The April Report

VOLUME I

New Zealand Today

Report of
The Royal Commission on Social Policy
Te Kōmihana A Te Karauna Mō
Āhuatanga-Ā-Iwi
April 1988

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THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON SOCIAL POLICY

TE KŌMIHANA A TE KARAUNA MŌ
NGĀ ĀHUATANGA-Ā-IWI

Sir Ivor Richardson *Chairman*
Ann Ballin *member*
Marion Bruce *member*
Len Cook *member*
Mason Durie *member*
Rosslyn Noonan *member*

THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON SOCIAL POLICY

TE KŌMIHANA A TE KARAUNA MŌ
NGĀ ĀHUATANGA-Ā-IWI

Warrant

Royal Commission on Social Policy

ELIZABETH THE SECOND, by the Grace of God Queen of New Zealand and Her Other Realms and Territories. Head of the Commonwealth. Defender of the Faith:

To Our Trusty and Well-beloved The Right Honourable Sir IVOR LLOYD MORGAN RICHARDSON, of Wellington, a Judge of the Court of Appeal, REUBINA ANN BALLIN, C.B.E. of Christchurch, Psychologist, MARION EDNA BRUCE, Q.S.O., of Porirua, Community Worker, MASON HAROLD DURIE, iwi *Kauwhata* and *Rangitane*, of Feilding, Medical Practitioner, and ROSSLYN JOY NOONAN, of Wellington, Trade Unionist:

GREETINGS

KNOW YE that We, reposing trust and confidence in your integrity, knowledge, and ability, do hereby nominate, constitute and appoint you, the said The Right Honourable IVOR LLOYD MORGAN RICHARDSON, REUBINA ANN BALLIN, MARION EDNA BRUCE, MASON HAROLD DURIE, and ROSSLYN JOY NOONAN, to be a Commission to inquire into the extent to which existing instruments of policy meet the needs of New Zealanders, and report on what fundamental or significant reformation or changes are necessary or desirable in existing policies, administration, institutions, or systems to secure a more fair, humanitarian, consistent, efficient, and economical social policy which will meet the changed and changing needs of New Zealand and achieve a more just society:

And, in particular, to receive representations upon, inquire into, investigate, and report on—

(i) The extent to which New Zealand meets the standards of a fair society and the main reasons why New Zealand falls short of any of these standards, and, in particular,—

—To investigate whether the ways in which responsibility for social wellbeing is currently shared among individuals, families, voluntary social groups, ethnic and tribal affiliations and other communities as well as local and central government hinders or assists the achievement of a fair society:

—To investigate both how existing government systems and policies assist or hinder the achievement of a fair society, and whether any hindrance results from inappropriate or conflicting objectives or inappropriate processes:

—To identify the constraints on the achievement of the standards of a fair society:

(ii) The principles, derived from the standards of a fair society and based on the social and economic foundations of New Zealand, which government may apply to all policy:

(iii) The guidelines for the application of these principles in each of the areas of social wellbeing:

(iv) The nature and extent of change in policies and institutions which will enable New Zealand to meet the standards of a fair society with greater effectiveness and efficiency:

(v) The criteria and mechanisms by which the social impact of policies may be monitored and assessed:

(vi) Your priorities for the implementation of your recommendations:

(vii) Any associated matter that may be thought by you to be relevant to the general objects of the inquiry:

And We Declare that, in carrying out this Our Commission, the standards to which you shall have regard as the standards of a fair society are—

—dignity and self-determination for individuals, families, and communities:

—maintenance of a standard of living sufficient to ensure that everybody can participate in and have a sense of belonging to the community:

—genuine opportunity for all people, of whatever age, race, gender, social and economic position or abilities to develop their own potential:

—a fair distribution of the wealth and resources of New Zealand including access to the resources which contribute to social wellbeing:

—acceptance of the identity and cultures of different peoples within the community, and understanding and respect for cultural diversity.

And We Further Declare that, in carrying out this Our Commission, you shall have regard to the social and economic foundations of New Zealand, namely—

—democracy based on freedom and equal rights:

—adherence to the rule of law:

—collective responsibility of New Zealand society for its members with continuing roles for individuals, families, voluntary social groups, ethnic and tribal affiliations and other communities as well as local and central government:

—the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi:

—the operation of a mixed economy with private, co-operative and public activity:

—the responsibility which all people have to be independent and self-reliant to the best of their ability and to contribute to society:

—a commitment to the children of New Zealand and regard for the future generations of New Zealand:

—the equality of men and women, and the equality of all races:

And We hereby appoint you, the said The Right Honourable IVOR LLOYD MORGAN RICHARDSON, to be the Chairman of the said Commission:

And for the better enabling you to carry these presents into effect you are hereby authorised and empowered, subject to the provisions of this Our Warrant, to make and conduct any inquiry or investigation under these presents in such manner and at such time and place as you think expedient, with power to adjourn from time to time and from place to place as you think fit, and so that these presents shall continue in force and any such inquiry may at any time and place be resumed although not regularly adjourned from time to time or from place to place:

And you are hereby required, in carrying these presents into effect.—

—To consult widely, in ways which show regard for the dignity of individuals, of Maori and other ethnic groups, and other social groups, and for the modes of communication to which they are accustomed:

—To adopt procedures which encourage people to participate in your proceedings:

—To draw upon the findings of reviews such as those by the Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare, the Task Forces on Income Maintenance and Social Welfare Delivery, the Health Benefits Review Team and the Officials Review of the Accident Compensation Scheme:

—To conduct research through your secretariat and through contracts with independent researchers and Government departments:

And you are hereby empowered, in carrying these presents into effect, to prepare and publish discussion papers from time to time on topics relevant to the inquiry:

And it is hereby declared that the powers hereby conferred shall be exercisable notwithstanding the absence at any time of any one or any two of the members hereby appointed so long as the Chairman or a member deputed by the Chairman to act in the place of the Chairman, and at least two other members, are present and concur in the exercise of the powers:

And We do further ordain that you have liberty to report your proceedings and findings under this Our Commission from time to time if you shall judge it expedient to do so:

And, using all due diligence, you are required to report to His Excellency the Governor-General in writing under your hands, not later than the 30th day of September 1988, your findings and opinions on the matters aforesaid, together with such recommendations as you think fit to make in respect thereof:

And, lastly, it is hereby declared that these presents are issued under the authority of the Letters Patent of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second constituting the office of Governor-General of New Zealand, dated the 28th day of October 1983*, and under the authority of and subject to the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1908, and with the advice and consent of the Executive Council of New Zealand.

In witness whereof We have caused this Our Commission to be issued and the Seal of New Zealand to be hereunto affixed at Wellington this 30th day of October 1986.

Witness The Most Reverend Sir Paul Alfred Reeves, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order, Principal Companion of The Queen's Service Order. Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief in and over New Zealand.



Governor-General.

By His Excellency's Command—



Prime Minister.

Approved in Council—



Clerk of the Executive Council.

*S.R. 1983/225

Warrant

Addition of Member to Royal Commission on Social Policy

ELIZABETH THE SECOND, by the Grace of God Queen of New Zealand and Her Other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith:

To Our Trusty and Well-beloved The Right Honourable Sir IVOR LLOYD MORGAN RICHARDSON, of Wellington, a Judge of the Court of Appeal, REUBINA ANN BALLIN, C.B.E., of Christchurch, Psychologist, MARION EDNA BRUCE, Q.S.O., of Porirua, Community Worker, MASON HAROLD DURIE, iwi *Kauwhata* and *Rangitane*, of Feilding, Medical Practitioner, ROSSLYN JOY NOONAN, of Wellington, Trade Unionist, and LEONARD WARREN COOK, of Wellington, Statistician:

GREETING:

WHEREAS, by Our Warrant dated the 30th day of October 1986*, We constituted you, the said The Right Honourable Sir IVOR LLOYD MORGAN RICHARDSON, REUBINA ANN BALLIN, MARION EDNA BRUCE, MASON HAROLD DURIE, and ROSSLYN JOY NOONAN, to be a Commission to inquire into the extent to which existing instruments of policy meet the needs of New Zealanders, and report on what fundamental or significant reformation or changes are necessary or desirable in existing policies, administration, institutions, or systems to secure a more fair, humanitarian, consistent, efficient, and economical social policy which will meet the changed and changing needs of New Zealand and achieve a more just society:

And whereas it is desirable that you, the said LEONARD WARREN COOK, be appointed to be an additional member of the said Commission:

Now know ye that We, reposing trust and confidence in your integrity, knowledge, and ability, do hereby appoint you, the said LEONARD WARREN COOK, to be a member of the said Commission:

And it is hereby declared that all acts and things done and decisions made by the said Commission or any of its members, in the exercise of its or their powers, before the issuing of these presents, shall be deemed to have been made and done by the said Commission, as reconstituted by these presents, and as if you, the said LEONARD WARREN COOK, had originally been appointed to be a member of the said Commission:

And We do hereby confirm Our said Warrant and the Commission thereby constituted save as modified by these presents:

And, lastly, it is hereby declared that these presents are issued under the authority of the Letters Patent of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second constituting the office of Governor-General of New Zealand, dated the 28th day of October 1983†, and under the authority of and subject to the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1908, and with the advice and consent of the Executive Council of New Zealand.

In witness whereof We have caused this Our Commission to be issued and the Seal of New Zealand to be hereunto affixed at Wellington this 5th day of October 1987.

Witness The Most Reverend Sir Paul Alfred Reeves, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order, Principal Companion of The Queen's Service Order, Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief in and over New Zealand.

[L.S.] PAUL REEVES, Governor-General.

By His Excellency's Command—

DAVID LANGE, Prime Minister.

Approved in Council—

C. J. HILL.
Acting for Clerk of the Executive Council.

**Gazette*, 1986, p. 4650
†S.R. 1983/225
Amendment: S.R. 1987/8

Letter of Transmittal

To His Excellency The Most Reverend Sir Paul Alfred Reeves, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order, Principal Companion of The Queen's Service Order, Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief in and over New Zealand.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY

Your Excellency by Warrant dated 30 October 1986 appointed us the undersigned IVOR LLOYD MORGAN RICHARDSON, REUBINA ANN BALLIN, MARION EDNA BRUCE, MASON HAROLD DURIE, and ROSSLYN JOY NOONAN, to report under the terms of reference stated in that Warrant.

Your Excellency by further Warrant dated 5 October 1987 appointed the undersigned LEONARD WARREN COOK as a Commissioner.

We now submit this report.

We have the honour to be
Your Excellency's most obedient servants,

Ivor Richardson *Chairman*

Ann R. Ballin *Member*

Marion E. Bruce *Member*

L. W. Cook *Member*

Mason Durie *Member*

Rosslyn J. Noonan *Member*

Dated at Wellington this 29th day of April 1988.

Letter of Transmittal

Contents

Contents of Other Volumes

Preface

The Royal Commission was established to undertake a nationwide inquiry designed to set social policy goals and to recommend what needs to be done to make New Zealand a more fair and just society.

Social Policy as a subject encompasses a whole range of social behaviour. Crucial to the inquiry has been the assessment of the values, concerns and goals New Zealanders have as a society. For that we have reflected on our history, on the values that have shaped social policy, on current social arrangements, and on what we have learnt in the course of the inquiry, particularly from the submissions received. These submissions, while numbering approximately 6,000, actually represent through national and community organisations, and individuals involved, some hundreds of thousands of people in every part of the country.

