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


progress



V. VYSOTSKY

West Berlin



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West Berlin

In memory of those Soviet officers
and men who fell in the battle
to liberate Berlin



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Translated from the Russian by DAVID FIDLON

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PUBLISHERS' NOTE

In 1971, Mysl Publishers in Moscow put out in Russian a 483 page monograph by the Soviet historian V. N. Vysotsky entitled *West Berlin and Its Place in Contemporary International Relations*. In this work the author outlines the history of West Berlin and analyses the dialectical inter-relationship of the historical, political, legal, financial and economic aspects of the problems associated with the city.

The book has aroused the interest of the general public and brought high praise from Soviet critics.

In view of the topicality of the West Berlin problem, the interest shown in it by the public and the attention which V. N. Vysotsky's book attracted, Progress Publishers are offering readers a slightly abridged and revised version of this work which includes sections dealing with the talks and the agreement on West Berlin.

The author who has worked in Berlin for many years displays a thorough knowledge of the subject matter and the ability to elucidate involved political issues to the general reader.

Fully justified by the subject matter, the polemic character of the book serves only to enhance its value. The text is abundantly supplemented by charts and illustrations.

Progress Publishers sincerely hope that readers abroad will find the book interesting.

The Publishers

“He who lives on an island should not antagonise the sea” (from the Statement issued by the Board of the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin on October 16, 1965).

INTRODUCTION

For a quarter-century the world press has been devoting a lot of column space, frequently on its front pages, to West Berlin. There has also been an unceasing flow of diverse publications on the problem of West Berlin and its individual aspects.

Why is so much being said and written about West Berlin? Why is it constantly the focus of international politics and world public opinion?

The main reason is that Berlin, the city which witnessed the greatest triumph of the joint struggle of the anti-Hitler coalition against the fascist aggression became a source of the most serious exacerbation of contradictions between its members. At the end of the forties and the beginning of the fifties, the western part of Berlin was artificially severed from the rest of the city and the surrounding territory, and since then has often been regarded as one of the most dangerous trouble-spots in the cold war. Numerous incidents and conflicts which took place in and around West Berlin in the postwar years worsened the situation and were fraught with the most dire consequences. In the fifties and sixties West Berlin became the flash-point of postwar international relations. It kept the world in a state of uneasiness and left an imprint on the world political climate.

The Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Party Congress (March 30-April 9, 1971) gave considerable attention to the problem of West Berlin. Among the five points listing what “is to be done to continue the improvement in the European situation, to make headway in ensuring

collective security in Europe and in developing co-operation both on a bilateral and on an all-European basis" the solution of problems associated with West Berlin ranked third after the convening of an all-European conference and bringing the Soviet-West German and Polish-West German treaties of 1970 into force.

Since the beginning of the seventies, the world has been showing increasing interest in West Berlin in view of the quadripartite negotiations which culminated in the settlement of the problems associated with West Berlin and the signing of corresponding agreements in 1971.

The general reader naturally wants to know more about West Berlin, about its past, present and future and its role in contemporary international life.

First and foremost, West Berlin is a capitalist enclave, an island, an alien body inside the GDR. It covers about 55 per cent of the area of the former Greater Berlin, the capital of old Germany, and is a large city inside the GDR, isolated from the surrounding territory. Extending 29 kilometres from east to west and 32 kilometres from north to south, it has an area of 479.38 square kilometres or 47,928 hectares.¹ Among the cities of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the GDR only Hamburg, which covers an area of 747 square kilometres, is bigger.

Even more impressive is the size of its population which numbered 2,091,000 at the beginning of 1972, larger than in any other city of the GDR or the FRG. It had more inhabitants than Iceland, Luxemburg, Lybia, Jordan, Somalia or Laos. In fact its population was almost as large as that of the Lebanon, some 30 per cent smaller than that of Norway and only 50 per cent smaller than that of Denmark or Finland. This means that by the end of the sixties the population of West Berlin was larger than that of nearly 30 UN member states, and it is still continuing to grow.

Since in our day and age it is the industrial and economic potential which above all determines a state's place in the international arena and its role in world economic and political affairs, West Berlin can be called a large and developed

¹ Including 7,704 hectares of forest parks and 3,062 hectares of water bodies and canals.

economic centre. At the beginning of the seventies its Gross National Product (GNP) reached DM 25,000 million (more than \$6,000 million) and surpassed the GNP of Luxemburg, Syria, Ireland or Portugal. It was almost as large as the GNP of Greece, only 30 to 50 per cent smaller than that of such advanced countries as Finland or Belgium, and nearly four per cent of the GNP of the Federal Republic of Germany. In other words, the GNP of West Berlin is greater than that of approximately half the UN member states.

West Berlin has followed a specific road of economic development and has developed into an economic-industrial complex with a wide range of characteristic features. But inasmuch as West Berlin was artificially drawn into the financial and economic system of the FRG which led to the close intertwining of their economies, it became firmly tied to the West German economy.

Such is West Berlin from the standpoint of economic geography.

However, West Berlin is not just an individual city, a fairly large entity both territorially and demographically and a big modern industrial and economic centre. It is also a specific formation with a special status, one that is not a part of any other state and is under an occupation regime which leaves an imprint on all aspects of its life.

Finally, West Berlin is not merely an international question, but an involved and intricate problem. For many years it gave particular poignancy to German affairs and acted as a catalyst to international tension. The recent settlement of the problems associated with West Berlin has taken the former edge out of the question and created a firm basis for its peaceful development and the maintenance of a normal situation in the heart of Europe. Now everything depends on how the different sides will observe the agreement on West Berlin.

Yet there are people who oppose any relaxation of tension and are doing their utmost to cripple the West Berlin settlement and aggravate the situation. Some, including the reactionary West German politicians Franz-Josef Strauss and Karl Guttenberg, are trying to attain this objective by attacking the agreement. Others, Doctor Schweissfurth, for example, are resorting to "juridical subversion" in an effort to prove that it follows from the quadripartite agreement on West

Berlin (signed on September 3, 1971—*Ü.U.*) that "West Berlin belongs to the Federal Republic" and that "from the point of view of international and state law it is subordinate" to the FRG.¹ Therefore West Berlin inevitably attracts the close attention of world public opinion.

The *SShA. Ekonomika, politika, ideologia* magazine justly remarked that the "struggle of the two lines around the important and acute international problem of West Berlin is being conducted not only in the political and diplomatic spheres, but, needless to say, also in the fields of history and jurisprudence".²

This is borne out by the avalanche of publications dealing with the problem of West Berlin that are put out in the capitalist world³ and which already number more than 10,000. They range from small popular brochures and thick volumes intended for the general reader, to special documentations and collections of documents.

All these publications can be divided into two groups.

Some writers, including Hermann Rauschning,⁴ Golo Mann⁵, Rüdiger Altmann⁶, von Kube⁷, Schöneberger⁸, Harold Rasch⁹, Geoffrey McDermott¹⁰ and Erich Müller-Gangloff¹¹ make a more sober appraisal of the situation. Despite their contradictory and inconsistent stand and inability to advance any truly acceptable solutions for the current situation, all of them are somewhat critical of the policy of the Western

¹ *Recht und Politik. Vierteljahreshefte für Rechts und Verwaltungspolitik* (West Berlin), 1971, No. 4, p. 155.

² *SShA. Ekonomika, politika, ideologia* (USA. Economy, Policy, Ideology), 1971, No. 11, p. 85.

³ In 1965 the first more or less complete bibliography giving a general idea of the literature dealing with West Berlin was published in the West (*Berlin-Bibliographie*, Berlin, 1965).

⁴ H. Rauschning, *Mut zu einer neuen Politik*, 1959.

⁵ G. Mann, *Der verlorene Krieg und seine Folgen*, 1960.

⁶ R. Altmann, *Das deutsche Risiko. Aussenpolitische Perspektiven*, Seewald Verlag, 1962.

⁷ *Berlin und keine Illusion. 13 Beiträge zur Deutschlandpolitik*, Hamburg, 1964.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ H. Rasch, *Die Bundesrepublik und Osteuropa. Grundfragen einer künftigen deutschen Ostpolitik*, Cologne, 1963.

¹⁰ G. McDermott, *Berlin. Success of a Mission*, New York, 1963.

¹¹ E. Müller-Gangloff, *Mit der Teilung leben*, Berlin, 1965.

Powers and the Governments of Konrad Adenauer, Ludwig Erhard and Kurt-Georg Kiesinger on the West Berlin issue and in some measure endeavour to justify the need for changes in the position of the West on problems connected with West Berlin.

Regretfully, this group of bourgeois historians has always been in the minority, a mere handful, and their proposals were of an abstract nature, essentially intended not to abolish the causes but merely to surmount some of the most unpleasant consequences, primarily in the interests of the West.

Comprising an overwhelming majority, the other group of writers is making every effort to justify the policy of the Western Powers and the FRG with regard to West Berlin. They are not only extremely biased in their approach to historical facts but are not averse to juggling and falsifying them, grossly distorting the policy of the USSR, the GDR and other socialist countries.

The above refers both to multi-volume studies of the history of West Berlin and works which the Western press views as the basis of bourgeois historiography on West Berlin, and to the fundamental works dealing with the various aspects of the problems associated with West Berlin. Just as tendentious are reminiscences and memoirs of statesmen and politicians who also discuss the West Berlin question. Attempts are being made in the West to offset their dubious qualities by putting them out in increasing quantities.

Despite their vast number it would hardly be worth-while, even impossible, to group them according to specific schemes or trends, for these simply do not exist. Their authors rehash the old arguments which fully correspond to those put forward in official Western publications. There is only one difference: the publications appearing in the USA, Britain and France uphold the official line of these countries, while West German publications support the position of the FRG or the various political trends there. Some works take up the entire West Berlin problem; others deal with its different aspects or stages, and still others lay stress on the political, legal or other sides of the issue.

A fresh "wave of publications" designed to misrepresent the agreement on West Berlin has started in the West, particularly in the FRG.

The slander campaign about West Berlin being led in the West has received a deserved rebuff both in official publications¹ and in the works of many writers, mainly in the USSR and the GDR. Most of them, however, deal only with separate aspects of the West Berlin problem.

This book is an attempt to compensate for this shortcoming. Its purpose is to inform the reader about the milestones in the city's history: the emergence in 1948-49 of the West Berlin problem, the specific features of the city's development, the conclusion of the 1971 agreement on West Berlin and its significance for the cause of peace and security in Europe. It also exposes some of the most crass distortions of the Soviet Union's policy with regard to the above issues.

It analyses the historical, political and legal aspects of the West Berlin problem and illuminates the city's role in post-war international relations. At the same time it deals with the most important events in the city's history, including its liberation by the Soviet Army and the normalisation of life there in the first few weeks following liberation, the so-called Berlin crisis of 1948-49, the measures taken by the GDR on August 13, 1961, and so forth. The author carries out a particularly thorough analysis of the development of West Berlin and the talks on West Berlin issues in the sixties and seventies in the light of the general international situation. Such an approach enables the reader to get a better understanding of the West Berlin problem and the city's place in contemporary international affairs.

Covering the period from the last days of the war to 1972, the book is based on numerous, formerly unknown sources, including archival documents, and on the author's personal observations.

¹ Two collections of documents published in Russian by the USSR Foreign Ministry in 1948 and 1949; *The Soviet Union and the Berlin Question*; *The Truth about the Policy of the Western Powers on the German Question*, Moscow, 1959; *West Berlin: the Facts*, Moscow, 1962, and other books.

CHAPTER I
BERLIN AT THE CONCLUDING STAGE
OF THE WAR AND IN THE FIRST MONTHS
FOLLOWING ITS LIBERATION

BERLIN PRIOR TO 1945

As a separate entity West Berlin has been in existence for over two decades. All history prior to this relates to Berlin as one city.

According to chronicles, Berlin arose on the site of two communities which appeared in the early Middle Ages on the banks of the Spree at the point where it flows into the Havel. One of these communities was called Kölln, the other Berlin.

In the 13th century Berlin and Kölln were already fairly large towns. In 1411, when the Brandenburg Mark was transferred to the Hohenzollerns, they were proclaimed the residence of the prince (duke). It was only on January 17, 1709, however, that the king issued a decree authorising the union of Berlin, Kölln and several other communities into a single city with a single magistrate. Since then the city has been called Berlin.¹ According to the first official census it had a population of 49,885.

Berlin developed at an especially rapid rate in the latter half of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century, mainly as a result of the strengthening of Prussia and the subsequent unification of Germany. In 1914, on the eve of the First World War, it was one of the world's largest capitals with a population of 4,300,000. Berlin became a centre of the financial bourgeoisie, junkerism, militarism and officialdom, the bulwark of German imperialism which systematically and persistently strove to re-partition the world.

¹ Hellmuth Neumann, *Die Geschichte Berlins*, Vol. 1, Berlin, 1928, pp. 20-21.

In the mid-19th century Berlin also became one of the most important centres of the working-class movement and revolutionary struggle.

Berlin workers have written many glorious pages in the history of the revolutionary movement in Germany. The working people of Berlin were also in the vanguard of the revolutionary movement in the country in the years of the First World War. On November 9, 1918, the revolution which overthrew the rule of the Hohenzollerns took place in Berlin. From the balcony of the Imperial Palace Karl Liebknecht proclaimed the establishment of the Socialist German Republic on behalf of the revolutionary masses and red flags were hoisted over the town-hall and the Brandenburg Gate.

Here, in Berlin, the Communist Party of Germany was born during a bitter struggle against the Right-wing leadership of the Social-Democratic Party. The Communist Party was founded in 1918 by the outstanding leaders of the working-class movement Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Wilhelm Pieck, Franz Mehring and other foremost representatives of the German people.

The formation of the CPG was the logical outcome of preceding events, a turning point in the history of Germany and the German working class and a most important development in the international working-class movement.¹

Led by the Communist Party the German proletariat carried on the struggle against imperialism, to gain national liberation and social emancipation.

In the twenties and the early thirties the German capital was one of the main centres of the Communist Party's activity,² and, according to Ernst Thälmann, the "most important organisation of the CPG" was located in Berlin.³

The years of nazi rule were the grimmest in the history of Germany and her capital. During that period Berlin personified nazi obscurantism and became a centre from which nazism

¹ *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Vol. 3, p. 180.

² In the elections to the City Chamber of Deputies in October 1921 the Communists won 21 seats out of 225, 43 in October 1925, and 56 seats in November 1929. The CPG faction in the chamber was headed by Wilhelm Pieck.

³ E. Thälmann, *Reden und Aufsätze zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Vol. 1, Berlin, 1955, p. 250.

conducted its subversive activity. It was in Berlin that the "new order in Europe" was framed and from there it was implanted with "iron and blood" at the cost of millions of lives. Plans "Green", "White" and "Yellow", Operation Barbarossa and many other criminal intentions of the Hitlerite clique who dreamed of creating a world-wide German empire were designed and carried into effect from Berlin. The German capital became the arsenal of the country and a centre of arms production.

Nevertheless, during the years of Hitler's dictatorship Berlin was one of the main centres of the anti-fascist Resistance Movement. Braving brutal terror and persecutions Resistance groups headed mainly by Communists were active in Berlin and other German cities.

The anti-fascist Resistance Movement intensified markedly following the outbreak of the Second World War and even more so after Hitler had attacked the Soviet Union.

In the early forties Berlin was the scene of operations for one of the largest anti-fascist Resistance groups which was headed by Harro Schultze-Boysen, Arvid von Harnack and John Sieg (it had several hundred members and managed to infiltrate the most important links of the nazi apparatus).¹ A number of other organisations also operated in Berlin.

The formation in 1943 of the Free Germany National Committee which united the anti-fascist patriotic forces of the German people gave the Resistance Movement fresh impetus. The Committee was a political and organisational centre of the Resistance Movement—a German anti-fascist coalition² headed by Communists.

The Communist Party of Germany was the inspirer and organiser of the anti-fascist Resistance.

The brutal regime of terror instigated by the nazi authorities weakened the anti-fascist forces, and as a result of treachery in the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party the unity of action of the working class was undermined and its less conscious elements disoriented. The venom of national

¹ On October 6, 1969, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet posthumously conferred Soviet orders and medals on many members of this group.

² *Einheit*, 1968, No. 7, p. 884.

socialism poisoned the consciousness of the masses. Due to these and other causes "there were no large-scale anti-fascist actions by the German people till the very end of the war".¹ The Resistance Movement did not develop to a level that would have enabled it to influence either the situation in the country or the course of the war. During the battle for Berlin, for example, there were only isolated actions by small groups and individuals and, naturally, they could in no way influence the development of military operations. Despite its hopeless position, the Hitlerite clique continued to remain in control over the masses of German people even at the concluding phase of the war and force the Wehrmacht to fight to the tragic end. The Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SUPG) noted that "in spite of the heroic efforts of the CPG and other anti-fascists, the German people were unable to destroy the nazi dictatorship on their own. They owe their freedom to the epoch-making victory of the Soviet Army over nazism".² The banner of victory and freedom was carried into Berlin by Soviet troops.

THE WESTERN POWERS' PLAN TO SEIZE BERLIN

The Soviet Army routed the main forces of the Wehrmacht in the heavy fighting which took place between 1941 and 1944. Its powerful blows shook the Third Reich to its very foundations and by the beginning of 1945 it was facing a catastrophe. Even then Germany was a fairly powerful enemy capable of giving a strong and prolonged resistance. Her Armed Forces totalled 7,500,000 officers and men. A grim struggle still lay ahead.

Fully aware of this, the Soviet Command prepared with the utmost thoroughness for the last battle. Of the four strategic areas—coastal, Prague, Vienna and Berlin—designated by the Soviet GHQ for the offensive on the Soviet-German front, the Berlin area was the most important. The main

¹ *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Vol. 5, p. 431.

² Theses of the Propaganda Department of the CC SUPG issued on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the liberation of the German people from nazism (*Neues Deutschland*, March 31, 1970).

Soviet forces were concentrated there and engaged the enemy in the fiercest fighting. In 1945 the Soviet Army reached the Oder after hard-fought winter battles and occupied assault positions for striking the decisive blow.

This meant that the plans that were being hatched towards the end of the war in the Western capitals were not destined to materialise. Leaders in the USA and Britain, particularly Winston Churchill and his closest associates, were greatly alarmed by the developments on the Soviet-German front. In view of the fact that the Hitlerite clique which was giving stubborn resistance in the east was at the same time opening the front in the west, Churchill did his utmost in the spring of 1945 to talk the United States into altering the plans for military operations agreed with the Soviet Union, and step up the pace of the US Army's offensive.

The fact that in the spring of 1945 Washington and London were making active preparations for the seizure of Berlin was disclosed in a statement made on US television in 1963 by Major-General James Gavin. During the war he commanded the US 82nd Airborne Division, held several important posts in the State Department¹ in the Kennedy Administration and had a good knowledge of the plan for Western operations. These plans are also mentioned in other sources.²

Gavin said that a little before midnight on March 25, 1945, he summoned senior officers of his division to a secret meeting at his headquarters in Sissonne, northern France, in order to discuss the final assault (meaning the "assault on Berlin") which was part of a First Allied Airborne Army operation. According to this plan the US 101st Airborne Division was to capture the Gatow Airfield in Berlin, the 82nd Airborne Division was to seize Tempelhof Airport and a brigade from the British 1st Airborne Corps was to take Oranienburg Airfield. British and US troops were to enter Berlin a few days later. The operation was scheduled to take place within two weeks of the meeting.

Energetic preparations to seize Berlin were begun in the division immediately after the meeting. All elements of the

¹ *Telegraf*, November 12, 1963.

² Cornelius Ryan, *The Last Battle*, London, 1966, pp. 97-101.

forthcoming operation were practised on a specially built mock-up of Tempelhof Airport and the surrounding area. All was ready, but the order to attack never came.

Though influential circles in the US Administration were fully in favour of Churchill's plans to seize Berlin, they did not venture to carry them into effect¹ mainly because the USA was very anxious to see the USSR enter the war against Japan and enlist its maximum support in routing her. Moreover, in view of the swift pace of the Soviet offensive, the US ruling circles, as can be judged from the memoirs of some US generals, and especially from the memoirs of General Eisenhower, were not certain that the Allied armies would be able to reach Berlin ahead of the Soviet troops, for the situation at the front was developing contrary to the expectations of some Western politicians. The Soviet Army had advanced much farther to the west than they thought it would and had reached the Danube-Enns and the Oder-Neisse lines. In other words, it was in the very heart of Europe, whereas the Allied forces were still several hundred kilometres from Berlin.

On April 1, 1945, G. K. Zhukov, Commander of the First Byelorussian Front, and I. S. Konev, Commander of the First Ukrainian Front, were summoned to Moscow to discuss the final details of the Berlin operation.

At a conference in the Kremlin, General S. M. Shtemenko, Chief of Operations of the Soviet General Staff, read a telegram from one of the Soviet embassies abroad. "The US-British Command," the telegram said in part, "was staging an operation to capture Berlin with the aim of taking the city before the Soviet Army could do it. The main forces were being organised under the command of Field-Marshal Montgomery. The direction of the main attack was being planned north of the Ruhr, along the shortest road between Berlin and the main British forces."² The telegram also listed a series of preliminary measures taken by the Allied Command.

"Well, then, who is going to take Berlin, we or the

¹ Eisenhower, too, did not exclude this possibility (See F. S. Pogyu, *Supreme Command*, Moscow, 1959, p. 458; *The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov*, New York, 1972, pp. 586-87).

² I. S. Konev, *Year of Victory*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969, p. 79.

Allies?" Stalin asked.¹ His words did not imply that there would be a "competition" or a "race to capture Berlin", as bourgeois historians are trying to "prove".² Such thoughts, as Stalin told Walter Bedell Smith, the US Ambassador in Moscow, on August 23, 1948, were alien to the USSR. The position of the Soviet Union was determined by the developments at the front and also by the fact that, in keeping with the plans agreed by the members of the anti-Hitler coalition and the established line of contact of the Allied forces, Berlin lay within the territory which was to be occupied by the Soviet Army. At the same time the Soviet side took into account that the earliest fall of the capital of Hitler Germany—the country's political and military centre—would hasten the end of the war and save thousands of lives. In view of this fact GHQ issued instructions that the final recommendations concerning the Berlin operation should be worked out within one or two days, as it "would have to be started not later than April 16th and completed in not more than 12 to 15 days".³

THE FALL OF BERLIN AND THE UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF THE HITLER REICH

In March 1945, the American forces crossed the Rhine practically without resistance, firing only a few shots in the course of the operation and then, in the words of the Commander of the US 12th Army, advanced "all the way to the Elbe under an arch of white flags of surrender".⁴ Meanwhile the Soviet troops had to fight their way to Berlin and liberate it in bitter and bloody fighting.

The days of Nazi Germany were numbered, but the Hitlerites did their utmost to force the Germans to continue their senseless resistance.

¹ Ibid.

² E. Kuby, *Die Russen in Berlin 1945*, Munich, 1965; Cornelius Ryan, *The Last Battle*, pp. 192, 276-77.

³ S. M. Shtemenko, *The Soviet General Staff at War (1941-1945)*, Moscow, 1970, p. 320.

⁴ Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, New York, 1951, p. 494.

Urgent steps were taken to strengthen Berlin and create a broad defensive belt at its approaches. About 400 bunkers well-equipped with anti-aircraft guns were turned into powerful resistance points. Barricades and weapon emplacements were everywhere. Over a hundred armaments factories supplied the troops with all they needed. Crack units were brought into the city and the strength of the Berlin garrison was increased to more than 300,000 officers and men. The Hitlerites forced all those who could carry a gun into action against the Soviet Army and even youngsters born in 1929 were recruited into the Wehrmacht.

On March 19, 1945, Hitler issued a so-called basic order of the day concerning the defence of Berlin, which stated in part that the "imperial capital should fight to the last man and to the last round". In addition to this order, the Commander of Army Group Vistula on April 11, 1945, received fresh instructions to destroy all bridges, power stations, the water-supply system, the Underground, the city railway, etc., if his troops had to retreat.¹

However, nothing could save the "thousand-year Reich" now. Two hours before sunrise on April 16, 1945 the First Byelorussian and the First Ukrainian fronts mounted an offensive, swiftly crossed the Oder—the river of "German destiny", as Hitler called it—and several days later reached Berlin. On April 21, advance Soviet units broke into the city's suburbs and engaged the enemy in Berlin itself. A state of seige was declared in the city.

Although the situation was catastrophic for the German forces and called for the immediate cessation of the senseless battle, the nazis continued their fierce resistance. Still hoping for a split in the anti-Hitler coalition, Hitler firmly decided to go on with the struggle. This was not merely the fantasy of a maniac. The decision was taken in the hope of reaching some sort of separate agreement with the Western Powers whose influential circles were also working towards this end.

In violation of the principle of unconditional surrender and rejection of separate negotiations with the fascist bloc countries, the Western Powers conducted backstage bargaining with the Hitlerites throughout the war. Separate talks

¹ *Neues Deutschland*. February 19, 1965.

with nazi emissaries were not isolated incidents, though efforts are being made in the USA and Britain to "prove" that they were. During the war British and US diplomats maintained contact with Hitler's henchmen through Portugal, Spain, the Vatican, Switzerland, Sweden, Turkey, Rumania and other countries. This shows that British and American ruling circles were quite willing to conclude a separate peace with Germany behind the back of the Soviet Union.

The plans for concluding a separate deal with Germany, however, were not destined to materialise. Germany's efforts to exert "military pressure" on the Western Powers fell through as a result of the Soviet Army's January offensive, which prevented the rout of the Anglo-American forces and deprived Hitler of his trump-card for bargaining with the USA and Britain. Hitler made one more attempt to "demonstrate Germany's value as a partner" to the Western Powers by launching an offensive against the Soviet troops in Hungary on February 17, 1945. However, his plan was shattered by a powerful counterblow delivered by the Soviet Army.

At the end of March 1945 the Soviet Government made an emphatic demand that the Allies cease all separate negotiations with Hitler Germany.¹ It further decided that in conjunction with this the Soviet delegation to the United Nations conference scheduled to take place in San Francisco in April 1945 would be headed by the Soviet Ambassador to the United States and not by the Soviet Foreign Minister, as was originally intended. The Soviet Union's firm stand produced its results: on April 21, 1945, Washington sent a cable to its representatives in Berne to stop all separate contacts with the Germans.

Whatever explanation the West might now offer concerning the separate negotiations between representatives of the Western Powers and Hitler's clique, the fact remains that Hitler had every reason to think that there were forces in the USA and Britain which were inclined to conclude a separate deal with Germany and he cherished this hope to his

¹ See: *Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945* (hereafter: *Correspondence...*), Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, pp. 199-200, 206.

last days. Being absolutely certain that American and British ruling circles were concerned only with ousting Germany as their rival for world markets, Hitler gambled on further disagreements taking place between the USSR and its allies and even on the possibility of a clash between their armies. The ring-leaders of the Third Reich intended to prolong the struggle against the Soviet Army to a maximum, stop its drive as far to the east as possible and prevent it from entering Berlin. After that they planned to open the Western Front and negotiate a separate agreement with the Anglo-American Command.

It was these plans that determined the activity of the Nazi leaders at the end of April 1945, but they were helpless to stop the Soviet Army's onslaught. The pace of the offensive increased from day to day and the fighting grew in intensity.

On the morning of April 24, 1945, the troops of the First Byelorussian Front linked up in Basdorf in the southeastern part of Berlin with the units of the First Ukrainian Front.¹ The main detachments of the German 9th Army which Hitler considered was his best fighting force, were now cut off from the German troops in Berlin, and the enemy's Frankfurt-Guben group was encircled.

On the following day the troops of the First Ukrainian Front linked up at Ketzin, northwest of Potsdam, with the tank armies of the First Byelorussian Front, thus sealing off the last corridor connecting Berlin with the rest of the country. Berlin was now completely encircled, the Berlin group of forces being cut in two and pocketed by the armies of the First Byelorussian and the First Ukrainian fronts.²

On April 25, the advance units of General A. S. Zhadov's 5th Guards Army met with the units of the American 1st Army on the Elbe. This historic meeting showed that the anti-Hitler coalition, having stood the test, had lived up fully to expectations. Hitler's hopes for a clash between the Allied armies did not materialise and Germany and the Wehrmacht were cut in two.

Beside himself with rage, Hitler ordered the formation of special commands to mobilise as many civilians as possible

¹ See: I. S. Konev, op. cit., p. 156.

² See: *The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov*, p. 621.

for the fight against the Soviet Army.¹ On his instructions the German Command undertook fresh efforts to drive the Soviet Army back from Berlin and, if the worst came to the worst, to surrender it to the Anglo-American forces. However, the Soviet troops repulsed the counterattacks of Steiner's group from the north and Wenck's 12th Army from the south and began to crush them.

In radio broadcasts and leaflets the Soviet Command spoke of the utter futility of further German resistance. "The Red Army," it was stated in one of the leaflets, "is not waging a war against the peaceful population. The Red Army has no intention of wiping out the German nation. Entering Berlin, the Red Army pursues only one objective: to destroy the Hitler regime, to punish Hitler and his entire criminal clique."²

The Resistance fighters also appealed to the population.

Ignoring the appeals to lay down arms, the German Command and the Berlin garrison entrenched in the Tiergarten district and the adjoining blocks continued their resistance which led to the loss of thousands of lives and severe damage to the city. The Germans were helpless to stop the Soviet onslaught.

On April 30 units of the 150th Division finally broke into the Reichstag where they fought for every inch of the building. On the same day Hitler committed suicide. Before his death he dictated a "personal" and a "political" will to one of his secretaries. In it the chieftain of the brown-shirt clique attempted to absolve himself from responsibility for the Nazi atrocities and appointed a new cabinet of trusted people headed by Gross-Admiral Dönitz instructing them to continue the fight "with all the means at their disposal".

On the same day the scouts of the 756th Regiment, 3rd Striking Army, M. A. Yegorov and M. V. Kantaria raised the banner of victory over the Reichstag.

Late in the evening of May 1 the last meeting of the officers of the Berlin Defence HQ summoned by General Weidling finally decided that further resistance was senseless. Shortly afterward a radio message was received from the

¹ See: *Der Spiegel*, 1966, No. 33, p. 34.

² *Archiv beim Rat des Stadtbezirks Friedrichshain*, G-B/77 (leaflet issued on April 27, 1945).

Germans in Russian: "Hello, hello, 56th Panzer Corps calling. Please, cease fire. At 00.50 hrs Berlin time we shall send truce envoys to Potsdam Bridge. Identification sign: white flag against a red background. Awaiting your answer."¹ At 05.55 hours German truce emissaries headed by Colonel Diffwing, Chief of Staff of the 26th Panzer Corps, were met by officers of the Soviet 47th Guards Infantry Division. The Germans said that they had been authorised by the Commander of the Berlin Defence, Lieutenant-General Weidling, to inform the Soviet Command of his decision to stop resistance and surrender unconditionally. The Soviet Command affirmed its acceptance of the surrender and proposed to complete it by 07.00 hours on May 2.

At 06.00 hours General Weidling crossed the line of the front and surrendered. On instructions from the Soviet Command he drew up an order for the German forces to end resistance. Shortly before General Weidling's surrender Hans Fritzsche, Deputy Minister for Propaganda, sent his representatives headed by State Councillor Heinesdorf to General V. I. Chuikov's Command Post in order to inform the Soviet Command that after Goebbels's death, he, Fritzsche, "remains the sole representative of the authorities in Berlin and that in connection with the situation which has come about he is prepared to issue an order to the Army command authorising the surrender of the Berlin garrison and the entire German Army". V. I. Chuikov told Fritzsche's emissaries that "the Soviet Command accepts Berlin's surrender and orders the cessation of military operations".² At the same time he demanded that Fritzsche should immediately order the unconditional surrender of the German forces. The Soviet Army radio station broadcast Weidling's and Fritzsche's orders to the German troops.

The mass surrender of enemy forces began at daybreak on May 2. Only the SS troops holding the Imperial Chancellery and some other buildings refused to submit, but that had no effect on the general situation. The last centres of resistance were swiftly crushed and by 15.00 hours on the same day the Berlin garrison laid down its arms.

¹ I. S. Konev, op. cit., p. 191.

² V. Chuikov, "The End of the Third Reich", *Oktyabr*, 1964, No. 5, p. 157.

The fall of Berlin was an event of tremendous historic significance. It marked the complete collapse of the Hitler Reich and the end of hostilities and portended the surrender of nazi Germany. By routing one of the biggest enemy groups and capturing Berlin, the Soviet Army shattered the nazis' hopes of splitting the anti-Hitler coalition, hastened Germany's surrender and the suppression of the last pockets of enemy resistance in Czechoslovakia and Austria, and speeded up the end of the war in Europe.

The signing of Germany's unconditional surrender was the last page in this chapter of her history. Among the Western officials who arrived in Berlin for the ceremony were Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, head of the delegation from the Command of the Allied Expeditionary Force, General Carl Spaatz and Admiral Harold Burrough.

Germany's unconditional surrender was signed in Karlshorst in the former army engineers school at 22.43 hours local time on May 8 (May 9, 00.43 hours Moscow time).

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people which lasted 1,417 days was over. A thirty-salvo Victory Salute was fired from a thousand guns in Moscow.

The "Drang nach Osten" ended in Berlin where it had been elaborated in the minutest detail. The total war ended in total defeat. Hitler's "thousand-year Reich" having lasted a mere 12 years four months and eight days ceased to exist both in fact and in law. The righteous cause triumphed. It was a defeat of world-wide historic significance, which had a tremendous impact on the destiny of mankind, including the destiny of the German people themselves.

Guided by their Leninist Communist Party the Soviet people and their heroic army played the decisive role in routing nazism, humanity's most vicious enemy. More than 20 million Soviet people lost their lives in the war.¹ Some fell in battles against the invaders, others died in death camps and Gestapo prisons, or in factories in nazi Germany. During the Berlin operation alone, in the period from April 16 to May 8, 1945, the First and Second Byelorussian and

¹ US casualties in the Second World War totalled 1,134,000, of whom 325,000 were killed in action. During the war only two shells fell on US territory. They were fired by the Japanese on San Francisco.

the First Ukrainian fronts had 304,887 men killed, wounded or missing. The damage caused by the nazi invasion to the USSR has been estimated at 2,569,000 million pre-1947 rubles.

Almost three decades have passed since Germany's unconditional surrender. Much has changed in the world during these years. Battlefields have been ploughed and tilled, and war-damaged towns and villages restored. The appearance of our planet is changing continuously. People are gradually recovering from the loss of their relatives and friends, but the memory of those who gave their most precious possession, their lives, for the well-being and happiness of others will live for ever. Wishing to pay tribute to the unsurpassed heroism and self-sacrifice of the Soviet people and to their great service in delivering mankind from nazi slavery, endless queues of men, women and children file past the tombstones and monuments to Soviet soldiers and lay masses of flowers in their memory.

Revanchists in Bonn, not to mention numerous politicians in the Federal Republic of Germany, speak and write about May 8, 1945 as a "day of national disgrace" for Germany. Needless to say, the defeat of Hitler's Reich was also a defeat of the ruling classes who brought Germany to the brink of disaster. Therefore on February 10, 1965, a statement was issued in Bonn which said in part that "in the opinion of the Federal Government the 20th anniversary of the end of the war is not an occasion for celebration".¹ For the German people, however, May 8, 1945, was the end of the war and terror, the end of arbitrary rule and death. It was a day of liberation whose anniversary is now solemnly celebrated by progressive-minded Germans in West Germany and West Berlin. *For the majority of the German people the last hour of Hitler's Reich was the first hour of the birth of a new Germany.* The liberation of Berlin by the Soviet Armed Forces signified the rout of Hitler Germany and was a turning point in the history of the German people and Europe.²

¹ *Neues Deutschland*, March 21, 1965.

² *Befreiung und Neubeginn. Zur Stellung des 8. Mai 1945 in der deutschen Geschichte*, Berlin, 1968.

**ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY
ADMINISTRATION AND GERMAN CITY
SELF-GOVERNMENT BODIES**

The Hitlerite clique based nazi Germany's policy towards the Soviet Union on the phrase coined by Martin Bormann: "The Slavs are to work for us. In so far as we don't need them, they may die. . ."¹ Hitler expounded his "eastern policy" at a conference in the HQ of Army Group Centre in 1941. He said that Moscow should be encircled so that not a single Russian soldier, not a single inhabitant—man, woman or child—could leave it and that any attempt to do so should be crushed by force. Noting that necessary preparations had been carried out to flood Moscow and its environs, he said that a great lake should appear where Moscow stood and conceal the capital of the Russian people from the civilised world.

However, revenge sentiments were alien to the Soviet people, although they had borne the most terrible suffering and sustained incalculable losses in the war. The Soviet Army entered Germany as a liberator, and not as a conqueror, as an ally of the German working class, as an army which fought in the interests of all nations.² Besides liberating the German people the Soviet Army did its utmost to lessen their suffering, save them from hunger and epidemics, help them to return to normal life and restore their statehood. In the Soviet people the anti-fascist forces of the German nation found reliable friends who gave them every possible assistance in building a new Germany. Speaking at a meeting in Berlin on May 7, 1965, on the 20th anniversary of Germany's liberation from nazism, Alexei Kosygin noted that "even in the most difficult minutes of the war the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, our army and people never identified German nazism with the German people. The Soviet soldier set foot on German soil not as a conqueror and avenger, but as a friend of the working people of Germany whom he regarded as his natural allies in the struggle

¹ *International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 1947, Vol. V, p. 332.*

² *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, Vol. 6, Berlin, 1966, p. 27.*

against nazism, and in the struggle for socialism".¹ "Fighting was still going on in Berlin and its suburbs," wrote G. K. Zhukov, "when the Soviet Command, on the basis of the decisions of the Communist Party Central Committee and the Soviet Government, set about organising normal living conditions for the population of Berlin".² Prompt measures were taken to bring in the necessary food supplies, restore economic, socio-political and cultural life, create conditions for research organisations to resume their work, and so forth. The Soviet Command put out leaflets summoning the Germans to take an active part in this effort and stressed that "they themselves could speed up the restoration of normal life".³

The above decisions laid the foundation for the establishment of the Soviet Military Administration and local bodies of self-government in Berlin and for the rehabilitation of the city. On April 24, 1945, Colonel-General N. E. Berzarin, Commander of the 5th Army, was appointed Commandant of Berlin with the right to exercise full political and administrative powers in the city. Subsequently the Berlin Kommandatura operated under the direct guidance of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAG).

The first German city self-government bodies were formed at the same time as SMAG. The close co-operation, which developed immediately after the liberation of the city, between the SMAG representatives and the German anti-fascist forces headed by the Communists, played an important part in getting all urgent problems solved quickly.

On April 30 an initiative group headed by the special representatives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany, Walter Ulbricht, flew from Moscow to Berlin.⁴

¹ *Pravda*, May 8, 1965.

² *The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov*, p. 632.

³ J. Leithäuser, *Journalisten zwischen zwei Welten. Die Nachkriegsjahre der Berliner Presse. Berlin-Dahlem*, Berlin, 1960, p. 10.

⁴ The group also included Karl Maron, Otto Winzer, Richard Günther, Gustav Gundelach, Hans Mahle, Fritz Erpenbeck, Welly Keller. Two other initiative groups went to the north and south of Germany. One of them headed by Anton Ackermann and Hermann Matern worked in Saxony, the other, headed by Gustav Sobottka and Kurt Bürger, operated in Meklenburg.

Thus, as early as the beginning of May, the democratic forces in Berlin had a reliable political leadership in the shape of the above initiative group which acted in keeping with the decisions of the Brussels and Berne conferences of the Communist Party of Germany and the instructions of its Central Committee, and was guided by other documents drawn up early in 1945 by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the National Free Germany Committee.

Essentially, the instructions set forth in these documents were aimed at directing the Party's efforts to unite all the anti-fascist, genuinely patriotic forces in an effort to save the nation, uproot nazism and create a free, peace-loving, democratic Germany.¹

Rallying to the slogan "Berlin must live, Berlin will live", the anti-fascist, democratic forces, guided by the Communists, played a vigorous part in bringing life back to normal and rendered every possible support and assistance to the Soviet military authorities.

With the Communists at the helm the anti-fascist, Democratic forces of the German people were likewise active in establishing German city self-government bodies in Berlin.

On May 14, 1945, the Soviet Kommandatura (Commandant's Office) approved the composition of the first postwar Berlin Magistrate² which began to function on May 19.

The Chief Burgomaster was Arthur Werner, a prominent scientist, who had no party affiliations. In 1942 the nazis removed him from the post of director at a technical college for his anti-fascist views. His deputies were: Karl Maron, a veteran member of the Communist Party and former chairman of Fichte, a workers' sporting union; Andreas Hermes, a former minister in the Weimar Republic and a prominent member of the Centre Party; Paul Schwenk, who in the past was a deputy to the City Chamber and the Landtag, and Karl Schulze, a teacher.³ The other 13 members of the Mag-

¹ See: Walter Ulbricht, *Zur Geschichte der neuesten Zeit*, Berlin, 1955, p. 47.

² See: *Verordnungsblatt der Stadt Berlin 1945*, No. 1, p. 4.

³ H. Adler, *Berlin in jenen Tagen*, p. 29.

istrate¹ were also people of various occupations and political views, but all of them were confident in the bright future of the German people. They headed the city administration at a time when Germany was going through her most difficult period, and concentrated their efforts on raising Berlin from ruins and laying the foundation for a new Germany.

As regards its political composition the Berlin Magistrate was a coalition of Communists, Social Democrats, trade-union functionaries and bourgeois specialists.² It united reasonably experienced administrators of diverse political trends and views, and Communists did not hold key positions.³ After the establishment of political parties, the Magistrate had six Communists, five Social Democrats, two members of the Christian Democratic Union and five people with no party affiliations.⁴ In the regional German bodies, the Communists held only about a third of the seats.⁵

The Soviet occupation authorities granted the Magistrate, which was the first democratic body of city self-government, extensive rights and powers.

On instructions from their own Government, the Soviet Military Administration constantly extended the rights and functions of the German self-government bodies.

Thus, shortly after the war ended, the city bodies in Berlin received self-government rights within the framework of the occupation regime.⁶ This was a measure of the Soviet Union's trust in the anti-fascist forces of the German people.

The Magistrate was not only the first German self-govern-

¹ Arthur Pieck, Ferdinand Sauerbruch, Walter Jirak, Otto Winzer, Ernst Kehler, Fritz Kraft, Hermann Landwehr, Josef Orlopp, Otto Geschke, Hans Scharaun, Hans Jenderetzky, Peter Buchholz, Edmund Noortwyck.

² See: Walter Ulbricht, op. cit., p. 82.

³ See: P. Mendelssohn, *Zeitungsstadt Berlin. Menschen und Mächte in der Geschichte der deutschen Presse*, Berlin (West), 1959, p. 347.

⁴ See: *Tägliche Rundschau*, Berlin, October 10, 1946, p. 5.

⁵ There were 20 burgomasters in May and June 1945. Of them six were Communists, three Social Democrats, four were members of bourgeois parties and four had no party affiliations. In August six of the burgomasters were Communists, four Social Democrats, one was a Christian Democrat, one a Liberal Democrat and six did not belong to any political party.

⁶ See: H. Schützler, *Dissertation* . . . , p. 64.

ment body in Berlin, but also a model of anti-fascist coalition which could become an example for the whole country.¹

DAMAGE CAUSED TO BERLIN

The establishment of city self-government bodies took place at the same time as normal life was restored in Berlin. The latter was an incredibly difficult task due to the extensive damage sustained by the city in the course of heavy fighting. It has been estimated that Berlin suffered approximately one-seventh of the total damage caused to German cities during the war.

The residential districts, which were hit by Anglo-US air strikes, suffered the greatest damage. Out of 1.5 million flats, about 870,000 remained but only 370,000 of these were fit for habitation.² There were about 75 million cubic metres of debris and rubble whose removal, according to experts, would have required 14 million lorries or seven million railway trucks.³ Eyewitnesses said that Berlin was a heap of ruins.⁴ The damage caused to the city in the course of the fighting was estimated at RM 10,000 million.⁵

In the early days of May 1945 the municipal economy and public services were almost completely paralysed.

Food depots had been blown up, bakeries wrecked and the water supply and sewerage systems put out of action on orders from the Nazi command. The medical service ceased functioning and out of 33,000 hospital beds only 8,500 remained. The majority of doctors stayed in their homes leaving tens of thousands of sick and wounded to their fate. Water was polluted and there were outbreaks of dysentery, typhus and other diseases. Cultural life was at a standstill.

¹ See: *Neues Deutschland*, June 11, 1967.

² See: *Ein halbes Jahr Berliner Magistrat. Der Magistrat gibt Rechenschaft*, 1945, p. 68.

³ See: H. Adler, op. cit., p. 9.

⁴ See: *Berlin. Kampf um Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1945-1946*, p. 11.

⁵ The total damage caused to Berlin as a result of the war has been estimated at 17,000-18,500 million Marks, or almost 50 per cent of the city's total wealth, which was valued at RM 40,000 million prior to the war.

The greatest confusion, however, reigned in the minds and hearts of the Germans, who were emptied and exhausted by the war and poisoned by "national socialism". Their seemingly hopeless plight plunged them into despair, apathy and pessimism, and it was solely the prompt assistance of the Soviet Army and the self-sacrificing work of the German anti-fascists that saved the Berlin population from hunger, epidemics and disease when military operations ceased.¹ Pooling their efforts they did their utmost to overcome the aftermath of the war within the shortest possible time and bring life back to normal. Thus, by opening clear prospects before the German people, they gave them confidence in their future.

THE RESTORATION OF NORMAL LIFE IN THE CITY

The Soviet Government, the Soviet Command and the Communist-led German patriots acted with energy and determination to win the battle against famine, to avert epidemics, overcome the after-effects of the war and normalise life in Berlin. This work was started as soon as the Soviet troops entered the city.

The fighting for Berlin was still going on, when Soviet sappers began removing mines from buildings, repairing bridges, taking away anti-tank obstacles, clearing the streets and filling up trenches and shell-holes. Emergency medical assistance was organised for the population and the Soviet Command allotted a part of its ration supplies to feed the Berliners. Marshal V. I. Chuikov wrote that "practically all field kitchens, after distributing food to the fighting men, cooked meals for the German population right in the streets. Many Soviet soldiers gave away their rations to the Germans and frequently went without food. This acquired such proportions that the Soviet Command, concerned with the Army's fighting efficiency, was at that time forced to instruct the commanders to see that men did not go hungry".²

¹ See: Siegfried Thomas, *Entscheidung in Berlin. Zur Entfehlungsgeschichte der SED in der deutschen Hauptstadt (1945/1946)*, Berlin, 1964, p. 23.

² V. Chuikov, op. cit., p. 128.

On April 23, 1945, the Military Council of the First Byelorussian Front issued a directive ordering military councils and army supply officers to register all the inhabitants, take stock of the available food reserves and organise the supply of food to the population of Berlin. In keeping with the directive the Berliners received the following rations each day (in grammes):

	Bread	Potatoes	Meat	Salt	Fats	Sugar	Coffee
Adults	200	400	25	10	—	10	2
Children	150	200	25	10	5	10	1

Needless to say these were scanty rations, but the directive was a temporary measure designed to alleviate the plight of the population during the first few days after the Soviet Army's entry into Berlin. Since the city had no food stocks at all, the order was issued to distribute a part of the troops' food supply. The armies of the First Byelorussian Front alone carved out of their supplies 6,000 tons of flour, 1,250 tons of meat, 75 tons of pig fat, 12,000 tons of potatoes, 550 tons of salt, 500 tons of sugar, 65 tons of coffee and many other products for distribution among the population.

These were only the first steps. The food situation in the city remained very serious and so the Soviet side took further measures as soon as the fighting ended.

On May 8, the problem of supplying the population in those parts of Germany, and particularly Berlin, which had been liberated by the Soviet Army was taken up by the State Defence Committee of the USSR. It studied the proposals of the Military Council of the First Byelorussian Front concerning the food supply for the Berliners and fixed higher rations for them.¹ It also ordered the immediate dispatch of coffee and tea from the USSR to Berlin and the distribution of rations to the population from the reserves of the Second Byelorussian and First Ukrainian fronts. On the following day A. I. Mikoyan, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of

¹ The average per capita daily rations were fixed at 400-500 grammes of bread, 50 grammes of groats, 60 grammes of meat, 15 grammes of fats and 20 grammes of sugar. Vegetable, milk and other rations were fixed by the military councils of the fronts.

People's Commissars, accompanied by General A. V. Khrulev, Chief of Logistics, and a group of high-ranking officials arrived in Berlin to study the situation first-hand and ensure that the State Defence Committee's decisions were carried out as quickly as possible. Thus, the question of how best to aid the population of Germany, including Berlin, was resolved virtually on the first day after the end of hostilities.

Following the State Defence Committee's instructions, the Military Council of the First Byelorussian Front on May 11, 1945, passed a resolution "Concerning the Supply of Food to the Population of Berlin" which provided for the introduction on May 15, 1945, of a uniform rationing system and increased but differentiated rations.¹ The chief of railway transport of the front was ordered to assign not less than five trains per day to transport potatoes. The command of the First Byelorussian Front also detailed over 2,000 motor vehicles for delivering food. A new post was created, that of Deputy Commandant of Berlin for Assisting in the Organisation of Food Supply to the Population of the City.² Motor vehicles, fuel and approximately 6,000 cows were turned over to the Magistrate.

On the same day A. Mikoyan, G. Zhukov, A. Khrulev and K. Telegin submitted a report to the Soviet Government on the food situation in Berlin and the measures which had been taken by the Soviet Command to improve it.

This assistance and active co-operation with German self-government bodies not only saved the population from famine but restored the supply of food to Berlin by June 1945. At the time German bodies wrote in their reports that "were it not for the support rendered by the Red Army it would have been impossible to supply the population with food".

By August 1, 1945, the Soviet side had supplied Berlin

¹ They were distributed according to work and consisted of 300-600 grammes of bread, 400 grammes of potatoes, 30-80 grammes of groats, 20-100 grammes of meat, 7-30 grammes of fats and 15-25 grammes of sugar daily. The supply of coffee and tea to the population depended on the available resources.

² More than 1,000 Soviet officers took part in organising the supply of food to the Berlin population. The newly created bodies of city self-government were still not too efficient and, therefore, the greater portion of this urgent job was performed by the military authorities.

with food to the value of RM 41,586,457.75 (in wholesale prices).¹ According to the Soviet Kommandatura, from May 10 to August 1, 1945, the Soviet Command placed at the disposal of the German self-government bodies the following amounts of food: 58,771.2 tons of flour, 8,199.6 tons of meat, 97,589.6 tons of potatoes, 382.6 tons of natural and 804.7 tons of ersatz coffee, 11,015.9 tons of groats, 2,116.2 tons of fats, 5,221.3 tons of sugar and 161.3 tons of tea.²

At the same time steps were being taken to get the medical service going. During the fighting for the city and for some time after its liberation it was administered solely by Soviet military hospitals.

Life in the city quickly returned to normal as a result of the measures taken by the Soviet military authorities. On May 10, a water-pumping station in Stolpe in the northern part of Berlin was put into operation and shortly afterwards power stations began generating electricity. May 13 saw the resumption of the bus service and on the following day the Underground was opened to passengers. On May 20, the tram service was resumed,³ and on May 29 trains began running within the city. Theatres, nightclubs, literary circles, etc., opened to the public and on May 15 the first issue of the *Tägliche Rundschau* was published.⁴ By May 17 there were 30 cinemas operating in the city,⁵ and by the end of June this number had risen to 127. The first postwar football match took place in Berlin on May 20. On the following day the *Berliner Zeitung* was published and on May 27 the doors of the Renaissance Theatre were opened. Most of the schools had also re-opened by this time.

Reporting to A. I. Mikoyan on how the Berlin population was being supplied with food and the way in which the nor-

¹ See: *Stadtarchiv Berlin*, Rep. 101, No. 13.

² The Soviet Military Administration in Germany continued to supply the German bodies with large amounts of food even after the entry of troops of the three Western Powers into Berlin. For example, in August 1945, the Soviet Kommandatura distributed 14,076 tons of flour, 115 tons of vegetable oil, 1,329.7 tons of meat, 319.8 tons of sugar and other products to the Berliners.

³ See: H. Adler, op. cit., p. 10.

⁴ At first it was a "frontline newspaper for the German population" but from its fourth issue it was put out as a "daily newspaper for the population of Germany". It was published until the summer of 1955.

⁵ See: *Tägliche Rundschau*, May 17, 1945.

mal operation of municipal economy, city transport and medical and cultural institutions was being organised, the chief of logistics of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany noted that by June 21 the city food supply had been restored, there were 1,084 bakeries in operation, seats of infection had been wiped out, and 96 hospitals, 10 maternity homes, 146 pharmacies, nine out-patient clinics, four dispensaries, 13 aid posts, three maternity consultation centres and six first-aid stations were available to the public. The chief of logistics also mentioned that the capacity of the power stations already in operation had been raised to 98,000 kw, 33,000 buildings had electric lighting, 15 pumping and 35 sewerage stations and the key water mains were operating, 39.2 kilometres of the underground railway were open to traffic and eight tram and seven bus lines were functioning. He also said that five gas plants were operating, the delivery of coal was organised and a large number of shops and restaurants were catering for the public. The philharmonia symphony orchestra was giving concerts, performances were held at the Western and Renaissance theatres, and in addition there were 45 variety shows and nightclubs, 127 cinemas; Opera and Drama theatres and other places of entertainment, were about to open their doors to the public.

When the troops of the three Western Powers entered Berlin considerable progress had already been made in the city to overcome the aftermath of the war. Even some Western diplomats, Balfour, for example, and bourgeois historians who make no secret of their dislike for the Soviet Union, have had to give credit to the great amount of work which was carried out by the Soviet Command in the first postwar months to bring life back to normal in Berlin.¹

THE ENFORCEMENT IN BERLIN OF THE DECISIONS OF THE ANTI-HITLER COALITION

In line with the objectives enunciated by the anti-Hitler coalition to extirpate nazism and militarism in Germany and rebuild her along peaceful, democratic lines, the Soviet

¹ See: *Heimatchronik Berlin*, p. 483.

Command promptly took extensive measures to promote democratisation.

In his first official order issued on April 28, 1945, N. E. Berzarin banned the National Socialist Party and its branches and organisations, including nazi entrepreneurs' associations. Former adherents to the nazi regime were purged from city self-government bodies, schools and other institutions.

On May 20, the Magistrate decided to appoint special representatives from among the anti-fascists as heads of enterprises whose owners or directors had either been active nazis or had fled to the West. By the end of the month 73 nazi economic organisations had been dissolved.¹ Later all private associations of entrepreneurs were banned, and on July 2 the order of the Magistrate concerning the "registration and confiscation of property belonging to active nazis", legalised the transfer of this property to the production councils.

These steps considerably curbed the influence of large-scale capital and paved the way for the uprooting of nazism and militarism and the promotion of democratisation.

In Berlin the Soviet Command created the most favourable conditions for the awakening of political life and the free activity of anti-fascist democratic parties and other organisations which began to appear immediately after the liberation of the city. Order No. 2 of July 10, 1945, issued by the chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany allowed political parties to become active again.² This order was a measure of the trust in the democratic forces of the German people. It stimulated political activity enormously in the Soviet Occupation Zone³ and ushered in a new period of democratic development in Germany.

In an appeal to the German people issued on the following day the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany advanced a comprehensive programme for creating an

¹ See: Walter Ulbricht, op. cit., p. 84.

² The Americans allowed political parties in their zone of occupation on August 27, the British on September 14 and the French in December 1945 and then only on a regional basis.

³ See: Otto Grotewohl, "Im Kampf um unsere Zukunft", *Einheit*, 1946, No. 3, p. 131.

anti-fascist democratic regime which was to be based on the unity of action of the working class and the close co-operation of all anti-fascist, democratic forces.¹

The appeal showed the German people that there were definite prospects for their future development and was one of the key documents in Germany's postwar history.

It was at this time that Wilhelm Pieck, who had been living in exile, returned to Berlin with a group of prominent Party officials.

The Communist Party swept into the political arena in the country.

The Social-Democratic groups which merged at the end of May constituted the Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany (SDP) on June 15.² It was headed by Otto Grotewohl and Max Fechner, and at a conference on June 17 the former was elected Party Chairman. The Social-Democratic Party welcomed the initiative of the Communist Party for unity of action.

On June 26, 1945, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) on behalf of wide sections of the bourgeoisie officially informed the public that it had divorced itself from nazism, imperialism and militarism.³ On July 1, 1945, the Soviet Military Administration in Germany allowed the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to begin functioning.⁴

On July 14, in response to the appeal made on June 11 by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, all political parties in the Soviet Zone united into an Anti-Fascist Democratic Bloc. Its activity was guided by a United Committee consisting of five representatives from each party.⁵ Thus, the "idea of creating a popular front was translated into reality".⁶ Headed by Communists, who on June 19,

¹ See: Otto Grotewohl, "Im Kampf um unsere Zukunft", *Einheit*, 1946, No. 3, pp. 1-8.

² See: Stefan Doernberg, *Kurze Geschichte der DDR*, Berlin, 1964, p. 34.

³ See: *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Vol. 6, pp. 55-57.

⁴ Subsequently the Magistrate declined to register any other parties. The Soviet Military Administration supported this decision, believing that the formation of new parties would inhibit the consolidation of the democratic forces of the German people.

⁵ The Committee of the bloc of Berlin organisations of these parties was established in December 1946.

⁶ Walter Ulbricht, *op. cit.*, p. 124.



Sir William Strang, F. T. Gusev and John Winant. February 18, 1944.



Roger Jackling, P. A. Abrasimov, Kenneth Rush and Jean Sauvagnargues.



Berlin 1945. Food distributed to Berliners.

1945, formed a joint body with the Social Democratic Party for merging the two parties on an equal footing and ensuring unity in the working class (Joint Working Committee), the Anti-Fascist Bloc of Democratic Parties became the guiding force which was to lead the German people in their struggle for democratic reorganisation of the country.

The consolidation of the anti-fascist democratic forces in Berlin and the laying of the foundations for a new, peace-loving and democratic Germany, all of which was fully in keeping with the decisions of the anti-Hitler coalition and the interests of broad sections of the German people, took place with the active support of the Soviet Military Administration.

So, by the time troops of the three Western Powers¹ entered Berlin and the quadripartite administration became established there, the Soviet Command together with Communist-led anti-fascist forces of the German people had carried out the greater part of the work to restore normal life in the city. "In accordance with the instructions of the Communist Party Central Committee and the Soviet Government," notes G. K. Zhukov, "we helped the German people in every way we could in order to normalise their life as quickly as possible."² Berlin, which was like a dead city in the first days of May, not only returned to life, but became an example to the whole country of what anti-fascist democratic transformations could achieve.³ The most important prerequisites for this—unity of the working class, unity of the democratic patriotic forces and the anti-fascist democratic bodies of German self-government—were created in the city.

The selfless and vigorous measures taken by the Soviet Government and the Soviet Command to help the German population surmount the postwar difficulties in the Eastern Zone of occupation vividly manifested the genuine humanitarianism of the Soviet people as they fulfilled their internationalist duty.

¹ The first American patrols (212 men) arrived in Berlin on the morning of July 1, 1945. American and British troops entered the city on July 4. The Soviet troops left the western sectors of the city on July 11. The French took over their sector from the British on August 12, 1945.

² *The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov*, p. 613.

³ See: *Neues Deutschland*, April 17, 1965, p. 4.

It is doubtful whether history knows of any other example of such concern on the part of the victor for the people of a defeated country. The air was still filled with gunpowder smoke when the Soviet people extended a helping hand to the German people and gave them vital support in rebuilding their life along peaceful, democratic lines. Only a socialist state was capable of adopting such a policy.

The all-round assistance which the Soviet people began to render the German people immediately after the rout of nazism was a key factor in establishing the fraternal friendship which today binds the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic and which is one of their most important joint historical gains. The best representatives of the people of both countries had been striving for decades to attain the things that were now being translated into reality.

CHAPTER II
TWO LINES IN THE POSTWAR POLICY
TOWARDS GERMANY (1945-1949)

GROWTH OF ANTI-SOVIET TRENDS
IN THE POLICY OF THE WESTERN POWERS

At the end of the war in Europe the Allies were confronted with the stupendous task of postwar settlement. It was necessary to solve the pressing problem of Germany and agree on principles which could serve as a basis for peace treaties with her and her former satellites. War issues in the Far East were also awaiting solution. Finally, in order to ensure international security, the victorious powers had to search for ways and means of co-operating in peacetime, as they had done during the war.

However, the turn of events blasted the expectations of the war-wearied nations. In the first months after Germany's capitulation, two different lines in the policy of the members of the anti-Hitler coalition became clearly visible: the democratic line of the Soviet Union and the imperialist line of the Western Powers.

American and British ruling circles began to hatch their treacherous plots to use Germany's material, technical and manpower resources against the USSR. Diplomats, military specialists and statesmen worked on them in complete secrecy and although they had not been made concrete when the spring of 1945 arrived, it became absolutely clear that the United States and Britain were determined to bring together and mobilise all reactionary forces for the struggle against the Soviet Union.

The late British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the most candid spokesman for these circles, wrote in his memoirs that as he "moved about among the cheering crowds"

on May 9, 1945—Victory Day. . . “The Soviet menace, to my eyes, had already replaced the nazi foe”.¹ He said that “the destruction of Germany’s military might had brought with it a fundamental change”² in the relations between the USSR and the Western Powers, and that accordingly the Western Powers should bear in mind the following when charting their policy: “First, that Soviet Russia has become a mortal danger to the free world. Secondly, that a new front must be immediately created against her onward sweep. Thirdly, that this front in Europe should be as far east as possible.”³

This was an obvious summons to stop co-operating with the USSR, break up the anti-Hitler coalition, to betray the Allied commitments and throw back the democratic forces from the positions they had won in the grim fight against fascism.

A similar evolution was taking place in the US ruling circles.

A mere three days after the death of President Roosevelt, representatives of the US financial oligarchy at a meeting at the State Department⁴ spoke in favour of reversing Roosevelt’s policy and of turning Germany into a bastion against Bolshevism.

Averell Harriman, the US Ambassador in Moscow, who had been summoned to Washington for consultations told President Harry Truman on April 20, 1945, the eve of the United Nations Conference in San Francisco, that a “barbarian invasion of Europe” was taking place and demanded a “reconsideration” of the US policy towards the Soviet Union. At the same time he said that “the Soviet Government had no wish to break with the United States”.⁵

Formulating the line of the new US Administration, Tru-

¹ Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, London, 1954, Vol. VI, p. 495.

² *Ibid.*, p. 400.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ The meeting was attended by Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Vandenberg, Under Secretary of State Clayton (one of the wealthiest US millionaires), the Vice-President of General Motors, two influential representatives of military circles and John Foster Dulles, who subsequently was to play a prominent role in US foreign policy.

⁵ *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, Vol. I, New York, 1955, pp. 70, 71.

man declared in April 1945 that he "intended to be tough" in his relations with the Soviet Government.¹

His closest associates not only fully shared his view but went even further. General Arnold, an influential figure in US military circles, said in May 1945 that henceforth the Soviet Union was the United States' main enemy and proposed that they start preparing immediately for an air war with the USSR.

It is now known for certain that in the summer of 1945 Britain and the United States considered the possibility of launching a war against the Soviet Union if at the forthcoming talks on postwar settlement the Soviet side refused to make concessions and thus created "difficulties".

After a sober appraisal of the balance of forces, however, the British and US general staffs agreed that they "could not, under existing conditions, defeat Russia".² Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke admitted that "the chances of success" in this war, should it be started, were "quite impossible".³

Nevertheless, the USA and Britain did not give up their adventuristic plans even if at the time they could not pursue their anti-Soviet policy overtly and on a broad front. They needed the assistance of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan. Moreover, Western politicians could not afford to ignore the mood of broad sections of the population and world public opinion which relentlessly demanded effective measures to ensure peace and security in the world. The main thing, however, was that the military might of the Soviet Union deprived Washington and London of confidence in the success of these plans.

In the circumstances British and American ruling circles could not change their policy towards the Soviet Union abruptly without detriment to their own interests. However, the course advocated by Churchill and Truman and the forces that stood behind them had already become the cornerstone of their countries' foreign policy. In view of the historical developments following the rout of Nazi Germany the

¹ Ibid.

² *Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945*, Washington, 1955, p. 108.

³ Arthur Bryant, *Triumph in the West, 1943-1946*, London, 1959, p. 470.

US and British Governments were faced with the alternatives of fighting another war or adopting a policy of peaceful coexistence. They opted for "positions of strength" policy and decided to prepare for another war.

**THE PLANS OF THE WESTERN POWERS
WITH REGARD TO GERMANY AND BERLIN
ON THE EVE OF THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE**

Germany occupied a special place in the postwar plans of the Western Powers. Many historians note that in 1945 the US ruling circles already regarded her as a "bastion . . . from the point of view of both manpower and industrial potential and her strategic position on the European field of force",¹ and advanced diverse projects for using her against the USSR and the growing democratic movement.

Yet the US and British Governments were well aware that they would be unable to carry out such plans with regard to the whole of Germany as her eastern regions were in the Soviet Occupation Zone. Another serious obstacle was the existence of a central military administration in the shape of the Allied Control Council where the Soviet Union had its representatives. The Western Powers, therefore, considered it their primary task to paralyse the Control Council's work, whatever the cost, prevent the formation of any central German bodies and consolidate their position, even though, initially, this could be in the country's western zones. In their opinion this could be best achieved by splitting Germany.

It was only natural, therefore, that Stalin's Victory Day statement in which he said that the USSR intended "neither to dismember, nor destroy Germany"² threw Washington and London into confusion. The US and British Ambassadors in Moscow urgently asked for explanations.

Nevertheless, in spite of the Soviet Union's absolutely unequivocal stand on this question, the Western Powers did not abandon their plans for dividing Germany.

¹ Norbert Tönnies, *Der Staat aus den Nichts. Zehn Jahre deutscher Geschichte*, Stuttgart, 1954, p. 83.

² *Pravda*, May 9, 1945.

Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, chief of Truman's personal staff, wrote: "The President believed that the separation of Germany into separate sovereign states would be advantageous to future peace and security..."¹, that is, to the United States.

The US position became even clearer as the conference of the Great Powers drew near. The British and French were also in favour of splitting Germany.

The policy of dividing Germany drew a favourable response from the German bourgeoisie. Although unable at the time to influence the Western Powers, they made no secret of the fact that they were all for partitioning Germany so as to retain domination over her at least in the western part.

But perhaps the most vivid manifestation of the West's "new course" was its faith in the atom bomb, which the Western Powers regarded as the most important factor in their "positions of strength" policy, as an instrument that would enable them to dominate the world. "If it explodes," declared Truman, "I'll certainly have a hammer on those boys (Soviet representatives—*Ed.*)".²

It was with these plans and intentions that the heads of the Western Powers set out for Berlin and such was the atmosphere in which the meeting of the Big Three was to take place.

THE POTSDAM AGREEMENT, A PROGRAMME OF POSTWAR SETTLEMENT

The basic questions concerning the Big Three conference were agreed upon in correspondence between their heads of Truman's special representatives to Moscow (Harry Hopkins) and London (Joseph Davies) at the end of May 1945. It was envisaged that the conference would take place in Berlin.

Berlin was chosen as the site for obvious reasons. World

¹ W. D. Leahy, *I Was There*, London, 1950, p. 390.

² Jonathan Daniels, *The Man of Independence*, Philadelphia-New York, 1950, p. 266.

public opinion regarded the capital of defeated Hitler Germany as a personification of aggression and nazi obscurantism and, therefore, holding the conference between the victor powers there symbolised the collapse of nazism and the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition. Inasmuch as there were no suitable premises in Berlin proper, which had been heavily damaged during the war, it was decided that the conference would be held in Potsdam. Considering that Potsdam had once been the residence of Prussian kings, those proponents of German militarism, it was impossible to imagine a more suitable venue for the conference.

The Potsdam Conference,¹ which was the focus of world attention, was officially opened on the afternoon of July 17, 1945, in the Cäcilienhof Palace in Sanssouci Park.

On the whole the meeting took place in an atmosphere of co-operation characteristic of the wartime relations between the Great Powers. Realising that it was still too early for a blatant violation of their allied commitments, the Western Powers made a great show of wanting to co-operate with the USSR. Yet, in contrast to the Teheran and Yalta conferences, the influence of Britain and America's "tough course" could already be felt at the talks. There were indications that they were not inclined to take the interests of the Soviet Union into consideration and wanted to revise the historical decisions of the Yalta Conference and impose their will on the USSR. They intended to prevent the institution of thorough-going social and economic reforms in Germany and the passing of power into the hands of the working people, to safeguard the position of the ruling classes, turn them into a bulwark and a proponent of their policy and impose all the difficulties involved in recovering from the war on the broad sections of the population. The Western

¹ Soviet delegation: J. V. Stalin (head of delegation), V. M. Molotov, N. G. Kuznetsov, A. I. Antonov, A. Y. Vyshinsky, S. I. Kavtaradze, I. M. Maisky, S. G. Kucherov, A. A. Gromyko, F. T. Gushev, K. V. Novikov, S. K. Tsarapkin, S. P. Kozyrev, A. A. Lavrishchev, M. Z. Saburov, A. A. Sobolev, S. A. Golunsky. US delegation: Truman (head of delegation), Y. Byrnes, W. Leahy, J. Davis, E. Pauley, W. Harriman, G. Marshall, H. Arnold, B. Somervell, W. Clayton, Y. Dann. British delegation: W. Churchill (head of delegation, replaced on July 28 by C. Attlee), A. Eden, E. Bevin, W. Strang, A. Brooke, H. Wilson.

Powers attached paramount importance to the plans for splitting the country, as a means of attaining their objections.

The Soviet side countered these reactionary imperialist plans with a democratic programme to solve the problems of Germany. The Soviet Government was firm in its opinion that it would be wholly incorrect to identify the German people with Hitler's clique and to subject them to a policy of revenge, national humiliation and oppression and that, on the contrary, everything should be done to enable Germany to develop as a united, peace-loving and democratic state.

German imperialism, which plunged the world into two world wars and brought the German nation to the brink of disaster, was the main enemy of the people of other countries as well as of the German people themselves, and the greatest obstacle to Germany's democratic development and European security. The Soviet Union and all democratic forces, therefore, considered the extirpation of German militarism of primary importance in securing peace on the European continent and reorganising the life of the German nation.

