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Update: Investigation of Anthrax Associated with Intentional Exposure and Interim Public Health Guidelines, October 2001

On October 4, 2001, CDC and state and local public health authorities reported a case of inhalational anthrax in Florida (1). Additional cases of anthrax subsequently have been reported from Florida and New York City. This report updates the findings of these case investigations, which indicate that infections were caused by the intentional release of *Bacillus anthracis*. This report also includes interim guidelines for postexposure prophylaxis for prevention of inhalational anthrax and other information to assist epidemiologists, clinicians, and laboratorians responding to intentional anthrax exposures.

For these investigations, a confirmed case of anthrax was defined as 1) a clinically compatible case of cutaneous, inhalational, or gastrointestinal illness* that is laboratory confirmed by isolation of *B. anthracis* from an affected tissue or site or 2) other laboratory evidence of *B. anthracis* infection based on at least two supportive laboratory tests. A suspected case was defined as 1) a clinically compatible case of illness without isolation of *B. anthracis* and no alternative diagnosis, but with laboratory evidence of *B. anthracis* by one supportive laboratory test or 2) a clinically compatible case of anthrax epidemiologically linked to a confirmed environmental exposure, but without corroborative laboratory evidence of *B. anthracis* infection.

Laboratory criteria for diagnosis of anthrax consist of 1) isolation and confirmation of *B. anthracis* from a clinical specimen collected from an affected tissue or site or 2) other supportive laboratory tests, including (a) evidence of *B. anthracis* DNA by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) from specimens collected from an affected tissue or site, (b) demonstration of *B. anthracis* in a clinical specimen by immunohistochemical staining, or (c) other laboratory tests (e.g., serology) that may become validated by laboratory confirmation.

^{*}Cutaneous illness is characterized by a skin lesion evolving from a papule, through a vesicular stage, to a depressed black eschar; edema, erythema, or necrosis without ulceration may be present. Inhalational illness is characterized by a brief prodrome resembling a "nonspecific febrile" illness that rapidly progresses to a fulminant illness with signs of sepsis and/or respiratory failure, often with radiographic evidence of mediastinal widening; signs of bacterial meningitis may be present. Gastrointestinal illness is characterized by severe abdominal pain usually accompanied by bloody vomiting or diarrhea followed by fever and signs of septicemia.

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Florida

On October 2, the Palm Beach County Health Department (PBCHD) and the Florida Department of Health (FDOH) were notified of a possible anthrax case in Palm Beach County. The suspected case was identified when a gram stain of cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) revealed a gram-positive bacilli. An epidemiologic investigation was initiated by FDOH, PBCHD, and the FDOH state laboratory. The state laboratory and CDC confirmed *B. anthracis* from a culture of CSF on October 4. Later the same day, FDOH and CDC epidemiologists and laboratory workers arrived in Palm Beach County to assist PBCHD with the investigation. As of October 16, two confirmed cases of inhalational anthrax have been identified.

The index patient was a 63-year-old male resident of Palm Beach County who sought medical care at a local hospital on October 2 with fever and altered mental status. Despite antibiotic therapy, his clinical condition deteriorated rapidly, and he died on October 5. An autopsy performed on October 6 confirmed the cause of death as inhalational anthrax. An investigation revealed no obvious exposures to *B. anthracis*.

On October 1, the second patient, a 73-year-old co-worker of the index patient, was admitted to a local hospital for pneumonia. On October 5, a nasal swab was obtained from the patient that yielded a positive culture for *B. anthracis*. Subsequent testing revealed positive PCR tests for *B. anthracis* in hemorrhagic pleural fluid and reactive serologic tests. The patient remains hospitalized on antibiotic therapy. Enhanced case finding and retrospective and prospective surveillance systems were initiated in Palm Beach, and surrounding counties. Environmental assessments and sampling were performed at the index patient's home, work site, and travel destinations for the 60 days preceding symptom onset. Environmental sampling revealed *B. anthracis* contamination of the work site, specifically implicating mail or package delivery. Environmental samples of other locations the patient visited, including extensive sampling of his home, were negative.

Questionnaires were administered to employees at the index patient's work site. Postexposure prophylaxis was administered, and nasal swabs were obtained from those with exposure to the work site for >1 hour since August 1. Of 1,075 nasal swabs performed, one was positive for *B. anthracis*. Environmental and co-worker testing indicated contamination of specific locations at the work site. The investigation and environmental sampling are ongoing.

New York

On October 9, the New York City Department of Health notified CDC of a person with a skin lesion consistent with cutaneous anthrax. CDC sent a team to New York City to provide epidemiologic and laboratory support to local health officials. As of October 16, two persons with confirmed cases of cutaneous anthrax have been identified. One person with confirmed anthrax was a 38-year-old woman who had handled a suspicious letter postmarked September 18 at her workplace. The letter contained a powder that subsequently was confirmed to contain *B. anthracis*. On September 25, the patient had a raised lesion on the chest, which over the next 3 days developed surrounding erythema and edema. By September 29, the patient developed malaise and headache. On October 1, a clinician examined the patient and described an approximately 5 cm long oval-shaped lesion with a raised border, small satellite vesicles, and profound edema. The lesion was nonpainful and was associated with left cervical lymphadenopathy. Serous fluid from the lesion was obtained and was negative by gram stain and culture. The

Anthrax — Continued

patient was prescribed oral ciprofloxacin. Over the next several days, the lesion developed a black eschar, and a biopsy was obtained and sent to CDC for testing. The tissue was positive by immunohistochemical staining for the cell wall antigen of *B. anthracis*.

The other person with confirmed cutaneous anthrax was a 7-month-old infant who visited his mother's workplace on September 28. The next day, the infant had an apparently nontender, massively edematous, weeping skin lesion on his left arm; he was treated with intravenous antibiotics. Over the next several days, the lesion became ulcerative and developed a black eschar; clinicians presumptively attributed the lesion to a spider bite. The infant's clinical course was complicated by hemolytic anemia and thrombocytopenia, requiring intensive care. The diagnosis of cutaneous anthrax was first considered on October 12 after the announcement of the other confirmed anthrax case in New York City. A serum specimen collected on October 2 was positive for *B. anthracis* by PCR testing at CDC; a skin biopsy obtained on October 13 was positive by immunohistochemical staining at CDC for the cell wall antigen of *B. anthracis*. No suspicious letter with powder was identified at the mother's workplace. Both patients were treated with ciprofloxacin and are clinically improving.

B. anthracis grew from swabs (two nasal and one facial skin swab) from three other persons, suggesting exposure to anthrax. One of the exposures was in a law enforcement officer who brought the letter containing *B. anthracis* from the index patient's workplace to the receiving laboratory. The other two exposures were in technicians who had processed the letter in the laboratory. Environmental sampling in both workplaces is ongoing and investigations of other exposed persons continue.

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Editorial Note: The findings in this report indicate that four confirmed cases of anthrax have resulted from intentional delivery of *B. anthracis* spores through mailed letters or packages. These are the first confirmed cases of anthrax associated with intentional exposure in the United States and represent a new public health threat.

Anthrax is an acute infectious disease caused by the spore-forming bacterium *B. anthracis*. It occurs most frequently as an epizootic or enzootic disease of herbivores (e.g., cattle, goats, or sheep) that acquire spores from direct contact with contaminated soil. Humans usually become infected through direct contact with *B. anthracis* spores from infected animals or their products (e.g., goat hair), resulting in cutaneous anthrax (2) (Box 1). Inhalational and gastrointestinal are other forms of the disease in the natural setting (4,5). Human-to-human transmission has not been documented.

