Papers by Cintia Quiliconi
Revista uruguaya de ciencia política, Jul 1, 2019
United Nations University Series on Regionalism, 2016
Regional and International Cooperation in South America After COVID
International Development, 2014
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace, 2020
Relaciones Internacionales, 2022
Leaving aside their differences and the problem to categorize them as a group, there is little qu... more Leaving aside their differences and the problem to categorize them as a group, there is little question that BRICS are increasingly seen as key actors in the international system (Mansfield 2014), thus there is an important space in the international political economy debate to analyse the meaning of the rise of these countries for their regions and the international system. Systematic studies of the role of the BRICS at the global and regional levels are still scarce, however the debate has been clearly divided in two camps. On one hand, a group considers the rise of BRICS as a challenge to the current US hegemonic driven order; leading to political and economic instability. On the other hand, another group considers that the US hegemonic power is still alive given that BRICS face important domestic challenges, need to build trust in their group and many of their members are reluctant to lead in global affairs (Donno and Rudra 2014). This book addresses some of these debates openin...
Revista Uruguaya de Ciencias Políticas, 2019
El siguiente artículo analiza cómo las dinámicas de convergencia/ divergencia de ideologías polít... more El siguiente artículo analiza cómo las dinámicas de convergencia/ divergencia de ideologías políticas en América del Sur, y la presencia y apoyo de líderes regionales en agendas regionales influyeron en los niveles de cooperación en Unasur. Para este objetivo, se analizan diversos niveles de cooperación regional durante el período 2008-2015, a fin de explorar por qué la cooperación se ha profundizado en ciertos sectores en detrimento de otros. A través del análisis de dos consejos sectoriales, el artículo muestra que un contexto de convergencia ideológica es una condición necesaria pero no suficiente para mejorar la cooperación regional.
En el artículo se argumenta que la combinación entre convergencia ideológica con un fuerte liderazgo regional, que apoya la agenda del Consejo de Defensa Suramericano, y la mejora del consenso entre los miembros, profundizó la cooperación. Además, la alternancia en liderar este tema por otros países como Argentina y Venezuela hizo posible la cooperación en defensa. Por el contrario, el caso del Consejo Suramericano sobre el Problema Mundial de las Drogas muestra que, aunque hubo una importante convergencia ideológica entre los miembros, esta agenda no prosperó, dado que no había líderes regionales comprometidos con la promoción del tema.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Paper, 2021
Chinese mining companies were drawn to Ecuador by a strong interest in diversifying their sources... more Chinese mining companies were drawn to Ecuador by a strong interest in diversifying their sources of copper in Latin America. But Chinese mining operations in Ecuador, which could have contributed to Ecuadorian development, soon gained a negative reputation after these activities prompted a great deal of local pushback, especially from affected Indigenous communities. As a result, the major Chinese mining consortium that now controls Ecuador’s two main copper mines has taken adaptive steps to stabilize its mining investment and increase the security of its supply networks, steps that often have not produced the intended results.
Working through two subsidiaries, the Chinese mining consortium has responded to this localized criticism with a blend of tactics that includes co-opting select local figures, colluding with national officials to sidestep environmental and sociocultural safeguards, and coercing inhabitants into relocating under the threat of force from accommodating Ecuadorian authorities. By turning Ecuadorian national elites against locals and using divide-and-conquer tactics among Indigenous communities, the Chinese-led mining projects have entrenched existing political cleavages, have undermined community cohesion, and ultimately have harmed Ecuador’s democratic fabric, especially the standing of civil society and Indigenous rights organizations. While Ecuador has welcomed Chinese capital and other sources of international investment, this infusion of financing has increased the risk of political abuses at the national and local levels.
This paper explains the adaptive strategies employed by the Chinese consortium and its subsidiaries in charge of the Mirador and San Carlos Panantza mining sites, contrasting the differing results these tactics have produced in each case. Both projects are located in Ecuador’s so-called Copper Belt provinces of Morona Santiago and Zamora Chinchipe, which are part of a mountain range known as the Cordillera del Cóndor. They are embedded in an ecologically and culturally sensitive zone that includes territory of the Indigenous Shuar community in the Ecuadorian Amazon.
