

One Discipline or Many?
TRIP Survey of International Relations Faculty in Ten Countries

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Williamsburg, Virginia

February 2009

We thank the 2,724 international relations scholars around the world who generously gave time to fill out our detailed survey and provide important feedback on the survey instrument that will improve future versions. We especially thank our TRIP partners around the world who helped tailor the survey to their national academic populations, identify those populations, and persuade them to complete this survey: Michael Cox and Jeff Chwieroth (United Kingdom) from the London School of Economics; John Doyle and Stephanie Rickard (Ireland) from Dublin City University; Jacqui True (New Zealand) from Auckland University; Jason Sharman (Australia) from Griffith University; TJ Cheng and Alan Chong (Singapore) from William and Mary and National University of Singapore, respectively; TJ Cheng and James Tang (Hong Kong) from William and Mary and University of Hong Kong, respectively; Michael Lipson (Canada) from Concordia University; and Cameron Brown (Israel) from UC San Diego. For assistance in designing the survey, identifying our sample providing technical support, and extensive comments in the pre-test phase, we thank our colleagues and students: Will Armstrong, Megan Cameron, Greg Cooper, David Dessler, Morgan Figa, James Long, Ron Rapoport, Jess Sloan, Dennis Smith, Alena Stern, Sasha Tobin, Raj Trivedi, Kate Weaver, and Heather Winn. For financial support, we thank Arts and Sciences and the Reves Center for International Studies at the College of William and Mary and the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

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Reflecting on the discipline of international relations (IR) in the post-Cold War era, Ole Wæver writes, “IR is and has been ‘an American social science.’”¹ Not only is American IR hegemonic, according to Wæver, it is also insular: European scholars are aware of theoretical developments in the United States, but U.S. scholars are afflicted with “narrow-mindedness.” Wæver worries that this divide produces an intellectual loss—for all scholars of IR—because it leads to “lower standards, less exchange, and fewer challenges to think in new ways.”²

At the same time, many scholars argue that there are no distinctive national approaches to the study of international politics. Norman Palmer, for example, claims that any perceived differences should be attributed to competing theories or paradigms. He maintains that there is not an “American approach, but a multitude of approaches,” all of which are well represented outside the United States.³ In the same vein, Tony Porter asks rhetorically: “What do [American IR scholars] Kenneth Waltz, Richard Ashley, Cynthia Enloe, and Craig Murphy have in common?” He concludes that the fierce debates in the American academy reveal that nationality is “an insignificant determinant of the intellectual development of ideas, theory, and approaches to the study of international politics.”⁴

To what extent is there national variation in how scholars teach IR, think about the discipline, view their role in the policy process, and approach critical contemporary foreign policy debates? Conversely, to what extent is there a single—perhaps American-driven—IR discipline? To begin to answer these questions, the Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) project has conducted the first cross-national survey of IR faculty in ten countries: Australia, Canada, Ireland, Israel, Hong Kong,⁵ New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, United Kingdom, and the United States. This task was made possible through close cooperation with scholars who were familiar with academic and specifically IR norms and practices within each country. These partners ensured that the survey design and content were appropriate for their national contexts. Our partners also contributed questions to the survey, including several that were asked only of respondents in their own countries.⁶ The responses to country-specific questions do not appear in this report.

¹ Ole Wæver, “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations,” *International Organization* 52 (Autumn 1998): 687. See also Stanley Hoffman, “An American Social Science: International Relations,” *Daedalus* 106 (Summer 1977), 9.

² Wæver, “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline,” 723.

³ Norman D. Palmer, “The Study of International Relations in the United States: Perspectives on Half a Century,” *International Studies Quarterly* 24 (1980): 343.


⁴ Tony Porter, “Can There be National Perspectives on Inter(national) Relations?” in Robert Crawford and Darryl Jarvis, eds., *International Relations: Still an American Social Science? Towards Diversity in International Thought* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2001), 131.

⁵ Of course, Hong Kong is not a “country” but a special administrative region of the People’s Republic of China with a robust IR scholarly community. In 2010 we plan to survey IR scholars in the PRC, as well as Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and continental Europe.

⁶ For a complete list of our partners in the project, see the title page to this report. We did not have a partner for the South African survey or for the survey in the Caribbean. We dropped the latter case from our results after receiving only 5 responses from a population of 17 scholars. Although our partners’ input was invaluable and formed the basis of many of our decisions, we made all final decisions on wording and inclusion of questions. Any remaining

This cross-national survey builds on previous TRIP faculty surveys, which were conducted in 2004 and 2006. In 2004, we surveyed IR scholars in the United States. Two years later, in the fall of 2006, we followed up that survey to track changes in views and practices of U.S. scholars. The 2006 survey also contained 36 new questions and included scholars at Canadian colleges and universities. By adding eight new countries and new questions on disciplinary practices and current foreign policy debates, the 2008 survey represents another substantial expansion of the TRIP project.⁷

The biennial faculty survey is one part of a larger TRIP project designed to study the relationships among teaching, research, and foreign policy.⁸ As political scientists who specialize in international relations, we spend most of our time seeking data on foreign policy and international relations—whether trade or aid flows, terrorist attacks, the diffusion of democracy, or the outbreak of war—that fall in the lower right hand corner of the triad pictured in Figure 1.



The survey results reported here and in our two previous reports provide important data on two neglected corners of the triad, teaching and research, as well as providing valuable data on scholars' views on policy issues.⁹ In the larger TRIP project, the survey data is supplemented by a second large empirical project: a database of all international relations articles published in the twelve top peer-reviewed IR and political science journals from 1980 to the present.¹⁰ With these two types of data scholars can describe changes in the discipline over time, observe variation in research and teaching practices across different countries and regions of the world, identify and

errors or inconsistencies in the questionnaires are therefore our responsibility alone.

⁷ In addition to adding questions, we also dropped a number of questions from the 2006 survey that were not likely to vary over time. Where possible, the questions were identical across countries, but because of different naming conventions, some questions (and closed end options) were modified slightly to fit the local context.

⁸ For further information on the TRIP project, see <http://irtheoryandpractice.wm.edu/projects/trip/>

⁹ The two previous reports are: Susan Peterson, Michael Tierney, and Daniel Maliniak, "Teaching and Research Practices, Views on the Discipline, and Policy Attitudes of International Relations Faculty at U.S. Colleges and Universities," (Williamsburg, VA: Wendy and Emery Reves Center for International Studies, August 2005); and Daniel Maliniak, Amy Oakes, Susan Peterson, and Michael J. Tierney, "The View from the Ivory Tower: TRIP Survey of International Relations Faculty in the United States and Canada," (Williamsburg, VA: Program on the Theory and Practice of International Relations, February 2007). Both reports are available at <http://irtheoryandpractice.wm.edu/projects/trip/>

¹⁰ We are in the process of expanding our journal article database to include books.

analyze network effects, and identify areas of consensus and disagreement within the IR discipline. These data also help us to understand the influence of academic research on foreign policy, the way research affects teaching, the effect of teaching on foreign policy opinions of students (and future policy makers), the impact of specific policy outcomes and real world events on both teaching and research, and a variety of other issues that have previously been the subject of vigorous speculation.

In this report, we describe the results of the 2008 TRIP survey of IR faculty, providing descriptive statistics for every question and preliminary discussion of our findings. First, however, we detail the survey's methodology, examine issues of continuity and change in the U.S. discipline, and explore the question of whether IR can be considered a truly global discipline.

Methodology

We sought to identify and survey all faculty members at four-year colleges and universities in ten national settings—Australia, Canada, Ireland, Israel, Hong Kong SAR, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, United Kingdom, and the United States—who do research in the IR field or who teach courses on IR. The overwhelming majority of our respondents have jobs in departments of political science, politics, government, social science, international relations, international studies, or professional schools associated with universities. Given our definition of “IR scholar”—individuals with an active affiliation with a university, college, or professional school—we excluded many researchers currently employed in government, private firms, or think tanks. A substantial minority of the scholars that we surveyed do not self-identify as “international relations” scholars (see questions 27 and 28). We attempted to include any scholar who taught or did research on trans-border issues as they relate to some aspect of politics. So, our population includes political scientists specializing in American politics who study trade and immigration. It includes researchers who study regional integration. It includes many specialists of comparative politics who happen to teach IR courses. We ask questions about first and second fields of specialization to permit analysis of our broad definition, or of narrower definitions of the field. All the results reported below follow from our broad definition of “IR.” We adopt this broad definition because we are interested in those scholars who create knowledge, teach students, and provide expert advice to policy makers about trans-border issues – whether they adopt the “IR” moniker themselves or not.

The expansion of the TRIP faculty survey in 2008 presented some challenges. We discovered, for example, that the meaning of “international relations” is understood somewhat differently across the ten countries in our survey. To ensure the comparability of the data across the three iterations of our survey, we held constant the procedures we used (and have used in the past) to identify the population of IR faculty (see below). At the same time, however, cross-national variation presents an opportunity to learn more about whether there exists an international IR discipline. In the United States and New Zealand 68 percent of respondents (question 21) reported that IR was their primary subfield, but fewer than half the scholars in the United Kingdom, Israel, Hong Kong, and Singapore surveys responded similarly. On two questions (27 and 28), respondents were able to indicate that, even though they fit the TRIP criteria for inclusion, they did not self-identify as IR scholars. In Ireland, for example, 23 and 21 percent of respondents on these questions,

respectively, said that they did not consider themselves to be part of the IR discipline. In contrast, only four percent of respondents in New Zealand reported that they were not IR scholars.

We identified the population to be surveyed in all ten countries using similar methods, but we tailored them to the locale. For the survey conducted in the United States we used the *U.S. News and World Report 2007-2008* report on American higher education to compile a list of all four-year colleges and universities. There were 1,406 such institutions. We also included the Monterey Institute and seven military schools that were not rated by *USNWR* but that do have a relatively large number of political science faculty who do research and/or teach courses on international relations. We then identified IR faculty members teaching at these schools through a systematic series of web searches, emails, and communications with department chairs, secretaries, and individual scholars. To identify the population of IR scholars at Canadian universities, we began with *Macleans Magazine*, which publishes an annual ranking of all four-year universities in Canada. There were 94 such schools. Again, we used web searches, supplemented by emails and phone calls, to identify faculty members who teach or do research in IR. We then asked our country partner to review the list of survey recipients to ensure its accuracy.¹¹ UNESCO collects data on the educational systems of more than 200 countries and territories. These data were used to identify all universities and colleges in the remaining eight countries in the survey. We also consulted with our country partners to ensure that these lists were complete. The same procedures that were used in Canada were then followed to assemble lists of IR faculty in these countries. By August 2008, we identified a total of 6,055 individuals in the ten countries who met the TRIP criteria for inclusion.

After generating the pool of potential respondents, we sent emails to each of these individuals, asking them to complete an online survey that would take approximately 24 to 32 minutes. We promised confidentiality to all respondents: no answers are publicly linked to any individual respondent. We provided a live link to a web survey. If a respondent contacted us and asked for a hard copy or did not have an email address, we sent a hard copy of the survey via regular mail. If respondents did not complete the survey, we sent reminder emails; in all, five reminders were sent between September 18 and October 23.

A total of 187 respondents or their representatives informed us that they did not belong in the sample because either they had been misidentified and did not teach or conduct research in the field of IR, or they had died, changed jobs, or retired.¹² These individuals were not included in the calculation of the response rate. The sample size for each country is listed in the table below.

With the assistance of our country partners, we worked to construct comparable, but not identical, surveys for each of the ten countries. The surveys were adjusted to reflect differences in national conceptions of political ideology, terminology, academic institutions, academic rank, public and private institutions, and policy issues. The wording of some questions and answers was changed to reflect these differences. Finally, each of our partners contributed country-specific questions that were included at the end of their country survey.

¹¹ A substantial minority of scholars takes new positions, retire, or die every year. Partners with local knowledge are crucial in identifying such cases.

¹² If respondents said that they were not IR scholars, but nevertheless met the TRIP criteria, we urged them to complete the survey and did not remove them from the sample, even if they refused to answer the survey.

In all, 2,724 scholars responded to the survey, either online or by mail. There likely were additional individuals who were misidentified by our selection process and did not inform us. Hence, the total response rate of 46.4 percent is conservative.

There was significant variation in response rates across countries (see table below), although no country had a response rate below 38 percent. The 2008 U.S. response rate is nearly identical to that in 2006 (41 percent), and the 2008 Canadian response rate showed an increase of 8 points from 40 percent in 2006.¹³ In 2008, New Zealand, Ireland, and Hong Kong had the highest response rates. The relatively small size of the IR scholar populations in these countries suggests tighter knit communities, the members of which may be easier to convince to participate in a project like this. In South Africa, a notable exception to this norm, we did not have a local partner to help administer the survey and encourage potential respondents to participate.

Table 1: 2008 TRIP Response Rates

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Sample Size	5868	4126	747	488	184	43	42	108	52	30	48
Responses (N)	2724	1719	456	239	131	35	31	41	21	22	25
Responses (%)	46.4	41.7	61.0	49.0	71.2	81.3	73.8	38.0	40.4	73.3	52.1

On an individual basis, as in 2004 and 2006, we found that response rates among the most prominent scholars in the field were higher than among the rest of the population. For the U.S. survey, for example, of the top 25 scholars rated as having “the largest impact on the field over the past 20 years” (see question 14), 62 percent of those eligible completed the survey.¹⁴

Continuity and Change in American Discipline of IR

The story of the American discipline of IR over the past four years is one of significant continuity punctuated by modest change in specific areas.¹⁵ On many key points U.S. scholars of IR demonstrate remarkable stability: virtually identical majorities across time say their scholarship is more basic—research for the sake of knowledge—than applied; large numbers of respondents still

¹³ The U.S. response rate in 2004 was 47 percent. The decline in 2006 probably reflects, at least partially, an expanded sample size. In 2004, we identified 2,406 individuals at 1,157 schools, and in 2006 we identified 2,838 individuals at 1,199 schools.

¹⁴ Four of the top 25 scholars are no longer living and, so, not included in this number.

¹⁵ When we use the terms “American discipline of IR” or “U.S. scholars of IR,” we refer to faculty who teach and/or conduct research at American universities. Throughout this report, national IR communities are defined by the locations of the universities, rather than respondents’ country of origin, citizenship, or location where they earned their Ph.D.s. These alternative measures certainly may influence scholars’ worldviews—that is, there are good conceptual reasons to adopt any (or all) of these identity markers. In our survey, moreover, we ask questions that allow us to identify each of these definitions of national community and, so, to turn the conceptual issue into an empirical one and determine which of these variables is the best predictor of someone's response to questions. In this report, however, because we seek to address the question of whether there are distinct national IR communities, we focus on the location of the universities where respondents teach and conduct research.

describe their work as realist or liberal; consistently high percentages of US scholars (64 percent in 2004, 70 percent in 2006, and 65 percent in 2008) portray themselves as positivists; and a substantial majority (69 percent in 2006 and 68 percent in 2008) primarily employ qualitative methods in their research. In fact, formal modeling, sometimes thought to be growing in popularity, especially among newly minted Ph.D.s, remains exactly where it was in 2006, the primary methodological approach of a scant 2 percent of the field.¹⁶

IR scholars are equally consistent in their policy views. Seventy-five percent describe themselves as liberal (including slightly liberal, liberal, and very liberal) compared with 69 percent in 2004 and 70 percent in 2006. Not surprisingly, huge majorities of U.S. scholars still think that the current war in Iraq is not good for U.S. or international security. An overwhelming majority of 95 percent (compared to 92 percent in 2004 and 96 percent in 2004) continues to believe that the United States is less respected today than in the past.

Despite the short time frame and the general stability in responses, there are some notable areas of change over the last four years. For starters, fewer respondents think of their research as falling within the sub-field of international relations: There was a decline—from 76 percent in 2004 and 75 percent in 2006 to 63 percent in 2008—in the percentage of scholars who reported that their primary field of study was international relations.¹⁷ This was matched by a concomitant increase—from 19 percent in 2004 and 2006 to 25 percent in 2008—in the percentage of respondents who said their primary field was comparative politics. Most notable, perhaps, is the decline in paradigmatic research. We see a 4 percent decline (from 25 percent in 2004 and 2006 to 21 percent in 2008) in the number of U.S. scholars who call themselves realists. More surprisingly, even, the percentage of liberals in the sample is falling sharply, from 33 percent in 2004 to 31 percent in 2006 to only 20 percent today. In 2008, 26 percent of faculty respondents said that they do not use paradigmatic analysis in their research. Within IR, international security slid 5 percentage points, but at 22 percent it maintained its place as the most popular area of study or substantive focus of respondents. International political economy (IPE) already had made this slide in 2006 and, in holding steady at 14 percent, retained the second spot on the list.¹⁸

On the policy side, we see several important changes from previous surveys. In 2008, for instance, we see fewer than half as many scholars (23 percent of respondents in 2008 compared to 48 percent in 2006) describing terrorism as one of the three most significant current foreign policy challenges facing the United States. Most surprisingly, while 50 percent of U.S. scholars in 2006 said that terrorism was one of the most important foreign policy issues the United States would

¹⁶ While survey responses provide one measure to describe the distribution of methods in the field, an alternative would measure the types of methods actually employed in published research. If a discipline is defined by the work published in its leading journals, then the proportion of formal and quantitative work is much higher. For examples see Daniel Maliniak, Amy Oakes, Susan Peterson, and Michael J. Tierney “The Discipline of International Relations: Past, Present, and Future,” paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August/ September 2007; and Daniel Maliniak and Michael J. Tierney, “The American school of IPE,” *Review of International Political Economy* 16:1 (2009).

¹⁷ This change may reflect a change in attitude among scholars of IR, the falling walls between political science sub-fields, and/ or the fact that there was a shift in respondents from 2006 to 2008; in 2008 more comparativists, who fit our criteria because they teach IR or have research interests in IR, answered the survey.

¹⁸ Again, some of these changes may be due to the inclusion in the 2008 survey of more comparativists who teach IR classes. When we restrict the sample to only those who chose IR as their primary subfield, the decline in paradigmatic research is much smaller, even though it still persists.

face over the subsequent decade, in 2008 only 1 percent of respondents agreed. American faculty members are becoming more sanguine about the war in Iraq, as well: in 2006 76 percent said that the Iraq conflict was one of the three most important issues facing the country, but in 2008 only 35 percent of U.S. respondents concurred. Concern over several other foreign policy issues is also declining markedly: when asked about the most important problems facing the country over the next ten years 18 percent fewer respondents chose WMD proliferation, 12 percent fewer said armed conflict in the Middle East, and 13 percent fewer indicated failed states. At the same time, 17 percent more respondents in 2008 than in 2006 believed that climate change will pose a serious challenge, 6 percent more worried about global poverty, and 4 percent more said that resource scarcity is one of the most significant foreign policy challenges.

A Global Discipline?

K. J. Holsti describes the “ideal model of a community of scholars” as one in which there are “reasonably symmetrical flows of communication, with ‘exporters’ of knowledge also being ‘importers’ from other sources.”¹⁹ To fully gauge whether the field of IR has become a global discipline—that is, to determine the extent to which ideas originate in the United States and whether American scholars are attentive to theoretical developments in other countries—we would need to map the course of ideas over time. As the TRIP faculty survey is replicated and expanded, this will be increasingly possible. That said, we can use the 2008 survey to assess: (1) whether there are systematic cross-national differences in theoretical paradigms, methodology, and epistemology, with, say, positivist or realist research being published exclusively in one country; and (2) whether the study of IR outside the United States mirrors the American academy, as it would if the U.S. approach were hegemonic.²⁰

There are signs that the field of IR may fall short of being a truly global discipline. The major fault line is epistemology: there is a deep division between American scholars, the vast majority (65 percent) of whom are self-described positivists, and scholars in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, where majorities report that they are either non-positivist or post-positivist. But, importantly, U.S. IR scholars are not alone in their commitment to positivism—even higher percentages of respondents in Israel (79 percent) and Hong Kong (71 percent) said their work was positivist. There is only limited evidence, however, of regional or national divisions along methodological or theoretical lines.

How one answers the question of whether there is diversity or an American hegemony in IR will depend largely upon one’s definition of hegemony. If hegemony means that most of the resources (richest universities and private foundation in the world), most authors in the top ranked journals (76 percent in 12 peer reviewed journals²¹), and top universities (16 of the top 20) come, overwhelmingly, from the United States, then, yes, American IR is hegemonic. U.S. scholars are recognized more often as the “most influential” scholars in the discipline by their peers in the

¹⁹ K. J. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985), 13.

²⁰ See Waever, “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline.”

²¹ This figure comes from our TRIP journal article database. It is based on the affiliation of the authors at the time of publication, using the author-article observation as the unit of analysis. To date, we have coded more than half of all IR articles published between 1980 and 2007 in the top 12 IR journals.

United States but also in the rest of the world (question 39), and there simply are many more IR scholars in the United States than in any other country in the world. Perhaps then, as Palmer suggests, the biggest difference between the study of IR in the United States and other parts of the world is simply “scale.”²²

Table 2: Percentage of IR scholars with degrees from U.S. universities, by country²³

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Percent with US Degree	68	96	9	31	14	36	14	34	8	53	45

If, however, hegemony means that there is a single discourse, epistemology, ontology, paradigm, method, issue area, or regional expertise among IR scholars as dictated by some mythical American consensus, then there is more diversity than hegemony in IR. There exists no distinctively American school of thought reflected as a mono-culture across the globe. For example, Benjamin Cohen argues persuasively that the sub-discipline of IPE within IR may be characterized by a distinctively “American School” of thought, but this school is countered by a “British School.” According to Cohen, we are *not* seeing the imperial domination of IPE by the American School; instead, we are seeing two schools that are growing further apart and ignoring each other.²⁴ Many of the countries we surveyed, moreover, draw faculty with degrees from countries other than the United States. As Table 2 shows, though, 96 percent of scholars at U.S. institutions get their degrees in the United States. With the United States importing the lowest percentage of scholars of these ten countries, the division between the American IR community and the rest of the world may be less one of scale than of insularity.

