Bon Ha Gu
Columbia University, Advanced Clinical Practice, Graduate Student
- Biola University, Talbot School of Theology, Graduate StudentNew York University, Psychology, UndergraduateNew York University, Silver School of Social Work, Undergraduateadd
- International Social Work, Clinical Social Work, Social Psychology, Clinical Psychology, Developmental Psychology, Personality Psychology, and 17 morePsychoanalysis, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy Of Religion, Psychodynamic Psychotherapy, Western Philosophy, Christian Apologetics, Natural Theology, Child Clinical Psychology, Existentialism, Neon Genesis Evangelion, Classics, Textual Criticism, New Testament Textual Criticism, Systematic Theology, Philosophical Theology, Biblical Hermeneutics, and Philosophy of Mindedit
- Licensed psychotherapist in the City of New Yorkedit
The argument from divine hiddenness centers on the claim that God’s hiddenness from nonresistant nonbelievers counts as evidence against his existence. The argument could be raised this way: given the alleged facts of widely-experienced... more
The argument from divine hiddenness centers on the claim that God’s hiddenness from nonresistant nonbelievers counts as evidence against his existence. The argument could be raised this way: given the alleged facts of widely-experienced hiddenness of and the absence of belief in God, on the assumption that theism is true, what we observe in the world is surprising or evidentially unexpected. On the other hand, on the assumption that theism is false, what we observe in the world—both epistemically and experientially—is what we should expect. In this paper, I assess the most recent incarnation of J.L. Schellenberg’s argument from nonresistant nonbelief and present what I think are potential solutions to (or ways to reevaluate) the problem.
Research Interests:
Surveying the historical contours of cosmological arguments shows their renewed interest in recent years in analytic philosophy. In this paper, I assess a major core of Alexander Pruss and Richard Gale’s “New Cosmological Argument”... more
Surveying the historical contours of cosmological arguments shows their renewed interest in recent years in analytic philosophy. In this paper, I assess a major core of Alexander Pruss and Richard Gale’s “New Cosmological Argument” whereby they introduce the weak-Principle of Sufficient Reason in efforts to re-evoke conclusions reached by classical Leibnizian-style arguments. Then, I present an overview of objections raised by three sets of authors Almeida & Judisch (2002), Oppy (2000), and Davey & Clifton (2001), and present what I think are adequate responses to them.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Evidential or probabilistic arguments of evil have enjoyed sustained philosophical debate since William Rowe’s formal inception of his argument in 1978. More recently, Paul Draper’s indirect inductive version has similarly generated a... more
Evidential or probabilistic arguments of evil have enjoyed sustained philosophical debate since William Rowe’s formal inception of his argument in 1978. More recently, Paul Draper’s indirect inductive version has similarly generated a wealth of discussion, and according to some “… exemplified [the argument] best” and “…is the strongest version… [which] raises the bar in the debate over the evidential argument.”
In this paper, I shall survey the notable contours of the argument as raised by Draper and present what I think are the strongest objections to them.
In this paper, I shall survey the notable contours of the argument as raised by Draper and present what I think are the strongest objections to them.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Bayesian probability has accorded itself a degree of theoretical utility in historical hypothesizing, as it demonstrates how a subjective degree of belief should rationally be formed (or updated) in accordance with the availability of... more
Bayesian probability has accorded itself a degree of theoretical utility in historical hypothesizing, as it demonstrates how a subjective degree of belief should rationally be formed (or updated) in accordance with the availability of related evidence towards a proposition. In this paper, I dispute the objections raised by Bart Ehrman and Jeffery Lowder that argue against one’s holding to a reasonable posterior probability for Jesus’ resurrection given E and B and also given the historical evidences for the empty tomb or “ƐΤ” (as opposed to a general E) and B, respectively.