Clinical laboratorians should be alert to the presence of *Bacillus* species in patient specimens. In particular, laboratorians should suspect *B. anthracis* when the specimen is from a previously healthy patient with a rapidly progressive respiratory illness or a cutaneous ulcer. If *B. anthracis* is suspected, laboratories should immediately notify the health-care provider and local and state public health staff. For rapid identification of *B. anthracis*, state and local health departments should access the Laboratory Response Network for Bioterrorism (LRN). LRN links state and local public health laboratories with advanced capacity laboratories—including clinical, military, veterinary, agricultural, water, and food-testing laboratories. Laboratorians should contact their state public health laboratory to identify their local LRN representative.

Anthrax — Continued

BOX 1. Clinical forms of anthrax

Clinical Forms of Anthrax

The following clinical descriptions of anthrax are based on experience in adults. The clinical presentation of anthrax in infants is not well defined.

Inhalational. Inhalational anthrax begins with a brief prodrome resembling a viral respiratory illness followed by development of hypoxia and dyspnea, with radiographic evidence of mediastinal widening. Inhalational anthrax is the most lethal form of anthrax and results from inspiration of 8,000–50,000 spores of *Bacillus anthracis* (3). The incubation period of inhalational anthrax among humans typically ranges from 1–7 days but may be possibly up to 60 days. Host factors, dose of exposure, and chemoprophylaxis may affect the duration of the incubation period. Initial symptoms include mild fever, muscle aches, and malaise and may progress to respiratory failure and shock; meningitis frequently develops. Case-fatality estimates for inhalational anthrax are extremely high, even with all possible supportive care including appropriate antibiotics.

Cutaneous. Cutaneous anthrax is characterized by a skin lesion evolving from a papule, through a vesicular stage, to a depressed black eschar. The incubation period ranges from 1–12 days. The lesion is usually painless, but patients also may have fever, malaise, headache, and regional lymphadenopathy. The case fatality rate for cutaneous anthrax is 20% without, and <1% with, antibiotic treatment.

Gastrointestinal. Gastrointestinal anthrax is characterized by severe abdominal pain followed by fever and signs of septicemia. This form of anthrax usually follows after eating raw or undercooked contaminated meat and can have an incubation period of 1–7 days. An oropharyngeal and an abdominal form of the disease have been described. Involvement of the pharynx is usually characterized by lesions at the base of the tongue, dysphagia, fever, and regional lymphadenopathy. Lower bowel inflammation typically causes nausea, loss of appetite, and fever followed by abdominal pain, hematemesis, and bloody diarrhea. The casefatality rate is estimated to be 25%–60%. The effect of early antibiotic treatment on the case-fatality rate is not established.

Update: Investigation of Anthrax — Continued

TABLE 1. Interim recommendations for postexposure prophylaxis for prevention of inhalational anthrax after intentional exposure to *Bacillus anthracis*

Category	Initial therapy	Duration
Adults (including pregnant women and immunocompromised persons)	Ciprofloxacin 500 mg po BID or	60 days
	Doxycycline 100 mg po BID	
Children	Ciprofloxacin 10–15 mg/kg po Q12 hrs*	60 days
	Doxycycline:	
	>8 yrs and >45 kg: 100 mg po BID	
	>8 yrs and ≤45 kg: 2.2 mg/kg po BID	
	≤8 yrs: 2.2 mg/kg po BID	

^{*}Ciprofloxacin dose should not exceed 1 gram per day in children.

Postexposure prophylaxis is indicated to prevent inhalational anthrax after a confirmed or suspected aerosol exposure. When no information is available about the antimicrobial susceptibility of the implicated strain of *B. anthracis*, initial therapy with ciprofloxacin or doxycycline is recommended for adults and children (Table 1). Use of tetracyclines and fluoroquinolones in children has adverse effects. The risks for these adverse effects must be weighed carefully against the risk for developing life-threatening disease. As soon as penicillin susceptibility of the organism has been confirmed, prophylactic therapy for children should be changed to oral amoxicillin 80 mg/kg of body mass per day divided every 8 hours (not to exceed 500 mg three times daily). *B. anthracis* is not susceptible to cephalosporins or to trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole, and these agents should not be used for prophylaxis.

CDC is assisting other states and local areas in assessing anthrax exposures. Additional information about anthrax and the public health response is available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov. This information was current as of 4 p.m., eastern daylight time, October 17, 2001.

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Recognition of Illness Associated with the Intentional Release of a Biologic Agent

On September 11, 2001, following the terrorist incidents in New York City and Washington, D.C., CDC recommended heightened surveillance for any unusual disease occurrence or increased numbers of illnesses that might be associated with the terrorist attacks. Subsequently, cases of anthrax in Florida and New York City have demonstrated

the risks associated with intentional release of biologic agents (1). This report provides guidance for health-care providers and public health personnel about recognizing illnesses or patterns of illness that might be associated with intentional release of biologic agents.

Health-Care Providers

Health-care providers should be alert to illness patterns and diagnostic clues that might indicate an unusual infectious disease outbreak associated with intentional release of a biologic agent and should report any clusters or findings to their local or state health department. The covert release of a biologic agent may not have an immediate impact because of the delay between exposure and illness onset, and outbreaks associated with intentional releases might closely resemble naturally occurring outbreaks. Indications of intentional release of a biologic agent include 1) an unusual temporal or geographic clustering of illness (e.g., persons who attended the same public event or gathering) or patients presenting with clinical signs and symptoms that suggest an infectious disease outbreak (e.g., ≥2 patients presenting with an unexplained febrile illness associated with sepsis, pneumonia, respiratory failure, or rash or a botulism-like syndrome with flaccid muscle paralysis, especially if occurring in otherwise healthy persons); 2) an unusual age distribution for common diseases (e.g., an increase in what appears to be a chickenpox-like illness among adult patients, but which might be smallpox); and 3) a large number of cases of acute flaccid paralysis with prominent bulbar palsies, suggestive of a release of botulinum toxin.

CDC defines three categories of biologic agents with potential to be used as weapons, based on ease of dissemination or transmission, potential for major public health impact (e.g., high mortality), potential for public panic and social disruption, and requirements for public health preparedness (2). Agents of highest concern are *Bacillus anthracis* (anthrax), *Yersinia pestis* (plague), variola major (smallpox), *Clostridium botulinum* toxin (botulism), *Francisella tularensis* (tularemia), filoviruses (Ebola hemorrhagic fever, Marburg hemorrhagic fever); and arenaviruses (Lassa [Lassa fever], Junin [Argentine hemorrhagic fever], and related viruses). The following summarizes the clinical features of these agents (3–6).

Anthrax. A nonspecific prodrome (i.e., fever, dyspnea, cough, and chest discomfort) follows inhalation of infectious spores. Approximately 2–4 days after initial symptoms, sometimes after a brief period of improvement, respiratory failure and hemodynamic collapse ensue. Inhalational anthrax also might include thoracic edema and a widened mediastinum on chest radiograph. Gram-positive bacilli can grow on blood culture, usually 2–3 days after onset of illness. Cutaneous anthrax follows deposition of the organism onto the skin, occurring particularly on exposed areas of the hands, arms, or face. An area of local edema becomes a pruritic macule or papule, which enlarges and ulcerates after 1–2 days. Small, 1–3 mm vesicles may surround the ulcer. A painless, depressed, black eschar usually with surrounding local edema subsequently develops. The syndrome also may include lymphangitis and painful lymphadenopathy.

Plague. Clinical features of pneumonic plague include fever, cough with muco-purulent sputum (gram-negative rods may be seen on gram stain), hemoptysis, and chest pain. A chest radiograph will show evidence of bronchopneumonia.

Botulism. Clinical features include symmetric cranial neuropathies (i.e., drooping eyelids, weakened jaw clench, and difficulty swallowing or speaking), blurred vision or diplopia, symmetric descending weakness in a proximal to distal pattern, and respiratory

dysfunction from respiratory muscle paralysis or upper airway obstruction without sensory deficits. Inhalational botulism would have a similar clinical presentation as foodborne botulism; however, the gastrointestinal symptoms that accompany foodborne botulism may be absent.