Theoretical Paradigm

IR scholars employ a diversity of paradigms and theoretical approaches. At the same time that we see some clear national differences, each of the major schools of thought in IR—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—is well represented (if in different proportions) among faculty in every country we surveyed.

Akin to Cohen’s claim about IPE, Robert Crawford argues that there is “strong evidence of a distinctively British approach,” in IR, and we find some evidence for this claim.²⁵ American scholars are noticeably more devoted to paradigmatic analysis than their British counterparts, for example. Twenty-one percent of American scholars but only 8 percent of British respondents describe their work as realist, while 20 percent of U.S. respondents but only 9 percent of British faculty call their work liberal (question 26).

²² Palmer, “The Study of International Relations in the United States,” 353.

²³ This table refers to highest degree attained by respondents.

²⁴ Benjamin J. Cohen, *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History* (Princeton University Press, 2008).

²⁵ See Robert Crawford, “International Relation as an Academic Discipline: If It’s Good for America, Is it Good for the World,” in Robert Crawford and Darryl Jarvis, eds., *International Relations: Still an American Social Science? Towards Diversity in International Thought* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2001), 2.

At the same time, American IR scholars are far less realist—and other national IR communities are more realist—than is often assumed. The conventional wisdom among critics of the study of IR in the United States is that there is a “distinctive American approach, an approach characterized as that of ‘state-centric realism,’ that accepts the ‘billiard ball’ rather than the “cobweb’ model of international relations.”²⁶ That observation may be true of the field’s past, but we find that only 21 percent of U.S. respondents said their work fell within the realist paradigm. Large percentages of American IR scholars described themselves as liberals (20 percent), constructivists (17 percent), and non-paradigmatic (26 percent).²⁷ More interestingly, substantial proportions of non-Americans also call themselves realists: Israel (34 percent), New Zealand (22 percent), and Hong Kong (22 percent) have higher concentrations of realists than does the United States; and Singapore (17 percent), Canada (16 percent), Australia (16 percent), Ireland (14 percent), and South Africa (13 percent) are not far behind. As Palmer argues, there is little systematic evidence for a theoretical approach to IR that is peculiar to the United States.²⁸

While no country has a monopoly on any theoretical paradigm, one school of thought that is not well represented in the American academy, but that is found in higher concentrations outside the United States, is the English School. This theoretical paradigm is dominant nowhere in our sample, but there are more scholars working in the English School tradition in nearly every other country. Indeed, with the exception of Ireland, the percentage of English School adherents in every other country in our sample is at least twice that in the United States, providing at least limited evidence of what Steve Smith terms, “a U.S.-versus-the-rest phenomenon.”²⁹

The biggest story here is the diversity of theoretical approaches in the IR community. The trend in the United States, as documented above, is a movement away from the major theoretical paradigms toward non-paradigmatic analysis. In 2008, 36 percent of U.S. scholars indicated that their work did not fall within one of the major theoretical paradigms. We find that similar percentages of scholars outside the American academy also describe their research as non-paradigmatic. Moreover, many scholars in each country (except for Israel) selected “other” when asked to describe their theoretical approach.

The sheer number of different theoretical approaches both within and outside the United States—and the fact that the major theoretical traditions are present in different proportions in each country across the sample—is not suggestive of a discipline in which American IR is hegemonic. Rather,

²⁶ Palmer, “The Study of International Relations in the United States,” 351.

²⁷ If Smith were doing the classifying, he might well code some of these self-described non-paradigmatic and liberal scholars as realists (especially those working in the liberal-institutionalist tradition and the strategic choice tradition), but in this report we use survey data that results from scholars classifying themselves. If scholars have different definitions in mind when they answer “realist,” or “positivist,” or “quantitative method,” or “IPE specialist,” then it will be difficult to make valid comparisons across respondents. This is a perennial problem with survey research and suggests the need for a coding scheme that employs consistent standards and definitions of such variables across countries and over time. For recent efforts in this vein, see John Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neo Realism* (Cambridge University Press, 1999); Thomas Walker and Jeffrey Morton, “Realism’s Dominance? Updating Vasquez’s ‘Power of Power Politics’ Thesis,” *International Studies Review*, (2007); and Maliniak, Oakes, Peterson, and Tierney, “The Discipline of International Relations.”

²⁸ Palmer, “The Study of International Relations in the United States,” 353.

²⁹ Steven Smith, “The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: ‘Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline,’” *International Studies Review* 4 (Summer 2002): 68.

it suggests that no approach has yet become “the” paradigm or “the” method or “the” epistemology. Instead of Kuhnian “normal science” taking place within the discipline of IR, we seem to have many distinct research communities.³⁰

Methodology

Several studies of the IR discipline hypothesize that Americans emphasize quantitative rather than qualitative approaches.³¹ Compared to U.K. and Canadian IR communities, the U.S. community is more quantitatively oriented, but the 2008 TRIP survey presents a more complicated picture than that found in the extant literature about the place of quantitative methods in the American IR community.

The field of IR—including in the United States—is populated overwhelmingly by scholars who employ qualitative methods as their primary empirical tool. Nearly all respondents in all countries indicate that they use qualitative approaches in their research as either a primary or secondary method (see questions 32 and 33). While nearly a quarter of U.S. IR scholars specialize in quantitative methods (23 percent), moreover, larger percentages of academics in Ireland (31 percent) and Israel (24 percent) primarily use this empirical method. And significant percentages of scholars in every country report using quantitative analysis as a secondary method, for example, 21 percent in the United Kingdom, 34 percent in Canada, 48 percent in Australia, and 32 percent in Singapore. Of course, there is a difference between the preferred method of individual scholars and the proportion of articles using that method that actually get published. If the Smith/Palmer hypothesis refers to the latter, they may indeed be correct. In a previous paper we show that quantitative and formal methods are represented in leading journals at a much higher rate than survey responses would suggest.³²

Epistemology

In his essay on the study of IR in the United States, Steve Smith argues that the difference between IR in the United States and the rest of the world is epistemological. Aside from the United States, he contends, “in most of the rest of the world, certainly in Europe and Australasia, IR remains skeptical of the merits of both positivism and the associated belief that there is one standard to assess the quality of academic work.”³³

The 2008 TRIP survey largely supports Smith’s claim. We find that American IR scholars are more likely than academics from other countries, with the exception of Israel and Hong Kong, to describe their work as positivist. A majority of academics from the other countries surveyed report that their research was either non-positivist or post-positivist, but only 35 percent of U.S.

³⁰ In “Be Careful What You Wish For,” *Review of International Political Economy* (forthcoming, 2009), Robert Wade argues that the discipline of economics does indeed have a hegemonic discourse that is built around the neo-classical model that became dominant in the United States after the Second World War. He warns scholars of international political economy not to go down the same road, and instead to maintain the extant plurality of approaches to IR and IPE.

³¹ See Palmer, “The Study of International Relations in the United States,” 353; Waeber, “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline,” 701; Smith, “The United States and the Discipline of International Relations.”

³² Maliniak, Oakes, Peterson, and Tierney, “The Discipline of International Relations.”

³³ Smith, “The United States and the Discipline of International Relations,” 81. See also Waeber, “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline.”

respondents describe their research in this way. Thus, there is evidence of significant epistemological differences among IR scholars, particularly between the American academy and IR scholars in the United Kingdom and Australia.

The TRIP survey also included two questions (24 and 25) that explore whether there is a rationalist-reflectivist (or in our survey a “rationalist-constructivist”) divide in the field. In his study of leading U.S. and European journals, Waever finds that “rationalism” is more likely to appear in U.S. journals, while “reflectivism” is more likely to appear in European journals.³⁴ Rationalism, for Waever, includes theoretical approaches—such as neo-realism, neoliberal institutionalism, formal theory, and non-post-modern constructivism—which are positivist in epistemology, while reflectivism refers to approaches—including critical theory, postmodernism, feminist theory, postcolonial theory, and historical sociology—which are post-positivist.³⁵ We found that 58 percent of respondents in the U.S. survey said their work is purely or partly rationalist. Contrary to Waever’s findings, however, they were not alone. Large percentages of IR faculty in Singapore (67 percent), New Zealand (63 percent), Israel (54 percent), and Ireland (52 percent) described their work similarly. That said, the survey finds that only 18 percent of U.S. IR scholars are constructivist. Higher percentages of respondents in every other country, save New Zealand (15 percent) and Hong Kong (11 percent), said their work was constructivist, with the highest percentages in Canada (27 percent) and South Africa (40 percent).

Is American IR Hegemonic?

Is the IR discipline characterized by hegemony or diversity? Certainly, there is evidence of U.S. hegemony. Nearly a quarter of IR scholars in Israel, Hong Kong, Singapore, and New Zealand are from the United States. Sixty-eight percent of all IR scholars—including about half of scholars in Hong Kong and Singapore and around a third in Canada, New Zealand, and Israel—receive their Ph.D.s in the United States. American universities top the rankings of the best Ph.D. and M.A.-granting institutions. Only 4.5 percent of scholars at U.S. universities received graduate training outside the United States. Americans, in short, export far more Ph.D.s than they import. At the same time, large majorities of respondents in all other countries in our sample received their Ph.D.s outside the United States. More important, the range of epistemological, methodological, and theoretical approaches documented by our survey suggests that scholars outside the United States are not merely consumers of ideas produced by the U.S. IR community.

³⁴ Waever, “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline,” 702-3.

³⁵ See also Smith, “The United States and the Discipline of International Relations,” 70.

Part I – Teaching International Relations

Q1: In the past five years have you taught Introduction to International Relations (or its equivalent)?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Yes	60	63	57	56	59	61	57	57	80	63	52
No	40	37	43	44	41	39	43	43	20	37	48

Q2: In the past five years, have you taught courses in any of the following? Check all that apply.

Course Area	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Area Studies	35	37	35	27	31	32	26	45	35	32	38
Comparative Foreign Policy	10	9	8	13	18	18	3	20	25	16	8
Comparative Politics	35	41	26	23	20	32	26	24	50	26	38
Environmental Politics	8	8	7	7	15	12	3	3	10	5	4
Gender and IR	5	4	5	5	9	3	6	3	15	0	4
Global Development	13	13	11	19	19	18	19	0	20	5	8
History of the IR Discipline	5	4	9	6	6	6	10	3	25	0	8
Human Rights	12	12	11	11	20	24	13	13	20	11	0
International Ethics	6	5	10	6	11	12	0	10	5	11	8
International Health	1	1	<1	1	2	0	0	3	0	0	0
International History	10	8	18	8	16	9	0	23	15	5	8
International Law	12	15	6	7	11	12	6	13	20	16	4
International Organizations	22	23	17	24	20	26	32	15	40	32	13
International Political Economy	26	28	21	30	24	32	19	18	55	5	13
International Security	29	29	28	30	31	38	16	35	30	21	33
IR of a particular region/country	18	16	21	11	34	26	19	23	20	32	21
IR Theory	36	33	40	37	40	44	45	30	70	37	29
Methods	16	17	18	13	9	6	23	23	30	5	0
Philosophy of Science	3	3	7	3	4	3	3	8	10	0	8
Political Analysis	6	5	7	5	9	6	16	10	10	5	4
Political Theory	10	9	13	7	17	6	10	15	30	16	8
Terrorism	13	13	11	7	23	15	10	28	35	11	13
US Foreign Policy	28	36	15	14	17	21	6	25	15	16	4
[Country X] Foreign Policy	15	-	6	19	27	18	10	38	55	53 ³⁶	4
Other	15	15	16	16	10	12	26	10	10	11	25

A large minority of IR scholars around the world teach courses on area studies, comparative politics, and the international relations of a particular region. This trend is strongest in Israel,

³⁶ Includes both “Chinese foreign policy” and “external affairs of Hong Kong”

South Africa, and Singapore; robust in the New Zealand, Hong Kong, United States, Australia, and United Kingdom; and weaker, but still significant, in Ireland and Canada. Adding the categories of area studies and IR of a region to the survey in 2008 (these answers were not available in the 2004 and 2006 TRIP surveys) may explain some of the change from the 2004 and 2006 surveys of U.S. and Canadian scholars. We see a noticeable drop over time in both countries in the teaching of international security (from 39 percent in 2004 in the United States to 29 percent in 2008; from 37 percent in 2006 in Canada to 30 percent in 2008), international political economy (from 35 percent in 2004 in the United States to 28 percent in 2008; from 40 percent in 2006 in Canada to 30 percent in 2008), international organization (from 31 percent in 2004 in the United States to 23 percent in 2008; from 33 percent in 2006 in Canada to 24 percent in 2008), and international relations theory (from 48 percent in 2004 in the United States to 33 percent in 2008; from 52 percent in 2006 in Canada to 37 percent in 2008). IR theory remains strong across all countries, however, and faculty members in all countries save Ireland continue to teach security in large numbers.

Q3: What is/ was the average number of students in your Introduction to IR class at your current institution?³⁷

	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Average	63	120	138	244	218	71	152	221	53	58
Median	35	100	98	213	200	60	120	200	45	40
Std Deviation	75	106	127	211	170	57	111	140	22	66
Min	4	2	10	15	25	12	20	50	30	10
Max	632	650	700	1300	550	200	350	250	100	240

Professors in the United States teach fewer students on average in their introductory classes than do faculty in any other country except Singapore and Hong Kong. This may be partially explained by the large number of “liberal arts” colleges in the United States that specialize in undergraduate education. The average size of an introductory IR class at such schools, which are relatively rare in most of the other countries in this survey, is 33. When we eliminate all respondents from liberal arts colleges, the average number of students per class in the United States rises to 70, so the liberal arts variable does not explain all of the cross-national differences in size of courses.

³⁷For questions like 3, 6 and 7, in which the respondents write in answers, we did not calculate an “all” column. Note also that as this question allowed respondents to write in any number, the low minimums (4 and 2) and the highest maximum (1300) may be input errors. Readers are encouraged to keep this in mind for successive free response questions as well.

Q4: In your Intro IR course, what areas of the world do you study in substantial detail (i.e. you devote one or more classes to discussion of that area)? Check all that apply.

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
East Asia	33	37	25	27	43	50	21	11	23	50	18
FSU/Eastern Europe	28	31	28	24	19	13	36	6	23	17	0
Latin America	16	21	9	17	2	6	7	6	8	0	0
Middle East	36	40	31	33	29	38	21	50	31	33	0
North Africa	6	6	4	8	5	0	14	6	8	0	0
North America	27	23	35	32	34	44	36	28	31	17	18
Oceania	2	1	1	2	17	38	0	0	0	0	0
South Asia	14	15	8	15	19	19	7	17	15	0	18
Southeast Asia	13	12	9	12	34	31	0	6	15	25	27
Sub-Saharan Africa	20	23	14	18	7	19	14	6	62	0	0
Western Europe	40	41	42	39	29	44	79	17	46	25	9
None	42	42	46	43	36	25	43	44	46	42	64

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the closer a region is to the school of the respondent, the more professors teach about it in their IR courses. Thus, 38 percent of professors in New Zealand and 17 percent of their colleagues in Australia teach about Oceania in substantial detail, while scholars elsewhere spare not a day on the subject. Similarly, professors in Oceania and Hong Kong devote more time to East and Southeast Asia than do, for instance, their colleagues in the British Isles. Faculty in the United States and Canada, on the other hand, pay three and four times more attention to Latin America than do scholars in other regions, and IR professors in South Africa focus much more attention on Sub-Saharan Africa than their counterparts in the rest of the world. Overall, scholars tend to research regions in which there are great powers or war initiated by great powers: East Asia, the states of the former-Soviet Union, North America, and Western Europe.

Q5: Is your Intro IR course designed more to introduce students to scholarship in the IR discipline, or more to prepare students to be informed about foreign policy and international issues and debates?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Introduce students to scholarship in the IR discipline	8	6	17	10	3	19	21	17	0	0	0
Both, but primarily introduce students to scholarship in the IR discipline	29	26	38	33	25	25	42	33	46	25	8
Both about equally	27	27	26	28	39	19	21	11	8	33	33
Both, but primarily prepare students to be informed about foreign policy and IR debates	27	31	15	23	25	25	11	22	31	33	50
Prepare students to be informed about foreign policy and IR debates	9	11	5	6	7	13	5	17	15	8	8

In general, schools outside the United States tend to focus more heavily on IR theory and the discipline of IR in their introductory courses, while their counterparts in the States place more emphasis on policy issues in their courses. This is consistent with the pattern observed in question 2, where IR scholars outside the United States were more likely to teach courses purely on IR theory. The big exceptions, however, are Hong Kong and Singapore, where faculty place less emphasis on introducing their students to IR scholarship. At the same time that scholars in New Zealand and South Africa devote more class time to IR scholarship, they also report in higher numbers that they are more interested in preparing students to be informed about policy debates. Fewer, in short, attempt to balance the two goals.

Q6: Approximately what percentage of your Intro IR course is devoted to policy analysis and/or policy-relevant research? The policies analyzed need not be current.

	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Average	33	25	34	32	30	35	38	24	35	43
Median	30	20	25	50	23	30	40	23	32	50
Std Deviation	20	18	23	22	27	24	22	18	13	19
Min	0	0	0	0	5	0	5	0	20	5
Max	100	80	100	90	85	78	90	60	60	70

The United States and most other IR communities devote 30-43 percent of class time to policy issues, although scholars in the United Kingdom and South Africa spend only a quarter of their time on such topics. Interestingly, the introductory courses in the United States and Canada appear

to be growing more policy-relevant. In 2006, on average, 27 percent of U.S. class time and 28 percent of Canadian class time were devoted to policy analysis. These figures jumped to 33 and 34 percent, respectively, in 2008.

Q7: Approximately what percentage of the assigned readings in your Intro to IR course is authored or co-authored by women?

	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Average	21	18	25	23	19	17	13	24	21	16
Median	15	20	20	30	10	18	10	25	15	10
Std Deviation	20	10	20	16	20	10	9	19	18	11
Min	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
Max	100	50	100	80	75	40	30	50	60	40

Readings in introductory IR courses that are authored by women range from 25 percent in Canada to 13 percent in Israel. In almost every country, except for Canada and Hong Kong, the proportion of required reading authored by women is lower than the proportion of female faculty within that country (question 15). Further, countries that have more female IR faculty members do not seem to assign more readings authored by women. Even more surprisingly, countries that have more IR scholars working within a “feminist” paradigm (question 26) also do not assign more work authored by women. Of course, these aggregate numbers could be hiding variation at the individual level, which should be the subject of future research.

Q8: Approximately what percentage of the assigned readings in your Intro to IR course is written by:

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
% US Authors	51	78	45	47	42	58	46	75	29	58	57
% UK Authors	24	10	39	18	27	24	32	14	16	30	26
% [Country X] Authors	-	-	-	22	21	6	5	12	47	4 ³⁸	3
% Authors from other countries	12	12	16	13	12	12	17	9	13	9	17

With the notable exception of the IR community in South Africa, Intro IR classrooms around the world are dominated by U.S. literature, supporting the claim that international relations is an American social science.³⁹ In fact, other than South Africa, every country in our survey uses more literature authored by Americans than by scholars from any other country in the world, including the country in which the survey was implemented. Even U.K. faculty assign 6 percent more U.S. literature than homegrown material.

³⁸ Includes authors from both Hong Kong and China.

³⁹ Many of the foundational texts, which are likely to be taught in an intro IR course, are written by scholars affiliated with American universities, but like Hans Morgenthau, Karl Deutsch, Stanley Hoffman and Arnold Wolfers, many of these scholars were born and educated outside the United States. It is possible, then, that the syllabi for advanced courses in IR theory, which may include more recent IR scholarship, are more diverse.