Believing that the reorganisation of Germany on a new foundation would be in the interests of the German people and European security, the Soviet delegation at the Potsdam Conference put forward a programme for the demilitarisation, denazification, decartelisation and democratisation of the country, whose general principles had been proclaimed in Yalta.

Due to the determined efforts of the Soviet delegation these principles were endorsed and formulated in the Potsdam decisions. The Conference proclaimed that German militarism and fascism would be extirpated, the domination of monopolies abolished and the country would be subject to the broadest democratisation. The Potsdam Agreement emphasised that, having assumed supreme authority in Germany, the Allies would not seek to destroy or enslave the German people. "It is the intention of the Allies," the Agreement stated, "that the German people should be given the opportunity to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis." The Allies

also undertook to take the necessary measures to assure that Germany would never again threaten her neighbours or the peace of the world.¹

In keeping with its principled stand on Germany's unity, the Soviet delegation at the Potsdam Conference turned down the plans to divide Germany just as it had done at the Crimea Conference. "We reject this proposal," said Stalin, "it is contrary to nature. Germany should not be dismembered; it should be made into a democratic, peace-loving state."²

The Soviet delegation, therefore, insisted on the establishment of a central German administration which could ensure Germany's political and economic unity.

However, since the existence of a single, independent, democratic and peace-loving Germany on the political map of Europe was completely at odds with the postwar plans of the Western Powers, they turned down the Soviet proposal.

Thereupon the Soviet side proposed that several central German departments should be established. Besides helping to speed up the achievement of the Allies' objectives and bring about the restoration of the country, this measure, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation, would make it possible to preserve Germany's political and economic unity.

Thanks to the insistence of the Soviet Union the Conference decided that, pending the establishment of a central German government, certain essential central German administrative departments (particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry) headed by state secretaries would be set up. These were to function under the direction of the Control Council.

The Potsdam Agreement also envisaged the need to ensure Germany's economic unity.

Thus, the principle of preserving the country's unity, which was championed by the Soviet Union, triumphed at Potsdam. In its decisions the Conference unequivocally

¹ *The Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, Moscow, 1959, p. 320.

² *The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov*, p. 636.

cally stated that Germany should be regarded as a single entity.

The heads of the three powers reaffirmed an earlier agreement on the tasks facing the control machinery in Germany and the rights it possessed. They clearly defined the aims of



Berlin. The Occupation Sectors established under the agreement signed by the Great Powers on September 12, 1944 (with changes introduced as of July 26, 1945).

1—Soviet Sector; 2—French Sector; 3—British Sector; 4—American Sector.

the occupation and indicated practical measures to assure the reconstruction of life for the German people on a peaceful and democratic basis and the creation of a united, peace-loving and democratic Germany.

A range of other key issues concerning Germany, including reparations, frontiers, restitutions and the German Navy, were also resolved at Potsdam.

The Conference established a Council of Foreign Ministers which was authorised to propose settlements of territorial questions left over from the war in Europe and to draw up a peace settlement with Germany and with the former satellites of the Third Reich. The Big Three ended the successful conference on August 2 by signing the agreed documents.

The Potsdam Conference occupies a *special place* in history.

Its decisions crowned the efforts made by the anti-Hitler coalition over many years to draw up a concerted policy with regard to Germany. They had a most progressive and constructive character and were permeated with a spirit of justice and concern for peace and the future of the German people. They were not a *diktat* of the victors, but a natural result of the struggle by many nations for liberation from German nazism, the deadliest enemy of all mankind.

The Soviet Union's decisive role in routing fascism, the swing in the balance of forces in favour of socialism, the powerful anti-war feelings of the broad masses and their warm regard for the Soviet Union were all bound to leave an imprint on the character of the Potsdam decisions.

Thanks to the firm and consistent position of the Soviet Union, the Potsdam Conference was able to arrive at decisions on all the basic issues, including the crucial German question, that were fully in the spirit of the Crimea Conference and furthered the cause of peace and security. The purposeful efforts of the Soviet side left the Western Powers with no alternative but to sign agreements which were in keeping with the liberatory nature of the war against nazi Germany and the vital interests of the peoples of the anti-Hitler coalition. Despite the difficulties which arose at the Conference due to the attitude of the Western Powers and the differences between its participants, it was the idea of Germany's anti-fascist and democratic development and postwar settlement championed by the Soviet Union and not

the imperialist line advanced by the US and British delegations which triumphed at Potsdam.

In the final count the Potsdam Conference was a victory for the policy of common sense and peaceful coexistence and proved that states with different socio-economic systems could, if they wished, solve the most complex international problems. That was why the decisions of the Potsdam Conference laid the foundation for postwar settlement and won the support of world democratic opinion and of the German people themselves.

THE ALLIED CONTROL MACHINERY FOR GERMANY AND BERLIN

Special control machinery was set up to implement the Allied policy declared at Potsdam, and Germany was temporarily occupied and divided up into four occupation zones.

The control machinery for Germany had the following structure. Four Commanders-in-Chief acting jointly constituted the supreme control body—the Control Council. Its purpose was to ensure concerted action by the occupation organs of the Four Powers in their respective zones, draw up joint decisions on key military, political, economic and other matters concerning the whole of Germany and to exercise control over the central German administration.

To ensure the smooth functioning of the Control Council which had its seat in Berlin, it was decided to turn the city into a “special area” inside the Soviet zone, make it subject to a special regime and place it under “joint administration” and “joint occupation”. Berlin was divided into four sectors,¹ three of which were temporarily administered by the Western Powers who set up their Control Council apparatus in them and brought in a specified contingent of troops.

¹ The sectors were established in keeping with the Protocol on the Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Administration of Greater Berlin of September 12, 1944. The Protocol was amended on July 27, 1945, following the allocation of a sector to France. The sectoral boundaries were finally delimited and approved on August 1, 1945.

The Occupation Sectors in Berlin¹

Sectors and number of districts in each	Districts	Area		Population	
		sq. km.	per cent	size	per cent
Soviet (8)	Mitte, Prenzlauerberg, Friedrichshain, Treptow, Pankow, Weissensee, Lichtenberg, Köpenick	402.8	45.3	1,058,000	37
American (6)	Kreuzberg, Neukölln, Tempelhof, Steglitz, Schöneberg, Zehlendorf	210.8	23.7	836,000	31
British (4)	Tiergarten, Wilmersdorf, Charlottenburg, Spandau	165.6	18.6	503,000	19
French (2)	Wedding, Reinickendorf	104.6	12.4	372,000	13

¹ See: A. Zimm, *Westberlin. Eine politisch- und ökonomisch-geographische charakteristik*, Berlin, 1961, p. 10.

A military Inter-Allied Kommandatura was established to administer jointly the Greater Berlin area.¹

The Kommandatura "observed and controlled" the activities of local bodies in Berlin in keeping with the Potsdam decisions which envisaged uniform principles for the whole of Germany, including her capital. As distinct from the Control Council, the Kommandatura had only administrative powers and could not promulgate laws, but only orders and instructions. It was headed by four commandants, each of whom served in rotation as chief commandant for a period of one month. The Kommandatura, just as the Control Council, functioned in keeping with the principle of unanimity. The rules of the Allied Kommandatura approved on January 18, 1946, stated that only unanimous decisions of the representatives of the Four Powers would be enforced.

¹ The administrative unit of Greater Berlin was formed by the Law of October 1, 1920, which provided for the merger of eight towns, 59 rural communities and 26 adjoining districts with the city of Berlin.

The establishment of control bodies for Germany and Berlin created the prerequisites for the speediest implementation of the Potsdam decisions. The Soviet Government in its negotiations with the Western Powers on the German question, and the Soviet Military Administration in its practical activity in Germany and Berlin, undeviatingly adhered to and executed these decisions in East Germany. Had the Western Powers also unerringly and consistently enforced the Potsdam decisions, the latter could have become a firm and durable basis for regulating German affairs and ensuring European peace and security.

However, things did not work out this way. Instead of carrying out the Potsdam decisions and co-operating with the Soviet side, the US, British and French representatives on the control bodies embarked on a different policy. Despite certain differences on a number of issues the three Western Powers were at one in their efforts to prevent any serious democratic changes in Germany and to preserve the socio-economic system that had fostered nazism. They also wanted to carve up the country and her capital, create a separate West German state, and, arming it step by step, incorporate it into their military and strategic plans.

THE WESTERN POWERS FRUSTRATE THE POTSDAM DECISIONS IN THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN

Being the initiator of the Crimea and Potsdam decisions, the Soviet Union swiftly and decisively carried them into effect in its zone and made consistent efforts to have the Western Powers do the same in the Western Zones of Germany and the Western Sectors of Berlin. The US, British and French Governments had other plans, however.

Having signed the Potsdam Agreement on August 2, 1945, the Western Powers naturally could not turn it into a mere scrap of paper on the very next day. Considering the world situation at the time it was impossible for them to come out openly against the Potsdam decisions. Moreover, the Berlin self-government bodies initially included very powerful anti-fascist progressive forces. Thus, the Western Powers resort-

ed to other tactics. Backed by local reactionary elements and Right-wing Social Democrats the US, British and French military authorities began to sabotage the introduction of anti-fascist democratic reforms and with growing persistence endeavoured to isolate the Western Sectors from the city's eastern part and turn them into seats of hostile activity against the Soviet Union.

Later on Churchill declared that the decisions of the Potsdam Conference gave rise to disappointment and apprehension, and then directly said that they should be rejected.

US Secretary of State James Byrnes spoke in a similar vein when he described the Potsdam decisions as a mistake.

On October 18, 1945, at a meeting of the Berlin commanders at which the draft of the rules of the Allied Kommandatura was discussed, representatives of the Western Powers proposed to delete its Paragraph 5, because it contained a reference to the Potsdam Agreement.

In a word, since the Potsdam decisions made it impossible for the Western Powers to achieve their objectives they simply decided to prevent their enforcement.

In the opinion of the United States, Britain and France, the best way they could undermine these decisions and carry through their plans was to dismember Germany and her capital, create a separate West German state and gradually arm it and include it in their military-strategic plans.

Therefore, in violation of the Potsdam principles, the Western Powers adopted a course aimed at splitting Germany and Berlin politically and economically, liquidating their quadripartite control machinery and terminating the activity of the Council of Foreign Ministers. This would give them a free hand to revive and strike a deal with German imperialism and use it in their aggressive intentions.

In the first postwar months the occupation authorities in the Western Sectors of Berlin and in West Germany began to establish close contacts with the local reactionary circles which soon became their chief mainstay. Shortly after the troops of the three Western Powers entered Berlin, about 60 Berlin industrialists and directors of various concerns led by a certain Bernhard Skrodzki met in secret in one of the city's villas to discuss ways and means of boycotting the decisions of the Magistrate, preventing the confiscation of their prop-

erty and developing close co-operation with the US, British and French military authorities.¹

Supported by reactionary elements and Right-wing Social Democrats the Western Powers sabotaged the denazification, decartelisation and democratisation measures in the Western Sectors of Berlin as they did in the Western Zones and adopted a course to separate these sectors from the rest of the city and the surrounding area. Referring to these developments the Foreign Ministries of the USSR and the GDR stressed that even in the first months of their presence in Berlin, the Western occupation authorities began to prepare the economic and political separation of the Western Sectors from the rest of the city. To quote Albert Norden, a GDR politician, "as soon as the Anglo-American forces entered Berlin in July 1945, they launched measures which led to the split of Berlin".²

In August 1945 the Americans and then the British (October 6, 1945) and French (August 1946) banned the activity of street and house foremen who constituted a sort of auxiliary organ of the new Berlin self-government which was being formed at the time and played a considerable role in normalising life in the city. This measure by the Western occupation authorities was the first move in furthering their policy of rejecting democratic reforms and quadripartite co-operation and an element of their preparations to split Berlin. Through these block and house foremen the Magistrate was able to work in close contact with the population and involve large numbers of people in the rehabilitation and administration of Berlin. There are many researchers even in the West, Hans Hertzfeld, for example, who admit that the institute of street and house foremen "was a recognised auxiliary instrument of the bodies of city self-government".³ Therefore this step could be qualified only as a broad and undisguised offensive against the democratic city self-government on the part of the Western occupation authorities undertaken with a view to severing the Magistrate's ties with

¹ See: H. Adler, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

² *Berliner Zeitung*, May 22, 1965.

³ See: *Berlin. Kampf um Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1945-1946*, Berlin, 1961, Vol. I, p. 121.

wide sections of the population, weakening their influence on the city's political activity and undermining the position of German self-government bodies in Berlin.

The same month the Americans terminated the Magistrate's right to administer the property of ex-nazis and placed it under their control to prevent its socialisation.¹ The same was done by the British in their sector. The Magistrate's influence on these enterprises was in fact brought to nought in the Western Sectors where occupation authorities placed them under the administration of representatives of the old concerns and established special agencies for the purpose.

In this way the Western Powers handicapped the enforcement of democratic reforms in the city and saved the economic foundation of German imperialism. Appointed by the Western occupation authorities, the managers of these enterprises with their large-scale machinery formed the embryo of a separate administration in Berlin's Western Sectors which began to develop first and foremost in the economic sphere.

The Western occupation authorities increased their efforts to pave the way for the political separation of their sectors from the rest of the city. They began to "purge" the administrative machinery of "undesirable persons" and replace them with reactionary and openly neo-nazi elements.

In September 1945, the British occupation authorities demanded that what they called "professional officials", that is, former members of the police force in Hitler Germany, should be included in the Berlin police. British representatives announced that several hundred of these "specialists" were being trained in the British Zone and would shortly be brought to Berlin for this purpose.²

Then followed the dismissal of active anti-fascists and their replacement by former supporters of the nazi regime who had by now openly entered the service of the Western Powers. In September 1945, the British dismissed Lesche, the burgomaster of Spandau, for being a member of the Communist Party of Germany. The same month the Americans discharged the deputy burgomaster of Zehlendorf for thanking the street and house foremen dismissed by the American

¹ See: *Berlin. Kampf um Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1945-1946*, Vol. I, p. 154.

² See: H. Adler, op. cit., p. 53.

authorities, saying that he was guilty of "impermissible criticism of the occupation authorities".¹ The Americans also dismissed and arrested the head of one of the sub-districts in Zehlendorf for allowing two Jews who had suffered at the hands of the nazis to move into the apartment of a former Gestapo official. In Neukölln the American authorities replaced one of the anti-fascist members of the local magistrate by a former senior police inspector, Hans Zimmermann, who had faithfully served in Hitler's police from 1933 to 1945. In Wedding the French removed district director Wilhelm Ziegelmayr from his post for the same reason. Then the Americans replaced the burgomaster in Steglitz despite vigorous protests on the part of the Magistrate. On March 29, 1946, the British authorities without the knowledge of the Public Security Committee of the Allied Kommandatura and in the teeth of protests from the Soviet representatives dismissed the chiefs of district police departments in Tiergarten and Charlottenburg just because they were Communists.

At the same time the Western Powers stubbornly opposed the extension of the rights of local self-governments in Berlin. At a meeting in September 1945, in which the commandants considered the status of district self-government bodies in Berlin, the US representative came out against the draft status submitted on the grounds that the proposed constitution granted too much authority to the magistrates and not enough to the local allied governing bodies.

One of the leaders of the Magistrate, Karl Maron, recalls that the Western occupation authorities began to obstruct its work as soon as they entered Berlin. In August and September 1945, when, in keeping with the established procedure, the American and then the British commandants served as chief commandants, the Allied Kommandatura, in contrast to the preceding period, approved only one out of approximately 20 orders and instructions presented by the Magistrate for its consideration,² though all of them were important for the further development of Berlin.

It was clear that the tactics of the military administration of the Western Powers were designed to paralyse the work of the Magistrate, to lead the population into believing that

¹ *Berliner Zeitung*, May 22, 1965, p. 3.

² See: *Neues Deutschland*, April 25, 1965, p. 4.

Berlin self-government, in which the influence of anti-fascist democratic forces was quite powerful, was wholly inactive, and to prepare the ground for its demise.

In violation of the decisions of the Allied Kommandatura and the Control Council, the Western occupation authorities took to the road of independent administration, introducing more and more unilateral measures in their sectors.

In November 1945 the British set up a separate economic agency (*Wirtschaftsstelle*) which concerned itself with industrial and commercial questions in their sector. The agency started issuing directives to district administrations in the British Sectors and in fact replaced the Magistrate in this respect. The creation of the agency was a major step in the preparations for an economic and administrative division of the city.

In the same month the American authorities violated Article 7 of the Agreement on the Control Machinery for Germany. Unilaterally, without the knowledge of the Allied Kommandatura, they set up administrative courts in their sector to curtail the activity of the Magistrate there.¹ The British followed suit. These courts ruled as illegal a range of democratic measures which had been enforced in the American and British sectors, including many decisions made by Berlin executive bodies. In keeping with Law No. 18 of the Control Council, these bodies expropriated the apartments of former active nazis and turned them over to the victims of the nazi regime. The courts ordered the mass eviction of the new tenants, revoked many decisions of the Magistrate and upheld the interests of rich proprietors. In disregard of Law No. 36 "On Administrative Courts", which was passed by the Control Council, the Western occupation authorities refused to introduce a uniform democratic system of administrative legal proceedings to Berlin.

In compliance with the Soviet Commandant's Order No. 1 of April 28, 1945, which like all his other ordinances remained in force after the entry of the troops of the three Western Powers into Berlin, all the old banks were closed in the city and their activity banned. By the Allied Komman-

¹ See: *Berlin. Kampf um Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1945-1946*, Vol. 1, p. 263.

datura's Order No. 130 of September 26, 1945, a single bank was established for the whole of Berlin. The authorities in the three Western Sectors, however, allowed a number of the old banks there to function for the most part under their former directors. For example, three directors retained their posts at the Dresdner Bank, seven at the Deutsche Länderbank and six at the Kommerzbank. A representative of the Allied Kommandatura's Finance Committee was prevented from auditing the Deutsche Länderbank in the British Sector by the bank's director on the grounds that he was subordinate to a special representative of the US occupation authorities with offices in Frankfurt-am-Main.

Early in 1946 the American administration made another move towards wrecking the city's economic and administrative unity by forbidding the industrial enterprises in its sector to accept orders from the Soviet sector without its approval.

At the same time, the Americans, who from the end of 1945 became more and more overt in their efforts to split Germany, began to impede the unification of the democratic forces, particularly of the Communist and the Social-Democratic parties. While the Soviet occupation authorities considered that the merger of these parties was the internal affair of the German working people, the Western Powers did their utmost to undermine German unity, a policy which their occupation authorities also pursued in Berlin.

As early as September 1945 they prohibited the Association of Free German Trade Unions from holding an all-Berlin conference. In October 1945, General Eisenhower, chief of the US military government in Germany, openly opposed the formation of any party blocs,¹ and in the beginning of January 1946, General Clay, deputy chief of the US military government, officially announced to the press that there would be no merger of the Social-Democratic and Communist parties.²

The Western occupation authorities intensified the persecution of the Communists and launched a campaign of direct intimidation of the democratic forces.

¹ See: *Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 17, 1945.

² See: *Die Neue Zeitung*, January 11, 1946.

As soon as the first reports on the meeting of the leaders of the Social-Democratic and Communist parties to negotiate their merger were published the Western authorities began to act even more crudely. The British military authorities told Wilhelm Lorenz, the former political secretary of the Berlin Social-Democratic organisation, that the British and their allies would ban the activity of the united party and demanded urgent measures to prevent the merger of the Social-Democratic and Communist parties. A special plan was worked out. Kurt Schumacher, who had been hastily flown to Berlin, and representatives of the Western occupation authorities for two days brainwashed the Social Democrats in the American Sector opposed to the move. "You must work to prevent the merger in Berlin," he demanded.

However, in spite of the manoeuvring and crude pressure on the part of Schumacher and his associates, who on April 10, 1946, set up the Eastern Bureau of the Social-Democratic Party for the purpose of preventing the merger, the provocateurs sustained a defeat. The results of the poll which they conducted in Berlin showed that out of 66,246 members of the Social-Democratic Party only 19,529 voted against the immediate merger with the Communist Party and a mere 5,568, that is, approximately 8 per cent, opposed the merger or any other form of alliance with the Communists. That meant that 66 per cent of the Social Democrats of the Berlin organisation had held to correct and principled positions.¹

This was a definite setback for the splitters. At a joint meeting on April 14, 1946, the Berlin organisations of the Social-Democratic and Communist parties voted in favour of the merger and on April 21, the congresses of these parties in Berlin took a similar decision. The Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SUPG) was founded. Thus, the working class of Germany acquired a united and powerful revolutionary party. It was equipped with Marxist-Leninist teaching and embodied the foremost traditions of the German working-class movement.²

However, with the help of lies, overt pressure and active support from the US, British and French occupation authori-

¹ See: *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Vol. 6, p. 140.

² *Ibid.*, p. 153.

ties the Right-wing opposition managed to split the ranks of the Social Democrats and register their break-away group in the Western Sectors as an independent Berlin organisation of the Social-Democratic Party. Having permitted the splitters to unfold their activity in the Western sectors, their occupation authorities for six weeks refused to allow the newly formed Socialist Unity Party to operate. As a result, the leadership of the Right-wing Social Democrats was able to seize the Party's premises and brainwash the vacillating members. Only on May 28, 1946, at the insistence of the Soviet representatives, did the Co-ordinating Committee sanction SUPG activity throughout Berlin, on the condition, however, that the break-away Social-Democratic Party would also be allowed to function in the city.

The blocking of democratisation in Berlin's Western sectors and the establishment of separate organisations of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which began to function there shortly after the formation of the independent organisation of Right-wing Social Democrats, enabled reaction to strengthen its positions and created serious difficulties for the progressive, anti-fascist forces.

Simultaneously the Western sectors were being turned into a *centre of subversive and hostile propaganda* against the Soviet Union and countries friendly to it.

In quick succession the Western Powers established intelligence service branches in their sectors of the city. The Headquarters of the US Occupation Forces (now at Clay-Allee 170-172) became the seat of special sections of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), together with branches of the US Military Intelligence Service (MIS) and Naval Intelligence (ONI). The West Berlin branches of the Office of Special Investigation (OSI USAF) and the US Air Intelligence Service (AIS) were sited in other parts of the city. The British turned the Olympic Stadium into a centre of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and other secret services, whilst the main branches of the French Secret Service were based at the Napoleon Barracks.

In the wake of the secret services there appeared in the Western sectors numerous anti-Soviet emigrant organisa-

tions such as the Nationaler Bund der Schaffender and the Zentralverband der Nachkriegsemigranten aus der UdSSR.

The RIAS (Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektor Berlins) radio station began operating in West Berlin on February 7, 1946. According to the Berlin correspondent of the *New York Post Meridian*, even then Berlin had the biggest propaganda machine turning out anti-Soviet fabrications.

Western newspapers wrote in 1946 that all this showed that the spirit of Potsdam had receded into the past.

Thus, the involvement of the USA, Britain and France in the joint occupation and administration of Berlin not only inhibited the enforcement of the Potsdam decisions in the Western sectors, but seriously aggravated the situation in the city. The activity of the Western Powers in Berlin fully mirrored their policy towards the whole of Germany. It was a part of the West's steadily developing aggressive anti-Soviet course.

THE WESTERN POWERS PREPARE THE SPLIT OF BERLIN

The Western Powers' policy on Germany entered a new phase at the end of 1946 following a speech by US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in Stuttgart on September 6.

In this speech he, in fact, directly repudiated the Potsdam Agreement and unfolded the principal aspects of America's new course, whose immediate aim was to do away with the Four-Power administration, split up Germany and create a separate West German state. This meant that the US was turning to separatist actions on the German question. It was also quite obvious that the US intended to restore the potential of West Germany's armament industry and turn the country into a strategic springboard against the socialist countries.

The transformation of the western part of Germany into a separate state with a reactionary anti-democratic regime submissive to the will of the United States, and West Berlin into its strategic springboard was declared as the cornerstone of the US policy on Germany. General Clay, one of the most zealous advocates and initiators of the partition of Germany

and Berlin, had every reason to characterise Byrnes's speech as "a major development" in the US policy towards Germany.

The German bourgeoisie was enthusiastic over the new course. The Prime Minister of Hessen, Karl Geiler, with tears in his eyes thanked the US Secretary of State on behalf of the West German ruling classes.

In Berlin, too, the reactionary circles began to close ranks. Elections to the City Chamber of Deputies were held on October 20, 1946. The Social-Democratic Party campaigned under the demagogic slogan: "For democracy and socialism", and the Christian Democratic Union, which also advertised itself as a socialist party, assured the electors that it was fighting for "Christian socialism".

While providing the Right-wing parties with the most favourable conditions for conducting their election campaign, the Western occupation authorities created all sorts of difficulties for the Communists. On September 20, 1946, the US military authorities prohibited the Socialist Unity Party from holding any meetings in dwellings (other premises were also in fact out of bounds to them).¹

As a result of false pre-election promises, the smear campaign against the SUPG, pressure from the Western Powers and outright hounding and persecution of democratic elements, the majority of the votes were cast for the Right-wing Social Democrats.²

On October 22, 1946, the British *Manchester Guardian* made the following observation: It can hardly be doubted that the results of the Berlin elections would have been different if the British, American and French authorities had not interfered during the merger (of the Social-Democratic Party

¹ See: *Berlin. Kampf um Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1945-1946*, Vol. I, p. 535.

² The Social Democrats received 48,7 per cent of the vote; CDU, 22,2 per cent; SUPG, 19,8 per cent, and the LDP, 9,3 per cent. In the City Chamber of Deputies the Social Democrats had 63 seats, SUPG 26, CDU 29, LDP 12 (*Berlin. Kampf um Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1945-1946*, Vol. I, p. 212). In the Magistrate which was formed on December 5, 1946, the Social Democrats had 10 seats, CDU 3, LDP 2 and SUPG 3 (one burgomaster and two members of the Magistrate were SUPG representatives).

and the Communist Party—*U.U.*) and not taken steps to prevent this merger in Berlin.

The undisguised deal with West German imperialism and the strengthening of the positions of the reactionary forces in the Berlin Magistrate, made it easier for the Western Powers to conduct subversive activity against the Soviet Occupation Zone and to carry through their plans of splitting Berlin and Germany as a whole.

At the end of 1946 the first bi-zonal (Anglo-American) associations were established, and on December 2, 1946, Byrnes and Bevin signed an agreement in New York on the economic merger of the British and American zones which came into effect as of January 1, 1947. This economic complex, called Bizonia, was shortly granted administrative and political functions.

The separate control machinery, called the Bipartite Board, which was set up especially for Bizonia announced that it would function as the supreme organ of power for the economic union and would be subject only to the policy of the two governments.¹

In Berlin, where the Western Powers made no secret of their efforts to disorganise the activity of the Allied Kommandatura and scrap the quadripartite agreements, the situation continued to deteriorate.

The number of matters unresolved by the Kommandatura grew from month to month. While in 1945 the commandants failed to reach a unanimous decision on nine out of 217 questions, in 1946 the corresponding figures were 129 and 199.

The Western occupation authorities intensified the purge of the administrative apparatus, removing anti-fascists from self-government bodies and replacing them with former active nazis and prominent supporters of the Hitler regime.

Fresh steps were taken to isolate the Western Sectors from the surrounding territory. The Western authorities began to solve all questions at their own discretion, bypassing the

¹ Other organs of the separate control machinery, including the "Bipartite Secretariat" modelled on the Inter-Allied Secretariat of the Control Council, various "bipartite committees", whose functions were similar to those of directorates, and "bipartite control groups" were established at the same time.

quadripartite organs, and were clearly paving the way for splitting the city. At the end of 1945 and the beginning of 1946 the Western occupation authorities still resorted to manoeuvres to camouflage their plans, but in the last months of 1946 and particularly at the start of 1947 they no longer made a secret of their divisive activity.

Acting on instructions from the Western occupation authorities, the Magistrate on January 15, 1947 adopted the decision "to incorporate the production capacities of the American and British sectors into the production and supply plans for Bizonia".

On the orders of the Western occupation authorities, business contacts between the Western Sectors and the Soviet Sector of Berlin and the Soviet Zone were increasingly curtailed. At the same time West Berlin firms and enterprises hastily re-orientated their activity on the West German market.

The number of special administrative organs grew steadily in the Western Sectors. In 1947 a special Criminal Police Department, which was independent of the Berlin chief of police and the Allied Kommandatura, and some other separatist departments were established there.

At the end of April 1947, the American, British and French commandants imposed a ban on the posters calling for the unity of Germany and Berlin and the unity of the trade-union movement, which were hung out in their sectors by the Association of Free German Trade Unions.¹

The Soviet Commandant in the Allied Kommandatura vigorously objected to the divisive activity of the American, British and French occupation authorities in Berlin. At a meeting of the Kommandatura on March 18, 1947, he stressed that the activity of the Western Powers "is wrecking and bringing to nought the work of the quadripartite administration. This has already driven the Allied Kommandatura into a blind alley." On June 13, 1947, the Soviet representative emphasised at a meeting of the commandants that "judging by their activity the American and British military authorities have set themselves the aim of dismembering the Great-

¹ *Berlin. Behauptung von Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1945-1946.* p. 218.

er Berlin area" and demanded that they should put an end to such activity.

The Western Powers, however, went ahead with their anti-Potsdam course. The pursuit of this line in Berlin was facilitated by the fact that the Western Powers had by then established close contacts with the local reactionary elements. Chief Burgomaster Otto Ostrowski, a Social Democrat, who tried to maintain ties with the anti-fascist democratic forces was soon removed from office under pressure from the extreme Right-wing circles of the Social-Democratic Party headed by Franz Neumann, Otto Suhr and Ernst Reuter who accused him of allegedly being "too amenable" to the Communists.¹ In June 1947, Ernst Reuter, an extreme reactionary, notorious for his anti-Soviet sentiments, was elected to this post.

Energetically supported by the Western occupation authorities, the reactionary elements, which were consolidating their forces in the Western Sectors and commanded not only political parties but the majority in the Chamber of Deputies and the Magistrate, began to play an active part in preparing the split of the city.

THE SITUATION IN GERMANY FOLLOWING THE LONDON SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

The situation in Berlin and the country became more and more complicated as a result of the divisive activities of the Western Powers. In the course of the summer of 1947 the Control Council even proved incapable of drawing up a report on its activity for submission to the session of the Council of Foreign Ministers due to take place in London at the end of November.

In October 1947 Clay was urgently summoned to Washington where he was told that the United States would torpedo the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers and that it was necessary to carry through the plans of creating a separate West German state with the utmost speed. Return-

¹ See: Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 1950, New York, p. 144.

ing from Washington he told a press conference that if the London session failed to produce any results it would be highly desirable to unite economically and politically as big a portion of Germany as possible. Should such a union take place it would be quite possible to establish a provisional government on the basis of the existing bi-zonal authorities.

The session opened on November 25, 1947, in Lancaster House, a gloomy old mansion. From the very outset the Soviet delegation proposed that the focal point in the discussion on Germany should be the preparation of a peace treaty, the establishment of an all-German government and the restoration of the country's political and economic unity.¹

Replying to the Soviet proposals, US Secretary of State George C. Marshall said that thus far the conditions were not right for bringing about Germany's political and economic unity, and that the establishment of an all-German government was nothing more than fiction.²

On December 15, 1947, Marshall proposed an adjournment of the session, although not all the items on the agenda had been exhaustively debated. This was seconded by Bevin and Bidault. The ministers departed without setting the date for the next meeting. In the words of the Soviet Government the London session "ended in failure".³

As Clay himself put it, after the London session the American and British moved "more rapidly and certainly" to the formation of a West German government and finally persuaded the French to take part in this effort.⁴

On January 7, 1948, Generals Clay and Robertson had a conference in Frankfurt-am-Main with the Prime Ministers of the German Länder at which it was decided to "reorganise" Bizonia. The Economic Council which was set up in May 1947 was given greater powers and, in effect, became the lower house of Parliament. The Administrative Council acquired the character of a government, and the branch departments were granted ministerial rights. The Council of

¹ *Pravda*, December 1, 1947.

² *Ibid.*, December 7, 1947.

³ *Ibid.*, December 31, 1947.

⁴ Lucius D. Clay, *op. cit.*, p. 394.

States (Landerrat), the Supreme Court and a bank of issue called the Bank deutscher Länder were also established. The establishment of the latter was of particular significance in preparing a separate currency reform.

Thus West Germany acquired the necessary attributes of statehood. In effect a West German "*de facto* government"¹ was formed which became an instrument in the hands of the occupation authorities of the Three Western Powers and large-scale German capital.

The decisions taken in Frankfurt-am-Main struck one of the most powerful blows at the quadripartite administration of Germany and Berlin. They paralysed the activity of the quadripartite bodies and constituted one of the most decisive moves towards the final division of Germany and Berlin and the creation of a separate West German state.

The separate currency reform which the Western Powers had long been preparing, making use of the substantially urgent need to carry out currency reform throughout the country was one of the most effective means of splitting Germany and Berlin and a reason for proclaiming the establishment of a separate West German state. A nation-wide currency reform would have made it possible to organise finances and improve the country's economic position. The Control Council had been studying this problem since the end of 1945 and thanks to the constructive stand of the Soviet representatives on the Council's Finance Directorate the sides arrived at an understanding on many controversial issues. Samples of new banknotes were approved and it was decided that they would be printed in Berlin and Leipzig. The US occupation authorities, however, in an attempt to control the circulation of notes throughout the country, suddenly demanded that they should be printed in the US Sector of Berlin. This was an outrageous demand and even the British and French did not dare to support it openly.

In order to deprive the Americans of the opportunity to prejudice the solution of the currency reform question, the Soviet side consented to have the new notes printed in Berlin, provided that the territory of the German State Printers be

¹ *Neues Deutschland*, February 10, 1948.

isolated from the American Sector and be directly answerable to the Control Council. Thereupon, the American representatives who raised one obstacle after another, began overtly to sabotage the work of the Finance Directorate.

It is now common knowledge that US ruling circles had long been nursing plans for a separate currency reform. Joseph Dodge, General Clay's financial adviser, began to study the question as early as 1946 when the US and British representatives on the Control Council were discussing an all-German currency reform. With a very serious expression General Clay made out that the Western Powers were seeking constructive decisions while actually they used the debates as a screen to hide their secret preparations for a separate currency reform. In 1947 the USA began printing new notes under the code name "Operation Bird Dog".¹ The same year they were delivered in thirty railway carriages to West Germany and deposited in one of the US ships in Bremerhaven.

Having suspected that the Western Powers were playing a double game, the Soviet representatives insisted that the Control Council pass a decision censuring all separate currency reforms. As they were not at all anxious to have their hands tied, the Western Powers turned down this proposal, although by 1948 all the basic difficulties had been surmounted and agreement was reached on almost all questions concerning preparations for an all-German currency reform.² On February 14, Clay and Robertson signed an act authorising the Bank deutscher Länder to carry out the separate currency reform.

On February 23, 1948, the United States, Britain and France made a great show of calling a conference in London in which the Benelux countries also took part and behind the back of the USSR discussed a range of questions, including the state structure of Germany, control over the Ruhr, reparations, and the inclusion of the Western zones in the

¹ Lucius D. Clay, *op cit.*, p. 211.

² The Four Powers agreed on the procedure governing the exchange of notes, their form and the number required for the whole of Germany. They also adopted instructions and regulations for quadripartite control over the issuing of money and so forth.

Marshall Plan. The four Great Powers alone were competent to deal with these issues.¹

This was a gross violation of the letter and spirit of Potsdam decisions and, although the Soviet Union pointed this out to the Western Powers on the eve of the conference, they continued to ignore all warnings. The so-called working committees began to put into practice the conference decisions—to merge the French Zone with Bizonia, complete the establishment of a separate West German state and prepare for a currency reform in the Western zones.²

On March 20, 1948, the Soviet representative Marshal Sokolovsky demanded to be advised of the separate agreements on Germany which were reached at the conference in London. The commanders-in-chief of the Western occupation forces, who had received the Soviet memorandum of this request in good time, withheld the information, although later General Clay admitted that the Soviet demand was reasonable.³ They also refused to give assurances that the London decisions did not clash with the Potsdam Agreement and the principles of the quadripartite administration of Germany.

The situation was far from normal: while the Soviet side regularly informed the Control Council about its moves, the Western representatives, having embarked upon a policy of making separate decisions, refused to supply similar information. As Marshal Sokolovsky stated at the March 20 meeting of the Control Council, by their actions the delegations of the Western Powers "offer fresh proof that the Control Council no longer exists as an organ of supreme authority in Germany exercising quadripartite administration of the country".

On the next day, the Western press, with a distortion of the facts, happily reported under banner headlines that the Soviet Union had quit the Control Council.

However, as can be seen from the above, it was actually the Western Powers themselves who wrecked the quadripartite administration of Germany, and the Soviet side had

¹ The first part of the conference took place from February 23 to March 6. the second, from April 20 to June 1, 1948.

² See: *Der Tagesspiegel*, March 20, 1968.

³ See: Lucius D. Clay, *op. cit.*, p. 356.

no alternative but to stress this fact and draw the necessary conclusions. It should be noted that even in these circumstances the Soviet side strove to preserve the quadripartite machinery in Germany. Marshal Sokolovsky who was in the chair on March 20, 1948, did not close the meeting, but only postponed it.¹ In his statement to the press on March 25, 1948, Lieutenant-General Lukyanchenko, chief of staff of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, made it clear, as even Western observers correctly pointed out, that the Soviet side was prepared to go on working in the Control Council.² After that the Soviet Command proposed, in particular, that the Finance Directorate and its committees should continue their meetings to consider outstanding issues connected with a single currency reform in the country. Clay, however, informed the Soviet side that US representatives would not participate in the meetings of any committee. They were pleased that there was no longer any need to make out that they were negotiating and could finally bring about the long-awaited division of Germany.

The 82nd meeting of the Control Council on March 20, 1948, proved to be its last. The Council ceased its activity and was never convened again. Having blasted the quadripartite administration of Germany, the Western Powers went ahead with their final measures to partition Berlin and the whole country.

THE WESTERN POWERS PREPARE TO COMPLETE THE DIVISION OF BERLIN

In the first half of 1948 the Western occupation authorities took urgent steps to separate the Western sectors completely from the rest of Berlin, to put an end to the Berlin Kommandatura as they did to the Control Council, and split up the city. These were the objectives of a special plan which subsequently became known as "Operation Counterpunch".³

¹ See: *Der Tagesspiegel*, March 30, 1968.

² See: *Berlin. Behauptung von Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1945-1946*, Vol. II, p. 441.

³ F. Howley, *Berlin Command*, New York, 1950, p. 201.

In February 1948, in response to the Soviet demands for strict adherence to the existing Four-Power agreements on the judicial system and fulfilment of the orders issued to the heads of judicial organs prohibiting them from carrying out instructions that ran counter to the decisions of the Allied Kommandatura, the Western Powers split up the above organs and established a separate supreme court (*Kammergericht*).

The splitting up of the Berlin police was the next step to seriously undermine the single system of city government. In an order issued on March 20, 1948, Bond, deputy chief of the security division of the US Military Government, withdrew the police in the American Sector from the authority of the *Polizei-Präsidium* and made it subordinate solely to the US occupation authorities.¹

In April 1948, the US occupation authorities transferred the Magistrate's Finance Department and its subordinate agencies to the US Sector. This was a key measure in preparation for a separate currency reform.

The following month witnessed the split of the trade union movement in Berlin and the formation in the Western zones of the so-called trade union opposition, which was set the task of preventing unity of action by the working class. Shortly afterwards the Western military authorities closed all the offices of the Association of Free German Trade Unions in the city's Western sectors.

By the middle of 1948, Berlin's Western sectors were largely isolated from the Soviet Sector and the rest of the Soviet Occupation Zone as a result of the splitting policy of the Western Powers.

The preparations for cutting up Berlin were accompanied by the persecution of all the Left-wing forces that opposed the separatist course of the Western Powers. On March 11, 1948, the US Military Police raided and wrecked the premises of the Socialist Unity Party.² By the beginning of April 1948, the Western occupation authorities had arrested more than 40,000 democratically minded people.³ Throwing aside

¹ The British authorities issued a similar order on July 14, 1948.

² See: *Berlin. Behauptung von Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1946-1948*, p. 429.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 477.

all restraint US Deputy Commandant Babcock declared at the April 2, 1948 meeting of the Kommandatura, that the US occupation authorities would continue this practice and in particular intended to purge the Berlin police of anyone who did not share the American point of view.

During the preparations for the 1948 May Day festivities, the US authorities banned the slogans of the Berlin Trade Unions: "Unity for Berlin", "Germany Is Indivisible, Berlin Without Sectors". People who dared to post these slogans on buildings were arrested.¹

In order to reduce Berlin's significance as the country's political and economic centre, British Commandant General Herberts admitted to the Allied Kommandatura the draft of a so-called legal status for Berlin under which the former capital of Germany was to be turned into a "Land".² In an effort to provide the divisive policy of his Western allies with a "legal foundation", General Ganeval of France said at a meeting of the Inter-Allied Kommandatura that since "Germany has no government, she does not have a capital" and Berlin should therefore be turned into a "Land".

The Soviet authorities exposed this manoeuvre that had been made in the hope of rending Berlin from the Soviet Occupation Zone and expediting the final split of Germany. Protesting at a Kommandatura meeting against these plans, Soviet Commandant Kotikov stressed that the Western Powers were "belittling Berlin's significance as the capital of a single Germany".³ He decisively turned down the British draft and said that the Soviet side was not authorised either to federalise or to dismember Germany.⁴

¹ See: *Berlin. Behauptung von Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1946-1948*, p. 477.

² The Western occupation authorities sought to justify their proposals by referring to Law No. 46 of the Control Council on the abolition of the state of Prussia, in particular, to Article II which stated that territories which were a part of the Prussian State and which were then under the supreme authority of the Control Council would receive the status of *Länder* or would be absorbed into *Länder*.

³ See: *Tägliche Rundschau*, May 29, 1948; *Telegraf*, May 20, 1948.

⁴ There was no further discussion of the draft since shortly afterwards the Allied Kommandatura ceased functioning following a walk-out by the US representatives.

THE SEPARATE CURRENCY REFORM IN THE WESTERN ZONES OF OCCUPATION AND SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES

Whilst rounding off their preparations for a separate currency reform and completing the split of Germany and Berlin, the Western Powers intensified their subversive activity against the Soviet Zone which was systematically infiltrated by bands of armed men, often disguised in Soviet military uniforms. More and more industrial enterprises were moved to West Germany from Berlin's Western sectors. At a meeting of Deputy Commandants on April 20, 1948, the Soviet representative pointed out, for example, that "about 300 various joint-stock companies, industrial enterprises and commercial firms had been moved out of Berlin with their equipment and technical documents". In order to cut short the unscrupulous plunder of the Berlin economy, on April 15, 1948, the City Chamber of Deputies unanimously supported the proposal of its SUPG faction and ordered the Magistrate to forbid the removal of industrial enterprises from Berlin.

The purchase of equipment and valuables in the Soviet Zone for dispatch to the West was conducted on a steadily increasing scale. In May 1948 alone, more than 1,000 tons of aluminium, 500 tons of copper and a large quantity of other non-ferrous metals and valuables were transported through Berlin to the Western zones.

Steps were also taken to cut off the Soviet Zone from the outside world and impede its economic development.

As early as 1946 and 1947, the USA and Britain carried out a number of measures aimed at preventing the Soviet Union from importing Western equipment and other essential commodities, and the Soviet Zone from purchasing West German products. In May 1946, General Clay issued an order prohibiting any reparation deliveries from the Western zones of occupation and Berlin's Western sectors. On January 1, 1947 Britain and the USA ordered that the settlement of all trade accounts between Bizonia and other zones be conducted in dollars and not in marks as previously. In other words, they established a regime in inter-German trade that was usually found only in international trade. After the

breakdown of the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the United States and Britain enforced what amounted to an economic blockade of the Soviet Occupation Zone. Early in 1948, the British and US authorities took openly to disrupting trade deliveries from West Germany to the Soviet Occupation Zone and banned the transit of goods through Bizonia to and from the Soviet zone.

The Soviet Command had no choice but to take counter-measures. In particular, it strengthened the guard and imposed stricter control on the border with the Western zones of occupation and the lines of communication between them and Berlin.

On March 25, 1948, the Soviet Military Administration in Germany amended the old forms of control over the movement of people and freight across the demarcation line with effect from April 1. A new procedure for checking accompanying documents on goods and the identity cards of the German population was introduced. The same order contained new instructions on questions of military transit of the three Western Powers into the Western sectors of Berlin through the Soviet Zone of Occupation, which only the Soviet side was competent to deal with. The US and British aid stations on the Berlin-Marienborn Autobahn were closed and replaced by Soviet stations where motor vehicles were serviced for cash payment. The Western Powers could as before use the Berlin-Helmstedt line to move their garrison troops by rail to Berlin. The US, British and French military authorities were to inform the Soviet section in the Berlin Air Safety Centre an hour in advance of the take off and landing of each aircraft.

The Soviet Military Administration's order to strengthen the guard and tighten control at the outer boundaries of Greater Berlin also came into force on April 1, 1948. Henceforth personnel from the garrisons of the Western Powers were permitted to move in and out of Berlin with their personal documents of identity through one check point only, which was situated two kilometres east of Nowawes; travel on all other roads required passes authorised by SMAG HQ.

Subsequently, a number of additional measures were introduced to tighten control on the demarcation line and along

the communications linking Berlin with the Western zones of occupation.

General Clay responded by resorting to a direct provocation aimed at pressuring the Soviet military authorities. On April 1, he dispatched a train to Berlin with instructions not to permit the Soviet Administration to inspect it. Since the Americans would not submit to control, the Soviet guard side-tracked the train, and two days later it was forced to turn back.¹ Simultaneously, the Western authorities suspended the movement of trains from the Western zones to the Soviet Zone, and on April 2, US Secretary of Army Kenneth C. Royall openly threatened the Soviet Union.² Ernest Bevin, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, supported him in a speech in the House of Commons on April 6.³ During this time the US Military Police had blockaded the Directorate of Railways in the Soviet Zone of Occupation which had its premises in the Western part of Berlin.⁴

The situation in Germany continued to deteriorate. To avert the split of Berlin and the country as a whole, the Soviet Government summoned the United States, Britain and France to return to the course of implementing the Potsdam Agreement and other quadripartite decisions.

Peaceloving forces in the world and the broad sections of the German people supported the Soviet Union's stand. The German People's Congress (Deutsche Volkskongress), which genuinely upheld the aspirations and interests of the overwhelming majority of the Germans, came forward with an important initiative when it proposed that the question of Germany's unity be submitted to popular vote.⁵

Since the fulfilment of this just demand could have done a great deal towards ensuring that Germany's development coincided with the interests of the majority of the German population, the Soviet Union upheld the initiative of the German People's Congress in every way.

¹ See: Wolfgang Paul, *Kampf um Berlin*, Munich-Vienna, 1962, pp. 149-50.

² See: *Der Tagesspiegel*, April 4, 1948; *Telegraf*, April 4, 1948.

³ *Ibid.*, April 7, 1948; *Telegraf*, April 1, 1948.

⁴ *Berlin. Behauptung von Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1946-1948*, p. 446.

⁵ See: St. Doernberg, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

However, the Western Powers turned a deaf ear to the voice of reason. They turned down the proposal, fearing an unfavourable development of events. "The German people do not want unity," declared Deputy US Military Governor General George Hays on April 17, 1948. The referendum was banned in the Western sectors of Berlin, too.¹

After resuming their conference in London on April 20, the Western Powers decided to carry out their plans for dividing Germany politically and economically, and creating a separate West German state. They also mapped out its political structure, and agreed to include it in the Marshall Plan. In addition they decided to impose a so-called Occupation Statute on West Germany instead of signing a peace treaty. The conference focussed particular attention on the enforcement of the separate currency reform. According to Robert Murphy, the Western Powers discussed this question at length in view of possible Soviet countermeasures. We realised, he wrote, "that the Russians could make trouble if we issued new German banknotes without Soviet co-operation, especially in Berlin".² Nevertheless, the Western Powers finally agreed to carry through the currency reform without any further delay.

The decisions passed at the London Conference made it clear that the Western Powers would not co-operate with the Soviet Union in solving the German question. These decisions revealed the intention of the US-led imperialist bloc, which had already taken shape by this time, to intensify its aggressive course, and they could only lead up to a grave crisis over Berlin. In the circumstances the Soviet authorities had every reason to take fresh steps to safeguard the security of the Soviet Zone and the interests of its population.

On June 8, 1948, the day after the publication of the official communique on the London Conference, the Soviet Military Administration in Germany issued Order No. 0201 "Specification of procedure permitting the passage of goods out of the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany and the

¹ See: *Der Tagesspiegel*, April 18, 1948; *Telegraf*, May 21, 1948.

² Robert Murphy, *Diplomat among Warriors*, New York, 1964, p. 311.

improvement of the work of control and customs points" in which it listed goods whose shipment out of the Soviet Zone was to be restricted. Accordingly, the movement of goods, with the exception of reparation of deliveries and Soviet Army freight, was conducted exclusively with the permission of the Soviet military authorities and competent German bodies in the Soviet Zone of Occupation with effect from June 15, 1948. On that day three check points—Bergen, Kirchgarten and Zonneberg—on the demarcation line were closed since there was no longer any need to keep them open in view of the increasing economic blockade of the Soviet Zone by the Western Powers.¹

As a result of these measures the Soviet Military Administration established effective control both on the demarcation line and on the border with the city's Western sectors and was thus able to inhibit the subversive activity against the Soviet Zone and greatly curb misuse of the communications between Berlin and West Germany.

Further developments showed that the Soviet Military Administration's measures to ensure the security of the Soviet Zone proved to be fully justified in the light of the circumstances which arose when the Western Powers were rounding off their preparations for a separate currency reform.

On June 18, 1948, in reply to an inquiry from the SUPG faction in the Berlin City Chamber of Deputies about reports in the Western press that the Western Powers were intending to put through a separate currency reform, Marshal Sokolovsky declared: "The Soviet Union is in favour of an all-German currency reform, since a separate currency reform in one or several zones in Germany would signify the final division of Germany. This is not in the interests of either the German people or the peaceloving, democratic

¹ It is asserted in the West that the Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn was allegedly closed to traffic at the same time. This is not true. On that day only the Hohenwarth bridge across the Elbe was closed to traffic for repairs. However, to ensure the uninterrupted flow of motor vehicles a detour by ferry was organised. In reply to a letter from General Robertson of June 16, 1948, Marshal Sokolovsky informed him on the following day that "the Soviet military authorities have taken all the necessary measures to have the Hohenwarth bridge repaired as quickly as possible" and that "steps are being taken to organise a detour at a point considerably closer to the bridge in the near future."

peoples of Europe. The Soviet Military Administration in Germany is prepared to support any measure conducive to the enforcement of an all-German currency reform on the basis of a four-power agreement, which, I believe, is quite possible."

The Western Powers, however, were dead set against the introduction of a single currency reform. General Clay blandly told a press conference on the same day that an all-German reform was completely out of the question.

On the following day, the Western Powers carried through the currency reform in their occupation zones. In a letter to Marshal Sokolovsky just a few hours before the reform was announced, the Western authorities said that the reform would not take effect in Berlin's Western sectors.¹ Shortly afterwards, however, it became clear that this was a deliberate falsehood designed to mislead the Soviet authorities.

The separate currency reform brought with it the danger of depreciated banknotes flooding the Soviet Zone, including Berlin. Urgent measures had to be taken to prevent the disorganisation of the economy in the Soviet Zone, especially as the Soviet side did not even have special banknotes at its disposal.²

On June 19, 1948, the Soviet Military Administration issued an address informing the German population that banknotes issued in the Western zones would not be allowed in the Soviet Zone and Berlin. It also pointed out that other essential measures stemming from the situation that had arisen would be taken to avert the disorganisation of economic activity in the Soviet Zone.

In his letters of June 22, 1948, to the three Western commanders-in-chief, Marshal Sokolovsky said that their actions had placed the Soviet Command in a difficult situation and forced it to put through a currency reform in the Soviet Zone, including Berlin. The conditions and the procedure of

¹ See: *Berlin. Behauptung von Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1946-1948*, p. 508; analogous statements were made by the commandants of the three Western Powers on June 18, 1948 (*Der Tagesspiegel*, June 19, 1948).

² This being the case, the Soviet Military Administration, with no other alternative but to effect a currency reform in its Zone, used the old Reichsmarks and Rentmarks with special coupons pasted on them.

the reform were set forth in the Soviet Military Administration's Order No. 111 attached to the letters.

On June 23, 1948, the US, British and French occupation authorities illegally extended the separate currency reform to the Western sectors of Berlin and began to put the B Mark into circulation there. At the same time banks and savings banks in the city's Western sectors received instructions forbidding them to present their financial and statistical accounts for examination by any organs of the Magistrate situated in the Soviet Sector.¹

The extension of the separate currency reform to Berlin was such an obvious provocation that even the French authorities opposed it. Unable to stand up to US and British pressure, however, the French eventually surrendered their position declaring that they "had no other choice" and that they "relieve themselves of the responsibility for all the consequences of such a step".²

The acts of provocation perpetrated by the Western Powers aggravated the situation still further and forced the Soviet authorities to adopt additional measures on communications between the Western zones of occupation and Berlin. The movement of boats along the waterways between Berlin and the Western zones was suspended on June 23, 1948, and that of trains on the following day.

The separate currency reform, which Marshal Sokolovsky considered as the biggest step taken by the Western occupation authorities towards completing the partition of Germany, delivered one of the most powerful blows on the unity of the country and Berlin. It undermined the single currency circulation, which had been formed in the course of centuries, broke normal economic ties between various parts of the country and both parts of Berlin and destroyed the prerequisites for free movement of people and goods between zones. Essentially inter-zonal trade turned into trade between two states, and virtually came to a standstill. The introduction of the separate currency reform also indicated

¹ At the same time the Western Powers suspended the movement of freight trains between the Soviet and the Western zones on the pretext that the Soviet Military Administration had not returned "tens of thousands of railway carriages" (*Der Tagesspiegel*, June 25, 1948).

² See: Wolfgang Paul, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

that the Western Powers had openly scrapped the agreement on joint control and administration of Germany and Berlin.

By carrying on a separatist policy and openly violating the Potsdam decisions and other quadripartite agreements the Western Powers were undermining the basis for their right to participate in the joint control of Berlin, which was an inalienable part of the agreement on the Four-Power administration of Germany as a single entity. To all intents and purposes Berlin lost its significance as the site of the Allied control machinery and consequently as the centre of the military administration of the three Western Powers.¹

In order to continue their presence in Berlin, the United States and Britain resorted to a bitter political struggle—"the battle for Berlin" as they called it, and declared that they would strive at any cost to retain the city as "their advance position".² At a meeting held from June 25 to 27 in the White House to discuss the situation, the US President, ignoring the opinion of the majority of his advisers, decided to remain in Berlin and send B-29 bombers to Germany.³

In response to Soviet countermeasures the Western Powers raised a tremendous ballyhoo about "increasing aggressiveness from the Kremlin", the "blockade of Berlin" and so forth. Finally, at the end of June 1948 they announced that an air lift (*Luftbrücke*) had been organised from the Western zones to Berlin to supply its Western sectors with food, fuel and raw materials.

However, claims about "the increasing aggressiveness of the Soviet Union" and its intention to "seize the whole of Berlin" were nothing more than fabrications characteristic of the Western propaganda machine. All the restrictive measures introduced by the Soviet authorities on the demarcation line and on the communications between the Western zones and Berlin were forced upon them and were only of

¹ See: L. Rshewski, *Westberlin—ein politisches Gebilde sui generis*, p. 51.

² H. Adler, op. cit., p. 156.

³ See: Wolfgang Paul, op. cit., p. 174; *The Forrestal Diaries*, New York, pp. 451-54.

a "temporary nature".¹ They were undertaken in response to the separate currency reform and designed to prevent the flow of depreciated banknotes into the Soviet Zone, including Berlin, and to safeguard the economy of East Germany and the interests of its population.

Just as far-fetched were the assertions about the "blockade of West Berlin by the Russians". Even many Western scholars maintain that all the measures taken by the Soviet authorities to strengthen the guard and tighten control on the demarcation lines and the boundary with the Western sectors of Berlin, were directed against the separatist moves of the Western Powers and not against the West Berlin population.²

On June 29, 1948, after the old banknotes had been exchanged for new ones in the Soviet Zone, SMAG lifted the restrictions on the movement of the German population between the Soviet and the Western zones upon presentation of inter-zonal passes, which was in keeping with the procedure prior to June 19.

People living in Berlin's Western sectors were also able to visit the Soviet Sector and the Western zones, but control over the movement of the population was considerably tightened as a measure against speculation and misuse which could harm the economy of the Soviet Zone.

Having enforced restrictive measures on communications between Berlin and the Western zones, SMAG offered to assume full responsibility for providing the entire population of Berlin with food and fuel.

The Magistrate and the US, British and French military authorities, however, rejected all the Soviet proposals as a "propaganda manoeuvre".³

In other words the "blockade" of the Western part of Berlin was artificially created by the Western Powers themselves. They used the ballyhoo about the protective measures on communications introduced by the Soviet Command and the organisation of the "air lift" to step up the

¹ *Berlin. Behauptung von Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1946-1948*, p. 530.

² See: *Wisio*, 1961, No. 22, p. 1046.

³ See: *Berlin. Behauptung von Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1946-1948*, p. 562.

“cold war”, fan war hysteria and complete the split of Berlin and the country as a whole. Operation *Luftbrücke* was a provocation designed to camouflage the divisive activities of the Western Powers and neutralise the resistance of the German people against the West's aggressive plans.

FRESH MOVES BY THE WESTERN POWERS TO SPLIT GERMANY AND BERLIN

At a meeting in Frankfurt-am-Main held on June 30 and July 1, 1948, the heads of the military administration of the three Western zones “recommended” the prime ministers of the West German Länder, who were also present, to convene a constituent assembly not later than September 1, in order to legalise the split of Germany and the establishment of a separate West German state.¹ The meeting also predetermined the nature of the future constitution and, consequently, of the West German state itself. The “recommendations” made amounted to direct pressure on the Germans, so much so that they are referred to as a *diktat* in political literature and even in Adenauer's memoirs.

When the West German representatives, who played the part of contractors for the military authorities of the three Western Powers, tried to absolve themselves of at least part of the responsibility for the direct betrayal of the German people's interests and were hesitant in accepting these “recommendations” which were tantamount to an order, General Clay voiced his displeasure at their irresolution and pressured the prime ministers² into carrying them out unconditionally. At their conference in Koblenz from July 8 to 10, 1948, the prime ministers of the West German Länder accepted Clay's instructions and only timidly requested that the wording in some places be softened.³ The West German representatives took the last step in Rüdeshheim on July 22 when

¹ See: *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Vol. 6, pp. 243, 480-84 (Document No. 50).

² *Telegraf*, July 14, 1948.

³ *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Vol. 6, pp. 248, 483-90.

they surrendered to pressure from Clay and Robertson, withdrew all reservations and announced that they were prepared to assume full responsibility for the reorganisation of life in Germany in keeping with the powers vested in them. The decisions taken in London, Frankfurt-am-Main, Koblenz and Rüdeshheim finally determined the political structure of the future separate West German state.

As they intensified their efforts to complete the political division of Germany, British and US ruling circles pressed ahead with measures to split Berlin.

There was a serious obstacle, namely the Allied Kommandatura, which stood in their way, and the Western occupation authorities at that stage decided to deliver their main blow against it.

At its regular meeting on June 16, 1948, the Allied Kommandatura considered proposals by the Soviet side aimed at improving the welfare and the legal status of the population. These had been tabled as far back as October 31, 1947, but discussion had been postponed time and again by the Western representatives. Of the fourteen points advanced by the Soviet Commandant, his American, British and French counterparts agreed to discuss only one—the proposal to increase food rations for the population. Late in the evening, when the Soviet side demanded that the commandants discuss the protest by the Association of Free German Trade Unions against the police measures to which it was being subjected in the Western sectors of the city, the Western Powers broke up the Kommandatura, too.

By grossly distorting the facts, bourgeois historians are now endeavouring to shift the blame onto the Soviet Union. For example, a handbook recently issued by the West Berlin Senate, which has been published several times before, claims that “on June 16, 1948 . . . the Soviet delegation walked out of the conference hall of the Allied Kommandatura” and thus turned it into a dead letter.¹

Actually, the opposite happened. It is recorded in the minutes of the last meeting of the Kommandatura that “it reached no decisions, since discussions . . . were broken off

¹ W. Krumholz, *Berlin—ABC*, Berlin, 1965, p. 450.

by the departure of the American representative from the conference hall”.

At 23.15 hours, the US Commandant Colonel Frank Howley yawned and abruptly rose to his feet, declaring that he had listened long enough and was “going home to sleep” because he had a lot to do the following day. He walked out of the hall without saying another word.

On June 21, 1948, Marshal Sokolovsky lodged a protest with Clay in connection with Howley’s insulting and provocative behaviour. Clay, however, chose to defend Howley, thus confirming the desire of the Americans to discontinue the work of the Allied Kommandatura.¹ So, having wrecked the Control Council the Americans did the same to the Berlin Kommandatura and paved the way for splitting the Berlin city self-government.

On July 26, 1948, Burgomaster Friedensburg sanctioned by the US, British and French occupation authorities exceeded his powers and dismissed Polizei-President Paul Markgraf² whose appointment to this post had been unanimously approved by the four commandants. This was an illegal move, as only the Allied Kommandatura was competent to appoint or dismiss the chief of police. At the same time a separate police department was established in the US Sector. Friedensburg unlawfully named a certain Stumm, formerly a loyal servant of Hitler’s, as chief of police.

On August 10, 1948, the Western occupation authorities prohibited money transfers between the Western sectors and the Eastern Sector of Berlin, thereby creating additional obstacles to the free circulation of currency in the city. Soon separate taxes were levied in the Western sectors. This virtually put an end to the operation of a single budget for the city. A special postal service and a number of other separate departments were established in Berlin’s Western sectors.³ The subsequent resiting of the transport, municipal, labour, economic, housing and other departments of the Magistrate completely paralysed the work of the city self-government.

¹ Formally the Allied Kommandatura ceased to exist on July 1, 1948.

² *Die Neue Zeitung*, July 27, 1948.

³ *Berlin—Brennpunkt deutschen Schicksals*, Berlin, 1960, p. 54.

The situation in Berlin and the country as a whole continued to deteriorate and relations between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers became extremely tense. Thus, it was the exceptionally involved and acute situation in the summer of 1948 that gave rise to the so-called Berlin crisis. A real danger of a split loomed over the city and the country, and the peril of a serious international conflict faced the world.

BREAKDOWN IN THE TALKS TO SOLVE THE "BERLIN CRISIS"

In the face of efforts by the Western Powers to split Germany and Berlin and the preparations made with West German reaction to proclaim a separate West German state and include it in the West's military plans, the socialist states were compelled to take countermeasures to ensure their own security. In June 1948, representatives of the socialist states assembled in Warsaw to discuss the situation which had developed after moves made by the USA, Britain and France on Germany. The meeting sharply condemned the West's intentions to complete the division of Germany, thwart the conclusion of a peace settlement with her and thus create favourable conditions for a repetition of German aggression. Rejecting the decisions of the London conference as absolutely illegal, the meeting put forward a democratic programme to settle the German problem in the spirit of the Potsdam Agreement. It stressed how urgent it was to form a provisional democratic and peaceloving central government consisting of representatives of democratic parties and organisations and sign a peace treaty with Germany in accordance with the Potsdam decisions. In this way the occupation forces of all the Powers concerned could be withdrawn from Germany within a year after its conclusion.

Viewing the peaceful proposals of the USSR and other socialist countries as a "sign of weakness", extreme Right-wing circles in the USA intended to take advantage of the situation to strengthen their positions and organise provocations against the Soviet Union. Informing Washington of

the situation in Germany, General Clay, a representative of these circles, noted on July 10, 1948, that he did not think the Russians wanted war. However, he went on to draw an absolutely groundless conclusion that the Soviet side would "yield" to direct military pressure and probably "retreat" from Germany altogether. He advised his Government to send an armed convoy across the Soviet Zone with orders to disobey the instructions of the Soviet Military Administration.¹ General Clay repeated his conclusion on July 19, 1948, in a cable to Washington in which he anxiously sought permission to carry out his proposals. He also had the vigorous support of Reuter's clique whose members held key positions in the Berlin Magistrate.

The US Administration, however, was fully aware that it was playing with fire, as George Marshall put it. Realising that this game could lead to an armed conflict with the Soviet Union, which in the circumstances promised ill for Washington, it did not venture to accept the proposal of the extreme Right-wing circles. Moreover, the situation in Germany and in the world, for that matter, was not developing at all as the United States would have liked.

As a result of the measures taken by the Soviet military authorities to increase surveillance and tighten control along the border with West Germany and on communications with Berlin, and because of the expeditious introduction of a currency reform in response to the one carried out in the Western zones, the Western Powers failed in their plans to disorganise the economy of the Soviet Zone, particularly in the Soviet Sector of Berlin where life continued to take its normal course. On June 30, 1948, the Eleventh Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany approved the first two-year plan for the rehabilitation and development of East Germany's peacetime economy that held out favourable prospects for the future.²

The United States was unable to isolate the Soviet Union. The Warsaw meeting demonstrated the solidarity of the

¹ See: Wolfgang Paul, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-79.

² See: *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Vol. 6, pp. 256, 475-79.

socialist countries who had come out firmly against the West's imperialist plans. More and more voices were raised in the world against America's adventuristic course of fomenting another world conflict. There were growing differences among the Western Powers where feelings were beginning to run high in favour of negotiations and a relaxation of tension. Fearing that the "Berlin crisis" could precipitate a conflict and that Britain and France could be drawn into a war to uphold US interests, the more sober-minded British and French politicians began to speak up in favour of negotiations.

The overwhelming majority of the Germans, both in the east and west of the country, had no use for America's adventuristic plans which clashed with the national interests of the German people. Even the reactionary majority in the Berlin Chamber of Deputies could not but support the proposal of the SUPG faction, and on July 1, 1948, appealed to the Great Powers to resume talks on normalising the situation in Berlin and re-establishing Germany's unity.¹

In the circumstances the United States could not afford to ignore these sentiments, and so, early in July 1948, it began to explore the possibility of holding talks on Berlin with the Soviet Union, thus hoping to mislead world public opinion and eradicate the stamp of "splitter of Berlin and Germany".

On July 6, 1948, the United States offered to discuss the situation in Berlin with the Soviet Government, provided it removed all restrictions on communications between the city and the Western zones of occupation. The Soviet Government confirmed that it was prepared to take part, but pointed out that it could not "associate the beginning of the talks with the fulfilment of any preliminary conditions" and that the "talks themselves would only produce results if they are not centred on the question of administering Berlin, since this issue cannot be considered in isolation from the general question" of the whole of Germany.

On July 30, 1948, representatives of the three Western Powers visited V. A. Zorin, Deputy Foreign Minister of the

¹ See: H. Adler, op. cit., p. 171; *Berlin. Behauptung von Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1946-1948*, p. 537.

USSR, handed him memoranda saying that they were willing to commence negotiations and requested a meeting of their ambassadors with the head of the Soviet Government "to discuss the current situation in Berlin and those wider issues with which it is connected".¹

In the course of a conversation at the Soviet Foreign Ministry on July 31, 1948, at which the forthcoming talks between the Soviet Union and the three Western Powers were discussed, it was once again made clear to the US, British and French ambassadors that the wider issues mentioned by the Soviet Government were questions concerning German affairs as a whole; the Western Powers agreed with this.²

The three ambassadors visited J. V. Stalin on August 2, 1948. During the conversation the head of the Soviet Government noted that when Germany was regarded as an entity and Berlin as her capital, the presence of the three Western Powers in Berlin was understandable. However, the situation had changed after the London conference when the western part of Germany was designated as a separate state. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government had no intention of getting the former allied troops to move out of Berlin. At the same time the ambassadors were given to understand that the transport restrictions introduced by the Soviet side were designed to prevent the flow of the separate currency into Berlin and the division of Germany into two states. The Soviet Government's measures were in response to the London decisions and were of a defensive nature.

To hasten the settlement of the Berlin question, the head of the Soviet Government offered to have the special B mark withdrawn from circulation in Berlin's Western sectors and to use the Soviet Zone currency in the city. He said that transport restrictions on communications would be lifted at the same time. J. V. Stalin also proposed that the Western Powers postpone the enforcement of the London decisions pending a Four-Power conference on the question of Germany as a whole. If the latter request should create difficulties, J. V. Stalin said, the Soviet Union would not insist

¹ *Dokumentation der Zeit*, Berlin, 1969, No. 15, p. 4.

² *Ibid.*

on its fulfilment as a condition for lifting the restrictions, but the expressed desire of the Soviet Government to postpone discussion on the establishment of a West German government should be recorded in the draft communique on the talks.¹

On August 6, 1948, the three Western ambassadors submitted to the USSR Foreign Ministry their draft communique on the talks on the Berlin question in which they agreed that the Soviet Zone Mark would be the sole legal tender in the whole of Berlin, provided that the Soviet side lifted transport restrictions². However, they made no mention of the question of the London decisions on West Germany.

On August 23, 1948, J. V. Stalin had another meeting with the US, British and French ambassadors, this time to work out a draft communique and directives from the Four Great Powers to their commanders-in-chief in Germany. It would be a good thing, he said, if the communique had it on record in the form of a commitment that the London decisions concerning the organisation of a government for West Germany would be postponed. J. V. Stalin further noted that if the three Governments considered that this should not be made public for reasons of prestige, it would be necessary, as the US Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith said at the previous meeting, to conduct at least a confidential exchange of letters on the issue.³

Describing and assessing other meetings in the Kremlin, the US representative Walter Bedell Smith admitted that the Soviet stand enabled the Western Powers to postpone their "plans for a Western German government without loss of prestige". "During our discussion," he wrote, "I felt quite sure that we could have produced an agreement in fifteen minutes at any time by an offer to abandon the London decisions. This, of course, was impossible for our side. . . ."⁴

So as not to make any commitments that could have prevented the Western Powers from splitting Germany and Berlin, the US, British and French ambassadors merely stated

¹ See: *Dokumentation der Zeit*, 1969, No. 15, p. 4.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Walter Bedell Smith, *Moscow Mission. 1946-1949*, Melbourne, London, Toronto, 1950, p. 244.

that they would "report" the position of the sides to their Governments. As a result, no agreement was reached on the wording of the communique.

