Fictional Attorney of the Month: Philip Banks

James Avery died this past New Year's Eve. He was perhaps known best for his portrayal of Philip Banks in the television sitcom "The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air," starring Will Smith as his nephew from the streets of Philadelphia now living in a posh Los Angeles suburb with his extended family.

Judge Banks was a Princeton and Harvard Law alum who practiced law at the southern California law firm of Firth, Wynn and Meyer. He was appointed to the bench and served as a judge for the bulk of the show's run. He even experienced the joys of campaigning for political office, as California elects its judges.

And, in his honor, he's this month's Fictional Attorney of the Month.

Bancroft and the space bar: word counts in appellate briefs

The space bar seems so unimportant. Despite hogging half a row of keys to itself at the bottom of the keyboard, its function is often unnoticed. It is, after all, the absence of text.

When filing an appellate brief, one is often constrained by difficult word counts. This is particularly true for Supreme Court briefs, when a party may have much to say, and when the briefs are the primary mechanism for alerting the Court of the legal issues.

Word counts are tricky things. It turns out that word counts can vary based upon one's word processor, which I've discussed before. Words counts may vary depending on how a program uses spaces or punctuation marks to distinguish words.

When reading the recent case brief filed by Bancroft PLLC in American Broadcasting Companies v. Aereo, I noticed that petitioners cited their appendix as "Pet.App.5" (if citing page 5 of the appendix). I noticed it because it's unusual to consolidate the abbreviations for a citation. The Bluebook rules dictate that "all adjacent single capitals" should be closed, but not single capitals with longer abbreviations (Bluebook Rule 6.1(a)); for instance, "N.W." and "S.D.N.Y.," but "D. Mass" and "S. Ct." This is, of course, advised, but not required, practice.

And it turns out that this is not the only time Bancroft has filed a brief with such abbreviations. Consider Bond v. United States (PDF), with a similar absence of spaces.

But, it is not the sole way that Bancroft briefs such cases. Consider this brief (PDF) in Northwest v. Ginsberg. There, ordinary spacing rule apply: "Pet. App. 5."

Word counts are what they are. But they can be a little more than they are with the right use of the little space bar.

By 2-1 margin, court finds Arizona redistricting constitutional

I blogged earlier about the Arizona legislature's challenge to the independent redistricting commission, authorized by initiative, on the grounds that the commission improperly removed power from the "legislature" to redistrict congressional districts. A three-judge federal panel has found that the commission is constitutional. Two judges joined an opinion adopting the rationale from Hildebrant and Smiley. But Judge Rosenblatt dissented, distinguishing precedent and concluding that the initiative's "evisceration" of the legislature's ability to redistrict "is repugnant to the Elections Clause's grant of legislative authority."

Arizona may appeal the case directly to the United States Supreme Court.

Law school microranking: federal judicial clerkship placement

Following up on my microranking of elite public interest legal employment, here is a microranking of federal judicial clerkship placement of law school graduates. This ranking is based upon the American Bar Association data, self-reported by schools. "Federal clerkships" is an admittedly broad category, but it's still a useful one for comparison of schools.

As usual, part of this microranking (i.e., ranking on a single, narrow metric) is a "score," which scores the school on a 20-80 scale based upon its relative performance. The top school, on a percentage basis, will score an 80; the schools who placed none will score a 20; and others will fall on a spectrum based upon their relative performance. Like many rankings, this will illustrate that there is a "pyramid" of placement: the farther down the ranking one goes, the more compressed the schools are among the scores.

I thought a three-year average for clerkships (over 3600 clerks) would be a useful metric. It does not include clerkships obtained by students after graduation; it only includes clerkships obtained by each year's graduating class.

The "placement" is the three-year total placement; the "percentage" is the three-year placement divided by the three-year graduating class total. Thoughts posted below the table.