U.S. scholars demonstrate a stronger bias toward the work of their national colleagues than do faculty in other countries. While other national IR communities assign 29-75 percent of their readings from U.S. literature, American scholars assign almost 80 percent. Israeli professors are the most avid importers of U.S. books and articles in their courses. Some national IR communities display similar, but weaker biases toward their countrymen’s scholarship. South African faculty are the most insular, after the United States, with 47 percent of assigned readings by South African scholars, but 39 percent of the readings on syllabi in the United Kingdom are also indigenous.⁴⁰

Q9: Approximately what percentage of your Intro to IR course do you devote to the study and/ or application of each of the following international relations paradigms? (If you have multiple answers for “other,” only record the most prominent “other” paradigm).⁴¹

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Realism	22	21	18	18	19	18	14	40	23	29	29
Liberalism	19	18	10	15	16	18	16	28	24	32	22
Marxism	9	7	10	11	8	12	7	10	18	10	15
Constructivism	11	10	7	11	10	13	10	13	11	15	15
Feminism	6	5	12	7	7	6	2	4	9	3	7
English School	6	3	17	5	8	4	5	8	3	13	10
Non-paradigmatic	17	17	17	17	25	10	19	18	11	16	7
Other	12	11	11	14	12	10	9	16	11	18	11

Consistent with the conventional wisdom that realism is the reigning paradigm within the study of IR, professors all over the world generally spend more class time on this paradigm than any other. Israeli scholars, in particular, seem devoted to realist approaches in the classroom. (Slightly higher percentages of class time are spent on liberalism than realism in Ireland, South Africa, and Hong Kong.) Indeed, the percentage of class time in Canada devoted to realism grew by 5 percent between 2006 and 2008.⁴² Despite the recent popularity of constructivism within IR research,⁴³ only a small proportion of class time in introductory courses is devoted to this paradigm, scarcely more than that given to generally declining paradigms like Marxism. Moreover, the prevalence of constructivist IR scholarship in countries like New Zealand, Ireland and South Africa (see question 26) does not translate into a larger share of class time.⁴⁴ The lack of liberal scholars in countries such as Australia and New Zealand has no effect on the time teachers devote to liberalism. Predictably, the English School paradigm is more prevalent in U.K. classrooms than anywhere else

⁴⁰ These results should be viewed in light of the fact that respondents had to define for themselves what is meant by a “U.S. author” or “U.K. author” or “[Country X] author.” We cannot be sure whether respondents queue an author’s institutional affiliation, location where Ph.D. was earned, nationality, or country of origin.

⁴¹ To generate these averages, we identified the midpoint of each range and multiplied by the number of respondents; those responses were then averaged across each paradigm in order to compare the overall percent variation across paradigms.

⁴² This percentage remained constant in the United States.

⁴³ Maliniak, Oakes, Peterson, and Tierney, “The View From the Ivory Tower.”

⁴⁴ It is possible that constructivism is being undercounted in non-U.S. cases because more time is spent within the classroom on English School or feminist approaches that may overlap with constructivism. When combined, those approaches account for a higher percentage of class time in all other countries than they do in the United States.

in the world. In all, while American and non-U.S. scholars differ significantly in their personal paradigmatic approaches, these differences do not noticeably influence their teaching practices: the major paradigms receive roughly the same course time regardless of country.

Q10: Please specify “Other” above [question 9].

Answers vary.

Part II – Questions About Your Research Interests

Q11: From what institution did you or will you receive your PhD / DPhil?

United States		
Rank	University	%
1	Columbia University	5
2	Harvard University	4
2	University of California, Berkeley	4
4	MIT	3
5	University of Michigan	3
5	Yale University	3
7	Cornell University	3
8	University of Chicago	3
9	Ohio State University	2
10	University of Wisconsin	2
11	Stanford University	2
12	University of North Carolina	2
12	University of Virginia	2
14	Johns Hopkins University	2
15	University of California, Los Angeles	2
16	University of California, San Diego	2
17	University of Denver	2
18	University of Pittsburgh	2
19	Indiana University	1
19	University of Illinois	1
19	University of Minnesota	1
22	American University	1
22	Duke University	1
22	University of Colorado	1
25	University of Maryland	1

United Kingdom		
Rank	University	%
1	London School of Economics	15
2	Oxford University	8
3	University of Warwick	6
4	Cambridge University	3
4	University of Bradford	3
6	University of Leeds	2
6	University of Melbourne	2
6	University of Swansea	2
9	European University Institute	2
9	University of Florence	2
9	University of Kent	2
9	University of Stellenbosch	2

Ireland		
Rank	University	%
1	Trinity College Dublin	18
2	Many-way tie	7

Israel		
Rank	University	%
1	The Hebrew University of Jerusalem	19
1	Tel Aviv University	19
2	London School of Economics	9
4	Indiana University	6
4	University of Toronto	6

Canada		
Rank	University	%
1	York University	9
2	University of Toronto	7
3	Queen's University	6
4	London School of Economics	5
5	Carleton University	5
6	McGill University	4
7	Cornell University	3
7	Harvard University	3
7	University of British Columbia	3
10	Stanford University	3
10	University of California, Berkeley	3

Australia		
Rank	University	%
1	Australian National University	11
2	University of Melbourne	6
3	Griffith University	5
3	University of Queensland	5
5	London School of Economics	4
5	University of Adelaide	4
7	Flinders University	3
7	Macquarie University	3
7	University of Sydney	3
10	Many-way tie	2

Hong Kong		
Rank	University	%
1	London School of Economics	12
1	Oxford University	12
1	University of Paris	12
4	many-way tie	6

New Zealand		
Rank	University	%
1	Australian National University	11
1	Victoria University of Wellington	11
3	York University	7

Singapore		
Rank	University	%
1	St. Andrews University	9
1	Oxford University	9
3	many-way tie	4

South Africa		
Rank	University	%
1	Stellenbosch University	23
2	Many-way tie	8

With the exception of Hong Kong and Singapore, each of the other non-U.S. countries in the 2008 survey has at least one national university as their largest source of graduate degrees. That large numbers of Ph.D.s in these countries are produced domestically likely explains much of the diversity in national perspectives we find throughout the survey. Although the United States is the largest exporter of Ph.D.s around the world, most Ph.D.s produced by American universities are for domestic consumption.

The lists of top degree-granting U.S. and Canadian schools have remained relatively constant across recent surveys: Columbia and Harvard produced the most Ph.D.s among American academics in both the 2004 and 2006, and York University and the University of Toronto also topped the list of Ph.D.-granting institutions in the 2006 survey. At the same time, both lists show some movement. The University of Virginia dropped from sixth place in 2004 and 2006 to twelfth in 2008. The Universities of North Carolina, Denver, and Maryland entered the top 25 for the first time in 2008. In Canada, similarly, Queens University jumped from eleventh to third place, and the London School of Economics jumped from eighth to fourth between 2006 and 2008. Overall, there is greater dispersion in 2008 than in 2004 or 2006 in the schools from which respondents received their Ph.D.s

Q12: What year did you receive or do you expect to receive your PhD / DPhil?

	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Average	1993	1996	1995	1997	1995	2000	1994	2000	1995	1999
Median	1996	1999	1998	1999	2000	2004	1997	2002	1996	2003
Std Deviation	12	8	11	10	11	9	10	9	9	9
Min	1957	1960	1953	1970	1968	1973	1967	1985	1979	1967
Max	2013	2010	2013	2009	2007	2009	2008	2010	2009	2007

Proportionately, Ireland and South Africa have the most newly-minted Ph.D.s. Academics in the United States are the oldest. This pattern is consistent with actual measurements of age (question 14), where U.S. scholars are older and also is consistent with more professors in the United States with rank of “full” (question 18).

Q13: From what institution did you receive your undergraduate degree?

United States		
Rank	Institution	%
1	Harvard University	3
2	Stanford University	2
3	Georgetown University	2
4	University of Chicago	2
5	University of Michigan	2
6	Cornell University	1
7	Princeton University	1
8	Columbia University	1
9	Oberlin College	1
10	Ohio State University	1
10	University of California, LA	1
12	University of North Carolina	1
13	Brigham Young University	1
13	Brown University	1
13	College of William and Mary	1
13	University of Wisconsin, Madison	1
17	Marquette University	1
17	Northwestern University	1
17	University of California, Santa Barbara	1
17	University of Pennsylvania	1
17	Williams College	1
22	Dartmouth College	1
22	Hebrew University	1
22	Michigan State University	1
22	University of Minnesota	1
22	University of Missouri	1

United Kingdom		
Rank	Institution	%
1	Oxford University	5
2	Cambridge University	5
3	London School of Economics	4
4	University of Wales, Aberystwyth	3
5	University of East Anglia	2
6	University of Birmingham	2
6	University of Essex	2
6	University of Leeds	2
9	Bristol University	2
9	University of London	2

Ireland		
Rank	University	%
1	University College, Dublin	18
3	National University of Ireland, Galway	11
2	Trinity College Dublin	7
2	University of Limerick	7
5	Many-way tie	4

Israel		
Rank	University	%
1	The Hebrew University of Jerusalem	52
2	Tel Aviv University	21
3	Bar Ilan University	6
4	Many-way tie	3

Canada		
Rank	University	%
1	University of Toronto	9
2	University of British Columbia	7
3	Carleton University	5
3	McGill University	5
5	University of Manitoba	4
6	University of Victoria	3
7	Université de Montréal	3
7	University of Western Ontario	3
9	Many-way tie	2

Australia		
Rank	University	%
1	Monash University	10
2	Griffith University	6
3	University of Adelaide	5
3	University of New South Wales	5
5	Flinders University	4
5	University of Melbourne	4
5	University of Queensland	4
5	University of Western Australia	4
9	Many-way tie	2

Hong Kong		
Rank	University	%
1	Chinese University of Hong Kong	13
1	University of Hong Kong	13
3	Many-way tie	6

New Zealand		
Rank	University	%
1	Victoria University of Wellington	14
2	Auckland University	7
2	Monash University	7
2	Purdue University	7
2	University of Lancaster	7
6	Many-way tie	4

Singapore		
Rank	University	%
1	National University of Singapore	17
2	Foreign Affairs University	9
3	Many-way tie	4

Even more respondents earn their undergraduate degrees than complete their Ph.D.s (question 11) at home; at least, more go on to work in the country where they received their bachelor’s degree. Only one non-American institution appears on U.S. list, for example. At the same time, most IR faculty begin their academic careers as undergraduates at major research institutions, with only five primarily undergraduate institutions among the top 25 schools. Finally, like the responses in question 11, the lists of schools where IR scholars did their undergraduate training have remained relatively stable since the last TRIP survey, although one liberal arts college—Oberlin—entered the top ten list in 2008.

Q14: What is your age?

	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Average	47	42	46	46	47	39	51	42	47	42
Median	46	41	43	44	42	36	51	41	45	40
Std Deviation	12	9	11	11	13	10	9	11	10	9
Min	23	20	28	30	31	27	36	28	35	30
Max	84	71	83	72	71	64	74	61	65	66

The average age of IR scholars varies little across countries. At the extremes (very young and very old), the U.S. system may be more accommodating than other countries. This outcome may result from a more flexible labor market in the United States that allows faculty members to keep teaching into their eighties, while mandatory retirement regulations compress the age distribution among faculty in the rest of the world. While average ages are similar across countries, in question 18 we see fewer instructional faculty members at higher ranks outside the United States. Most faculty in these systems never make it to Full Professor, whereas in the United States, scholars who are productive and stick around long enough are generally promoted to Full Professor. As suggested above, Irish IR scholars are on average the most recent graduates and the youngest contingent of the countries we surveyed.

Q15: Are you female or male?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Male	73	72	73	75	75	74	60	79	53	83	83
Female	27	28	27	25	25	26	40	21	47	17	17

Q16: What is your country of origin?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
US	54	80	11	11	5	22	10	24	0	25	24
UK	12	2	55	5	18	26	20	3	0	6	5
Canada	8	2	5	64	3	0	3	3	0	6	0
[Country X]	7	-	-	-	48	22	50	65	87	50 ⁴⁵	33
Other	19	16	29	20	25	30	17	6	13	13	38

By this measure, U.S. universities are the least international of all those surveyed. In U.S. institutions 80 percent of IR scholars originally come from the United States. In Australian and Irish universities, by contrast, about half the IR faculty are natives; and in New Zealand only 22 percent of faculty are kiwis. In fact, New Zealand institutions hire roughly equal numbers of Americans, British, New Zealanders, and scholars from “other” countries.

The United States imports the fewest IR scholars, but it exports more faculty than any other country.⁴⁶ These results are similar to those found in question 13 where we look not at country of origin, but at the country where the scholar received graduate training.

Q17: Which of the following best describes your political ideology?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Very Left/ liberal⁴⁷	17	19	9	28	7	8	16	6	0	0	5
Left/ liberal	36	36	40	34	33	27	36	32	27	11	23
Slightly Left/liberal	21	20	27	16	32	23	20	39	27	44	18
Middle of the Road	16	15	16	13	17	31	20	16	47	22	41
Slightly Right/ conservative	6	6	7	6	8	8	0	6	0	17	9
Right/ conservative	3	3	1	3	3	4	4	0	0	6	5
Very Right/ conservative	1	1	<1	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0

In every country surveyed, except Singapore, majorities of IR scholars self-identify as left-leaning. We ought to be cautious making comparisons across different IR communities on this variable, since IR scholars likely evaluated their political beliefs relative to the standards and populations of their own countries. Nevertheless, it is clear that large majorities (72-78 percent) of Canadian, Australian, and British academics perceive themselves as left, with Canadians describing themselves as the most left.

Q18: What is your current status within your home department?

⁴⁵ This includes both Chinese and Hong Kong scholars.

⁴⁶ According to surveys in all 10 countries, 12 percent of scholars in other countries are American, while 10 percent of scholars at universities outside the United Kingdom are from Britain.

⁴⁷ In the U.S. and Canada surveys we used “liberal” and “conservative.” In all other surveys we used “left” and “right.”

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Full Professor/Professor⁴⁸	29	32	26	27	13	11	10	8	13	47	20
Assoc. Professor/Reader⁴⁹	21	25	8	28	11	11	7	15	27	18	15
Assistant Professor/Sr. Lecturer	29	30	27	28	39	30	13	27	20	0	15
Instructor/Lecturer⁵⁰	12	4	32	7	26	41	53	27	33	6	5
Assoc. Lecturer	0	0	0	0	7	0	10	0	0	0	0
Visiting Instructor/Visiting Professor	2	3	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0
Adjunct Professor/Instructor	3	4	0	2	0	0	0	15	0	0	0
Post-Doctoral Fellow	1	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Emeritus	2	2	1	2	2	0	3	4	7	0	0
Other	3	2	2	1	2	7	3	0	0	29	45

The results in question 18 confirm our hypothesis above (question 14) that the United States permits much greater progression to the “top” of the academic food chain. But the United States is not the outlier; half of the respondents in the Hong Kong survey report that they hold the rank of full professor. It is worth noting in this context that over half of all respondents in the Hong Kong survey received their Ph.Ds. in the United States (see table 2 in the introduction), so it is not surprising that their academic hierarchy would be relatively top-heavy, like the American academy.

Q19: If you were looking actively, how easy or difficult would it be for you to find an acceptable academic position in IR?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Very Easy	5	4	6	7	4	0	0	6	0	11	0
Easy	11	10	11	10	18	11	14	18	0	17	9
Neither Easy nor Difficult	28	26	36	26	31	21	14	24	40	28	39
Difficult	27	27	27	25	26	36	38	24	53	22	17
Very Difficult	14	16	8	15	12	14	17	12	0	6	17
Don't Know	16	17	12	17	9	18	17	18	7	17	17

IR scholars in all countries believe movement from one academic position to another is difficult: overall, 41 percent say it would be difficult or very difficult to find a new position, while only 16 percent predict it would be easy or very easy. One might expect that, in larger countries with more

⁴⁸ This includes the categories “Chair” and “Professor” from the Ireland survey. It also includes the category “Professor (Min ha-Minyan)” from the Israel survey.

⁴⁹ This includes the category “Professor (Chaver)” from the Israel survey.

⁵⁰ This includes the category “Junior Lecturer” from the Israel survey.

academic positions, it would be easier for individual scholars to move. U.S. scholars, however, do not feel more mobile than their colleagues in countries with fewer universities. Scholars in Hong Kong and Australia are the most optimistic about the ability to find an acceptable alternative to their current position.

Q20: Other than your native language, how many foreign languages do you understand well enough to conduct scholarly research?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
None	27	27	30	20	36	43	40	0	20	6	22
One	40	41	33	47	38	36	20	65	40	50	57
Two	10	23	25	21	18	4	33	24	27	33	22
Three or More	23	9	12	13	8	18	7	12	13	11	0

While U.S. scholars appeared less “international” in terms of their country of origin (question 16), they appear to be at least as capable of conducting research in foreign languages as their counterparts in many IR communities. Seventy-three percent of U.S. scholars speak one or more foreign languages. Israel (100 percent), Hong Kong (94 percent), Canada (81 percent), South Africa (80 percent), and Singapore (79 percent) all boast higher percentages. U.S. scholars with two or more languages are also in the middle of the pack (at 32 percent). Singapore (22 percent), New Zealand (22 percent), and Australia (26 percent) trail the United States on this measure. These results do not completely fit the conventional wisdom of parochial U.S. scholars who know less about the rest of the world and/or lack the tools for field research outside the confines of the English-speaking world. This may be because many U.S. degree programs at the graduate and, especially, the undergraduate level require foreign language competency. The number of political science departments within the United States requiring language competency has declined in recent years, however, so the number of U.S. IR scholars able to conduct research in foreign languages may fall in the future.

Q21: What is your primary subfield within politics or political science?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Comparative Politics/Area Studies	24	25	24	19	15	11	28	16	21	22	36
Development Studies	2	2	2	6	3	7	3	0	0	0	0
International Relations	60	63	49	64	56	68	48	50	50	44	41
Methods	<1	<1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Political Philosophy/Political Theory	3	2	6	4	6	4	7	3	14	11	5
Public Policy/Public Administration⁵¹	<1	-	-	-	3	4	-	0	0	0	0
[Country X] Politics	2	2	2	2	2	0	3	3	0	22	0
Other	6	5	15	6	14	7	10	27	14	0	18

Q22: What is your secondary subfield within politics or political science?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Comparative Politics/Area Studies	35	39	24	35	30	44	22	28	29	17	14
Development Studies	6	5	8	4	8	12	15	0	7	0	0
International Relations	21	22	19	20	18	12	7	28	29	44	57
Methods	6	8	5	5	1	0	4	7	0	6	0
Political Philosophy/Political Theory	9	7	13	9	12	20	15	3	7	0	14
Public Policy/Public Administration	<1	-	-	-	6	0	-	3	0	-	0
[Country X] Politics	6	6	4	8	5	4	0	14	14	11	5
Other	12	9	19	14	13	8	26	10	7	22	10
None	6	5	8	6	6	0	11	7	7	0	0

In both primary and secondary subfields the United States appears a bit heavier on methods than the rest of the world, which is more focused on political philosophy. This fits Cohen's views on the differences between "American" and "British" schools of international political economy.⁵²

⁵¹ Because of a survey error in this and the following question "Public Policy/ Public Administration" was not a choice on the U.S., U.K., Canada, or Ireland surveys.

⁵²Cohen, *International Political Economy*.

Q23: Which of the following best describes your primary field of study?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Area Studies	12	13	11	13	7	8	3	13	0	0	30
Foreign Relations	6	6	6	5	2	8	0	6	0	22	0
Global Studies	6	4	9	18	8	16	3	3	8	6	5
International Affairs	5	5	5	5	8	4	3	13	8	6	0
International Relations	35	38	29	29	41	40	47	29	50	28	15
International Studies	7	6	8	9	7	12	10	10	0	0	5
Political Science	15	16	10	11	11	4	20	10	17	22	25
Politics	3	2	8	2	9	0	10	3	8	0	10
Other	10	10	13	8	9	8	3	13	8	17	10

While the term “international relations” is contested among scholars who study things international, it is also, by far, the preferred term among scholars who teach and do research on these issues.⁵³ At the margin, scholars outside the United States are less likely to conceive their primary field of study as “political science” and more likely to answer “politics,” “global studies,” or “international studies” than their U.S. counterparts.

Q24: Much recent IR scholarship adopts either a "rationalist" or a "constructivist" approach to IR. Which of the following most closely characterizes your work?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Rationalist	22	27	12	13	7	33	38	27	13	6	4
Constructivist	20	18	26	27	22	15	21	21	40	11	22
Both Rationalist and Constructivist	29	31	24	31	30	30	14	27	27	61	17
Neither Rationalist nor Constructivist	22	18	31	22	35	19	24	15	20	6	43
Don't Know	7	7	7	6	5	4	3	9	0	17	13

⁵³ It should be noted, however, that the repeated use in the survey of the term “international relations” could have biased the results.

Q25: If you characterize your work as both rationalist and constructivist, is your work:

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Mostly rationalist but somewhat constructivist	41	42	37	40	37	0	0	46	50	45	50
Evenly split between rationalist and constructivist	29	29	30	23	19	25	33	31	0	18	50
Mostly constructivist but somewhat rationalist	28	26	29	35	30	50	67	8	50	27	0
Don't know	5	4	3	2	15	25	0	15	0	9	0

Overall, IR scholars in our survey are divided fairly evenly along the constructivist (20 percent) and rationalist (22 percent) dimension. For those scholars who answered “both” in question 24, the slight advantage for rationalism becomes a slight advantage for constructivism. As on many other dimensions reported below, these answers do not suggest a monolithic approach within the field.

Despite the conventional wisdom that the U.S. academy is populated almost exclusively by “rationalist” approaches while non-U.S. communities are more open to constructivist work, we observe a surprisingly large proportion (18 percent) of U.S. constructivists (question 24). We also observe a synthetic/ compositional identity on the part of U.S. scholars who answer “both” more than any other option in question 24 and who do so more often than scholars in any other country save Canada (also 31 percent). At the same time, American scholars still trail many of their colleagues in terms of their commitment to constructivism. Only in New Zealand and Hong Kong do fewer scholars describe their work as constructivist. IR scholars in some countries find the “rationalist” and “constructivist” labels less useful for characterizing their own work. In the United Kingdom, Australia, and Singapore, for example, the most common answer is “neither.”

Q26: Which of the following best describes your approach to the study of IR? If you do not think of your work as falling within one of these paradigms, please select the category in which most other scholars would place your work.