This report is the outcome of that work. Volume I is called New Zealand Today. This first volume contains the following papers: *Social Policy in New Zealand: An Historical Overview*, by Professor W. H. Oliver; *The People of New Zealand*, a demographic profile prepared by the Department of Statistics; *The Voice of the People: An Analysis of Submissions; Attitudes and Values: A New Zealand Survey*, a report on the extensive attitudinal survey carried out for the Commission by the Department of Statistics to complement the submission material; and *A Chronological Narrative of the Inquiry*.

Volume II is called Future Directions. It discusses in fairly extensive overview chapters the broad areas around which the work of the Royal Commission was organised. As explained in the introductory chapter, the first 6 broad areas—*Standards and Foundations* which is addressed in the introduction, *The Treaty of Waitangi: Directions for Social Policy, Women and Social Policy, The Inter-relationship of Economic and Social Policy, Social Wellbeing*, and *Work*—approach in different ways and with different emphases the features of today's society which we consider should govern social policy. There are 5 further overviews in the volume. The first is called *Outcomes of Social and Economic Processes*, a title which speaks for itself. It is followed by *Funding, Income Maintenance and Taxation,*

Social Provision: Access and Delivery, and *Policy Development, Assessment and Monitoring.* These papers raise questions of principle of wide general application. It has seemed sensible to adopt this approach rather than to go directly to particular functional areas such as health, education or housing, or to specific perspectives on social policy such as those of the elderly, the young, the disabled, or ethnic minorities. Supporting papers relating directly to the overview papers in Volume II are included in Volume III, called Future Directions: Associated Papers, and follow the same subject sequence.

Volume IV, called Social Perspectives, contains position papers prepared for the Commission on functional areas and special perspectives by writers with special expertise in the particular subjects. They draw on the submissions and other work of the Commission and each was prepared in consultation with the Commissioner having responsibility for that subject area. The short overview that precedes the position papers expresses certain conclusions which the Commissioners have reached within the substantial time constraints under which this early report has been prepared. As we said publicly in January, when announcing the intention to present an early report, this has meant that the present analysis is necessarily limited and we have not had the advantage of presenting working papers for comment and discussion as a step in the process of developing the report.

The Commissioners have received quite exceptional assistance from all members of the secretariat, from the large team of phase managers and consultants, from government departments, national, local and community organisations, and individuals directly involved in the inquiry. Our special thanks go to all those who made submissions to the Commission and assisted us to a better understanding of contemporary New Zealand.

SOCIAL POLICY IN NEW ZEALAND: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

W. H. Oliver

Sig. 2—Vol. I

Social Policy in New Zealand: An Historical Overview

W. H. Oliver

This paper takes 'social policy' to include all those things deliberately done by government to promote wellbeing and to limit the effects of misfortune, primarily in terms of material advantages and disadvantages. Further, because there need to be losers if there are to be winners, some attention is paid to those at whose cost social policy goals were achieved. The opening definition, unless qualified, is broad enough to include the patronage of the arts and of recreation. That breadth is not encompassed here: education, for example, is discussed, but only because it is believed to enhance opportunities for material wellbeing. The compass of the paper, even so, remains broad, and breadth has been purchased at the cost of depth and detail.

The paper is divided into 3 chronological (though overlapping) sections:

1 The nineteenth century: the state as the agent of settlement
2 The early twentieth century: the state as the agent of welfare
3 The later twentieth century: the climax of the interventionist state?

These sub-headings point only to main trends. 'Settlement', in the broad sense of providing resources for people to use, 'welfare', as a set of measures to prevent the worst consequences of poverty and incapacity, and 'intervention', in the sense that the state is always having an effect, through what it chooses not to do as well as what it chooses to do, all to a greater or lesser degree characterise all 3 periods.

I The Nineteenth Century

In social policy the decades from the beginning of significant Pakeha settlement to the first world war show marked continuities with the period that follows. There are 2 kinds of continuity: first, in welfare provision, and second, in social policies which will here be called 'enablement'. Though, before the 1930s, there is no sign of an implicit 'welfare contract' for the redistribution of benefits and obligations according to life cycle stages, there was an abundance of devices of a 'rescue' kind to provide a hedge against poverty and misfortune. These remain to the present day: they have changed only in becoming more elaborate.

Of greater significance is the continuity which begins with the panoply of nineteenth century 'enablement' policies. These directed public resources to enhance the life opportunities of people who were expected to have enough enterprise to take advantage of them and quite quickly repay the cost. Such 'enablement' policies are concerned with land (where, for the Maori, they amount to 'disenablement'), public works, the labour market, and education. (From a twentieth century perspective the most striking omission is health.) In the twentieth century, 'enablement' policies came to embrace a much wider range of activities. There is a continuing belief, over the 2 centuries, in the capacity of the state to enable people to live better lives, and in the propriety of using the state to promote that goal.

Land Settlement and 'Native' Policy

The starting point for social policy, then, is not welfare but land settlement. Simply because New Zealand was, from a Pakeha standpoint, a new society, and because its one reliable long term resource was land, settlement policy and social policy are almost co-terminous.

The Maori tribes were at once the great source of land, and the great obstacle to access to it. What was known as 'native' policy from the 1840s to the 1940s, is not peripheral but central. It is, then, correct as well as fashionable to begin with the Treaty of Waitangi, through which the Crown became the channel for the movement of land from Maori to settler. Exercising its right of pre-emption, the Crown from the 1840s to the mid-1860s was the sole buyer of land from Maori. The first instrument of social policy

in New Zealand was the system set up by William Hobson in 1840 for the purchase and re-sale to settlers of Maori land. Because many settlers and some Maori rejected this monopoly, the first public controversy over social policy arose from the demand that private purchasing be allowed. In 1844 the campaign was successful but only for a few months.

Under the 1852 constitution, native policy and land acquisition were reserved to the Governor exercising the powers of the Crown. However, the same constitution set up representative institutions and gave them the power of the purse, so that the pace and direction of change in these policies was greatly influenced by settler demand. In the later 1840s Crown purchase proceeded steadily and peacefully, sufficiently ahead of settler demand. In the 1850s the pace quickened as settlement expanded. Especially on the interior peripheries of the Pakeha beachheads, Maori opinion turned around, from (often) a willingness to sell for the commercial advantages expected to follow, to (in the main) an effort to prevent further sales. The King movement was the major institutional result. War, beginning in Taranaki and spreading to Waikato, the East Coast, and the Wanganui district, arose from this conflict more than from any other cause.

War, followed by confiscation, was one way of implementing social policy. The law was another, more widespread and persistent in its effects. The appetites of settlers (and of speculators) became dominant in the early 1860s. The pre-emptive right of the Crown gave way to private purchase; the central government set up the Native Land Court as a permanent agency for the movement of land from Maori to Pakeha possession.

By the 1890s, these twin instruments of social policy had effectively done their work—a major part of the usable land of the North Island was in Pakeha hands. Almost the whole of the South Island had gone this way by Crown purchase in the 1850s. There was no war in that island because none was needed.

Creating and operating the devices for separating Maori from their land was a task for the central government. Distributing it and providing the infrastructure without which it would remain unproductive were functions for the provincial governments from 1853 to 1876, when the central government inherited the tasks. In the provincial period a cluster of separate land settlement policies grew up. All aimed, more or less, at 3 goals: public revenue for

public works, advantage for large owners and speculators, and sufficient scope for small settlers to encourage them not to despair. For the time being, until depression came in the late 1870s, there was (generally speaking) enough land to achieve all 3.

Even so, in the provinces before 1876 and nationally thereafter, debates between the advocates of large and small scale settlement flickered and flared, the more fiercely in the 1880s as the stock of accessible land dwindled. This debate over social policy, in which the advocates of the small settler attacked the entrenched position of the large landholder, was the genesis of New Zealand radicalism. By the end of the 1880s (with significant ideological inputs from Great Britain and the United States) it amounted to an effective articulation of the right of the humble to a place in the sun, and to a claim upon the services of the state in finding it for them.

Public Works and Immigration

There was considerable debate, too, about infrastructure (roads and railways) and labour (assisted immigration). There were deep differences of opinion over the extent to which such development should be based upon overseas borrowing. When, by the later 1880s, the colony's financial plight precluded further borrowing, debate focused upon the social incidence of taxation (property and income, or articles of everyday consumption) and upon the direction of retrenchment—education was a favourite target of the economisers.

Public works and immigration policies had an intimate connection with 'native' policy. In the 1860s some roads were constructed for military as well as economic purposes; others grew out of Armed Constabulary tracks. South of Auckland especially, the city was protected by an outlying ring of pensioner settlements—armed farmers who could be called into service. The central government recruited its own troops on a promise of a grant of land; often they were located on confiscated land in the vicinity of the resisting tribes.

The extension of settlement in the North Island was seen as an instrument of pacification. Roads and farming communities would draw Maori within the reach of 'civilising influences', and also within the reach of the merchants and land buyers, who first tempted Maori into debt, and then took them to the land court to secure title to land so that they could sell it to meet their debts. It

was hoped that work on roads and farms would draw Maori into the cash economy and expose them to the needs they would have to earn money to satisfy. From the period of the wars to the end of the century and beyond, the state provided an almost endless series of legislative, administrative and legal measures by which land continued to pass from Maori to settler use. In the 1890s the Liberal government, in the interests of closer settlement, revived Crown pre-emption in part, and bought considerable areas of the Maori land that remained in the North Island. Land is the basis from which all else flowed, and the keynote to social policy throughout this period.

Closer Settlement

From the 1880s (in national legislation, for there were provincial precedents) to well into the twentieth century a long series of enactments and administrative arrangements attempted to foster 'closer' settlement. Another series sought to encourage farming efficiency. If land, Reeves said, looking back on the 1890s, was seldom the first matter in any parliamentary session, it was invariably the second. Village settlement schemes, tenurial reforms, deferred payment systems, re-purchase of large estates for subdivision, the routeing of surplus labour into subsistence farming and rural labouring, provision of loans for land purchase and improvements, a renewed onslaught upon Maori held land, technical education and assistance, quality control measures for dairy exports, and a new department of state for agriculture, all demonstrate the zeal of the Liberal government of the nineties to look after the men on the land and to increase their numbers.

These policies were not thought to be simply material. The towns were growing at the time; rural virtue was held to be the great antidote to perceived urban degeneration. The small dairy unit, in particular, was praised because it was a family operation and likely to stabilise a basic social institution. It is certainly the case that the rural economy depended upon a large input of child and female labour. A good deal of Maori labour was also absorbed, on road building and seasonal work.

This was the central theme of social policy from the middle 1890s to the first world war. The extent to which policy was responsible for either the spread of closer settlement or the higher level of production is open to debate. The general view is that its

role was less than determinative but more than marginal. The trend was set in those directions in any case, by improving prices and wider markets for new and old farm exports, technological change affecting food exports, and rising land values stimulating rising prices. Private owners, when it proved profitable to do so, subdivided without compulsion. Financial institutions were ready with credit, and the private sector threw up meat and dairy processing plants. The state, through its legislators, administrators and inspectors, worked with the tide, but they did not cause it to flow.

Urban and Social Dimensions

Though these policies had a rural character, urban business interests were well to the fore. It has been argued that Liberal land settlement was essentially a townsmen's policy. It is the conventional wisdom that the countryside called the towns into existence to service the rural economy. The reverse argument has as much truth in it—that the towns summoned the farms into existence for the profits to be gained through sub-division, shopkeeping, handling farm products, and providing financial and legal services. Urban businessmen needed rural clients and customers; the closer settlement of the land multiplied them. Land remains the great resource, but the ways of utilising it are more complex than simply cultivating it.

