

Dr Mile BJELAJAC
Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, Beograd

NEDIĆEV MEMORANDUM GENERALU AJZENHAUERU MAJA 1945

O ličnosti generala Milana Nedića savremenici i istoričari napisali su veći broj radova. Savremenici među kojima i njegov sestrčić Stanislav Krakov, najčešće su objavljivali van Jugoslavije.¹ U zemlji, prevladavali su istoričari koji su mu posvetili jednu monografiju ali mnogo više stranica u delima o Drugom svetskom ratu na tlu Srbije.² Može se konstatovati da su unutar srpske emigracije već pedesetih polarizacije oko uloge generala Nedića počele gubiti na oštini sa tendencijom da se njegov rad prikaže kao drugi pol borbe za očuvanje srpske nacije i borbe protiv komunizma. U Jugoslaviji (Srbiji) je on i dalje bio povod za kontro-

¹ Boško Kostić, *Za istoriju naših dana*, Lil 1949; Petar Martinović Bajica, *Milan Nedić*, Čikago, Ilinoj 1956 (reprint, "Nikola Pašić", Beograd 2003); Bor. M. Karapandžić, *Gradanski rat u Srbiji*, Klivlend Ohajo 1958; B. N. Kostić, *Istina o Milanu Nediću*, Milvoki, SAD 1965; Stanislav Krakov, *General Milan Nedić*, I-II, Minhen 1968; Prof. Lazo M. Kostić, *Armijski general Milan Nedić, njegova uloga i delovanje pretežno prema stranim izvorima*, Privatno izdanje, Melburn, Australija 1976; Ilija M. Pavlović, „General Milan Đ. Nedić - Biografija i drugi istorijski podaci o srpskom stradanju u drugom svetskom ratu 1941-1945”, I-II, *Srpski preporod*, Southport, Quinsland, Australia 1990 (Otađbinsko izdanje: *Milan Đ. Nedić i njegovo doba*, I-II, *Nova iskra*, Beograd 1994) Milutin Propadović, „D.V. Ljotić, Zbor i Komunistička partija Jugoslavije 1935 - 1945”, *Iskra* 1990

² Milan Borković, *Milan Nedić*, Zagreb 1976; M. Borković, *Kontrarevolucija u Srbiji, Kvislinška uprava 1941-1944*, Knj.1-2, "Sloboda", Beograd 1979; Mladen Stefanović, *Zbor Dimitrija Ljotića 1934 - 1945*, Narodna knjiga, Beograd ; Vjenceslav Glišić, *Užička republika*, Beograd 1968; B. Petranović, *Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu 1939 - 1945*, VINC, Beograd 1992; Milan Ristović, *Nemački novi poredak i Jugoistočna Evropa 1940/1941 - 1944/1945*, VINC, Beograd 1991; Žarko Jovanović, *Seljaštvo Srbije u Drugom svetskom ratu*, INIS, Beograd 1995; Dragan Aleksić, *Privreda Srbije u Drugom svetskom ratu*, INIS, Beograd 2002; Mirjana Zorić, *Srbija u završnici rata 1943 - 1944*, doktorska disertacija odbranjena 2004 na Filozofskom fakultetu u Beogradu; vidi takođe naše: "Milan Nedić", u: *100 znamenitih Srba*, Princip, Beograd 1993; *Generali i admirali Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1918 - 1941*, Studija o vojnoj eliti i biografski leksikon, INIS-Dobra, Beograd 2004.

verze u nauci, a još više u javnosti. Jedan deo te javnosti nije ni do danas prihvatio činjenicu da je na sceni pored oslobodilačkog vođen i građanski rat, da su postojali legitimisti i revolucionari. Takođe se teško prihvata činjenica da je međunarodno ratno pravo predviđalo domaću civilnu upravu pod okupacijom, te propisivalo obaveze okupatora i okupiranog. Ovo poslednje je upravo bilo deo okolnosti u kojima je delovao general Nedić.

Dokumenta koja objavljujemo, *Memorandum* generala Milana Nedića generalu Ajzenhaueru (Eisenhower) u maju 1945. godine i nekoliko pratećih, do sada nisu korišćena u historiografiji. Ona se nalaze u Nacionalnom arhivu u Washington-u, u fondu State Department-a.³

Poslanstvo SAD u Beogradu primilo je 28. augusta 1945. godine kao „poverljivo” informaciju od američkog ambasadora u Berlinu Roberta Marfija (Robert Murphy) sa preliminarnog saslušanja generala Milana Nedića od 10. jula iste godine. Mesec dana pre ove informacije, isto poslanstvo je iz Berlina dobilo kopiju „Memoranduma” u obimu od šest strana, kucanih bez proreda, koji je general Nedić uputio 25. maja 1945. glavno-komandujućem savezničkih snaga Ajzenhaueru preko generala Harija Kolinsa (Harry T. Collins) komandanta 42. američke divizije u Kicbilu (Kitzbuhel).⁴ Kako saznajemo iz američke prepiske, američki štab po pitanju memoranduma nije preduzeo ništa. Nedić je potom uhapšen 6. jula, a pred obaveštajne organe američke Treće armije doveden je 9. jula.⁵

Prema zapisniku majora Edmunda L. Kinga, Nedić je svoj boravak u Austriji, posebno u Kicbilu, predstavio kao internaciju u koju su ga stavili Nemci sve do dolaska Amerikanaca. Dao je informacije o svim svojim saradnicima koji su ostali u Kicbilu ili su se nalazili u Italiji kao general Đura Dokić i ministar dr Nedeljковиć. Američki obaveštajac je u komentaru zabeležio da bi uz dodatne izvore, Nedić, budući dobro upoznat sa balkanskim stvarima, mogao rasvetliti svoju saradnju sa Nemačkom. Rezimirajući Nedićeve tvrdnje naveo je da general svoju saradnju sa Nemačkom video kao nuždu da se zaštiti Srbija od razaranja u građanskom ratu koji su zazivali komunisti, a s druge strane da ne bude previše eksploatisana od Nemačke. „Izjavio je da nema čega da se boji od Amerikanaca jer misli da će se njegova pozicija razumeti”, završava King.

³ National Archives Washington, odeljenje Maryland College Park, Fond State Department, Record Group 84, Yugoslavia, box 52, file 800. Koristimo priliku da se zahvalim kolegi Prof. Dr Dragu Roksandiću koji nam je ljubazno skrenuo pažnju na ovaj dokument.

⁴ Marfi je obe informacije poslao Državnom sekretaru SAD Achesonu i James W. Riddleberger-u CE (verovatno odeljenje Central Europe). Ambasador SAD takođe obaveštava da je kopiju Nedićevog memoranduma prosledio britanskom ambasadoru u Berlinu. Dakle ovaj memorandum bi trebao da se nalazi sačuvan i u PRO, FO, britansko poslanstvo Berlin, 1945.

