H. D. P. Envall
The Australian National University, International Relations, Department Member
- International Relations, Japan, Japanese politics, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Japanese Studies, Northeast Asian Security, and 26 morePolitical leadership, Leadership (Political Science), Security Studies, Asian security, Japan, Australia, Australian foreign policy, Security, Foreign Policy, Japanese Ssecurity Policy, LDP, DPJ, Party Politics, Prime Minister, Leadership, Abe Shinzo, Junichiro Koizumi, Japanese Leadership, Japanese Politics (Political Science), International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Analysis, East Asia Security, History of US-Japan Relations, International Politics, Sino-Japanese relations, International Relations of East Asia, Japanese Foreign Policy, and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Reliefedit
- David Envall is a fellow / senior lecturer in the Department of International Relations at The Australian National Un... moreDavid Envall is a fellow / senior lecturer in the Department of International Relations at The Australian National University. In addition to having worked as a copy editor and corporate editor/writer, David has formerly held appointments teaching Japanese foreign relations at Tokyo International University and politics at La Trobe University. Find out more about David's work at https://hdpenvall.com/edit
his East-West Center Occasional Paper is the first in a set of two papers examining the ways in which Australia and Japan have sought to leverage minilateral forms of cooperation as a means of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.... more
his East-West Center Occasional Paper is the first in a set of two papers examining the ways in which Australia and Japan have sought to leverage minilateral forms of cooperation as a means of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. The topic of minilateralism is usually treated as response to the rise of China on the part of “Western” countries, but this obscures the fact that Beijing is also a major practitioner of minilateral forms of cooperation. This paper concludes that Australia and Japan have taken a traditional “security-first” approach to minilateralism. This stands in contrast to the more expansive approach pursued by Beijing, which focuses primarily on geoeconomics along with China’s broader goal of becoming a global leader, which has potential implications for international order. This indicates a significant “mismatch” between the respective vectors along which Australia/Japan and China are pursuing competitive advantage, and underscores how Canberra and Tokyo will need to manage the “security/economic disconnect” in the region, questions to be examined further in the second Occasional Paper that follows.
This East-West Center Occasional Paper is part of an Australia-Japan Foundation funded project, entitled “Enhancing Australia-Japan Cooperation: New Approaches to Minilateralism,” undertaken by Thomas Wilkins, Miwa Hirono, Kyoko Hatakeyama, and H.D.P. Envall. It is the first in a series of two papers. The second is entitled “Japan/Australia Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific (II): Advancing Cooperation in Order-Building and Geoeconomics.”
CITATION: Wilkins, Thomas S., Hirono, Miwa, Hatakeyama, Kyoko and Envall, HDP (2024) “Indo-Pacific Minilateralism and Strategic Competition (I): Australia/Japan and Chinese Approaches Compared,” East-West Center Occasional Paper 9, 9 June, Washington, DC: East-West Center.
This East-West Center Occasional Paper is part of an Australia-Japan Foundation funded project, entitled “Enhancing Australia-Japan Cooperation: New Approaches to Minilateralism,” undertaken by Thomas Wilkins, Miwa Hirono, Kyoko Hatakeyama, and H.D.P. Envall. It is the first in a series of two papers. The second is entitled “Japan/Australia Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific (II): Advancing Cooperation in Order-Building and Geoeconomics.”
CITATION: Wilkins, Thomas S., Hirono, Miwa, Hatakeyama, Kyoko and Envall, HDP (2024) “Indo-Pacific Minilateralism and Strategic Competition (I): Australia/Japan and Chinese Approaches Compared,” East-West Center Occasional Paper 9, 9 June, Washington, DC: East-West Center.