Three-Year Average Federal Clerkship Graduate Placement from excessofdemocracy.com
Score	School Name	Placement	Percentage
80	YALE UNIVERSITY	207	32.6%
73*	CALIFORNIA-IRVINE, UNIVERSITY OF	16	28.6%
69	STANFORD UNIVERSITY	147	26.9%
51	HARVARD UNIVERSITY	296	16.8%
43	DUKE UNIVERSITY	79	12.2%
42	CHICAGO, UNIVERSITY OF	74	12.1%
40	VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY	65	10.9%
	VIRGINIA, UNIVERSITY OF	122	10.9%
38	PENNSYLVANIA, UNIVERSITY OF	81	9.9%
36	COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY	116	8.6%
	MICHIGAN, UNIVERSITY OF	101	8.9%
	NEW YORK UNIVERSITY	129	8.9%
	TEXAS AT AUSTIN, UNIVERSITY OF	99	8.6%
35	ALABAMA, UNIVERSITY OF	41	8.1%
	GEORGIA, UNIVERSITY OF	56	8.3%
34	CALIFORNIA-BERKELEY, UNIVERSITY OF	71	7.7%
	NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY	65	7.5%
	WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIVERSITY	30	7.9%
32	CORNELL UNIVERSITY	37	6.3%
	EMORY UNIVERSITY	49	6.6%
	NOTRE DAME, UNIVERSITY OF	35	6.3%
	WILLIAM AND MARY LAW SCHOOL	40	6.4%
31	KENTUCKY, UNIVERSITY OF	25	6.2%
30	MONTANA, UNIVERSITY OF	13	5.3%
	NORTH CAROLINA, UNIVERSITY OF	41	5.5%
	SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, UNIVERSITY OF	34	5.5%
29	RICHMOND, UNIVERSITY OF	22	4.7%
28	CALIFORNIA-LOS ANGELES, UNIVERSITY OF	47	4.6%
	GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY	73	4.5%
	MINNESOTA, UNIVERSITY OF	35	4.5%
27	BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY	16	3.6%
	GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY	77	4.0%
	IOWA, UNIVERSITY OF	22	3.8%
	TULANE UNIVERSITY	30	3.9%
	WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY	18	3.8%
	WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY	14	3.6%
26	ARKANSAS, FAYETTEVILLE, UNIVERSITY OF	12	3.1%
	BOSTON COLLEGE	28	3.5%
	FLORIDA, UNIVERSITY OF	34	3.0%
	FORDHAM UNIVERSITY	43	3.1%
	ILLINOIS, UNIVERSITY OF	20	3.3%
	MARYLAND, UNIVERSITY OF	29	3.2%
	MISSISSIPPI, UNIVERSITY OF	16	3.3%
	OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY	22	3.4%
	RUTGERS UNIVERSITY-CAMDEN	24	3.0%
	SOUTH CAROLINA, UNIVERSITY OF	22	3.3%
	TEMPLE UNIVERSITY	31	3.5%
	WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY	29	3.3%
25	AMERICAN UNIVERSITY	37	2.7%
	ARIZONA, UNIVERSITY OF	12	2.6%
	BOSTON UNIVERSITY	21	2.6%
	CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY	12	2.6%
	GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY	16	2.6%
	LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY	16	2.8%
	PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY	16	2.5%
	WASHINGTON, UNIVERSITY OF	15	2.8%
24	BROOKLYN LAW SCHOOL	32	2.3%
	CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK	8	2.1%
	COLORADO, UNIVERSITY OF	13	2.4%
	GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY	14	2.4%
	HOUSTON, UNIVERSITY OF	16	1.9%
	HOWARD UNIVERSITY	9	2.0%
	LOUISVILLE, UNIVERSITY OF	9	2.2%
	MEMPHIS, UNIVERSITY OF	9	2.4%
	MERCER UNIVERSITY	10	2.4%
	NEVADA - LAS VEGAS, UNIVERSITY OF	10	2.3%
	OKLAHOMA, UNIVERSITY OF	11	2.1%
	OREGON, UNIVERSITY OF	10	1.9%
	SAMFORD UNIVERSITY	10	2.1%
	SAN DIEGO, UNIVERSITY OF	21	2.2%
	SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY	20	2.4%
	TENNESSEE, UNIVERSITY OF	9	1.9%
	UTAH, UNIVERSITY OF	8	2.0%
	VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY	17	2.3%
23	ARKANSAS, LITTLE ROCK, UNIVERSITY OF	6	1.5%
	BAYLOR UNIVERSITY	9	1.9%
	CALIFORNIA-DAVIS, UNIVERSITY OF	9	1.5%
	CALIFORNIA-HASTINGS, UNIVERSITY OF	19	1.5%
	CAMPBELL UNIVERSITY	6	1.6%
	CARDOZO SCHOOL OF LAW	20	1.7%
	CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA	12	1.5%
	CINCINNATI, UNIVERSITY OF	6	1.5%
	CONNECTICUT, UNIVERSITY OF	9	1.5%
	FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY	15	1.9%
	HAWAII, UNIVERSITY OF	5	1.7%
	INDIANA UNIVERSITY - BLOOMINGTON	10	1.5%
	INDIANA UNIVERSITY - INDIANAPOLIS	14	1.8%
	LEWIS AND CLARK COLLEGE	9	1.4%
	LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY-LOS ANGELES	22	1.8%
	LOYOLA UNIVERSITY-CHICAGO	13	1.6%
	LOYOLA UNIVERSITY-NEW ORLEANS	14	1.8%
	MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE	7	1.4%
	NEBRASKA, UNIVERSITY OF	6	1.6%
	SETON HALL UNIVERSITY	16	1.7%
	WYOMING, UNIVERSITY OF	4	1.9%
22	ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY	6	1.0%
	CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY	6	1.0%
	CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY	5	1.0%