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Realism	18	21	8	16	16	22	14	34	13	22	17
Liberalism	17	20	9	15	8	7	21	9	7	22	13
Marxism	5	3	11	8	6	7	7	0	0	0	0
Constructivism	17	17	14	23	18	26	21	16	40	17	22
Feminism	2	2	3	2	4	7	4	0	7	0	0
English School	4	2	9	7	6	4	0	9	7	11	4
Other	12	10	17	15	18	15	4	9	7	6	17
I do not use paradigmatic analysis	25	26	30	16	26	11	29	22	20	22	26

The take home message on paradigms in the discipline is that the most prominent answer overall and in most individual countries is “I do not use paradigmatic analysis.” This result holds even though we increased from 2006 the number of paradigms listed beyond the “big four,” we provided an “other” category, and we asked where “other scholars would place your work.” All these features of the question and the options ought to encourage the selection of at least one of the six paradigms listed. This makes the “no paradigm” answer much more powerful and provocative.

As important, the percentage of scholars using non-paradigmatic analyses may be increasing. We did not include this option in our previous surveys, but 20 and 21 percent of respondents in the 2004 and 2006 U.S. surveys, respectively, selected “other.” Presumably, these respondents included those in both our current categories “other” and non-paradigmatic, yet the 2004 and 2006 figures are lower than the 26 percent of Americans in 2008 who said they do not use paradigmatic analysis and considerably lower than the 36 percent who in 2008 selected either “other” or non-paradigmatic analysis. At the same time, we see a modest drop in the major paradigms in the United States and Canada. In 2004 and 2006, 25 percent of U.S. respondents characterized their work as realist, while only 21 percent did in 2008. Thirty-three percent and 31 percent of US faculty reported in 2004 and 2006, respectively, that their work was liberal, compared to only 20 percent in 2008. Similarly, 22 percent of Canadian scholars described their work as liberal in 2006, but only 15 percent did in 2008. Still, the overwhelming majority of textbooks in IR organize the field around paradigms.

While conventional wisdom suggests that the United States is the last bastion of realist theory, the survey results reflect an academic community that has healthy populations of realists outside the United States. The United Kingdom has the lowest proportion of realists at 8 percent.⁵⁴ Both realism and liberalism are more prominent in the United States than in most other countries (except Israel and Hong Kong). While previous surveys observed an upward trend within the United States for the constructivist paradigm (15 percent in 2004 and 19 percent in 2006), we see no additional rise in 2008 (17 percent). In six other countries, however, constructivism is the most frequent answer. Outside South Africa, Hong Kong, and Singapore, where no respondents identify as Marxist, the proportion of self-described Marxists is about twice as prominent outside the United States as within. Still, Marxists remain a small minority in every country and never surpass 11 percent (United Kingdom).

⁵⁴ Interestingly, in Part V of the UK survey that was overseen by Mick Cox and Jeff Chweiroth they asked, “Do you agree or disagree with John Mearsheimer’s claim that there are no ‘realists’ in the UK IR profession?” Fifty-six percent of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed, while only 24 percent agreed or strongly agreed.

Q27: What is your main area of research within IR?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
[Country X] Foreign Policy	2	-	2	7	4	11	3	12	0	47	0
Comparative Foreign Policy	4	4	2	4	5	4	0	12	7	0	10
Development Studies	4	5	2	5	7	7	3	0	0	0	0
Global Civil Society	2	2	1	3	4	4	0	0	0	0	0
History of the International Relations Discipline	<1	<1	1	1	0	4	3	3	0	0	0
Human Rights	4	4	2	2	4	4	0	6	0	6	0
International Environment	2	2	3	4	5	0	0	0	0	6	0
International Ethics	2	1	3	4	3	0	3	3	0	6	0
International Health	<1	<1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
International Law	3	3	2	1	1	4	3	3	7	0	0
International Organization(s)	6	6	4	6	3	7	10	0	0	0	5
International Political Economy	14	14	14	19	6	7	20	0	33	0	10
International Relations of a Particular Region/ Country	7	6	9	8	15	4	3	18	7	12	24
International Relations Theory	7	6	9	4	7	15	3	12	20	12	10
International Security	20	22	18	17	14	11	17	12	20	6	14
Philosophy of Science	<1	<1	<1	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0
US Foreign Policy	6	7	5	3	5	4	0	3	0	0	0
Other	7	7	8	6	9	7	7	6	0	6	14
I am not an IR scholar	11	11	15	9	5	4	23	12	7	0	14

Q28: What are your secondary areas of research within IR? Check all that apply.

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
[Country X] Foreign Policy	4	-	5	20	15	19	7	11	47	12	5
Comparative Foreign Policy	11	11	9	16	13	12	0	11	27	24	14
Development Studies	11	12	10	12	11	19	7	4	33	6	0
Global Civil Society	7	7	7	9	9	4	0	7	20	0	5
History of the International Relations Discipline	3	3	3	4	4	8	4	4	20	0	0
Human Rights	8	9	7	9	8	12	7	4	20	0	0
International Environment	5	5	4	5	8	4	0	0	0	6	5
International Ethics	5	4	7	4	8	8	4	4	0	18	5
International Health	1	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
International Law	8	8	7	7	8	8	4	4	0	6	0
International Organization(s)	16	17	8	23	11	19	21	4	27	0	14
International Political Economy	13	14	8	12	14	23	4	19	13	18	0
International Relations of a Particular Region/Country	15	15	18	15	20	15	14	15	20	12	9
International Relations Theory	18	17	20	24	19	23	14	15	20	12	23
International Security	18	18	14	21	24	27	4	37	27	24	45
Philosophy of Science	2	2	3	2	2	0	4	4	0	0	5
US Foreign Policy	16	21	6	11	8	8	4	15	13	6	5
Other	9	8	11	8	13	12	4	4	0	0	5
I am not an IR scholar	11	10	15	8	6	4	21	7	0	6	9

Overall, the sub-field of international security is the most prominent specialty (20 percent) among IR scholars in our 10 countries. International political economy runs a distant second (14 percent).

U.S. scholars are significantly more insular by this measure than faculty in most other national communities. Twenty-eight percent of U.S. respondents reported that their primary or secondary area of research is U.S. foreign policy. In contrast, only 5 percent of those surveyed in Singapore, 10 percent in Ireland, and 7 percent in the United Kingdom make their own country's foreign policy their primary or secondary research focus. Indeed, a higher percentage of British scholars study American foreign policy than U.K. foreign policy.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Of course, insularity is not the only obvious explanation for this focus on U.S. foreign policy. Since the United States has been the most powerful country in the world over the past 70 years, it makes sense that IR scholars spend

Like American academics, IR scholars in Canada, New Zealand, and Singapore have relatively parochial research interests. Twenty-seven percent of Canadian and 30 percent of New Zealand scholars indicated that their research examines their country's foreign policy. The most inward looking scholars are found in Hong Kong, where nearly half said that their primary area of interest is Hong Kong or Chinese foreign policy, and South Africa, where the same percentage reported that their secondary area of research was South African foreign policy. A high percentage (73 percent) of respondents in South Africa also said that their main regional focus is Sub-Saharan Africa (see question 28 below).

Q29: In your research, what is the main region of the world you study, if any?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
East Asia (including China)	10	10	7	7	18	22	0	6	0	78	30
Former Soviet Union/Eastern Europe, including Central Asian states, except for Afghanistan	7	7	10	5	5	0	17	6	0	6	0
Latin America (including Mexico and the Caribbean)	8	10	4	6	0	4	3	3	0	6	0
Middle East	8	9	8	6	3	7	7	36	7	0	0
North Africa	1	1	<1	<1	1	0	0	3	0	0	0
North America (not including Mexico)	6	5	8	19	7	0	0	6	0	6	0
Oceania	1	<1	<1	0	11	11	0	0	0	0	0
South Asia (including Afghanistan)	2	2	2	2	4	0	0	9	0	0	9
Southeast Asia	3	2	1	1	13	4	0	0	0	0	22
Sub-Saharan Africa	6	6	7	5	0	11	3	0	73	0	4
Western Europe	11	12	7	11	7	4	43	6	0	0	9
Transnational Actors/International Organizations/International Non-Governmental Organizations	11	9	15	16	15	11	7	6	0	6	9
Global/Use cross-regional data	17	19	17	13	13	15	17	12	20	0	13
None	9	9	14	7	2	11	3	0	0	0	4

time describing, explaining, and critiquing American foreign policy.

Q30: In your research, what other areas of the world do you study, if any? Check all that apply.

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
East Asia (including China)	17	18	14	13	29	35	3	16	33	6	36
Former Soviet Union/Eastern Europe, including Central Asian states, except for Afghanistan	13	15	11	9	13	19	7	13	13	33	9
Latin America (including Mexico and the Caribbean)	10	12	7	10	8	15	3	23	33	11	5
Middle East	15	18	12	9	13	15	3	35	0	6	18
North Africa	6	7	5	2	8	12	3	3	0	0	5
North America (not including Mexico)	17	16	18	26	26	35	20	13	13	22	27
Oceania	3	2	3	1	22	35	0	0	0	0	14
South Asia (including Afghanistan)	9	10	7	7	14	27	3	0	13	6	14
Southeast Asia	10	9	9	6	29	23	3	6	20	17	32
Sub-Saharan Africa	11	11	10	9	11	19	10	10	27	0	5
Western Europe	26	24	41	25	25	27	23	23	20	33	5
Transnational Actors/International Organizations/International Non-Governmental Organizations	23	25	22	26	25	23	30	10	40	22	0
Global/Use cross-regional data	20	23	12	19	22	19	17	3	40	22	5
None	11	13	11	13	5	4	13	23	0	6	5

IR scholars tend to investigate their neighbors. As question 29 shows, American academics (10 percent) are more likely than scholars from other countries to study Latin America, while Irish IR experts (an astonishing 43 percent) focus on Western Europe. Thirty percent of scholars in Singapore, 18 percent in Australia, and 22 percent in New Zealand research East Asia. Academics from these same countries are also more likely to conduct research on Southeast Asia.

Although they might stick close to home when conducting most of their research, large percentages of IR scholars in each country reported that they study other regions as well. Indeed, very few respondents in either question report studying no other countries aside from their own. Similarly, if we combine the results from questions 29 and 30, a third (or more) of scholars in each country included in the TRIP survey, except Israel and Singapore, use cross-regional or global

data. There also is significant interest in transnational actors, IOs, and NGOs. Again, well over a third of respondents in each country except Israel and Singapore research these actors.

Q31: In general, how would you characterize your work in epistemological terms?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Non-Positivist	23	18	37	31	33	26	21	4	33	18	20
Positivist	55	65	33	43	30	41	61	79	27	71	60
Post-Positivist	21	17	31	26	37	33	18	18	40	12	20

American IR scholars are more likely than academics from other countries, with the exception of Israel and Singapore, to describe their work as positivist, although Ireland and Singapore are close behind the United States. A majority of academics from the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa reported that their research was either non-positivist or post-positivist, while only 35% of U.S. respondents said their research could be categorized as such. Here, therefore, the conventional wisdom is upheld: there is evidence of a substantial epistemological divide among IR scholars; the deepest cleft being between the American academy and IR scholars in the United Kingdom, Australia, and South Africa.

Q32: In your research, what method do you primarily employ?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Quantitative Analysis	17	23	7	7	3	8	31	24	0	11	0
Qualitative Analysis	72	68	77	85	78	81	52	68	67	72	87
Experimental	<1	<1	0	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0
Counterfactual Analysis	1	1	1	2	5	0	3	3	0	0	0
Pure Theory	3	2	8	2	5	4	7	0	33	0	9
Formal Modeling	1	2	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0
Legal or Ethical Analysis	5	4	7	5	8	8	3	3	0	17	4

Q33: In your research, what other methods do you employ, not including your primary method? Check all that apply.

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Quantitative Analysis	33	32	21	34	18	48	19	17	20	6	32
Qualitative Analysis	26	27	15	12	20	12	26	30	33	17	18
Formal Modeling	13	13	8	9	4	0	15	9	7	6	18
Experimental	8	8	6	4	8	0	4	17	7	6	27
Counterfactual Analysis	20	20	13	19	19	24	7	4	7	22	9
Pure Theory	19	15	21	20	30	16	37	30	20	22	5
Legal or Ethical Analysis	22	18	22	30	25	20	15	22	20	17	5
None	18	14	23	17	15	4	15	30	13	22	9

The field of IR is still dominated by scholars who employ qualitative analysis.⁵⁶ Nearly all respondents in all countries indicate that they use qualitative methods in their research (questions 32 and 33 combined). And, while nearly a quarter of U.S. scholars specialize in quantitative methods, larger percentages of academics in Ireland (31 percent) and Israel (24 percent) rely primarily on statistical approaches. In fact, the four countries with the highest number of respondents who use quantitative methods—Israel, Hong Kong, United States, and Ireland—are the same four countries who report having the highest number of positivists (question 31). The frequent use of quantitative methods in Ireland also may be explained by the high percentage of respondents in that country whose subfield is IPE, and/ or it may be capturing quantitative comparativists who study European integration and political behavior within EU institutions.

We also find that few scholars use only one method. For example, only 14 percent of U.S. academics report that they use no other approach in addition to their primary method. This suggests that IR scholars mix methods or at least are inclined to use more than one approach in their work.

⁵⁶ As we argued in the introductory section, the fact that many scholars tend to use a particular method does not mean that method will be the most prominent in published research. Scholars who use qualitative methods may be less research active, or they may be publishing in books or journals that are not covered by the TRIP journal article database. As we have shown in previous research, quantitative and formal methods appear in top journals more frequently than survey results would suggest.

Q34: If you employ qualitative methods, which of the following do you use? Check all that apply.

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Comparative Case Studies	89	87	71	80	77	87	85	87	87	81	71
Discourse Analysis	34	26	40	35	47	52	42	29	47	50	43
Ethnography	15	14	20	14	17	13	4	3	20	13	14
Process Tracing	41	43	26	34	26	22	35	35	7	31	48
Thick Description	37	32	42	37	37	39	35	35	40	50	19
Other	7	7	7	6	7	0	4	0	0	13	10

While the IR discipline in all countries in the sample is dominated by qualitative methods, there is a divide between the United States and the other national communities in the use of methods associated with what Ole Wæver calls “reflectivism” and Steve Smiths terms “constitutive theories”—for example, critical theory, postmodernism, feminist theory, postcolonial theory, normative theory, peace studies, and historical sociology. Relatively few American scholars use discourse analysis, while this approach is frequently employed outside the United States.

Q35: Does your research tend to be basic or applied? By basic research, we mean research for the sake of knowledge, without any particular immediate policy application in mind. Conversely, applied research is done with specific policy applications in mind.

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Primarily basic	21	20	29	16	23	19	30	19	13	6	13
Both basic and applied, but more basic than applied	35	33	37	42	33	48	33	44	33	56	43
Both equally	15	15	14	14	16	11	20	6	20	17	9
Both basic and applied but more applied than basic	19	22	13	17	20	15	7	16	27	6	22
Primarily applied	10	11	7	12	7	7	10	16	7	17	13

Here we see approximately the same mix of attitudes towards the purpose of research across all the countries in the sample—IR research tends to be more basic than applied. There is a somewhat greater emphasis in the United States on producing research that has a specific policy application. Thirty-three percent of U.S. scholars say that their work is intended to be partly or entirely a guide to policymakers. In only three other countries—Israel, Singapore, and South Africa—is the share of scholars committed to applied research so high. Stanley Hoffman hypothesizes that the interest in producing policy-relevant work in the United States may be because nowhere else in the world is there as strong a link between the “kitchens of power” and “academic salons,” largely because American universities operate in a mass education market and are encouraged to “innovate and specialize in their research activities . . . [and] are able to respond to the demands of the government in a way that was impossible in the European university sector.”⁵⁷

⁵⁷Steve Smith, “The Discipline of International Relations: Still an American Social Science?” Paper presented at the annual conference of the Australian Political Science Association, Canberra, 5 October 2000, 15.

Part III – The IR Discipline

Q36: What percentage of IR literature do you estimate is devoted to each of these paradigms today?⁵⁸

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Realism	30	28	29	29	32	31	20	31	41	36	31
Liberalism	28	26	26	26	29	28	32	22	38	27	27
Marxism	6	3	12	6	9	6	5	7	16	9	8
Constructivism	21	17	7	21	28	24	21	22	40	20	21
Feminism	7	4	7	7	8	7	7	6	25	5	5
English School	7	4	25	6	10	9	5	7	22	7	7
Non-Paradigmatic	12	11	9	10	10	10	13	10	6	9	8
Other	11	11	7	10	7	3	5	5	11	4	15

Scholars in every country other than Ireland believe that realism is the most prominent paradigm in the IR literature -- even though less than 20 percent of scholars self-identify as realists (question 26).⁵⁹ Similarly, despite the relative dearth of liberals worldwide, scholars around the world believe that liberalism is scarcely less prominent than realism. In fact, while most scholars employ a non-paradigmatic approach in their own work (question 26), they perceive the literature as overwhelmingly paradigmatic: the troika of realism, liberalism and constructivism is consistently estimated to constitute almost 80 percent of published research.

Scholars in different countries appear to read different literatures, which might lead us to question whether there is such thing as a single IR literature. Whereas the English School constitutes barely 5 percent of an American or Irish diet, for instance, it is a staple for the British IR community (25 percent). Constructivism exhibits similar variation. Cross-national differences in the prominence of certain journals reflects these national differences: the *Review of International Studies*, which publishes the most English School research, is twice as prominent in the United Kingdom as in almost any other country; similarly, nearly a quarter of British academics rate *Millennium*, which tends to publish critical approaches to IR, as very influential, while only 3 percent of American scholars do.

⁵⁸ Columns add to more than 100 percent because respondents were asked to estimate a percentage for each paradigm. Some respondents' answers added to more than 100 percent: The United States (104 percent), Israel (109 percent) and Ireland (108 percent) were closer to 100 percent, while scholars in the United Kingdom (122 percent), Australia (133 percent), and South Africa (199 percent) overestimated by larger amounts. The ranking of paradigms is likely the most relevant feature of this table, rather than the absolute amounts estimated.

⁵⁹ In a recent paper that systematically measures the proportion of the literature that employs realist theory over the past 25 years, Maliniak et al (2007) find that realism actually constitutes only about 10 percent of the articles in the top 12 journals.

Q38: Recently, much IR scholarship has been categorized as either rationalist or "constructivist." How should IR scholars conceive of the explanations developed within these broader categories?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
As alternative approaches to be tested against each other	16	15	20	19	22	16	24	7	8	7	21
As complementary explanations that should remain distinct and that explain different features of IR	44	42	46	49	46	42	44	64	15	50	43
As two important paradigms that could be usefully synthesized to create a more complete theory of IR	40	43	34	32	32	42	32	29	77	43	36

Overwhelming majorities in every country believe that constructivist and rationalist explanations are either complementary approaches or paradigms that can be usefully synthesized. At most, less than a quarter of respondents believe these are alternative approaches to be tested against each other. South Africans, by far, are the most optimistic about synthesis, although American, Hong Kong, and New Zealand scholars also give strong support for synthetic research. The American academy, in particular, may be warming to synthetic approaches: in 2004 only 37 percent of U.S. respondents believed that rationalist and constructivist approaches could be usefully synthesized, compared to 43 percent in 2008; likewise, where 20 percent said they were competing approaches in 2004, only 15 percent thought so in 2008.

Q39: List four scholars whose work has had the greatest influence on the field of IR in the past 20 years.

Overall Rank	Scholar	All %	US %	UK %	Can %	Aus %	NZ %	Ire %	Isr %	HK %	SA %	Sin %
1	Robert Keohane	47	49	43	55	30	50	48	38	27	44	50
2	Alexander Wendt	45	41	60	51	40	50	43	38	36	44	50
3	Kenneth Waltz	34	33	45	24	36	33	35	31	45	44	31
4	John Mearsheimer	19	21	16	10	18	17	9	31	18	0	6
5	James Fearon	13	17	5	6	3	0	13	8	0	0	0
6	Joseph Nye	13	13	10	12	13	17	4	15	36	11	25
7	Robert Jervis	11	14	4	4	4	0	0	15	9	0	13
8	Samuel Huntington	10	10	10	12	16	0	0	8	0	11	0
9	Peter Katzenstein	9	10	4	12	12	11	4	15	0	0	0
10	Robert Cox	8	3	21	21	18	28	17	6	0	44	6
11	B. Bueno de Mesquita	8	10	2	4	0	0	9	8	9	0	0
12	Bruce Russett	7	9	2	3	1	6	0	23	0	0	0
13	Robert Gilpin	6	6	3	8	4	11	0	8	27	11	6
14	John Ruggie	6	5	5	15	3	17	0	0	0	0	0
15	Stephen Krasner	5	5	4	7	9	0	0	0	0	0	6
16	Barry Buzan	5	2	13	7	10	11	17	6	0	22	6
17	Stephen Walt	5	5	3	4	3	0	4	15	9	0	6
18	Hans Morgenthau	4	5	5	1	7	6	4	15	0	0	6
19	James Rosenau	4	4	2	6	3	6	0	15	9	11	6
20	Michael Doyle	4	4	3	2	6	0	4	0	0	0	0
21	Hedley Bull	4	2	10	4	10	6	9	15	0	11	6
22	Susan Strange	4	2	8	9	7	11	0	0	0	22	0
23	Martha Finnemore	3	4	1	8	0	11	0	0	0	0	6
24	Cynthia Enloe	3	2	6	3	6	0	0	6	0	0	0
24	John Ikenberry	3	3	2	2	0	0	0	0	9	0	0

When asked who has had the greatest impact on the field over the past 20 years, IR scholars select Princeton's Robert Keohane more than any other individual. However, Alexander Wendt receives the most votes in seven countries, whereas Keohane ranks highest in six countries. As in previous TRIP surveys, the top three individuals are leading lights in the three most prominent IR paradigms—liberalism, constructivism, and realism. Note also that only 3 of the “top” 25 scholars use quantitative methods extensively in their research.