A political leader is most often a nation’s most high-profile foreign policy figure, its chief diplomat. But how do individual leadership styles, personalities, perceptions, or beliefs shape diplomacy? In Japanese Diplomacy, the question... more
A political leader is most often a nation’s most high-profile foreign policy figure, its chief diplomat. But how do individual leadership styles, personalities, perceptions, or beliefs shape diplomacy? In Japanese Diplomacy, the question of what role leadership plays in diplomacy is applied to Japan, a country where the individual is often viewed as being at the mercy of the group and where prime ministers have been largely thought of as reactive and weak. In challenging earlier, simplified ideas of Japanese political leadership, H. D. P. Envall argues that Japan’s leaders, from early Cold War figures such as Yoshida Shigeru to the charismatic and innovative Koizumi Jun’ichirō to the present leadership of Abe Shinzō, have pursued leadership strategies of varying coherence and rationality, often independent of their political environment. He also finds that different Japanese leaders have shaped Japanese diplomacy in some important and underappreciated ways. In certain environments, individual difference has played a significant role in determining Japan’s diplomacy, both in terms of the country’s strategic identity and summit diplomacy. What emerges from Japanese Diplomacy, therefore, is a more nuanced overall picture of Japanese leadership in foreign affairs.
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Japan has been a strong supporter of America’s ‘pivot’, or ‘rebalance’, to the Asia-Pacific. Why has it responded in such a way? Japan’s established position in the region naturally makes it a keen supporter of the status quo and thus of... more
Japan has been a strong supporter of America’s ‘pivot’, or ‘rebalance’, to the Asia-Pacific. Why has it responded in such a way? Japan’s established position in the region naturally makes it a keen supporter of the status quo and thus of the US-led order. Yet this does not fully explain Japan’s support. This article contends that to understand Japan’s position, it is necessary to more closely consider how Japan views the rebalance’s probable strategic benefits and costs. In fact, increasingly difficult Sino-Japanese relations have led Japan to reassess such costs and benefits, with Japan becoming more anxious to ensure that the United States continues to provide strategic reassurance to the region, even if this means that Japan is required to restructure its own security role in return. In turn, Japan’s security restructuring has important implications not only for its national security but also for wider regional stability.
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This article examines the use of strategic partnerships by Asian states as a means of enhancing national and regional security, as well as advancing economic and other objectives. It argues that strategic partnerships are best conceived... more
This article examines the use of strategic partnerships by Asian states as a means of enhancing national and regional security, as well as advancing economic and other objectives. It argues that strategic partnerships are best conceived as a new practice that signals the emergence of new forms of “security governance” in the region. It observes, however, that whereas early strategic partnerships were based on substantive shared agreement on “system principles,” contemporary strategic partnerships take different forms, some grounding closer cooperation between like-minded partners and some intending to facilitate better management of partners with divergent values and interests. The contemporary behavior of the United States and its traditional and new security partners in the region conform to this general pattern. The article concludes that the proliferation of strategic partnerships and the emergence of regional security governance should prompt a reappraisal of traditional approaches to Asian security, which tend to concentrate on architecture and community at the expense of practices.
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Discontent over US military bases in Japan's Okinawa prefecture has long been a prominent " thorn in the side " of US–Japan relations. But what exactly has been the effect of Okinawa's base politics on the management of the alliance? We... more
Discontent over US military bases in Japan's Okinawa prefecture has long been a prominent " thorn in the side " of US–Japan relations. But what exactly has been the effect of Okinawa's base politics on the management of the alliance? We examine Okinawa's significance on the US–Japan alliance—the " Okinawa effect " —in terms of the alliance's strategic coherence. Through an examination of the post–Cold War history of the base issue, we argue that, while there little to suggest that the Okinawa issue has undermined the alliance's strategic effectiveness , alliance efficiency in dealing with burden sharing problems has been diminished, at times substantially. While reduced efficiency may often be inevitable in alliances between democracies , this persistent inability to resolve burden sharing disputes in the Okinawan case means that there is still potential for deteriorating efficiency to eventually undermine the alliance's solidarity and effectiveness.