	DAYTON, UNIVERSITY OF	4	0.8%
	DETROIT MERCY, UNIVERSITY OF	6	1.0%
	DRAKE UNIVERSITY	4	0.9%
	DREXEL UNIVERSITY	5	1.3%
	IDAHO, UNIVERSITY OF	3	1.0%
	JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL	13	1.1%
	KANSAS, UNIVERSITY OF	4	0.8%
	MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY	6	0.9%
	MIAMI, UNIVERSITY OF	11	0.8%
	MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY	11	1.2%
	MISSOURI, UNIVERSITY OF	5	1.2%
	NEW MEXICO, UNIVERSITY OF	3	1.0%
	NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY	5	0.8%
	NORTHERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY	5	1.0%
	PITTSBURGH, UNIVERSITY OF	9	1.3%
	REGENT UNIVERSITY	4	1.1%
	SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY	8	0.9%
	SEATTLE UNIVERSITY	8	0.8%
	ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY	11	1.3%
	ST. MARY'S UNIVERSITY	7	0.9%
	STETSON UNIVERSITY	10	1.0%
	SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY	6	1.1%
	TOLEDO, UNIVERSITY OF	4	0.9%
	VERMONT LAW SCHOOL	5	0.9%
	WASHBURN UNIVERSITY	4	0.9%
	WISCONSIN, UNIVERSITY OF	9	1.1%
21	ALBANY LAW SCHOOL OF UNION UNIVERSITY	5	0.7%
	AVE MARIA SCHOOL OF LAW	1	0.3%
	BALTIMORE, UNIVERSITY OF	5	0.5%
	BUFFALO-SUNY, UNIVERSITY OF	3	0.4%
	CALIFORNIA WESTERN SCHOOL OF LAW	3	0.4%
	CHARLESTON SCHOOL OF LAW	4	0.7%
	CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW-IIT	4	0.5%
	CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY	4	0.7%
	DENVER, UNIVERSITY OF	5	0.5%
	DEPAUL UNIVERSITY	4	0.4%
	DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY	2	0.3%
	FAULKNER UNIVERSITY	2	0.7%
	FLORIDA COASTAL SCHOOL OF LAW	8	0.6%
	FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY	3	0.6%
	GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY	2	0.4%
	HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY	6	0.6%
	LA VERNE, UNIVERSITY OF	1	0.3%
	MAINE, UNIVERSITY OF	2	0.8%
	MCGEORGE SCHOOL OF LAW	7	0.8%
	NEW ENGLAND LAW | BOSTON	4	0.4%
	NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL	9	0.6%
	NORTH DAKOTA, UNIVERSITY OF	1	0.4%
	NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY	1	0.3%
	OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY	1	0.3%
	PACE UNIVERSITY	2	0.3%
	PENN STATE UNIVERSITY	2	0.4%
	ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY	2	0.4%
	RUTGERS UNIVERSITY-NEWARK	5	0.7%
	SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY	5	0.6%
	SOUTH TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW	4	0.3%
	SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY-CARBONDALE	2	0.5%
	ST. THOMAS, UNIVERSITY OF (MINNESOTA)	3	0.7%
	TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY	2	0.4%
	TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY	5	0.8%
	VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY	4	0.8%
	WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY	4	0.8%
	WESTERN NEW ENGLAND UNIVERSITY	2	0.4%
	WHITTIER LAW SCHOOL	2	0.5%
	WIDENER UNIVERSITY-DELAWARE	5	0.6%
	WIDENER UNIVERSITY-HARRISBURG	2	0.5%
20	AKRON, UNIVERSITY OF	1	0.3%
	APPALACHIAN SCHOOL OF LAW	0	0.0%
	ARIZONA SUMMIT LAW SCHOOL	1	0.3%
	ATLANTA'S JOHN MARSHALL LAW SHOOL	0	0.0%
	BARRY UNIVERSITY	1	0.2%
	CAPITAL UNIVERSITY	1	0.2%
	CHARLOTTE SCHOOL OF LAW	1	0.2%
	DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	0	0.0%
	ELON UNIVERSITY	0	0.0%
	FLORIDA A&M UNIVERSITY	1	0.2%
	GONZAGA UNIVERSITY	1	0.2%
	HAMLINE UNIVERSITY	1	0.2%
	LIBERTY UNIVERSITY	0	0.0%
	MASSACHUSETTS DARTMOUTH, UNIVERSITY OF	0	0.0%
	MISSOURI-KANSAS CITY, UNIVERSITY OF	1	0.2%
	NEW HAMPSHIRE UNIVERSITY OF	1	0.2%
	NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL UNIVERSITY	0	0.0%
	NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY	1	0.1%
	OKLAHOMA CITY UNIVERSITY	1	0.2%
	QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY	1	0.3%
	SAN FRANCISCO, UNIVERSITY OF	0	0.0%
	SOUTH DAKOTA, UNIVERSITY OF	0	0.0%
	SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY	1	0.2%
	SOUTHWESTERN LAW SCHOOL	1	0.1%
	ST. THOMAS UNIVERSITY (FLORIDA)	0	0.0%
	SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY	4	0.3%
	TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY	0	0.0%
	THOMAS JEFFERSON SCHOOL OF LAW	0	0.0%
	THOMAS M. COOLEY LAW SCHOOL	2	0.1%
	TOURO COLLEGE	1	0.2%
	TULSA, UNIVERSITY OF	1	0.3%
	WESTERN STATE COLLEGE OF LAW	0	0.0%
	WILLAMETTE UNIVERSITY	0	0.0%
	WILLIAM MITCHELL COLLEGE OF LAW	2	0.2%
	*denotes only one year's data