Yet, in the course of these meetings and additional talks the Governments concerned worked out a directive which was dispatched to the commanders-in-chief in Germany on August 30, 1948. It stated that, provided the four commanders-in-chief came to an agreement, the following measures would be simultaneously carried out in Berlin: (a) the earlier introduced restrictions on communications, transportation and commerce and also on the movement of freight to and from the Soviet Zone in Germany were to be lifted; (b) the Soviet Zone German Mark was to be introduced as the single currency for Berlin and the Western B Mark was to be withdrawn from circulation in Berlin.

The directive given by the four Governments also provided that supervision of currency circulation in Berlin would be exercised by the German Bank of Issue in the Soviet Zone through the credit organisations operating in Berlin. A financial commission consisting of representatives of the four commanders-in-chief was to be established to supervise the implementation of financial measures for introducing and circulating a single currency in Berlin.

The commanders-in-chief met in Berlin on August 31, 1948.¹ A day earlier, however, the US and British commanders-in-chief assured the prime ministers of the Western Länder that the talks on the settlement of the Berlin crisis would not affect the realisation of the plans already agreed on with the Germans. So, while assuring the Soviet side of their desire to end the "Berlin crisis", the Western Powers continued their divisive activity.

It is not surprising, therefore, that at the very first meeting in Berlin the US, British and French representatives adopted a stand contrary to the directive given by the Governments.² They insisted that the Finance Commission

¹ The US side declared that it did not view these talks as a meeting of the Control Council (*Berlin. Behauptung von Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1946-1948*, p. 621).

² There were also meetings of commissions consisting of transportation, financial and commercial experts established under the commanders-in-chief.

should be the "supreme financial authority" in the city, supervising control over all the operations of the German Bank of Issue "connected with the conversion of money and its further circulation in Berlin"¹ and thus, be in a position to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Zone. They also disputed the right of the Soviet Military Administration to control communications between Berlin and the Western zones.

Naturally, the Soviet side could not agree to relinquish control of the access routes to Berlin which passed through its zone. Neither could it agree with such an interpretation of the functions of the Finance Commission which would have enabled the Western Powers to control financial and economic activity in the Soviet Zone.

On September 7, 1948, negotiations between the commanders-in-chief were broken off at the insistence of General Clay.

In its notes of September 25 and October 3, 1948² the Soviet Government condemned the stand of the United States, Britain and France and repudiated their attempts to misrepresent the substance of the talks with J. V. Stalin. Pointing out that the situation in Berlin was steadily deteriorating, it proposed that the issue be settled on the basis of the directive of August 30, 1948. It also laid especial emphasis on the need for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers "to discuss the situation in Berlin and in Germany as a whole, in accordance with the Four-Power Potsdam Agreement."

Remaining true to their obstructive tactics, the US, British and French Governments turned down the Soviet proposals for settling the "Berlin crisis" and normalising the situation in Germany.

THE WESTERN POWERS COMPLETE THE SPLIT OF BERLIN

The Western Powers did not venture to complete the split of Germany and Berlin in August while negotiations with

¹ *Dokumentation der Zeit*, 1969, No. 15, p. 5.

² They were sent in reply to the notes of the three Western Powers of September 22 and 26, 1948.

the Soviet representatives were still going on, but as soon as they were suspended, the situation changed drastically. At a meeting which was going on at the time in Paris, US Secretary of State Marshall and General Clay decided to speed up the division of Germany and Berlin.¹

It was now the turn of the City Chamber of Deputies and the Berlin Magistrate.

On September 6, 1948, the Social-Democratic, Christian Democratic and the Liberal-Democratic factions, with the "agreement" of the US, British and French military authorities, left the building of the Berlin Town Hall in the Soviet Sector and moved to the British Sector.² The formal pretext was provocation by Stumm's police agents on the same day in the Town Hall. Although the People's Police and workers swiftly dispersed the provocateurs and restored order, Right-wing deputies refused to attend sittings in the "Red Town Hall". The Chamber of Deputies was split.

In a letter of September 28, 1948, the Western commandants let it be known that they refused to have any further meetings with their Soviet counterpart.³

Arriving in Berlin in the early days of October 1948, Washington's special emissary John Foster Dulles ordered the US military authorities to ban the circulation of the Eastern Mark in the Western sectors and to abolish the last vestiges of the joint city administration, first and foremost the Magistrate.⁴

The single system of self-government in Berlin ceased to exist on August 13, 1948.

On November 30, 1948, in response to the splitting activities of the Western Powers, the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party and the bourgeois parties, Ottomar Geschke, Vice-Chairman of the City Chamber of Deputies, summoned an extraordinary meeting of the Chamber which was also attended by deputies of district assemblies and representatives of the working people and various enter-

¹ See: Lucius D. Clay, op. cit., pp. 375-77.

² See: *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Vol. 6, p. 287.

³ See: J. Rshewski, *Westberlin—ein politisches Gebilde sui generis*, p. 29.

⁴ See: *Berlin. Behauptung von Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1946-1948*, pp. 644, 653.

prises. This representative meeting in which more than 1,600 people took part decided to dissolve the Magistrate that was elected on October 20, 1946, for failing in its duties, and to form a provisional democratic magistrate of Greater Berlin which was to hold elections to the City Chamber of Deputies.¹ Friedrich Ebert became the Chief Burgomaster.

The Soviet side regarded the elections to the City Chamber of Deputies, scheduled to be held at the end of 1948, as the last opportunity for re-establishing the unity of Berlin, and came out in favour of holding city-wide elections, if the authorities in the Western sectors lifted the ban on democratic organisations, restored the unity of the municipal services and dissolved all militaristic and revanchist organisations.² However, on December 5, 1948, the Magistrate headed by Friedensburg conducted separate elections in the city's Western sectors to provide the division of Berlin with a legal basis and lend a semblance of legality to the separate organs of city self-government. Actually, these elections were unconstitutional because Berlin's Provisional Constitution did not provide for elections to be held in individual sectors, and also undemocratic as they were carried out in an atmosphere of persecution and terror and whilst the ban on the activity of democratic organisations was in force.

At the elections in the Western sectors the Social-Democratic Party won 64.5 per cent of the votes, the Christian Democratic Union polled 19.7 per cent and the Liberal-Democratic Party 16.2 per cent.³ The representatives of these parties had the absolute majority in the separate West Berlin Chamber of Deputies and the separate Magistrate it established.⁴

On December 21, 1948, the Western Powers created a

¹ See: *Berlin. Behauptung von Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1946-1948*, p. 713; *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Vol. 6, pp. 288-90.

² See: *Berlin. Behauptung von Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1946-1948*, p. 677.

³ The Communists did not take part in the elections.

⁴ On January 18, 1949, the City Chamber of Deputies of West Berlin elected L. Schröder and F. Friedensburg to the positions of First and Second Burgomaster, respectively. The post of the Third Burgomaster was abolished.

separate West Berlin governing authority. Then, with the active support of their military administration, the separate Magistrate completed the splitting of Berlin. On December 30, 1948, the order was issued authorising the establishment of the so-called Central Berlin Bank and the independent Savings Bank Board in the Western sectors.¹ Early in 1949 a separate system of social insurance was organised there. On January 26, 1949, the Western commandants introduced new restrictions on commercial transactions with firms in the Soviet Sector. Henceforth they were permitted only in exceptional cases. The US military authorities even prohibited telephone conversations with firms in the Soviet Sector.

Thus, by the beginning of 1949 almost all links with the eastern part of the city had been severed.

SETTLEMENT OF THE "BERLIN CRISIS"

At the end of 1948 and the beginning of 1949 the situation in Germany became extremely sensitive and an acute international crisis arose. In these circumstances the easing of tension and the removal of the threat of war generated by the "Berlin crisis" became the principal tasks before all peaceloving forces with the Soviet Union at the head. In order to deprive the USA of a pretext for further aggravating the international situation and stirring up anti-Soviet hysteria under the cover of which the United States in alliance with local reactionary elements was hastening the final split of Germany and the formation of a separate West German state, the Soviet Government undertook a series of measures aimed at prompting the Western Powers to agree to negotiate directly and re-establish the unity of Germany. The Soviet side said that it would lift all restrictions on transportation, communications and trade provided that the Council of Foreign Ministers was convened to discuss the German question. In an interview with Kingsbury Smith, director general of the European bureau of the International News Service, at the end of January 1949, the head of the

¹ See: *Der Tagesspiegel*, December 28 and 29, 1948; *Berlin. Ringen um Einheit und Wiederaufbau 1948-1951*, Berlin, 1962, pp. 73-74.

Soviet Government said that the USSR was prepared to lift the restrictions on communications if the Western Powers did the same and also put off the establishment of a separate West German state. On February 15, 1949, the Soviet representative at the United Nations Yakov Malik furnished the necessary additional explanations on this issue to the US representative Philip Jessup.¹

Thanks to the Soviet initiative the USSR and the USA resumed negotiations on Berlin and Germany as a whole. These took place in the spring of 1949 between Yakov Malik and Philip Jessup.

Why did the Western powers decide to negotiate a settlement of the "Berlin crisis"?

The primary reason was that the United States and its allies failed in their attempts to undermine the economy of the Soviet Zone and force the Soviet Union out of Germany. Just as futile were their hopes of splitting up the united front of the socialist states. The Western Powers were also seriously concerned about the steadily worsening situation in their sectors where the lack of raw materials, especially those which could not be brought in by air, was having a detrimental effect on industry. According to the Magistrate, by the end of 1948 an estimated 5,712 industrial enterprises (out of 62,500)² had been closed because of the absence of raw materials, whilst 12,937 were operating on short time. In March 1949 the number of unemployed reached 144,944, not counting those who worked a short week.³

Disturbed by the mounting tension in Berlin, world public opinion, like the Germans themselves, insisted that the Western Powers get down to negotiations with the USSR and bring to an end the steadily intensifying conflict.

The following agreement was reached on May 4, 1949, in New York as a result of the talks between Yakov Malik and Philip Jessup:

1. All the restrictions imposed since March 1, 1948, by

¹ See: B. Meissner, *Russland, die Westmächte und Deutschland*, Hamburg, 1954, p. 181.

² See: *Berlin. Ringen um Einheit und Wiederaufbau 1948-1951*, p. 74.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

the Government of the USSR on communications, transportation and trade between Berlin and the Western zones of Germany and between the Eastern Zone and the Western zones will be lifted on May 12, 1949. 2. All the restrictions imposed since March 1, 1949 by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, or by any one of them, on communications, transportation and trade between Berlin and the Eastern Zone and between the Western zones and the Eastern Zone of Germany will also be lifted on May 12, 1949. 3. Eleven days after the removal of the restrictions set forth in Paragraphs 1 and 2, that is, on May 23, 1949, the Council of Foreign Ministers will meet in Paris to discuss questions related to Germany and problems arising from the situation in Berlin, including the question of currency for Berlin.

The settlement of the "Berlin crisis" was a major international development. World public opinion assessed it as a major contribution to world peace, paving the way towards a solution of a number of urgent international questions, mainly those related to Germany and Berlin.

However, while conducting talks with Soviet representatives on normalising the situation in Berlin and Germany, the United States had not the slightest intention of fulfilling its commitments. As future events showed, the USA continued its attempts to present the Soviet Union on the eve of the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers with the *fait accompli* of a divided Germany and make it appear that the Germans themselves had decided the issue.

On April 4, 1949, the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the aggressive military and political bloc of the Western Powers, was speedily completed. On the same day US Secretary of State Dean Acheson signed the first peacetime military agreement entered into by the United States since the adoption of the US Constitution.

On April 8, 1949, the Bonn Constitution and the Occupation Statute, under which the Western Powers retained supreme powers and full control over West Germany, were published.

On April 25, 1949, the White House sent Ambassador Robert Murphy on a special assignment to Germany. He

was to inform General Clay that the US Government "desired the prompt formation of the Western German government",¹ and wanted to give it full legal standing by the end of the talks with the Soviet side and the convocation of the session of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

On May 12, 1949, the day when both sides lifted the restrictions introduced in 1948 on the zonal boundary and communications between the Western zones of occupation and Berlin, the Western Powers formed this government. "The Western German state came into existence before the four Foreign Ministers met in Paris. We have achieved the prime objective of our policy,"² General Clay noted with satisfaction.

He wrote that during his conversation with State Secretary Dean Acheson in the middle of May 1949, he became convinced that the United States was determined not to sign an agreement with the Soviets as a result of which the United States "would lose the position" which it "had attained in Europe".³

THE PARIS SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

On May 23, 1949, after a long interval, the Foreign Ministers of the Four Great Powers met in Paris for the session of their Council.⁴

The Soviet delegation proposed that supreme power in Germany be once again exercised by the Control Council. At the same time it suggested that some of the Control Council's functions be transferred to German bodies, particularly to an all-German Council of State which could be set up on the basis of the German economic bodies operat-

¹ Lucius D. Clay, *op. cit.*, p. 433.

² *Ibid.*, p. 437.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 439.

⁴ The agenda of the session, which ended on June 20, 1949, included the following points related to the German question: Germany's unity, economic and political principles and allied control; preparation of a peace treaty with Germany; Berlin and the currency question.

ing in the Eastern and Western zones. The Soviet side also held that with the Control Council retaining supreme power, the proposed all-German Council of State could become the country's economic and administrative organ exercising state functions in economic and state affairs and thus develop into a prototype of an all-German government.

The Soviet Union moved that a peace treaty be drawn up within three months which would provide for the withdrawal of all foreign troops a year after its signing, and the procedure worked out for preparing the treaty directly at the Paris session.

As a means of restoring Berlin's economic and political unity, the Soviet side spoke in favour of resuming the work of the Allied Kommandatura which would co-ordinate the administration of the city and ensure normal conditions for its inhabitants. Furthermore, the Soviet delegation suggested that the single Magistrate should be restored and the commandants instructed to announce free elections in Berlin. The Western Powers, however, turned down the Soviet proposal.

Instead of re-investing the Control Council, with its full powers, they proposed establishing a high commission which would pass decisions not by unanimous vote, as was the case in the Control Council, but by a simple majority. In other words, they wanted to set up an organ which would have enabled them to impose their will on the Soviet Union.

The Western Powers made the preparation of a draft peace treaty dependent on the re-establishment of Germany's unity, which, as they saw it, was to come about as a result of the incorporation of the Soviet Zone into their separate West German state, that is, through the absorption of East Germany. In a memorandum replying to the Soviet proposal on Germany's unity, the Western Powers bluntly asserted that the re-establishment of Germany's unity could only take place in the form of the extension of the Bonn Constitution to the Soviet Zone Länder and the latter's acceptance of the Occupation Statute.¹

As regards the Soviet proposal on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Germany within a year of the signing of

¹ See: *Wiso*, 1961, No. 24, p. 1132.

a peace treaty, US, British and French representatives declared outright that it was unacceptable. In the words of the prominent West German historian Richard Thilenius, the Soviet proposal was turned down because the troop withdrawal "would have deprived the Western Powers of a key military base on the continent—a German springboard for whose political establishment and consolidation the Federal Republic was established".¹

The position of the Western Powers offered further proof of their reluctance to solve the problem of Germany, including Berlin.

Nevertheless, the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers had an important impact on further developments, even if it did not resolve the key questions. The ministers contrived to end the dangerous Berlin crisis, and the Soviet Union managed to find a way to safeguard peace in spite of the growing aggressiveness of US imperialism. The session made it absolutely clear that a solution of controversial international issues could only be reached through negotiations. Moreover, in view of the Soviet position at the session, the Western Powers were forced to make certain concessions and record their agreement with the USSR on a number of questions relating to Germany and Berlin.

The communique issued on June 20, 1949, reaffirmed that the New York agreement of May 4, 1949, between Yakov Malik and Philip Jessup would remain in force. There were also to be Four-Power consultations in Berlin to discuss, amongst other things, questions on the administration of the city's four sectors. The occupation authorities were instructed to continue their efforts to restore Germany's economic and political unity.

The communique further stated that, although this session found it impossible to reach an agreement on the re-establishment of Germany's political and economic unity, the foreign ministers would continue to work in this direction and had agreed that at the UN session in September 1949 they would exchange views on the date and other conditions for convening a foreign ministers' meeting to discuss the German problem.

¹ *Bonn ist nicht Weimar*, Cologne-Berlin, 1956, p. 159.

**THE PARTITION OF GERMANY
AND THE RISE OF TWO STATES—THE FRG
AND THE GDR—ON HER SOIL**

However, no sooner had the foreign ministers concluded their session, than it became evident that the United States and its allies had gone back on their Paris commitments. It was their intention to complete the partition of Germany by the next meeting of the foreign ministers due to take place during the UN General Assembly in September 1949, legalise the existence of the West German state as a lawfully established formation and wreck the last chances of returning to the Potsdam decisions and re-establishing the country's unity. One could easily see through their intentions by the fact that on June 20, 1949, the day the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers ended its debate and issued a communique, the Western Powers signed an agreement establishing an Allied High Commission for West Germany. This was yet another violation of the Four-Power agreements and the Paris commitments on German affairs.

Throughout the summer the USA, Britain and France were busy legalising the partition of Germany instead of fulfilling the decisions made at the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and never did carry them into effect.¹

When the UN General Assembly opened in New York on September 20, 1949, the division of Germany had not only been completed but now rested on a legal basis. The elections to the Bundestag in West Germany were held on August 14. They ended in a victory for the biggest party of monopoly capital—the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)²,

¹ In July 1949, the deputy commanders-in-chief of the Four Powers at the insistence of the Soviet side discussed the procedure for Four-Power consultations as envisaged in the communique issued by the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Two advisory groups were to be formed, one of which (consisting of the four commandants) was to deal with questions common to the whole of Berlin. However, these meetings produced no positive results and in effect were used by the Western Powers to mislead public opinion.

² The CDU/CSU won 7,367,579 votes (139 mandates), the Social-Democratic Party of Germany—6,932,272 votes (131 mandates), the Free Democratic Party—2,788,653 votes (52 mandates) and the Communist Party of Germany—1,360,443 votes (15 mandates).

which became the bulwark of the militaristic and revanchist forces and an instrument of their "positions of strength" policy. On September 12, 1949, the West German Bundestag and the Bundesrat elected the President of the newly formed separate West German state and three days later its Chancellor. In his very first interview, 73-year-old Konrad Adenauer, the first Federal Chancellor, declared that "his government cannot adopt a friendly position with regard to the USSR".¹ The Government of the separate West German state took office on September 20, 1949, the day the Fifth UN General Assembly opened in New York.

The partition of Germany and the German nation had become a reality, an accomplished fact.

It was only natural that the formation of a separate West German state, which decided on a militaristic and vengeful course, should have encountered resistance from the progressive forces of the German people fighting for their country's peaceful and democratic development. In response to the divisive course followed by the West and German reactionary elements, they intensified the national patriotic movement headed by the German People's Congress of the peaceful and democratic state—the German Democratic Republic—which was formed in that part of the country where the Potsdam decisions were consistently being put into practice. On October 7, 1949, the Ninth Session of the German People's Congress passed historical decisions which led to the formation of the GDR. The German People's Council (elected on May 30, 1949, by the Third German People's Congress) proclaimed itself a Provisional People's Chamber. The first (constituent) assembly of the Provisional People's Chamber which opened on the same day unanimously passed a law on the formation of the government and enacted the Constitution. On October 11, 1949, the Provisional Chamber of Länder held its constituent meeting and on the same day the joint sitting of both Chambers elected Wilhelm Pieck, who was Chairman of the SUPG Board, President of the Republic.

The Soviet Union immediately transferred the administrative functions exercised by the Soviet Military Administra-

¹ *Die Neue Zeitung*, September 16, 1949.

tion in Germany to the German Democratic Republic. The ceremony took place in the hall of the former Army Engineers School in Karlshorst where four years earlier Hitler Germany's unconditional surrender had been signed. The Soviet Military Administration was replaced by the Soviet Control Commission whose functions were to see that the German Democratic Republic carried through the Four-Power decisions on Germany. The USSR and the GDR exchanged diplomatic missions.

The rise of the GDR, the first workers' and peasants' state in German history, was an important event in the life of the German people and a turning point in European history.

The GDR became the German people's citadel in the struggle against West German imperialism and revanchism. It proclaimed peace and friendship between nations as its supreme goal and announced its determination to fulfil the Potsdam Agreement.

Thus, *Germany ceased to exist as a single entity, both de facto and de jure*. Now, instead of Germany, there were two states, the FRG and the GDR, which developed along different paths. A special formation called West Berlin comprising the Western part of Berlin, which had been illegally isolated from the surrounding territory by the Western Powers, gradually took shape inside one of these states—the German Democratic Republic.

The existence of two separate states and the special formation of West Berlin on German soil became one of the characteristic features of subsequent development in the centre of Europe and part and parcel of the postwar territorial *status quo* which came about there.

CHAPTER III
THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT
OF WEST BERLIN (1950-1972)

INTENSIFICATION OF SUBVERSIVE
ACTIVITY AGAINST SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
FROM WEST BERLIN

The years following the partition of Germany and the formation of two separate states on German soil are characterised, on the one hand, by the steady strengthening of the GDR, and on the other, by the policy openly proclaimed by the USA of "rolling back Communism", re-arming the FRG, including this state directly in the West's military and political groups and stepping up preparations for war against the socialist states. In these plans a special role was assigned to West Berlin which continued to remain under US, British and French occupation.

The artificial severance of Berlin's Western Sectors from their natural surroundings inside the German Democratic Republic gave rise to a *special formation* with a totally different socio-economic structure and political system.

In view of its insular position, West Berlin could only look forward to a secure future through peaceful development and the establishment of normal relations with the surrounding area. The United States and its allies had other plans, however. They held that West Berlin's specific geographic position was ideal for the attainment of other objectives. West Berlin lies almost 200 kilometres away from the West's eastern frontiers, deep inside the community of the socialist states in the very centre of the GDR, which from the moment of its formation became the target of vicious attacks from the imperialist forces. Prior to August 13, 1961, it was

the only point on the dividing line between two worlds with opposing socio-economic systems, where movements across the border were not subject to restrictions.

These aspects of West Berlin's geographic position inspired the Atlantic strategists with the hope of turning it into an extremely advantageous observation tower in the enemy's deep rear, of launching from it far-flung subversive activities against the socialist countries and, when necessary, using it as a pretext for heightening world tension and fanning military hysteria. As their own press admitted, the Western Powers intended to convert West Berlin in the course of time into a "bridgehead" and a "springboard" for the leap into Eastern Europe.

Even at the end of the forties, the city's Western sectors were an important strongpoint for hostile activity against the socialist countries. In the fifties, as the Western Powers intensified their aggressive course and stepped up the remilitarisation of the FRG, West Berlin came to play a still greater role as the West's anti-communist outpost. As a result of the efforts of the Western Powers and the FRG, *Berlin was converted into a major centre of slanderous propaganda and "psychological warfare" against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.*

Cheap novels and all sorts of militaristic and anti-communist publications were brought by the wagonload into West Berlin and then smuggled into the GDR. A considerable portion of this trashy literature was manufactured in West Berlin, too.

A special role in these ideological subversions against the socialist countries was played by RIAS, a radio station under the US Information Service which was closely connected with the State Department and US intelligence.

Apart from being one of the most important anti-communist propaganda media in the West, RIAS was also a nest of spies and agents provocateurs. Besides engaging in slander, its no less important mission was direct espionage. In 1952 the *New York Herald Tribune*, for instance, reported that thanks to its broadcasts and the information which it collected, RIAS had become a priceless assistant in the activity of certain "resistance groups" (that is, espionage and sabotage centres—*U.U.*) based in West Berlin. Its objec-

tive, the newspaper pointed out, was to be a spark for a powder keg.¹

A similar role was assigned to Radio Free Berlin (SFB). It opened in 1953 and was subsidised primarily by the FRG.²

The cinema, press, TV and other means of exerting ideological pressure were enlisted for service in the cold war.

A real *economic war* was conducted against the GDR from West Berlin in which the principal weapon was the maintenance, by devious measures, of the extremely low exchange rate of the GDR Mark against the FRG Mark.

Even bourgeois economists estimated the real purchasing power of the West and East Mark at 1:1.8.³ Actually it ranged from 1:0.9 to 1:1.5, depending on the type of commodity and service.⁴ Nevertheless, in West Berlin the average exchange rate was 3.7 East German Marks to one West German Mark.⁵ This was a fraudulent rate⁶ since it was based neither on the gold parity nor on the unit of account employed in inter-German trade; neither was it based on official trade relations nor on the purchasing power of the currencies.⁷ The exchange rate was arbitrarily fixed by a special committee consisting of representatives of West German banks and approximately 50 exchange offices. The committee was guided solely by political considerations, namely, to fix the very lowest exchange rate in order to pump as much foreign currency out of the GDR as possible and create the most advantageous conditions for all sorts of commodity-financial machinations and thus undermine the GDR economy. With no customs control at the border this policy made it possible to engage in large-scale purchases of GDR commodities and speculate on the market.⁸

In spite of the measures introduced by the GDR authorities, the smuggling of currency and commodities out of the

¹ *New York Herald Tribune*, October 19, 1953.

² It has a TV and several radio programmes.

³ See: S. Heller, *Bundeshilfe an Berlin und Seine Wirtschaft von 1949 bis 1959*, Bonn, 1960, p. 26.

⁴ See: P. A. Steiniger, *Westberlin. Ein Handbuch zur Westberlin-Frage*, Berlin, 1959, p. 172.

⁵ Sometimes the exchange rate was artificially raised to 1:8

⁶ See: P. A. Steiniger, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ See: *West Berlin—The Facts*, Moscow, 1962, p. 103.

Republic continued to grow, thereby causing it heavy financial losses. The following figures alone suffice to show the scope and scale of these machinations: in a random inspection on the border between West Berlin and the capital of the GDR, when out of the 10,000 persons crossing the frontier only 1 per cent were examined, it was revealed that annually there were over 20,000 cases of illegal carriage of currency, goods and foodstuffs.¹

All this seriously damaged the GDR economy. According to the estimates of the American economist, Professor Hans Apel, by August 13, 1961, the GDR had lost more than 13,000 million Marks from exchange machinations and various kinds of speculations.²

Enticement of qualified workers, particularly specialists, with a view to "bleeding the GDR white" was conducted on an ever increasing scale.

At the end of 1961 the GDR Government published extensive material on the organisers, purposes and scale of the systematic trade in human beings which was being conducted in West Berlin. The Government memorandum on this question stated that West Berlin was playing the part of an "assembly point and sluice" and had been turned into a sort of a "gateway to the West" through which GDR citizens, who had fallen into the hands of traders in human beings and foreign intelligence services, were transferred.

The drain of qualified manpower not only denuded a number of key economic sectors in the GDR, but also impeded technological progress and the fulfilment of plans, and handicapped the normal functioning of the various services. In 1960, for example, an acute shortage of doctors forced the GDR to turn for help to the socialist countries.

The well-known West German economist, Dr. Baade, calculated that the recruitment of qualified workers and the enticement of technical specialists had caused the GDR a loss of 22,500 million Marks, even more than the loss caused by exchange machinations and various black market activities.³

This was not the end of the problem, however. According to incomplete official figures, about 63,000 inhabitants of

¹ *West Berlin—The Facts*, p. 110.

² See: *Neues Deutschland*, March 5, 1964.

³ See: *West Berlin—The Facts*, p. 122.

the capital of the GDR were working in West Berlin up to August 13, 1961. They created surplus value at West Berlin enterprises and whilst contributing nothing at all to the development of the GDR, enjoyed all the advantages of its socialist legislation (free medical care, kindergartens and schools, cheaper communal services, and old-age and disability pension). As a result, the Republic lost about 1,000 million Marks annually.¹

The GDR sustained considerable losses from economic espionage, particularly from the theft of the results of important research and development work and from various indirect forms of economic warfare such as the blocking of deliveries, sabotage, economic boycott, creation of additional difficulties for its foreign trade and so forth.

Professor Apel estimated that the total losses (including indirect losses), sustained by the GDR from the day it was founded to the day when the borders with West Berlin were taken under control, added up to the colossal sum of 83,300 million Marks.²

From the point of view of international law such activity from West Berlin was plain economic aggression against the GDR.

In the fifties, the imperialists operating from West Berlin launched *espionage and subversive activities* on a hitherto unprecedented scale against the socialist countries, chiefly against the German Democratic Republic.

The numerous trials of spies and saboteurs caught red-handed in the GDR and other socialist countries, showed that in its efforts to harm socialism, imperialism did not shrink from using the basest means and perpetrating the most heinous crimes.

The role which imperialism had assigned to West Berlin became especially evident during the counter-revolutionary putsch of June 17, 1953, when West Berlin sent "reinforcements" to agents already active in the GDR, together with arms and ammunition. The overall guidance of the putsch was also conducted from West Berlin, particularly through RIAS.

¹ See: *West Berlin—The Facts*, p. 123.

² See: *Neues Deutschland*, March 5, 1964 (according to official GDR figures the total losses exceeded 100,000 million Marks).

On June 13, 1953, acting on instructions from the chief of US intelligence Allan Dulles who "happened" to be in West Berlin, RIAS worked out a special "argumentation" of radio broadcasts in the event of disturbances in East Berlin. From midnight June 16, 1953, RIAS uninterruptedly broadcast instructions and assignments to agents in the GDR, disseminated false reports, encouraged provocations and incited the people to mutiny.¹

One of the most influential US newspapers, *The New York Times*, wrote that "the United States propaganda station in Berlin, RIAS" was one of the best weapons of the cold war and that the events of June 17, 1953, would "never have taken place but for this station's broadcasts".²

In the years that followed hardly a month passed without GDR security bodies arresting spies and secret agents who had penetrated into the Republic from West Berlin or who received their instructions from there.

On April 22, 1956, Soviet servicemen discovered a tunnel in the Altglienicke area (in the capital of the GDR) which had been dug from West Berlin. US intelligence had been using this tunnel to tap three telephone cables operated by the Group of Soviet Troops in Germany and GDR Government institutions. This was a "spy set-up of unprecedented scale".³

Preparations for counter-revolutionary action against the GDR designed to repeat the putsch of June 17, 1953, assumed huge proportions in the autumn of 1956, following the events in Hungary.⁴ Strikes were to take place in Berlin, Magdeburg, Leipzig and other GDR towns and there were even plans to "set up a counter government which, if the putsch were carried off, would request assistance from the Western Powers".⁵ Although the USSR, the GDR and other socialist countries frustrated the West's plans, the Western Powers and the FRG did not cease their subversive activity.

In the early sixties there were more than 90 intelligence agencies and their subversive and sabotage organisations in

¹ See: *RIAS und SFB im Spionageschlingel Westberlin*, pp. 35-36.

² *The New York Times*, June 23, 1953.

³ *West Berlin—The Facts*, p. 51.

⁴ See: *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Vol. 8, p. 61.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

West Berlin, and also a large number of secret and cover addresses and so forth.¹ To co-ordinate the activity of the intelligence agencies and espionage organisations each of the three Western Powers established its own special centre in West Berlin, and then, under the same roof as the separate governing authority, the joint co-ordination group called G-2 HQ Berlin Command.

In the middle of the fifties West Berlin became the seat of the FRG secret services.² Headed by Reinhard Gehlen, the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) set up a large number of branches in West Berlin. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution officially set up its Land office there, and branches of the FRG military intelligence and counter-intelligence were established in West Berlin when the Bundeswehr was formed.

From January 1960 to July 1961, about 4,000 spies and saboteurs who had committed crimes against the GDR were arrested in the Republic. This fact alone reveals the extent of the steadily increasing espionage and subversive activity that was coming from West Berlin. A total of 87 radio sets belonging to various intelligence agencies were discovered in the GDR in the period from 1959 to 1961 alone.³

The kind of activity that was emanating from West Berlin and the misuse of the uncontrolled border were acts of outright aggression against the GDR and a gross interference in its internal affairs.

In these years numerous *militarist and revanchist organisations* were founded in West Berlin, in violation of the Potsdam Agreements. Headed by former Hitler generals and diehard nazis, they included the Stahlhelm War Veterans' Union, the Union of German Soldiers, the Union of Ex-Servicemen of the Parachute Corps, the Mutual Aid Association of Ex-Servicemen of the SS Troops (HIAG), numerous associations of countrymen (*Landsmannschaft*) united into the Land Union of Exiles and their affiliated organisations.⁴ They openly called for an intensification "of the

¹ See: *West Berlin—The Facts*, p. 17.

² *Ibid.*, p. 18.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

⁴ See: *Westberlin—Hort der Reaktion, Herd der Kriegsgefahr*, Berlin, 1958, pp. 14-25.

struggle against Communism" and demanded a revision of the results of the Second World War. Moreover, they vigorously set about "reviving the military traditions of the past" and "raising the fighting spirit" of the West Berliners, whilst poisoning the minds of wide sections of the German population with the spirit of militarism and fanning military hysteria.

Generously subsidised by the Adenauer Government, the militarist and revanchist organisations in West Berlin showed less and less restraint, doing virtually what they pleased in the city and openly preaching war and violence. In September 1959, HIAG urged the German people "to win back their place in the sun by blood and thunder"¹. At a rally of the militarist Kyffhäuser-Kameradschaft association in July 1960, a man named Baumann said: "It is a tragedy for the German people that they have lost such an outstanding statesman as Hitler." In conclusion he promised that the day would come when "we shall settle accounts with the Bolsheviks"².

At a meeting in West Berlin on November 13, 1960, which included a parade of soldiers' unions and other militarist and revanchist organisations, Chaplain Willingmann urged the Germans "to become a proud soldier-like people once again"³. Grammelsdorf, the head of the notorious Stahlhelm Union, speaking in West Berlin urged that the "time has come to imbue the population with the genuine spirit of a frontline city"⁴.

This sort of activity in West Berlin ran counter to the Four-Power agreements and crassly violated the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic.

West Berlin was gradually being drawn into the *military preparations* of the Western Powers, and particularly the FRG.

The occupation troops of the Western Powers were re-armed with the most sophisticated weapons, and in April

¹ *Zur Lage in Westberlin. Hrsg. vom Ausschuss für Deutsche Einheit*, Berlin, 1961, p. 13.

² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

³ *Die Wahrheit*, November 15, 1960.

⁴ *Zur Lage in Westberlin*, p. 13.

1958 US units in West Berlin were re-organised to adapt to the conditions of an atomic war.¹

All these measures were designed to convert West Berlin into a "centre of armaments production", a "military camp" and a "NATO military base".

At the same time the Western Powers turned Berlin into a "show-case of the free world"² hoping to conceal its unseemly role in the plans of the imperialists. In 1950 there was a sharp increase of the Marshall Plan aid to West Berlin. Various privileges and subsidies running into thousands of millions of dollars were granted to the city. The purpose of this window-dressing was to create the impression of the "superiority of the capitalist system", to "increase the attractiveness of the West" and to "dazzle" the GDR population and lure it away from the Republic.

Thus, in the *fifties* West Berlin became an outpost of militarism and revanchism and a major centre for anti-communist propaganda and subversive activity against the socialist countries, primarily the GDR.

In no other city in the world was anti-communist propaganda so unbridled and the concentration of secret services so great as in West Berlin. On August 7, 1954, the West German *Schwäbisches Tageblatt* wrote that West Berlin had been turned into a secret service exchange without parallel in the world. It had long since surpassed Shanghai, Tunis and other well-known centres of international espionage. Never before in history had subversive activity been conducted on such a tremendous scale and been so generously subsidised as it was in West Berlin.

Subversive activity directed from West Berlin became the city's *main function*. This fact was no longer concealed either in Bonn, the Western capitals or in West Berlin. As far back as 1951 Ernst Reuter described West Berlin as a "thorn in the flesh" of the German Democratic Republic,³ a "lever with which it will be possible to open the door to the East". Two years later, in 1953, he called West Berlin a worm gnawing from within the organism of the German Democratic Republic, the West's cheapest atom bomb in the struggle

¹ See: *Der Tagesspiegel*, April 12, 1958.

² *Die Berliner Wirtschaft*, 1956, No. 56, p. 1129.

³ *Zur Lage in Westberlin*, p. 11.

against the GDR.¹ At the same time he said: "We must act as dynamite against the Eastern Zone", and his successors were fond of repeating that "West Berlin's mission was to handicap to the greatest possible extent the stabilisation" of the GDR and to play the role of "peace-breaker".

US Presidential candidate Henry Stassen described West Berlin as the West's most considerable fortress inside the communist sphere of influence,² and the US High Commissioner for Germany, James B. Conant, called the city a spearpoint reaching to the very heart of East Germany.³

There were loud calls in the West to turn West Berlin into a "frontline territory" (J. Kaiser), a frontline city of the cold war,⁴ a second Quemoy (J. Dulles) or a second Pearl Harbour (General Clay).

This list of "titles" could be continued. In other words, West Berlin was turned into a *holbed of permanent tension*.

MOUNTING DISCONTENT IN WEST BERLIN WITH THE POLICY OF THE SENATE

The growing tension around West Berlin caused by the policy of the Western Powers, the FRG and the Senate had a detrimental impact on the situation in the city and provoked the increasing discontent of large numbers of West Berliners who bore the brunt of its "frontline life". More and more people demanded an end to the cold-war policy and called for a settlement that would be acceptable to all the interested parties, thus making it possible to reduce the tension around West Berlin and creating conditions for its normal peaceful development.

Many people were beginning to realise that West Berlin could not permanently exist on such an unstable and dangerous foundation as "a far-advanced anti-communist outpost", and that it could only be certain of its future if it normalises its relations with the surrounding world. They wanted it to acquire a definite degree of independence and

¹ See: *Newsweek*, March 16, 1953, p. 17.

² *So sieht es in Westberlin wirklich aus*, Berlin, 1954, p. 8.

³ *Neues Deutschland*, December 6, 1955.

⁴ *Der Tagesspiegel*, February 3, 1952.

pursue a policy in keeping with the interests of the West Berlin population, the majority of which, as even the West admitted, opposed the city's incorporation into the FRG.¹

These sentiments made themselves felt in the discussions on the city's development and were repeated by the West Berlin press and in speeches in the West Berlin Chamber of Deputies in the early fifties. During these discussions there were loud protests against the city's unconditional subordination to Bonn's course and calls for a "constructive policy" on this particular question.²

Erik Reger, one of the publishers of *Der Tagesspiegel*, a leading bourgeois newspaper in West Berlin, came forward with a plan designed to give the city "fresh impetus" by granting Berlin "UN status and replacing the occupation troops of the Four Powers by troops from several UN member-countries".³ Another plan was put forward by Ferdinand Friedensburg, one of West Berlin's burgomasters, who suggested that the city be granted a status similar to that of Palestine and be governed by a "neutral commissioner".⁴ There were also proposals to grant the city a status similar to that of Danzig or Trieste.⁵

To some extent these plans mirrored the opposition of certain circles both within and without West Berlin to the official course of Reuter and Adenauer for effecting an FRG-West Berlin Anschluss. Yet essentially they were reactionary, for they were aimed at depriving the GDR of its legitimate capital. Moreover, they could have impeded Germany's unification and the conclusion of a peaceful settlement with her, a question whose practical solution was still on the agenda in those days and which was the centre of a bitter controversy. Taking all this into account, the Soviet Union and the GDR turned down these plans. As regards their authors, they shortly abandoned them under pressure from Bonn and the Western Powers.


¹ See: *Berlin—Brennpunkt deutschen Schicksals*, p. 50.

² *Der Tagesspiegel*, September 2, 1951; October 25, 1951.

³ *Mittleuropa*, 1965, No. 1, p. 38.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Berlin. Ringen um Einheit und Wiederaufbau 1948-1951*, p. 446.

⁵ *Historical Division. Office of the Executive Secretary of the US High Commission of Germany, Economic Assistance to West Berlin 1949-1952*, p. 5.



Subversive centres and organisations established in West Berlin in the postwar years.

1, 2, 3, 4—US intelligence agencies; 5—headquarters of British intelligence; 6, 7—French intelligence agencies; 8—RIAS; 9—Radio Free Berlin; 10—Indivisible Germany Curatorium, one of the numerous FRG cold-war agencies against the GDR; 11—Europe House, headquarters of revanchist organisations; 12—centres of various subversive, revanchist and emigrant organisations; 13—Branch of the FRG Ministry for All-German Affairs; 14—the Land Branch of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution; 15—air corridors between West Berlin and the FRG.

Power in West Berlin passed into the hands of the forces which were counting on the US "positions of strength" policy,

on West Berlin's intensive participation in the cold war as a frontline city and on the further development of subversive activity against the GDR, the USSR and other socialist states directed from its territory.

**THE COUNTERMEASURES OF THE USSR AND
THE GDR IN CONNECTION WITH THE INCREASING
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY FROM WEST BERLIN**

The Soviet Union and the GDR repeatedly demanded that the increasing subversive activity being conducted from the territory of West Berlin must end immediately, otherwise they would be forced to resort to measures to safeguard their own security.

On October 1, 1952, for example, General V. I. Chuikov, Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission, sent a letter to the US High Commissioner for Germany, Donnelly, after several representations had been made to Western officials in the course of his personal meetings with them. In citing numerous facts about the subversive activity carried on from West Berlin against the GDR and listing, in compliance with the wishes of the Western representatives, the addresses of the most important espionage and subversive centres, V. I. Chuikov stated that "West Berlin has become a hotbed of espionage and subversive and terrorist activity" against the GDR and other socialist countries. He emphasised that the facts cited in his letter prove that "American, British and also French occupation authorities in West Berlin encourage criminal activity aimed at harming the population" of the GDR and its capital and undermining their economy, and insisted "on the immediate closure of all espionage, subversive and terrorist centres" in West Berlin.

In their reply of November 3, 1952, the high commissioners of the three Western Powers refuted the facts set forth in V. I. Chuikov's letter of October 1, 1952, and even tried to justify the subversive activity which included assassinations, explosions, arson and other crimes conducted from West Berlin, by calling it the "normal everyday life" of the city.

On December 30, 1952, V. I. Chuikov sent a letter to acting US High Commissioner for Germany Reber in which

he most emphatically repudiated the attempts of the Western Powers to deny incontrovertible facts and to justify the subversive activity carried on from West Berlin. After citing additional facts about the terrorist, subversive and espionage activity against the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Control Commission insisted "on the prompt liquidation" of the criminal organisations and stressed that the "entire responsibility" for the ensuing consequences rested with the American, British and French occupation authorities.

On September 23, 1954, the USSR High Commissioner for Germany G. M. Pushkin sent another letter on this issue to his American counterpart. He wrote that within a short period of time the GDR security bodies had apprehended more than 400 spies and saboteurs who had been transferred to the Republic by US espionage and subversive centres in West Germany and especially in West Berlin. Moreover, over 100 agents had given themselves up and were penitent of their crimes. G. M. Pushkin listed the names of these organisations and the names and addresses of their heads and demanded that an end be put to the criminal activity being directed from West Berlin.

Unable to refute any of the numerous facts cited in G. M. Pushkin's letter, the Americans simply declared that the letter was "unacceptable".

Thereupon, the Office of the USSR High Commissioner for Germany once again declared that "Soviet organs in Germany continue to press for effective measures from the American occupation authorities to liquidate the espionage and subversive organisations in West Germany and West Berlin". It also said that the Soviet side and the GDR Government could not tolerate such a state of affairs and would "take appropriate measures to cut short the espionage and subversive activity being conducted against the GDR and the Soviet troops".

The Western Powers, however, were unmindful of the warnings of the USSR and the GDR. Hostile activity from the territory of West Berlin increased, thus heightening tension in the centre of Europe.

The atmosphere around West Berlin became particularly strained in the latter half of the fifties, following the conclusion of the Paris Agreements and the entry into NATO of

the FRG, which openly began to work for an *anschluss* with the city. West Berlin's unsettled position in international law, the artificial preservation of the occupation regime in the city after occupation in the GDR and the FRG had ended, and the misuse of the communications passing through the GDR to West Berlin (a factor which frequently generated additional friction) aggravated the situation in this area to a still greater extent. West Berlin became one of the most dangerous theatres of the cold war, the scene of more and more incidents and conflicts, all of which were pregnant with the most dire consequences.

On top of that, West Berlin was increasingly drawn into the preparations for an open aggression against the countries of the socialist community, primarily against the GDR. Even the Western press wrote that the city was to play the role of "detonator in the charge of aggression". GDR historians noted in their studies that in response to their republic's "transition to planned socialist construction, the West sharply intensified the cold war and stepped up preparations to abolish its socialist order".

Bonn had been hatching these plans for a long time. On January 14, 1959, one of the West German ultras, the FRG Ambassador to Washington Wilhelm Grewe, noted that the "re-unification" of Germany could not only be achieved through so-called free elections, but by staging a provocation similar to the one of June 17, 1953.

After the unsuccessful provocations of 1953 and 1956, the FRG concentrated on preparing a counter-revolutionary putsch coupled with a direct invasion of the GDR by the Bundeswehr. William Schlamm, an ideologist of the West German and American ultras, wrote at the time that if "the West wants to survive" it must decide "to go to war".¹

There is more to these statements than meets the eye. Facts which have since come to light prove that at that time the FRG was urgently working on plans for a direct military attack on the GDR.

One plan, code-named Operation Deko II, provided for, among other things, the employment of agents to organise provocations and subversive acts in the GDR and to give them the appearance of popular disturbances. After that,

¹ *Unsere Zeit*, 1962, No. 1, p. 5.

airborne troops would be landed at the GDR capital and the Bundeswehr would invade the republic to help brothers and sisters.

Meanwhile the FRG was remilitarising at a rapid pace and consolidating its position in NATO.

Since the Western Powers and the FRG continued to carry on subversive activity from West Berlin, the Soviet Union and the GDR found it necessary to put through decisive countermeasures. Thousands of spies and saboteurs were apprehended and control tightened on communications between the FRG and West Berlin and on the border with the city.

In view of the increasing military preparations by the FRG and the Western Powers, further measures were taken to ensure the security of the USSR, the GDR and other fraternal socialist countries.

It was becoming increasingly obvious, however, that apart from combating the provocations, it was also necessary to eliminate their root causes, that is, to achieve a settlement of the entire problem of West Berlin which was poisoning the world and especially the European political climate, and thus remove it from the international agenda.

**FRESH DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE
BY THE USSR AND THE GDR
(END OF 1958-BEGINNING OF 1959)**

In the latter half of the fifties, the Soviet Government, guided by the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, took vigorous steps to negotiate a settlement of controversial international problems, bring about a relaxation of world tension and, first and foremost, improve the situation on German soil. In this connection it was of the utmost importance to solve the problem of West Berlin. "In view of the mounting military threat emanating from the Federal Republic of Germany," the 21st Congress of the CPSU pointed out, "the Soviet Union has submitted a number of proposals aimed at settling the German problem." The Soviet Government urged that a peaceful settlement on Germany be found immediately and that it be used as a basis for solving the West Berlin problem by putting an end to its abnormal posi-

tion and bringing its status in line with peacetime conditions. These proposals were set forth in the complementary notes of November 27, 1958, and January 9, 1959.

This time the Soviet Government put forward detailed proposals, including plans for resolving the West Berlin problem, so as to stop the Western Powers from evading a practical discussion of the issues.

It goes without saying that the correct decision would have been to re-unite West Berlin, which the Western Powers had artificially isolated from its natural surroundings, with the GDR, for both geographically and legally it belonged to the latter Republic.¹ However, for the sake of preserving peace and improving the situation in Europe, the Soviet Union and the GDR agreed to have, to the great detriment of their interests, West Berlin turned into an "independent political entity", a neutral free city "without any state, including the two existing German states, interfering in its life". It was envisaged that the Four Powers and the two states which had arisen on German soil would undertake to respect West Berlin's special status.

The Soviet side took account of proposals, which in one form or another had been advanced by various circles both inside and outside West Berlin in the fifties, to convert Berlin into a "city-state", an "independent" or "open" city with specific international guarantees. Now these ideas had been given concrete expression with regard to West Berlin, the only city to which they could possibly apply.

West Berlin was a source of mounting tension not only because its social system differs from that of the GDR, but because of its undefined status in international law. This tension was heightened, first and foremost, by Bonn's illegal claims to the city and by the fact that it had been converted into a centre of subversive activity against the socialist community, into a "frontline city", a "Trojan horse" inside the GDR and a "fuse attached to a delayed action mine" in order to create a new hotbed of war and bring about an open military conflict. This being the case it was necessary to solve the question of the status of West Berlin, put an end to the illegal "Federal presence" there, cut short the subversive activity being conducted from its territory against the social-

¹ See J. Rshewski, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

ist countries and normalise the city's relations with the surrounding area. All this was fully in line with the demands of the time and the cause of safeguarding international security.

The above considerations formed the basis of the proposals which the Soviet Government advanced at the end of 1958 and beginning of 1959 after consultations with the German Democratic Republic.

The conversion of West Berlin into a free city would have ensured it a firmly fixed and clearly defined status appropriate to peacetime conditions and the prevailing situation, that is, it would have taken into account the transformation of West Berlin into a separate and special territorial entity. The German peace treaty was to have finally determined the international legal status of the GDR, the FRG and West Berlin, their place in the family of European nations, and to perpetuate the existing borders.

In other words, the Soviet proposals were designed to ring down the curtain on the Second World War and ensure a reliable peace and security in Europe. They took into account the objective realities and interests of everybody, and constituted a wholly suitable basis for achieving a mutually acceptable agreement. The Soviet Union was motivated exclusively by the desire to ensure peace and eliminate all sources of tension between states that might precipitate a dangerous conflict. Declaring its readiness to enter into talks with the governments of the countries concerned, the Soviet Government made it clear that it wanted the issue to be solved in a calm atmosphere, without undue haste and friction and with the utmost consideration for the interests of everyone.

The Western press responded with a frenzied campaign against the Soviet proposals. Calling them a *diktat* "ultimatum" and a "threat" it accused the Soviet Union of creating "another international crisis".

Bonn set the tone of the campaign. Prompting the Western Powers, Konrad Adenauer declared on November 27, 1958, the day when the Soviet Government submitted its notes, that the USA, Britain and France would "turn down" the Soviet proposals. On December 4, 1958, during a brief visit to West Berlin, he urged the Western Powers to be "firm".

In the capitals of the Western Powers there were many

high-ranking officials who fully supported the Bonn ultras and even resorted to threats of war themselves.

In the circumstances the Soviet Government had no option but to issue a warning that "in the event of an attack on the GDR the aggressors would incur a deserved rebuff from the united forces of the Warsaw Treaty countries". At the same time the Soviet side repeatedly indicated that it opposed any confrontation and welcomed a peaceful settlement of the West Berlin problem.

On January 5, 1959, A. I. Mikoyan, who was in the United States at the time, handed over to the US authorities a memorandum from the Soviet Government further elucidating the Soviet position. In a reference to West Berlin, it noted that the Soviet Government was seriously concerned with the situation in the city because it had become a permanent source of tension and the scene of confrontations that were a constant threat to European and world peace. The Soviet side pointed out that events had forced the nations involved to face up to the problem of normalising the situation in West Berlin and that the sooner means of settling it were found the better it would be for the cause of peace. In indicating that they wanted the issue to be resolved without detriment to the legitimate interests and prestige of all the states concerned, the Soviet Government suggested that this should be achieved on a co-ordinated basis and that measures be taken to ensure the city's free communications with the outer world and non-interference in its internal affairs. It proposed that international guarantees should be worked out to assure confidence in the stability of West Berlin's position.¹

These proposals were specified in the Soviet Government's notes of January 10, 1959, to the Governments of the Western Powers.

However, the Western press went ahead with the campaign it had started following the Soviet note of November 27, 1958, and even intensified it in order to present the new Soviet initiative as an "encroachment on the freedom of West Berlin" and "another effort" to seize the city. The Soviet side was, therefore, forced to refute these fabrications. In public statements and conversations Soviet representatives made the point that the USSR wanted to solve the entire range

¹ See: *Dokumentation der Zeit*, p. 3.

of German problems, including the problem of West Berlin, on the basis of an agreement with the Western Powers which would take into account the interests of all parties concerned and contribute to the strengthening of peace.

The Soviet proposals became the focus of attention of world public opinion and drew a wide response from statesmen and politicians everywhere. The initial excitement soon died down and more sober voices began calling on the West, as did Mike Mansfield, Democratic leader in the US Senate, to give up their inflexible ideas, agree to hold talks and formulate their own constructive proposals giving greater consideration to the actual situation in the world.

Naturally, the growth of such sentiments in the West was not caused by a change of attitude to communism and the Soviet Union, but by the further change in the balance of power in favour of the developing and strengthening anti-imperialist front headed by the countries of the socialist community.

The failure of the West's military doctrines and strategic plans became increasingly obvious with the launching in 1957 of the first Soviet sputniks. Now the Western press wrote that since the Soviet sputniks began to orbit the earth "it has become clear to Western observers that all hopes of forcing the Russians to retreat in the face of ordinary military superiority should be abandoned".¹

"The Dulles policy from positions of strength has suffered a defeat,"² wrote bourgeois observers. Dulles himself began drawing conclusions from the changing situation. For example, he decided not to stage a show of force during the Hungarian events, although Adenauer advised the USA to intervene.

Neither were the Americans unheeding of the Soviet Government's warnings during the Suez crisis.

Now there was greater caution and a certain degree of realism in Dulles's statements on the Berlin question and his assessment of the situation it engendered. He even stated that the US policy took into account the existence of two states on German soil, and that recognition or non-recognition of the GDR was merely a question of political expediency.

¹ *Die Welt*, October 15, 1963, p. 5.

² *Ibid.*, October 17, 1963, p. 5.

In November 1958 he declared for the first time that the USA would not object if control of communications between West Berlin and the FRG rested with the GDR authorities.¹ In January 1959 he acknowledged that so-called free elections were not the only way of solving the German problem.² On February 18, 1959, President Dwight D. Eisenhower dissociated himself from the irresponsible appeals of a number of US generals who threatened to send armoured forces into West Berlin, and on March 11, 1959, declared that his administration would not wage a land war over West Berlin.³

Still more realistic was the attitude of the British Government which spoke with understanding of the need to hold negotiations to avert a conflict in the area.

Certain changes began to take place in the FRG, too. While the CDU/CSU would not budge from its position, the SDP and the FDP were in favour of talks between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union. Although the realistic attitude of the Western Powers was tainted with threats, they could not very well ignore the Soviet initiative and the almost universal demands for talks with the USSR at which a peaceful settlement of outstanding international problems could be negotiated. In the circumstances they had to hold an exchange of views with the Soviet side on the talks which the USSR had been proposing for such a long time.

The Western Powers made the first practical step in this direction at the end of 1959 when British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Selwyn Lloyd visited Moscow.

During the talks in the Soviet capital the two sides agreed on the need to hold negotiations between all the parties concerned on the whole range of German problems, including the question of West Berlin.

After this visit to Moscow by the two British statesmen, diplomatic channels were used to resolve all practical ques-

¹ See: Hans Speier, *Die Bedrohung Berlins. Eine Analyse der Berlin-Krise von 1958 bis heute*, Cologne-Berlin, 1961, p. 76.

² *Ibid.*, p. 77.

³ See: Gerhard Keiderling, Percy Stulz, *Berlin 1945-1968*, Berlin, 1970, p. 421.

tions on the forthcoming talks between the Four Great Powers.

In a note of March 30, 1959, to the three Western Powers, the Soviet Government stated that the USSR, the USA, Britain and France had agreed to get down to solving crucial international problems at a conference of foreign ministers and at a summit conference.

As a result of the efforts of the Soviet Union agreement was reached on holding a foreign ministers' conference as a step towards a conference of Heads of State and Government, and the necessary conditions for a businesslike discussion of urgent problems were created. This time the Western Powers could neither disregard the Soviet proposals nor refuse to discuss them. Thus, the new Soviet initiative paved the way for the Geneva conference.

FOUR-POWER FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE IN GENEVA IN WHICH REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE GDR AND THE FRG ALSO TOOK PART

On May 10, 1959, the foreign ministers of the Four Powers finally gathered for their conference at the Palace of Nations on the shores of Lake Geneva. Representatives from the GDR and the FRG were invited to attend the conference on an equal footing with each other.

During the discussion of the items on the agenda the Western Powers submitted a package plan, subsequently called the Herter Plan (or "Western Peace Plan" in the West) which embraced a wide range of problems from German affairs to disarmament and European security. On May 15, 1959 the British *Daily Telegraph* rightly remarked: "The plan includes nearly every proposal on which agreement with Russia has been found impossible during the past 10 years."

The plan, which was submitted by the US delegation on May 14 on behalf of the Western Powers, provided for four stages by which they proposed to carry through their extensive but wholly unrealistic measures.

In effect the Herter Plan made the solution of all the problems it listed contingent on the reunification of Ger-

many through so-called free elections. This showed that the Western Powers deliberately closed their eyes to the actual situation in Germany and by doing so precluded any possibility of solving the problem.

Their proposals on West Berlin, which were submitted on May 14 as part of the package plan, were also closely linked with Germany's reunification and other issues. They made provision for Berlin to be torn away from the GDR and amalgamated with West Berlin through so-called free elections. The restoration of quadripartite control and the guaranteeing of "freedom of access" to the city were also stipulated in the plan.¹

In contrast to the Soviet proposals on West Berlin which took into account the need to avoid a painful mutilation of the new pattern of life in the city and gave neither side any unilateral privileges, the proposals of the Western Powers completely ignored the existing situation. They were permeated with the West's desire to have the problem solved at the expense of the other parties concerned, primarily at the expense of the GDR.

The measures with which the Western Powers sought to ensure European security were really intended to maintain the presence of US forces in Europe.

The disarmament question, which was linked with the problem of Germany's reunification, was posed just as unrealistically.

Since the Western Powers were fully aware that so-called free elections were absolutely unrealistic and, moreover, were afraid of Germany's reunification, their proposals were in effect designed to deadlock the talks and preserve the existing situation which fully suited them.

In the light of the foregoing, the *Daily Telegraph* rightly pointed out on May 15, 1959, that it was "hard to see that fruitful negotiations with Russia would be likely to result from it".

¹ The proposals of the Western Powers were outlined in greater detail by Christian Herter at a plenary meeting on May 25, 1959. His statement, which touched on several different points, specified how and when the proposed measures on West Berlin were to be carried out. Moreover, the implementation of Herter's proposals was made dependent on the execution of the package plan in its entirety.

In his assessment of the plan Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko indicated that it took no account of the problems facing the conference, and merely led it away from their solution. Moreover, the Western Powers were in effect proposing that the Soviet Union help West Germany to absorb the German Democratic Republic, separate the latter from its capital and extend the occupation regime to the whole of Berlin.

After drawn-out discussions, the conference decided to concentrate chiefly on the question of West Berlin. However, when the Soviet side turned down the West's proposals on Berlin contained in the "package plan", and the Western Powers rejected the Soviet proposals to make West Berlin a free city, the Four Powers decided to look for some sort of an interior settlement.

In the long run the Western Powers were forced to withdraw their demand to discuss the question of "Greater Berlin", acknowledge that the situation in the city was not normal and agree to consider ways and means of putting it right.

Taking this into account the Soviet delegation after consultations with the GDR submitted a proposal¹ on June 10, 1959, which made provision for an interim settlement of the problem. This depended on agreement being reached on a provisional status for West Berlin and on the establishment of an all-German committee to develop relations between the two German states and work out measures for the unification of Germany and a subsequent peace treaty.²

¹ Ten days earlier, on June 1, 1959, the Soviet side tendered the Western Powers a protocol guaranteeing the status of a free city to West Berlin.

² Specifically the Soviet proposals envisaged that the Western Powers would retain their occupation rights for a strictly limited period (during the work of the all-German committee which the Soviet side initially suggested should function for a year), provided that agreement be reached on the interim settlement of the question of West Berlin on the basis of the following principles: the Western Powers would reduce their troops and armaments in West Berlin and just retain a token force there; they would ban hostile propaganda against the GDR and other socialist countries directed from the city; liquidate all subversive centres and not establish any atomic or missile installations in the city. If such an agreement were signed, West Berlin would retain its communications with the rest of the world as they existed at the time. This agreement was to

The efforts of the Soviet Union and the GDR to achieve an agreement and bring about a relaxation of tension alarmed Bonn and the West Berlin Senate. During the recess in the conference, the FRG intensified subversive activity in West Berlin and on July 1, 1959, convened the Federal Assembly for the election of the President. Then, on July 10, 1959, Konrad Adenauer sent a memorandum to the three Western Powers summoning them to revert to the Herter Plan. The West German press warned them not to agree upon any "unsound compromises". It did not shrink from attacking them and even went so far as to demand that they should break off the talks.

While pursuing a policy that was still far from realistic, the Western Powers, nevertheless, saw the absurdity of Bonn's demands and went ahead with the negotiations.

On July 22, 1959, in an effort to meet the Western Powers halfway and thus facilitate agreement, the Soviet delegation spoke out in favour of holding parallel discussions on a provisional status for West Berlin and the establishment of an all-German committee.

At its concluding stage the conference concentrated primarily on studying the two sides' proposals on the provisional status for West Berlin.¹

have become a provisional status for West Berlin, which could have been guaranteed by the Four Great Powers and, in a form acceptable to all, by the GDR. The UN could also have been requested to act as a guarantor. In order to supervise the implementation of the agreement on the provisional status for West Berlin it was proposed to establish a team of observers consisting of representatives of the Four Powers.

¹ The Western Powers presented their last proposals on July 28, 1959. Provided that they retained their so-called right of presence in West Berlin and have "unrestricted access" to the city in conformity with the procedures in effect in April 1959 and that free traffic between West Berlin and the capital of the GDR would be preserved, they agreed "to maintain the size of the present Western garrison" in the Western sectors; "from time to time, if developments permit," to "consider the possibility of reducing their forces"; not to establish atomic or missile installations; "to avoid activity" in Berlin or with regard to it "that might disturb public order or seriously affect the rights and interests of others, or amount to interference in the internal affairs of others". To settle disputes that may arise with respect to "access" they proposed to establish a quadripartite commission which would consult "German experts" if necessary. Observation of the ban on propaganda, provided for in the proposals, including subversive activity in general, was to be

The Soviet side, just as the GDR, "displayed maximum willingness to work out a settlement"¹ and adopted a positive stand towards many of the Western proposals on West Berlin's provisional status. "The gap has been narrowed between the two sides on a number of issues," stated the communique on the results of the conference.² On the whole, a framework for possible agreement could be clearly perceived. However, the sides failed to arrive at an understanding on the main issue, that of providing a legal basis for the presence of the Western Powers in West Berlin following the expiration of the interim agreement. This was because the USA, Britain and France were against replacing the "right of the victor", which is not recognised by international law but which they persistently sought to invoke, by any other agreement that could be reached by the parties concerned.³ "This was the principal issue that divided us," noted Andrei Gromyko. And although the Soviet Union declared that "it would undertake no unilateral action" while the interim agreement on West Berlin remained in force and also in the course of the negotiations to re-examine the question which would take place upon its expiration the Western Powers would not budge from their position.

Evidently, the fact that on August 3, 1959, the sides arrived at an understanding to exchange top-level official visits between the USSR and the USA, also influenced the position of the Western Powers. Considering it inexpedient to conclude any agreements on the eve of these meetings, they tabled a motion to adjourn the foreign ministers' conference.

The Conference in Geneva showed that the policy from positions of strength was collapsing; it was proof that the

entrusted to the UN Secretary General who would perform this function with the assistance of a special on-the-spot team. On the whole, these proposals were the same as the ones made by the Western Powers on June 16, 1959, except that now it was proposed to conclude an agreement for a term of five years (and not for the period until Germany's reunification) and to include a provision for bringing in the UN Secretary General to observe the enforcement of the ban on subversive activity and propaganda.

¹ G. Keiderling, P. Stulz, op. cit., p. 427.

² *Pravda*, August 6, 1959.

³ See: *Dokumentation der Zeit*, 1971, No. 21, p. 5.

international situation was beginning to relax and that circles in the USA, Britain and France having a more sober view of the situation and a more realistic approach to the solution of international problems were strengthening their positions. It was clear from the statements made by Adlai Stevenson,¹ Chester Bowles,² Hubert Humphrey, Averell Harriman, Harold Macmillan and other leading Western statesmen and politicians that amidst the changing balance of forces on the world scene, influential circles in the West were giving greater thought to questions of war and peace. They were beginning to realise the utter futility of the cold war and the need to revise their foreign policy and find ways of resolving controversial issues through negotiations. All this indicated that it was becoming clear to people in the United States that Bonn's revanchist course would in the long run lead their country into an open conflict with the USSR. The Geneva conference offered the first tangible proof that these changes were being appreciated and taken into consideration. Speaking on May 13, 1959, in Geneva, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko underlined that the conference "was the first step towards the resumption, after a long break, of co-operation between the Four Powers at the conference table with a view to resolving key international questions". It was also significant that the Western Powers could no longer avoid businesslike negotiations "on the basis of Soviet proposals".

The fact that for the first time since the war German representatives had their say in the discussion of the complex German questions was another important feature of the conference. US Secretary of State Christian Herter was compelled to declare in Geneva that neither of the states existing on German soil could claim to represent all the Germans and speak on behalf of the whole of Germany.

¹ In 1959, following his trip to the USSR, Adlai Stevenson published a book entitled *Friends and Enemies. What I Learned in Russia* which contained an appeal to recognise "the principle of equality with the Soviet Union" with all the ensuing consequences (p. 101).

² In 1958 Chester Bowles published a book, *Ideas, People and Peace*, in which he wrote about the need to "seek in every realistic way to break loose from the rigidities of the cold war and create bit by bit the foundations of a lasting peace" and to consider "any proposal that promises to ease present tension" (pp. 117-18).

The participation of the GDR in the talks showed that the Republic had greatly strengthened its positions and prestige. That was exactly the view held by world public opinion. Furthermore, the conference confirmed the belief that questions of vital concern for the German people could not be solved without the participation of the GDR and the FRG. This meant that a more realistic approach to the solution of the entire range of German problems was coming to the fore. The Geneva conference also proved that not a single question related to German affairs could be discussed, let alone resolved, without the GDR's participation.

The most important thing, however, was that the participants in the Geneva conference made serious attempts to narrow the gap between various states on key international questions. Although "essential" differences over basic questions, primarily the German problem and West Berlin, were not resolved, the conference did take a step in the right direction. It made some progress towards a realistic approach to the questions involving West Berlin. In particular the sides reached an understanding on the range of questions on West Berlin which should be included in the interim agreement, and decided that the agreement should last a specific period of time.

Finally, the participants arrived at the unanimous conclusion that all questions should be resolved at the negotiating table.

Taking all these facts into consideration, the Geneva conference played an important part in bringing about a certain relaxation of tension and helping to find ways of solving controversial issues by paving the way for a series of meetings and subsequent negotiations. The idea of reaching negotiated solutions was winning more and more support.

The foreign ministers agreed to report the results of the conference to their governments and arranged that the "date for continuing the conference and the place where it would be held would be fixed through diplomatic channels".¹

¹ *Pravda*, August 6, 1959.

DIPLOMATIC STRUGGLE OVER WEST BERLIN AFTER THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

With the Geneva conference over, those who opposed a relaxation of international tension reinvigorated their activity. As usual, this campaign was led by Konrad Adenauer who, following the death of John Foster Dulles, changed his mind about retiring from the Chancellorship on the grounds that in such a complicated situation he could not relinquish the leadership of the FRG.

Although Bonn intensified its intrigues and the extreme Right-wing forces in the United States stimulated their own activity, the Soviet Union worked hard to hasten the convocation of a summit conference in order to find a solution to the problems on which the foreign ministers had been unable to reach agreement.

The questions of a German peace settlement and West Berlin were high on the agenda of the meeting between the Heads of the USSR and US Governments in 1959. The Soviet side urged the Americans to resolve these problems on an agreed basis, to conclude a German peace treaty and normalise the situation in West Berlin. However, when it became clear that the United States was still not ready to do this, the Soviet Government informed the US President that an interim agreement could be the first step in this direction. Over an agreed period the GDR and the FRG could undertake measures to work out the principles of unification. If they failed to do so, a peace treaty would be concluded with them.

In acknowledging that the situation in West Berlin was abnormal and had to be straightened out, President Eisenhower made it clear that the United States did not intend to keep its troops there for ever. He tried to avoid making any specific commitments, but in view of the Soviet Union's firm stand, he had to agree to continue looking for mutually acceptable solutions. It was decided to continue negotiations without limiting their duration, although both sides agreed that they should not go on indefinitely.

US consent to a summit meeting to discuss urgent world problems, including the West Berlin question, intensified the

struggle between the two trends in the American leadership. Some politicians, including Harry Truman, Dean Acheson and to a certain extent Douglas Dillon and the forces behind them in fact supported Konrad Adenauer's point of view. They opposed any changes whatsoever in West Berlin and in general were against negotiations with the Soviet Union. The majority, however, in response to the mood of broad sections of the population and world public opinion believed that negotiations and a conference with the USSR should take place.

So, when early in 1960 Konrad Adenauer expressed to the US President his "concern that even an interim agreement on West Berlin could undermine the West's positions there", the US response was quite restrained. Moreover, in some official statements made in the last months of 1959 and the first months of the following year, Washington in effect refused to take Bonn's views into consideration on the grounds that they were "unjustified claims to determine US policy".

On the whole, Britain and France supported the US stand on the issue. The meetings between the Soviet and French Heads of Government at the end of March 1960 disclosed that "their positions on certain major questions were either close to one another or coincident" and that "both Governments had no irreconcilable contradictions over the German problem". The parties also noted that it was necessary to normalise the situation in West Berlin.

However, the approaching conference and the US preparations for it, that coincided with the mounting election campaign, intensified the struggle between the two trends and the discord between the country's political forces.

Doing his best to fan this struggle, Konrad Adenauer in a review of the developments in 1959 dropped a broad hint to the Western Powers when he said that "we must continue to pursue a straightforward policy instead of cherishing shortsighted utopias and illusions".¹ At the beginning of 1960, the Chancellor and members of his cabinet visited the United States, Britain, France and several other countries in an effort to block the conference whatever the cost and prevent the Western Powers from getting down to negotia-

¹ *Die Welt*, December 21, 1959.

tions with the Soviet Union. Commenting on Bonn's stand, the *Frankfurter Rundschau* wrote in the spring of the same year that "Konrad Adenauer's foreign policy rests on notions and suppositions that there could and should not be any mutual understanding between the West and the East This policy questions the possibility of holding reasonable talks with the Soviet Union, and regards them as capitulation."¹

As the day of the conference drew nearer, Bonn's anxiety increased and the voices of those who had no taste for a lessening of world tension grew louder.

