, because they were blind to the need of obtaining clear and distinct ideas before starting with reasoning at all. Errors can have causes outside the understanding, such as our passions, or by defects in the understanding itself, such as wrong habits. A major example of the last category is the wrong association of ideas. Wrong habits can be prevented and cured by right habits, which must be installed by gradual and repetitive practice of our mental faculties. Instead of being filled with particular material principles, the faculty of the understanding should be taught to develop the general formal ability of inspecting these principles. The

406 Op. cit. p. 327.

Conduct is not primarily an educational treatise. It is well-stocked with didactic advice, but this is given in the context of prevention and cure of errors that are relevant for Locke's logic of ideas.

The content of Locke's logic, especially its stress on clear and distinct ideas, but also the place that is accorded to the mental faculties and methodological questions, shows distinctly Cartesian influences. However, some of these elements were already anticipated in the works of Aristotelian textbook writers. This background becomes even more important if one considers the structure rather than the content of the logic of ideas. The tripartite structure of the Aristotelian textbooks that Locke bought for his pupils at Oxford reflects the three basic levels of Aristotelian logic: words, propositions and syllogisms. The third part on syllogisms usually ended with a discussion of the errors that were relevant to this logic: sophistical syllogisms. By contrast, Descartes's analysis of ideas gave rise to a logic that did not need three levels, but only two: that of separate ideas and that of the combination of ideas. He bequeathed to his successors the question of how to relate this essentially bipartite logic to the traditional tripartite structure of Aristotelian logic. Arnauld's *Logique*, Malebranche's *Recherche* and Locke's *Essay* can be seen as different answers to this question. The urgency of this question depended in large part on how much these successors were bent on presenting something that would still be recognized and accepted by contemporaries as 'logic'. The structure of Aristotelian logic is still very much present in Arnauld, it is completely neglected in Malebranche, and its influence can still be detected in the *Essay*. The function of the analysis of error as performed by the *Conduct* within the frame of Locke's logic, is comparable to that of *De sophisticis elenchis* in Aristotelian logic. This comparable function is confirmed by a projected place of the *Conduct* within the general structure of Locke's *Essay* that is mirrored by the place of *De sophisticis elenchis* in the *Organon*.

TEXT

The most important manuscript for the *Conduct* is MS Locke e.1. It is filled with projected additions to the Fourth Edition of the *Essay*, the largest of which is the *Conduct*. This part remained unfinished, but the MS also contains substantial parts on 'Enthusiasm' and 'Association' that were indeed published in the Fourth Edition of the *Essay*. MS e.1 can be said to form one unit in the limited sense of containing (projected) additions to this edition and also because of some material characteristics. Since this MS forms one unit, it will be described as such, although special attention will be given to the parts containing the *Conduct*. MS Locke c.28 on the other hand, is not a unit. It is a collection of different MSS on various philosophical and religious topics that were bound together and numbered only after the transference of the Lovelace Collection to the Bodleian Library. Only fols. 121-138 pertain to the *Conduct* and only this part of the MS will be described. It gives a partial copy of MS e.1.

Locke's papers and letters plus the moiety of his library (3,000 books) that was inherited by Peter King remained in the latter's family until 1942, when their last owner, the Earl of Lovelace, deposited most of the MSS and some of the books in the Bodleian Library, Oxford. In 1947 the Bodleian purchased this collection. Furthermore, a substantial part of Locke's library in the King moiety, consisting of about 660 items (including some 20 bound manuscript volumes) was rediscovered in 1951 by Peter Laslett and purchased by Paul Mellon, who presented the material to the Bodleian. The MSS were ordered, bound and shelved together with the books in a separate room named after the philosopher. MSS e.1 and c.28 form part of this collection. Sometimes page numbers and folio numbers were added by the librarian, as was the case with MS e.1 (partly) and MS c.28 (completely).[407]

In what follows I shall give a description of the manuscripts and present an overview of entries in Locke's correspondence that are related to the *Conduct*. I shall then continue with a history of the text of the *Conduct* until its posthumous publication in 1706 and discuss the relation between the *Conduct* and the *Essay*, the problem of the copy-text to be used for the present edition and the question of the order in which to present the material. Finally, I shall state the principles that underlie this edition. For the sake of easy reference, the elements of the description of the MSS, of the correspondence and of the history of the *Conduct*

407 For the history of Locke's MSS and books see Long, *A Summary Catalogue*, p. vii; id. 'The Mellon Donation', *passim*, Harrison/Laslett, pp. 54-61; and Laslett/Rogers, 'The Recovery of Locke's Library', *passim*.

will be given progressive numbers between [ ]. For the relation between the pages of MS e.1, the folios of MS c.28, the sections of the *Conduct* as given in O-1706, the relevant parts of the *Essay* and the paragraphs of the present edition, see Table 1, at the end of this chapter.

1. Description of the manuscripts

MS Locke e.1.

Pp. vi+272. Paper. Throughout the MS the main text is entered on the left-hand even-numbered pages, while the right-hand odd-numbered pages are reserved for corrections and additions.[408]

[1] *Formula*. π^4(-π1) A-N^8 *O-R*^{8}. Explanation of the formula:[409] quires A up to and including N were given their respective signatures by Locke. The first quire has no signature. Since this quire is placed before a quire that is marked 'A', it is given the Greek letter 'π'. Quires *O-R* received no signature either and are therefore given in italics. The superscripted numbers indicate the number of leaves of each quire. Quire π was originally 1 half sheet, divided with the longer side horizontal by three vertical folds in 4 equal sections, resulting in 4 leaves = 8 pages. However, the first leaf was lost (indicated by '-π1' in the formula), leaving quire π with only 3 leaves = 6 pages, pp. *i-vi* (all page numbers in MS e.1 not entered by Locke himself are presented in italics); see Figure 1.



Figure 1: quire π of MS Locke e.1

The hypothesis concerning a missing first leaf in quire π is confirmed by the fact that the present length of π is about 3/4 the length of 1 half sheet, as deduced from the size of the quarter sheets that make up the remaining quires (see [6] below); by the place of the countermark (see [8] below); and by the fact that the *present* first page of the quire gives only the last part of an index to the *Conduct* (see [3] below). The *original* first leaf probably contained the first part of this index. Quires A-N and *O-R* (together 17 quires) each consist of 1 sheet that was divided, with the longer side horizontal, in 2 equal parts by 1 vertical fold, that was then divided again, with the longer side horizontal, in 2 equal parts by 1 vertical fold

408 For a comparable way of making additions to the *Essay*, see MS Locke c.28, fols. 117-118.

409 Cf. Bowers, *Principles of Bibliographical Description*, pp. 193-254 and Greetham, *Textual Scholarship*, pp. 153-168.

and that was finally divided again, with the shorter side horizontal, in 2 equal parts by 1 vertical fold, resulting in quires with 4 quarter sheets = 8 leaves = 16 pages each, with the following page numbers: *1* 2-74 74^2 76-83 83^2 84 86-145 246 147-155 154^2-155^2 156-199 199^2 200-203 205-208 *209* 210-239 *240* 241-252 153^2 254 *255* 256-261 *262-270* [=272 pp.]; number of p. 2 only partially legible; Locke miswrote 75 as 74, 84 as 83, 85 as 84, 146 as 246, 200 as 199, 201-204 as 200-203 and 253 as 153; page numbers corrected by Locke (wrong ⇒ right): 73^2 ⇒ 74; 81^2-82 ⇒ 82-83; 204 ⇒ 205; 213 ⇒ 214; 127^2-128^2 ⇒ 228-229; 130^2-137^2 ⇒ 230-237; 152^2 ⇒ 252; 154^2 ⇒ 254; 156^2-157^2 ⇒ 256-257. The Bodleian librarian added some missing page numbers in the MS: *i, iii, v, 263, 265, 267* and *269*. He also corrected most misnumberings left uncorrected by Locke himself: 74^2 ⇒ 75; 83^2 ⇒ 84; 84 ⇒ 85; 154-155 ⇒ 154^a-155^a; 154^2-155^2 ⇒ 154^b-155^b; 199^2 ⇒ 200; 200-203 ⇒ 201-204. However, in the present edition all reference to MS e.1 is by means of Locke's own page numbers (including miswritten page numbers) or by italicized page numbers used for pages that Locke did not number himself. Reference is made to corrected page numbers when the correction was made by Locke himself, but no reference is made to the corrected page numbers as given by the Bodleian librarian.

[2] *Quires*. Quire π has no signature; quires A-M have their signature at the top of the first and last page; quire N has 'N' at the top of the first page but not on the last page; quires *O-R* have no signature at all. On the first page of quire A and the last page of quires B-M, the signature is preceded by 'Understanding'. In most cases 'Understanding' and the subsequent signature were entered together and before Locke had started entering the text itself. An exception to this rule can be found on the last page of quire A, p. 16, where 'Understanding' is entered at a distance from 'A', after the page had already been filled with text.[410] The number of the first page of each quire is: π *i*; A *1*; B 17; C 33; D 49; E 65; F 81; G 97; H 113; I 129; K 145; L 159; M 175; N 191; *O* 207; *P* 223; *Q* 239; *R 255*.

[3] *Contents*. Page *i*, from top to foot: the last part of an index to the *Conduct* (the first part of this index was probably on a previous page that has been lost, see [1], but p. *i* must already have been the first page of what is now called 'MS e.1' about as long as p. 270 has been its last page, since both pages are discoloured in a similar degree); instructions by Locke: 'Mem: That these following discourses are to be writ out under their several heads into distinct Chapters, and then to be numberd and ranged according to their natural order', followed by the stamp of the Bodleian

410 For a similar use of the word 'Understanding' for a quire that contains additions to the *Essay*, see MS Locke c.28, fols. 115-116.

Library; and finally 'MS Locke e.1' in the hand of the Bodleian librarian. Page iv: the Ciceronian motto: 'Quid tam temerarium tamque indignum sapientis gravitate atque constantiâ, quam aut falsum sentire, aut quod non satis explorate perceptum sit et cognitum sine ullâ dubitatione defendere? Cic: de Nat: deorum l. 1' (see ill. 1). Page *1*: a list of some subjects (most of them deleted) that Locke was to address in the *Conduct* and some loose remarks, anticipating the text of the *Conduct* (see again ill. 1). In addition, pages *1*-31 contain substantial parts of *Essay*, IV.xix 'Of Enthusiasm' (deleted), this chapter was included in the Fourth Edition (and also in the Fifth Edition and subsequent editions) of the *Essay*. Pages 6-10 contain an addition to *Essay*, IV.iii 'Of the Extant of Humane Knowledge', section 6 (deleted), also included in the Fourth Edition. Pages 30-31: a list of scriptural passages. Pages 32-56: a piece on 'Association' (deleted); pp. 32-52 were included in the Fourth Edition of the *Essay*, II.xxxiii 'Of the Association of *Ideas*' (up to '… that follow', §18, p. 401, line 9 in Nidditch's edition), while the text on pp. 52-56 reappears later, as part of the *Conduct*, on pp. 210-216 in the same MS (however, this later version is probably not copied directly from the first version; see [9] below). Pages 56-62: a passage on 'Reasoning' (belonging to the *Conduct* and continued on pp. 248-261 of the same MS). On p. 62 starts 'B: IV C: XX Of the Conduct of the understanding' (see ill. 2). The rest of the MS, up to and including p. 261, is covered by the text of the *Conduct*, with the exception of p. 182, which gives an addition to *Essay*, IV.xii.3 and p. 184, which has an addition to *Essay*, III.vi.26 (both passages deleted); both passages were included in the Fourth Edition of the *Essay*. Page 81 contains a short list (deleted), similar to the one on p.1, of subjects that Locke was to address in the *Conduct*; and p. 270 ends with an entry in the Bodleian librarian's hand: 'vi+270 pages really 272 for 154, 155 are double' and with again the stamp of the Bodleian Library. Deletion of the *Essay* passages does not imply their rejection but their transcription elsewhere.

[4] *Marginal entries*. All marginal entries in MS e.1 are in the left margin of the text. These entries fall into 5 categories. (1) General headers placed at the top of the margin. The pages containing the text of the *Conduct*, i.e. pp. 52-182/184-261 have the following general headers: 'Association' (pp. 32-56); ('Reasoning' (p. 58); 'Conduct' (pp. 64-106, 110-182); 'Fallacies' (pp. 218-222); 'Fundamental verities' (pp. 226-228); 'Bottoming' (p. 230); 'Transfering' (p. 232). (2) Entries stating the content of one or more paragraphs (headwords), placed at the start of a new paragraph. From p. 208 onwards, headwords started in the margin are continued into the space reserved for the main text, while no more keywords are given. (3) Entries high-lighting a specific topic within a paragraph (keywords)

and whose place can be anywhere in the margin alongside the text. It is not always possible to distinguish with certainty between headwords and keywords (headwords/keywords of the *Conduct* as given in MS e.1 are listed in Table 2, at the end of this chapter). (4) Entries consisting of numbers that appear after some headwords/keywords: p. 56: Reasoning 1; p. 60: partial views 3; p. 62: Introduction 4 ('4' superimposed on '61'); p. 62: Parts 6; p. 64: Practise 9; p.68: Habits 11; p. 78: Suffisance 19. (5) Entries consisting of a vertical line in the margin: pp. 56-64, 114-116 and 248-260; the line signals the transcription of the text from these pages to another document (see below [46]).

[5] *Catchwords*. Most pages ending with text that is continued on the next page have a catchword. In the few cases where they do not, there is no evidence of discontinuity in the text.

[6] *Size*. The 4 quarter sheets of each quire have the same size, but there is variation between the different quires themselves. The sizes that follow are in mm and not of the leaves but of the complete quarter sheets of the quires (the size given for π is of what has remained from what was probably one half sheet, see [1]): π 230×194; A 199×159; B 196×156; C 195×155; D 205×157; E 206×156; F 205×156; G 206×152; H 206×155; I 206×156; K 206×155; L 205×155; M 205×155; N 195×154; *O* 190×153; *P* 191×153; *Q* 199×154; *R* 201×154.

[7] *Stitchings and pins*. The MS was bound after transference to the Bodleian Library. However, traces of earlier stitching, in the form of small holes on the folds, have remained in the quires. The distance between these holes is roughly equal for all the quires, suggesting that they were all tied together. Quire π is again a special case. It has traces of previous stitching on one of its outer edges, viz. the right edge of p. *iv* = the left edge of p. *v*. The Bodleian librarian stitched it with the other quires with 1 of its 2 folds, viz. the fold separating pp. *ii-iii* on the inside and *vi-i* on the outside (see above, Figure 1). Finally, the leaves within each of the quires A-N show signs of being held together by a pin.[411]

[8] *Watermarks*. The half sheet of quire π has no watermark, the countermark gives the initials 'CS'. The watermark of the paper of quire A consists of a large medallion with the Seven Provinces' lion, the countermark gives a combination of the letters 'P' and 'L':[412]

411 For a similar use of pins by Locke, see his Journal for 1690, MS Locke f.10, pp. 24-25.
412 Cf. Heawood, *Watermarks*, Nr. 3138.

The watermark in quires B-C shows the London coat-of-arms (a shield in four quarters with a sword in the first quarter), the countermark gives the initials 'EB'. The watermark in quires D-M shows a horn and baldric and the countermark gives again the combination of the letters 'P' and 'L' (somewhat smaller than the similar countermark on quire A). The watermark in quires N-*O* shows again a London coat-of-arms and the countermark gives the initials 'CS' (as quire π). The watermark in quires *P-R* shows a small sword and the countermark is an 'A'.

[9] *Scribes*. MS e.1 is for the most part written in Locke's hand. His handwriting shows what may be signs of diminishing vigour towards the end of MS e.1; this seems to be the case at least for the last unfinished paragraph on 'Custome', p. 260. The text of the *Conduct* was not entered entirely by Locke alone. MS e.1 has some added and corrected page numbers and some other additions in the hand of the Bodleian librarian (see [1] and [3]). Moreover, there is the text on pp. 210-216, which largely repeats pp. 52-56, i.e. the part of Locke's remarks on 'Association' that he had previously chosen not to include in the Fourth Edition of the *Essay* and that would be included in the *Conduct*. The text on pp. 210-216 is in the hand of Locke's amanuensis William Shaw (see ill. 3; more on Shaw below, [39]). At least part of the text on pp. 210-216 must have been copied by Shaw from another source then pp. 52-56; the text on pp. 210-216 contains a full sentence that is absent from the text on pp. 52-56 (in the present edition this is the last sentence of paragraph 77).

[10] *Corrections and additions*. Larger additions are mostly entered either on the empty odd-numbered right-hand pages facing the even-numbered left-hand pages on which the 'first version' text had been entered, or on new even-numbered pages with a higher page-number. In the latter case Locke generally takes care to give clear internal references to page numbers, allowing us to follow the various jumps from one page to another. For example: the end of the paragraph on p. 145 of MS e.1 (par. 50 of the present edition) is followed by: 'vid 2 p. 192' (with '2' written inside a square); the subsequent paragraph, on p. 192 (par. 51) is then preceded by: 'v 2 p. 145' (with '2' again written inside a square). Most of the text in MS e.1 is entered in black ink. However, the occasional use of ink that now looks brown

(possibly caused by a chemical reaction in the paper) sets apart at least one layer of corrections and additions.[413]

[11] *Printed notices*. Long, *A Summary Catalogue*, pp. 30-31; and Schankula, *A Summary Catalogue*, pp. 33-34.

MS Locke c.28, fols. 121-138.

Fols. 18. Paper.

[12] *Formula*. π^2 $2\pi^2$ A^2 B^2 C^2 D^2 E^2 F^2 G^2; 18 leaves, fols. 121-138 (all folio numbers were added by the Bodleian librarian). Each quire consists of 1 half sheet divided, with the longer side horizontal, by 1 vertical fold in 2 equal leaves.

[13] *Quires*. Quires A-C have their signature at the foot, left side, of the first page of each quire. Quires π-2π and *D-G* have no signature. The folio number of the first leaf of each quire is: π 121; 2π 123; A 125; B 127; C 129; *D* 131; *E* 133; *F* 135; *G* 137.

[14] *Contents and headings*. Fol. 121r, the first page of the first quire (quire π), starts with 'Of the conduct of / the understanding / Ch: I / Introduction' (see ill. 4); this chapter covers fols. 121r-123r and corresponds with MS e.1, pp. 62, 114-116, 62-64. Fol. 125r, the first page of quire A, is headed 'Ch: / Of Reasoning'. This entry is repeated in the headers of fols. 125v-129v (both recto and verso). The impression is, at least on fols. 126r-129v, that 'Of Reasoning' is inserted later between 'Ch:' and the main text. This chapter covers fols. 125r-130r and corresponds with MS e.1, pp. 56-62, 248-261. After a gap, consisting of several leaves that are now lost, the text then resumes mid-sentence on the first page of quire *D* with the latter part of what in the present edition is par. 17 plus pars. 18-20. This part is covered by fols. 131r-132v and corresponds with MS e.1, pp. 82-88. The next chapter is headed 'Ch. / Of Mathematicks', covers fols. 132v-135v and corresponds with MS e.1, pp. 88-95. The last chapter is headed 'Ch. / of Religion', covers fols. 135v-137r and corresponds with MS e.1, pp. 92-96.

[15] *Marginal entries*. Fols. 121-132 have an inner margin but no outer margin. Fols. 133-138 have margins on both sides of the page. There are 4 kinds of marginal entries, all appearing in fols. 121-132 and none in fols. 133-138: (1) the number '1' at the top of the margin of fol. 121r, the first page of quire π; (2) the word 'Conduct' at the top of the margin of fol. 125r, the first page of quire A; (3) numbers in the

413 The main instances of use of this different ink are listed in the annotation to the text.

margin of fols. 121r-132v: fol. 121r has 62; fol. 121v 114; fol. 122v 62; fol. 125r 56 and 58; fol. 126r 60; fol. 126v 62 and 248; fol. 127r 250; fol. 127v 252; fol. 128r 254; fol. 128v 256; fol. 129r 258; fol. 129v 260; fol. 131r 84; fol. 132r 86; and fol. 132v has 88 at the end of the incomplete chapter on fols. 131r-132v and again 88 at the start of 'Of Mathematics'; (4) other entries, such as an occasional expansion of an abbreviation (fol. 122v) and an addition (fol. 125r). The headwords and keywords in the margins of MS e.1 were not copied into MS c.28, unless they were used in the latter MS as the title of a chapter.

[16] *Catchwords*. All pages ending with text that is continued on the next page have catchwords.

[17] *Size*. Sizes given are in mm and not of the leaves but of the complete half sheets of which each quire is made up: π 309×198; 2π 311×197; A 311×199; B 310×197; C 309×197; *D* 320×205; *E* 320×207; *F* 311×192; *G* 314×189.

[18] *Stitching*. Quires π-2π and A-C have holes that suggest earlier stitching. These holes are not on the fold but 5-10 mm away from it, each hole perforating both leaves of the quire. The distance between the holes in these quires suggests that π-2π have been stitched together and that A-C have been stitched together, but that π-2π and A-C remained separate from each other. Quires π-2π and A-C may have been parts of separate notebooks. Quires *D-F* show no traces of earlier binding.

[19] *Watermarks*. The watermark of the paper of quires 2π and B shows a small sword and the countermark of quires π, A and C gives an 'A'. It is likely that quires π-C all consist of the same paper. (The combination of a small sword as watermark and an 'A' as countermark was already noted in the last quires, *P-R*, of MS Locke e.1.) The countermark in quire *D* is a crown. The watermark in quire *E* gives an elaborate horn and baldric. Quire *F* has neither watermark nor countermark. The countermark in quire *G* gives the initials 'IASH'. This means that quires *D-G* consist of at least two different sorts of paper.

[20] *Scribes*. Fols. 121-130, i.e. the chapters 'Introduction' and 'Of Reasoning', are largely in the hand of Locke's amanuensis William Shaw (see [39] below). However, there are some exceptions. (1) The hand of Locke himself appears briefly on fol. 121r to set up the text of the *Conduct* for his scribe; 'Of the conduct of / the understanding / Ch: I / Introduction / The last resort …' is in Locke's hand (see ill. 4). In the same way he had set up a new paragraph for Shaw on p. 210

in MS e.1 (see ill. 3). (2) On fol. 121v the following sentence appears immediately after the first introductory paragraph:

> There is, tis visible, great variety in mens understandings: And their natural constitutions put soe wide a difference between some men in this respect, that art and industry would never be able to master and their very natures seem to want a foundation to raise on it that which other men easily attain unto.

This sentence had also appeared after the first introductory paragraph of the *Conduct* in the version of MS e.1, p. 62. However, on fol. 121v of MS c.28 a foreign hand breaks in that deletes this sentence and then adds:

> this is repeated again two leaves farther, where I think is its proper place. and it ought to be omitted here.[414]

This hand is neither Locke's nor Shaw's, rather, it belongs to Peter King (see [48] below). (3) Next, Locke made an addition on fol. 123r, at the end of chapter 1. After Shaw had copied the last sentence:

> And it is easy to perceive that men are guilty of a great many faults in the exercise and improvement of this facultie of the minde which hinders them in their progresse and keeps them in ignorance and error all their lives

Locke added the following sentence that is absent from MS e.1:

> Some of them I shall take notice of, and endeavour to point out proper remedies for in the following Chapters.[415]

(4) The title of the next chapter, on fol. 125r, 'Of Reasoning', is also in Locke's hand. (5) In addition, Shaw's transcription of the chapters 'Introduction' and 'Of Reasoning' has several minor additions and corrections by Locke and by King. For instance, Locke made some additions on fols. 125r, 125v and 126v, while King's corrections can be found on fols. 125v, 126r and 126v. After fols. 121-130 follow fols. 131-138, which are in the hand of yet one other scribe, probably a scribe employed by King (see [48] below). However, a foreign hand breaks in shortly on fol. 132v to write the head of the chapter 'Of Mathematicks' and its first four lines (see ill. 5). The writer of these lines is again King. Folios 131-138 no longer show any trace of Locke's hand. The scribe employed by King left open a space on fol. 131r, so that a word he could not decipher could be entered later, but this

414 The place that Locke prescribes here is indeed the place that it has been given both in C-1706 and in the present edition; this place results once his instructions in MS e.1 pp. 113-114 concerning the introductory paragraphs on pp. 114-116 of the same MS are carried out (see below, §6).

415 In the present edition, this sentence is given in the collation of MS e.1 with MS c.28.

completion was never made. (6) Finally, all folio numbers in MS c.28 fols. 121-138 were added by the Bodleian librarian.

[21] Printed notices. Long, *A Summary Catalogue*, p. 29; and Schankula, *A Summary Catalogue*, p. 34.

2. *The Conduct in Locke's correspondence*

The following passages constitute the main references to the *Conduct* in Locke's correspondence, either by himself or by his correspondents. Some allusions are clear, others are more ambiguous. Some fragments were already presented above, but are given here again for the sake of completeness.

[22] Letter from Locke to William Molyneux, 10 April 1697, where he announces the start of work on the *Conduct*.

> I have lately got a little leisure to think of some additions to my book, against the next edition, and within a few days have fallen upon a subject that I know not how far it will lead me. I have written several pages on it, but the matter, the farther I go, opens the more upon me, and I cannot yet get sight of any end of it. The title of the chapter will be Of the Conduct of the Understanding, which, if I shall pursue, as far as I imagine it will reach, and as it deserves, will, I conclude, make the largest chapter of my Essay.[416]

[23] Molyneux's encouraging answer to this letter, 15 May 1697.

> You never write to me, that you do not raise new expectations in my longing Mind of partaking your Thoughts on those Noble Subjects you are upon. Your Chapter concerning the *Conduct of the Understanding* must needs be very Sublime and Spacious.[417]

[24] Letter from Locke to William Molyneux, 11 September 1697, in which he complains that his polemic with Bishop Edward Stillingfleet distracts him from working on additions to *Education* and to the *Essay*.

> Pray give my humble service to your brother, and let me know whether he hath any children, for then I shall think my self obliged to send him one of the next edition of my book of Education, which, my bookseller tells me, is out of print; and I had much rather be at leisure to make some additions to that, and my Essay of Humane Understanding, than be employed to defend my self against the groundless, and, as others think, trifling quarrel of the Bishop.[418]

[25] Letter from Locke to Philippus van Limborch, 29 October 1697, where the author states that he has written some additions for the Fourth Edition of the *Essay* 'that are rather substantial'.

416 *Corr.* 2243, VI, p. 87.
417 *Corr.* 2262, VI, p. 123.
418 *Corr.* 2310, VI, p. 190.

> I had decided to make some additions and have already composed some that are rather substantial and that might have appeared in their proper place in the Fourth Edition that the publisher is preparing and I would readily have complied with your desire or that of any of your friends by inserting the proofs of God's unity that present themselves to my mind. For I am inclined to believe that God's unity can be demonstrated as evidently as his existence and that this can be based on proofs that will not leave any room for doubt. However, I like peace and there are people that are so much given to bickering and vain quarrels that I doubt whether I should provide them with new subjects for argument.[419]

[26] Letter from Jean le Clerc to Locke, 11/21 October 1699, probably referring to the *Conduct*.

> I have been told that you have produced another philosophical work, on the Conduct of the Understanding in the Search of Truth. If this is indeed the case you risk being somewhat importuned to publish it and finding me amongst those who will trouble you, for there is no book that the public is more in need of.[420]

[27] Letter from Locke to Peter King, 11 December 1699, possibly making an allusion to the *Conduct* (the letter from King to which this is a reply is not in the *Correspondence*).

> I received yours of the 6th and return you my thanks for it. I am sorry that Ideas are such perverse things and soe troublesome to conducters. (…) Pray come as soon as you can, that we may have time to consider this greivance of Conducters or some thing else.[421]

419 *Corr*. 2340, VI, pp. 243-244: 'J'avois resolu de faire quelques additions, dont j'ai déja composé quelques unes qui sont assez amples, et qui auroint pû ⟨paroitre⟩ en leur place dans la quatriéme Edition que le Libraire se dispose à faire, Et j'aurois voluntiers satisfait a votre desir ou au desir d'aucun de vos amys en y ⟨inserant⟩ les preuves de l'unité de Dieu qui se presentent à mon Esprit. Car je suis enclin à croire que l'Unité de Dieu peut etre aussi evidemment demonstre que son existance; et qu'elle peut etre établie sur de preuves qui ne laisseront aucun suject d'en douter. Mais j'aime la Paix, et il y a des gens dans le monde qui aiment si fort les criailleries et les vaines contestations, que je doute, si je dois leur fournir de nouveaux sujets de dispute.'

420 *Corr*. 2624, VI, p. 704: 'On m'a dit que vous aviez encore composé un autre Ouvrage de Philosophie de la maniere de conduire son esprit dans la Recherche de la Verité. Si cela est, vous courez risque de'être un peu importuné de le publier, et de me voir dans le nombre de ces importuns. Il n'y a point de livres, dont le Public ait tant besoin que de ceux-là.'

421 *Corr*. 2649, VI, pp. 758-759.

[28] Letter from Pierre Guenellon (1650-1722)[422] to Locke, 9/20 July 1700, probably referring to the *Conduct*. The letter was forwarded by Le Clerc on 1/12 October 1700.[423]

> Mr. Le Clerc has told me that you are working on a new tract, the goal of which is the discovery of the diseases of the mind. In that case the public will have a new obligation towards you. How good it would be if you could cure men of their wrong ideas and by the use of method put them on the course of truth.[424]

[29] Again a letter from Guenellon to Locke, 31 December 1700/11 January 1701, addressing the same subject. No reaction by Locke has survived.

> My friends who have read your Essay concerning Understanding often ask me, on what they have been made to hope for, if your reflections on the errors of the understanding will see light soon. The excellence of what you have published makes them expect that the public will be much obliged to you.[425]

[30] Letter from Peter King to Locke, 21 January 1704, in which he informs Locke about the latter's apparent request concerning the transfer of some of his MSS from London to, probably, Oates. (King announces that this material will be taken along by Sir Francis Masham.)

> I have opened your Standish, and found therein only One Key, which was the Key of your square deal box, in which I found the thick quarto of Pamphlets bound together in Parchment, Indors'd on the back, Unitarians, and also a manuscript concerning the Conduct of the Understanding — In the deal box there was a bag, wherein are several Keys, but there is not amongst them the Key of the large trunk, that stands in your chamber, so That I could not open that — Sir Francis [Masham] will be so kind to deliver you the above quarto and manuscript with the Observators you want …[426]

422 Guenellon, born in France, was one of the principal doctors of the St. Pieters Gasthuis in Amsterdam from 1684 to 1720. He and Locke had become acquainted in Paris around 1678 and met regularly again during the latter's exile in the Dutch Republic. Cf. *Corr*. 831, II, p. 738, n. 2.

423 *Corr*. 2785, VII, p. 156, n. 1.

424 *Corr*. 2743, VII, p. 105: 'Monsieur le Clerc m'a dit que vous travaillez a un nouvel ouvrage, pour decouvrir les maladies de l'esprit, c'est une nouvelle obligation que le public vous aura, quel bien ne sera ce pas, si vous pouvez guerir les hommes de leur fausses idees, et les mettre par methode dans le chemin de la verité!'

425 *Corr*. 2835, VII, pp. 212-213: 'mes amis qui ont lu vótre traitté de l'entendement me demandent souvent, sur ce qu'on leur a fait esperer, si vos reflexions sur les erreurs de lentendement verront bien tost le jour. il jugent par l'excellence de ce que vous avez publiez, que le public vous en sera fort obligé.'

426 *Corr*. 3429, VIII, pp. 171-172. De Beer assumes that the MS is MS Locke e.1. *The Observator* was a newspaper.

[31] Letter from Locke, dated 4 and 25 October 1704, written shortly before his death on 28 October in the same year, with final instructions concerning his MSS to Peter King.

> You will find amongst my papers several subjects proposed to my thoughts, which are very little more than extemporary views, layd down in suddain and imperfect draughts, which though intended to be revised and farther looked into afterwards, yet by the intervention of business, or preferable enquiries happend to be thrust aside and so lay neglected and sometimes quite forgotten. Some of them indeed light upon me at such a time of leisure and in such a temper of mind that I laid them not wholy by upon the first interruption, but took them in hand again as occasion served, and went on in pursuance of my first designe till I had satisfied my self in the enquiry I at first proposed. of this kind is
> (…)
> 3° *The Conduct of the understanding* I have allways thought ever since it first came into my mind to be a subject very well worth consideration, though I know not how, it seems to me for any thing that I have met with to have been almost wholy neglected: what I have done in it is very far from a just treatise. All that I have done has been, as any miscarriage in that point has accidentaly come into my minde, to set it downe, with those remedies for it that I could think of. This method though it makes not that hast to the end which one could wish, is yet perhaps the onely one can be followed in the case, it being here as in physick impossible for a physitian to describe a disease or seek remedies for it till he comes to meet with it. But those particulars that have occurd to me and I have set down being as I guess sufficient to make men see some faults in the conduct of their understandings, and suspect there may be others you may also doe with as you think fit. For they may perhaps serve to excite others to enquire farther into it, and treat of it more fully than I have done. But the heads and chapters must be reduced into order.[427]

3. A short history of the Conduct, 1697-1706

[32] Locke's letter to Molyneux from 10 April 1697 (see above, [22]), suggests this date minus 'a few days' as the start of work on the *Conduct*.

[33] Locke's work on the *Conduct* was resumed on several occasions in the years from 1697 until his death in 1704. MS e.1 shows signs of different layers of corrections and additions (see [10]). In his final letter to King (see [31]) Locke ranged the *Conduct* amongst those projects that he had not laid 'wholy by upon the first interruption' but taken 'in hand again as occasion served'. King's letter to Locke of 21 January 1704 (see [30]), where the former announces the transfer by Francis Masham of 'a manuscript concerning the Conduct of the Understanding' from London to, presumably, Oates, may mark one such an occasion.

427 *Corr.* 3647, VIII, pp. 412-414.

[34] The earliest major interruption of work on the *Conduct* was probably caused by Locke's controversy with Stillingfleet (see above, Context, §1). *Mr. Locke's Reply to the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Worcester's Answer to his Letter* was finished 29 June 1697.[428] On 11 September in the same year Locke complained to Molyneux that the 'triffling quarrel of the Bishop' kept him from work on additions to *Education* and the *Essay* (see [24]). This is not necessarily a reference to the *Conduct*. Other projected additions to the Fourth Edition of the *Essay*, apart from a chapter on the 'Conduct', were the chapters on 'Association' and on 'Enthusiasm' (MS e.1 contains substantial parts of these additions, see [3]). However, work on these subjects had probably started already at about April 1695 (see 'Context', first paragraph).

[35] The *Conduct* was not started in MS e.1. At least part of MS e.1 is a copy from another MS. The progressive series of numbers in the margin of pp. 56-78 of MS e.1 (see [4] (4)) probably refer to the page numbers of an earlier MS that is now lost. The progression of the marginal numbers matches the progression in page numbers 56-78.

[36] MS e.1 was not originally one single note book. It consists of a collection of quires of unequal size (see [6]). These quires had been tied together already at some time before they were transferred to the Bodleian Library (see [7]). However, this was not yet the case when Locke started writing. If it had been, he would have had no reason to mark the first and the last page of most quires with their relevant signature. So, there is good reason to assume that at least not all the quires of MS e.1 were tied together when Locke started entering text on their pages. The leaves of each of the quires A-N were kept together by the provisional device of a pin (see [7]).

[37] Since MS e.1 was originally not a note book but a series of unbound quires, we should at least consider the possibility of Locke discussing different subjects of the *Conduct* on different quires at the same time, resulting in a non-chronological order of the text after the pages of MS e.1 had been bound together. However, this is not a likely possibility. Had this been the case, then:

1. It might be possible to find in the MS some additions appearing on pages with a lower number than that of the page to which they were added.
2. One would expect to see the start of new subjects on the first even-numbered page of some quires and a gap between such a new entry and the end of the text on the previous quire.

428 Yolton, *John Locke a Descriptive Bibliography*, nr. 249, p. 299.

Yet:

1. All additions as listed in Table 1 appear on pages with a higher number than that of the page to which they were added; most page numbers are in Locke's own hand (see [1]), and he took care to clearly mark the connection between original entries and later additions (see [10]).
2. The first even-numbered pages of all quires from B onwards simply continue the text of the last even-numbered page of the previous quire. No quire marks any break in the running sequence of the text. (An exception is quire H; its first even-numbered page, p. 114, starts with two introductory paragraphs to the *Conduct*, pars. 2 and 3 of the present edition. This entry ends on p. 116, leaving a blank space, after which the text of the next paragraph, par. 43, starts on p. 118. These introductory paragraphs stand isolated from what comes before and after. However, the text of the last even-numbered page of the previous quire G is continued — not on the first *even*-numbered page of quire H, but on the first *odd*-numbered page of quire H.)

To summarize: the impression is that Locke entered his text *as if* the quires of MS e.1 already formed a note-book, i.e. that he started writing on the first page of the first quire and ended on the last (written) page of the last quire, even although the final pattern was complicated by numerous corrections and additions.

[38] MS e.1 gives the text of the *Conduct* on pp. 52-261. However, there is one interruption: on p. 182 Locke enters a short addition to *Essay* IV.xii.3 and on p. 184 an addition to III.vi.26 (see [3]), after which he proceeds again with the *Conduct*. He gives page numbers and line numbers of the Third Edition to stipulate the intended place of these additions within the existing text of the *Essay*, and this is indeed exactly where they appear in print in the Fourth Edition.[429] So, they were produced at the latest shortly before this edition went to the press, which according to Nidditch was in late June or July 1699.[430] Assuming that Locke had already produced the text of the *Conduct* on pp. 52-182 by the time he had reached pp. 182-184 to produce these two small fragments (see [37]), it follows that the part of the *Conduct* comprised by pp. 52-182 of MS e.1 (127 odd-numbered pages out of a total of 206) must have been on paper by June/July 1699 at the latest.

[39] For a further attempt at dating MS e.1 we first need to substantiate the proposed identification of William Shaw as the scribe who copied the *Conduct*-part on 'Association' to pp. 210-216 of MS e.1 (see [9]). I already mentioned Shaw

429 Cf. *Essay*, notes on p. 640 and p. 454 respectively.
430 Nidditch, 'Introduction' to *Essay*, p. xxix.

also as the scribe who copied paragraphs of the *Conduct* from MS e.1 to fols. 121-130 of MS c.28 (see [20]). Although the handwritings on MS e.1 pp. 210-216 and on MS c.28 fols. 121-130 at first sight seem to differ from each other (compare ills. 3 and 4), there a good reasons for attributing both to Shaw. The solution starts with MS Locke f.34, which is a small account book that contains a series of entries in which Locke's servants entered payments on behalf of their master. The first entries are by Sylvester Brownover. The entries from 6 July 1701 (fol. 69v) up to and including 9 August 1704 (fol. 87r) are first headed by 'J:Locke', but from 7 April 1703 onwards by 'Wm Shaw'. The entries from fol. 69v onwards show a clear resemblance with the handwriting of the scribe who filled pp. 210-216 of MS e.1 (compare ill. 6 with ill. 3).[431] Now, it can be proved that the entries on fol. 69v-70r and onwards in MS f.34 are by Shaw. Consider the entries on fol. 70r:

MR J: Locke C[r]

1701	Jul.	7	By a Guinea lent me	1	1	6
		8	By M. : lent me	0	1	0
		9	By ditto	0	0	2
	Sep[r]	30	By money paid me	0	18	11½

The money that Locke lent to Shaw was not only noted down by Shaw, but also by Locke himself. MSS Locke c.1-2 consist of two ledgers, containing Locke's accounts, 1671-1704. These accounts were ordered per person. MS c.1 contains the accounts for the period 1671-1702. Consider the following fragment from the entries booked under the name of William Shaw, p. 342 (see ill. 8):

William Shaw D[r]

1701	July	7	5	To Cash lent him	361	1	2	6
	Sept	30	21	To ditto	9		18	11½

So, an entry of the money received by Shaw from the creditor Locke is mirrored by an entry of the money given by Locke to the debtor Shaw (the sums of £ 1-1-6 and £ 0-1-0 that Shaw had entered separately were taken together by Locke and entered as £ 1-2-6). So much on the resemblances between the handwriting of the scribe in MS e.1 pp. 52-56 and in MS f.34 fols. 69v-70r, and on the attribution of this hand to Shaw. The handwriting in the subsequent pages of MS f.34 starts to change; it closely resembles the hand that filled MS c.28 fols. 121-130 (compare ill. 7 with ill. 4). The corresponding entries in Locke's ledger confirm that these later entries in MS f.34 are still by Shaw. In addition, we have

431 The first entry on fol. 69v and the entries on fol. 70r are in the hand of Locke, who can be seen here initiating his new servant in the art of book-keeping.

a copy of a letter from Locke to Dr. Daniel Whitby, 17 September 1702,[432] that resembles the handwriting in MS c.28 fols. 121-130 and that according to De Beer was by William Shaw (compare ill. 9 with ill. 4). To conclude: although the handwritings in MS e.1 pp. 210-216 and in MS c.28 fols. 121-130 differ from each other, they can both be safely attributed to William Shaw.[433] In the early modern period it was not at all unusual for one scribe to use different scripts at different occasions.[434] Shaw seems to use an 'every-day' script in MS e.1 pp. 210-216 and a neat English copperplate script in MS c.28 fols. 121-130. As a scribe Shaw is a very likely candidate. It is known that at the end of his life Locke intended to make use of his services in transcribing (part of) his *Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul* even although the man must have been rather lazy.[435] Yet Locke was to keep this servant until his death. In his last will (11 April 1704) he bequeathed to Shaw 'five pounds and all my wearing apparell if he shall be in my service at the time of my death'[436] and the latter duly signed for having received both the money and the clothes on 1 November 1704.[437]

[40] If William Shaw was the scribe of MS e.1 pp. 210-216, than the moment that this man went into Locke's service can be used for further dating of MS e.1. De Beer states that Shaw succeeded James Dorrington as Locke's servant in the Summer of 1701.[438] Indeed, the first entry in Shaw's hand in MS f.34, the account book mentioned above (see [39]), is dated 6 July 1701 and the first entry in Locke's Journal relating to Shaw can be found on 7 July 1701: 'Lent Will £ 1-2-6'[439] (see [39] for this transaction in Locke's ledger). Also, the last mention

432 MS Locke c.24, fol. 285r, *Corr*. 3188, VII, pp. 676-677.

433 The identification of Shaw as the scribe of MS c.28 fols. 121-130 is mine; however, credit for the identification of Shaw as the scribe of MS e.1 pp. 210-216 as well, and the subsequent use of Locke's ledgers to test (and confirm) both hypotheses goes to Prof. M. A. Stewart. In addition, Prof. C. Dekker was so kind as to submit both hypotheses to careful paleographical scrutiny; he could confirm that both hands belong to the same person.

434 Cf. Greetham, *Textual Scholarship*, p. 172 and pp. 211-213.

435 Cf. Locke's farewell letter to P. King, 4 and 25 October 1704, *Corr*. 3647, VIII, p. 416: 'If my Paraphrase and notes on the Ephesians are not wholy transcribed before I dye (as I fear they will not. For however earnestly I have pressed it again and again I have not been able to prevaile with *Will* to dispatch the two first Chapters in three months) you must get it to be transcribed out of my filed papers after I am dead, that so it may be in a condition to be in a condition to be printed. *Will* after all I think be the fitest to transcribe them because he can read my hand and knows my way of writeing with the use of the references.'

436 *Corr*. (no number) VIII, p. 424.

437 MS Locke c.35, fol. 6v.

438 *Corr*. 3647, VIII, p. 417, n. 1.