Note: due to rounding, some schools may appear to have similar percentages but have different ranks, or vice versa.

Yale's placement, as expected, dwarfs all others. Irvine placed its first class well, but it is, of course, deceptive given that it is a single year's data. The "score" also reflects that beyond the first six or eight schools, it is highly compressed among institutions on the way down. Finally, 14 schools did not place a federal clerk in the last three graduating classes.

The American Bar Association's "Law Day" and the right to vote

Each year, the American Bar Association helps celebrate "Law Day." The theme for Law Day 2014 is "American Democracy and the Rule of Law: Why Every Vote Matters."

Planning materials to celebrate Law Day on May 1 are available from the ABA.

The ABA has a planning guide (PDF). Here are some excerpts.

Shelby County v. Holder

The ABA guide explains (p. 9):

In June 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Shelby County v. Holder that the Voting Rights Act's key provision, which required several states to receive preclearance from the federal government before implementing voting changes, was invalid. The Court reasoned that the formula used to determine which jurisdictions were subject to preclearance because they had a history of discrimination was out of date.

The first sentence is not precise; the second is. Granted, because the preclearance formula of Section 4 fell, the preclearance remedy under Section 5 was a nullity. But the Court did not conclude that Section 5's preclearance remedial scheme was invalid. (Indeed, only Justice Thomas, speaking for himself, has written opinions to that effect.)

The ABA guide then (pp. 10-11) quotes from the majority and the dissenting opinion. It offers space for 29 words from the majority, and 146 words from the dissent.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., writing for the majority, said: "Our country has changed. While any racial discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current conditions."