Speaking at a meeting of the leading organs of the CDU in Essen on January 18, 1960, Konrad Adenauer sought to frighten those present with a terrible danger, which, he asserted, emanated not only from Moscow, but also from London and even Washington where, he said, they were disposed to make an effort to settle a range of urgent world problems with the Soviet Union, including, as Eisenhower declared, the anomaly in West Berlin.

The world gave a sigh of relief when at last it was agreed that the meeting should begin on May 16, 1960, for it was hoped that it would reduce tensions and ensure peace.

There was a totally different reaction from the cold-war strategists. The ominous signs of their activity became increasingly evident as the day of the conference drew nearer. In the West all the forces which strove, come what may, to torpedo the meeting and turn the clock back to the period of the most acute confrontation, redoubled their efforts.

In the United States the extreme Right-wing circles intensified anti-Soviet propaganda and their attacks on the Administration for its alleged malleability. Giving in to their pressure, Washington began to display increasing intransigence. One important reason for this was the desire of the ruling elite to surmount the differences in its own house by aggravating the situation once again.

In March and April 1960 the US Administration renewed its efforts to couple the solution of the West Berlin question with the settlement of the "entire German problem", that is,

¹ *Frankfurter Rundschau*, April 14, 1960.

the holding of so-called free elections. Speaking in Chicago on April 4, 1960, Christian Herter also coupled it with the disarmament problem.

On April 9, 1960, the US President ordered a military spy plane to fly over Soviet territory.

US Assistant Secretary of State Dillon issued a sort of ultimatum to the USSR on April 20. He demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe granting "self-determination... to the peoples of the states in Eastern Europe".¹

President Eisenhower took Herter and Dillon under his wing by saying that in their statements they had defined the policy of the United States.

At the same time the US Administration decided to resume underground nuclear tests.

These were not isolated developments, but links in a chain of measures aimed at wrecking the summit meeting. They stemmed from the "course of aggravating tensions" which, as even the West itself admitted, was adopted in March 1960 after Konrad Adenauer's US visit and were the end-product of the struggle inside US ruling circles where the ultras had managed to gain the upper hand.

The campaign to torpedo the summit meeting culminated on May Day 1960 when a US Lockheed U-2 spy plane violated Soviet air space. Putting US policy in its true perspective, this was an act of downright treachery for it was sanctioned by the US President himself.

Taking off early in the morning of May 1, 1960, from a military base in Pakistan, the US plane flying at a high altitude intruded into Soviet air space. It was quickly spotted by Major M. Voronov and Lieutenant E. Feldblum who were on duty at a radar tracking station. On receiving the order E. Feldblum pressed a button and seconds later a rocket blasted the intruder out of the sky.

News of the US provocation shocked world public opinion and aroused its fears for the future of peace. Many Western statesmen and politicians either directly or indirectly condemned the United States. Konrad Adenauer alone was deeply satisfied. His spirits soared. "I know," he said, "that

¹ Hans Speier, *Divided Berlin*, London, 1961, p. 97.

the Americans are doing this sort of thing over Russia, and thank God for it".¹

In the complex and tense situation prevailing at the time, the Soviet Union pursued a principled and at the same time flexible policy so as to prevent the US and Bonn ultras from directing the course of events into a channel suitable to them.

At the preliminary and, as it turned out the only meeting of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers in Paris on May 16, 1960, the stand made by the USA revealed its determination to obstruct the meeting. The Soviet side suggested that they "postpone it until a more favourable moment".² In a communique on May 18, 1961, the Western Powers, largely due to France's stand, in fact accepted the Soviet proposal and declared that they would be prepared to hold talks with the Soviet Union on settling key international problems at "any suitable time in the future".

Taking into account the election campaign under way in the USA, the Soviet Government made no attempt to force the issue so as to avoid a further aggravation of the situation, especially as the new presidential candidate John Kennedy while repeating the old stereotype anti-communist utterances had made a considerable number of quite sober statements.

In November 1960 John F. Kennedy was elected President and replaced Dwight D. Eisenhower in the White House.

Astrologists and political observers invented numerous reasons for the victory of the relatively unknown 40-year-old senator over such an experienced politician as Richard Nixon who was backed not only by powerful circles but by the state machinery. Some attributed Kennedy's victory to his looks which they said had influenced the electorate, others said that it was the appearance of his charming 33-year-old wife that had opened the doors of the White House before him. Still others believed that he owed his victory to the fact that the numerous members of the Kennedy family had united into a friendly "election clan", as they put it. There were also people who said that it was his meritorious service

¹ *Die Welt*, May 10, 1960, p. 1.

² *Pravda*, May 21, 1960.

in the Second World War that had swayed the voters in his favour. Of course, these and other, more important reasons played their part in his election to the presidency. The main reason, however, was that Kennedy severely criticised the policy of the outgoing Administration and spoke out in favour of joining the Soviet Union in the search for a peaceful solution of controversial issues. When on November 7, 1960, the people of America went to the polls, they remembered what he had said the previous day: "Should I be successful next Tuesday, I want above all else to be a President known at the end of four years as one who not only prevented war but won the peace"¹

Election promises, however, were one thing, while actual policy was quite a different matter. It was much more involved and conservative than it appeared to be during the President's first days in the White House when he made a number of reasonable steps, including the issuance of an order prohibiting US planes to violate Soviet air space. The contradictory nature of Kennedy's programme inevitably meant that the entire policy of the new Administration was also contradictory and inconsistent. These features were also manifest at the meeting in Vienna at which the continuity of the US foreign policy became apparent to all.

PREPARATIONS FOR A SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT MEETING

After John F. Kennedy had been voted into the White House, some of his closest friends and advisers prompted him to take the initiative in German affairs. The President's friend, Republican Senator John Cooper, on his return from Moscow advised him to see to it that the new Administration played the role of a "new broom", took over the initiative and proposed to the Soviet Union that talks be held on Berlin, giving a certain degree of consideration to the position of the Soviet side. Adlai Stevenson, who held similar views, pointed out that the time had come to initiate a new beginning in the direction of ensuring peace. William

¹ *The New York Times*, November 6, 1960, p. 67.

Fullbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who enjoys considerable prestige and influence in the USA insistently called upon the new President to declare that the Berlin situation should be changed, and to display the necessary initiative.

Still louder were the demands of world opinion to put an end to the abnormal and dangerous situation arising from the unresolved West Berlin question. Even Field-Marshal Montgomery in an interview given to Edward R. Murrow, a US radio commentator, on February 6, 1961, said that it was time to pull all foreign troops out of Berlin.

However, the more influential champions of an unalterable line of action towards Berlin, chiefly State Secretary Dean Rusk, Russian affairs adviser Charles Bohlen, and former State Secretary Dean Acheson, whose advice carried weight with the President, declared that any compromise in the Berlin question would seriously weaken the position of West German Chancellor Adenauer and the NATO alliance as a whole.

So, on the question of a German peace settlement and West Berlin, President Kennedy in effect adhered to the position of the former Administration. When asked at his press conference on February 1, 1961, whether the fact that he did not mention West Berlin and Germany when he spoke about the critical areas of the world in his State of the Union Message signified some sort of change in the US assessment of the situation, he replied: "No, my view, and I think the United States Government's view, which is the same as the view expressed by the previous Administration, remains constant... There is no change in our view on Berlin."¹

Still it was felt that the President, contrary to his pre-election statements, wanted to put off the summit meeting.

Dwelling on Dean Rusk's earlier statement, he told a press conference on January 25, 1961, that prior to a summit meeting it would be necessary to explore the possibilities of the lessening world tension through "traditional exchanges".² Two days later Adlai Stevenson softened this state-

¹ *The New York Times. International Edition*, February 2, 1961, p. 4.

² *The New York Times*, January 26, 1961.

ment by saying that the President would be glad to meet the Soviet Head of Government¹. However, White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger declared the same day that Mr. Stevenson expressed "his personal views", and Dean Rusk emphasised that the United States intended to use its ambassadors to the full².

Moreover, the Pentagon and the White House were hastily co-ordinating their projects for stepping up the arms race and interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, whilst US intelligence was working flat out on plans to throttle the Cuban Revolution.

In general, however, the United States considered it necessary to avoid any further aggravation of relations with the Soviet Union and thus guard against increasing the hazard of a nuclear conflict. Therefore, it decided to look for some sort of a *modus vivendi* with the USSR. This question was discussed at a number of conferences at the State Department and White House, in which President Kennedy, Dean Rusk, Averell Harriman, Walt Rostow, Charles Bohlen, George Kennan, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, who was summoned from Moscow, and a number of presidential political and military advisers took part. As could be judged from the information that was leaked to the press, the President did not object in principle to a summit meeting, but he believed that it should take place after a certain improvement in Soviet-American relations had been achieved. As a step in this direction he considered it advisable to organise, after a certain period of time, a series of Soviet-American meetings.

At the end of February Llewellyn Thompson left for Moscow with instructions to convey the above consideration to the Soviet side and explain the "philosophy" of the new Administration concerning East-West relations and also to forward the President's personal message to the Head of the Soviet Government.³

This message, which the US Ambassador conveyed on March 9 in Novosibirsk, initiated a fresh round of Soviet-

¹ Ibid., January 28, 1961.

² Ibid.

³ See: *Le Figaro*, February 24, 1961, p. 3.

American correspondence on the basic issues of the international situation.

After reports about the statements by President Kennedy's roving ambassador Averell Harriman on March 8 and by a White House representative P. White on March 10, 1961, to the effect that the US Administration did not consider itself committed to the former Administration's proposals on West Berlin, and following the rather vague statement made by Dean Rusk on March 9, 1961, which the press interpreted as America's withdrawal of its proposals on West Berlin, the US Charge d'Affaires in Moscow Freers on behalf of the State Department officially informed the Soviet Foreign Ministry that these reports were incorrect. What Dean Rusk had meant in his statements, Freers said, was that the US Administration was studying the German problem, including the situation in Berlin.

The Soviet side viewed with understanding the desire of the US Administration to be given an opportunity to formulate its own position on these problems, and also on the question of disarmament.

At the same time the Soviet Union took steps to explain its stand to Bonn and to improve Soviet-West German relations. On February 17, 1961, the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn A.A. Smirnov handed a Soviet memorandum to the Federal Chancellor. In it the Soviet Government said that it had always "wanted an all-round improvement of relations with the Federal Republic" whose state "was always of tremendous significance for the destiny of European peace" and considered that the question of a German peace treaty was "the principal issue in Soviet-West German relations, and it attaches primary importance to its urgent solution". The memorandum made it clear that "as before the Soviet stand does not preclude the possibility of reaching a provisional settlement of the West Berlin question" pending the signing of a German peace treaty, "bearing in mind, however, that the time needed to conclude this treaty would be strictly fixed in advance". Further the memorandum made the point that "if peace treaty is not signed with the two states within the agreed time-limit, the Soviet Union and other states who so desired would sign a peace treaty with the GDR" with all the ensuing consequences. Should, however, Bonn agree

to conclude a peace settlement, the Soviet side would be prepared "at any time to enter into negotiations with the Government of the Federal Republic".¹

Nevertheless, as had been the case in the past, this initiative met with a negative response in Bonn. On February 22, 1961, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, a newspaper close to government quarters, published a report from Bonn which said: "The Federal Government rejects the proposals set forth in this memorandum for solving the German and Berlin questions just as it rejected the Soviet draft for a peace treaty of January 10, 1945" and opposes any "unilateral German-Soviet talks".

Another influential West German newspaper, the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, noted on February 23, 1961, that Bonn was against any talks on reunification and a peace treaty, and was in general "against any Western initiative on the German question". It went on to say that "the only feeling which this memorandum could evoke in the corresponding government circles, was irritation with the fact that now it would be necessary to formulate a reply. Soviet ideas on the advancing of reciprocal proposals will not be accepted".

Konrad Adenauer not only turned down the Soviet proposals, but did his utmost to prevent the West from holding talks with the Soviet Union on the question of a German peace settlement and West Berlin, or at best force the Western Powers into accepting his stand which was manifestly unacceptable to the Soviet side.

Though Bonn managed to exert a certain amount of influence over the USA, it proved incapable of blocking the Soviet-American summit on which agreement had already been reached. It was only put off for a period in view of the US intervention in Cuba in April 1961 and the resulting aggravation of the international situation.

MEETING IN VIENNA

On May 19, 1961, as previously arranged, Moscow and Washington simultaneously announced that a meeting between the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and the

¹ *Pravda*, March 4, 1961.

US President would take place on June 3 and 4. The two sides accepted the kind offer of the Government of neutral Austria to meet in her capital, Vienna. Although the official announcement contained only two paragraphs, after enduring the cold war for so long, people began to breathe easier again. World public opinion welcomed the news with deep satisfaction.

Bonn was probably the only place where the announcement was greeted with unconcealed malice. As soon as news of the forthcoming meeting between Nikita Khrushchev and John Kennedy were made public, Bonn hastened to express its disapproval. In its Bonn-inspired leader the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on May 19, 1961, wrote that the "Americans... caught the Western public unawares", and that "on this side of the Atlantic, Kennedy's aspirations were being regarded more with restraint than with enthusiasm".

The agenda of the meeting had been agreed in the course of a prolonged exchange of views conducted through diplomatic channels and specified in the official announcement which stated that the meeting was not aimed at holding talks or negotiating an agreement on international problems that would affect the interests of other countries. Its objective was to establish personal contacts between the Head of the Soviet Government and the US President and to promote an exchange of views on the basic issues in the relations between the two countries.

The future atmosphere in Soviet-US relations depended largely on the outcome of the Vienna meeting: if the talks took place in a spirit of understanding and efficient co-operation, then it would be easier to clear away the cold-war debris and get down to discussing and solving urgent world problems. Should the reverse be the case, then the world would have to face fresh difficulties.

The postwar climate in Vienna favoured the solution of a considerable number of problems. For many years representatives of the Four Powers had co-operated in the Austrian capital. Even at the height of the cold war Vienna, alongside the UNO, was the sole spot where the USSR, the USA, Britain and France maintained fairly close contacts. It was there that the Austrian State Treaty was signed in 1955. This marked a definite change in the European political climate and

inaugurated a series of international meetings and conferences which in subsequent years led to a considerable relaxation of world tensions.

It was natural, therefore, for the peoples of the world to hope that the Vienna meeting would disperse the clouds shrouding the political horizon in various areas and casting a gloom over the situation in the world as a whole.

The talks were held in rotation in the Soviet and American Embassies. They alternated with official visits and ended with a grand reception at Schönbrunn Palace. The outlook appeared to be promising. Vienna fully lived up to its reputation as one of the world's most hospitable capitals and the Austrian Government did everything it could to facilitate the work of the two Heads of Government. Behind this façade, however, there were no small difficulties which arose during the talks.

During their two days' stay in the Austrian capital the two Heads of Government exchanged views on a wide range of questions of interest to both sides, centering their attention on disarmament and more particularly on a German peace settlement and West Berlin.

On June 4, President Kennedy was given a memorandum on the questions of a German peace treaty and West Berlin in which the Soviet side called for their prompt solution. It was made clear to President Kennedy that the Soviet Union intended to have the proposed German peace treaty signed by the end of 1961. The conversation became sharper and lasted longer than planned, but the two sides failed to arrive at an understanding on this issue, just as they failed to come to an agreement on the problem of disarmament.

While recognising that the USA and the USSR were equally powerful, the US President nevertheless tried to pressure the Soviet Union into agreeing not to ring down the curtain on the Second World War in Europe. "Even if we were to agree with the President of the United States when he declared that our strength is equal," noted the report of the CPSU Central Committee to the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU, "then it is obviously unreasonable to threaten us. If equality is recognised, then one must draw the appropriate conclusions from it."

Regretfully, President Kennedy failed to do so at the time. The two sides only agreed in principle to support the peaceful independent state of Laos and honour her independence, and also to maintain contacts on all questions of interest to both sides and the world as a whole; in other words, they took as their basis the need to settle these questions through peaceful negotiations.

Now the task was to join forces in finding ways of surmounting the existing difficulties, narrowing the gap between their positions and solving urgent problems.

However, because of the position of the USA, the events of the next few months took a totally different turn.

AGGRAVATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION BY IMPERIALIST CIRCLES IN THE SUMMER OF 1961

After the summit meeting in Vienna, Dean Acheson and other extreme Right-wing politicians with Bonn's support tried to take advantage of the situation to prompt President Kennedy into following a more aggressive and adventuristic course in European matters, including the German problem. Dean Acheson, for instance, sought to impress upon the President that it was necessary to proclaim a state of national emergency in the USA and order the mobilisation of a million reservists. This was unsound advice, and President Kennedy did not venture to follow it despite the fact that his stand on the question of a German peace treaty and the situation in West Berlin did impede the establishment of lasting peace in Europe. He displayed a more sober assessment of the situation that was taking shape in the centre of Europe. Kennedy's point of view that the USA should not abandon negotiations as a means of conducting world affairs gained the upper hand at the meeting of the National Security Council on July 19, 1961. Realising how utterly rash and dangerous were Bonn's plans and being fully determined to hold on to one of the most important levers for pressuring his allies, that is, the possession of nuclear weapons, the President did not yield either to West Germany's wooing on this question. The United States, he often said, will not give nuclear weapons to any country. He would often note that

he "would be extremely reluctant to see West Germany acquire a nuclear capacity of its own".¹

Nevertheless, sabre-rattling remained the leitmotif of US foreign policy. President Kennedy yielded to US and West German ultras on a number of other issues. He asked the Senate to approve an increase of \$3,400 million in military allocations and bring the strength of the US Army from 870,000 to a million men. He also requested increases for the Navy and the Air Force. Call-ups came in quick succession, and more and more units were transferred to the European continent. Some circles in the USA even began advocating a pre-emptive war against the socialist countries.²

All this, naturally, had an impact on the FRG where military preparations were being conducted on a mounting scale. The strength of the Bundeswehr rose from approximately 200,000 men in 1958 to 390,000. The training of officers was conducted at an especially rapid pace. While in 1957 an estimated 75 per cent of the instructors in the West German Air Force were Americans, in 1961 they had been fully replaced by Germans. Military restrictions were lifted one after another. As far back as 1959 the Western European Union (WEU) revoked the ban on the manufacture of anti-tank missiles and then on anti-aircraft missiles. The United States delivered increasing quantities of the most sophisticated weapons. In 1961 the Bundeswehr was armed with Sergeant, Honest John, Matador, Nike-Hercules and many other missiles. Early in 1961 the FRG was allowed to build naval vessels of up to 6,000-ton displacement. The Federal Republic steadily increased its influence in NATO as the number of its representatives in the various agencies of this bloc rose from 17 in 1956, to 1,200 in 1961. At the same time there was a growing discrepancy between the Federal Republic's economic and military strength, on the one hand, and its political debility, on the other, a fact which tended to heighten Bonn's aggressiveness.

Bonn strategists vigorously opposed any talks on a German peace settlement and West Berlin, and incited the West to increase its pressure on the Soviet Union and thus force it to

¹ Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days. John F. Kennedy in the White House*, Boston, 1965, pp. 855-56.

² *The New Yorker*, August 6, 1961, p. 36.

retreat even "at the cost of a military conflict". Illusions were still harboured in the FRG that by means of a so-called police action or a small war it would be possible to seize the GDR in a swift, intensive campaign, to present the USSR with a *fait accompli* and by threatening it with a nuclear war prevent it from resorting to countermeasures. Assessing Konrad Adenauer's bankrupt policy in a speech at an SDP Congress in May 1962, Willy Brandt said that all along Bonn had been obsessed with the idea that "its own power would one day force the Soviet Union to drop the zone like a hot potato",¹ that is, that the Soviet Union would withdraw its support for the GDR.

Shortly before the Vienna summit in June, the American press published a plan inspired by extreme Right-wing circles in the FRG according to which the Bundeswehr intended to commit an act of provocation and even resort to force against the GDR if the question of West Berlin were settled on the basis of a German peace treaty.²

In the summer of 1961 the West German press launched a big campaign in which it openly threatened the GDR and called upon its population to intensify their resistance and preparations for a coup.

On June 24, 1961, the *Münchener Rundschau*, the mouth-piece of the Bonn militarists, published an appeal to increase subversive activity in the GDR, demanded that the "situation should be brought to a head" and called for an "uprising against the Soviet troops".

On July 10, 1961, Robert Ingram, Adenauer's spokesman, writing in the *Bonner Rundschau* urged the GDR population to "stiffen internal resistance", "engage in sabotage" and "begin a revolution", that is, carry through a counter-revolutionary putsch.

At the same time practical preparations for this act of subversion against the GDR were being conducted in the FRG. Hoping to carry it out in the near future, the Bonn militarists and the CDU/CSU leadership stopped making a secret of their aggressive plans and with mounting persistence sought US support.

¹ *Die Welt*, May 28, 1962.

² See: *Zur Lage in Westberlin*, p. 11.

Early in June 1961 Franz-Joseph Strauss met in conference with Bundeswehr generals and then had two meetings with General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, in the course of which the West German Defence Minister tried to persuade the Americans that the time had come for joint efforts to put an end to the German Democratic Republic.¹ Soon it became known that there would be another increase in the NATO armed forces bringing the number of divisions from 22 to 30.² On July 7, 1961, the Board of the CDU/CSU published a statement openly proclaiming the "liberation" of the GDR as its official goal.³ A day later General Adolf Heusinger came forth with a provocative declaration that seven Bundeswehr divisions were prepared "to fulfil any mission without delay".

Enjoying the moral support of General Norstad, West German Defence Minister Franz-Joseph Strauss left for the United States on July 14, 1961, where he hoped to talk the government into energizing its policy of "rolling back communism" and supporting Bonn's adventurist plans. In talks with the US President and his closest associates, particularly Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk, Strauss tried to carry his point that the "popular uprising" had matured in the GDR and that West Germany could easily gain possession of the Republic. Strauss went on to say that since in keeping with the Paris agreements the Western Powers regarded the Federal Republic as the sole legitimate representative of the entire German nation, Bonn's interference in GDR affairs should be viewed as a "police action in an inter-German conflict" and not as aggression. The United States, the West German minister argued, should therefore support the FRG and, by threatening to use nuclear weapons, force the Soviet Union to refrain from interfering in the "inter-German conflict".⁴

To pressure the US Administration into accepting his demands, Strauss launched an intensive campaign in the country. He made numerous speeches and statements hoping

¹ See: *Unsere Zeit*, 1962, No. 1, p. 16.

² See: *Der Tagesspiegel*, July 11, 1961.

³ See: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, July 12, 1961.

⁴ *Unsere Zeit*, 1962, No. 1, p. 12.

to win over US public opinion and spur the US ultras into acting with greater determination. In a narrow circle of friends he even made threats against the United States if it did not unconditionally and fully support Bonn's revenge-seeking plans. With his usual insolence he declared: "First we shall make our military contribution to NATO. But when the Bundeswehr is fully prepared, we shall talk to the brainless followers of Moscow and the apostles of international detente in true German language and we shall show them who really runs NATO."¹

The length of service in the Bundeswehr was extended from 12 to 18 months.²

After laying on a training exercise to practise the transfer of US airborne troops to West Germany, the Bundeswehr began exercises on August 8, 1961, in the Baltic Sea deploying its units directly on the GDR borders.³ At the same time General Hans Speidel, Commander of the Allied Land Forces in Central Europe, was making an inspection tour along the GDR borders.

Preparations to foment a counter-revolutionary putsch in the GDR were intensified. Trained terrorists and saboteurs were hastily transferred from the FRG to West Berlin. Formed into assault groups they were to cross the open border into the capital of the German Democratic Republic, incite disturbances and thus provide Bonn with a pretext for direct intervention. The formation of volunteer police units for operations in the civil war was commenced in West Berlin. There was a sharp increase in the activity of the West German intelligence service. In a directive entitled "General Instructions for All" it supplied its agents with instructions to be followed in case of war.⁴ Leaflets began to appear in the GDR designed to undermine the population's confidence in the policy of the Socialist Unity Party and create the impression that there was a "resistance movement" in the Republic. The enticement and recruitment of specialists living in the GDR were conducted by subversive centres on a growing scale.

¹ Quoted by *World Marxist Review*, September 1961, No. 9, p. 23.

² See: *Die Welt*, August 5, 1961.

³ See: *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Vol. 8, p. 284.

⁴ See: *West Berlin—The Facts*, pp. 89-91.

Acts of sabotage and provocation came one after another and increased noticeably in the capital of the GDR.

In that period the subversive activity against the GDR attained such proportions that it amounted to direct preparations for aggression. Exposing the adventuristic plans of the FRG ruling circles, Walter Ulbricht wrote in August 1961: "We are aware of the plans of the Bonn Government. They are designed to intensify hostile activity to the extreme and thus create conditions in which West Germany, after holding elections, would be able to launch a direct attack against the GDR, begin civil war and undertake open military operations."¹

All this brought the international situation to the boil, and a major conflict whose consequences could hardly be predicted, could have broken out at any moment.

This course of events began to worry even the Western Powers; after all they had no small share of responsibility for the situation because of their continual connivance with Bonn. Circles close to the US President expressed growing concern over the fact that if things continued to develop as they had been doing, they would in general lose control over the situation and find themselves drawn by the German ultras into a conflict which, in view of the existing balance of forces, boded ill for the West. The President himself was disquieted,² and the public statements which he and Dean Rusk made at that time were more cautious. Several influential US politicians even urged the introduction of measures to prevent Bonn from going too far.

At a conference of the foreign ministers of the three Western Powers and the FRG in Paris on August 5 and 6, 1961, Dean Rusk proposed that they hold talks with the Soviet Union in the autumn, and asked directly what price Bonn would put on this.

Addressing a press conference on August 10, 1961, President Kennedy was more circumspect than in his speeches of the preceding months. In effect he favoured a peaceful settlement of the West Berlin question and declared that

¹ *Neues Deutschland*, August 19, 1961.

² See: *Der Spiegel*, 1966, No. 34, p. 26.

every means should be employed to see if a peaceful solution to this difficult matter could be achieved.¹

The opinion was gaining ground in the West that effective measures ought to be introduced on the border with West Berlin to preclude the possibility of a serious conflict in the area which could be provoked by the ultras and, in general, to delimit in a more precise manner the sphere of interests and the responsibilities of the different sides. On July 30, 1961, Senator William Fullbright declared: "I don't understand why the East Germans don't close their border (with West Berlin—U.U.) because I think they have a right to close it."²

These and many analogous statements showed that the West was beginning to evince an understanding of the "realities that have appeared in the world".

Although Bonn had brought things to the boil there were indications of a lack of unity among the ruling circles of the Western Powers and of the struggle that was going on between the ultras and those who assessed the facts more soberly and did not want to risk an open conflict to uphold the interests of the Bonn militarists and American hawks.

The situation was crying out for a fresh initiative and for vigorous measures to thwart the mounting threat to peace and bring the advocates of the "tough policy" to their senses. Inaction was impermissible in the circumstances, for the ultras could have interpreted it as a sign of weakness and demanded increased pressure on the Soviet Union. In 1961, *Der Spiegel* wrote that if the Soviet side "continued to wait" in these conditions, this would result in the "re-introduction of the whole 'roll-back' programme", that is, a programme of "rolling back communism".

Only determined measures could cool the bellicosity of the West German militarists and their supporters, ensure the inviolability of the GDR and help preserve peace in Europe.

¹ See: *Pravda*, August 11, 1961.

² *The New York Times*, August 11, 1961, p. 6.

THE MEASURES OF AUGUST 13, 1961

The situation was discussed at the meeting of the first secretaries of the central committees of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Warsaw Treaty countries which took place in Moscow from August 3 to 5. Expressing "preparedness to take all measures to reach agreement with the Western Powers on a peaceful settlement with the two German states", the meeting decided to take steps to ensure the security of the socialist community.¹ At the same time the Warsaw Treaty countries came to the conclusion that it was necessary "to establish on the borders of West Berlin an order that would reliably bar the way to subversive activity against the countries of the socialist community; that there should be reliable protection and effective control around the entire territory of West Berlin, including its border with democratic Berlin", but which, however, would affect neither the existing procedure for movement nor control on communications between West Berlin and West Germany.² Within the next few days the People's Chamber and the Government of the GDR passed a number of concrete decisions on this question.

On the night of August 12, 1961, units of the People's Police and workers' detachments of the GDR formed a live barrier along the entire 46-kilometre border between the Republic and West Berlin. Within minutes the border was closed and customary border conditions came into operation there. Uncontrolled entry into the GDR capital was ended. Passage was only allowed through a number of check-points and was subject to regulations established by the GDR authorities. When the city awoke on Sunday, August 13, the security measures which the GDR had worked out and agreed with its allies were in the main completed and the construction of border installations was proceeding apace.³ While emergency conferences and meetings were taking place behind closed doors in Bonn and the Schöneberg Town Hall, the masses were making history in the streets of the city. They were putting up a stout wall against militarism and revan-

¹ See: *Pravda*, August 6, 1961.

² *Ibid.*, August 14, 1961.

³ See: *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Vol. 8, p. 287.

chism. The Brandenburg Gate, through which, according to the *Industriekurier*, the West German militarists dreamed of seeing the "Bundeswehr enter"¹ the GDR, was barred and bolted.

Although the erection of a defensive wall between West Berlin and the capital of the GDR created certain difficulties for Berliners who had relations on either side of the boundary, the people of the German Democratic Republic and people of good will everywhere experienced a sense of relief. They welcomed the determination of the socialist countries in bridling the Bonn revanchists and their supporters, and averting the imminent conflict.

The measures of August 13, 1961, evoked a totally different reaction in Bonn and West Berlin. Though the Federal Government and the Senate were expecting that strict regulations would sooner or later be established on the border with West Berlin, the measures of August 13 took them unawares. That night Chancellor Adenauer slept serenely in his Bonn mansion. News of the measures taken by the GDR to strengthen the border with West Berlin came as a complete surprise to him. Many years later West Berlin Burgomaster Heinrich Albertz wrote that there were no reports from the intelligence service about the measures which were being planned in the GDR.²

The State Secretary of the Federal Chancellery, to whom General Gehlen's spy service was subordinated, was only informed of the GDR measures at five o'clock in the morning.³

According to eyewitnesses, when the diehard revanchist Minister for All-German Affairs, Ernst Lemmer, whom the Western press aptly dubbed "minister for all-German phrases", told Adenauer what was taking place on the border with West Berlin, the Chancellor's parchment features paled with fury and he could not sleep for many nights afterwards.

Bonn and West Berlin were by now in a state of utter confusion. The shock, however, soon gave way to rage. The West German ruling circles, the West Berlin Senate and all the forces whose future depended on the existence of West Berlin as a centre of subversive activity, reacted to the meas-

¹ *Neues Deutschland*, August 13, 1964.

² *Der Spiegel*, 1966, No. 44, p. 72.

³ *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Vol. 8, p. 287.

ures of August 13, 1961, with intense hostility. This was only natural, for the blow was delivered at the most vulnerable spot and, according to admissions made in the West, proved to be a very telling one. Bonn and the West Berlin Senate used all the means at their disposal to aggravate the situation and demanded that the Western Powers act with "firmness" and "determination".

In the first official statement, which was made by State Secretary of the Ministry for All-German Affairs, Franz Thedieck, Bonn called upon the Western Powers to "eradicate the situation that has arisen".¹

In an effort to pressure the US Administration, the FRG Ambassador in Washington, Wilhelm Grewe declared that the West's "delayed reaction" to the GDR measures was "disappointing" to Bonn. Chancellor Adenauer sent a message to the US President warning him against making concessions to the USSR and predicted that there would be catastrophic consequences for the USA if the Western Powers alter their stand on the Berlin question.² Indicating that the West's continual retreat had engendered a dangerous growth of neutralistic tendencies in the FRG, Adenauer tried to frighten the Americans with the "spectre of Rapallo".³

At the same time Bonn demanded that the Americans give them access to nuclear weapons. "I am speaking quite frankly, and I fully realise what I am saying," declared Konrad Adenauer in Hannover at the end of August 1961. "In an extreme situation the Federal Chancellor assumes command of the Wehrmacht, and I shall never send German soldiers without nuclear weapons against an enemy armed with such weapons."⁴

The attitude of the West Berlin Senate was just as malevolent. The city's authorities poured abuse on the GDR, the USSR and other socialist countries. They also accused the Western Powers of indecision and amongst other things called upon them to turn from words to political actions, tear down the wall, reinforce their garrison in the city and proclaim a new status for West Berlin to deprive the Soviet

¹ *Der Spiegel*, 1966, No. 34, p. 23.

² See: *The New York Times*, September 8, 1961.

³ *Der Spiegel*, 1966, No. 36, p. 53.

⁴ *Neues Deutschland*, September 2, 1961.

Union of any rights there. In their talks with the three Western commandants, the representatives of the Senate made a number of demands, including a revision of the allied qualifications prohibiting West Berlin's incorporation into the FRG, the imposition of a ban on the SUPG and the transference of control of the GDR railway in West Berlin to the Senate. The leadership of the West Berlin organisation of the Social-Democratic Party even coined the provocative slogan "Down with the wall", declaring its demolition "one of the most important issues of German policy."¹

The stand adopted by Bonn and the West Berlin Senate, which was supported by US ultras and certain powerful circles in other countries that favoured a "tough policy", undoubtedly influenced the US position but did not play a decisive role in determining the latter's course of action. In view of the situation in the world, where the balance of forces had radically changed in favour of socialism, the Western Powers could not possibly resort to nuclear weapons. Feeling was growing in favour of a normalisation of the situation in West Berlin and ringing the curtain down on the Second World War in Europe.

The conference of non-aligned countries which was held early in September 1961 showed that more and more states were coming to regard the existence of the GDR and the FRG as a historical reality which had to be taken into account if a solution of the problems of Germany and European security was to be achieved. "The facts of life," Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru said at the conference, "are, first, that there are two independent entities, powers, countries: the Government of Western Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany) and the Government of Eastern Germany (the German Democratic Republic). That is a fact of life . . . that has to be recognised. If you ignore the facts of life and the facts of contemporary politics that means that you are ignoring something which will lead you to wrong results."²

James Warburg, a well-known US publicist, warned his country against sticking to a bigoted course and summoned her to assess the situation from a more constructive standpoint,

¹ *Die Welt*, December 4, 1961.

² *The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, September 1-6, 1961*, p. 113.

thus making a negotiated settlement possible.¹ Walter Lippmann urged the Germans to put aside their illusions. "If the Germans having recognised the fact of partition," he wrote, "change their present policy and seek better relations in Eastern Europe, they will do a great service to the world."² Of course, Washington, London and Paris, being more concerned with their own interests, had no intention of risking a war for Adenauer's sake. It was only natural, therefore, that the reaction of the Western Powers to the measures of August 13, 1961, was fairly a calm and sober one.

That day British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was out shooting, and Presidents de Gaulle and Kennedy were also away from their capitals. However, none of them interrupted their Sunday leisure³ even when they were informed of the measures taken by the GDR. For instance, when Dean Rusk telephoned President Kennedy and said that he did not think that the measures enforced by the GDR would harm the interests of the United States,⁴ the President agreed and then set off for a day's sailing.

After that Dean Rusk officially announced that the GDR action was not aimed directly at the Western Powers, but seeing that it violated the Four-Power status of Berlin, it would become "the subject of a vigorous protest through appropriate channels".⁵ The British and the French fully agreed with him.

On the same day the US, British and French commandants in West Berlin turned down the Senate's request "to do something"⁶ and at least as a first step to send troops to the border for the sake of "putting on a demonstration".⁷

The reaction of the Western Powers to the GDR measures was confined to purely formal protests against the tightening of control on the border with West Berlin. Fifty-four hours after these measures had been enforced they lodged a protest

¹ See: "Opportunity in Berlin", *The Progressive*, September 1961, pp. 7-11.

² *New York Herald Tribune*, September 19, 1961, p. 22.

³ See: J. Smith, *Der Weg ins Dilemma. Preisgabe und Verteidigung der Stadt Berlin*, Berlin, 1963, p. 230.

⁴ *Der Spiegel*, 1966, No. 35, p. 44.

⁵ *Archiv der Gegenwart*, 1961, p. 9287.

⁶ See: *Der Spiegel*, 1966, No. 34, p. 23.

⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 35, p. 42.

with the commandant of the Soviet garrison in Berlin, and 18 hours later with Moscow. The Soviet side, however, promptly dismissed these protests because they concerned GDR border regulations which only the latter was competent to deal with.¹

For reasons of prestige and because they had to have a certain regard for the opinion of their Bonn ally, the Western Powers reaffirmed their earlier "guarantees" to West Berlin and reassured Bonn of their support for West Germany's "special interests" in the city. However, they did not venture beyond taking purely token measures such as Vice-President Lyndon Johnson's visit to West Berlin and a symbolic increase of their garrisons in the city.

To avoid involvement in a situation which could prove to be much too dangerous for them, the United States, Britain and France turned down other provocative proposals made by the FRG Government and the West Berlin Senate. For instance, they refused to withdraw their qualifications concerning the full inclusion of West Berlin in the FRG on the grounds that this would have been a "premature step", rejected the proposal to turn over the administration of the urban railway of the GDR in West Berlin to the Senate, or at least place it under its control, refused to give covering fire to those who violated the border² and turned down the demand of the West Berlin authorities to ban the Socialist Unity Party in West Berlin.

According to the Western press, the appeals of the Senate and the Federal Government, and particularly Adenauer's demand to act "from positions of strength", were not only "left hanging in the air" but encountered a certain degree of disapproval in Washington, London and Paris.

At a White House meeting on August 14, 1961, to discuss the situation caused by the GDR measures, President Kennedy, replying to Dean Rusk's remark about the need for preliminary consultations with Bonn, pointed out that he, Kennedy, was not Eisenhower and that Adenauer would no longer have the right of veto on American policy.³ He also

¹ See: *Pravda*, August 20, 1961.

² *Der Spiegel*, 1962, No. 36, p. 24.

³ *Ibid.*, 1966, No. 35, p. 47.

reacted very strongly to the letter of August 16, 1961, from the West Berlin Senate and bluntly stated that he would permit no one to tell the President how to act. It was only thanks to the efforts of the chief of the United States Information Service, Edward Murrow, that Kennedy consented to soften his reply to the West Berlin Senate. The reaction to Adenauer's message of August 29, 1961, was just as negative. As regards the unceasing importunities of the FRG Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe, Kennedy frankly told his advisers that he got on his nerves,¹ and a year later saw to it that the troublesome diplomat left the United States.

The Bonn ambassador, the Chancellor and representatives of the West Berlin Senate were made to understand that the guarantees of the three Western Powers ended at the wall and that they did not think it expedient to take steps that could occasion additional countermeasures on the part of the USSR and the GDR where the West's positions were quite vulnerable. The Western Powers kept their troops in the barracks and told the West Berlin Senate that they expected it to take steps to preserve peace and order in the city.² The ultras' demand to tear down the wall was discussed neither at the White House, nor during the three Western Powers' talks with FRG representatives in the so-called working group in Washington, nor at the meeting of their foreign ministers on September 15 and 16, 1961, in the United States.³

Judging from the above, the Western Powers not only displayed judicious realism, but in fact were compelled to agree that the GDR, as any other state, had the right to lay down its own rules on its frontiers.

Moreover, influential circles in the Western Powers, especially in France and Britain, were even pleased with the measures of August 13, 1961, believing that they would still further increase Bonn's dependence on them and help preserve the *status quo* in Europe. In the final analysis this was in the interests of Washington, London and Paris, because of the balance of forces that had taken shape in the world. J.E.

¹ See: *Der Spiegel*, 1966, No. 34, p. 25.

² *Ibid.*, No. 35, p. 47.

³ *Ibid.*, No. 44, p. 85.

Smith who was stationed as a regular US Army officer in West Berlin wrote that in the opinion of the Western Powers any East German move "was not totally undesirable"¹. John Galbraith, US Ambassador in India and one of President Kennedy's advisers, was even more straightforward when he said that in his opinion the erection of the wall was a positive act.² Even Adenauer disclosed that the American side tried to make the Germans see that the construction of the wall was a good thing.³

In the following weeks, however, there was an increase in military preparations and a certain worsening of the international situation due to the efforts of extreme Right-wing elements in the United States.

The defensive character of the August 13, 1961 measures prevented Bonn and the American ultras from taking advantage of the situation to provoke an armed conflict over the West Berlin issue and conduct a trial of strength in the area.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AUGUST 13 MEASURES

The first radio and press reports on August 13, 1961, focussed worldwide attention on events around West Berlin, for they represented a battle for peace and security in Europe in the full sense of the word. With hindsight, it can be said for certain that the socialist countries won this battle, and that the erection of a defensive wall against militarism and revanchism on the border with West Berlin was a major achievement by the entire socialist community and an event of truly historic significance.

The measures of August 13 were a logical outcome of the initiative in German affairs taken by the USSR and the GDR at the end of 1958 and the beginning of 1959. They were important because they made it possible to solve a series of urgent questions which were then facing the USSR and other socialist countries, chiefly the GDR.

¹ J. E. Smith, *The Defense of Berlin*, Baltimore, 1963, p. 273.

² *Die Zeit*, July 5, 1968, p. 21.

³ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, November 4, 1963.

One of the most serious survivals of the Second World War and the occupation period was the open border with West Berlin. In view of the existence of two sovereign states on German soil, the transformation of West Berlin into a "frontline" city and the incessant attempts to turn it into a "FRG bridgehead" and a "NATO base", this situation was totally unjustified and intolerable inasmuch as it only made it easier for the West to carry through its plans with regard to the GDR and the other socialist countries. The measures of August 13 put an end to all this and thus solved one of the most crucial questions still outstanding from the Second World War. The GDR border with West Berlin was taken under control. It was turned into a special frontier zone and became subject to ordinary frontier regulations. Henceforth the sovereignty of the GDR was assured along the entire length of its borders.

On top of that the German Democratic Republic had considerably strengthened its position. The measures of August 13, 1961, opened a new chapter in the Republic's history. "The spiritual atmosphere has become cleaner; in the economic respect we are making rapid headway... The outward hindrances which operated like some elemental force have been abolished," wrote the *Neues Deutschland* on August 13, 1964. As the GDR press pointed out at the time, it was largely thanks to the measures of August 13, 1961, that the Republic, now reliably protected behind its borders, was able to begin the "large-scale construction of socialism", introduce a new system of economic planning and administration and develop the economy at a faster pace. Dwelling on the consequences of these measures in a speech in New York on June 15, 1964, Heinrich Albertz, the West Berlin Burgomaster at that time, admitted that the "zonal regime on the other side of the wall has become consolidated whether we like it or not".¹

The important part about these measures was that a reliable anti-fascist wall had been built to bar the road to West German militarism.

German imperialism, which had gone down in defeat more than once in a single generation, received another blow on

¹ *Der Tagesspiegel*, June 16, 1964.

August 13, 1961. The CDU/CSU policy of "reunification", essentially a policy of preparing an *anschluss* and absorbing the GDR, "was a complete fiasco", as the *Frankfurter Rundschau* put it. The insolvency of the concept of "local war" or "police action" against the GDR became clearly evident. August 13, 1961, showed that the adventurist plans of the West German militarists and revanchists were doomed and that nothing could stop the progressive development of the GDR and rob socialism of fresh victories on German soil. The ultras in Bonn and the United States were taught a lesson. Now they could see for themselves that with the support of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, the GDR was capable of rendering a decisive rebuff to the aggressive intentions nursed by Bonn and its allies.

These events marked the beginning of the end of Bonn's foreign policy and the complete political bankruptcy of its ideological patriarch Adenauer. The elections to the Bundestag on September 17, 1961, ended in a serious setback for the CDU/CSU which lost its absolute majority, having polled 45.3 per cent of the votes compared to 50.2 per cent in the preceding elections.¹ It took the parties eight weeks of negotiations to form a new coalition government. This also included the Free Democrats who only agreed to participate on the condition that Adenauer would resign within a specified period. Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano, one of his staunchest supporters, was left out of the new cabinet and there were growing signs of disenchantment with Adenauer's fruitless and dangerous policy. The "Adenauer era" was on its way out.

The measures of August 13, 1961, once again testified to the new balance of power on the world scene and constituted an important political act demonstrating the power of the socialist countries and their determination to ring down the curtain on the Second World War and ensure European security. They made it possible to preserve the postwar *status quo* and avert a civil war, which most probably could

¹ See: *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1968*, Stuttgart-Mainz, 1969, p. 119.

have become a world war, on German soil. The chances of averting another world conflict increased considerably.¹

Many politicians in the United States, Britain and France expressed the same view. Replying to a journalist's question in the summer of 1964 the political adviser to the British commandant in West Berlin, Geoffrey McDermott, said he was inclined to believe that the construction of the wall on the border between West Berlin and the capital of the GDR actually averted the emergence of another hotbed of world conflict in the area.² John Galbraith, who was even more explicit, declared that in his opinion the erection of the wall saved the world.³

Finally, it was also important that the measures of August 13, 1961, not only shattered any illusions about carrying out an *anschluss* of the GDR and its capital and cooled the heads of the over-zealous strategists and proponents of the cold war, but also had a sobering effect on the West in general, opening the eyes of many people to the fact that there were two German states and a special territorial entity—West Berlin—on German soil. After August 13, 1961, the attitude of the Western Powers to the problem of Germany became even cooler and they no longer actively supported Bonn's demands for so-called free elections and the reunification of Germany as prerequisites for settling other international problems and working towards a relaxation of tension. These demands came to be regarded as special German wishes which no one took seriously.⁴ In other words, the West was forced to abandon those positions in German affairs to which it had clung so stubbornly for such a long time.

The measures of August 13, 1961, accelerated the process of reassessment of spiritual and political values in the West, particularly in West European countries. This was a positive development. There were widespread demands for the West to change its course and show greater common sense in evaluating the existing situation. Many people adopted a more

¹ See: *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Vol. 8, p. 290.

² See: *Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, 1964, No. 10, p. 960.

³ See: *Zeit*, July 5, 1968, p. 21.

⁴ See: A. Riklin, *Das Berlinproblem*, Cologne, 1964, p. 145.

realistic approach to the facts, opening the eyes of the Western Powers to the need to resume the talks which Adenauer's government and the American extremists had tried so desperately to torpedo.

On August 13, 1961, the day after the introduction of the new measures, a conference on the international situation was held in the White House, at which the participants led by President Kennedy decided that negotiations with the Soviet Union on West Berlin and Germany as a whole had to be resumed, even if Bonn continued to object.¹ In the circumstances the Federal Government had no choice but to alter its stand, and on August 18, 1961, it at last officially withdrew its objections against the resumption of talks between the Great Powers.

Wide sections of the West Berlin population came out in support of a course that would further the cause of peace and European security. In view of the fact that the measures of August 13, 1961, had created considerable difficulties for West Berlin's economic and political position, the Senate gave in to pressure from the population and was forced to enter into direct negotiations with the GDR.

There was increasing differentiation and polarisation of forces in the FRG, too. A number of West German publications expressing the views of fairly influential circles in the country assumed a more reasonable approach. "An aggravation of the situation will not benefit us," wrote the *Saarbrücker Zeitung* about the events and implications of August 13, 1961.² "We know that the forcible demolition of the wall is impossible without a large-scale war," wrote the *Schleswig-Holsteinische Volkszeitung*. "We know that we shall not only fail to win support on this question from those who are in authority in West Berlin—our allies, but also realise that it would mean the destruction of our people. It would bring unification in a common grave."³

Although the lessening of tension which followed in the wake of the measures of August 13, 1961, was not lasting enough and was attended by repeated acts of aggression

¹ See: *Der Spiegel*, 1966, No. 35, p. 44.

² *Saarbrücker Zeitung*, August 13, 1964.

³ *Schleswig-Holsteinische Volkszeitung*, August 14, 1964.

from the USA, the situation in the world at that time became calmer. The thunder clouds dispersed somewhat and the political horizon cleared. "From the moment that our defensive wall clearly indicated the line of the border," wrote the *Neues Deutschland* on August 13, 1964, "a much greater degree of tranquility was established in Central Europe than previously." The right conditions had been created for pursuing the struggle to ensure European security and for normalising West Berlin's and West Germany's relations with the German Democratic Republic on the basis of the same principles of peaceful coexistence which were generally accepted between independent and equal subjects of international law.

It was only natural, therefore, that the measures taken by the GDR Government to introduce additional safeguards and tighten control on the border with West Berlin, thus improving the political climate in the centre of Europe and eliminating the breeding ground of cold war in the area, were acclaimed by all who wanted to see the situation around West Berlin normalised and cherished the ideals of peace and security in the world.

Whilst for Bonn August 13, 1961, was a "black Sunday" in postwar German history,¹ it was a day of considerable success for the German Democratic Republic. August 13, 1961, has gone down in history as the date of one of the most important events in postwar history, as a day of great victory for the GDR, the USSR and all the countries in the socialist community. In its congratulatory cable of October 6, 1961, to the GDR leadership on the 12th anniversary of the Republic, the Soviet Government noted that the measures of August 13 were a "significant contribution to the cause of peace and a serious warning to the militaristic and revanchist circles harbouring aggressive plans against the socialist countries."²

The assertions in Western propaganda that the border wall divided the city and perpetuated the split of Berlin and Germany are nothing more than a clumsy fabrication. Germany had long ago been replaced by the GDR and the FRG and

¹ See: *Die Mauer oder der 13. August*, Hamburg, 1962, p. 7.

² *Pravda*, October 7, 1961.

Greater Berlin by West Berlin, which is a special entity, and by Berlin, the capital of the GDR.

There are incontrovertible historical facts showing beyond a shadow of doubt who actually initiated the split of Germany and Berlin.

Consequently, the border wall was merely a physical embodiment of the situation which arose as a result of the splitting up of Germany and Berlin by the Western Powers hand in hand with the German reactionaries. The establishment of adequate regulations on the border with West Berlin was the logical outcome of developments on German soil in the post-war years. It was a reply to Bonn's unceasing provocations and the use of West Berlin by the Western Powers, especially by the FRG, to carry through their aggressive plans and subversive activity against the GDR, the USSR and other socialist countries. The prominent West German politician, now Federal President Gustav Heinemann very aptly noted in 1962 that "the measures taken by the GDR Government were a reply to the Government of the FRG for its 12-year-long false policy on the German question".¹ He called the border wall with West Berlin a "heritage of Adenauer's policy", an expression of the "erroneousness and failure of his entire political line".² On August 12, 1962 the *Neues Deutschland* quoted Senator Fullbright as saying that a great share of the responsibility for the situation that arose in Berlin also rested on the Western Powers themselves.

The results of the measures of August 13, 1961, and of all the developments which took place on German soil in the sixties were reaffirmed in the agreements on friendship, mutual assistance and co-operation between the GDR and the countries of the socialist community, principally the Soviet Union.

SOVIET-US CONTACTS (1961-1962)

Besides perceptibly altering West Berlin's role by depriving this so-called frontline city of its former functions, the measures of August 13, 1961, confronted the Western Powers

¹ *Neues Deutschland*, August 13, 1962.

² *Der Spiegel*, 1963, No. 41, p. 71.

with the growing need to modify their attitude towards the Soviet Union. Seeing that the West had failed to gain its objectives either by threats or attempts to exert military pressure on the USSR, the United States, Britain and France began to think seriously about resuming negotiations with Moscow, and at the end of July and the beginning of August they began to sound out the Soviet position on this question through diverse channels. For example, the well-known American journalist Cyrus Sulzberger, Amintore Fanfani, President of the Italian Council of Ministers, and Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak pursued this objective. At a press conference on August 30, 1961, the US President also gave the impression that the United States was considering the possibility of holding talks with the USSR.

"Concerned with the seriousness of the crisis threatening the world", the conference of non-aligned states which took place in Belgrade in September 1961, sent a message to the Heads of the US and Soviet Governments on September 5 earnestly asking them to begin talks to "rid the world of the threat of war and enable mankind to embark on a peaceful way of life".¹

In his reply of September 13, President Kennedy said that the United States was "prepared to use the existing and appropriate channels to establish the possibility of surmounting the present impasse".² In a public statement on the same day he assumed an even more definite stand: he said that the United States was prepared to enter into serious talks on the German and other problems with the Soviet Union, if the Soviet side was willing to do so. The US President noted that the arrival of the US Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister in New York for the Sixteenth Session of the UN General Assembly provided an opportunity for holding talks.

The British Foreign Office welcomed President Kennedy's statement.

It was clear that these were pre-arranged moves undertaken for the purpose of resuming the exchange of views as had been repeatedly proposed by the Soviet Union.

¹ *Pravda*, September 23, 1961.

² *The New York Times*, September, 16, 1961.

The foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom and France who gathered in Washington on September 15 and 16 agreed to hold talks with the Soviet Union.¹ After the meeting was over it was announced that the Western Powers wanted to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Berlin crisis with Russia.²

In other words, having come up against the firm stand of the USSR and all socialist countries, those who were opposed to clearing away the remnants of the Second World War in Europe consented to negotiate.

Taking account of the position of the Western Powers, the USSR Foreign Ministry was authorised to announce that Andrei Gromyko who was to head the Soviet delegation was "prepared to enter into an exchange of opinions with US Secretary of State Dean Rusk".³ The Soviet side hoped that it would be conducted in all seriousness so as to achieve a mutually acceptable settlement of German affairs and the West Berlin issue.

On September 21 Andrei Gromyko had a four-and-a-half-hour working lunch with Dean Rusk at the Waldorf Astoria. In the course of his further conversations with Dean Rusk and President Kennedy, and also with the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister of Britain, it was agreed that Soviet-American contacts would be continued in Moscow by US Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson.

"We gained the impression from those conversations," said the report of the Central Committee to the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, "that the Western Powers are showing some understanding of the situation and are inclined to seek a solution to the German problem and the West Berlin issue on a mutually acceptable basis".⁴

Characteristically, however, the US stand was both two-faced and contradictory. Although forced to support negotiations, the United States did not give up its intentions to pressure the Soviet Union. Moreover, the extreme Right-wing elements in the country demanded "decisive measures" from

¹ See: *Der Spiegel*, 1966, No. 44, p. 85.

² See: *Documents on Germany 1944-1961. Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Senate*, Washington, 1961, p. 801.

³ *Pravda*, September 15, 1961.

⁴ *The Road to Communism*, Moscow, 1961, p. 49.

the US Administration. Therefore, while agreeing to resume negotiations with the USSR, the United States took a series of steps which were not only against the spirit of this understanding but came in direct opposition to it.

More US troops were moved to Europe, and the US garrison in West Berlin was reinforced. The organiser of the "air lift", General Lucius Clay was appointed the President's special representative in West Berlin where he was to draw up special recommendations whose implementation would emphasise America's firm stand and improve the West's position in the negotiations with the Soviet Union.

General Clay's arrival in West Berlin on September 19, 1961, immediately sparked off feverish activity in the city. He made a provocative helicopter flight over the West Berlin enclave of Steinstücken. US political and military figures visited West Berlin where they made statements designed to "raise the spirit of the frontline city". US troops stationed in West Berlin systematically conducted demonstrative exercises and were trained in the methods of street fighting. On General Clay's instructions US military vehicles from time to time tried to patrol the autobahn but these attempts were immediately cut short by the Soviet Command. Finally, in the last ten days of October 1961 there were a number of serious provocations at the Friedrichstrasse check-point on the border between West Berlin and the German Democratic Republic.

On the evening of Saturday, October 22, 1961, following a pre-arranged plan, two Americans in civilian dress tried to pass through the GDR check-point without observing the established procedure. As they refused to show their identity cards, the GDR frontier guards naturally did not permit them to cross the border. Nevertheless, one of the two men, who said that he was deputy chief of the US Military Administration in West Berlin, A. Leitner, insisted that he should be allowed entry and that he would present his documents "only to Russian officers". That, too, was refused. Thereupon, at 21.00 hours nine US soldiers armed with carbines with fixed bayonets escorted his car to the GDR capital. They repeated this act of provocation twice after short intervals, wounding one of the GDR frontier guards. General Clay personally commanded the "operation" by telephone.

On the following day the US commandant demanded that his Soviet counterpart permit all civilians driving to the GDR capital in cars with US number plates to move through the check-points without observing the established procedure. At the same time the Americans continued provocations on the border.

The Americans were told that only the GDR was competent to deal with the question of regulations on the border and that the observance of these regulations was obligatory for all.¹

On its part the GDR Government issued a sharp protest to the US Government.

On October 25, 1961, after a number of unsuccessful attempts to cross into the GDR capital without observing the regulations, the Americans brought up ten tanks and several motor vehicles to the border. At about 11.00 hours an American car carrying three civilians escorted by a convoy of five jeeps, three in front and two behind, each with four armed soldiers, drove into the GDR capital.

At a meeting with the Commandant of the US Sector, General Watson, which took place on that day, the commandant of the Soviet garrison in Berlin General Solovyev classed the actions of the US authorities as an armed provocation and a provocative intrusion into GDR territory. He demanded an immediate cessation of border provocations and warned Watson that otherwise there could be dangerous consequences for which the US authorities would be held fully responsible.²

Despite General Solovyev's warning and the vigorous protest from the GDR Government, the Americans continued their provocations on October 26 and also sent helicopters into the air space of the GDR capital.

On October 27 the People's Militia used its cars to block the road and prevented the Americans from crossing the border without observing regulations.

The Americans responded by bringing 14 tanks to the check-point and alerting their garrison. On General Clay's insistence British and French units stationed along the border were reinforced. Things were taking a dangerous turn.

¹ See: *Dokumentation der Zeit*, 1971, No. 21, p. 7.

² *Ibid.*

In the circumstances, the Soviet Command, after consulting the GDR Government, moved 10 tanks into position at the Friedrichstrasse check-point on the afternoon of the same day to join the tanks of the GDR People's Army. Then the Americans brought their tanks right up to the border. The Soviet tanks responded by taking up positions 200 metres in front of the US armour. Thus they remained facing each other throughout the night of October 27 and the early hours of October 28, 1961.¹

Anxiety and uneasiness mounted in the world. France and Britain were quite unenthusiastic about the provocative measures being carried out by the United States. Moreover, fully aware of the precariousness of the situation, they began to insist that General Clay's powers should be restricted.

In view of these developments the Government of the GDR "was forced to strengthen the anti-fascist wall to a still greater extent and thus preclude any possibility of irresponsible actions sparking off a world nuclear war".² Anti-tank obstacles, reinforced concrete fortifications and a two-and-half-metre-high concrete wall extending for 16 kilometres were put up along the border with West Berlin. "This wall reliably protected the capital of the GDR from a possible intrusion of imperialist troops."³

Just as futile was another provocation engineered by General Lucius Clay. Code-named "Eyeball" it was launched in November 1961 and consisted of the systematic movement of large contingents of US troops across GDR territory along the Berlin-Marienborn Autobahn, under the pretext of holding "exercises".

Realising that the trial of strength was a futile venture which merely aroused dissatisfaction with US policy throughout the world, Washington at long last sounded the retreat. Troop movements along the autobahn were halted in the middle of December and US tanks were moved away from the border and then ordered to return to barracks. General Lucius Clay's powers were restricted and several months later he was recalled to the United States.

¹ See: *Der Tagesspiegel*, January 13, 1962.

² *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Vol. 8, Berlin, 1966, p. 298.

³ G. Keiderling, P. Stulz, op. cit., p. 515.

The serious warnings issued by the Soviet side to the Western Powers and the determined reaction of the USSR and the GDR compelled the United States to discontinue the armed provocations on the border. Its plans suffered a complete setback. The firm rebuff delivered by the socialist countries to the intrigues of the imperialist forces cooled many a hot head. The USA and its allies were compelled to reckon with the actual state of affairs after the introduction of new safeguards and the tightening of control on the borders with West Berlin.

Speaking at the centenary celebrations of the University of Washington on October 16, 1961, President Kennedy said: "...the United States is neither omnipotent nor omniscient, ... we are only 6 per cent of the world's population ... and ... therefore there cannot be an American solution for every world problem."¹

At the end of December 1961, President Kennedy sent a personal letter to Konrad Adenauer. Though it had the form of New Year message, it gave little comfort to the aged Chancellor and, according to witnesses, seriously dampened his New Year spirits. In it the President informed the Chancellor about his Bermuda talks with Harold Macmillan, and noted that while retaining their determination, right up to running the extreme risk, the United States and Britain were simultaneously placing their stakes on negotiations.²

At the same time the US and British ambassadors in Moscow, Thompson and Roberts, received "fresh instructions" from their governments.³ Thompson was instructed to begin talks with Andrei Gromyko on a wide range of European issues, and Roberts was to give his American counterpart every possible assistance.

The Soviet-US exchanges of views began immediately after the New Year. In January and February 1962 Andrei Gromyko had several meetings with Llewellyn Thompson, at which the latter gave top priority to the question of ensuring freedom of access to West Berlin and forwarded to Andrei Gromyko generally formulated proposals concerning the establishment of an international access agency.

¹ *The New York Times*, November 17, 1961, p. 16.

² See: *Spandauer Volksblatt* (Westberlin), December 29, 1961.

³ See: *Der Tagesspiegel*, December 29, 1961.

On his part, Andrei Gromyko expounded the Soviet viewpoint and on January 12, 1962, advanced concrete proposals¹ on the status of West Berlin and a protocol on guarantees.² He also stressed the need for all sides to respect the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic.

The American side, on the other hand, first sought to narrow down the subject of the talks and confine them solely to the question of "access". It was these considerations that comprised the essence of the US memorandum of February 1, 1962, and the attached proposals on the "reunification of Berlin".

Thanks to the efforts of the Soviet side, however, the talks produced some positive results and somewhat narrowed the gap between the two sides. In a memorandum to the Soviet side forwarded by Llewellyn Thompson on March 6, 1962, which in a way summed up the results of the first round of the exploratory talks on the "question of Germany and Berlin", the United States, though proposing to begin discussion with the "critical" and "key" question of "guarantees for free access", simultaneously agreed that the talks should embrace a wider range of issues and declared that the question of access would not be the sole theme of discussion.

After these talks, at which the sides had stated their principled positions on the questions at issue, it was arranged that Andrei Gromyko and Dean Rusk would continue discussions in Geneva when the Committee of Eighteen held its meetings there in March 1962.

The official statements made by US and British representatives on the eve of these meetings were an indication of the more realistic approach that was being shown to the situation. For instance, Dean Rusk declared early in March 1962 that the GDR was a reality and that the United States was acting in conformity with this fact. At about the same time Sir Alec Douglas-Home told the House of Lords that the Western Powers had "no desire to infringe the authority of the German Democratic Republic".³

¹ The Soviet side handed L. Thompson A. A. Gromyko's statement, a draft statute of a free demilitarised city for West Berlin and a protocol on the guarantees of the status of free city.

² *Dokumentation der Zeit*, 1971, No. 21, p. 8.

³ *The Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)*. *House of Lords*, Vol. 238, March 28, 1962, p. 994.

On Sunday, March 11, 1962, Andrei Gromyko met Dean Rusk and Sir Alec Douglas-Home at the Richmond Hotel, and on the following day Dean Rusk visited the Soviet delegation at Villa Rose. For two weeks (March 12-27) there were exchanges of views on German affairs and the West Berlin question almost every day at working breakfasts and lunches which took place parallel with the sittings of the Committee of Eighteen.

These conversations touched upon a wide range of questions on how to tie up the loose ends from the Second World War and maintain peace in Europe, including the achievement of a German peace settlement, the inviolability of the existing borders, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, conclusion of a non-aggression pact, respect for the sovereignty of the GDR and normalisation of the West Berlin situation.¹ These conversations disclosed a certain "desire on the part of the different sides to bring their positions closer and to take into account the existing conditions" on German soil.²

The exchange of views on the impermissibility of arming both German states with nuclear weapons, an issue which the GDR had long wanted settled, disclosed that the "American side understands the importance of solving this question".³ Dean Rusk, for instance, was against providing nuclear weapons and information about them to other countries.⁴

The US and Soviet Governments agreed in principle that NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries should sign a non-aggression treaty. This was a step in the right direction. Dean Rusk said then that the USA was against using force as a means of changing the borders and demarcation lines in Europe. There was also a certain positive shift in the US attitude towards the GDR. It was felt that the USA was prepared "within the framework of the policy of respect for the postwar *status quo* in Europe not to raise the question of the border along the Oder-Neisse, Elbe and Werra. Although

¹ Two documents raising these issues were forwarded to Dean Rusk in Geneva: "General Principles" (March 19, 1962) and Proposals Concerning Communications Between West Berlin and the Outside World (March 20, 1962). On March 22 the Americans handed over their reply called "Draft Principles".

² See: *Pravda*, April, 25, 1962.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ See: *Der Tagesspiegel*, April 14, 1962.

the US had a number of reservations in this connection, it was a fact that respect for the borders of the GDR and the recognition of its existence in international law was no longer a controversial point".¹

But once again it was the question of West Berlin that dominated the discussions and the Western Powers continued to focus particular attention on ensuring "freedom of access to the city". The Soviet side and the GDR never objected to West Berlin having communications with the outside world, but everything depended on whether West Berlin would continue to be a "frontline city" with all the ensuing consequences, or whether it would become a city of peace, tranquility and mutual understanding. In the latter case it could expect the most favourable regulations on communications with the GDR.

The exchange of views in Geneva introduced "clarity into the issue of ensuring unhindered communications between West Berlin and the outside world, a matter which the Western Powers said was of especial importance to them. The Soviet Government indicated that this could be achieved and all they needed was to agree that generally recognised rules of international law would be observed with regard to the GDR",² in other words, that its sovereignty would be respected. At the same time the Soviet side, with the consent of the GDR Government, proposed that they set up a special international body to mediate on differences that might arise during the practical implementation of the agreement on transit. This organ would not have any administrative functions on GDR territory nor would it interfere in its internal affairs since that would be incompatible with the Republic's sovereignty.³

On March 28, 1962, Britain's Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that East Germany's proposals for creating a special body to arbitrate on controversial matters of access should be carefully examined.⁴

Speaking at a press conference on April 26, 1962, Dean Rusk noted that what Mr. Gromyko had said about the con-

¹ G. Keiderling, P. Stulz, *op. cit.*, p. 517.

² *Pravda*, April 25, 1962.

³ See: *Dokumentation der Zeit*, 1971, No. 21, p. 9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

nection between access and what he called the sovereignty of East Germany, or the GDR, touched on a problem which had been discussed from time to time, namely, that the United States on its part saw no incompatibility between unhindered access and local responsibility, i.e., local authorities in an area through which the access routes passed. He went on to say that in principle there was nothing contradictory between free access and the fact that there were specific authorities responsible for what was happening in East Germany.¹

In the spring of 1962 Walter Lippmann urged the West to adopt a more sober policy. He wrote: "Sooner or later, the freedom of West Berlin will have to be guaranteed in an international covenant which makes it an international city under the specific protection of the Great Powers, the general protection of the NATO and the Warsaw alliance, and of the United Nations."²

Despite the fact that the sides managed in the main to come to an understanding on the functions of the body mentioned above, many issues remained unresolved. One of them was the status of West Berlin.

A joint Soviet-US statement on the results of the Geneva conversations noted that some progress had been made in defining the areas of agreement between them and where their views diverged.³

It was arranged that the sides would renew contacts on these questions⁴ after they had reported on the results of the talks to their respective governments and consulted their allies.

These contacts were continued in April 1962 by the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, A. Dobrynin, and Dean Rusk.

The progress that had been achieved in the course of the Soviet-American contacts threw Bonn and particularly Konrad Adenauer into a violent and profound rage.


The Federal Government not only stubbornly continued to shun any improvement of relations with the Soviet Union,

¹ See: *Dokumentation der Zeit*, 1971, No. 21, p. 8.

² *New York Herald Tribune*, April 3, 1962, p. 26.

³ *Pravda*, April 25, 1962.

⁴ *Ibid.*



May 2, 1945, Berlin capitulates. The Red Banner of victory over the Reichstag.



Tens of thousands of West Berliners came out into the streets to protest against US intervention in Vietnam.

but objected to the United States negotiating with the USSR.

Bonn opposed any understanding between the Great Powers on the non-transference of nuclear weapons to third parties since that "would block the emerging process of NATO's transformation into an independent nuclear power".¹

As regards a non-aggression pact, the Federal Government regarded it as a measure which would "give the zonal boundary the status of a state boundary".²

The FRG voiced its misgivings wherever possible, even on the question of setting up the above-mentioned international body, believing that "its creation implied some measure of recognition" for the GDR.

When early in April 1962 the Americans turned over their draft proposals, all ready for presentation to the Soviet side, to Wilhelm Grewe to find out what the FRG thought about them, Bonn decided to do everything possible to block them and in general to obstruct the Soviet-American exchange of views.

Going ahead with its plans on April 14, 1962, Bonn deliberately disclosed the content of the American proposals, and then dispatched former Minister of Foreign Affairs von Brentano with all speed to Washington with instructions to talk the Americans into assuming a more rigid stand. During his meeting with President Kennedy on April 29, 1962, von Brentano said that the "German public is still insufficiently prepared for the compromises contained in the American plan".³

In an interview with the Associated Press at the time Dr. Gerhard Schröder said that the "Federal Government disagrees with some of the details of the US plan" to solve West Berlin issues.⁴

After that the Federal Chancellor came into the foreground of events. On May 7, 1962, while visiting West Berlin, he declared that in his opinion "the creation of a 13-power access authority is impracticable". He was against the GDR and the FRG taking part in it and flagrantly pressured

¹ *Die Welt*, March 12, 1962.

² *Dokumentation der Zeit*, April 21, 1971, p. 9.

³ *Die Welt*, May 1/2, 1962.

⁴ *Der Tagesspiegel*, April 29, 1962.