439 MS f.10, p. 495.

made of Dorrington is 20 June 1701 in Locke's ledger[440] and 21 June of the same year in Locke's Journal: 'paid James Dorington £ 5-10-6½'.[441]

[41] Assuming again a chronological order within MS e.1 (see [37]), and further assuming that Shaw wrote MS e.1 pp. 210-216 (see [39]) and that this man went into Locke's service in June/July 1701 (see [40]), it follows that the last part of MS e.1, starting with the paragraphs copied by Shaw on p. 210, was not written earlier than June/July 1701.

[42] If pp. 52-184 of MS e.1 were written June/July 1699 at the latest (see [38]) and pp. 210-261 in June/July 1701 at the earliest (see [41]), then there is a period of at least two years in which Locke did not write more than pp. 184-210. (He had been very busy as Commissioner for Trade; he handed over this function in May 1700, thus freeing time to spend his waning energies again more fully on scholarly pursuits.) The existence of a period of at least two years with hardly any work done on the *Conduct*, covered by pp. 184-210, is confirmed by four characteristics of MS e.1 that all either start or end in pp. 184-210. Firstly, quire M (pp. 175-190) is the last quire that has a signature on both its first and its last page, quire N (pp. 191-206) has only a signature on its first page and the remaining quires *O-R* have no signature at all (see [2]). Secondly, quire N is the last quire to show traces of having had a pen trough its leaves (see [7]). Thirdly, although the quires all vary in size, the length of the quarter sheets of quires N-*R* is considerably shorter than that of the previous quires (see [6]). Fourthly, from p. 208 onwards, headwords started in the margin are continued into the space reserved for the main text, while no more keywords are given (see [4] (2)).

[43] So far, the genesis of the text of the *Conduct* as contained by MS e.1 has been divided into three major periods: the text up to and including p. 184 was written in June/July 1699 at the latest; pp. 184-210 were written between June/July 1699 or later and June/July 1701 or later; and the last part, pp. 210-261, was written between June/July 1701 or later and Locke's death in October 1704. This rough chronology is largely confirmed and further refined by the story that is told by the watermarks in the paper of the quires of MS e.1 (see [8]). The quires fall into 5 categories (assuming that quires π and N-*O* belong in the same category), each with a specific combination of one watermark and one countermark. Each of these 5 combinations has been traced back in letters and other dated MS material of Locke, thus enabling a tentative dating of the corresponding quires (results

440 MS c.1, p. 342.
441 MS f.10, p. 492.

cannot be more than tentative because it is not possible to determine the amount of time that passed between Locke's purchase and his actual use of a sheet of paper). The results of this exercise are shown in Table 3, at the end of this chapter.

[44] MS e.1 was not stitched when Locke started work on it (see [36]), but it was stitched at some later moment (see [7]). The continuous way in which he entered some additions on the last *even*-numbered page on one quire and then proceeded with this same correction on the first *odd*-numbered page of the next quire, makes it likely that these quires were tied together by the time Locke started to make these relatively late additions. Clear examples of such additions can be found on pp. 64-65 (quires D/E), pp. 144-145 (quires I/K), pp. 158-159 (quires K/L) and pp. 254-255 (quires *Q*/*R*).

[45] The 'working order' of the *Conduct* in MS e.1 was not meant as a definitive order. On fols. 121-130 of MS c.28 Locke made a start with the task outlined by himself on page *i* of MS e.1 (see [3]): 'Mem: That these following discourses are to be writ out under their several heads into distinct Chapters, and then to be numberd and ranged according to their natural order'. Folios 121-130 contain two chapters, 'Introduction' (numbered 'I') and 'Of Reasoning' (unnumbered), both consisting of paragraphs that can be found on different places in MS e.1 (see [14]). Each chapter was stitched separately (see [18]). Locke himself only wrote the first words of these chapters, while the rest of the work was done by William Shaw. However, Locke's hand keeps appearing on fols. 121-130 in order to make some additions (see [20]).

[46] Folios 121-130 of MS c.28 are clearly copied from MS e.1; the numbers in the margins of fols. 121-130 (see [15]) correspond with the pages of the respective passages in MS e.1 (for a similar procedure see [35]). The pages in MS e.1 that were copied in MS c.28 are marked by a vertical line in the margin of MS e.1 (see [4] (5)).

[47] It is not clear when Locke started work on fols. 121-130 of MS c.28, but it must have been after practically all of MS e.1 had been written. One of the passages covered by fols. 121-130 of MS c.28 is on pp. 248-261 of MS e.1. The only thing that Locke was to write in MS e.1 after these pages was the unfinished last paragraph on 'Custom' on p. 260. If the manuscript sent from London to Oates in January 1704 (see [30]) was MS e.1, then Shaw's partial transcription of this MS to fols. 121-130 of MS c.28 and Locke's writing of 'Custom' in MS e.1 probably took place between this time and the latter's death on 28 October 1704.

[48] The next folios of MS c.28, fols. 131-138 (quires *D-F*), differ from the previous fols. 121-130 (quires π-2π and A-C) in various respects. Folios 131-138 no longer show any trace of Locke's handwriting. Also, there are no signs of previous binding (see [18]). Finally, the size of the quires that contain fols. 131-138 is different from the previous quires (see [17]). Locke had probably started to work on fols. 121-130 only during the last six months of his life (see [47]). In his farewell letter to Peter King (see [31]) he confirmed that his instructions on the first page of MS e.1 (see [45]) still had to be carried out. The last sentence in this letter about the *Conduct* gains extra urgency by the fact that it was inserted later and in a different colour of ink than the rest of the letter: 'But the heads and chapters must be reduced into order.' Since Peter King was the recipient of these instructions, he is the most likely candidate for being their executor. After Locke's death he took over responsibility for the transcription of MS e.1 to MS c.28. Whereas fols. 121-130 had still been produced under Locke's own direction, King was responsible for the production of fols. 131-138; this explains the differences between fols. 121-130 and fols. 131-138. The task of transcribing the text of MS e.1 to MS c.28 fols. 131-138 was not carried out by King himself, but by a scribe in his service. However, King did set up the chapter 'Of Mathematicks' on fol. 132v for this scribe (as had been the habit of Locke himself). These few lines on fol. 132v show indeed a close resemblance with King's hand, which can be found in various Locke MSS in the Bodleian Library (compare ill. 5 with ill. 10). Locke must have died even before he had been able to thoroughly check and correct Shaw's transcription on fols. 121-130. This task was finished by King, which explains why these folios bear witness to interventions in the hands of both Locke and King.

[49] King was probably the editor of the *Conduct* as it would appear for the first time in O-1706. The passage about the *Conduct* in Locke's farewell letter to King (see [31]) was repeated almost verbatim in the 'Advertisement to the Reader' to O-1706:

> *The* Conduct of the Understanding *he always thought to be a Subject very well worth Consideration. As any Miscarriages in that point accidentally came into his Mind, he used sometimes to set them down in Writing, with those remedies that he could then think of. This Method, tho' it makes not that Haste to the End which one would whish, yet perhaps* [is] *the only one that can be followed in the Case. It being here, as in Physick, impossible for a Physician to describe a Disease, or seek Remedies for it, till he comes to meet with it. Such Particulars of this kind as occurr'd to the Author at a time of Leisure, he, as is before said, sat down in Writing; intending, if he had lived, to have reduc'd them into Order and Method, and to have made a complete Treatise; whereas now it is only a Collection of casual Observations, sufficient to make Men see some Faults in the Conduct of their*

Understanding, and suspect there may be more, and may perhaps serve to excite others to enquire farther into it, than the Author hath done.[442]

[50] Neither MS e.1 nor MS c.28 fols. 121-138 functioned as printer's copy for the *Conduct* in O-1706, but both were used as a source. MS e.1 is the main source, but O-1706 has a (slightly altered) passage that was added in Locke's hand on fol. 123r of MS c.28 (see [20] (3) and below, [51]), but that is absent in MS e.1. This suggests that MS c.28 was also used as a source.

[51] Peter King did make a start with task of ordering and correcting the text of the *Conduct*. He corrected Shaw's work on fols. 121-130 of MS c.28 and he was responsible for the transcription by what was probably his own scribe on fols. 131-138 of the same MS (see [48]). However, it is clear that King did not finish his job. The elements of MS e.1 that were presented as the *Conduct* in O-1706 were not 'writ out … into distinct Chapters', nor were they ranged 'according to their natural order' (see [45]). King must have felt that this task went above his capacities. Locke's instructions, combined with such information as King could have gathered from marginal headwords and keywords (see [4]) and from the content of the rather loose remarks that make up the *Conduct*, did not provide him with the necessary information. Instead, he presented the parts of MS e.1 in roughly the same chronological order as they had been written down by Locke, without any additional ordering. He divided these parts into 45 rather arbitrary sections (whose headings were derived from the marginal headwords and keywords in MS e.1) and omitted the unfinished last paragraph on p. 260. There is even an example of King undoing a case of Locke's own ordering in MS c.28. Locke had ranged three parts of MS e.1, one on p. 62 (headword 'Introduction'), the next on pp. 114-116 and the last on pp. 62-64 (headword 'Parts') together in chapter 1, 'Introduction', of MS c.28, fols. 121r-123r. King decided to ignore this ordering and to go back to a more fragmented presentation. He presented the first two parts as '§1 Introduction' and the third as '§2 Parts'.[443] Since King failed to order Locke's 'discourses' into chapters, it is only fitting that his edition does not consist of chapters, but of sections. We have seen ([20] (3)) that at the end of chapter 1 in MS c.28, fol. 123r. Locke had added the following sentence: 'Some of them [errors] I shall take notice of and endeavour to point out proper remedies for in the following Chapters.' King decided to include this sentence in O-1706, but since he had not ordered the material of MS e.1 into chapters he

442 Op. cit. no page number.

443 This fact confirms my assertion that MS c.28 did not function as printer's copy for C-1706.

duly substituted the word 'Discourse' for 'Chapters'. He knew his task but he also understood that he had been unable to fulfil it.

4. The relation between the Conduct and the Essay

The *Conduct* was projected as an addition to the *Essay*. The title 'Of the Conduct of the understanding' in MS e.1 p. 62 is preceded by its planned chapter number in the *Essay*: 'B:IV C:XX'. This heading was never deleted. Also, on pp. 113-114 Locke gives the following instructions about the desired place of two introductory paragraphs to the *Conduct* on pp. 114-116 (these instructions may have been added later, so we cannot be sure about their chronology in relation to the rest of the text): 'NB what here immediately follows concerning Logic is to begin this Chapter of the conduct of the understanding'. The implication of this entry is that the *Conduct* is here still regarded as a chapter of the *Essay*. However, MS e.1 provides us with proof for a change of mind concerning the status of the *Conduct*. Occasionally, in the *Conduct* Locke refers back to the *Essay*. There are at least four clear cases in MS e.1 of corrections or additions that amount to changing an internal reference to the *Essay* into an external reference.[444] By the time that these conversions were made, Locke must have decided that the *Conduct* would not be a part the *Essay*.

(1) On p. 72 of MS e.1 (par. 10) Locke writes: 'Those hindrances of our understandings in the pursuit of knowledg I have sufficiently enlarged upon in an other place so that noe thing more needs here to be said of those matters'. However, the MS shows that he first wrote 'other parts of this treatise' and only later changed this in 'an other place so'.

(2) On p. 98 of MS e.1 (par. 30) Locke briefly mentions the problem of the relation between words and ideas: '… what I have said in the 3^{d} booke of my Essay will excuse me from any other answer to this question'. Initially he had written 'this Essay', and replaced 'this' only later by 'my'.

(3) On p. 148 of MS e.1 (par. 63) we read: 'I have copiously enough spoken of the abuse of words in an other place …' He first wrote 'spoken in this tract'. Probably he then substituted 'treatise' for 'tract', then deleted 'in this treatise' and finally added 'in an other place'.

(4) The clearest indication for a parting of ways between *Essay* and *Conduct* is given by the paragraphs on 'Association' (pars. 76-79). We have already noted

444 For what probably amounts to an internal reference to the *Essay* that was left unchanged, see par. 64: 'this essay'.

('Context', first paragraph) that Locke probably started work on some projected additions for the Fourth Edition of the *Essay* in about April 1695; that one of these projected additions was on 'Association', comprising pp. 32-56 of MS e.1; and that he only included the first part of this material in the Fourth Edition of the *Essay*, while the remaining part was to be included in the *Conduct* (see 'Context', §3). It is now time to look into this matter with greater detail. Consider the following passage in MS e.1, pp. 50-52:

> [50] when two things [52] in them selves disjoynd appear to the sight constantly united. if the eye sees those things rivited which are loose where will you begin to rectifie the mistakes that follow [*] from it. Tis a [**] hard thing to convince any one that things are not soe, & naturaly soe as they constantly appear to him

The part from p. 32 until * on p. 52 was included in Book II, Chapter xxxiii 'Of the Association of *Ideas*' in the Fourth Edition of the *Essay*. In this edition (and in subsequent editions), the text until * was continued with the following words (section 18), which cannot be found in MS e.1:

> [*] in two *Ideas*, that they have been accustom'd so to join in their Minds, as to substitute one for the other, and, as I am apt to think, often without perceiving it themselves?

Since the Fourth Edition went to the press in June/July 1699 (see [38]), it was at the latest by then that Locke decided not to include pp. 52-56 of MS e.1 on 'Association' in the new chapter for the *Essay*. It was only later that he decided to use this remaining material for the *Conduct*.[445] By the time he ordered William Shaw to copy the remaining material on 'Association' to pp. 210-216 of MS e.1, it was June/July 1701 at the earliest (see [40]). It is certain that Shaw copied at least part of the text on pp. 210-216 from another source than pp. 52-56 (see [9]). However, it is likely that Shaw's unknown source was similar to pp. 32-56 of MS e.1, in that the *Conduct*-part on 'Association' was not yet set apart from the previous *Essay*-part on the same subject. This meant that Locke first had to provide an acceptable beginning for a new paragraph in the *Conduct*. He could not simply ask Shaw to start at (the place in the unknown source that was parallel to) ** on p. 52 in MS e.1. Something had to be entered before ** in order to produce a decent introductory sentence for what in the *Conduct* was to be the new subject on 'Association'. This is what Locke added in his own hand on pp. 208-210 of MS e.1:

445 That pp. 52-56 give a part of the *Conduct* seems to have escaped Long, *A Summary Catalogue*, although he remarks, p. 30: 'The draft [containing both the *Essay*-part and the *Conduct*-part] is longer than the printed version [containing only the *Essay*-part].'

> [208] Though I have in the 2[d] book of my *Essay concerning humane understanding* treated of the *Association of Ideas* yet haveing donne it there historicaly as giveing a view of the understanding in this as well as its several other ways of operateing rather than designeing there to enquire into the remedies ought to be applied to it, It will under this later consideration afford other matter of thought to those who have a minde to instruct them selves throughly in the right way of conducting their *understandings* and that the rather because this if I mistake not is as frequent a cause of mistake and error in us as perhaps [210] any thing else that can be named, and is a disease of the mind as hard to be cured as any· It being a very [**]

With these words he had set up a new paragraph for Shaw, who could now start at ** with copying the text from (the unknown source that ran parallel to) MS e.1 pp. 52-56 to pp. MS e.1 210-216. It is not clear why exactly Locke chose to include in the *Conduct* a part on 'Association' that he first had discarded as an addition to the *Essay*, but wrong association of ideas is certainly an important aspect of the central theme of the *Conduct*, i.e. that of errors relevant for his logic of ideas. Given the intimate connection between the *Essay* and the *Conduct* in general, and the *Essay*-part and the *Conduct*-part on 'Association' in particular, it is doubtful whether Locke's characterization of these parts in the quotation above amounts to much more than a posterior rationalization. What is clear however, is that for all practical purposes he had started to regard the *Conduct* as a work separate from the *Essay*. All this provides detailed confirmation of John Yolton's remark that 'In some ways, the *Conduct* picks up from the *Essay* chapter on the association of ideas …'[446]

5. Choice of copy-text

Either MS e.1 or MS c.28, fols. 121-138 can be chosen as copy-text for an edition of the *Conduct*. Another candidate, the text in O-1706 (used for all subsequent editions of the *Conduct*), must be discarded. It is a posthumous text that is based on these two sources. MS c.28 gives a copy of the draft version in MS e.1. However, MS c.28 covers only a small part of the text presented in MS e.1. I will chose MS e.1 pp. 52-182/184-261 as copy-text for the present edition of the *Conduct*. The *Conduct*-part on 'Association' demands special attention, since it appears twice in MS e.1. The first version on pp. 52-56 is in Locke's own hand. The second version appears on pp. 210-216; it is in the hand of William Shaw, but contains corrections in the hand of Locke. Shaw's copy follows in most cases the wording of Locke's holograph, but is probably copied from another version that has been lost (see [9]). Shaw's copy differs from Locke's holograph in punctuation, orthography, and in some wordings. In addition, this copy has one sentence (at the end of par.

446 'Introduction' to C-1996, p. vii.

77 in the present edition) that is absent from Locke's holograph. Although Shaw's copy is more recent than Locke's holograph and although it contains corrections in Locke's hand, the choice for this copy as copy-text would imply that Shaw's orthography and punctuation would be given priority over Locke's own writing on pp. 52-56. The fact that Locke did not bother to correct Shaw's orthography and punctuation does not imply that he preferred his scribe's idiosyncrasies to his own habits. However, Locke's corrections indicate that he did check the wording of the text. I have therefor taken Locke's holograph of as copy-text, but in the few cases of differences in wording I have opted in most cases for Shaw's copy (in cases where substantive differences are likely to be due to scribal errors that Locke failed to correct, preference has been given to Locke's holograph). The complete sentence that is present in Shaw's copy but not in Locke's holograph, is included in the present edition (it is also included in O-1706). Differences in wording between Locke's holograph and Shaw's copy are registered in the annotation.

6. The order of the text

I have concluded that, apart from additions and corrections on odd-numbered right-handed pages, the text of the *Conduct* on pp. 52-182, 184-261 of MS e.1 is in chronological order (see [37]); that this was not meant to be a definitive order; that Locke started ordering the material of MS e.1 on fols. 121-130 of MS c.28 (see [45]); and that King failed to complete this job (see [51]). A modern editor of the *Conduct* has two choices. He can either try to finish King's job or present the parts of MS e.1 in the 'working order' in which they have come down to posterity. The former option presents us with grave difficulties. We are in no better position than King was, and I have noted that he did not have the necessary information to bring the job to a successful and unambiguous end (see [51]). I therefore choose for the second possibility, which is also the disposition to which King eventually fell back. Once this general choice is made, some particular problems still remain to be solved.

It is only on p. 62 of MS e.1 that we meet the starting paragraph of the *Conduct*, headed 'Introduction' by a marginal entry and preceded by 'B:IV C: XX Of the Conduct of the understanding'. The text that follows from this point onwards contains the bulk of the *Conduct* and runs to the end on p. 260. I will call this 'A'. However, before p. 62 there are already two *Conduct*-fragments. The question is what place should be assigned to these fragments relative to A. Pages 52-56 contain the *Conduct*-part on 'Association' (see above, §5). It is not difficult to give this a part an acceptable place. It reappears in a second version on pp. 210-216, where it is included in the running text of A. So, in the present edition

the *Conduct*-part on 'Association' will be given the place that corresponds with the place of pp. 210-216 relative to the previous and subsequent pages in A (this is also the place given to 'Association' in O-1706).

The second *Conduct*-fragment before p. 62 is an entry on 'Reasoning' (pp. 56-62). It is continued with a late addition on pp. 248-261. Pages 56-62 and pp. 248-261 make up what I will call 'B'. The text on pp. 248-261 is clearly marked by Locke as a continuation of the first part of B on pp. 56-62. There can be no doubt about B being a part of the *Conduct*. The two subfragments, pp. 56-62 and pp. 248-261, were taken together by Locke and copied by Shaw as the chapter 'Of Reasoning' on fols. 125-130 of MS c.28. At the top of the margin of fol. 125r Locke himself wrote 'Conduct' (see [15]). However, the number of this chapter was repeatedly and conspicuously left open (see [14]). Apparently Locke had not yet made up his mind about its definitive place in a finished version of the *Conduct*. This leaves us with the problem of where to place B in relation to A. There are three options: B can be placed before, somewhere within, or after A. The obvious start of the *Conduct* is formed by its introduction as given in A, which eliminates the first possibility. King settled for the second alternative. He inserted B as §3 between §2 and §4 of his edition (where it has remained in all subsequent editions), i.e. between pars. 5 and 6 of the present edition. However, neither MS e.1 nor MS c.28 contain any justification for this solution. We can only guess here at King's motives. So far as we know, 'Of Reasoning' (=B) is the only chapter in MS c.28 fols. 121-138 that was ordered by Locke himself, apart from the introductory chapter. This may have prompted King to place B immediately after this introductory chapter (i.e. after §1-2 in his own edition), thus starting his edition with the only two chapters that were arranged by Locke himself. However, it is clear that the place assigned by King to B is not only unmotivated but also destroys the connection between pars. 5 and 6 in A. Par. 5 ends with a remark about the errors that are caused by a lack of exercise of our mental faculties: 'And it is easy to perceive that men are guilty of a great many faults in the exercise and improvement of this facultie of the mind which hinders them in their progresse and keep them in ignorance and error all their lives.' And par. 6 continues with the importance of exercising these faculties ('powers'): 'We are borne with faculties and powers capable almost of any thing such at least as would carry us farther then can be easily imagined. But tis only the exercise of those powers which gives us ability and skill in any thing and leads us towards perfection'. The MS material does not provide us with clear cues for another place of B within A. What remains is the third option: placing B after A.

An easier problem is that of the internal order of the introductory paragraphs. We have seen that p. 62 of MS e.1 gives a paragraph marked 'Introduction', but that there are also two introductory paragraphs on pp. 114-116 of the same MS, also marked 'Introduction' in the margin. These latter paragraphs are unconnected with the entries before and after them (see [37]). However, Locke himself had entered the following instructions concerning these introductory paragraphs on pp. 113-114 : 'NB what here immediately follows concerning Logic is to begin this Chapter of the conduct of the understanding'. Does this mean that the introductory paragraphs on pp. 114-116 should precede even the introductory paragraph on page 62, or should they be placed after this paragraph? When Locke asked Shaw to copy this material as the chapter called 'Introduction' on fols. 121-123 of MS c.28, he chose for the latter possibility. This order was also taken by King in O-1706 and it is the order for which I have opted as well.

Finally, in addition to the text comprising A and B, MS e.1 contains some secondary material pertaining to the *Conduct* (see [3]). This material is included as items C-K in an appendix to the main text. The Ciceronian motto on page iv of MS e.1, 'Quid tam …', cannot with certainty be regarded as the motto of the *Conduct*. However, it is included as such in the present edition (as it was also included in O-1706). Its subject is that of error, which very well fits the main theme of the *Conduct*.

The order of the present edition, with the exception of the place assigned to B, is the same as the one given by King in O-1706. However, since I have not ordered the material into chapters and since an ordering into sections, as practised by King, is bound to remain an arbitrary procedure, I have taken the successive paragraphs (as marked by Locke himself) as the basic unit for this edition (the well-established section numbers are also given, in the inner margin of the text). These paragraphs will be referred to by means of Arabic numbers. For the sake of easy reference the series of paragraph numbers that starts with the first paragraph of A, will be continued with the two paragraphs of B. The over-all result is a text that starts where it should, that continues in an order that is based on the evidence provided by the MSS and that does not assume more than the evidence warrants.

7. Editorial principles[447]

This edition of the *Conduct* is annotated by three footnote apparatuses. The first apparatus gives text-critical notes with information on alterations, emendations,

447 In choosing editorial principles I have made grateful if not always unaltered use of the Clarendon-edition of Locke's *Drafts* by Nidditch and Rogers.

and other characteristics of the copy text MS not covered in the edited text itself. In order to relieve the text from an abundance of superscript markings, the lines of the text are numbered in the margin, with the footnotes of this first apparatus keyed to the line numbers. The second apparatus, which elucidates the content of the *Conduct*, uses reference numbers in the text. The first and the second apparatus are given at the bottom of the main text. The third apparatus contains collations of the copy-text in MS e.1 with MS c.28 and is made up of endnotes that are keyed to the line numbers; this third apparatus is given in a separate section, 'Collation of MS Locke e.1 with MS Locke e.28'. The 'scribe' is Locke himself or his amanuensis William Shaw.

(1) All additions in MS e.1 are marked between ` ´ in the relevant text-critical note:

a. Interlineated words or letters are marked between ` ´, followed by '*il.*'
b. Additions on another page (often this will be on the odd-numbered right-hand page opposite the relevant even-numbered left-hand page) are marked between ` ´, followed by '*add.*', followed by the page(s) on which the addition is entered.
c. Additions that start on one page but that are continued on another page are marked between ` ´, followed by *add.*, followed by '*cont.*', followed by the page(s) on which the addition is continued. If the continued addition is an interlineation, then the text between ` ´ is followed by '*il.*', followed by '*cont.*', followed by the page(s) on which the interlineation is continued. The point where the addition leaves its original page and continues on the other page is marked by a '|' within the addition as it is presented in the text-critical note.
d. Marginal additions are marked between ` ´, followed either by '*l.*' (=left) or by '*r.*' (=right), followed by '*marg.*'

(2) Scribal deletions are marked by [ ] in the text-critical note.

(3) Scribal cancellation by superimposition of correction is included selectively and marked between [[ ]].

(4) Unfinished or conjectural lettering in the MS is indicated in the annotation by 'subimposed' dots: '.'.

(5) Indecipherable letters are registered in the annotation by subimposed dots that are not accompanied by letters, every dot roughly corresponding with one letter.

(6) Editorial insertions and corrections of mistakes are indicated by angle brackets in the text: ⟨ ⟩.

(7) Cases of editorial deletions in the text (which are rare), for instance where the scribe mistakenly repeats one or more words or where a period impedes a fluent reading of the text, are indicated between { } in the annotation.

(8) The sign for an editorially inserted stop, used to facilitate a fluent reading of the text, is a superscripted dot: '·'.

(9) Each paragraph in this edition is preceded by a number between brackets: ( ).

(10) The section numbers used by King in O-1706 are given in the inner margin, also between brackets. However, in King's edition there are two cases of misnumbered sections (numbers 13 and 38 were used twice). In later editions these errors have been corrected. I will give these corrected section numbers.

(11) All marginal headwords and keywords in the text of the *Conduct* of MS e.1 are presented in the outer margin, even where this implies repetitions (these headwords/keywords are listed in Table 2).

(12) Page numbers of MS e.1 are also entered in the outer margin. These numbers are given as they appear in the MS, misnumberings included (see above, §1 [1]). Page breaks in MS e.1 are marked by a | in the text of the present edition. The fact that the text of this MS was written on the even-numbered left-hand pages, while the odd-numbered right-hand pages were used for additions, calls for special attention. If an addition to a left-hand page is started or continued on the corresponding right-hand page and also ends on this same page, as is very frequently the case, this has *not* been separately marked in the margin by a change in page number (however, these cases of transition from one page to the opposite page are registered in the annotation, see above, point 1c). If an addition to a left-hand page spills over from the corresponding right-hand page to (an)other page(s), or if the addition is started or continued on any other page than on the corresponding right-hand page, then *all* page numbers of the addition are marked in the margin.

(13) Locke often uses cross-references when he gives an addition to a section on later pages in the MS (see above, §1 [10]). These cross-references will not be registered; jumps become immediately apparent from the page numbers given in the outer margin.

(14) The general header *Conduct*, used by Locke on most pages of MS e.1 (see above, §1 [4] (1)), has been used throughout in the header of text of the *Conduct*.

(15) Information concerning quires and marginal numbers has been given above (§1 [1] and [4]) and will not be included in the transcription.

(16) Pages ending with text that is continued on the next page in most cases have a catchword; these cases are not registered, but exceptions to this rule are noted.

(17) Locke's lineation is neither retained nor recorded.

(18) Locke's erratic word division is retained as far as possible.

(19) Line breaks are indicated by '-/' or '/-' in the annotation if a hyphen was used and by '/' if no hyphen was used. Line breaks are only registered where this is relevant. For instance, since Locke wrote both 'thereby' and 'there by', it is relevant to enter 'there/-by'. Furthermore, if the text in the present edition gives a hyphen to indicate a line break while no such break appeared in the original MS, the relevant word will be entered in the annotation without break.

(20) Locke's abbreviations are expanded. I print *and* for *&*, *the* for *y^{e}*, *that* for *y^{t}*, *which* for *w^{ch}*, *what* for *w^{t}*, *again* for *ag^{n}*, *you* for *y^{u}*, *your* for *y^{r}*, *against* for *ag^{t}*, *part* for *p^{t}*, *account* for *acc^{t}*, *said* for *s^{d}*, *-ment* for *-m^{t}*, *natural* for *nāal*, *Lord* for *Ld*, *atque* for *atq* and *quod* for *q^{d}*. Exception: ambiguous abbreviations, listed in the annotation, are not expanded.

(21) Italics in the main text reflect cases of underlining by the scribe himself.

(22) The list of collations in the third apparatus only includes differences in actual wording between MS e.1 and MS c.28, but does not include differences in orthography, punctuation or other differences caused by minor errors of the scribes employed by Locke or King.[448] The list also ignores the differences between MS e.1 and MS c.28 that were already noted above, §1 [15] and [20].

448 For similar collational principles cf. Wainwright, 'Introduction' to Locke, *A Paraphrase and Notes*, Vol. I, p. 80.

TABLE 1

The relation between the paragraph numbers in the present edition and the source MSS, the Essay *and O-1706*

Paragraph numbers in present edition	*MS Locke e.1* (Page numbers)	*MS Locke c.28* (Folio numbers)	*Essay* (Bk./Ch.)	*The* Conduct *in O-1706* (Sections)
	1 'Misconduct'			
	1-29 'Enthousiasme'		IV.xix 'Of Enthusiasm'	
	30-31 Scriptural passages			
	32-52 'Association'		II.xxxiii 'Of the Association of Ideas'	
1	62	121r-121v 'Introduction'		1
2	114, 116	121v-122r 'Introduction'		1
3	116	122r-122v 'Introduction'		1
4	62, 64	122v 'Introduction'		2
5	64	122v-123r 'Introduction'		2
6	64, 66			4
7	66, 68			4
8	68, 70			4
9	70			4
10	70, 72			5
11	72			6
12	72, 74			6
13	74, 76			6
14	76			6
15	76, 78			6
16	78, 80			6

Paragraph numbers in present edition	*MS Locke e.1* (Page numbers)	*MS Locke c.28* (Folio numbers)	*Essay* (Bk./Ch.)	*The* Conduct *in O-1706* (Sections)
17	80, 82			6
17	82	131r		6
18	82, 83, 84, 83^2	131r-132r		6
19	83^2, 86	132r		6
20	86, 88	132r-132v		6
21	88	132v-133r 'Of Mathematics'		7
22	88	133r 'Of Mathematics'		7
23	88, 90	133r-133v 'Of Mathematics'		7
24	90	133v 'Of Mathematics'		7
25	90, 92, 93, 95	133v-135r 'Of Mathematics'		7
26	95, 92	135r 'Of Mathematics'		7
27	92	135r-135v 'Of Mathematics'		7
28	92, 94	135v-136v 'Of Religion'		8
29	94, 96	136v-137r 'Of Religion'		8
30	96, 98			9
31	98, 100			10
32	203, 206, 208			10
33	208, 100			10
34	100			11
35	100, 102, 104			12
36	104, 105, 107			12
37	104, 106			12
38	106			12
39	106, 108, 110			13
40	110, 112			14
41	112			15
42	112			15

Paragraph numbers in present edition	*MS Locke e.1* (Page numbers)	*MS Locke c.28* (Folio numbers)	*Essay* (Bk./Ch.)	*The* Conduct *in O-1706* (Sections)
43	118, 120			16
44	120, 122, 124			17-19
45	126, 128, 130			20
46	130			20
47	130, 132			21
48	132, 134, 136			22
49	136, 138, 201, 203, 138, 139, 141			23-24
50	141, 143, 145			24
51	192			24
52	192, 194			24
53	194			24
54	194			24
55	194, 196			24
56	196, 198, 199^2			24
57	199^2, 201			24
58	138, 140			25
59	145, 147			25
60	140, 142			26
61	142, 144			27
62	144, 246 ('146' miswritten by Locke as '246'), 148			28
63	148, 150, 152			28-29
64	152, 154, 154^2			30
65	154^2, 156, 158, 160			31
66	162, 164, 165, 167			31-32
67	164, 166, 168, 170, 172			33-34
68	172, 174, 176, 178			34-35
69	178			36
70	178			37
71	178, 180			38
72	180, 182			39

Paragraph numbers in present edition	*MS Locke e.1* (Page numbers)	*MS Locke c.28* (Folio numbers)	*Essay* (Bk./Ch.)	*The* Conduct *in O-1706* (Sections)
	182		IV.xii.3	
	184		III.vi.26	
73	184, 186			39
74	186, 188, 190, 192			39
75	203			40
76	208, 210			41
77	210, 52, 210, 212			41
78	52, 54			41
79	54, 56			41
80	216, 218			42
81	218, 220			42
82	220, 222			42
83	222			42
84	222, 224, 226, 228			43
85	228, 230			44
86	230			45
87	230, 232			45
88	232, 234, 236			45
89	236			45
90	236			45
91	236, 238			45
92	238			45
93	238, *240*, 242			45
94	242, 244			45
95	244, 246			45
96	246, 248			45
97	260			
98	56, 58, 60, 62, 248, 250, 252, 254, 256	125r-129r 'Of Reasoning'		3
99	256, 258, 260, 261	129r-130r 'Of Reasoning'		3

TABLE 2

Headwords/keywords of the Conduct in MS e.1

Paragraph numbers in present edition	*Headwords/keywords of Conduct in MS e.1*	*Page numbers of headwords/keywords in MS e.1*
1	Introduction	62
2	Introduction	114
3		
4	Parts	62
	Parts	64
5		
6	Practise	64
	Practise	66
7	Practise	68
8	Habits	68
9	Practise	70
10	Ideas	70
11	Principles	72
12		
13	Principles	74
14	Principles	76
15	Practise	78
16	Suffisance	78
17	Practise	80
	Mathematics	82
18	Rational	82
19	Practise	83[2]
20	Practise	86
21	Mathematics	88
22	Probability	88
23		
24	Counterballance	90
25		
26		
27		

Paragraph numbers in present edition	*Headwords/keywords of Conduct in MS e.1*	*Page numbers of headwords/keywords in MS e.1*
28	Religion	92
29		
30	Ideas	96
31	Prejudices	98
32	Prejudice	203
33		
34	Indiferency	100
35	Examin	100
36	Indifferency	104
37		
38		
39	Observation	106
	Reading	108
	Conclusions	108
40	Bias	110
41	Arguments	112
42		
43	Hast	118
	Testimony	118
	One proof	118
	Topicks	118
44	Desultory	120
	Smattering	120
	Universality	122
45	Reading	126
	Lazynesse	128
46		
47	Intermediate principles	130
48	Partiality	132
49	Theologie	136
	Imposition	138
	Partiality	138
50		
51		

Paragraph numbers in present edition	*Headwords/keywords of Conduct in MS e.1*	*Page numbers of headwords/keywords in MS e.1*
52		
53		
54		
55		
56		
57		
58	Hast	138
	Variety	138
59		
60	Anticipation	140
61	Resignation	142
62	Practise	144
	Humeri	144
63	Words	148
64	Wandering	152
65	Distinctions	154[2]
66	Similes	162
67	Assent	164
	Indifferency	166
[deleted paragraph]	Ἐπέχειν	172
68	[Questions]	172
	Indifferency	172
69	Question	178
70	Persivereance	178
71	Presumption	178
72	Despondency	180
73		
74		
75	Analogie	203
76	Association	208
77		
78		
79		
80	Fallacies	216

Paragraph numbers in present edition	*Headwords/keywords of Conduct in MS e.1*	*Page numbers of headwords/keywords in MS e.1*
81		
82		
83		
84	Fundamental verities	222
85	Bottoming	228
86	Transferring of thoughts	230
87		
88		
89		
90		
91		
92		
93		
94		
95		
96		
97	Custome	260
98	Reasoning	56
	Partial views	60

TABLE 3

The watermarks in MS Locke e.1 compared with similar watermarks in Locke's dated MSS

Quire(s) in MS e.1	*Page numbers in MS e.1*	*Paragraph numbers of the* Conduct *in the present edition**	*Watermark*	*Countermark*	*Dated MSS of Locke with similar watermarks/countermarks*
π	*i-vi*			CS	See quires N-*O*
A	*1*-16		Large medallion with Seven Provinces' lion		MS c.28, fols. 115-116: 'Understanding A' (additions for the *Essay*); date given by Long: *c.* 1694.†
B-C	17-48		London coat-of-arms	EB	MS c.27, fols. 114-115: 'Christianity Jun. [16]95' (notes for *The reasonableness of Christianity*). MS c.27, fols. 92-93: 'Observations on a discourse [...] by S[tephen] N[ye] [16]95'. MS c.27, fols. 138-141: 'Revelation [16]96' (quotations).
D-M	49-190	1-31, 33-50, 58-74, 77-79, 98	Horn and baldric		MS c.40, fols. 3-32: letters by Locke to P. King, 8 March 1698 - 11 February 1699. MS c.27, fols. 116-117: 'Christianity 1695' (notes for *The reasonableness of Christianity*).

* The numbers of all *Conduct* paragraphs contained by the relevant quire(s) are given, including paragraphs that are contained only partially by these quires. For the exact relation between page numbers and paragraph numbers see above, table 1.

† Long, *A Summary Catalogue*, p. 29; on MS c.28, fols. 115-116 see also above, 'Context', §5.

Quire(s) in MS e.1	*Page numbers in MS e.1*	*Paragraph numbers of the* Conduct *in the present edition*	*Watermark*	*Countermark*	*Dated MSS of Locke with similar watermarks/countermarks*
N-*O*	191-222	32-33, 49, 51-57, 74-77, 80-84	London coat-of-arms	CS	MS c.40, fols. 175-284: letters by Locke to P. King, 27 October 1701 - 1 June 1703. MS c.27, fols. 213-216: 'Christianæ Religionis Synopsis [17]02'. MS c.27, fols. 217-220: 'Paraphrase', on the back: 'St Pauls Epistles [17]03' (early draft of *An essay for the understanding of st. Paul's epistles*).
P-R	223-270	84-99	Small sword	A	MS c.40, fols. 287-414: letters by Locke to P. King, 4 June 1703 - 4/25 October 1704. MS c.27, fols. 162-177: 'Resurrectio et quæ sequuntur'; date given by Long: *c.* 1699.‡

‡ Long, *A Summary Catalogue*, p. 28.

ILLUSTRATIONS



Ill. 1: the Ciceronian motto of the *Conduct* and some miscellaneous entries pertaining to the *Conduct* (MS Locke e.1, p. *iv* and p. *1*).



Ill. 2: the beginning of the chapter 'Of the Conduct of the understanding' in MS Locke e.1, pp. 62-63.



Ill. 3: Shaw's copy of the end of par. 76 and the beginning of par. 77 of the *Conduct* (MS Locke e.1, p. 210).


Of the conduct of the understanding

Ch: I

Introduction

62. The last resort a man has recourse to in y^e conduct of himself is his understanding for though we distinguish the faculties of the mind & give y^e supreme command to the will as to an agent, yet the truth is the man which is the agent determins himself to this or y^t voluntary action upon some precedent knowledg or appearance of knowledg in the understanding. no man ever sets himself about any thing but upon some view or other, w^ch serves him for a reason for what he does And whatsoever faculties he imploys the understanding with such light as it has well or ill informed constantly leads & by that light true or false all his operative powers are directed. The will it self how absolute & uncontroleable so ever it may be thought never fails in its obedience to the dictates of the understanding. Temples have their sacred images & we see what influence they have always had over a great part of mankind. But in truth y^e Ideas & images in mens minds are y^e invisible powers that constantly governe

Ill. 4: the beginning of the chapter 'Of the Conduct of the understanding' in MS Locke c.28, fol. 121r, copied from MS Locke e.1, p. 62 (see ill. 2).



for want of will or application, but realy for want of
perceiveing y^e^ connection of two Ideas y^t^ to one whose understand=
ing is more exercised is as visible as any thing can be. The same would
be with a grown man beginning to study Mathematicks, the
understanding for want of use often sticks in very plain 88.
way & y^t^ is soe puzzeld, when he comes to see y^e^ connection
himself wonders what it was he stuck at in a case soe plain.
I have mentiond mathematicks as a way to Settle in y^e^
minde an habit of reasoning closely & in train, not y^t^ I
thinke it necessary y^t^ all men should be deep Mathemati=
cians

Ch.

Of Mathematicks

I have mentioned mathematicks as a way to Settle 88
in the mind an habit of Reasoning closely and in
train, not that I think it necessary that all men
Should be deep Mathematicians, but that having got
y^e^ way of reasoning w^ch^ y^t^ Study necessarily brings y^e^ minde
to, they might be able to transfer it to other parts of
knowledg, as they shall have occasion for in all sorts of
reasoning every single argum^t^ should be managed as
a mathematical domonstration, the connection &
dependence of Ideas should be followed till y^e^
minde is brought to y^e^ sourse on w^ch^ it bottoms & observes

Ill. 5: the end of par. 20 and the beginning of par. 21 of the *Conduct* in MS Locke c.28, fol. 132v, copied from MS Locke e.1, pp. 88, 90.



Ill. 6: fols. 69v-70r from an account book in which Locke's servants entered payment on his behalf (MS Locke f.34).



Ill. 7: fols. 78v-79r, again from MS Locke f.34.



Ill. 8: Locke's ledger, MS Locke c.1 (covering the period 1671-1702), p. 342, giving the accounts that William Shaw had with him.



Ill. 9: first page of William Shaw's copy from Locke's letter to Dr. Daniel Whitby, 17 September 1702 (MS Locke c.24, fol. 285r, see *Corr.* 3188, VII, pp. 676-677).



Sr Exeter August: 16. 1704 269

Being last week at Buckland at Sr Francis Drakes I did from thence trouble you with a letter, as also inclos'd ye other that I left for you at London when you came out of Town - I can add no more about Mr Cost than what I writ in my last, saving that if Mr Coste hath any inclination to undertake any such Imployment, I know no family where he will be more at his ease - I shall be next week at Wells, and Saturday Sevennight at Bristol and the Tuesday or Wensday after at Colonel Colchesters and as fast as I can after that for London and Oates, that I may have a little time to wait upon you - You forgot in your last letter one very principal thing, which was to let me know how you do, I hope I shall hear by your next letter that you are pretty well Considerably Considerandis, To Expect a perfect recovery is what I cannot expect, but God Almighty may make your condition more easy and less painfull, and so you may be continued longer with us, which I earnestly desire and especially for the great advantage that the

Ill. 10: first page of a letter from Peter King to Locke, 16 August 1704 (MS Locke c.12, fol. 269r, *Corr.* 3614, VIII, pp. 379-380).

Of the Conduct of the Understanding

by John Locke

SIGNS AND ABBREVIATIONS

(For detailed explanations, see General Introduction, 'Text', §7.)

` ´	scribal addition
[ ]	scribal deletion
[[ ]]	scribal cancellation by superimposition of correction
a̩ .	the sign 'a' is conjectural or written incompletely, and the next is indecipherable
⟨ ⟩	editorial insertion or substitution
{ }	editorial omission
/	editorial end-of-line marker
·	editorial stop
|	the point where one page ends and where the next begins
add.	*addition*
il.	*interliniation*
cont.	*continued*
marg.	*margin*

iv Quid tam temerarium tamque indignum sapientis gravitate atque constantiâ, quam aut falsum sentire, aut quod non satis explorate perceptum sit et cognitum sine ullâ dubitatione defendere? Cic: de Nat: deorum l. 1.[1, 2]

1 For a photographic copy from MS e.1, p. *iv*, see ill. 1.

2 Cicero, *De natura deorum*, Bk. I, §1: 'what is so ill-considered or so unworthy of the dignity and seriousness proper to a philosopher as to hold an opinion that is not true or to maintain with unhesitating certainty a propostion not based on adequate examination, comprehension and knowledge?' Transl. H. Rackham. The quotation is part of a context where Cicero stresses the importance of Academic suspension of judgement in the face of insufficient proof; cf. the second motto on the title-page of the *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, also taken from *ND,* Bk. I, §84 : 'Quam bellum est velle confiteri potius nescire quod nescias, quam ista effutientem nauseare, atque ipsum sibi displicere!' Locke's library was filled with a substantial collection of works by Cicero. Harrison/Laslett do not mention a separate edition of *ND,* but they do mention two general editions of Cicero's works (nr. 711, p. 108 and nr. 721q, p. 109).