Dissenting, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote: "The sad irony of today's decision lies in its utter failure to grasp why the VRA has proven effective. The Court appears to believe that the VRA’s success in eliminating the specific devices extant in 1965 means that preclearance is no longer needed. With that belief, and the argument derived from it, history repeats itself. The same assumption—that the problem could be solved when particular methods of voting discrimination are identified and eliminated—was indulged and proved wrong repeatedly prior to the VRA’s enactment. Unlike prior statutes, which singled out particular tests or devices, the VRA is grounded in Congress' recognition of the 'variety and persistence' measures designed to impair minority voting rights. In truth, the evolution of voting discrimination into more subtle second-generation barriers is powerful evidence that a remedy as effective as preclearance remains vital to protect minority voting rights and prevent backsliding."

Bush v. Gore, Bush v. Kerry

The guide also offers historical trivia, such as this detail about the 2000 presidential election (p. 12):

In the 2000 presidential election, Al Gore received 50,999,897 popular votes, while George W. Bush 50,456,002. Bush received 271 electoral votes to Gore’s 266. The result of the election was not final until the U.S. Supreme Court issued its controversial ruling in Bush v. Gore.

The guide also recommends a series of resources, such as books or movies about the right to vote. One resource it recommends (p. 34) is the movie Stealing America: Vote by Vote (2008). A Salon review describes the movie as follows:

I don’t mind that Dorothy Fadiman’s film “Stealing America: Vote by Vote” raises once again the massively vexed question of whether the 2004 presidential election was fixed. That spectral possibility lingers in many people’s minds, retains at least a general outline of plausibility and, thanks to the electronic voting systems in use in so much of the country, can never be conclusively proven or disproven. I do mind, though, that “Stealing America” is a clumsy if well-intentioned work of recycled propaganda, a mixture of hard evidence, random anecdote and far-flung inference that may convince some viewers that a clear verdict can be rendered on that impossibly murky event.

Lessons for Children

Here's how the ABA guide for students in Grades 6-8 (p. 53) describes Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission; of note, it does not mention the First Amendment.

In the 2010 landmark case, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court ruled to allow corporations and unions to use their general treasuries to pay for political advertisements that clearly call for the election or defeat of a candidate.

As a result, the 2012 presidential election was the first time in over 60 years that outside groups, super Political Action Committees, were allowed to raise and spend their own unlimited funds to advocate for the election or defeat of a candidate. Super PACs are allowed to raise unlimited sums of money from corporations, unions, associations, and individuals, and then spend unlimited sums to directly advocate for or against political candidates. They are not allowed to contribute to the candidate directly or coordinate with a candidate’s campaign.

The exercises for older students tie voter identification laws to pre-Voting Rights Act registration forms. In one lesson (pp. 55-59), students are asked to complete a 1964 voter registration form from Alabama. Students are then asked to consider how the Voting Rights Act of 1965 changed things. In the second part of the exercise, students are asked:

Question for students:

• Are there barriers to voting today?
• What are some of the barriers that exist today?

Introduce students to topic of voter ID laws. Have students brainstorm reasons or arguments for supporting these laws and reasons for not supporting them.

Voter ID Laws

Since 2001, a new wave of voter ID bills have been proposed in 46 states. These proposed bills would require in most cases official photo identification such as a driver’s license or state ID before casting their vote in elections.

The final lesson guide for high school students is entitled "Voter Suppression." The exercise opens with the following political cartoon:

The recommended PowerPoint (PPT) and lesson guide begins with the March on Washington in 1963. The guide takes students through a 1960s literacy test, a pre-Voting Rights Act poll tax and grandfather clause, the intimidation at Selma in 1965, and English-only ballots. It then asks students to consider today's "voter suppression," "voter ID laws," "registration limits," and "early voting curbs," as the cartoon recommends.

That's "Law Day 2014," from the American Bar Association.

Law school microranking: elite public interest employment

I've been aggregating data from a handful of law school data sets, and I thought it might be useful to provide some "microrankings" derived from that data. The first: elite public interest employment.

Public interest employment is perhaps the most underdiscussed aspect of law school employment outcomes. It may be because it doesn't pay well, like elite law firms. Or it may be a skepticism from many that anyone "chooses" public interest work given debt loads.