Smallpox (variola). The acute clinical symptoms of smallpox resemble other acute viral illnesses, such as influenza, beginning with a 2–4 day nonspecific prodrome of fever and myalgias before rash onset. Several clinical features can help clinicians differentiate varicella (chickenpox) from smallpox. The rash of varicella is most prominent on the trunk and develops in successive groups of lesions over several days, resulting in lesions in various stages of development and resolution. In comparison, the vesicular/pustular rash of smallpox is typically most prominent on the face and extremities, and lesions develop at the same time.

Inhalational tularemia. Inhalation of *F. tularensis* causes an abrupt onset of an acute, nonspecific febrile illness beginning 3–5 days after exposure, with pleuropneumonitis developing in a substantial proportion of cases during subsequent days (7).

Hemorrhagic fever (such as would be caused by Ebola or Marburg viruses). After an incubation period of usually 5–10 days (range: 2–19 days), illness is characterized by abrupt onset of fever, myalgia, and headache. Other signs and symptoms include nausea and vomiting, abdominal pain, diarrhea, chest pain, cough, and pharyngitis. A maculopapular rash, prominent on the trunk, develops in most patients approximately 5 days after onset of illness. Bleeding manifestations, such as petechiae, ecchymoses, and hemorrhages, occur as the disease progresses (8).

Clinical Laboratory Personnel

Although unidentified gram-positive bacilli growing on agar may be considered as contaminants and discarded, CDC recommends that these bacilli be treated as a "finding" when they occur in a suspicious clinical setting (e.g., febrile illness in a previously healthy person). The laboratory should attempt to characterize the organism, such as motility testing, inhibition by penicillin, absence of hemolysis on sheep blood agar, and further biochemical testing or species determination.

An unusually high number of samples, particularly from the same biologic medium (e.g., blood and stool cultures), may alert laboratory personnel to an outbreak. In addition, central laboratories that receive clinical specimens from several sources should be alert to increases in demand or unusual requests for culturing (e.g., uncommon biologic specimens such as cerebrospinal fluid or pulmonary aspirates).

When collecting or handling clinical specimens, laboratory personnel should 1) use Biological Safety Level II (BSL-2) or Level III (BSL-3) facilities and practices when working with clinical samples considered potentially infectious; 2) handle all specimens in a BSL-2 laminar flow hood with protective eyewear (e.g., safety glasses or eye shields), use closed-front laboratory coats with cuffed sleeves, and stretch the gloves over the cuffed sleeves; 3) avoid any activity that places persons at risk for infectious exposure, especially activities that might create aerosols or droplet dispersal; 4) decontaminate laboratory benches after each use and dispose of supplies and equipment in proper receptacles; 5) avoid touching mucosal surfaces with their hands (gloved or ungloved), and never eat or drink in the laboratory; and 6) remove and reverse their gloves before leaving the laboratory and dispose of them in a biohazard container, and wash their hands and remove their laboratory coat.

When a laboratory is unable to identify an organism in a clinical specimen, it should be sent to a laboratory where the agent can be characterized, such as the state public health

laboratory or, in some large metropolitan areas, the local health department laboratory. Any clinical specimens suspected to contain variola (smallpox) should be reported to local and state health authorities and then transported to CDC. All variola diagnostics should be conducted at CDC laboratories. Clinical laboratories should report any clusters or findings that could indicate intentional release of a biologic agent to their state and local health departments.

Infection-Control Professionals

Heightened awareness by infection-control professionals (ICPs) facilitates recognition of the release of a biologic agent. ICPs are involved with many aspects of hospital operations and several departments and with counterparts in other hospitals. As a result, ICPs may recognize changing patterns or clusters in a hospital or in a community that might otherwise go unrecognized.

ICPs should ensure that hospitals have current telephone numbers for notification of both internal (ICPs, epidemiologists, infectious diseases specialists, administrators, and public affairs officials) and external (state and local health departments, Federal Bureau of Investigation field office, and CDC Emergency Response office) contacts and that they are distributed to the appropriate personnel (9). ICPs should work with clinical microbiology laboratories, on- or off-site, that receive specimens for testing from their facility to ensure that cultures from suspicious cases are evaluated appropriately.

State Health Departments

State health departments should implement plans for educating and reminding health-care providers about how to recognize unusual illnesses that might indicate intentional release of a biologic agent. Strategies for responding to potential bioterrorism include 1) providing information or reminders to health-care providers and clinical laboratories about how to report events to the appropriate public health authorities; 2) implementing a 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week capacity to receive and act on any positive report of events that suggest intentional release of a biologic agent; 3) investigating immediately any report of a cluster of illnesses or other event that suggests an intentional release of a biologic agent and requesting CDC's assistance when necessary; 4) implementing a plan, including accessing the Laboratory Response Network for Bioterrorism, to collect and transport specimens and to store them appropriately before laboratory analysis; and 5) reporting immediately to CDC if the results of an investigation suggest release of a biologic agent.

Reported by: National Center for Infectious Diseases; Epidemiology Program Office; Public Health Practice Program Office; Office of the Director, CDC.

Editorial Note: Health-care providers, clinical laboratory personnel, infection control professionals, and health departments play critical and complementary roles in recognizing and responding to illnesses caused by intentional release of biologic agents. The syndrome descriptions, epidemiologic clues, and laboratory recommendations in this report provide basic guidance that can be implemented immediately to improve recognition of these events.

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, state and local health departments initiated various activities to improve surveillance and response, ranging from enhancing communications (between state and local health departments and between public health agencies and health-care providers) to conducting special surveillance projects. These special projects have included active surveillance for changes in the number of hospital

admissions, emergency department visits, and occurrence of specific syndromes. Activities in bioterrorism preparedness and emerging infections over the past few years have better positioned public health agencies to detect and respond to the intentional release of a biologic agent. Immediate review of these activities to identify the most useful and practical approaches will help refine syndrome surveillance efforts in various clinical situations.

Information about clinical diagnosis and management can be found elsewhere (1–9). Additional information about responding to bioterrorism is available from CDC at http://www.bt.cdc.gov; the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at http://www.usamriid.army.mil/education/bluebook.html; the Association for Infection Control Practitioners at http://www.apic.org; and the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense at http://www.hopkins-biodefense.org.

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Weekly Update: West Nile Virus Activity — United States, October 10–16, 2001

The following report summarizes West Nile virus (WNV) surveillance data reported to CDC through ArboNET and verified by states and other jurisdictions as of October 16, 2001.

During the week of October 10–16, six human cases of WNV encephalitis were reported in Florida (five) and Maryland (one). During the same period, WNV infections were reported in 312 crows, 50 other birds, and 12 horses. A total of 23 WNV-positive mosquito pools were reported in four states (Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania).

During 2001, 31 human cases of WNV encephalitis have been reported in Florida (nine), Maryland (six), New York (six), Connecticut (five), New Jersey (four), and Georgia (one); one death occurred in Georgia. Among these 31 cases, 16 (52%) were in males, the

Update: West Nile Virus — Continued

median age was 70 years (range: 37–81 years), and dates of illness onset ranged from July 14 to September 30. A total of 3,695 crows and 1,349 other birds with WNV infection were reported from 25 states and the District of Columbia (Figure 1); 125 WNV infections in other animals (all horses) were reported from 11 states (Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia); and 694 WNV-positive mosquito pools were reported from 14 states (Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island).

Additional information about WNV activity is available at http://cindi.usgs.gov/hazard/event/west_nile/west_nile.html.





FIGURE 1. Areas reporting West Nile virus (WNV) activity — United States, 2001*

^{*} As of October 9, 2001.

[†] Mississippi reported WNV infection in a horse but no birds.

FIGURE I. Selected notifiable disease reports, United States, comparison of provisional 4-week totals ending October 13, 2001, with historical data



^{*} No rubella cases were reported for the current 4-week period yielding a ratio for week 41 of zero (0).