⁵ Smatramo da su ovi datumi tačni. Borković i neki drugi autori navode 5. juni kao datum hapšenja. (Borković, *n.d.*, knj.II, s.370)

U memorandumu koji je Nedić uputio Ajzenhaueru na prvom mestu se izražava zadovoljstvo i pozdravlja pobeda saveznika, a posebno činjenica da su ih oslobodile američke snage, predstavnici demokratija koje su svoje predstavnike slale glavnom štabu Draže Mihailovića kao vid velike moralne podrške. Podseća da je i on učesnik neravnopravnog rata koji je bio nametnut Jugoslaviji te da su u Kicbilu komandanti dve trećine ondašnje armije koja se oduprla Nemcima (on na čelu 3. i brat mu na čelu 2. grupe armija JV). Upro je prstom u hrvatsku izdaju koja je još više oslabila otpor i na tragediju srpskog naroda koja je nastupila po slomu armije na svim stranama, a posebno na teritoriju NDH. Naveo je nedela Mađara i Bugara, što je sve zajedno pretilo istrebljenjem srpskog naroda. Podsetio je na činjenicu da su ga Nemci držali u internaciji sve dok krajem augusta nije prihvatio položaj. Pa i tada na svaki njegov zahtev ili najavu odstupanja, pretili su da će ostatak Srbije podeliti između Bugara, Hrvata i Mađara. Uprkos tim teškim okolnostima, obaveštava Ajzenhauera da je spašeno 400.000 izbeglica sa drugih područja Jugoslavije među kojima 86.000 dece, siročadi starih do 14 godina.

Nedić je objašnjavao svoju antikomunističku akciju zaštitom srpskog naroda od represalija, ali i borbom za njegovu budućnost u slobodi posle rata. Kada je njegov odnos prema pokretu Draže Mihailovića u pitanju, on u ovom memorandumu sebe predstavlja kao tajnog pristalicu te akcije koji je na sve načine pomagao da ta organizacija opstane i da se što bolje opremi, koliko je bilo u njegovoj moći.

Dve strane svog memoranduma posvetio je stanju u Srbiji posle dolaska sovjetskih snaga i partizana 1944. godine. Istako je činjenicu da ni jednog trenutka ni njegove, ni snage generala Mihailovića nisu pomišljale da se suprotstave savezničkim sovjetskim jedinicama, mada su i dalje bili angažovani u borbi sa partizanima. Da bi izbegli sukob svojevoljno su se povukli iz Srbije na Zapad. Tako je, po Nediću, politička manjina, uz pomoć sovjetskih trupa zagospodarila Srbijom i uskoro se nametnula celoj Jugoslaviji.

Nedić moli generala Ajzenhauera da se niko od preko dvesta hiljada Srba iz zarobljeništva, srpskih radnika te 20.000 izbeglih boraca prisilno ne vraća u Jugoslaviju dok tamo ne bude demokratije. Zalaže se da Amerika utiče i kontroliše izražavanje slobodne narodne volje na izborima jer u protivnom pobeđiće politička manjina manipulacijom. Izražava ličnu spremnost, kao i spremnost ministara svoje vlade koji su u Kicbilu da se podvrgnu ispitivanju o njihovom radu tokom okupacije, ali tačno i pred međunarodnim sudom, a ne pred Titovim.

U prilogu memoranduma Ajzenhaueru, general Nedić je priložio rezime svog memoranduma koji je 19. januara 1945. poslao dr Nojbaheru (Dr Herman Neubacher) predstavniku nemačkog ministarstva vanjskih poslova. On u više navrata pominje ovaj dokument i njegovu sudbinu u samom memorandumu.

Upoređivanjem ovog skraćenog teksta sa originalnim, istoričari mogu uočiti šta je Nedić smatrao neoportunim da se iznosi pred pobednike, a šta podupire njegove ocene iznete u memorandumu američkom generalu. U najkraćem, ispušten je predistorijat memoranduma Nojbaheru, tj. pozivanje na njihove susrete u Beču, ponude o stvaranju zajedničke vlade koje su navodno stigle od generala Mihailovića preko Sarajeva, odlazak Nojbahera u Sarajevo da se situacija rasvetli i očekivanje pregovarača Mihailovića u Beču.⁶ Imajući u vidu pismo Milana Nedića ministru Nojbaheru od 2. februara 1945. godine, u kome general i njegove kolege u izbeglištvu komentarišu negativan odgovor nemačke vlade po memorandumu od 19. januara i daju razjašnjenja oko mogućih nejasnih tačaka, možemo se pitati zašto se Nedić nije odlučio da i njega priloži uz spis kojim se obratio Ajzenhaueru. Naime, u ovom pismu od 2. februara je pozicija Nedića i nekadašnje vlade daleko preciznije iznesena i, ako je hteo, išla bi mu više u prilog:

„Povodom Vaših primedaba pod 1) i 2) u Vašem pismu od 28. prošlog meseca molim da izvolite primiti ova obaveštenja od Srpske vlade:

Srpska vlada je diskutovala po pitanju stava Memoranduma od 19. januara ove godine na svojim sednicama 1. i 2. februara tek. godine i došla do ovog zaključka:

1) Izgleda nam da je ovde po sredi izvestan nesporazum. Shvatanje koje je izloženo u Memorandumu od 19. januara ove godine samo konstatuje ovu situaciju i ovaj odnos koji je od 1941–1944. postojao između Nemačke i Srbije, kao dela zaraćene sa Nemačkom Jugoslavije, tj. odnos pobedioca prema pobedom, okupatora prema okupiranom, a taj odnos i sada još postoji. Pri ovome napominjemo da Nemačka nikada, ni u kom obliku nije tražila od srpske Vlade u Srbiji, da se taj odnos, pa dakle i njen odnos prema njenim saveznicima, ma u kom pogledu izmeni. Takvi pokušaji izgleda nam da se tek sada čine sa nemačke strane, da se srpska Vlada izjasni za borbu u saradnji sa Nemačkom, a „protiv zajedničkog neprijatelja.”

Mi međutim nemamo ni ovlašćenja ni mogućnosti da činjenično stanje sada menjamo (...)