But there are thousands who enter the legal work force each year in public interest work, and many of them who don't choose it as a "fallback" position but who are genuinely interested in such work. (In a prestige-obsessed legal culture, it can be hard for some to accept.) One way to measure that, I thought, would be through a measurement of "elite" public interest work--which, I guess, is a concession to a prestige-obsessed legal culture.

The Skadden Fellowship Foundation awards one of the most prestigious and coveted public interest-related positions one can obtain--so prestigious, David Lat meticulously tracks the placement each year alongside the placement of Bristow Fellows or Supreme Court clerks.

Another set of coveted fellowships come from Equal Justice Works, which helps place students in Equal Justice Works Fellowships and as AmeriCorps Legal Fellows.

Fortunately, each site maintains comprehensive records of recent placement. I looked at each school's placement for these fellowships over the last three years (Skadden, 2012-2014; EJW, 2011-2013).

Part of this microranking is a "score," which scores the school on a 20-80 scale based upon its relative performance. The top school, on a percentage basis, will score an 80; the schools who placed none will score a 20; and others will fall on a spectrum based upon their relative performance. Like many rankings, this will illustrate that there is a "pyramid" of placement: the farther down the ranking one goes, the more compressed the schools are among the scores.

I thought a three-year average for two sets of fellowships (nearly 400 in all) would be a useful metric. Admittedly, these are not many positions, but they are not few, either. Certainly, one may quibble as to whether these, and these only, are "elite" public interest positions. These and other usual caveats apply.

The "placement" is the three-year total placement; the "percentage" is the three-year placement divided by the three-year graduating class total. I thought I'd call this a "microranking," as it is a ranking of a single, narrow metric. Thoughts posted below the table.