The most significant change from previous surveys is the ascension of Stanford professor James Fearon. Ranked sixteenth among U.S. IR scholars in 2004, he rose to eighth in 2006 and fifth in 2008. Unlike the other top scholars on this list, Fearon is mentioned most often by U.S. scholars but receives no votes in several non-U.S. countries, namely Singapore, Hong Kong, New Zealand, and South Africa. As in previous surveys, very few scholars under the age of 50 rank amongst the most influential; men far outnumber women (two women in 2006 and three in 2008 made the top 25); and U.S. scholars dominate the list.⁶⁰

Just as Fearon's stature outside the United States is limited, several scholars who rank highly worldwide are relatively ignored in the States. Robert Cox, who is ranked tenth overall, garners a scant 3 percent of American votes, compared with 17 to 44 percent in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa and the United Kingdom. Similarly, the late Hedley Bull, author of the foundational English School text, and Barry Buzan, a prominent contemporary acolyte of the same paradigm, are mentioned by only 2 percent of U.S. respondents, although they rank sixteenth and twenty-first in the world.

⁶⁰ Twenty-one of the 25 individuals spent most of their careers at U.S. universities and all of them received their terminal degrees in the United States. A number of scholars were born in other countries, but nevertheless made their career in U.S. universities, e.g., Hans Morganthau, Peter Katzenstein, and John Ruggie.

Q40: Aside from you, please list four scholars who have produced the most interesting scholarship in the past five years.

Overall Rank	Scholar	All %	US %	UK %	Can %	Aus %	NZ %	Ire %	Isr %	SA %	HK %	Sin %
1	Alexander Wendt	9	9	9	11	3	6	5	8	11	22	7
2	John Mearsheimer	7	9	3	3	2	18	10	8	0	22	0
3	James Fearon	7	10	3	3	0	6	10	0	0	0	0
4	Martha Finnemore	7	8	1	8	3	6	0	0	0	0	14
5	Joseph Nye	5	6	3	3	2	12	0	0	0	22	0
6	Peter Katzenstein	4	5	2	5	0	0	0	17	0	11	0
6	Michael Barnett	4	5	3	5	5	12	0	0	0	0	0
8	Stephen Walt	4	5	3	2	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	John Ikenberry	4	5	2	2	5	6	5	0	0	33	0
10	Barry Buzan	3	3	6	3	5	0	5	8	0	22	7
11	Kathryn Sikkink	3	4	<1	3	2	6	0	0	11	11	0
12	Jack Snyder	3	4	1	3	2	0	0	0	0	22	0
13	Beth Simmons	3	4	<1	3	2	0	10	0	0	0	0
14	Samuel Huntington	3	4	1	0	7	6	0	0	11	0	0
15	Robert Pape	3	4	0	1	2	0	5	8	0	0	0
16	John Ruggie	3	3	2	4	5	6	0	0	0	0	7
17	Robert Keohane	3	3	2	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	B. Bueno de Mesquita	2	4	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	Cynthia Enloe	2	2	3	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	Ole Waever	2	1	4	3	10	0	5	8	22	0	7
21	Robert Jervis	2	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	Daniel Deudney	2	2	2	2	3	0	5	0	0	0	0
23	Michael Tomz	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
23	Randall Schweller	2	3	<1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
23	Erik Gartzke	2	3	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	11	0

Not surprisingly, there is far greater variation among respondents on the question of who is doing the most interesting work than there is on the question of who has had the greatest impact on the field (question 39). Scholars are interested in very different issues and kinds of research, so when they are asked who is doing the most interesting work no individual gets more than 9 percent of the worldwide vote. This total pales beside, say, the 47 percent of respondents who chose Robert Keohane as one of the discipline's most influential scholars.

The rise of scholars amongst the ranks of the influential (question 39) may be at least partially explained by their reputations for doing interesting research in the past. James Fearon has ranked among the top three scholars doing the most interesting research in every TRIP survey since 2004; simultaneously, he has risen from the sixteenth to the fifth most influential IR scholar.

As in the previous question, we sometimes see a marked difference between the United States and other countries. Indeed, some of the scholars doing the most interesting research, according to American scholars, receive few or no votes in other countries. Fearon ranks highly in the United States and Ireland, and to a lesser extent in New Zealand, but he receives no votes in five countries. Similarly, 5 percent of U.S. respondents listed Stephen Walt, ranked eighth in the world on this question, but he gets no votes in six other countries. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita gets 4 percent of U.S. responses, but none of the respondents in eight other nations list this political scientist. The constructivist scholar Martha Finnemore continues to rank highly in the United States, but she receives almost no votes in the United Kingdom, which is somewhat surprising, given that 14 percent of UK scholars describe themselves as constructivist (question 26). This result might be explained by the fact that many UK constructivists are non-positivist, while the majority of U.S. constructivists, including Finnemore, work within a positivist epistemology.⁶¹

⁶¹ See Finnemore and Sikkink, "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics, *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001): pp 391-416.

Q41: List four scholars whose work has most influenced your own research.

Overall Rank	Scholar	All %	US %	UK %	Can %	Aus %	NZ %	Ire %	Isr %	SA %	HK %	Sin %
1	Robert Keohane	8	10	3	9	2	5	5	8	0	9	0
2	Alexander Wendt	7	7	8	8	6	10	5	0	22	18	6
3	Kenneth Waltz	6	7	3	5	5	5	0	8	0	18	19
4	Robert Jervis	6	8	1	4	0	0	0	15	0	9	13
5	John Ruggie	5	5	1	9	3	5	5	13	11	0	6
6	Peter Katzenstein	5	6	1	6	0	5	0	15	22	9	0
7	James Fearon	5	6	2	2	0	0	5	0	0	0	0
8	Hans Morgenthau	4	4	2	2	5	10	0	38	0	18	0
9	Hedley Bull	4	2	7	6	11	10	0	0	11	9	0
10	Robert Cox	4	2	5	14	3	10	5	0	22	0	6
11	Samuel Huntington	3	5	0	2	2	0	0	0	11	0	0
11	Kathryn Sikkink	3	4	2	3	0	5	0	8	0	9	6
11	Martha Finnemore	3	4	1	5	2	5	0	0	0	9	13
14	John Mearsheimer	3	4	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14	Joseph Nye	3	3	1	2	0	10	0	0	0	27	0
16	James Rosenau	3	3	<1	3	2	0	0	0	11	0	13
17	Bruce Russett	3	3	1	1	0	0	0	8	0	0	0
17	Barry Buzan	3	2	5	3	3	5	5	0	11	9	0
19	Alexander George	3	3	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	Robert Gilpin	2	3	0	2	2	0	0	8	11	0	0
20	Susan Strange	2	2	2	8	3	0	0	0	22	0	0
22	Jack Snyder	2	3	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22	B. Bueno de Mesquita	2	3	1	2	0	0	10	8	0	0	0
24	Stephen Krasner	2	3	<1	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
25	Helen Milner	2	3	0	1	0	0	5	0	0	0	0
25	Charles Tilly	2	3	1	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0

Here again, we see much greater dispersion among the answers to the question of which scholars have most profoundly influenced respondents' own research than we do on the question of who has had the greatest impact on the field (question 39). Nevertheless, as we might expect, academics who have had the greatest impact on the field of IR also have the greatest impact on the respondents' individual research agendas, since these leading scholars presumably have shaped respondents' understanding of the discipline through their research and by training hundreds of graduate students. As in question 39, Keohane, Wendt, and Kenneth Waltz top the list, and Fearon and Robert Jervis make the top ten on both lists.

Q42: List the four journals in IR that publish articles with the greatest influence on the way IR scholars think about international relations. These can include general political science journals and/or non-political science journals.

Overall Rank	Journal	All %	US %	UK %	Can %	Aus %	NZ %	Ire %	Isr %	SA %	HK %	Sin %
1	International Organization	73	74	70	75	69	58	71	71	88	70	80
2	International Security	45	47	38	46	51	21	14	64	13	70	47
3	International Studies Quarterly	44	49	29	50	28	32	33	43	0	40	20
4	American Political Science Review	28	36	9	18	6	5	33	36	0	10	20
4	World Politics	28	29	20	31	29	42	33	14	50	30	20
6	Foreign Affairs	28	30	19	25	32	21	14	21	25	50	40
7	Journal of Conflict Resolution	14	18	4	7	0	5	19	29	0	10	7
8	European Journal of Intl Relations	14	9	31	14	26	21	10	21	0	10	0
9	Review of International Studies	14	4	47	22	0	53	24	0	25	0	7
10	Foreign Policy	9	20	5	7	9	11	0	14	38	10	7
11	Millennium	8	3	24	12	18	11	19	7	38	0	0
12	American Journal of Pol. Science	6	7	2	2	2	0	0	7	0	0	0
13	Security Studies	5	7	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
14	International Affairs	4	2	14	1	14	11	0	0	0	20	7
15	Review of Intl Political Economy	4	2	6	14	3	16	5	0	13	0	0
16	International Studies Review	4	4	2	5	6	16	5	14	13	0	0
17	Journal of Peace Research	3	5	2	1	2	5	0	0	0	0	0
18	Global Governance	2	2	2	5	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	Journal of Politics	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	International Studies Perspectives	2	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	Survival	2	2	3	1	5	0	0	7	13	0	0
22	National Interest	1	1	2	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0
23	International Relations	1	1	0	3	8	0	5	7	0	0	0
24	Political Science Quarterly	1	1	1	1	2	0	0	7	0	0	0
25	Comparative Politics	1	1	1	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0

There is very little consensus about which are the best journals, beyond the fact that every scholarly community in our survey ranks *International Organization* as the top IR journal. If peer-reviewed journals define the state of knowledge in a field, then IR is not a single discipline. American-based political science journals, e.g. *APSR*, *AJPS* and *JOP*, are predictably more prominent in the United States than elsewhere. The divergence of opinion regarding the European journals is even greater: *Millennium* is ranked as the third most important journal in South Africa and is listed as one of the top 4 journals by 24 percent of British IR scholars; yet this same journal is apparently unread and certainly unrated in Hong Kong and Singapore and is considered to be in the top 4 by only 3 percent of U.S. scholars. Perhaps the biggest transatlantic disconnect revolves around the British International Studies Association's flagship journal, *Review of International Studies*, which is mentioned by 47 percent of UK scholars (and 53 percent of Kiwis), but only 4 percent of U.S. scholars. The conflicting assessments of *JCR* may be driven by the relative popularity of quantitative methods in the United States, Israel, and Ireland compared to the United Kingdom, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand.

Within the U.S. IR community there is some movement among the top journals. *APSR* rises from number 6 to number 4, perhaps as a consequence of publishing more IR research over the past 6 years and because the new editor is a prominent IR scholar, Ronald Rogowski. *World Politics* is headed in the opposite direction, probably because it is publishing less IR (when it publishes at all) and continues its decline from number 4 in 2004 (37 percent) to number 5 in 2006 (30 percent) to number 6 in 2008 (29 percent). The *European Journal of International Relations* maintains a solid reputation among American IR scholars and remains locked at number 9 on the list. There are two non-peer reviewed publications in the top 10 journals, *Foreign Affairs*, which holds steady at around 30 percent and *Foreign Policy*, which has improved from 2004 (14 percent) to 2006 (16 percent) to 2008 when 20 percent of U.S. scholars listed it as a top 4 journal.

Q43: List the four journals that publish the best research in your area of expertise.

Overall Rank	Journal	All %	US %	UK %	Can %	Aus %	NZ %	Ire %	Isr %	SA %	HK %	Sin %
1	International Organization	40	44	17	35	11	33	33	36	56	33	7
2	International Security	26	29	19	20	26	17	5	21	0	42	20
3	International Studies Quarterly	24	31	9	17	12	22	5	43	0	17	7
4	World Politics	14	16	10	10	9	6	5	0	0	0	27
5	American Political Science Review	13	18	7	4	0	0	14	21	0	8	0
6	Journal of Conflict Resolution	13	17	3	5	5	0	10	21	0	8	0
7	European Journal of Intl Relations	12	9	21	18	23	11	33	14	11	0	0
8	Review of International Studies	10	4	25	18	21	22	19	14	11	17	20
9	Security Studies	10	13	5	4	2	6	0	7	0	0	0
10	Foreign Affairs	8	9	2	6	9	17	0	7	0	25	0
11	American Journal of Political Science	7	9	3	1	4	6	14	7	0	8	0
12	Millennium	7	4	13	14	12	11	14	0	44	0	13
13	Journal of Peace Research	7	8	4	4	2	11	0	14	0	0	0
14	Review of Intl Political Economy	6	4	7	18	12	6	0	0	33	0	0
15	Comparative Political Studies	5	5	6	1	2	6	10	0	0	0	7
15	Global Governance	5	4	4	12	8	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	Survival	4	3	6	6	12	6	0	7	0	0	7
18	Comparative Politics	4	5	0	2	0	6	0	0	0	0	13
19	Foreign Policy	3	4	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	7
20	Third World Quarterly	3	1	6	3	14	0	0	0	22	0	0
21	American Journal of International Law	3	3	3	2	2	0	5	0	0	8	0
22	Journal of Politics	3	3	1	1	0	0	10	7	0	0	0
22	International Studies Review	3	3	<1	2	3	11	0	14	11	0	7
22	International Affairs	3	4	7	2	5	0	10	0	0	0	13
25	Foreign Policy Analysis	2	3	1	2	0	0	0	7	0	0	0

Q44: List the four book presses that have the greatest influence on the way IR scholars think about international relations.

Overall Rank	Book Press	All %	US %	UK %	Can %	Aus %	NZ %	Ire %	Isr %	SA %	HK %	Sin %
1	Cambridge University Press	79	78	75	91	82	93	79	60	100	40	67
2	Princeton University Press	58	69	33	52	30	29	29	30	17	60	27
3	Cornell University Press	51	55	48	48	35	29	43	40	0	20	53
4	Oxford University Press	51	45	69	55	60	79	86	40	0	30	40
5	Routledge	21	10	47	34	40	71	50	10	50	20	20
6	Columbia University Press	15	16	10	22	11	14	7	20	0	30	20
7	Palgrave MacMilan	11	3	30	11	37	36	57	20	67	10	13
8	Harvard University Press	10	10	10	9	11	7	14	30	0	10	13
9	University of Michigan Press	8	12	1	2	2	0	0	20	0	0	0
10	Lynne Reinner	8	7	7	17	11	0	0	0	50	10	7
11	MIT Press	7	9	3	8	5	7	0	10	0	0	0
12	Yale University Press	6	7	2	2	2	0	0	20	17	10	13
13	Stanford University Press	5	4	4	7	2	0	7	30	0	20	13
14	University of Chicago Press	4	5	1	2	4	0	0	10	0	0	7
15	University of California Press	3	3	1	3	2	7	0	10	17	0	7
16	W.W. Norton & Company	3	3	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	10	0
17	Johns Hopkins University Press	2	3	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	Polity	2	0	12	0	11	7	0	0	0	0	0
19	SAGE	2	1	4	1	2	0	0	10	0	0	0
20	Rowman and Littlefield	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	Congressional Quarterly Press	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	Westview Press	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	University of Minnesota Press	1	0	4	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
24	Longman	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
25	McGraw Hill	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25	Prentice Hall	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

The top four presses are no surprise to American IR scholars—conventional wisdom suggests these are the top presses, and the survey data confirm it. Cambridge University Press leads by a substantial margin in almost every country. Princeton University Press and Cornell University Press have better reputations in the United States than in the rest of the world, while Oxford University Press has a better reputation in the rest of the world than in the United States. But the biggest anomaly within the top four presses is Princeton, which is second in the United States but only fifth in the United Kingdom and sixth in Australia; indeed, in many non-U.S. academic communities Princeton actually ranks behind two commercial presses, Routledge and Palgrave. Michigan’s highly positivist/quantitative list displays a similar pattern – ranked by about 12 percent of U.S. scholars and 20 percent of Israelis, but almost none from the rest of the world.

Q45: List the four book presses that publish the best research in your area of expertise.

Overall Rank	Book Press	All %	US %	UK %	Can %	Aus %	NZ %	Ire %	Isr %	SA %	HK %	Sin %
1	Cambridge University Press	79	79	75	91	82	93	79	64	100	40	67
2	Princeton University Press	58	69	33	51	30	29	29	36	17	60	27
3	Oxford University Press	51	45	69	55	60	79	86	55	83	30	40
4	Cornell University Press	51	55	48	48	35	29	43	27	0	20	53
5	Routledge/Taylor & Francis	21	10	47	35	40	71	50	36	50	20	20
6	Columbia University Press	15	16	10	22	11	14	7	9	0	30	20
7	Palgrave Macmillan	11	3	30	11	37	36	57	27	67	10	13
8	Harvard University Press	10	10	10	9	11	7	14	18	0	10	13
9	University of Michigan Press	8	12	1	2	2	0	0	9	0	0	0
10	Lynne Reinner	8	7	7	17	11	0	0	0	50	10	7
11	MIT Press	7	9	3	8	5	7	0	9	0	0	0
12	Yale University Press	6	7	2	2	2	0	0	0	17	10	13
13	Stanford University Press	5	4	4	7	2	0	7	9	0	20	13
14	University of Chicago Press	4	5	1	2	4	0	0	9	0	0	7
15	U. of California Press	3	3	<1	4	4	7	0	9	17	0	7
16	W.W. Norton & Company	3	3	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	10	0
17	Johns Hopkins U. Press	2	3	<1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	Polity Press	2	0	12	0	11	7	0	0	0	0	0
19	Sage	2	1	4	1	2	0	0	9	0	0	0
20	U. of Minnesota Press	1	1	4	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	Rowman and Littlefield	1	2	<1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22	Cong. Quarterly Press	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22	Westview Press	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
24	Longman	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
25	Mcgraw Hill	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Q46: Does funding from the following sources have a positive impact, negative impact, or no impact on the integrity of IR research?

(Very Negative=-2, Negative=-1, no impact=0, positive=1, very Positive=2)

	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Department of Defense/ Ministry of Defense	-0.19 ⁶²	-0.34	0.08	-0.08			-0.17	-0.50		
Governmental Intelligence Organizations	-0.16	-0.29		-0.10		-0.21	0.08	-0.63		0.00
Nation's Research Council	0.85 ⁶³	0.46 ⁶⁴	1.07	0.75	0.18 ⁶⁵	0.88	0.85	0.69 ⁶⁶	0.64	
National Government/EU⁶⁷						0.42	0.64		-0.25 ⁶⁸	0.20
Department of Foreign Affairs or Foreign Ministry			0.16		0.45		0.08			
Think Tanks	0.47	-0.01	0.12	0.22	0.33	0.21	0.62	0.13	0.54	0.69
Universities	1.28	0.78	1.11	1.13					0.92	1.38
National Aid Agency			0.30		0.24	0.38				
Private Foundations	0.83	0.45	0.24	0.45	0.10	0.21	0.38 ⁶⁹	0.57	0.04 ⁷⁰	1.13

⁶² For the United States, Department of Defense (-0.13) and Department of Homeland Security (-0.24) are averaged.

⁶³ The U.S. option was "National Science Foundation."

⁶⁴ For the United Kingdom, the nation's research council is an average of National Research Council (0.34) and Economic and Social Research Council (0.58)

⁶⁵ For New Zealand, the nation's research council is an average of Royal Society of New Zealand Marsden Fund (0.29), Foundation for Research, Science and Technology (0.05) and the Human Rights Commission (0.20)

⁶⁶ For South Africa, the National Research Foundation (0.75) and Human Science Research council (0.63)

⁶⁷ For Ireland and Israel, the question was (incorrectly) asked about EU funds.

⁶⁸ For Hong Kong, the government of Hong Kong and Mainland China are averaged.

⁶⁹ For Israel, "private foundations" is an average of Private foundations (0.50) and American Private Donors (0.25)

⁷⁰ For Hong Kong, "private foundations" is an average of private foundations (0.46) and Mainland China foundations (-0.38).

Recently, the Department of Defense and various intelligence agencies in the United States have turned to social scientists in an attempt to understand the causes of terrorism, effectively target terrorist networks, and provide systematic empirical evidence to aid policymakers in Washington. Funding of this type of research by the U.S. government has been controversial and has caused some to argue that the findings are likely to be flawed or biased.

Unsurprisingly, scholars generally regard universities as the least problematic source of funding, while they view financial support from government agencies, particularly ministries and departments of defense with the most suspicion. This trend persists even in countries where scholars are active in government, such as Israel (see questions 50-51). Other sources of government funding—if they are not associated with the defense or intelligence communities—are viewed more positively, for example national aid agencies and research councils.

Q47: How useful are the following kinds of IR research to policy makers?