A

B: IV C: XX[3, 4]

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Of the Conduct of the understanding

(§1) (1.) The last resort a man has recourse to in the conduct of himself is his understanding for though we distinguish the faculties of the minde and give the supreme command to the Will as to an agent yet the truth is the man which is the agent determins him self to this or that voluntary action upon some precedent knowledg or appearance of knowledg in the understanding. no man ever sets himself about any thing but upon some view or other, which serves him for a reason for what he does And whatso ever faculties he imploys the understanding with such light as it has well or ill informd constantly leads and by that light true or false all his operative powers are directed. The will it self how absolute and uncontrouleable so ever it may be thought never fails in its obedience to the dictates

Introduction

2 under[standing]standing 3 {I} [Conduct] Introduction (*l. marg.*) 6 is the [minde] [o͟r] `man which is the agent´ (*il.*) determins [it self] him self 7–8 or [reas⟨on⟩] appearance 153.8–154.5 of knowledg [in the understanding. There is noe action that of Choice a man sets about but he has to him self some reason for doing of it and tis some light in the minde such as it is that always guides and which we all follow in [all] every step we take.] `in the understanding. [he n] `no man´ (*il.*) ever sets himself about anything but upon some view or other, which serves him for a reason for what he does´ (*add. p. 63, after next add., also on p. 63*) `[Whatsoever a man sets himself about [tis always] tis always in pursuance of some view he has] `And whatso ever faculties he imploys´ (*il.*) [[T]]the understanding … ready submission´ (*add. p. 63*) 12 `light´ (*il.*) 12 false [the will and all [[th]]is other [faculties] `powers´ (*il.*) are directed] all

3 For a photographic copy from MS e.1, p. 62, see ill. 2.

4 The *Conduct* was originally intended to form the penultimate chapter of Book IV of the *Essay;* see Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §10 and 'Text', §4.

of the understanding,[5] Temples have their sacred images and we see what influence they have always had over a great part of mankinde. But in truth the Ideas and images in mens mindes are the invisible powers that constantly governe them and to these they all universally pay a ready submission. It is therefor of the higest concernement that great care should be taken of the understanding to conduct it right in the search of knowledg and in the judgments it makes·

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(2.) The Logick now in use has soe long possessed the chair as the only art taught in the Schools for the direction of the minde in the study of the Arts and sciences that it would perhaps be thought an affectation of Noveltie to suspect that rules that have served the learned world these two or three thousand years and which without any complaint of defects the learned have rested in are not sufficiente to guide the understanding. And I should not doubt but this attempt would be censured as vanity or presumption did not the Great Lord Verulams authority justifie it. Who not servilely thinkeing learneing could not be advanced beyond what it was because for many ages it had not been did not rest in the lazy approbation and applause of what was because it was: but enlarged his minde to what might be· In his preface to his *Novum Organum* concerning

1 of the [mind] understanding, 1 understanding, [and what ever complements may be made to those in the temples [tis] the images and Ideas in their mindes [that as if these were] are the invisible powers [they] `that´ ( *il.*) men really pay] Temples [&] have 2 had [in the world] over 3 mindes [`.. ....´] are 7 and `in´ (*il.*) the 8 *Preceded by a separate remark on pp. 113-114:* NB what here immediately follows concerning Logic is to begin this Chapter | of the conduct of the understanding (*see Gen. Introd.: 'Text', §6*) 8 Chair [and] `as´ (*il.*) 10–11 thought [vanity or presumption] an affectation 11 to [thing the understanding] [think] `suspect´ (*il.*) 12 years [were not sufficient to] and 13 of [their deficiency] `defects´ (*il.*) 13 the[y] `learned´ (*il.*) 13 in [sh] are 15 would [`quic⟨kly⟩´ (*il.*)] be 18 in the [admiration of wh⟨at⟩] lazy

5 On *understanding* and *will* see *Essay,* II.xxi.6: 236: 'These Powers of the Mind, *viz.* of *Perceiving,* and of *Preferring,* are usually call'd by another Name: And the ordinary way of Speaking is, That the *Understanding* and *Will* are two *Faculties* of the mind …' On the will following the dictates of the understanding, see ibid. p. 237. Cf. the priority given by Locke to the understanding over the will with Descartes, e.g. *Principia philosophiæ*, I.xxxviii, AT VIII-I, p. 19: 'Quòd autem in errores incidamus, defectus quidem est in nostrâ actione sive in usu libertatis, sed non in nostrâ naturâ …' and Malebranche, e.g. *Recherche,* Vol. I, Bk. I, Ch. ii, Sect. ii, p. 50: 'Que les jugemens & les raisonnemens dépendent de la volonté.'

Logick he pronounces thus *Qui summas Dialecticæ partes tribuerunt atque inde fidissima Scientiis præsidia comparari putarunt verissime et optime viderunt intellectum humanum sibi permissum merito suspectum esse debere. Verum infirmior omnino est malo medicina; nec ipsa mali expers. Si quidem Dialectica, quæ recepta est, licet ad civilia et | artes,* 116 *quæ in sermone et opinione positæ sunt, rectissime adhibeatur; naturæ tamen subtilitatem longo intervallo non attingit, et prensando, quod non capit, ad errores potius stabiliendos et quasi figendos, quam ad viam veritati aperiendam valuit.*[6]

(3.) *They* says he *who attributed soe much to Logick perceived very well and truly that it was not safe to trust the understanding to it self without the guard of any rules. But the remedy reachd not the evil but became a part of it. For the Logick which tooke place though it might doe well enough in civil affairs and the Arts which consisted in talke and opinion, yet comes very far short of the subtilty in the reall performances of nature and catching at what it cannot reach has served to confirme and establish errors rather than to open a way to truth.* And therefor a little after he says. *That it is absolutely necessary that a better and perfecter use and imployment of the minde and understanding should be introduced. Necessario requiritur ut melior et perfectior mentis et intellectus humani usus et adoperatio introducatur·*

(§2) (4.) There is tis visible great variety in mens understandings. *Parts* 62 And their natural constitutions put soe wide a difference between some men in this respect that art and industry would never be able

13 `though it´ (*il.*) 15 yet [reaches not by much the nice and subtil] comes 15–16 subtilty [and secrets] `in the reall performances´ (*il.*) 16 served [rather] to confirme 22–23 understandings. [[T]]And

6 Cf. Bacon, *Works*, I, 129. The preface is to the *Instauratio Magna*, of which the *Novum Organum* was designed to be a part. For Bacon on investigations that go beyond 'civilia et artes, quæ in sermone et opinione positæ sunt', see *Of the Advancement of Learning*, Bk. II, *Works*, III, 406: 'For those whose conceits are seated in popular opinions, need only to prove or dispute; but those whose conceits are beyond popular opinions, have a double labour; the one to make themselves conceived, and the other to prove and demonstrate …' While Bacon denies the old logic philosophical or scientific use, but concedes that it can render practical services, Locke in *Essay*, III.x.12: 496 more radically also denies the Peripatetic logic any use in 'Humane Life and Society'. On the anti-scholastic purport of the *Conduct* see Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §6; on Aristotelian logicians see ibid. §7.

Parts 64

to master and their very natures seem to want a foundation to raise on it that which other men easily attein unto· | Amongst men of equall education there is great inequality of parts. And the woods of America as well as the Schools of Athens produce men of severall abilitys in the same kinde.[7]

(5.) Though this be soe yet I imagin most men come very short of what they might attein unto in their severall degrees by a neglect of their understandings· A few rules of Logick are thought sufficient in this case for those who pretend to the highest improvement whereas I thinke there are a great many natural defects in the understanding capable of amendment which are over looked and wholy neglected. And it is easy to perceive that men are guilty of a great many faults in the exercise and improvement of this facultie of the minde which hinder them in their progresse and keep them in ignorance and error all their lives.

Practise 64

(6.) We are borne with faculties and powers capable almost of any thing such at least as would carry us farther then can be easily imagined·[8] But tis only the exercise of those powers which gives us ability and skill in any thing and leads us towards perfection. A midle aged plough man will scarce ever be brought to the cariage and language of a Gentleman though his body be as well proportioned his 66 joynts as supple and his natural parts not any inferior. The | legs of a danceing master and the fingers of a musitian fall as it were naturaly

(§4)

1–2 raise [[t]]on] on 2 unto (*catchword but not repeated on p. 64*) 5 *End of paragraph marked by vertical line.* 10 many [faults] natural 10 defects [and] in 12 `it is easy to perce|ive´ (*il. cont. on p. 65; revision made across division between quires D and E*) 14 hinder[s] 14 keep[s] 19 to`wards´ (*il.*) 19 perfection 21–22 as [handsomely made and his hands as capable of any motion] `well proportioned his jo|ynts as supple´ (*il. cont. on p.65; revision made across divison between quires D and E*) 22 any [way] inferior

7 Locke's *tabula-rasa* conception of the mind implied no denial of the 'different Inclinations, and particular Defaults' (*Education,* §217, p. 265) that can be found in children (or adults).

8 Cf. *Essay,* IV.iii.6: 540: 'that Humane Knowledge, under the present Circumstances of our Beings and Constitutions may be carried much farther, than it hitherto has been, if Men would sincerely, and with freedom of Mind, employ all that Industry and Labour of Thought, in improving the means of discovering Truth, which they do for the colouring or support of Falshood, to maintain a System, Interest, or Party, they are once engaged in.'

without thought or pains into regular and admirable motions.[9] bid them change their parts and they will in vain endeavour to produce like motions in the members not used to them and it will require length of time and long practise to atteine but some degrees of a like ability. what incredible and astonishing actions doe we finde rope dancers and tumblers bring their bodys to. not but that sundry in almost all manual arts are as wonderfull but I name those which the world takes notice of for such because on that very account they give money to see them. All these admired motions beyond the reach and almost the conception of unpractised spectators are noething but the mere effects of use and industry in men whose bodys have noething peculiar in them from those of the amazed lookers on.[10]

(7.) As it is in the body soe it is in the minde practise makes it what it is, and most even of those excellencys which are looked on as naturall endowments will be found when examined into more narrowly to be the product of exercise and to be raised to that pit⟨c⟩h only by repeated actions.[11] Some men are remarked for pleasantnesse in raylery others for apalogues and apposite diverting storys· this is apt to be taken for the effect of pure nature and that the rather because it is not got by rules: and those who excelle | in either of them never 68 purposely set themselves to the study of it as an art to be learnt· But yet it is true that at first some lucky hit which tooke with some body

Practise

2 endeavour{s} 6 sundry [iŋ] in 9–10 these [admird and unimitable by the unpractised] `admired … spectators´ (*add., p. 67*) 18 `apposite´ (*il.*) 20 `got´ (*il.*) 20 *No catchword.* 20 in [it] `either of them´ (*il.*) 22 `it is true that´ (*il.*) 157.22–158.4 tooke [with the company brought [that way] them into a likeing of it, made them afterwards forwards to offer at that way bend their thoughts to it and insensibly `without designe´ (*il.*) get a facility in it] `with | some body … practise.´ (*add. cont. on p. 69*)

9 Cf. *Essay,* II.xxxiii.6: 396: 'A Musician used to any Tune will find that let it but once begin in his Head, the *Ideas* of the several Notes of it will follow one another orderly in his Understanding without any care or attention, as regularly as his Fingers move over the Keys of the Organ to play out the Tune he has begun, though his unattentive Thoughts be elsewhere a wandering.'

10 For Locke on exercise or practice, see Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §4.

11 For comparisons between body and mind cf. *Essay,* II.xxi.12: 239: 'As it is in the motions of the Body, so it is in the Thoughts of our Minds; where any one is such, that we have power to take it up, or lay it by, according to the preference of the Mind, there we are *at liberty*'; *Education,* §1, p. 83; and 'Of Study', p. 414. See also Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §4.

and gaind him commendation encouraged him to trye again inclined his thoughts and endeavours that way till at last he insensibly got a facility in it without perceiving how, and that is attributed wholy to nature which was much more the effect of use and practise. I doe not deny that natural disposition may often give the first rise to it but that never carrys a man far without use and exercise and tis practise alone that brings the powers of the minde as well as those of the body to their perfection. Many a good poetick vein is buried under a trade and never produces any thing for want of improvement. We see the ways of discourse and reasoning are very different even concerning the same matter at Court and in the university. And he that will goe but from Westminsterhall to the Exchange will finde a different genius and turne in their ways of talkeing and yet one cannot thinke that all whose lot fell in the citty were borne with different parts from those who were brad at the university or Innes of court.[12]

Habits (8.) To what purpose all this but to shew that the difference soe observable in mens understandings and parts doe not arise soe much from their naturall faculties as acquired habits. He would be laughed at that should goe about | to make a fine dancer out of a country hedger at past fifty. And he will not have much better successe who shall endeavour at that age to make a man reason well or speake handsomly who has never been used to it, though you should lay before him a collection of all the best precepts of Logick or Oratory. Noe body is made any thing by hearing of rules or laying them up in his memory, practise must setle the habit of doeing without reflecting on the rule, and you may as well hope to make a good painter or musitian extempore by a lecture and instruction in the arts of musick and painting as a coherent thinker, or a strict reasoner by a set of rules shewing him where in right reasoning consists.[13]

2 last [without perceiving how] he 7 those of the[ir] body 8 buried [in] `under´ (*il.*) 15 `who´ (*il.*) 18 their [nall] `naturall´ (*add. p. 69; abbreviation expanded for copyist*) 19 about (*catchword not repeated on p. 70*) 21 well [who has never been] or speake 27 musitian [by] extempore 27 lecture [of] `and´ (*il.*) 27–28 `in the arts of musick and painting´ (*add. p. 71*) 28–29 reasoner [about truth] {b} `by a set of rules … consists´ (*add. p. 71*)

12 Westminster Hall was the seat of the Law Courts and the Royal Exchange was London's centre of trade.

13 On 'right reasoning' cf. *Essay,* IV.xvii.4-6: 670-679 and 'Some Thoughts concerning Reading', p. 398. On the limited use of rules in learning how to

(9.) This being soe that the defects and weaknesse in mens understandings as well as other faculties comes from want of a right use of their owne mindes I am apt to thinke the fault is generaly mislaid upon nature and there is often a complaint of want of parts when the fault lies in want of a due improvement of them. we see men frequently dextrous and sharp enough in makeing a bargain who if you reason with them about matters of religion appear perfectly stupid· *Practise*

(§5) (10.) I will not here in what relates to the right conduct and improvement of the understanding repeat again the geting clear and determined Ideas[14] and the imploying our thoughts rather | about them than about sounds put for them· Nor of setleing the signification of words which we use with our selves in the search of truth or with others in discoursing about it. Those hindrances of our understandings in the pursuit of knowledg I have sufficiently enlarged upon in an other place so that noe thing more needs here to be said of those matters·[15] *Ideas* 72

(§6) (11.) There is an other fault that stops or misleads men in their knowledg which I have also spoken some thing of but yet is necessary to mention here again that we may examin it to the bottom and see the root it springs from and that is a custom of takeing up with principles that are not self evident and very often not soe much as true.[16] Tis not unusual to see men rest their opinions upon foundations that have noe more certainty nor solidity than the propositions built on them and imbraced for their sake. Such foundations are these and the like *Principles*

3–4 generaly [ill] `mis´laid (*il.*) 6 men [oft] frequently 11 clear and [distinct] `determined´ (*il.*) 12 *No catchword.* 12 of [setleing] setleing 16 in [other parts of this treatise] `an | other place so´ (*add., in diff. ink, cont. on p. 73*) 20 that [bett⟨er⟩] we 23 men [build] `rest´ (*il.*) their 23 upon [certain facile suppositions which are as doubtfull as the] foundations 159.24–160.1 propositions [that are imbraced for their sake. As that the] `built … viz The´ (*add. p. 73*)

reason well, cf. par. 84 below; *Education,* §64, p. 120; ibid. §66, pp. 121-124; and ibid. §188, p. 240: 'For I have seldom or never observed any one to get the Skill of reasoning well, or speaking handsomly by studying those Rules which pretend to teach it …'

14 On 'clear and determined Ideas', cf. Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §2 and §8.

15 See *Essay,* III.ix-xi: 475-524.

16 Cf. *Essay,* IV.xx.7-10: 711-713 on *'Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident, but doubtful and false, taken up for Principles.'* On principles, see Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §2.

viz The founders or leaders of my party are good men and therefor their tenets are true: It is the opinion of a sect that is erroneous therefor it is false: It hath been long received in the world therefor it is true: or It is new and therefor false.

(12.) These and many the like which are by noe means the measures of Truth and falshood the generality of men make the standards
74 by which they accustome | their understanding to judg, And thus they falling into an habit of determining of truth and falsehood by such wrong measures tis noe wonder they should embrace error for certainty and be very positive in things they have noe ground for.[17]

Principles (13.) There is not any who pretends to the least reason but when any of these his false maximes[18] are brought to the test but must acknowledg them to be fallible and such as he will not allow in those that differ from him and yet after he is convinced of this you shall see him goe on in the use of them and the very next occasion that offers argue again upon the same grounds. Would one not be ready to thinke that men are willing to impose upon them selves and mislead their owne understandanding⟨s⟩ who conduct them by such wrong measures even after they see they cannot be relied on. But yet they will not appear soe blamable as may be thought at first sight; for I thinke there are a great many that argue thus in earnest and doe it not to impose on them selves or others, they are perswaded of what they say and thinke there is weight in it though in a like case they have been convinced there is none· but men would be intolerable
76 to them | selves and contemptible to others if they should imbrace opinions without any ground and hold what they could give noe manner of reason for. True or false solid or sandy the minde must have some foundation to rest it self upon and as I have remarkd in an

2 true: [that] [[i]]It 3 false: [That] [[i]]It hath 4 true: or [[i]]It 4 false. [&c] 7 judg, [by which] `And | thus′ (*add., in diff. ink, cont. on p. 74²*) 8 of [judging] determining [by such wrong rules] of 9 wrong [rules] `measures′ (*add. p. 74²*) 21 doe `it′ (*il.*) 23 in a[.] like 24–25 there is none *at first ended this paragraph, followed by a new paragraph starting with* [Men must have something to rely on] *however, these words were deleted and replaced by the following il. that did not start a new paragraph, but continued the original paragraph* `but men would be intolerable to them′ (*il.*) 25 *No catchword.*

17 On habit as a cause of error, see Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §3.
18 On 'maximes' in general, cf. *Essay,* IV.vii: 591-608.

other place[19] it noe sooner enterteins any proposition but it presently hastens to some hypothesis to bottom it on· till then it is unquiet and unsetled. soe much doe our owne very tempers dispose us to a right use of our understandings if we would follow as we should the inclinations of our nature.

Principles

(14.) In some matters of concernment espetialy those of religion men are not permitted to be always wavering and uncertain, they must embrace and professe some tenents[20] or other, and it would be a shame nay a contradiction to⟨o⟩ heavy for any ones minde to lye constantly under for him to pretend seriously to be perswaded of the truth of any religion and yet not to be able to give any reason of ones beleif or to say any thing for his preference of this to any other opinion, and therefor they must make use of some principles or other and those can be noe other than such as they have and can manage and to say that they are not in earnest perswaded by them and doe not rest upon those they make use of is contrary to experience, and to allege that they are not mislead when we complain they are·

(15.) If this be soe it will be urged why then doe they not rather make use of sure and unquestionable principles rather than rest on such grounds as may deceive them and will as is visible serve to

3 owne [natural] `very´ (*il.*) 8 tenents{.} 9–10 contradiction [not to be borne] `to⟨o⟩ heavy … for him {to}´ (*add. p. 77*) 12 for [the ̣] `his´ (*il. in diff. ink*) 13–17 `and therefor they must m|ake use … complain they are´ (*add. cont. on p. 77*) 16 upon [them is to say they doe not reason a̤mi̤ss̤e̤] `those they make … complain they are´ (*add. in diff. ink*) 18 it will `be´ (*il. in diff. ink*) 19 unquestionable [found⟨ations⟩] principles

19 Cf. *Essay,* IV.xii.13: 648 on hypotheses: 'that we should *not take up any one too hastily,* (which the Mind, that would always penetrate into the Causes of Things, and have Principles to rest on, is very apt to do,) …' See also Bacon, *Novum Organum,* Bk. I, Aph. xlviii, *Works,* I, pp. 166-167: 'Gliscit intellectus humanus, neque consistere aut acquiescere potis est, sed ulterius petit; at frustra. (…) At majore cum pernicie intervenit hæc impotentia mentis in inventione causarum: nam cum maxime universalia in natura positiva esse debeant, quemadmodum inveniuntur, neque sunt revera causabilia; tamen intellectus humanus, nescius acquiescere, adhuc appetit notiora.'

20 'tenent' = tenet (*OED*)

support error as well as truth. To this I answer the reason why they doe not make use of better and surer principles is because they can not: but this inability proceeds not from want of natural parts
78 (for these few | whose case that is are to be excused) but for want of use and exercise, Few men are from their youth accustomed to strict reasoning, and to trace the dependence of any truth in a long train of consequences to its remote principles and to observe its
Practise connection.[21] And he that by frequent practise has not been used to this imployment of his understanding tis noe more wonder that he should not when he is grown into years be able to bring his minde to it than that he should not be on a suddain able to grave or designe dance on the ropes or write a good hand who has never practised either of them.

Suffisance (16.) Nay the most of men are soe wholy strangers to this that they doe not soe much as perceive their want of it. they dispatch the ordinary business of their callings by roat[22] as we say as they have learnt it and if at any time they miss success they impute it to any thing rather than want of thought or skil, that they conclude, (because they know noe better) they have in perfection. or if there be any subiect that interest or phancy has recommended to their thoughts, their reasoning about it is still after their own fashion. be it better or worse it serves their turns and is the best they are acquainted with and there for when they are lead by it into mistakes and their businesse

1 truth. [and] To 1–3 answer [because they cannot, not from want of] `they do not make use | of better and surer principles´ *il. cont. on p. 77; this first addition is followed by a later addition (in diff. ink), consisting of two parts, the first part* `the reason why´ *is an il. on p. 76, at a place before the first il., and* `is because … want of natural [p⟨arts⟩]´ *is an add. on p. 77, at a place after the first il.* 4 few [..] whose 4 *No catchword.* 9 `more´ (*il.*) 11 suddain [be] able 15–21 want of it. [What is the cheife businesse that takes up their thoughts [necessity d.....] they reason about well enough to serve their turns after their fashion] [`The businesse of their [particular] `proper´ (*il.*) callings and [imploiments some particular subiect that interest phansy has engaged them in] may perhaps employ their thoughts: and [they sometimes reason about some particular subiect] that interest or phansy has engaged them in they at times reason about´ (*add. p. 79*)] `th|ey dispatch … own fashion´ (*add., in diff. ink, cont. on p. 79*) 21 about `it´ (*il.*) 22 they [know] `are acquainted with´ (*il. in diff. ink*)

21 Cf. Locke on demonstrative knowledge, which is 'made out by a long train of Proofs', *Essay,* IV.ii.6: 533. See also Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §2.

22 'roat' = rote (*OED*)

succeeds accordingly, they impute it to any crosse accident or default of others rather than to their owne want of understanding.[23] That is what noe body discovers or complains of in him self.[24] What so ever made his business miscary it was not want of right thought and judgment in him self· he sees noe such defect in himself But is satisfied that he carrys on his designes well enough by his owne reasoning or at least should have done had it not been for unlucky traverses not in his power. Thus being content with this short and imperfect use of his understand⟨ing⟩ he never troubles him self to seek out methods of improveing his mind and lives all his life without any notion of close reasoning | in a continued connection of a long 80 train of consequences from sure foundations, such as is requisite for the makeing out and clearing most of the speculative truths[25] most men owne to beleive and are most concernd in. not to mention here what I shall have occasion to insist on by and by more fully.[26] viz that in many cases tis not one series of consequences will serve the turne

1 impute[d] 1 or [miscariage] `default´ (*il. in diff. ink*) 2–6 [That is what noe body] (*deleted, together with next deletion, then undeleted by underdotting*) [in himself `finds´ (*il.*) a want of. Everyone] `discovers or complains of in himself. What so ever made his business miscary it was not. want of [understanding] `right thought and judment in him self´ (*il. in diff. ink*) he sees noe such defect in himself But is satisfied that he´ *add. p. 79 followed by a deleted add. in diff. ink:* [`never [ḥạṣ] troubles himself about any methods of improveing his mind and lives all his life without´ (*add.*)] carries on 6 designes [pretty w⟨ell⟩] [pretty] well `enough´ (*il.*) 7 for [crosse trave⟨rses⟩] unlucky 8 power. [and] `Thus´ (*il. in diff. ink*) 8–9 and [very] imperfect 9–10 understand[ing has never] `he never … life without´ (*add. p. 79 in diff. ink*) 11 *No catchword.* 11 continued [connection] [`ṣẹṛịẹṣ´ (*il. in diff. ink*)] `connection´ (*il. in diff. ink*) 14–15 here [that I] what I 15 occasion to [mention] `insist on´ (*il.*) 16 one [ṭṛạịṇ] `series´ (*il. in diff. ink)*

23 Cf. *Essay,* IV.xx.12: 714-715.

24 Cf. Descartes, *Discours de la méthode,* Pt. I, AT VI, pp. 1-2: 'Le bons sens est la chose du monde la mieux partagée: car chascun pense en estre si bien pouruû, que ceux mesme qui sont les plus difficiles a contenter en toute autre chose, n'ont point coustume d'en desirer plus qu'il en ont.'

25 'Speculative truths' are the goal of the first category (natural philosophy) in Locke's tripartite division of the sciences. This category embraces 'The Knowledge of Things, as they are in their own proper Beings, their Constitutions, Properties, and Operations, whereby I mean not only Matter, and Body, but Spirits also, which have their proper Natures, Constitutions, and Operations as well as Bodies', *Essay,* IV.xxi.2: 720.

26 See below, esp. pars. 21-23.

but many different and opposite deductions must be examined and laid to geather before a man can come to make a right judgment[27] of the point in question· What then can be expected from men that neither see the want of any such kinde of reasoning as this nor if they doe know they how to set about it or could performe it. you may as well set a country man who scarce knows the figures and never cast up a sum of three particulars, to state a merchants long account and finde the true ballance of it.

Practise

(17.) What then should be done in the case? I answer. we should always remember what I said above[28] that the faculties of our soules are improved and made usefull to us just after the same manner that the powers of our bodys are. would you have a man write or
82 paint dance | or fence well or performe any other manual operation dextrously and with ease, let him have never soe much vigor and activity, supplenesse and addresse naturaly yet noe body expects this from him unlesse he has been used to it and has imployd time and pains in fashoning and formeing his hand or outward parts to those motions. Just soe it is in the minde· would you have a man reason well you must use him to it betimes exercise his minde in observeing the connection of Ideas and following them in train. Noe thing does

Mathematicks

this better than Mathematicks which therefor I thinke should be taught all those who have the time and oportunity, not soe much to make them mathematicians as to make them reasonable creatures.[29] for though we all call our selves soe because we are borne to it if

1 `many´ (*il.*) 1 `deductions´ (*il.*) 2 right [use] judgment 4 of [reasoning][imployment as this] reasoning 4–5 if they [did] `doe´ (*add.*) kn[e]`o´w (*il. in diff. ink*) `they´ (*il. in diff. ink*) 5 perfo̱rm{o̱rṃe̱} 10 `what I said above´ (*il.*) 11 are [all] improved 17 `fashioning and´ (*il.*) 20 thing [I think] (*deleted in diff. ink*) does

27 Cf. *Essay,* IV.xvii.17: 685: '*Judgment,* is the thinking or taking two *Ideas* to agree, or disagree, by the invention of one or more *Ideas,* whose certain Agreement, or Disagreement with them it does not perceive, but has observed to be frequent and usual.'

28 Par. 7.

29 On this 'collateral' use of mathematics, cf. Bacon, *Of the Advancement of Learning,* Bk. II, *Works,* III, p. 360: 'So that as tennis is a game of no use in itself, but of great use in respect it maketh a quick eye and a body ready to put itself into all postures; so in the Mathematicks, that use which is collateral and intervenient is no less worthy than that which is principal and intended.' See also Introduction: 'Context', §5.

we please, yet we may truly say nature gives us but the seeds of it· we are borne to be if we please rational creatures but tis use and exercise only that makes us soe, and we are indeed soe noe farther than industry and application has caryed us. And therefor in ways of reasoning which men have not been used to he that will observe the conclusions they take up must be satisfied they are not at all rational.

(18.) This has been the lesse taken notice of because every one *Rational* in his private affairs uses some sort of reasoning or other enough to denominate him reasonable. But the mistake is that he that is found reasonable in one thing is concluded to be soe in all and to th|ink or say other wise is thought soe unjust an affront and soe 83 senselesse a censure that noebody ventures to doe it· It lookes like the | degradation of a man below the dignity of his nature. It is true that 84 he that reasons well in any one thing has a minde naturaly capable of reasoning well in others and to the same degree of strength and clearnesse and possibly much greater had his understanding been soe imploid. But tis as true that he who can reason well to day about one sort of matters cannot at all reason to day about others though perhaps a year hence he may. But wherever a mans rational faculty fails him and will not serve him to reason there we cannot say he is rational how capable soever he may be by time and exercise to become soe. Trie in men of low and mean education who have never elevated their thoughts above the spade and the plough nor lookd beyond the ordinary drudgery of a day-labourer. Take | the thoughts 83^{2} of such an one, used for many years to one tract, out of that narrow

5 reasoning [they] `which men´ (*il.*) 7–8 one [uses reason enough] in his private affairs [to denominate him reasonable] uses 9–10 he that [is thought] [`passes for´ (*il.*)] `is found´ (*il.*) 10 in [a] one 10–24 all and t[[is]]o (*cancellation with the aim of making a connection with the next non-deleted add.*) [concluded] [looked on as a degradation of his | [of] nature `and the highest affront´ (*il.*) to be tought otherwise. whereas if you take [those men] who⟨se⟩ th[[e..]]ougts for a long time `have´ (*l. marg.*) been used to one tract and that within a narrow compasse you finde them noe more capable of reasoning about matters of a larger view] `th|ink or say … day-labourer· Take´ (*add. cont. on pp. 83, 84*) 11 thought [[u]]soe unjust [and senselesse] an 13 {degra} | degradation (*catchword* dation) 18 of [subject] matters 18 cannot [ṇọṭ] at 19 mans [reason] rational 19–20 faculty [will not] fails 22 soe. [Take] Trie 23 thoughts [be⟨yond⟩] above 24 day-/labourer 165.25–166.1 of [men] `such [an on[[.]]e] an one,´ (*il.*) used … narrow compas⟨s⟩e [they] his ha[[ve]]s been all [their] `his´ (*il.*) li[[ṿẹṣ]]fe confinded to you will finde [them] `him´ (*il.*)

compasse his has been all his life confined to· you will finde him noe more capable of reasoning than almost a perfect natural. Some one or two rules on which their conclusions immediately depend you will finde in most men have governd all their thoughts, these true or false have been the maximes they have been guided by. take these from them and they are perfectly at a losse· their compas and pole star are gon and their understanding is perfectly at a nonplus and therefor they either immediately returne to their old maximes again as the foundations of al truth to them not with standing all that can be said to shew their weaknesse; or if they give them up to your reasons, they with them give up all truth and further enquiry and thinke there is noe such thing as certainty. For if you would enlarge their thoughts and setle them upon more remote and surer principles they either cannot easily apprehend them; or if they can, know not what use to make of them, for long deductions from remote principles is what they have not been used to and can not manage·[30]

Practise

(19.) What then can grown men never be improved or enlarged
86 in their understandings? I say not soe. But this I | thinke I may say, that it will not be done without industry and application which will require more time and pains then grown men setled in their course of life will allow to it and therefor very seldome is done· and this very capacity of atteineing it by use and exercise only brings us back to that which I laid down before·[31] that it is only practise that improves our minds as well as bodys, and we must expect noething from our understandings any farther than they are perfected by habits· The

2 `almost a´ (*il.*) 2 natural[s]. 3 rules [on which] on which 3–4 depend [has] `you will find in most men´ (*il.*) have [been] [guided] `governd´ (*l. marg., in diff. ink*) 7 nonplus and [are apt to conclude] therefor 9 all `that´ (*il.*) can 15 from [general [maxims] `views´ (*il.*)] `remote principles´ (*add. p. 84*) 18 understandings 19 without [time] industry 24 noething [from] [therefor] from 25 habits (*followed by a deleted vertical stroke*) The

30 Cf. Nicole, *Discourses* (Locke's own partial translation of Nicole's *Essais*), II. 43, pp. 69-70: 'What does a Cannibal, Iroquois, Brazilian, Negro, Caffre, Greenlander, or Laplander, think on during his whole life? (…) Talk to them of God; heaven or hell; religion or morality; they understand not what you say, or forget it as soon as said. Their minds return presently into their old road, which is confined within that circle of gross objects, they have been used to.' A 'Caffre' = a member of a South African race of blacks belonging to the great Bantu family (*OED* 4).

31 See above, par. 7.

Americans are not all borne with worse Understandings than the Europeans though we see none of them have such reaches in the arts and sciences. And amongst the Children of a poor country man the lucky chance of education and geting into the world gives one infinitely the superiority in parts over the rest who continueing at home had continued also just of the same siz⟨e⟩ with his brethren.

Practise

(20.) He that has to doe with yonge scholars espetialy in Mathematicks may perceive how their mindes open by degrees and how it is exercise alone that opens them. Some times they will stick a long time at a part of a demonstration not for want of will or application but realy for want of perceiveing the connection of two Ideas that to one whose understanding is more exercised is as visible as any thing can be. The same would be with a grown man begining to study Mathematicks, the understanding | for want of use often sticks in 88 very plain way⟨s⟩ and he himself that is soe puzzeld, when he comes to see the connection wonders what it was he stuck at in a case so plain.

Mathematicks

(§7) (21.) I have mentioned mathematicks as a way to setle in the minde an habit of reasoning closely and in train· not that I thinke it necessary that all men should be deep mathematicians, but that haveing got the way of reasoning which that study necessarily brings the minde to they might be able to transfer it to other parts of knowledg as they shall have occasion. For in all sorts of reasoning every single argument should be managed as a mathematical demonstration, the connection and dependence of Ideas should be followed till the minde is brought to the sourse on which it bottoms and observes the coherence all along, though in proofs of probability one such train is not enough to setle the judgment as in demonstrative knowledg.[32]

1 understanding`s´ (*add. in diff. ink*) 2 none [have] of them 5 `continueing´ (*il.*) 7 has [ever had] to 7–8 Mathematicks [can] may 8 and [t̤h] how 9 stick [at] a 15–16 way⟨s⟩ and [the man who sees that connection] `he himself [when he comes to] that is soe puzz|eld, when he comes to see the connection´ (*il. cont. on p. 89*) 21 bring`s´ (*add. in diff. ink*) 22 tran`s´fer (*add. in diff. ink*) 25 `and dependence´ (*il.*) 25–26 till [they are brought] the minde 28 *End of par. marked by vertical stroke.*

32 Cf. *Essay,* IV.xv.1: 654: 'As Demonstration is the shewing the Agreement, or Disagreement of two *Ideas,* by the intervention of one or more Proofs, which have a constant, immutable, and visible connexion one with another: so *Probability* is nothing but the appearance of such an Agreement, or Disagree-

Probability

(22.) Where a truth is made out by one demonstration there needs noe farther enquiry but in probabilitys where there wants demonstration to establish the truth beyond doubt, there tis not enough to trace one argument to its source and observe its strength and weaknesse but all the arguments after haveing been soe examind on both sides must be laid in ballance one against another and upon the whole the understanding determin its assent.

(23.) This is a way of reasoning the understanding should be
90 accustomed to which is soe | different from what the illiterate are used to that even learned men often times seeme to have very little or noe notion of it, nor is it to be wonderd since the way of disputeing in the schools leads them quite away from it by insisting on one topical argument[33] by the successe of which the truth or falshood of the question is to be determind; and victory adjudgd to the opponent or defendant, which is all one as if one should ballance an account by one sum charged and discharged when there are an hundred others to be taken into consideration.

Counter-ballance

(24.) This therefor it would be well if mens mindes were accustomed to and that early that they might not erect their opinions upon one single view when soe many other are requisite to make up the account and must come into the reconning before a man can forme a right judgment. This would enlarge their mindes and give

1 [where th⟨e⟩] `Where´ (*add. in the space that previously marked the indention of the new par.*) a truth 2 there [wants] (*deleted, then undeleted by underdotting*) {`wants´} (*il.*) 5 `after … examined´ (*add. p. 89*) 8 This `is´ (*il.*) 9 *No catchword.* 9 what `the´ (*il.*) illiterate [men] are 10 even [logi⟨cians⟩] learned 10 `often times´ (*il. in diff. of ink*) 11 of it, [if we may judg by [their [arguings] [wayṣ of] way where] [their ways of manageing the cause of truth which they pretend either to propagate or defend wherein] nor is 16 sum [received] charged 18 therefor `it´ (*il.*) would 19 not [fix] `erect´ (*il.*) 20–21 when [twenty other thinks are to be taken into consideration wherein to] `soe many … a man can´ (*add. p. 91*)

ment, by the intervention of Proofs, whose connexion is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is, or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the Mind to *judge* the Proposition to be true, or false, rather than the contrary.'

33 In *Topica* II-VII Aristotle gave a collection of argumentative rules. Each of these τόποι, 'locations' or 'places', is a device for discovering premises from which to deduce a given conclusion. See also Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §6 and §7.

a due freedom to their understandings that they might not be lead into error by presumption, lazynesse or precipitancy· for I thinke noebody can approve such a conduct of the understanding as shall mislead it from truth though it be never soe much in fashion to make use of it·

(25.) To this perhaps it will be objected that to manage the understanding as I propose would require every man to be a scholler and to be furnished with all the | materials of knowledg and exercised 92 in all the ways of reasoning. To which I answer that it is a shame for those that have time and the means to attein knowledg to want any helps or assistance for the improvement of their understandings that are | to be got and to such I would be thought here cheifly 93 to speake. Those me thinks who by the industry and parts of their ancestors have been set free from a constant drudgery to their backs and their bellys should bestow some of their spare time on their heads and open their mindes by some trials and essays in all the sorts and matters of reasoning. I have before mentiond Mathematicks where in Algebra[34] gives new helps and views to the Understanding· If I

8 and to `be´ (*il.*) 8 the (*catchword not repeated on p. 92*) 11 im/provement 169.12–171.2 that are (a) [to be got] (b) [and to such I would be thought here] (c) [cheifly to speake. But besides that what I here propose] (d) is not of that vast extent as may be imagined (e) `and soe comes not within the objection´ (f) `to be got´ (*add. p. 93, deleted and then undeleted by underdotting*) (g) `and to such I would be thought here´ (*add. p. 93*) (h) `cheifly to speake. Those me thinks … repeat it´ *add. p. 93, cont. on p. 95, followed by dot, followed by vertical stroke indicating end of par., followed by first part of new par., number 26 in present edition*: (k) `. As to men whose fortunes and time is narrower what may suffice them´ *Locke first wrote a par. ending with (a)-(b)-(c)-(d). He then mistakenly deleted (a), whereas he had intended to delete (c). He deleted (c). He added (h)-(k) on pp. 93 and 95. He formulated (k) on p. 95 in such a way as to enable reading to be continued with (d), which had already been entered on p. 92, and which was then supplemented with (e). He restored the mistaken deletion of (a) on p. 92 with the addition of the same words (f) on p. 93. By now (b) was an isolated undeleted phrase on p. 92, preceded by deleted (a) and followed by deleted (c). On this place, i.e. on p. 92, (b) could not serve as connecting phrase between (f) and (h), which are both on p. 93; so, Locke deleted (b) and repeated the same words (g) on p. 93, placing (g) between (f) and (h) and thus producing the required connecting phrase. However, in the process (f) was mistakenly deleted, so that he had to undelete it by underdotting. The overall result is par. 25, ending with (f)-(g)-(h) and par. 26, consisting of (k)-(d)-(e).* 14 from [the] a constant 16 some [sort of] trials 16–17 and [ways of rea⟨oning⟩] matters

34 On algebra see Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §5.

propose these it is not as I said[35] to make every man a through[36]
Mathematician or a deep Algebraist. But yet I thinke the study of
them is of infinite use even to grown men, first by experimentaly
convinceing them that to make any one reason well it is not enough
to have parts wherewith he is satisfied and that serve him well enough
in his ordinary course, a man in those studys will see that however
good he may thinke his understanding yet in many things and those
very visible it may faile him· this would take off that presumption
that most men have of them selves in this part and they would not be
soe apt to thinke their mindes wanted noe helps to enlarge them that
there could be noething added to the accutenesse and penetration
of their understandings· Secondly the Study of Mathematicks would
show them the necessity there is in reasoning to seperate all the
distinct Ideas and see the habitudes that all those concerned in the
present enquiry have to one an other, and to lay by those which
relate not to the proposition in hand and wholy to leave them out of
the reconing. This is that which in other subjects of enquiry besides
Quantity is what is absolutely requisite to just reasoning, though in
them it is not soe easily observd, nor soe carefully practised. In those
parts of knowledg where tis thought Demonstration hath noe thing
95 to doe men reason as it were | in the lump, and if upon a summary
and confused view or upon a partial consideration, they can raise
the appearance of a probabi⟨li⟩ty they usualy rest content espetialy
if it be in a dispute where every little straw is laid hold on, and
every thing that can but be drawn in any way to give colour to the
argument is advanced with ostentation. But that minde is not in a
posture to finde the truth that does not distinctly take all the parts a
sunder and omitting what is not at all to the point draw a conclusion
from the result of all the particulars which any way influence it.
There is another noe lesse usefull habit to be got by an application
to Mathematical demonstrations and that is of useing the minde

3 them [are] `is´ (*il. in diff. ink*) 10 thinke [it beneath them u̱ṉ] their mindes 13 `there is´ (*il.*) 14 habitudes [they all have one to an other] `that all those concerned´ (*il.*) 15 and [wholy] to lay 24 be [[o]]in [cont⟨roversy⟩] a dispute 26 But y[ę]t 27–28 parts [..] `a´ (*il. in diff. ink*) sunder

35 See above, par. 21.
36 'through' = thorough (*OED* 2)

to a long train of consequences but haveing mentiond that already I shall not here again repeat it.[37]

(26.) As to men whose fortunes and time is narrower what may suffice them | is not of that vast extent as may be imagined and soe 92 comes not within the objection·

(27.) Noebody is under an obligation to know every thing· knowledg and science in generall is the businesse only of those who are at ease and leisure· Those who have particular callings ought to understand them and tis noe unreasonable proposal nor impossible to be compassed that they should thinke and reason right about what is their dayly imployment·[38] This one cannot thinke them uncapable of without leveling them with the brutes and chargeing them with a stupidity below the rank of rational creatures·

(§8) (28.) Besides his particular calling for the support of this life *Religion* every one has a concerne in a future life which he is bound to looke after. This engages his thoughts in religion and here it mightily lyes[39] him upon to Understand and reason right. Men therefor cannot be excused from understanding the words and frameing the general notions relateing to religion right· The one day of | seven besides 94 other days of rest in the Christian world allows time enough for this (had they noe other idle hours) if they would but make use of these vacancys from their dayly labour and apply them selves to an improvement of knowledg with as much diligience as they often

3 *For the constitution of par. 26 see text-critical annotation to par. 25.* 5 objection [Every man has his particular calling and noeb⟨ody⟩] (*entered as first sentence of a new par. then deleted; cf. next par.*) 7 science [is the businesse] in 8 Those who [are] have 8 `particular´ (*il.*) 8 callings [may be] ought 9 unreasonable [demand] `proposal´ (*il.*) 12 with`out´ (*il.*) leveling 14 Besides [this which] his 15 in [religion] a 17 right. [And here] {m]Men `therefor´ (*il.*) 19 of [all] seven 19–20 `besides … world´ (*il.*) 21–22 if they [would but] `would … labour and´ (*add. p. 95*) 22 the[[m]]se [and] vacancys 22–23 selves to [this] `an improvement of knowledg´ (*il.*) 23 `often´ (*il.*)

37 See above, par. 17.

38 Cf. *Essay,* I.i.6: 46: 'Our Business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our Conduct.'

39 'to lye upon' = to rest or be imposed as a burden, charge, obligation upon (*OED* 12.f)

doe to a great many other things that are uselesse, and had but those that would enter them according to their several capacitys in a right way to this knowledg· The original make of their mindes is like that of other men and they would be found not to want understanding fit to receive the knowledg of religion if they were a little incouragd and helpd in it as they should be· For there are instances of very meane people who have raised their mindes to a great sense and understanding of religion· And though these have not been soe frequent as could be wished yet they are enough to clear that condition of life from a necessity of grosse ignorance, and to shew that more might be brought to be rational creatures and Christians (for they can hardly be thought realy to be soe who wearing the name know not soe much as the very principles of that religion) if due care were taken of them. For if I mistake not the pesantry lately[40] in France (a rank of people under a much heavier pressure of want and poverty than the day labourers in England) of the Reformed religion understood it much better and could say more for it than those of an higer condition amongst us·

(29.) But if it shall be concluded that the meaner sort of people must give them selves up to a bruteish stupidity in the things of their
96 nearest concernment | which I see noe reason for, this excuses not those of a freer fortune and education if they neglect their Understandings and take noe care to imploy them as they ought, and set them right in the knowledg of those things for which principaly they were given them. At least those whose plentifull fortunes allow them the oportunitys and helps of improvements are not soe few but that

1 other [uselesse] things `that are uselesse´ (*il.*) 1–5 had but [those that would a little instruct them] `those | that `would´ (*il.*) enter them [as they were capable] according … to this knowledg·´ (*add. cont. on p. 95*) [(*deleted start of new par.*) But if it shall be concluded that the meaner sort of people must give them selves up to a bruteish stupidity in the things of their greatest concernement which I see noe reason for] `The original make … knowledg of religion´ (*add. p. 95*) 7 have [d] raised 10 condition of [men] `life´ (*il.*) 10 `grosse´ (*il.*) 12 for [I can not thinke them] `they can hardly be thought´ (*add. p. 95*) 12 thought [them] realy 12 who [assuming] wearing 14 `lately´ (*il.*) 23 care{.} to [set the.] imploy

40 'lately' i.e. in the time before the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, resulting in the emigration of around 300,000 Huguenots; a substantial part of these refugees fled to the Dutch Republic, where Locke was also staying at that time (1683-1689).

it might be hoped great advancements might be made in knowledg of all kindes espetialy in that of the greatest concerne and largest views if men would make a right use of their faculties and study their own Understandings.