TABLE I. Summary of provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, cumulative, week ending October 13, 2001 (41st Week)*

		Cum. 2001		Cum. 2001
Anthrax		4	Poliomyelitis, paralytic	-
Brucellosis [†]		65	Psittacosis†	16
Cholera		3	Q fever [†]	18
Cyclosporiasis	S [†]	121	Rabies, human	1
Diphtheria		2	Rocky Mountain spotted fever (RMSF)	432
Ehrlichiosis:	human granulocytic (HGE)†	166	Rubella, congenital syndrome	-
	human monocytic (HME) [†]	70	Streptococcal disease, invasive, group A	2,892
Encephalitis:		66	Streptococcal toxic-shock syndrome [†]	47
•	eastern equine [†]	6	Syphilis, congenital [¶]	166
	St. Louis [†]	1	Tetanus	22
	western equine [†]	-	Toxic-shock syndrome	93
Hansen diseas	se (leprosy)†	67	Trichinosis	21
	ılmonary syndrome [†]	7	Tularemia [†]	88
Hemolytic ure	emic syndrome, postdiarrheal [†]	112	Typhoid fever	205
HIV infection,	pediatric†§	153	Yellow fever	-
Plague	•	2		

^{-:} No reported cases.

Updated from reports to the Division of STD Prevention, NCHSTP.

[†] Ratio of current 4-week total to mean of 15 4-week totals (from previous, comparable, and subsequent 4-week periods for the past 5 years). The point where the hatched area begins is based on the mean and two standard deviations of these 4-week totals.

[.] No reported cases. *Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date).

[†] Not notifiable in all states.

⁵ Updated monthly from reports to the Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention — Surveillance and Epidemiology, National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention (NCHSTP). Last update September 25, 2001.

TABLE II. Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending October 13, 2001, and October 14, 2000 (41st Week)*

we	eks enai	ng Oct	ober 13	, 2001,	and Od	(41st Week)*					
		•	0.1	8					a coli 0157:H7		
	Cum.	Cum.	Chlan Cum.	Cum.	Cryptos Cum.	poridiosis Cum.	NET Cum.	Cum.	Cum.	LIS Cum.	
Reporting Area	20011	2000	2001	2000	2001	2000	2001	2000	2001	2000	
UNITED STATES	29,580	29,952	545,524	545,047	2,281	2,395	2,312	3,759	1,788	3,083	
NEW ENGLAND	1,129	1,586	18,058	18,211	103	119	209	331	202	340	
Maine	36	27	839	1,153	15	17	25	24	26	27	
N.H.	31	27	1,042	862	10	20	31	31	24	31	
Vt.	13	29	485	417	30	24	13	31	8	33	
Mass.	602	998	7,619	7,787	39	32	109	149	105	155	
R.I.	78	75	2,322	2,111	4	3	12	18	10	16	
Conn.	369	430	5,751	5,881	5	23	19	78	29	78	
MID. ATLANTIC	6,710	6,678	60,361	51,045	215	309	172	375	165	265	
Upstate N.Y.	731	662	10,704	1,587	86	97	133	244	121	57	
N.Y. City	3,385	3,609	23,412	20,896	70	146	8	21	10	15	
N.J.	1,389	1,295	8,600	8,704	7	15	31	110	34	110	
Pa.	1,205	1,112	17,645	19,858	52	51	N	N		83	
E.N. CENTRAL	2,238	2,865	82,862	93,623	848	818	589	922	430	656	
Ohio	430	430	17,284	24,706	145	220	140	225	132	201	
Ind.	264	282	11,055	10,490	68	54	70	105	39	77	
III.	992	1,568	21,277	26,170	1	102	130	173	128	139	
Mich.	413	437	23,337	19,401	150	81	76	125	67	100	
Wis.	139	148	9,909	12,856	484	361	173	294	64	139	
W.N. CENTRAL	637	680	27,824	30,973	350	256	385	538	301	518	
Minn.	108	129	4,958	6,375	137	55	148	132	98	165	
lowa	71	69	3,797	4,197	72	68	73	165	57	134	
Mo.	312	318	10,345	10,504	34	26	42	94	6 8	84	
N. Dak.	2	2	728	695	12	9	17	15	29	18	
S. Dak.	22	7	1,389	1,440	6	15	37	51	40	57	
Nebr.	52	53	2,175	2,962	88	74	51	56	9	45	
Kans.	70	102	4.432	4.800	1	9	17	25		15	
S. ATLANTIC	9,497	8,257	103,994	103,012	265	372	187	307	120	254	
Del.	203	156	2,041	2,279	6	5	4	2	6	1	
Md.	1.506	1,056	8,880	11,208	32	9	22	29	1	1	
D.C.	644	569	2,372	2,540	10	13	46	1	Ú	Ú	
Va.	723	556	14,233	12,214	22	15		57	36	55	
W. Va.	61	46	1,837	1,691	2	3	10	14	8	11	
N.C.	726	505	16.445	17,704	24	21	41	75	28	65	
S.C.	577	639	8,986	7,562	-	-	8	21	11	16	
Ga.	1,031	991	21,691	21,634	100	134	24	35	15	36	
Fla.	4,026	3,739	27,509	26,180	69	172	32	73	15	69	
E.S. CENTRAL	1,423	1,507	38,106	39,948	39	43	116	113	95	97	
	278	159	7,007	6,283	4	5	57	38	46	31	
Ky. Tenn.	456	635	11,564	11,372	12	10	36	48	36	47	
Ala.	347	395	10,404	12,454	13	15	16	7	6	9	
Miss.	342	318	9,131	9,839	10	13	7	20	7	10	
W.S. CENTRAL	3,141	3,005	82,225	82,679	31	140	70	210	64	260	
Ark.	159	149	5,753	5,312	6	10	11	54		37	
La.	665	493	13,644	14,511	7	10	3	13	25	44	
Okla.	186	259	8,132	7,125	11	15	25	17	24	15	
Tex.	2,131	2,104	54,696	55,731	7	105	31	126	15	164	
MOUNTAIN	1,073	1,105	31,678	30,634	177	132 10	233	356	118	262	
Mont. Idaho	14 17	11 19	1,507 1,440	1,094 1,447	28 20	13	16 54	30 60	-	33	
Wyo.	3	7	642	629	6	5	5	15	1	9	
Colo.	231	259	6,899	8,697	33	58	80	131	51	96	
N. Mex.	103	116	4,738	3,878	21	14	11	19	9	16	
Ariz.	437	348	11,130	10,136	7	10	23	42	22	34	
Utah	90	108	1,513	1,656	58	18	30	47	34	64	
Nev.	178	237	3,809	3,097	4	4	14	12	1	10	
PACIFIC	3,732	4,269	100,416	94,922	253	206	351	607	293	431	
Wash.	395	379	10,661	10,221	43	U	99	193	62	189	
Oreg.	154	113	5,753	5,251	42	16	59	124	56	106	
Calif.	3,112	3,669	79,029	74,661	164	190	172	250	168	122	
Alaska	16	15	2.037	1,981	1		4	27	1	3	
Hawaii	55	93	2,936	2,808	3	-	17	13	6	11	
Guam P.R.	10 934	13 1,023	1,930	400 U	-	-	N 1	N 6	U U	U U	
V.I. Amer. Samoa	2	27	53 U	Ū	Ū	Ū	- U	Ū	Ü	Ü	
C.N.M.I.	-	-	103	Ŭ	-	ŭ		ŭ	ŭ	Ŭ	

N: Not notifiable. U: Unavailable.

^{-:} No reported cases.

C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.

^{*} Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and cumulative (year-to-date).

Individual cases can be reported through both the National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance (NETSS) and the Public Health Laboratory Information System (PHLIS).