In the case of Mirador, the Chinese mining consortium’s adaptive response helped its subsidiary overcome local resistance but only by crushing it. In the case of San Carlos Panantza, local resistance so far has not been overcome, so the Chinese consortium has remained unable to proceed with its project. Neither case, even the Mirador site where mining has moved forward, is a sign of success for future relationships between Chinese mining conglomerates and Ecuadorian communities.
To understand why the Chinese consortium’s adaptive tactics were somewhat more successful in Mirador, it is important to focus on the differing composition of the inhabitants of the land where the two mines are located. Mirador sits on territory shared by Shuar and non-Shuar settler communities who have different bonds with the land. The non-Shuar settlers emphasize the productive and commercial value of the land over the spiritual and symbolic value that is key for many in the Shuar community. The Canadian-held and later Chinese-controlled companies active in Ecuador’s mining industry understood this difference between Mirador’s inhabitants and adapted accordingly: they managed to displace resistant residents despite widespread opposition through questionable and sometimes arguably illegal purchases of land.
In San Carlos Panantza, a second subsidiary of the Chinese consortium chose to respond to local criticism with the same alleged practices of violence, occupation, and displacement used in Mirador. However, although the two projects are geographically near each other, the situation played out differently at the second would-be mine: ongoing opposition has prevented mining operations from beginning at all yet. Again, paying attention to the inhabitants of the land is instructive. San Carlos Panantza is in the heart of Shuar territory in Arutam, a region with few non-Indigenous settlers. The mining incursion by the Chinese-run subsidiary and the Ecuadorian security forces tasked with supporting it were seen as a threat to the area’s Shuar people, who have been strongly protesting and opposing the mining venture since late 2016.
This state of affairs is likely to have far-reaching effects for Ecuador too. The apparent collusion between Ecuador’s national government and the Chinese consortium (and its subsidiaries) has crushed those who oppose mining, has upended the country’s policies on resource extraction, and has yielded documented violations of local communities’ human rights. These events have transpired because both the Chinese firms and the Ecuadorian state have tended to see local communities as an obstacle to the development of the country’s extractive industries. As a result, local social and environmental safeguards have been weakened, tenuous consultation processes have eroded, environmental licenses have been granted under dubious circumstances, and local communities have been forcibly displaced.
This paper explores the implications of the adaptive tactics chosen by the Chinese mining subsidiaries that run the Mirador and San Carlos Panantza mines. It also addresses how Chinese companies have, in some cases, negotiated with local communities to begin mining exploitation, while also analyzing the ways the Chinese mining consortium has interacted with the Ecuadorian government and other players, such as the Canadian mining company it acquired and other peer companies that set up successful coalitions for mining development in Ecuador. Finally, the paper explores the effects the agreements between the Ecuadorian government and the Chinese consortium have had on local actors.
All Azimuth, 2020
The field of IPE has traditionally being conceptualized as an Anglo Saxon construct, in this pape... more The field of IPE has traditionally being conceptualized as an Anglo Saxon construct, in this paper we argue that it is critically important to reflect on the way IPE has developed outside the mainstream, in the periphery, focusing on the case studies of Africa-in particular South Africa; Asia-in particular China; and South America, in order to start a conversation that engages with the contributions of peripheral IPE. By bringing to light the way IPE has been approached in these regions of the world we identify problems, ideas, and concerns different from those in the North and which also call attention to the necessity of a conscious reading of these works and to opening a dialogue and comparison among them. The paper explores the contributions made by IPE in Africa, Asia and South America in order to discuss the possibility of widening IPE's 'global conversation' including peripheral approaches.