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The US military bases in the Japanese prefecture of Okinawa have long been a source of domestic political opposition to the US–Japan alliance. As an alliance management issue, the ongoing troubles surrounding the bases raise questions as... more
The US military bases in the Japanese prefecture of Okinawa have long been a source of domestic political opposition to the US–Japan alliance. As an alliance management issue, the ongoing troubles surrounding the bases raise questions as to when and why states adopt particular bargaining strategies when dealing with allies. Why, for instance, has the Japanese government not made greater use of this ‘Okinawa card’ when negotiating alliance issues with the USA? Even though highlighting particular domestic problems as a part of a negotiating strategy (known as tying hands) should appeal to a weaker ally such as Japan, this article argues that in the Okinawan case the reverse has been true. Japan has generally, though not always, sought to minimise or downplay domestic opposition to its alliance agreements, essentially preferring a cutting-slack to a tying-hands approach. The Japanese experience suggests that when states which are directly dependent on an alliance for their security see their security environment as unstable, they view tying-hands strategies as too likely to undermine their bargaining credibility. Maintaining credibility is important in an alliance bargaining context because it is a way for such states to signal their commitment to an alliance and so guard against abandonment.
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On becoming prime minister in 2006, Abe Shinzō was feted as the ‘prince’ of Japanese politics. A year later, Abe's Liberal Democratic Party had suffered a major electoral defeat and Abe's time as his country's leader was over. As a study... more
On becoming prime minister in 2006, Abe Shinzō was feted as the ‘prince’ of Japanese politics. A year later, Abe's Liberal Democratic Party had suffered a major electoral defeat and Abe's time as his country's leader was over. As a study of political leadership, this article seeks to explain the leadership outcomes of Abe's brief prime ministership, in particular the dramatic fall in public support Abe suffered during his tenure. It is argued that, despite the difficult circumstances Abe faced, the nature of his political demise cannot be fully accounted for by structural factors alone. It is also necessary to understand the role played by Abe himself and, in particular, his flawed leadership strategy. In the end, Abe's political demise followed a basic logic: high expectations followed by disillusionment characterised by sudden plunges in approval—a tragedy of hubris leading to nemesis.
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Japan's alliance with the United States remains the cornerstone of the country's security policy. Indeed, the alliance has long delivered Japan considerable strategic advantages, such as greater deterrence of regional security threats.... more
Japan's alliance with the United States remains the cornerstone of the country's security policy. Indeed, the alliance has long delivered Japan considerable strategic advantages, such as greater deterrence of regional security threats. Yet the alliance has also come with costs. It has institutionalized Tokyo's dependence on Washington, thus limiting the country's strategic autonomy. This chapter examines how Japan has sought to manage the task of reconciling such tensionsbetween the often-conflicting goals of deterrence and autonomy. It argues that, while Japan has pursued autonomy where possible, it has repeatedly prioritized deterrence as the country's primary national security goal.
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This East-West Center Occasional Paper is the second of a set of two papers examining how Japan and Australia are seeking to employ minilateral institutions to enhance their cooperation and compete strategically in an increasingly... more
This East-West Center Occasional Paper is the second of a set of two papers examining how Japan and Australia are seeking to employ minilateral institutions to enhance their cooperation and compete strategically in an increasingly contested region. The first paper demonstrated how Japan and Australia have adopted a minilateralist approach that chiefly prioritizes traditional security concerns, in contrast to China's emphasis on geoeconomics alongside its efforts to entrench its global/regional leadership and shape the international order. This second paper considers the strategic objectives underlying China's practice of minilateralism and reevaluates the order-building and geoeconomic dimensions within the Australian/Japanese practice of minilateralism. It concludes that for Australia and Japan minilateral cooperation in these areas continues to lag traditional security efforts, and thus points to the need for the partners, along with the United States, to invest greater attention and resources in these directions to give greater substance to their joint vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: This Occasional Paper was written with the generous support of the Australia-Japan Foundation. The East-West Center promotes better relations and understanding among the people and nations of the United States, Asia, and the Pacific through cooperative study, research, and dialogue. Established by the US Congress in 1960, the Center serves as a resource for information and analysis on critical issues of common concern, bringing people together to exchange views, build expertise, and develop policy options. The East-West Center in Washington provides US and Indo-Pacific government stakeholders and program partners with innovative training, analytical, dialogue, exchange, and public diplomacy initiatives to meet policy priorities.