Sweden, Switzerland and Austria by declaring that in his opinion "they would not want to be members" of this body.¹

The Americans reacted fairly sharply to Bonn's impertinence. Referring to Konrad Adenauer's statement a State Department spokesman announced that the objections of the Bonn Government could neither block nor procrastinate Soviet-American negotiations, that the US Administration was convinced of the advisability of continuing talks with Moscow and called upon the Chancellor to submit "alternate proposals" if he considered the US proposals impractical.² As regards the composition of the international access authority, the US statement went on, the USA as before wanted it to consist of 13 representatives, namely, five from the West (USA, Britain, France, FRG and West Berlin), five from the East (USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, GDR and East Berlin) and three from neutral countries (Sweden, Switzerland and Austria).³

A British Foreign Office spokesman announced immediately after a meeting between the US Ambassador in London, David Bruce, and British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home that Great Britain fully supported US policy on the Berlin question.⁴

On May 9, 1962, President Kennedy told a press conference that it was not the best way to prepare for negotiations when Western proposals became known to the public before they were put to the Soviet side.⁵

Although in principle he opposed any "changes in Germany and Berlin" considering them premature, and gave "preference to restraint", General De Gaulle, nevertheless, underlined on May 15, 1962, that "France would not undertake anything that could block the exploratory talks" of the Americans with the Soviet side.⁶

There was profound dissatisfaction with Adenauer's policy in the FRG itself.

¹ *Der Tagesspiegel*, May 8, 1962.

² *Ibid.*, May 9, 1962.

³ See: *Die Welt*, May 10, 1962.

⁴ See: *Der Tagesspiegel*, May 9, 1962.

⁵ See: *Die Welt*, May 11, 1962.

⁶ *Der Tagesspiegel*, May 16, 1962.

All these developments forced the Federal Government to retreat. It formally consented to the continuation of Soviet-American contacts, but at the same time tacked on a number of conditions to the West's proposals in the certain knowledge that they would be unacceptable to the USSR.

Conversations between Soviet and American representatives were resumed. At first they were conducted by Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, and State Secretary Dean Rusk. In October 1962 they were continued by Andrei Gromyko. Shortly afterwards, however, they were blocked by the Caribbean crisis.

On the whole Soviet-American contacts in 1961 and 1962 were not fruitless. Addressing a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in December 1962, Andrei Gromyko noted that as a result of the exchange of views between the USSR and the USA "the gap between the two sides has been narrowed on many questions left over from the Second World War", including such issues as formalising the existing German borders, respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, preventing the two German states from obtaining nuclear weapons, and the conclusion in one form or another of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

A number of key issues, however, remained unresolved, including the question of the status of West Berlin which was a serious obstacle to agreement.

Moreover, US diplomats began to manoeuvre and make absolutely unacceptable demands and diverse reservations whenever the question of the practical implementation of one or another agreement was taken up.

After that the US Administration yielded to the pressure of the "wildmen", the war-mongers and also Bonn militarists, and embarked on a course of "perpetual negotiations".

The course of events also wrought changes in the international situation.

The measures of August 13, 1961, and the conclusion on June 12, 1964, of a treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and co-operation between the USSR and GDR, considerably strengthened the position of the German Democratic Republic and gave greater assurance to the security of the countries of the socialist community.

As a result of this and the changes that were taking place on German soil, the problem of a German peace settlement appeared in a new light. The question of a German peace treaty viewed in the light of the most urgent and direct interests of the USSR, the GDR and other socialist countries was no longer as pressing as it had been prior to the introduction of the defensive measures of August 13, 1961.

The West Berlin problem which had been a kind of malignant growth inside the German Democratic Republic, was now localised to a considerable degree.

WEST BERLIN AFTER AUGUST 13, 1961

With its open borders West Berlin was a malignant tumour in the organism of the GDR, and the measures of August 13, 1961, were the scalpel that cut out and isolated it from the Republic. "Prior to August 13, 1961, the city was a rendezvous, a show-case, a loophole for emigrants, a springboard for intelligence services and a centre of propaganda against the East," wrote the West Berlin journalist Schöneberger. "All these functions, excluding the latter, are now practically paralysed. . . . After August 13 West Berlin ceased to be as dangerous as it had been for the East, and also lost its former significance for the West."¹

One can question the correctness of these conclusions, but not the fact that as a result of the measures of August 13, 1961, *West Berlin lost a number of its former functions.*

It ceased to be a gateway for traders in human beings. The enticement and recruitment of specialists from the GDR practically came to an end and the balance in the movement of the population between the two German states radically changed in favour of the GDR.

West Berlin was no longer able to continue in its role as a centre in the economic war against the GDR. An end was put to economic sabotage.² Financial and commercial operations based on the artificial depreciation of the Eastern Mark

¹ *Berlin und Keine Illusion*, Hamburg, 1964, p. 92.

² See: *West Berlin—The Facts*, p. 125.

were curbed. This put paid to the plunder and "bloodletting" of the German Democratic Republic.

West Berlin was deprived of its functions as the "West's show-case" and a source of direct ideological influence on some sections of the GDR population.

Subversive activity emanating from the city was inhibited to a considerable degree. Many of the tentacles of the intelligence services of the Western Powers and the FRG which had wound around West Berlin and extended far beyond its borders were lopped off.

Nonetheless, even after August 13, 1961, West Berlin continued to be a source of considerable friction.

Principally, this was due to the fact that the FRG authorities, where the CDU/CSU coalition was still calling the tune, persisted in their illegal claims to West Berlin.¹ Another important reason was that the Western Powers and the West Berlin Senate had no intention of switching to a sober policy which would concern itself with the realities of the situation and further the cause of peace and security.

Militarist organisations still had complete freedom of action in the city where they organised noisy parades, "traditional rallies" and other measures designed to foment revanchist sentiments. Affiliated with them were numerous youth and women's organisations, including the Kyffhäuser Youth Union, the Youth Corps Scharnhorst (youth section of the Stahlhelm) and the Queen Luisa Union (women's section of Stahlhelm). Together with other para-military associations, the number of militarist organisations in West Berlin exceeded 100 by the end of the sixties.

West Berlin remained the local point of the biggest *revanchist* organisations. It was the centre of activity of 16 *Landmannschaften* (associations of countrymen) and affiliated unions which had special centres, headquarters, clubs and influential newspapers. "A battle for Europe and consequently for the eastern part of Germany is being waged in West Berlin. . . . Victory over Communism . . . —that is the milestone on the road to a single Germany which would not

¹ See Chapter VI for details.

be limited in the East by the Oder and Neisse,"¹ wrote the *Pommersche Zeitung*. Similar sentiments were expressed by many other publications of the *Landsmannschaften* which also had access to West Berlin radio and television.

Revanchists from the Federal Republic and other countries, even Spain and Portugal, frequently assembled in West Berlin. Arriving illegally on planes owned by the Western Powers, they organised provocative demonstrations, demanded a revision of the results of the Second World War, the return of the "German Länder" and heaped slander on the GDR and other socialist countries.

The biggest revanchist rally in West Berlin, the so-called Fatherland Day, was held each year on the anniversary of the attack on Poland by Hitler Germany and the beginning of the Second World War.

The West Berlin authorities and the police, however, not only protected the revanchist assemblages from the just indignation of wide sections of the population, but sent their own representatives to them declaring their support for and solidarity with the objectives proclaimed by the *Landsmannschaften*.

The *neo-nazis* also intensified their activity in West Berlin. At rallies and meetings they openly advocated their views, recruited new members and hatched plans to increase their activity as, in their opinion, the atmosphere was very favourable to do so. These neo-nazi rallies were always attended by Adolph von Thadden, Chairman of the National Democratic Party (NDP), and his henchmen.

Encouragement for the provocative acts of the militarists, revanchists and neo-nazis was an important aspect of Bonn's activity in West Berlin. This showed that while the CDU/CSU coalition was in power, the FRG was determined to adjust West Berlin to the requirements of the aggressive policy of the West German imperialists and to use the city as a springboard for provocations against the GDR and other socialist countries.

The "*psychological war*" conducted from the city acquired even greater proportions. Day after day the city's mass media

¹ Quoted from V. Kuznetsov's *On the other Side of the Brandenburg Gate*, Moscow, 1965, p. 64 (in Russian).

poured out torrents of biased information, lies, vicious anti-communist slander and unbridled nationalistic great-German propaganda. This hostile propaganda and subversive activity poisoned the international climate and did enormous harm to the cause of peace and tranquility in Europe.

West Berlin continued to be a "military camp" for the Western Powers with its intricate system of barracks, arms depots, airfields, take-off strips, reinforced concrete bunkers, anti-tank ditches and other military installations. The Western occupation troops numbering about 13,000 consisted of men from selected units that had seen action in Korea, Vietnam, Aden, Cyprus and other areas where the imperialists had resorted to the harshest possible methods against the national liberation movement. They regularly held military exercises and manoeuvres in the city, often very close to the border. This was fraught with all kinds of unforeseeable circumstances, especially as West Berlin abounded in elements who were prepared to take advantage of any pretext to provoke a conflict between the Western Powers and the USSR.

In violation of the quadripartite decisions on the disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany,¹ "that fully apply to West Berlin being as it is under the occupation regime",² *arms production* was conducted on an increasing scale in the city which was being drawn further and further into the military preparations of the FRG.

On orders from the Defence Ministry, the Bundeswehr Command, the FRG police and the special services, a large number of West Berlin factories were manufacturing military equipment and other strategic products in violation of Law No. 43 of the Control Council which prohibited the production, export, import, shipment and storage of all types

¹ The Potsdam decisions and the corresponding laws of the Control Council, including Law No. 8 of November 30, 1945, on the repeal and prohibition of military training; Law No. 34 of August 20, 1946, on the abolition of the Wehrmacht; Law No. 43 of December 20, 1946, on the prohibition of production, export, import, transportation and storage of war materials; Directive No. 39 of October 2, 1946, on the liquidation of the German military-industrial potential.

² Note of the USSR Government to the GDR Government of February 28, 1969 (*Pravda*, March 1, 1969).

of weapons, tanks, armoured cars, armour, radars, airfield equipment, military optical instruments, explosives and so forth.

A number of West German bodies moved to West Berlin to conduct overt military activity from the city. For instance, the Federal Building Bureau checked the quality of building projects, including airfields and premises for panzer units, which were being commissioned in some West German cities, and also NATO installations on the FRG territory.

The recruitment of young men into the Bundeswehr, which was being carried out illegally in the city, increased considerably after the Federal Administrative Court passed a special decision encouraging this activity in 1967.¹

Bundeswehr generals and officers increased the frequency of their visits to West Berlin, and from time to time separate units were even sent to the city in line with the special plans that were worked out by the Defence Ministry and the Ministry for All-German (now Inter-German) Affairs.²

Contrary to the ordinances of the military administrations of the three Western Powers, a permanent Bundeswehr group was set up in the city to maintain liaison with the Senate and the West Berlin authorities. It functioned under the seemingly harmless name, German Organ for Notifying the Relatives of the Lost Servicemen of the Wehrmacht, which operated in close contact with the Internal Affairs Department of the West Berlin Senate.

Espionage and subversive activity against the USSR, the GDR and other socialist countries did not cease. Although, as Walter Lippmann admitted, after August 13, 1961, West Berlin became less convenient as a site for intelligence and political operations, the West persisted in its efforts to use the city for this purpose. The number of branches of the FRG intelligence service in the city rose to 30 and the total number of espionage and subversive centres exceeded 150.

From time to time the Intourist and other Soviet organisations would be raided. There were cases of assault on the

¹ See: *Neues Deutschland*, March 6, 1969.

² *Ibid.*

employees of the GDR railways in West Berlin and open provocations on the border between West Berlin and the GDR were a regular occurrence, numbering 45,000 from August 13, 1961 to December 31, 1968. In this period the territory of the GDR was fired upon on 500 different occasions: six frontier guards were killed and 33 wounded (not counting civilians); 30 tunnels were dug under the frontier installations of the GDR and there were many other serious acts of provocation.

Thus, West Berlin remained a frontline city and a major centre of subversive activity from where, according to the Western press itself, a minor war was waged against the countries of the socialist community.

NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS TO SETTLE WEST BERLIN AFFAIRS (1969)

The "third Berlin crisis", as the Western press described the worsening state of affairs around West Berlin caused by the increasing provocation from Kiesinger's government at the end of 1968, offered fresh and striking proof that the unresolved West Berlin issues created an abnormal and dangerous situation. At the same time the joint measures taken by the GDR and the USSR in response to Kiesinger's moves, showed that the intensification of provocative acts would not only fail to bring the West closer to its aims, but would worsen the situation in West Berlin and create still greater difficulties for the Western Powers themselves.

It became ever more apparent that their hopes of using West Berlin as a frontline city had been dashed, that their policy of exploiting it as a springboard for subversive activity against the GDR, USSR and other socialist countries had, in effect, outlived its usefulness and that the efforts to galvanise it were absolutely irrational and constantly rebounding on their perpetrators. The need to settle the West Berlin problem on a mutually acceptable basis became particularly poignant at the time when certain positive changes were beginning to be felt in Europe. Even those forces which had actively used West Berlin to further their aggressive intentions and had for many years stubbornly opposed the settle-

ment of West Berlin affairs, could no longer afford to ignore these changes. In the West there were more and more calls not only in the press but in a number of works¹ which were published at that time to revise the former fruitless course and align the policy on West Berlin by taking full account of the realities of the late sixties and the world situation as a whole, characterised by a tendency to reduce tension and establish co-operation between European states.

It was at this time that a nuclear non-proliferation treaty was signed, Soviet-French co-operation was developing and the Soviet Union's ties with other countries were expanding and acquiring a new and more diversified content. In West Germany it was becoming clear that the CDU/CSU coalition would be replaced by the Social-Democratic Party which approved of negotiations with the Soviet Union and the achievement of a mutually acceptable settlement of the issues dividing the FRG and the socialist countries.

In view of these favourable conditions, the Soviet Union considered that the time was right to make a new move to resolve urgent world problems, including the question of West Berlin. This was developing into a sort of "cold war" iceberg against the background of a general thaw in Europe, as the Western press put it.

In the latter half of the sixties the countries of the socialist community launched a comprehensive programme to create an effective system of European security and achieve all-round co-operation between European states, in which a great deal of importance was attached to West Berlin. The city always figured as a special point in all the principal documents on the above questions drawn up by the socialist countries at that time. They believed that West Berlin too should play a specific role in their proposed system of European security which was based on the inviolability of the existing European borders, rejection of the use of force and good-neighbourly relations and co-operation between European states.

¹ See: *Berlin und Keine Illusion. 13. Beiträge zur Deutschlandpolitik*, Hamburg, 1954; G. McDermott, *Berlin: Success of a Mission?* New York, Evanst., 1963; Erich Müller-Gangloff, *Mit der Teilung leben*, Munich, 1965.

Solidly backed by the GDR, other fraternal socialist countries and all peace-loving forces, the Soviet Union was constantly searching for ways of settling individual West Berlin issues and the West Berlin problem as a whole.

Presenting a report on the international situation to a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on July 10, 1969, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said: "If the other powers—our wartime allies—who bear their share of the responsibility for the situation in West Berlin approach this question with an eye to the interests of European security, they will find the Soviet Union prepared to exchange views on how to avoid complications around West Berlin now and in the future."¹

These words elicited the following comments in the Western press: "New Soviet initiative on the West Berlin question", "Soviets offer negotiations", "Gromyko extends an invitation for a fresh exchange of views on West Berlin issues".

Washington, London and Paris correctly assessed the Soviet initiative and responded with alacrity. On August 6 and 7, 1969, the US, British and French ambassadors in Moscow said that their Governments were prepared to hold conversations to clarify the positions of the different sides on the question of improving the situation around West Berlin and removing causes of friction in this area.² In its reply on September 12, 1969, the Soviet Government welcomed their willingness to conduct exploratory talks.

A further exchange of views was held in the following months. As a result of the contacts and exchange of notes which took place between October 1969 and February 1970, the sides agreed to begin negotiations. They were to be conducted by the US, British and French ambassadors to the FRG and the Soviet Ambassador to the GDR in the former Allied Control Council building in West Berlin.

The press made the point that in its memorandum of February 10, 1970, the Soviet Government stated that under-

¹ *Pravda*, July 11, 1969.

² See: *Bulletin des Press-und-Informationamtes der Bundesregierung*, No. 127, September 3, 1971, p. 1308.

standing had been reached on the date and place of the talks for improving the position in and around (West) Berlin, abolishing frictions in that area and finding ways and means of normalising the situation and ensuring security in Europe. At the same time the Soviet side indicated that first and foremost it was necessary to agree on the elimination of activity which was incompatible with the international status of West Berlin and which generated tension there. In the opinion of the Soviet side the settlement of the problem of so-called access and a number of other practical questions could be achieved only on the basis of the Potsdam and other Four-Power agreements and decisions, and the questions concerning West Berlin's communications with the outside world and access to it could not be taken up without considering the legitimate interests and sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic whose communications were being used by West Berlin.

The Soviet Union believed that, as the war had been over for so long, the time had come to turn from words to deeds and to take practical steps which could lead to a settlement of the urgent problem of West Berlin. If, however, it was not feasible to resolve the entire problem, then it would be necessary to find a solution to those West Berlin issues for which a practical settlement was possible. The Soviet side considered that a search for mutual understanding in areas where the views of the different sides were not widely separated could yield positive results. Any improvement in West Berlin affairs that could alleviate tension in and around the city would be beneficial and have the approval of world public opinion. Too many obstacles had been created around West Berlin and to all appearances the only logical course, as the Soviet side saw it, was to remove them gradually. In the interests of peace and security it was absolutely imperative that the sides concerned should work out a mutually acceptable basis for the solution of all problems connected with West Berlin.

On March 26, 1970, the ambassadors of the Four Powers held their first meeting inaugurating a fresh round of talks on West Berlin affairs. Thanks to the new Soviet initiative the road to a settlement was now open, provided, of course, that the Western Powers wanted such a settlement.

FOUR-POWER TALKS ON WEST BERLIN (1970-1971)

The talks on West Berlin issues were long, complex and intensive, especially in the latter stages. It took a great deal of time and effort to work out a concerted approach to the questions under discussion. The Western press estimated that the Ambassadors alone conferred for about 150 hours. On top of that there were conversations between the foreign ministers and discussions by their respective governments.

Apart from the preliminary exchange of views (summer of 1969-March 1970), the talks passed through three basic phases: (1) mutual examination of the positions of the different sides and exchange of proposals on a range of basic issues (March 26, 1970-February 1971); (2) summary of the results of the preliminary exchange of views and exchange of joint proposals (February-March 1971);¹ (3) the final stage of working out agreed positions, and the framing of the agreement itself which was signed on September 3, 1971.

The Soviet Union, which was striving to bring about a lessening of tension and normalisation of the situation in Europe, abolish the sources of friction and conflict and ensure peace and security on the continent, attached great importance to the successful outcome of the talks. It considered that agreement on West Berlin should be based on Four-Power inter-allied commitments, understanding of the existing situation in the area and consideration for the legitimate interests and sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic.

Believing it important to clear Europe of all the cold-war debris and find a radical solution for the West Berlin problem, the USSR in principle favoured a settlement which would disentangle the West Berlin knot and remove this problem from the agenda for all time. Accordingly it submitted a comprehensive arrangement, embracing all aspects of the issue. The Western Powers, however, were not yet ready to take this step.

¹ The Western Powers presented their joint working document on February 5, 1971; the Soviet side presented its draft of the agreement on March 26, 1971 (See: *Bulletin des Presse-und-Informationamtes der Bundesregierung*, No. 127, September 3, 1971, p. 1389).

In view of the Western Powers' position, the Soviet side proposed to formulate an agreement embracing all issues whose solution would lead to mutual understanding and the normalisation of the situation in and around West Berlin. Such a settlement would have to include certain common principles in the approach to West Berlin matters and agreed practical measures designed to lessen tension in the city. The Soviet side also suggested that the parties concerned work out concrete decisions on all questions on which their views coincided.

Neither the USSR, nor the GDR sought to derive any unilateral advantages in their efforts to find a solution to the West Berlin problem. There is ample evidence that the USSR searched for a reasonable solution that took into account the realities of the situation and did not infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of any of the sides concerned.

On its part the GDR also did its utmost to create an atmosphere in which "the talks between the ambassadors of the Four Great Powers on West Berlin would produce positive results",¹ and submitted a number of fresh proposals to the FRG Government and the West Berlin Senate between the end of 1970 and the beginning of 1971.

Since at all the preceding stages the sides had found it very difficult to see eye to eye on the political and legal aspects of the problem, particularly on defining the geographical area under discussion and determining its status, they decided to exclude these questions from the agenda of the negotiations. They agreed to parenthesise and set aside all the controversial political and legal matters on which they could not agree and to concentrate on the practical aspects of the West Berlin problem.

Furthermore, they arrived at an understanding not to discuss the existing quadripartite agreements and decisions and the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers, but to try to reach an agreement in those fields where their views were closest and where it would be possible to get positive results.

It was likewise understood that no side would seek to augment its rights or win unbalanced privileges and that the outcome of the negotiations must be acceptable to all con-

¹ *Pravda*, November 21, 1970.

cerned and serve to lessen tension in the area and ensure peace in Europe.

This meant that the Four Powers would take decisions within the framework of their responsibilities, while the GDR would negotiate with the West Berlin Senate and the FRG on matters which they were competent to deal with.

As a result of the exchange of views, over a period of several months the Four Powers agreed in principle that the measures they intended to carry through should be aimed at promoting a relaxation of tension and would cover *four areas*: curtailment of the illegal political activity of the FRG in West Berlin; safeguarding of the Soviet Union's interests in the city; movement of civilians between West Berlin and the FRG; visits by West Berliners to the GDR, including its capital.

Following on from this the Soviet Union proposed to draw up an agreement which would first and foremost record the basic proposition that West Berlin was not a part of the FRG and could not be governed by it. Under the Soviet proposals FRG officials and institutions would be prohibited from carrying out any official functions in West Berlin that could either directly or indirectly support Bonn's illegal claims to the city. The question of respect for political, economic, proprietary and other Soviet interests in West Berlin should be settled and recorded in corresponding agreements.

Given a satisfactory understanding on the first two measures, the Soviet Union, to help lessen tension, announced its readiness, after consultations with the GDR, to include in the agreement provisions for a settlement in the other two areas, that is, to introduce appropriate measures bringing the procedure on transit of civilians and the trips of West Berliners to the GDR into line with generally recognised international principles and regulations. In these two areas, which affected the interests of the German Democratic Republic, the Four Powers were required to arrive solely at a mutual understanding, bearing in mind that the Soviet side would consult the GDR in each particular case and act only with its approval. The final settlement of these questions was to be worked out in the course of direct negotiations between the GDR and the interested parties, namely the FRG and West Berlin authorities.

Adhering to these principles, the Soviet side made every effort to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

In outlining the Soviet position and emphasising the seriousness of the Soviet Government's intentions, Leonid Brezhnev noted in a speech in Yerevan at the end of November 1970: "The settlement of some issues on West Berlin, which is the subject of the current talks between representatives of the Four Powers—USSR, USA, Britain and France—would go a long way towards normalising the situation in Europe. We believe it is quite possible to improve the situation around West Berlin. In order to achieve this the interested parties need only display good will and formulate solutions which meet the wishes of the West Berlin population halfway and take into consideration the interests and rights of the German Democratic Republic."¹

The attitude of the Western Powers made it clear that in the event of a satisfactory settlement of the issues which concerned them, they would be prepared to reaffirm the fact that West Berlin did not belong to the FRG and limit its political activity in the city (which was incompatible with its status) by banning meetings of the Bundesrat and the Bundestag and their committees and prohibiting FRG representatives from performing constitutional and official functions and conducting other activity on its territory.

Thanks to the persistent efforts of the Soviet Union in the course of its 1970 exploratory talks with the three Western Powers the sides recognised the need to avoid any actions in and around West Berlin which might cause tension. In line with their allied commitments, the participants in the talks reaffirmed that the city did not belong to the FRG and agreed to prevent any political activity running counter to this fact. At the same time they expressed their common desire to promote peaceful links between West Berlin and the outside world. With this aim in view the GDR declared its readiness to sign an agreement with the FRG and West Berlin based on generally recognised standards of international law.

Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1971 the Western Powers began to adopt a more rigid attitude which was reflected

¹ *Pravda*, November 30, 1971.



The signing of the Quadripartite Agreement on September 3, 1971.



The Eighth Congress of the SUPG, July 1971.

in their draft agreement submitted on February 5, 1971.

This draft was an obvious departure from the results of the exchange of views which had taken place at various levels in the preceding period. As distinct from the proposals submitted by the USSR on December 10, 1970, there was nothing in the Western draft that indicated a desire on the part of its authors to consider the interests of the Soviet Union and the GDR and to adhere to the basic propositions worked out by the Four Powers at their summit meetings (to seek a settlement on the basis and within the framework of the allied decisions, to discuss West Berlin only and not to violate the sovereign rights of any country).

The Western draft was a backward step and since it could not serve as a basis for a fruitful exchange of views, it was rejected.

The Western Powers' claims to possess certain rights with regard to civilian transit and access for West Berliners to the territory of the GDR to which they had never been entitled under the quadripartite agreements, and also their disinclination to take adequate steps to terminate the Federal Republic's unlawful political presence in West Berlin stalemated the talks for a long time.

On March 26, 1971, in response to the Western Powers' proposals, the Soviet side presented its own draft of a comprehensive agreement. The draft, which aroused a good deal of interest abroad, contained a balanced solution of the questions under discussion. It was an extensive document covering all areas of possible agreement which had been examined in the course of the exploratory talks.

The Soviet document consisted of a Four Powers' draft agreement plus five annexes, together with a final act determining the procedure of enforcing all the elements of the agreement.

The preamble and the three principal sections underlined that the sides were acting in accordance with the quadripartite agreements and decisions and took into account the results of the Second World War and the current situation. They undertook to relax tension and avert complications in relations between the Four Powers and other interested parties and, with this aim in view, pledged to take practical steps to improve the situation.

Furthermore the Soviet proposals made provision for the need to observe the UN Charter and prohibit use or threat of force in the area under discussion. The *status quo* in this area should not be unilaterally altered irrespective of the existing political and legal views. The sides undertook not to do anything which by generally accepted standards of international law would be tantamount to interference in the internal affairs of others, or could undermine public safety and order.

The basic provisions concerning West Berlin, wrote the *Zycie Warszawy* on April 15, 1971, comprised what could be called the central part of the draft agreement submitted by the Soviet Union. In keeping with the formulas put forward by the three Western Powers it was stated that West Berlin was not a constituent part of the FRG and was not governed by it, and that the articles of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic and of the West Berlin Constitution which contradicted this were not valid. The relations between West Berlin and the FRG should be based on the recognition of the above basic provision. Details were outlined in an annex in the form of a letter from the three Western Powers informing the Soviet Union that the Federal President, the Federal Assembly, the Government, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, their commissions and factions and also other Federal and Länder state institutions and FRG officials would not perform any acts or actions with the view to extending their jurisdiction to that city. Special liaison organs would represent the interests of the Federal Republic before the West Berlin Senate and the three Western Powers.

It was worth noting, the newspaper continued, that with the exception of political ties the Soviet proposals did not restrict any of the other extensive contacts between the FRG and West Berlin. The Western representatives regarded this as a generous move by the USSR to meet the wishes of the three Western Powers and the Federal Republic halfway.

The West likewise attached great importance to the fact that the Soviet draft agreement opened the way to establishing favourable conditions for civilian traffic between West Berlin and the FRG which hitherto had not been subject to any treaty regulations. As a means of settling this issue, which the Western side regarded as crucial for reaching un-

derstanding, the Soviet Union proposed that an agreement should be concluded by the relevant authorities, namely between the Government of the GDR and the Government of the FRG and the West Berlin Senate, under which the civilian traffic would be subject to generally accepted international procedure and take place without interruption. The concrete conditions for its realisation were set forth in an annex drawn up in the form of a communication from the Soviet Government to the Governments of the three Western Powers. This communication was based on a GDR Government statement on its readiness to hold talks with the different sides and work out the necessary settlement under which the organisation and procedure for transit along the Republic's roads and railways would be improved for the benefit of West Berlin. In particular, it was intended to make transit simpler and more efficient. The checking of documents (identification) and control would be conducted in keeping with the usual international procedure. The GDR consented that vehicles could be sealed by the sender and their examination would, as a rule, be confined to the inspection of the accompanying documents. In contrast to the old practice of collecting transit tolls per vehicle, the GDR could consider the introduction of lump charges which would considerably speed up the formalities on the Republic's borders.

Judging by press reports about the position of the three Western Powers and the FRG, the *Zycie Warszawy* noted, these proposals took into consideration almost all the main points advanced by the Western side with regard to practical measures to improve West Berlin's communications with the outside world.¹

As regards the question of letting West Berliners visit the GDR, which was a matter of particular interest to them, favourable prospects were opening up in this field, too. It was envisaged that permanent residents of West Berlin would be able to travel to the GDR for compassionate, family, religious and cultural reasons and as tourists. Alongside the other practical questions on West Berlin raised by the Western side, this was to take place after the necessary agreements had been reached between the West Berlin Senate and GDR

¹ See: *Zycie Warszawy*, April 15, 1971.

authorities. As in the case of other sections of the agreement, details were set forth in an annex in the form of a letter from the USSR Government based on corresponding statements of the GDR Government.

The *Zycie Warszawy* reported that diplomatic circles regarded the consent of the Soviet side to settle the question of the representation of West Berlin's interests abroad as yet another big step towards meeting the wishes of the three Western Powers and the FRG.

In the exchange of letters on this question appended to the draft, the Soviet Union said that it was prepared to waive its objections to the FRG consulates representing the interests of permanent residents of West Berlin abroad, provided, of course, that that would not give them the status of FRG citizens. Given the consent of all the sides involved and provided that it would observe a special procedure established by the Four Powers, West Berlin could participate in non-military and non-political agreements entered into by the Federal Republic. In its relations with individual states and international organisations, West Berlin's interests in the fields of politics and security would, as before, be represented by the Governments of the United States, Britain and France.

Resolutions guaranteeing Soviet economic, proprietary and other interests in West Berlin were also included in the draft agreement.

The agreement between the Four Powers was to come into force by virtue of a special final act which envisaged that the agreement between the "German authorities", that is, the GDR with the FRG and the West Berlin Senate, and the arrangements of the Four Powers would come into force simultaneously and that each of these agreements and settlements would remain in force on the understanding that all the other agreements and arrangements were observed. Any violation of the agreements would be straightened out and the situation rectified by consultation which would take place according to a specially established procedure.

The *Zycie Warszawy* characterised the Soviet proposals as unquestionably the most comprehensive in the long history of the talks on the West Berlin question. These proposals, according to a number of top-level Western representatives, aroused a great deal of attention in the capitals of the three

Western Powers and evoked a vast response ranging from guarded optimism on the part of those who were eager not to miss an opportunity to improve the situation, to deliberate pessimism from those circles which intended to continue using West Berlin as a means of influencing the course of European affairs and the policy of individual European states. However, it was clear to all the impartial observers that the Soviet draft agreement, based as it was on the quadripartite allied decisions and agreements and on the actual state of affairs in the area, was in the interests of all concerned and served the cause of peace and detente in Europe.

The Soviet proposals allowed the negotiations to be completed on a mutually acceptable basis. The Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 24th Party Congress (March-April 1971) made the point that "if the USA, France and Britain proceed, as we have done, from respect for the allied agreements which determine the special status of West Berlin, from respect for the sovereign rights of the GDR as an independent socialist state, the current negotiations could be successfully completed to the advantage of all the parties concerned, including the West Berlin population itself".¹

At the outset the Western Powers made excessive and unrealistic demands in an effort to avoid a businesslike discussion of the Soviet draft. In the ensuing months, however, in view of the Soviet Union's principled stand, they were forced to reconsider their attitude to the Soviet proposals and to negotiations.

In effect, the Soviet draft of March 26, 1971, became the basis for discussion in the final stages of the negotiations. This made it possible to extend the range of problems under consideration, make the discussions more fruitful and achieve a satisfactory settlement acceptable to all the parties concerned.

THE SEPTEMBER 3, 1971 QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON WEST BERLIN ISSUES

Thanks to the untiring efforts of the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, in which they were supported

¹ *24th Congress of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1971, p. 33.

by all peace-loving forces, West Berlin issues which had been the subject of discussion by the different sides were at long last resolved.

At 3 p.m. on August 23, 1971, the ambassadors of the Four Powers in West Berlin, P. A. Abrasimov (USSR), Kenneth Rush (USA), Jean Sauvagnargues (France) and Roger Jackling (UK) shook hands to mark the achievement of an understanding on West Berlin. The talks on easing tension caused by West Berlin issues and improving the situation in the area were successfully completed 16 months and 27 days after their initiation. As soon as their results were announced in the West Berlin residence of the US Ambassador, newspaper correspondents rushed to the telephones to send a report which immediately spread throughout the world: "The ambassadors of the Four Powers—USSR, Britain, USA and France—held their 33rd meeting here today. According to the communique issued at the end of the talks, they arrived at an understanding on the entire draft agreement. . . ."¹

The agreement was signed at a ceremony ten days later, on September 3, 1971. Simultaneously the parties initialled the Final Protocol and two protocol notes.²

The world press reacted to the news with editorials and numerous commentaries by leading political columnists. "Sensational Success", "Agreement Reached on One of the Most Acute Postwar Issues", "A Major Breakthrough Towards a Detente Since the End of the Second World War", "Giant Step Forward Not Only for West Berlin but for the Entire Set of East-West Relations in Europe", these were just some of the headlines.

One could hardly have expected a different reaction, for West Berlin, as is seen from its history, had indeed been one of the most dangerous sources of international tension and friction between states for many years.

The sides succeeded in working out an agreement, because this time they displayed a businesslike and sober approach to West Berlin issues, taking as a basis the existing situation on German soil and the territorial and political realities in the area.

¹ See: *Pravda*, August 24, 1971.

² *Ibid.*, September 4, 1971.

The *principal reality* has always been the fact that West Berlin is an independent entity inside the GDR and is not a constituent part of any state. This fact was also recognised by the Western Powers, who repeatedly declared that West Berlin was neither a Land nor part of the FRG and could not be governed by its authorities,¹ and also in increasing measure in the FRG and West Berlin itself.² This reality was the starting point in the efforts to relax tension around West Berlin and stabilise the situation in the city itself,³ especially as the CDU/CSU Government had tried hard to have the city illegally incorporated into the Federation. So the first thing to do was bring the situation in West Berlin into line with the quadripartite agreements and put a stop to the sittings of the FRG Bundestag and the Bundesrat, their factions and committees, and to the official activity of the Federal Chancellor, cabinet members and the Federal Government and its bodies in the city.

Now the parties have come to an understanding on this question. It is recorded in the Quadripartite Agreement that the Western Sectors "continue not to be a constituent part of the FRG and not be governed by it."⁴

This basic provision was specified in Annex II ("Communication from the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America to the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics").

¹ Approving the Bonn Constitution on May 12, 1949, the Western Powers vetoed and nullified only that part of it which proclaimed Berlin (West) a Land of the FRG (See: *Dokumente zur Berlin-Frage. 1944-1962*, 1962, pp. 124-25). They did the same on August 29, 1950, when approving the West Berlin Constitution (*Ibid.*, p. 154). The USA., Britain and France subsequently reaffirmed this point of view on several occasions, particularly at the Foreign Ministers conference in Geneva in 1959, in later talks with the USSR and also in the decisions of the tripartite governing authority of May 23, 1967, which noted that in accordance with the view of the three Western Powers Berlin (West) should not be regarded as a Land of the Federal Republic and should not be governed by it (See: *Der Tagesspiegel*, June 13, 1967).

² For example, in an interview granted to *Der Spiegel*, Chief Burgomaster Klaus Schütz, though with certain reservations, spoke about West Berlin's special status within the framework of the quadripartite regulations and tripartite responsibility of the Western Powers (*Der Spiegel*, 1970, No. 36, p. 22).

³ See: *Dokumentation der Zeit*, 1971, Vol. 12, p. 7.

⁴ *Pravda*, "Quadripartite Agreement", September 4, 1971.

lics"). It stated that corresponding articles of the Basic Law of the FRG and the West Berlin Constitution had been suspended and continued not to be in effect, and that the Federal President, the Federal Government, the Federal Assembly, the Bundestag and Bundesrat, including their committees and factions, and other FRG state institutions would not perform any constitutional or official acts in the Western Sectors. There will be permanent liaison agencies to represent the FRG Government in the Western Sectors to the three Western Powers and the West Berlin Senate.

In other words, as the US press noted, "the Four Powers did not accept the Bonn thesis, which is on shaky legal ground, that West Berlin is part of West Germany".¹ The Agreement stipulated that West Berlin was not a part of the Federal Republic of Germany and envisaged the curtailment of the Federal Republic's illegal activity in the city, which, as is universally known, had led to complications in the area and created inconveniences for the West Berliners and the FRG population. The Agreement placed the activity of the FRG in West Berlin within clearly defined limits and prevented all those who harboured aggressive intentions against the city from performing any acts which might signify that Bonn was extending its state authority over it.

At the same time it was a fact that although West Berlin lies inside the GDR, it has economic, scientific, technological and cultural links, thriving communications and other ties with the FRG. "This was another political reality which the participants in the talks had to take into consideration."² Once they had arrived at an understanding to eradicate the main causes of trouble in the area, in particular, to put an end to the illegal activity in West Berlin which clashed with certain quadripartite decisions, violated the city's special status and generated friction, they were able to solve other problems on the agenda. Many Western journalists had good reason to note that "the common view of the Four Powers that West Berlin is not a constituent part of the FRG and cannot be governed by it and that the Federal presence of the FRG in West Berlin will be ended" was a prime prereq-

¹ *Washington Post*, August 24, 1971.

² *Dokumentation der Zeit*, 1971, No. 12, p. 7.

quisite for the successful outcome of the quadripartite talks.¹ It was this understanding that really enabled the parties to work out an arrangement concerning West Berlin's peaceful links with the outside world and also to concur on other related and concomitant questions on the city.

On the basis of the above arrangement, which in fact was the *main point of the agreement*, affirming that West Berlin was not a part of the Federal Republic the participants in the talks came to an understanding that they would improve the city's links with the outside world, particularly with its immediate surroundings, that is, with the GDR and also with the FRG.

These provisions were set forth in Part II (A) of the Quadripartite Agreement, and in Annexes I and III containing more detailed information about the steps planned by the GDR in this area. These steps were incorporated into the Agreement after consultation and agreement with the GDR Government which made a very constructive contribution to the achievement of understanding on West Berlin.

Annex I is a communication from the Soviet Government to the Governments of the United States, Britain and France. After consultation and agreement with the Government of the GDR the Soviet Government informed the Governments of the three Western Powers that the GDR would facilitate transit of civilian persons and goods along its roads, railways and waterways between West Berlin and the FRG. This would be done in the simplest, quickest and most propitious way according to the accepted international practice.²

In another communication, likewise drawn up after consultation and agreement with the GDR Government and finalised in the form of Annex III, the Soviet Government informed the Governments of the three Western Powers that communications between West Berlin and the GDR would be improved and that permanent residents of the Western Sectors would be able to visit the GDR for compassionate, family, religious, cultural or commercial reasons, or as tourists, under conditions comparable to those applying to other people entering the Republic. The problem of the small West Berlin

¹ *Neues Deutschland*, August 27, 1971.

² See: *Pravda*, September 4, 1971.

enclaves would be solved by exchange of territory negotiated by the Senate and the GDR Government, which also gave assent to the Western Sectors expanding their telephone, telegraph, transport and other external links.¹

Since the above questions were the exclusive province of the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany and the West Berlin Senate, they would become the subject of negotiations and agreements between the three of them.

Other important issues were also resolved, including the representation of West Berlin and its permanent residents abroad and the procedure on consular services for West Berliners visiting foreign countries,² and the establishment of a Soviet Consulate General, a Bureau of Soviet Foreign Trade Associations and Aeroflot offices in West Berlin.

The above practical arrangements have been placed within certain political and legal limits specified in the Preamble and Part I of the Quadripartite Agreement setting forth the general provisions.

¹ There is a telegraph service between West Berlin and the GDR. Telephone and teletype communications between them were severed in 1954. The negotiations, began in 1957 on the initiative of the GDR for putting 70 telephone lines into operation, produced no results in view of "procedural difficulties", or, in other words, due to the disinclination of the West Berlin Senate to conduct them on an official basis. In February 1971, the German Democratic Republic unilaterally put several dozen telephone lines connecting West Berlin with the Republic into operation, and in September 1971 this question was fully resolved in a protocol drawn up by the two sides.

² The three Western Powers maintain their rights and responsibility relating to the representation abroad of the interests of the Western Sectors and their permanent residents, including matters of security and status, both in international organisations and in relations with other countries. Provided questions of security and status are not involved, the FRG can perform consular services for West Berliners travelling abroad; in keeping with the established procedures and provided that matters of security and status are not affected, the international agreements and arrangements entered into by the FRG may be extended to the Western Sectors, but this should be specified in each case; the FRG may represent the interests of the Western Sectors in international organisations and conferences; West Berliners may take part jointly with participants from the FRG in international exchanges and exhibitions, and international exhibitions and conferences may take place in the Western Sectors, but invitations to them would have to be issued by the Senate or jointly by the Senate and the FRG.

The Preamble states that quadripartite rights and responsibilities, and the corresponding wartime and postwar agreements and decisions of the Four Powers are not affected, that the existing situation in the relevant area is taken into account and that in concluding the agreement the parties are guided by the desire to contribute to practical improvements in the situation without detriment to their legal positions.¹

In view of the existing political and territorial situation in the centre of Europe, the parties made known in the General Provisions their desire "to promote the elimination of tension and the prevention of complications in the relevant area". They agreed that there "shall be no use or threat of force in the area", that "disputes shall be settled solely by peaceful means", that "the four Governments will mutually respect their individual and joint rights and responsibilities, which remain unchanged" and that "irrespective of the differences in legal views, the situation which has developed in the area, as it is defined in this Agreement as well as in other agreements referred to in this Agreement, shall not be changed unilaterally".²

The Final Quadripartite Protocol defined the procedure for putting the entire Agreement into effect and envisaged the possibility of consultations on questions arising from the implementation of the Agreement.

This roughly is the substance of the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin.

It is a balanced arrangement that takes into account the interests of the USSR, GDR and other socialist countries and of the United States, France and Britain.

**AGREEMENTS SIGNED BY THE FRG
AND THE WEST BERLIN SENATE WITH
THE GDR ON DECEMBER 17 AND 20, 1971**

With the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement and the Final Quadripartite Protocol, the Four Powers had done their part in getting a settlement on the West Berlin question. The next task on the way to completing this settlement

¹ See: *Pravda*, September 4, 1971.

² *Ibid.*

was the conclusion of agreements by the Federal Government and the West Berlin Senate with the German Democratic Republic on questions that came within their jurisdiction.

Mentioning this in his speech at the 24th Session of the UN General Assembly on September 28, 1971, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said: "...the two German states did not participate directly in the quadripartite negotiations, but consultations on which a great deal depended were regularly held with them. Now the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany have to conclude the negotiations between themselves as envisaged by the Quadripartite Agreement. We should like to express the hope that this part of the settlement on West Berlin will go through just as successfully."¹

Since questions concerning entry into and transit through the territory of the German Democratic Republic come within the jurisdiction of the latter, it was only natural that the Quadripartite Agreement, while containing certain general provisions on, for example, the transit of civilian persons and goods into and from West Berlin and visits by West Berliners to the neighbouring GDR, at the same time clearly states that concrete arrangements on these questions may only be agreed by the competent German authorities, that is the Governments of the GDR and the FRG and the West Berlin Senate.

Acting within its rights and jurisdiction, the German Democratic Republic, which did not have to obtain a special mandate from anyone, during the sixties repeatedly proposed that the FRG Government negotiate a settlement with them on all questions of mutual interest and conclude corresponding agreements drawn up on the basis of standards of international law. While preparations were being made for another round of exploratory talks between the Four Powers on West Berlin, the German Democratic Republic made new moves in this direction. On September 17, 1969, the GDR Council of State sent a message to the Federal President proposing that they conclude an agreement on the establishment of equitable relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in line with

¹ *Pravda*, September 29, 1971.

generally accepted standards of international law. These proposals were specified in a letter from Willi Stoph, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR, to Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt on February 12, 1970, and then at their meetings in Erfurt (March 23, 1970) and Kassel (May 18, 1970).

In its desire to help the Four Powers to achieve a West Berlin settlement and also to normalise its relations with the FRG through appropriate measures and agreements, the GDR Government made a new move at the end of October 1970 when it proposed that the Federal Republic hold talks with them on these questions. On October 29, 1970, the "Governments of both German states finally agreed to exchange views on issues whose settlement would help bring about a detente in the centre of Europe and which are of interest to them both as independent sovereign states".

During the sixties the GDR Government also repeatedly suggested to the West Berlin Senate that relations be normalised between West Berlin and the GDR.¹

On February 4, 1971, Willi Stoph received a delegation from the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin headed by its Chairman Gerhard Danelius and outlined a comprehensive programme for normalising relations between the GDR and West Berlin.

On February 24, 1971, Willi Stoph, as Head of Government, sent concrete proposals on this question to the West Berlin Senate. It was noted that the curtailment of the Federal Republic's unlawful political presence in West Berlin and the cessation of hostile activity from its territory would have created conditions for normalising and establishing genuinely neighbourly relations between the GDR and West Berlin. Striving to promote European peace and security, the

¹ A few provisional arrangements concerning permit passes to West Berliners visiting their relatives in the GDR capital on specified holidays were concluded in the past thanks to the initiative of the German Democratic Republic. After the last arrangement was signed on March 7, 1966, however, the Senate refused to sign any agreement with the GDR, thus depriving West Berliners of the opportunity to travel to the GDR capital. Nevertheless, the German Democratic Republic continued unilaterally to issue permits to those West Berliners who had to see their relatives in its capital for exceptional family reasons.

GDR said that it was prepared to enter into negotiations with the Senate immediately in order to settle all matters of mutual interest, including the development of economic, scientific, technological and cultural ties, the question of West Berlin's links with the outside world, the transit of West Berlin residents and goods through the GDR and visits of West Berliners to the Republic, including its capital. The GDR consented to facilitate transit, including the use of sealed vehicles, exchange of border territories and so forth.¹

After agreement with the GDR, the Soviet side communicated these proposals to the ambassadors of the United States, France and Britain at the talks on West Berlin.

In view of the position of the Western side, however, the exchange of views, which was begun on the initiative of the GDR between GDR State Secretary Michael Kohl and State Secretary Egon Bahr of the Federal Republic and between State Secretary of the GDR Foreign Ministry Günter Kohrt and Head of the Chancellery of the West Berlin Senate Müller and which went on parallel with the quadripartite talks, produced no results until September 1971. It was only after the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement on September 3, 1971, that, as the Western press pointed out, the United States, Britain and France gave the "go-ahead" to the Federal Government and the West Berlin Senate.

In a reference to the talks between the GDR and the FRG and between the GDR and the West Berlin Senate, Erich Honecker told a Plenary Meeting of the SUPG Central Committee in the middle of September 1971 that "despite the difficulties encountered during the talks, the GDR believes that given good will on all sides they can be brought to a successful conclusion". He underlined that "at the beginning of this year the Party and the GDR Government said that they would react favourably to any step which would bring us nearer to a genuine detente in Europe. Needless to say, and there should be no doubt on this score, this can be attained provided that the sovereign rights and legitimate interests of our Republic are respected".

On September 17, 1971, the Plenary Meeting adopted a resolution which re-emphasised that the GDR was "seeking

¹ Sec: *Neues Deutschland*, March 3, 1971.

quick and positive results in the talks with the Government of the FRG and with the West Berlin Senate".¹

GDR representatives adopted a constructive stand and submitted concrete proposals on all questions under discussion with the West Berlin Senate and the Federal Government.

Thanks to the efforts of particularly the German Democratic Republic which displayed sound reason and good will, it proved possible to surmount the existing difficulties and conclude corresponding agreements to further the relaxation of tension, increase co-operation and strengthen security in Europe.

On December 17, 1971, the Governments of the GDR and the FRG signed an agreement covering the transit of people and goods between West Berlin and the FRG. Under this agreement the procedure for transit across the territory of the GDR to and from West Berlin has been simplified and brought into line with accepted international practice.

This was an important step on the way to implementing the Agreement on West Berlin and normalising relations between the two German states.

By signing this document, Erich Honecker pointed out, "the Government of the FRG for the first time concluded with the Government of the GDR an international law agreement in which it is forced to recognise the GDR borders". "On the whole," he went on, "this cannot help but bring about a further settlement of the issues before us."

On December 20, 1971, the GDR Government and the West Berlin Senate signed arrangements to facilitate and improve the procedure for travel and visits by West Berliners to the Republic, and to resolve the problem of enclaves by exchange of territory. According to the first arrangement, West Berliners are entitled annually to one or more permits to enter and visit the GDR (up to a total of 30 days a year). On top of that permits will be granted in the event of "family or compassionate reasons". These regulations also apply to entry permits issued to people visiting the Republic for public, scientific, commercial or cultural reasons. By the second arrangement the Senate turned over to the GDR four of the

¹ *Neues Deutschland*, September 18, 1971.

ten enclaves belonging to West Berlin and one so-called semi-enclave (covering 15.6 hectares all told) in exchange for 17.1 hectares of territory and a compensation of four million Marks.

Other questions connected directly with a West Berlin settlement were resolved in these arrangements which helped pave the way for a normalisation of relations between West Berlin and the GDR. Addressing a Plenary Meeting of the SUPG Central Committee in December 1971, Erich Honecker noted that the GDR "carries on its relations with West Berlin on the decisive principle that West Berlin is not a constituent part of the FRG and cannot be governed by it. The agreements between the Government of the GDR and the West Berlin Senate take into account that Berlin is the capital of the GDR".¹

The above agreements and arrangements signed by the GDR with the FRG and the West Berlin Senate brought to a successful conclusion the so-called German phase of the West Berlin settlement. Now there remained the last act—the signing of the Final Protocol by the Four Powers and the implementation of the Agreement on West Berlin.

THE SIGNING OF THE FINAL QUADRIPARTITE PROTOCOL (JUNE 3, 1972)

The Quadripartite Agreement was signed by the different sides on the understanding that it would come into force by virtue of a special final quadripartite protocol. The Four Powers were to sign the protocol on the completion of negotiations and the conclusion of corresponding agreements between the Governments of the GDR and the FRG, and between the Government of the GDR and the West Berlin Senate on matters related to West Berlin and coming under the jurisdiction of three parties. All these agreements and arrangements were to come into force simultaneously.

Earlier, the Federal Government had made the ratification of the Soviet-West German Agreement of August 12, 1970, conditional on the achievement of a "satisfactory settlement" of the West Berlin problem.

¹ *Neues Deutschland*, December 18, 1971.

In this way a series of different questions were all tied in together. Therefore, the signing of the Final Quadripartite Protocol could take place only after the Federal Republic ratified the Agreement with the USSR.

When the USSR and the FRG exchanged ratification documents in Bonn on June 3, 1972, thus bringing the Agreement into effect, Foreign Minister of the USSR Andrei Gromyko, US State Secretary William Rogers, French Foreign Minister Maurice Shumann and British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home signed the Final Quadripartite Protocol in West Berlin in the building formerly occupied by the Allied Control Council.

By virtue of the Final Protocol the four Governments brought into force the Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971¹ "on the basis that the Agreement between the GDR and the FRG on transit traffic, and the arrangements between the GDR and the West Berlin Senate achieved in connection with the quadripartite agreement shall come into force simultaneously with the latter".²

Speaking on behalf of the Soviet Government at the signing of the Final Protocol, Andrei Gromyko rated the Quadripartite Agreement very highly and noted that its practical implementation, "if all the sides observe its provisions strictly and undeviatingly, will create the necessary conditions for a radical improvement of the situation here both now and in the future".³

Maurice Shumann declared that the Agreement was of historical significance, and added that it was a good guarantee

¹ The Final Protocol also envisaged the need for consultations on questions stemming from the implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement. It stated that in the event of any difficulty in the application of the Quadripartite Agreement or any other agreements or arrangements mentioned in it, which any of the four Governments considers serious, or in the event of non-implementation of any part thereof, that Government would have the right to draw the attention of the other three Governments to the provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement and the Final Protocol and to conduct the requisite quadripartite consultations in order to ensure the observance of the commitments undertaken and to bring the situation into conformity with the Quadripartite Agreement and the Final Protocol (*Neues Deutschland*, September 4, 1971).

² *Pravda*, June, 1972.

³ *Ibid.*

for Europe and the whole world. William Rogers said that the success of the talks on the Quadripartite Agreement would be a stimulus to further efforts in the interests of peace and concord. Sir Alex Douglas-Home likewise welcomed the Agreement, calling it the beginning of a new era.

Judging by their public statements in connection with Andrei Gromyko's official visit to Bonn which took place a few days after the signing of the Agreement, the Federal Government and the leaders of the ruling parties Willy Brandt and Walter Scheel were very happy to see the West Berlin settlement come into force.

In a special statement on June 3, 1972, the Political Bureau of the SUPG Central Committee and the GDR Council of Ministers described the enactment of the Quadripartite Agreement as "an event of great significance for reducing tension and ensuring security in Europe".¹ They had especially high praise for the Soviet Union's constructive policy and its contribution to the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin.

June 3, 1972, the day when the agreements on West Berlin were put into effect, "will go down in the history of international relations". This was the unanimous opinion of the statesmen of the Four Powers, both German states and many other countries, and also of world public opinion which expressed widespread approval of the signing of the Final Protocol which rounded off the current stage of the West Berlin settlement.

The signing of a set of agreements on West Berlin, underlined Leonid Brezhnev, was a "convincing demonstration of useful co-operation between states with different social systems for the sake of reducing international tension and strengthening peace".²

The settlement of this most difficult of problems, which Western aggressive circles had been using for a quarter of a century to exacerbate the international situation and stir up tension, in a certain sense marked the end of the preceding course of development in the area. It was a major step towards strengthening peace and ensuring European security,

¹ *Neues Deutschland*, June 4, 1972.

² *Pravda*, June 6, 1972.

which opened up favourable prospects for arriving at other East-West settlements based on the preservation and further consolidation of the *status quo*.

SOME SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE AGREEMENT ON WEST BERLIN

The 1971 Agreement on West Berlin embraces a wide range of problems which are reflected in individual acts.¹ All of them are equally important and operate together as a whole.

However, the Quadripartite Agreement and the GDR's agreements with the FRG and the West Berlin Senate are independent juridical acts. In concluding the Quadripartite Agreement the USSR, the USA, France and Britain, as has already been pointed out, proceeded from their rights and responsibilities, the agreements between the GDR, the FRG and the West Berlin Senate being concluded under the jurisdiction of the three authorities.

¹ The Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971, between the Governments of the USSR, France, USA and Britain on matters concerning West Berlin (with four Annexes); the Final Quadripartite Protocol of June 3, 1972; Protocol Entry on visits to the GDR by permanent residents of the Western Sectors and Protocol Entry on the establishment in these sectors of a Consulate General of the USSR, a Bureau of Soviet Foreign Trade Associations and Aeroflot offices, and also on other matters concerning the activity of Soviet institutions in West Berlin; Agreement of December 11, 1971, between the GDR and FRG Governments on transit traffic of civilian persons and goods between West Berlin and the FRG (with an Annex and a Protocol Entry); Arrangement of December 20, 1971, between the GDR and West Berlin Senate on facilitation and improvement of procedures for travel and visits to the Republic (with the statement of the GDR Government on the implementation of this arrangement, three Protocol Entries, a letter and verbal statements pertaining to the above arrangement by State Secretary of the GDR Foreign Ministry); Arrangement of December 20, 1971, between the GDR Government and the West Berlin Senate on the resolution of the problem of enclaves by exchange of territory (with maps of the exchanged areas and a Protocol Entry concerning its implementation); Points 6 and 7 of the Protocol on negotiations between a delegation of the GDR Ministry for Post and Telecommunications and a delegation of the Federal Ministry for Post and Telecommunications of the FRG dated September 30, 1971.

In view of its specific content, the West Berlin settlement is designed first and foremost to eliminate the source of friction and tension in the centre of the European continent and, on this basis, improve the position of the West Berlin population. It resolved some very important questions which for many years had been the cause of differences and friction that in turn had led to serious complications. "The new Agreement," wrote the *New York Times* on August 25, 1971, "provides the first detailed, written statute governing key elements of West Berlin's relations with West Germany, East Germany and the four occupying powers. . . ."

The *object of the settlement* was to solve questions related to West Berlin. In an interview given to the *Neues Deutschland* on September 5, 1971, Erich Honecker underlined that the talks were about West Berlin, specific issues concerning its population, representation of the interests of West Berlin abroad and transit between West Berlin and the FRG along routes passing through and belonging to the GDR. The capital of the GDR was not discussed and was not an objective of the Quadripartite Agreement. Analysing the Agreement the US press justly noted that it applied exclusively to West Berlin. For this reason the Joint Soviet-American Communiqué of May 31, 1972, on President Nixon's visit to the USSR, refers to the Agreement on West Berlin as an agreement on questions concerning the Western Sectors,¹ that is, West Berlin only.

The Soviet point of view on West Berlin did not change nor could it change. It was expounded during the negotiations and in public statements by leading Soviet officials, chiefly in Leonid Brezhnev's speeches at the 24th CPSU Congress in April 1971, at the 8th SUPG Congress in June 1971, in his subsequent statements, and in speeches by the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, and remains unchanged.

In determining their attitude to this question, the USSR and the GDR took into account that the Western Sectors, which had been artificially isolated from their natural surroundings in the postwar period by the Western Powers, turned into a sort of a capitalist enclave, a special formation inside the GDR, "a city with a special political status which

¹ Sec: *Pravda*, May 31, 1972.

never belonged and would never belong to the FRG", as the Plenary Meeting of the SUPG Central Committee underlined in its resolution of September 17, 1971.¹ The documents comprising the Quadripartite Agreement take this into consideration. As is evident from its text, the Agreement contains no decisions and introduces no new procedures previously unknown to international law, which could alter the position of West Berlin.

The agreements stipulate that quadripartite agreements or decisions reached previously are not affected. They *do not nullify any other agreements*, for example the agreements between the USSR and GDR, although the *New York Times* claimed the opposite in its issue of August 24, 1971.

Similarly, the Agreements do not affect the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers which were shared by them according to corresponding war time and postwar agreements and decisions. They *do not and cannot introduce any changes in the jurisdiction of the German authorities* and this was not and could not have been a topic of the talks. As the French *Combat* rightly pointed out on August 24, 1971, the settlement "pertains exclusively to the destiny of West Berlin. . . ."

The agreements *take full account of the interests of the German Democratic Republic*. "It is no secret," the *Combat* wrote, "that during the protracted negotiations between the Four Powers, there were consultations between the USSR and the GDR on matters concerning the Quadripartite Agreement at each stage of the conversations of the Ambassadors." Immediately after the quadripartite talks, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited Erich Honecker, First Secretary of the SUPG Central Committee, and informed him of the results of the talks. Both sides affirmed their "complete unity of views on the entire draft agreement". The regular consultations between the governments of both sides largely contributed to the successful completion of the quadripartite talks and the achievement of an agreement which fully ensured the sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic. *All documents agreed upon in the process of finalising the West Berlin settlement proceed from the fact that the German*

¹ See: *Neues Deutschland*, September 18, 1971.

Democratic Republic is a full and equal subject in international law. This has now been fixed by the Western Powers in an obligatory international law form. It "testifies to the factual recognition of the sovereign jurisdiction of the socialist German state by all the four partners in the talks".¹ In its resolution of September 17, 1971, the 2nd Plenary Meeting of the SUPG Central Committee "notes with satisfaction that the three Western Powers for the first time in an obligatory international law form reaffirmed in the Agreement the existence of the GDR as a sovereign state".² Therefore the GDR Council of Ministers in a special decision welcomed the Agreement of September 3, 1971.

The settlement *introduced no procedures that were foreign to international law.*

The solution of the question of representation abroad of the interests of the Western Sectors and their permanent residents, as envisaged in the Quadripartite Agreement, is not without precedent in international practice.

The adoption from without and application by a special procedure, of specific legal acts, including international treaties and agreements entered into by other subjects of international law, is likewise a fairly common occurrence in international practice, especially in the relations between states maintaining extensive business and economic ties.

Of late the sealing of railway carriages, containers and motor vans, even by the sender, and also the general facilitation of procedures with regard to international goods transit, is becoming more and more widespread. This applies, for example, to transportation between the USSR and Finland for transit through Soviet territory under a Soviet-Finnish Agreement on border rail communications of December 19, 1947. The settlement envisaged in the Quadripartite Agreement takes this experience and the sovereignty of the GDR into account. It is stated in the Agreement that communications between West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany apply to transit only and should be conducted in keeping with international practice and with respect for the laws and corresponding instructions of the GDR and bearing

¹ *Neues Deutschland*, September 13, 1971.

² *Ibid.*, September 18, 1971.

in mind that these communications belong to the GDR. Thus, the Agreement introduces no changes whatever into the existing legal position on the GDR's communications which link West Berlin with the outside world. It is based on the recognition of the sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic and the need to achieve a corresponding settlement within the framework of international law between the GDR and the parties interested in using these communications.

The establishment of a Consulate General of the USSR in West Berlin is not a complex matter. Foreign countries have been maintaining about 40 consulates general, consulates, delegations and military missions in the city for a long time. The Soviet Union has quite definite interests in West Berlin and its links with the city are continually expanding. During the past few years the Soviet Union has annually issued ten to twenty thousand visas to West Berliners. This number, naturally, will increase due to the normalisation of the situation in West Berlin and the expected further development of the city's ties with the USSR.

It follows, therefore, that the existing international practice, in keeping with which a number of so-called land-locked states and various small state political formations were able to solve specific practical problems concerning their relations with the outside world, had to be taken into consideration in the solution of questions related to West Berlin. Moreover, this international practice has been further developed in the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WEST BERLIN SETTLEMENT

The completion of the talks on West Berlin and the signing of a corresponding agreement is one of the most important postwar developments. It is fully in keeping with the present alignment of forces in Europe and is a true reflection of the actual state of affairs on the continent. The Agreement on West Berlin entered into by the different parties attests to the consolidation of the *status quo* in Europe and the mounting support for the policy of peaceful coexistence.

As far as the significance of the West Berlin settlement is concerned, it should first be noted that it eliminated the tension around West Berlin and created conditions for a steady normalisation of the situation in that area.

In its numerous comments, the Western press made the point that it was an event which defused the time-bomb of tension and crisis, helped eliminate a source of constant friction and unrest in the centre of the European continent and was an important step towards improving the situation there.

The beginning of the talks between the Four Powers in 1970 in itself had a positive impact on the situation in that area. The achievement of a settlement on West Berlin presented even more favourable prospects for its further improvement. "There is every reason to breathe a sigh of relief," wrote the *Stuttgarter Zeitung* on August 24, 1971. "In the world political arena it signifies that the hotbed of crises has been cooled down." Taking up the subject in one of its leading articles, the *New York Times* noted on August 25, 1971: "For a quarter-century, Berlin has been an island of trouble in the centre of Europe, the neuralgic point. . . . The new Big Four draft accords now promise to make Berlin an island of peace. . . ."

The new atmosphere developing around West Berlin which at all times directly influenced the world political climate, naturally made itself felt on the situation in Europe as a whole.

It was universally noted that the most favourable conditions ever for solving urgent issues between the GDR and West Berlin and also between the GDR and the FRG were beginning to take shape.

The conclusion of the West Berlin settlement cut the ground from under the feet of those circles which artificially tried to block the enactment of the Soviet-West German and Polish-West German agreements by referring to the absence of a "satisfactory" settlement of West Berlin affairs. This Agreement for which the whole of Europe waited, said a *London Times* editorial on August 24, 1971, will pave the way for the ratification of West Germany's agreement with Moscow and Warsaw. And further events proved the correctness of this estimate.

Furthermore, numerous commentaries pointed out that the Agreement "could be the stepping stone to the removal of tension in Europe and the end of the cold war, the scaling down of arms and withdrawal of foreign troops, and the opening up of trade and co-operation",¹ and that those who opposed a relaxation of tension and co-operation in Europe were now deprived of their basic argument against the holding of an All-European Peace and Security Conference. This conclusion was also borne out by events.

The West Berlin settlement helped further strengthen the German Democratic Republic's international position, as the *Neues Deutschland* pointed out in a leading article on August 27, 1971, and its weight and authority in international affairs increased perceptibly. The West's recognition of the German Democratic Republic and its entry into the United Nations Organisation and its agencies together with the FRG were considerably speeded up. This question was now on the agenda as an urgent practical and concrete issue.

Immediately after the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement diplomatic relations were established between the GDR and Nepal, and the Finnish Government decided to begin talks with both German states on the issue of extending them diplomatic recognition. A wave of diplomatic victories started for the GDR in 1972, and by the summer of 1973 it had been recognised by over 80 states. The French newspaper *Monde* had good reason to write that this process would develop inexorably and that "the immediate future will witness the absolute stabilisation of the status of the German Democratic Republic, including its admission to UN membership together with the Federal Republic of Germany."

Finally, the significance of the Agreement lies in the fact that it can "open up prospects for the future," as the West German press points out, "which will have a bearing on the entire complex of East-West relations".² It is an important landmark on the road from confrontation to co-operation in Europe.

The inclusion in the Agreement of the rejection of the use or threat of force which is an important principle in in-

¹ *Morning Star*, August 24, 1971.

² *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, August 24, 1971.

ternational relations and the settlement of disputes solely by peaceful means was a new and considerable step forward after the conclusion of the Moscow and Warsaw Agreements of 1970 on the way to strengthening the inviolability of the borders and stabilising the current situation in Europe. Alongside the Agreement between the USSR and the FRG, this principle was also fixed in the agreement with the three Western Powers (although in a more limited area) and was of great significance for its further gradual implementation on a European scale.

CHAPTER IV
STATE AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE
OF WEST BERLIN

CONSTITUTION

Throughout its history Berlin's position in the country was defined by special legislative acts. At first these were municipal codes and agreements on unification with other towns, for instance accession to the Hanseatic League, and then when the Brandenburger Mark came under the rule of the Hohenzollerns (1411), these were superseded by decrees and laws of the monarchial and imperial power, in particular the decree of January 17, 1709, on the merger of a number of urban settlements on the Spree into a single town called Berlin with a common magistrate.¹

From February 21, 1747, the city self-government bodies in Berlin and other Prussian towns were established in accordance with so-called regulations on town halls which were a component part of the Prussian absolutist system. Formally Berlin had a Magistrate (20 members) and a City Assembly (32 deputies). In effect, however, it was governed by a chief of police who was appointed by the king and who was also the real head of the city over the Magistrate.

The French bourgeois revolution, which had shaken absolute monarchy to its very foundations on the European continent, had its repercussions in Germany, too. On November 19, 1808, a code of towns and communities drawn up by the Prussian minister von Stein, which introduced the principles of bourgeois city self-government, was proclaimed in the country. An elected city chamber of deputies was established in Berlin and invested with the right to draw up the budget, elect and control the Magistrate and perform other functions.

¹ See: H. Neumann, *Die Geschichte Berlins*, Part II, pp. 20-21.

The Chamber's functions were extremely limited, however, and only a very small number of ordinary citizens could be elected to it because of the high property qualifications.

Things began to develop in the opposite direction when the 1848 revolution was crushed. The reaction once again took the offensive, and although a greater number of Berliners were able to take part in the elections, the city self-government was deprived of its already curtailed rights. On March 11, 1850, a new statute for cities came into effect and then several annexes to it, particularly the May 30, 1853 Annex, which strengthened state control and supervision over the Berlin Magistrate. The laws promulgated in the period from 1881 to 1883 did not in principle alter Berlin's position; they merely withdrew it from the Brandenburg Province and turned it into an independent administrative district, and at the same time clarified its administrative system and position in the state. To a certain degree Berlin now combined the elements of a city-Land, an administrative district and a province. Its independence was now virtually non-existent. As the West Berlin jurist Kettig put it, "city self-government in the true meaning of the word was completely out of the question in a city which was both an imperial capital and residence".¹

Such was Berlin's position right up to the rout of Kaiser Germany and the end of the First World War.

Berlin's status in the Weimar Republic was defined by the "law on the formation of the new city community of Berlin" which was passed on April 27, 1920.² According to this law eight towns, 59 rural communities and 26 adjoining districts were united into a single administrative unit with an area of 87,810 hectares and a population of 3,850,000. It was split up into 20 districts.³ The city Chamber of Deputies which was endowed with specific rights to solve issues of local self-government consisted of 225 people elected for a four-year term.

It fixed the budget, elected the Magistrate of 30 members

¹ *Heimatchronik Berlin*, p. 419.

² Came into effect on October 1, 1920. The city's administrative and legal status was equivalent to that of a Prussian province (*Wörterbuch der Völkerrechts*, Berlin, 1960, p. 182).

³ See: *Heimatchronik*, Berlin, p. 447.

for a period of four years, and controlled the health service, education, public amenities and so on, in conjunction with the Magistrate. In other words, during the Weimar Republic, Berlin achieved a considerable degree of autonomy in local self-government.

With Hitler's rise to power, Berlin was gradually divested of all its rights. In May 1933, a state commissar for the capital was appointed. The Magistrate was made subordinate to his authority and a year later all the elected bodies in Berlin were abolished and replaced by a consultative body of 45 members called the Community Council. The members were appointed by the Burgomaster at the recommendation of the Gauleiter who in effect made the final decision on all questions.

After the Second World War and the liberation of Berlin from nazism, all political parties upheld the idea of approving a special constitution that would define the status of the city and guarantee the rights of city self-government. The abolition of Prussia which formerly included Berlin, made it a particularly urgent task.

On August 13, 1946, after consultations with the leaders of the parties represented in the Berlin Magistrate, the Allied Kommandatura approved a Provisional Constitution of Greater Berlin,¹ which was drawn up with regard for the status of Berlin in the Weimar Republic which was designed "to grant the population the right of self-determination in matters of city administration". It proclaimed "the transfer of all power to the elected people's representatives" and made it incumbent on the Berlin Chamber of Deputies (Article 35) to draw up a draft democratic constitution for the city and submit it for approval by the commandants before May 1, 1948.