The social dimension of land settlement was always prominent. As policy goals were re-set to include the small owner and occupier, there was a shift of emphasis away from economic growth to social wellbeing. Small farms were of marginal economic significance until refrigeration brought a major dairy export industry into existence in the early twentieth century. Nevertheless, small scale settlement was promoted from the beginning of the 1880s. Proprietorship was a goal in itself. On the outskirts of the cities, tiny blocks were subdivided for town workers so that they could grow their own food. Small farmers on larger blocks could at least feed themselves and their families, produce a surplus for cash sale on the local market, and escape from the demoralisation of urban unemployment. That the small farms of the emergent dairying districts (Taranaki, Manawatu, Waikato, Southland) were later to become a significant source of exports was not the result of policy, but of market growth and technology.

Agricultural Efficiency

Nevertheless, the government and the private sector were aware of the prospects presented by technology. The first hesitant steps were taken in the 1880s, but it was in the next decade that agricultural promotion and regulation became a prime object of policy. If the Department of Agriculture, set up in 1891, did not create the dairy industry, it was at least its midwife, nurse and mentor, through inspection, monitoring, and advisory services from the point of production to the point of export. There were strenuous efforts to raise the quantity and quality of horticulture and viticulture, which, however, stubbornly refused to become major industries. Scab and rabbits, the twin scourges of the pastoral industry, were attacked—so, too, without much effect, were the depredations of small birds upon grain and seed crops.

Throughout the country Land Boards supervised the activities of state tenant farmers, watching over the conditions of settlement attached to the tenures. The Agricultural and Pastoral Associations, nurtured and consulted by the government, became important agencies of improvement and sources of advice to the government. Through the Advances to Settlers Office the state became an important source of farm finance, typically acting as a means through which the farmer could re-finance upon less onerous terms.

Liberal land policy, overall, was a deliberate and substained effort, carried through with intelligence and information, to put more men and their dependents on the land, and to help them to become more efficient, for their own sakes, for the sake of an economy dependent upon farm exports, and for the sake of a healthy, moral society. All this can be properly represented as social policy, and it is wholly without welfare connotations. The principles of user-pays and cost-recovery—not that the terms were current then—were rigorously enforced.

Labour and Unemployment

Governments made no direct financial payments to the unemployed in this period, but in the 1890s the Liberals intervened with some effect in the labour market. Through the Bureau of Labour, set up in 1892 as the nucleus of the new Department of Labour, it

provided a colony-wide employment agency. It shifted large numbers of men around the country, mainly from the towns to farm and construction work. Many of them were immigrants from depressed Australia.

Arbitration (and conciliation) was a much more significant government intervention. An act of 1894 strengthened the bargaining position of the unions through a system of conciliation and arbitration through which they would have a voice in the settlement of disputes and, given a sympathetic court, an influence upon the outcome. It was not that a strong union movement demanded a share of power and won it. It was rather that middle class radicals, such as W. P. Reeves, the responsible Minister, and Edward Tregear, the permanent head of the department, were so impressed by the weakness of the labour unions in the 1890 maritime dispute, that they set out to support them by eliminating direct action. The state reshaped the labour movement, though the work force remained far from wholly unionised. The Arbitration Court exercised a dominant influence upon wages and conditions of work for three quarters of a century. Though the history of industrial relations has been persistently disputatious, it has been geared to compromise solutions.

The Department of Labour policed working conditions, prosecuted employers for breach of awards, and enforced minimum conditions of hygiene and safety. Though, in good measure, rural employment lay outside the system, thanks to the strength of the rural lobby, shearers' accommodation was brought within regulation. Women factory workers benefited from government inspection, and an effort, at least, was made to regulate the activities of agencies supplying domestic labour.

Cost Recovery

The profligate seventies gave way to the penny-pinching eighties, struggling under a load of debt servicing. The Liberals in the 1890s were committed to frugality and retrenchment, and opposed to overseas borrowing. During their 20 years in office they modified this policy by a cautious return to overseas borrowing for development. But they were never lavish. They expected those who benefited from policies to pay for them, and by and large they did. State tenants paid their rents and state mortgagees met their obligations; railway rates were set to provide a return upon invested capital;

roads were maintained by rate-collecting local authorities. Even the surplus town labourers sent to the country with a one-way ticket were expected to pay for it later, and to a surprising extent they seem to have done so. Co-operative gangs on railway construction (chiefly the North Island main trunk) worked under strict supervision and had to pay for their tools as well as for food, clothing and shelter. The Liberals 'targeted' policies towards people capable of paying their way. Policies were administered with a care bordering on parsimony.

Education

A more conventional field of social policy, education, was free (and secular, if not yet, except in principle, compulsory), but only at primary level. But though the government paid the bills, it was confidently believed that costs would be recovered in the near future, in the form of a literate, numerate, docile and virtuous labour force, both industrial and domestic. Virtue was a goal as prized as skill. Even the arguments advanced by the churches for religious education emphasised civic virtue rather than religious truth.

Women were an essential part of this labour force, as the nurturers of breadwinners, the bearers and raisers of children, and the bastions of domestic virtue. Maori children, too, were to be absorbed (literally) into the mainstream, through its language, its values and its skills. In its expected impact upon the poor, the Maori and the women, state education was a hegemonic system designed to secure the interests of a middle class, white, male establishment. The fact that many of the poor, many Maori, and many women enthusiastically co-operated in the programme serves only to underline its hegemonic efficacy.

There is no evidence of efforts to undermine the system, nor to provide a rival system. The arduously constructed Catholic parish school system limited its separateness to cultic values and practices. Its social goals matched those of the public system. Those who passed through either system had held out to them the prospect of individual betterment and were equipped to achieve it. But it was betterment within a prevailing and regularly reinforced consensus. Cost-recovery, with the return seen in terms of reinforced social values and norms, was real and continuous. The public system was permeated with an ethos of economy, efficiency and accountability. Payment by results controlled grants; inspectors kept the system

lean and trim; school committees recruited from the respectable kept teachers in their place—and it was a humble one.

Public Health

Public schooling, until the end of the century, was essentially elementary schooling for the less well-to-do. The better off were expected to send their children to fee paying schools. It was much the same with health: those who could afford to do so were expected to see to their own needs. Those who could not were served by hospitals, and the benevolence of practitioners forgoing their fees.

Nineteenth century public health, unlike education, is not a system at all, but a collection of regional and functional fragments. Officials, both national and local, had some responsibility for sanitation, quarantine, vaccination, food hygiene, public nuisances and notifiable diseases. Direct state responsibility was limited to the care of the insane, including many alcoholics. For other illnesses, the provincial system bequeathed a patchwork of boards which administered a further patchwork of hospitals of diverse origin, financed by local, voluntary, and central government contributions. The whole was subject to the supervision of a department of state that remained minute and incapable of enforcing policy until the twentieth century, with responsibility not only for the sick but also for the aged and the indigent.

However, permeating this administrative welter, the elements of a health policy can be detected, one which was little more than a rescue operation. The poor who fell sick had to have somewhere to go: those who met other misfortunes could find at least some support in charitable aid. Both treatment and support were administered through the hospital system. A high proportion of those inside the hospitals were the permanently incapable—the old, the chronic, and the feeble-minded. Hospitals provided custodial care at a rather primitive level, but not unrelieved by instances of good sense and kindliness.

Little attention was paid to the promotion of health in the interests of social efficiency, as education was designed to promote efficiency. It appears to have been widely expected that the advantages of a new society would be enough. As evidence to the contrary piled up in the later nineteenth century, there was a good deal

of public anxiety, but little actual policy. Sexually transmitted diseases, a high level of infant mortality, insanity and mental disorder, cholera and typhoid, all seemed to show that the old world, far from being left behind, was reproducing itself in the small colonial cities. Further evidence lay to hand in the high perceived level of criminal and immoral behaviour. Remedies were proposed in abundance—a curfew on the young, the punishment of parents of delinquent children, labour camps in the country, censorship, prohibition, and religious education. But prospective policy faltered at the door of legislative and administrative capacity. Concern remained concern—it has stayed that way to the present day. Public health, after the bubonic plague scare of 1900 and then the influenza epidemic of 1919 presented real threats, remained at the sub-policy level.

The least healthy section of the population was an object of less concern. Maori had easily the worst mortality and morbidity rates of the later nineteenth century. They suffered from epidemics, localised but still devastating. Successive censuses seemed to point to a solution which precluded the need for policy—that the Maori would die out after contributing a submerged exotic element to a new white race of better Britons. Through the native schools, the Education Department—or more precisely the Inspector of Native Schools, James H. Pope—tried to inculcate more hygienic habits, but this approach was not inconsistent with the 'humane' desire to 'smooth the pillow of a dying race'.

However, the censuses of the early twentieth century suggested that the Maori were not, after all, dying out. More determined efforts were then made, through the Department of Health (specifically by Peter Buck, Te Rangi Hiroa) to improve sanitary and living conditions in the villages. For a time, many Maori communities responded vigorously. As with the Pakeha poor, the conscience of the times could not let the Maori poor go wholly without some provision for sickness. But the gap in rates of morbidity and mortality between even the 2 poorer sections of the population remained. When the influenza epidemic struck in 1919, the Maori death rate was spectacularly higher than that of the Pakeha.

Welfare and Charitable Aid

Though the term 'welfare state' should not be applied to the period, it is true that the nineteenth century presents a variety of public and private welfare institutions, policies and practices—too great for easy summary. But they do not have the characteristics of the modern welfare state, except with that persisting 'safety net' of rescue operations which deal with the casualties of society.

The nineteenth century label for welfare was 'charitable aid'. Too various to be called a system, it was a complex mix of locality, region and centre, and of public, corporate and individual agency. In effect, it was a colonial Poor Law. Under the 1852 constitution, the provinces had been charged with responsibility for the indigent, and each had discharged it by subsidising voluntary institutions, by setting up their own, and by channelling through them a modest amount of money for the relief of indigence among the elderly, deserted women and families, and children in need of care. In principle, it was laid down by the Destitute Persons Act of 1877, that responsibility lay with the near relatives of the indigent. In practice, many families were absentee, broken, or otherwise incapable. There was a wide gap to be bridged in other ways, if it was to be bridged at all.

The protestant ethic proposed that helping the poor was a Christian virtue and should be a charge upon the Christian conscience through donations. A number of institutions were established, mostly by churches, and in part supported by private charity, including hospitals, refuges for fallen women, and homes for destitute and neglected children. But private charity was never enough. It was held that the local poor should be a charge upon the local community through rates. But as ratepayers people were as reluctant as they had been as donors, especially when many of the applicants for aid were not local at all. Refugees from rural unemployment homed in upon the charitable opportunities of the cities. So government contributions were required, and normally provided upon a capitation basis.

The provincial inheritance added to the complexity. After abolition the central government (but not until 1885) set up a colony-wide system of Charitable Aid Boards, in most cases identical with Hospital Boards, so that the hospital became the characteristic

charitable aid institution administering 'outdoor relief'. But further, the Boards presided over a medley of private voluntary institutions. During the provincial period, each province had evolved in its own manner. The legislation of 1885 simply incorporated the existing variety. There was variety, too, in the level at which these programmes had been financed. Not surprisingly, Otago and Canterbury, the 2 wealthiest provinces, had been the most generous. They inherited, after abolition, a lion's share of central government provision. Again, the indigent migrated to better opportunities, especially in the later 1880s, when depression hit hardest in the North Island.