[†] Schlamydia refers to genital infections caused by *C. trachomatis*.
† Updated monthly from reports to the Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention — Surveillance and Epidemiology, National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention. Last updated September 25, 2001.

TABLE II. (Cont'd) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending October 13, 2001, and October 14, 2000 (41st Week)*

we	eks ending	October	13, 2001,	tober 14	(4 IST W					
	Gono	rrhea	Hepati Non-A,	tis C; Non-B	Legione	llosis	Listeriosis		me ease	
Reporting Area	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	
UNITED STATES	251,083	278,456	2,616	2,502	775	848	369	10,020	13,549	
NEW ENGLAND Maine N.H. Vt. Mass. R.I. Conn.	5,190 90 149 53 2,394 645 1,859	5,131 73 87 53 2,132 501 2,285	14 - - 6 8 -	24 2 - 4 13 5	49 8 9 5 12 6 9	48 2 2 5 16 8 15	32 4 2 18 1 7	3,179 112 14 653 413 1,987	4,277 - 55 29 1,071 414 2,708	
MID. ATLANTIC Upstate N.Y. N.Y. City N.J. Pa.	30,196 6,626 9,801 5,261 8,508	30,253 5,482 9,072 5,890 9,809	1,311 50 - 1,214 47	554 29 - 489 36	157 53 16 7 81	232 66 38 20 108	57 25 8 10 14	5,039 2,731 2 927 1,379	7,076 2,992 163 2,297 1,624	
E.N. CENTRAL Ohio Ind. III. Mich. Wis.	44,730 9,700 4,773 13,133 13,630 3,494	55,615 14,991 4,939 16,446 13,700 5,539	142 8 1 13 120	190 10 - 18 162	202 95 18 - 58 31	222 89 30 28 39 36	49 13 8 1 20 7	501 100 20 - 1 380	729 53 21 33 22 600	
W.N. CENTRAL Minn. Iowa Mo. N. Dak. S. Dak.	11,850 1,596 997 6,355 32 223	13,992 2,503 967 6,888 57 238	558 9 - 536 -	453 5 1 436 -	45 9 7 19 1 3	53 7 13 23 - 2	15 - 2 8 -	332 277 28 22	278 187 27 45 1	
Nebr. Kans.	710 1,937	1,183 2,156	3 10	4 7	5 1	4 4	1 4	3 2	3 15	
S. ATLANTIC Del. Md. D.C. Va. W. Va. N.C. S.C. Ga. Fla.	64,371 1,212 4,858 2,187 8,422 526 13,452 6,083 11,882 15,749	72,962 1,350 7,695 2,035 8,144 520 14,499 6,635 13,986 18,098	94 - 15 - 9 18 6 - 46	86 2 11 3 3 14 13 2 3 35	165 8 31 7 20 N 7 10 9	156 8 54 4 30 N 13 4 6	61 - 11 - 11 5 4 5 11	724 49 462 10 110 35 5	965 167 563 5 128 26 42 7	
E.S. CENTRAL Ky. Tenn. Ala. Miss.	24,639 2,779 7,813 8,065 5,982	28,722 2,777 9,121 9,572 7,252	167 8 56 3 100	376 31 78 7 260	48 11 23 12 2	29 16 9 3 1	19 5 8 6	48 22 17 8 1	46 10 28 5 3	
W.S. CENTRAL Ark. La. Okla. Tex.	40,347 3,550 9,437 3,739 23,621	43,705 3,107 10,753 3,150 26,695	165 3 78 3 81	605 7 354 7 237	5 - 2 3 -	21 7 2 12	17 1 - 2 14	79 - 1 - 78	72 5 7 - 60	
MOUNTAIN Mont. Idaho Wyo. Colo. N. Mex. Ariz. Utah Nev.	7,910 84 61 64 2,332 799 3,034 120 1,416	8,300 38 65 40 2,516 854 3,418 167 1,202	56 1 2 6 17 11 9 3 7	62 4 3 2 12 13 16	45 3 1 13 2 18 5 3	33 1 5 - 11 1 7 8	29 - 1 1 7 6 6 2 6	11 - 6 1 1 - - 1 2	10 - 2 3 - - - 2 3	
PACIFIC Wash. Oreg. Calif. Alaska Hawaii	21,850 2,374 902 17,789 325 460	19,776 1,808 745 16,576 278 369	109 19 12 78	152 26 24 100 - 2	59 7 N 48 - 4	54 15 N 38 - 1	90 7 8 69 - 6	107 8 7 90 2 N	96 7 9 78 2 N	
Guam P.R. V.I. Amer. Samoa C.N.M.I.	461 6 U 10	43 408 - U U	1 - U -	3 1 - U U	2 - U	1 U	- - - -	N - U	N U U	

N: Not notifiable. U: Unavailable. -: No reported cases.
* Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and cumulative (year-to-date).

TABLE II. (Cont'd) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending October 13, 2001, and October 14, 2000 (41st Week)*

we	eks enain	y Uctob	er 13, 20	υι, and O	ctober 14,	tober 14, 2000 (41st Week)* Salmonellosis'							
	Mala	aria	Rahie	es, Animal	NE.	TSS		HLIS					
D	Cum.	Cum.	Cum.	Cum.	Cum.	Cum.	Cum.	Cum.					
Reporting Area UNITED STATES	2001 894	2000 1,172	2001 5,393	2000 5,683	2001 28,425	2000 30,983	2001 22,957	2000 26,461					
NEW ENGLAND Maine N.H. Vt. Mass. R.I. Conn.	62 4 2 1 26 7 22	63 6 1 2 29 8 17	5,555 592 55 20 55 214 53 195	660 106 19 50 221 46 218	1,977 153 150 65 1,110 113 386	1,839 107 117 98 1,060 117 340	1,912 137 136 63 1,042 147 387	1,878 88 121 94 1,065 130 380					
MID. ATLANTIC Upstate N.Y. N.Y. City N.J. Pa.	217 55 105 25 32	312 59 180 41 32	1,000 641 24 161 174	1,036 657 11 156 212	3,371 977 803 651 940	4,024 979 999 981 1,065	3,212 1,043 1,091 657 421	4,344 1,070 1,083 848 1,343					
E.N. CENTRAL Ohio Ind. III. Mich. Wis.	88 21 15 1 33 18	118 16 5 58 26 13	118 42 3 24 43 6	144 47 - 22 64 11	3,818 1,091 438 956 660 673	4,305 1,146 515 1,290 723 631	3,569 1,061 399 1,049 658 402	2,903 1,189 520 79 788 327					
W.N. CENTRAL Minn. Iowa Mo. N. Dak. S. Dak. Nebr. Kans.	30 6 6 11 - 2 5	47 13 2 15 2 1 8 6	286 40 70 38 33 25 4 76	471 73 69 49 105 85 2 88	1,795 485 281 503 53 134 125 214	1,959 445 297 579 48 82 191 317	1,848 474 263 744 73 111 - 183	2,141 573 291 725 68 90 130 264					
S. ATLANTIC Del. Md. D.C. Va. W. Va. N.C. S.C. Ga. Fla.	234 2 100 13 43 1 13 6 12	262 4 86 15 46 3 30 2 19 57	1,839 30 279 - 373 118 482 97 294 166	1,950 42 341 - 462 100 473 136 268 128	6,965 79 676 68 1,113 103 1,055 676 1,128 2,067	6,310 95 651 52 808 131 885 593 1,144 1,951	4,746 87 723 U 747 107 905 595 1,210 372	4,879 112 578 U 768 124 935 468 1,442 452					
E.S. CENTRAL Ky. Tenn. Ala. Miss.	30 12 11 5 2	41 17 10 13 1	180 25 96 57 2	170 19 88 62 1	2,068 299 510 575 684	1,894 312 483 526 573	1,505 192 633 409 271	1,488 219 664 498 107					
W.S. CENTRAL Ark. La. Okla. Tex.	10 3 4 2 1	67 3 11 8 45	875 20 - 56 799	744 20 3 50 671	2,965 719 286 379 1,581	3,971 583 690 322 2,376	1,461 92 566 292 511	2,409 472 565 248 1,124					
MOUNTAIN Mont. Idaho Wyo. Colo. N. Mex. Ariz. Utah Nev.	44 2 3 - 19 3 7 3 7	40 1 3 - 20 - 7 4 5	216 31 28 20 - 14 108 14 1	238 60 9 50 - 19 82 10 8	1,738 60 115 50 482 243 489 179 120	2,224 77 101 52 602 194 575 392 231	1,418 - 4 43 484 186 503 175 23	2,113 - 95 47 584 179 617 411 180					
PACIFIC Wash. Oreg. Calif. Alaska Hawaii	179 8 10 151 1 9	222 24 34 154 - 10	287 - 2 248 37	270 - 7 237 26	3,728 406 194 2,803 34 291	4,457 466 248 3,499 52 192	3,286 491 266 2,218 28 283	4,306 561 304 3,208 33 200					
Guam P.R. V.I. Amer. Samoa C.N.M.I.	- 3 - U	2 5 U U	73 - U	- 64 - U U	- 455 - U 11	21 545 - U U	UUUUU	U U U					
N: Not notifiable	II-IIInav	roilabla	. Na sana	orted cases									