Three-Year Average Elite Public Interest Graduate Placement from excessofdemocracy.com
Score	School	Placement	Percentage
80	YALE UNIVERSITY	15	2.4%
65*	CALIFORNIA-IRVINE, UNIVERSITY OF	1	1.8%
63	HARVARD UNIVERSITY	30	1.7%
62	STANFORD UNIVERSITY	9	1.6%
59	CALIFORNIA-BERKELEY, UNIVERSITY OF	14	1.5%
	NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY	9	1.5%
55	CALIFORNIA-LOS ANGELES, UNIVERSITY OF	14	1.4%
54	CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK	5	1.3%
50	ILLINOIS, UNIVERSITY OF	7	1.2%
	NEW YORK UNIVERSITY	17	1.2%
48	WASHINGTON, UNIVERSITY OF	6	1.1%
46	CALIFORNIA-DAVIS, UNIVERSITY OF	6	1.0%
	SOUTH DAKOTA, UNIVERSITY OF	2	1.0%
44	COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY	13	1.0%
	MICHIGAN, UNIVERSITY OF	11	1.0%
40	CINCINNATI, UNIVERSITY OF	3	0.8%
	DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	2	0.8%
39	PENNSYLVANIA, UNIVERSITY OF	6	0.7%
38	TOLEDO, UNIVERSITY OF	3	0.7%
37	CHICAGO, UNIVERSITY OF	4	0.7%
	GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY	13	0.7%
36	NORTHERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY	3	0.6%
34	BUFFALO-SUNY, UNIVERSITY OF	4	0.6%
33	BOSTON COLLEGE	4	0.5%
	IOWA, UNIVERSITY OF	3	0.5%
	LOYOLA UNIVERSITY-CHICAGO	4	0.5%
	SEATTLE UNIVERSITY	5	0.5%
	SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY	3	0.5%
	TEXAS AT AUSTIN, UNIVERSITY OF	6	0.5%
	VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY	3	0.5%
	WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIVERSITY	2	0.5%
	WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY	2	0.5%
32	OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY	3	0.5%
	SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, UNIVERSITY OF	3	0.5%
30	CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY	2	0.4%
	DEPAUL UNIVERSITY	4	0.4%
	MIAMI, UNIVERSITY OF	5	0.4%
	MINNESOTA, UNIVERSITY OF	3	0.4%
	WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY	2	0.4%
	WISCONSIN, UNIVERSITY OF	3	0.4%
29	AMERICAN UNIVERSITY	5	0.4%
	APPALACHIAN SCHOOL OF LAW	1	0.3%
	BOSTON UNIVERSITY	3	0.4%
	CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY	2	0.3%
	GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY	2	0.4%
	NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY	1	0.3%
28	CALIFORNIA-HASTINGS, UNIVERSITY OF	4	0.3%
	INDIANA UNIVERSITY - BLOOMINGTON	2	0.3%
27	ARIZONA SUMMIT LAW SCHOOL	1	0.3%
	AVE MARIA SCHOOL OF LAW	1	0.3%
	CARDOZO SCHOOL OF LAW	3	0.3%
	EMORY UNIVERSITY	2	0.3%
	ST. MARY'S UNIVERSITY	2	0.3%
	TULANE UNIVERSITY	2	0.3%
	VIRGINIA, UNIVERSITY OF	3	0.3%
26	CALIFORNIA WESTERN SCHOOL OF LAW	2	0.2%
	CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY	1	0.2%
	DREXEL UNIVERSITY	1	0.3%
	HOWARD UNIVERSITY	1	0.2%
	LOUISVILLE, UNIVERSITY OF	1	0.2%
	LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY-LOS ANGELES	3	0.2%
	MARYLAND, UNIVERSITY OF	2	0.2%
	SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY	2	0.2%
	ST. THOMAS, UNIVERSITY OF (MINNESOTA)	1	0.2%
	TEMPLE UNIVERSITY	2	0.2%
	WHITTIER LAW SCHOOL	1	0.2%
25	BALTIMORE, UNIVERSITY OF	2	0.2%
	FORDHAM UNIVERSITY	3	0.2%
	KANSAS, UNIVERSITY OF	1	0.2%
	MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY	2	0.2%
	NOTRE DAME, UNIVERSITY OF	1	0.2%
	NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY	2	0.2%
	OKLAHOMA CITY UNIVERSITY	1	0.2%
	OKLAHOMA, UNIVERSITY OF	1	0.2%
	ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY	1	0.2%
	SOUTHWESTERN LAW SCHOOL	2	0.2%
	STETSON UNIVERSITY	2	0.2%
24	ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY	1	0.2%
	BROOKLYN LAW SCHOOL	2	0.1%
	CORNELL UNIVERSITY	1	0.2%
	DETROIT MERCY, UNIVERSITY OF	1	0.2%
	DUKE UNIVERSITY	1	0.2%
	GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY	1	0.2%
	HAMLINE UNIVERSITY	1	0.2%
	JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL	2	0.2%
	LEWIS AND CLARK COLLEGE	1	0.2%
	PACE UNIVERSITY	1	0.1%
	PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY	1	0.2%
	SAN FRANCISCO, UNIVERSITY OF	1	0.2%
	SOUTH TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW	2	0.2%
	THOMAS JEFFERSON SCHOOL OF LAW	1	0.1%
	WILLIAM AND MARY LAW SCHOOL	1	0.2%
23	CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA	1	0.1%
	CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW-IIT	1	0.1%
	DENVER, UNIVERSITY OF	1	0.1%
	GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY	2	0.1%
	HOUSTON, UNIVERSITY OF	1	0.1%
	INDIANA UNIVERSITY - INDIANAPOLIS	1	0.1%
	LOYOLA UNIVERSITY-NEW ORLEANS	1	0.1%
	MCGEORGE SCHOOL OF LAW	1	0.1%
	NEW ENGLAND LAW | BOSTON	1	0.1%
	NORTH CAROLINA, UNIVERSITY OF	1	0.1%
	RUTGERS UNIVERSITY-CAMDEN	1	0.1%
	SAN DIEGO, UNIVERSITY OF	1	0.1%
	SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY	1	0.1%
	SETON HALL UNIVERSITY	1	0.1%
	SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY	2	0.1%
	VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY	1	0.1%
	WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY	1	0.1%
	WIDENER UNIVERSITY-DELAWARE	1	0.1%
22	FLORIDA COASTAL SCHOOL OF LAW	1	0.1%
	FLORIDA, UNIVERSITY OF	1	0.1%
	NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL	1	0.1%
21	THOMAS M. COOLEY LAW SCHOOL	1	0.0%
20	(remainder)	0	0.0%
	*denotes only one year's data

Note: due to rounding, some schools may appear to have similar percentages but have different ranks, or vice versa.