(Very Useful= 3, Somewhat Useful=2, Not Very Useful=1, Not Useful At All=0)

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Theoretical Analysis	1.40	1.41	1.33	1.31	1.55	1.48	1.57	1.64	2.00	1.43	1.44
Quantitative Analysis	1.64	1.62	1.68	1.61	1.76	1.60	1.75	1.5	2.00	1.29	1.69
Policy Analysis	2.28	2.30	2.18	2.24	2.48	2.32	2.13	2.29	2.44	2.20	2.19
Area Studies	2.31	2.36	2.23	2.15	2.38	2.50	2.04	2.23	2.67	2.07	2.06
Historical Case Studies	1.85	1.89	1.76	1.75	1.86	1.67	1.42	1.85	2.11	1.87	1.56
Contemporary Case Studies	2.22	2.23	2.16	2.18	2.33	2.43	1.92	2.23	2.33	2.07	2.19
Formal Models	0.97	0.97	0.95	0.82	1.10	0.86	1.25	1.00	1.78	0.71	0.94

There is a consensus among all the respondents in the survey that policy analyses, area studies, and contemporary case studies are the most useful kinds of research for foreign policy decision makers. Similarly, scholars across countries are skeptical that policy makers find formal models, historical case studies, quantitative analyses, and theoretical analyses useful.

While scholars in no country think formal models are especially useful to policy makers, there is cross-national variation, with respondents in many of the countries in which there are higher percentages of formal modelers judging this research positively: Ireland (with 18 percent formal modelers), Israel (9 percent), and South Africa (7 percent). That said, while a significant percentage of scholars who use formal models in their research are found in the United States (15 percent), American respondents are generally dubious about the utility of this approach for policy makers.

Q48: List four IR scholars whose work has had the greatest influence on [Country X] foreign policy in the past 20 years.

United States		
Rank	Scholar	%
1	Joseph Nye	36
2	Samuel Huntington	34
3	John Mearsheimer	17
4	Henry Kissinger	16
5	Michael Doyle	12
5	Bruce Russett	12
6	Francis Fukuyama	12
7	Robert Keohane	11
8	Stephen Krasner	10
9	Kenneth Waltz	9
10	Condoleezza Rice	9

United Kingdom		
Rank	Scholar	%
1	Lawrence Freedman	37
2	Anthony Giddens	19
3	Robert Cooper	15
4	William Wallace	14
5	Samuel Huntingdon	12
6	Adam Roberts	10
6	Chris Hill	10
6	Mary Kaldor	10
9	Barry Buzan	7
9	Michael Cox	7
9	Timothy Garton-Ash	7

Canada		
Rank	Scholar	%
1	Kim Richard Nossal	46
2	Janice Stein	35
3	Denis Stairs	29
4	Andrew Cooper	20
5	Jack Granatstein	13
6	John Kirton	12
7	Jennifer Welsh	11
7	Tom Keating	11
9	Claire Sjolander	6
9	Joseph Nye	6
9	Stéphane Roussel	6
9	Thomas Homer-Dixon	6

Israel		
Rank	Scholar	%
1	Uri Bialer	27
2	Aharon Klieman	18
2	Hans Morgenthau	18
2	Yehoshafat Harkabi	18
5	20-way tie	9

Ireland		
Rank	Scholar	%
1	Patrick Keatinge	56
2	Brigid Laffan	33
3	Eunan O Halpin	22
3	John Doyle	22
6	14-way tie	11

South Africa		
Rank	Scholar	%
1	Deon Geldenhuys	50
1	Peter Vale	50
3	15-way tie	17

Australia		
Rank	Scholar	%
1	Desmond Ball	26
1	Paul Dibb	26
3	Hugh White	24
4	Hedley Bull	19
5	Stuart Harris	14
5	William Tow	14
7	James Cotton	12
7	John Ravenhill	12
7	Coral Bell	12
10	Michael Wesley	10
10	Ross Garnaut	10

New Zealand		
Rank	Scholar	%
1	Roderic Alley	73
2	Stephen Hoadley	64
3	John Henderson	55
4	Malcolm McKinnon	18
4	Robert Keohane	18
4	Richard Kennaway	18
5	13-way tie	9

Singapore		
Rank	Scholar	%
1	Michael Leifer	73
2	11-way tie	9

Hong Kong		
Rank	Scholar	%
1	James Tang	100
2	Ting Wai	40
3	7-way tie	20

When asked to identify the scholars that have most shaped their country's foreign policy in the last 20 years, respondents identify several scholars who have had influence far beyond their own national borders. For example, Samuel Huntington makes the list in the United Kingdom, Robert Keohane appears on New Zealand's list, and Joseph Nye is ranked highly in Canada, even though all are American. In the United States, however, not a single non-American scholar cracks the top ten. This again suggests, as Waever hypothesizes, that the U.S. IR community is insular—although perhaps not usually so. The scholars that received the lion's share of the votes in Hong Kong and Singapore are affiliated with universities there.

Q49: How should IR scholars contribute to the policy-making process? Please pick up to two.

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Formal Participants	22	24	19	19	22	9	12	17	13	13	27
Informal Advisors	49	49	48	51	36	43	48	67	50	73	67
Creators of New Information/Knowledge for Policy makers	70	72	58	73	75	91	60	44	75	67	53
Trainers of Policy makers	28	29	24	28	33	30	28	33	38	20	33
Should not be Involved in the Policymaking Process	4	3	9	5	4	4	8	6	13	0	13
Don't Know	3	3	6	1	1	0	4	0	0	0	0
Other	2	1	3	2	3	4	4	6	0	7	7

Respondents strongly prefer that IR scholars adopt informal roles in policymaking, whether as advisors, knowledge creators, or trainers of policy makers. That said, few state categorically that academics should stay out of the policymaking process.

Nearly all respondents in New Zealand (91 percent) indicate that an important purpose of IR research is to aid foreign policy decision making. This is unsurprising, given that, as we see below, a high percentage of scholars in New Zealand have worked for their government (41 percent in a paid position and 42 percent in an unpaid capacity). A third have also done unpaid work for NGOs and think tanks. Indeed only 29 percent of IR experts in New Zealand have *not* consulted or worked outside the university in the last two years. Compare this finding to the United States where more than half of respondents did venture outside the ivory tower.

Q50: In the past two years, have you consulted or worked in a paid capacity for any of the following? Check all that apply.

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK ⁷¹	Sin
[Country X] Government	23	23	15	24	25	41	23	20	22	33	19
Foreign Government	8	7	13	10	14	14	6	7	0	13	31
Interest Groups	3	2	6	4	6	5	4	7	11	7	6
International Organizations	9	8	15	8	8	14	21	13	11	7	19
Non-Governmental Organizations	14	13	15	14	11	14	17	20	33	33	25
Private Sector	11	10	14	6	14	9	8	13	22	7	31
Think Tanks	16	15	13	20	18	14	8	7	33	0	63
Other	4	3	6	5	1	14	0	7	0	0	6
None	57	59	55	56	59	50	50	53	44	40	25

Q51: In the past two years, have you consulted or worked in an unpaid capacity for any of the following? Check all that apply.

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK ⁷²	Sin
[Country X] Government	29	14	18	34	25	42	21	44	30	33	27
Foreign Government	8	7	12	13	13	17	4	13	0	27	20
Interest Groups	10	9	13	12	13	8	4	13	30	27	7
International Organizations	10	10	12	7	14	17	4	0	0	7	13
Non-Governmental Organizations	27	27	21	31	29	38	33	31	40	47	33
Private Sector	6	7	4	6	8	4	4	13	10	7	13
Think Tanks	17	14	22	25	18	33	17	19	30	33	40
Other	3	3	3	5	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
None	51	56	48	39	42	29	54	38	30	27	33

Most respondents would like to see a significant, if informal, role for IR experts in the policy process (see question 49 above), but comparatively small percentages actually work or consult for government or other organizations. A majority of scholars were cloistered in the academy during

⁷¹ Includes work done for the governments in Hong Kong and Beijing.

⁷² Includes work done for the governments in Hong Kong and Beijing.

the last two years: overall 57 percent said they had not worked a paid capacity and 51 percent had not worked in an unpaid capacity for organizations outside the university.

When working outside the ivory tower, scholars tend to take paid positions in think tanks, perhaps because these jobs tend to be full-time and/or yearlong fellowships. When the work is unpaid, scholars gravitate towards NGOs. Furthermore, scholars in almost all countries do more unpaid work than paid, possibly indicating a desire to maintain an active affiliation with a university while also consulting for other organizations. Given the difficulty in finding a tenure-track job (see question 19), academics may be reluctant to leave the academy unless the policy work is paid or high profile.

Two trends manifest regarding scholars’ participation in government. First, smaller countries employ a higher percentage of IR scholars than larger ones, particularly in unpaid capacities. Likely this trend reflects size of the IR community in small countries. Second, although the direction of causation is unclear, countries employing a higher percentage of scholars also tend to have higher concentrations of realists; thus, the three countries with the most self-identified realists—Israel, New Zealand and Hong Kong—are also the three countries whose IR scholars are most active in government.

Q52: Assuming the members of a discipline generally agree on a policy choice, please rate the relative influence of these groups on policy outcomes in [Country X].

(Very Influential=3, Influential=2, Slightly Influential=1, Not influential=0)

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Climatologists	1.30	1.36	1.77	1.48	1.71	2.00	1.26	1.00	1.33	0.30	1.78
Economists	2.12	2.24	2.26	2.28	2.42	2.21	2.10	2.46	2.13	1.75	2.30
Historians	0.66	0.77	0.53	0.60	0.74	0.88	0.65	0.23	0.67	0.25	0.55
IR scholars	0.87	1.01	0.64	0.95	0.84	0.83	0.50	0.54	0.56	0.50	0.92
Legal scholars	1.49	1.59	1.72	1.67	1.51	1.71	1.64	1.71	1.56	1.83	1.44
Medical doctors	1.45	1.56	1.85	1.70	1.52	1.59	1.77	1.40	0.89	1.83	1.44
Scientists	1.57	1.64	1.94	1.65	1.71	1.59	1.68	1.36	1.44	1.73	2.30

Respondents universally rank economists as the most influential of all the epistemic groups that were included as options; natural scientists follow at a distant second. In contrast, IR scholars barely edge out the characteristically hermetic historians to avoid the distinction of being judged (by themselves) the most irrelevant academic community for policy making. This perceived policy irrelevancy is mirrored in question 53, below. Note, the question is asking not whether particular individuals who attain positions of authority in the government have influence, since they almost certainly do. It asks whether their expertise in a given policy area combined with disciplinary consensus will matter. IR scholars believe that they do not matter in this way, while they believe that other epistemic groups do matter.

Q53: When a broad consensus on a foreign policy issue exists among IR scholars within [Country X], which of the following is most likely?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
The policy advocated by IR scholars has no impact on the policy adopted.	38	37	46	29	36	33	57	57	67	50	38
The policy advocated by IR scholars is adopted.	1	1	2	2	0	5	8	7	0	0	8
The policy advocated by IR scholars shapes public debate and/ or puts issues on the national agenda but the policy advocated is not necessarily adopted.	61	62	53	69	64	62	43	36	33	50	54

IR scholars harbor no illusions about their importance to government—majorities in almost half of the countries surveyed felt IR scholars have no impact on policy, and even in the most optimistic communities nearly a third of scholars felt politically irrelevant. Indeed, Israeli scholars, who are more likely to participate in policymaking than their counterparts in other countries, also deem themselves to be the most politically impotent. That said, large percentages of respondents in each country—except for Israel, South Africa, and Ireland—believe that IR scholars shape foreign policy debates, including helping to set the national agenda, even if they are not able to determine the outcome.

Q54: What are the five best PhD programs in the world for a student who wants to pursue an academic career in IR?

Overall Rank	Ph.D. Program	All %	US %	UK %	Can %	Aus %	NZ %	Ire %	Isr %	SA %	HK %	Sin %
1	Harvard University	59	53	74	69	68	76	89	69	67	80	54
2	Princeton University	42	40	38	54	42	47	39	69	17	70	38
3	Stanford University	34	36	29	40	28	18	28	38	0	10	31
4	Columbia University	31	30	31	35	16	29	33	62	17	60	54
5	Yale University	20	21	14	23	14	18	6	31	17	20	8
6	London School of Economics	19	6	61	34	44	18	44	31	50	40	46
7	University of Chicago	18	19	21	10	10	0	11	15	0	20	23
8	University of California, Berkeley	14	15	8	14	18	24	11	8	33	30	8
8	Oxford University	14	6	39	31	32	35	33	8	17	0	15
10	University of Michigan	11	13	6	5	2	12	6	8	0	20	0
11	University of California, San Diego	10	12	6	9	2	0	17	0	0	0	0
12	Massachusetts Institute of Technology	10	11	7	5	4	6	6	8	17	0	0
13	Cornell University	9	6	10	17	26	12	0	8	0	0	8
14	University of Wales, Aberystwyth	7	0	31	8	28	24	28	0	17	0	15
15	Cambridge University	7	3	17	12	20	18	11	15	17	20	8
16	Johns Hopkins University	6	6	7	5	8	6	11	8	17	0	0
17	Georgetown University	5	5	1	4	8	6	11	8	17	10	8
18	New York University	3	4	4	2	0	0	11	0	0	0	0
19	University of California, Los Angeles	3	4	0	5	0	0	11	8	0	0	0
20	University of Minnesota	3	2	7	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	Ohio State University	3	3	0	4	2	0	6	0	0	0	0
22	University of Rochester	2	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
23	Duke University	2	2	0	2	10	0	0	0	0	0	0
24	Tufts University	2	2	1	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	8
25	Australian National University	2	0	0	0	24	24	6	0	0	0	8

For those who have hypothesized that U.S. IR dominates in the discipline, here is stout evidence of an American hegemony—and without a doubt an Anglo-American hegemony. Eight of the top 10 Ph.D. programs, according to scholars in the 10 countries we surveyed, are located in the United States. And of the top 25 schools, *all* save one (Australian National University) are in the United Kingdom or the United States. There is also complete consensus across the countries we surveyed regarding which schools are at the very apex of higher education in IR. Harvard University is ranked number 1 in every country in the sample, and Princeton University is ranked number 2 or 3 in eight of the ten countries.

Q55: What are the five best terminal masters programs in the world for a student who wants to pursue a policy career in international relations?

Overall Rank	Masters Program	All %	US %	UK %	Can %	Aus %	NZ %	Ire %	Isr %	SA %	HK %	Sin %
1	Georgetown University	48	54	29	46	50	38	29	80	33	50	54
2	Johns Hopkins University	44	49	29	44	29	54	29	20	0	63	38
3	Harvard University	43	38	59	40	53	38	43	60	33	63	23
4	Tufts University	29	37	15	20	9	31	0	20	0	38	31
4	Columbia University	29	29	35	27	15	31	29	30	33	38	23
6	Princeton University	25	27	21	19	35	15	0	10	33	50	0
7	London School of Economics	22	6	62	44	47	38	29	30	67	13	31
8	George Washington University	16	18	9	12	21	23	0	0	0	25	46
9	American University	9	13	3	6	6	0	0	20	0	0	0
10	Oxford University	9	1	41	5	15	15	7	0	0	0	0
11	University of Chicago	5	6	4	0	0	8	7	0	0	0	0
12	Yale University	4	3	10	2	6	0	7	10	0	0	0
13	Syracuse University	4	6	2	1	3	8	0	0	0	0	0
14	Carleton University	4	0	0	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15	Stanford University	4	2	11	2	6	0	7	0	0	0	0
16	Cambridge University	4	0	19	1	12	0	0	10	0	0	0
17	Kings College London	3	0	19	0	0	0	0	10	33	0	0
18	University of California, San Diego	2	3	2	1	0	0	0	10	0	0	0
19	MIT	2	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	University of Wales, Aberystwyth	2	0	10	2	0	0	14	0	0	0	0
21	University of Denver	2	3	0	1	0	0	0	10	0	0	0
22	University of California, Berkeley	1	1	3	0	3	8	0	0	0	0	0
23	New York University	1	1	1	1	0	0	14	0	0	0	0
24	University of Pittsburgh	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
24	University of Kentucky	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

While one might expect scholars to rank masters programs at their own country's universities highly—presumably because they offer training better suited for a policy career in their country's government, this is not what we observe. Again, nearly all of the top masters programs are at American and British universities—even according to scholars in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, South Africa, Hong Kong, and Singapore. These results may be a product of the question wording, which asks about programs that facilitate a career in “international relations” broadly conceived. This may have prompted respondents to consider where students can receive the best training for jobs at IOs or NGOS. If so, then the fact that many prominent IOs (e.g., the UN, the OAS, the World Bank, and the IMF) and NGOs (e.g., Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch) are based in the United States might explain the prominence of American universities on this list.

Q56: What are the five best colleges or universities in [Country X] for undergraduate students to study IR?

United States		
Rank	University	%
1	Harvard University	21
2	Princeton University	16
3	Yale University	12
5	Stanford University	12
3	Georgetown University	12
6	Columbia University	11
7	University of Chicago	7
8	Dartmouth College	5
9	U. of California, Berkeley	4
10	Tufts University	3
10	University of Michigan	3
12	Duke University	3
13	Williams College	2
13	Cornell University	2
13	MIT	2

United Kingdom		
Rank	University	%
1	London School of Economics	83
2	University of Wales, Aberystwyth	80
3	Oxford University	56
4	University of Warwick	32
5	University of St. Andrews	30
6	Cambridge University	24
6	Kings College London	24
8	University of Sussex	18
9	University of Manchester	11
10	University of Bristol	11
11	University of Birmingham	10
12	University of London	9
12	University of Sheffield	9
14	University of Essex	8
15	University of Exeter	7

Canada		
Rank	University	%
1	University of Toronto	86
2	University of British Columbia	80
3	McGill University	54
4	Queen's University	34
5	Carleton University	29
6	York University	27
7	Dalhousie University	22
8	University of Ottawa	21
9	McMaster University	18
10	Université de Montréal	13
11	University of Waterloo	12
12	University of Victoria	10
13	Laval University	8
13	Alberta University	8
15	Calgary University	6

Israel		
Rank	University	%
1	Hebrew U. of Jerusalem	100
2	University of Haifa	85

Ireland		
Rank	University	%
1	Dublin City University	75
2	U. College Dublin	70

South Africa		
Rank	University	%
1	Rhodes University	100
2	University of Cape Town	75

3	Bar Ilan University	62
4	Tel Aviv University	46
5	Ben Gurion University	31
5	Interdisciplinary Center-Haifa	31

3	Trinity College Dublin	55
4	Queens U. Belfast	40
5	University of Limerick	30

2	University of Johannesburg	75
2	U. of the Witwatersrand	75
5	2-way tie for 5th	63

Aus		
Rank	University	%
1	Australian National U.	79
2	University of Queensland	71
3	University of Melbourne	50
4	Sydney University	39
5	Griffith University	27
6	University of Sydney	25
6	U. of New South Wales	25
8	Monash University	21
9	Deakin University	14
9	La Trobe University	14
9	Flinders University	14
12	U. of Western Australia	9
13	University of Adelaide	7
13	Queensland University	7
13	Murdoch University	7

NZ		
Rank	University	%
1	Auckland University	100
1	Victoria University	100
3	Otago University	89
4	Canterbury U.	72
5	Massey University	44

HK		
Rank	University	%
1	Fudan University	86
2	Peking University	57
3	Chinese U. of Hong Kong	43
3	University of Hong Kong	43
5	6-way tie for 5 th	29

Singapore		
Rank	University	%
1	National U. of Singapore	100
2	Nanyang Technological U.	46
2	Singapore Management U.	46

Q57: Which of the following do you believe generate the most division among IR scholars today? Please rank the following in descending order with 1 indicating the greatest divide.⁷³

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Epistemology	67	64	78	76	64	60	74	64	75	54	77
Generational	29	31	22	30	27	20	32	29	38	15	31
Issue Area	22	23	21	19	24	25	26	36	0	38	31
Method	69	74	62	59	55	75	68	71	63	46	8
Ontology	39	34	46	49	57	45	32	21	75	38	54
Paradigm	52	53	50	53	48	60	42	50	38	69	23
Region of Study	10	9	9	9	13	15	21	14	13	23	85

Scholars in almost all countries consider epistemology and method as the two most divisive issues in IR research. Paradigm tends to rank a rather distant third, with the notable exception of New Zealand, where 50 percent of scholars are split between realism and constructivism and only 11 percent do not use paradigmatic analysis (question 26).

Interestingly, the four countries in which scholars care least about ontology—the United States, Ireland, Hong Kong and Israel—are also the four countries with the greatest percentages of positivists.

Respondents from Singapore (80 percent) are largely alone in believing that region of study divides the field. But this may be explained by the fact that the regional focus of Singaporean scholars is split evenly among East Asia (30 percent), Southeast Asia, and those who use cross-national data or study transnational actors (21 percent)—with no respondents specializing in the former Soviet Union states, Latin America, the Middle East, North America, and Oceania (see question 29).

⁷³ This table displays the percentages of scholars in a given country who rank a divide within the top 3.