U nastavku ovog pisma se izražava stav prema onima iz srpske emigracije koji su imali drugačije poglede:

„Ako pak izvesne srpske borbene grupe i politički ljudi, koji iza njih stoje – kako Vi ističete u svom pismu od 28. prošlog meseca – doista stoje i ostaju na stanovištu neposrednog produžavanja borbe, to je njihovo privatno

⁶ Verzija dokumenta Predsednika srpske vlade, Str. Pov. Br.1/1945, od 19. januara 1945. u Kicbilu, Nj. E. Gosp. Ministru dr Nojbaheru u Beču, objavljena je u *Glasi Kanadskih Srba*, br. 1990 i 1991 za 1971. godinu (priređio Radoje L. Knežević). Prema napomeni priređivača radio ih je Nedić lično kao i sva podertavanja na njima. Vidi takođe: Ilija M. Pavlović, *n.d.* s.167-173.

mišljenje, koje srpska nacionalna Vlada, kojoj ja stojim na čelu, ne može prihvatiti.”⁷

Pišući o ovoj poslednjoj epizodi iz života „srpske vlade” i samog generala Nedića istoričari, posebno u Jugoslaviji, su se do sada koristili najviše zarobljenom nemačkom građom, izjavama pojedinih ličnosti kao što su Dragi Jovanović, Tanasije Dinić, Aleksandra Cincar Markovića, pa i samog Nedića tokom njegovog saslušanja. Takođe su koristili selektivno ili ukrštajući različita svedočenja savremenika, od kojih su neki nastavili da žive posle 1945. godine u emigraciji.⁸ Za uže znalce biće svakako do značaja da uporede ono što se do sada znalo i činjenice iz ovih dokumenata u kojima Nedić pokušava da se predstavi u svetlu doslednog borca protiv komunizma za koga bi saveznici trebalo da imaju razumevanja.

Prema dosadašnjim znanjima, predsednik „vlade nacionalnog spasa” Milan Nedić i njegovi ministri, izuzev Veselinovića i Đorđevića koji su ostali u Beogradu, otputovali su početkom oktobra 1944. iz Beograda i preko Srema, Subotice i Budimpešte stigli u Beč 11. oktobra. Privid funkcionisanja ove grupe kao „vlade” nastavljen je sve do kapitulacije Trećeg Rajha maja 1945. godine.

Po dolasku u Beč „vlada” je nastavila da održava sednice i razrađuje svoje planove i taktiku za bližu budućnost. Neki ministri su bili mišljenja da vlada više ne postoji i da bi eventualno mogao da se formira samo jedan komitet koji bi se starao o izbeglicama i pokušao da uspostavi vezu sa Kairom i Londonom. Nedić i većina su bili protiv zastupajući mišljenje da će se situacija promeniti. To im je bila osnova da traže od vlade Rajha da ih kao vladu i priznaju. Sam Nojbaher se zalaga da to ne bude više vlada nego „Srpski klub” ili „Srpski odbor za saradnju sa Nemačkom”, a Nedić da bude predsednik tog odbora. Već od 17. oktobra u Beču je počela delovati „Srpska kancelarija” u prostorijama hotela „Imperijal”. Vlada je u tom trenutku kao prvu zadaću videla dobijanje novca za brigu o brojnim izbeglicama, internircima i bivšim zarobljenicima. Mnogi su nagrnuli u holove hotela već prvog dana. U Beču je vladala beda, skupoća, a grad je bio izložen bombardovanjima. U grad su se slivale i druge izbegličke formacije pa su domaćini već za nekoliko dana odlučili da prebace bivšu srpsku vladu u hotel „Grand” u Kicbilu. Kako se verovatno ne bez ironije prisećao Aleksandar Cincar Marković, koji je preko Jonića saznavao šta se među članovima vlade dešava, oni su se zaista „igrali vlade” i tražili priznanje od Nemaca, pomoć u organizaciji novih trupa, vojno-politički savez sa Rajhom. Na sve to Nemci su im nudili da se organizuju kao „Komitet spasa”.⁹

⁷ Vidi nap. 4; I. M. Pavlović, *n.d.* 173-174.

⁸ M. Borković, *Kontrarevolucija*, knj.2, s. 362-372, vidi poglavlje: „Aktivnost srpskih kvisinga u izbeglištvu do završetka Drugog svetskog rata”.

⁹ Borković, *Kontrarevolucija*, s. 364-365

Na dan nemačke kapitulacije, 8. maja u Kicbil je ušla prethodnica američke 36. divizije, a potom je upravu tog dela Austrije sprovala 42. američka divizija.

Posle kapitulacije otvorilo se za sve ove emigrante egzistencijalno pitanje – „Šta će s nama biti?“ Kako će ih tretirati zapadni saveznici, kako će se prema njima odnositi Kralj i političari u Londonu i kakva potraživanja će ispostaviti nove vlasti u Jugoslaviji? U tom kontekstu se pojavljuje i ovaj apel na generala Ajzenhauera koji je ostao bez odjeka, a sudbina Nedića i većine njegovih saradnika bila je tragična. Na zahtev nove jugoslovenske vlade većina je uhapšena jula 1945. godine. Tokom narednih šest meseci Nedić i drugovi prebacivani su i isledivani od američkih organa u logorima Frajzinlu, Mosburg i Novi Ulm. Potom su bili izručeni jugoslovenskim istražnim organima 5. januara 1946. godine. U međuvremenu prema svedočanstvima u emigrantskoj literaturi Nedić je održavao veze sa onima koji nisu bili uhapšeni, a oni su mu pored pisama slali pakete sa hranom. Nedić je proveo nešto više od mesec dana u beogradskom pritvoru gde je vođena istraga, kada je prema službenom saopštenju za javnost izvršio samoubistvo 6. februara 1946. godine.

DOKUMENTI O ŠTETAMA NASTALIM BOMBARDOVANJEM BEOGRADA 1941–1944.

U jugoslovenskoj i srpskoj historiografiji krajem 1980-ih i početkom 1990-ih ponovo je bila otvorena jedna skoro zaboravljena tema – povodi i rezultati savezničkog bombardovanja gradova u Srbiji 1944. godine. Jedan deo srpskih istoričara i javnosti u klimi opšteg preispitivanja jugoslovenske prošlosti bio je sklon da u tom segmentu rata vidi isključivo tendenciju zatiranja srpskog naroda, umanjene njegovog broja i poraz građanskih snaga čiji je oslonac bio u pokretu generala Dragoljuba Mihailovića, a privremena egzistencijalna zaštita u civilnoj upravi generala Milana Nedića.¹⁰

Na takvu suženu interpretaciju upozoravali su drugi istoričari nudeći komparativne informacije o bombardovanju ostalih delova Jugoslavije. Svoj doprinos u rasvetljavanju ove kontroverze daju i oni koji su istraživali dublje razloge strateškog i taktičkog bombardovanja otkrivajući sve aspekte vojne stvarnosti pa i aktivnost ondašnje jugoslovenske vlade u Londonu.¹¹

¹⁰ Momčilo Pavlović, Veroljub Trajković, „Savezničko bombardovanje Leskovca 6. septembra 1944“, *Leskovački zbornik*, Leskovac 1995; Đoko Tripković, *Beograd pod bombama*, Beograd 1999. Ovaj autor navodi da je samo u bombardovanju Beograda 16. i 17. aprila 1944 poginulo 1.260 građana, teško povredeno 1.600, a lakše nekoliko hiljada. "Razoreno je oko 600 kuća, dok je veći broj stanova pretrpeo veća ili manja oštećenja." (s.65)