By the end of that decade it was clear that the problem was a national as well as a public one. The response was more administrative than legislative, and more a reinforcement of contemporary attitudes than a new departure. The public servant in charge of the system, Duncan MacGregor (also Inspector of Lunatic Asylums) attempted over a long tenure of office both to bring in some element of unity and to apply the most rigorous nineteenth century 'benevolent' principles. These were to make relief as unattractive as possible, and to do everything to avoid encouragement of 'pauperisation'. The undeserving were to be excluded, and even the deserving were to be discouraged. The boards and other local institutions, less able to ignore pressing local demand, frustrated him at every turn. There was more charity at the periphery than at the centre.

Officially, the able-bodied did not receive relief. Unemployment in the 1880s led to some provision, in a haphazard and discontinuous way, as governments handed out money to local bodies for road works. Charitable Aid Boards were sometimes forced to supply food and fuel to the families of the out of work. Nevertheless, the accepted targets of assistance were those more obviously unable to fend for themselves—the aged and the young, and, because the young were frequently in the care of an unsupported female parent, women.

Children and Women

The problems presented by destitute, neglected and criminal children perplexed policy makers. The family, through the dereliction of one or both parents, was not a sufficient answer. Though the notion that healthy moral children were an investment in the

future was not widely current until the early twentieth century, the view that delinquent children were a threat to it was a nineteenth century commonplace. Social Darwinian, and eventually eugenicist, notions played their part. It was necessary to ensure that the best stock was preserved and that the worst was either neutralised or made better. The paradox that the worst stock was carelessly fertile, and so well equipped for survival, was always present and never resolved.

The problem of children in need of care lacked neither laws nor corrective institutions. It was a prime object of philanthropy: most orphanages were run by churches and voluntary groups, subsidised by the government. For criminal, and also orphaned and illegitimate children, the state maintained industrial schools. In both the regime was austere and economical. So, too, was the lot of children sent out to fostering, often a source of income and unpaid labour for those taking in children. Stories of mistreatment, exploitation, and malpractice are plentiful enough. 'Child welfare' is not an appropriate term until well into the twentieth century.

Contemporaries were convinced that these institutions did no more than scratch the surface of the problem. It seemed to many alarmed observers towards the end of the century that the colony was breeding a race of lawless, violent and immoral young people, and that the fault lay with parents over-intent upon pleasure and wealth. The widespread belief that the young were in peril and the future in jeopardy led, in the next century, to major reforms in education and in the justice system.

Delinquent young women were seen as an especially menacing phenomenon. Their sins, especially extra-marital fertility, forcibly demonstrated the consequences of a bad childhood, and their offspring threatened to transfer the evil to a new generation. There were maternity homes which normally dealt only with 'first falls' and 'rescue homes' devoted to the reclamation of 'fallen women'. They were characterised by the customary austerity, discipline and economy.

The Aged Poor

At one end of the life cycle, the young could be regarded as incapable of self help and so as 'deserving'. At the other end, the indigent aged were also accepted as deserving, but for the sake of the past,

not the future. The maleness of the colonial population, the difficulty in finding marriage partners, and the general fragility and dispersal of families, all contributed to the plight of the helpless aged, especially derelict old men. There were numerous old people's homes, and hospitals were forced to devote a share of their resources to those of advanced age and without support. The characteristic nineteenth century blend of private and public initiative dealt with this problem until 1898.

Why the state should have brought in direct benefit payments for the elderly poor in that year is not at all clear. Seddon, a keen advocate of the measure both for its own sake and for its electoral promise, came from the West Coast, where the receding gold industry had left an especially high proportion of helpless old men. He spoke, movingly, of the merits of those who had borne the brunt of pioneering and now deserved the thanks of a grateful nation. But, for all the rhetoric, the payments were neither lavish nor indiscriminate. They were to be limited to the deserving of those 65 years of age and over; tests were provided for moral fitness as well as for residence and financial need. These were enforced with some rigour, especially as the pensions bill mounted in the early twentieth century. By 1904, those receiving the pension had been reduced to 35 percent of those qualifying by age and residence. Nevertheless, though contemporaries might have been dismayed, New Zealand had moved irreversibly into income maintenance. Where the aged led, widows, the blind, miners suffering from pulmonary disease, dependants of victims of the 1919 epidemic, wives of mental hospital patients, low income parents of large families, the sick, and the unemployed were to follow, well within a half century.

The extent to which Maori shared in the welfare and pension provision of the later nineteenth century has not been investigated. It may be that it occurred to few of them to seek assistance from hospitals and charitable aid authorities. It is known that some were rejected as applicants for the old age pension, whether on residential, financial, or moral grounds is unclear. Their needs were probably met by their communities in a traditional manner. Schools alone, of the whole jigsaw of social provision, were used widely by Maori families. From the 1870s on, Maori leaders in many regions supported the native schools and exhorted their people to acquire the advantages of a European education.

Summary

For the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the prime examples of social policy lie well outside the welfare realm. It must be added that this has not been the consensus of historians. It has been their habit, with their awareness shaped by the welfare achievements of the 1930s, to see in the Liberal era the foundations of the welfare state. 2 assumptions are made: first, that welfare provisions were then a dominant theme in social policy, and second, that they closely resemble those of the middle twentieth century. Other than old age pensions, little can be advanced by way of evidence.

This section has concentrated upon the Liberals' 2 decades in power (1891–1911) because in that period the main themes of nineteenth century social policy were brought together and taken further. In land and labour the Liberals were significant innovators. In welfare they made one major departure—old age pensions. Closer settlement, mortgage finance, improvements in efficiency; labour direction, industrial regulation, arbitration; income maintenance—here the Liberals either significantly accelerated existing trends or made fresh departures. The activist, not the welfare, state is their legacy to the twentieth century.

Even so, the limits to their activity were much narrower than the country would become accustomed to in less than half a century. Further, it is all too easy to exaggerate the effects of their intervention. Though the state was a major agent of closer settlement, the provision of credit, and the spread of technology, once world commodity prices and land values recovered, the private sector proceeded briskly in the same direction and with much greater effect. The hidden history of a multitude of financial institutions, stock and station agencies, importers and manufacturers of equipment, chemical and fertiliser companies, co-operative and private dairy companies and freezing works, Agricultural and Pastoral Associations, and farmer groups contains the major impetus toward the same outcomes. The role of the state, however, as a participant in the process, and as a participant which often took the lead, remains profoundly significant.

II The Early Twentieth Century

During the first half of the present century, the emphasis in social policy shifts from development towards welfare. Underlying this shift are a number of demographic and social changes. The population becomes older, more urban, and more gender-balanced; more settled in its occupational pattern and less inclined to see solutions in geographical movement; more fixed in institutions and interest groups and so more capable of bargaining for sectional advantage; more governed and more bureaucratised and so more likely to believe that solutions can be found for problems; more vulnerable to depression and so more likely to be spurred into a quest for solutions; less secure in the world economy and so more inclined to diversify its natural and human resources.

The welfare state which emerged in this period was the product of a more mature society which had enjoyed a lengthy period of growth and prosperity terminating in an unprecedented experience of insecurity in the early 1930s. In these circumstances there occurred, first, a broadening of the range and magnitude of welfare provisions, and second, a marked growth in other social policy fields, especially education and health. These changes culminated in a rapid burst of activity between the mid-thirties and the mid-forties.

Land and Public Works

The old concern with land and public works did not vanish, though the quest for new land diminished as the unsettled area receded, and the need for new construction grew less as transport and communications developed. In another way, however, land remained the basic; the economy was still dependent upon farm exports. The efforts of the state to improve production, marketing and transport intensify, with (in the 1920s) the creation of industry boards to manage overseas marketing, the wider provision of rural credit, an acceleration of scientific research, the improvement of roads, and the generation of electricity.

From the later 1920s to the second world war farming was in such a depressed condition that the major policy goal became simply to keep on the land those who were already there, and

improve their efficiency, not extend the farming frontier. The regulation of the exchange rate, the dismantling of the arbitration system, the adjustment of farm indebtedness, the expansion of mortgage finance, a guaranteed price and controlled marketing for dairy exports, were all products of the great depression of the thirties. During the war export production became a patriotic and strategic duty; exporting came under detailed government regulation, which lasted till well after the end of the war. These moves, though they matched with the ideology of the Labour government after 1935 (and with the approach of Gordon Coates in the preceding Coalition government), were responses to special wartime and post-war circumstances.

Public works policy, though no longer as central as it had been, remained important. In the 1920s Coates (as Minister of Public Works) began a process of rationalisation. New construction of railways declined and the retirement of uneconomic lines began. Coates created the State Highways Board for major roads and fixed upon local authorities the responsibility for local roads. In the 1930s the renewal of construction was a depression and post-depression programme to provide work for the unemployed. Again in the 1920s, Coates carried through a major reorganisation of electricity generation and supply combining a national grid for generation and reticulation with retail distribution by regional authorities. Electricity had its greatest effect upon houses and streets, and to a lesser extent upon production, on farms and in factories.

Marketing Boards

The most significant policy development in the 1920s was the establishment of industry based boards to manage exports, insofar as they could be managed. The Reform government from 1919 to 1928 was too dependent upon rural support to ignore the belief that the producer was being deprived of his due rewards by the shipping lines and the London merchants. Sharp practice there undoubtedly was, but the main cause of the plight of the producer lay in a high level of farm debt and in declining export prices. The government was cautious. It did not enter the marketplace itself, but set up industry boards for most primary exports, to deal with shippers and merchants as best they could. The record, at best, was patchy; the attempts of the Dairy Board to manage the market

failed; the less ambitious efforts of the Meat Board to rationalise supply did rather better. Wool producers, suffering much less from the free market, stayed outside. There was little these boards could do in the depression, but they were put to use by the Labour government after 1935. All these forms of public action were to be self-financing. They were designed to help people to grasp, and to pay for, improved opportunities.

Housing

The same is true, in intention, of the activity of the state in housing. To some extent (e.g., in mortgage finance) this was so in practice. But in state rental housing, rents did not turn out to provide anything like a full recovery of costs. Housing, with health and education, becomes a case of investment made in the expectation of future, not immediate, social returns.

The housing problem had been a source of alarm since the later nineteenth century. The growth of suburbs at first seemed to be a solution. However, the inner city blots did not go away. The first minute step was taken with the Workers' Dwellings Act in 1905, but only a small number of rental houses were built, and let at rents beyond the capacity of the urban poor. These were still left to the sub-standard accommodation provided by the private sector.

Much more was done for those able to borrow and meet their obligations. The Advances to Workers Act of 1906 provided mortgage finance for urban housing, a major step towards the State Advances Corporation of 1936. This was a development especially dear to Reform, a party which extolled the virtues of proprietorship, whether rural or urban. But, for all the success of these policies, the problem of the urban poor was untouched.

The depression of the 1930s increased the number of the poor and caused a rapid deterioration to the country's housing stock. The change of government in 1935 brought a spectacular development of policy in state rental housing. Some in the new Labour government hoped that the state would itself build houses. But in fact the work was done on contract by construction firms, the most notable that of James Fletcher of Auckland. Between 1937 and 1944 the state financed the construction of over 15,000 good quality rental houses and flats. The state house suburb became a feature of New Zealand cities and towns. Private construction also picked up rapidly, stimulated by increased finance from the State

Advances Corporation. Housing construction also had a welcome effect upon employment.

All this was directed chiefly to the towns, and in the towns predominantly to the Pakeha. The Maori movement to the towns had not gone far by the 1940s; it would take many years before they became major occupiers of state houses. In the meantime little was done for Maori rural housing, and that little, especially in remote districts, was inadequate until after the second world war, when a great deal of sub-standard housing was replaced.