In 1947 a fierce battle flared up in the Chamber of Deputies over the draft constitutions submitted by the factions of Right-wing parties, on the one hand, and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, on the other. However, the so-called Berlin crisis of 1948-1949, which considerably aggravated the situation in Germany, held up the preparation of the draft. Work was resumed only in November 1949 and continued up

¹ Came into force on October 20, 1946.

to August 4, 1950. This time, however, it went on without the participation of the SUPG and was concentrated on adjusting the draft to the Constitution of the FRG.¹ Article 1 of the draft, for example, stipulated that "Berlin (West) is a Land of the Federal Republic of Germany" (Point 2) and that the "Constitution and the Laws of the Federal Republic are valid in Berlin (West)" (Point 3).² Article 87 was drawn up with a view to binding West Berlin as firmly as possible to the FRG and subordinating it fully to Bonn.³ Restrictions were imposed to cramp the activity of the opposition forces, especially the so-called inhibiting reservation which keeps the parties that poll less than five per cent of the vote out of the Chamber of Deputies.⁴

Yet, so long as the bourgeois propaganda persistently strove to portray West Berlin as a "torch of freedom", the West Berlin authorities did not venture to adopt a reactionary constitution. In addition they were in no small way influenced by the example of the GDR where profound democratic changes were taking place and also by the unrelenting struggle of the progressive forces in West Berlin to steer the city's development along peaceful and democratic lines.

As a result the West Berlin Constitution "defines political and social rights which are not known to the Bonn Constitution"⁵ and is in a much healthier condition than the constitu-

¹ See: *Berlin. Quellen und Dokumente 1945-1951*, Berlin, 1964, p. 1974.

² *Ibid.*, p. 1988.

³ Article 87 reads: "(1) Article 1, Points 2 and 3 of the Constitution will come into force as soon as the limited implementation of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany ceases in Berlin (West). (2) In the transitional period the Chamber of Deputies can define in its Law which law of the Federal Republic of Germany extends also to Berlin (West). (3) Just as in the transitional period the application of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany will not be limited in Berlin (West) (Point 1), so it is an operating law also for Berlin (West) and prevails over its Constitution. In separate cases the Chamber of Deputies can by a two-thirds majority of the deputies present pass a different decision.... (4) In the transitional period the constitutionally formed bodies of Berlin (West) must observe the fundamental principles of the Basic Law concerning the relations of the Federation and the Länder within the broadest possible limits as a directive for the entire legislative activity and administrative functions."

⁴ Article 26.

⁵ P. A. Steiniger, *West Berlin*, p. 120 (in Russian).

tions of other bourgeois states. The West Berlin Constitution proclaims the principle of people's rule (Article 2) and makes provision for the holding of referendums. It proclaims all people equal before the law (Article 6) and reaffirms the basic freedoms, including the "right of each person openly to express his views within the limits of the law" (Article 8), "the inviolability of the individual" (Article 9), "privacy of correspondence" (Article 10), "the right to work" and its implementation through a "policy of full employment and administration of the economy" (Article 12). The Constitution prohibits "any misuse of economic power" (Article 16) and requires "the guarantee by law of the right of workers and employees to participate in the control of production" (Article 17). It also proclaims the very important principle of the "right to refuse to undergo military service" (Article 21) and guarantees universal, equal, secret and direct elections to the Chamber of Deputies. The right to vote is granted to citizens who have reached the age of twenty (and not 21 as in the FRG and its Länder).¹

On August 29, 1950, the tripartite governing authorities approved the Constitution of West Berlin. The commandants made reservations concerning Articles 1 and 87, however, and in effect vetoed them saying that "Points 2 and 3 of Article 1 will not be implemented" and that Article 87 "should be interpreted in the sense that during the transition period Berlin (West) will not function in the capacity of the twelfth Land".²

The Constitution came into force on October 1, 1950,³ and with certain minor amendments is still in operation.⁴

Bourgeois propaganda is using the formal rights and free-

¹ The West Berlin electoral system has been described as a personified system of proportional representation with a number of restrictions (the 5 per cent reservation, a six months' settlement qualification, etc.).

² *Berlin. Quellen und Dokumente*, p. 1977.

³ The Constitution has 89 articles, grouped in nine Sections (I. Basic Provisions; II. Basic Rights; III. Popular Representation; IV. Government; V. Legislation; VI. Administration; VII. Justice; VIII. Finance; IX. Transitional and Final Decrees).

⁴ Since then it has been amended eight times (Articles 2, 4, 25, 26, 30, 31, 44, 51, 53, 54, 57, 59, 60, 63, 69, 83). The alterations involve minor issues and have no bearing on its basic principles.

doms proclaimed in the West Berlin Constitution, the permission granted to various parties to pursue their activity in the city, the electivity of the Chamber of Deputies, and so forth, to create the appearance of "people's rule" and to present Berlin as a "sample of democracy", and an "island of freedom in the sea of totalitarianism". Nevertheless these rights and freedoms are just a sham in a capitalist society where power is in the hands of the ruling classes. The West Berlin Constitution is nothing more than a front for the dictatorship of monopoly capital, which operates with the help of bourgeois parliamentarism. The establishment in West Berlin of the system of bourgeois parliamentarism ensures the interests of the ruling classes and not those of the entire population.

ORGANS OF POWER AND ADMINISTRATION

The organs of power and administration in West Berlin are built on the principle of "division of authority" which is typical of bourgeois parliamentarism.

Legislative power is exercised by the *Chamber of Deputies (Parliament)* which is elected for a four-year term.¹ It is supposed to consist of 200 deputies, but has in fact only 138. The remaining seats are symbolically "reserved" for representatives from "East Berlin", since the West Berlin authorities wanted to infer that their Constitution was representative of the whole of the city. The Chamber is headed by a President and two Vice-Presidents who are elected by the Chamber and remain in office until its term of office expires. The President chairs the Chamber's sittings, finalises its decisions, represents the Chamber and directs its administrative and technical apparatus. He convenes the Chamber twice a month. The passage of bills requires two readings and they are usually discussed in the committees between the readings.

The bills become law after they have been passed by a majority vote in the Chamber of Deputies and published by the Chief Burgomaster in the West Berlin Bulletin of Laws and Regulations (unless the law itself specifies the date of enactment).

¹ Berlin. *Quellen und Dokumente*, p. 1979.

The Chamber also elects the Senate (Government) and must exercise parliamentary control over its activity and the administrative bodies under its jurisdiction. It can convene the Senate or its individual members, demand the presence of senators at its sittings and answers to what are called big, small and verbal inquiries.

Though provision is made for it by the Constitution, the Chamber's right of parliamentary control over the Senate is actually purely declarative.

The executive power is vested in the Senate (Government) which consists of the Chief Burgomaster, the Deputy Burgomaster and not more than 16 Senators (Article 40).¹ The Senate is formed by the Chief Burgomaster who is elected by the Chamber on the recommendation of the most powerful faction. When the Senate is formed its members have to be approved by the Chamber (Article 41).

The Chief Burgomaster is invested with extensive authority. Virtually all the power is in his hands. He defines "with the Senate's agreement" the directives of the government policy which are formally subject to the approval of the Chamber of Deputies, supervises their implementation and directs all affairs in the city within the competence granted him by the military authorities of the three Western Powers, and also represents the Senate as head of the administration.

West Berlin's *administrative system* is divided into two parts: central and district (local).

The central administration includes sectoral departments which function as ministries and are headed by members of the Senate, specialised agencies, subordinate departments (Polizei-Präsidium, Department for the Reimbursement of Losses, Department for Surveillance over Industry), the so-called non-independent organisations (the Archive, the Senate Library, etc.) and municipal services (transport, gas, water, sewerage).

District or local administrations take care of all matters within the limits of their given districts, or which, because of their specific character, lie outside the jurisdiction of the central administration.² District assemblies of deputies, depu-

¹ See: *Die Verfassung von Berlin*, pp. 34-35.

² See: *Berlin. Quellen und Dokumente*, p. 1982.

tations and burgomagistrates make up the local self-government bodies.

Views on the basic issues of city administration are exchanged at what is known as the Council of Burgomasters which meets at least once a month and includes the district burgomasters and the Chief Burgomaster and his deputy. Since the Council functions as a consultative body, it plays an insignificant role in the life of West Berlin.

Justice is administered by "independent" courts which are subject "only to the law".¹ There are administrative, civil, financial, social and other courts, depending on the functions they are called upon to perform. Judges are nominated by the Senate, but their election to this lifetime post is subject to approval by a special committee elected by the Chamber of Deputies, and a senator for juridical affairs. Members of higher courts are elected by the Chamber of Deputies on the recommendation of the Senate, and only after that they are appointed by the Senate to their post.

Whilst maintaining an outward appearance of democracy, the constitutionally established state and political structure of West Berlin in effect bars the overwhelming majority of the population from participating in the administration and "does not let it go further than the ballot-box". Therefore, the people have virtually no influence on state affairs, the legislative activity of the Chamber or the policy of the Senate.

The main driving forces of this system, the Social-Democratic Party and two bourgeois parties, the Christian Democratic Union and the Free Democratic Party in which all affairs are run by the party elite, are closely connected with the military administration and Big Business. They control the election machinery, the state apparatus and the powerful propaganda machine and have the unlimited financial backing of industrial and financial circles. They have monopolised everything, ranging from the selection of candidates to the Chamber to the allocation of the most insignificant positions in the executive, judiciary and other bodies.

Thus, judging by its class nature, West Berlin's state and political system is nothing more than an ordinary system

¹ Berlin. *Quellen und Dokumente*, p. 1984.

of bourgeois parliamentarism with a number of specific features caused by the presence of the occupation authorities in the city and the close intertwining of links with the FRG. This system is meant to cover up the omnipotence of the military administration of the three Western Powers and the domination of big capital, primarily that of the West German monopolies.

PARTIES AND ORGANISATIONS

At present there are four parties in West Berlin: the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin (SUP-WB), the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). Other political parties periodically appeared in the city but they had a short life-span as a rule and were absorbed either by the SDP, CDU or the FDP.

Standing in the vanguard of the working class and all the working people is the almost 8,000-strong *Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin*¹ which expresses the interests of the progressive forces of the city's population. Its highest organ is the Party Congress which elects the Central Committee. The Chairman of the Central Committee is Gerhard Danelius.

In the initial postwar period the Communists in the western districts of Berlin formed into a single party organisation—the SUPG of Greater Berlin. However, Germany was now divided and the two sovereign states which had sprung up on German soil were developing along different lines. All this plus the transformation of West Berlin into a special entity meant that the West Berlin organisations of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany were confronted with the pressing issue of finding new organisational forms of activity that would conform to the existing situation. The First Party Conference which took place in West Berlin on April 29, 1959, established the West Berlin City Organisation. In view of the specific conditions in which the Communists had to work and the special tasks they had to fulfil after the introduction of the measures of August 13, 1961, when it

¹ See: *Neues Deutschland*, January 19, 1967.

became clear that West Berlin was developing as a special formation on German soil, the West Berlin city organisation had to separate from the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. At a conference in November 1962, the West Berlin organisation of the SUPG "constituted itself into an independent Marxist-Leninist Party", elected a Board, adopted its Rules and approved the basic political principles of its activity.¹ In May 1966 the First Congress of the Party approved "Proposals . . . on the Peaceful and Happy Future of West Berlin".² These proposals were outlined in detail in the document "Principles and Aims of the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin and Its Rules"³ adopted at the Extraordinary Congress of the Party in February 1969, and the "Programme of Action of the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin in the Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Social Progress"⁴ approved at its Second Congress in May 1970.

These documents, which submit the processes taking place in West Berlin to a searching scientific analysis, define the Party's ultimate aim and its immediate tasks in the struggle for peace, democracy and social progress—matters of great concern to the working people of West Berlin.

In 1964, contrary to the Potsdam Agreement and other quadripartite decisions, a *National Democratic Party (NDP)* was established illegally in West Berlin. It was formed from Right-wing extremist groups and brought together all the neo-nazi forces. At first it had 500 members, but early in 1968 it sprang into fairly hectic activity, setting up branches in every district in the city.

There are also progressive democratic organisations in West Berlin, among them the Union of Free German Youth, the Democratic Union of Women and the Association of Persons Persecuted under Nazism. The German-Soviet Friendship Society has been operating in the city since 1947.

Regrettably it was not the democratic forces that deter-

¹ See: K. Kniestedt, *Der Kampf der antifaschistisch-demokratischen Kräfte für ein friedliches und demokratisches Westberlin (1958-1963)*, Dissertation, Moscow, 1968, p. 204.

² The full text was published by *Neues Deutschland* on May 23, 1966.

³ *Die Wahrheit*, February 8, 1969.

⁴ *Ibid.*, May 22-26, 1970.

mined the political course and climate in West Berlin, but parties and organisations which were instruments in the hands of large-scale capital and the Western Powers.

ELECTIONS TO THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

There have been six elections to the West Berlin Chamber of Deputies since the split of Berlin was completed, as the following table shows.¹

Date ^a	SDP		CDU		FDP ^a		SUP-WB		Other Parties	
	votes, per cent	number of mandates	votes, per cent	number of mandates	votes, per cent	number of mandates	votes, per cent	number of mandates	votes, per cent	number of mandates
Dec. 3, 1950	44.7	61	24.6	34	23.0	32	did not partici- pate	GP ⁴ — 3.7, others — 4.0	—	—
Dec. 5, 1954	44.6 (50.4%)	64	30.4 (34.6%)	44	12.8 (15%)	19	2.7 —	GP — 4.9, others — 4.6	—	—
Dec. 7, 1958	52.1 (58.6%)	78	37.3 (41.4%)	55	8.8	—	1.9 —	GP — 3.3, others — 0.7	—	—
Feb. 17, 1963	61.9 (63.6%)	89	28.8 (29.3%)	41	7.9 (7.1%)	10	1.4 —	—	—	—
March 12, 1967	56.9	81	32.9	47	7.1	9	2.0 —	UIG ⁵ — 1.4	—	—
March 15, 1971	50.4	73	38.2	54	8.5	11	2.3 —	0.6	—	—

¹ Compiled on the basis of figures published in the *Statistisches Jahrbuch. Berlin*, 1964, Berlin, 1964; *Berlin (West)*, 1965, SS. 159-60; *Der Tag*, February 16, 1963; *Der Tagesspiegel*, March 4, 1967; *Telegraf*, March 16, 1971.

² The results of the elections of October 20, 1946, and December 5, 1948, are given in Chapter II.

³ In 1946 and 1948 it participated as the Liberal Democratic Party.

⁴ The German Party.

⁵ The first letters of a group called Union of Independent Germans which was formed in West Berlin shortly before the elections.

Since the split of Berlin the Social Democrats, in coalition with one of the bourgeois parties, have always formed the Senate. After the 1948 elections the SDP formed a coalition

with the CDU and the FDP. Then the Social Democrats ruled in coalition with the CDU alone. After the elections of February 17, 1963, they entered into a coalition with the FDP which existed until 1971.¹ As a result of the 1971 elections the Social Democrats formed a one-party Magistrate.

Until recently the ruling parties were capable neither of solving the problems facing West Berlin, nor putting the city on a course which would further its own interests and the cause of peace in the area. For a long time they remained in the cold-war trenches. West Berlin was faced with a dilemma: whether to remain a frontline city and a "preserve of the occupational order" with all the ensuing consequences, or find ways of normalising relations with its natural surrounding and ensuring favourable prospects for further development and a secure future. It was the latter course that won the decisive support of the overwhelming majority of West Berliners, and of late the Senate has also been forced to heed their views.

The Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin has been the most consistent champion of this course. However, as the city was under occupation and had the atmosphere of a frontline city, the SUP-WB, like the other democratic organisations and opposition forces there, encountered tremendous difficulties and obstacles and was frequently persecuted. Outlawed in 1961, for example, it was only allowed to resume its activity and organise open meetings in the city shortly before the 1963 elections.

The Party's central organ, *Die Wahrheit*, was placed in similarly difficult circumstances. Since its establishment in November 1955 it was forced to change its printing offices six times. In 1956 and 1957 the West Berlin authorities brought it to court on fabricated charges. It was banned in

¹ Ernst Reuter (SDP) was West Berlin's first Chief Burgomaster. After his death in 1953 the functions of the Chief Burgomaster pending the statutory elections were performed by Schreiber (CDU). Following the 1954 elections Otto Suhr (SDP) became the Chief Burgomaster; after his death in 1957 he was succeeded by Willy Brandt (SDP). With the formation in December 1966 of a new government in Bonn, in which Willy Brandt became Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister, Heinrich Albertz was made Chief Burgomaster. In October 1967, he was replaced by Klaus Schütz, also of the SDP.

1961 and the printing house where it was published was wrecked.

On the eve of the 1963 elections the West Berlin authorities lifted the ban, but in fact deprived the newspaper of the most elementary rights: they refused to deliver it by mail, prohibited its sale in newspaper stands and took other steps to interfere with its circulation. The Party had no access whatever to radio and television and it participated in the elections in the face of terror and persecution. In the past the police have often raided its offices and dispersed meetings it has organised.

There was another factor that considerably weakened the democratic movement in West Berlin: in the fifties tens of thousands of Communists and anti-fascists moved to the German Democratic Republic from the city where they were hounded and persecuted.¹

All this, naturally, affected the outcome of the elections to the Chamber of Deputies.

And though today the Party is not represented in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, it has boldly raised its voice in defence of the rights and interests of the working people, in support of the policy of common sense and mutual understanding and the transformation of West Berlin into a city of peace and security.

The Party made every effort to mobilise broad sections of the West Berlin population for action against the unlawful interference by the CDU/CSU administration in West Berlin's affairs, against the use of its territory for provocation against the socialist countries and for a normalisation of East-West relations, particularly relations with the German Democratic Republic.²

The West Berlin authorities hoped that anti-communism and psychological terror would enable them to turn the population, particularly the young people, into an obedient instrument. However, the reverse proved to be the case: despite favourable economic conditions, an ever greater number of West Berliners, including the younger generation, came into

¹ See: K. Kniestedt, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

² See: *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969, Prague, 1969*, p. 210.

conflict with the existing system and its rules. The internal political situation in West Berlin in recent years has been characterised by the mounting dissatisfaction of the population, direct action, particularly by young workers and students, against reaction, and the emergence of diverse opposition groups.

In the mid-sixties there appeared a so-called Republican Club and a number of other organisations of students and intellectuals, which came to be known as the extra-parliamentary opposition. Although the student movement in West Berlin has always been inclined to embrace ultra-Leftist ideas which are not infrequently used by the extremists of all hues to further their objectives, it is, as Gerhard Danelius pointed out, essentially progressive, mirroring the deep contradiction between the interests of the monopolies and the masses.¹

There has been increased activity on the part of the Liberal Union of Students and youth organisations associated with the Social Democratic Party, the trade unions and the Evangelical Church. Even though these organisations have different aspirations, all of them have intensified the fight for greater democratic freedoms and rights and the restriction of the monopoly rule. They are beginning to grasp the need for recognising the realities, particularly the GDR and the post-war frontiers, and are seeking the normalisation of West Berlin's relations with its neighbours.

Since the end of the sixties the Permanent Committee for Peace and National and International Mutual Understanding has been acting with greater determination. Its leadership repeatedly indicated that West Berlin could not do without a "new course", the elimination of all cold-war practices and the normalisation of relations with the GDR and other socialist countries.

Essentially this was also the position of the Civilian Committee. Established in 1968 with the former Chief Burgomaster of West Berlin, Heinrich Albertz, as its head, it included a number of Social Democrats with oppositional views and several prominent liberals.

The world-famous West Berlin director Professor E. En-

¹ See: *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, p. 213.

gel, the publicist Margret Boveri, prominent public figure Müller-Ganglow and many other well-known people openly supported the proposals to transform West Berlin from a frontline city into a city which would be an example of peace and mutual understanding between nations.

Democratic organisations and various opposition groups, workers, students, democrats and socialists gradually came to realise that they had common interests and began to co-ordinate their activity and act in concert.

In the process of co-operation with various anti-imperialist forces in West Berlin and in the struggle against the false political and ideological concepts of individual sections of the extra-parliamentary opposition the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin, as Gerhard Danelius put it, was still further consolidated and its influence with the working class and the students increased. Its work at industrial enterprises and amongst the trade unions also improved. The circulation of *Die Wahrheit* increased. The Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin became the recognised militant vanguard of the working people and an important political factor in the city. Its battlecry "Fight and conquer together; do not let us be smashed one by one!" is gaining growing support in the city.

The consolidation of a united front of Left-wing, genuinely progressive forces working for the normalisation of the situation in the city, for peace, democracy and socialism is one of the features of life in present-day West Berlin. It plays an important role in safeguarding the socio-economic and political gains of the working people, promoting West Berlin's peaceful development and helping to lessen tension and ensure security in Europe.

WEST BERLIN'S STATE AND LEGAL STATUS

West Berlin's administrative, political and social structure shows that from the standpoint of state law it is a state-political organism.

Being a specific territorial entity, West Berlin is not a part of any state and is a separate administrative and territorial unit with a clearly defined guarded border subject to special regulations. This separate administrative and territorial unit

has other attributes of statehood, including a flag,¹ coat of arms,² Constitution and organs of power and administration endowed with specific state prerogatives and performing certain state functions. West Berlin senators take the oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the city and not to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Chief Burgomaster is received in other countries as head of government. The West Berlin Senate concludes agreements with other states, including the GDR. The city has its own diplomatic and consular corps which by tradition is formally accredited to the military administration but which is in fact accredited to the Senate.

Due to West Berlin's specific development, its population has become what may be called a special community. Being the inhabitants of a special formation, West Berliners are neither FRG nor GDR citizens and have their own identification document called *Personalausweis*.

Thus, when Willy Brandt occupied the post of Chief Burgomaster he rebuffed the attacks of the CDU by saying that the Senate was "not an organ of power subordinated to the Federal Government, nor was it an imperial protectorate",³ neither was it the "long arm of the Federal Government".⁴ In other words, the Senate had the right to pursue an independent policy. Heinrich Albertz who succeeded Brandt as Chief Burgomaster also emphasised that the Senate was "not a branch of the Bonn Government".⁵

Nevertheless, the continuance of the occupation regime in the city seriously curtails West Berlin's rights, and its authorities are able to perform their functions only to the extent permitted by the military administration of the United States, Britain and France. Moreover, as will be shown in detail in Chapter V, West Berlin's rights were seriously impaired, too, by the illegal claims to the city and systematic interference

¹ The flag is rectangular with three horizontal stripes, the upper and the lower being red and the middle white. In the middle of the flag on the white stripe is a silhouette of a black bear standing on its hind legs.

² The coat of arms consists of a silhouette of a bear standing on its hind legs with a crown above it.

³ *Neues Deutschland*, February 21, 1964.

⁴ *Frankfurter Rundschau*, February 29, 1964.

⁵ *Die Wahrheit*, December 15, 1966.

in its affairs by the governments of Adenauer, Erhard and Kiesinger. This limited West Berlin's freedom of action and left a mark on its development. The very conditions in which the formation of West Berlin as a specific entity was taking place determined the features of its statehood. This is manifested in the way that this separate entity differed substantially from both the GDR and the FRG, and was developing, as the authors of the official preface to the West Berlin Constitution admit, in the direction of a so-called city-state.¹

In view of the above it can be said that West Berlin is a unique political formation which arose in the postwar period on German soil.

¹ See: *Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts*, Vol. I, p. 182.

CHAPTER V
WEST BERLIN'S STANDING
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

WHAT IS MEANT
BY THE "QUADRIPARTITE STATUS OF BERLIN"

The Great Powers—the members of the anti-Hitler coalition—began to work on policies and plans with regard to postwar Germany even in the first days of the war. These issues were on the agenda of all the Big Three meetings and were the subject of particular attention of the European Advisory Commission (EAC) which was principally concerned with drawing up the terms of Germany's unconditional surrender, delimiting the occupation zones and establishing a mechanism for implementing the Allied policy.

Anglo-US ruling circles discussed three possible ways of dealing with Germany, one of which would be submitted to the EAC: (1) not to conclude any agreement with the Soviet Union on zones of occupation, letting the Allied troops remain in the positions they would occupy at the end of the war; (2) sign an agreement on the joint occupation of Germany without dividing her into zones; (3) come to an agreement on dividing Germany into zones; the armed forces of the different sides would then occupy one zone each.

Two of these possibilities were soon discarded. The first one was rejected because London and Washington feared that the Soviet troops might advance too far to the west. The second aroused serious doubts inasmuch as it was considered extremely hazardous to let the Soviet troops reach the French borders. So the USA and Britain gave preference to the third variant which became the basis of all their proposals on Germany. Characteristically, all the drafts of the Western Powers were openly intended to infringe upon the interests of the USSR to as great an extent as possible. For example, the

US draft submitted to the EAC in the winter of 1944 envisaged that the Soviet zone should embrace only 22 per cent of the territory, population and production capacities of Germany.

As regards Berlin, the Western Powers at first planned to incorporate it into the Northwest Zone.¹ This sparked off a bitter controversy between the Americans and the British. Then, when Washington and London saw that their plans were unrealistic, their representatives on the EAC tried to get special sectors allotted to them in Berlin and sought permission to bring their troops into the city.

As the then head of the Soviet delegation on the Commission F. T. Gusev reaffirmed in a conversation with the author on March 3, 1972, the Soviet representatives proceeded from the basis that after the capitulation of Hitler's Reich it would be necessary to preserve Germany's political and economic unity and at the same time to divide the country into zones and subject her to a temporary occupation in order to implement the basic principles of the anti-Hitler coalition. The Soviet side held that Berlin, being the country's historical capital, should become the seat of her central organs and also the residence of the Allied military administration. Since Berlin was in the zone which was to be occupied by the Soviet troops, the Soviet side believed that it should remain an integral part of that zone. The city was to have been given a special status to ensure the normal operation of Allied central control bodies.

The Soviet draft conditions of surrender for Germany submitted for consideration by the EAC on February 15, 1944, proposed that they establish around Berlin a 10-15 kilometre zone which would be occupied jointly by the armed forces of the USSR, the United Kingdom and the USA. The Soviet side believed that this would be sufficient to guarantee the city's special status.

Seeking to consolidate their position in the centre of the Soviet Zone, the Western Powers demanded that their troops be allowed to enter the city proper and participate in its occupation on the grounds that this would afford their repre-

¹ See: Rankin Plan (summer of 1943) and Roosevelt's proposals of November 19, 1943, on occupation zones in Germany.

sentatives on the Control Council "equal" conditions with the Soviet representatives.

In an effort to achieve concerted Allied decisions on all questions, the Soviet side consented to the entry of the Western forces into Berlin provided that a "special order of occupation" was established for the city. This special order, or special system of occupation, envisaged that the Western Powers would not isolate Berlin from the Soviet Zone and only afforded them the right to joint administration of the city through the Allied Kommandatura *involving the administrative responsibility* of their military authorities in the Western Sectors and nothing more.

The Western Powers accepted this proposal. In a letter from Strang, the US representative on the EAC, of May 6, 1944,¹ the USA essentially no longer objected to the Soviet recommendations on the issue; it agreed that a "special order of occupation" had to be established for Berlin. The British had to follow suit. The understanding on this question was reflected in a draft agreement of June 29, 1944, on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of Greater Berlin, in which a special order for the occupation of the city was stipulated. The Western Powers were also forced to agree with the USSR proposals for increasing the size of the Soviet Zone of occupation. This time a draft drawn up by Britain envisaged the inclusion in the Soviet Zone of 40 per cent of the territory of Germany, 36 per cent of her population and 33 per cent of her production capacities, and the zones were delimited on the basis of this draft.

As a result of its hard work the EAC managed to pass decisions on all the basic issues concerning the administration and occupation of Germany as early as the autumn of 1944. The most important documents worked out by the Commission were as follows: a Protocol of the Agreement between the Governments of the USSR, USA and Britain on the Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Administration of Greater Berlin dated September 12, 1944,² which provided for the division of Germany into zones "for the purpose of occupa-

¹ Concerning the Soviet draft conditions of surrender for Germany.

² This Protocol (with amendment of November 14, 1944) was approved by Britain on December 5, 1944, the United States on February 2, 1945, and the USSR on February 6, 1945. On July 26, 1945, the USSR,

tion" and the delimiting of Berlin within the framework of the Soviet Zone into a "special area" occupied by the Four Powers for the purpose of "joint administration"; the agreement of November 14, 1944,¹ with regard to the organisation of the Allied control machinery in Germany in the "period during which Germany would be carrying out the basic requirements of unconditional surrender", and the establishment of the Control Council and the Allied Authorities (Kommandatura) operating under its "general direction"; finally, a number of decisions on Berlin approved by the Control Council and its agencies, or agreed by the commanders-in-chief of the Four Powers and their representatives in the summer and autumn of 1945 when the system of the quadripartite administration of Germany was created.²

The sum total of these decisions on Berlin which regulated its special status within the framework of the Soviet Zone of occupation came to be known as the quadripartite status of Berlin.

Since there has been no summary document defining Berlin's status it is incorrect to speak of its statute, as some writers are doing.³

This special status served only one purpose: to ensure the normal activity of the supreme organs of the military administration of the Four Powers, particularly of the Control Council, which was entrusted with the implementation of the agreed policy of the Four Powers on Germany, as laid down in the decisions of the Crimea and Potsdam conferences, during the period of her occupation. "The quadripartite status of Berlin appeared when it did because Berlin, as the capital

the USA and Britain entered into an agreement with the Provisional Government of the French Republic regarding amendments to the Protocol of September 12, 1944, whose purpose was to include France in the occupation of Germany and the administration of Berlin. The Soviet Government approved this agreement on August 13, 1945, the US Government on July 29, 1945, the British Government on August 2, 1945, and the French Government on August 7, 1945.

¹ France acceded to the agreement on May 1, 1945.

² The decision of the Control Council in Germany dated July 30, 1945 to assign the districts of Reinickendorf and Wedding for occupation by the French armed forces.

³ See: J. Zeprette, "Le Statut de Berlin", *Annuaire Français de Droit Information*, 1955.

of Germany, was designated as the seat of the Control Council, which was established in order to administer Germany in the initial period of the occupation."¹ This was reiterated in the notes of the Soviet Government and in the works of many international jurists.² No other considerations were taken into account when the special status for Berlin was defined in 1944-45.

In the West, however, the essence of the question of Berlin's status was distorted in every way and outright falsifications were invented in an effort to justify the exploitation of West Berlin in furtherance of aggressive intentions.

First and foremost the fact was denied that in establishing the quadripartite status for Berlin, all the parties concerned proceeded on the basis that the city was part of the Soviet Zone of occupation. The Berlin area, the US State Department has often declared in the past, was never a part of the territory of the Soviet Zone.³ "Berlin never belonged to the Soviet Occupation Zone",⁴ echoed Konrad Adenauer and his successors.

Seeking to "justify" this claim, Alois Riklin, Joachim Bentzien, Heinz Kreutzer, R. Legien and other bourgeois jurists are making an effort to prove that under the agreements of 1944-1945 Berlin was allegedly the "fifth occupation region",⁵ or a "special occupation zone in Germany independent of the other zones".⁶ They are also trying to deliberately hush up the fact that the military authorities of the Union States, Britain and France were granted only administrative responsibility in the Western Sectors.

Both the FRG and the Western Powers asserted that the agreements defining Berlin's quadripartite status had no connection whatsoever with the Potsdam decisions. In a note to the Soviet Government of December 31, 1958⁷, and in a

¹ The Soviet Government's note to the Governments of the Three Western Powers of November 27, 1958 (*Pravda*, November 28, 1958).

² See: Rudolf Arzinger, Walter Poeggel, *Westberlin—selbständige politische Einheit*, Berlin, 1965, p. 16.

³ A US State Department Statement of March 24, 1960.

⁴ *Die Welt*, November 22, 1958.

⁵ *Der Tagesspiegel*, October 9, 1964.

⁶ *Aussenpolitik*, 1961, No. 10, p. 687.

⁷ See: *Die Bemühungen der deutschen Regierung und ihrer Verbündeten um die Einheit Deutschlands 1955-1966*, 1966, p. 289.

number of other documents, the US Administration claimed that the status of Berlin does not depend on the Potsdam Agreement. To uphold their "rights" to the occupation of West Berlin, the Western Powers refer to the "victory" over Germany.

Finally, the Western Powers continually referred to the quadripartite status of Berlin, which they themselves had scrapped a long time before, to reinforce their position in West Berlin and in some way justify their attempts to meddle in the affairs of the capital of the German Democratic Republic.

Such an interpretation of the quadripartite decisions on Berlin of 1944-1945 and references to its quadripartite status are absolutely groundless and are contrary to widely known facts.

The most characteristic feature of Berlin's status was that it did not tear the city away from the Soviet Zone of occupation but regarded it as an integral part of that zone. It was never designated as a fifth zone of occupation. All the agreements on Germany and Berlin spoke only of the four zones of occupation and four commanders-in-chief. The very agreement on the zones of occupation was called Protocol on the Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Administration of Greater Berlin. Thereby it was underlined that Berlin was not a separate occupation zone. Many observers correctly note that in not a single quadripartite agreement was Berlin separated from the Soviet Zone nor detached from it in any other respect, except for the purpose of siting the control agencies, and only in this connection.

As F. T. Gusev noted in a conversation with the author on March 3, 1972, the principal basis on which the sides proceeded in solving the question of Berlin's status was that territorially the city was a part of the Soviet Zone. This was such a self-evident fact that the Western Powers entertained no doubts about it at the time. For this very reason not one of the agreements envisaged that the Western Powers would exercise supreme authority in Berlin or its Western sectors. The claims of the West Berlin jurist R. Legien that the Protocol on the Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Administration of Greater Berlin of September 12, 1944, and other pertinent documents do not draw a line between "supreme

authority" and "administration" and that "Berlin is occupied like the other parts of Germany"¹, do not correspond to reality. On the contrary, as the Memorandum of the German Democratic Republic of January 9, 1959, indicated, the agreements entered into by the Four Powers clearly differentiate between supreme authority, which belonged to the commanders-in-chief of the Four Powers in their own zones, and the administration of Berlin, which pertained to the Soviet Zone of occupation.² Furthermore, both during the preparations for these agreements and after their conclusion it was emphasised that the United States, Britain and France were only given the right to administrative management of Berlin jointly with the Soviet side through the Allied Kommandatura and to its occupation jointly with the USSR within the limits of the tasks defined by the Kommandatura. The Western representatives agreed.

In his letter of April 17, 1945, to the Soviet representative on the EAC, the British representative Lord Hood affirmed that the Berlin area was to be jointly occupied and that the Allied Kommandatura was being established solely for *its administration*. Directive No. 1 of the Control Council unequivocally stated that the term "Berlin Sectors" refers to the four sectors allotted to each of the four commandants for *administration* in the area of Greater Berlin.

An explanation from the British Liaison Headquarters with the Zonal Council in Hamburg in 1946 indicated that supreme authority in Germany was only exercised by the commanders-in-chief in their own occupation zones.³ The British Sector in Berlin, said the ordinance of the British Military Administration on the sphere of action of its legislation, was not a part of it.⁴

It could not be otherwise, for Greater Berlin was a constituent part of the Soviet Zone.

¹ Dr. R. Legien, *Die Viermächtevereinbärungen über Berlin. Ersatzlösungen für den Status Quo*, Berlin, 1961, p. 11.

² See: Rudolf Arzinger and Walter Poeggel, op. cit.; Gunter Förner, *DDR gewährleistet friedlichen Westberlin-Transit*, Berlin, 1969, pp. 12-15.

³ See: *Erklärung über die völkerrechtliche Lage Deutschlands*, September 16, 1946; *Jahrbuch für internationales und ausländisches öffentliches Recht*, Vol. 1, Hamburg, 1948, p. 188.

⁴ *Jahrbuch. . .*, p. 189.

That Berlin is a part of the Soviet Zone is also evidenced by the fact that there was a period when the United States intended to turn down the plans for creating a special regime for the city, for its joint occupation and for siting the Allied control agencies there, and preferred to have them in a more convenient place. Eisenhower admitted that at the beginning of 1945, that is, after the EAC had taken the decisions on the occupation zones in Germany, Roosevelt discussed the proposals of his (Eisenhower's) HQ not to agree to the joint occupation of Berlin and the establishment of a special regime for it, and to site the central control agencies of the Four Powers in a specially built township at the juncture of the Soviet, American and British zones, approximately 25 kilometres south of Göttingen.¹ These proposals, however, did not win the approval of the US Government because of the opposition of extreme Right-wing circles in the US ruling elite which was nurturing long-term aggressive plans. The fact that this question had been posed, however, shows that the Western Powers essentially regarded Berlin as a constituent part of the Soviet Occupation Zone. They would hardly have submitted such proposals if this had not been the case.

The practical activity of the Soviet Military Administration after the liberation of Berlin likewise left no doubt that territorially Berlin was a part of the Soviet Zone. In the first two postwar months Berlin was administered as a constituent part of the Soviet Zone through the Soviet Military Kommandatura which was established on April 28, 1945. Acting on the authorisation of the Soviet Command the Soviet Military Commandant of Berlin in Order No. 1 assumed supreme power in the city. At that time the Soviet military authorities in Berlin took steps to enforce the decisions of the anti-Hitler coalition and create the necessary conditions for promoting the activity of the anti-fascist forces of the German people.

Since Berlin was a part of the Soviet Zone, the first order of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAG) of June 9, 1945, announced that Berlin was to be its permanent location. SMAG Order No. 2 issued a day later, which permitted democratic parties to operate, and its subsequent

¹ See: *Der Spiegel*, 1962, No. 7, p. 14.

orders, for example, Order No. 3 of June 15 (on turning in weapons and ammunition) and Order No. 4 of July 6 (on turning in Soviet currency) were valid in Berlin also. This was never disputed by the Western Powers.

All SMAG decisions taken in the two months following the liberation of Berlin were confirmed in the first order of the Allied Kommandatura of July 11, 1945.¹

Some of the regulations and ordinances promulgated by SMAG were valid throughout Berlin even after the establishment of the Allied Kommandatura (G. K. Zhukov's orders: No. 15 of July 27, 1945, on the institution of strict control over the entry of settlers into Berlin; No. 21 of August 3, 1945, on the supply of the Berlin population; No. 78 of September 27, 1945, on radio broadcasting, and others). At the time the military administration of the three Western Powers upheld these regulations and ordinances. For example, on August 22, the Allied Kommandatura unanimously approved the decision on the distribution of coal in Berlin whose point "b" stated that the Soviet authorities would continue to issue orders concerning the transportation of coal inside the city limits of Berlin.²

Since Berlin was a part of the Soviet Zone, in Order No. 13 of July 25, 1945, which was promulgated while the Potsdam Conference was in session, SMAG altered the zoning of the territory under its jurisdiction, splitting up in particular the Brandenburg Province into four administrative districts: Brandenburg, Eberswalde, Cottbus and *Berlin*.

Another fact that was fully acknowledged by the military authorities of the three Western Powers and which also proved that Berlin was a part of the Soviet Zone was that its entire transportation network (railways, waterways, etc.) remained under the jurisdiction of the Soviet occupation authorities.³ Three weeks after the city came under the control of the Allied Kommandatura, SMAG, which exercised supreme authority in Berlin, issued a special proclamation announcing the establishment "on the territory of the Soviet

¹ See: F. Howley, *Berlin Command*, New York, 1950, p. 61.

² For details see: *Deutschland Frage und Ölkerrecht*, Vol. II, Berlin, 1962, p. 30.

³ See: *Juristische Rundschau*, Berlin, November 10, 1950 ("Die Rechtslage der Eisenbahnen und Wasserstrassen in Berlin").

Occupation Zone", including Berlin, of a Railway Directorate. Subsequently, on SMAG authorisation the communications were put under the jurisdiction of the German bodies in the Soviet Zone. The Western Powers recognised the legality of these decisions and abided by them.

In other words, at the time "Berlin was a constituent part of the Soviet Zone of occupation in political, economic and cultural respects,"¹ and the Soviet side dealt with many everyday matters in all its sectors.²

The fact that Berlin was a part of the Soviet Zone was recognised by many prominent bourgeois jurists, including an Englishman, F. A. Mann,³ and stipulated in quadripartite documents. For instance, the Control Council's report on the implementation of the Allied decisions on the democratisation of Germany, which was presented in February 1947 to the Council of Foreign Ministers as an official document, directly stated that Berlin was "the capital of the Soviet Zone of occupation."⁴

Recognition of this fact also formed the basis of the directive of August 30, 1948, from the Soviet, US, British and French Governments to the four commanders-in-chief of the occupation forces in Germany which envisaged the introduction of the "German Mark of the Soviet Zone as the single currency for Berlin".

Finally, if it was officially recognised that during the occupation Vienna was "a constituent part of the Soviet Zone"

¹ J. Rshewski, op. cit., p. 20.

² The Western Powers referred to the following documents of the Berlin Kommandatura in a futile attempt to support their claims that Berlin did not belong to the Soviet Zone: "On the Promulgation of Laws: Validity of the Laws, Directives and Orders"; "Telegraph and Telephone Communications Between Berlin and the Soviet Zone of Occupation"; "On Mailing Newspapers from Berlin to the Soviet Zone"; "On Postal Cheque Operations Between Berlin and the Soviet Zone" (all issued in early 1946) and others. These decisions simply took into account Berlin's special position in the Soviet Zone of occupation and the Soviet sphere of responsibility.

³ In his report on the status of Germany in 1947, F. A. Mann noted that Berlin was a part of the Soviet Zone (*Jahrbuch für internationales und ausländisches öffentliches Recht*, p. 189; *Süddeutsche Juristen-zeitung*, 1947, No. 417).

⁴ See: *Report of the Control Council in Germany to the Council of Foreign Ministers*, SMAG Publishers, Berlin, 1947, Section II, "Democratisation of Berlin", p. 44.

in Austria and had a "special regime solely within the framework of the supreme responsibility of the USSR for its zone of occupation", then what grounds were there to measure Berlin by a different yardstick? The occupation machinery was the same in both countries: Germany and Austria were divided into four zones and their capitals into as many sectors. On top of this both Vienna and Berlin were in the Soviet Zone and their legal status in it was determined by identical principles.

The fact that territorially Berlin belonged to the Soviet Zone is not in dispute. It would have been incompatible with Berlin's geographic and economic position and with the political aims proclaimed by the Allies if it had been turned into a special zone isolated from the surrounding territory. As regards the specific occupation and administrative functions "performed by the Western Powers within the framework of the Allied Kommandatura in Berlin, they had no bearing on the question of Berlin being territorially a part of the Soviet Zone of occupation".¹

Another feature of the quadripartite status of Berlin was that the participation of the Four Powers in the joint occupation and administration of Berlin had an absolutely specific objective—the implementation of the decisions of the Potsdam Conference on the extirpation of nazism and militarism and the introduction of measures ensuring Germany's peaceful, democratic development.

By stubbornly refuting this fact, the West intends to convince the world that the occupation was not in the least connected with the problems of demilitarisation, denazification and democratisation of life in Germany and Berlin, but stemmed from the unlimited "right of the victor". Hence, according to the reasoning of Western politicians this is their inalienable right, even if they use it to prepare another aggressive war rather than to ensure peace in Germany.

However, international law decisively rejects the so-called right of the victor and with it the reactionary theory of conquest (*debellatio*) advanced by the imperialist powers to

¹ G. Görner, op. cit., p. 14; J. Petrenkow, "Über einige völkerrechtliche Aspekte des Status von Westberlin", *Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, 1969, p. 153.

justify their aggressive plans and wars of aggrandisement. The rights of the Four Powers with regard to Germany stemmed from the agreements of the members of the anti-Hitler coalition and were determined by their joint struggle, the defeat of the aggressor and his responsibility for the war, and also by the general responsibility of the states for ensuring peace and security in the world. In any case, the Western Powers could not use the theory of *debellatio* to justify their attitude on West Berlin because they had never conquered the city, and only came into it several months later to fulfil specific tasks set out in international agreements and arrangements.

The efforts of R. Legien and other Western jurists to prove that the agreements on Berlin were not connected with the Potsdam decisions since these decisions had been adopted later and "make no mention of them"¹ were also ineffectual.

The tasks facing the anti-Hitler coalition and the aims of the Allied policy towards Germany were in the main formulated in the first years of the war, specifically in the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, and in the bilateral treaties signed by the Soviet Union with Britain and the United States. As the war drew to a close, these aims were particularised in the decisions of the Moscow Conference of the Prime Ministers of the Three Great Powers (October 1943), and the Tehran (November 1943) and Crimea (Yalta, February 1945) conferences of the Heads of Government of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain. In view of the Western Powers' stand, however, they were only drawn up into a comprehensive programme for Germany's postwar development at the Potsdam Conference.

The agreements defining the quadripartite status of Berlin were drawn up parallel to and in conjunction with the formulation of the basic principles of the Allied policy towards Germany. The decisions on Berlin were approved prior to the conclusion of the Potsdam Agreement because it proved easier to arrive at an understanding on them than to agree on the basic principles of the postwar policy on Germany.

The whole complex of decisions defining the quadripartite

¹ Dr. R. Legien, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

status of Berlin was not an end in itself but a way of accomplishing the tasks enunciated by the anti-Hitler coalition with regard to Germany, and consequently to any part of her territory, including Berlin.

Thus, the very first paragraph of the agreement of September 12, 1944, stated that Germany would be divided into zones "for the purpose of occupation" which were being worked out by the Allies. In a reference to the agreement of November 14, 1944, the US representative on the European Advisory Commission, Ambassador John G. Winant in a cable to the President likewise indicated that it only established "the mechanics essential to any programme that may be determined by those responsible for policy".¹ Therefore, the Heads of Government of the Three Powers only approved these agreements after arriving at an understanding in Yalta on the basic principles of Allied policy.

In other words, the decisions determining the quadripartite status of Berlin were of a subordinate nature, and only made sense in connection with the agreements reached at Yalta and Potsdam. The Soviet note of November 27, 1958, stated that the Potsdam Agreement is the "most concentrated expression of the commitments" undertaken by the Four Powers with regard to Germany, and "the other agreements entered into by the Four Powers with regard to the occupation of Germany, which are referred to by the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France to justify their rights in Western Berlin, were concluded to develop it".² "The quadripartite status of Berlin did not arise and exist in isolation from all the other Allied agreements on Germany, but was wholly subordinated to the basic tasks of the occupation of Germany in the initial postwar period as set forth in the Potsdam Agreement,"³ stated the Soviet Government's note of January 10, 1959, to the Governments of the three Western Powers.

Therefore, to deny that the quadripartite agreements on Berlin are dependent on the Potsdam Agreement, because they were formally signed before the Agreement was con-

¹ *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945*, p. 119.

² *Pravda*, November 28, 1958.

³ *Ibid.*, January 11, 1959.

cluded, is tantamount to distorting historical facts and flouting the elementary principles of international law.¹

The link between the decisions on Berlin and the Potsdam Agreement is so obvious that even many bourgeois historians do not question it. One of them, Alois Riklin, author of a fundamental work on the West Berlin question, writes: "The assertion that the Potsdam Agreement has nothing in common with the quadripartite status of Berlin, since no direct mention of it is made in this Agreement, is unfounded."²

Finally, another feature of the quadripartite status of Berlin was that it was not termless. The joint occupation and administration of Berlin, just as the quadripartite occupation and administration of the whole of Germany, was established for the period required to fulfil the basic demands of the anti-Hitler coalition. Since the special status of Berlin was based on the temporary occupation and joint administration of the city, it, too, had a temporary character. According to the generally recognised principles of contemporary international law, any occupation, however long it might last, is a temporary phenomenon. "The USSR never signed any agreement envisaging the permanent occupation of Germany or West Berlin," noted Andrei Gromyko. "Any occupation is a temporary phenomenon, and that has been clearly stipulated in the relevant agreements."³

So by abandoning an agreed policy in German affairs, grossly violating the Potsdam Agreement and splitting Germany and Berlin the Western Powers also wrecked the quadripartite status of that city. After the Western Powers had blasted the single organs of city self-government and the Allied Kommandatura and established special tripartite organs in West Berlin, and after the occupation regime in the GDR and its capital had been abolished, there could no longer be any talk about quadripartite responsibility for the whole of Berlin or of a quadripartite status of the city.⁴ Many Western observers note that the so-called quadripartite status

¹ See: *Staat und Recht*, January 1959, No. 1, p. 9.

² Alois Riklin, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

³ *Pravda*, April 25, 1962.

⁴ See: J. Rshewski, *op. cit.*, p. 51; Rudolf Arzinger, Walter Poeggel, *op. cit.*; J. Petrenkow, *op. cit.*

of Berlin has been a dead letter since the end of 1948.¹ As the Soviet Government has repeatedly pointed out,² the special status of West Berlin was the only thing that could be discussed.³

BERLIN AFTER THE SPLIT OF GERMANY

With the split of Germany and the emergence of two independent states on German soil the question arose of what should be done with Berlin. Since the city lay inside the Soviet Zone of occupation and was an integral part of it, it was proclaimed as the capital of the GDR in the Constitution of the newly formed Republic. This was a legitimate and justified decision, because by virtue of its geographic and legal position Berlin could belong only to the GDR as mentioned in the statements and notes of the Soviet Government and in the works of Soviet and GDR writers.⁴

As soon as the GDR was formed the Soviet Command began to hand over the administrative functions exercised by the Soviet Military Administration to the appropriate agencies in the Republic. The administrative functions in Berlin were transferred to the Magistrate on November 12, 1949.

The Soviet Control Commission (SCC) which in contrast to the SMAG had only control functions in the subsequent years was abolished in 1952. Simultaneously the Soviet military authorities relinquished their control over the activity of the German administration in the GDR, including its capital. The post of USSR High Commissioner in Germany was instituted. His sole task was to observe the implementation of the quadripartite decisions by the German bodies.

¹ See: *Berlin—Brennpunkt*. . . , p. 77.

² See: Soviet Government's note of July 28, 1960, to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France (*Pravda*, July 30, 1960).

³ See: Memorandum from the Soviet Government handed over to the Government of the FRG by S. K. Tsarapkin on July 5, 1968 (*Izvestia*, July 13, 1968); A. A. Gromyko's report to the USSR Supreme Soviet on July 10, 1969 (*Pravda*, July 11, 1969).

⁴ See: *Izvestia*, November 28, 1958; Rudolf Arzinger, Walter Poegel, op. cit.; J. Rshewski, op. cit., p. 76; V. Boldyrew, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

The next step, that went a long way towards consolidating the German Democratic Republic as an independent sovereign state, was the Soviet Government's Declaration of March 25, 1954, on USSR-GDR relations. Ending "surveillance of the activity of state organs of the German Democratic Republic which was hitherto conducted by the USSR High Commissioner to Germany", it proclaimed that the Soviet Union had established the same kind of relations with the GDR as it had "with other sovereign states."¹

The act which formalised the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic in international law was the treaty on the relations between the USSR and the GDR signed in Moscow on September 20, 1955. Under this treaty the "German Democratic Republic," as the Soviet note of September 27, 1960, to the Governments of the three Western Powers emphasised, "wields full power on the territory over which it exercises sovereignty, including its capital." The Soviet Union also transferred to the GDR the functions of guarding and controlling the border with West Berlin and the communications between West Berlin and West Germany passing through GDR territory. Henceforth the Soviet side only exercised control over the transport of personnel and goods from the West Berlin garrisons of the three Western Powers.²

On the same day, September 20, 1955, the position of USSR High Commissioner to Germany was abolished. The Soviet Ambassador in the GDR assumed responsibility for maintaining contacts on West Berlin and German affairs as a whole with the ambassadors of three Western Powers in the FRG (whose Governments had authorised them to perform these functions).³

¹ *Pravda*, March 26, 1954.

² See: The exchange of letters between V. Zorin and L. Bolz of September 20, 1955, during the signing of the treaty on the relations between the USSR and the GDR (*Pravda*, September 21, 1955); the statement of November 6, 1963, by the press officer at the Foreign Affairs Department of the Command of the Group of Soviet Troops in Germany to press representatives (*Pravda*, November 7, 1963); the note of November 21, 1963, from the USSR Foreign Ministry to the US Embassy in Moscow (*Pravda*, November 22, 1963).

³ Shortly after the signing of the USSR-GDR Treaty of September 20, 1955, the Soviet Command issued an order replacing the Soviet

Having split up Berlin and wrecked its quadripartite status, the Western Powers hastened the creation of a separate administration in the city's Western Sectors. On December 21, 1948, they set up a tripartite governing authority which illegally called itself the Allied Kommandatura of Berlin,¹ and on May 14, 1949, introduced a so-called statute for the city of Berlin which came to be known as the "lesser occupation statute" of West Berlin.²

This act proclaimed the establishment of supreme authority of military administration for the three Western Powers in the western part of Berlin and considerably curtailed the rights of the West Berlin self-government bodies. The "occupation statute" ruled that the Allied authorities retained all the rights which were necessary in the extraordinary conditions to guarantee law and order, and to stabilise the city's military and economic position.³

"Kommandatura of Berlin" with the "Kommandatura of the Garrison of Soviet Troops in Berlin". This decision underlined that the rights of the Soviet commandant were confined to the execution of routine commandant duties and that he was not invested with command or administrative functions with regard to the authorities of the GDR capital. On August 23, 1962, the USSR Defence Minister abolished the Kommandatura altogether. Questions of control over the movement of personnel and goods from the US, British and French garrisons in West Berlin remained under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union by the USSR-GDR Treaty of September 20, 1955, and the responsibility for guarding the Spandau prison and the monument in Tiergarten was transferred to the HQ of the Group of Soviet Troops in Germany (see: *Pravda*, August 23, 1962). The GDR authorities appointed their own military commandant in Berlin. With the introduction of these measures the Western Powers no longer had any grounds for continuing their efforts to refer to the non-existent quadripartite status of Berlin and use it as a pretext for interfering in the internal affairs of the German Democratic Republic.

¹ *Berlin. Ringen um Einheit und Wiederaufbau 1948-1951*, p. 67.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 239-40.

³ The West Berlin authorities were only granted specific self-government rights within the framework of this Occupation Statute. As regards questions that came under the jurisdiction of the Allied authorities, the Occupation Statute of May 14, 1949, stated that Berlin (West) had the right, after obtaining the consent of the Allied authorities, to issue legislation and undertake corresponding measures unless the Allied authorities ruled otherwise or if these instructions and actions did not contradict the decisions and actions of the occupation authorities (*Dokumente zur Berlin-Frage*, p. 117).

The Occupation Statute of 1949 finalised the split of Berlin and the separate development of its western part and thus undermined the legal basis for the presence of the occupation troops of the Western Powers there.

Even after it had been altered on March 7, 1951, the Occupation Statute for West Berlin still prescribed the "unconditional preservation" by the separate tripartite governing authorities of "full powers" in a number of key areas "as a guarantee for achieving the basic aims of the occupation". Although expressing the hope that the occupation authorities would not interfere in areas outside their jurisdiction, the commandants stated that they "reserve the right to re-assume full or partial authority if they consider this necessary to ensure security or preserve the democratic administration, or if it is in line with the international commitments of their governments", and that they would give advance notice and state the reason for their decision to the appropriate German organs.¹

The Paris agreements of October 1954 did not abolish the occupation regime in West Berlin. On the contrary, Article 2 of the so-called German Treaty, which is a part of these agreements, stipulated that the Three Powers retained the rights and duties they had hitherto been fulfilling or which they exercised with regard to Berlin. At the same time the Western Powers issued a statement on the so-called guarantees of Berlin's security reaffirming their intention to keep the occupation forces in West Berlin "for as long as their commitments oblige them to do so",² that is, in fact to perpetuate the occupation.

On May 5, 1955, the day the Paris agreements came into force, the US, British and French military commandants in West Berlin issued a statement on relations with the West Berlin authorities. Although the 1951 Occupation Statute was formally revoked, the occupation regime was preserved in a slightly altered form, since the statement clearly supported the claims of the Western Powers to "supreme", or unlimited, power. "The Allied authorities," the statement said, "retain the right whenever necessary to take measures essen-

¹ *Dokumente zur Berlin-Frage 1944-1962*, p. 116.

² *Ibid.*, p. 234.

tial to the fulfilment of their international commitments, the maintenance of public order and the preservation of the status and security of Berlin, its economy, trade and communications."¹

Hence, the US, British and French military authorities reserved fairly extensive rights with regard to West Berlin in all spheres of activity, from the city's "relations with foreign authorities" to the "right to issue instructions to the Berlin police", that is, everything necessary to exercise full control over West Berlin.

The Statement of May 5, 1955, has remained a formal basis for mutual relations between the military administration of the three Western Powers and West Berlin bodies, and the document with which they have sought to fortify their "rights" to continue the occupation of the city. The representatives of the tripartite authorities still attend the sittings of the Chamber of Deputies where special seats are reserved for them. They also attend the sittings of the Senate whenever they find it necessary, and are in full control over the activities of the West Berlin authorities.

THE ILLEGAL CLAIMS OF THE FRG TO WEST BERLIN

Even before the FRG had been formally constituted the West German authorities made undisguised and completely groundless claims not only to the Western Sectors of Berlin occupied by the US, British and French troops, but to the whole city. They did their best to take over Berlin, proclaiming it a part of the separate West German state.

At its very first sitting on September 1, 1948, the so-called Parliamentary Council decided to invite five representatives from Berlin "as guests with a deliberative vote" to take part in its work² in the hope that this would fortify West Germany's claims to Berlin.

The West German draft Constitution which was drawn up in February 1949, envisaged the inclusion of Berlin as

¹ *Documente zur Berlin-Frage 1944-1962*, p. 217.

² *Der Spiegel*, 1961, No. 51, p. 26.

a Land in the separate West German state which was being created at the time. The enormity of this claim to foreign territory forced even the Western Powers to come down on the revanchists in Bonn. The US, British and French military governors vetoed this part of the draft Bonn Constitution, thus abrogating the provisions on Berlin. In a memorandum of March 2, 1949, to the Parliamentary Council, they indicated that "in view of the present situation, that part of Article 23 which deals with Berlin must be repealed".¹ In another letter to the Parliamentary Council of April 22, they once again noted that the three Western Powers "cannot agree to the inclusion of Berlin with the rights of a Land in the Federal Republic of Germany which is about to be created".²

Yet, in spite of the Western Powers' position, the draft of the Bonn Constitution was not changed. It proclaimed the inclusion of Berlin as a Land in the FRG (Article 23)³ and emphasised Berlin's right to send representatives to the Bundestag (Article 144)⁴. On May 8, 1949, the Parliamentary Council and representatives from West Berlin approved the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany.

In response to this the Western Powers made a declaration on the Constitution, invalidating those provisions on Berlin which did not take their position into account. In their letters of May 12, 1949, to the Parliamentary Council, the military governors of the Western Powers stated: "In our interpretation Articles 23 and 144, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law represent the acceptance of our earlier wish that *Berlin will not be granted membership to the Bundestag or the*

¹ *Dokumente zur Berlin-Frage 1944-1962*, p. 112.

² *Ibid.*, p. 113.

³ Article 23 stated: "So far this Basic Law is in force in the following Länder: Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Greater Berlin, Hamburg, Hessen, Lower Saxony, N. Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Pfalz, Schleswig-Holstein, Württemberg-Baden, Württemberg-Hohenzollern. In other parts of Germany it must be put into effect after their accession to the Federation" (*Documente zur Berlin-Frage 1944-1962*, p. 124).

⁴ Article 144 stated in this connection that "since the application of the Basic Law in any one of the Länder listed in Article 23, or in a part of any one of these Länder is limited, this Land or a part of it has the right ... to send its representatives to the Bundestag and the Bundesrat" (*Ibid.*).

Bundesrat with the right to vote and will not be governed by the Federation."¹

Acting on Bonn's instructions the West Berlin Chamber of Deputies took a special decision at the end of June 1949 demanding "the removal of the veto on Article 23 and the inclusion of Berlin (West) in the Federal Republic" as the twelfth Land, since the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers had not led to the re-establishment of German unity but simply "created a new situation".² At the same time it authorised the Senate to begin preparations in West Berlin for elections to the Bundestag.

The tripartite authorities, however, were against the elections. They stated in their reply that "the military governors are of the opinion that nothing has changed in the relations between Berlin (West) and the Federal Republic as a result of the Paris conference. . . . Therefore the Allied authorities have issued instructions that elections to the Bundestag cannot be held".³

In January 1952 the high commissioners of the three Western Powers amended the "Law on the Position of Land Berlin (West) in the Financial System of the Federation", in which were expressed the Federal Republic's overt claims to West Berlin. They revoked the provisions on the inclusion of the city in the field of action of the Federal Constitution and the extension of the Federal law as such to the city.⁴

The Western Powers reaffirmed their view that West Berlin did not belong to the Federal Republic whilst the Paris agreements were being prepared.

In December 1952 the Allied authorities prohibited the extension of the law on the Federal Constitutional Court to West Berlin, for otherwise the city "would have looked like a constituent part of the Federation."⁵

In June 1953 and March 1956, the Western Powers demanded that Bonn amend the law on elections to the Bundestag which made provision for the participation of West Berliners.

¹ *Dokumente zur Berlin-Frage 1944-1962*, pp. 124-25.

² *Der Spiegel*, 1961, No. 51, p. 27.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Dokumente zur Berlin-Frage 1944-1959*, pp. 193-94.

⁵ *Der Spiegel*, 1961, No. 51, p. 24.

The Western Powers continued to maintain that West Berlin was not a part of the FRG.¹ Early in January 1964, for example, the head of the Post and Information Department of the West Berlin Senate, Egon Bahr, reaffirmed that the French Government had never removed its provisos to the effect that West Berlin was not a Land of the FRG and could not be governed by it.² In a special analysis, *Situation in Berlin*, issued in July 1961, the US Department of State underlined that Berlin (West) was not a part of the Federal Republic.³ The British Government adhered to a similar view. In November 1964 the then Foreign Secretary Gordon Walker reiterated the British Government's repeated statement that Berlin (West) "did not and does not belong" to the FRG and subsequently the British Government reaffirmed that it recognised the city bodies as the sole executive state authority in Berlin (West).⁴

France, the United States and Great Britain also made similar repeated statements in subsequent years.

However, while generally adhering to the principle of not recognising Berlin as a constituent part of the Federal Republic, the Western Powers were interested in using the city as a springboard for subversive activity against the GDR and other socialist countries. To further this aim they had to reckon to an ever greater degree with the FRG which became their principal ally on the European continent. *In the fifties and sixties they went a long way towards supporting the illegal claims of the Adenauer, Erhard and Kiesinger governments to West Berlin and even "legalised" them to a considerable extent.*

No sooner had the separate West German state been formed than Bonn began to extend the field of action of the international treaties and agreements entered into by the FRG to West Berlin. After consulting the FRG Government and the West Berlin Senate, the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France reaffirmed in a statement issued by the three-power authorities on May 21,

¹ *Der Tagesspiegel*, June 13, 1967.

² *Neues Deutschland*, January 5, 1964.

³ See: *Berlin 1961—eine Analyse des US-Aussenministeriums*, Bad Godesberg, 1961.

⁴ *Neues Deutschland*, April 1, 1965.

1952, that they would not object to the inclusion of West Berlin in the international agreements and commitments of the Federal Republic, provided that this be done in keeping with a number of specially stipulated conditions. When the Paris agreements came into force, the Western Powers reiterated their stand on this issue in a statement from their commandants on May 5, 1955. This meant that, in effect, they had agreed to a fairly extensive inclusion of West Berlin into the foreign policy commitments of the FRG, provided that this did not affect the rights of the occupation authorities in the city.

By 1969 West Berlin had passed more than 60 laws in which Bonn and the Senate considered the city to be participating in almost all the treaties and agreements signed by the FRG with foreign states (barring treaties and agreements of a military character), including the complex of agreements pertaining to the so-called West European integration (European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, or the Common Market, and the European Atomic Energy Community, or Euratom).

In reply to Konrad Adenauer's solicitations, the high commissioners of the three Western Powers informed him in a letter of May 26, 1952, that they would not object if Berlin (West), in keeping with the accepted procedure laid down by their authorities, also introduced legislation from the Federal Republic, particularly laws on currency, credit and devises, citizenship, passport system, emigration and immigration, extradition, uniformity in the field of customs and trade, and also with regard to agreements on trade and navigation, the development of commodity turnover and trade and payments agreements.¹ Accordingly, Bonn regarded West Berlin as included in the FRG legal system and the Federal laws, which have a so-called Berlin reservation and which did not encounter the objections of the military authorities of the three Western Powers,² as operating in the city.³

¹ Dr. R. Legien, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

² Practically all the Federal laws, with the exception of the law on general military service of July 21, 1956, the FRG legislation on military preparations and also laws whose application in West Berlin was prohibited by the military administration of the three Western Powers.

³ It should be noted, however, that Federal legislation, just as international agreements entered into by the Federal Republic, could not

Bonn also managed to get the green light from the Western Powers to represent the interests of West Berlin abroad. This was formalised in letters exchanged by the High Commissioners of the Western Powers and the FRG Government in connection with the signing of the Paris agreements and the abolition of the occupation regime in West Germany.

In the fifties the Federal Republic contrived to absorb West Berlin into its own economy and include it in its systems of finance, customs and trade. The city had the same currency and accounts system as the FRG and monetary affairs in both West Berlin and the Federal Republic were handled by one and the same credit and finance institutions. Their economic ties were just as closely intertwined.

Bonn also went a long way towards placing West Berlin under its administrative and political control and flooded the city with various Federal officials bodies.¹

The first Federal departments began operating in West Berlin as early as 1950. By the end of 1952 they employed a total of 1,031 people, or 2 per cent of the Federal civil servants.

be automatically extended to West Berlin. They became effective only if approved by the Chamber of Deputies, and consequently were the result of the legislative activity of the West Berlin authorities themselves. In other words, the decision of the city's supreme organs of power was all important for transforming FRG laws into operating laws in West Berlin.

¹ On October 21, 1949, the Bundestag authorised the Government "to ascertain which agencies and in what numbers, could be moved to Berlin (West) without detriment" (*Beschluss des Bundestages in 13. Sitzung. Protokolle*, p. 307). On February 28, 1950, the Government reached a decision making provision not only for the establishment of representation in Berlin (West), but also the "swiftest possible transference there of competent Federal bodies, despite the existing difficulties of maintaining communication with them". Following Chancellor Adenauer's talks with Chief Burgomaster Reuter, the Government on March 24, 1950, decided to open branches of the Federal ministries in West Berlin and also a number of Federal courts and departments (including the department of inter-zonal trade, the Federal Printers and others). On May 11, 1950, the Bundestag recommended economic organisations to move their control centres to West Berlin to "help strengthen the city's economic position" (*Sitzungsprotokoll der 63. Sitzung*, p. 2306). The West Berlin Chamber of Deputies not only supported these measures, but summoned Bonn to act with greater determination to incorporate West Berlin into the Federal Republic of Germany.

When the Paris agreements came into force, Bonn began to press its illegal claims to West Berlin with still greater determination. In the autumn of 1955 the Federal Republic held the first meeting of the Bundestag in West Berlin, and on March 16, 1956, a plenary meeting of the Bundesrat. Early in 1957 the Bundestag recommended the Government to expand the Federal bodies in West Berlin to a still greater extent. Among other things, the Bundestag decision envisaged the "re-instatement of Berlin as the capital of Germany", repairs to the former Reichstag building, the establishment of the presidential residence in Bellevue Palace and the transference of Federal courts and a number of ministries and departments to West Berlin.

In the next few years Federal bodies sprung up like mushrooms in West Berlin. In 1957 they numbered 34 and in 1969 almost 100.¹ In 1957 they employed approximately 12,000,² and in 1970, 23,000 people.³ In other words, one out of every six people in the Federal service worked in West Berlin, which meant that there were many more Federal employees there than in the FRG capital, Bonn, or in any other West German city.

Federal ministers, the Chancellor and the President all increased the frequency of their visits to West Berlin. While in office Chancellor Adenauer went to West Berlin 26 times.⁴ However, this was nothing compared to Ludwig Erhard who made more than 50 trips to West Berlin⁵ from the day the FRG was established to the day when he became

¹ Fifteen of them were branches of the Federal ministries, including the Ministry of Defence, and had their premises in Bundeshaus in the centre of the city. Three were departments of the Office of the Federal President, two were departments of the Office of the Federal Chancellor and there was one department of the Administrative Service of the Bundestag. The rest were Federal institutions directly answerable to the branches of the Federal ministries. Moreover, there were 19 medical and biological institutes and centres, five labour departments and a so-called investment committee, all of which should also be regarded as Federal institutions.

² *Bulletin des Press-und-Informationsmates der Bundesregierung*, 1957, No. 3.

³ *Der Spiegel*, 1970, No. 36, p. 24.

⁴ See: *Die Welt*, October 9, 1963.

⁵ *Ibid.*, October 28, 1963.

Chancellor. Once in office he continued to regularly visit the city as did his successor Kiesinger.

Parliamentary factions and various Bundestag and Bundesrat committees met more and more often in West Berlin. The Bundestag also organised its so-called working weeks in the city and the Federal Assembly met to elect the Federal President.

On October 7, 1964, the Federal Government held a meeting in West Berlin,¹ and early in 1965 even the Defence Committee held its sittings there.²

It was with the help of these acts that the CDU/CSU Government sought to uphold its illegal claims to this special entity and to "involve West Berlin in the West German state policy to such a degree," as Otto Winzer pointed out, "as to give it in effect the status of a full and equal Federal Land".³ The Bonn revanchists and their supporters on the banks of the Spree worked more and more persistently to get West Berlin incorporated into the FRG. Specifically they demanded that the jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court be extended to West Berlin,⁴ that all the Federal laws be automatically introduced into the city, West Berlin deputies given equal rights in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, West Berliners allowed to vote in the elections to the Bonn Parliament, that regular meetings of both its chambers and of the Federal Government be held in West Berlin, and so forth.⁵

It was clear that Bonn could only have gone so far in pressing its illegal claim to West Berlin with the direct or tacit support of the ruling circles in the West, principally the United States.

However, Bonn's activity with regard to West Berlin acquired such proportions when the governments of Ludwig Erhard and Kurt Kiesinger were in power that even

¹ See: *Der Tagesspiegel*, October 8, 1964.

² They were attended by Defence Minister Hassel and Air Force Commander Lieutenant-General Panitzki.

³ *Neues Deutschland*, April 10, 1965.

⁴ Earlier the Western occupation authorities did not permit the extension of the Law on the Constitutional Court of March 12, 1951, to West Berlin (R. Legien, *Die Viermächtevereinbarungen über Berlin*, p. 49).

⁵ See: *Spandauer Volksblatt*. January 31, 1965.