¹¹ Vidi članak u ovom broju *Tokova istorije*: M. Terzić, "Jugoslovenska kraljevska vlada, Draža Mihailović i savezničko bombardovanje ciljeva u Jugoslaviji 1942-1944. godine"; Đorđe Stanko-

Dokumenti američke provenijencije koje objavljujemo, po našem sudu doprinose racionalizovanju priče o stradanju srpskog stanovništva u Drugom svetskom ratu. Na drugoj strani, isti dokumenti upozoravaju nas da su danas u opticaju različiti kvantitativni iskazi o istom. Korisno je u svakom slučaju saznati koja metoda se koristila u prikupljanju njihovom i ko svedoči. Takođe, zbog ratne propagande, postojale su tendencije uvećavanja ili smanjivanja brojčanih iskaza u skladu sa potrebama i namerama.¹²

Tri dokumenta u prilogu su pripremljena u Ambasadi Sjedinjenih država u Beogradu i poslani su u Washington, State Department, 27. avgusta 1945. godine. Informaciju je izradio Eric L. Pridonoff, ekonomski savetnik, a potpisao tadašnji otpravnik poslova Harold Shantz. Iz analize je vidljivo da je jugoslovenska vlada odredila grupu od 40 inženjera da u roku od četiri dana pregleda razaranja Beograda, isključujući mostove i razaranja na železnici, koja su nastala nemačkim i savezničkim bombardovanjima. Takođe, u ovom izveštaju nisu uključena laka oštećenja nastala tokom uličnih borbi ruskih i nemačkih snaga, ali ni lična imovina građana (nameštaj, odeća i dr). Suma štete nad ličnim dobrima iskazana je posebno.

Metodološku osnovu za određivanje štete predstavljala je formula:

- a) jedinica mere je stan od četiri sobe i prosečne veličine od 100 metara kvadratnih.
- b) procenjena građevinska cena bila je 1.000 dinara za kvadrat kao u 1939. godini.
- c) cena štete za manja oštećenja iznosila je 20% od cene u 1939, za teška oštećenja 50% od iste cene, a 80% od predratne cene za potpuno uništenje.
- d) odvajanje štete koja je počinjena 1941. godine od one iz 1944.

U izveštaju američke ambasade u Beogradu navodi se da je ukupna šteta pričinjena na objektima i imovinom građana u Beogradu procenjena na 220.150.000 dinara (3.992.000 \$), od toga šteta na stvarima i ličnom imovinom građana procenjena je na 113.000.000 dinara (2.0250.000\$ prema kursu iz 1939). Udeo američkog bombardovanja u stambenoj šteti iznosio je 1.222.000, a na stvarima 1.270.000 \$. Nemačka šteta prema ovom izveštaju iznosila je

vić, „Savezničko bombardovanje Nezavisne države Hrvatske 1943 - 1945 (Istorijski stereotipovi i stvarnost)”, *Tokovi istorije*, br. 1-4/2001, s.77-86; „Savezničko bombardovanje Podgorice 1944”, *Pobjeda*, Podgorica 2004; Mirjana M. Zorić, „Srbija u planovima vodstva partizanskog pokreta 1941 - 1944”, doktorska disertacija odbranjena na Filozofskom fakultetu u Beogradu 2004,

¹² National Archives, Washington, Reg. 84, Box 53, dok. 815. Dokumente smo pribavili tokom skorašnjeg istraživanja u National Archives u Washington-u. Koristimo priliku da se zahvalimo prof. dr Dragu Roksandiću koji nam je skrenuo pažnju na njih prilikom našeg zajedničkog boravka u toj instituciji.

1.100.000 \$. Kod nemačkog dela, najviše štete nad imovinom građana pripisano je direktnoj pljački.

Prema navedenoj metodologiji Komisija je evidentirala 1.880 lakše oštećenih stanova, 679 teško oštećenih stanova i 440 potpuno uništena stana.

U komentaru koji je sačinila američka ambasada navodi se da je autor izveštaja prema savetu gospodina Emila Kekića proveo probna istraživanja u sedam gradskih rejona i da su ona dala veoma slične rezultate izveštaju koje je podneo tim od 40 inženjera.

Podaci do kojih je došla pomenuta komisija i saradnik ambasade koji je proveravao štetu na određenom uzorku, razlikuju se od podataka koje je samo za nemačko bombardovanje 6. i 7. aprila 1941. dala Tehnička direkcija opštine grada. Prema njenim nalazima potpuno je bilo porušeno 714, teže oštećeno 1.888, a lakše 6.615 zgrada, dok je lakše oštećen 22.831 stan. Ista direkcija je tada utvrdila da je vodovodna mreža bila oštećena na 360 mesta, oštećeno 76 tramvaja od 104, 16 od 87 autobusa. Razoreno 60.000 od ukupno 80.000 metara tramvajskih pruga. Zvanični izveštaji su govorili o 2.271 žrtvi, a nemačke procene o 4.000.¹³ Dodatno tokom prvih savezničkih bombardovanja pisci pominju još 600 porušenih objekata.

O ratnoj šteti koju je Nemačka počinila u srpskoj istoriografiji je već pisano, ali nisu navođeni posebni podaci za stradanja građevina i opreme u svakom gradu posebno.¹⁴ Posebno nije vršena uporedba sa štetama koje su nastale kao posledica delovanja savezničke avijacije ili borbi tokom rata. Dokumenti u prilogu su verovatno jedan od redih priloga u kojima se uporedno analizira koliko je u šteti koju je pretrpeo prostor, dobra i ljudi imao udela rat uopšte, odnosno različiti akteri na istom vojištu.

U radu dr Milana Terzića jedan deo se odnosi na izveštaje o tragičnim posledicama savezničkog bombardovanja na civilno stanovništvo Beograda, Zemuna i drugih srpskih gradova, što je izazvalo jugoslovensku vladu u

¹³ *Bombardovanje Beograda u Drugom svetskom ratu*, (Istorijski arhiv Beograda) Beograd 1975, s. 22-23

¹⁴ Nikola Živković, *Ratna šteta koju je Nemačka učinila Jugoslaviji u Drugom svetskom ratu*, ISI, Beograd 1975. Autor navodi da je direktni gubitak u nacionalnom bogatstvu bio 9,145 milijardi američkih dolara, a ukupno utvrđena ratna šteta 46,9 milijardi \$. Od toga 35,5 mld nemačka, 9,85 italijanska i 1,192 bugaraska (prema obračunskom kursu od 44 din za 1\$ u 1938). Prema izveštaju Komisije za utvrđivanje ratne štete 3.300.000 stanovnika ostalo je bez krova nad glavom I inventara, a 289.000 seoskih domaćinstava je spaljeno ili uništeno uključujući inventar i stoku; Dragan Aleksić, *Privreda Srbije u Drugom svetskom ratu*, INIS, Beograd 2002; Milan Koljanin, *Nemački logor na Beogradskom sajmištu 1941 - 1944*, Beograd 1992. Autor piše i o posledicama bombardovanja na prostor logora i nešto udaljenijeg zarobljeničkog logora (DULAG 172) na ušću Save u Dunav kojom prilikom je poginulo nekoliko stotina njih (Italijana, Rusa, pripadnika NOV).