Education

Education policy and administration evolved steadily from the later nineteenth century on, more under the impetus of administrators such as George Hogben, who became head of the Education Department in 1899, than of politicians. Behind the administrators were changes in the level and character of popular demand. The national system created in 1877, and the parallel system of Catholic parish schools, was of schooling at the elementary level. Secondary schools were places for those who could afford them. They received some public money (as well as income from earlier state provided endowments) but they catered overwhelmingly for fee paying pupils.

By the end of the 1890s there were signs of change. Better times were encouraging a demand for access to opportunities which, it was held, only secondary education could give. Primary schools developed 'Standard 7' tops; district high schools moved in the same direction; high schools and colleges were induced to increase the number of free places. New high schools were started in the growing towns. Many older high schools joined them as part of a secondary tier in the public system.

It was still a long way from secondary education for all, or even for most. Until 1938 a stiff Standard 6 examination filtered out all but a high-achieving minority of primary leavers. But, with 'Proficiency' gained, and a family able to do without a child's earnings, the route to secondary education was open. 'Competency', in the same examination, opened the way to trade and commercial education in the technical high schools the state had opened in the period of early twentieth century expansion.

The Labour government made its impact here, too. One of Labour's top 3, Peter Fraser, took the education portfolio, thereby

symbolising the new government's devotion to equality of opportunity. But the work of civil servants, such as C. E. Beeby, was as important. The Standard 6 filter was abolished, the leaving age raised, and secondary education made free for everyone who enrolled. The decisive examination verdict was moved up towards the end of a high school career. Prosperity enabled more parents to do without children's earnings. Rural schools were consolidated, and a school bus service took country children into town schools. The curriculum was humanised to some extent by an injection of social studies. Bursaries and scholarships encouraged those who could qualify to go on to university. Teacher training colleges were re-opened.

If education was dear to the new Labour government, so too were the twin pillars of the welfare state, the health and benefit systems. Education, health, and benefit policies were to ensure for all citizens a basic wellbeing and a fair opportunity 'from the cradle to the grave'. Health and benefits were presented together as the essential bases of 'social security'. Though there was marked innovation in both policy fields, this was less than total. A good deal had occurred earlier in the century to lay down the foundations.

Health

Since the beginning of the century an increasing concern with national efficiency had made health policy a more urgent matter. Horror at the 'fertility of the unfit' and at the prospect of deepening 'degeneracy', together with a fear that 'white' (and especially British) supremacy was under threat from more hardy Asians, focused attention on the nurture of children, and so upon the social function of women. This was an international movement of opinion; Truby King, the most notable New Zealand exponent, became a world figure. King's system for enforcing upon women a regimen revolving around infant nurture was propagated by the Plunket Society (founded in 1907) with weighty official and social patronage. His disciples were influential in the Department of Health and the medical profession.

Similar concerns had their effect upon education and penal policy towards children and juveniles. By the 1920s, the school medical and dental services had been established, together with juvenile courts and the beginnings of the probation system. The Child Welfare Act of 1925, the first comprehensive measure of its

kind, set up Children's Courts and the Child Welfare Branch of the Education Department, and gave wide power to child welfare officers.

Over the same period, advances in medical technology transformed public hospitals. As they acquired equipment which could be afforded and operated only by large institutions, they ceased to be simply places for the poor. The well-to-do, who had generally been treated in their homes, began to pay for hospital treatment. Two classes of patients, those who paid their way, and those who had to show that they could not, were treated in the same institutions, a situation which the egalitarian conscience found intolerable. A similar discrepancy obtained in general practice. In theory it was wholly fee-paying; in practice fees were paid by those who could afford them (or belonged to friendly societies), while doctors exempted their poorer patients. Practitioners managed a primary health care system and applied their own means-testing criteria. There can be no doubt that many stayed away to avoid such humiliation.

Benefits

Neither form of inequality was acceptable to the new government elected in 1935. Nor was it impressed by the haphazard pattern of benefits and pensions which had proved quite inadequate for the distress of the depression years. By the mid-1930s old age pensions had been supplemented by benefits for miners suffering total incapacity from pulmonary disease, widows with children and the widows of servicemen, the blind (alone of the disabled), and the victims of the 1919 influenza epidemic. The age at which women qualified for the old age pension was dropped to 60. The first hesitant step towards child benefits had been taken by the Family Allowances Act of 1926, by which a benefit on third and subsequent children was payable after means-testing. Assistance, in money or in kind, continued to be distributed by hospital almoners—the last vestige of charitable aid. During the depression, voluntary charity had been organised locally to deal with the large number of the impoverished in the towns. Unemployment policy adhered to the 'no pay without work' principle, but in practice payments were sometimes made to those for whom relief work could not be found.

Social Security

The social security legislation of 1938 was intended to achieve 2 goals. First, it was to provide for inability to earn by a wide-ranging system of benefits covering all those 'who through various misfortunes of age, sickness, widowhood, orphanhood, unemployment, or other exceptional conditions came to want' (in the words of the official paper of 1950). All benefits, except a tiny universal 'superannuation' for the aged, were to be means-tested. However, a significant change came in 1946, when the family benefit became 'universal'—i.e., payable irrespective of parental income or other means. Second, it would provide primary, specialist, hospital, maternity and other medical care, and prescriptions, without charge to the patient. The system was to be financed from taxation, a special social security levy on all income. Health services were to be universally available without further charge.

The benefits came into effect at once, but the health reforms had a protracted and untidy passage. The medical profession held out for its right to charge patients directly. Not until 1941 was a compromise reached, by which the government paid a fixed sum and practitioners could directly charge the patient above that level. In this way the future was lumbered with a legacy of controversy and discontent. Between 1939 and 1947, medical benefits were progressively extended to cover all hospital services and pharmaceutical supplies, physiotherapy, X-ray and laboratory services, district nursing, and domestic assistance.

By the early 1940s 'social security' was in place. For more than 40 years it has stayed there, often questioned, sometimes examined, but only marginally altered. More than had ever before been the case, Maori shared in the effects of these changes. The Labour-Ratana alliance of 1932, at least to this extent, paid off. Apart from the effect of social security, health standards had improved as a result of departmental initiatives in the 1930s, especially directed against tuberculosis, and also easing access to nursing services, doctors and hospitals. Cash benefits from social security (especially the family benefit), more employment and better wages, and (from the 1940s on) the effect of urbanisation in bringing people closer to medical services, had a major impact on Maori morbidity and mortality rates. However, the gap between Maori and non-Maori rates remained, as Pakeha health levels also picked up.

The Labour government of 1935 was the first in New Zealand which could be said to have been aware that it had a social policy. Earlier, piecemeal policies had been produced for special circumstances. In the 1930s, the initiatives from politicians, administrators, interest groups, and a handful of academics and intellectuals coalesced to make social welfare a continuing concern of government. The social portfolios, especially health, education and social security, rose higher in the cabinet pecking order, especially as they became bigger and bigger spenders. Large and ever growing departments of state employing an expanding body of professionals helped to evolve policy as well as to administer it. Issues of social policy became matters of persistent public interest and at times of intense public concern. Social policy, with a strong welfare emphasis, had come to stay. Its cost, absorbing an ever growing share of the tax dollar, ensured that it would be a constant subject of criticism and debate.

Economic Policy

In addition, social policy in a broader sense—the promotion of economic and material wellbeing—remained a basic concern. Before 1935, but in a government that had very little time or luck, Coates had made a start. After 1935, the new government showed itself committed to the belief that economic planning was possible and necessary—in industrial promotion, export marketing, import control, overseas exchange, prices and incomes, industrial relations, and the development of infrastructures. Paradoxically, it was concerned to move the state more emphatically into precisely those fields of policy from which its successor, 50 years on, is equally concerned to withdraw it.

One of Labour's slogans during the depression had been 'insulation'. The party's leaders could hardly have believed that they would be able to separate the country from the world economy, but the slogan was a valid expression of anger at the 'importing' of depression from Europe and America. An effort was made to minimise economic pressures from overseas. They were not part of a grand strategy, but piecemeal in nature and short-lived in effect. Yet the long term consequence of this aspiration is considerable—the conviction that the economy could be managed in precise detail by the state, a view as novel in the 1930s as it has become unfashionable in the 1980s.

The new government certainly believed that it could and should stimulate the growth of secondary industry. During the depression a future cabinet minister had denounced the view of New Zealand as 'one gigantic cowyard'. Industrial promotion was justified in the name of insulation, but the goal in fact was diversification. Secondary industries were dear to Labour hearts as sources of jobs, especially of jobs not within the gift of the rural capitalist employer, the farmer.

Before the war little was attempted and that little was ineffective. An Industrial Efficiency Act was passed in 1936 to rationalise industrial development; its results were minuscule. The exchange crisis of 1938 presented greater opportunities. Import and exchange controls, brought in to restrict the flow of money overseas, were also expected to encourage industrial growth. Their efficacy had hardly been tested before war brought a much more stringent form of import control. Scarce shipping could not be wasted on inessentials. After the war, import and exchange controls continued well into the peace.

That industrial growth and diversification were in fact fostered is by no means certain. It has been argued that while the war stimulated industrial growth, it also distorted it into unprofitable channels and had little to do with factories and finished goods. Over the long term, secondary industry shows a fairly steady and unspectacular growth from the 1920s to the 1960s. There was, certainly, a continuing expansion of plants for assembling and further processing imported components. This increased jobs, but it had little effect upon the country's dependence upon imports.

Beginning with import and exchange controls, and prompted by the need to manage the war effort and to prevent the post-war economy from diving into depression (memories of the depression of the early 1920s were still sharp), the government acquired a massive, and in the end unmanageable, armoury of controls—over exchange transactions with other countries, over the disposal of export earnings, over domestic credit and interest rates, and over incomes and prices. During the war, these controls had extended over the labour force in the shape of 'manpower' direction.

Labour Policy

But 'manpower' direction was a temporary measure. Of more significance was Labour's long-term effort to manage the labour

market in an orderly and an equitable manner, chiefly by strengthening (while domesticating) the trade unions, and by improving the bargaining machinery in which they were expected to work. And, as events were to show, the effort included a readiness to punish unions which tried to work outside the system.

During the depression the unions had been severely weakened. A ruinous series of hopeless strikes in the midst of massive unemployment had reduced most to impotence. The Coalition government had taken the compulsory provisions out of the arbitration system. Labour restored compulsory arbitration. It also made union membership compulsory for occupations covered by awards. The unions became larger, more professional, and more able to deliver satisfaction to their members. The greater number worked through the arbitration system; a powerful minority (particularly transport unions) did so too but added the threat or the reality of direct action.

In wartime the strength of the Federation of Labour was essential to the government's 'stabilisation' policy—in effect New Zealand's first effort at a prices and incomes policy. But the attempt to keep both down in the post-war period was defeated by the end of the 1940s. Unions with the power to do so made greater gains outside the system, following the trend set by other income earners beyond any form of control. The climax was the 1951 waterfront dispute, a major defeat for militancy, and a renewed enforcement (by the new National government elected in 1949) of conformity upon the union movement. These developments established a strongly interventionist role for government in industrial relations. Governments would enter the lists against militant unions, but they also sustained machinery through which a minimum wage was settled regularly by general wage orders. Powerful unions could bargain effectively for advances upon this basic level.