CITATION: Envall, HDP, Hatakeyama, Kyoko Wilkins, Thomas S., and Hirono, Miwa (2024) “Japan/Australia Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific (II): Advancing Cooperation in Order-Building and Geoeconomics,” East-West Center Occasional Paper 10, 10 June, Washington, DC: East-West Center.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: This Occasional Paper was written with the generous support of the Australia-Japan Foundation. The East-West Center promotes better relations and understanding among the people and nations of the United States, Asia, and the Pacific through cooperative study, research, and dialogue. Established by the US Congress in 1960, the Center serves as a resource for information and analysis on critical issues of common concern, bringing people together to exchange views, build expertise, and develop policy options. The East-West Center in Washington provides US and Indo-Pacific government stakeholders and program partners with innovative training, analytical, dialogue, exchange, and public diplomacy initiatives to meet policy priorities.
CITATION: Envall, HDP, Hatakeyama, Kyoko Wilkins, Thomas S., and Hirono, Miwa (2024) “Japan/Australia Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific (II): Advancing Cooperation in Order-Building and Geoeconomics,” East-West Center Occasional Paper 10, 10 June, Washington, DC: East-West Center.
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Japan and Australia, as middle powers in the Indo-Pacific, have a shared interest in using minilateralism to boost regional cooperation, strengthen regional economic order and prevent coercive economic practices, particularly from major... more
Japan and Australia, as middle powers in the Indo-Pacific, have a shared interest in using minilateralism to boost regional cooperation, strengthen regional economic order and prevent coercive economic practices, particularly from major powers such as China. While these countries have traditionally relied on bilateral partnerships and multilateral institutions, minilateral approaches have a unique advantage due to their agility and adaptability and are being used increasingly to protect against geoeconomic coercion.
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Australia and Japan's 'hard security' minilateralism focuses on countering China but lacks appeal for developing nations. By contrast, China uses multi-layered minilateralism (security, networked, economic, informal) to advance... more
Australia and Japan's 'hard security' minilateralism focuses on countering China but lacks appeal for developing nations. By contrast, China uses multi-layered minilateralism (security, networked, economic, informal) to advance geoeconomic and governance priorities, offering development assistance and building broader relationships. To compete, Australia and Japan should expand their minilateral agenda beyond security, focusing on economics and governance to offer developing nations a compelling alternative.
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The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the Quad, an initiative including Japan, Australia, India and the United States, faces challenges in harmonising its strategic outlook in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly due to India's... more
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the Quad, an initiative including Japan, Australia, India and the United States, faces challenges in harmonising its strategic outlook in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly due to India's reluctance to engage on security matters. Despite this, there is an increasing emphasis on maritime security and monitoring Chinese influence in the region. In the future, the Quad is expected to play a larger role by overcoming the different strategic positions among member states.
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The Indo-Pacific region is experiencing a rise in minilateral cooperation, with Japan and Australia heavily involved in these endeavours to address joint economic or security issues, both independently and through bilateral partnerships.... more
The Indo-Pacific region is experiencing a rise in minilateral cooperation, with Japan and Australia heavily involved in these endeavours to address joint economic or security issues, both independently and through bilateral partnerships. In particular, Australia has pushed for the creation of the AUKUS trilateral partnership for a nuclear-powered submarine program and defencetechnology collaboration, while Japan is part of a trilateral agreement with the United Kingdom and Italy for joint production of a stealth fighter under the Global Combat Air Programme. Minilaterals have the potential to provide a host of strategic benefits and mitigate the risks of strategic contestation in the Indo-Pacific.
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Japan and Australia have a common interest in cooperating to boost their resilience in the face of coercive economic practices by major powers in the Indo-Pacific. Increasingly, the two countries are pursuing minilateral arrangements to... more
Japan and Australia have a common interest in cooperating to boost their resilience in the face of coercive economic practices by major powers in the Indo-Pacific. Increasingly, the two countries are pursuing minilateral arrangements to achieve this economic-security goal, with areas of emerging cooperation in energy transition, supply-chain security, as well as critical and emerging technologies. This paper will examine Australia-Japan minilateral cooperation in this nexus between economics and security. It will demonstrate that growing minilateral cooperation is due to its inherent agility and adaptability in the face of a rapidly changing region and also because such arrangements can be easily built on a base of established bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
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Australia has long viewed Japan as a key strategic partner in Asia. Since 2007, the two countries have been working to deepen their strategic partnership, which was formalized when they signed the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation... more
Australia has long viewed Japan as a key strategic partner in Asia. Since 2007, the two countries have been working to deepen their strategic partnership, which was formalized when they signed the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in March that year.