Colombia Internacional , 2020
Análisis Fundación Carolina 23, 2019
Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política, 2019
Los Acuerdos Preferenciales de Comercio (APC –Acuerdos Preferenciales de Comer-cio, también c... more Los Acuerdos Preferenciales de Comercio (APC –Acuerdos Preferenciales de Comer-cio, también conocidos como Tratados de libre Comercio -TLCs) han proliferadovelozmente en América Latina desde la primera década del siglo XXI. Este trabajoexamina los factores que han facilitado u obstaculizado su difusión. Asimismo, expli-ca que la difusión de APCs, y su resistencia, han provocado dos modelos alternativosde integración comercial en la región. Por un lado, la difusión liberal de APCs, guiadapor Estados Unidos en los países latinoamericanos situados en la Cuenca del Pacífi-co. Por el otro, el apoyo al regionalismo post-liberal por parte de Brasil y los paísesdel MERCOSUR, que ha actuado como un muro de resistencia o contención a la difu-sión de APCs propuesta por la visión más neoliberal de la integración al estilo norte-americano. En primer lugar, este trabajo discute cómo la difusión competitiva deAPCs, guiados por Estados Unidos, comenzó en América Latina. Luego analiza dosdinámicas interconectadas (internacional-regional y doméstica-institucional) queexplican por qué los APCs liderados por los Estados Unidos proliferaron en la región.La tercera sección explora las reacciones desde el MERCOSUR a la difusión compe-titiva de APCs por parte de Estados Unidos y cómo el liderazgo brasilero ha evolucio-nado en la subregión sudamericana para limitar este proceso y proponer un modelode regionalismo diferente. Finalmente, la última sección argumenta que han surgidodos patrones diferentes de integración competitivos en América Latina que reflejandiferencias de proyectos económicos pero también políticos.
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Papers by Cintia Quiliconi
En el artículo se argumenta que la combinación entre convergencia ideológica con un fuerte liderazgo regional, que apoya la agenda del Consejo de Defensa Suramericano, y la mejora del consenso entre los miembros, profundizó la cooperación. Además, la alternancia en liderar este tema por otros países como Argentina y Venezuela hizo posible la cooperación en defensa. Por el contrario, el caso del Consejo Suramericano sobre el Problema Mundial de las Drogas muestra que, aunque hubo una importante convergencia ideológica entre los miembros, esta agenda no prosperó, dado que no había líderes regionales comprometidos con la promoción del tema.
Working through two subsidiaries, the Chinese mining consortium has responded to this localized criticism with a blend of tactics that includes co-opting select local figures, colluding with national officials to sidestep environmental and sociocultural safeguards, and coercing inhabitants into relocating under the threat of force from accommodating Ecuadorian authorities. By turning Ecuadorian national elites against locals and using divide-and-conquer tactics among Indigenous communities, the Chinese-led mining projects have entrenched existing political cleavages, have undermined community cohesion, and ultimately have harmed Ecuador’s democratic fabric, especially the standing of civil society and Indigenous rights organizations. While Ecuador has welcomed Chinese capital and other sources of international investment, this infusion of financing has increased the risk of political abuses at the national and local levels.
This paper explains the adaptive strategies employed by the Chinese consortium and its subsidiaries in charge of the Mirador and San Carlos Panantza mining sites, contrasting the differing results these tactics have produced in each case. Both projects are located in Ecuador’s so-called Copper Belt provinces of Morona Santiago and Zamora Chinchipe, which are part of a mountain range known as the Cordillera del Cóndor. They are embedded in an ecologically and culturally sensitive zone that includes territory of the Indigenous Shuar community in the Ecuadorian Amazon.
In the case of Mirador, the Chinese mining consortium’s adaptive response helped its subsidiary overcome local resistance but only by crushing it. In the case of San Carlos Panantza, local resistance so far has not been overcome, so the Chinese consortium has remained unable to proceed with its project. Neither case, even the Mirador site where mining has moved forward, is a sign of success for future relationships between Chinese mining conglomerates and Ecuadorian communities.
To understand why the Chinese consortium’s adaptive tactics were somewhat more successful in Mirador, it is important to focus on the differing composition of the inhabitants of the land where the two mines are located. Mirador sits on territory shared by Shuar and non-Shuar settler communities who have different bonds with the land. The non-Shuar settlers emphasize the productive and commercial value of the land over the spiritual and symbolic value that is key for many in the Shuar community. The Canadian-held and later Chinese-controlled companies active in Ecuador’s mining industry understood this difference between Mirador’s inhabitants and adapted accordingly: they managed to displace resistant residents despite widespread opposition through questionable and sometimes arguably illegal purchases of land.