Rehabilitation

Rehabilitation was a striking instance of intervention, by its nature a temporary one, directed to the situation of the men leaving the armed forces. Again, memories of the failures of Reform in the early 1920s were keen. The overall goal of the 1941 Act, and the Rehabilitation Department administering it, was to ensure that those who had served did not suffer as a result. A wide range of assistance was provided—loans for housing, for tools of trade and

for setting up business, and for the purchase of farms already basically developed by the state; assistance for training and further education; guarantees that promotion opportunities would be preserved; special disability benefits; and medical rehabilitation programmes. In effect, the whole range of welfare and assistance programmes was heightened and concentrated upon a particular group of the especially 'deserving'.

The Spectrum of Social Policy

Compared with previous decades, the 1930s and the 1940s witnessed an explosion of social policy, across the total spectrum from welfare to economic management. Labour's achievements were in themselves considerable. But more considerable was the heightened level of expectation bequeathed to succeeding generations. Compared with the earlier twentieth century, people from the 1940s expected more and better medical care, a better standard of housing, a longer period of education, a wider and more generous range of benefits, better access to mortgage finance, better wages and conditions of work, and more time and opportunity for leisure and recreation. The state became the focus of these aspirations. From that time to near the present, governments have encouraged the belief that they could satisfy them.

Welfare services attempted to meet every contingency and misfortune, not simply with benefits, but also with the professional services of a burgeoning army of social workers. Though many of these services were provided by voluntary organisations, especially residential care for the aged, they were in considerable measure subsidised by the state. Welfare remained, at heart, a rescue operation, but a more extensive and more generous one than the country had known before.

Outside the boundaries of this kind of welfare, the advantages that accrued from housing finance, the family benefit (including after 1958 its capitalisation for house purchase) and a tax structure tending to flatten real incomes, chiefly benefited young families in the process of formation. This pre-supposed a kind of social contract—a bargain struck with the recipients that they would exchange the benefits they accepted in their time of need for obligations when their needs had been met. It has been persuasively argued that this was, in the event, a contract which would not be fulfilled. This argument holds that as times worsened from the

later sixties, those who had benefited earlier clung to their advantages and were able to block the delivery of comparable advantages to the new generation of rising families. But this was not a shadow over social policy at the end of the 1940s, nor for many years to come.

This section has been devoted largely to the period of the first Labour government, 1935 to 1949, not because everything was then made new, but because (as in the earlier Liberal period) once again the threads of past aspiration and policy were brought together, more consciously and deliberately than before, and woven into a pattern which persists, rather frayed by the passage of time, to the present day.

Cultural Policy

To this conviction that government should safeguard and enhance life chances a further element was added in the 1940s. From then on it is possible to speak of cultural policy as a further mode of social policy. The year 1940, in that simpler age straightforwardly the centenary of British New Zealand, brought the state to the forefront of cultural activity. The war, and in a modest way a developing sense of nationalism, led in the same direction. Individual and group effort came first and led by some distance, but in the later thirties and the forties the state took on a commitment to the promotion of cultural activities—literature, music, film, and the theatrical and visual arts. It has never been a lavish patron, but (as yet) it remains the major one.

III The Later Twentieth Century

It is difficult to give an orderly account of developments in social policy since the second world war. The collective memory has not had time to sift through the pay-dirt of evidence and leave a few gleaming grains to catch the historian's eye. Further, as most commentators agree, the period has been an untidy one, lacking any watershed of fresh thought and action to give a perspective on the whole. Perhaps the changes of the late 1980s will prove to be such a watershed. But the historian's bag of tricks does not include a crystal ball.

Perspectives

Lacking a vision of the future, the period can be examined from the vantage point of the policies established in the thirties and forties. They created an expectation that governments will intervene to prevent distress and promote wellbeing. Governments, in their turn, have shown a keen awareness of the electoral rewards and penalties which flow from that expectation. All changes of government in the period—1949, 1957, 1960, 1972, 1975, 1984—bear a close relationship to perceived failures of performance in economic management. And though, in the last decade, governments seem to have moved away from the traditional programme of promises, it is still to be seen if a readiness to ignore this expectation will last until the 1990 election.

Public attention has been directed more consistently to economic policy than to social services. From time to time education, health and benefits have risen to the forefront of public debate. But such issues as state aid for private schools, the length of public hospital queues, and the domestic purposes benefit, have not excited prolonged debate. The one welfare-related issue that has done so is superannuation. Its capacity to persist and grow from the early 1970s to the late 1980s may be the first sign of a shift in public attention.

Thus far, however, it has been attention of a severely limited kind. The focus has been upon cost, and the capacity of the community to continue to bear it. This concern has not yet provoked a reappraisal, comparable to that of the thirties, of the goals of social policy in a society in many ways most unlike the one in which still current programmes were laid down.

Economic Development

If social policy, narrowly conceived, settled into a rut from which it has only partially emerged, social policy in its wider definition—managing the economy in order to promote wellbeing—has been a constant source of debate and decision. One may say of economic development in the third quarter of the twentieth century what was true of land settlement in the final quarter of the nineteenth—that though other issues caused more clamour from time to time, it has provided the prevalent themes of public debate.

Exports, Imports and Manufacturing

As early as 1932 the Ottawa Commonwealth Conference served notice upon New Zealand that the British market for farm exports was neither elastic nor immortal. But the second world war reinforced dependence upon that market. Not until the 1960s, when British entry into the Common Market became a possibility, was a major effort made to diversify the composition and the direction of exports. Both changed considerably over the next 20 years. Producer boards and governments worked together to seek out new markets and retain as much as possible of old ones. The land-based industries were encouraged to shift from traditional products to new ones; horticulture and forestry, especially, grew in importance. Products were processed to a more finished condition before export. The response of producers to the prospect of profit remained the basic factor, but governments encouraged change with advisory services, market research, taxation incentives, and development finance. These policies were designed to make an economy still dependent upon exports less vulnerable to movements affecting a narrow range of products and markets.

Export and import dependence go hand in hand. In import policy, too, government has been active. The traditional goals of maintaining and diversifying employment, of using import licensing to ration foreign exchange, and of promoting industries thought to be desirable, have operated over the period. A major effect of import licensing has been to alter the composition of imports, towards raw materials and machinery. It has also been frequently charged with keeping uneconomic industries in existence. In the main through licensing, governments have encouraged manufacturers to produce finished goods either from local products or from imported raw materials for the home market and for export.

Factory production of manufactured goods has been encouraged in order to preserve an economy in which a satisfying life could be led. It has not been based upon an abundance of natural resources awaiting exploitation, so much as an abundance of human needs requiring satisfaction. There has been, however, an abundance of one form of energy, electricity. By the 1970s this abundance was being advanced as a major reason for industrial development. Electricity, largely generated from hydro resources, underlay such state promoted enterprises as aluminium smelting and ironsands

exploitation. Natural gas and oil exploration and extraction were encouraged and the capacity to refine imported oil was increased. The so-called 'Think Big' projects of the National Government after 1975, incorporating these and other energy based industries, were a major development, though a highly controversial one. Such expansionist policies could find their ancestry in the Vogelite policies of the 1870s.

These broad-spectrum policies have been chiefly concerned with New Zealand's position as a trading nation. They have had important results, though not invariably those proposed by the policy makers. Other interventions have been more directly geared to the domestic, as well as to the external situation. Exchange rate changes, interest rate controls, taxation reform, wage regulation and price control, and above all efforts to bring down inflation, have been shaped to meet the perceived need to protect or improve the lot of a social group or of society as a whole.

Inflation and Employment

Underlying all these interventions has been the steady and then rapid upwards march of inflation. This, because of its immediately felt impact upon living standards, has been the most persistent source of disquiet. Since the National Party won in 1949 with the slogan 'Make the pound go further', the problem has obsessed successive governments. Labour's inability to fulfil its rash promise in 1972 to 'Knock inflation for six' contributed to its overwhelming defeat 3 years later. Since then, annual and quarterly rates have been awaited anxiously by finance ministers and spokespersons. Governments are judged by voters on their experience of trying to acquire a house, fill a shopping basket or clothe their children. A wide range of other situations are affected—wage regulation, price control (or at least popular demand for it), interest rates, taxation yields, the price of exports and the capacity of industry to maintain employment.

Inflationary price increases lead indirectly to demands for compensating wage increases. After the end of wartime stabilisation, the Arbitration Court became the main instrument of wage regulation by setting minimum rates through general wage orders. The discredit it suffered from the abortive 'nil' wage order of 1968 and the accelerating pace of inflation in the 1970s brought government directly into wage determination. The restriction of wage increases

involved governments in efforts to control prices, sometimes through price freezes. In neither were they particularly successful.

Governments of whatever colour, from the 1940s to the 1980s, have had a settled interest in the limitation of wage increases. But they have been shackled by their inability to have much effect upon other forms of income—higher salaries, dividends, non-salary packages, 'perks' and capital gains. This disparity, chiefly benefiting employers and managers, has stimulated unionist pressure to lose as little ground as possible, especially from those unions able to resort to direct bargaining.

One major section of the earning population, farmers whose incomes are directly affected by export prices, have not shared in this generally upwards movement of incomes. Apart from manipulating the exchange rate to increase the return from exports, governments have been able to do little to counter declining farm incomes. Nor have beneficiaries managed to keep up for most of the period. Recently, however, one of the costlier benefits, National Superannuation, has been tied first to the average wage and then to the cost of living index.

Until the 1970s the maintenance of full employment appeared to be a feasible policy goal. It remains, at least at the level of aspiration, a goal no government would renounce, but it is no longer one which they promise to attain in short order. Nevertheless, employment promotion finds a place in the objectives set for a number of policies. Export promotion and import substitution are expected to provide jobs. The energy-based 'Think Big' programmes were justified, in part, by the multitude of jobs which would be eventually created 'down stream'. In the early eighties, Labour in opposition entertained ideas of 'picking winners' for massive public investment, and of encouraging small and middle sized enterprises, in part for the jobs they were expected to create.

Unemployment

Such views were common enough as recently as the beginning of the present decade. But well before its end they have been displaced by the view that the market, invigorated by deregulation, competition, the expansion of overseas markets (especially in Australia through CER), the investment of overseas capital, and in general by the prospect of higher returns for investors, will provide

the jobs, and that if it does not, nothing (least of all direct government intervention) can be relied upon to do so. This approach may prove to be no more than the fashion of the moment. It may wilt in the face of electoral discontent. There is no lack of those who adhere to an earlier orthodoxy, that governments can intervene with effect, and should do so to eliminate unemployment.

In the meantime, the spectacular increase of unemployment (on 31 March 1956 only 5 unemployment benefits were being paid), and the threat held out by its penal effects upon some sections of the community—rural centres and secondary towns, the younger age groups and Maori—has brought into existence a bewildering series of policies. The unemployment benefit, universally known among its recipients as 'the dole', underpins the whole shaky structure. A succession of programmes to supply short term employment, to improve job placement, and to provide re-training, have come and gone, with little result.

The failure, perhaps the inability, of policy to deal with unemployment may have ominous social consequences. Even after 2 decades of unemployment, the expectations fostered in earlier years have left a legacy of frustration not the less real for being (as yet) without political effect. In the world view of both the secure and the insecure, work is still the badge of social standing. There is no sign of any shift of ideology that would devalue work. The persistence of the work ethic among a large body of people with little chance to live up to its imperatives, is likely to have political consequences. They could bring about a return to the humanitarian idealism of the thirties. They could see the development of a new insurgency awaiting politicisation—an outcome which would be hastened should current opinions on the 'undeservingness' of the unemployed deepen and harden.