Londonu da uloži hitne proteste i zatraži da se takav tim akcije obustavi. Na protest potpukovnika Živana Kneževića, vojnog izaslanika u Washington-u, povodom bombardovanja Beograda na Uskrs 1944. stigao je odgovor, koji je preneo američki vojni izaslanik potpukovnik L. Larrabe vladi, sa objašnjenjem:

„Prema ovim zvaničnim američkim podacima, šteta pričinjena nevojničkim objektima nije bila velika, a ni u kom pogledu srazmerna sa osovinskom propagandom bilo preko radija ili drugim putem”

U prilogu ove poruke vlada je dobila, navodi Terzić, deo izveštaja američkog brigadnog generala upućen Glavnom štabu savezničkih Sredozemnih vazdušnih snaga o izvršenju zadatka 16. i 17. aprila nad Beogradom: „Izvršeni napadi 16. i 17. aprila na Beograd (Sava, Zemunski aerodrom i fabrike aviona Rogožarski i Ikarus gde su ove avionske fabrike sastavni deo kompleksa fabrika zbog čega su veoma važan vojni cilj; da važnost koloseka Beograd – Zemun na Savi i Zemunskog aerodroma ne treba posebno podvlačiti; da je glavni udar bio usredsređen na ove glavne ciljeve; da fotografska interpretacija rezultata bombardovanja ukazuje da se sve uspešno izvršeno i da je rasipanje bombi izvan ciljeva bilo veoma malo; da su štete, sem ciljeva, kako se vidi iz fotografskih snimaka prilikom izviđanja, znatne i da nisu bile željene”.¹⁵

Prilikom proslave šezdesetogodišnjice savezničkog iskrcavanja u Normandiji 6. juna 1944. godine, u središte pažnje pored starih veterana bilo je stavljeno stradanje francuskog grada Caena u kome je od savezničkog bombardovanja poginulo oko 20.000 građana. Stradali su i drugi gradovi i sela u prvim danima otvaranja drugog fronta.

¹⁵ Vidi članak Milana Terzića u ovom broju *Tokova*.

DOKUMENTA

No. 14

American Embassy, Belgrade, Yugoslavia,
August 27, 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

BOMB DAMAGE IN BELGRADE

(Prepared by Eric L. Pridonoff)

The Yugoslav Government recently employed a group of 40 engineers to conduct a four-day survey of the damage done to greater Belgrade by the several bombings of the city by enemy and Allied aircraft since April, 1941. The formulae of appraisal of the damage were: (a) taking a four-room apartment as the numerical unit, each having an average of 100 square meters of space; (b) estimating construction cost a 1,000 dinars per meter in 1939; calculating the degree of damage at 20 percent of total 1939 value for slight damage, 50 percent of such value for heavy damage, and 80 percent of such value for complete demolition** and separating damage into that caused by the German bombings of 1941, and the American bombings of 1944.

The aggregate material loss from both the German and American bombings, according to the survey, amounted to 220,150,000 dinars (\$3,992,000 at the rate of 55.14 dinars to one dollar prevailing in 1939). The breakdown of the estimated damage to the buildings is shown in the attached table (Enclosure No. 1), which does not include the slight damage caused by the German-Russian street fighting in the latter part of 1944 and personal property. The loss of personal property (furniture, clothing and other personal effects) amounted to 113,000,000,000 dinars (about \$2,050,000 at the 1939 rate) 30,000,000 (about \$1,270,000) of such loss having been attributed to the American bombing, and 43,000,000,000 dinars (about \$780,000) to the German. The major share of personal property loss is said to have been caused by military pilfering.

Approved:

Harold Shantz,
Charge d' Affaires a.i.
(Voluntary)Eric L. Pridonoff,
Economic Analyst.Enclosure:
As stated.

* Not including damage done to bridges and railway installations.

** It was estimated that 20 percent of the materials in the completely destroyed buildings could be salvaged.

TABELA

Enclosure No. 1 to Report No. 14 dated August 27, 1945, American Embassy, Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

SURVEY OF BOMBING DAMAGE IN BELGRADE, 1941–1944

	Slight damage 20% value loss		Heavy damage 50% value loss		Complete destruction 80% value loss	
	American bombing	German bombing	American bombing	German bombing	American bombing	German bombing
Number of flats damaged	1,080	820	590	89	205	235
Total square meter damage	108,000	82,000	59,000	8,900	20,500	23,500
Loss in dinars*	21,600,000	16,400,000	29,500,000	4,450,000	16,400,000	18,800,000
Total housing damage by American bombing.....67,500,000 dinars - \$1,222,000 Total housing damage by German bombing.....39,650,000 dinars - 720,000 Total bombing damage.....107,150,000 dinars - \$1,942,000						

Report No. 14

Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

Sources: Surveyors employed by the Yugoslav Government and personal analyses.

Note: Prior to the Government Survey forming the basis of the report, the author, had conducted sample appraisals, at the suggestion of Mr. Emil Kekich, of the bombing damage in Belgrade. These spot checks on 12 properties in seven districts or regions of Belgrade tallied quite closely with those of the 40 engineers charged with making the overall damage estimates.

Hectograph to Department.

ELP. bb

Berlin, august 18, 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 794

SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY INTERROGATION
REPORT ON MILAN NEDIC

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have to honor to enclose for the Department's confidential information a report prepared by the Third United States Army Intelligence Center regarding the preliminary interrogation of Milan Nedic, former Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army and Minister of War, who later became the Prime Minister of the German controlled regime in Serbia.

Respectfully yours,

Robert Murphy

Enclosure:

Preliminary Interrogation Report
of July 10, 1945 on Milan Nedic.

In ozalid to Department

Copy for Mr. James W. Riddle Berger, CE.

Copy for American Embassy, Belgrade.

File No. 820,02A

RM:co

to despatch no. 794, August 15, 1945, from Ambassador Murphy, Berlin.