In San Carlos Panantza, a second subsidiary of the Chinese consortium chose to respond to local criticism with the same alleged practices of violence, occupation, and displacement used in Mirador. However, although the two projects are geographically near each other, the situation played out differently at the second would-be mine: ongoing opposition has prevented mining operations from beginning at all yet. Again, paying attention to the inhabitants of the land is instructive. San Carlos Panantza is in the heart of Shuar territory in Arutam, a region with few non-Indigenous settlers. The mining incursion by the Chinese-run subsidiary and the Ecuadorian security forces tasked with supporting it were seen as a threat to the area’s Shuar people, who have been strongly protesting and opposing the mining venture since late 2016.
This state of affairs is likely to have far-reaching effects for Ecuador too. The apparent collusion between Ecuador’s national government and the Chinese consortium (and its subsidiaries) has crushed those who oppose mining, has upended the country’s policies on resource extraction, and has yielded documented violations of local communities’ human rights. These events have transpired because both the Chinese firms and the Ecuadorian state have tended to see local communities as an obstacle to the development of the country’s extractive industries. As a result, local social and environmental safeguards have been weakened, tenuous consultation processes have eroded, environmental licenses have been granted under dubious circumstances, and local communities have been forcibly displaced.
This paper explores the implications of the adaptive tactics chosen by the Chinese mining subsidiaries that run the Mirador and San Carlos Panantza mines. It also addresses how Chinese companies have, in some cases, negotiated with local communities to begin mining exploitation, while also analyzing the ways the Chinese mining consortium has interacted with the Ecuadorian government and other players, such as the Canadian mining company it acquired and other peer companies that set up successful coalitions for mining development in Ecuador. Finally, the paper explores the effects the agreements between the Ecuadorian government and the Chinese consortium have had on local actors.
En el artículo se argumenta que la combinación entre convergencia ideológica con un fuerte liderazgo regional, que apoya la agenda del Consejo de Defensa Suramericano, y la mejora del consenso entre los miembros, profundizó la cooperación. Además, la alternancia en liderar este tema por otros países como Argentina y Venezuela hizo posible la cooperación en defensa. Por el contrario, el caso del Consejo Suramericano sobre el Problema Mundial de las Drogas muestra que, aunque hubo una importante convergencia ideológica entre los miembros, esta agenda no prosperó, dado que no había líderes regionales comprometidos con la promoción del tema.
Working through two subsidiaries, the Chinese mining consortium has responded to this localized criticism with a blend of tactics that includes co-opting select local figures, colluding with national officials to sidestep environmental and sociocultural safeguards, and coercing inhabitants into relocating under the threat of force from accommodating Ecuadorian authorities. By turning Ecuadorian national elites against locals and using divide-and-conquer tactics among Indigenous communities, the Chinese-led mining projects have entrenched existing political cleavages, have undermined community cohesion, and ultimately have harmed Ecuador’s democratic fabric, especially the standing of civil society and Indigenous rights organizations. While Ecuador has welcomed Chinese capital and other sources of international investment, this infusion of financing has increased the risk of political abuses at the national and local levels.
This paper explains the adaptive strategies employed by the Chinese consortium and its subsidiaries in charge of the Mirador and San Carlos Panantza mining sites, contrasting the differing results these tactics have produced in each case. Both projects are located in Ecuador’s so-called Copper Belt provinces of Morona Santiago and Zamora Chinchipe, which are part of a mountain range known as the Cordillera del Cóndor. They are embedded in an ecologically and culturally sensitive zone that includes territory of the Indigenous Shuar community in the Ecuadorian Amazon.
In the case of Mirador, the Chinese mining consortium’s adaptive response helped its subsidiary overcome local resistance but only by crushing it. In the case of San Carlos Panantza, local resistance so far has not been overcome, so the Chinese consortium has remained unable to proceed with its project. Neither case, even the Mirador site where mining has moved forward, is a sign of success for future relationships between Chinese mining conglomerates and Ecuadorian communities.