(§9) (30.) Outward corporeal objects that constantly importune our *Ideas* senses and captivate our appetites faile not to fill our heads with lively and lasting Ideas of that kinde. here the minde needs not be set upon geting greater store· they offer themselves fast enough and are usualy enterteind in such plenty and lodgd soe carefully that the minde wants room or attention for others that it has more use and need of. To fit the understanding therefor for such reasoning as I have been above speaking of care should be taken to fill it with moral and more abstract Ideas.[41] For these not offering them selves to the senses but being to be Framed by the understanding | people are generaly soe 98 neglectfull of a faculty they are apt to thinke wants noe thing, that I fear most mens mindes are more unfurnished with such Ideas than is Imagined. They often use the words and how can they be suspected to want the Ideas? what I have said in the 3^{d} booke of my Essay will excuse me from any other answer to this question.[42] But to convince people of what moment it is to their understandings to be furnishd with such abstract Ideas steady and setled in it give me leave to aske how any one shall be able to know whether he be obleiged to be

3 would [rightly apply their mindes to it] make 4 *Par. ends with a diagonal stroke, in diff. ink, which is followed by the deleted start of a new par.*: [The objects of sense] 5 corporeal [appet] objects 7 need`s´ (*add. in diff. ink*) 8 `geting´ (*il.*) 8–10 greater [store. The fear is that the Ideas of sensible objects should croud [int] too much and be longd to carefully to the exclusion of others more usefull rather than that there should be any want of them] `store they … need of´ (*add. p. 97; revision made across division between quires F and G*) 9 enterteind [with] `in´ (*il.*) 12 `with´ (*il.*) 13 `selves´ (*il.*) 14 [[[I]men] `people´ (*catchword*) 14 [underst] [men] `people´ (*il.*) 15 of a [part] (*deleted, then undeleted by underdotting, then deleted again*) [faculty] `faculty´ (*il.*) *Sequence is probably*: part *originally written*; part *immediately deleted and replaced by* faculty *on line*; faculty *deleted*; part *restored by underdotting*; part *again deleted and* faculty *restored interlinearly.* 15–16 I [suspect] fear 16–17 is [usualy] Imagined 18 of [this] `my´ (*il.*) 19 from [answer] any 21 such [clear and setled Ideas] `abstract Ideas steady and setled in it´ (*add. p. 99*) 173.22–174.1 to [Justice] `be Just´ (*il.*)

41 On the importance of abstract ideas, see Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §2.
42 Cf. *Essay,* III.ix-xi: 475-524.

Just, if he has not establishd Ideas in his minde of *Obligation* and of *Justice* since that knowledg consists in noething but the perceived agreement or disagreement of those Ideas and soe of all others the like which concerne our lives and manners.[43] And if men doe finde a difficulty to see the agreement or disagreement of two angles which lie before their eyes unalterable in a diagram, how utterly impossible will it be to perceive it in Ideas that have noe other sensible objects to represent them to the minde but sounds with which they have noe manner of conformity and therefor had need to be clearly setled in the minde them selves if we would make any clear judgment about them. This therefor is one of the first things the minde should be imploid about in the right conduct of the understanding, without which it is impossible it should be capable of reasoning right about those matters· But in these and all other Ideas care must be taken that they harbour noe inconsistencies and that they have a real existence where reall existence is supposed and are not mere Chimæras with a supposed existence.[44]

Prejudices (31.) Every one is forward to complain of the prejudices that (§10)
100 mislead other men or partys as if | he were free and had none of his owne, This being objected on all sides tis agreed that it is a

1 has not [setled] `establishd′ (*il.*) 2 that [`his′] knowledg 2 knowledg [`of doin|g well or otherwise′ (*add. cont. on p. 99*)] consists 2–3 `noething but′ (*il.*) the perceived agreement or disagreement of [`his actions with′ (*il.*)] those 3–4 `and soe of all | others … manners′ (*add. cont. on p. 99*) 8 but [a] sound`s′ 11 things the [und⟨erstanding⟩] minde 13 `right′ (*il.*) 14–17 `But in | these and … existence.′ (*add. cont. on p. 99*) 15–16 existence [and are not mere Chimæras] where 17 *Par. ends with diagonal stroke.* 18 prejudices [of other mens minds ...] that 19 if | `he′ (*l. marg.*)

43 Cf. the definition of knowledge in *Essay,* IV.i.2: 525: '*Knowledge* then seems to me to be nothing but *the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas.*'

44 Cf. *Essay,* II.xxx.1: 372: 'By *real Ideas,* I mean such as have a Foundation in Nature; such as have a Conformity with the real Being, and Existence of Things, or with their Archetypes. *Fantastical or Chimerical,* I call such as have no Foundation in Nature, nor have any Conformity with that reality of Being, to which they are tacitly referr'd, as to their Archetypes'; and ibid. III.x.33: 508: 'Only if I put in my *Ideas* of mixed Modes or Relations, any inconsistent *Ideas* together, I fill my Head also with *Chimæras*; since such *Ideas,* if well examined, cannot so much as exist in the Mind, much less any real Being, be ever denominated from them.'

fault and an hindrance to knowledg. what now is the cure?[45] Noe other but this that every man should let alone others prejudices and examin his owne, Noe body is convinced of his by the accusation of an other, he recriminates by the same rule and is clear. The only way to remove this great cause of ignorance and error out of the world is for every one impartialy to examin him self· if others will not deale fairly with their owne minds does that make my errors truths? or ought it to make me in love with them and willing to impose on my self? If others love chataracts on their eyes should that hinder me from couching of mine as soon as I could? Every one declares against blindenesse, and yet who almost is not fond of that which dims his sight and keeps the clear light out of his mind which should lead him into truth and knowledg? False or doubtfull positions relyd upon as unquestionable maximes keep those in the darke from truth, who build on them· Such are usualy the prejudices imbibed from education party reverence Fashion Interest etc: This is the mote which every one sees in his brothers eye, but never regards the beame in his owne.[46] For who is there almost that is ever brought fairly to examin his owne principles, and see whether they are such as will beare the triall. But yet this should be one of the first things every one should set about and be scrupulous in, who would rightly conduct his understanding in the search of Truth and knowledg·

Prejudice 203

(32.) To those who are willing to get rid of this great hinderance of knowledg (for to such only I write) To those who would shake off this great and dangerous impostor prejudice who dresses up falshood in the likeness of Truth and soe dexterously hoodwinks mens minds

3–22 convinced of [it by being rebuked by others every one may by fairely examining himself, and the principles he goes on] `[[it]]his | by the accusation … and knowledg′ (*add. cont. on p. 101*) 4 `an′ (*il.*) other[s], 6 self· [or] if 7 deale [im] fairly 8 them [?] and 12 dims [their] `his′ (*il.*) 12 sight [that] and 12 of [their mindes] his 14 positions [built] `relyd′ (*il.*) 14 as [un] `un′questionable (*il.*) 14 keep[s] [peop⟨le⟩] those 15 truth, [and.] `who build on them·′ (*il.*) [These are] Such 15 usualy the [principles] `prejudices′ (*il.*) 16 reverence [etc:] Fashion 18 `almost′ (*il.*) 21 be [very] scrupulous 23 *Start of par. 32 is after par. 75, also on p. 203.* 24 write) [this] To 25 `prejudice′ (*il.*)

45 On remedies against error see Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §4.
46 Matt. 7: 3.

as to keep them in the darke with a beleif that they are more in the light than any that doe not see with their eys I shall offer this
206 one marke whereby prejudice may be known. He that is | strongly of any opinion must suppose (unless he be self condemned) that his perswasion is built upon good grounds; and that his assent is noe greater than what the evidence of the truth he holds forces him to and that they are arguments and not inclination or phansy that make him soe confident and positive in his tenets. Now if after all this profession he cannot bear any opposition to his opinion; if he can not soe much as give a patient hearing much lesse examine and weigh the arguments on the other side, does he not plainly confesse tis prejudice governs him, and tis not the evidence of truth but some lazy anticipation some beloved presumption that he desires to rest indisturbd in. For if what he holds be as he gives out well fenced with evidence and he sees it to be true what need he fear to put it to the proof? If his oppinion be setled upon a firme foundation, if the arguments that support it and have obteined his assent be clear good and convinceing why should he be shie to have it tried whether they be proof or not. He whose assent goes beyond his evidence owes this
208 excess | of his adherence only to prejudice, and does in effect own it when he refuses to hear what is offerd against it, declareing thereby that tis not evidence he seeks but the quiet enjoyment of the opinion he is fond of, with a forward condemnation of all that may stand in opposition to it, unheard and unexamind. which what is it but Prejudice Qui æquum statuerit parte inauditâ alterâ etiam si æquum statuerit haud æquus fuerit.[47]

1 with a [perswasion] `beleif′ (*il.*) 1–2 they are [in broad daylight and see better than anybody] `more | in the light … eys′ (*il. cont. on p. 205*) 8 soe [positive and] confident 18 convinceing [what need he f⟨ear⟩] why 22 quiet [possession] `enjoyment′ (*add. p.* 209) 23 fond of, [which without trial and examination] with 23 forward [of] `condemnation of′ (*add. p.* 209) 26 *Vertical stroke marks end of par.*

47 Locke's own copy of L. & M. Annæi Senecæ *Tragœdiæ*, cum notis Th. Farnabii, Amsterdam: I. Ianssonium, 1645 (Harrison/Laslett nr. 2613, p. 230) gives the following version of these two lines (199, 200) from the *Medea*: 'Qui statuit aliquid parte inaudita altera, / Æquum licet statuerit, haud æquus fuit'; 'He who has judged aught, with the other side unheard, may have judged righteously, but was himself unrighteous', transl. F.J. Miller.

(33.) He that would acquit him self in this case as a lover of truth not giveing way to any preoccupation or bias that may mislead him must doe two things that are not | very common nor very easy· 100

(§11) (34.) First he must not be in love with any opinion, or wish it to *Indifferency* be true till he knows it to be soe and then he will not need to wish it. For noe thing that is false can deserve our good wishes, nor a desire that it should have the place and force of truth and yet noething is more frequent than this, Men are Fond of certain tenets upon noe other evidence but respect and custome, and thinke they must maintein them or all is gon though they have never examind the ground they stand on, nor have ever made them out to them selves or can make them out to others. We shoud contend earnestly for the truth but we shoud first be sure that it is truth, or else we fight against god who is the god of truth,[48] and doe the worke of the Devill who is the father and propagator of lies[49] and our zeale though never soe warme will not excuse us. For this is plainly prejudice·

(§12) (35.) Secondly he must doe that which he will finde himself very *Examin* averse to as judging the thing unnecessary or him self uncapable of doing of it, He must trie whether his principles be certainly true or noe and how far he may safely relye upon them· This whether fewer have the heart or | skill to doe I shall not determin: But this I am 102 sure this is that which every one ought to doe who professes to love truth and would not imposse upon him self which is a surer way to be made a foole of than by being exposed to the Sophistrye of others. The disposition to put any cheat upon our selves works constantly and we are pleased with it but are impatient of being banterd or

1–3 He that would … must doe *on p. 208 replaces the following passage on p. 100, although this passage has not been deleted*: But here he must [avoid] `doe´ (*il.*) 2–3 mislead him [must as I have said] must 3 must [pr] doe 3 *Vertical stroke marks end of par.* 4 be [fond or] in 8 tenets [whose] upon 14 god [of truth] who 17–19 must `doe that which [he requires | of others viz] he will [either] finde … of it. He must´ (*il. cont. on p. 101*) 22 that [.....] which 24–25 foole of [than the Bantering [`.....´ (*il.*)] of others for this works] `[thạn | sophistrie] than by being … constantly´ (*add. cont. on p. 103*) {constantly} 26 `banterd or´ (*il.*)

48 Cf. Deut. 32: 4: 'He is the Rock, his work is perfect: for all his ways are judgment: a God of truth and without iniquity, just and right is he.'

49 Cf. John 8: 44: 'When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own: for he is a liar, and the father of it.'

mislead by others. The inability I here speak of is not any natural defect that makes men uncapable of examining their own principles: To such, rules of conducting their understandings are uselesse, and that is the case of very few; The great number is of those whom the ill habit of never exerting their thoughts has disabled, The powers of their mindes are starved by disuse and have lost that reach and strength which nature fited them to receive from exercise· Those who are in a condition to learne the first rules of plaine Arithmatick and could be brought to cast up an ordinary sum are capable of this if they had but accustomd their mindes to reasoning. But they that have wholy neglected the exercise of their understandings in this way will be very far at first from being able to doe it and as unfit for it as one unpractised in figures to cast up a shop booke and perhaps thinke it as strange to be set about it. and yet it must neverthelesse be confessd to be a wrong use of our understandings to build our tenets (in things where we are concerned to hold the truth) upon principles that may lead us into error. We take our principles at haphazard upon trust and without ever haveing examined them, and then beleive a whole systeme upon a presumption that they are true and solid, and
104 what is all this | but childish shamefull senslesse Credulity·

Indifferency (36.) In these two things viz an equall indifferency for all truth I meane the receiveing it in the love of it as truth, but not loveing it for any other reason before we know it to be true. And in the examination of our principles and not receiveing any for such nor building on them till we are fully convinced as rational creatures of their solidity truth and certainty, consists that freedom of the understanding which is necessary to a rational creature and without which it is not truly an Understanding: Tis conceit phansy extravagance any thing rather than understanding if it must be under the constraint of receiveing

2 makes [them] `men´ (*il.*) 3–4 and `that´ (*il.*) 4–7 very few; [whom their own negligence and an ill habit has `not´ (*il.*) disabld] `The great n|umber … from exercise´ (*il. cont. on p. 103*) 6 starved `by´ (*il.*) 6–7 reach and [vigor] `strength´ (*il.*) 7 them [for] to 7–8 who [are] [have parts] are 9 sum [of] [of di] `are´ (*il.*) {are} 11 `in this way´ (*il.*) 12 doe it [and it will seem] `and as unfit for it´ (*il.*) 13 `in figures´ (*il.*) 16 tenets (in [this of concernment] things 17 hap/hazard 18 then [`thereupon´] beleive 18–19 beleive [all the rest] `a whole systeme´ (*il.*) 21 *Preceded by two deleted words of an abortive new par.*: [The two] (*cf. first sentence of par. 36*) 21 things [viz not allowing to any opinions a stronger assent nor a greater affection than the evidence of their truth demand] viz 29 under [the imposition of] [ten receiveing] the constraint

and holding opinions by the authority of any thing but their owne not phansied but perceived evidence· This was rightly called Imposition and is of all other the worst and most dangerous sort of it. For | 105
we impose upon our selves which is the strongest imposition of all others; And we impose upon our selves in that part which ought with the greatest care to be kept free from all imposition. The world is apt to cast great blame on those who have an indifferency for opinions espetialy in religion· I fear this is the foundation of great error and worse consequences. To be indifferent which of two opinions is true is the right temper of the minde that preserves it from being imposed on and disposes it to examin with that indifferency till it has done its best to finde the truth and this is the only direct and safe way to it. But to be indifferent whether we imbrace falshood for truth or noe is the great road to Error· Those who are not indifferent which opinion is true are guilty of this. They suppose without examining | that what 107
they hold is true, and then thinke they ought to be zealous for it. Those tis plain by their warmth and eagernesse are not indifferent for their own opinions, but methinks are very indifferent whether they be true or false since they cannot endure to have any doubts raised or objections made against them, and tis visible they never have made any them selves, and soe never haveing examind them know not, nor are concerned as they should be to know whether they are true or false·

(37.) These are the common and most general miscariages which 104
I thinke men should avoid or rectifie in a right conduct of their understandings and should be particularly taken care of in education the businesse whereof in respect of knowledg is not as I thinke to perfect a learner in all or any one of the sciences but to give his minde that freedom that disposition and those habits that may enable him to attein | any part of knowledg he shall apply him self to or stand 106
in need of in the future course of his life. This and this only is well principleing, and not the instilling a reverence and veneration

1 holding [any] opinions 3–23 `For | we impose … or false′ (*add. cont. on pp. 105, 107*) 10 is the [true freedom] right 11 on and [lays on it] disposes 15 `They′ (*il.*) suppose [what] without 25 should [take care to rectifie] avoid 26 be [espetialy] `particularly′ (*il.*) 26 care of [`early′ (*il.*)] in [the formeing of their mindes] education 28 perfect [the scholer] a learner 28 in [any one] all 29 `freedom that′ (*il.*) 31 life [`&′ (*add. in l. marg.*)] This

for certain dogmas under the specious title of principles which are often soe remote from that truth and evidence which belongs to Principles that they ought to be rejected as false and erroneous, and is often the cause to men soe educated when they come abroad into the world and finde they cannot maintein the principles soe taken up and rested in, to cast of all principles and turne perfect scepticks regardlesse of knowledg and virtue·

(38.) There are several weaknesses or defects in the understanding either from the natural temper of the minde or ill habits taken up which hinder it in its progresse to knowledg. Of these there are as many possibly to be found if the minde were throughly studyd as there are diseases of the body, each whereof clogs and disables the understanding to some degree and therefor deserve to be looked after and cured. I shall set down some few to excite men espetialy those who make knowledg their businesse to looke into them selves and observe whether they doe not indulge some weaknesse allow some miscariage in the management of their intellectuall faculty which is prejudicial to them in the search of truth.

Observation (39.) Particular matters of fact are the undoubted foundations (§13) on which our civill and natural knowledg is built· The benefit the understanding makes of them is to draw from them conclusions which may be as standing rules of knowledg and consequently of practise. The minde often makes not that benefit it should of the information it receives from the accounts of Civil or natural historians in being too forward or too slow in makeing observations on the
108 particular facts recorded | in them. There are those who are very
Reading assiduous in reading, and yet doe not much advance their knowledg by it, They are delighted with the storys that are told and perhaps can tell them again for they make all they read noe thing but history to themselves. But not reflecting on it, not makeing to themselves

2 evidence [that] which 3–7 `, and is of|ten the cause … virtue´ (*add. cont. on. p. 107*) 8 are [besides] several 10 `Of these´ there are [p̣e̤r̤h̤a̤p̣s̤] (*deleted, undeleted by underdotting, deleted again*) as 11 possibly `[of these] to be found … studyd´ (*add. p. 107*) 12 w`h´ereof (*il.*) 14 men [to] espetialy 16 `indulge some wea|knesse´ (*il. cont. on p. 107*) 23 practise. [He that] The 26 `very´ (*il.*) 27 reading [of history] [who `and make all they read history to them but´ (*il.*)] `and yet [doe ...]´ (*il.*) doe not 29–30 tell [them again But] `them again … it, not´ (*add., p. 109*) 180.30–181.1 themselves [noe] observations

observations from what they read they are very litle improved by all that croud of particulars that either passe through or lodg themselves in their understandings.[50] They dream on in a constant course of reading and craming themselves, but not digesting any thing it produces noe thing but a heap of cruditys. If their memories reteine well one may say they have the materials of knowledg, but like those for building they are of noe advantage, if there be noe other use made of them but to let them lie heaped up togeather. Opposite to these there are others who loose the improvement they should make of matters of fact by a quite contrary conduct. They are apt to draw general conclusions and raise axioms from every particular they meet with· These make as little true benefit of history as the other nay being of forward and active spirits receive more harme by it· It being of worse consequence to steer ones thoughts by a wrong rule than to have none at all, error doeing to busy men much more harme then ignorance to the slow and slugish. Between these those seeme to doe best who takeing materiall and usefull hints sometimes from single matters of fact cary them in their mindes to be judgd of by what they shall finde in history to confirme or reverse these imperfect observations which may be establishd into rules fit to be relyd on when they are justified by a sufficient and wary induction[51] of

Conclusions

1 from [them] `what they read they´ (*il.*) 2 that [clou⟨d⟩] croud 3–5 their understand[ings]`in|gs. They dream … heap of cruditys.´ (*add. cont. on p. 109*) 4 digesting{,} [[[it i]]any] `any´ (*il.*) 4–5 it [[[p]]was but] produces 5 retein [them] well 7 noe [use if they only] advantage 17 takeing [us] materiall

50 Cf. Locke, 'Some Thoughts concerning Reading and Study', p. 398: 'But the next step towards the improvement of his understanding must be to observe the connection of these ideas in the propositions which those books hold forth and pretend to teach as truths; which till a man can judge whether they be truths or no his understanding is but little improved, and he does but think and talk after the books that he hath read without having any knowledge thereby. And thus men of much reading are greatly learned, and but little knowing'; and Malebranche, *Recherche,* Vol. I, Bk. II, Pt. II, Ch. iv, p. 285: 'Car il ne faut pas s'imaginer, que ceux qui vieillissent sur les Livres d'Aristote & de Platon, fassent beaucoup d'usage de leur esprit. (…) Ils ne sçavent que des Histoires & des faits, & non pas des véritez évidentes; & ce sont plûtôt des Historiens, que de véritables Philosophes, des hommes qui ne pensent point, mais qui peuvent raconter les pensées des autres.'

51 The first clear sign of Locke's reading of Bacon's *Novum Organum* does not appear before 1690, which is after he wrote the *Essay* but before he started work

particulars. He that makes noe such reflections | on what he reads only loades his minde with a rapsodie of tales fit in winter nights for the enterteinment of others. And he that will improve every matter of fact into a maxime will abound in contrary observations that can be of noe other use but to perplex and pudder[52] him if he compares them or else to misguide him if he gives himself up to the authority of that which for its novelty or for some other phansy best pleases him.

Bias (40.) Next to these we may place those who suffer their owne (§14) natural tempers and passions they are possessed with to influence their judgments espetialy of men and things that may any way relate to their present circumstances and interests·[53] Truth is all simple all pure will bear noe mixture of any thing else with it. Tis rigid and inflexible to any bye interests and soe shoud the understanding be whose use and excellency lies in conformeing it self to it. To thinke of every thing just as it is in it self is the proper businesse of the understanding·[54] Though it be not that which men always imploy it to. This all men at first hearing allow is the right use every one should make of his understanding· Noe body will be at such an open defiance with common sense as to professe that we should not endeavour to know and thinke of things as they are in them selves, and yet there is noe thing more frequent than to doe the contrary and men are apt to excuse them selves and think they have reason to

2 fit [for] in 10 `to´ (*il.*) 14–15 be [that would conforme it self to] whose 17 that [to] which 18 This [every one] `all men at first hearing´ (*il.*) allow[s] 20 `as to professe´ (*il.*)

on the *Conduct* (see Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §3). Given this background, it is not surprising that in the *Conduct* Locke uses the word 'induction', while this is completely is absent from the *Essay.* Cf. Locke's 'sufficient and wary induction of particulars' with Bacon's 'Inductio legitima et vera', *Novum Organum,* Bk. II, Aph. x, *Works,* I, p. 236.

52 'to pudder' = *obs. or dial. var. of* to pother = to confuse (*OED* 1).

53 On passion as a cause of error, see Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §3. On 'bias', cf. *Essay,* II.xxi.53: 268: 'But the forbearance of a too hasty compliance with our desires, the moderation and restraint of our Passions, so that our Understandings may be *free* to examine, and reason unbiassed give its judgment, being that, whereon a right direction of our conduct to true Happiness depends; 'tis in this we should employ our chief care and endeavours.'

54 We have 'an Idea of the thing, as it is in it self', when we have perceived its primary qualities; see *Essay,* II.viii.23: 140. See also Gen Introd.: 'Context', §5.

doe soe if they have but a pretence that it is for god or a good cause | that is in effect for them selves their own perswasion or party, for 112 to those in their turns the several sects of men espetialy in matters of religion entitle god and a good cause. But god requires not men to wrong or misuse their faculties for him nor to lie to others or them selves for his sake, which they purposely doe who will not suffer their understandings to have right conceptions of the things proposed to them and designedly restrain them selves from haveing just thoughts of every thing as far as they are concerned to enquire·[55] And as for a good cause that needs not such ill helps. If it be good truth will support it and it has noe need of fallacy or falshood.

(§15) (41.) Very much of kin to this is the hunting after arguments *Arguments* to make good one side of a question and wholy to neglect and refuse those which favour the other side· what is this but willfully to misguide the understanding and is soe far from giveing truth its due value that it wholy debases it, espouse opinions that best comport with their power, profit or credit and then seek argument to support them· Truth light[56] upon this way is of noe more availe to us than error. For what is soe taken up by us may be false as well as true and he has not done his duty who has thus stumbled upon truth in his way to preferment·

(42.) There is an other but more innocent way of collecting arguments very familiar amongst bookish men which is to furnish them selves with the arguments they meet with pro and con in the questions they study.[57] This helps them not to judg right nor argue

4 religion [bę]`en´title (*il.*) 6 sake, [which they even of designe] `which they purposely´ (*il.*) 16–18 `espouse … support them´ (*add. l. marg.*) [For] Truth 18 Truth [light] [`stumbled´] `light´ (*il.*) 19 `us may´ (*il.*) 20 `thus´ (*il.*) 20–21 `in´ (*il.*) [ţ]his way `to preferment´ 23 amongst [studious] `bookish´ (*il.*) 24–25 con in [any question they consider] the questions 183.25–184.24 `questions they … implicit knowledg.´ (*Add. cont. on p. 113; since this add. is on the first odd-numbered page of a new quire, H, this add., and probably the whole par., was entered after the introductory pages (pars. 2-5 of the present edition) that start on the first even-numbered page of this quire, i.e. p. 114. See also Gen. Introd.: 'Text', §3 [37]*)

55 On religious sectarianism as a source of error, see also *Essay,* IV.xix: 697-706, '*Of Enthusiasm*'.

56 'to light upon' = to chance upon (*OED* 10.d)

57 Cf. Locke, 'Of Study', p. 418: 'This grand miscarriage in our studies draws after it another of less consequence, which yet is very natural for bookish men

strongly but only to talk copiously on either side without being steady and setled in their owne judgment. For such arguments gatherd from other mens thoughts floating onely in the memory are there ready indeed to supply copious talke with some appearance of reason but are far from helping us to judg right· such variety of arguments only distract the understanding that relyes on them unlesse it has gon farther than such a superficial way of examining. This is to quit truth for appearance only to serve our vanity· The sure and only way to get true knowledg is to forme in our mindes clear and setled notions of things with names annexed to those determined Ideas. These we are to consider with their several relations and habitudes and not amuse our selves with floating names and words of indetermined signification which we can use in several senses to serve a turne· Tis in the perception of the habitudes and respects our Ideas have one to an other that reall knowledg consists and when a man once perceives how far they agree or disagree one with an other he will be able to judg of what other people say and will not need to be lead by the arguments of others which are many of them noe thing but plausible sophistry. This will teach him to state the question right and see where on it turnes, and thus he will stand upon his own legs and know by his own understanding. Whereas by collecting and learning arguments by heart he will be but a reteiner to others, and when any one questions the foundations they are built upon he will be at a non plus and be fain to give up his implicit knowledg.[58]

1 only {only} 1 on 4 supply [us with] `copious´ (*il.*) 5 right· [talk unlesse they are examind to the bottom o̲r̲ unlesse they are soe examind as to shew us the true] such 7–8 `This is … vanity·´ (*il.*) 9 mindes [true] `clear´ (*il.*) 10–11 things [and when we would [consider] know the truth] `with names … These we are [to]´ (*il.*) to consider 11–14 consider [them] {and} [not the words that are set for them] [this is the only way to perceive their habitudes and respects one] `with their … have one´ (*il.*) 11 relations [respects] and habitudes 13 `Tis´ (*il.*) 15 that [where in consists] reall knowledge `consists´ (*il.*) 16 other [the arguments of others, which are for the most part but talkeing sophi⟨stry⟩] he will 18 others which [for the most part] are 18 `many of them´ (*il.*) 19 This [and] will 23 they [are] are

to run into, and that is in the reading of authors very intently and diligently to mind the arguments pro and con they use, and endeavour to lodge them safe in their memories to serve them upon occasion …'

58 For 'implicit knowledg' cf. below, par. 56 on 'second hand or implicit knowledge'; par. 67, note 104; and *Essay,* I.iv.22: 99: 'some (and those the most)

(§16) (43.) Labour for labours sake is against nature the understanding *Hast* 118
as well as all the other facultys chooses always the shortest way to its end; would presently obtein the knowledg it is about and then set upon some new enquiry: But this whether lazynesse or hast often misleads it and makes it content it self with improper ways of search and such as will not serve the turne. Sometimes it rests upon testimony where testimony, of right, has noe thing to doe because it *Testimony* is easier to beleive than to be scientificaly instructed.[59] Sometimes it contents it self with one argument and rests satisfied with that as if it *One proof* were a demonstration where as the thing under proof is not capable of demonstration and therefor must be submitted to the trial of probabilities and all the material arguments pro and con be examined and brought to a Ballance. In some cases the minde is determined by probable topicks in enquiries where demonstration may be had, *Topicks* all those and several others which lazynesse impatience custom and want of use and attention leade men into are misapplications of the understanding in the search of truth. In every question the nature and manner of the proof it is capable of should be first considerd to make our enquiry such as it should be. This would save a great
| deale of frequently misimploid pains and lead us sooner to that 120
discovery and possession of truth we are capable of. The multiplying varietie of arguments espetialy frivolous ones such as are all that are meerly verbal is not only lost labour, but cumbers the memory to noe purpose and serves only to hinder it from seiseing and holding of the truth in all those cases which are capeable of demonstration. in such a way of proof the truth and certainty is seen and the minde fully possesses it self of it when in the other way of assent it only

1 nature· the [mind] understanding 5 self{.} 5 with [those ways of search] improper 7 where [o̲f right] testimony, `of right,´ (*il.*) 13 Ballance. [Sometimes] In some 14 probable [conjectures] [though⟨ts⟩] `topicks´ (*il.*) `in enquiries´ (*il.*) where [in] demonstration 16 `of´ (*il.*)

taking things upon trust, misimploy their power of Assent, by lazily enslaving their Minds, to the Dictates and Dominion of others, in Doctrines, which it is their duty carefully to examine; and not blindly, with an implicit faith, to swallow …'; for a non-pejorative use of the term 'implicit Knowledge', cf. *Essay,* I.ii.22: 59-60.

59 For 'testimony' cf. *Essay,* IV.xv-xvi: 654-668.

hovers about it, is amused with uncertaintys· In this superficial way indeed the minde is capable of more varietie of plausible talke but is not inlarged as it should be in its knowledg. Tis to this same hast and impatien⟨c⟩e of the minde also that a not due traceing of the arguments to their true foundation is oweing, men see a little presume a great deale and soe jump to the conclusion· this is a short way to phansy and conceit and (if firmly imbraced) to opiniatrity:[60] But is certainly the farthest way about to knowledg· For he that will know must by the connection of the proofs see the truth and the ground it stands on and therefor if he has for hast skipt over what he should have examind he must begin and goe over all again or else he will never come to knowledg.

Desultory (44.) Another fault of as ill consequence as this which proceeds (§17) also from lazynesse with a mixture of vanity, is the skiping from one sort of knowledg to an other· Some mens tempers are quickly weary of any one thing, constancy and assiduity is what they cannot bear, the same study long continued in is as intolerable to them as the appearing long in the same clothes or fashion is to a court Lady, Others that they may seem universally knowing get a litle smattering (§18)
Smattering in every thing· Both these may fill their heads with superficial notions of things but are very much out of the way of atteineing truth or
122 knowledg. I doe not here speake against the takeing a tast | of every sort of knowledg. It is certainly very usefull and necessary to forme the minde but then it must be done in a different way and to a
Universality different end. Not for talke and vanity to fill the head with shreds of (§19) all kinde that he who is possessed of such a frippery may be able to match the discourses of all he shall meet with as if noe thing could come amisse to him and his head was soe well a stored Magazin

1–2 uncertaintys· [Is] [`Th|is´ (*add. cont. on p. 121*)] `In this `superficial´ (*il.*) way indeed the minde [the minde] is´ (*add. p. 121*) 2 capable [indeed] of 2 more [superficial] varietie of [superficial] `plausible´ (*il.*) 3 not [at all] inlarged 3 its [knowledg. To] `kno|wledg. Tis to´ (*add. cont. on p. 121*) 4–12 `impatien⟨c⟩| e (*letter between ⟨⟩ obliterated by binding*) of the minde … knowledg. (*add. cont. on p. 121*) 6 soe [run to the conclusion] jump 8 about [if any at all to truth kn⟨owledg⟩] to knowledg 10 therefor [must] if he 10 `for hast´ (*il.*) 11 begin [all again] and 15 other· [w] Some 20 these [fil⟨l⟩] may 22 takeing [the] `a´ (*il.*) 25 with [patch⟨es⟩] shreds 26 `kinde | that he … be able´ (*add. cont. p. 123*)

60 'opiniatrity' = stubbornness (*OED*)

that noething could be proposed which he was not master of and was readily furnishd to entertein any one on. This is an excellency indeed and a great one too to have a reall and true knowledg in all or most of the objects of contemplation· But tis what the minde of one and the same man can hardly attein unto and the instances are soe few of those who have in any measure approachd towards it, that I know not whether they are to be proposed as examples in the ordinary conduct of the understanding. For a man to understand fully the businesse of his particular calling in the commonwealth and of Religion which is his calling as he is a man in the world is usualy enough to take up his whole time, and there are few that informe them selves in these, which is every mans proper and peculiar businesse, soe to the bottom as they should doe. But though this be soe and there are very few men that extend their thoughts towards universal knowledg, yet I doe not doubt but if the right way were taken and the methods of enquiry were orderd as they should be men of little businesse and great leisure might goe a great deale farther in it than is usualy done. To returne to the bussinesse in hand The end and | use of a little insight into 124 those parts of Knowledge which are not a mans proper businesse is to accustome our mindes to all sorts of Ideas and the proper ways of examining their habitudes and relations. This gives the minde a freedom and the exerciseing the understanding in the several ways of enquiry and reasoning which the most skilfull have made use of teaches the minde sagacity and warynesse and a supplenesse to apply it self more closely and dextrously to the bents and turns of the matter in all its researches. Besides this universal tast of all the sciences with an indifferencie before the minde is possesd with any one in particular and grown into love and admiration of what is made its dareling will prevent an other evill very commonly to be obse⟨r⟩ved in those who have from the begining been seasond only by one part of knowledg. Let a man be given up to the contemplation of one sort of knowledg and that will become every thing. The minde will take such a tincture from a familiarity with that object that every

2–3 indeed [in those who] `and a great one too to´ (*il.*) 3 have `a ´ (*il.*) 4–5 `one and | the same´ (*il. cont. on p. 123*) 9 `particular´ (*il.*) 10 in th[[is]]e world{.} 10–11 up [every mans] `his whole´ (*il.*) 16 were [better] [`rightly´ (*il.*)] orderd 187.25–188.15 dextrously [in all its researches. This is a variety of knowledg. And] `to the ben|ts and turns … each of them´ (*il. cont. on p. 125*) 27 indifferencie[s]

thing else how remote soever will be brought under the same view. A metaphysitian will bring plowing and gardening immediatly to abstract notions· the history of nature shall signifie noe thing to him· an Alchymist on the contrary shall reduce Divinity to the maximes of his laboratory explain Morality by Sal Sulphur and Mercury,[61] and allegorize the Scripture it self and the sacred mysterys thereof into the philosophers stone. And I heard once a man who had a more than ordinary excellency in musick seriously accomodate Moses seven days of the first week to the notes of Musick as if from thence had been taken the measure and method of the Creation. Tis of noe small consequence to keep the minde from such a possession. which I thinke is best done by giveing it a fair and equall view of the whole intellectuall world, wherein it may see the order ranke and beauty of the whole, and give a just allowance to the distinct provinces of the several sciences in the due order and usefulnesse of each of them. If this be that which old men will not thinke necessary nor be easily brought to Tis fit at least that it should be practised in the breeding of the yonge. The businesse of Education as I have already observed is not as I thinke to make them perfect in any one of the sciences but soe to open and dispose their mindes as may best make them capable of any, when they shall apply themselves to it.[62] If men are for a long time accustomd only to one sort or method of thoughts, theyr mindes grow stif in it and doe not readily turne to an other. Tis therefor to give them this freedom that I thinke they should be made looke into all sorts of knowledg and exercise their understandings in soe wide a variety. But I doe not propose it as a variety and stock of knowledg but a varietie and freedom of thinkeing as an increase

3–4 him· `an´ (*add.*) 4 the [r̤ul̤e̤s̤] `maximes´ (*il.*) 5 laboratory [and] explain 8 musick [several] seriously 8 accomodate [the] Moses 13–14 of the [role] whole, 16–17 necessary [and] nor `be´ (*l. marg.*) easily [be] brought 17 in the [education] `breeding´ (*add.*) 18 business [whereof] `of | Education´ (*add. cont. on p.125*) `as I have already observed´ (*il.*) 19 `one´ (*il.*) 22 for [a l⟨ong⟩] `a long time´ (*il.*) 22 sort [of know⟨ledge⟩ thoughts] or 25–26 in [th] soe

61 'Sal Sulphur and Mercury': basic elements (the *tria prima*) in the (al)chemical theory of Paracelsus (=Philippus Aureolus Theophrastus Bombast von Hohenheim, 1493-1541) and his followers, see Debus, *The Chemical Philosophy,* Vol. I, pp. 78-84.