COPY

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
INTELLIGENCE CENTER
Interrogation Section
APO 403

PRELIMINARY INTERROGATION REPORT

PRISONER: NEDIC, Milan

AIC 1588

(Political)

Date: 10 July 1945

PERSONAL DATA:

Nedic was born in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, fought against Germany during World War I and emerged as a general of the Yugoslav Army. From 1918 to 1933 he was a corps commander, then rose to the rank of General of the Armies and held that position until 1935. After that he became Chief of the General Staff, a position he relinquished in 1939 in order to accept an appointment as Minister of War. He was pensioned in October 1940 but accepted the command of Army Group South with which he remained until the collapse of the Yugoslav Army in April 1941. He was placed under house arrest in Belgrade by the Germans, stayed there for three months at which time he agreed to become Prime Minister of Serbia. With German consent he formed a government which he claim was resolved to fight Tito, the communists, and the Bolsheviks, at the same time protecting the Serb people from German designs. He was left to govern only a slice of Serbia, the rest being divided among Germany and her satellites. He states he entered a silent coalition with Gen. Draja Mihailovitch whom he surreptitiously supplied with arms in order to meet the Russian, as well as German threats effectively. The Russian advance into Serbia becoming imminent, he fled to Austria in October 1944. From Wien the Germans sent him to Kitzbuhl, Austria where he remained interned until the arrival of the Americans. During his internment there were persistent proposals on the part of the Germans to form a new Serb government. In a memorandum, dated 9 January 1945, he stated the terms under which collaboration would be acceptable to him. His offer, however, was rejected and the whole matter was dropped by the Germans. The following members of Nedic's government are still at Kitzbuhl, Jochsbergstrasse 40: Bogoljub Kujudjitch, Minister of Justice; Josif Kostitch, Minister of Kuzmanovitch, Minister of Public Travel. Nedic believes two other members of his cabinet can be found in Venice, Italy. They are: Djura Dokitch, Minister of Communication, and Dr ž. M. Nedeljkovitch, Minister of Finance.

ADMINISTRATIVE DATE:

Nedic was arrested by the 42nd CIC Detachment on 6 July 1945 at Kitzbuhl, Austria and arrived at the Third US Army Intelligence Center on 9 July 1945. SHAEF Index Card.

KNOWLEDGE BRIEF:

Augmented by accompanying files, Nedic could ahead light on his collaboration with Germany. He is well-acquainted with Balkan affairs.

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Nedic explains his collaboration with Germany by insisting that it was necessary in order to protect Serbia from becoming ravaged by communist-agitated civil war on one hand from being unduly exploited by Germany on the other. He states he has nothing to fear from the Americans because he thinks his position will be understood.

/s/ Edmund L. King
/t/ EDMUN L. KING
Major, Infantry
Commanding

COPY FOR AMERICAN EMBASSY, BELGRADE

SECRET

July 14, 1945

SECRET

No. 633

SUBJECT: LETTER ADDRESSED TO GENERAL EISENHOWER
BY MILAN D. NEDITCH

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit for the information and records of the Department, copy of a lengthy communication dated May 25 addressed to the Supreme Allied Commander by General Milan D. Neditch in justification of Serb policy since the German attack on Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941.

No action has been taken on this communication at this Headquarters. I have provided my British colleague with a copy of General Neditch's memorandum.

Respectfully yours,
Robert Murphy

Enclosure:
Communication described above.
In triplicate to the Department
Copy for CE - Mr. Riddle Berger
Copy sent to:
American Embassy, Belgrade
File No. 800
GFR/dn

M E M O R A N D U M

To H. Excellency General Harry T. Colloins Commander to the 42d Division of the American Army in Kitzbuhel with the request to be transmitted to H. Excellency Fieldmarshal Eisenhower, Commander of the American Forces in Europe.

Excellency,

The Serbs nationalists – political emigrants, who are now far from their country in Kitzbuhel, wish first of all to express their great joy for the victory of the Allies, which, as they are deeply persuaded will also bring the deliverance to the whole Serbian people. They express their admiration for the people and for the army of the United States of America, which have such a great part in this victory. This admiration is so much the greater because the really democratic conscience and the high conception of the right and justice of the American nation gave to this people an enormous force to combat all round the oceans and the continents with an ardour and enthusiasm much greater than any other nation has given for the defence of the own liberty and her territory.

We are particularly happy that the destiny was so favorable to us as to get liberated by the American troops because the U.S. of America had the most comprehension for our so difficult and delicate situation during the four years of enemy occupation and who gave us an inappreciable moral help with sending military missions to the Head Quarter of General Draja Mihailovitch.

It is well known that Yugoslavia entered into this war on the side of the Allies under extremely difficult political and military conditions. Surrounded from all parts, on a front of two thousand miles by the enemy armies, German, Italian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian, Yugoslavia did not hesitate to enter in this conflict, which from military point of view was a real suicide. She has done that with the knowledge that nobody could help her because the whole Europe was already oppressed by Germany and allies. Yugoslavia succumbed honorably in this unequal fight conscious not only that by this fact she stayed faithful with her Allies but that she rendered them also in this moment important services by her sacrifice.

The Serbs now in Kitzbuhel mention that there are among them two commanders of armies who commanded in April 1941, in this difficult and fatal days, two thirds of the Yugoslav forces. If this fight did not give better results the reason for that is the treachery of the Croats, who facilitated to the Germans to penetrate so quickly into Zagreb. From there the Croats announced the fall of Yugoslavia the formation of an independent Croat State and by this they caused the dislocation of the not only of the Croat unities, but also of the mixed Serbo-Croat unities.

From this moment begins the terrible tragedy of the Serbian people. The principle actors of this tragedy are the Germans and their allies, especially the Croats and the communists.

The first act of Germany was the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the division of the Serbian people in five deals and every part was given to each of the German allies, exasperate and mortal enemies of the Serbian nation. The independent Croat State engulfed nearly two millions of Serbs on the north territory and on the west of Sava and Drina. They resolved the Serbian problem by the following principle: one third of the Serbs killed, one third depopulated and to one third was imposed the Catholic religion and by this way denationalized. Hungary engulfed about three hundred thousand Serbs on the north of Sava and the Danube and they began to exterminate them by different methods. Bulgaria engulfed about one million of Serbs in the regions of the south Morava and of the Vardar (Macedonia) and Italy with Albania nearly 750,000 Serbs in Montenegro, Kosovo, Hercegovina and Dalmatia. Germany kept for herself the central part of the Serbian people, Serbia (Shumadia) with about four millions inhabitants.

The first three months of the enemy occupation passed away with the organized occupation of the conquered land. Germany at this time was in friendly relations with U.S.S.R. The communists of the country were in good relations and faithful collaborators with the authorities of occupation, especially the German ones. Victims of this coordination were exclusively the nationalist elements and especially the Serbs, who were imprisoned and confined in the concentration camps. However when the war broke out between Germany and the Soviets, the 22nd of June 1941, the communists of the country have immediately changed their attitude. Their infernal plan, directed in first place against the Serbian nationalists and the Serbian people, was to provoke incidents in an extremely hard and savage form, for instance massacring small detachments of German soldiers, cutting them their noses, ears, or drawing out their eyes. Their aim was to provoke from German side the most hard reprisals according to their principle: "hundred Serbs for one German". In this way a great number of men run away into the woods and the mountains. There they fell in the hands of Communist organisations, who educated and prepared them to be employed for the propagation of the communism in Yugoslavia.