N: Not notifiable. U: Unavailable.

^{-:} No reported cases.

N. Not notificable.

- No reported cases:
Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and cumulative (year-to-date).

Individual cases can be reported through both the National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance (NETSS) and the Public Health Laboratory Information System (PHLIS).

TABLE II. (Cont'd) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending October 13, 2001, and October 14, 2000 (41st Week)*

we	eks endin			01, and Oc	tober 14, 2000 (41st Week)*							
	NET		ellosis† I i	PHLIS	Sy (Primary)	/philis & Secondary)	Tube	erculosis				
B	Cum.	Cum.	Cum.	Cum.	Cum.	Cum.	Cum.	Cum.				
Reporting Area UNITED STATES	2001 13,764	2000 17,642	2001 6,215	2000 10,123	2001 4,507	2000 4,763	9,409	11,031				
NEW ENGLAND Maine N.H. Vt. Mass. R.I. Conn.	220 6 6 7 169 17	335 10 5 4 238 24 54	233 2 3 5 162 23 38	325 11 8 - 221 26 59	47 1 2 26 8 10	64 1 1 44 4 14	326 8 13 4 185 29 87	319 12 16 4 186 27 74				
MID. ATLANTIC Upstate N.Y. N.Y. City N.J. Pa.	1,054 413 279 185 177	2,158 611 852 455 240	669 101 319 184 65	1,382 180 584 391 227	400 21 212 105 62	225 9 94 57 65	1,792 268 906 386 232	1,764 236 950 415 163				
E.N. CENTRAL Ohio Ind. III. Mich. Wis.	3,383 2,378 179 326 256 244	3,509 295 1,332 1,020 579 283	1,573 1,045 34 288 182 24	1,010 251 139 44 527 49	759 65 130 229 316 19	948 63 287 339 217 42	1,014 182 80 487 203 62	1,081 227 107 504 172 71				
W.N. CENTRAL Minn. Iowa Mo. N. Dak. S. Dak. Nebr. Kans.	1,449 354 335 268 20 350 63 59	1,957 650 425 580 16 6 99 181	1,054 341 276 170 27 206 - 34	1,673 733 292 410 49 4 82 103	69 22 4 20 - 5 18	58 15 10 26 - - 2 5	362 175 34 109 3 12 29	396 124 28 147 2 14 18 63				
S. ATLANTIC Del. Md. D.C. Va. W. Va. N.C. S.C. Ga. Fla.	1,924 13 127 48 264 8 290 221 216 737	2,332 19 164 67 366 4 259 107 193 1,153	636 10 75 U 124 8 143 112 130 34	978 20 94 U 304 3 235 80 149	1,584 9 188 43 86 3 370 195 287 403	1,589 8 238 31 107 3 400 182 302 318	1,891 15 170 51 191 25 267 146 361 665	2,243 14 196 23 209 23 271 218 499 790				
E.S. CENTRAL Ky. Tenn. Ala. Miss.	1,244 553 78 182 431	858 352 279 58 169	473 236 84 124 29	462 74 334 48 6	497 38 264 95 100	708 65 425 99 119	615 90 221 211 93	744 95 279 247 123				
W.S. CENTRAL Ark. La. Okla. Tex.	1,831 474 117 52 1,188	2,761 165 230 93 2,273	721 155 137 17 412	868 48 141 38 641	562 27 130 55 350	653 82 177 97 297	742 119 - 111 512	1,627 154 146 124 1,203				
MOUNTAIN Mont. Idaho Wyo. Colo. N. Mex. Ariz. Utah Nev.	762 4 33 3 188 109 313 49 63	933 7 43 5 202 121 379 67 109	547 - 1 210 69 213 46 8	675 - 25 3 162 86 261 72 66	194 - 1 1 35 18 124 8 7	189 - 1 1 8 15 159 1 4	377 6 8 3 90 23 165 30 52	411 14 7 2 68 36 165 38 81				
PACIFIC Wash. Oreg. Calif. Alaska Hawaii	1,897 159 70 1,607 6 55	2,799 388 149 2,224 7 31	309 167 87 - 6 49	2,750 358 98 2,264 3 27	395 41 13 331 -	329 53 10 265 - 1	2,290 190 82 1,862 40 116	2,446 193 78 1,981 86 108				
Guam P.R.	- 8	34 29	U	U U	172	3 127	- 76	44 119				
V.I. Amer. Samoa C.N.M.I.	U 4	U U	U U U	U U U	U 4	U U	U 23	U U				

N: Not notifiable.

U: Unavailable. -: No reported cases.

funcidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and cumulative (year-to-date).

[†] Individual cases can be reported through both the National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance (NETSS) and the Public Health Laboratory Information System (PHLIS).

TABLE III. Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases preventable by vaccination, United States, weeks ending October 13, 2001, and October 14, 2000 (41st Week)*