62 See above, par. 37.

of the powers and activity of the minde, not as an enlargement of its possessions.[63]

(§20) (45.) This is that which I thinke great Readers are apt to be mistaken in· Those who have read of every thing are thought to understand every thing too. But it is not alway soe· Reading furnishes the minde only with the materials of knowledg tis thinkeing makes what we read ours· we are of the ruminating kinde and tis not enough to cram our selves with a great load of collections unlesse we chew them over again they will not give us strength and nourishment. There are indeed in some writers visible instances of deepe thought, close and accute reasoning and Ideas well pursued, The light these would give would be of great use if their readers would observe and immitate them. All the rest at best are but particulars fit to be turned into knowledg. but that can be done only by our owne meditation and examining the reach force and coherence of what is said and then as far as we apprehend and see the connection of Ideas soe far it is ours· without that it is but soe much loose matter floating in our brain· the memory may be stored but the judgment is little better and the stock of knowledg not increasd by being able to repeat what others have said or produce the arguments we have found in them. such a knowled⟨g⟩ as this is but knowled⟨g⟩ by hear say. And the ostentation of it is at best but talking by roat and very often upon weake and wrong principles. For all that is to be found in bookes is not built upon true foundations, nor always rightly deduced from

Reading 126

1–2 not as [a store and collection of knowledg.] `an enlargement of its posessions´ (*add.*) 5 soe [th] Reading 6 thinkeing [and rumi⟨nating⟩] makes 6–7 makes [it] `what we read´ (*il.*) 7 of the [.....] `ruminating´ 7–8 tis not [enough to load ourselves with large [coll] `budget full of´ (*add. p. 127*)] `enough … of coll´ (*add. pl. 127*) 8–9 chew [it] `them´ (*il.*) 9 they [it] will 9 give [ust] us 10 writers [in⟨stances⟩] visible 11 accu[ste]`te´ (*il.*) 13 `at best´ (*il.*) 14–17 owne [thinking] `meditation … is ours´ (*add. p. 127*) 16 then [.. it] as far 17–18 our [brain but ...] brain 20 others [of] `have´ (*il.*) 20 or [urge] produce 20–22 them. [But this is noe more than] `su|ch a knowled⟨g⟩ … best but´ (*add. cont. on p. 127*) 24 upon [right] true [principles] `foundations´ (*il.*)

63 Cf. Montaigne, 'De l'institution des enfans', in: *Essais*, p. 182, on the importance of a governor who has 'plutost la teste bien faicte que bien pleine'. On the importance of this kind of formal training see also Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §4.

the principles it is pretended to be built on. such an examen as is
requisite to discover that every readers mind is not forward to make
128 espetialy in those who have given them selves up to a party | and
only hunt for what they can scrape togeather that may favour and
support the tenets of it. Such men wilfully exclude them selves from
truth and from all true benefit to be received by reading. Others of
Lazynesse more indifferency often want attention and industry. The minde is
backwards in it self to be at the pains to trace every argument to its
original and to see upon what Basis it stands and how firmly. But yet
it is this that gives soe much the advantage to one man over an other
in reading. The minde should by severe rules be tied down to this at
first uneasy taske, use and exercise will give it facility, soe that those
who are accustomed to it readily as it were with one cast of the eye
take a view of the argument and presently in most cases see where it
bottoms. Those who have got this faculty one may say have got the
true key of books and the clue to lead them through the mizmaze[64]
of variety of opinions and authors to truth and certainty. This yonge
beginners should be enterd in and shewd the use of that they might
profit by their reading. Those who are strangers to it will be apt to
thinke it too great a clog in the way of mens studys and they will
suspect they shall make but small progresse if in the books they read
they must stand to examin and unravell every argument and follow it
130 step by step up to its ori|ginal. I answer This is a good objection and
ought to weigh with those whose reading is designed for much talke
and little knowledg and I have noething to say to it. But I am here
enquireing into the conduct of the understanding in its progresse
towards knowledg and to those who aime at that I may say that he
who fair and softly goes steadily forward in a course that points right

1–2 built on. [The minde is not forward always to trace these] `su|ch an examen … to make′ (*add. cont. on p. 127*) 4 for [argument that] `what they can scrape togeather that′ (*il.*) 9 and [upon] how 11 minde [at first] should 13–14 eye [as] tak[[es]]e 14 see[s] 16 them [out of the maze] through 21 `suspect they shall′ (*il.*) 23 ginal (*catchword*) 23 objection [for those] and 28 who [gently] fair

64 'mizmaze' = labyrinth (*OED* 1)

will sooner be at his journeys end, then he that runs after every one he meets though he gallop all day full speed.[65]

(46.) To which let me adde that this way of thinkeing on and profiting by what we read will be a clog and rub to any one only in the begining· when custome and exercise has made it familiar it will be dispatchd in most occasions without resting or interruption in the course of our reading, the motions and views of a minde exercised that way are wonderfully quick, and a man used to such sort of reflections sees as much at one glimps as would require a long discourse to lay before an other and make out in an entire and gradual deduction. Besides that when the first difficultys are over the delight and sensible advantage it brings mightily incourages and enlivens the minde in reading which without this is very improperly caled Study·

(§21) (47.) As an help to this I thinke it may be proposed that for the saveing the lazy progression of the thoughts to remote and first principles in every case the minde should provide it selfe several stages that is to say intermediate principles which it might have recourse to in the | examining those positions that come in its way. These though they are not self evident principles yet if they have been made out from them by a wary and unquestionable deduction may be depended on as certain and infallible truths and serve as unquestionable truths to prove other points depending on them by a nearer and shorter view than remote and general maximes. These may serve as land markes to shew what lies in the direct way of truth or is quite besides it. And thus Mathematicians doe who doe not in every new problem run it back to the first axioms through all the whole train of intermediate propositions. Certain theorems that they have setled to themselves upon sure demonstration serve to resolve to them multitudes of propositions which depend on them and are as

Intermediate principles
132

3–4 and [improveing] profiting 4 be [only] a clog 4 to [us o⟨nly⟩] any 6 i̯n 9 sees [more] `as much´ (*add. p. 131*) 10 entire [deduction.] and 11–13 `Besides that when the | first … Study´ (*add. cont. on p. 131*) 15 lazy [train of] progression 15 the [minde] thoughts 17 stages [and resting places] that 21–22 as [Criterions t̯o̯ judg of other points] `un|questionable … on them´ (*add. cont on p.133*) 22 other [trut⟨hs⟩] points 24 what [are] lies 26 back [to so⟨me⟩ thr⟨ough⟩] to 27 propositions. [They] [The] Certain

65 Cf. Descartes, *Discours de la méthode,* AT VI, p. 2: 'ceux qui ne marchent que fort lentement, peuuent auancer beacoup dauantage, s'ils suiuent tousiours le droit chemin, que ne sont ceux qui courent, & qui s'en esloignent'.

firmly made out from thence as if the minde went afresh over every link of the whole chain that ties them to first self evident principles. Only in other sciences great care is to be taken that they establish those intermediate principles with as much caution exactnesse and indifferency as mathematicians use in the setleing any of their great theorems. Where this is not done, but men take up their principles in this or that science upon credit inclination interest etc in hast without due examination and most unquestionable proof they lay a trap for themselves, and as much as in them lyes captivate their understandings to mistake falshood and error.

Partiality

(48.) As there is a partiality to opinions | which as we have (§22)
134 already observed[66] is apt to mislead the understanding soe there is often a partiality to studyes which is prejudicial also to knowledg and improvement. Those sciences which men are particularly versed in they are apt to value and extol as if that part of knowledge which every one has acquainted him self with were that alone which was worth the haveing and all the rest were idle and empty amusement, comparatively of noe use or importance. This is the effect of ignorance and not knowledg the being vainly puffed up with a flatulency ariseing from a weake and narrow comprehension. Tis not amisse that everyone should relish the science that he has made his peculiar study: A view of its beautys and a sense of its usefulnesse carys a man on with the more delight and warmth in the pursuit and improvement of it. But the contempt of all other knowledg as if it were noething in comparison of law or physick of Astronomie or Chymistrie or perhaps some yet meaner part of knowledg where in I have got some smattering or am some what advanced, is not only the marke of a vain and little minde, but does this prejudice in the conduct of the understanding, that it coops it up within narrow
136 bounds and hinders it from lookeing abroad into other | provinces

1 if [they] the minde 2 first [m] self 4–5 exactnesse and [evidence] indifferency 7 that [sort of knowledg] `science´ (*il.*) 9 them [[lọv]]lyes 11 there `is ´ (*il.*) 14 `particularly´ (*il.*) 15 to [extol and] value 15 if [those alone] that part 15–16 which [he] `every one´ (*add. p. 135*) 16–17 which w[[ere]]as 18 use [nor worth.] `or importance.´ (*add. p. 135*) 19–20 flatulency [of some ..] [of] `ari|seing from´ (*add. cont. on p. 135*) 21–22 his [particular] `peculiar´ (*add. p. 135*) 29 that it [hinders it from lookeing] coops

66 Par. 31.

of the intellectual world more beautyfull possibly and more fruitfull than that which it had till then labourd in, wherein it might finde besides new knowledg ways or hints whereby it might be inabled the better to cultivate its owne.[67]

(§23) (49.) There is indeed one Science (as they are now destinguishd) *Theologie* incomparably above all the rest where it is not by corruption narrowed into a trade or faction for meane or ill ends and secular interests, I meane Theologie, which conteining the knowledg of god and his creatures, our duty to him and our fellow creatures and a view of our present and future state is the comprehension of all other knowledg directed to its true end i·e· the honour and veneration of the Creator and the happynesse of man kinde· This is that noble study which is every mans duty and every one that can be called a rational creature is capable of. The workes of nature and the words of the Revelation displai it to mankinde in Characters soe large and visible that those who are not quite blind may in them read and see the first principles and most necessary parts of it and from thence as they have time helps and industry may be inabled to goe on to the more abstruse parts of it and penetrate into those infinite depths filld with the treasures of wisdome and knowledg. This is that Science which would truly enlarge mens |minds were it studyed or permitted to be studyed 138 every where with that freedom, love of truth and charity which it teaches, and were not made contrary to its nature the occasion of strife faction, malignity and narrow impositions. But I shall say noe *Imposition* more here of this but that it is undoubtedly a wrong use of my

1 world [where by it might not only] more 2 labourd in, [but from whence it] wherein 2–3 finde [ways and helps for the better cultivateing its owne.] `[perhaps] besides new knowledg′ (*add. p. 137*) 3 be [help.] [in better] inabled 4 *End of par. marked by vertical line.* 5–6 destinguishd) [infini⟨tely⟩] incomparably 6 not [for] by 7 `or ill′ (*il.*) 13 every [man that] one 20–21 `would′ (*il.*) truly enlarge⟨s⟩ 21 mens [y^{t}] (*probably catchword but not repeated on next page*)

67 Cf. Bacon, *Novum Organum,* Aph. I., liv, *Works*, I, p. 169: 'Adamant homines scientias et contemplationes particulares; aut quia authores et inventores se earum credunt; aut quia plurimum in illis operæ posuerunt, iisque maxime assueverunt. Hujusmodi vero homines, si ad philosophiam et contemplationes universales se contulerint, illas ex prioribus phantasiis detorquent et corrumpunt (…) Chymicorum autem genus, ex paucis experimtentis fornacis, philosophiam constituerunt phantasticam et ad pauca spectantem.'

Partiality
139
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understanding to make it the rule and measure of an other mans, a use which it is neither fit for nor capable of. This par|tiality where it (§24)
is | not permitted an authority to render all other studys insignificant or contemptible is often indulgd soe far as to be relied upon and made use of in other parts of knowledg to which it does not at all belong, and wherewith it has noe manner of affinity. Some men have soe used their heads to mathematical figures that giveing a preference to the methods of that Science they introduce lines and diagrams into their study of divinity or politique enquirys as if noe thing could be known without them[68] and others accustomd to retired speculations run natural philosophie into methaphysical notions and the abstract generalitys of Logique and how often may one meet with religion and morality treated of in the termes of the Laboratory and thought to be improved by the methods and notions of Chymistry. But he that will take care of the conduct of his understanding to direct it right to the knowledg of things must avoid these undue mixtures and not by a fondness for what he has found usefull and necessary in one, transfer it to an other science where it serves only to perplex and confound the understanding. It is a certain truth that res nolunt male administrari.[69] tis noe less certain res nolunt male intelligi.[70] Things them selves are to be considerd as they are in them selves and then they will shew us in what way they are to be understood. For to have right conceptions about them we must bring our understandings to
203 | the inflexible natures and unalterable relations of things and not endeavour to bring things to any præconceived notions of our own.
138 | There |
139 is an other partiality very commonly observable in men of study noe lesse prejudicial nor ridiculous than the former and that

2–25 `This par|tiality where´ (*add. cont. on p. 139*) `{where} it is … of our own {There in an}´ (*add. pp. 201, 203, continuation of previous add.*) 9 their [speculations … in] `study of´ (*il.*) 10 others [used] accustomd to [abstract generalitys] `retired speculations´ (*il.*) 12 with [the k] religion 13 treated of {treated of} 17 what [is] `he has found´ (*il.*) 20 `male intelligi´ (*il.*) 25 th[[em]]ings 194.26–196.11 `There | is an other … in them´ (*add. cont. on pp. 139, 141*) 26 very [ordinary] commonly 27 that is a[n]

68 For a discussion of the application of mathematical method outside the narrow field of mathematics itself in the second half of the seventeenth century, cf. Arndt, *Methodo scientifica pertractatum,* esp. pp. 69-97.
69 'Things are unwilling to be badly managed.'
70 'Things are unwilling to be badly understood.'

is a phantastical and wilde attributeing all knowledg to the Ancients alone or to the Modernes.[71] This raveing upon antiquity in matter of poetry Horace has wittily described and exposed in one of his Satyrs,[72] The same sort of madnesse may be found in reference to all the other Sciences. Some will not admit an opinion not authorized by men of old who were then all Giants in knowledg. noe thing is to be put into the treasury of Truth or knowledg which has not the stamp of Greece or Rome upon it and since their days will scarc⟨e⟩ allow that men have been able to see thinke or write. Others with a like extravigancy contemn all that the ancients have left us, and being taken with the moderne inventions and discoverys lay by all that went before as if whatever is calld old must have the decay of time upon it, and truth too were lyable to mould and rottennesse. Men I thinke have been much what the same for natural indowments in all times, Fashon discipline and Education have put eminent differences in the ages of several countrys and made one generation much differ from an other in arts and sciences. But Truth is always the same, time alters it not nor is it the better or worse for being of ancient or modern tradition. Many were eminent in former ages of the world for their discovery and delivery of it but though the knowledg they have left us be | worth our study yet they exhausted not all its treasure. They 141

6 `who were … knowledge´ (*il.*) 7 into the [the] treasury 7 of [knowl⟨edg⟩] Truth 8 will [....] scarc⟨e⟩ 9 able [write or thinke] to 11 moderne [and] inventions 12 whatever [wa⟨s⟩] is 15 put [differences] eminent 17 is [unalterably] `always´ (*il.*)

71 Cf. Locke's Valedictory Speech as censor of moral philosophy, 'An secundam naturam quisquam potest esse fælix in hac vita? Negatur', in: Locke, *Essays on the Law of Nature',* p. 224: 'Sunt, fateor, qui prioris sæculi laudes perpetuo crepant, quibus nihil eximium nihil mediocre nisi quod antiquum audit, in quibus omnia forte antiqua reperies præter mores; quasi majores nostri tantum fælicitate nos præirent quantum tempore'; and Bacon, *Novum Organum,* Bk. I, Aph. lvi, *Works,* I, p. 170: 'Reperiuntur ingenia alia in admirationem antiquitatis, alia in amorem et amplexum novitatis effusa; pauca vero ejus temperamenti sunt ut modum tenere possint, quin aut quæ recte posita sunt ab antiquis convellant, aut ea contemnant quæ recte afferuntur a novis'. Locke wrote the *Conduct* during the Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns; his library contained Perrault's *Parallèle des anciens et des modernes* (Harrison/Laslett, nr. 2258, p. 206) and Wotton's *Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning* (ibid. nr. 3187, p. 266). See also Foster Jones, *Ancients and Moderns, passim.*

72 Reference is probably to Horace's *Epistolæ*, Bk. II, Ep. i.

left a great deale for the indistry and sagacity of after ages and soe shall we. That was once new to them which any one now receives with a veneration for its antiquity nor was it the worse for appearing as a novelty and that which is now imbraced for it⟨s⟩ newness will to poster⟨it⟩y be old but not there by be lesse true or lesse genuin. There is noe occasion on this account to oppose the ancients and the modernes to one an other or to be squemish on either side. He that wisely conducts his minde in the pursuit of knowledg will gather what light and get what helps, he can from either of them from whom they are best to be had without adoreing the errors or rejecting the truths which he may finde mingled in them.

(50.) Another partiality may be observed in some to vulgar in others to Haterodox tenets. Some are apt to conclude that what is the common opinion cannot but be true, so many mens eyes they thinke cannot but see right soe many mens understandings of all sorts cannot be deceived and therefor will not venture to looke beyond the received notions of the place and age nor have soe presumtious a thought as to be wiser than their neighbours· they are content to goe with the croud and soe goe easily which they thinke is goeing right or at least serves them as well.[73] But however vox populi vox dei[74] has prevailed as a Maxime yet I doe not remember wherever god deliverd his oracles by the multitude, or nature her truths by the heard. On the other side some flie all common opinions as either

2 which [we] `any one´ (*il.*) 4 it⟨s⟩ [novelty] `newness´ (*il.*) 5–6 genuin. [Knowledg is not to be valued by the hand it comes from but its evidence and usefulnesse.] There 7 `to one an other´ (*il.*) 9 can [`indifferent⟨ly⟩´ (*il., deleted caret marker is after* either of them)] from 11 them. [all] 12 *Par. 50 is a continuation of add. to par. 49 on pp. 139, 141.* 13 others to [lesse received opinions] `Haterodox tenets´ (*il.*) 14 common [cannot but] opinion 14 true, so[me] 15 `of all sorts´ (*il.*) 16–17 beyond the [vulgar] `received notions of the place and age´ (*il.*) 17 nor [be] have [a thọụg⟨ht⟩] soe 18 than [all] their 20 however [the] vox 21 prevailed [by] as 23 `all´ (*il.*)

73 For the history of the argument 'that what is the common opinion cannot but be true', see Schian, *Untersuchungen über das 'argumentum e consensu omnium', passim.*

74 'Vox populi vox dei', 'The voice of the people is the voice of God', possibly by Alcuin (*c.* 732-804) to Charlemagne. Locke uses this saying also to start the fifth essay, 'An lex naturæ cognosci potest ex hominum consensu?', of his *Essays on the Law of Nature,* p. 160.

false or frivilous. The title of many headed beast[75] is a sufficient reason to them to conclude that noe| truths of weight or consequence 143
can be lodgd there· vulgar opinions are suited to vulgar capacities and adapted to the ends of those that governe· he that will know the truth of things must leave the common and beaten tract which none but weake and servil mindes are satisfied to trudge along constantly in. Such nice palats relishe noe thing but strange notions quite out of the way, whatever is commonly received has the marke of the beast[76] on it and they thinke it a lessening to them to hearken to it or receive it, their minde runs only after paradoxes these they seeke these they imbrace these alone they vent and soe, as they thinke, distinguish them selves from the vulgar. But common or uncommon are not the markes to distinguish truth or falshood and therefor should not be any bias to us in our enquirys, we should not judg of things by mens opinions but of opinions by things. The multitude reason but ill and there for may be well suspected and cannot be relied on nor should be followed as a sure guide. But philosophers who have quitted the Orthodoxie of the communitie and the popular doctrines of their countrys have fallen into as extravagant and as absurd opinions as ever common reception countenanced· Twould be madnesse to refuse to breath the common air or quench ones thirst with water because the rabble use them to those purposes, and if there are conveniencys of life which common use reaches not tis noe reason to reject them because they are not grown into the ordinary fashion of the country and every villager doth not know them. Truth whether in or out of fashon is the measure of knowledg and the businesse of the Understanding· whatsoever is besides that

2 `to them´ (*il.*) 4 governe [them] he 5 which [to keepe constantly in] none 7 Such [there for] `nice palats´ (*il.*) 7 relish[[es]]e 9 to [.] `them´ (*il.*) 10 `it´ (*il.*) 11 `vent´ (*il.*) 15 opinions [nor] `but´ (*il.*) 15 multitude [judg] `reason´ (*il.*) 17 `nor should be followed´ (*il.*) 20 ever [possessed] common 21 `refuse to´ (*il.*) 23–24 reaches not [they are not to be rejected] tis 24–25 into the [common] `ordinary´ (*il.*) 26 of [trut⟨h⟩] knowledg

75 Rev. 13: 1: 'And I stood upon the sand of the sea, and saw a beast rise up out of the sea, having seven heads and ten horns, and upon his horns ten crowns, and upon his heads the name of blasphemy.'

76 Rev. 13: 17: 'And that no man might buy or sell, save that he had the mark, or the name of the beast, or the number of his name.'

however authorized by consent or recommended by raretie is noe
145 thing but | ignorance or some thing worse.
192 (51.) Another sort of partiality there is whereby men impose upon them selves and by it make their reading little usefull to them selves· I mean the makeing use of the opinions of writers and laying stresse upon their authorities wherever they find them to favour their own opinions·[77]

(52.) There is noe thing almost has donne more harme to men dedicated to letters than the giveing the name of Study to *Reading* and makeing a man of great reading to be the same with a man of great knowledg or at least to be a title of honour· All that can be
194 recorded in writeing are | only facts or reasonings. Facts are of three sorts

1⟨o⟩ Meerly of Natural agent⟨s⟩ observable in the ordinary operations of bodys one upon an other whether in the visible course of things left to themselves, or in experiments made by men applying agents and patients to one an other after a peculiar and artificial manner·

2º Of voluntary agents more espetialy the actions of men in Society which makes civil and moral history.

3º Of Opinions·

(53.) In these three consists as it seems to me that which commonly has the name of learning. To which perhaps some may adde a distinct head of Critical writeings which indeed at bottom is noe thing but matter of fact and resolves it self into this that such a man or set of men used such a word or phrase in such a sense. i·e· that they made such sounds the marks of such Ideas·

(54.) Under reasonings I comprehend all the discoverys of general truths made by humane reason whether found by intuition demon-

3 *Start of an add. comprising pars. 51-57.* 3 `there is whereby´ (*add. p. 193*) 4 selves `and´ (*il.*) by [and] it 5 opinions of [others] writers 9 than the [calling] giveing 11 to `be´ (*il.*) a 12 record[ed]`ed´ (*il.*) 15 `whether´ (*il.*) 21 *Par. 53 is preceded by the deleted first words of an abortive par.*: [There is indeed] 22 of {of} 27 discoverys [made and set down] of 28 truths [whether] [bade] made

77 For Locke on the *argumentum ad verecundiam,* cf. *Essay,* IV.xvii.19: 686.

stration or probable deductions.[78] And this is that which is if not alone knowledg (because the truth or probability of particular propositions may be known to) yet is as may be supposd most properly the business of those who pretend to improve their understandings and make themselves knowing by reading.[79]

(55.) Books and reading are lookd upon to be the great helps of the understanding and instruments of knowledg, as it | must be 196
allowed that they are. And yet I beg leave to question whether these doe not prove an hindrance to many and keep several bookish men from attaining to solid and true knowledg. This I think I may be permitted to say, that there is noe part where in the understanding needs a more carefull and wary conduct than in the use of books, without which they will prove rather innocent amusements than profitable imployments of our time, and bring but smal additions to our knowledg.

(56.) There is not seldom to be found even amongst those who aim ⟨at⟩ knowledg who with an unwearied industry imploy their whole time in books, who scarce allow them selves time to eat or sleep but read and read, and read on but yet make noe great advances in reall knowledg, though there be noe defect in their intellectual faculties to which their little progress can be imputed. The mistake here is that it is usualy supposd that by reading the authors knowledg

1 or [probability.] probable 1–5 which is [properly cald knowledg viz the perception of the truth or falshood probability or improbability] `if | not alone … by reading´ (*add. cont. on p. 195*) 3 `as may be supposd´ (*il.*) 4 those who [would make themselves knowing] `pretend to´ (*il.*) 8 are [soe]. And 8–9 whether [there be any one thing that [`more´ (*il.*)] hinders many] `these doe … bookish men´ (*add. p. 197*) 11 that [noe thing] there 13–14 than [as] profitable 17 aim {and} ⟨at⟩ (*also added in O-1706*) 20 `reall´ (*il.*) 20 knowledg, [which] though

78 This division of 'general truths' reflects the taxonomy given in the *Essay;* Book IV treats '*Of Knowledge and Opinion*', and (general) knowledge is intuitive or demonstrative, ibid. IV.ii.1-2: 530-532.

79 Cf. *Essay,* IV.ii.14: 536-537: 'These two, (*viz.*) Intuition and Demonstration, are the degrees of our Knowledge; whatever comes short of one of these, with what assurance soever embraced, is but Faith, or Opinion, but not Knowledge, at least in all general Truths. There is, indeed another *Perception* of the Mind, employ'd about *the particular existence of finite Beings* without us; which going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty, passes under the name of Knowledge.'

is transfusd into the Readers understanding and soe it is, but not by bare reading but by reading and understanding what he writ, whereby I mean not barely comprehending what is affirmd or denied in each proposition, (though that great readers doe not always think them selves concerned precisely to doe) but to see and follow the train of his reasonings, observe the strength and clearness of their connection and examin upon what they bottom. without this a man may read the discourses of a very rational author writ in a language and in
198 propositions that he very well | understands and yet acquire noe one jot of his knowledg, which consisting only in the perceived certain or probable connection of the Ideas made use of in his reasonings, the readers knowledg is noe farther increased than he perceives that. soe much as he sees of this connection soe much he knows of the truth or probability of that authors opinions. All that he relyes on without this perception he takes upon trust upon the authors credit without any knowledg of it at all. This makes me not at all wonder to see some men soe abound in citations and build soe much upon authorities, it being the sole foundation on which they bottom most of their own tenets, soe that in effect they have but a second hand or implicit knowledg. i·e· are in the right if such an one from whom they borrowed it were in the right in that opinion which they took from him, which indeed is noe knowledg at all. Writers of this or former ages may be good witnesses of matters of fact which they deliver, which we may doe well to take upon their authoritie, but their credit can goe noe farther than this, it can not at all affect the truth and falshood of opinions, which have an other sort of trial by reason and proof which they themselves made use of to make themselves knowing and soe must others too that will partake in their knowledg.[80] Indeed tis an advantage that they have been at the

2 bare reading [his sense in] but 2 what `he´ (*il.*) 5 see [the connection] `and | follow the train´ (*add. cont. on p. 197*) 8 author [in a lan⟨guage⟩] writ 13 `as´ (*il.*) 18 foundation [of] `on which they bottom´ (*il.*) 20 knowledg [which m]. i·e· 24 deliver, [but] which 24 `doe well to´ (*il.*) 27 proof [`and | not by vote and testimony´ (*add. cont. on p. 199*)] which

80 Cf. Locke's *Second Reply to the Bishop of Worcester,* in: W-1963, IV, p. 371: 'In matters of fact, I own we must govern ourselves by the testimonies of others; but in matters of speculation, to suppose on, as others have supposed before us, is supposed by many to be only a way to learned ignorance, which enables to talk much, and know but little.'

pains to finde out the proofs and lay them in that order that may shew the truth or probability of their conclusions, and for this we owe them great acknowledgments for saveing us the pains in searching out those proofs which they have collected for us and which possibly after all our pains we might not have found nor been able to have set them in soe good a light as that | which they left them us in. Upon 199[2] this account we are mightily beholding to judicious writers of all ages for those discoverys and discourses they have left behind them for our instruction if we know how to make a right use of them; which is not to run them over in an hasty perusal and perhaps lodg their opinions or some remarkable passages in our memorys. but to enter into their reasonings examin their proofs and then judg of the truth or falshood probability or improbability of what they advance, not by any opinion we have enterteind of the Author, but by the evidence he produces and the conviction he affords us drawn from things themselves. Knowing is seeing and if it be soe it is madnesse to perswade our selves that we doe soe by an other mans eyes let him use never soe many words to tell us that what he asserts is very visible, till we our selves see it with our own eyes, and perceive it by our own understandings· we are as much in the dark and as void of knowledg as before let us beleive any learned author as much as we will·

(57.) Euclid and Archimedes are allowed to be knowing, and to have demonstrated what they say. And yet whoever shall read over their writeings without perceiveing the connection of their proofs, and seeing what they shew though he may understand all their words yet he is not the more knowing. He may beleive indeed but does not know what they | say. and soe is not advanced one jot in mathematical 201 knowledg by all his reading of those approved Mathematicans.[81]

1 pains [and] to 4 `out´ (*il.*) 4 `which they have collected for | us and´ (*il. cont. on p. 199*) 5 to {to} 7 ju`di´cious (*il.*) 8 and [infor⟨mation⟩] discourses 9 make [use] a right 11–12 but to [exami⟨n⟩] enter 12 proofs and [judg] then 13 falshood{.} 16 themselves [To these we]. Knowing 19 percieve `it´ (*il.*) 20 understandings· 20 `as much´ (*il.*) 20–21 dark [as much] `[& and] and as void | of knowledg´ (*il. cont. on p. 200*) 21 beleive [him] `any learned author´ (*il.*) 25 their [boo⟨ks⟩] writeings 28 soe [are] `is´ (*il.*) 29 all [their] his 29 `his´ (*il.*) 29 *End of add. comprising pars. 51-57.*

81 Cf. Malebranche, *Recherche,* Vol. II, Bk. VI, Pt. I, Ch. i, pp. 245-246: 'Comme il ne suffit pas pour être bon Géomètre, de sçavoir par mémoire toutes les

Hast (58.) The Eagernesse and strong bent of the minde after knowledg (§25)
138 if not warily regulated is often an hindrance to it· It still presses on
Variety to farther discoverys and new objects and catches at the variety of
knowledg and therefor often stays not long enough on what is before
it to looke into it as it should for hast to pursue what is yet out of
sight· He that rides post through a country may be able from that
transient view to tell how in general the parts lye and may be able to
give some loose discription of here a mountain and there a plain here
a morasse and there a river, woodland in one part and Savanas in an
other. such superficial Ideas and observations as these he may collect
in galloping over it. But the more usefull observations of the Soyle
plants, animals and inhabitans with their several sorts and properties
must necessarily scape him and tis seldom men ever discover rich
mines without some diging.[82] nature commonly lodges her treasure
and Jewells in rocky ground. If the matter be knotty and the sense
140 lyes deep the minde must stop and buckle to it | and stick upon it
with labour and thought and close contemplation. And not leave it
till it has masterd the difficulty and got possession of truth. But here
care must be taken to avoid the other extrem, A man must not stick
at every uselesse nicety and expect mysteries of science in every trivial
question or scruple that he may raise. He that will stand to pecke[83] up

3–4 `and new … of knowledg′ (*il.*) 6–7 that [hasty] `transcient′ (*il.*) 13 discover [the] rich 14 mines [of treasure] without 14 diging. [and] nature 17 contemplation. [But] And 19–20 stick [and] `at′ (*il.*)

démonstrations d'Euclide, de Pappus, d'Archimede, d'Appolonius, & de tous ceux qui ont écrit de la Géometrie: Ainsi ce n'est pas assez pour être sçavant Philosophe d'avoir lû Platon, Aristote, Descartes, & de sçavoir par memoire tous leurs sentimens sur les questions de Philosophie.'

82 Cf. Malebranche, *Recherche,* Vol. II, Bk. VI, Pt. I, Ch. v, pp. 283-284: 'Car de même qu'il y a autant ou plus de sentiment dans la vûë sensible d'un objet, que je tiens tout proche de mes yeux & que j'examine avec soin, que dans la vûë d'une campagne entiére, que je regarde avec négligence & sans attention; de sorte que la netteté du sentiment que j'ai de l'objet qui est tout proche de mes yeux, récompense l'étenduë du sentiment confus que j'ai de plusieurs choses, que je voi sans attention dans une campagne: ainsi la vûë que l'esprit a d'un seul objet, est quelque-fois si vive & si distincte, qu'elle renferme autant ou même plus de pensée, que la vûë des rapports qui sont entre plusieurs choses.'

83 'to pecke up' should probable be read here as: 'to picke up'.

and examine every peble that comes in his way is as unlikely to returne inrichd and laden with Jewels as the other that travelled full speed. Truths are not the better nor the worse for their obviousnesse or difficultie, but their value is to be measurd by their usefulnesse and tendency. Insignificant observations should not take up any of our minutes and those that inlarge our view and give light towards farther and usefull discouverys should not be neglected though they stop our course and spend some of our time in a fixed attention·

(59.) There is an other hast that does often and will mislead the 145 minde if it be left to its self and its own conduct. The understanding is naturally forwards not only to enlarge its knowledg by variety (which makes it skip over one to get speedily to another part of knowledg,) but also eager to enlarge its views by running too fast into general observations and conclusions without a due examination of particulars enough whereon to found those general axiomes.[84] This seems to enlarge their stock but tis of phansies not realities, such Theories built upon narrow foundations stand but weakely and if they fall not of themselves are at least very hardly to be supported against the assaults of opposition· And thus men being to hasty to erect to them selves general notions and ill grounded theories finde them selves deceived in their stock of knowledg when they come to examine their hastily assumed maximes themselves or to have them attacked by others. General observations drawn from particulars are the Jewels of knowledg comprehending great store in a little roome. But they are therefor to be made with the greater care and caution,

1–2 unlikely to [enrich himself with Jewe⟨ls⟩] returne 3 speed. [Observations] `Truths´ (*il.*) 5–6 up [much] `any´ (*il.*) of our [time] `minutes´ (*il.*) 7 fa̱ṟther 7 neglected [what time] though 8 course [in a long] and 203.9–204.14 There is an other … between them (*add. pp. 145, 147; this add. was written around an add. to p. 144 on p. 145 and around an add. to p. 146 on p. 147; these additions both belong to par. 62; so, par. 59 postdates par. 62*) 10 conduct. [It is not only we] The 13 also [.] eager 14 with`ou´t[he] `a due´ (*il.*) 16 realities, [and] such

84 Cf. Bacon, *Novum Organum,* Bk. I, Aph. xx, *Works,* I, p. 160: 'Eandem ingreditur viam (priorem scilicet) intellectus sibi permissus, quam facit ex ordine dialecticæ. Gestit enim mens exilire ad magis generalia, ut acquiescat; et post parvam moram fastidit experientiam', and ibid. Bk. I, Aph. xxv, *Works,* I, p. 161: 'Axiomata quæ in usu sunt ex tenui et manipulari experientia et paucis particularibus, quæ ut plurimum occurunt, fluxere; et sunt fere ad mensuram eorum facta et extensa …'

least if we take counterfeit for true our losse and shame be the greater when our stock comes to a severe scrutiny· One or two particulars may suggest hints of enquiry and they doe well who take those hints.
147 But if they turne them into conclusions and make them | presently general rules they are forward indeed but it is only to impose on themselves by propositions assumed for truths without sufficient warranty. To make noe observations is as has been already remarked to make the head a magazin of materials, which can hardly be called knowledg or at least tis but like a collection of Lumber not reduced to use or order.[85] And he that makes every thing an observation has the same useless plenty and much more falshood mixed with it. the extreams on both sides are to be avoided and he will be able to give the best account of his studys who keeps his understanding in the right mean between them.

Anticipation
140 (60.) Whether it be a love of that which brings the first light and information to their minds and want of vigor and industrie to enquire, or else that men content them selves with any appearance of knowledg right or wrong which when they have once got they will hold fast this is visible that many men give them selves up to the first anticipations of their mindes and are very tenacious of the opinions that first possesse them· They are often as fond of their first conceptions as of their first borne and will by noe means recede from
142 the judgment they have once made or any conjecture or | conceit, which they have once enterteind. This is a fault in the conduct of the understanding since this firmnesse or rather stifnesse of the minde is not from an adherence to truth but a submission to præjudice. Tis an unreasonable homage paid to prepossession whereby we shew a reverence not to (what we pretend to seeke), Truth; but what by hap hazard we chance to light on be it what it will. This is visibly a præpostrous use of our faculties and is a downright prostituteing of (§26)

8 ma`ga´zin (*il.*) 10 order. Ạṇḍ 18 knowledge [ri] right 18–19 `which when they have once | got they will hold fast´ (*il. cont. on p. 141*) 19 up[tọ] to 20–21 of the [first] opinions 21–22 possesse the[[ir]]m [minds and will not easily] `They [seem] `are often´ (*il.*) as … means´ (*add. p. 141*) 23 or [which ....] conceit, 24 enterteind. [This firmnesse of minde.] [`by the .. ... people´ (*il.*)] This is 27 Tis [a fondnesse] an 27 we [pay] `shew´ (*il.*) 28 we [should seek] pretend 30 is a [kinde] downright

85 See above, pars. 39 and 45.

the minde to resigne it thus and put it under power of the first comer. This can never be allowd or ought to be followed as a right way to knowledg till the understanding (whose businesse it is to conforme it self to what it findes in the objects without) can by its owne opiniatrity change that and make the unalterable nature of things comply with its owne hasty determinations which will never be. What ever we phansy things keepe their course and their habitudes correspondencies and relations keepe the same to one an other·

(§27) (61.) Contrary to these but by a like dangerous excesse on the *Resignation* other side are those who always resigne their judgment to the last man they heard or read. Truth never sinkes into these mens minds nor gives any tincture to them but camelion like they take the colour of what is laid before them and as soon loose and resigne it to the next that happens to come in their way·[86] The order where in opinions are proposd to or received by us is noe rule of their rectitude nor ought to be a cause of their preference· First or last in this case is the effect of chance and not the | measure of truth or falshood. This every one 144 must confesse and therefor should in the pursuit of truth keepe his minde free from the influence of any such accidents. A man may as reasonably draw cutts for his tenets and regulate his perswasion by the cast of a die, as take it up for its noveltie or retein it because it had his first assent and he was never of an other minde. well weighed reasons are to determin the judgment· those the minde should be always ready to hearken and submitt to; and by their testimony and suffrage entertein or reject any tenet indifferently whether it be a perfect stranger or an old acquaintance·

1 it [in the] `under´ (*il.*) 1–2 comer [and] `. This´ (*add. p. 143*) 4 to [the natures of things] `what it findes in the objects without´ (*il.*) 5 change [them and bring them to complye] that 5 the [nature] unalterable 6 comply [with its... hasty phansys of the brain.] with 6–8 `determinations … one an other´ (*add. p. 143*) 10 their [opinion] judgment 11 read. [These men [`never´ (*il.*)] the tincture of truth let into their mindes] Truth 12 like `they´ (*il.*) 13 loose [it by the intervention] `and´ (*add.*) resigne 14 in [things] `opinions´ (*il.*) 15 to [our mindes] or 17–18 one [sees] must 19 from [all] `the´ (*il.*) 20 draw [lots] `cutts´ (*add. l. margin*) 20 his [opinions] tenets 20 and [throu] regulate 21 up [or lay it downe] for 21 because [he has] it 22 had [its] his 23 judgment· [for which the understanding ought always to be ready] those 24 and [receive or reject any proposi⟨tion⟩ tenet whether it be] by

86 Cf. *Education,* §67, p. 126: 'We are all a sort of Camelions, that still take a Tincture from things near us …'

Practise (62.) Though the faculties of the minde are improved by exercise (§28)
yet they must not be put to a stresse beyond their strength. quid
Humeri valeant humeri quid ferre recusent[87] must be made the measure of
every ones undertakeing who has a desire not only to performe
well, but to keepe up the vigor of his faculties and not to bauke[88]
his understanding by what is too hard for it. The minde by being
engaged in a taske beyond its strength like the body strained by
246 lifting at a weight too heavy has | often its force broken and thereby
gets an unaptnesse or an aversion to any vigerous attempt ever after.
a sinew cracked seldom recovers its former strength, or at least the
tendernesse of the sprain remains a good while after and the memory
of it longer and leaves a lasting caution in the man not to put the part
quickly again to any robust imployment· soe it fares in the minde
once jaded by an attempt above its power, it either is disabled for
the future or else checks at any vigorous undertakeing ever after at
least is very hardly brought to exert its force again on any subject
that requires thought and meditation, The understanding should be
brought to the difficult and knotty parts of knowledg that trie the
strength of thought and a full bent of the minde by insensible degrees
and in such a gradual proceeding noe thing is to hard for it. Nor let
it be objected that such a slow progresse will never reach the extent
of some sciences· It is not to be imagind how far constancy will carry
a man. however it is better ⟨to⟩ walke slowly in a rugged way than to
breake a leg and be a cripple. He that begins with the calf may carry
the ox but he that will at first goe to take up an ox may soe disable

5 his [minde] `faculties´ (*il.*) 6 by [jadeing of it] `what is | too hard for it´ (*add. cont. on p. 145; revision made across the divion between quires I and K*) 6 minde [being] by 7 taske [to hard it for `it´ (*il.*)] `beyond its strength´ (*il.*) 8 weight [above its strength] `too heavy´ (*il.*) [has] (*deleted, then undeleted by underdotting*) 8 *Page number* 146 *miswritten as* 246. 8 often [its fo⟨rce⟩] its 9 ever{y} 10 cracked [.] seldom 11 tendernesse [and memory] of 11 remains [and hinders [it from] the part from being] `a good while | after´ (*add. cont. on p. 247*) 12 put [[it]] `the | part´ (*add. cont. on p. 147*) 13 the [.] minde 14 its [force] `power´ (*il.*) 16 least `is´ (*il.*) 21 that [..] such 22 imaginḍ 23 man. [but] however 24 with [..] the 25 ox [w⟨ill⟩] may

87 Horace, *Ars Poetica,* II, 38-40: 'Sumite materiam vestris, qui scribitis, æquam / viribus et versate diu, quid ferre, recusent, / quid valeant umeri', 'Take a subject, ye writers, equal to your strength; and ponder long what your shoulders refuse, and what they are able to bear', transl. H. Rushton Fairclough.

88 'to bauke' = to balk = to hinder (*OED* 5a).

himself as not to be able to lift a calf after that. When the minde by insensible degrees has brought it self to attention and close thinkeing it will be able to cope with difficultys and master them without any prejudice to it self and then it may | goe on roundly, every 148 abstruse probleme every intricate question will not baffle discourage or breake it. But though putteing the minde unprepared upon an unusuall stresse that may discourage or damp it for the future ought to be avoided, yet this must not run it by an overgreat shinesse of difficu⟨l⟩ties into a lazy sauntering about ordinary and obvious things that demand noe thought or application, this debases and enarvates the understanding makes it weake and unfit for labour. This is a sort of hovering about the surface of thin⟨g⟩s without any insight into them or penetration. and when the minde has been once habituated to this lazy recumbency and satisfaction on the obvious surface of things it is in danger to rest satisfied there and goe noe deeper since it can not doe it without pains and diging. He that has for some time accustomed himself to take up with what easily offers it self at first view has reason to fear he shall never reconcile himself to the fatigue of turning and tumbling things in his minde to discover their more retired and more valuable secrets·

(63.) Tis not strange that methods of learning which schollers have been accustomed to in their begining and entrance upon the sciences should influence them all their lives and be setled in their mindes by an over ruleing reverence espetialy if they be such as universal use has established. Learners must at first be beleivers and their masters rules haveing been once made axioms to them tis noe wonder they should keepe that dignitie, and by the authoritie they have once got mislead those who thinke it sufficient to excuse them (§29) if they goe out of their way in a well beaten tract. I have copiously

1 When [a man] the 4 *No catchword.* 6 breake it. [This though it be soe yet care must be taken that the avoiding.] But 6 minde `[...] unprepared´ (*il.*) 7 future [be to] ought 12 thin{k}⟨g⟩s 13–20 `and when the {the} | minde has … valuable secrets´ (*add. cont. on p. 149*) 13 once [lazily used to it will seldom goe deeper] habituated 15 things [where it accustomed it self] it 18 shall [like the fatigue] never 21 not [wonder⟨ful⟩] `strange´ (*il.*) 24 `espetialy´ (*il.*) 27 dignitie, and [be in authoritie] by 28 who [have been] thinke 29 have [ab] copiously

Words enough spoken of the abuse of words in an other place[89] and therefor shall upon this reflection that the sciences are full of them warne those that would conduct their understandings right not to take any turne howso ever authorised by the language of the schools | to stand for any thing till they have an Idea of it. And A word may be of frequent use and great credit with several authors and be by them made use of as if it stood for some real being, but yet if he that reads cannot frame any distinct Idea of that being, it is certain to him a mere empty sound without a meaning, and he learns noe more by all that is said of it, or attributed to it, than if it were affirmed only of that bare empty sound. They who would advance in knowledg and not deceive and swell them selves with a little articulated air should lay down this as a fundamental rule, not to take words for things nor suppose that names in books signifie real entities in nature till they can frame clear and distinct Ideas of those Entities. It will not perhaps be allowed if I should set down *substancial formes* and *Intentional species* as such that may justly be suspected to be of this kind of insignificant termes.[90] But this I am sure to one that can forme noe determined Ideas of what they stand for they signifie noe thing at all, and all that he thinks he knows about them is to him soe much knowledg about noe thing and amounts at most but to a learned ignorance.[91] Tis not without all reason supposed that there are many such empty termes to be found in some learned writers to which they had recourse

1 spoken [in this [tract] `treatise´ (*il.*)] of the abuse of words `in an other place´ (*il.*) 2 upon [the occasion] [the] `this´ (*il.*) 5 of it. And [to conclude that if in several places of different authors where it occurs it has noe perceiveable distinct meaning it will be fit to conclude there is noe such thing in nature as that sound pretends to stand for. It will perhaps `not´ (*add. r. margin*) be allowed if I should `for such´ (*il.*). name `*substantial´* (il.) *Formes*, [*Sympathie*] *Intentional species* and a great many other `terms´ (*il.*) currant in learned writers] [for such] `A word | may be … from things´ (*add. cont. on p. 151*) 9 without `a´ (*il.*) 11–12 deceive [them selves] and 13 take [names] words 15 allowed [that] if 16 should [me⟨ntion⟩] set 16 as [termes] `such´ (*il.*) 19 and [to him] all 208.19–209.2 he [has learned about the] thinks [abo⟨ut⟩] he 20 is [soe m⟨uch⟩] to him soe 23 `some´ (*il.*) 23 writers `to´ (*il.*)

89 See above, par. 10, note 15.

90 Cf. *Essay,* III.x.14: 498, where the error of taking words for things is illustrated in a similar anti-scholastic way by pointing to the terms '*peripatetick Forms*' and '*intentional Species*'.