To understand why the Chinese consortium’s adaptive tactics were somewhat more successful in Mirador, it is important to focus on the differing composition of the inhabitants of the land where the two mines are located. Mirador sits on territory shared by Shuar and non-Shuar settler communities who have different bonds with the land. The non-Shuar settlers emphasize the productive and commercial value of the land over the spiritual and symbolic value that is key for many in the Shuar community. The Canadian-held and later Chinese-controlled companies active in Ecuador’s mining industry understood this difference between Mirador’s inhabitants and adapted accordingly: they managed to displace resistant residents despite widespread opposition through questionable and sometimes arguably illegal purchases of land.
In San Carlos Panantza, a second subsidiary of the Chinese consortium chose to respond to local criticism with the same alleged practices of violence, occupation, and displacement used in Mirador. However, although the two projects are geographically near each other, the situation played out differently at the second would-be mine: ongoing opposition has prevented mining operations from beginning at all yet. Again, paying attention to the inhabitants of the land is instructive. San Carlos Panantza is in the heart of Shuar territory in Arutam, a region with few non-Indigenous settlers. The mining incursion by the Chinese-run subsidiary and the Ecuadorian security forces tasked with supporting it were seen as a threat to the area’s Shuar people, who have been strongly protesting and opposing the mining venture since late 2016.
This state of affairs is likely to have far-reaching effects for Ecuador too. The apparent collusion between Ecuador’s national government and the Chinese consortium (and its subsidiaries) has crushed those who oppose mining, has upended the country’s policies on resource extraction, and has yielded documented violations of local communities’ human rights. These events have transpired because both the Chinese firms and the Ecuadorian state have tended to see local communities as an obstacle to the development of the country’s extractive industries. As a result, local social and environmental safeguards have been weakened, tenuous consultation processes have eroded, environmental licenses have been granted under dubious circumstances, and local communities have been forcibly displaced.
This paper explores the implications of the adaptive tactics chosen by the Chinese mining subsidiaries that run the Mirador and San Carlos Panantza mines. It also addresses how Chinese companies have, in some cases, negotiated with local communities to begin mining exploitation, while also analyzing the ways the Chinese mining consortium has interacted with the Ecuadorian government and other players, such as the Canadian mining company it acquired and other peer companies that set up successful coalitions for mining development in Ecuador. Finally, the paper explores the effects the agreements between the Ecuadorian government and the Chinese consortium have had on local actors.
El ascenso global de la ultraderecha y el nacionalismo, los regionalismos, las políticas exteriores y los liderazgos internacionales en el Siglo XXI, los grandes trazos de la reconfiguración en marcha, el multilateralismo regional, el retorno al regionalismo abierto con la Alianza del Pacífico, y la experiencia de UNASUR en la perspectiva de la
integración latinoamericana, son algunos de los temas que se abordan en esta publicación, con el objetivo de contribuir al debate sobre el futuro de la región tanto a nivel nacional, regional e internacional.
grandes trazos de la reconfiguración en marcha con el desarrollo de la evolución de China a nivel global y su despliegue en América Latina. Es un proceso con profundas resistencias sociales y serias ricciones políticas Cierra con algunas reflexiones que
remiten a cómo se desarrolla la crisis venezolana en este escenario conflictivo
En este marco, el proyecto que ha dado origen a la publicación de este libro ha tenido como principal objetivo analizar la creciente tensión que existe hoy en América Latina entre el crecimiento económico, su sustentabilidad medioambiental y la necesidad de promover la inclusión social.
Estructurado en torno del concepto de crecimiento verde e inclusivo, el libro indaga los principales desafíos y oportunidades que existen en la región para lograr la transición hacia un desarrollo más sustentable y equitativo. Dicha transición implica un cambio estructural y el proyecto ha sido un puntapié inicial para comenzar a discutir opciones de políticas públicas que puedan ayudar a compatibilizar los tres pilares del desarrollo sustentable: la sociedad, el medioambiente y la economía.