Part IV – Foreign Policy Views

Q58: Which area of the world do you consider to be of greatest strategic importance to [Country X] today?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
East Asia (including China)	27	30	8	17	63	57	8	13	10	50	50
Former Soviet Union/Eastern Europe, including Central Asian states, except for Afghanistan	6	6	15	1	0	0	4	0	0	14	0
Latin America (including Mexico and the Caribbean)	1	1	<1	1	0	0	0	0	20	0	0
Middle East	34	46	20	5	3	9	0	56	0	0	0
North Africa	<1	<1	<1	1	0	0	4	0	0	0	0
North America (not including Mexico)	11	2	18	66	5	13	8	25	0	36	6
Oceania	<1	0	<1	0	7	13	0	0	0	0	0
South Asia (including Afghanistan)	6	6	7	7	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
Southeast Asia	2	<1	<1	0	17	4	0	0	0	0	44
Sub-Saharan Africa	1	<1	1	0	0	0	0	0	40	0	0
Western Europe	11	7	31	3	0	4	75	6	30	0	0

Q59: Which area of the world do you believe will be of greatest strategic importance to [Country X] in 20 years?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
East Asia (including China)	61	68	36	43	75	87	21	20	40	50	73
Former Soviet Union/Eastern Europe, including Central Asian states, except for Afghanistan	5	5	14	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Latin America (including Mexico and the Caribbean)	2	2	<1	0	0	4	0	0	20	0	0
Middle East	9	11	10	1	0	4	0	53	0	0	0
North Africa	<1	<1	<1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
North America (not including Mexico)	7	2	4	49	4	0	8	13	0	29	0
Oceania	<1	0	<1	0	5	4	0	0	0	0	0
South Asia (including Afghanistan)	3	3	3	2	4	0	0	0	0	7	7
Southeast Asia	1	1	<1	1	12	0	0	0	0	0	20
Sub-Saharan Africa	2	2	1	0	0	0	4	7	30	7	0
Western Europe	9	5	31	4	0	0	67	7	10	7	0

While scholars in all countries believe their nations have strategic concerns in most areas of the world today, they believe that East Asia will soon eclipse many other regions in importance. A majority or plurality of respondents in almost every country designated East Asia to become the region of greatest strategic importance in the next two decades.

This trend is not surprising given the recent news that, having overtaken Germany, China is now the world's third largest economy. By contrast, most scholars expect the Middle East, considered the most strategically important region today, to become largely irrelevant within 20 years. South Asia similarly declines in significance, perhaps reflecting an expectation that Afghanistan will stabilize (only those countries with troops on the ground in Afghanistan consider the region as strategically important today).

Q60: Arguments about [Country X] foreign policy that draw upon which IR paradigm resonate best with [Country X] citizens?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Realism	48	56	40	10	58	14	32	88	75	23	0
Liberalism	38	34	36	71	28	73	18	0	13	54	86
Marxism	1	<1	3	0	0	0	0	0	13	0	0
Constructivism	3	1	3	9	6	9	14	0	0	0	0
Feminism	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
English School	2	1	9	4	0	5	0	0	0	0	7
None of the Above	8	8	9	6	8	0	36	13	0	23	7

Just as IR scholars do not find any single paradigm convincing, respondents are split on which paradigms prove most effective in convincing their country's citizenry of foreign policy solutions. Realism is the majority answer in Israel, the United States,⁷⁴ and Australia, and a plurality response in the United Kingdom. Interestingly, all these countries have used military force in recent years—the United States and its coalition partners (Australia and the United Kingdom) in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Israel in both Gaza and Lebanon. It is not clear whether war might lead to a greater willingness to accept realist arguments, or whether leaders are less constrained in their decisions on the use of force by publics who think in realist terms. South Africa does not fit this pattern. Unsurprisingly, arguments in the liberal paradigm are perceived as most convincing to citizens of Singapore and Hong Kong, countries that benefited greatly from liberalized trade arrangements.

⁷⁴ The U.S. finding is especially interesting given the recent argument along these lines offered by Daniel Drezner, "The Realist Tradition in American Public Opinion," *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 6, No. 8, March 2008.

Q61: In the spring of 2003, did you support or oppose the U.S. decision to go to war with Iraq?

	All	US 06	UK	Can 06	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Strongly Supported	4	4	3	0	7	0	9	6	0	7	6
Supported	7	14	8	7	4	5	0	25	20	14	6
Neutral	8	7	6	8	5	14	9	38	10	7	13
Opposed	24	23	26	23	14	41	35	25	20	21	25
Strongly Opposed	56	53	58	63	70	41	48	6	50	50	50

As in Canada and the United States in 2006, the majority of IR scholars in the newly surveyed countries report having opposed the Iraq war in 2003. This gives further evidence of the broad consensus among IR scholars that the Iraq invasion was imprudent. The fact that their consensus had absolutely no discernable political effect supports the conclusion of many IR scholars (see questions 52 and 53) that their views are irrelevant in the policy-making process. Although we conducted our survey in a limited number of countries, our respondents represent countries outside the coalition (Canada, Hong Kong SAR, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa), those within but not providing troops (Singapore), and those supplying the bulk of military capacity (Australia, United Kingdom, and United States). Only Israeli scholars were equally divided in their attitudes towards the war.

Q62: Will the U.S. presence in Iraq increase or decrease [Country X] national security?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Strongly increase national security	2	2	2	0	3	5	0	18	0	0	7
Somewhat increase national security	8	6	4	4	8	9	0	29	0	7	7
Neither increase nor decrease national security	13	8	8	29	26	45	43	29	40	57	14
Somewhat decrease national security	39	36	47	48	46	36	30	12	40	21	71
Strongly decrease national security	37	45	36	19	13	0	17	6	10	7	0
Unsure/ Don't know	3	3	3	NA ⁷⁵	4	5	9	6	10	7	0

⁷⁵ “Unsure/Don’t Know” was not an option on the Canadian survey.

Q63: Will the U.S. presence in Iraq increase or decrease international security?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Strongly increase international security	2	2	3	0	3	5	4	6	0	0	7
Somewhat increase international security	9	9	7	9	7	29	4	29	10	14	13
Neither increase nor decrease international security	8	8	5	6	7	0	13	18	10	14	0
Somewhat decrease international security	38	40	35	36	29	24	39	41	0	50	60
Strongly decrease international security	41	38	48	48	49	38	39	0	80	21	20
Unsure/ Don't know	3	3	3	NA ⁷⁶	5	5	0	6	0	0	0

Scholars in most countries believe that the U.S. presence in Iraq will decrease their nation’s security. Nevertheless, a significant number of scholars from New Zealand and Israel believe that the aggregate effect of the U.S. operations will be increased security for the world. Israeli respondents are the only group of scholars to believe that their country’s national security will be improved by the U.S. presence in Iraq. Interestingly, scholars from many countries in the sample—for example Australia, Hong Kong, and Ireland—judged that, while the war has not significantly threatened their own country’s security, it has seriously undermined international security more generally.

Q64: Thinking about the U.S. presence in Iraq, do you agree or disagree with setting a timetable for a U.S. withdrawal?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Strongly agree	34	34	29	37	36	19	26	19	70	36	29
Somewhat agree	34	36	27	30	34	43	48	38	10	36	21
Neither agree nor disagree	10	8	13	18	12	14	9	19	0	7	14
Somewhat disagree	12	11	15	11	7	5	9	13	10	14	21
Strongly disagree	8	8	10	4	8	14	4	6	0	0	14
Unsure/ Don't know	3	3	5	NA ⁷⁷	3	5	4	6	10	7	0

In line with the generally negative attitudes towards the war in Iraq, a majority of scholars in every country we surveyed believes that the United States should set a timetable for withdrawal from Iraq—including Israeli scholars, who were more positive about the effect of the war on international and Israeli security (see question 63).

⁷⁶ “Unsure/Don’t Know” was not an option on the Canadian survey.

⁷⁷ “Unsure/Don’t Know” was not an option on the Canadian survey.

Q65: Thinking about the political and military “benchmarks” for ending violence in Iraq, has the Iraqi government done an excellent, good, fair, or poor job in meeting these benchmarks?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Excellent	0	<1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Good	4	4	3	7	1	10	5	12	0	8	0
Fair	37	37	36	38	36	50	32	35	33	38	57
Poor	48	51	43	41	45	25	32	41	56	31	36
Unsure/ Don't know	11	8	18	14	17	15	32	12	11	23	7

IR scholars are similarly skeptical of the Iraqi government’s ability to meet political and military benchmarks for ending violence in Iraq. They almost unanimously agree that the Iraqi government has done either a fair or poor job of meeting these benchmarks. The extremely high rate of “don’t know” answers suggests that scholars know more and feel more strongly about the presence of U.S. troops than they do the performance of the Iraqi government.

Q66: In your opinion, is a redeployment of US troops from Iraq to Afghanistan likely to increase U.S. national security, decrease U.S. national security, or make no difference to U.S. national security?⁷⁸

Response	US
Strongly increase national security	7
Somewhat increase national security	50
Neither increase nor decrease national security	25
Somewhat decrease national security	10
Strongly decrease national security	4
Unsure/ Don't know	4

American scholars believe that if their advice is taken, and troops are withdrawn from Iraq, they should be redeployed in Afghanistan, a shift in priorities that, they argue, would enhance U.S. national security. Like those in question 64, the answers to this question are consistent with Obama’s stated intentions during the campaign. It is no surprise, then, that U.S. IR scholars overwhelmingly supported Obama in the recent election (see question 76).

⁷⁸ This question was asked only of U.S. respondents.

Q66: Which three U.S. Presidents have been the most effective in the area of foreign policy over the past 100 years?⁷⁹

	All	US 06	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Theodore Roosevelt	18	14	19	13	17	14	4	31	56	7	14
William Taft	<1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Woodrow Wilson	31	20	30	25	39	43	48	6	56	14	29
Warren Harding	<1	0	<1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Calvin Coolidge	<1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Herbert Hoover	<1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Franklin Roosevelt	69	68	67	73	67	67	61	50	22	71	64
Harry Truman	29	28	32	29	22	43	22	31	0	21	21
Dwight Eisenhower	15	18	17	17	8	5	13	6	0	14	14
John F. Kennedy	21	24	21	13	26	14	30	13	56	29	0
Lyndon Johnson	1	1	<1	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richard Nixon	29	25	24	28	35	19	13	63	11	43	50
Gerald Ford	<1	0	<1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jimmy Carter	13	8	13	14	13	5	13	0	11	7	7
Ronald Reagan	28	22	25	21	33	29	35	38	33	43	43
George H.W. Bush	12	20	12	14	6	19	9	6	11	0	14
Bill Clinton	31	36	29	36	25	24	35	6	33	50	29
George W. Bush	3	4	2	2	3	0	4	19	11	0	0

In every country save South Africa and Israel, Franklin Roosevelt is considered the most effective foreign policy president in the United States since 1900. Five presidents then jostle for second honors: Wilson, whose reputation abroad is, curiously, much higher than in the States; Truman, best regarded in the United Kingdom; Nixon, deemed most effective in Israel, most likely because of his role in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War; Reagan, universally popular despite the fact that IR scholars are left-leaning in their political ideology; and Clinton, the darling of North America. Unsurprisingly, George W. Bush has few supporters anywhere outside Israel, to whom he has long been considered a good friend, and South Africa, which has benefitted significantly from increased foreign aid under President Bush and from his President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.

⁷⁹ This question was asked of respondents in all countries except the United States, where it was asked in 2006. The 2006 responses are included here. This question bears the same number as the previous question, which was asked only on the U.S. survey.

Q67: Compared with the past, how respected is the United States by other countries today?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
More respected than in the past	<1	<1	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	7	0
As respected as it was in the past	5	5	5	3	4	0	4	18	0	0	14
Less respected than in the past	95	95	95	97	96	100	96	76	100	93	86

Q68: If you believe the United States is less respected, do you think less respect for the United States is a major problem, a minor problem, or not a problem at all?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Major problem	69	75	58	70	52	41	50	46	40	50	67
Minor problem	26	23	31	24	41	45	27	38	20	43	17
Not a problem at all	5	2	11	3	7	14	23	15	40	7	17

The majority of scholars in all the countries surveyed agree that international respect for the United States has eroded. American scholars (73 percent) and their Canadian neighbors to the north (72 percent) are the most likely to think that this loss in respect poses a major problem. Few scholars anywhere think the United States' diminished global standing is not a problem.

Q69: The foreign aid budget of [Country X] should be:

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA ⁸⁰	HK	Sin
Increased substantially	58	60	53	59	71	41	43	12		36	29
Increased marginally	26	25	27	29	20	41	22	18		57	50
Remain about the same	12	11	15	8	8	18	30	53		7	21
Decreased marginally	2	2	2	3	0	0	0	6		0	0
Decreased substantially	2	2	3	1	1	0	4	12		0	0

Most IR scholars believe that their countries should allocate substantially more money to foreign aid. That said, significant numbers of respondents in Israel (53 percent), Ireland (32 percent) and Singapore (21 percent) consider their country's current aid levels sufficient. Almost no scholars advocate reducing their government's foreign aid budget. Still, while most favor increasing foreign aid, when asked on which program they would rather their country spend money (question 90) respondents decisively privilege climate change over development assistance. Scholars might like to see increased foreign aid, in short, but their top priorities lie elsewhere.

⁸⁰ This question did not appear on the South African survey.

Q69: In general, do you think that multilateral trade arrangements (like the EU, NAFTA, and WTO) have been good or bad for [Country X]?

	All	US 06	UK	Can 06	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Very good	28	20	32	15	10	14	39	38	0	36	64
Good	52	61	53	55	53	64	48	50	40	57	29
Neither good nor bad	14	13	10	17	27	18	13	13	30	7	0
Bad	5	6	4	8	10	5	0	0	30	0	7
Very bad	1	1	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

On balance, a majority of scholars in every country agree that multilateral trade arrangements have benefitted their country. In both newly industrialized countries in the sample, Hong Kong and Singapore, scholars felt that expanded trade had profoundly benefitted their countries. On the other hand, scholars in South Africa, the only developing country in the survey, were the least enthusiastic, though positive responses still outnumbered negative ones.

Q69: In general, do you think that multilateral trade arrangements (like the EU, NAFTA, and the WTO) have been good or bad for developing countries?

	All	US 06	UK	Can 06	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Very good	2	2	2	2	1	0	0	12	0	14	14
Good	29	34	26	34	25	32	48	41	20	50	43
Neither good nor bad	19	21	17	21	21	27	9	29	20	36	21
Bad	39	31	41	31	47	32	30	18	60	0	21
Very bad	10	12	14	12	5	9	13	0	0	0	0

IR scholars diverge on how multilateral trade agreements have affected developing countries. In most countries, either majorities or pluralities of scholars believe that these arrangements have harmed developing nations. This question reveals bi-modal distributions at the aggregate level, with more respondents in the “good” and “bad” categories and fewer in the “neither” middle category. This question requires individual level analysis to determine whether ideology, paradigm, region, issue area, or some other factors are driving these interesting results. In the one developing country in our survey, 60 percent of scholars answered that these institutions were “bad” for developing countries. UK (55 percent) and Australian (52 percent) IR communities also were quite negative about the impact of multilateral trade arrangements for poor countries. Still, scholars in Hong Kong and Singapore, two countries where trade largely drove development, ardently believe in the promise of these institutions for less-developed countries.

Q72: In general should development assistance programs allocate foreign aid to:

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Countries with governments that are most willing and able to implement aid projects as they are designed	52	57	44	44	27	45	48	69	60	43	79
Countries with the highest rates of poverty	42	36	50	52	61	50	48	19	30	50	21
Former colonies	1	<1	3	1	1	0	0	0	10	0	0
Geo-political allies	6	6	3	3	11	5	4	13	0	7	0

Among scholars in the established OECD DAC donor countries—namely the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland—American academics are the outliers: scholars in all other DAC countries prefer to direct foreign aid to the most poverty-stricken countries, but scholars in the United States strongly prefer to allocate money to those governments that also can credibly commit to using the money as intended by the donor. This preference reflects the Bush Administration’s new U.S. foreign aid philosophy, embodied in the recently established Millennium Challenge Corporation, that money should be disbursed only to countries with effective governments that respect the rule of law and enforce “pro-growth” economic policies.

Scholars from emerging donor countries, such as Israel, South Africa, and Singapore, share the views of U.S. scholars. High rates of liberalism and rationalism in Israel and Singapore may explain this pattern, since the research that under-girds “aid selectivity” was championed by U.S. economists and IPE scholars in the 1990s, but they do not explain the enthusiasm among South African scholars for selective aid policy. Unlike Israel and Singapore, South Africa is both a donor and a recipient of foreign aid. Perhaps South African scholars recognize that, compared to other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa has a reputation for effective institutions and thus could expect to receive more assistance from a selective aid regime. Scholars from South Africa are also the only ones showing any enthusiasm for allocations to former colonies, perhaps because their country continues to receive substantial aid from the United Kingdom.

Q73: Currently, the level of immigration in [Country X] is:

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Too high	10	10	14	8	11	0	4	6	30	21	21
At about the correct level	48	49	46	53	35	48	57	59	20	36	57
Too low	22	23	16	23	37	38	17	18	20	21	0
Unsure/Don't know	19	19	24	16	17	14	22	18	30	21	21

IR scholars are less xenophobic than the general public. Public opinion across the countries in our survey demonstrates a widespread belief that immigration levels are too high and that restrictions on immigration should be increased. In a recent cross-national public opinion poll Pew found that 75 percent of British citizens wanted additional restrictions on immigration. In Israel the number

was 74 percent, and in the United States 75 percent. Canadian citizens were the most open to immigration, but 62 percent still preferred more restrictions. Only in South Africa (30 percent), Hong Kong (21 percent), and Singapore (21 percent), do significant percentages of IR scholars believe immigration is too high. But even in these countries scholars are more accommodating of immigration than the general public. For example, in South Africa fully 89 percent of citizens prefer stricter immigration laws.⁸¹

Q74: What are the three most important foreign policy problems facing [Country X] today?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Armed Conflict in the Middle East	28	32	26	19	8	5	9	59	0	14	0
Epidemic and/or Pandemic Disease	6	5	6	10	7	11	9	0	50	43	21
Ethnic Conflict	7	7	3	10	4	11	9	29	10	0	0
Failed States	18	19	14	19	15	26	9	24	40	0	14
Global Climate Change	45	37	58	67	64	58	57	12	0	43	29
Global Population Growth	4	3	8	5	12	0	4	0	0	7	0
Global Poverty	25	21	35	42	28	11	35	0	30	7	0
Global Reliance on Oil	33	33	39	24	32	26	43	18	20	50	14
Homeland Security	4	3	6	7	4	0	4	12	0	0	21
International Organized Crime	5	3	6	9	4	16	22	12	10	7	7
International Terrorism	22	23	25	15	17	5	4	47	0	7	57
Reform of the United Nations	2	1	2	6	7	16	4	0	20	0	0
Regional Integration	5	1	7	10	15	21	52	0	50	7	36
Resource Scarcity	12	10	12	10	19	47	22	12	50	21	21
Rogue States	3	4	1	3	3	0	0	6	10	0	0
Russian Resurgence	12	15	11	6	3	0	9	6	0	14	0
The Rising Power of China	21	23	9	16	33	21	0	0	10	43	57
War in Iraq	27	35	21	4	13	0	0	0	0	0	7

⁸¹ Pew Global Attitudes Project, *47 Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey*, October 4, 2007, especially pp 25-28.

WMD Proliferation	21	27	11	2	13	16	0	53	0	0	14
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Climate change is by far the most pressing foreign policy issue facing their governments today, according to IR scholars. This is both striking and surprising, given the current economic turmoil and the participation of many of the countries surveyed in various wars. Yet, despite widespread concern about global climate change among IR scholars, only 7 percent actually research the environment (as a primary or secondary field; see questions 27 and 28), and 8 percent teach courses on global environmental issues. The only scholarly community in which climate change does not rank in the top 5 foreign policy problems is South Africa, the only developing country in our sample.⁸²

In our 2006 survey, 48 percent of U.S. scholars and 49 percent of Canadian scholars identified “terrorist attacks” as a top foreign policy problem, while in 2008 those numbers dropped to 23 and 15 percent, respectively. In terms of cross-national comparisons, IR experts in neutral countries, such as Ireland (4 percent), New Zealand (5 percent) and South Africa (0 percent) are less concerned about terrorism than scholars in countries with military forces deployed abroad, such as the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Israel and (until recently) Singapore.

Whether the rising power of China worries IR scholars depends on their country’s proximity to Beijing. Scholars in the United States, the current global hegemon, are also concerned about China as a potential to become a peer competitor. For scholars in Ireland, United Kingdom, South Africa, and Israel, China’s ascendance is a non-issue.

⁸² This pattern is consistent with the policy views of developing versus developed country governments as well. For a discussion of the long standing disagreement on the priority of climate change see Robert L. Hicks, Bradley C. Parks, J. Timmons Roberts, and Michael J. Tierney, *Greening Aid? Understanding the Impact of Development Assistance* (Oxford University Press, 2008).

Q75: What are the three most important foreign policy issues [Country X] will face over the next 10 years? Please rank only the top three.

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Armed Conflict in the Middle East	19	22	18	8	7	5	0	65	0	7	7
Epidemic and/or Pandemic Disease	9	7	7	14	5	11	5	0	50	43	29
Ethnic Conflict	7	7	5	8	3	0	10	29	10	7	0
Failed States	16	17	9	17	15	16	5	29	30	0	14
Global Climate Change	53	46	68	73	66	63	76	18	20	57	43
Global Population Growth	5	4	8	5	16	11	5	0	0	7	0
Global Poverty	28	25	36	38	30	11	29	6	60	0	0
Global Reliance on Oil	35	34	42	31	36	21	62	12	10	21	21
Homeland Security	3	3	5	6	4	0	0	12	0	0	14
International Organized Crime	4	3	5	6	3	5	29	6	0	0	0
International Terrorism	2	1	3	7	3	11	5	0	10	0	7
Reform of the United Nations	17	19	17	10	15	5	5	18	0	7	36
Regional Integration	5	1	7	10	16	21	43	0	40	21	21
Resource Scarcity	19	18	21	19	22	37	19	24	50	36	0
Rogue States	4	4	0	6	1	5	0	6	0	0	0
Russian Resurgence	13	15	13	8	1	0	5	12	0	14	0
The Rising Power of China	33	39	15	22	39	42	5	0	20	43	71
War in Iraq	6	8	4	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
WMD Proliferation	23	27	15	12	16	21	0	65	0	0	7

Fears about global climate change intensify when considering the foreign policy challenges of the next 10 years. In New Zealand, for example, fully 76 percent of IR scholars agree that this environmental concern is one of the top three foreign policy issues. This preoccupation with climate change persists when scholars are asked to which of three social issues they would rather allocate money (question 90); it also likely explains scholars' continued focus on reducing global oil dependence.