A few thoughts.

First, the top public interest schools are, perhaps unsurprisingly, the top "overall" schools.

Second, UC-Irvine's rank as #2 overall is awfully deceptive, given that it placed one student from an extremely small graduating class of 56. But I thought it would be unfair to exclude the school entirely.

Third, Northeastern's placement is notable. It not only has one of the highest public interest placement rates in the country, but its novel first-year curriculum orients students toward public interest. Its placement is high even among "elite" public interest opportunities.

What does the Constitution mean by "Legislature"?

An Arizona initiative several years ago took away the power to redistrict from the legislature and put it in the hands of an independent redistricting commission. The legislature is now challenging that this initiative as running afoul of the Times, Places and Manner Clause, which provides that the “manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof.” (A relevant news story here.) The Arizona legislature’s argument is that such power, seized from the legislature by initiative, is prohibited.

One issue is that there are a handful of cases that have limited the power of the legislature: Davis v. Hildebrant (1916), which permitted a referendum to disapprove of legislative redistricting; and Smiley v. Holme (1932), which permitted a gubernatorial veto of legislative redistricting. But there is other precedent in other constitutional contexts in which the Court has construed “legislature” to mean not simply the law-making apparatus, but the legislature itself: McPherson v. Blacker (1892), which ensured that the legislature has plenary power over the manner of appointment of presidential electors; and Hawke v. Smith (1920), which held that a state constitution could not require that proposed constitutional amendments be put to a vote of the people, as that task was reserved to the legislature.

The Arizona legislature is arguing that the initiative is unlike a veto or referendum, because it essentially removes the legislature from the process altogether (except in some smaller ministerial ways, such as giving recommendations to the commission). But I think, on appeal, it would happily argue that the functional approach in Hildebrant and Smiley was incorrect, if it has the opportunity to do so on appeal.

The definition of "legislature" has been the subject of some scholarly debate, as Rick Hasen recently argued in the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly (PDF) that the definition of "legislature" may be the subject of some genuine debate in the context of the Electoral College and whether changes to the selection of electors could occur by initiative. Additionally, Franita Tolson has argued in the Utah Law Review that the legislature holding this power of redistricting helps states protect themselves in our federalist structure by giving them an additional mechanism to influence federal policy.

And courts have policed the word "legislature." In 2002, a three-judge panel in Smith v. Clark struck down a state court's congressional redistricting plan because the court lacked a "legislative" function under state law. (Thanks to Christopher Greene for flagging this case.)

So what about this case? The congressional election is fast approaching in Arizona, and a result in this case should be forthcoming soon. But the definition of "legislature" is not so simple as it might appear to be. Whether the Supreme Court will weigh in is, of course, another matter.

Two charts on non-JD law school enrollment figures for 2014

Following up on last week's post on non-JD enrollment, I thought I would update last year's charts on the ratio of JD and non-JD enrollment in law schools.

The first update reflects the last 26 years of non-JD enrollment as a percentage of law school enrollment, updated to include the 2013-2014 figures.

Non-JD enrollment was in the 4-5% range until around 2000, when it increased to around 5-5.5% for the next few years, and has risen each year since 2007. In the 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 academic years, non-JD students were 6% of all law school enrollment. In 2010-2011, it was 6.2%; in 2011-2012, it was 6.5%; and in 2012-2013, it was 7.4%. This year, it increased yet again to 8.0%.

Part of that recent increase is, of course, relative.  The non-JD percentage appears higher in the last three academic years in particular simply because of the significant drop-off in JD enrollment. But it's also higher in absolute terms, too. Consider the last 11 years.

When I drafted this chart last year, I tried to make the scale the same on both sides, with a common starting point for the JD enrollment (blue, on the left axis) and the non-JD enrollment (red, on the right axis), to reflect changes in absolute numbers. That, however, yielded an uncomfortable chart when I updated it. The sharp drop in JD enrollment means that the non-JD axis of the chart technically dips below zero (denoted by a small line below the last numbered axis point). But I wanted to preserve the same chart I used last year for continuity.