91 See Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), *De docta ignorantia* (1440).

to etch out their Systems where understandings could not furnish them with conceptions from things. But yet I beleive the supposeing of some realities in nature answering those and the like words have much perplexd some and quite mislead others in the Study of nature. That which in any discourse signifies *I know not what*[92] should be considerd *I know not when*. Where men have any conceptions they can if they are never soe abstruse or abstracted explain them and the termes they use for them. For our Conceptions being noe thing but Ideas which are all made up of simple ones, If they cannot give us the Ideas their words stand for tis plain they have none. To what purpose can it be to hunt after his conceptions who has none or none distinct? He that knew not what he himself meant by a learned terme cannot make us know any thing by his use of it let us beat our heads about it never soe long. Whether we are able to comprehend all the operations of nature and the manners of them it matters not to enquire· but this is certain that we can comprehend noe more of them than we can distinctly conceive and therefor to obtrude termes where we have noe distinct conceptions as if they did | contein or 152 rather conceale some thing is but an artifice of learned vanity to cover a defect in an hypothesis or our understandings. Words are not made to conceale but to declare and shew some thing. Where they are by those who pretend to instruct otherwise used they conceale indeed something but that that they conceale is noe thing but the ignorance error or sophistry of the talker for there is in truth noe thing else under them·

(§30) (64.) That there is constant succession and flux of Ideas in our mindes I have observed in the former part of this essay and every one *Wandering*

2–3 supposeing [o̤n̤e̤] of 3 `and the like´ (*il.*) 10 the`ir´ 10–11 none. [And it can never be worth while] `To what purpose can it be´ (*add., p. 151*) 12 `meant´ (*il.*) 12–13 learned [...] terme 13 by [our] `his´ (*il.*) 14 to [conceive] `comprehend´ (*il.*) 17 distinctly [to] conceive 19 learned [ignorance] `vanity´ (*il.*) 21–22 they [are] `are by those who pretend to instruct´ (*add., p. 153*) 22–23 indeed [but it] something 23 is [in truth] noe 23–24 ignorance [or] error

92 Cf. *Essay,* II.xxiii.2: 295: 'So that if any one will examine himself concerning his *Notion of pure Substance in general,* he will find he has no other *Idea* of it at all, but only a Supposition of he knows not what support of such Qualities, which are capable of producing simple *Ideas* in us …'

may take notice of it in himself.[93] This I suppose may deserve some part of our care in the conduct of our understandings and I thinke it may be of great advantage if we can by use get that power over our mindes as to be able to direct that train of Ideas that soe since there will new ones perpetualy come into our thoughts by a constant succession we may be able by choise soe to direct them that none may come in view but such as are pertinent to our present enquiry and in such order as may be most usefull to the discovery we are upon. Or at least if some foraigne and unsought Ideas will offer themselves that yet we might be able to reject them and keepe them from takeing off our minde from its present pursuit and hinder them from running away with our thoughts quite from the subject in hand. This is not
154 I suspect | soe easy to be done as perhaps may be imagined, and yet for ought I know this may be if not the cheif yet one of the great differences that carry some men in their reasoning soe far beyond others where they seeme to be naturaly of equall parts. A proper and effectual remedie for this wandering of thought I would be glad to finde. He that shall propose such an one would doe great service to the studious and contemplative part of man kinde and perhaps help unthinkeing men to become thinkeing· I must acknowledg that hitherto I have discoverd noe other way to keepe our thoughts close to their businesse but the endeavouring as much as we can, and by frequent attention and application geting the habit of attention and application. He that will observe children will finde that even when they endeavour their uttermost they cannot keep their minds from stragling.[94] The way to cure it I am satisfied is not angry chideing or beating for that presently fils their heads with all the Ideas that

5 into [the minde] our 7 are [use⟨ful⟩] pertinent [and usefull] to 9 that[th] 11 mind[[ęș]]ę from [their] its 11 and [run away] hinder 11 keepe [them] (*deleted, then undeleted by underdotting*) [`it´ (*il.*)] 12–13 not I [im⟨agine⟩] suspect 13 perhaps [I] may 13–14 yet [perhaps] for 15 `soe far´ (*il.*) 16–17 `and effectual´ (*add. p. 155*) 23 get`ing´ (*il.*) 25 endeavour [the contrary] `their ut| termost they´ (*add. cont. on p. 155*) cannot [be kept] `keep´ (*il.*) [from stragling]

93 Cf. *Essay,* II.vii.9: 131: 'For if we look immediately into our selves, and reflect on what is observable there, we shall find our *Ideas* always, whilst we are awake, or have any thought, passing in train, one going, and another coming, without intermission.' See also ibid. II.xiv '*Of Duration, and its simple Modes*', pp. 181-196.

94 Cf. *Education,* §167, pp. 221-223.

fear dread and confusion can offer to them. To bring back gently their wandering thoughts by leading them into the path and goeing befor them in the train they should pursue, without any rebuke or soe much as takeing notice (when it can be avoided) of their roveing I suppose would sooner reconcile and inure them to attention than all | those rougher methods which more distract their thought and 154[2] hindering the application they would promote introduce a contrary habit.[95]

(§31) (65.) Distinction and Division are (if I mistake not the import *Distinctions* of the words) very different things the one being the perception of a differance that nature has placed in things the other our makeing a division where there is yet none.[96] At least if I may be permitted to consider them in this sense I thinke I may say of them, that one of them is the most necessary and conducive to true knowledg that can be· the other when too much made use of serves only to puzzell and confound the understanding. To observe every the least difference that is in things argues a quick and clear sight and this keepes the understanding steady and right in its way to knowledg. But though it be usefull to discerne every variety is to be found in nature, yet it is not convenient to consider every difference that is in things and divide them into distinct classes under every such difference· this will run us if followed into particulars (for every individuall

1 fear [and] dread 1 `gently´ (*il.*) 2–3 into the [track they should goe in] `path | and [shewing them the way] {and} goeing … pursue,´ (*add. cont. on p. 155*) 4 avoided 5 sooner [bring them] reconcile 6 all (*catchword not repeated on p. 154[2]*) 7 promote [confirme th] introduce 11 other [..] `our´ (*il.*) 12 where [nature has made] `there is yet [...]´ (*il.*) 12–13 to [use] consider 15 `when too much made use of´ (*il.*)

95 Cf. *Education,* §147, p. 208: 'gently correct, and weed out any Bad Inclinations, and settle in him good Habits'.

96 This sentence is rather confusing; Locke's point seems to be that *division* concerns 'the perception of a differance that nature has placed in things', and *distinction* 'our makeing a division where there is yet none'. Cf. *Essay,* III.x.12: 496 about artificial 'curious Distinctions, and acute Niceties', and *Education,* §195, p. 252: 'it will be of great use to his [the tutor's] Pupil to accustome him to distinguish well, that is, to have distinct Notions, where-ever the Mind can find any real difference, but as carefully to avoid distinctions in terms, where he has not distinct and different clear Idea's'. See also Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium,* Pt. I, Ch. 18, p. 62: 'Divisio est latioris in angustiora deductio. Quæ si sit *Nominis, Distinctio;* si *Rei, Divisio* magis propriè appellatur.'

has something that differences it from an other) and we shall be able to establish noe general truths or else at least shall be apt to perplex the minde about them. The collection of several things into several classes gives the minde more general and larger views, but
156 we must take care to unite them only in that and soe far as | they doe agree for soe far they may be united under one consideration. Entity it self that comprehends all things as general as it is may afford us clear and rational conceptions. If we would well weigh and keep in our mindes what it is we are considering that would best instruct us when we should or should not branch into farther distinctions which are to be taken only from a due contemplation of things to which there is noe thing more opposite than the art of verbal distinctions made at pleasure in learned and arbitrarily invented termes to be applyd at a venture without comprehending or conveying any distinct notions, and soe altogeather fitted to artificial talke or empty noise in dispute without any clearing of difficulties, or advance in knowledg. What soever subject we examin and would get knowledg in, we should I thinke make as general and as large as it will bare, nor can there be any danger of this if the Idea of it be setled and determined, for if that be soe we shall easily distinguish it from any other Idea though comprehended under the same name· For it is to fence against the intanglement of equivocal words and the great art of Sophistry which lies in them that distinctions have been multiplied and their use thought soe necessary. But had every distinct abstract Idea a distinct knowne name there would be little need of these multiplied scholastick distinctions, though there would be never the lesse as much need still of the mindes observeing the differences that are in things, and discriminateing them thereby one from an other. Tis not therefor the right way to knowledg to hunt
158 after and fill the head with aboundance of artificial | and scholastick

1 it [..] from 4 gives [us] `the minde´ (*il.*) 5 them [in] only 6–7 consideration. [For] [[e]]Entity 10 us [from the constitution] when 12 thing [soe] `more´ (*add.*) 12 than the [artificial and verbal distinctions which consists] art 15–16 `to [artifici⟨al⟩] artificial talke´ (*add. cont. on p. 157*) 20 setled and [clear and distinct] `determined´ (*add. p. 157*) 22 against the [imposition] intanglement 23 `which | lies in them´ (*add. cont. on p. 157*) 24 been [principally made use of and have been made] `multiplied and their use | thought´ (*il. cont. on p. 157*) 28 dis[cerneing]`criminateing´ (*il.*) 28 there-/by 29 knowledg to [fill the] hunt

distinctions where with learned mens writeing are often filled, and we sometimes finde what they treat of soe divided and subdivided that the minde of the most attentive reader looses the sight of it, as it is more than probable the writer himself did. for in things crumbled into dust tis in vain to affect or pretend order, or expect clearnesse. To avoid confusion by too few or too many divisions is a great skill in thinkeing as well as writeing which is but the copying our thoughts but what are the boundarys of the meane between the two vitious excesses on both hands I thinke is hard to set down in words, Clear and distinct Ideas is all that I yet know able to regulate it. But as to verball distinctions received and applyd to common termes i·e· equivocal words they are more properly I thinke the businesse of Criticisme and dictionarys than of real knowledg and Philosophie since they for the most part only explain the meaning of words and give us their several significations. The dexterous management of termes and being able to *Fend and prove* with them I know has and does passe in the world for a great part of learning But it is learning distinct from knowledg For knowledg consists only in perceiveing the habitudes and relations of Ideas one to an other which is done without words, the intervention of a sound helps noething to it, and hence we see that there is least use of distinctions where there is most knowledg I mean in Mathematics where men have determined Ideas with known names to them and soe there being noe roome for equivocations there is noe need of distinctions. In argueing the opponent uses as comprehensive and equivocal termes as he can to involve his adversary in the doubtfulnesse of his expressions this is expected and therefor the answerer on his side makes it his play to destinguish as much as he can and thinkes he can never doe it too much, nor can he indeed in that way wherein victory may be had without truth and without knowledg. This seems to me to be the art of disputeing, use your words as captiously as you can in your

1–12 learned [mens writeings are often filled They] `me|ns writeing … words they´ (*add. cont. on p. 159; written across the division between quires K and L*) 1 filled [with], and 3 of `it´ (*il.*) 11 distinctions [affixed] received 13 knowledg and [the] Philosophie 14 `for the most part´ (*il.*) only [give us] explain 17 learning [But where] But 21 we [fin⟨d⟩] see 22 have [clear and distinct] `determined´ (*il.*) 23 Ideas [and] with 23 names [for] `to´ (*il.*) 24 `need´ (*il.*) 25 can [by] to 26 of [..] his 29 where `in´ (*il.*)

argueing on one side, and apply distinctions as much as you can on the other side to every terme to nonplus your oponent soe that in this sort of scholarship there being noe bounds set to distinguishing some
160 men have thought all accutenesse to have | lain in it and therefor in all they have read or thought on their great businesse has been to amuse themselves with distinctions and multiplie to themselves divisions at least more than the nature of the thing required. There seems to me as I said to be noe other rule for this but a due and right consideration of things as they are in them selves.[97] He that has setled in his minde determined Ideas with names affixed to them will be able both to discerne their differences one from an other which is realy distinguishing and where the penury of words affords not termes answering every distinct Idea will be able to apply proper distinguishing termes to the comprehensive and equivocal names he is forced to make use of. This is all the need I know of distinguishing termes and in such verbal distinctions each terme of the distinction joynd to that whose signification it distinguishes is but a new distinct name for a distinct Idea, where they are soe and men have clear and distinct conceptions that answer their verbal distinctions they are right and are pertinent as far as they serve to clear any thing in the subject under consideration. And this is that which seems to me the proper and only measure of distinctions and divisions, which he that will conduct his understanding right must not look for in the accutenesse of invention nor the authoritie of writers but will finde only in the consideration of things themselves whether they are lead into it by their owne meditations or the information of books.

162 (66.) An aptnesse to Jumble things together wherein can be found any likenesse is a fault in the understanding on the other side which will not faile to mislead it and by thus lumping of thing⟨s⟩

1 on[e] one 1 side and [distinguish as much] apply 1–2 `on the other side´ (*il.*) 4 lain `in it´ (*il.*) 5–6 has been to [mu⟨l⟩tiplie to themselves distinctions and divisions] amuse 7–8 There [is] `seems´ (*il.*) to `me | as I said´ (*add. cont. on p. 161*) 10 minde [clear `and real´ (*il.*) Ideas] [true and clear] `determined´ (*il.*) 11 able [to [di⟨scerne⟩] only to dis⟨erne⟩] both 11–12 differences [which] `one from another which´ (*add. p. 161*) 16 termes [which] and 16 verbal [....] distinctions 17 to that [which it] whose 17 new [...] `distinct´ (*il.*) 19 answer [them] their 23 must [finde not in the] not 27 *Par. preceded by deleted words of a new par.:* [A lumping of things togeather w⟨here⟩]

97 See above, pars. 49 and 56.

hinder the minde from distinct and accurate conceptions of them.[98]
(§32) To which let me here add an other neare of kin to this at least in name and that is leting the minde upon the suggestion of any new notion run immediately after similies to make it the clearer to it self, *Similes* which though it may be a good way and usefull in the explaining our thoughts to others yet it is by noe means a right method to settle true notions of any thing in our selves, because similes always faile in some part and come short of that exactnesse which our conceptions should have to things if we would thinke aright. This indeed makes men plausible talkers for those are always most acceptable in discourse, who have the way to let in their thoughts in to other men⟨s⟩ mindes with the greatest ease and facility, whether those thoughts are well formed and correspond with things matters not, few men care to be instructed but at an easy rate. They who in their discourse strike the phansy and take the hearers conceptions along with them as fast as their words flow, are the applauded talkers and goe for the only men of clear thoughts· noe thing contributes soe much to this as similes | whereby men thinke they themselves understand better because they 164 are the better understood.[99] But it is one thing to think right and an other thing to know the right way to lay our thoughts before others with advantage and clearnesse be they right or wrong. well chosen similes metaphors and allegories with method and order doe

2 other [something of the same family and that is] neare 3 minde [run] upon 7 similes 9 thinke [rig⟨ht⟩ 12 whether [though⟨ts⟩] those 13 few [h.....] men [scarce] care 14 who[se] `in their´ (*il.*) 14–15 discourse [reach] `strik[[es]]e´ (*il.*) the phansy and tak[[es]]e 16 talkers [and] `and | goe for´ (*add. cont. on p. 163*) 17 similes (*catchword not repeated on p. 164.*) 19 `is´ (*il.*) 21 `with advantage and clearn|esse´ (*il. cont. on p. 165*) 22 allegories [doe this the b⟨est⟩] with 215.22–216.1 `doe this´ (*il.*)

98 Cf. Bacon, *Novum Organum,* Pt. I, Aph. lv, *Works,* I, p. 169: 'Maximum et velut radicale discrimen ingeniorum, quoad philosophiam et scientias, illud est; quod alia ingenia sint fortiora et aptiora ad notandas rerum differentias, alia ad notandas rerum similitudines. (…) Utrumque autem ingenium facile labitur in excessum, prensando aut gradus rerum aut umbras.'

99 Cf. *Essay,* IV.xix.9: 700 on enthusiasts: 'This is the way of talking of these Men: they are sure, because they are sure: and their Perswasions are right, only because they are strong in them. For, when what they say is strip'd of the Metaphor of seeing and feeling, this is all it amounts to: and yet these Similes so impose on them, that they serve them for certainty in themselves, and demonstration to others.'

this the best of any thing. because being taken from objects already known and familiar to the understanding they are conceived as fast as spoken· and the correspondence being concluded the thing they are brought to explain and elucidate is thought to be understood too· Thus phansy passes for knowledg, and what is prettily said is
165 mistaken for solid. I say not this to decrie | metaphor or with designe to take away that ornament of speech· my business here is not with Rhetoricians and Orators but with philosophers and lovers of truth to whom I would beg leave to give this one rule whereby to trie whether in the application of their thoughts to any thing for the improvement of their knowledg they doe in truth comprehend the matter before them really such as it is in it self. The way to discover this is to observe whether in the laying it before themselves or others they make use only of borrowed representations and Ideas forreigne to the thing which are applyd to it by way of accomodation as bearing some proportion or imagined likeness to the subject under consideration. Figured and metaphorical expressions doe well to illustrate more abstruse and unfamiliar Ideas which the minde is not yet throughly accustomed to, but then they must be made use of to illustrate Ideas that we already have, not to paint to us those which we yet have not.
167 | such borrowed and allusive Ideas may follow reall and solid truth to set it off when found but must by noe means be set in its place and taken for it· If all our search has yet reached noe farther than simile and metaphor we may assure our selves we rather phansy than know and are not yet penetrated into the inside and reality of the thing be it what it will. but content our selves with what our imaginations not things themselves furnishes us with·

Assent
164 (67.) In the whole conduct of the understanding there is noe thing of more moment than to know when and where and how (§33)

1 from [things known and] `objects´ (*il.*) 1–2 already [familiarly] known 6–27 `I say not this to decrie | metaphor or … us with´ (*add. p. 165, cont. p. 167*) 13 in the [representing it to themselves or] laying 13 before [others] themselves 14–15 thing [it only] `[..] which are´ (*il.*) 18 `throughly´ (*il.*) 19 but [they must seek allusive representations] `then they´ (*il.*) 20–21 not. [Such borrowed and] | such 26–27 `but … us with´ (*add.*) 26 with `what´ (*il.*) 29 thing [there is noe thing] of

far to give assent and possibly there is noething harder.[100] Tis very easily said and noe body questions it. That giveing and witholding our assent and the degrees of it should be regulated by the evidence which things carry with them and yet we see men are not the better for this rule. Some firmly imbrace doctrines upon slight grounds some upon noe grounds and some contrary to appearance. Some admit of certainty and are not to be moved in what they hold, others waver in every thing and there want not those that reject all as uncertain. What then shall a novice, an enquirer a stranger doe in the case? I answer use his eyes, there is a correspondence in things and agreement and disagreement in Ideas discernable in very different degrees | and 166 there are eyes in men to see them if they please, only their eyes may be dimned or dazeld and the discerneing sight in them impaired or lost· Interest and passion dazels,[101] the custome of argueing on any side even against our perswasions dims the understanding and makes it by degrees loose the facultie of discerneing clearly between truth and falshood and soe of adhereing to the right side. Tis not safe to play with error and dresse it up to our selves or others in the shape

4–5 for [it] `this rule´ (*il.*) 9 shall a [travellar doe in the case] novice 9 enquirer a [traveller doe in] stranger 10 is [an evidence in things] a correspondence 10–11 agreement [[o͟r͟]]and disagreement 11 `very´ (*il.*) 13 be [dazled or their phansys] dimned 13 [sight] (*deleted, then undeleted by underdotting*) [`faculty´ (*il.*)] 14 customę 14–15 argue[/ing]`in|g on any side even´ (*add. cont. on p. 167*)

100 Cf. *Essay,* IV.xv.3: 655: '*Probability* is likeliness to be true, the very notation of the Word signifying such a Proposition, for which there be Arguments or Proofs, to make it pass or be received for true. The entertainment the Mind gives this sort of Propositions, is called *Belief, Assent,* or *Opinion,* which is the admitting or receiving any Proposition for true, upon Arguments or Proofs that are found to perswade us to receive it as true, without certain Knowledge that it is so' and ibid. IV.xvi.1: 657-658: 'The grounds of Probability, we have laid down in the foregoing Chapter, as they are the Foundations on which our *Assent* is built; so are they also the measure whereby its several degrees are, or ought to be *regulated*: only we are to take notice, that whatever grounds of Probability there may be, they yet operate no farther on the Mind, which searches after Truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they appear …'

101 Cf. Malebranche, *Recherche,* Vol. I, Bk. I, Chap. iv, p. 67: 'Mais nos *inclinations* & nos *passions* agissent encore tres-fortement sur nous: elles ébloüissent nôtre esprit par de fausses lueurs, & elles le couvrent, & le remplissent de ténèbres.'

of truth. The minde by degrees looses its natural relish of real solid truth is reconciled insensibly to any thing that can but be dressed up into any faint appearance of it. and if the phansy be allowed the place of the judgment at first in sport it after wards comes by use to usurp it, and what is recommended by this flatterer (that studys but to please) is received for good. There are soe many ways of fallacie. such arts of giveing colours appearances and resemblances by this Court dresser the phansy, that he who is not very wary to admitt noe thing but truth it self, very carefull not to make his minde subservient to any thing else cannot but be caught. He that has a minde to beleive has half assented already and he that by often argueing against his owne sense imposes falshoods on others is not far from beleiveing himself. This takes away the great distance there is betwixt truth and falshood, it bring⟨s⟩ them almost to geather and makes it noe great odds in things that approach soe near which you take· and when things are brought to that passe passion or interrest etc easily and without being perceived, determin which shall be the right· I have (§34)

Indifferency

said above that we should keep a perfect Indifferency for all opinions, not wish any of them true or trie to make them appear soe but being indifferent receive and imbrace them according as Evidence and that allone gives the attestation of truth.[102] They that doe thus i·e· keep their mindes indifferent to opinions to be determined only by evidence, will always finde the understanding has perception enough to distinguish between evidence or noe evidence, betwixt plain and doubtfull and if they neither give nor refuse their assent but by that

1–3 natural [abhorrence] [`taste [and] for truth´ (*il.*)] `re|lish of real solid truth is reconciled `insensibly´ (*il.*) to … appearence of it.´ (*add. cont. on p. 167*) {of it} and `if´ (*il.*) 4 sport `it´ (*il.*) 5–17 recommended by [this Court dresser that alway pleases is received for good:] `this flatterer … the right´ (*add., p. 167*) 8–10 phansy that [the minde] he who (a) [has a] (b) `is not very wary to admitt noe |thing but truth it self, very carefull not to make his´ (*il.*) (c) [minde] (*deleted, then undeleted by underdotting*) (d) [to be caught [cann⟨ot⟩] may easily be deceived ..] (e) `subservient to any thing else´ (*il.*) *Original text: (a)-(c)-(d); (a)-(c)-(d) deleted; (b) added; (c) undeleted; (e) added.* 13 is [and should be] betwixt 14 them [near] `almost´ (*il.*) 16 `ẹṭc´ (*il.*) 19 not [tr.] wish 20 according [to] `as´ (*il.*) 21 allone [recommends them to us as] `gives the attestation of´ (*il.*) 22 their [und⟨erstandings⟩] mindes 25 `neither´ (*il.*) 25 refuse [not] their

102 See above, par. 33.

measure, they will be safe in the opinions they have· which being perhaps but few this caution will have also this good in it that it will put them upon considering and teach them the necessity of examining more than they doe. without which the minde is but a receptacle of inconsistencys not the storehouse of truths. They that doe not keep up this indiffe⟨re⟩ncy in themselves for | all but truth 168 not supposed but evidenced to themselves, put colourd spectacles before their eyes and looke on things through false glasses and then thinke themselves excused in following the false appearances which they themselves put upon them. I doe not expect that by this way the assent should in every one be proportioned to the grounds and clearnesse where with every truth is capable to be made out, or that men should be perfectly kept from error· That is more than human nature can by any means be advanced to. I aime at noe such unatteinable priviledg. I am only speaking of what they should doe who would deale fairly with their owne mindes and make a right use of their faculties in the pursuit of truth. We faile them a great deale more than they faile us. Tis mismanagement more than want of abilities that men have reason to complain of. and which they actualy doe complain of in those that differ from them· he that by an indifferency for all but truth suffers not his assent to goe faster than his evidence nor beyond it will learne to examin and examin fairly instead of presumeing, and noe body will be at a losse or in any danger for want of imbraceing those truths which are necessary in his station and circumstances. In any other way but this all the world are borne to orthodoxie they imbibe at first the allowed opinions of their country and party and soe never questioning their truth not one of an hundred ever examines. They are applauded for presumeing they are in the right. He that considers is a foe to Orthodoxie because possibly he may deviate from some of the received doctrines there.

1 have· [and] which 2 this [ṃe̱t̤ḥo̱d̤] caution 5–6 that [that] doe 6 for | [but] all 7 supposed [befor⟨e⟩] but 9 excused [by] in 9 appearances [of things] which 10 not [thinke that by] expect 14 can `b[[e]]y´ (*add.*) [in any wa{r}y means be priviledgd form.] [I am] [Tis not that is to be aimed at] any (*first words represent different layers of correction*: (1) be in any wa{r}y; (2) by any means be; (3) by any priviledgd form.) 19–20 `and which | they actualy doe [`d s̱e̱̱´ (*il.*)]complain of in those that differ from them´ (*add. cont. on p. 169*) 23–24 `or in any danger´ (*il.*) 24 i̱m̱braceing 25 world [and all in it] are 26 borne `to´ (*il.*) 27 `never questioning their truth´ (*il.*)

170 And thus men without any industry or acquisition of their own | inherit local truths (for it is not the same every where) and are inured to assent without Evidence. This influences farther than is thought. For what one of an hundred of the zealous bigots in all partys ever examined the tenets he is soe stiff in? or ever thought it his businesse or duty soe to doe?[103] It is suspected of Lukewarmnesse to suppose it necessary and a tendency to Apostacy to goe about it:[104] And if a man can bring his minde once to be positive and feirce for positions whose evidence he has never once examined and that in matters of greatest concernement to him, what shall keepe him from this short and easy way of being in the right in cases of lesse moment? Thus we are taught to clothe our mindes as we doe our bodys after the fashon in vogue and tis accounted phantasticalnesse or some thing worse not to doe soe. This custome, (which who dares oppose?) makes the short sighted bigots and the warier scepticks as far as it prevailes and those that breake from it are in danger of heresie. for takeing the whole world how much of it doth Truth and Orthodoxie possesse togeather, Though tis by the last alone (which has the good luck to be every where) error and heresye are judgd of· For argument and Evidence signifie noe thing in the case. And excuse noe where but are sure to be borne down in all societies by the infallible Orthodoxie of the place. Whether this be the way to truth and right assent let the opinions that take place and prescribe in the several habitable parts of the Earth declare. I never saw any reason yet why truth might not

1–2 own | [men are borne to] (*catchword* [men] *deleted as well*) `inherit´ (*il.*) 5 stiff in [,]? 6 doe? [suspected, of] `It | is suspected of´ (*add. cont. on p. 171*) [Apostacy or at least] Lukewarmnesse 8 for [tenets] `po|sitions´ (*add. cont. on p. 171*) 12 are [accust⟨omed⟩] taught 12–13 fashon [of the place or] in 17 world [`togeather´ (*il.*)] how 18 tis `by´ (*il.*) 19 where) [by w̱.ch] error 20 And [are] excuse 20–22 `but [...] are sure | to be borne downe [everywhere] `in all societies´ (*il.*) by the infallible Orhodoxie of the place´ (*il. cont. on p. 171*)

103 Cf. *Essay*, IV.xx.18: 719: 'if any one should a little catechize the greatest part of the Partisans of most of the Sects in the World, he would not find, concerning those Matters they are so zealous for, that they have any Opinions of their own: much less would he have Reason to think, that they took them upon the Examination of Arguments, and Appearance of Probability'.

104 Cf. Locke, 'Error', in: King, II, p. 77: 'As soon as it is perceived that he quits the implicit faith, expected though disowned by the Church, his orthodoxy is presently questioned, and he is marked out for a heretic.'

be trusted to its own evidence. I am sure if that be not able to support it there is noe fence against error; and then Truth and falshood are but names that stand for the same things. Evidence therefor is that by which alone every man is (and should be taught) to | regulate his 172 assent who is then and then only in the right way when he follows it.

(68.) Men deficient in knowledg are usualy in one of these three states either wholy ignorant: or as doubting of some proposition they have either imbraced formerly, or at present are inclined to: or lastly they doe with assurance hold and professe without ever haveing examined and being convinced by well grounded arguments. The first of these are in the best state of the three by haveing their mindes yet in their perfect freedom and indifferency the likelier to pursue (§35) truth the better, haveing noe bias yet clapd on to mislead them· For ignorance with an indifferency for truth is nearer to it, than opinion *Indifferency* with ungrounded inclination which is the great source of Error. And they are more in danger to goe out of the way who are marching under the conduct of a guide that tis an hundred to one will mislead them, than he that has not yet taken a step and is likelyer to be prevaild on to enquire after the right way. The last of the three sorts are in the worst condition of all· For if a man can be perswaded and fully assured of any thing for a truth without haveing examined, what is there that he may not imbrace for truth? and if he has given himself up to beleive a lie what means is there left to recover one who can be assured without examining? To the other two This I crave leave to say. That | as he that is ignorant is in the best state 174 of the two, soe he should pursue truth in a method suitable to that state. i·e· by enquiring directly into the nature of the thing it self without mindeing the opinions of others or troubleing himself with their questions or disputes about it but to see what he himself can sincerely searching after truth finde out. He that proceeds upon others

1 sure if [it cannot may not] that 2 error; [and Truth] `and then Truth´ (*add. p. 171*) 3–4 things. [This therefor alone ought to] `Evidence therefor … taught) to´ (*add. p. 171*) 3 therefor [alone] is 4 regulate [our assent] [every mans] `his´ (*il.*) 6 *Par. 68 is preceded by the deleted start of a new par.*: [I have said above p. [7.] 96 that] *the marginal entry that accompanies this abortive par. is not deleted:* Ἐπέχειν. *Par. 68 itself starts with a deleted marginal entry:* [Questions] 6 knowledg [may be considerd] are 8–9 lastly [that] they 11 by [being yet] haveing 13 `clapd on´ (*il.*) 14 ignorance [of] with 19 `after´ (*il.*) 22 and [when] if 25 is [fully] ignorant 30 `after´ (*il.*)

principles in his enquiry into any sciences though he be resolved to examin them and judg of them freely, does yet at least put himself on that side and post himself in a party which he will not quit till he be beaten out. by which the minde is insensibly engaged to make what defence it can and soe is unawares biassed. I doe not say but a man should embrace some opinion when he has examined, else he examines to noe purpose, But the surest and safest way is to have noe opinion at all till he has examined and that without any the least regard to the opinions or Systems of other men about it. For example were it my Businesse to understand physick would not the safer and
176 readier way be to consult nature her self | and informe my self in the history of diseases and their cures than espouseing the principles of The Dogmatists, Methodists or Chymists[105] engage in all the disputes concerning either of those systemes and suppose it true till I have tried what they can say to beat me out of it. Or supposeing that Hippocrates or any other booke infallibly conteines the whole art of physick would not the direct way be to study read and consider that booke weigh and compare the parts of it to finde the truth rather than espouse the doctrines of any party who though they acknowledg his authority have already interpreted and wiredrawn all his text to their owne sense the tincture whereof when I have imbibed I am more in danger to misunderstand his true meaning than if I had come to him with a minde unprepossessed by doctors and commentators

1 principles in [any science] his 7 way [t̤ill] is 9 it. [Religion every mans businesse gives us.] For 10 understand [Aristotles Philosophie aright, would it not be the natural and Genuin way to begin with reading what he himself writt] physick 13 Chymists [exam⟨ine⟩] engage 14 and [trye what] suppose 15 it. [Espeti⟨ally⟩] Or 16 `infallibly´ (*il.*) 20 wire-/drawn 21 `when´ (*il.*) I have imbibed [and] `I am | more´ (*add. cont. on p. 177*) [therefor]

105 Locke here mentions three schools of medicine: the dogmatists were followers of Hippocrates (*c.* 460 BC—*c.* 377 BC); the Methodical School was possibly founded by Themison of Laodicea (fl. 1st century BC), who himself was a pupil of Asclepiades of Bithynia (124 BC—1st century BC); and the main inspirator of the chymists was Paracelsus (see above, par. 44, note 61. For more on dogmatists and methodists see Phillips, *Greek Medicine,* pp. 161-171; for chymists see Debus, *The Chemical Philosophy, passim*.

of my sect, whose reasonings interpretation and language which I have been used to will of course make all chime that way and make another and perhaps the genuine meaning of the author seeme harsh straind and uncouth to me. For words haveing naturaly none of their owne cary that signification to the hearer that he is used to put upon them what ever be the sense of him that uses them. This I thinke is visibly soe and if it be, he that begins to have any doubt of any of his tenets which he received without examination ought as much as he can to put himself wholy into this state of ignorance in reference to that question and throwing wholy by all his former notions and the opinions of others examin with a perfect indifferency the question in its source without an inclination to either side, or any regard to his or others unexamined opinions. This I owne is noe easy thing to doe, But I am not enquiring the easy way to opinion but the right way to truth which they must follow | who will deale fairly with their 178 own understandings and their own soules·

(§36) (69.) The indifferency that I here propose will also enable them *Question* to state the Question right which they are in doubt about without which they can never come to a fair and clear decision of it·

(§37) (70.) Another fruit from this indifferency and the considering *Persivereance* things in themselves abstract from our owne opinions and other mens notions and discourses on them will be that each man will pursue his thoughts in that method which will be most agreeable to the nature of the thing and to his apprehension of what it suggests to him.[106] in which he ought to proceed with regularity and constancy untill he come to a well grounded resolution wherein he may acquiesce. If it

1–6 my sect, [whose language [and] reasonings `and interpretations´ (*il.*) I haveing been used to will of course make that of the country appear to me more harsh straind and uncouth] [`or questions re|lateing there unto´ (*il. cont. on p. 177*)] `whose reasonings … uses them´ (*add. p. 177*) 1 reasonings [language and] interpretation 1–2 `which´ (*il.*) I have[ing] 5 signification [every one] `to the hearer that he´ (*il.*) 7 doubt [in] of 8 tenets [ought as ṃ⟨uch⟩] which 12 side, [but that which to] or 13 others [opinions] unexamined 15 followe 15–16 their [u̇n̤⟨derstandings⟩] own 17 propose [is that too that] will `also´ (*il.*) 20 indifferency [is the] and 20–21 considering [thin[[k]]gs] things 22 that [we] each 23 that [sear⟨ch⟩] method

106 On the dependance of method on the kind of object under investigation, see Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §5.

be objected that this will require every man to be a schollar and to quit all his other businesse and betake him self wholy to study. I answer. I propose noe more to any one than he has time for. Some mens state and condition requires noe great extent of knowledg. The necessary provision for life swallows the greatest part of their time But one mans want of leisure is noe excuse for the oscitancy and ignorance of those who have time to spare. And every one has enough to get as much knowledg as is required and expected of him, and he that does not that is in love with ignorance and is accountable for it·

Presumption (71.) The variety of distempers in mens minds is as great as of (§38) those in their bodys some are epidemic few scape them and every one too if he would looke into himself would finde some defect of his particular Genius. There is scarce any one without some idyosyncrasie that he suffers by. This man presumes upon his parts that they will
180 not faile him at time of need and soe | thinks it superfluous labour to make any provision befor hand. His understanding is to him like Fortunatus's purse[107] which is always to furnish him without ever puteing any thing into it before hand. And soe he sits still satisfied, without endeavouring to store his understanding with knowledg· Tis the Spontaneous product of the country and what need of labour in tillage? Such men may spread their native riches before the ignorant But they were best not come to stresse and triall with the skilfull· We are borne ignorant of every thing· The superficies of things that surround them make impressions on the negligent but noe body penetrates into the inside without labour attention and Industry. Stones and timber grow of them selves but yet there is noe uniforme pile with symmetry and convenience to lodg in whithout toile and pains. God has made the intellectual world harmonious and beautifull without us but it will never come into our heads all at once· we must bring it home peice meale and there set it up by our owne

1 `that´ (*add. p. 179*) 1 require [`th´ (*il.*)] every 2 `all´ (*il.*) 5 provision[s] 16 him [and] at 17 `is to him´ (*il.*) 18 Fortunatus's [p..] purse 18 which `is´ (*il.*) 18 furnish{es} 20 to [furnish] `store´ (*il.*) 22 tillage? [.] Such 23 with the [kn.] skilfull 24–25 `that surround them´ (*il.*) 26–27 Industry [Labo⟨ur⟩]. Stones 28 whith`out´ (*il.*) 31 home [peace] peice

107 Fortunatus: a hero of mediaeval legend, derived from Eastern sources, who possessed an inexhaustible purse or wishing-capability.

industry or else we shall have noe thing but darknesse and a Chaos within what ever order and light there be in things without us·

(§39) (72.) On the other side there are others that depresse their owne *Despondency* mindes despond at the first difficulty and conclude that the geting an insight in any of the sciences or make⟨ing⟩ any progresse in knowledg farther then serves their ordinary businesse is above their Capacities, These sit still because they thinke they have not legs to goe, as the others I last mentioned doe because they thinke they have winges to flie and can soare on high when they please. To these latter one may for answer apply the proverb Use legs and have legs. Noe body knows what strenght of parts he has till he has tried them· And of the understanding one may most | truly say That its force is greater 182 generaly than it thinks till it is put to it. viresque acquirit eundo.[108]

(73.) And therefor the proper remedie here is but to set the minde 184 to worke and apply the thoughts vigorously to the businesse for it holds in the struggles of the minde as in those of warr dum putant se vincere vicere[109] a perswasion that we shall overcome any difficultys that we | meet with in the sciences seldom failes to carry us through 186 them. Noe body knows the strength of his minde and the force of steady and regular application till he has tried. This is certain he that sets out upon weake legs, will not only goe farther but grow stronger too than one who with a vigerous constitution and firme limbs only sits still.

(74.) Something of kin to this men may observe in them selves when the mind frights it self (as it often does) with any thing reflected on in grosse and transiently viewd confusedly and at a distance, Things thus offerd to the mind carry the shew of noe thing but

3 that [despond of their owne] depresse 4–5 the [lookeing into] `get|ing an insight in´ (*add. cont. on p. 181*) 5 in [knowledg] knowledg 14 [[[&]]A] And therefor 15 businesse [for it holds] for 17 we [may w] {v} shall 22 and [athletick] `firme´ (*il.*) 24 may [often] observe

108 Virgil, *Æneas*, iv.175-176: 'mobilitate viget viresque adquirit eundo; / parva metu primo, mox sese attollit in auras', 'Speed lends her strength, and she wins vigour as she goes; small at first through fear, soon she mounts up to heaven', transl. H. Rushton Fairclough.

109 Livy, *Historiarum Libri,* Vol. I, Bk. II, Ch. 64, 'believing themselves to be conquering, they conquered', transl. B.O. Forster. Locke's own edition (Leyden, 1645; see Harrison/Laslett, nr. 1772, p. 176) gives: 'Impetu facto, dum se putant vincere, vicere'.

difficulty in them and are thought to be wrapd up in impenetrable obscurity But the truth is these are noe thing but specters that the understanding raises to it self to flatter its own lazynesse, it sees noe thing distinctly in things remote and in an huddle and therefor concludes too faintly that there is noe thing more clear to be discoverd in them. Tis but to approach nearer and that mist of our own raiseing that inveloped them will remove and those that in that mist appeard hideous giants not to be grappled with will be found to be of the ordinary and naturall size and shape. Things that in a remote and confused view seem very obscure must be aproached by gently and regular steps and what is most visible easy and obvious in them first considerd. reduce them into their distinct parts and then in their
188 due order bring all that should | be known concerning every one of those parts into plain and simple question⟨s⟩ and then what was thought obscure perplexd and too hard for our weak parts will lay it self open to the understanding in a fair view and let the minde into that which before it was awed with and kept at a distance from as wholy mysterious· I appeale to my readers Experience whether this has never happend to him espetialy when busy on one thing he has occasionaly reflected on another· I aske him Whether he has never thus been scared with a suddain opinion of mighty difficulties which yet have vanished when he has seriously and methodicaly applied himself to the consideration of this seeming terrible subject and there has been noe other matter of astonishment left but that he amused himself with soe discourageing a prospect of his owne raiseing about a matter which in the handleing was found to have noe thing in it more strange nor intricate than several other things which he had long since and with ease masterd. This experience should teach us how to deale with such Bug bears an other time which should rather serve to excite our vigor than enervate our industry· The surest |
190 way for a learner in this as in all other cases is not to advance by

1 `to be´ (*il.*) 6–7 raiseing [will disappear] `that inveloped them will remove´ (*il.*) 7–8 `in that mist´ (*il.*) appeard `[in that mist] hideous´ (*il.*) 9–12 shape. [Let them be taken into consideration by regular steps] `Things that … first considered´ (*add. 187*) 14–15 what [appeard] `was thought´ (*il.*) 15 and [mysterious] `too hard for our weak parts´ (*il.*) 17 `and kept at a distance from´ (*il.*) 24 but [of wonder] that 25 soe [terr⟨ifying⟩] discourageing 26 handleing [had] was 29 with [the] `such´ (*il.*) 29 time [and] `which should´ (*il.*) 30 than [abate] enervate

jumps and large strides· let that which he sets himself to learn next be indeed the next i:e: as nearly conjoynd with what he knows already as is possible· let it be distinct but not remote from it. Let it be new and what he did not know before, that the understanding may advance. but let it be as little at once as may be, that its advances may be clear and sure. All the ground that it gets this way it will hold. This distinct gradual growth in knowledg is firme and sure, it carys i⟨t⟩s own light with it in every step of its progression in an easy and orderly train than which there is noe thing of more use to the Understanding. And though this perhaps may seem a very slow and lingering way to knowledg yet I dare confidently affirm that whoever will trye it in himself or any one he will teach shall finde the advances greater in this method than they would in the same space of time ⟨have⟩ been in any other he could have taken. The greatest part of true knowledg lies in a distinct perception of things in them selves distinct. And some men give more clear light and knowledg by the bare distinct stateing of a question than others by talkeing of it in gross whole hours togeather. In this they who soe state a question doe noe more but seperate and disintangle the parts of it one from an other, and lay them when soe disintangled in their due order. This often without any more adoe resolves the doubt and shews the minde where the truth lies. The agreement or disagreement of the Ideas in | question when they are once seperated and distinctly 192 considerd is in many cases presently perceived and thereby clear and lasting knowledg gaind, where as things in gross taken up togeather and soe lyeing togeather in confusion can produce in the minde but a confused which in effect is noe knowledg or at least when it comes to be examined and made use of will prove little better than none· I therefor take the liberty to repeat here again what I have said else where[110] That in learning any thing as little should be proposed

4 before, [but let] that 10 this [ṃay̰] perhaps 14 ⟨have⟩ (*also added in O-1706*) 14–15 of [a̲l̲⟨l⟩] true 16 `clear´ (*il.*)̇ 24 `thereby´ (*il.*) clear [kno⟨wledge⟩] and 25–26 togeather [conteining t] and

110 See pars. 58 and 62; see also *Education,* §180, p. 236: 'Give them first one simple Idea, and see that they take it right, and perfectly comprehend it before you go any farther, and then add some other simple Idea which lies next in your way to what you aim at, and so proceeding by gentle and insensible steps, Children without Confusion and Amazement, will have their Understanding opened, and their Thoughts extended farther, then could have been expected.'

at once to the mind as is possible and that being understood and fully masterd to proceed to the next adjoyning part yet unknown simple unperplexd proposition belonging to the matter in hand, and tending to the clearing what is principally designed.