Social Security

It was noted earlier that prominent among the reasons for recent questioning of social security was its increasing cost. That concern has been deepened by the need seen by governments in recent years to reduce the level of their own spending. For though neither government nor opposition will quite say so, the level of spending on the social services must be a prime target for retrenchment. However, in the buoyant mood of the sixties and seventies, considerations of cost though present were not so prominent. In 1972,

the Royal Commission on Social Security reported that 'We are not persuaded that our social security system should be radically changed at this time'. The seventies in fact saw far reaching if uncoordinated changes which basically altered the system put in place in 1938. One of them, superannuation, has become the chief cause for anxiety over costs.

Before the seventies, there were only slight changes. Some were logical extensions of the 1938 enactment; others, however, went in the opposite direction. The ideal of a free medical service was an early casualty. To secure the mere implementation of its proposals, the government as early as 1941 abandoned the proposed capitation system of payment to doctors. They were permitted to charge a fee for service to patients and to accept payments in excess of the amount recoverable from the social security fund. The amendment Act of 1949 explicitly allowed doctors to charge patients above the level of the social security payment. Over time that payment became a smaller and smaller proportion of the total charge. The cost of medical services to patients has steadily increased.

The major extensions of the system of monetary benefits involved the family benefit. In 1946 it became universal and applicable to every child in a family. From 1958 it could be capitalised for house purchase and later for other purposes. In 1968, thanks to the increasing pace of inflation, an additional allowance was brought in for the children of means-tested beneficiaries, a departure from the principle of universality. Another extension of benefit—contemplated in 1938—was to bring the universal superannuation benefit to parity with the age benefit in 1960, though the 2 were not merged into a single benefit.

At intervals from 1942 on the level of benefits and the level of allowable other income were increased. But these increases did not prevent them from falling behind the rate of wage increases, and well behind increases in the cost of living. This was quickly apparent, and led to the introduction of a supplementary assistance scheme in 1952 for additional payments above the benefit. By 1971 nearly 10 percent of all social security beneficiaries were receiving this assistance. For them, at least, the aspiration of 1938 had not been fulfilled. Supplementary assistance echoes charitable aid rather than social security.

The Changes of the 1970s

More fundamental changes came in the 1970s—the Domestic Purposes Benefit (DPB) (1973), Accident Compensation (1972) and National Superannuation (1976). Taken together (and irrespective of their merits or demerits) these 3 have basically altered the character of social security. The benefit system, intended as an all-embracing structure affording security to all, has been relegated to a more humble position.

The Act of 1973 creating the DPB took a group of beneficiaries—mainly women—who had previously received emergency benefits and placed them in a distinct category. Public attention, much of it scandalized, has concentrated on the number of women beneficiaries with dependants and lacking a male partner, though women in other situations, and some men, receive the same benefit. For some the novelty of this benefit is the encouragement it is said to give to irresponsible sexual behaviour. It is of more significance that the benefit caters for people whose situation is less the result of unavoidable circumstances such as age or infirmity, but rather of voluntary (if socially conditioned) choice. This benefit, together with the unemployment benefit, has prompted debate on the question of whether benefits should be available as of right to all those in difficult circumstances irrespective of personal responsibility. Within five years of its implementation, over 17,000 people were in receipt of the DPB.

The DPB was an extension, though a radical one, of the existing system. The Accident Compensation Act of 1972 made a significant change of direction, first by financing the scheme from contributions, not taxation, and second by making compensation income-related. The report of the Woodhouse Commission of 1967 had gone beyond its original brief (to consider work-related injuries) and came out in favour of a comprehensive entitlement to compensation for all kinds of injuries. The Act of 1972 (and its extension in the following year) created a fund derived from levies on employers, the self-employed and motor vehicle owners, supplemented by government contributions. Compensation, in the form of both lump sum and weekly payments, became available to all accident victims however injured and whether in employment or not. Up to a limit (at first set at $15,600 pa) weekly payments were set at 80 percent of the victim's weekly income. The effect is to maintain accident victims at close to their former standard of

living. Similar principles (funding by contributions and income-related payments) shaped Labour's abortive superannuation scheme in 1974. The tendency of these 2 schemes was to preserve existing inequalities. This marks them off from the measures brought in a quarter of a century before by the government then formed by the same Labour Party. Indeed, when Walter Nash had mooted contributory superannuation at that time, he had found no support.

The Labour superannuation scheme became law, but following the general election of 1975 National immediately fulfilled its election promise to give a uniform benefit to all those over the age of 60, irrespective of means and other income, set at 80 percent of the average weekly wage for married couples and 60 percent for single people. The payments were to be funded out of general revenue, without any special additional taxation. This was to take immediate effect. By contrast, the Labour scheme was to take as much as 40 years before it came into full operation.

The National scheme was immensely attractive in its simplicity and in its undiscriminating generosity. It immediately proved itself to be very expensive. Within a year transfer payments to the aged almost doubled. By the end of the seventies transfer payments (including subsidies) had increased greatly, and the main contributor to the rise was National Superannuation. Only one step has since been taken to reduce the cost—a taxation surcharge which in effect eliminates the benefit for those already with considerable income. There can be little doubt that greater restrictions will follow.

Two major classes of beneficiaries, the aged and the victims of accident, are no longer catered for by the system set up in 1938. That has become a 'rescue' provision for the casualties of society, too like nineteenth century charitable aid for comfort. The tendency of these developments, if carried further, suggests the possibility that the later twentieth century may witness a prolonged retreat from mid-century aspirations to achieve a more egalitarian society. Other recent developments, in health, education, taxation and family support, point to the same possibility. Further, the renewed importance of the voluntary sector in social services, and the differential impact of economic stringency upon the Maori people, suggest the same outcome.

Health

As well as the declining capacity of the social security payment to meet doctors' bills, the declining capacity of public hospitals to deliver quality health care, quickly created an everwidening gap between rich and poor. In the 1950s it was clear that hospital beds had declined relative to population; this induced the National government to bring in subsidies for private hospitals. Long waiting lists for non-urgent surgery in public hospitals induced those who could afford to do so to join private medical insurance schemes to help finance prompt private hospital treatment. By the mid-1970s one sixth of New Zealanders were covered by private insurance; in the later 1980s nearly one-third. Again a National government encouraged the trend by making premiums tax deductible in 1967. A dual health system appears to be firmly established. The zeal of the 1972 Labour government to abolish it, reflected in its ineffective White Paper, *A health service for New Zealand*, has not been revived by its successor of 1984.

The better off have opted out of the public system and have been helped to do so by government. But they still need the expensive treatments and services only large public hospitals can provide. Those who can afford both premiums and taxes can take advantage of both systems. It is at least arguable that they have paid for a right to both. But the situation of those who lack the means to buy their way into the private system runs counter to the aspiration of the 1930s that all should have equal access to health services whatever their means. Private insurance also meets the cost to the patients of consultations, both general practitioner and specialist, and the recently introduced prescription charges. The 'free medicine' ideal has vanished; access to all kinds of health services has diminished for many.

Education

In education, as in health, the ideal of equality has receded. Within the public sector education is far from cost-free. But in spite of the increasing demands public schools place upon parents for unpaid labour, fund-raising and additional fees, their resources, relative to the size of the school population, have declined. Fresh demands have been placed upon them—to widen the curriculum with new courses designed, for example, to foster racial harmony and

enhance Maori self-respect, or to satisfy with 'human development' courses those who are anxious about a variety of sexual problems. And at the same time they are under increasing criticism for their perceived failure to impart useful skills.

These difficulties have not had an even effect upon all schools in the public system. Especially with secondary schools, a hierarchy of perceived desirability has emerged. Schools drawing upon well to do catchment areas, usually with a fairly homogeneous Pakeha population, are able to tap a high level of voluntary support. Such schools, together with many of the fee-supported private schools, have, especially in the larger cities, acquired a reputation for respectability, discipline and achievement. The more affluent parents have been drawn to these 'desirable' schools, which have thus become agencies for the transmission of advantage to a following generation. Governments (of either party) have encouraged the trend, by granting tax exemption for school fees, and by enabling private schools to receive public money through 'integration' (while preserving their distinctiveness) with the public system.

Taxation and Family Support

The increased cost of social security was at first financed through a flat tax upon income; this was increased in 1946 by absorbing part of the wartime national security tax. In 1968 the special levy was eliminated and the costs met from general taxation. This contributed to a shift in the incidence of taxation by which direct taxation came to contribute the major share of all tax revenue. Income tax rates were intended to have a progressive effect, and thus to effect a redistribution of resources from rich to poor. Whether they in fact had this effect, especially as inflation drove more and more people into the higher tax brackets, is uncertain. However, it seems likely that recent and proposed tax changes will have a regressive effect. The shift from direct to indirect taxation through goods and services tax and the simplification and lowering of income tax rates, are likely to bear most heavily upon those on low incomes. The family support package, containing both special tax rebates and a payout adjusted to family size and income, is designed to avert this probable result.

This development holds out the prospect that a sizeable section of the community will become state pensioners, not on account of any misfortune nor even from inability to find work, but because

they cannot earn enough to provide for themselves. Such people seem to be a new class of 'deserving poor'; their incomes are supplemented in a way which may entrench their dependence. This resembles, in a much more sophisticated manner, the Speenhamland system of wage supplementation operated by parish authorities in England in the early nineteenth century, by which agricultural wages were brought up to a level set by the price of bread. The welfare state seems to be in danger of becoming the charitable state. The poor, once again, are deemed to be always with us. This nineteenth century commonplace was once accepted by all except the socialist ancestors of the present day Labour movement, and was rejected in New Zealand by the same movement only half a century ago.

Voluntary Societies

The presence of the poor, and their acceptance as a providential occasion for the exercise of charity, prompted the immense growth of voluntary societies in the nineteenth century Great Britain. Their presence in the later twentieth century New Zealand has contributed to the considerable growth of such societies over the last 20 years.

The number and variety of such bodies make them impossible to classify—it seems unlikely that anyone knows how many there are and what they do. Some, like the Foundation for the Blind, come down from the nineteenth century, as do the social services maintained by many churches, for whom a major concern is now the residential care of the aged. Many, of more recent origin, are directed to those who suffer from a specific condition—e.g., the Society for the Intellectually Handicapped. Others are concerned with particular social problems such as those of tenants and the unemployed. There are, too, a multitude of local community groups. A Federation of Voluntary Welfare Organisations, limited to those with a national organisations, was set up in 1969. Its member bodies, in 1971, had an annual budget of $10 million, 75 percent of which came from voluntary contributions. They employed over 2,500 people, as well as thousands of volunteers. The unknown number of community groups, the rising cost of living, and the pressure of unemployment, would multiply these figures considerably at the present time.

Among the reasons for this expansion must be counted the remoteness, formality and inadequacy of state organisations, as well as the readiness of the state to leave a host of welfare functions to voluntary groups. Further, and especially in recent years, a conviction has grown that the number of the poor is increasing while the attitude of government has become less caring. Individuals and groups are increasingly dedicated to giving the poor a voice. The borderline between social service and social protest is no longer clear.

That voluntary societies have come to bulk larger in the social services generally, provides further support for the view that the earlier high hopes that the state would, or indeed could, do all that was required, have receded. Yet there is a paradox here. Many of these groups, from the mainline churches to special interest pressure groups, are directing their demands not to the charitable impulses of the community but to the resources of the state. The level of expectation laid upon the state in the earlier part of this period has not yet fallen away.