Respondents' attitudes towards WMD proliferation suggest that this issue is at best only moderately important for most countries. The exception is Israel, where 65 percent of scholars rank proliferation as one of the most pressing questions facing the country, no doubt because of concern over the Iranian and Syrian nuclear programs.

Although question 81 reveals that IR scholars do not want Russia to surpass the United States in relative power, very few respondents in any country rank the possibility as an important foreign policy challenge. It is likely, therefore, that they also believe that the probability of such resurgence is low.

Q76: Which U.S. Presidential candidate would be better for [Country X] foreign policy interests if elected?⁸³

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Barack Obama	69	78	59	51	36	27	45	19	60	43	29
John McCain	8	8	5	7	12	14	0	44	0	0	36
Both about the same	11	6	17	22	26	32	14	25	10	21	29
Neither	8	4	14	17	18	27	23	0	30	14	0
Unsure/Don't know	4	4	5	3	8	0	18	13	0	21	7

While Barack Obama was popular with American voters in 2008, he was even more popular among American IR scholars, who preferred him at a ratio of about 10:1 over John McCain—an unsurprising trend given the left-leaning ideology of the US IR academy (see question 17). More interesting is the variation we observe across countries. Every country except Israel and Singapore felt that Obama would advance its foreign policy interests more than McCain, although these numbers pale in comparison to Obama’s popularity among U.S. academics.⁸⁴

Remarkably, many scholars outside the United States either did not believe there was a clear difference among the candidates on this issue or did not know how the election would impact their countries’ foreign policy interests: combining the “don’t know,” “neither,” and “both the same” responses yields huge numbers of IR experts who thought that, at least on this dimension, the election simply didn’t matter (UK = 36%, SA = 40%, Can = 42%, Aus = 52%, Ire = 55%, HK = 56%, Isr = 38%, NZ = 59%). Either these experts were unsure of the differences between the candidates, or they believed that U.S. policy is constant regardless of the personality in the White House.

Q77: In your opinion, which U.S. Presidential candidate is more likely to advance the interests of the international community if elected?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Barack Obama	81	84	78	80	67	64	77	50	80	57	79
John McCain	3	3	3	1	4	0	5	38	0	7	7
Both about the same	6	4	7	11	12	9	14	0	10	14	0
Neither	6	4	11	7	13	23	5	6	10	14	0
Unsure/Don't know	4	4	1	2	4	5	0	6	0	7	14

Most scholars considered Obama better for their countries’ national interests, but they have even more confidence that he will advance the interests of the international community. The “don’t know” and “both about the same” responses drop dramatically for this question, such that scholars end up favoring Obama at a rate of 27 to 1.

⁸³ The survey was conducted prior to the 2008 presidential election

⁸⁴ Note, the question does not ask, “who would you support if you could vote in the U.S. election;” instead, it asks how the 2008 election would affect the foreign policy interests of the state within which the respondent currently holds a position.

Q78: Do you think that [Country X] should increase its spending on national defense, keep it about the same, or decrease it?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK ⁸⁵	Sin
Increase national defense spending	11	6	15	34	17	29	32	0	0	7	43
Keep national defense spending about the same	35	30	39	41	45	57	55	59	10	64	50
Decrease national defense spending	54	64	46	24	38	14	14	41	90	29	7

IR scholars are mixed on the question of whether their governments ought to increase defense spending. Scholars in six countries prefer lower to higher defense spending (excluding the middle category), while those in the remaining four countries vote to increase more than the vote to decrease it. Because the U.S. community is so strongly in favor of spending cuts, however, and because they have so many respondents relative to all the other countries combined, the “all” column appears to favor defense spending cuts. Interestingly, those countries with the largest per capita defense spending (Israel and the U.S.) have IR scholars that are most adamant about spending cuts.

U.S. IR scholars have shifted their thinking over the past four years. In 2004, 49 percent of scholars recommended that the United States reduce defense spending while 10 percent favored an increase; in 2008 only 6 percent thought spending should increase while 64 percent favored a reduction. On this point Obama may disappoint IR scholars since he has pledged to increase defense spending in the short run.

Q79: Would you like to see another country surpass the United States as the most powerful country in the world?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Yes	5	4	8	8	7	9	9	0	10	7	0
No	58	66	39	50	47	41	18	100	10	43	50
Depends on the Country	36	30	54	41	47	50	73	0	80	50	50

If ever foreigners harbored ill will for the United States, it was in late 2008. Anti-American sentiment was at an all time high,⁸⁶ and Bush himself was wildly unpopular with both U.S. and non-American publics. Yet few IR scholars are eager to see the United States supplanted as the most powerful country in the world. Perhaps academics believe, as does Michael Mandelbaum,

⁸⁵ The question on the Hong Kong survey said, “Do you think that the PRC government should increase its spending on national defense, keep it about the same, or decrease it?”

⁸⁶ Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006.

that the United States still provides international public goods, which others would miss were U.S. hegemony to wane.⁸⁷

Enthusiasm for a power transition is predictably low in the United States, but it is even lower in Israel, which relies on U.S. foreign aid and diplomatic support, as well as the U.S. Security Council veto. Overall, respondents who describe themselves as realists are most likely to say that they do not want any country to surpass the United States. That said, in many countries the plurality answer is “it depends on which country surpassed the United States.” For those who answer “it depends,” there is clearly something other than the distribution of power that is shaping their answers—it is not merely a matter of preferring multi- or bipolarity to unipolarity. Something about the United States—its institutions, liberal culture, or willingness to provide security guarantees—keeps respondents from hoping for a shift away from U.S. hegemony. We can infer this by the identities of those middle powers that are acceptable to scholars (question 80). Ironically, while the U.S. and U.K. governments enjoy a special relationship, U.K. (along with Irish and South African) scholars most enthusiastically support an American decline.

Q80: If you checked 'yes' or 'depends on the country,' which entity would you like to see surpass the United States? Check all that apply.

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
China	9	8	6	5	11	30	6	0	0	43	14
European Union	86	80	82	86	71	50	83	0	89	71	71
France	6	5	10	6	3	0	0	0	11	0	0
Germany	8	6	12	3	8	10	0	0	22	0	0
India	8	7	9	6	5	10	6	0	22	0	29
Japan	5	3	7	3	5	0	6	0	22	0	0
Russia	2	1	2	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0
UK	8	6	11	8	5	0	0	0	33	0	0
All of the Above	3	4	1	3	5	0	0	0	11	0	0
None	11	7	1	6	11	40	6	0	0	29	0
Other	8	6	13	3	8	0	0	0	0	0	14

Among scholars supporting an American decline, most prefer the European Union to succeed the United States. In fact, support for the European Union as the next dominant entity never falls below 50 percent in any country. British scholars were the only respondents who had the option of voting for their own country to supplant the United States, but they demurred; only 11 percent of British IR scholars desired that their own country rival the United States. Even more surprising, 12 percent of UK scholars selected Germany.

⁸⁷ *The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World's Government in the 21st Century* (Public Affairs Publishing, 2006).

Q81: Which entity would you not like to see surpass the United States?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
China	55	51	64	54	49	47	55	47	67	29	43
European Union	5	4	8	2	6	0	5	18	0	14	0
France	12	9	19	10	17	11	14	6	0	7	0
Germany	11	8	18	10	14	5	9	18	11	7	0
India	20	16	26	19	28	21	18	6	11	7	7
Japan	15	11	24	12	17	11	18	6	11	14	14
Russia	67	60	80	71	63	58	45	53	100	43	79
UK	8	6	17	7	8	0	9	6	0	0	0
All of the Above	18	23	2	11	11	5	14	29	0	0	7
None	9	9	6	7	15	21	18	6	0	29	29
Other	3	2	4	1	0	5	0	0	0	0	0

Scholars universally oppose a Chinese or Russian superpower. Of the two, a Russian resurgence elicits more anxiety. Interestingly, China’s neighbors (New Zealand, Australia, and Singapore) are less fearful of a Chinese ascension than their counterparts in other countries.

The results in questions 80 and 81 support liberal and constructivist predictions that institutional and shared normative constraints result in higher levels of trust. Interestingly, however, there is no statistically significant difference among respondents from different paradigms on this question. This result might cause some readers to wonder whether professed realists actually believe the logic of their own theory.

Q82: How will the rise of China affect international politics? Check all that apply.

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
China’s rapid economic growth will make it a threat to international stability.	22	25	19	23	19	10	29	29	33	21	36
China’s growing military power will make it a threat to international stability.	37	43	32	39	39	25	38	47	22	43	57
China’s rapid economic growth will enhance international stability.	27	27	21	28	35	40	29	12	22	36	50
China’s growing military power will enhance international stability.	5	5	3	8	5	15	5	0	33	7	7
None of the Above	32	30	43	37	36	40	33	35	22	21	7

The scale of last year’s Olympic spectacle in Beijing led to widespread speculation that the games were indicative of China’s regional or even global ambitions. As the *Economist* reported on the eve of the opening ceremony, the 2008 Olympics revealed “the rise of a virulently assertive strain of Chinese nationalism,” portending trouble for the international community. Quoting George Orwell, it was “international sport as ‘mimic warfare.’”⁸⁸ These worries largely align with how IR experts assess China’s rise.

A third to a quarter of respondents in each country expects that a militarily powerful China will threaten international stability. The highest percentages are found in China’s nearest neighbors—Singapore (57 percent) and Hong Kong (43 percent)—and in the United States (43 percent), which has significant economic and security interests in the region.

IR scholars are divided on how rapid economic growth would affect Beijing’s aims. Scholars saying that there would be greater international stability if China had a larger piece of the global economic pie have the edge (if slight in some cases) over those who predict a wealthier China would destabilize the international system in every country, except for Israel and South Africa.

Q83: In 50 years do you expect Europe to be a sovereign entity, or will the various members of the European Union continue to maintain their independence?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Europe will be united as one state	16	18	10	16	11	20	29	12	30	29	0
Europe will be pretty much like it is today	72	72	76	72	73	65	52	82	70	57	93
The EU will disintegrate and member states will reassert their sovereignty	3	3	5	3	5	10	5	0	0	7	0
Don't know	8	7	9	10	11	5	14	6	0	7	7

In general, IR scholars expect the *status quo* to persist in Europe. The only two European states in the sample, the United Kingdom and Ireland, are on opposite ends of a narrow distribution: U.K. scholars doubt the likelihood of a united Europe, while 29 percent of Irish scholars anticipate an eventual union. This result is ironic, since only a few months before the survey was conducted the Irish people voted resoundingly to reject the EU draft constitution. If the prediction that the EU will disintegrate and member states will reassert their national sovereignty is the “realist” answer, then we might expect to see more scholars from the United States and Israel selecting that option than we do.

⁸⁸ China’s Dash for Freedom,” *The Economist*, 31 July 2008.

Q84: Which of the following most closely captures the process by which [Country X] foreign policy is made?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Foreign policy reflects the preferences of domestic elites in [Country X].	38	39	38	41	30	33	23	12	30	14	36
Foreign policy reflects the preferences of certain powerful interest groups in [Country X].	31	36	22	24	19	10	14	29	50	14	0
Foreign policy reflects the strategic interests of [Country X].	17	15	20	13	26	33	23	35	20	50	64
Foreign policy reflects the interests of other powerful states	3	0	12	7	14	0	5	0	0	0	0
Foreign policy reflects domestic political norms or culture in [Country X].	10	9	7	14	11	24	27	24	0	21	0
Foreign policy reflects public opinion in [Country X].	2	2	0	1	1	0	9	0	0	0	0

No matter their country, IR scholars agree on one thing: their country's foreign policy does not reflect public opinion. The trend holds even in highly institutionalized democracies where the number never exceeds 10 percent. (For scholars who do survey research on public opinion and foreign policy, this result is mildly distressing; our peers think we are wasting our time.)

While we might expect that the foreign policy of poor or weak states, which are more easily coerced by great powers, would reflect the interests of other states, in fact it is the U.K. and Australian scholars who believe that their governments' policies are swayed by powerful states' interests. The finding may result from British and Australian scholars' resentment of their governments' decisions to follow the United States into the 2003 invasion of Iraq, despite the opposition of both public opinion and the academic community (see question 61).

Q85: If the Sudanese government continues human rights abuses within its borders, do you support or oppose the United States taking unilateral military action against Sudan?⁸⁹

Q86: If the Iranian government continues to produce material that can be used to build nuclear weapons, do you support or oppose the United States taking unilateral military action against Iran?⁹⁰

Q87: If the Russian government violates the recently negotiated ceasefire and attacks Georgia again, do you support or oppose the United States taking unilateral military action to defend Georgia?⁹¹

(Strongly support=2, Somewhat support=1, Neither support nor oppose=0, Somewhat oppose=-1, Strongly oppose=-2)⁹²

		All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Sudan	Unilateral	-0.4	-0.4	-0.3	-0.5	-0.2	-0.8	-0.8	0.3	-0.7	0.2	0.1
	Coalition	0.1	0.2	-0.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NATO	0.2	0.3	-0.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	UN	0.6	0.6	0.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iran	Unilateral	-1.2	-1.3	-1.5	-1.3	-1.2	-1.4	-1.4	0.4	-1.7	0.9	0.9
	Coalition	-1.2	-1.1	-1.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NATO	-1.1	-1.1	-1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	UN	-0.8	-1	0.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Georgia	Unilateral	-1.5	-1.5	-1.5	-1.6	-1.6	-1.8	-1.1	-0.3	-0.5	-0.6	-
	Coalition	-1.3	-1.3	-1.4	-1.2	-1.6	-1.3	-1.4	0	-1	-0.5	-
	NATO	-1.2	-1.4	-1.1	-1	-1	-0.7	-1.8	-1.8	1.3	-0.8	-
	UN	-1.1	-1.2	-1	-1	-1	-0.8	-0.4	-0.2	-1	0.5	-

⁸⁹ The three other experimental variations were: “If the Sudanese government continues human rights abuses within its borders, do you support or oppose a U.S.-led coalition of willing countries taking military action against Sudan?”, “If the Sudanese government continues human rights abuses within its borders, do you support or oppose a NATO-approved force, led by the United States, taking military action against Sudan?”, and “If the Sudanese government continues human rights abuses within its borders, do you support or oppose a UN Security Council-approved force, led by the United States, taking military action against Sudan?”

⁹⁰ The three other experimental variations were: “If the Iranian government continues to produce material that can be used to build nuclear weapons, do you support or oppose a US-led coalition of willing countries taking military action against Iran?”, “If the Iranian government continues to produce material that can be used to build nuclear weapons, do you support or oppose a NATO-approved force, led by the United States, taking military action against Iran?”, and “If the Iranian government continues to produce material that can be used to build nuclear weapons, do you support or oppose UN Security Council-approved force, led by the United States, taking military action against Iran?”

⁹¹ The three other experimental variations were: “If the Russian government violates the recently negotiated ceasefire and attacks Georgia again, do you support or oppose a U.S.-led coalition of willing countries taking military action to defend Georgia?”, “If the Russian government violates the recently negotiated ceasefire and attacks Georgia again, do you support or oppose a NATO-approved force, led by the United States, taking military action to defend Georgia?” and “If the Russian government violates the recently negotiated ceasefire and attacks Georgia again, do you support or oppose a UN Security Council-approved force, led by the United States, taking military action to defend Georgia?”

⁹² Due to a technical glitch in the survey software, all but the U.S. and U.K. respondents received only one treatment for the Sudan and Iran questions. Singapore did not receive the Georgia question.

There is little appetite among IR experts—in any country we surveyed—for unilateral military action by the United States in Sudan, including importantly in South Africa, which has the most at stake in that conflict. Canadian and U.S. scholars are also skeptical (although slightly less so) of intervention in Sudan, even if it were conducted under the aegis of NATO or the United Nations.

When asked about a possible U.S. military intervention in Iran or Georgia, scholars are divided. Many IR experts in the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Ireland and South Africa somewhat or strongly support a decision by Washington to use force against Iran, if it continues to pursue a nuclear capability. On the other hand, scholars from important U.S. allies—Canada and Australia—strongly oppose action, if the United States were to go it alone. Certainly reflecting Israel’s tense relationship with Iran, Israeli scholars were noncommittal: they neither support nor oppose U.S. military action against Tehran. There is less support for a multilateral response to Iranian proliferation: we find some resistance among American scholars to intervention conducted by a coalition of the willing or NATO—and *opposition* to a UN intervention. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, a chief U.S. ally during its wars the Middle East, there is more stomach for action by an ad-hoc (perhaps smaller) coalition than for a NATO or UN mission.

When contemplating a confrontation with Russia if Moscow adopts a bellicose stance towards Georgia, there is again a divergence of opinion. American, British, and New Zealand scholars support the use of military force to defend Georgia in any guise, although there is a slight preference for a unilateral U.S. intervention over multilateral action. However, if Washington were to come to the defense of Georgia, it would likely encounter resistance from IR experts in Canada and Australia, who oppose a military response under any conditions.

Q88: Do you think that [Country X] should increase its spending on global AIDS, keep it about the same, or decrease it?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
Increase global AIDS spending	61	59	69	63	72	42	62	38	90	57	62
Keep global AIDS spending about the same	37	39	27	36	24	58	38	56	10	43	38
Decrease global AIDS spending	2	2	4	1	4	0	0	6	0	0	0

Substantial majorities of IR scholars desire an increase in spending to address the global AIDS pandemic. The two notable exceptions are New Zealand and Israel, both countries with very low HIV prevalence rates.⁹³ Still, the United Kingdom and Australia, among others, have low prevalence rates as well, but large majorities in these countries favor increased AIDS spending. More likely, the relatively large proportion of realists in New Zealand and Israel, as well as in Hong Kong and the United States, oppose increased spending on social issues. While almost all the other respondents believe current spending levels are appropriate, almost no scholars believe that spending should be cut.

⁹³ Estimated adult (aged 15-49) HIV prevalence rate, UNAIDS, *2008 Report on the global AIDS epidemic* (Geneva: Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, 2008).

Q89: Some people argue that the most effective way to curb the global AIDS pandemic is through prevention education, while others emphasize the provision of drug treatment or the development of an AIDS vaccine. In which of the following areas should the United States and other donor countries invest most heavily?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA	HK	Sin
AIDS prevention education	44	43	42	39	47	63	62	69	60	58	50
Development of an AIDS vaccine	27	28	24	23	26	16	14	19	10	33	50
Provision of antiretroviral medications	29	29	33	38	27	21	24	13	30	8	0

IR scholars once again take issue with a signature policy of the Bush Administration. Under President Bush the United States led the way in devoting significant new resources to the global fight against HIV/AIDS, but for the first time the United States emphasized the provision of antiretrovirals (ARVs) to help the sick and dying. This policy has been controversial among AIDS experts, who worry that it diverts resources from prevention. A strong plurality of IR scholars shares their concern: forty-four percent of IR faculty believe that AIDS prevention education is the most effective way to address the global pandemic. Unsurprisingly, the provision of medications to people who are already infected is relatively popular in South Africa, where 18.1 percent of the population is infected with HIV and/or AIDS.⁹⁴ It is more popular, still, in Britain and especially in Canada, where nearly as many scholars prefer this option to prevention education. The provision of ARVs is distinctively unpopular in Hong Kong and Singapore, perhaps because of concerns about intellectual property rights and patent protection on these medications.

⁹⁴ Estimated adult (aged 15-49) HIV prevalence rate, UNAIDS, *2008 Report on the global AIDS epidemic*, 214.

Q90: If the [Country X] government had an additional one billion dollars to spend in the next fiscal year on an international problem or initiative, to which of the following areas should it devote these resources?

	All	US	UK	Can	Aus	NZ	Ire	Isr	SA ⁹⁵	HK	Sin
Greenhouse gas emissions and climate change	54	55	57	54	45	50	59	27	40	54	43
Economic development assistance	35	34	33	32	44	44	32	67	40	46	50
Global AIDS pandemic	10	10	9	13	11	6	9	7	20	0	7

IR scholars clearly see poverty reduction and especially climate change as higher priorities than addressing the global AIDS pandemic. This pattern reinforces the results from questions 74 and 75 and holds true even though almost no scholars wanted to cut funding to address AIDS (question 89). Rather, the responses suggest how intensely scholars feel about global climate change. The most enthusiastic support for the AIDS budget item comes from South African scholars, who live in a country where 18.1 percent of people are thought to be infected by the virus, but even there support for AIDS spending is only half that for foreign aid or greenhouse emissions.

⁹⁵ In South Africa, the question read, “If donor countries had an additional one billion dollars to spend in the next fiscal year on an international problem or initiative, to which of the following areas should it devote these resources?”