Analogie 203

(75.) Analogie is of great use to the minde in many cases espetialy (§40) in natural philosophie and that part of it cheifly which consists in happy and succesfull experiments.[111] But here we must take care that we keep our selves within that wherein the analogie consists. For example The acid oyle of Vitriol is found to be good in such a case therefor the Spirit of Niter or Vinegar may be used in the like case· If the good effect of it be oweing wholy to the acidity of it the trial may be justified, but if there be some thing else besides the acidity in the oyle of vitriol which produces the good we desire in the case, we mistake that for analogie which is not, and suffer our understanding to be misguided by a wrong supposition of analogie where there is none·

Association 208

(76.) Though I have in the 2^{d} book of My *Essay concerning humane understanding* treated of the *Association of Ideas* yet haveing donne it there historicaly as giveing a view of the understanding in this as well as its several other ways of operateing rather than designeing there to enquire into the remedies ought to be applied to it, It will under this later consideration afford other matter of thought to those who have a minde to instruct them selves throughly in the right way of conducting their *understandings* and that the rather because this if I mistake not is as frequent a cause of mistake
210 and error in us as perhaps | any thing else that can be named, and is a disease of the mind as hard to be cured as any·[112] It being a very hard thing to convince any one that things are not soe, and naturaly soe as they constantly appear to him·

(§41)

5 in [natural] many 6 philosophie 9 acid [spirit] oyle 11 `wholy´ (*il.*) 19 there [rather] historicaly 19 giveing [an account of the way of operation] a view

111 Cf. *Essay,* IV.xvi.12: 665: '*In things which Sense cannot discover, Analogy is the great Rule of Probability*' (header of section); ibid. IV.iii.29: 559-560; and ibid. IV.viii.9: 615.

112 For Locke on the importance of wrong association as a cause of error see Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §3. For the relation between the '*Conduct*-part' on association and the '*Essay*-part' on the same subject, see Gen. Introd.: 'Text', §4 (4).

(77.) By this one easy and unheeded miscariage of the understanding sandie and loose foundations | become infallible principles 52
and will not suffer them selves to be touchd or questiond. Such unnatural connections become by custom as natural to the minde, as
5 sun and light, fire and warmth goe togeather and soe seem to carry with them as natural an evidence as self evident truths themselves. And where then shall one with hopes of successe begin the cure? Many men firmly embrace falshood for truth not only because they never thought otherwise but also because thus blinded as they have
10 been from the beginning they never could think otherwise, at least without a vigor of minde able to contest the empire of habit, and looke into its own principles, a freedom which few men have the notion of in them selves and fewer are allowed the practise of by others. It being the great art and businesse of the teachers and Guides in
15 most sects to suppresse as much as they can this fundamentall duty which every man owes him self and is the first steady step towards right and truth in the whole train of his actions and opinions. | This 210
would give one reason to suspect that such teachers are conscious to them selves of the falshood or weaknesse of the Tenets they professe
20 | since they will not suffer the grounds where on they are built to be 212
examined, when as those who seek truth only and desire to own and

2 become infallible principles … *Text from this point on p. 210 of MS e.1 onwards was copied by William Shaw (see ill. 3) and runs up to and including p. 216 (par. 79 of the present edition). This text has corrections in Locke's hand. There is an earlier version of this text, entirely in Locke's own hand, on pp. 52-56 of the same MS. At least part of Shaw's copy is not directly from Locke's text on pp. 52-56, but from yet another version that is now lost. The copy-text for pars. 77-79 is on pp. 52-56. However, the last sentence of par. 77 is absent in Locke's holograph and has been taken from Shaw's copy. Also, in the case of substantive differences (i.e. differences in wording), preference is in most cases given to Shaw's copy over Locke's holograph. Cases of substantive differences between Locke's holograph and Shaw's copy are registered in this annotation, below. See also Gen. Introd.: 'Text', §5.* 2 become [princip..] infallible 4 become [as] by 4 natural `to´ (*add.*) [`....´ (il.)] the 5 `go|e togeather´ (*add. cont. on p. 53*) 5 to [have] carry 7 cure *Locke's holograph; Shaw's copy, p. 210, gives*: cures 8 `firmly´ (*il.*) 11 to [to] contest 13 of by *Shaw's copy, p. 210; Locke's holograph gives*: of it by 14 art and [businesse] `busi|nesse of the teachers and Guides´ (*add. cont. on p. 53*) 15 most *Shaw's copy, p. 210; Locke's holograph gives*: all erroneous 15 `as much as they can this´ (*il.*) 15–16 duty [which every] which [is y^e^] every 16 `steady´ (*il.*) 229.17–230.6 This would … and allow· (*Shaw's copy, fails in Locke's holograph*) 20 *No catchword.* 21 `examined´ (*probably inserted in space that at first was left blank*)

propagate noe thing else freely expose their principles to the test, are pleased to have them examined, give men leave to reject them if they can and if there be any thing weak and unsound in them are willing to have it detected that they them selves as well as others may not lay any stress upon any received proposition beyond what the evidence of its truth will warrant and allow·

52 54 (78.) There is I know a great talke amongst | all sorts of people of principleing their children and Schollers well, which at last when lookd into amounts to noe more but makeing them imbibbe their teachers notions and tenets by an implicit faith, and firmly to adhere to them whither true or false. What colours may be given to this or of what use it may be when practised upon the vulgar destined to labour and given up to the service of their bellys, I will not here enquire. But as to the ingenuous part of man kinde whose condition allows them leisure and letters and enquiry after truth, I can see noe other right way of principleing them but to take heed as much as may be that in their tender years Ideas that have noe natural cohesion come not to be united in their heads and that this rule be often inculcated to them to be their guide in the whole course of their lives and studys viz That they never suffer any Ideas to be joynd in their understandings in any other or stronger combination than what their own nature and correspondence give them. And that they often examin those that they finde linked togeather in their minds· whether this assotiation of Ideas be from the visible agreement that is in the Ideas them selves or from the habitual and prevaileing custom of the minde joyning them thus togeather in thinking·

56 (79.) This is for caution against this evil | before it be throughly rivited by custom in the understanding, but he that would cure it when habit has establishd it, must nicely observe the very quick and

1 else [truly] `freely′ (*add. p. 213, in Locke's hand*) 3 `and′ (*add. in Locke's hand*) 3 `unsound′ (*add. in Locke's hand*) 4 dete`cted′ (*il. in Locke's hand*) 5 `stress′ (*il. in Locke's hand*) 5–6 `received proposition | beyond … and allow′ (*add. cont. on p. 213, in Locke's hand*) 7 Th[[is]]ere `is′ (*il.*) 7 talke *Locke's holograph; Shaw's copy, p. 212, gives*: faulte 9–10 their [notions] teachers 11 may be given to this *Shaw's copy, p. 212; Locke's holograph gives*: this may bear 12 vulgar [designed] destined 17 years [that] Ideas [are not unite⟨d⟩] that 20–21 in [a stronger combi⟨nation⟩] any 24 from [o̤wn̤⟨e⟩] the 24–25 in th[[...]]e [`Ideas them selves′ (*add. p. 55*)] Ideas them selves or from [their owne custom of joyning them togeather in thinking] the 28 in the [minde] `understanding′ (*il.*)

almost imperceptible motions of the minde in its habitual actions.[113] what I have said in an other place about the change of the Ideas of sense into those of judgment may be a proof of this.[114] let any one not skild in painting be told when he sees bottles and tobaco pipes and other things soe painted, as they are in some places shown that he does not see protuberancys and you will not convince him but by the touch he will not beleive that by an instantaneous legerdemain of his own thoughts one Idea is substituted for the other. How frequent instances may one meet with of this in the argueings of the learned who not seldom, in two Ideas that they have been accustomed to joyn in their mindes, substitute one for the other and I am apt to think often without perceiveing it them selves. This whilst they are under the deceit of it makes them uncapeable of conviction. And they applaud themselves as zealous Champions for truth when indeed they are contending for Error. And the confusion of two different Ideas which a customary connection of them in their mindes hath made to them almost one fills their heads with false views and their reasonings with false consequences·

(§42) (80.) Right understanding consists in the discovery and adherence to truth and that in the perception of the visible or probable agreement or disagreement of Ideas as they are affirmed or denyd one of an other. From whence it is evident that the right use and conduct of the understanding whose business is puerly truth and noe thing else, is that the mind should be kept in a perfect indif-

Fallacies[115] 216

2 of [sensible Ideas into t] the Ideas 3 a proof *Locke's holograph; Shaw's copy, p. 214, gives*: proof 4 told [that] when 4–5 sees [a globe or a bunch of grapes well painted] `.. | bottles and pipes and [such] other things `soe´ (*il.*) painted as they were shewn [a͟t] in Holborn´ *Add. cont. on p. 57; Shaw's copy, p. 214, gives* tobaco pipes *where Locke's holograph gives* pipes *and Shaw's copy, p. 214, gives* are in some places shown *where Locke's holograph gives* were shewn in [a͟t] Holborn 7–8 `of his own thoughts´ (*il.*) 8 is [a consequence and] substituted 15 for [an] Error 15 `different´ (*il.*) 17 made to them *Shaw's copy, p. 216; Locke's holograph gives*: `to them´ (*il.*) made 17 one [with them] fills 22 an other. [In this respe͟⟨ct⟩] From

113 For this mechanical explanation for the acquisition of habits and customs in general, see Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §3.

114 A reference to 'Molyneux's problem'; see *Essay,* II.ix.8-10: 145-147: 'Ideas *of Sensation often changed by the Judgment*' (marginal heading).

115 For a comparison of Locke's discussion of fallacies with the same subject in Aristotelian works on logic, see Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §10.

ferency not inclineing to either side any farther than evidence setles it by knowledg or the overbalance of Probability gives it the turn of assent and beleif· But yet it is very hard to meet with any discourse where in one may not perceive the author not only maintain (for that is reasonable and fit) but inclined and biassed to one side of the question with marks of a desire that that should be true. If it be asked me how Authors who have such a bias and lean to it may be discovered. I answer by observeing how in their writeings or argueings they are often lead by their inclinations to change the Ideas of the question either by changeing the termes or by addeing and joyning others to them, where by the Ideas under consideration are soe varied as to be more serviceable to their purpose and to be thereby brought to an easier and nearer agreement or more visible and remoter disagreement one with an other. This is plain and direct Sophistry. But I am far from thinking that wherever it is found, it
218 is made | use of with designe to deceive and mislead the readers. It is visible that mens prejudices and inclinations by this way impose often upon them selves. And their affection for truth under their prepossession in favour of one side is the very thing that leads them from it. Inclination suggests and slides into their discourse favourable termes which introduce favourable Ideas till at last by this means that is concluded clear and evident thus dressed up which taken in its native state by makeing use of none but precise determind Ideas would find noe admittance at all. The puting those glosses on what they affirme, these as they are thought handsome easy and gracefull explications of what they are discourseing on is soe much the Character of what is called and esteemd writeing well that it is very hard to think that authors will ever be perswaded to leave what serves soe well to propagate their opinions and procure them selves credit in the world, for a more jejune and drie way of writeing by

1 evidence [or the greater probability determins] `setles′ (*il.*) 2–3 knowledg or [gains assent and beleif] [`the greater probability′ (*il.*)] `the | overbalance … beleif′ (*add. cont. on p. 217*) 3 to [read] meet 7–8 how [this shall be known] `Authors … discovered.′ (*add. p. 217*) 9 `are′ (*il.*) 10 question [[and]]either 14 other. [I … am far from think⟨ing⟩] This 15–16 found, it `is′ (*il.*) 16 to [misl⟨ead⟩] deceive 17 mens [prepossessions] `prejudices′ (*add. p. 219*) 18 their [zeale] `affection′ (*il.*) 19 side [misleads] `is the very thing that leads′ (*add. p. 219*) 23 but [the] precise 24 Ideas [in question] would 25 `as they are thought′ (*il.*) 25 `easy′ (*il.*) 29 `selves′ (*il.*)

keeping to the same termes precisely annexd to the same Ideas, a sower and blunt stifness tolerable in mathematicians only, who force their way and make truth prevail by irresistable demonstration·

(81.) But yet if Authors can not be prevailed with to quit the looser though more insinuateing ways of writeing if they will not think fit to keep close to truth and instruction by unvaried termes and plain unsophisticated arguments, yet it concerns readers not ⟨to⟩ be imposed on by fallacies and the prevailing ways of insinuation· To doe this the surest and most effectual remedye: is to fix in the minde the clear and destinct Ideas of the question | stripped of words 220 and soe likewise in the train of argumentation to take up the authers Ideas neglecting his words observeing how they connect or separate those in the question. He that does this will be able to cast off all that is superfluous: He will see what is pertinent what coherent, what is direct to, what slides by the question· This will readily shew him all the forain Ideas in the discourse and where they were brought in, and though they perhaps dazled the writer yet he will perceive that they give noe light nor strength to his reasonings.

(82.) This though it be the shortest and easiest way of reading books with profit and keeping ones self from being mislead by great names or plausible discourses, yet it being hard and tedious to those who have not accustomed them selves to it, it is not to be expected that every one (amongst those few who realy pursue truth) should this way guard his understanding from being imposed on by the wilfull or at least undesigned Sophistrie which creeps into most of the books of argument· They that write against their conviction or that next to them are resolvd to maintain the tenents of a party they are engaged in can not be supposed to reject any arms that may help to defend their cause and therefor such should be read with the greatest caution. And they who write for opinions they are sincerely

2 blunt [way] [of writeing] [`..... ..... discours´ (*il.*)] `stifness´ (*add. p. 219*) 2 tolerable [only] in 3 and [establish truth] make 4 if [`it´ (*il.*) cannot be hoped that] Authors 4 can [should] `not´ (*il.*) 4–5 quit the [the.. insi⟨nuateing⟩] looser 6 by [plain] unvaried 7 plain [unadorn] `unsophisticated´ (*il.*) 7 concerns [those] readers [who would] not 7 ⟨to⟩ (*also added in O-1706*) 10 question [and] 11 like-/-wise 11 argumention `to´ (*il.*) 16 discourse `and´ (*il.*) 17 `he will perceive that´ (*il.*) 21 or [skilfull] plausible 22 `ac´-/[.....]`customed´ 27–28 `they | are engaged in´ (*il. cont. on p. 221*)

perswaded of, and beleive to be true, think they may soe far allow themselves to indulge their laudable affection to truth as to permit their esteem of it to give it the best colours and set it off with the
222 best expressions and dress they | can· there by to gain it the easiest enterance in to the minds of their readers and fix it deepest there·

(83.) One of those being the state of mind we may justly suppose most writers to be in tis fit their readers who apply to them for instruction should not lay by that caution which becomes a sincere pursuit of truth and should make them always watchfull against what ever might conceale or misrepresent it· If they have not the skil of representing to them selves the authors sense by pure Ideas seperated from sounds and thereby divested of the false lights and deceitfull ornaments of speech this yet they should doe, they should keep the precise question steadily in their minds· carry it along with them through the whole discourse and suffer not the least alteration in the termes either by addition substraction or substituteing any other. This every one can doe who has a mind to it. And he that has not a mind to it, tis plain makes his understanding only the warehouse of other mens lumber I mean false and unconcludeing reasonings rather than a repository of truth for his own use which will prove substantiall and stand him in stead when he has occasion for it. And whether such an one deals fairly by his own mind and conducts his own understanding right I leave to his own understanding to judg.

Fundamental verities

(84.) The mind of man being very narrow and soe slow in (§43)
224 making acquaintance with things | and takeing in new truths that noe one man is capable in a much longer life than ours to know all truths, it becomes our prudence in our search after knowledg to imploy our thoughts about fundamental and material questions carefully avoiding those that are trifleing and not suffering our selves to be diverted from our main even purpose by those that are merely

3 give [to] it 4 can [and] `there by to´ (*il.*) 4–5 easiest [interest and ..... possession in the minds of their readers] enterance 6 `of mind´ (*il.*) 7 be in [when treating of any subject] tis 8 becomes [thọse] a 11 `pure´ (*il.*) 11 Ideas [divested of the false lights and ornaments d̤iv̤e̤s̤t̤e̤d̤ of sounds] seperated 12 lights [.] and 14–15 them [iṇ] through 18 it, [....] tis 18 only the [repository] warehouse 20 than [..... a storehouse of truth] a repository 21 substantiall and [usefull] stand 21 has [use of] `occasion for´ (*il.*) 24 and [far from being capable to know all things even] soe 25 mak[[.]]`ing´ (*il. in diff. ink*) 29 trifleing [.] and

incidentall. How much of many yonge mens time is thrown away in purely logical enquirys I need not mention. This is noe better than if a man who was to be a painter should spend all his time in examining the threads of the several clothes he is to paint upon, and counting the hairs of each pencil and brush he intends to use in the laying on of his colours: Nay it is much worse than for a yonge painter to spend his apprentiship in such useless nicetys for he at the end of all his pains to noe purpose finds that it is not painting, nor any help to it, and soe is realy to noe purpose whereas men designed for scholars have often their heads soe fild and warmed with disputes on logical questions that they take those airy useless notions for real and substantial knowledg, and think their understanding soe well furnishd with science that they need not looke any farther into the nature of things, or descend to the mechanical drudgery of experiment and enquiry· This is soe obvious a mismanagement of the understanding and that in the professed way to knowledg that | it could not be passed by, to which might be joynd abundance 226
of questions and the way of handleing of them in the schools. what faults in particular of this kind every man is or may be guilty of would be infinite to enumerate· It suffices to have shewn that superficial and slight discoverys and observations that contein noe thing of moment in them selves, nor serve as clues to lead us into farther knowledg should be lightly passed by and never thought worth our searching after· There are fundamental truths that lie at the bottom as the bassis upon which a great many others rest and in which they have their consistency, these are teeming truths rich in store with which they furnish the mind, and like the lights of heaven are not only beautiful and enterteining in them selves, but give light and evidence to other things that without them could not be seen or known. Such is that admirable discovery of M^{r} Newton that all bodys gravitate to one an other which may be counted as the basis of natural philosophie, which of what use it is to the understanding of the great frame of our solar Systeme he has to the astonishment of the learned world shewn, and how much farther it would guid us in other things if

5 he [uses] intends 14 descend [..] to 19 `in particular´ (*il.*) 19 every [particular] man 24 `that lie at | the bottom as´ (*il. cont. on p. 227*) 25 others [bottom] rest 27 like [lumin⟨ous⟩] the 29 tha{d}⟨t⟩

rightly pursued is not yet known.[116] Our Saviours great rule that we should love our neighbour as our selves[117] is such a fundamental truth for the regulating humane society that I think by that alone one might without difficulty determin all the cases and doubts in
228 Social morality·[118] These and such as these are the truths | we should endeavour to finde out and stere our minds with, which leads me to an other thing in the conduct of the understanding that is noe lesse necessary viz

Bottoming (85.) To accustom our selves in any question proposed to examin (§44) and find out upon what it bottoms. Most of the difficulties that come in our way when well considerd and traced lead us to some proposition which known to be true clears the doubt and gives an easy solution of the question, whilst topical and superficial arguments of which there is store to be found on both sides filling the head with varietie of thoughts and the mouth with copious discourse serve only to amuse the understanding and entertein company without comeing to the bottom of the question the only place of rest and stability for an inquisitive minde whose tendency is only to truth and knowledge· For example if it be demanded whether the grand Signior can lawfully take what he will from any of his people[119] this question can not be resolved without comeing to a certainty whether all men are naturaly equal for upon that it turns and that truth well

3 truth [in morality] for 3 regulating [all..] humane 10 out [..] upon 12 true [resolves] clears 22 are [born equal whether all are .....] naturaly

116 Newton's *Principia mathematica* was published in 1687; the review of this work in the *Bibliothèque universelle & historique,* 8 (March 1688), pp. 436-450, was probably by Locke; see Axtell, 'Locke's Review of the *Principia*', *passim* and Rogers, 'Locke's *Essay* and Newton's *Principia*', p. 228, note 34.

117 Matt. 22: 39.

118 Cf. *Essay,* IV.iv.7: 565: 'that *moral Knowledge* is as *capable of real Certainty,* as Mathematicks. For Certainty being but the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our *Ideas*; and Demonstration nothing but the Perception of such Agreement, by the Intervention of other *Ideas,* or Medium, our *moral Ideas,* as well as mathematical, being *Archetypes* themselves, and so adaquate, and complete *Ideas,* all the Agreement, or Disagreement, which we shall find in them, will produce real Knowledge, as well as in mathematical Figures.' See also Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §5.

119 Cf. the second of the *Two Treatises,* §138, p. 360: 'The *Supream Power cannot take* from any Man any part of his *Property* without his own consent.'

setled in the understanding and caried in the minde through the various debates concerneing the various rights of men in societie will | goe a great way in puting an end to them and sheweing on which 230 side the truth is·

(§45) (86.) There is scarce any thing more for the improvement of knowledg for the ease of life and the dispatch of business, than for a man to be able to dispose of his own thoughts and there is scarce any thing harder in the whole conduct of the understanding than to get a full mastery over it. The mind in a wakeing man has always some object that it applys it self to which when we are lazy or unconcerned we can easily change and at pleasure transfer our thoughts to an other and from thence to a third which has no relation to either of the former. Hence men forwardly conclude and frequently say noe thing is so free as thought and it were well it were so· But the contrary will be found true in several instances, and there are many cases wherein there is noe thing more resty and ungovernable than our thoughts· They will not be directed what objects to pursue nor be taken off from those they have once fixd on, but run away with a man in pursuit of those Ideas they have in view let him doe what he can.[120] *Transferring of thoughts*

(87.) I will not here mention again what I have above[121] taken notice of how hard it is | to get the mind narrowed by a custome 232 of 30 or 40 years standing to a scanty collection of obvious and common Ideas to enlarg it self to a more copious stock, and grow into an acquaintance with those that would afford more aboundant matter of usefull contemplation tis not of this I am here speaking. The inconveneience I would here represent and find a remedie for

1 in the [minde] understanding 2 `men´ (*il. in diff. ink*) 9 it. [a̤s̤] The 15 contrary [is] will 15 in [...] several 25 more [copẹous] `aboundant´ (*il.*) 26 contemplatio̤n 26–27 sp`e´[[.]]a̤king. (*il.*) [That which] The 27 I [am here] would

120 Cf. *Essay,* II.xxi.12: 239: 'As it is in the motions of the Body, so it is in the Thoughts of our Minds; where any one is such, that we have power to take it up, or lay it by, according to the preference of the Mind, there we are *at liberty.* (…) But yet some *Ideas* to the Mind, like some Motions to the Body, are such, as in certain circumstances it cannot avoid, nor obtain their absence by the utmost effort it can use'; and *Education,* §75, p. 136 on the importance of the mind getting 'an habitual Dominion over it self'.

121 See par. 8.

is the difficulty there is sometimes to transfer our minds from one subject to an other in cases where the Ideas are equaly familiar to us·

(88.) Matters that are recommended to our thoughts by any of our passions take possession of our minds with a kind of authority and will not be kept out or dislodgd, but as if the passion that rules were for the time the Sherif of the place and came with all the posse, the understanding is ceised and taken with the object it introduces as if it had a legal right to be alone considerd there.[122] There is scarce any body I think of so calm a temper who hath not sometime found this tyrany on his understanding, and sufferd under the inconvenience of it. who is there almost whose mind at some time or other Love, or Anger Fear or Greif has not soe fastend to some clog that it could not turn if self to any other object· I call it a clog for it hangs upon
234 the minde so as to hinder its vigor and | activity in the pursute of other contemplations, and advances it self little or not at all in the knowledg of the thing which it so closely huggs and constantly pores on· Men thus possessed are sometimes as if they were so in the worst sense, and lay under the power of an inchantment. They see not what passess before their eyes; hear not the audible discourse of the company; And when by any strong application to them they are roused a little they are like men brought to themselves from some remote region whereas in truth they come noe farther than their secret cabinet within where they have been wholy taken up with the puppet which is for that time appointed for their enterteinment· The shame that such dumps cause to wellbred people when it carrys them away from the company where they should bear a part in the conversation is a sufficient argument that it is a fault in the conduct of our understanding not to have that power over it as to make use of it to those puposes and on those occasions where in we have need of its assistance· The mind should be always free

4 possession[s] 5 if [any] the 9–10 this [inconvenience] tyrany 11 almost [that] `whose mind´ (*add. p. 233*) 11 other [the] Love, 12 Anger [o̩r] F̣ear 13 to [any] any 13 object· [..] I 13 for it [onely] hangs 14 minde [`so | as to´ (*add. cont. on p. 233*)] [hinder its pursute of other things fit to be consider] so as 15 advances [but] it 17 are [some times] [are so] sometimes 20 `when´ (*il.*) 22 `than´ (*il.*) 25 when [they] it

122 Cf. *Essay,* II.xxi.12: 239-240: 'sometimes a boisterous Passion hurries our Thoughts, as a Hurricane does our Bodies, without leaving us the liberty of thinking on other things, which we would rather chuse'.

and ready to turn it self to the variety of objects that occur and allow them as much consideration as shall for that time be thought fit. To be ingrossed so by one object as not to be prevailed on to leave it for an other that we judg fiter for our contemplation is to make it of noe use to us. Did this state of mind remain always so | every one 236 would without scruple give it the name of perfect madnesse·[123] And while it does last at what ever intervals it returns such a rotation of thoughts about the same object no more carrys us forwards to wards the attainment of knowledg, than geting upon a milhorse whilst he jogs on in his circular tract would carry a man a journey.

(89.) I grant some thing must be allowed to legitimate passions and to natural inclinations. Every man besides occasional affections has beloved studys and those the mind will more closely stick to· But yet it is best that it should be always at liberty and under the free disposal of the man to act how and upon what he directs· This we should endeavour to obtain unless we would be content with such a flaw in our understandings, that some times we should be as it were without it for it is very little better than so in cases where we cannot make use of it to those purposes we would and which stand in present need of it·

(90.) But before fit remedies can be thought on for this disease we must know the several causes of it and thereby regulate the cure if we will hope to labour with succes·

(91.) One we have already instanced in where of all men that reflect have so general a knowledg and so often an experience in themselves that noe body doubts of it.[124] A prevaileing passion so pins down our thoughts to the object and concerne of it | That a man 238 passionately in love can not bring himself to think of his ordinary affairs, nor a kind mother drooping under the loss of a child is not able to bear a part as she was wont in the discourse of the company or conversation of her friends.

3 `so´ (*add.*) 5 Did [it] `this state of mind´ (*il.*) 8 thoughts [upon] about 8 more [goes] `carrys us´ (*il.*) 12 occasional [passions] affections 15 directs· Th[[ę]]is[e] 19 purposes [it] we 25 general a {a} 29 `is´ (*il.*) 30 bear [and] `a´ (*il.*) 31 *End of par. indicated by vertical stroke.*

123 For the topic of madness and foolishness in Locke's analysis of error see Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §6.

124 See par. 40.

(92.) But though passion be the most obvious and general yet it is not the onely cause that binds up the understanding and confines it for the time to one object from which it will not be taken off· Besides this we may often find that the understanding when it has a while imploid it self upon a subject which either chance or some slight accident offerd to it without the interest or recommendation of any passion, workes it self into a warmth and by degrees gets into a career wherein like a bowle down at hill it increases its motion by goeing and will not be stopd or diverted, though when the heat is over it sees all this earneste application was about a trifle not worth a thought and all the pains imploid about it lost labour·

(93.) There is a third sort if I mistake not yet lower than this. Tis a sort of Childishness if I may soe say of the understanding where in dureing the fit it plays with and dandles some insignificant puppet to noe end nor with any designe at all, and yet cannot easily be got off from it. Thus some trivial sentence or a scrap of poetry will
240 sometimes | get into mens heads and make such a chimeing there that there is no stilling of it, no peace to be obteind nor attention to any thing else, but this impertinent guest will take up the mind and possess the thoughts in spight of all endeavours to get rid of it. Whether every one hath experimented in them selves this trouble some intrusion of some frisking Ideas which thus importune the understanding and hinder it from being better imploid I know not. But persons of very good parts and those more than one I have heard speake and complain of it in them selves. The reason I have to make this doubt is from what I have known in a case some thing of kin to this though much odder, and that is of a sort of visions that some people have lieing quiet but perfectly awake in the darke or with their eyes shut, It is a great variety of faces most commonly very odde ones that appear to them in train one after an other so that haveing had just the sight of one it immediately passes away to give place to an other that the same instant succeeds and has as quick an exit as its leader and soe they march on in a constant succession nor can any one

1 `and general´ (*il.*) 3–4 off· [(*deleted vertical stroke*)] Besides 5 while [go] imploid 6 accident [set] offerd 7 passion, [gets] workes 12 mistake [not] not 14 `with´ (*il.*) 16 or [the parts] a scrap 17 into [their] `mens´ (*il.*) 17–20 there that [it can not be got out nor will let the mind quietly attend to any thing else] `there is … of it´ (*add. p. 241*) 22 some [importunity] `intrusion´ (*il.*) 30 other [wher⟨e⟩] so 31 had [..] just

of them by any endeavour be stopd or retaind beyond the instant of its appearance but is thrust out by its follower which will have its turne· Concerning this phantas⟨t⟩ical phænomenon I have talked with several people where of some have been perfectly acquainted with it and | others have been soe wholy strangers to it; that they 242 could hardly be brought to conceive or beleive it. I knew a Lady of excellent parts who had got past thirty without haveing ever had the least notice of any such thing. She was so great a stranger to it that when she heard me and an other talkeing of it could scarce forbear thinkeing we banterd her. But some time after drinkeing a large dose of dilute Tea (as she was orderd by a physitian) goeing to bed she told us at next meeting that she had now experimented what our discourse had much a doe to perswade her of· she had seen a great variety of faces in a long train succeeding one an other as we had discribed. they were all strangers and intruders, such as she had noe acquaintance with before nor sought after then and as they came of them selves they went too, none of them staid a moment nor could be detein⟨ed⟩ by all the endeavours she could use, but went on in their solemn procession just appeard and then vanished. This odd phenomenon seems to have a mechanical cause and to depend upon the matter and motion of the bloud or animal spirits·[125]

(94.) When the Phansy is bound by passion I know noe way to set the mind free and at liberty to prosecute what thoughts the man would make choise of but to allay the present passion or counter-ballance it with an other which is an | art to be got by Study and 244 acquaintance with the passions·

(95.) Those who find them selves apt to be carried away with the spontaneous current of their own thoughts not excited by any passion or interest must be very wary and carefull in all the instances of it

1 `of them´ (*il.*) 2 but [makes] is 3 turne· [Thọse] Concerning 6 could [scarse] `hardly´ (*il.*) 7 had [been maried the better part of twenty years] got 8 was [a] `so´ (*il.*) great `a´ (*il.*) 12 what [we] our 13 seen [an in] a 15 all [intruders] strangers 20 to [be from] have 23 and [set it] at 24 but `to´ (*il.*) allay[ing] 24–25 counterballance[/ing] 29 interest [hastẹ] must

125 T. Forster, *Original Letters of John Locke,* p. lxxv, thinks this paragraph may be autobiographical and adds: 'It is probable that most literary men, and persons of sedentary and studious habits, are subject to these phantoms.' On 'animal spirits' cf. above, par. 79, note 113.

to stop it and never humer their minds in being thus triflingly busy· Men know the value of their corporal liberty and therefore suffer not willingly fetters and chains to be put upon them. To have the mind captivated is for the time certainly the greater evil of the two, and deserves our utmost care and endeavours to preserve the freedom of our better part, And in this case our pains will not be lost. Striveing and strugling will prevail if we constantly in all such occasions make use of it. We must never indulge these trivial attentions of thought· As soon as we find the mind makes it self a business of noe thing, we should immediately disturb and check it, introduce new and more serious considerations and not leave till we have beaten it off from the pursuit it was upon. This at first, if we have let the contrary practise grow to an habit, will perhaps be difficult, But constant endeavours will by degrees prevail and at last make it easy. And when a man is pretty well advanced and can command his mind off at pleasure
246 from incidental and undesigned pursuits | it may not be amiss for him to goe on farther and make attempts upon meditations of greater moment, that at the last he may have a full power over his own mind and be soe fully master of his own thoughts as to be able to transfer them from one subiect to an other with the same ease that he can lay by any thing he has in his hand and take some thing else that he has a mind to in the room of it. This liberty of mind is of great use both in business and study and he that has got it will have noe small advantage of ease and dispatch in all that is the chosen and usefull imployment of his understanding·

(96.) The 3^{d} and last way which I mentiond the mind to be sometimes taken up with I mean the chimeing of some particular words or sentence in the memory and as it were makeing a noise in the head and the like seldom happens but when the mind is lazy or very loosly and negligently imploid. It were better indeed be without such impertinent and useless repetitions, any obvious Idea when it is roveing causlesly at a venture being of more use and apter to suggest something worth consideration, than the insignificant buz of purely empty sounds· But since the rouseing of the mind and seting the

1 and [g.. ṭḥẹ .....] never 3 them[[,]]. [[t]]To 6 part, [to] And 7 `such´ (*il.*) 8 thought[s]· 13–14 endeavours will [a̤ṭ] by 24 all [that] that 24–25 chosen [business] `and usefull imployment´ (*il.*) 29 `and the like´ (*il.*) 31 useless [repetitions] repetitions 31 Idea[s] 32 roveing [at a v⟨enture⟩] causlesly

understanding on worke with some degrees of vigor does for the most part | presently set it free from these idle companions, it may 248 not be amisse when ever we find our selves troubled with them to make use of soe profitable a remedie that is always at hand·

Custome 260

(97.) Custome haveing that influence upon our senses as to make that which at first was indifferent or perhaps even nautious to become in time pleasant and agreeable as we see in the Raguos, parfumes and Musick of several nations· The palates of men are soe differently set by the diet and cookery they have been used to, that they eat that with delight and gusto which one not accustomed to can hardly bring him self to tast and would sooner fast than make a meale of.[126] By the same dominion of Custome actions that were at first very hard and uneasy to us become

1 with [any sort] `so|me degrees´ (*add. cont. on p. 247*) 1 `does´ (*il.*) 9 and [c̣o̱o̱k̲] cookery 10 accustomed t̤o 13 *MS e.1 ends here.*

126 Cf. *Essay*, 'Epistle to the Reader', p. 8: '*We have our Understandings no less different than our Palates; and he that thinks the same Truth shall be equaly relished by every one in the same dress, may as well hope to feast every one with the same sort of Cookery...*' and Locke in letter to W. Molyneux, 10 January 1698, *Corr.* 2376, VI, pp. 294-295: 'If I could think that discourses and arguments to the understanding were like the several sorts of cates to different palates and stomachs, some nauseous and destructive to one, which are pleasant and restorative to another; I should no more think of books and study, and should think my time better imploy'd at push-pin than in reading or writing. But I am convinced of the contrary …'

B

(§3) (98.) Besides the want of determined Ideas and of Sagacity and exercise in finding out and laying in intermediate Ideas[127] There are three miscariages that men are guilty of in reference to their Reason, whereby this faculty is hinderd in them from that service it might doe and was designed for: And he that reflects upon the Actions and discourses of | mankinde will finde their defects in this kind very frequent and very observable· *Reasoning* 56 58

1⟨o⟩ The first is of those who seldom reason at all but doe and thinke according to the example of others whether parents neighbours minister or who else they are pleased to make choise of to have an implicit faith in for the saveing of them selves the pains and trouble of thinkeing and examining for themselves·

2o The second is of those who put passion in the place of reason and being resolvd that shall governe their actions and arguments neither use their owne nor hearken to other peoples reason any farther then it suits their humer interest or party, and these one may observe commonly content them selves with words which have noe distinct Ideas to them though in other matters that they come with an unbiassed indifferency to, they want not abilities to talke and hear

1–2 `Besides the want of determined Ide|as and … intermediate Ideas´ (*il. cont. on p. 57*) 2 exercise [and] `in´ (*il.*) 3–5 three [defects which narrow and restrain this Faculty whereby it is hinderd from doing mankinde that service it might.] `mis|cariages that … designed for:´ (*add. cont. on p. 57*) 4 `from´ (*il.*) 5 `doe´ (*il.*) 6 of (*catchword, not repeated on p. 56*) 6 `defects in this | kind´ (*il. cont. on p. 59*) 10–12 they [are pleased for the saveing themselves the pains of thinkeing and examining to have an implicit faith in] `are | `pleased´ (*il.*) to make … for themselves´ (*add. cont. on p. 59*)

127 Cf. *Essay,* IV.ii.3: 532: 'A quickness in the Mind to find out these intermediate *Ideas,* (that shall discover the Agreement or Disagreement of any other,) and to apply them right, is, I suppose, that which is called *Sagacity*' and ibid. IV.xvii.2: 668-669.

reason where they have noe secret inclination that hinders them from being untractable to it·

3º The third sort is of those who readily and sincerely follow reason but for want of haveing that which one may call *large sound round about sense* have not a full view of all that relates to the question and may be of moment to decide it. We are all short sighted and very often see but one side of a matter. our views are not extended to all that has a connection with it. From this defect I thinke noe man is
60 free. We see but in part and we know but in part | and therefor tis
Partial views noe wonder we conclude not right from our partiall views·[128] This might instruct the proudest esteemer of his own parts how usefull it is to talk and consult with others even such as came short of him in capacity quicknesse and penetration for since noe one sees all and we generaly have different prospects of the same thing according to our different as I may say positions to it tis not incongruous to thinke nor beneath any man to trie whether an other may not have notions of things which have scaped him and which his reason would make use of if they came into his minde. The faculty of Reasoning seldom or never deceives those who trust to it. its consequences from what it builds on are evident and certain but that, which it oftenest if not only misleads us in, is that the principles from which we conclude the grounds upon which we bottom our reasoning are but a part some thing is left out which should goe into the reconing to make it just and exact. Here we may imagin a vast and almost infinite advantage that angels and seperate spirits may have over us. Who in their severall degrees of elevation above us may be indowed with more comprehensive faculties and some of them perhaps have perfect and exact views of all finite beings that come under their consideration ⟨and⟩ can as it were in the twinkleing of an eye collect
62 togeather all their | scatterd and almost boundlesse relations·[129] A

4 may [cl.] call 10 from [p⟨artiall⟩] our 14 generaly [take d⟨ifferent⟩] have 15 `as I may say´ (*il.*) 16 man `to´ (*il.*) 24 imagin [and] a 25 angels and [seper⟨ate⟩..] [several degrees of] seperate 27 with [larger] more

128 Cf. I Cor. 13: 12: 'For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known.'

129 Cf. *Essay,* II.x.9: 154 on the amazing memory of Pascal: 'For this of Mr. *Pascal* was still with the narrowness, that humane Minds are confin'd to here, of having great variety of *Ideas* only by succession, not all at once: Whereas

minde soe furnishd what reason has it to acquiesce in the certainty of its conclusions? In this | we may see the reason why some men 248 of study and thought that reason right and are lovers of truth doe make noe great advances in their discoverys of it, Error and truth are uncertainly blended in their minds; their decisions are lame and defective; and they are very often mistaken in their judgments· The reason where of is. They converse but with one sort of men they read but one sort of books· They will not come in the hearing but of one sort of notions. The truth is They canton out to them selves a little Goshen[130] in the intellectual world where light shines and as they conclude day blesses them· but the rest of that vast expansum they give up to night and darkeness and so avoid comeing near it. They have a pretty trafick with known correspondents in some litle creek within that they confine themselves and are dexterous managers enough of the wares and products of that Corner with which they content themselves but will not venture out into the great Ocean of knowledg to survey the riches that nature hath stored other parts with noe less | genuine, noe less solid, no less usefull than what has fallen to 250 their lot in the admired plenty and sufficiency of their own little spot which to them conteins whatso ever is good in the universe. Those who live thus mued up within their owne contracted terretorys and will not looke abroad beyond the boundarys that chance conceit or lazyness has set to their enquirys but live seperate from the notions discourses and attainments of the rest of mankind may not amiss be represented by the Inhabitants of the Marian Islands[131] which

247.2–250.20 `In this | we may … understandings.´ (*add. cont. on p. 248; this add. is continued by the next par.*) 2 `some´ (*il.*) 4 advances [of] in 8–9 `They will not come | in … The truth is´ (*il. cont. on p. 249*) 14 creek [.... ẹxcẹll] within 19 their [contracted Systeme] own 23 their [nọtiọnṣ ..] `en|quirys´ (*add. cont. on p. 251*) 23–24 notions [rẹaṣọ⟨nings⟩] discourses

the several degrees of Angels may probably have larger views, and some of them be endowed with capacities able to retain together, and constantly set before them, as in one Picture, all their past knowledge at once'; see also ibid. IV.xvii.14: 683.

130 Gen. 47: 27: 'And Israel dwelt in the land of Egypt, in the country of Goshen; and they had possessions therein, and grew, and multiplied exceedingly.'

131 Archipelago in the Pacific Ocean, 2,400 km east of the Philippines, discovered in 1521 by Ferdinand Magellan, named initially 'Ladrones Islands', but not colonized until 1668 by Jesuit missionaries, who changed its name to honour Mariana of Austria, then regent of Spain.

being separate by a large tract of sea from all communion with the habitable parts of the earth thought themselves the onely people of the world and though the straitness of the conveniencys of life amongst them had never reachd so far as to the use of fire till the Spaniards not many years since in their voyages from Acapulco to Manilia brought it amongst them, yet in the want and ignorance of almost all things they looked upon themselves even after that the Spaniards had brought amongst them the notice of variety of nations abounding in sciences arts and conveniencys of life of which they
252 knew no thing they looked upon themselves | I say as the happyest and wisest people of the universe. But for all that noe body I think will imagin them deep naturalists or Solid metaphysitians· noe body will deem the quickest sighted amongst them to have very enlarged views in Ethicks or politiques· Nor can any one allow the most capable amongst them to be advanced so far in his understanding as to have any other knowledg but of the few little things of his and the neigbouring Islands with in his commerce but far enough from that comprehensive enlargement of mind which adornes a soule devoted to truth assisted with letters and a free consideration of the several views and sentiments of thinking men of all sides. Let not men therefore that would have a sight of what every one pretends to be desireous to have a sight of truth in its full extent narrow and blind their own prospect. Let not men think there is noe truth but in the Sciences that they study or the books that they read. To prejudg other mens notions before we have looked into them is not to shew their darkness but to put out our own eys. *Trie all things hold fast that which is good*[132] is a divine rule comeing from the father of light and truth, and tis hard to know what other way men can come at truth to lay hold of it if they doe not dig and search for it as for gold and hid

1 separate [fr⟨om⟩] by 3 of [this e̤a̤rt̤h̤] [w⟨orld⟩] the world 8 them the [news] `notice´ (*il.*) 8 of [other] nations 9 life o[[r]]f 15 advanced [[t]]so [any competent] far 17 `in´ (*il.*) 18 enla`r´gement (*il.*) 18 which [b̤e̤c̤o̤m̤e̤s̤] `adornes´ (*il.*) 19–20 truth [which he makes it his business sincerely [`sincerely´ (*il.*)] in love with it and [s̤i̤n̤c̤e̤r̤e̤l̤y̤] diligently seeking after it] `assisted with … all sides´ (*add. p. 153²*) 22 `truth in its full extent´ (*il.*) 29 `dig and´ (*il.*) 29 for it [f⟨or⟩] as

132 I Thess. 5: 21: 'Prove all things; hold fast that which is good.'

treasure,[133] but he that does soe must turn much earth and rubish before he gets the pure mettle. Sand and pebbles and | dross usualy 254
lye blended with it, but the gold is never the less gold and will inrich the man that imploys his pains to seek and separate it. Neither is there any danger he should be deceived by the mixture· Every man carys about him a touch stone if he will make use of it, to distinguish substantial gold from superficial glitterings; truth from appearances. And indeed the use and benefit of this touch stone which is natural reason is spoiled and lost onely, by assumed prejudices overweening presumption and narrowing our minds. The want of exerciseing it in the full extent of things intelligible is that which weakens and extinguishes this noble faculty in us. Trace it and see whether it be not soe. The day labourer in a country village has commonly but a small pittance of knowledg because his Ideas and notions have been confined to the narrow bounds of a poor conversation and imployment. The low mechanique of a country town does some what out doe him· Porters and coblers of great Cittys surpass them. A country Gent who leaveing Latin and learning in the university removes thence to his mansion house and associates with neighbours of the same strain who relish no thing but hunting and a bottle, with these alone he spends his time, with these alone he converses and can away with no company whose discourse goes beyond what claret and dissoluteness inspires. Such a patriot formed in this happy way of improvement cannot fail as we see to give notable decisions upon the bench at quarter sessions, and emine⟨n⟩t proofs of his skil in politiques, when the strength of his purse and party have advanced him to a more conspicuous station· to such a | one truly an ordinary 256
Coffee house gleaner of the Citty is an arrant States man and as much

1 must [remove] turn 2 and (*catchword, not repeated on p. 254*) 3 lye [mixed] blended (*il.*) 6 it, [the right] to distinguish 13 in [the] `a´ (*il.*) country [`village usualy´ (*il. no caret*)] [has] `village has | commonly´ (*il. cont. on p.* 255) 14 knowledge [for] because 19–24 removes [to the Societys whose business is hunting and a bottle, and can away with noe company whose discourse goes beyond what Claret and intemperance inspire [`such an one´ (*il.*)] gives.] `thence to his | mansion house … to give´ (*il. cont. on p.* 255) 21 alone [they] he spends [their] `his´ (*il.*) 22 goes [beyon⟨d⟩] beyond 27 such a[n] | one 249.28–250.1 much [exceeds] `superior too´ (*il.*)

133 Cf. Prov. 2: 3-5.

superior too as a man conversant about Whitehall[134] and the Court is to an ordinary shop keeper·[135] To carry this a little farther Here is one muffled up in the zeale and infallibility of his own sect and will not touch a booke or enter debate with a person that will question any of those things which to him are Sacred· Another surveys our differences in religion with an equitable and fair indifferency and so finds probably that none of them are in every thing unexeptionable, These divisions and systemes were made by men and carry the marke of fallible on them and in those whom he differs from and till he opend his eyes had a general prejudice against he meets with more to be said for a great many things than before he was aware of or could have imagined. Which of these two now is most likely to judg right in our religious controversies and to be most stored with truth the marke all pretend to aime at? All these men that I have instanced in thus unequally furnishd with truth and advanced in knowledg I suppose of equall natural parts· all the oddes between them has been the different Scope that has been given to their understandings to range in, for the gathering up of information and furnishing their heads with Ideas notions and observations wheron to imploy their minds and forme their understandings.