	H. influenzae, Hepatitis (Viral), By Type Measles (Rubeola)													
		<i>ienzae,</i> isive		epatitis (Vi		ре			7					
	Cum.	Cum.	Cum.	Cum.	Cum.	Cum.	Indiger	Cum.	Impo	rted⁺ Cum.	Total Cum.	Cum.		
Reporting Area	2001 [§]	2000	2001	2000	2001	2000	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2000		
UNITED STATES	1,027	985	7,943	10,327	5,087	5,534	-	49	-	42	91	71		
NEW ENGLAND	71 2	78 1	492 10	308 15	77 5	92 5	-	4	-	1	5	6		
Maine N.H.	4	12	16	18	12	15	-	-	-	-	-	3		
Vt. Mass.	3 35	7 36	12 209	8 116	4 3	6 13	-	1 2	-	1	1 3	3		
R.I.	3 24	4	46 199	22 129	22 31	18	-	1	-		1	-		
Conn. MID. ATLANTIC	152	185	755	1,198	828	35 933	-	4	-	11	15	21		
Upstate N.Y.	58	77	205	193	111	102	-	1	-	4	5	10		
N.Y. City N.J.	36 38	50 35	216 159	410 233	332 169	457 146	Ū	2	Ū	1 1	3 1	10		
Pa.	20	23	175	362	216	228	-	1	-	5	6	1		
E.N. CENTRAL Ohio	139 56	150 45	834 190	1,349 219	701 86	575 90	-	-	-	10 3	10 3	7 2		
Ind.	43	26	90	85	41	41	-	-	-	4	4	-		
III. Mich.	10 8	50 9	233 267	582 392	118 456	98 313	-	-	-	3	3	3 2		
Wis.	22	20	54	71	-	33	-	-	-	-	-	-		
W.N. CENTRAL Minn.	54 32	61 32	337 34	582 163	161 17	235 34	-	4 2	-	-	4 2	1 1		
Iowa	-	-	30 90	59	21	27	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Mo. N. Dak.	13 7	19 2	3	237 3	87 1	117 2	-	2	-	-	2	-		
S. Dak. Nebr.	- 1	1 3	2 30	1 27	1 19	1 33	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Kans.	i	4	148	92	15	21	-	-	-	-	-	-		
S. ATLANTIC Del.	300	225	1,906	1,134 12	1,141	963 13	-	4	-	1	5	3		
Md.	73	65	219	167	117	104	-	2	-	1	3	-		
D.C. Va.	25	35	43 109	20 120	11 139	27 128	-	1	_	-	1	2		
W. Va. N.C.	14 42	8 20	18 173	52 117	20 173	10 188	-	-	-	-	-	-		
S.C. Ga.	5 68	7 54	64 728	61 223	26 295	13 162	-	- 1	-	-	- 1	-		
Fla.	73	36	552	362	360	318	-	-	-	-	-	1		
E.S. CENTRAL	63 2	39 12	316	341 43	357	369	-	2	-	-	2 2	-		
Ky. Tenn.	33	16	113 119	120	41 189	63 173	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Ala. Miss.	26 2	9 2	68 16	44 134	73 54	46 87	-	-	-	-	-	-		
W.S. CENTRAL	37	61	1,055	1,947	492	920	-	1	-	-	1	-		
Ark. La.	3	2 16	60 55	120 70	77 32	82 129	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Okla. Tex.	34	41 2	104 836	213 1,544	70 313	124 585	-	- 1	-	-	- 1	-		
MOUNTAIN	121	95	624	724	413	416	_	1	_	1	2	12		
Mont.	-	1	10	6	3	6	-	-	-	-	-	-		
ldaho Wyo.	1 -	4 1	53 7	22 4	10 2	6 3	-	-	-	1 -	1 -	-		
Colo. N. Mex.	31 19	23 19	76 31	166 61	90 124	74 116	-	-	-	-	-	2		
Ariz.	54 6	35 8	338 60	365 45	125 23	152 19	-	1	-	-	1	-		
Utah Nev.	10	4	49	45 55	23 36	40	Ū	-	Ū	-	-	3 7		
PACIFIC	90	91	1,624	2,744	917	1,031	-	29	-	18	47	21		
Wash. Oreg.	2 17	5 27	114 67	239 148	114 78	86 91	-	13 4	-	2	15 4	3		
Calif. Alaska	43 6	31 6	1,426 14	2,333 11	700 9	834 9	-	10	-	11 -	21	14 1		
Hawaii	22	22	3	13	16	11	-	2	-	5	7	3		
Guam P.R.	- 1	1 4	- 91	1 216	136	9 229	U	-	U	-	-	2		
V.I. Amer. Samoa	Ü	U	Ū	Ü	Ū	Ū	Ŭ	Ū	Ü	Ū	Ū	Ū		
C.N.M.I.		ŭ		ŭ	28	ŭ	ŭ		ŭ	-		<u> </u>		

N: Not notifiable. U: Unavailable. -: No reported cases.

* Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and cumulative (year-to-date).

[†] For imported measles, cases include only those resulting from importation from other countries. [§] Of 216 cases among children aged <5 years, serotype was reported for 112, and of those, 20 were type b.

TABLE III. (Cont'd) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases preventable by vaccination, United States, weeks ending October 13, 2001, and October 14, 2000 (41st Week)*

		an	a Octo	2000) (41st Week)*							
	Dis	gococcal ease		Mumps			Pertussis		Rubella			
Reporting Area	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	2001	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	2001	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	2001	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	
UNITED STATES	1,708	1,764	2	171	270	44	3,620	5,329	-	20	125	
NEW ENGLAND	93 3	109	-	-	4	-	333 21	1,333	-	-	12	
Maine N.H.	12	8 11	-	-	-	-	26	35 97	-	-	2	
Vt. Mass.	5 49	3 62	-	-	1	-	27 237	199 946	-	-	8	
R.I. Conn.	4 20	9 16	-	-	1 2	-	5 17	16 40	-	-	1 1	
MID. ATLANTIC	175	195	_	19	22	4	249	543	-	5	9	
Upstate N.Y. N.Y. City	49 32	56 38	-	3 9	9 6	4	124 38	266 73	-	1 3	1 8	
N.J. Pa.	41 53	37 64	U	3 4	3 4	U	18 69	30 174	U	1 -	-	
E.N. CENTRAL	227	313	_	16	20	1	497	608	-	3	1	
Ohio Ind.	75 35	74 36	-	1 1	7 1	-	257 67	263 85	-	1	-	
III. Mich.	22 53	74 93	-	11 3	6 5	- 1	59 53	83 73	-	2	1	
Wis.	42	36	-	-	1	-	61	104	-	-	-	
W.N. CENTRAL Minn.	123 18	124 18	-	7 3	17	2	205 70	444 268	-	3	1	
Iowa Mo.	24 44	26 60	-	-	7 4	2	19 85	46 65	-	1 1	-	
N. Dak.	6 5	2 5	-	-	1	-	4	6 4	-	-	-	
S. Dak. Nebr.	12	6	-	1	2	-	4	21	-	-	1	
Kans. S. ATLANTIC	14 322	7 251	2	3 32	3 39	-	19 191	34 393	-	1 6	- 73	
Del.	4 37	1	-	52 - 5	- 9		-	8		1	1	
Md. D.C.	-	26	-	-	-	-	30 1	98 3	-	-	-	
Va. W. Va.	33 12	37 12	-	6	9	-	36 2	90 1	-	-	-	
N.C. S.C.	60 31	32 20	2	4 5	5 10	-	58 31	77 26	-	2	64 6	
Ga. Fla.	38 107	41 82	-	7 5	2 4	-	7 26	35 55	-	3	2	
E.S. CENTRAL	116	119	-	6	5	2	124	99	-	-	6	
Ky. Tenn.	19 54	25 48	-	1 1	1 2	2	31 55	50 29	-	-	1 1	
Ala. Miss.	30 13	33 13	-	4	2	-	34 4	17 3	-	-	4	
W.S. CENTRAL Ark.	186 17	188 11	-	10 1	28 1	25	365 22	305 33	-	1	8 1	
La.	58	42	-	2	5	5 -	2	19	-	-	1	
Okla. Tex.	26 85	25 110	-	7	22	20	11 330	21 232	-	1	6	
MOUNTAIN Mont.	83 4	76 4	-	11 1	17 1	9	1,134 31	630 35	-	1	2	
Idaho	7	7	-	1	-		168	57 4	-	-		
Wyo. Colo.	5 29	26	-	1 1	1	4	1 224	361	-	1	1	
N. Mex. Ariz.	12 13	7 22	-	2 1	1 4	1 4	129 498	81 63	-	-	1	
Utah Nev.	7 6	7 3	Ū	1 3	4 6	Ū	71 12	17 12	Ū	-	-	
PACIFIC	383	389	-	70	118	1	522	974	-	1	13	
Wash. Oreg.	58 34	44 53	N	1 N	9 N	1 -	130 44	322 99	-	-	7	
Caliř. Alaska	278 2	276 8	-	32 1	81 8	-	311 6	498 19	-	-	6	
Hawaii	11	8	-	36	20	-	31	36	-	1	-	
Guam P.R.	4	9	U U	-	13	U U	2	3 6	U U	-	1 -	
V.I. Amer. Samoa	Ū	Ū	U U	Ū	Ū	U U	Ū	Ū	U U	Ū	Ū	
C.N.M.I.		Ü	Ü	-	Ü	Ü	-	Ü	Ü		Ü	

N: Not notifiable. -: No reported cases.
* Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and cumulative (year-to-date).