The consequences of this infernal policy were terrible for the Serbian nation. First of all, all the Serbs in the whole Yugoslavia were indicated as communists by the occupiers. Although this different occupiers knew very well that the Serbian people was all but communists, this action of the home communists, among whom were many foreign elements, suited very well to the occupiers to begin a general extermination of the Serbs, regulating in this way their ancient accounts with the Serbs which dated from the first full of cruelties. With

their punishing expeditions whole towns and groups of villages disappeared in few hours. For instance in Kragujevac in one day the German have shot 2,500 Serbs, among whom all the pupils of the 7th and 8th class of gymnasium who were taken out of the forms to the place of execution. A similar fate had also the population of Krushevac, Kraljevo and other localities, while the town of Gornji Milanovac and whole groups of villages in the north-west part of Serbia, the Matchiva, were entirely destroyed by fire. The German principle hundred for one began to devastate the country. At the same time the communist gangs continued to kill the Serbs known as nationalists and anticommunists.

Under this conditions the situation of the Serbian people became catastrophic. The national Committee of Commissaires, whom the Germans designed immediately after the occupation, completely powerless to help the Serbian people, presented his demission and in and in agreement with all the national political Serbian parties proposed the formation of a national government with a greater authority and whose only aim should be the protection and the deliverance of the Serbian people, on one side from the Germans and on the other side from the communists. The mission of such a government was extremely difficult and asked personal sacrifices. Spontaneously the eyes of all were directed towards the General Milan Neditch, commander of the army in the south against the Germans during the war, who was made prisoner and confined in Belgrade. His position, out of all political parties, his national attitude and his indisputable authority in the army and in the large classes of the Serbian people, were the only hope for the realisation of this extremely difficult and delicate mission.

General Milan Neditch because of his military position and his non political attitude refused to accept his mission and proposed to find an other person more adapt to inspire more confidence to the occupators. Such a person could not be found and the situation in the country became very day more difficult. The representatives of all the political national parties, as well as representatives of the cultural and economical corporation and the representatives of other non political organisations addressed a public appeal to general Milan Neditch to accept in this extremely difficult moment the formation of a government, with the aim to protect the Serbian people and to save him from the action of the communists as well as reprisals of the occupators. To mark the situation in which was the Serbian people at this time, it must be mentioned that a special appeal was addressed to general Neditch by the president of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and the rector of the University in Belgrade Dr. Alexander Belitch who recently was Tito's candidate for a member of the Regency of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

The situation for the Serbian people became still more critical because of the new German plan, which foresaw to parcel out Serbia herself (Shumadia) in three parts and to give them to the Croats, Hungarian and Bulgarian.

Under these conditions a group of well known political men declared themselves ready to bring this sacrifice and with the consent of the German authorities to form a government of public order under the presidency of General Milan Neditch. The only and principle aim of this presidency of General Milan Neditch. The only and principle aim of this government was to neutralize the communists and at the same time to protect the Serbian people from them and from the German, Bulgarian and their occupators. Such a government was formed and the whole Serbian people answered to his appeal.

The communists, thrown out from Serbia, withdrew from the frontiers of Shumadia, concentrating their forces especially in the independent Croat State, where they were not really pursued and combated, neither from the Croats nor from Germans, because they wanted to use them for their political aims.

However this state of things caused much worsen situation in the other Serbian regions, especially under the Croat, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Albanian occupation. There happened awful massacres and incredible ferocities which, added to the action of execution by the occupator in Serbia, caused to the Serbian people the loss of more than one million lives.

In spite of all these difficulties, the situation in Serbia was less critical then in the other Serbian regions, thanks to the efforts of the Serbian Government of Public Safety. That is why a great number of Serbs from the other regions – more than 400,000 men, among them 86,000 children from two to fourteen years without parents – escaped in Serbia (Shumadia) more difficult, for the country was in extremely heavy conditions. But Serbia received and helped all her fellow countryman, because they were all brave, well known and good nationalists.

Simultaneously with this action of the Serbian government, which protected the Serbian people from the communists and the occupators, was formed and gradually developed the movement of Draža Mihailovitch, independent from the occupator, but secretly supported by the Serbian government. Draža Mihailovitch and his organisation remained in the woods and on the mountains, while the Serbian government directed and protected the Serbian people, helping at the same time secretly the movement of Draža Mihailovitch directly and indirectly because from one side the authorities of the government did not prevent really the development of the organisation and from the other vent really the development of the organisation and from the other side the government gave them arms, ammunition, clothing, food etc.

By these two simultaneous action of the government and of Draža Mihailovitch, the danger of the communists was in great measure removed from Serbia, but much greater was the danger which menaced Serbia from her neighbors, especially from Croatia. From there whole communist armies well organ-

ized and recruited voluntary and by force among the local elements, sometimes attacked the frontiers of Serbia with the aim to penetrate and to restore the dispersed communist organisation. Side by side with the armed detachments of the Serbian government the unities of Draza Mihailovitch defended the menaced frontier and repulsed the communists who attacked the kernel of the Serbian people.

The danger of this attacks was so much the greater because in the Croatian State was formed a small communist state with an army under the command of marshal Josip Broz – Tito. But these communist actions were not seriously neither from the Croats nor from the Germans. For thanks to this the Croats could continue to exterminate the Serbs, and the Germans thought, it seems, by tolerating the development of the communism in the Balkans that they could impressinate their enemies, the Allies, and cause a collision between them.

That was the general situation till the appearance of the Soviets in the Balkans at the beginning of autumn 1944.

When the Soviet troops were already on the frontier of Serbia, the Serbian government and the armed detachments of Draza Mihailovitch with their troops, always faithful to the principle of solidarity with the Allies, did not even think to fight against the Soviet troops and renounced even to continue the fight against Tito, addressing the 6th of October 1944 an appeal to the Serbian people, and retiring their troops in the north-west direction and took refuge at least out of the Serbian territory and Yugoslavia. Like hat finished the civil war in Serbia and an unimportant minority of communists under the command of Tito and with help of the Soviet troops became ruler of Serbia, entered into Belgrade and imposed his power in the whole Yugoslavia.

At the beginning of October 1944, the majority of the members of the Serbian government took refuge in Vienna, from where they were send and practically interned in Kitzbuhel in Tyrol. During the first three months, the high competed German factors determined political attitude. The same government should also give a declaration that Serbia will be on the side of the German Reich in the fight against the common enemy.