(99.) It will possibly be objected. Who is sufficient for all this? I answer more than can be imagined. Every one knows what his proper
258 business is and what according to the Character he makes of | him self the world may justly expect of him, and to answer that he will find he will have time and opertunity enough to furnish him self if he will not deprive him self by a narrowness of Spirit, of those helps that are at hand. I doe not say to be a good Geographer that a man should visit every mountain river promontory and creeke upon the face of the Earth view the buildings and survey the land every where as if he

1–2 Court [does this] `is to an ordinary′ (*il.*) 7–10 `probably that none | of them [infallible] `are in every thing unexceptionable′ (*il.*), [[t]]These divisions … meets with′ (*il. cont. on p. 257*) 15 thus [differently] `un|equally′ (*add. cont. on p. 257*) 16 all the [difference] `oddes between them′ (*il.*) 250.21–251.24 *Par. 99 continues addition to the previous par.* 29 Earth [and] view

134 'Whitehall': street in Westminster, London, seat of principal government offices and, in Locke's time, of the English court.

135 For similar acid remarks on the aristocracy, cf. Malebranche, *Recherche,* Vol. II, Bk. V, Ch. vii, p. 196.

were goeing to make a purchase. But yet every one must allow that he shall know a country better that makes often salleys into it and traverses it up and down, than he that like a mill horse goes still round in the same tract or keeps within the narrow bounds of a feild or two that delight him. He that will enquire out the best books in every science and informe himself of the most material authers of the several sects in Philosophie and religion will not find it an infinite worke to acquaint himself with the sentiments of mankind concerning the most weighty and comprehensive subjects, Let him exercise the freedom of his reason and understanding in such a latitude as this and his mind will be strengthened, his capacity inlarged his facultys improved. And the light which the remote and scatterd parts of truth will give to one another | will so assist his judgment that he will 260 seldom be widely out or miss giveing proof of a clear head and a comprehensive knowledg. At least this is the onely way I know to give the understanding its due inprovement to the full extent of its capacity, and to distinguish the two most different things I know in the world a logical chicanner from a man of reason. Onely he that would thus give the mind its flight, and send abroad his enquirys into all parts after truth must be sure to setle in his head determined Ideas of all that he imploys his thoughts about, and never fail to judg himself and judg unbiassedly of all that he receives from others either in their writeings or discourses· Reverence or prejudice must not be sufferd to give beauty or deformity to any of their opinions.

4 tract [and] or 11 and `his´ (*il.*) mind [inlarged his] `will be´ (*add. p. 259*) 14–20 miss [being thought a knowing man. Only he] `give|ing proof of … after truth´ (*add. cont. on p. 261*) 20 his [mind] head 22 himself [of all that he] and

APPENDIX

The following parts of MS e.1 clearly pertain to the Conduct *although they do not strictly belong to the text itself. Deleted entries are given between* [ ].

C

Page i *starts with the last entries of a list to the contents of MS e.1, every entry on a new line. The preceding leaf is now lost (see Gen. Introd.: 'Text', §1[1]). All entries, except the last, are followed by numbers. These numbers correspond with the pages of MS e.1.*

Analogie 203
Fallacies 222
Fundamental questions 222
Bottoming 228
Transplanting 230
Reasoning right in narrow and in large views 248
Custome

D

Instructions concerning the Conduct, *entered at the middle of p.* i.

Mem: That these following discourses are to be writ out under their several heads into distinct Chapters, and then to be numberd and ranged according to their natural order·

5 Bottoming [[1]]228

E

E-I were all entered on p. 1 *of MS e.1 (see ill. 1). They are given here as seperate items because they may have been entered at different times and because their mutual connexion is tenuous. The one word forming E may have been intended as header.*

Misconduct

F

A partially deleted list with subjects that Locke was going to address in the Conduct.

[Jadeing the minde by things too difficult, or deposeing it by a confinement to things too easy, or stoping at the first difficulty or lazily siting still][136]
Hunting after similes[137]
[Makeing too much haste with conclusion and not goeing by gradual steps][138]
[Learning of arguments][139]
[Allowing too much to first impressions][140]
[some take all some reject all popular opinions][141]
[some wholy assert novelty others antiquitie][142]

G

G-I also contain subjects that Locke was going to address in the Conduct.

Thinking of things transciently and in gros we fright our selves with supposed difficulties which vanish where we come to examine things by their distinct parts[143]

11 wholy assert

136 See par. 62.
137 See par. 66.
138 See pars. 43 and 59.
139 See par. 42.
140 See par. 60.
141 See par. 50.
142 See par. 49.
143 See par. 74.

H

To read books for arguments: The right way to knowledge and improvement is to setle determind Ideas in our minds and then to observe and finde out their relations and habitudes in the knowledg of self evident propositions· all men that are rational creatures are equall, the difference of men in their parts is a sagacity to finde out the intermediate Ideas that shew the agreement or disagreement of others. And the difference of men in knowledg is the actualy haveing discoverd the agreement or disagreement of more Ideas.[144]

I

The mind often frights it self with things seen in grosse in confusion and at a distance and soe forbears application which comeing to be viewd nearer and by parts would be as easy as other things that are masterd[145]

K

Page 81, the first page of a new quire, contains a deleted list similar to F.

[Variety of Ideas and those abstract espetialy[146]
Freedom of minde for truth[147]
Examin our own principles: which we demand of others[148]
Observations too soon or too seldom made[149]
Stoping at difficulties[150]
Concludeing too soon[151]
Running to similies[152]
To sit still lazy is noe conduct at al[153]]

17 st̤o̤ping

144 See pars. 42 and 98.
145 See par. 74.
146 See pars. 30 and 65.
147 See pars. 36, 37, 44, 49, 68, 77 and 99.
148 See pars. 11, 13, 15, 31, 35, 36, 45 and 47.
149 See pars. 39, 59, 60 and 61.
150 See par. 62.
151 See pars. 43, 58 and 59.
152 See par. 66.
153 See pars. 43, 44, 45 and 62.

COLLATION OF MS LOCKE E.1 WITH MS LOCKE C.28

Each entry starts with two numbers, followed by one or more words, followed by the lemma-symbol ']', followed again by one or more words. The numbers refer to the page number and line number in the present edition. The word(s) to the left of the lemma-symbol form the version as it is presented in the present edition, based on MS e.1, while the entry to the right of this symbol gives the variant as given by MS c.28.

Collation of MS e.1, pp. 62, 114-116, 62-64 (pars. 1-5) with MS c.28, fols. 121r-123r

p. 155, l. 1: Dialecticæ] Dialectica
p. 156, l. 14: hinder] hinders
p. 156, l. 14: keep] keeps
p. 156, l. 15: *Addition in Locke's hand in MS c.28 fol. 123r, not in MS e.1*: Some of them I shall take notice of, and endeavour to point out proper remedies for in the following Chapters. *(see Gen. Introd.: 'Text', §1 [20] (3))*

Collation of MS e.1, pp. 80-96 (par. 17, second half, and pars. 18-29) with MS c.28, fols. 131r-137r

p. 164, l. 14: ease, let him … *start of collation*
p. 164, l. 22: the time] time
p. 164, l. 24: for though] *in MS c.28 a space is left open at this place* (*see above, Gen. Introd.: Text, §1, [20] (5)*)
p. 165, l. 19: year] years
p. 166, l. 1: compasse his] compasse he
p. 166, l. 7-8: and therefor they] they
p. 166, l. 10: your] their
p. 167, l. 15: he himself that] that
p. 167, l. 16: connection] connection himself
p. 167, l. 17: *MS c.28 continues with a deleted sentence*: [I have mentiond mathematicks as a way to setle in the minde an habit of reasoning closely and in train, not that I thinke it necessary that all men should be deep Mathematicians.] (*this sentence is repeated at the start of the next par., which is also the place where it can be found in MS e.1*)
p. 167, l. 25: and dependence] [of] dependence
p. 170, l. 18: is what is] is
p. 170, l. 24: be in a] be a
p. 170, l. 30: by an] by
p. 171, l. 3: fortunes and time is] fortunes are

p. 172, l. 1: things that] that
p. 172, l. 6: are] be
p. 173, l. 2: in that of] of that in

Collation of MS e.1, pp. 56-62, 248-260 (pars. 98 and 99) with MS c.28, fols. 125 r-130r

p. 246, l. 12: talk and] talke or
p. 246, l. 24: we] one
p. 247, l. 11: expansum] expansion (*Locke's hand*)
p. 251, l. 15: way] may

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. EDITIONS OF THE *CONDUCT*

This section contains separate editions of the *Conduct* (C),[1] editions of the *Conduct* together with the *Essay* (E), of the *Conduct* with other works, either by Locke or by other authors (O), of the *Conduct* in editions of Locke's works (W), of abridgements, abstracts or selections from the *Conduct* (AS), and of translations that consist of or comprise the *Conduct* (Tr). Each entry is given an identification code consisting of the abbreviation for the category to which it belongs, followed by the year in which it appeared; for instance 'C-1754' means: a separate edition of the *Conduct* that appeared in 1754. No claim to completeness is made. Information was extracted primarily from Jean Yolton's monumental *John Locke. A Descriptive Bibliography* (largely confined to titles that appeared before 1801) and from John C. Attig's *The Works of John Locke* (for titles not covered by Yolton). Reference to entries in these bibliographies is by 'Yolton' or 'Attig', followed by the number given by these authors to the relevant title. Attig does not always specify the exact relation between a given title and a previous title from which it is somehow derived, in which case it is not clear whether he is referring to a new edition, a reprint or a reissue. In these cases the new edition/reprint/reissue is given a note with a noncommittal 'As', followed by the earlier edition/reprint/reissue from which it is derived. For instance, the existence of a relation between C-1833 and C-1832 is established by a note to C-1833, saying 'As C-1832'. Copies that I have been able to inspect are marked with a * after the year of appearance. The library signatures of inspected copies that appeared before 1901 are given between [ ]; BOD = Bodleian Library Oxford and UBU = Universiteitsbibliotheek Utrecht.

Seperate editions of the Conduct

C-1741
Some Thoughts on the Conduct of the Understanding in the Search of Truth. Particularly, Of Parts, Reasoning, Practice, Habits, Ideas, Principles, Mathematicks, Religion, Ideas, Prejudices, Indifferency, Examination, Observation, Biass, Arguments, Haste, Desultory, Smattering, Universality, Reading, Intermediate Principles, Partiality, Theology, Partiality, Haste, Anticipation, Resignation, Practice, Words, Wandering, Distinctions, Similies, Assent, Indifference, Perseverance, Presumption, Despondency, Analogy, Association, Fallacies, Fundamental Verities, Transferring of Thoughts. By John Locke Esq. [s.l.: s.d.] 1741.* [BOD Vet. A4 f.827] *Ref*. Yolton 300. *Note*. The list of topics in the title is taken from the marginal headings printed in O-1706.

C-1754
Some Thoughts on the Conduct of the Understanding in the Search of Truth. By John Locke Esq; Glasgow: R. Urie, 1754.* [BOD 265.k.104] *Ref*. Yolton 301. *Note*. Reprint of C-1741.

1 Includes issues of the *Conduct* with other works in one volume, in cases where the *Conduct* and the other work each have their own title page and sequence of page numbers, e.g. C-1825.

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C-1782
The Conduct of the Understanding. Dublin: W. Wilson, 1782.* [BOD Vet. A5 e.4087] *Ref*. Yolton 305.

C-1794
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C-1800
The Conduct of the Understanding. For a man to understand fully the business of his particular calling, and of his religion, is usually enough to take up his whole time. See sect. xix. A New Edition. Divided under Heads. Dedicated to the Right Hon. Earl Spencer. London: E. Jeffery, 1800.* [BOD Vet.A5 g.130] *Ref*. Yolton 307. *Note*. Reprint of C-1794.

C-1801
The Conduct of the Understanding. By John Locke, Esq. A New edition. London: W. Baynes, 1801.* [BOD 26782 e.120] *Ref*. Attig 734.

C-1802
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C-1807
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C-1812
The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Esq. A New Edition, Divided under Heads. To which is Prefixed, a Sketch of the Life of the Author. London: Sherwood, 1812.* [BOD 26782 f.38] *Ref*. Attig 737.

C-1823
The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Esq. New Edition, Divided under Heads. London: J. Bumpus, 1823. *Ref*. Attig 741.

C-1825
A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Gent. Boston: R.P. & C. Williams, 1825. *Ref*. Attig 744. Issued with *Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political by Francis Bacon.*

C-1828
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C-1831(a)
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C-1859
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C-1882(b)
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E-1801
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E-1803
An Essay concerning Human Understanding by John Locke, Gent., to which are now added, I. An Analysis of Mr. Locke's Doctrine of Ideas, on a Large Sheet, II. A Defence of Mr. Locke's

Opinion concerning Personal Identity, with an Appendix, III. A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understanding, IV. Some Thoughts concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman, V. Elements of Natural Philosophy, VI. A New Method of a Common-Place-Book, extracted from the Author's Work; to which is prefixed the Life of the Author, 1st American from the 20th London ed. (3 vols.). Boston: Thomas & Andrews, 1803. *Ref.* Attig 257.

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E-1818
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E-1819(a)
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E-1819(c)
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An Essay concerning Human Understanding by John Locke, Gent. New Edition. New York: V. Seaman, 1824. *Ref*. Attig 257. *Note*. Reprint of E-1803, q.v. for complete title. Two vols. in one.

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E-1828(b)
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E-184-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding; and, A treatise on the Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Gent.; complete in one volume, with the author's last additions and corrections. Philadelphia: J. Kay, [184-]. *Ref*. Attig 260.

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E-1852
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O-1781(a)
The Conduct of the Understanding. By John Locke, Esq. To which is added, an Abstract of Mr. Locke's Essay on Human Understanding. Cambridge: J. Nicholson, 1781 (1st issue).* *Conduct*: pp. 1-238. [BOD Buchanan e.113] *Ref*. Yolton 304.

O-1781(b)
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O-18–
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O-1802
Philosophical Beauties selected from the Works of John Locke, Esq.; containing The Conduct of the Understanding, Elements of Natural Philosophy, The Studies Necessary for a Gentleman, an A Discourse on Miracles; with several other Subjects treated on by this Great Philosopher; to which is prefixed some account of his life. London: T. Hurst, 1802. *Ref*. Attig 862.

O-1813
The Conduct of the Understanding. By John Locke, Esq. Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political. By Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, Viscount St. Albans, and Lord High Chancellor of England. With sketches of the lives of Locke and Bacon. London: J. Walker, 1813.* *Conduct*: pp. 1-96. [BOD Johnson f.2074] *Ref*. Attig 738.

O-1818
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The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Esq. Essays, Moral, Economical and Political by Francis Bacon...; with sketches of the author's lives. London: Baynes, 1825. *Ref*. Attig 743.

O-1828(a)
Philosophical Beauties selected form the Works of John Locke, Esq.; containing The Conduct of the Understanding, Elements of Natural Philosophy, The Studies Necessary for a Gentleman, and A Discourse on Miracles; with several other Subjects treated on by this Great Philosopher; to which is prefixed some account of his life. New York: Langdon, 1828. *Ref*. Attig 863.

O-1828(b)
The Conduct of the Understanding by Locke. Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political by Lord Bacon; with a biographical preface. London: Joseph Smith, 1828. *Conduct*: pp. 1-92. *Ref*. Attig 745.

O-1829(a)
On the Conduct of the Understanding. With other pieces by John Locke. Chiswick: Th. Tegg, 1829.* *Conduct*: pp. 1-104. [BOD 26782. f.8] *Ref*. Attig 746. *Note*. Also includes 'Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman' and 'Elements of Natural Philosophy'. Issued together with the *Rev. W. Jone's Letters to his Pupils*. London: J. Sharpe, 1821.

O-1829(b)
Philosophical Beauties selected from the Works of John Locke, Esq.; containing The Conduct of the Understanding, Elements of Natural Philosophy, The Studies Necessary for a Gentleman, and A discourse on Miracles; with several other subjects treated on by this great philosopher; to which is prefixed some account of his life. New York: S. & D.A Forbes, 1829. *Ref*. Attig 863 (Attig: unverified). *Note*. As O-1828(a).

O-1830
The Conduct of the Understanding; by John Locke Esq. Essays, Moral, Economical, & Political; by Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, Viscount St. Alban's, and Lord High Chancellor of England. Dove's English Classics. London: [s.d.]* *Conduct*: pp. 3-101. [BOD 26782 f.36] *Ref*. No reference found in Attig, but cf. Attig 751. *Note*. According to Bodleian catalogue, date of publication is *c*. 1830.

O-1837(a)
The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke and Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political by Francis Bacon. London: Scott, 1837. *Conduct*: pp. 1-101. *Ref*. Attig 749.

O-1837(b)
The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke. Essays, Moral, Economical & Political by Lord Bacon; with prefaces. Edinburgh: P. Brown, 1837. *Conduct*: pp. 9-107. *Ref*. Attig 750.

O-1838(a)
The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke and Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political by Francis Bacon. London: Scott, 1838. *Conduct*: pp. 1-101. *Ref*. Attig 749. *Note*. Reprint of O-1837(a).

O-1838(b)
The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke. Essays, Moral, Economical & Political by Francis Bacon. London: C. Daly, 1838. *Ref*. Attig 751.

O-1840
The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke. Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political by Francis Bacon. London: T. Allman, [1840?]. *Ref*. Attig 749. *Note*. As O-1837(a).

O-1841
Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political by Francis Bacon. The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Esq.; with an introductory essay, by A. Potter. New York: Harper, [1841?]. *Conduct*: pp. 211-299. *Ref*. Attig 752.

O-1844(a)
Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political by Francis Bacon. The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Esq.; with an introductory essay, by A. Potter. New York: Harper, 1844. *Ref*. Attig 752. *Note*. Reprint of O-1841.

O-1844(b)
Philosophical Beauties selected form the Works of John Locke, Esq.; containing The Conduct of the Understanding, Elements of Natural Philosophy, The Studies Necessary for a Gentleman, and A Discourse on Miracles; with several other subjects treated on by this great philosopher; to which is prefixed some account of his life. Cooperstown, [New York]: H. & E. Phinney, 1844. *Ref*. Attig 863. *Note*. As O-1828(a).

O-1862
Bacon's Essays and Locke's Conduct of the Understanding with Memoirs of the Authors. London: W. and R. Chambers [sd.].* *Conduct*: pp. 180-263. [BOD 250.g.70] *Ref*. Attig 754. *Note*. Attig suggests 1862 as date of publication.

O-1874
Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political by Francis Bacon. The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Esq.; with an introductory essay, by A. Potter. New York: Harper, 1874. *Conduct*: pp. 211-299. *Ref*. Attig 752. *Note*. Reprint of O-1841.

O-1912
The Educational Writings of John Locke, ed. John William Adamson. New York: Longmans, 1912. *Ref*. Attig 560.

O-1922
The Educational Writings of John Locke, 2nd ed. by John William Adamson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922.* *Conduct*: pp. 181-265. *Ref*. Attig 560. *Note*. 2nd ed. of O-1912.

O-1996
Some Thoughts concerning Education and Of the Conduct of the Understanding, eds. Ruth W. Grant and Nathan Tarcov. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996.*

The Conduct *in editions of Locke's Works*

W-1714
The Works of John Locke Esq. In Three Volumes. London: J. Churchill, 1714.* *Conduct*: Vol. 3. [BOD H1.6 Th] *Ref.* Yolton 363.

W-1722
The Works of John Locke Esq; The Second Edition (3 vols.). London: A. Churchill, 1722.* *Conduct*: Vol. 3. [BOD 267822.c3] *Ref.* Yolton 364. *Note*. Reprint of W-1714.

W-1727(a)
The Works of John Locke Esq; 3rd ed. (3 vols.). London: A. Bettesworth, 1727 (1st issue).* *Conduct*: Vol. 3. [BOD Vet.A4.c.103] *Ref.* Yolton 365. *Note*. Reprint of W-1722.

W-1727(b)
The Works of John Locke Esq; 3rd ed. (3 vols.). London: E. Parker, 1727 (2nd issue). *Conduct*: Vol. 3. *Ref.* Yolton 365. *Note*. Reprint of W-1722. As W-1727(a)

W-1740
The Works of John Locke, Esq; 4th ed. (3 vols.). London: E. Parker, 1740.* *Conduct*: Vol. 3. [BOD Vet. A4.c.96] *Ref.* Yolton 366. *Note*. Reprint of W-1714.

W-1751
The Works of John Locke, Esq., 5th ed. (3 vols.). London: S. Birt, 1751.* *Conduct*: Vol. 3. [BOD Vet.A5.c.117] *Ref.* Yolton 367. *Note*. New typesetting based on W-1740.

W-1759
The Works of John Locke, Esq; In Three Volumes. The Sixth Edition. To which is added, The Life of the Author; and a Collection of several of his Pieces published by Mr. Desmaizeaux. London: D. Browne, 1759.* *Conduct*: Vol. 3. [BOD Vet.A5.c.50] *Ref.* Yolton 368. *Note*. Reprint of W-1751.

W-1768(a)
The Works of John Locke in Four Volumes. The Seventh Edition. London: H. Woodfall...I. Shuckburgh..., 1768 (1st issue). *Conduct*: Vol. 4. *Ref.* Yolton 369.

W-1768(b)
The Works of John Locke in Four Volumes. The Seventh Edition. London: H. Woodfall...A. and J. Shuckburgh..., 1768 (2nd issue).* *Conduct*: Vol. 4. [BOD Vet.A5.d.372] *Ref.* Yolton 369. *Note*. As W-1768(a).

W-1777
The Works of John Locke, in Four Volumes. The Eight Edition. London: W. Strahan, 1777.* *Conduct*: Vol. 4. [BOD 4°BS.365] *Ref.* Yolton 370. *Note*. Reprint of W-1768(a/b).

W-1794
The Works of John Locke, in Nine Volumes. The Ninth Edition. London: T. Longman, 1794.* *Conduct*: Vol. 2, pp. 323-401. [BOD Vet. A5.e.2379] *Ref.* Yolton 371. *Note*. Vols. 1 and 2 are as E-1793.

W-1801
The Works of John Locke, in Ten Volumes. The Tenth Edition. London: J. Johnson, 1801.* *Conduct*: Vol. 3, pp. 185-265. [BOD 26782 e.31] *Ref.* Attig 857.

W-1812
The Works of John Locke: in Ten Volumes, 11th ed. London: W. Otridge, 1812. *Ref.* Attig 858.

W-1823
The Works of John Locke. A New Edition, Corrected (10 vols.). London: Th. Tegg, 1823. *Ref.* Attig 859. *Conduct*: Vol. 3, pp. 203-289.

W-1824
The Works of John Locke, in Nine Volumes. The Twelfth Edition. London: C. and J. Rivington, 1824.* *Conduct*: Vol. 2, pp. 321-401. *Ref.* Attig 860. *Note*. Reprint of W-1794.

W-1826
The Works of John Locke: in Nine Volumes. The Twelfth Edition. London: C. and J. Rivington, 1826. *Ref.* Attig 860. *Note*. Reprint of W-1824.

W-1843
The Philosophical Works of John Locke. With a Preliminary Discourse and Notes, by J.A. St. John, Esq. Author of 'The Hisotry of the Manners, Customs, Arts, &c. of Ancient Greece. The Conduct of the Understanding. Essay on the Human Understanding. An Examination of P. Malebranche's Opninion of Seeing All Things in God; with Remarks upon some of Mr. Norris's Books. Elements of Natural Philosophy. Some Thoughts concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman. London: G. Virtue, 1843.* *Conduct*: pp. 19-66. [BOD 43.1604] *Ref.* Attig 864.

W-1854(a)
The Works of John Locke: in Nine Volumes. The Twelfth Edition. London: C. and J. Rivington, 1854. *Ref.* Attig 860. *Note*. Reprint of W-1824.

W-1854(b)
The Works of John Locke. With a Preliminary Essay and Notes by J.A. St. John, Esq. (2 vols.). London: H.G. Bohn, 1854.* *Conduct*: Vol. 1, pp. 23-111. [BOD 26782 e.6] *Ref.* Attig 864. *Note*. As W-1843, q.v. for complete title.

W-1872
The Works of John Locke. Philosophical Works, ed. J.A. St. John, Esq. (2 vols.). London: Bell & Daldy, 1872. *Ref.* Attig 864. *Note*. As W-1843, q.v. for complete title.

W-1882
The Works of John Locke. Philosophical Works, ed. J.A. St. John, Esq. (2 vols.). London: Bell & Daldy, 1882. *Ref.* Attig 864. *Note*. As W-1843, q.v. for complete title.

W-1892
The Philosophical Works of John Locke, ed. J.A. St. John, Esq. (2 vols.). London: G. Bell, 1892. *Ref*. Attig 864. *Note*. As W-1843, q.v. for complete title.

W-1963
The Works of John Locke. A New Edition, Corrected (10 vols.). Aalen: Scientia, 1963 (repr. of W-1823).* *Conduct*: Vol. 3, pp. 203-289.

Abridgements, abstracts or selections containing the Conduct

AS-1706
[Anonymous], 'Posthumous Works of Mr. John Lock', *History of the Works of the Learned*, 8 no. 6 (June 1706) 366-376.* *Ref*. Yolton 299. *Note*. Abstract of O-1706, including the *Conduct.*

AS-1707
[le Clerc, Jean], 'Posthumous Works of Mr. John Locke', *Bibliothèque choisie, pour servir à la bibliothèque universelle* (1707) 12, 123-170.* [UBU AB: A oct. 138 T 12 (1707)] *Ref*. Yolton 299. *Note*. Review and comprehensive abstract of O-1706, including the *Conduct*.

AS-1708
[Wolff, Christian], 'Posthumous Works of Mr. John Locke. h.e. Joannis Lockii Opera Posthuma', *Acta Eruditorum* (1708) 40-44.* [UBU AB: A qu 177 T 27 (1708)] *Ref*. Yolton 299. *Note*. Short review and abstract of O-1706, including the *Conduct*. For the identity of the reviewer, cf. Zart, *Einfluß der englischen Philosophen seit Bacon*, p. 18.

AS-1753
Simm, Alexander, *Miscellaneous Tracts; or, Select Passages, Historical, Chronological, Moral, &c. Extracted from Eminent Authors, Ancient and Modern. Containing An Abstract of Mr. Locke's Conduct of the Understanding. For the Benefit of younger Scholars. By Mr. Alexander Simm, late Schoolmaster at Bathgate. Quædam breviare permittur. Quintil.* Edinburgh: W. Gray, 1753.* *Conduct*: 130-146. [BOD 3987 f.489] *Ref*. Yolton 311.

AS-1825
The Beauties of Locke, Consisting of Selections from his Philosophical, Moral, and Theological Works. By Alfred Howard, Esq. London: T. Davison [1825].* *Conduct*: pp. 143-150. [BOD 26782 f.41] *Ref*. no reference found in Attig.

AS-1831(a)
Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding. Condensed under the Superintendence of A.J. Valpy. London: A.J. Valpy, 1831.* *Conduct*: pp. 373-427. [BOD 265. k.131] *Ref*. Attig 304. *Note*. *Conduct* is abridged as well.

AS-1831(b)
Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, Condensed under the Superintendence of A.J. Valpy. London: Whittaker, 1831. *Conduct*: pp. 373-427. *Ref*. Attig 304. *Note*. See AS-1831(a).

AS-1839
The Conduct of the Understanding also Some Thoughts concerning Education by John Locke. With a Memoir of the Author and his Writings. Edinburgh: W. and R. Chambers, 1839.* *Con-*

duct: pp. 7-27. [BOD 3974 d.971] *Ref*. Attig 762. *Note*. Abridgment with other works by various other authors.

AS-1851
The Conduct of the Understanding; also Some Thoughts concerning Education by John Locke; with a memoir of the author and his writings. Edinburgh: W. and R. Chambers, 1851. *Ref*. Attig 762. *Note*. Reprint of AS-1839.

AS-1881
The Conduct of the Understanding; also, Some Thoughts concerning Education. Philadelphia: Lippincott, c. 1881. *Ref*. Attig 763 (Attig: unverified). *Note*. Abridged versions?

AS-1897
'John Locke (1632-1704)', in: *The Library of the World's Best Literature, Ancient and Modern*, ed. Charles Dudley Warner. New York: R.S. Peale and J.A. Hill, 1897. *Ref*. Attig 326. *Note*. Contains selections from the *Conduct.*

AS-1900
Essays of British Essayists: Including Biographical and Critical Sketches, ed. Chauncey C. Starkweather. New York: Colonial Press, 1900. Pages devoted to Locke, Vol. 1, pp. 115-135, contain selections from the *Conduct*. *Ref*. Attig 879.

AS-1921
'Of the Understanding', in: *English Prose*, ed. W. Peacock. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1921. *Ref*. Attig 329. *Note*. Selections from the *Essay* and the *Conduct*.

AS-1926
'Of the Conduct of the Understanding: John Locke', in: *Century Readings in the English Essay*, ed. Louis Wann. New York: Century, *c* 1926. *Conduct*: pp. 124-127. *Ref*. Attig 764.

AS-1939
'Of the Conduct of the Understanding: John Locke', in: *Century Readings in the English Essay*, ed. Louis Wann. New York: Century, *c* 1939. *Ref*. Attig 764. *Note*. As AS-1926

AS-1946
'Of Reading', in: *The Treasure Chest: an Anthology of Contemplative Prose*, ed. J. Donald Adams. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1946. *Ref*. Attig 765.

AS-1952
'Of the Conduct of the Understanding', in: *Toward Liberal Education*, rev. ed., by Louis G. Locke, William M. Gibson and George Arms. New York: Rinehart, *c* 1952. *Ref*. Attig 331. *Conduct*: pp. 224-227.

AS-1964(a)
Some Thoughts concerning Education, ed. F.W. Garforth. London: Heinemann, 1964. *Ref*. Attig 564. *Note*. Abridged version. Includes selections from the *Conduct* in the Appendix.

AS-1964(b)
Some Thoughts concerning Education, ed. F.W. Garforth. Woodburry, New York: Barron's Educational Series, [1964]. *Ref*. Attig 564. *Note*. Abridged version. As AS-1964(a).

AS-1965
Locke on Politics, Religion and Education, ed. Maurice Cranston. New York: Collier Books, 1965. *Ref*. Attig 887. *Note*. Contains selection(s) from the *Conduct*.

Translations that consist of or comprise the Conduct

Tr(Du)-1979
Leidraad voor het verstand, eds. Jeanne Marie Noël and Henk de Wolf. Meppel: Boom, 1979.* *Ref*. Attig 766. *Note*. Yolton 308 mentions an earlier Dutch translation (*Korte inhoud Van een Werk genaamt Wysgeerige Proeven, Aangaande het Menschelyk Verstand, Door den Heer Jan Locke*. Antwerpen: W. Jugla, 1766 [UBU AB-THO: 14-220]); however, this is not a translation of the *Conduct*, but of the *Abrégé* of the *Essay.*

Tr(Fr)-1710
Œuvres diverses de Monsieur Jean Locke. Rotterdam: Fritsch and Böhm, 1710.* [BOD Vet. B4 f.177] *Conduct*: pp. 141-348 (*De la conduite de l'esprit dans la recherche de la verité)*. *Ref*. Yolton 372. *Note*. Modelled after O-1706 but printing the first French translation of the 'toleration' letter from the Latin edition (instead of the incomplete fourth letter), and omitting the 'Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion'. According to Yolton 372, the editor is probably Jean Frédéric Bernard, who is also the publisher of Tr-1732(Fr.). Divided into 40 sections, instead of the 45 sections in O-1706.

Tr(Fr)-1732
Œuvres diverses de Monsieur Locke. Nouvelle Edition considérablement augmentée (2 vols.). Amsterdam: J. F. Bernard, 1732.* [BOD Vet. B4 f.184] *Conduct*: Vol. 1, pp. 124-308. *Ref*. Yolton 373. *Note*. As Tr(Fr)-1710, plus the 'Essay for the Understanding of St. Paul's Epistles', the 'Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion', and selected correspondence with Philippus van Limborch. According to Yolton, the editor is probably Jean Frédéric Bernhard, who is also the publisher.

Tr(Fr)-1821
Œuvres philosophiques de Locke. Nouvelle édition revue par M. Thurot (7 vols.). Paris: F. Didot, 1821-1825.* *Conduct*: Vol. 7, pp. 1-135. [BOD 265 j.245] *Ref*. Attig 870.

Tr(Fr)-1975
De la conduite de l'entendement, ed. Yves Michaud. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1975.* *Ref*. Attig 767.

Tr(Ger)-1755
Johann Lockens Anleitung des menschlichen Verstandes zur Erkäntniß der Wahrheit nebst desselben Abhandlung von den Wunderwerken. Aus dem Englischen überstzt von George David Kypke. Königsberg: J.H. Hartung, 1755.* [BOD Vet. A5 e.4835] *Ref*. Yolton 309. *Note*. Divided into 103 sections, unlike the 45 sections in O-1706 and most subsequent editions. Also contains the 'Discourse on Miracles'.

Tr(Ger)-1857
Die Leitung des Verstandes, ed. Bertha Leopold. Hamburg: [publisher not given], 1857. *Ref*. Attig 769.

Tr(Ger)-1883
Locke's Leitung des Verstandes, ed. Jürgen Bona Meyer. Heidelberg: G. Weiss, 1883. *Ref*. Attig 770.

Tr(Ger)-1920
Über den richtigen Gebrauch des Verstandes, ed. Dr. Otto Martin. Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1920.* *Ref*. Attig 771.

Tr(Ger)-1996
Anleitung des menschlichen Verstandes. Eine Abhandlung von den Wunderwerken. In der Übersetzung Königsberg 1755 von Georg David Kypke, (2 vols.) eds. Terry Boswell, Riccardo Pozzo und Clemens Schwaiger. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1996.* *Note*. Vol. 1 gives repr. of Tr(Ger)-1755.

Tr(It)-1776
Guida dell' intelletto nella ricerca della verità. Opera postuma di Gio. Locke da Francesco Soave C.R.S. Prof. di Filos. Mor. nel R. Ginnasio di Brera. Milano: G. Motta, 1776.* [BOD Vet. F5 e.133] *Ref*. Yolton 310. *Note*. Text is not divided into 45 sections, as in O-1706 and in most subsequent editions, but into 39 'articoli' that follow largely the division into 40 sections in Tr(Fr)-1710.

Tr(It)-1790
Saggio filosofico di Gio: Locke su l'umano intelletto. Compendiato dal Dr. Winne, 2nd ed. by Francesco Soave (3 vols.). Venezia: Baglioni, 1790. *Conduct*: Vol. 3. *Ref*. Attig 394. *Note*. Unlike the first edition, this second edition of Wynne's abridgement of the *Essay* contains the *Conduct* as well.

Tr(It)-1794
Guida dell' intelletto nella ricerca della verità. Opera Postuma di Gio: Locke. Tradotto, e Commentato da Francesco Soave C.R.S. Prof. di Fil. nel Ginnasio di Brera. Terza Edizione Veneta. Venezia: Baglioni, 1794.* *Conduct*: pp. 1-137. [BOD Vet. f5 f.12] *Ref*. Yolton 146. *Note*. *Conduct* is Vol. 3 after two previous volumes, containing a translation of Wynne's abridgement of the *Essay*. The inspected volume of the *Conduct* was bound together with Vol. 2, containing the abridgements of Books III and IV of the *Essay*. Division is into 39 'articoli', see Tr(It)-1776. Attig: as Tr(It)-1790.

Tr(It)-1801
Guida dell'intellectto nella ricerca della verità. Opera postuma di Gio: Locke. Tradotta, e Commentata da Franceso Soave C.R.S. Prof. di Fil. Mor. nel R. Ginnasio di Brera. Quarta Edizione Veneta. Tomo Terzo. Venezia: Baglioni, 1801.* *Conduct*: pp. 1-137. [BOD 26682 f.16] *Ref*. Attig 396. *Note*. As Tr(It)-1794, however, in this case the inspected copy of the *Conduct* is bound together with both previous volumes containing Wynne's abridgement of the *Essay.*

Tr(It)-1807
Guida dell'intelletto di Gio: Locke su l'humano intelletto compendiato dal Dr. Winne. Tradotto, e Commentato da Francesco Soave C.R.S. Professor di Filosofia Morale nel R. Ginnasio di Brera. Quinta Edizione Veneta. Tomo Terzo. Venezia: Baglioni, 1807. *Conduct*: pp. 1-137. *Ref*. Attig 397. *Note*. As Tr(It)-1794. The remark 'compendiato dal Dr. Winne' applies probably to the two previous volumes containing the abridged versions of the *Essay*, but not to the volume containing the *Conduct.*

Tr(It)-1926
Della guida dell'intelligenza nella ricerca della verità, ed. Eugenio Cipriani. Lanciano: R. Carabba, [1926]. *Ref*. Attig 773.

Tr(It)-1979
Scritti filosofici e religiosi, ed. Mario Sina. Milano: Rusconi, 1979. *Ref*. Attig 873.

Tr(Jap)-1998
Chisei no Tadashii Michibikikata, ed. Kiyoshi Shimokawa. Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobo, 1999.*

Tr(Pol)-1955
Rozwazania dotyczace rozumu ludzkiego, ed. Czeslaw Znamierowcki (2 vols.). Krakowie: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1955.* [BOD 26682 e.91] *Ref*. Attig 428. *Note*. Translation of the *Essay* that contains also a translation of the *Conduct*: 'O wlasciwym uzywaniu rozumu', Vol. 2, pp. 497-613.

Tr(Rus)-1960
Izbrannye filosofskie proizvedeniia, eds. I.S. Narskogo and A.A. Makarovskogo (2 vols.). Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Sotsial'no-Ekonomicheskoi Literatury, 1960. *Ref*. Attig 875. *Note*. Translation of W-1843.

Tr(Sp)-1827
Del gobierno civil; seguido de Carta sobre la tolerancia por Locke. Paris: en casa de Rosa, 1827. *Ref*. Attig 774.

2. MANUSCRIPTS

Amsterdam University Library, *MS R.K., J 57a*. Letter by Damaris Cudworth Masham to J. le Clerc, 12 January 1705.

London, Public Record Office, *PRO 30/24/2, fols. 47-56*. Thomas Sydenham / John Locke, *De arte medica*.

—, *PRO 30/24/47/2, fols. 31-38*. Thomas Sydenham / John Locke, *Anatomia*.

Oxford, Bodleian Library, *MS Locke c.1-2*. Ledgers containing Locke's accounts, 1671-1704.

—, *MS Locke c.24*. Letters and drafts of letters of Locke, 1652-1704, arranged in alphabetical order of the addressees' names.

—, *MS Locke c.27, fols. 92-93*. 'Observations on a discourse concerning natural and revealed Religion [*A Discourse of Natural and Revealed Religion in Several Essays* (1691)] by S[tephen] N[ye] [16]95'.

—, *MS Locke c.27, fols. 94-120*. Notes made by Locke for the *Reasonableness of Christianity* (1695), including (fol. 94) three addenda inserted in the second edition of 1696.

—, *MS Locke c.27, fols. 138-141*. 'Revelation. Its several ways under the old Testament [16]96', quotations written out by Locke.

—, *MS Locke c.27, fols. 162-177*. 'Resurrectio et quæ sequuntur', by Locke [*c*. 1699].

—, *MS Locke c.27, fols. 213-216*. 'Christianæ Religionis Synopsis [17]02', by Locke.

—, *MS Locke c.27, fols. 217-220*. An early draft by Locke of *An Essay for the Understanding of St. Paul's Epistles by Consulting St. Paul himself* (1707), with notes on the chronology of the epistles.

—, *MS Locke c.28, fols. 52-69 and 76-82*. 'Epitome' of Locke's manuscript of the *Essay* in the hand of S. Brownover with a few corrections and additions by Locke.

—, *MS Locke c.28, fols. 115-118*. Additions by Locke for the *Essay* [*c*. 1694].

—, *MS Locke c.28, fols. 121-138*. Partial copy of the *Conduct*, copied from MS Locke e.1.

—, *MS Locke c.35*. Acknowledgements of receipts by persons to whom Locke had bequeated money or property.

—, *MS Locke c.40*. Letters from Locke to Peter King, 1698-1704.

—, *MS Locke e.1*. Drafts for additions to the *Essay*, including the *Conduct*.

—, *MS Locke f.1*. Journal, 1675-1676.

—, *MS Locke f.2*. Journal, 1677.

—, *MS Locke f.3*. Journal, 1678.

—, *MS Locke f.8*. Journal, 1684-1685.

—, *MS Locke f.10*. Journal, 1689-1704.

—, *MS Locke f.11, fols. 7v-57*. Account book that includes accounts of money received from and disbursed for Locke's pupils at Christ Church, 1661-1666.

—, *MS Locke f.14*. Notebook.

—, *MS Locke f.33*. An early notebook containing entries in an unidentified hand.

—, *MS Locke f.34*. Three small account books, one of which is: (C) fol. 69 ff.: Account book of William Shaw.

Oxford, Christ Church, *Christ Church Collection Book (1699-1720), shelfmark li.b.1*. Reading lists for individual students.

3. PRIMARY LITERATURE

Aristotle, *Ethica nicomachea*, ed. I. Bywater. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957.

—, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (2 vols.). Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991.

—, *Les réfutations sophistiques*, ed. Louis-André Dorion. Paris: J. Vrin, 1995.

—, *Topica et sophistici elenchi*, ed. W.D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958.

Arnauld, Antoine, *Des vrayes et des fausses idées, contre ce qu'enseigne l'auteur de La Recherche de la Vérité*. Cologne: N. Schouten, 1683.

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