As a regional order-builder, Japan has come to play an key role in the Indo-Pacific. According to Saori Katada, it has become something of a “pivotal state” driving regionalism and shaping the norms and rules of the Indo-Pacific. Japan is also significant for Australia. First, as an entrepreneurial state engaged in order-building, Japan represents a useful model for Australia as it pursues its own order-building initiatives. Second, Japan’s preferred vision for regional order, FOIP, is well aligned to Australia’s own thinking.
So, what might Australia learn from Japan’s attempts at order-building in the Indo-Pacific? And how might the two countries cooperate more effectively as they pursue their visions for the region? The aims of this paper are to: (1) outline Japanese and Australian approaches to order-building in the Indo-Pacific; (2) compare the two approaches and ascertain their strengths, weaknesses, and differences; and (3) using Japan’s FOIP as a guide, consider options for Australia to enhance its role as an Indo-Pacific order builder and to further develop its partnership with Japan in regional order-building.
As a regional order-builder, Japan has come to play an key role in the Indo-Pacific. According to Saori Katada, it has become something of a “pivotal state” driving regionalism and shaping the norms and rules of the Indo-Pacific. Japan is also significant for Australia. First, as an entrepreneurial state engaged in order-building, Japan represents a useful model for Australia as it pursues its own order-building initiatives. Second, Japan’s preferred vision for regional order, FOIP, is well aligned to Australia’s own thinking.
So, what might Australia learn from Japan’s attempts at order-building in the Indo-Pacific? And how might the two countries cooperate more effectively as they pursue their visions for the region? The aims of this paper are to: (1) outline Japanese and Australian approaches to order-building in the Indo-Pacific; (2) compare the two approaches and ascertain their strengths, weaknesses, and differences; and (3) using Japan’s FOIP as a guide, consider options for Australia to enhance its role as an Indo-Pacific order builder and to further develop its partnership with Japan in regional order-building.
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The quadrilateral security dialogue, or “Quad,” was reborn in 2017 to secure a “rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.” Bringing together the US, Japan, India, and Australia, the Quad was initially intended as a mechanism for responding... more
The quadrilateral security dialogue, or “Quad,” was reborn in 2017 to secure a “rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.” Bringing together the US, Japan, India, and Australia, the Quad was initially intended as a mechanism for responding to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. However, it quickly became entangled in growing strategic competition across Asia and collapsed in 2008. Although the four countries still sometimes differ in their views of the region’s strategic trends, the Quad’s revival points to a greater alignment of interests this time around. Nonetheless, major challenges to the Quad’s viability remain. First, it is unclear whether the four powers will be able to maximise opportunities for cooperation while ensuring that wider geopolitical rivalries do not again overwhelm the grouping. Second, given that it has been revived to support this “Indo-Pacific” order, the Quad is constrained by the vagueness of the Indo-Pacific concept and the absence of Indonesia.
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Pity the news subeditor in summertime Australia. It’s January, the days are languid, and even the Trump administration can’t fill the entire World News section. Unsurprisingly, then, some headlines published in the lead-up to last week’s... more
Pity the news subeditor in summertime Australia. It’s January, the days are languid, and even the Trump administration can’t fill the entire World News section. Unsurprisingly, then, some headlines published in the lead-up to last week’s meeting between Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and his Japanese counterpart, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, with its prospect of a new security deal, were overhyped.
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Speculation is rife that North Korea’s burgeoning nuclear and ballistic missile programs will spark a dangerous new Northeast Asian arms race.
