Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences, Jan 5, 2014
One of the most contested areas in the field of animal cognition is non-human future-oriented cog... more One of the most contested areas in the field of animal cognition is non-human future-oriented cognition. We critically examine key underlying assumptions in the debate, which is mainly preoccupied with certain dichotomous positions, the most prevalent being whether or not 'real' future orientation is uniquely human. We argue that future orientation is a theoretical construct threatening to lead research astray. Cognitive operations occur in the present moment and can be influenced only by prior causation and the environment, at the same time that most appear directed towards future outcomes. Regarding the current debate, future orientation becomes a question of where on various continua cognition becomes 'truly' future-oriented. We question both the assumption that episodic cognition is the most important process in future-oriented cognition and the assumption that future-oriented cognition is uniquely human. We review the studies on future-oriented cognition in the ...
In a series of 4 experiments, we tested children&... more In a series of 4 experiments, we tested children's understanding that the causes of their actions must necessarily be attributed to information known prior to (i.e., "pre-action" information), rather than after (i.e., "post-action" information), the completion of their actions. For example, children were shown a dog, asked to get some cheese to feed the dog, and then returned to discover a mouse. In Experiment 1, the majority of 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds claimed that they had gotten the cheese to feed the mouse. In Experiments 2 and 3, we ruled out the possibilities that (1) children had forgotten the critical "pre-action" information (e.g., "dog"), and (2) children had merely attributed the cause of their action to the most recent item (e.g., "dog") that they had seen. Finally, in Experiment 4, we determined that 7-year-olds, but not 6-year-olds, correctly attributed the cause of their action to the pre-action information, suggesting that this is the age at which children are no longer influenced by associative post-action information when explaining the causes of their actions. These results are discussed in terms of their relevance for causal reasoning, action explanation, and memory.
Providing adults with relevant information (knowledge that they will be tested at some future tim... more Providing adults with relevant information (knowledge that they will be tested at some future time) increases motivation to remember. Research has shown that it is more effective to have this information prior to, rather than after, an encoding phase. We investigated this effect in apes and children in the context of tool-use tasks. In Experiment 1 we presented chimpanzees, orangutans, and bonobos with two tool-use tasks and three different two-tool sets. We had two conditions: prospective (PP) and retrospective (RP). In the PP subjects were shown the task that they would have to solve before they were shown the tools with which they could solve it. In the RP this order was reversed. Apes remembered the location of the useful tool better in the PP than in the RP. In Experiment 2 we presented 3- and 4-year-olds with the same conditions. Both age groups remembered the location of the correct tool in the PP, but only the 4-year-olds did so in the RP. Thus providing apes and preschool children with relevant information prior to, rather than after, the encoding phase enhances memory. These results have important implications for the understanding of the evolution of memory in general, and encoding mechanisms in particular.
ABSTRACT In this paper we describe a special form of future thinking, termed “episodic foresight”... more ABSTRACT In this paper we describe a special form of future thinking, termed “episodic foresight” and its relation with episodic and semantic memory. We outline the methodologies that have largely been developed in the last five years to assess this capacity in young children and non-human animals. Drawing on Tulving's definition of episodic and semantic memory, we provide a critical analysis of the role that both types of memory might have on the episodic foresight tasks described in the literature. We conclude by highlighting some unanswered questions and suggesting future directions for research that could further our understanding of how memory is intimately connected to episodic foresight.
Determining the memory systems that support nonhuman animals' cap... more Determining the memory systems that support nonhuman animals' capacity to remember distant past events is currently the focus an intense research effort and a lively debate [1-3]. Comparative psychology has largely adopted Tulving's framework by focusing on whether animals remember what-where-when something happened (i.e., episodic-like memory) [4-6]. However, apes have also been reported to recall other episodic components [7] after single-trial exposures [8, 9]. Using a new experimental paradigm we show that chimpanzees and orangutans recalled a tool-finding event that happened four times 3 years earlier (experiment 1) and a tool-finding unique event that happened once 2 weeks earlier (experiment 2). Subjects were able to distinguish these events from other tool-finding events, which indicates binding of relevant temporal-spatial components. Like in human involuntary autobiographical memory, a cued, associative retrieval process triggered apes' memories: when presented with a particular setup, subjects instantaneously remembered not only where to search for the tools (experiment 1), but also the location of the tool seen only once (experiment 2). The complex nature of the events retrieved, the unexpected and fast retrieval, the long retention intervals involved, and the detection of binding strongly suggest that chimpanzees and orangutans' memories for past events mirror some of the features of human autobiographical memory.
Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences, Jan 5, 2014
One of the most contested areas in the field of animal cognition is non-human future-oriented cog... more One of the most contested areas in the field of animal cognition is non-human future-oriented cognition. We critically examine key underlying assumptions in the debate, which is mainly preoccupied with certain dichotomous positions, the most prevalent being whether or not 'real' future orientation is uniquely human. We argue that future orientation is a theoretical construct threatening to lead research astray. Cognitive operations occur in the present moment and can be influenced only by prior causation and the environment, at the same time that most appear directed towards future outcomes. Regarding the current debate, future orientation becomes a question of where on various continua cognition becomes 'truly' future-oriented. We question both the assumption that episodic cognition is the most important process in future-oriented cognition and the assumption that future-oriented cognition is uniquely human. We review the studies on future-oriented cognition in the ...
In a series of 4 experiments, we tested children&... more In a series of 4 experiments, we tested children's understanding that the causes of their actions must necessarily be attributed to information known prior to (i.e., "pre-action" information), rather than after (i.e., "post-action" information), the completion of their actions. For example, children were shown a dog, asked to get some cheese to feed the dog, and then returned to discover a mouse. In Experiment 1, the majority of 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds claimed that they had gotten the cheese to feed the mouse. In Experiments 2 and 3, we ruled out the possibilities that (1) children had forgotten the critical "pre-action" information (e.g., "dog"), and (2) children had merely attributed the cause of their action to the most recent item (e.g., "dog") that they had seen. Finally, in Experiment 4, we determined that 7-year-olds, but not 6-year-olds, correctly attributed the cause of their action to the pre-action information, suggesting that this is the age at which children are no longer influenced by associative post-action information when explaining the causes of their actions. These results are discussed in terms of their relevance for causal reasoning, action explanation, and memory.
Providing adults with relevant information (knowledge that they will be tested at some future tim... more Providing adults with relevant information (knowledge that they will be tested at some future time) increases motivation to remember. Research has shown that it is more effective to have this information prior to, rather than after, an encoding phase. We investigated this effect in apes and children in the context of tool-use tasks. In Experiment 1 we presented chimpanzees, orangutans, and bonobos with two tool-use tasks and three different two-tool sets. We had two conditions: prospective (PP) and retrospective (RP). In the PP subjects were shown the task that they would have to solve before they were shown the tools with which they could solve it. In the RP this order was reversed. Apes remembered the location of the useful tool better in the PP than in the RP. In Experiment 2 we presented 3- and 4-year-olds with the same conditions. Both age groups remembered the location of the correct tool in the PP, but only the 4-year-olds did so in the RP. Thus providing apes and preschool children with relevant information prior to, rather than after, the encoding phase enhances memory. These results have important implications for the understanding of the evolution of memory in general, and encoding mechanisms in particular.
ABSTRACT In this paper we describe a special form of future thinking, termed “episodic foresight”... more ABSTRACT In this paper we describe a special form of future thinking, termed “episodic foresight” and its relation with episodic and semantic memory. We outline the methodologies that have largely been developed in the last five years to assess this capacity in young children and non-human animals. Drawing on Tulving's definition of episodic and semantic memory, we provide a critical analysis of the role that both types of memory might have on the episodic foresight tasks described in the literature. We conclude by highlighting some unanswered questions and suggesting future directions for research that could further our understanding of how memory is intimately connected to episodic foresight.
Determining the memory systems that support nonhuman animals' cap... more Determining the memory systems that support nonhuman animals' capacity to remember distant past events is currently the focus an intense research effort and a lively debate [1-3]. Comparative psychology has largely adopted Tulving's framework by focusing on whether animals remember what-where-when something happened (i.e., episodic-like memory) [4-6]. However, apes have also been reported to recall other episodic components [7] after single-trial exposures [8, 9]. Using a new experimental paradigm we show that chimpanzees and orangutans recalled a tool-finding event that happened four times 3 years earlier (experiment 1) and a tool-finding unique event that happened once 2 weeks earlier (experiment 2). Subjects were able to distinguish these events from other tool-finding events, which indicates binding of relevant temporal-spatial components. Like in human involuntary autobiographical memory, a cued, associative retrieval process triggered apes' memories: when presented with a particular setup, subjects instantaneously remembered not only where to search for the tools (experiment 1), but also the location of the tool seen only once (experiment 2). The complex nature of the events retrieved, the unexpected and fast retrieval, the long retention intervals involved, and the detection of binding strongly suggest that chimpanzees and orangutans' memories for past events mirror some of the features of human autobiographical memory.
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