TABLE IV. Deaths in 122 U.S. cities,* week ending October 13, 2001 (41st Week)

October 13, 2001 (41st Week)															
		All Cau	ıses, By	Age (Y	ears)		P&I [†]			All Cau	ises, B	y Age (Y	ears)		P&I⁺
Reporting Area	All Ages	≥65	45-64	25-44	1-24	<1	Total	Reporting Area	All Ages	≥65	45-64	25-44	1-24	<1	Total
NEW ENGLAND Boston, Mass. Bridgeport, Conn Cambridge, Mass Fall River, Mass. Hartford, Conn. Lowell, Mass. Lynn, Mass. New Bedford, Ma New Haven, Conn Providence, R.I. Somerville, Mass Springfield, Mass Waterbury, Conn. Worcester, Mass. MID. ATLANTIC Albany, N.Y. Allentown, Pa. Buffalo, N.Y.	. 12 23 70 14 13 sss. 23 . 41 51 . 7	434 110 41 11 11 50 9 9 22 26 36 5 34 22 48 1,578 32 60	3 1 8 9 1 6 1 13	47 7 4 - 6 7 2 1 - 6 4 1 1 6 - 3 3 338 7 1 5	6 2 1 1 1 1 64 - 2	5 - 2 1 2	44 17 2 1 3 - 2 2 - 2 4 5 4 117 5 2 3	S. ATLANTIC Atlanta, Ga. Baltimore, Md. Charlotte, N.C. Jacksonville, Fla Miami, Fla. Norfolk, Va. Richmond, Va. Savannah, Ga. St. Petersburg, F Tampa, Fla. Washington, D.t Wilmington, Del E.S. CENTRAL Birmingham, Al. Chattanooga, Te Knoxville, Tenn. Lexington, Ky. Memphis, Tenn.	61 50 46 62 61 63 172 6. 99 1. 20 846 a. 183 nn. 60 105 66	734 119 97 69 76 27 29 25 44 49 120 59 20 573 126 40 79 317	272 52 34 27 35 22 11 16 12 6 31 26 - 166 32 14 17 18	115 26 13 8 10 9 5 3 6 6 17 12 - 59 11 4 5 13	28 6 5 4 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 7	20 3 4 5 2 2 3 - - 1 - 22 4 - 1 3 11	53 4 8 9 5 4 1 10 2 - 70 23 2 5 4 13
Camden, N.J. Elizabeth, N.J. Erie, Pa.§ Jersey City, N.J. New York City, N.' Newark, N.J. Paterson, N.J. Philadelphia, Pa. Pittsburgh, Pa.§ Reading, Pa. Rochester, N.Y. Schenectady, N.Y. Schanton, Pa.§ Syracuse, N.Y. Trenton, N.J. Utica, N.Y. Yonkers, N.Y.	36 34 43 28 42 1,313 32 437 48 177 1399 - 25 41 80 20 25 U	20 22 31 19 765 32 18 269 31 12 105 20 32 56 15 22 U	11 7 8 5 285 22 6 97 13 2 21 4 3 14 8 1 U	1 5 4 221 14 5 48 2 1 8 1 6 1 3 1 U	3 - - 25 3 1 17 2 1 3 - - 5 1 1 U	1 - - 16 2 2 6 - 1 2 - - 4 -	4 - 1 - 42 4 - 21 5 - 11 5 4 7 2 1 U	Mehiphis, tern. Mobile, Ala. Montgomery, Al Nashville, Tenn. W.S. CENTRAL Austin, Tex. Baton Rouge, La Corpus Christi, T Dallas, Tex. El Paso, Tex. Ft. Worth, Tex. Houston, Tex. Little Rock, Ark. New Orleans, La San Antonio, Te Shreveport, La. Tulsa, Okla. MOUNTAIN	76 38 133 1,180 55 . 60 Fex. 51 170 71 102 281 61	755 40 35 33 119 49 61 159 35 U 132 17 75 655	28 257 9 17 12 34 15 27 76 13 U 30 8 16	13 10 2 9 112 2 4 3 8 7 10 30 9 U 22 4 13 81	30 1 2 1 6 4 8 2 U 2 4 34	2 26 3 2 2 3 - 8 2 U 3 1 2	13 2 7 14 56 2 16 - 5 14 - U 12 - 5
E.N. CENTRAL Akron, Ohio Canton, Ohio Canton, Ohio Cincinnati, Ohio Cleveland, Ohio Columbus, Ohio Dayton, Ohio Dayton, Ohio Detroit, Mich. Evansville, Ind. Fort Wayne, Ind. Grand Rapids, Mi Indianapolis, Ind. Lansing, Mich. Milwaukee, Wis. Peoria, III. Rockford, III. South Bend, Ind. Toledo, Ohio Youngstown, Ohi W.N. CENTRAL Des Moines, Iowa Duluth, Minn. Kansas City, Kans Kansas City, Mo. Lincoln, Nebr. Minneapolis, Min Omaha, Nebr. St. Louis, Mo. St. Paul, Minn. Wichita, Kans.	176 35 107 51 55 49 111 0 49 690 1 22 . 31 . 36 40	1,109 369 27 U26 227 929 1199 92 388 45 41 41 41 49 49 32	301 100 8 U 15 34 38 36 16 10 28 8 15 15 16 12 23 7 146 6 12 12 12 16 16 17 17 18 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19	110 13 11 11 13 25 33 33 11 14 25 21 27 55 11 29 13 54 17	37 	32 1 - U 2 5 5 2 2 5 - 1 1 2 2 3 - 1 1 2 1 1 7 1 5 5 5 5 - 1	103 5 4 4 U 9 9 2 2 5 5 7 15 5 6 6 1 2 2 6 6 4 4 7 7 2 2 6 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 4 9 9 7 1 6 3 3	MOUNTAIN Moise, Idaho Colo. Springs, C Denver, Colo. Las Vegas, Nev. Ogden, Utah Phoenix, Ariz. Pueblo, Colo. Salt Lake City, U Tucson, Ariz. PACIFIC Berkeley, Calif. Fresno, Calif. Glendale, Calif. Honolulu, Hawa Long Beach, Call Los Angeles, Cal Passadena, Calif. Portland, Oreg. Sacramento, Cal San Diego, Califi San Francisco, C San Jose, Calif. Santa Cruz, Califi Seattle, Wash. Total	.M. 112 olo. 66 102 200 35 163 35 163 32 5 144 137 1,390 8 105 15 15 16 33 11 15 16 17 18 19 19 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10	75 200 66 121 96 129 96 85 95 975 65 21 241 44 241 18 96 109 124 69 37 47	25 2 100 19 49 49 6 6 8 5 23 32 265 33 24 4 33 32 36 0 U 7 7 19 11 14	8 8 2 4 4 10 21 1 - 21 1 2 2 7 7 6 6 6 3 3 3 3 4 4 2 2 7 7 13 15 5 U U - 6 3 3 6 6 1,009	2 2 2 2 7 7 - 6 4 4 32 - 2 5 3 3 3 U U U 1 4 1 1 1 278	20 - 1 1 5 1 0 U - 5 1 1 - 198	94 23 39 11 38 2 55 12 101 4 4 1 6 6 10 20 5 7 7 13 18 8 U U 2 9 4 2 6 5 8

U: Unavailable.

Unavailable. ::No reported cases.

Mortality data in this table are reported voluntarily from 122 cities in the United States, most of which have populations of ≥100,000. A death is reported by the place of its occurrence and by the week that the death certificate was filed. Fetal deaths are not included. Pneumonia and influenza.

Because of changes in reporting methods in this Pennsylvania city, these numbers are partial counts for the current week. Complete counts will be available in 4 to 6 weeks.

¹ Total includes unknown ages.

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