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When Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited then US President-elect Donald Trump in November 2016, he presented Trump with a Honmas Beres S-05 golf driver embellished with gold and intended, apparently, ‘for players seeking a higher... more
When Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited then US President-elect Donald Trump in November 2016, he presented Trump with a Honmas Beres S-05 golf driver embellished with gold and intended, apparently, ‘for players seeking a higher trajectory and slice correction.’ The clubs were well received (even if, as it turned out, they were made in China). So when the two leaders met again in February 2017, they played golf together and spent five hours discussing United States-Japan relations.
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For reasons largely of poor diplomatic management, however, the two parties [Australia and Japan] allowed their more aspirational hopes for a major strategic relationship to get ahead of the complex realities of the biggest defense... more
For reasons largely of poor diplomatic management, however, the two parties [Australia and Japan] allowed their more aspirational hopes for a major strategic relationship to get ahead of the complex realities of the biggest defense acquisition in Australian history
Research Interests: Asia Pacific Region, Northeast Asian Security, Japanese Foreign Policy, Australian foreign policy, Maritime security Asia Pacific, and 9 moreJapanese security policy, Australia-Japan, Asian security, Japan, Australia, Strategic Partnership, Security and defence issues in the Asia Pacific, Australian Strategic Policy, Japan - Australia relations, Japanese security, and Japanese Foreign and Defense Policy
The ‘competitive evaluation process’ Australia is now applying to decide who manufactures the country’s future submarines looms as a potential tipping point for the Japan–Australia strategic partnership. If the two countries were to enter... more
The ‘competitive evaluation process’ Australia is now applying to decide who manufactures the country’s future submarines looms as a potential tipping point for the Japan–Australia strategic partnership. If the two countries were to enter into a long term relationship to build these submarines, a closer strategic partnership across the board becomes more likely. But if Australia opts for a German or French partnership, the momentum in Australia–Japan security relations could be seriously eroded.
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In December 2012, Shinzō Abe achieved perhaps the most remarkable comeback of post-war Japanese politics by becoming the Japanese prime minister for a second time. Not since Shigeru Yoshida in 1948 has a Japanese politician managed such a... more
In December 2012, Shinzō Abe achieved perhaps the most remarkable comeback of post-war Japanese politics by becoming the Japanese prime minister for a second time. Not since Shigeru Yoshida in 1948 has a Japanese politician managed such a feat. In The Abe Restoration: Contemporary Japanese Politics and Reformation, Craig Mark offers an early analysis of the Abe prime ministership.
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The ‘competitive evaluation process’ Australia is now applying to decide who manufactures the country’s future submarines looms as a potential tipping point for the Japan–Australia strategic partnership. If the two countries were to enter... more
The ‘competitive evaluation process’ Australia is now applying to decide who manufactures the country’s future submarines looms as a potential tipping point for the Japan–Australia strategic partnership. If the two countries were to enter into a long term relationship to build these submarines, a closer strategic partnership across the board becomes more likely. But if Australia opts for a German or French partnership, the momentum in Australia–Japan security relations could be seriously eroded.
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The full report may be accessed here:https://www.stimson.org/2019/international-disaster-response-rebuilding-quad-views-next-generation/<br>
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review 5 in 2006 in the electronic journal of contemporary japanese studies - book review of Hook, Glenn D. and Gavan McCormack (2001), Japan's Contested Constitution: Documents and Analysis, London: Routledge.
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book review 2 in 2010 in the electronic journal of contemporary japanese studies - book review of Samuels, Richard J. (2007) Securing Japan: Tokyofs Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, Ithaca: Cornell University
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The quadrilateral security dialogue, or “Quad,” was reborn in 2017 to secure a “rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.” Bringing together the US, Japan, India, and Australia, the Quad was initially intended as a mechanism for responding... more
The quadrilateral security dialogue, or “Quad,” was reborn in 2017 to secure a “rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.” Bringing together the US, Japan, India, and Australia, the Quad was initially intended as a mechanism for responding to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. However, it quickly became entangled in growing strategic competition across Asia and collapsed in 2008. Although the four countries still sometimes differ in their views of the region’s strategic trends, the Quad’s revival points to a greater alignment of interests this time around. Nonetheless, major challenges to the Quad’s viability remain. First, it is unclear whether the four powers will be able to maximise opportunities for cooperation while ensuring that wider geopolitical rivalries do not again overwhelm the grouping. Second, given that it has been revived to support this “Indo-Pacific” order, the Quad is constrained by the vagueness of the Indo-Pacific concept and the absence of Indonesia.