It was clear that such a fight would be directed against the Allies of the Serbian people and of Yugoslavia, which, for the cause of the Allies has sacrificed herself in April 1941 and endured during for years a hard occupation by the enemies, loosing more than a million Serbs. The Serbian government was opposed resolutely to this, and in his Memorandum Nr. 1 of the 19th January 1945 made an end to all the German pressures for a political collaboration, declaring that the mission of the government was over after leaving the country.

On account of this attitude of the Serbian government the Allies of the Serbian people and of Yugoslavia, which, for the cause of the Allies has sacrificed herself in April 1941 and endured during four years a hard occupation by the enemies, loosing more than a Million Serbs. The Serbian government was opposed resolutely to this, and in his Memorandum No. 1 of the 19th of January 1945 made an end to all the German pressures for a political collaboration, declaring that the mission of the government was over after leaving the country.

On account of this attitude of the Serbian government the German rulers refused to this government to be transferred to Gorizia where were the Serb armed detachments. The Germans were afraid that this attitude of the Serbian government could be an obstacle to the German plan to employ the Serbian troops for their own interests.

But the commanders of the Serb detachments agreed entirely with the attitude of the Serbian government and at the end of April and at the beginning of may this year they withdraw to the west in order to surrender to the Allied troops in the region of Trieste, Gorizia and Udine.

The situation of the Serbian people to-day is the following: Yugoslavia is under a terror regime of a communist minority. If a really free plebiscite could be guaranteed, we are persuaded that the Serbian people in an enormous majority will vote against the also in the future about the destiny of our people

In Germany are to-day:

a) about 136,000 serbian war prisoners, officers and soldiers, who were liberated by the Allies during the last weeks.

b) A great number of Serbs confined by the Germans.

c) More than 75,000 serbian workers, whom the Germans in great majority have collected by force in Serbia and brought in Germany.

d) In Germany and especially in Italy are armed detachments of serbian nationalists consisting of about 20,000 men, who have fought against the communists of the country, but never against the Allies, not even against the russian troops when they pñenetrated into Serbia.

e) In Germany and Italy is a considerable number of serbian refugees, from Serbia na from the other serbian regions, who as nationalists had to abandon their homes and seek abroad a refuge against he communist terror.

With the serbian group in Kitzbuhel are too the serbian Patriarch Dr. Gavriilo and the Erzbishopo of Zica Dr. Nikolai. From the beginning of the war 1941, both were imprisoned by the Germans and stayed three years and a half in

a prison in Serbia, and the six last months they were interned in the concentration camp of Dahau and after that confined in Vienna, Klagenfurt and Kitzbuhel.

They, as well as the serbian nationalists, ask the great American Allz, that all serbian war prisoners, all confined Serbians and who do not dars to go back to their countrz as long as the communist regime lasts, should not be send back.

They ask also that all the armed serbian national detachments and all the serbian refugees should be brought together and placed out of Germany, but on a territory under the control and occupation of the American forces, where they could wait the development of the events and the definite arrangements of the political situation in their own country, as well as in Europe. We pratically pray that nobody of them should be send back to Yugoslavia and delivered to Tito.

Finally, here in kitzbuhel are some members of the former serbian government who, for the defence and the protection of the serbian people vis-a-vis of the occupator and his allies, as well as vis-a-vis of the communists, have ruled, so to say, in Serbia during the ennemy occupation, but who never did anything against the Allied interests, as it can be seen in their Memorandum Nr. 1 of the 19th of january 1945. They all declare that they do not fear at all the responsability which results from their work and they express the desire that this responsability should be exactly examined, but only by the international tribunal, and not by a tribunal of Tito.

Here enclosed a summary of the copy of the Memorandum Nr. 1 of the 19th of january 1945.

Yours very respectfully,

(signed MILAN D. NEDITCH)
General of the yugoslav forces,
former chief of the General
Staff and former Minister of
War of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia,
former Prime Minister of
the serbian government.

The 25 th of may 1945
Kitzbuhel

A summary of the Memorandum Nr. 1 of the 19th of January 1945, send by the General Neditch to H.E. Dr. Neubacher, representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

My declaration about the situation in which are now the serbian government and the serbian people, and my declaration about the possibility of a further coordination of the serbian government with the Great German Reich. I have presented clearly, frankly and sincerely by words, and now I repeat it in writing:

THE POSSIBILITY OF A COLLABORATION

a) We want and wish a loyal collaboration with the Great German Reich. This collaboration shall be enabled by the German help, in a way that at a certain and suitable moment, the whole serbian people could participate.

b) The German Reich must help us to create the serbian army. These troops should be employed only for the fight against the communists and for the liberation of the serbian territory and that at the right moment for both, the German and the serbian government.

c) The German Reich must help us to take care of the serbian refugees. They were forced to leave their native land and to take refuge in Germany, because they supported the policy of the serbian government in his collaboration with Germany.

We also ask to relieve the life of the serbian workers and war prisoners in Germany.

d) We ask to regulate our financial question in order not to be considered as German mercenaries, but that our existence in Germany should be afforded by the middle of our land, that means by loans on the serbian demands.

e) We, the Serbs were and are fighters against the communism, and as such we are ready to collaborate with the German Reich.

f) We wish to form a serbian government with necessary attributes, consisting of the three groups which are now in Germany: Draža Mihailovitch, Ljotitch and the Neditch adherents. It is impossible to form another government under the circumstances of today.

THE COLLABORATION COULD NOT BE POSSIBLE:

1) If the German asked a foreign policy which does not correspond to the interests of the serbian people. Because we have not the consent of the serbian people and we are persuaded that the people would never give it.

2) We cannot and dare not incite now the serbian people. Its position under the communist terrorregime of to-day is very hard. Upon our people weigh its most illfamed enemies and executioners: the Soviets, the Croats and the Bulgarian, who all would utilize every occasion to extirpate the serbian people.

3) We cannot give now any political declarations which would be in contrast with our above-mentioned policy.

4) It would be the best to let us have time and possibility to arrange all our affairs, to come in connexion with the Serbs from all the serbian regions, to accomplish a secret organisation, which could be set in action by our order, at a suitable time.

When all these references and conditions will be clarified, a new serbian government could be formed. This new government could be formed on the foundation and on the programme of the following declaration:

"The serbian people, faithful to its strong high developed national spirit, to its traditions and to its glorious passed, remains also in the present situation, the decisive and irreconcilable adversary of the communism.

In this sens the serbian people agrees with all the other peoples, which have the same point of view, without changing its terms towards the other nations, – terms, which have origin in the position of Yugoslavia in the present great international collision.

If the Great German Reich would suppose that such our policy is unfounded, I should ask to dismiss the preveous government and thereby facilitate to find another solution.