El sistema internacional se ha transformado en las últimas décadas, y pese a que Estados Unidos y Europa han liderado colectiva e independientemente, esos liderazgos no han estado libres de disputas. Además, el surgimiento de los BRICS ha causado una profunda transformación de la política internacional, que vis-à-vis el reciente retroceso de la globalización en Estados Unidos y Europa, abre nuevos desafíos globales y regionales. A la par con lo anterior, estas transformaciones han resultado en un cambio tectónico en la política exterior y en la economía política internacional en tanto los líderes tradicionales y favorecedores de la gobernanza global no se perciben más a sí mismos como tales y están repensando sus roles respectivos. Por un lado, el referéndum del Brexit y la elección de Trump señalizan una revuelta de los votantes, y por otro, constituyen un viraje para reajustar los términos bajo los cuales los poderes tradicionales proyectarán su liderazgo. Esta nueva estructura de múltiples ejes aumenta el pluralismo dentro del sistema internacional, pero también crea presión desde abajo para que los procesos internacionales migren su gobernanza desde el nivel global hacia subsistemas regionales, flexibles y focalizados en temas específicos. Estas transformaciones han llamado la atención de académicos y líderes políticos por igual, al punto de que actualmente el recelo sobre la supremacía occidental es profundo, producto del desafío que representan los nuevos competidores del poder, capturados primero en el grupo de los BRICS y liderados ahora por China. Las fuentes de cambio están reflejadas en una batalla por influir en la gobernanza global. La pelea por el poder ocurre en relación a la capacidad de dictar y hacer cumplir las reglas, normas y leyes que son parte de la gobernanza global y regional, incluyendo el acceso a mercados y recursos. Esta conferencia se propone abordar y repensar a los nuevos contendientes del poder establecido, en conjunto con las dinámicas y disputas que están rehaciendo las reglas del juego, tanto a nivel global y regional, a través de un análisis, aunque no necesariamente limitado, de las siguientes preguntas: ■ ¿Cómo se constituye el poder, la autoridad y la legitimidad en los niveles regionales y globales? ■ ¿Quiénes son los actuales contendientes del poder establecido? ¿Ejercen liderazgo para repensar y rehacer la gobernanza regional y global? ■ ¿Existe una agenda no-Occidental en formación? Y si fuera así, ¿qué características posee? Si no, ¿por qué la preocupación por el ocaso del liderazgo de los poderes occidentales? ■ ¿De qué manera el regreso del nacionalismo está afectando los actuales órdenes global y regional? ¿Cómo las actuales variaciones de nacionalismo difieren o son similares a manifestaciones de este fenómeno en el pasado, y qué significan para el futuro? ■ ¿Cuál es el rol de los BRICS para moldear el nuevo orden global y regional? ¿Presentan un frente unido y contra-hegemónico para establecer liderazgo global/regional? ■ ¿Son las transiciones de poder similares a las transformaciones de poder en los niveles global y regional? ¿Están estas transiciones marcadas siempre por el conflicto y los desafíos de seguridad o es posible el cambio pacífico? ¿Cómo identificar una transformación de poder si es que existiera actualmente? ■ ¿De qué manera estas nuevas dinámicas de poder afectan a los países del Sur Global (en términos políticos, económicos, sociales y securitarios)? ¿Existen regiones particularmente afectadas en temas específicos? ¿Cuáles han sido las repuestas del Sur Global a los dilemas que representan estas reconfiguraciones de poder? El objetivo de esta conferencia basada en Quito está relacionado con dos dimensiones: 1) Proveer un espacio para el diálogo en el cual la investigación y el expertise en relaciones internacionales pueda ser compartido entre académicos tanto del Sur como del Norte Global, y 2) Fortalecer la internacionalización de la disciplina de relaciones internacionales en América Latina que ha alcanzado un verdadero grado de madurez. En ese sentido, alentamos a presentar paneles y mesas redondas que incluyan académicos del Sur y el Norte Global, y también buscamos incentivar debates que se centren en América Latina y el Sur Global. Aceptaremos propuestas en español y en inglés.
American flavor envisaged in the recently created CELAC. The study concludes that these new developments of a regionalism à la carte are a product of dislocation of the economic agenda of regionalism towards a set of diverse issues. Hence it demands a rethinking of the theorization of Latin American Regionalism.