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Research Interests: Sociology, Economics, International Relations, Philosophy of Agency, International Security, and 12 morePolitical Science, Security Studies, Politics, Southeast Asia, Music and identity, Multidisciplinary, Reputation, Normative, Security Policy, Globe, Music Teacher Identity, and Southeast Asia Contemporary Art
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ABSTRACT
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The orthodox view or ‘rule’ of Japanese politics over past decades has been that Japanese leadership is weak and reactive. As such, Koizumi Jun'ichirō, a recent Japanese prime minister, is seen as a great exception to this rule. This... more
The orthodox view or ‘rule’ of Japanese politics over past decades has been that Japanese leadership is weak and reactive. As such, Koizumi Jun'ichirō, a recent Japanese prime minister, is seen as a great exception to this rule. This article seeks to re-evaluate this orthodoxy in light of wider leadership theory and recent studies on Japanese political leadership. Focusing especially on how assessments of Koizumi's leadership compare to those of previous leaders, it looks at how the literature on Japanese politics has viewed both Japan's political environment and its political leaders. It argues that Koizumi interacted with, not merely reacted to, his political environment. At the same time, he employed a leadership style which, although distinctive, shared important similarities with previous leaders. Accordingly, he was less an exception to this rule than a confirmation of the historical diversity of Japanese political leadership.
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... March 2005. It is edited by Linus Hagström and Marie Söderberg (also author of the introductory chapter) and includes contributions from a range of scholars, including Yoichiro Sato, Christopher Hughes and Quansheng Zhao. ...
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Since 2012, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe Shinzō has sought to remake the country’s foreign and security policy. Abe’s agenda, which is increasingly called an ‘Abe Doctrine’, has prompted considerable debate as to its true nature. Is the Abe... more
Since 2012, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe Shinzō has sought to remake the country’s foreign and security policy. Abe’s agenda, which is increasingly called an ‘Abe Doctrine’, has prompted considerable debate as to its true nature. Is the Abe Doctrine nationalist, revisionist, or realist? This article contributes to these debates by tracing the competing characterizations of an Abe Doctrine’s policy ideas and assessing these against the doctrine’s policy prescriptions. It argues that the Abe Doctrine–situated within the long-term evolution of Japanese policymaking – is chiefly realist rather than nationalist in its policy prescriptions. In fact, where the doctrine does constitute a major departure from past policy practice, largely unrecognized until now, is not so much in how it expands Japan’s international role but in how it narrows this role. The underlying logic of the Abe Doctrine may therefore be pushing Japan towards a new form of regional realism.
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Japan’s recent policy shifts suggest a national strategy designed to present a counterweight to China without challenging it for regional primacy.
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Abstract Discontent over US military bases in Japan’s Okinawa prefecture has long been a prominent “thorn in the side” of US–Japan relations. But what exactly has been the effect of Okinawa’s base politics on the management of the... more
Abstract Discontent over US military bases in Japan’s Okinawa prefecture has long been a prominent “thorn in the side” of US–Japan relations. But what exactly has been the effect of Okinawa’s base politics on the management of the alliance? We examine Okinawa’s significance on the US–Japan alliance—the “Okinawa effect”—in terms of the alliance’s strategic coherence. Through an examination of the post–Cold War history of the base issue, we argue that, while there little to suggest that the Okinawa issue has undermined the alliance’s strategic effectiveness, alliance efficiency in dealing with burden sharing problems has been diminished, at times substantially. While reduced efficiency may often be inevitable in alliances between democracies, this persistent inability to resolve burden sharing disputes in the Okinawan case means that there is still potential for deteriorating efficiency to eventually undermine the alliance’s solidarity and effectiveness.