Washington, London and Paris began to show signs of apprehension. Consequently, in the latter half of the sixties, the Western Powers took steps to keep the FRG in check. For instance, they objected to Bonn's intention to hold a sitting of the Bundestag in West Berlin on April 7, 1965, and when the Federal Government insisted on having its own way, they declared that if the USSR and the GDR resorted to counter-measures not directly affecting the interests of the United States, Britain and France, the FRG should not count on their support. The three Western governments also used Bonn's intention to hold a provocative meeting of the Bundestag in Berlin "as a pretext for making it clear to Bonn that they were not inclined to sacrifice their own interests in West Berlin and unconditionally follow the adventurist course of the West German ultras".¹

The Western Powers adopted a similar stand in the summer of 1965, when Erhard tried to prompt them into action to counteract the GDR's new regulations on its communications between West Berlin and West Germany designed to remove the survivals of the occupation period which the FRG had been using in its own interests,² and also in the period from 1967 to 1969 when on Kiesinger's instructions further provocative steps were taken there.

For instance, in response to Bonn's attempts to extend the competence of the Federal Constitutional Court to West Berlin without the permission of the Western Powers, the tripartite authorities in a letter of May 24, 1967, to the Chief Burgomaster and the President of the Chamber of Deputies emphasised that in the opinion of the Western Powers "Berlin (West) should not be regarded as a Land of the Federal Republic and should not be governed by the Federation", and consequently the Federal Constitutional Court "has no jurisdiction with regard to Berlin (West)".³

The United States, Britain and France intentionally

¹ *Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, 1965, No. 10, pp. 1161-62.

² On July 1, 1965, the GDR introduced a new internal tariff on railway traffic between West Berlin and the FRG and a new system for processing the accompanying documents. It also introduced a new procedure for the transportation of goods by waterways, giving it the character of ordinary inter-state transportation.

³ *Der Tagesspiegel*, June 13, 1967.

adopted this contradictory attitude with regard to the Federal Republic's illegal claims to West Berlin and Bonn's provocations, either condoning them, or from time to time reining in the West German ultras. On the one hand, the Western Powers had to show at least some degree of consideration for the FRG which was an ally of theirs; on the other, they were becoming more and more apprehensive that excessive support for the demands of Bonn, which showed less and less restraint in its claims when the CDU/CSU Government was in power, not only undermined their own positions, but could also weaken their hold over the Federal Republic. Furthermore, it was feared in London and Washington that the provocative activity of the Bonn authorities automatically confirmed the truth of the arguments advanced by the USSR and the GDR about the abnormal state of affairs in West Berlin and the need to do something about it.¹ In other words, the stand of the Western Powers concerning Bonn's claims to West Berlin was due not so much to their desire to divorce themselves from Bonn's revanchist pretensions to foreign territories, but rather to their fear of undermining their own position in the area.

To justify their policy of annexing West Berlin, both Adenauer, Erhard and Kiesinger pointed to the fact that the Bonn Constitution proclaimed it a Land of the FRG. This argument, however, holds no water, for being an instrument embodying the inner-state law, the FRG Constitution cannot specify to whom a territory belongs in inter-state relations. Even if the Western Powers had gone as far as Bonn wished, it would not have provided any legal basis for such an act since recognition which contradicts the principles of international law cannot create a legal basis for any claims whatever.

Just as untenable are references to the FRG gradually acquiring sovereignty over West Berlin as the military administrations of the Western Powers turned over their rights to the Federal Republic, for *West Berlin had never belonged to the Western Powers and consequently they could not transfer to the FRG that which did not belong to them.*²

¹ See: *Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, 1965, No. 10, pp. 1162-63.

² See: *Deutschlandfrage und Völkerrecht*, Vol. 11, p. 28.

Occupation, however long it might last, cannot of itself, predetermine the question of the territorial appurtenance of any given region.

Therefore, as soon as the West German Parliamentary Council advanced its illegal claims to West Berlin early in 1949, the Soviet Union resolutely and unconditionally rejected them as being totally groundless. A statement issued by the SMAG Information Bureau on February 11, 1949, said that being situated in the Soviet Zone of occupation and being connected with it, Berlin could in no way be included in a separate West German state. The Soviet Union has adhered to this stand ever since.

Moreover, the USSR and the German Democratic Republic declared time and again that they would never allow West Berlin to be included in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The joint communique of September 24, 1965, on the visit of a GDR Party and Government delegation to the USSR noted the following with regard to this: "The sides have taken notice of the intensification of revanchist activity of the FRG ruling circles in West Berlin and in this connection have found it necessary to stress that West Berlin does not and will never belong to the FRG. The Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic . . . declare their determination to take all necessary measures to put a stop to the provocations of the revanchist and militarist forces in West Berlin and counter all attempts to illegally incorporate West Berlin in the FRG."¹

A similar warning was issued in a joint communique of December 12, 1967, on the results of the Moscow visit of a GDR Party and Government delegation which classed the Federal Republic's pretensions to West Berlin as a manifestation of Bonn's aggressive course and cautioned that they would meet with a "decisive rebuff".² This warning was repeated in the letters from Soviet Ambassador S. K. Tsarapkin to Vice-Chancellor Willy Brandt of January 6, 1968,³ and from Soviet Ambassador P. A. Abrasimov to Chief

¹ *Pravda*, September 28, 1965.

² *Ibid.*, December 13, 1967.

³ See: *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, January 29, 1968.

Burgomaster Klaus Schutz of January 18, 1968,¹ and also in a number of subsequent letters to the ambassadors of the three Western Powers and special statements for the press.²

Nevertheless, the CDU/CSU leadership disregarded the warnings. Taking advantage of the undisguised support of the Senate and the condonement of the military administration of the three Western Powers, Kiesinger's government continued to steer a course to increase the "integration" of West Berlin into the FRG. Neo-nazi elements stepped up their activity in West Berlin and the city was being dragged into Bundeswehr's military preparations on an ever increasing scale. More and more Federal bodies were being moved into the city. Early in March 1968, on Kiesinger's insistence another "parliamentary week" and a demonstrative meeting of the cabinet, which for the first time was attended by the Federal Defence Minister, were held in West Berlin. In November 1968, a Federal Congress of the CDU, which approved a programme of action reasserting the Federal Republic's illegal pretensions to West Berlin, was held in the city, and on March 5, 1969, the Federal Assembly met there to elect a new Federal President.

Whenever an exhibition or an international congress was held in West Berlin, Kiesinger, immediately sent his emissaries so that it would take place under the Federal flag and ostentatiously emphasise the "presence" of the FRG in West Berlin.

Naturally such a policy on West Berlin evoked an appropriate reaction from the countries of the socialist community. Thus, wherever Bonn after plunging into a delirium of revanchist passions began to overstep the mark the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic would cool the aggressive zeal of the West German militarists and provocateurs with measures they could not fail to understand.

On March 10, 1968, on the order of the GDR Interior Minister NDP members and persons engaged in neo-nazi

¹ See: *Die Wahrheit*, January 27-28, 1968.

² For example, P. A. Abrasimov's letter of February 14, 1968, to the ambassadors of the United States, the United Kingdom and France (*Pravda*, February 15, 1968); P. A. Abrasimov's statement to the press of March 4, 1968 (*Izvestia*, March 5, 1968).

activity were henceforth not allowed to enter West Berlin through the territory of the German Democratic Republic.¹

On April 13, 1968, the Minister prohibited members and high officials of the Federal Government from travelling across the GDR to West Berlin to perform official functions there.²

On June 11, 1968, in response to the passage of the Extraordinary Legislation in the FRG and the attempts to extend it to West Berlin the GDR authorities introduced passport and visa regulations for West German citizens and West Berliners travelling across the territory of the GDR. At the same time a ban was imposed on the transportation of neo-nazi literature through the German Democratic Republic.

On February 8, 1969, the GDR Government instructed Interior Minister Dickel to enforce "additional measures" against the illegal activity of the FRG in West Berlin. An order issued on the same day prohibited all Bundeswehr servicemen, including generals, and members of the Bundeswehr Defence Committee from travelling to West Berlin across the GDR. The order applied equally to the members and officials of the Federal Assembly due to convene illegally in West Berlin on March 5, 1969, who were, in addition, banned from visiting the capital of the GDR.³

On February 28, 1969, the Soviet Government asked the Government of the GDR to examine, in accordance with the control functions it exercised on the communications between the FRG and West Berlin, the possibility of enforcing appropriate measures to curb the illegal militaristic activity of the authorities and citizens of the Federal Republic and West Berlin which affected the security of the socialist states and European peace.

On March 1, 1969, the GDR Government instructed the competent bodies of the Republic to ensure the strict observance of the relevant statutes prohibiting the transportation of goods which the FRG could use for military purposes along the routes running across the GDR territory between West Berlin and West Germany.

¹ See: *Neues Deutschland*, March 11, 1968.

² *Ibid.*, April 15, 1968.

³ *Ibid.*, February 9, 1969.

At the end of January 1970, when West Berlin was once again illegally chosen as the site for a session of the FRG parliamentary bodies, the GDR authorities tightened control on communications and issued a serious warning to the organisers of this venture. The Soviet Union did the same. A statement made on February 1 by a representative of the Soviet Embassy in the GDR made the point that "the Soviet side will continue to react in a fitting manner to the attempts of the Bonn authorities to illegally extend their jurisdiction to West Berlin which, as everyone knows, is a special political entity independent of the FRG".¹

Whenever measures were taken to counter the intrigues of the West German revanchists, their propaganda machine raised a terrific ballyhoo. Artificially inciting tension, bourgeois newspapers wrote about a "fresh crisis", "preparations for a blockade", "a threat to the life and freedom of West Berlin", "playing with fire next to a powder keg" and so forth.

These assertions were merely venomous fabrications concocted by West German propaganda to mislead world public opinion and absolve the CDU/CSU of the responsibility for the situation around West Berlin which deteriorated from time to time as a result of the provocative activity of the Adenauer, Erhard and Kiesinger governments.

If nothing had been done to counter the aggressive acts of the Bonn revanchists it would have only encouraged them to continue their intrigues and provocations. Therefore, the measures introduced by the USSR and the GDR in the sixties were timely, necessary and wholly justified. They were directed *not against West Berlin and its links with the outside world, but against the militarists, revanchists and provocateurs*, against all those who encroached on this special formation, devised plans for "incorporating it into the Federation" and strove to sow the seeds of unrest in the area. These measures were fully in keeping with the quadripartite decisions and the interests of West Berlin and did not contradict the point of view of the Western Powers themselves who repeatedly declared that West Berlin was neither

¹ *Pravda*, February 2, 1970.

a Land, nor a part of the FRG and could not be governed by it.

The 1971 settlement of West Berlin affairs improved the situation in the centre of Europe and is now creating the necessary conditions for further normal development in the area.

SOVIET UNION'S REALISTIC VIEW ON WEST BERLIN

For more than two decades West Berlin has been the subject of negotiations and exchanges of views between the Four Powers. Because of the West's position, however, the city's standing in international law has remained uncertain for many years and that was one of the reasons for the complications and conflicts that have arisen there time and again.

In the opinion of the Western Powers West Berlin was a special region under their sovereignty.¹ They regarded the city as conquered territory although they themselves had never conquered it and were only allowed to enter the city in keeping with the quadripartite agreements for the fulfilment of specific tasks. Furthermore in the Declaration of June 5, 1945, they forswore any annexation of German territory.

The FRG, however, thought differently. Despite the fact that the Western Powers nullified those provisions of the Bonn Constitution which illegally proclaimed the inclusion of West Berlin in the Federation (Art. 23; Art. 144, Para. 2), the FRG continued to regard it as its Land which was temporarily occupied by the United States, Britain and France. West German jurists strove to prove that West Berlin belonged to the FRG and that only the occupation regime and the reservations of the Western Powers prevented it from taking full advantage of its *de jure* membership of the Federation.² In other words, they looked upon West Berlin as a Land of the Federal Republic, but a Land of "a

¹ See: Willy Brandt, *Von Bonn nach Berlin. Eine Dokumentation zur Hauptstadtfrage*, Berlin, 1957, p. 63.

² See: *Juristenzeitung*, 1957, No. 18, p. 574.

special kind" in which the Federation exercised those rights to which the occupation authorities did not object. In their view West Berlin "could be considered a constituent part of the Federal Republic inasmuch as the Allied authorities as the supreme government body approved the establishment by the city of legal, economic and political links with the Federal Republic".¹

The West Berlin Senate held similar views.²

This interpretation of West Berlin's status contradicted the actual state of affairs, the quadripartite agreements and international law and was not accepted by the USSR, the GDR and other countries.

The conclusion of the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin resolved many questions which in the past had been stumbling-blocks in the relations between the three Western Powers and the Soviet Union, between the FRG and the Soviet Union and also between both German states. Despite the fact that the United States, Britain and France on the whole showed a greater degree of understanding and a more sober attitude to the realities of the situation in this particular area, the sides continued to hold quite different views on questions concerning West Berlin's standing in international law.

In tackling West Berlin problems, the Soviet side, as distinct from the Western Powers, invariably maintained a realistic viewpoint and took into account the actual state of affairs. It considered that West Berlin, as a result of the specific nature of its development and long period of isolated existence, as has been pointed out in Chapter III, gradually turned into a special entity and acquired elements of statehood. Recently this has been reflected both in the direct talks between the West Berlin Senate and the GDR Government,

¹ See: *Der Tagesspiegel*, March 30, 1965. "Berlin (West) is a Land of the Federal Republic of Germany," states the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of May 21, 1957, "but in view of the reservations, introduced by the military governors when they approved the Constitution, Federal bodies in Berlin (West) are directly precluded from carrying out the functions of state authority in the fullest sense of the word insofar as this is prohibited by the three Western Powers in separate areas" (*Der Spiegel*, 1961, No. 51, p. 27).

² See: R. Legien, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

and in the agreements which they have reached together.

Where there are signs of statehood there must also be elements which indicate that the state is a subject of international law.

As regards its legal standing West Berlin may be looked upon as a special state and political formation falling into the category of "internationalised" or "free" territories and "free cities" with the reservation that in the past it was unable to manifest these qualities to a sufficient degree because of its inadequately defined standing in international law, the foreign occupation and the illegal claims of the Adenauer, Erhard and Kiesinger governments.

Taking all this into account the USSR and the GDR proposed at the end of 1958 that West Berlin's standing in international law be formalised by placing its existence on a firm contractual basis appropriate to peacetime conditions and the objectively existing situation. Although the Western Powers rejected this proposal, the Soviet Union, the GDR and other socialist countries continued their struggle.

This helped to underline the need for a sober, unbiased approach to West Berlin as a singular political entity.

Before the conclusion of the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin more and more voices were raised in support of the fact that West Berlin was a special territorial entity which had a special status and was not a part of the Federal Republic.

Addressing the conference of foreign ministers in Geneva on May 22, 1959, French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville said: "When the Federal Republic of Germany was established approximately ten years ago, we told this new Federal Republic that the Western part of Berlin, for which we were and still are responsible, must not be connected with it. That part of Berlin is a distinctive entity and so it will remain. The West Berlin Government is not directly connected with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. The territory of West Berlin is not a part of the territory of the Federal Republic." M. Couve de Murville often referred to West Berlin as a *sui generis* political entity.

In an interview granted *Der Spiegel* on August 31, 1970, Chief Burgomaster Klaus Schutz spoke, though with certain

reservations, about Four-Power "West Berlin's special status within the framework of the administration and tripartite responsibility of the Western Powers".¹

The well-known German observer Joachim Nawrocki, in a work published in 1971 acknowledged that West Berlin which "remains outside the sovereignty" of the FRG², "is something special, 'a special political unit' in which supreme political power does not belong to the Germans".³

Now that agreement has been reached on West Berlin, this fact becomes all the more apparent. Some acknowledge it with reservations; others, and their number is increasing all the time, quite openly.

Even the reactionary West German observer Dieter Cycon, who was working for the Springer concern, for instance, noted that after the conclusion of the Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971, West Berlin had "indeed become a special political unit, though not an independent one."⁴

Der Spiegel called West Berlin a "singular society".⁵ The magazine noted that with the conclusion of the Quadripartite Agreement West Berlin for the first time since 1945 had "become an object and partner in agreements which are obligatory from the point of view of international law".⁶

Hence the history of international relations and diplomatic practice points to the fact that West Berlin is the first state and political formation of its kind. It does not fit into the hitherto existing concept of international law and historical patterns, but has, as Andrei Gromyko pointed out, "a unique international law status".⁷ As was stated in a resolution in connection with the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement adopted at the Second Plenary Meeting of the SUPG Central Committee on September 17, 1971, West Berlin is "a city with a special political status which has never

¹ *Der Spiegel*, 1970, No. 36, p. 22.

² Joachim Nawrocki, *Brennpunkt Berlin. Politische und wirtschaftliche Realitäten*, Cologne, 1971, p. 95.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

⁴ *Die Welt*, September 24, 1971.

⁵ *Der Spiegel*, 1972, No. 12, p. 35.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁷ *Pravda*, July 11, 1969.

belonged and will never belong to the FRG".¹ At the 9th Plenary Meeting of the SUPG Central Committee in June 1973 Erich Honecker pointed out that West Berlin is a special separate formation, which is not a part of any state, a capitalist enclave inside the socialist community.

In this way the present status of West Berlin is an objectively existing reality and we can talk about its "formed",² "legal and factual",³ "international", "special" or "special political status"⁴.

The main factors determining West Berlin's standing in international law and its current status are that it lies inside the German Democratic Republic, that it does not belong to the Federal Republic and that all the basic agreements and decisions concerning Berlin and Germany, including allied legislation, are still binding on West Berlin. The Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin of September 3, 1971, fully confirmed this fact. Its conclusion constitutes an important step towards the clarification of West Berlin's standing in international law and consolidation of its special status.

West Berlin only appeared as a special formation because of the policy of the Western Powers. Geographically and legally West Berlin should have belonged to the GDR, but the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic took into account the actual state of affairs and, wishing to normalise the situation in the centre of Europe, ring down the curtain on the Second World War and ensure peace, made a major political concession: they agreed to the separate existence and independent development of West Berlin as a separate entity, that is, as a city with a special political status, and to the establishment of normal relations with it based on principles of peaceful coexistence and contemporary standards of international law.

The West Berlin settlement reached in 1971 has provided a good foundation for this. Nevertheless, it is absolutely essential that none of the sides should deviate from the letter and spirit of the entire complex of concluded agreements

¹ *Neues Deutschland*, September 18, 1971.

² *Pravda*, October 27, 1968.

³ *Neues Deutschland*, October 16, 1967.

⁴ *Ibid.*, September 18, 1971.

which together comprise the West Berlin settlement, as this goes a long way towards ensuring European security and world peace.

**THE HISTORIC ROLE OF FREE CITIES
AND OTHER STATE AND POLITICAL FORMATIONS
WITH A SIMILAR STANDING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW¹**

The history of the past thousand years has witnessed the rise of numerous free cities and other political entities with analogous standing in international law. These special territorial units existed in Russia, Italy, Poland and many other countries, but were particularly numerous in Germany.

Under feudalism the appearance of free cities as one variety of the mediaeval city was due above all to economic factors: the development of productive forces and the expansion of trade which followed the separation of crafts from farming. However, the cities' fight for freedom and independence also played an important part in their development. From the 12th to 14th century many mediaeval cities managed to break away from the domination of secular and clerical feudal lords and turn into sovereign or almost sovereign politically organised units such as Novgorod and Pskov in Russia, the free and imperial cities in Germany, the republic cities in Italy and the city communes in France. Having won independence, these cities formalised it in constitutional and special agreements guaranteeing them a clearly defined status. Despite the diversity of statuses, these polities had many common features and have gone down in history and international law as free cities.

With the strengthening of central authority, however, the mediaeval free cities gradually lost their independence. Only in Germany they lasted for a long time. This was due to specific political and economic conditions, above all to the empire's age-old struggle against the papacy. At certain periods the number of free and imperial cities in Germany was as high as 145. As capitalist relations and a nation-

¹ In this section the author draws on documents made available by the History Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

wide market developed, their number decreased. As a rule typical mediaeval forms of production (guilds) were preserved along with mediaeval forms of political organisation (oligarchy). Thus the free cities were in effect left out of the process of development of capitalist relations and gradually fell into decline.

The changing conditions which had engendered the rise of the mediaeval free cities also caused their gradual demise as special types of political and socio-economic organisation and put a brake on their development.

The capitalist era produced new conditions. The appearance of free cities under capitalism was chiefly due to political reasons—the inability of the states involved, primarily the great powers, to agree at one stage or another to what state a city or city territory belonged. The establishment of free cities became a means of resolving territorial and political disputes and so free cities usually arose after wars and international conflicts.

After the defeat of Napoleon (1815), for example, the former German free cities of Frankfurt-am-Main, Lubeck, Hamburg and Bremen were re-instated as independent political units primarily because the states entering the German Confederation failed to agree on how to divide them up among themselves.

Cracow is another example. Since Russia, Austria and Prussia were unable to agree to whose territory it belonged, the Vienna Congress proclaimed it a free, independent and strictly neutral city (1815-1846).

The new era in world history, the transition from capitalism to socialism, ushered in by the Great October Socialist Revolution, created a basically new situation.

If in the period of the undivided rule of capitalism the free cities had appeared as the result of imperialist deals, conditions now were completely different. True enough there were compromises between capitalist states (the Danzig problem, 1920-1939, for example), but after the Second World War, when the balance of forces radically changed in favour of socialism, such an approach to the solution of disputes directly or indirectly with the socialist countries was no longer possible. An instance of the basically new approach was the decision to establish the Free Territory of Trieste

(1947) and the subsequent solution of this question. Another example was the Soviet proposal to turn West Berlin into a special political entity (in the sixties). The USSR advanced this proposal after an exchange of views with the GDR Government.

A study of the historical aspects of the free cities and other analogous polities is interesting both from the academic and practical points of view.

Cracow merits attention as an example of a free city which made great headway in economic development. The system of guarantees by the great powers (Russia, Austria and Prussia) and such a specific feature of its status as the undertaking not to give asylum to fugitives from justice, deserters or any subjects of the guarantor states are particularly interesting aspects of this city's history.

A feature of the Vatican as a special political entity has been the settlement of the question of access to it on the basis of special agreements with the state in which it lies, that is, with Italy.

The Free Territory of Trieste also has certain interesting features, such as the formalising of its status in an annex to the Peace Treaty with Italy of 1947, and the designation of the UNO (Security Council) as its guarantor.

On the whole, it is worth taking a close look at the problems of demilitarisation and neutralisation of such political entities, the protection of their populations' rights, and above all, the effectiveness of the guarantees on which their fate ultimately depends.

The distinguishing feature of the status of the Ionian Islands Republic, Liechtenstein and Andorra is the way in which their interests abroad are represented.

All this together with the experience of the so-called land-locked states in settling the practical issues in their relations with the outside world was naturally taken into account in solving the West Berlin question.

When in the sixties and seventies the USSR and the GDR put forward proposals on West Berlin it was also a matter of compromise, though not an imperialist one, since these proposals were designed to settle the problem in the interests of peace and security in Europe without detriment to any of the parties concerned, including the population of West

Berlin. What the USSR and the GDR had in mind *was not that something had to be given or taken, but that the situation that had taken shape after the Second World War should be consolidated and legalised* to put the existence of West Berlin on a firm contractual basis guaranteeing it a reliable status appropriate to the Potsdam and other quadripartite agreements which would also be consistent with peacetime conditions. The settlement of September 3, 1971, confirmed the correctness of the socialist countries' approach to West Berlin affairs. It serves the cause of peace and mutual understanding and is in the interests of the forces of peace.

CHAPTER VI
WEST BERLIN'S LINKS
WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD
AND GDR CONTROL
ON ITS BORDER

THE IMPORTANCE TO WEST BERLIN
OF ITS LINKS WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD

In an age of scientific and technological revolution, internationalisation of production and rapid development of communications, it is practically impossible for a single state to exist without links with the outside world.

This applies to an even greater extent to so-called land-locked states, including such a specific political entity as West Berlin which appeared when the Western sectors of the city were artificially detached from the surrounding territory.

West Berlin maintains very extensive ties with more than 100 countries. These ties are developing with each year that goes by. For example, the *goods traffic* between West Berlin and the outside world increased from 5.88 million tons in 1950 to nearly 18 million in 1970.¹ The total value of freight carried in 1970 in both directions has been estimated at approximately DM 33,000 million.² *Passenger traffic* increased to a still greater degree: in 1970 more than 14 million people moved in both directions between West Berlin and the outside world by various means of transport.

From 1949 to 1970 more than 100 million people and about 200 million tons of freight were carried along the GDR communication routes between West Berlin and the FRG.

¹ See: *Statistisches Jahrbuch, Berlin, 1967*, pp. 204-14; *Die Berliner Wirtschaft, 1969*, No. 10, p. 324.

² See: *Der Senat von Berlin, 10. Bericht, Lage der Berliner Wirtschaft und die Massnahmen in ihrer Weiterentwicklung*, Berlin, 1972, p. 31.

Many trains¹ and a fairly large number of private cars pass through West Berlin on their way to other destinations.

There has been a considerable increase in transit air traffic via West Berlin as a result of the establishment in the mid-sixties of a direct bus service between West Berlin airports and Schönefeld airport in the GDR.

West Berlin has postal, telephone, telegraph and radio links with almost every country.

Since West Berlin is situated in the centre of the GDR it naturally can only maintain links with the outside world by using its communications. In the past, however, the Western Powers, the FRG and the West Berlin authorities often misused the transit routes and violated the procedure in force on the communications between the city and the Federal Republic. At times this gave rise to friction and incidents which tended to make the already uneasy situation around West Berlin still more involved.

As the Western press and some politicians and statesmen, including General Lucius D. Clay, pointed out, West Berlin's links with the outside world which were of such vital significance for the city were its Achilles' Heel, that weakest spot of the West. In this connection they invented the so-called problem of access and strove to confine the entire problem of West Berlin to this issue. Actually, however, no problems ever arose over West Berlin's peaceful life-line with the outside world. The procedure established for communications by the GDR authorities was fully in keeping with standards of international law and operative international documents. West Berlin's ties with the outside world and the volume of passenger and goods traffic expanded steadily and the German Democratic Republic under the agreements of 1955 and 1964 undertook to observe fully the aims and principles of the Potsdam and other postwar agreements and help implement them. It did its best to ensure normal peaceful transit traffic in keeping with the established procedure and spent large sums on keeping the communications in good order.

¹ In 1970 twelve passenger trains from other countries and as many freight trains (not counting the trains running between the FRG and West Berlin) passed through West Berlin daily.

The problem which did exist, however, was that of abiding by the existing regulations, which were fully consistent with the generally recognised principles of international law and international practice, and respecting the legitimate rights and interests of the GDR when using its communications for transit to and from West Berlin.

Events show that the calmer the situation in West Berlin and the less complications it engendered, the easier it was for the city to maintain peaceful links with the outside world.

THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSIT TO WEST BERLIN

While using the communications of the German Democratic Republic for transit traffic between West Berlin and the outside world and, in particular, between West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany, the West on many occasions advanced totally unfounded claims simply to challenge the sovereignty of the GDR over its communication routes. It usually tried to justify these pretensions by referring to the theory of conquest (*debellatio*) and asserting that the presence of the three Western Powers in West Berlin by virtue of the "right of the victor" automatically granted them and the West as a whole "the right of absolute, unlimited and uncontrolled access" to the city.¹ Then, when West Berlin became a special political entity inside the GDR, in addition to invoking the "right of the victor", the West tried to justify such claims by referring to the insular position of the city whose existence depended on its ties with the outside world.

These claims, however, were absolutely unjustified.

The fact of being present on any territory does not automatically entail the "right of access". This principle has long been a norm of international law and has been applied in international practice. The conflict which flared up in the

¹ W. Krumholz, *Berlin—ABC*, Berlin, 1965; A. Riklin, *op cit.*, J. Nawrocki, *op cit.*; note of the US Embassy to the USSR Foreign Ministry of July 17, 1961.

postwar period between India and Portugal over the latter's access to her colony of Goa was a particular case in point. The colony lay inside Indian territory but had been artificially isolated some time before. The dispute was brought before the International Court of Justice in the Hague and this authoritative body ruled that the right to be present on any territory did not automatically include the right of free access to it.¹

This fully applied to West Berlin too. From the point of view of international law, Goa and West Berlin were fully analogous in this respect, especially as Western Powers, like Portugal, had invoked the theory of conquest to justify their "rights".

Since supreme authority in the Soviet Zone of occupation was exercised by the Soviet side without any restrictions and reservations it also adjudicated on all questions of entry, exit and transit. Many people, including Doctor Görner (GDR), correctly observed that the commander-in-chief in each zone of occupation in Germany who exercised supreme power in it was invested with the unlimited right to take decisions on questions of military and civilian entry, exit and transit through his zone from other zones and from abroad.

In other words transit traffic was *granted on sufferance*. As applied to the Soviet Zone this meant that only SMAG was entitled to decide which routes could be used for transit to and from the Western sectors of Berlin and the conditions under which this might take place. It also regulated and controlled all access to them, including travel by citizens of the USA, Britain and France and the movement of personnel and goods from the West Berlin garrisons through the Soviet Zone, just as the Western Powers did in their zones.

The Western Powers themselves had long recognised this principle. For instance, when in 1945 the British flatly rejected the US demand for "free access" and "free transit" between the US Occupation Zone in Germany and the port of Bremerhaven by rail or motorway through the British Zone the Americans were compelled to conclude a corresponding agreement with them, covering all the related issues.

¹ See: *Aussenpolitik*, 1961, No. 10, p. 688.

On their part the British also concluded a transit agreement with the Americans on travel through the US Zone in Germany to the British Zone in Austria. The French signed a similar agreement with the Swiss authorities on transit to the Büsingen enclave, a part of their occupation zone which was situated inside Swiss territory.¹

With the formation of two independent German states on German soil, control of those communications which were now a part of the GDR transport system passed into the hands of the GDR authorities. In a note of October 18, 1955, to the Governments of the three Western Powers, the Soviet Government unequivocally stated: "The German Democratic Republic exercises jurisdiction over the territory under its sovereignty and naturally this also applies to the communications in this territory."² The GDR itself regulates all questions of transit through its territory, including transit traffic between West Berlin and the Federal Republic with the exception of personnel and goods from the West Berlin garrisons of the three Western Powers, which under the agreement between the USSR and the GDR of September 20, 1955, is controlled by the Group of Soviet Troops in Germany.³

References to West Berlin's insular position were also without justification, for contemporary international law does not recognise any special "rights of access" to states lying inside the territories of other countries (so-called land-locked states). The principles and rules of international law lay down that the transit of transport, goods and individuals across the territory of a sovereign state can take place only with the latter's consent. Therefore, any transit traffic by one state (even if it is land-locked) through the territory of another is subject to permission from the country through which it takes place. In practice all transit questions are regulated either by the internal acts of a state through which it takes place or, as a rule, by appropriate agreements entered into by the sides concerned. This is borne out by the increasing number of multilateral and bilateral agree-

¹ Günter Görner, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-83.

² *Pravda*, October 19, 1955.

³ *Ibid.*, September 21, 1955.

ments and arrangements on air, rail, road and waterway communications. For example, the Vatican, San Marino and Lesotho, whose position as land-locked states is similar to that of West Berlin, were given the right of transit and the chance to maintain ties with the outside world not by virtue of their specific geographic position, but solely on the basis of agreements with the countries inside whose territories they are situated.

Since all questions of entry and transit through the territory of the GDR lie within its jurisdiction, it is only natural that the Quadripartite Agreement, which contains certain general provisions concerning, for instance, the transit traffic of civilian persons and goods to and from West Berlin or the travel of West Berliners to the territory of the neighbouring GDR, also stipulates that detailed arrangements on these questions can be agreed only by the competent German authorities, that is the Governments of the GDR and the FRG and the West Berlin Senate.

The Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971, and the subsequent arrangements concluded by the GDR with the FRG and the West Berlin Senate on questions of transit through and entry into the territory of the GDR fully substantiated the principled stand of the USSR and the GDR which maintained that every sovereign state was the master of its own communications.

However hard some people may try to put a different interpretation on this section of the West Berlin settlement, they can do nothing about the fact, which was confirmed by the West Berlin settlement, that the German Democratic Republic's communications can only be used with the permission of the GDR authorities.

MILITARY TRANSIT

As documents and repeated explanations by Soviet representatives make clear, there are two aspects to the so-called access to West Berlin: military transit, that is, the transportation of personnel and goods of the military administrations and the West Berlin garrisons of the three Western Powers, and civilian transit, including all other traffic between the

city and the outside world, arising from its position as a special political entity within the German Democratic Republic.

To enable the military administrations and garrisons of the three Western Powers to transport personnel and goods, in 1945 the Soviet side granted them the right to use specially designated communications in the Soviet Zone, provided they observed the appropriate standards of international law, generally recognised transit regulations and the procedure established on these communications by the Soviet Military Administration in Germany.

On June 29, 1945, the Soviet Command gave their permission for the Western Powers to use the road and railway between Berlin and Marienborn (Helmstedt) and two air corridors¹ to the Western zones of occupation. Subsequently the procedure for travelling along the routes between Berlin and the Western zones was regulated with the consent of the Soviet side by appropriate agreements within the framework of the Control Council and its organs. In the initial period of the occupation these bodies had taken a number of decisions which substantiated the understanding reached by the commanders-in-chief on June 29, 1945 (on the number of trains, the establishment of Four-Power bodies to ensure the safety of flights through the air corridors, control over transit and so forth).

Although the decisions were taken by the Control Council, it did not mean that these issues lay within its competence, the reason being that in the period when the Four Powers were still enforcing a more or less concorded policy in Germany, the Control Council was the most convenient place for the meetings of the commanders-in-chief and also for holding talks at all other levels. Without exception all the decisions adopted within the framework of the Control Council and its agencies concerning transit procedure from the Western zones to the Western sectors of Berlin "concerned only the organisational and technical aspect of the problem, purely practical measures to establish transport

¹ On November 30, 1945, the number of air corridors was increased to three.

links and not any basic problems concerning the right of access".¹

The Soviet side always regulated transit traffic to the city along the communications in the Soviet Zone. The Soviet Military Administration often altered the procedure and form of control on land routes, although the Western Powers sometimes tried to oppose this.

Up to April 1, 1948, the Soviet Command exercised only general control over the transit traffic of the Western Powers on the railway between the Western sectors of Berlin and the Western zones of occupation. Under the new control regulations established by SMAG on the same day, the train conductor had to furnish the accompanying documents stating the number of personnel on the train and also documents identifying the personnel as belonging either to the occupation forces or the military administrations of the Western Powers in Berlin. Persons having no connection with the military administration of the three Western Powers were strictly prohibited from using troops trains. The document-checking procedure was fixed by the Soviet Command. On April 3, 1948, Deputy Soviet Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-General Dratvin, turned down the objections of the Western Powers concerning the new control regulations and declared once again that "unregulated and uncontrolled traffic of people and freight across the Soviet Zone"² was completely out of the question. Whenever the Western Powers tried to violate the Soviet side's regulations and procedure for inspecting troops trains or attached carriages with German civilians the Soviet Command detained such trains.

Subsequently, SMAG amended the regulations governing "military transit" by rail whenever the situation demanded it.³

¹ R. Arzinger, W. Poeggel, op. cit., p. 19.

² *Tägliche Rundschau*, April 6, 1948; *Berlin. Behauptung von Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1946-1948*, p. 447.

³ Thus, prior to the resumption on May 12, 1949, of rail communications between the Western zones and the Western sectors of Berlin, the Soviet military authorities informed the occupation authorities of the three Western Powers that only the locomotives of the railways in the Soviet Zone of occupation in Germany would be permitted to pull their trains (*Berlin. Ringen um Einheit und Wiederaufbau 1948-1951*, p. 234).

The Soviet side also changed the regulations governing "military transit" along the Berlin-Marienborn highway, first in 1948 (see Chapter II) and then in 1958. On August 1, 1958, after introducing a new procedure for the transit of military vehicles of the Western Powers along this highway, the Soviet representatives declared that they reserved the right to introduce whatever control procedure the situation might warrant.

CIVILIAN TRANSIT

On more than one occasion the German Democratic Republic proposed that the West Berlin authorities, the FRG and the three Western Powers sign agreements with them on the use of the GDR communications. Since they stubbornly evaded the issue, however, the GDR regulated all questions connected with West Berlin's "civilian transit" across the territory of the Republic by its own internal legal acts. In the last twenty years the GDR has issued a whole series of such acts.

On September 6, 1951, it issued an order introducing the payment of road tolls for transit between West Berlin and the FRG.¹ On December 5, 1956, passport and visa formalities were established for the transit of foreigners between West Berlin and the outside world. The ordinances which were adopted in connection with the measures of August 13, 1961, had a direct bearing on a number of questions concerning civilian transit (some border check-points were resited, changes were introduced in train routes and their movement across the territory of the Republic and so forth). On July 1, 1965, the GDR authorities established a new procedure for transit traffic along the waterways between West Berlin and the FRG² and in the spring of 1968 neo-nazis were prohibited from using the Republic's communications,³ as were members and high officials of the Federal Government who made

¹ See: *Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*, Berlin, No. 115, September 27, 1951, p. 865.

² *Ibid.*, 1965, p. 477.

³ See: *Neues Deutschland*, March 11, 1968.

trips to West Berlin to perform "official functions".¹ On June 11, 1968, passport and visa formalities were introduced for West German citizens and the population of West Berlin travelling through the GDR. Early in 1969, Bundeswehr servicemen were prohibited from travelling across the GDR and in April 1970, a special compensatory toll was established on transit traffic between West Berlin and the FRG.

Whenever the GDR authorities introduced requisite measures to regulate transit to and from West Berlin across the territory of the Republic, the West raised a hue and cry about a "threat to the city's viability" and an "encroachment on the freedom of access".

When, for example, in the spring of 1968 the GDR authorities prohibited NDP members and persons engaged in neo-Nazi activity, and members and top officials of the Federal Government from using the Republic's communications, Kiesinger's cabinet launched a vigorous campaign to procure the "condemnation" of the GDR and get the United States, Britain and France to support his demands. On March 11, 1968, he appealed to the Western Powers to come out "in defence of the freedom of access" to West Berlin and "resolutely reject" the attempts of the GDR to introduce any "restrictions" on its communications. The Springer press came out against what it called the "illegal interference" of the German Democratic Republic in the "freedom of transit" between West Berlin and the FRG. On April 24, 1968, the Federal Government discussed the GDR measures, on April 25, on Kiesinger's insistence, it was taken up at a meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Western European Union² and on April 30, at a meeting of the NATO Council³. On May 1, 1968, the FRG Government declared that the GDR was "playing with fire" and called upon the Western Powers to react sharply to these measures.

Giving in to pressure from Bonn, the US, British and French ambassadors in the FRG made a statement to the press on March 13, 1968, in which they tried to shift the

¹ See: *Neues Deutschland*, April 15, 1968.

² See: *Der Tagesspiegel*, April 26, 1968.

³ *Ibid.*, May 1, 1968.

"responsibility for the normal functioning of communications between Berlin (West) and the Federal Republic of Germany"¹ onto the Soviet Union. They also included this demand in the joint communique of the NATO Council of April 30, 1968.

The Soviet Union opposed these efforts to interfere in the internal affairs of the GDR, resolutely supported the GDR measures against the neo-nazis and provocateurs and clarified its position once again on the issue. On May 9, 1968, P. A. Abrasimov, Soviet Ambassador to the GDR, made a statement in which he declared: "As regards the orders of the Minister of the Interior of the GDR concerning the ban on transit along routes passing across GDR territory for members of the neo-nazi National Democratic Party and for ministers and officials travelling to West Berlin to demonstrate the illegitimate claims of the FRG to this city, this is a question for the German Democratic Republic, as laid down in the agreement of September 20, 1955, on the relations between the USSR and the GDR."²

The USSR supported the new measures enforced by the GDR on June 11, 1968, to increase the effectiveness of the procedure for entry and transit and also for the carriage of West German and West Berlin freight across the territory of the Republic. At a press conference in Stockholm on July 13, 1968, Alexei Kosygin emphasised that "everything to do with the movement of the civilian population and freight comes under the jurisdiction of the independent state, the German Democratic Republic, through whose territory it is effected".³

On July 3, 1968, the Western Powers under pressure from Bonn protested against the measures taken by the GDR⁴ in notes to the USSR which the latter rejected as being absolutely unfounded. In a note of July 26, 1968, replying to these protests, the USSR Foreign Ministry once again reminded the Western Powers that the questions they had raised came "under the jurisdiction of the GDR Government" which was

¹ *Ibid.*, March 14, 1968.

² *Pravda*, May 10, 1968.

³ *Ibid.*, July 15, 1968.

⁴ See: *Die Welt*, July 4, 1968.

fully entitled to establish the sort of procedure for the transit of foreign citizens and freight through its territory which it considered essential to its security and interests.

The Soviet Union adopted a similar stand early in 1969 and also in January and April 1970 when the GDR authorities were compelled to enforce new measures on communications after the Federal Republic had intensified its illegal activity in West Berlin.

Questions of transit were resolved in the agreement of December 17, 1971, between the Governments of both German states on the transit traffic of civilian persons and goods between the FRG and West Berlin across the sovereign territory of the German Democratic Republic. Under this agreement transit traffic between the FRG and West Berlin "will receive the simplest and most expeditious treatment provided by international practice" and will be "facilitated and unimpeded". The agreement makes provision for the following: the use of through buses and trains and the simplification of the procedure for issuing and inspecting visas¹; the use of vehicles for the transport of goods sealed by the sender;² the replacement of various individual fees and tolls on road, rail and waterway traffic (including visa fees) by the payment of an annual lump sum³ and a number of other facilitations.

Consistent observance of this agreement, which is fully in keeping with generally accepted international practice and is the first official contractual act signed by the two German states in the course of their long years of existence, will guarantee the normal development of West Berlin's links with the outside world.

At present the GDR authorities control West Berlin's civilian transit traffic with the outside world across the territory of the Republic, which comprises approximately 98 per cent of all traffic to, and out of, West Berlin.

¹ Including the issuance of visas near or in the vehicles, and the issuance of collective visas to passengers travelling on through buses.

² Namely, lorries, railway freight cars, river cargo vessels and containers.

³ It has been fixed at 234.9 million Marks a year for the period 1972-1975.

At the end of the sixties, passenger traffic was distributed as follows: 63.3 per cent of the passengers travelled by road, 28.3 per cent by air and 8.4 per cent by rail.¹ In 1968, 42 per cent of the transit goods traffic went by road, 39.1 per cent by waterways, 18.7 per cent by rail and 0.2 per cent by air.²

After the settlement on West Berlin there was a change in the distribution of these figures. Overland transport, particularly road transport, increased in view of the considerable simplification in existing procedures of control and reception of transit charges.

The transportation of passengers and civilian goods between West Berlin and the outside world which is biased towards the West, primarily the FRG, was conducted along nine land routes (four motor-roads and five railways), two waterways and three air corridors.

The following roads were designated for use by *motor transport* between West Berlin and the Federal Republic:

Road	Length of roads lying within the territory of the GDR (km)	GDR check-points on the border with West Berlin	GDR and FRG check-points on the border between them
West Berlin-Hamburg (290 km)	220	Staaken	Horst (Lauenburg)
West Berlin-Hannover (285 km)	160	Drewitz	Marienborn (Helmstedt)
West Berlin-Frankfurt-am-Main (508 km)	320	Drewitz	Wartha (Herleshausen)
West Berlin-Munich (582 km)	280	Drewitz	Hirschberg (Rudolfstein)

Lorries and cars travelling from West Berlin to the FRG or vice versa were only allowed to stop at specially designated spots.

On August 24, 1949, the railway authorities in the Soviet

¹ There is no passenger transit traffic by waterways.

² See: *Die Berliner Wirtschaft*, 1969, No. 10, p. 325; prior to the war 6 per cent of the freight to and from Berlin was transported by road, 33 per cent by waterways and 61 per cent by rail.

and Western zones agreed to increase the number of passenger trains making daily runs between Berlin and West Germany from two to ten. After the establishment of the GDR and the FRG the number of trains was increased to 20 a day during the winter months and to 26 in the summer (in both directions). It was also envisaged that the number of trains would be increased at weekends and holidays.¹ Passenger railway traffic between West Berlin and the FRG ran on the basis of these arrangements.²

After August 13, 1961, no trains running between West Berlin and the FRG took on passengers within the territory of the German Democratic Republic. People travelling between the GDR and the FRG did so on trains running between various cities in the two states.³

Prior to July 4, 1965, the *movement of civilian freight by rail* between West Berlin and the FRG was conducted along the Marienborn-West Berlin line which was serviced by 26 freight trains daily. The West Berlin line was mainly used to bring back the empty wagons which accumulated because the volume of freight entering West Berlin from the FRG was much greater than that carried in the opposite direction.

Under the new agreement of September 9, 1964,⁴ between the GDR Ministry of Transport and the Department of West German Railways the sides arranged to use another three lines passing through the border stations of Hof, Bebra and Büchen⁵ for rail freight between the FRG and West Berlin and also to increase the number of trains whenever necessary. More than 20 freight trains a day made runs between West Berlin and the Federal Republic.⁶

Marienborn has remained the most important check-point

¹ See: *Telegraf*, January 13, 1966.

² The partners in these agreements were the GDR and the FRG but not the West Berlin authorities, because the entire railway system in West Berlin belongs to the GDR.

³ In 1968, 18 trains (9 from the FRG to the GDR and 9 in the opposite direction) made daily runs between the FRG and the GDR.

⁴ Came into force on July 5, 1965.

⁵ The corresponding check-points on the GDR territory were Gutenfürst, Gerstungen and Schwanheide.

⁶ See: *Telegraf*, January 13, 1966; *Der Tagesspiegel*, October 11, 1966.

on the GDR-FRG border, handling almost all the rail freight from the FRG to West Berlin and back, and the bulk of the freight carried by road. It is also the main border check-point for people travelling by car or train.

Freight being transported between West Berlin and the FRG *by waterways* went along the 190-kilometre Central German Canal¹ into the Ruhr area and the 180-kilometre Elbe-Havel waterway² to Hamburg. Inland waterways only carry freight and are not open to passenger traffic.

**West Berlin's Links with
the Outside World and GDR Control on the Border**

Route	Length within the territory of the GDR (km)	GDR check- points on the border with West Berlin	GDR and FRG check- points on their border	Number of daily trains (there and back)
West Berlin- Hamburg (290 km)	220	Griebnitzsee*	Schwanheide (Büchen)	4
West Berlin- Hannover (256 km)	160	Griebnitzsee	Marienborn (Helmstedt)	8
West Berlin- Frankfurt-am-Main (539 km)	340	Griebnitzsee	Gerstungen (Bebra)**	4
West Berlin- Munich (653 km)	320	Griebnitzsee	Probstzella (Ludwigstadt)	4

* Prior to August 13, 1961, there were two other railway check-points on West Berlin's perimeter. Since August 13, 1961, all FRG-bound trains have passed through Griebnitzsee.

** Prior to October 1963, all trains on this line bound from West Berlin to the FRG passed through the Wartha-Herleshausen check-point. Now they do not run to Wartha from Eisenach, but to Fert, Gerstungen and then to the West German station of Bebra. There is only a road check-point left in Wartha now.

The agreement of December 17, 1971, between the Governments of the GDR and the FRG did not introduce any fundamental changes into the question of communications and border check-points. The protocol note to this agreement states that the existing transit routes and check-points

¹ Through the FRG check-point of Rügen. Approximately two-thirds of the freight carried by inland waterways between the FRG and West Berlin is transported along the Central German Canal.

² Through the FRG check-point of Schnackenburg.

will be used for transit traffic between the Federal Republic and West Berlin.¹

Three air corridors are used for *air transit traffic* between West Berlin and the FRG. The planes mainly carry passengers and do not play a significant role in freight haulage.² However, any transportation conducted by US, British and French airlines which is not directly connected with the needs of the West Berlin garrisons of the three Western Powers "has no legal foundation".³ In the early postwar period when Germany was still united flights between the occupation zones, like all interzonal traffic over land and water, were regulated by the commanders-in-chief or their representatives. With the establishment of the GDR and the FRG, however, the communications between them, including air traffic, became international and consequently subject to regulation by the state across whose territory they passed.⁴

As far back as 1919 the Paris Air Convention proclaimed that each state has full and exceptional sovereignty in the

¹ The agreement, however, makes provision for the following improvements in communications: rail—via the border check-point of Gutenfürst for regular and supplementary trains and also for the transportation of cattle and transit freight trains if such a measure were justified by the volume of transit traffic; via the border check-point of Eibisfelde for express goods trains provided that the movement of trains through Marienfeld be reduced accordingly; via the border check-point of Schwanheide for transit goods trains if this should prove necessary; for the transportation of freight of express urgency by passenger trains if freight cars are coupled to them; for motor transport—via the border check-point of Wartha for company cars and lorries, including the transportation of cattle.

² Approximately 100,000 flights which carried 4,128,743 passengers were made between West Berlin and the FRG in 1968 (*Die Berliner Wirtschaft*, 1969, No. 10, p. 326).

³ *Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, No. 1, pp. 19-20.

⁴ Discussing the question of air communications in Germany, the Allied control bodies drew a sharp dividing line between flights intended to supply the occupation forces and flights "serving as ordinary inter-state transit traffic". Approving the establishment of air routes in 1945 the Control Council not only turned down the proposals of the Western Powers to establish international air routes over Germany, as the Soviet side resolutely objected to this measure, but also pronounced itself incompetent to consider such questions. The Co-ordinating Committee has it on record that "the question does not lie within its competence and should be resolved by the governments". The Control Council expressed its full agreement with this conclusion and never took any decisions concerning international flights over Germany.

air space over its territory. This provision was formalised in a number of subsequent international acts, including the agreement on international air travel signed in Chicago to which the majority of countries, including the United States, acceded and which is a generally recognised standard of international law. Article 3 of the convention stipulates that planes may only fly over foreign territory with the agreement of the country to which that territory belongs. Article 6 says that regular international traffic across another state or through the air space above it may only take place with the latter's special permission and with the observance of the conditions implicit in that permission. This includes obligatory compliance with the laws and other ordinance governing air communications in the country concerned.

These principles have been reflected in international agreements concluded between the German Democratic Republic and other countries, principally in the treaty on relations between the USSR and the GDR of September 20, 1955, which confirmed the latter's sovereignty, including its sovereignty over its air space. They have also been stipulated in a number of other documents¹ and in the internal state law acts of the GDR.²

In formulating their policy, many countries take into account the existence on German soil of two independent states and have long since signed air travel agreements with them. The German Democratic Republic, for instance, has entered into such agreements with 56 foreign air companies.³

¹ For example, in the joint statement made by the government delegations of the USSR and the GDR on January 7, 1957, which declares that the existing decisions on the use of air corridors by the United States, Britain and France between West Berlin and West Germany "are of a temporary and limited character and do not affect the sovereignty of the GDR in its air space", and also in agreements on air travel concluded with Poland (June 20, 1955), with Rumania (July 28, 1955), Bulgaria (July 30, 1955), Czechoslovakia (August 8, 1955), Hungary (September 10, 1955) and the USSR (June 18, 1956) (*Dokumente zur Aussenpolitik der Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*, Vol. IV, Berlin, 1957, pp. 61-65, 224-29, 325-30, 399-403, 441-45, 495-500).

² One of them is the law on civil air communications passed by the People's Chamber of the GDR on April 17, 1968, which states that the "German Democratic Republic has unlimited sovereignty in the air space over its territory".

³ See: *Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR 1968*, p. 328.

These agreements included the GDR in the international air traffic system and regulate the use of its air space. Countries which do not have such agreements with the GDR and the FRG have to obtain their permission for each flight through their air space. This was what the Soviet Union did with respect to the FRG until 1971 when it concluded an agreement on air travel with the Federal Republic. These principles should also govern the flights of all foreign airlines over GDR territory. The time is long overdue, as the GDR Foreign Ministry has pointed out, for the West Berlin Senate and the civil airline companies of the three Western Powers to conclude requisite agreements with the GDR on transit through its territory.¹

WEST BERLIN'S POSTAL AND TELECOMMUNICATION LINKS WITH WESTERN EUROPE

West Berlin has postal, telephone and telegraph links with Western Europe which until recently were chiefly maintained by the FRG.

Letters to and from the FRG are as a rule delivered by air mail, while most of the parcels and other types of postal packets are carried by rail. Telephone and telegraph links between West Berlin and the outside world in the main depend on the so-called radio bridges. The link with the southern and central parts of the FRG is maintained with the help of two VHF stations which were built in 1959. One is situated in Schäferberg (West Berlin) and the other in Torfhaus in Harz Mountains (West Germany).² Telecommunications with the northern part operate through similar stations in Nikolassee (West Berlin) and Lübeck (West Germany).³ A certain number of the telephone, telegraph and teletype messages between West Berlin and the FRG are carried by GDR long-distance cables.⁴

By means of the "radio bridge" and overland cables it is

¹ See: *Aussenpolitische Korrespondenz*, 1963, No. 16.

² Torfhaus, which is a relay station, is also connected by means of a "radio bridge" with the central station of the FRG in Hannover and Frankfurt-am-Main.

³ See: *Der Tagesspiegel*, September 7, 1963.

⁴ *Ibid.*

possible for West Berlin to link up with the telegraph and automatic telephone services of the FRG and then with those of other countries of the capitalist world. Until recently West Berlin's links with the socialist states, including the GDR, had been reduced to a minimum.

WEST BERLIN'S LINKS WITH THE GDR

Having divided up first Germany and then Berlin, the Western Powers, the FRG ruling circles and the West Berlin Senate did their utmost to isolate West Berlin completely from the surrounding territory. After splitting the city self-government bodies and cutting off trade and economic links, they took steps which led to the rupture of all ties with the GDR capital.

In February 1952, water mains were disconnected on the initiative of the West Berlin authorities.¹ In March of the same year an independent power supply system went into operation in West Berlin and at the end of 1954 all telephone lines were disconnected. The negotiations on putting 70 telephone lines back into operation which were opened in 1957 on the initiative of the GDR produced no results due to "procedural difficulties" or, in other words, due to the unwillingness of the Senate to hold them on an official level. Until just recently, therefore, telephone calls from the GDR capital to West Berlin went via Leipzig or Frankfurt-am-Main. On February 15, 1953, the West Berlin authorities closed the city to tram-cars from the GDR capital on the pretext that the tram-drivers were women. As a result the tram-car service which operated along 10 lines² between West Berlin and the GDR capital was terminated.

Yet West Berlin, which is situated inside the German Democratic Republic, had to maintain certain communications with the Republic. There was a direct telegraph line between West Berlin and the GDR capital and a teletype link between the West German (Kreuzberg) and GDR police.

¹ The total length of the West Berlin water supply system, which is fully isolated from the GDR, is approximately 4,000 km.

² Of these ten lines that crossed the border, eight belonged to the GDR and two to West Berlin.

There were direct telephone lines between the fire departments of West Berlin and the GDR capital, between the respective administrations of the underground railway and the airports of Schönefeld (GDR) and Tempelhof (West Berlin), between the different branches of the Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) and the offices of the Reuter news agency. The three cables passing across Bellevuestrasse between West Berlin and the GDR capital were used during the Leipzig trade fairs. Recently there has been an increase in the number of telephone and telegraph lines operating between West Berlin and the GDR capital.

There was an exchange of electricity between the Licht AG (BEWAG) association of power stations in West Berlin and the power system of the GDR capital.

A direct railway line was in operation between West Berlin and the GDR capital. It was used by international and urban railway trains, the latter being a ramified system belonging to the GDR in West Berlin.¹

Two through lines of the West Berlin Underground ran from north to south across the GDR capital.² Trains using the first line did not stop in the GDR capital, whilst the trains on the other line stopped at Friedrichstrasse.

Postal deliveries were made by road and rail. Every day three mail lorries from the Berlin District Postal Directorate of the GDR entered West Berlin through the Heinrich-Heine-strasse check-point and five mail lorries entered the GDR capital from West Berlin. Parcels were delivered in a special mail car which ran between the Gleisdreieck Station in West Berlin and East Station (GDR).

The sewage system existed as a single whole.³ On January 7, 1953, an agreement was reached on re-connecting a part of the water supply system between West Berlin and the GDR capital.⁴

¹ Several thousand railway workers of the Republic's Railways Directorate are employed on the GDR Railway in West Berlin.

² The total length of the underground railways in operation in West Berlin and the GDR capital is 97 kilometres.

³ Under an agreement signed on December 12, 1950, GDR sewage stations pump approximately 90 per cent of the sewage out of West Berlin for disposal into special fields outside the city limits.

⁴ Under this agreement the GDR compensates West Berlin for the water used on the Republic's railways in the city.



Coat-of-arms of West Berlin



Flag of West Berlin

West Berlin and GDR representatives maintained contact on all questions arising out of these links which grew and strengthened after the West Berlin settlement. Now there are regular meetings between these representatives.

REGULATIONS ON THE GDR BORDER WITH WEST BERLIN

The border between West Berlin and the GDR extends for 161 kilometres,¹ of which 45.7 kilometres run between West Berlin and the GDR capital.²

Up to 1955 the border was patrolled by Soviet troops. Under the agreement of September 20, 1955, the GDR now guards and patrols the entire border with West Berlin, with the exception of the movement of personnel and freight from the garrisons of the three Western Powers between West Berlin and the FRG, which, in keeping with the above agreement, is supervised by the Group of Soviet Troops.

Until 1961, except for the so-called outer ring of West Berlin, the border between it and the capital of the GDR was in effect open. Seventy-six streets were available for pedestrians and motor vehicles and five urban railway and four underground lines crossed the border.

More than 500,000 people³ daily crossed the border in both directions and were subject only to selective control. In a statement made early in August 1961, the Warsaw Treaty countries noted that the borders with West Berlin were left open for such a long time "in the hope that the Western Powers would not abuse the good will of the Government of the German Democratic Republic. But without regard for the interests of the German people and the Berlin population they took advantage of the existing regulations on the border with West Berlin to further their insidious, subversive aims".⁴

In view of this regulations of the type usually in force on the borders of all sovereign states were established on

¹ Approximately 24 kilometres pass along rivers, canals and lakes.

² See: *Statistisches Jahrbuch. Berlin, 1964*, p. 17.

³ See: *Die Welt*, December 14, 1961.

⁴ *Pravda*, August 14, 1961.

the border with West Berlin on the night of August 12, 1961, on the instructions of the GDR Government.

Henceforth West Berliners were allowed to visit the GDR capital "on presentation of a West Berlin certificate of identity". Entry procedure for citizens of the FRG and other countries, and also for members of the diplomatic corps and representatives of the occupation authorities of the Western Powers was not changed. GDR citizens, including the inhabitants of the GDR capital, could visit West Berlin "with special permission" or on "presentation of a special pass" issued by the People's Police.

Thirteen check-points were left open on the border between West Berlin and the GDR capital. Direct communication by the city railway was terminated and a special procedure was established for underground commuters. The procedure for international trains passing through West Berlin was not affected.

Later, in view of the provocations on the border, the GDR increased safeguards and tightened control on it. On August 14, 1961, the check-point at the Brandenburg Gate was closed on orders from the GDR Minister of the Interior. But since the provocations continued the GDR authorities took further measures to strengthen the border, and as of August 23, 1961, left only seven check-points open.

For the same reason a border zone several hundred metres wide, where entry was permitted by special permits, was set up around West Berlin on June 21, 1963.

At present *seven check-points* handling a fairly heavy flow of traffic function directly on the border between West Berlin and the capital of the GDR.¹

One check-point (Friedrichstrasse-Zimmerstrasse) is for

¹ Thousands of people pass daily through the check-points. In the past most of them were FRG citizens with permits allowing them to make one visit to the GDR. Then came foreigners and also West Berliners who might visit their relatives in exceptional circumstances (a total of 411,165 such permits were issued from 1965 to 1970). Since the West Berlin settlement the majority of visitors are West Berliners. In turn all citizens of the GDR over retiring age were allowed to visit the Federal Republic and West Berlin after 1965. There has been a noticeable increase in this category since 1973. In addition all citizens of the GDR who are of pension age have been allowed to visit the Federal Republic and West Berlin since 1965.

Soviet servicemen, servicemen of the garrisons of the three Western Powers in West Berlin and all foreigners, including diplomats accredited both in West Berlin and the GDR.

Two check-points (Bornholmer Strasse and Heinrich-Heine-Strasse) were established for FRG citizens crossing the border.

Four check-points (Chausseestrasse, Invalidenstrasse, Oberbaumbrücke and Sonnenallee) were set up for West Berliners. Since visits made by West Berliners to the GDR capital after August 13, 1961, were widely used for subversive and disruptive activity, on August 23, 1961, the GDR authorities ordered that only persons with special permits would be allowed entry. The latter were issued at two branches of the GDR Travel Bureau which were opened on August 26, 1961, at the Zoo and Westkreuz stations on the GDR-owned railway.¹ But the West Berlin authorities with the knowledge and consent of the three-power authorities ordered their closure,² thus depriving West Berliners of the opportunity to visit the GDR capital. This was subsequently restored as a result of the West Berlin settlement and the conclusion of corresponding agreements between the GDR and the West Berlin Senate.

In addition, there is a combined check-point at Friedrichstrasse Station (where trains using one of the two West Berlin underground lines which run under the GDR capital make a stop and where GDR urban railway trains leave for West Berlin), through which all the above categories of people are granted entry in keeping with the existing regulations.

There are seven check-points on the West Berlin-GDR border which was formerly known as the outer ring.³

¹ See: *Neues Deutschland*, August 27, 1961.

² See: *Der Tagesspiegel*, December 7, 1963.

³ The Griebnitzsee check-point is situated on the railways between West Berlin and the FRG. Troops trains from the US, British and French garrisons also pass through it. Road transport passes through the Neu-Babelsberg and Staaken check-points. The transportation of goods by waterway takes place through the Nedlitz check-point. The check-point between West Berlin and Potsdam (Glienicke Brücke on the Havel) was set up for the passage of the military liaison missions of the three Western Powers accredited at the HQ of the Group of Soviet Troops in Germany and for Soviet servicemen and diplomats. The

The GDR authorities alone are competent to impose regulations on the borders of the German Democratic Republic, including its border with West Berlin. "Every state in the world," the GDR press has emphasised, "has the right to guard its borders with a neighbour who displays hostile intentions and to safeguard itself against subversive activity and attacks."¹ It is within the competence of every state to establish whatever regulations it thinks fit on its borders, as stated in Article 51 of the UN Charter guaranteeing the right of every state to collective and individual defence, including the right to strengthen its borders.²

So, when on August 13, 1961, the German Democratic Republic established effective control on the border with West Berlin, the Soviet Government declared in a note on August 18, 1961, to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France that "any state establishes on its border with other states those regulations which it considers essential and which are in line with its legitimate interests" and resolutely rejected all their protests as absolutely unfounded and dismissed them as irrelevant attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the GDR.³

The Soviet Union also extended full support to the passport and visa formalities introduced by the GDR for FRG citizens and West Berliners visiting the GDR or travelling through its territory, including transit between the FRG and West Berlin, and also to the other measures the GDR had taken in recent years to strengthen its sovereignty.

Believing that normal, neighbourly relations between the GDR and West Berlin would be in the interests of both sides and lead to the establishment of international co-operation in Europe, the GDR Government proposed on many

Kohlhasenbrücke check-point is open for the transit of residents of the Steinstücken enclave and their relatives to and from West Berlin. This is regulated by a special procedure established by the appropriate GDR bodies. On July 15, 1963, the GDR Government opened a new check-point on Rudower Strasse/Waltersdorfer Strasse specially for West Berliners and foreigners, including FRG citizens, on their way from West Berlin to the Schönefeld Airport (*Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, 1963, No. 11, p. 917).

¹ *Neues Deutschland*, October 19, 1963.

² See: *Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, 1963, No. 9, p. 707.

³ *Pravda*, August 20, 1961.

occasions that the West Berlin Senate hold talks with them on this issue.

Although the GDR displayed initiative in this matter, it proved possible to conclude only four provisional agreements in the sixties on permits for West Berliners to visit their relations in the capital of the GDR on specified holidays.¹

The Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin opened the way to the conclusion on December 20, 1971, of the agreement between the Government of the German Democratic Republic and the Senate on facilitations and improvements in travel and visitor traffic for West Berliners visiting the Republic, including its capital. Visas are now issued at five travel and visitor bureaus which have been opened in West Berlin, and West Berliners may enter the GDR through almost all the check-points on the border with West Berlin.²

World public opinion welcomed the agreement of December 20, 1971, as an important step on the way to improving relations between the GDR and West Berlin still further.

The normalisation of the situation in West Berlin, the removal of the tension associated with the city, the end of illegal activity, which was incompatible with the Four-Power decisions, violated West Berlin's special status and gave rise to all sorts of problems, will enable this special formation to develop essential economic, cultural and other peaceful links with the outside world.

The USSR and the GDR have repeatedly declared that they want to see West Berlin develop and expand its peaceful ties with the outside world, that transit traffic should be normal and uninterrupted and that communications should take place in an atmosphere of good will and tolerance. But as they have shown in the past they will not stand for any encroachment on their legitimate rights.

¹ On December 17, 1963, September 24, 1964, November 25, 1965, and March 7, 1966.

² For pedestrians: Bornholmer Strasse, Chausseestrasse, Invalidenstrasse, Oberbaumbrücke, Sonnenallee, Drewitzstaaken Rudower Strasse; entry by car is also possible through all these check-points with the exception of Oberbaumbrücke.

CHAPTER VII
SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION—
THE MAIN PROBLEM
BEFORE PRESENT-DAY EUROPE

The complex of German questions, West Berlin and European security were the major problems in postwar Europe. Despite the specific nature of each of these problems the key to their solution was the achievement of a settlement which would help solve other controversial issues, relax tension and establish peace and would pave the way for extensive co-operation between all European states and peoples.

THE COMPLEX OF GERMAN QUESTIONS

Among the numerous problems created by the Second World War, one of the most serious in the postwar period was the entire complex of German questions which caused a sharp political struggle between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers.

The essence of this many-sided question lay in the removal of the source of conflict in the centre of the European continent, assistance to the German people in reconstructing their life on a democratic and peaceful basis and the creation of the right conditions for assuring that Germany would never again threaten her neighbours or world peace, as envisaged in the decisions of the anti-Hitler coalition, particularly the Potsdam Agreement. Although the substance of the German questions remained unchanged at all stages of postwar development, the approach to solving them could not and did not remain the same in the course of the entire

postwar period. It changed as the situation in the world and on German soil itself changed.

Prior to 1949, that is, before the ruling circles of the Western Powers and the West German reaction had split up Germany, which led to the formation of two states—the FRG and the GDR in her place, the Four Powers who accepted the unconditional surrender of the Hitler Reich in the spring of 1945 and assumed supreme power in the country bore the responsibility for the solution of all questions connected with German affairs. This is confirmed in the quadripartite agreements on Germany of that period and also by the practical activity of the military administrations of the Four Powers headed by the Control Council which handed down decisions (appeals, laws, orders, directives and instructions) on all questions of life in the country, ranging from demilitarisation, denazification, decartelisation and democratisation to fixing tax rates, legislation on the family and marriage and even regulating working hours and wages at industrial enterprises.¹

The situation changed with the establishment in 1949 of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic and their gradual development into sovereign states, and the termination of the occupation in 1954-1955 when corresponding agreements were signed. Since then the GDR and the FRG have been responsible for solving questions of their home and foreign policy.² Consequently there can no longer be any question of responsibility "for Germany as a whole", because the old Germany has long ceased to exist. She has been replaced by two states—the GDR and the FRG—and a special political entity, West Berlin. The

¹ The Control Council, for example, passed Directive No. 26 of January 26, 1946, "On the Regulation of Working Time"; Law No. 12 of February 11, 1946, "On the Amendment of Laws on Corporation Tax and Tax on Superprofits"; Law No. 16, of February 28, 1946, "On Marriage"; Directive No. 41 of October 17, 1946, "On Raising Wages for the Coal Industry Workers"; Directive No. 54 of June 25, 1947, "On the Basic Principles of Democratisation of the Education System in Germany", and so forth.

² See: "Statement of the Soviet Government on Relations Between the USSR and the GDR" of March 25, 1954 (*Pravda*, March 26, 1954); Agreement on Relations Between the USSR and the GDR of September 20, 1955 (*Pravda*, September 21, 1955).

Four Powers, however, must continue to fulfil certain obligations they have to wartime and postwar decisions, including the Potsdam Agreement which finalised the outcome of the war and formulated the programme of postwar reconstruction aimed primarily at ensuring European peace and security. It stands to reason that many provisions of the Potsdam Agreement which were only relevant to the initial postwar period (for example, the powers of the occupation authorities and the restrictions imposed on heavy industry) have now outlived themselves. Yet it should be borne in mind that by assuming the rights and responsibilities set forth in the above agreements, the Four Great Powers undertook first and foremost to ensure peace and security in Europe and to prevent the appearance of another seat of war. This being the case, the responsibility for European peace and security could not and cannot be taken out of the hands of the Four Powers.

On August 2, 1970, the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Potsdam Agreement, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Alexei Kosygin, sent messages to the heads of the three Western Powers in which he underlined that the Potsdam decisions "were important political acts designed to merge the efforts of the states in order to win peace after having won the war". "The basic principles of Potsdam still constitute the basis for the peaceful postwar organisation in Europe. Nowadays their implementation means recognition of the inviolability of the existing European borders, political realities which appeared as a result of the Second World War and postwar development, and the guarantee of lasting peace on the European continent".¹

The position of the Four Powers in respect of their rights and responsibilities was restated in the Declaration of the Governments of the USSR, the USA, France and Britain, which they made on November 9, 1972, in support of the acceptance of the two German states into UNO.

Throughout the history of international relations and diplomatic practice there have been various ways of ringing down the curtain on a war, the generally accepted or classical way being the conclusion of peace treaties. Yet there

¹ *Pravda*, August 2, 1970.

have been many cases when for various reasons these were not signed and the former belligerents gradually settled all controversial questions in their relations. Therefore, because of the specific postwar conditions, developments on German soil followed the latter course.

By the mid-fifties all the Four Powers who had signed the instruments for the unconditional surrender of Hitler's Germany had terminated the state of war with that country.

Afterwards, when it became clear that the two states which had arisen on German soil were developing in different directions, the victorious powers and other states established relations with the FRG based on accepted standards of international law, and the Soviet Union and a number of countries established relations with the GDR.¹ The conclusion of corresponding agreements by the USA, Britain and France with the FRG (Paris agreements of October 23, 1954) and by the Soviet Union with the GDR (the treaties of September 20, 1955, and June 12, 1964) settled many other questions in the relations between the two states which now occupied the territory of what was formerly Germany. With the coming into force of the Moscow, Warsaw, Berlin and Prague treaties of 1970-1973, a number of other questions still outstanding from the Second World War were removed from the agenda. The completion of this process is in keeping with the actual state of affairs and is dictated by events themselves. It is paving the way for the further normalisation of the situation in the centre of the European continent and helping guarantee European security.

THE WEST BERLIN QUESTION

The West Berlin question was one of the most complicated and acute problems mankind inherited from the war and the early postwar period. So long as it was still possible to find a practical solution to the problem of Germany's reunification, the Berlin question was not singled out to any great extent from among the entire complex of German affairs. The proposals put forward by the USSR

¹ Today the GDR maintains such relations with over 80 countries.

and the GDR to create a single peaceloving and democratic German state and finalise a German peace settlement also led to the solution of the West Berlin question.

A basically different situation, that further aggravated the split of the country and nation, arose after the conclusion of the Paris agreements and the Federal Republic's accession to NATO in 1955. The policy of the Western Powers and Bonn ruling circles completely sealed off all the roads to the unification of the GDR and the FRG. It became clear that the two states and the two social systems which appeared on German soil would exist side by side for a long time to come. Meanwhile West Berlin was becoming more and more isolated from its natural surroundings and gradually turning into a specific administrative and territorial entity, a city with a special status, a separate political unit without precedent in international practice.

In the circumstances the West Berlin question became detached from German affairs and developed into a separate problem requiring a special approach.

The crux of the problem was to improve the situation in West Berlin and then agree to curb any activity incompatible with its status, to remove the cause of friction in the area, preclude any possibility of the city being used by the aggressive imperialist circles as a weapon to build up tension, and guarantee its peaceful development. The settlement of the West Berlin problem had to be worked out in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement and other Four-Power decisions and take into account the postwar realities on German soil, the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers under the corresponding wartime and postwar agreements, the legitimate interests and the sovereignty of the GDR and, of course, the requirements of the West Berlin population itself. It was also necessary to normalise West Berlin's relations with other states, particularly with its immediate neighbour, on the basis of peaceful coexistence and the standards of contemporary international law. Such a solution would have been in the interests of all concerned, including the West Berlin population and the Western Powers, and would have contributed to the cause of peace and security in Europe.

The West Berlin situation was the concern of the Four

Powers and the Soviet side often spoke of the "quadripartite responsibility" for the city and the fact that the solution of the entire problem was the business of the USSR, the USA, France and Britain. Emphasising this again and again the Soviet side took requisite practical measures whenever West Berlin's status was violated and the rights and interests of the USSR and its allied states were infringed, and more than once submitted proposals that could have settled West Berlin affairs. In doing so the Soviet Union proceeded from the basis that the normalisation of the situation in West Berlin which lies inside the GDR would be in the interests of the German Democratic Republic. Moreover, the practical solution of the West Berlin issue "would require", as the Soviet Government repeatedly indicated in its statements, "active participation on the part of the German Democratic Republic".¹

Referring to West Berlin's socio-economic and political structure, the Soviet Government underlined in its notes that the city's population has the "inalienable right ... to use their own discretion in resolving domestic issues and to establish whatever political and social system they wish".²

The conclusion of the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin confirmed that the Soviet Union had taken the correct stand and underlined the important role which it had played in the West Berlin settlement. At the same time it reaffirmed the responsibility of the Four Powers in solving questions connected with West Berlin.

Pending the solution of all questions on West Berlin and the termination of occupation in the city, the Soviet Union will exercise certain rights and fulfil its duties stemming from the Potsdam and other Four-Power agreements both with regard to the city of West Berlin and the situation arising from it. It also guards the monument to Soviet soldiers in Tiergarten, participates in the joint administration of the Allied prison for the chief war criminals of Hitler's Germany in Spandau and in the activity of the Berlin Air Safety Centre any performs a number of other specific functions in the city.

¹ *Izvestia*, November 27, 1958.

² *Pravda*, August 5, 1961.

The active role being played by the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic in the settlement of West Berlin affairs is a guarantee that the situation in this important sector of international policy will continue to improve.

SOCIALIST COUNTRIES—INITIATORS OF AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

Security in Europe is a component part of international security and one of its most important prerequisites. Therefore the problem of European security has always been the focal point of the political activity of the Soviet Union and the socialist states that came into existence after the Second World War. As is stated in the Resolution of the 24th CPSU Congress on the Report of the CPSU Central Committee, "One of the key problems in strengthening world peace and easing tensions is to ensure European security on the basis of recognition of the territorial and political realities that have taken shape as a result of the Second World War."¹

Since the establishment of peace and security was a most difficult task and the resistance of the forces which pursued a totally different aim in Europe was fierce and tenacious, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries had to find various ways and means of solving this problem. Depending on the nature of the situation, they came forward with alternative versions of both partial and overall measures to improve the political climate in Europe and promote co-operation between European states.

The first postwar decade (1945-1955) was marked by the historical Potsdam decisions on the postwar settlement in Europe and the consistent efforts of the socialist countries to have them enforced. At the time priority was given to formulating draft peace treaties with the former allies of Hitler's Germany (Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland) and settling German affairs. This was regarded as an "immediate and important task" on which the development of the situation in Europe depended to a decisive degree. Some of the problems were successfully solved thanks

¹ *24th Congress of the CPSU*, p. 217.

to the consistent struggle of the Soviet Union, the People's Democracies and all democratic forces. Peace treaties were signed with these countries; anti-fascist forces came to power in East Germany where the Potsdam decisions were put into effect. But the Western Powers acting in alliance with German reaction managed to split the country. They created a separate West German state, began to arm it and incorporated it in their military and political alliances. The appearance of this new source of tension in Europe produced an appropriate reaction from the countries of the socialist community. The end of this period was marked by the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance which took place in Warsaw on May 14, 1955. The Treaty signified the creation of an organisation of collective security of a number of socialist countries which became a reliable basis for strengthening the socialist community and an important stabilising factor in Europe and played an enormous part in preserving peace there.

The second postwar decade (1955-1965) was characterised by the intensification of the socialist community's struggle to ring down the curtain on the Second World War, relax tension in Europe and promote co-operation between European states. But the resistance of the ruling circles of the Western Powers and the FRG impeded the achievement of a German settlement through the conclusion of a peace treaty, and in fact it followed the course of gradual, stage-by-stage solution characteristic of this complex of problems. At the same time the threat to the cause of peace from West German militarism became more and more of a reality as a result of West Germany's accession to NATO and her continually accelerating remilitarisation. So, parallel with its efforts to tie up the loose ends from the Second World War and rally all the peaceloving forces to avert the fresh threat of war, the Soviet Union took important and constructive initiative when it suggested that the establishment of a collective system of security be negotiated in Europe. The concrete proposals to this effect submitted by the Soviet side at the end of 1954 and the beginning of 1955 left their imprint on all future developments and contributed a great deal to the cause of easing tension.

In the third postwar decade (1965-1975) the countries of

the socialist community advanced a comprehensive long-term programme for creating an effective system of European security and solving questions of concern to the European states within its framework. Bearing in mind that some of the questions still remaining from the Second World War had been solved as a result of the measures of August 13, 1961, the conclusion of the 1964 Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Co-operation between the USSR and the GDR and a number of other steps taken by the countries of the socialist community, that the political activity of the working class was gaining momentum and the movement in Europe to establish co-operation between states irrespective of their social systems was growing and that socialism's influence on events was becoming ever more decisive, while the Federal Republic's increasingly aggressive course was arousing discontent and resistance from other states, the problem of ensuring European security became a matter of still greater urgency. It had become one of the key problems in international politics but at the same time the conditions for solving it had improved greatly.

The situation called for a programme which would take into account all the changes that had taken place in the world and which would be broad enough to win the support of all European countries and yet sufficiently concrete and effective to ensure European peace and co-operation. At the same time it had to be based on the realisation that only the solution of crucial world problems, and not diplomatic unions, could pave the way to the creation of an effective system of European security. Real security could be ensured not by a "balance of fear" sustained by the arms race and entailing the risk of war, but only by a system based on the principles of peaceful coexistence, co-operation between all European states and the settlement of controversial questions and disputes that might arise between them by peaceful means.

An effective system of European security could only be established by recognising the *status quo* with all the ensuing consequences in the field of politics and in international law.

In other words, the Soviet side maintained that in order to ensure peace and tranquility it was necessary to accept

Europe just as it was with its system of frontiers and states which had taken shape as a result of the war and the events that followed it.

Needless to say the development of co-operation in Europe would have been facilitated by the elaboration of principles of mutual relations between the states involving respect for the inviolability of existing borders and territorial integrity of the states, the repudiation of the use or threat of force or of discrimination of any kind, the solution of all controversial questions through negotiations, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual advantage and the spirit of good will and neighbourliness.

With regard to the material basis of European security, this could only be the development of trade, economic co-operation and other links in all fields of science, technology and culture, and also measures promoting disarmament and relaxation of tension caused by the threat of war.

The most reliable way to banish wars and conflicts from Europe would have been to replace the existing military and political groupings by a stable and reliable system of security. But since the West was not yet prepared to do this, the only road that remained open was the gradual offsetting of military confrontation by fostering relations between European states along lines precluding the possibility of aggressive wars and ensuring peaceful development. Relations between European states had to be built on a firm foundation conducive to the establishment of an effective system of European security.

The world socialist system, the bulwark of peace and social progress which consistently pursued a peaceloving policy, was the main counterpoise to imperialism. It was only natural, therefore, that it was the socialist countries of Europe which assumed the initiative in uniting and mobilising all the healthy forces on the continent for the struggle against the new military threat and the creation of a reliable security system.

In the wake of the proposals advanced by the Political Consultative Committee which met in Bucharest in July 1966, the socialist countries took further steps and drew up corresponding documents which played an important part in European affairs. Jointly they drew up the Bucharest

Declaration (1966), the Budapest Appeal (1969) and the Berlin Statement (1970) formulating a constructive long-term programme which raised questions of vital importance for European peace and security. All the Warsaw Treaty countries took a most active part in elaborating these documents. In advancing these proposals, they also declared that they were prepared to join forces to find ways of strengthening peace, guaranteeing security and promoting co-operation between European states and to take the necessary steps in this direction both individually and in co-operation with other interested states.

Being in line with the interests of the European states the proposals of the socialist countries met with a warm response and started a wide-spread discussion of ways and means for safeguarding peace and security in Europe. In time the governments of virtually all European countries were compelled to examine the proposals of the Warsaw Treaty states and not a single European country said anything directly against them. Questions connected with European security were given increasing prominence in various communiqués and other official documents from the meetings of statesmen of different countries.

The positive response to the proposals of the Warsaw Treaty countries confirmed their view that there were real possibilities for solving the problem of European security.

But the situation was not at all simple. It was still characterised by two opposing trends in European affairs. On the one hand, there was the trend to escalate the old aggressive course and heighten tension and, on the other, there was the trend to ease tension, to further relations and develop extensive co-operation between the European states on an all-European basis. Although the opponents of a detente did their utmost to aggravate the situation by stepping up military preparations, an analysis of the situation showed that the right conditions did exist for further promoting the trend towards peace.

For a number of reasons, primarily the continued shift in the balance of forces in favour of socialism and the socialist community's persistent efforts, it became possible at the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies to partially neutralise the aggressive course of imperialist circles

in the United States and West German reaction and in some measure remove the phenomenon of "cold war" from European life, and extend and improve relations between European states with different socio-economic systems. Perceptible changes were taking place in Europe's approach to the problems confronting it and new kinds of conditions for solving the problem of European security were being created. The situation that was taking shape in the world and on the European continent was, among other things, conducive to the further struggle to establish wide-spread co-operation between European states. But for this trend to prevail and become decisive vigorous steps had to be taken to mobilise the states and nations and all peaceloving forces for the effort. Taking into account that the right conditions for a conference were beginning to emerge, it became necessary to work out a precise and clearly reasoned programme on which it could base its work.

In this respect an important role was played by the Prague session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation held on January 25 and 26, 1972.

In view of the events which took place in the world in 1971, particularly the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin, the conclusion of the talks conducted by the GDR with the FRG and the West Berlin Senate on a West Berlin settlement, the submission for ratification by the FRG Parliament of the 1970 treaties with the USSR and the Polish People's Republic by the Federal Government and the mounting support for an all-European conference, it became necessary for the socialist countries to hold an exchange of views and further define their position.

The participants of the meeting held in Prague at the end of January 1972, exchanged views on a wide range of international issues of common interest. First and foremost, they discussed European affairs and preparations for an all-European conference.

The meeting in Prague ended on January 26, 1972, with the adoption of an important political document, the Declaration on Peace, Security and Co-operation in Europe.

The Declaration recounted and generalised the experience of the Warsaw Treaty countries' tenacious struggle for assert-

ing the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence. It took into account the constructive, realistic elements which had appeared in the policies of a number of West European states in recent years and indicated ways of consolidating the positive changes taking place in Europe, solving urgent problems and further improving the situation on the continent.

One of the most important results of the Prague session of the Political Consultative Committee was that it formulated principles for European security and relations between European states. These principles formed the basis of the declaration and constituted a well-thought-out programme of peaceful development on the European continent.

Here are the principles advanced by the Warsaw Treaty countries.

INVIOABILITY OF BORDERS

Inviolability of borders is the starting point of the efforts aimed at achieving agreement, promoting co-operation between European states and safeguarding European security.

Territorial disputes have always been one of the main causes of international controversy and conflict, including the two world wars. It is most important, therefore, that the inviolability of borders be guaranteed, when one considers that more than 90 per cent of the wars which have taken place in the past centuries were caused by border provocations.

There is no question of bargaining over the existing European borders. It is just as impossible to alter them as it is to resurrect the millions of people who fell in the fight against fascist aggression. "Any attempt to violate them would create a threat to European peace," states the declaration approved in Prague on January 26, 1972. "Therefore the inviolability of the existing borders and the territorial integrity of the European states should be punctiliously respected and the claims of some states to the territories of others should be completely ruled out."¹

¹ *Pravda*, January 27, 1972.

REPUDIATION OF THE USE OF FORCE

Another question just as important for ensuring European security is the repudiation by the European countries of the use or threat of force which constitute aggressive actions and should be ruled out of the relations between them. All disputes between European states, as the declaration proposes, "should be solved by peaceful means only, through negotiations according to the basic principles of international law and in a way which does not impair the legitimate interests, peace and security of the nations". The repudiation of the use of force by all European states would signify the triumph of the principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems in international relations.

This principle has already proved its worth. Since states with opposing social systems have appeared in Europe as a result of historical development, peaceful coexistence has become the only alternative to military confrontation between them. "Having rejected war as a political instrument European states with different social systems can and should build their relations on the basis of agreement and co-operation in the interests of peace."¹

Peaceful coexistence is a specific form of class struggle on the international scene. However, it precludes war as a means of solving disputes between states, demands renunciation of interference in the internal affairs of other states and nations, of imperialist attempts to export counter-revolution and the efforts of some states to impose a specific social and political system on others. Since it is an objective necessity of human development in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, peaceful coexistence, as V. J. Lenin repeatedly pointed out, opens up real possibilities for a peaceful settlement of international disputes and controversies and consequently for the establishment of fruitful co-operation between states with different social systems. "For us," as Leonid Brezhnev put it at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in 1969, "peaceful coexistence is not a temporary tactical

¹ Ibid.

method, but an important principle underlying the consistently peace-loving foreign policy of socialism."¹

Peaceful coexistence is a political concept directed at easing international tension, creating a system of European security, barring the way to wars and averting a nuclear catastrophe.

The only alternative to the arms race and dangerous military confrontation is the creation of a system of security in Europe and the furtherance of extensive co-operation between all European states on the basis of peaceful coexistence. This is the road which people who have had enough of the cold war and unstable peace will gladly follow.

In its declaration of January 26, 1972, the Political Consultative Committee noted that thanks to the efforts and the constructive contribution of the states participating in the Prague session and other countries, "relations based on peaceful coexistence are becoming more firmly established"² between European countries.

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF GOODNEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE

There are more than 30 states in Europe. When they co-operated there was peace and tranquillity on the continent, but when co-operation gave way to hostility and disputes there were clashes and armed conflicts. The considerable headway in the development of relations between the states forming the capitalist and the socialist parts of Europe in recent years has mainly been a result of the major change in the balance of forces in favour of socialism and the consistent policy of the socialist countries.

The most convincing and notable examples of such co-operation are the relations between the USSR and France. As a result of Leonid Brezhnev's visit to France in October 1971 they rose to a new level and today constitute one of the mainstays of European peace.

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, p. 171.

² *Pravda*, January 27, 1972.

Other European countries have also begun to take this road and relations between them have become increasingly diversified.

In order to solve the problems facing them, European countries have had to pool their efforts and expand co-operation. But to be able to do this they have to establish good-neighbourly relations. This means that they have to observe the principles of independence and national sovereignty, equality, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and mutual advantage. "Such an approach must become a permanent policy in the relations between European states, an ever-present factor in the life of the European peoples and also lead to the development of goodneighbourly relations and mutual understanding between states in various parts of Europe."¹ History has shown that ignoring these principles of international relations undermines peace and engenders all sorts of complications and conflicts. So, the observance of these principles is a guarantee of stability and peace.

Relations between European states must develop in such a way as enable them to gradually eliminate the division of the continent into military and political groupings and put an effective system of European security in their place.

MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TIES BETWEEN STATES

From time immemorial European countries have been maintaining numerous ties in commerce, science and technology, culture, tourism and in many other fields. The lessening of tension in Europe in recent years has further stimulated their development and the scientific and technological revolution has been accelerating this process to a still greater extent. In peacetime mutually beneficial ties between European states should be expanded even more. The development of these ties, enabling the European peoples to translate into reality their aspirations for peace, order and prosperity, will enhance the stability of the system of security and co-operation which is taking shape in Europe.

¹ Ibid.

DISARMAMENT

War is the terrible scourge of mankind. It has caused the greatest devastation in Europe. The arms race has always been the forerunner of armed conflicts and has inevitably led to war. Never before has it been so obvious that the arms race is a fearful threat to mankind. Experts have estimated that if all the stockpiles of nuclear weapons were to be exploded simultaneously, each person on our planet would be subject to a blast of 15 tons of TNT. Besides nuclear weapons there is a large stock of other weapons of mass annihilation in the arsenals of many countries. The effectiveness of so-called conventional weapons has risen immeasurably.

A report submitted by scientists from 14 countries to the UN Secretary General in 1971 pointed out that the arms race is an onerous burden on the peoples of the world which retards their economic and social development. In the past decade almost \$1,900,000 million have been swallowed up by arms production programmes.

The Warsaw Treaty countries consider that everything should be done to first check and then put an end to the arms race. It is the duty of all peace-loving states and nations to mobilise the will of the overwhelming majority of mankind to solve this problem. "The European states should in the interests of strengthening world peace do everything in their power to help solve the problem of general and complete disarmament, principally nuclear disarmament, to implement measures to restrict and halt the arms race¹".

UN Support. The aims of the European states in the international arena are in accord with the provisions of the UN Charter; that is to help maintain peace and security and promote friendly relations and co-operation between states. That is why the Warsaw Treaty countries issued an appeal to all parties concerned that they proclaim that "the European countries support the United Nations Organisation and are in favour of its consolidation in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter"².

¹ *Pravda*, January 27, 1972.

² *Ibid.*

These principles give no unilateral advantages to any state or group of states; they simply attest to the good will of the socialist countries and to their desire to see that European development proceeds in line with the vital interests of all European peoples, and crystallise the experience of the socialist community's long struggle for European peace and security. They take into account all the constructive elements which have appeared in the policies of several West European states in recent years.

The principles set forth in the Prague Declaration have been applied in one form or another in relations with France and a number of other countries, including the FRG and the USA. They are being implemented more and more extensively in relations with other states. In their Declaration, the participants of the Prague Session of the Political Consultative Council "expressed satisfaction that the results achieved in the process of easing tension in Europe are secured whenever necessary by appropriate documents which are valid in international law".¹

The Warsaw Treaty countries have expressed the hope that an all-European conference would be able to turn these principles into a basis for relations between all European states and that they would become the officially recognised standard of international law for the European countries.

The press in the socialist countries has emphasised that lasting peace, security and co-operation depend on whether European states can reach agreement on these principles and implement them in their practical policy. If the conference rules that European states should build their relations on these principles it would be a historical decision furthering the cause of peace and the interests of all the peoples of Europe.

The Prague Declaration also dwelt on another important question which is being raised more and more frequently in connection with the problem of normalising the situation on the continent, namely, the achievement of an agreement on cutting back armed forces and armaments as a step towards strengthening European security. As was stated in the

¹ Ibid.

Declaration, the participants in the conference "proceed from the basis that the problem of reducing the number of troops and armaments in Europe, both foreign and national, should be solved in a way that would not harm the countries concerned. It should not be the prerogative of the military and political alliances existing in Europe to discuss and determine the ways of solving this question". In discussing where and how the talks on this question should take place, the sides should take all this into account. The Prague conference was in favour of carrying out a parallel exchange of views on preparations for an all-European conference and on the reduction of armed forces and armaments without linking them together, or entrusting the discussion of this question to a body which would be set up at the all-European conference (or in some other way acceptable to all sides). In expressing their readiness to discuss this question, the socialist countries have taken into account the tremendous importance which everyone attaches to the problem of a military detente in Europe.

The meeting of the Political Consultative Council was a striking "confirmation of the vital force and historic significance of the programme for peace and international security adopted at the 24th CPSU Congress",¹ and a new and important step towards settling urgent problems. It offered further proof of the determination of the Warsaw Treaty countries to continue working for a detente and lasting peace in Europe and co-operate closely with all the interested parties. They are prepared to do their utmost to have this historic task fulfilled.

World public opinion assessed the meeting of the Political Consultative Council as an important milestone on the road to security in Europe and the realisation of the peaceful aspirations of its peoples. Even the US press acknowledged that the documents signed in Prague were "a strong restatement of the Soviet policy of detente in Europe".² The Prague conference was a prologue to the multilateral consultations which began in November 1972 in Helsinki in preparation for an all-European conference.

¹ *Pravda*, January 29, 1972.

² *The Washington Post*, January 27, 1972.

WAYS OF ENSURING EUROPEAN SECURITY

It follows that the conditions are ripe for creating a reliable system of security and promoting extensive co-operation in Europe. The 24th CPSU Congress (March-April 1971) not only reached this conclusion and advanced the constructive Peace Programme but also pointed out what should be done "to continue the improvement in the European situation, to make headway in ensuring collective security in Europe and in developing co-operation both on a bilateral and all-European basis".¹

As was pointed out at the congress, the accomplishment of these tasks would be facilitated by the convention of an all-European conference, the entry into force of the Soviet-West German and Polish-West German Treaties, a settlement of problems associated with West Berlin, the establishment of relations of equality between the GDR and the FRG and their acceptance by the UN, a positive solution to the question of the invalidity of the Munich dictate and the normalisation of relations between the FRG and Czechoslovakia.

Today it can be said with satisfaction that "certain clauses in the Peace Programme have, in essence, already been carried into effect and the implementation of others is proceeding at quite an active pace".² This part of Leonid Brezhnev's speech, delivered in the Kremlin on July 11, 1973, was concerned primarily with Europe. In European affairs good progress has been made on all five of the tasks formulated by the congress.

The signing of the agreements on West Berlin marked the settlement of West Berlin problems which was attainable under present conditions.

The FRG's treaties with the USSR and Poland have now been ratified. Their conclusion was regarded everywhere as one of the most important events in the postwar period, for it opened the way to the normalisation of relations between the Federal Republic and the other socialist countries. These

¹ *Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow, 1971, p. 31.*

² *Pravda, July 12, 1973.*

treaties are working successfully and have fully justified all the hopes that were put in them. Strict adherence to the letter and spirit of these treaties will guarantee the further successful development of relations between the FRG and the socialist countries and will help increase security and promote co-operation in Europe.

Considerable success has been achieved on the road to normalisation of relations between the FRG and the GDR. On June 15, 1972, the secretaries of state of the two governments Michael Kohl and Egon Bahr got down to an exchange of views on this particular question. As a result of the subsequent talks a Treaty on the Basic Principles in Relations between the GDR and the FRG was signed on December 21, 1972 (it came into force on June 21, 1973). After this the Security Council made a recommendation to admit the two German states into UNO. On September 18 the GDR and the FRG became full members of the United Nations Organisation.

After prolonged negotiations a treaty on mutual relations between Czechoslovakia and the FRG was initialled on June 20, 1973, in Bonn. With the signing of the Prague Treaty the heads of the two governments solved one of the most complex post-war problems engendered by the Munich dictate. At last the two governments found a mutually acceptable formula, by which they regarded the so-called Munich agreement as insignificant in their relations. The Prague Treaty, which rights the historical wrong inflicted on the Czechoslovak people, is a document of great political significance.

All these treaties and agreements are constituent parts of the system which is laying the foundation for a reliable system of security and symbolises the transition of Europe from a continent of enmity and confrontation to one of mutual understanding and co-operation.

The obstacles to the convention of an all-European conference on security and co-operation have finally been overcome. Multilateral consultations were begun in Helsinki on November 22, 1972, and after six months' hard work led to the convention of the conference on July 3, 1973. Here the socialist countries tabled a whole range of important and constructive proposals.

Thus provision has been made for practical discussion of the most important problems facing Europe today. The work going on to solve these problems is now being supplemented with measures aimed at achieving military détente. Naturally, success has been due in large part to the socialist countries and their diplomacy.

The process of normalising relations between European states and establishing an effective system of security was underway on the continent and regarded with approval by all European people and peaceloving forces throughout the world.

THE GDR—SOCIALISM'S WESTERN OUTPOST, AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN EUROPEAN PEACE AND SECURITY

In contemporary conditions it is impossible to ensure European security without taking into account that two sovereign states—the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic—have replaced Hitler's former Reich. Now it is clear to everyone that problems bearing upon Europe's future and the states existing on German soil cannot be solved without the participation of the GDR.

The formation of the German Democratic Republic was one of the most important postwar events—a turning point in European history. The GDR has become a reliable base in the struggle against West German militarism and revanchism. The socialist community acquired a new member, the sphere of imperialist domination narrowed considerably and prospects for ensuring European security improved markedly.

That was why world democratic forces welcomed the establishment of the GDR with profound satisfaction.

The GDR came into existence on October 7, 1949, and immediately Western circles began prophesying its inevitable doom, saying that it had no future whatsoever. But these so-called prophets were mistaken just as they had often been in the past. While the Weimar Republic lasted 15 years and Hitler's Thousand-Year Reich only 12, the GDR will soon be celebrating its 25th anniversary.

Today it is impossible to imagine Europe without the

German Democratic Republic. It has been a hard struggle for the country and its population. Looking back over the years one comes to realise what tremendous headway the Republic has made within the relatively short period it has been in existence. The GDR is a highly developed socialist state which has proved that the working people are more efficient administrators of their country than her former masters. The Republic gave its population what it needed most—peace and tranquility, the opportunity to engage in creative labour which makes for the country's development, happiness and greatness. "The entire process of formation of our socialist state," noted Erich Honecker, "gives us every right to say that leadership of society by the Marxist-Leninist Party in alliance with other parties united in the National Front of Democratic Germany, has completely justified itself."¹

A new society, a totally new state has been established on a third of the territory occupied formerly by Germany. Today the GDR ranks eighth in the world and fifth in Europe (after the USSR, the FRG, Great Britain and France) in volume of industrial output. From 1950 to 1970, its national income increased more than fourfold and industrial production more than fivefold. In ten months it produces more than Germany did in 1936. Its foreign trade turnover has increased by a factor of 8.2 and agriculture is developing rapidly. Commenting on the economic upsurge in the GDR the Western press wrote that it has far surpassed anything that West Germany achieved in the fifties. The GDR has become a country of modern science and advanced socialist culture. In the course of two decades it has solved all the basic tasks in the transition period from capitalism to socialism.

These successes mirror the enormous organising and guiding activity of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany headed by its Leninist Central Committee. They have been attained by the creative fulfilment of general and specific, and international and national tasks and show that the GDR is inexorably moving towards socialism.

The development of the GDR has shown that the basic

¹ *Pravda*, March 31, 1969.

laws of socialism are fully operative in specific German conditions.

By carrying through the programme of socialist construction in the home country of Marx and Engels, the people of the German Democratic Republic are fulfilling their internationalist duty and securing their future. Their successes on German soil attest to socialism's superiority over capitalism.

In contrast to imperialism, whose policy of political and military adventurism has caused great suffering to the German people, the GDR has given its population clear-cut prospects for a peaceful and happy future. It proclaimed peace as the goal of its foreign policy and raised this demand to the *level of one of the most important constitutional provisions* making it obligatory to all its citizens to work for security and mutual understanding between nations in accordance with the Constitution of April 6, 1968.

The GDR has set itself the lofty task of doing everything in its power to see that no threat of war should ever stem from German soil.

The German Democratic Republic came into existence and developed under this motto which it later proclaimed as its *historic mission*.

The 20 years and more that have passed since the establishment of the GDR have witnessed the strengthening of friendship and co-operation between the Republic and the Soviet Union. This was a parallel process and one inseparably linked with the building of socialism. It was the Socialist Unity Party of Germany headed by Wilhelm Pieck, Walter Ulbricht, Otto Grotewohl, Erich Honecker, Willi Stoph and other experienced internationalists which guided the German masses along this road. One of the SUPG's greatest services was that it helped the Republic's population to surmount the vicious chauvinist ideology and put the working people on the right road, proclaiming in the Party Rules, the Constitution and other fundamental documents that development and consolidation of friendship and co-operation between the GDR and the USSR and other socialist countries was one of its most important tasks.

SUPG Rules state that "each member of the Party supports the inviolable friendship with the Soviet Union and

other socialist countries and also with all peoples fighting for their national and social liberation. He must steadfastly fight against any manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism, for peace and friendship between peoples."

The new Socialist Constitution of the German Democratic Republic adopted on April 6, 1968, states that the GDR "in conformity with the principles of socialist internationalism maintains and fosters all-round co-operation and friendship with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other socialist states".¹

Friendship and co-operation between the peoples of the socialist community is proletarian internationalism in action, an important factor in building socialism and communism and safeguarding European peace and security. Friendship and co-operation between the peoples of all socialist countries is the fountain-head of strength in the struggle for a happy future. The common aims and tasks of the countries making up the socialist community is a reliable foundation for this friendship whose nucleus is the indestructible unity of their parties.

All people of goodwill experience a sense of deep satisfaction that the SUPG attaches such great significance to the principles of proletarian internationalism and friendship with the USSR and other countries of the socialist community.

Historical experience and the entire existence of the GDR attest to the fact that this policy is fully in keeping with the class interests of the working class and of all working people in the Republic and furthers the cause of peace and security in Europe.

The expansion of friendship and co-operation between the GDR and the USSR and other countries of the socialist community was accompanied by an all-round development of their relations, finalised and formalised in appropriate treaties and agreements and other legal acts which were landmarks in the Republic's rise and development as a sovereign socialist state and an inalienable part of the socialist community.

The efforts of the German Democratic Republic in foreign policy are directed at securing peace and mutual understand-

¹ *Constitution of the GDR*, Berlin, 1968, p. 12 (in German).

ing between peoples. All its proposals are imbued with deep concern for peace both now and in the future, and constitute an appeal to draw appropriate lessons from the tragic events of the past and prevent their repetition. The GDR Government has put forward a comprehensive and substantial programme which offers real prospects for peaceful development on German soil; it advocates an improvement of relations between European states, including the GDR and the FRG, disarmament and a constructive contribution by both these states to the creation of a system of European security.

In this way the German Democratic Republic has "become a very important factor in European and international reality", as is noted in the joint statement on the results of the visit of the GDR Party and Government delegation to the Soviet Union in 1969. It "asserts the ideals of peace, social progress and humanism on German soil".¹ The German Democratic Republic is a *dependable link in the socialist community*,² a *solid outpost of socialism in the West*; it is confidently marching ahead along the road chosen by the people and alongside other socialist countries and is doing a great deal to safeguard European security and normalise the situation with regard to West Berlin.

To a considerable degree the fate of peace in Europe is being decided on German soil and the situation on the continent depends in many respects on the course of development there.

By rendering the necessary assistance and support to the German Democratic Republic in its efforts to strengthen its position, the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community are also acting in the interests of European peace and security, thus creating essential conditions for the solution of other European questions.

As Alexei Kosygin has pointed out, the Soviet side proceeds from the fact that "the stronger and more powerful the German Democratic Republic becomes, the more reliable will be the bulwarks of peace on German soil and the more stable will be European security".³

Those who dream of recarving the political map of Europe

¹ *Pravda*, July 15, 1969.

² *Ibid.*, October 7, 1969.

³ *Ibid.*, March 2, 1965.

and are still harbouring aggressive intentions against the GDR should have long ago realised the futility of their plans.

Characterising the German Democratic Republic's place and role in the contemporary world, Leonid Brezhnev said at the 15th Congress of Trade Unions on March 20, 1972: "It should long since have been understood that there is not and cannot be an effective normalisation of the European situation without full consideration being given to the position of the GDR as an independent, sovereign socialist country."¹

THE NEW ALIGNMENT OF FORCES IN THE FRG

The general course of events in Europe naturally had an impact on the Federal Republic. The process of differentiation and further division of political forces became more pronounced there in the early seventies as did the confrontation between the ruling parties (SDPG/FDP) and the opposition (CDU/CSU) which was actively supported by the NDP and all the extreme Right-wing forces. This was most vividly manifested in the struggle over the ratification of the so-called Eastern treaties which led to the premature elections to the Bundestag on November 19, 1972. These elections were the most intense and hard-fought in the history of the Federal Republic. For the first time in its existence premature elections became a sort of a referendum on foreign policy matters, above all on Willy Brandt's Eastern policy. At the same time they amounted, in effect, to a struggle to prevent the CDU/CSU from gaining state power in the country.

It was with a feeling of unconcealed relief that the overwhelming majority of the FRG population and many people in other countries welcomed the election results. The SDPG and the FDP considerably improved their position, winning 271 seats instead of the 254 which they had in 1969. The CDU/CSU lost 17 seats (225 instead of 242). As a result the Government has 46 seats more than the opposition. This means that the Government has a firm parliamentary base,

¹ *Pravda*, March 21, 1972.

while the opposition has been deprived of the chance to disorganise the work of parliament and the organs of state power.

This was both a decisive victory for the ruling coalition and a major defeat of the CDU/CSU. The first signs of this defeat appeared in the spring of 1972 during the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties by the FRG Parliament. Now it became a bitter reality. By turning their backs on the opposition alliance the population showed exactly what they thought of the proponents of the cold war. The CDU lost votes in all the Länder with the exception of Hessen. There was a marked decline in the percentage of votes cast for Bartzel, Kiesinger, Hassel and other top party officials, many of whom were simply blackballed. The party ceased to be a powerful faction and lost the posts of President of the Bundestag and chairmen of many of its committees. It could have sustained a still greater defeat if not for the NDP support which practically gave it all its votes.

Many factors determined the outcome of the struggle, but the most important was the foreign policy of Willy Brandt's cabinet which won him prestige and the support of millions of new voters. Judging by the election results, broad sections of the population gave priority to the policy of détente and normalisation of relations with the socialist countries and questions of peace and security, and not to the price of beer, as many foreign commentators justly noted. A factor which undoubtedly tipped the balance in favour of the ruling coalition on the eve of the elections was the Treaty on the Basic Principles in the Relations between the GDR and the FRG which was initialled on November 8, 1972.¹

All this showed that the process whose cornerstone was the Soviet-West German Treaty and the Agreement on West Berlin has become deeply rooted in the FRG. The election results also attested to the mounting political awareness of the broad strata of the West German population, which have learnt a lot from the acute confrontation between the SDPG and the CDU/CSU over the past several years. By casting their ballots for the SDPG and the FDP, the absolute

¹ Signed on December 21, 1972; came into force on June 21, 1973.

majority of the population unequivocally voted for the continuation of the realistic course of consolidating and further developing goodneighbourly relations and co-operation with the USSR and other countries of the socialist community. The election results are a clear mandate to the former government, as the West German press pointed out,¹ "an order" to work with still greater determination to dispel faded illusions, to see the reality of the situation which had evolved over the years, normalise relations with socialist countries and take fresh measures to safeguard security in Europe and develop extensive co-operation between all European states. The election results reflect the changes that have taken place in the FRG which in their turn mirror the changes in Europe and in the whole world.

Such is the unanimous opinion of virtually all unbiased political observers in the FRG and other Western countries.

LEONID BREZHNEV'S VISITS TO THE GDR AND THE FRG (MAY 1973)

Amongst the many great events that were concentrated into the summer of 1973 Leonid Brezhnev's visits to the two German states are of particular significance.

"Welcome to the GDR!", "Fraternal greetings to Leonid Brezhnev!", "Freundschaft—Friendship!", "United with the Soviet Union forever!"—these were the slogans with which the working people of the German Democratic Republic greeted the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee during his friendly visit to the GDR. Brezhnev's 29-hour stay in the republic was yet another manifestation of friendship that exists between the peoples of the two countries. This visit captured the imagination of the whole nation. Tens of thousands of Berliners warmly welcomed Leonid Brezhnev and the official Soviet party wherever they went during their stay in the capital. Everywhere there was a feeling of unprecedented enthusiasm for the visit of the Soviet representatives. The rapturous reception given to Leonid Brezhnev and the stream of letters and telegrams

¹ *Der Tagesspiegel*, November 26, 1972.

from groups of working people and private individuals, expressing heartfelt gratitude to the USSR, offer convincing evidence of the love and respect which the working people of the Republic have for the great Soviet state. For they recognise the decisive role of the Soviet Union in helping the GDR finally to break the artificial diplomatic blockade and show a wide front in the international political arena. Evidence of the changes which have taken place in the GDR were clearly seen as soon as the Soviet representatives set foot on the soil of the German Democratic Republic. At the time of Leonid Brezhnev's previous visit to Berlin eighteen months before he was welcomed at Schönefeld Airport by diplomats from the thirty countries represented in the capital. Now the GDR has diplomatic relations with more than eighty states. As representatives of the German Democratic Republic have pointed out, they could never have broken the boycott imposed on the first German workers' and peasants' state by the NATO countries without the help of the Soviet Union. The deep gratitude which they feel is expressed in the words of Erich Honecker: "We must not forget that we achieved success by working shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet Communist Party and the USSR. The co-ordinated actions of the socialist countries and the support which we received from them have made it possible for the German Democratic Republic to participate in international affairs on an equal basis with other countries. For this we are deeply indebted to the fraternal parties and states."¹

During Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the German Democratic Republic there was a detailed exchange of views on a wide range of current international problems and questions pertaining to relations between the USSR and the GDR. The two sides informed each other about the implementation of decisions taken at the last party congresses and emphasized their firm resolve to consolidate and develop fraternal friendship, to "increase co-operation in all spheres of public, state, economic and cultural life"², to co-ordinate their activity even more closely in the international arena, and to steadily

¹ *Pravda*, May 17, 1973.

² *Ibid.*, May 14, 1973.

intensify their efforts in foreign policy aimed at strengthening peace and providing the right external conditions for the peaceful building of socialism and communism.

The results of the meetings and the exchange of views were reflected in speeches by Leonid Brezhnev and Erich Honecker and in the joint communique issued on May 14, 1973, which was received with profound satisfaction in all parts of the world.

Leonid Brezhnev's trip to the German Democratic Republic, taking place as it did in an atmosphere of exceptional warmth and cordiality, was a further demonstration to the world of the inviolable union between the USSR and the GDR, further proof of their desire to strengthen friendship and co-operation and bring the peoples of the two countries even closer together. The visit was a convincing demonstration of the complete mutual understanding and unity which exist between the leaders of the two countries' parties and governments.

There have long been regular contacts between statesmen and party officials of the USSR and the GDR and the closest possible links exist between them. Since 1964 Leonid Brezhnev has visited the republic on nine occasions. Representatives of the GDR have made many reciprocal visits to the Soviet Union during this time. They have also met periodically in various forums in the fraternal socialist countries. Such meetings have been used for fruitful discussions of the most important problems concerning the two sides and for agreeing on their future course. This was just the aim of Brezhnev's May 1973 visit to the GDR. And that is why the visit received the highest possible appraisal in speeches by GDR leaders and in the press, and attracted the attention of people all over the world.

Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the GDR clearly demonstrated the strength of the friendship that exists between the USSR and the GDR. Yet another important chapter was written in the history of fraternal relations between the two countries. "Complete unity of views!", "Further proof of growing friendship and co-operation!", "An emphatic demonstration of the solidarity of the fraternal union!", "A triumph for fraternity!"—this was how the world's press reacted to the results of Brezhnev's visit to the GDR.

The visit, which went further than just bilateral relations between the USSR and the GDR, took on even greater significance on the eve of Brezhnev's trips to the FRG and the USA.

General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's first official visit to the FRG, which lasted from May 18 to May 22, was one of the most important events for that country in 1973.

In recent years there have been considerable improvements in Soviet-West German relations, mainly due to initiatives from the Soviet side. These improvements covered a wide area and took place at quite a considerable rate. So the time came to review this development, consolidate the positive aspects of Soviet-West German relations and drew guidelines for the future. "As I see it," Leonid Brezhnev told the chief editor of the West German magazine *Stern* in an interview on May 13, 1973, "in our talks Chancellor Brandt and I will try to do more than just review what has already been achieved. Our primary concern is to consider the prospects for the future and see how we might develop ties between our states in the field of politics, economics, science and technology and culture. Of no less importance is the need to strengthen mutual trust. Naturally, Chancellor Brandt and I are anxious to consider major international problems which are of concern to the USSR and the FRG. This, of course, applies particularly to European affairs."¹

This was the purpose of Brezhnev's visit. It was hardly surprising then that his arrival in the FRG caused such widespread interest both inside the country and in the world at large.

At the very outset there was an air of optimism in regard to the visit. "The visit of Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev, due to begin this Friday," wrote *Westfälische Rundschau*, "marks the beginning of extensive Soviet-West German co-operation which is expected to develop for many years to come. . . ."² The president of the SDPG faction in the Bundestag was even more outspoken when he declared in a conversation with a *Pravda* correspondent that he and his colleagues considered the high-level talks to be

¹ *Pravda*, May 17, 1973.

² Quoted in *Pravda*, May 18, 1973.

of tremendous importance.¹ A public opinion poll carried out by the *Stern* magazine showed that the population of the FRG thought that Brezhnev's visit was a "good, positive move". As the *Stern* itself pointed out, the results of the poll proved that the majority of people in the FRG were in favour of "close co-operation with the Soviet Union".²

These assessments and expectations were fully justified. The meetings on the Rhein were businesslike and intensive, and yielded impressive practical results. The fruitful and constructive conversations between Leonid Brezhnev and Chancellor Brandt, the whole complex of important agreements arising out of the visit and the joint statement on the results of the talks consolidated the progress achieved in Soviet-West German relations, elevated these relations to a new level, set them on an even firmer footing and gave them a stable, long-term character. They also contributed to the further normalisation of relations between the FRG and the other fraternal socialist countries and to the general improvement in the political climate not just in Europe but throughout the world.

As *Pravda* pointed out in one of its leading articles, "the new degree of mutual understanding and co-operation between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany, achieved as the result of the talks between Leonid Brezhnev and Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt, is completely in line with the current trends in the international situation".³ The achievement of durable, long-term co-operation between the USSR and the FRG is becoming one of the key factors in stabilising the situation on the European continent.

The present stage of development in relations between the USSR and the FRG is a striking example of peaceful coexistence in action and an important step towards the implementation of the Peace Programme proclaimed by the 24th Congress of the CPSU.

As was observed by the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the results

¹ Quoted in *Pravda*, May 18, 1973.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, May 26, 1973.

of Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the FRG offer further convincing evidence of the triumph of the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence between states whatever their social systems. This policy finds its fullest expression in the Peace Programme approved by the 24th Congress of the CPSU and the April Plenary Meeting of the Party Central Committee (1973)¹.

The unanimous opinion of all the unbiased political observers in the West is, essentially, that the visit turned over a page in the history of Europe and opened a new chapter in the development of Soviet-West German relations, that its results are in the interests of all nations and serve the cause of peace on the European continent and throughout the world. "Only now has the Second World War really come to an end", wrote the weekly *Die Zeit* with no little satisfaction, as it summed up Brezhnev's visit to the FRG².

Leonid Brezhnev's visits in 1973 to the socialist countries, the FRG, the USA and France were all part of the Soviet Union's unflinching efforts to further relax international tension, strengthen peace and security and increase co-operation between nations.

THE STRUGGLE OF THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE TO SAFEGUARD EUROPEAN SECURITY

It is quite natural that the future of Europe, which has been the scene of the greatest military conflicts, including two world wars, should be uppermost in the minds of all the 600 million Europeans. The concern of the broadest masses of the population of the West European countries for the solution of the social problems facing them and the satisfaction of their vital requirements is also directly connected with the struggle for easing world tension and consolidating European security and world peace.

It is impossible to solve the problem of peace and security in Europe without the participation of the people. It should be solved by governments together with the people.

No sooner had the socialist countries advanced their pro-

¹ *Ibid.*, May 25, 1973.

² *Die Zeit*, 1973, No. 22.

gramme for safeguarding European security, than the general public circles resolutely joined the struggle for its implementation.

With this in mind the Conference of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the European countries which took place in Karlovy Vary in 1967 raised the question of forming a broad union of European peoples in the struggle for peace and security and for the unity of action of all peace-loving democratic forces concerned with the future of Europe. In this connection the participants in the conference came out in favour of holding a Congress of the Peoples of Europe with the widest possible representation to discuss what should be done to consolidate peace and security.

This change, or to be precise, the decision to expand the representation of the congress was due to the improvements which have taken place in the sphere of inter-state relations, namely, the increased influence of the masses on international affairs and the foreign policy of their governments, and also to the fact that without the participation of the people themselves it would be impossible to remove the threat of war from our life.

Since the day Soviet power was established Soviet diplomacy has made it a practice to issue appeals to the peoples, particularly on crucial issues of war and peace. Lenin made the following observation in connection with the promulgation of the Decree on Peace:

"We cannot ignore the governments, for that would delay the possibility of concluding peace, and the people's government dare not do that; but we have no right not to appeal to the peoples at the same time. Everywhere there are differences between the governments and the peoples, and we must therefore help the peoples to intervene in questions of war and peace."¹

With the formation of the world socialist system this has become a norm of the diplomatic activity of the socialist countries.

The Karlovy Vary decisions gave fresh impetus to the movement of the broad masses who were determined to frustrate the aggressive plans of the United States, build up

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 252.

a solid front in the fight for peace, freedom and social progress, and establish all-European co-operation. In 1968 the World Peace Assembly was held in Berlin and in 1969 European public circles sponsored a conference "For Security and Co-operation in Europe" which took place in Vienna. Representatives of the public from many countries came to these forums to work out principles and chart ways of developing co-operation and unity of action of all those public organisations and groups, irrespective of their political views and convictions, who were anxious to strengthen peace and international security and urged that they close ranks and form a broad united front to achieve these aims.

The International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in 1969 noted that "in Western Europe the movement against the aggressive NATO bloc for normalisation of relations and the development of co-operation between states and the safeguarding of European security is embracing ever wider strata of the population".¹ "Today we are gratified to note the very auspicious fact," said M. A. Suslov at a meeting marking the 53rd anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, "that there is a growing tendency in the most diverse socio-political circles on our continent to achieve a detente, implement the principles of peaceful coexistence and develop all-round business, scientific, technological and other forms of mutually beneficial co-operation".²

The growing activity of the peoples, particularly the intensification of the mass movement for safeguarding European security and the furtherance of widespread co-operation between European states is a feature of the current situation in Europe. These changes in European public opinion became especially pronounced after the countries of the socialist community had advanced concrete proposals on preparations for an all-European conference on security and co-operation.

Questions connected with preparations for the conference have caused considerable excitement among broad sections of the population in all European countries and are discussed

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, pp. 16-17.

² *Pravda*, November 7, 1970.

at representative public forums; this springs from the fact that the issues of war and peace and the safeguarding of security are of direct concern to all Europeans whatever their ideological convictions and political views.

Committees, associations and action groups whose aim is to mobilise as many people as possible from the most diverse sections of the population to work for European security are now very active in the USSR,¹ Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Belgium, Finland, Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany and many other countries. The idea of turning Europe into a zone of lasting peace has met with understanding and is supported by religious and pacifist circles, a fairly large group of trade union functionaries, a growing number of Social Democrats and even by many people in the conservative camp.

An increasing number of MPs and politicians have urged their governments to pursue a policy of peace and co-operation and appealed to the public to take the matter into their own hands.

At the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies a considerable number of national and international meetings were held at which demands were made for the convocation of a representative conference of the European public which could forcefully and with the utmost determination express the will of the peoples of Europe to safeguard peace and security and establish peaceful co-operation between European states.

A situation was created in which the European public could take effective steps on an all-European scale towards strengthening peace and safeguarding security on the continent.

¹ In expressing the desire of the Soviet people to strengthen peace and co-operation between peoples, the Soviet public showed its willingness to make the greatest possible contribution to the unification of the anti-war, peace-loving forces by establishing a public body which would help improve the co-ordination of efforts by Soviet public organisations to put the idea of European security into practice. It was constituted in June 1970, in Moscow at a meeting of representatives of the Moscow public and called the Soviet Committee for European Security. Its elected Chairman is A. P. Sheetikov, Chairman of the Soviet of the Union, USSR Supreme Soviet, and Chairman of the USSR Parliamentary Group.

On the initiative of the President of the Belgian Association for European Security and Co-operation, Albert de Smaele, a three-day consultative meeting of representatives of public circles from 24 European countries was held in Brussels at the end of June 1971. It was also attended by a Soviet delegation headed by A. P. Sheetikov, Chairman of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Chairman of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The meeting agreed to begin preparations for an Assembly of public forces, and this decision considerably stimulated the further development of the mass movements for European security. The demand to convene the Assembly showed that public forces in Europe were fully aware of the need to take into account the mood of the masses who are working towards the removal of potential trouble-spots, freedom from the excessive burden of the arms race and the establishment of a lasting peace.

In October 1971, representatives from many European countries once again gathered in Brussels on the initiative of a group of Belgian functionaries to continue their efforts to carry through the decisions of the preceding consultative meeting on convening the Assembly. Their opinion was that all socio-political forces working for detente and co-operation should take part in the Assembly on a basis of full equality.

The third consultative meeting of representatives from European public circles on questions of security took place in Brussels on January 12-14, 1972. It was attended by more than 200 delegates from 27 European countries, which showed that the movement of public forces in support of European security had embraced practically the entire continent.

In his opening speech Robert De Gendt, a prominent figure of the Belgian Catholic Trade Unions, said that the meeting convened to discuss in detail ways and means of further enhancing the struggle of the continent's public forces with a view to creating an atmosphere of mutual understanding and co-operation in Europe which would make for the speediest convocation and the success of the all-European Conference.

The participants in the meeting exhaustively analysed the results of the activity of the national organisations and compared notes on their work. They were unanimous that

at present conditions are ripe for the further easing of tension in Europe, the establishment of a lasting peace on the continent and the growth of goodneighbourly relations and peaceful coexistence of states with different political systems.

The meeting agreed that the Assembly of representatives of the European public for security and co-operation should take place in Brussels from June 2 to 5, 1972, and elected a sponsoring committee to convene the Assembly. It also decided to set up working bodies to carry out the necessary preparations. The idea of holding the Assembly, as the head of the Soviet delegation A. P. Sheetikov pointed out, "has now been given a concrete political foundation".¹

About a thousand representatives from nearly all the European countries gathered for the Assembly in June 1972. It ended with a declaration addressed to the peoples, governments and all the social and political alignments and movements on the European continent. The representatives confirmed the basic principles for European security (rejection of the use or threat of force, inviolability of existing borders, non-interference in the internal affairs of others, respect for the national independence and equality of all states, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the countries on the continent, respect for the right of the peoples to determine their own future without hindrance, peaceful coexistence and goodneighbourly relations between states) and urged that they be put into practice by pursuing a common policy of detente and disarmament and, in the long term, by overcoming military-political alignments. The Assembly gave its unconditional support to the idea of convening an all-European conference and expressed its intention to actively contribute to its preparation.

The convening of the Assembly in June 1972 in Brussels has become an important factor in socio-political life in Europe. It is helping to create the right sort of situation for the consolidation and continued development of the positive changes which are now taking place on the European continent.

The voice of public opinion is becoming stronger and more forceful. The mass movement for security and co-operation

¹ *Pravda*, January 15, 1972.

is acquiring greater scope and influence and developing into an increasingly important factor in detente in Europe and the creation of an effective system of security there.

There is a growing conviction that Europe should remove the threat of fresh military upheavals and that this depends wholly on the collective efforts undertaken not only by states but also by peoples, on the joint measures of the governments and broadest strata of the population of all European countries.

Thus, definite progress has been made in safeguarding security and establishing co-operation in Europe. Important changes are taking place in Europe today. This is due to a number of objective reasons, principally to the all-round consolidation of the position of the Soviet Union and the socialist community as a whole, the establishment of a worldwide anti-imperialist front and the shift in the balance of forces in favour of socialism.

To an ever greater degree the political atmosphere in Europe is determined by socialism's increasing influence and international prestige.

The efforts of the countries of the socialist community to consolidate the results of the war and the socio-political changes that have taken place in Europe in the postwar years are bearing fruit.

Thanks to their persistent endeavours the socialist countries managed to partially neutralise the aggressive course of US and West German ultras in Europe, considerably de-escalate the cold war in European affairs and achieve a substantial broadening and improvement in the relations between the capitalist and socialist countries of the continent.

Europe has reached an important stage, a turning point in its history, now that there exists a fairly strong foundation for the establishment of a system of European security. The coincidence of views of the European countries on the basic questions of war and peace, the growing realisation that only practical measures can avert another military conflict in the area are a reliable foundation for bringing the position of the sides still closer together in their efforts to solve urgent European problems.

All this gives sufficient grounds to regard the present stage in European development as the end of the postwar

period, as Leonid Brezhnev noted at the Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party at the end of 1971. In effect Europe is now moving towards a new historical phase, in the course of which it should develop under the banner of peaceful coexistence, mutually beneficial co-operation and reliable security for all European peoples.

Europe has entered the new decade, the seventies, assured of its peaceful future. Peace should be a permanent factor in the life of the European people.

The fulfilment of their age-old hopes of seeing Europe become an area of lasting peace and all-round co-operation would markedly improve the international situation.

Whilst welcoming the positive changes taking place in Europe the Warsaw Treaty countries "take into account that forces interested in sustaining tension, setting European states against each other and retaining the possibility of aggravating the situation on the European continent once again, are still active in Europe. These forces, as can be seen from the facts and as recent events have shown, think of European politics only in terms of blocs and are striving to intensify the arms race in Europe. The Warsaw Treaty countries cannot but draw the necessary conclusions with regard to their security from this fact. Yet they are convinced that the alignment of forces which has taken shape in Europe makes it possible to surmount the opposition from the enemies of detente if there is unity and consistency in furthering the cause of peace."¹

The only way of avoiding the arms race and dangerous military confrontation is to create an effective system of security in Europe and develop all-round co-operation based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. History has shown that there is no other alternative. So "the most immediate task in Europe is to complete the work of the All-European Conference which has already got off to a good start". Leonid Brezhnev said recently, "We consider that this must be carried out in the shortest possible time without any undue delay. And we are convinced that the General Declaration

¹ *Pravda*, January 27, 1972.

on the Basic Principles of European Security and the Principles in the Relations between States in Europe, submitted at Helsinki by the Soviet Union in conjunction with the socialist countries, and the proposals which were tabled by our friends and allies with our support, will be effective instruments in the realisation of the historic task that lies before us—the transformation of Europe into a continent of lasting peace.”¹

The efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to create an effective system of security and co-operation in Europe are an important step towards detente and lasting peace not just in Europe but throughout the world.

CONCLUSION

Thus, as events have shown, the road to the achievement of an agreement on West Berlin was neither easy nor smooth. As the situation in the world and on German soil changed, so did the approach to the settlement of West Berlin issues and it was the solution of questions concerning tension in Europe which was gradually achieved in the sixties and early seventies that facilitated the West Berlin settlement. In the end a solution was found which was in line with the interests of all the parties concerned and also bolstered the cause of European peace and security.

The world had every reason to assess the agreement on West Berlin as the outcome of a realistic approach to international affairs which was asserted above all as a result of the consistent and principled Marxist-Leninist foreign policy of the socialist countries.

The agreement on West Berlin is a milestone in the struggle for European peace and security and the promotion of wide-spread co-operation between European states. The fact that it was achieved thanks to the efforts of all sides and their sober approach to the actual state of affairs should not be overlooked. Yet, on the whole, the achievement of the West Berlin settlement was mainly due to the consistent and

¹ *Ibid.*, July 12, 1973.

steadfast efforts of the USSR, the GDR and other socialist countries and to their work in achieving a co-ordinated foreign policy. "The Soviet Union," wrote Alexei Kosygin on September 6, 1971, replying to a letter from Willy Brandt, "has done all it can towards achieving an agreement which will improve the situation in West Berlin and preclude complications and frictions arising in this area."¹ In a message of reply to Erich Honecker of September 10, 1971, Leonid Brezhnev noted: "... the agreement is undoubtedly a measure of the success of the policy of peaceful coexistence and of the line taken by the socialist countries for strengthening peace, security and co-operation, which has been reflected in the decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress and the 8th Congress of the SUPG."² It is a great achievement for the peaceful Leninist foreign policy of the USSR and the entire socialist community. Unquestionably it was the vigorous line taken by the socialist countries for strengthening peace, security and co-operation on the European continent that has made it possible to reach an agreement on West Berlin.

The West Berlin settlement is yet another confirmation, a vivid example of how the USSR, the GDR and other socialist countries carry out their consistent and principled policy of detente and the establishment of a lasting peace on the European continent. The agreement on West Berlin is completely in keeping with the Programme of Peace set forth in the Report of the CPSU Central Committee and endorsed at the 24th CPSU Congress, and also with the joint policy of the socialist countries in European affairs which was agreed at a meeting between the leaders of the fraternal parties and governments. The talks on West Berlin conclusively demonstrated that the socialist countries are making a decisive contribution to the cause of European peace and security and are displaying a constructive approach to the existing problems in order to achieve mutually acceptable decisions and agreements.

Today the West is no longer in a position to deny the great part played by the Soviet Union in the achievement of the West Berlin settlement and the peaceful nature of Soviet

¹ *Pravda*, September 8, 1971.

² *Ibid.*, September 11, 1971.

foreign policy. The *Sunday Telegraph* wrote on August 29, 1971, that the Russians clearly wanted detente in Europe. On the same day the DPA reported that the FRG State Secretary Egon Bahr had said that by signing the Agreement on West Berlin the Soviet Union had shown its desire to bring about detente in Europe. On September 3, 1971, in a message to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin, Chancellor Willy Brandt wrote: "I think highly of your Government's contribution which enables us to continue the policy which was reflected in the Treaty of August 12, 1970."

The German Democratic Republic also played an important part in the successful outcome of the quadripartite talks on West Berlin.

World public opinion has paid tribute to the Soviet Union and the GDR and to the peaceloving policy of the socialist countries as a whole for their contribution to the improvement in the international atmosphere and their undeviating efforts to safeguard European security.

West Berlin, which is part of the territorial *status quo* in Europe, should have its own place in the system of European security based on the universal recognition of the borders existing in Europe, the policy of normalising relations between European states and development of co-operation and friendship between their peoples.

Now that the complex of agreements on West Berlin has created a lasting and durable basis for the normalisation of the situation in the centre of Europe, it remains for all those directly concerned to see that they are strictly and precisely observed.

The joint communique of May 13, 1973, on the results of Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the German Democratic Republic states: "The leaders of the USSR and the GDR have also exchanged views on West Berlin. They have declared that the quadripartite agreement of September 3, 1971, which states that West Berlin is not a part of the FRG and will not be governed by it in the future, and also the corresponding agreements between the GDR and the FRG, and between the GDR and the West Berlin Senate, have created the right basis for maintaining a normal, calm situation in this area. Strict observance of these agreements is a guarantee of

mutual understanding between all those who are concerned with West Berlin affairs."¹

In the joint statement of May 21, 1973, on the results of Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the FRG reference is made to the effect that the two sides had had "a detailed exchange of views on questions concerning the quadripartite agreement of September 3, 1971". The statement goes on: "Leonid Brezhnev and Willy Brandt share the view that the strict observation and precise implementation of this agreement are essential conditions for a stable detente in the centre of Europe and improvement in relations between the states involved, in particular between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany".²

The future depends on a realistic approach to international affairs.

¹ *Pravda*, May 14, 1973.

² *Ibid.*, May 22, 1973.

QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the French Republic,

Represented by their Ambassadors, who held a series of meetings in the building formerly occupied by the Allied Control Council in the American Sector of Berlin,

Acting on the basis of their quadripartite rights and responsibilities, and of the corresponding wartime and post-war agreements and decisions of the Four Powers, which are not affected,

Taking into account the existing situation in the relevant area,

Guided by the desire to contribute to practical improvements of the situation,

Without prejudice to their legal positions,
Have agreed on the following:

P A R T I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. The four Governments will strive to promote the elimination of tension and the prevention of complications in the relevant area.
2. The four Governments, taking into account their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, agree that

there shall be no use or threat of force in the area and that disputes shall be settled solely by peaceful means.

3. The four Governments will mutually respect their individual and joint rights and responsibilities, which remain unchanged.

4. The four Governments agree that, irrespective of the differences in legal views, the situation which has developed in the area, and as it is defined in this Agreement as well as in the other agreements referred to in this Agreement, shall not be changed unilaterally.

P A R T II

PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN

A. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that transit traffic by road, rail and waterways through the territory of the German Democratic Republic of civilian persons and goods between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be unimpeded; that such traffic will be facilitated so as to take place in the most simple and expeditious manner; and that it will receive preferential treatment.

Detailed arrangements concerning this civilian traffic, as set forth in Annex I, will be agreed by the competent German authorities.

B. The Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America declare that the ties between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be maintained and developed, taking into account that these Sectors continue not to be a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Germany and not to be governed by it.

Detailed arrangements concerning the relationship between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany are set forth in Annex II.

C. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that communications between the Western Sectors of Berlin and areas bordering on these Sectors and those areas of the German Democratic Republic which do not border on these Sectors will be improved. Permanent

residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin will be able to travel to and visit such areas for compassionate, family, religious, cultural or commercial reasons, or as tourists, under conditions comparable to those applying to other persons entering these areas.

The problems of the small enclaves, including Steinstuecken, and of other small areas may be solved by exchange of territory.

Detailed arrangements concerning travel, communications and the exchange of territory, as set forth in Annex III, will be agreed by the competent German authorities.

D. Representation abroad of the interests of the Western Sectors of Berlin and consular activities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Western Sectors of Berlin can be exercised as set forth in Annex IV.

P A R T III
FINAL PROVISIONS

This Quadripartite Agreement will enter into force on the date specified in a Final Quadripartite Protocol to be concluded when the measures envisaged in Part II of this Quadripartite Agreement and in its Annexes have been agreed.

DONE at the building formerly occupied by the Allied Control Council in the American Sector of Berlin this third day of September 1971, in four originals, each in the English, French and Russian languages, all texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

P. ABRASIMOV

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

R. JACKLING

For the Government of the United States of America:

K. RUSH

For the Government of the French Republic:

J.-U. SAUVAGNARGUES

A N N E X I

COMMUNICATION

FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO THE GOVERNMENTS
OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with reference to Part II (A) of the Quadripartite Agreement of this date and after consultation and agreement with the Government of the German Democratic Republic, has the honour to inform the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America that:

1. Transit traffic by road, rail and waterways through the territory of the German Democratic Republic of civilian persons and goods between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be facilitated and unimpeded. It will receive the most simple, expeditious and preferential treatment provided by international practice.

2. Accordingly,

a) Conveyances sealed before departure may be used for the transport of civilian goods by road, rail and waterways between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany. Inspection procedures will be limited to the inspection of seals and accompanying documents.

b) With regard to conveyances which cannot be sealed, such as open trucks, inspection procedures will be limited to the inspection of accompanying documents. In special cases where there is sufficient reason to suspect that unsealed conveyances contain either material intended for dissemination along the designated routes or persons or material put on board along these routes, the content of unsealed con-

veyances may be inspected. Procedures for dealing with such cases will be agreed by the competent German authorities.

c) Through trains and buses may be used for travel between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany. Inspection procedures will not include any formalities other than identification of persons.

d) Persons identified as through travellers using individual vehicles between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany on routes designated for through traffic will be able to proceed to their destinations without paying individual tolls and fees for the use of the transit routes. Procedures applied for such travellers shall not involve delay. The travellers, their vehicles and personal baggage will not be subject to search, detention or exclusion from use of the designated routes, except in special cases, as may be agreed by the competent German authorities, where there is sufficient reason to suspect that misuse of the transit routes is intended for purposes not related to direct travel to and from the Western Sectors of Berlin and contrary to generally applicable regulations concerning public order.

e) Appropriate compensation for fees and tolls and for other costs related to traffic on the communication routes between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany, including the maintenance of adequate routes, facilities and installations used for such traffic, may be made in the form of an annual lump sum paid to the German Democratic Republic by the Federal Republic of Germany.

3. Arrangements implementing and supplementing the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 above will be agreed by the competent German authorities.

A N N E X II

COMMUNICATION

FROM THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, with reference to Part II (B) of the Quadripartite Agreement of this date

and after consultation with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, have the honour to inform the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that:

1. They declare, in the exercise of their rights and responsibilities, that the ties between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be maintained and developed, taking into account that these Sectors continue not to be a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Germany and not to be governed by it. The provisions of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the Constitution operative in the Western Sectors of Berlin which contradict the above have been suspended and continue not to be in effect.

2. The Federal President, the Federal Government, the Bundesversammlung, the Bundesrat and the Bundestag, including their Committees and Fraktionen, as well as other stage bodies of the Federal Republic of Germany will not perform in the Western Sectors of Berlin constitutional or official acts which contradict the provisions of paragraph 1.

3. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany will be represented in the Western Sectors of Berlin to the authorities of the three Governments and to the Senat by a permanent liaison agency.

A N N E X III

COMMUNICATION

FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO THE GOVERNMENTS
OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with reference to Part II (C) of the Quadripartite Agreement of this date and after consultation and agreement with the Government of the German Democratic Republic, has the honour to inform the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America that:

1. Communications between the Western Sectors of Berlin and areas bordering on these Sectors and those areas of the German Democratic Republic which do not border on these Sectors will be improved.

2. Permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin will be able to travel to and visit such areas for compassionate, family, religious, cultural or commercial reasons, or as tourists, under conditions comparable to those applying to other persons entering these areas. In order to facilitate visits and travel, as described above, by permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin, additional crossing points will be opened.

3. The problems of the small enclaves, including Stein-tuecken, and of other small areas may be solved by exchange of territory.

4. Telephonic, telegraphic, transport and other external communications of the Western Sectors of Berlin will be expanded.

5. Arrangements implementing and supplementing the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 4 above will be agreed by the competent German authorities.

A N N E X I V

A. COMMUNICATION
FROM THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, with reference to part II (D) of the Quadripartite Agreement of this date and after consultation with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, have the honour to inform the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that:

1. The Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America maintain their rights and responsibilities relating to the representation abroad of the interests of the Western Sectors of Berlin and their permanent residents, including those rights and responsibilities concerning matters of security and status, both in international organisations and in relations with other countries.

2. Without prejudice to the above and provided that

matters of security and status are not affected, they have agreed that:

a) The Federal Republic of Germany may perform consular services for permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin.

b) In accordance with established procedures, international agreements and arrangements entered into by the Federal Republic of Germany may be extended to the Western Sectors of Berlin provided that the extension of such agreements and arrangements is specified in each case.

c) The Federal Republic of Germany may represent the interests of the Western Sectors of Berlin in international organisations and international conferences.

d) Permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin may participate jointly with participants from the Federal Republic of Germany in international exchanges and exhibitions. Meetings of international organisations and international conferences as well as exhibitions with international participation may be held in the Western Sectors of Berlin. Invitations will be issued by the Senate or jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Senate.

3. The three Governments authorise the establishment of a Consulate General of the USSR in the Western Sectors of Berlin accredited to the appropriate authorities of the three Governments in accordance with the usual procedures applied in those Sectors, for the purpose of performing consular services, subject to provisions set forth in a separate document of this date.

**B. COMMUNICATION
FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO THE GOVERNMENTS
OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with reference to Part II (D) of the Quadripartite Agreement of this date and to the communication of the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America with regard to the representation abroad

of the interests of the Western Sectors of Berlin and their permanent residents, has the honour to inform the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America that:

1. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics takes note of the fact that the three Governments maintain their rights and responsibilities relating to the representation abroad of the interests of the Western Sectors of Berlin and their permanent residents, including those rights and responsibilities concerning matters of security and status, both in international organisations and in relations with other countries.

2. Provided that matters of security and status are not affected, for its part it will raise no objection to:

a) the performance by the Federal Republic of Germany of consular services for permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin;

b) in accordance with established procedures, the extension to the Western Sectors of Berlin of international agreements and arrangements entered into by the Federal Republic of Germany provided that the extension of such agreements and arrangements is specified in each case;

c) the representation of the interests of the Western Sectors of Berlin by the Federal Republic of Germany in international organisations and international conferences;

d) the participation jointly with participants from the Federal Republic of Germany of permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin in international exchanges and exhibitions, or the holding in those Sectors of meetings of international organisations and international conferences as well as exhibitions with international participation, taking into account that invitations will be issued by the Senate or jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Senate.

3. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics takes note of the fact that the three Governments have given their consent to the establishment of a Consulate General of the USSR in the Western Sectors of Berlin. It will be accredited to the appropriate authorities of the three Governments, for purposes and subject to provisions described in their communication and as set forth in a separate document of this date.

REQUEST TO READERS

Progress Publishers would be glad to have your opinion of this book, its translation and design, and any suggestions you may have for future publications.

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