The Maori Dimension

The matters discussed in this section, from economic management to welfare services, affect the lives of all those who live in New Zealand, from infancy to old age, from country to city, from the most recently arrived immigrant to those whose ancestry reaches back to remote antiquity. But those whose presence in this country is the longest occupy a special situation, partly from the objective circumstances of colonisation, and partly from choice. Maori can, for many purposes, be considered under the general headings of this discussion, but not for all. Within the general situation, they occupy a special position. Upon average, they enjoy lower standards of health, as well as lower standards (as measured by Pakeha performance levels) of education; they are under-represented among higher income earners and they suffer more from unemployment; they live in poorer housing in poorer suburbs; they provide a disproportionate share of the prison population. They are also aware of a distinct cultural inheritance and of the extent to which it has been damaged and remains under threat. They assert with increasing vehemence the right of that tradition to recognition, respect and status. Of recent years, this assertiveness has gone beyond a simple demand for the redress of grievances to a demand

for a separate institutional identity and for ethnic self-determination.

Few would be ready to guess where this will lead. But at least something can be said about where it has come from. In essence it comes from the long series of determined efforts since the beginning of colonisation to preserve the character and values of Maori life. Both armed resistance and co-operation were intended to achieve that end. So, too, were movements to express and enhance the unity of the Maori people, movements to find a secure basis for the redress of grievances in the Treaty of Waitangi, movements of a prophetic and religious character, movements to achieve political self-determination, and movements to reinforce traditional life through economic development and educational improvement. A multitude of movements have asserted Maori distinctiveness and claimed a right to Maori autonomy.

This period opens with the defeat of a major attempt to achieve autonomy. The Maori War Effort Organisation had been seen by its leaders as the nucleus of an institutional development which would become the apex of a hierarchy of community organisations. It would operate within the framework of general government, but outside the scope of what was then a Pakeha dominated Native Affairs Department. The Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act of 1945 created the hierarchy, but placed it under the aegis of the department, and did not confer upon it separate resources or authority.

Within those limitations, the policy enshrined in the Act achieved something. It replaced the word 'Native' with 'Maori' in official usage; it gave welfare functions to the department and to Maori wardens; it set up a network of committees and executives concerned with welfare and marae administration. It led to the Maori Women's Welfare League in 1951, and the Maori Council at the top of the structure in 1962. Important as these institutions are, they are a far cry from the original wartime hopes, and further from the aspirations towards autonomy which have grown up since then.

In social welfare the Act had one important result. It finally eliminated the discriminatory legal provisions in earlier pension legislation by which Maori recipients of old age and widow's benefits received significantly less than Pakeha beneficiaries. Even after the Social Security Act of 1938 had removed the earlier provision

by which land rights could be reckoned as income, and so lead to a reduction, the level appears to have been lower for Maori.

Three factors are of basic significance to the Maori dimension of social policy. First, that Maori are a section of the population distinguished, by most social indicators as well as by historical circumstance, as deprived and under-privileged. Second, that from that population has emerged an elite demanding a new deal, in the shape of changes that range from the redress of grievances to the reversal of historical change. Third is the underlying fact of urbanisation—underlying because it concentrates and intensifies problems, and also because it is difficult to accommodate with the ideology of land and community informing much of the Maori resurgence. The major demographic fact is that in the 30 years since the end of the Second World War the Maori population, from being 3:1 rural, became 3:1 urban. This predominantly urban population shares, in an accentuated form, the general social problems of employment and unemployment, housing, access to health services, educational opportunity, cost of living, crime and delinquency, with its neighbours of all kinds and origins. Further, outside the cities, the consequences of economic policy have most severely affected those regions and rural areas where Maori are numerous.

On the one hand, this situation will heighten the level of demand placed upon the resources, institutions and provisions designed by government for the necessitous segment of the whole population. On the other, it places major social problems upon the agenda of those who look for a traditional remedy for present-day problems. Current advocacy looks to the use of traditional institutions to deal with unemployment, criminal behaviour, educational and health needs. It also looks to the return of considerable economic resources to tribal institutions, and the devolution of political authority to them. To adjust these demands, should they be met, to the needs of a predominantly urban and partially de-tribalised population, will be no easy task.

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THE PEOPLE OF NEW ZEALAND

Department of Statistics

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Preface

This report contains an overview of historical and contemporary trends in the demographic and social situation of the people of New Zealand. The report has been prepared at the request of the Royal Commission on Social Policy.

The general topics covered are population growth and distribution, fertility, mortality, international migration, internal migration, population age and sex composition, ethnic and cultural diversity, labour force, marriage and marriage dissolution, family and household structure, children, solo parents, the unemployed and the elderly. In compiling the report every effort was made to include material for the period since 1980. However, this was not always possible due to the unavailability of some material, or to the lack of comparability of some data over time.

This report was compiled by Jeffrey Sheerin, Vasantha Krishnan and Zaiem Baksh of the Social Reporting Section under the direction of Denise Brown, Senior Research Officer.

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1 Population Growth

Introduction

By world standards New Zealand's population is small, numbering 3.3 million in mid-1987. New Zealand's first million of population was reached in 1908. Forty-four years later, in 1952, the second million was reached, and the third million late in 1973. Despite the continuous growth in population, there has been considerable variability in growth rates over the last 100 years. Growth was sluggish during the years of the Great Depression with annual growth rates falling to a minimum of 0.8 percent. High levels of sustained growth, on the other hand, occurred after the Second World War until the 1970s, with annual rates of growth averaging over 2 percent. In the 1970s and early 1980s the population continued to grow, but at a declining rate. The average annual rate of growth during 1976–1981 was 0.3 percent, the lowest on record since the first Population Census in 1858. While the growth rate recovered slightly to 0.8 percent per annum during 1981–6, it was still well below that recorded for any intercensal period (excluding 1976–1981) in the post Second World War era.

The two major groups of the New Zealand population, the New Zealand Maoris, and the non-Maoris (including Europeans, Pacific Island Polynesians and others), have been characterised by significantly different demographic histories. Their distinctive features and increasing similarity are an integral part of the historical growth of population in New Zealand.

The Maori Population

The Maori people are the first known settlers of New Zealand, and are believed to have arrived from Polynesia somewhere between 900AD and 1350AD. Little is known with any degree of certainty of the size and scale of Maori settlement before the nineteenth century. It is estimated, however, that at the time of initial European

contact in 1769 there was somewhere between 125,000 and 175,000 Maoris in New Zealand.

During the next 70 years, recurrent problems of disease and warfare resulted in high levels of mortality and an overall decline in numbers to about 60,000 in 1857–8, when the first census of the Maori population was carried out. From the late 1850s to the early 1870s (the period spanning the Land Wars) decline continued at a rate of around 1.4 percent per annum, while from 1874–1896 numbers appear to have fluctuated indicating an arrest in the trend towards depopulation (Neville and O'Neill, 1979).

The twentieth century has witnessed a resurgence in Maori population growth, at first gradually, but after the Second World War more rapidly. By the late 1940s, population numbers had recovered to about what they were at the time that systematic European colonisation began. Following the Second World War, the growth rate accelerated to reach a peak of 4.4 percent per annum during the early 1960s: close to the physiological maximum for a population 'closed' to migration (Pool, 1986). Since then, the rate of population growth has declined, to 3.6 percent during the 1966–1976 period and further to 1.2 percent during 1976–1986 (refer Table 1.1).

The Maori population numbered 56,049 and constituted 48 percent of the total population at the time of the first census in 1857–8. By the early 1900s, however, it made up a mere 4 percent of the total, and although numbers have increased rapidly, especially since the 1950s, persons of Maori descent still comprised only 12 percent of New Zealand's total population in 1986.

Because fertility levels did not change significantly for a prolonged period, the major factor influencing Maori population growth until the 1960s was mortality. The introduction of many diseases produced rapid declines in life expectation in the nineteenth century. From around 1900 there was a slow increase in life expectancy until about 1945, after which there was a more rapid improvement. International migration did not emerge until the 1970s as a significant factor influencing the growth of the Maori population. Since then, there has been a large movement of young Maoris overseas, particularly to Australia and the United Kingdom. Indeed, from 1981–6 net emigration removed 8,100 from the Maori population, the equivalent of 31 percent of the natural increase for the period (Population Monitoring Group, 1986). As a result of the steady net migration losses over the last decade, there

are now sizeable Maori communities in cities such as Sydney, although the exact numbers in residence are difficult to determine.

TABLE 1.1: New Zealand Maori population, successive population censuses, 1858–1986

	N.Z. Maori Population[1]				*N.Z. Maori Descent*[2]			
		Intercensal increase or decrease				*Intercensal increase or decrease*		
Census date	*Population*	*Number*	*Percent*	*Annual average percent*	*Population*	*Number*	*Percent*	*Annual average percent*
24 Mar 1858	56,049	...	...	...	..	..	..	..
1 Mar 1874	47,330	...	...	...	..	..	..	..
3 Mar 1878	45,542	–1,788	–3.78	–0.97	..	..	..	..
3 Apr 1881	46,141	599	1.32	0.42	..	..	..	..
28 Mar 1886	43,927	–2,214	–4.80	–1.00	..	..	..	..
5 Apr 1891	44,177	250	0.57	0.11	..	..	..	..
12 Apr 1896	42,113	–2,064	–4.67	–0.96	..	..	..	..
31 Mar 1901	45,549	3,436	8.16	1.59	..	..	..	..
29 Apr 1906	50,309	4,760	10.45	1.98	..	..	..	..
2 Apr 1911	52,723	2,414	4.80	0.96	..	..	..	..
15 Oct 1916	52,997	274	0.52	0.09	..	..	..	..
17 Apr 1921	56,987	3,990	7.53	1.62	..	..	..	..
20 Apr 1926	63,670	6,683	11.73	2.24	..	..	..	..
24 Mar 1936	82,326	18,656	29.30	2.62	..	..	..	..
25 Sep 1945	98,744	16,418	19.94	1.93	..	..	..	..
17 Apr 1951	115,676	16,932	17.15	2.89	134,842	..	..	..
17 Apr 1956	137,151	21,475	18.56	3.46	162,458	27,616	20.48	3.73
18 Apr 1961	167,086	29,935	21.83	4.02	202,535	40,077	24.67	4.41
22 Mar 1966	201,159	34,073	20.39	3.84	249,867	47,332	23.37	4.20
22 Mar 1971	227,414	26,255	13.05	2.48	290,501	40,634	16.26	3.01
23 Mar 1976	270,035	42,621	18.74	3.50	356,847	66,346	22.84	4.11
24 Mar 1981	279,252	9,217	3.41	0.67	385,524	28,677	8.04	1.55
4 Mar 1986	..	..	..	..	403,185	17,661	4.58	0.90

[1] Persons of half or more Maori descent

[2] Persons of any Maori descent

Sources: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings, 1981, Vol. 8A, Department of Statistics, 1982

New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings, 1986, Provisional National Summary Statistics 1987, Department of Statistics.

Non-Maori Population[1]

The beginning of non-Maori settlement in New Zealand followed Cook's rediscovery of New Zealand in 1769, and consisted of small numbers of whalers, sealers, traders and missionaries, who established temporary or semi-permanent settlements along the country's coastline. It was not until 1840, however, when the British officially annexed New Zealand, that systematic colonisation began. During the following 30 years population growth was rapid due to the very high immigration levels of mainly European settlers encouraged by better economic prospects, the discovery of gold, a new deal in labour relations and a vigorous public works policy. It was not until the 1870s that natural increase permanently displaced net immigration as the chief contributor to population growth. By the census of 1881, the proportions of the total population born in New Zealand and born overseas had become approximately equal (50.2 and 49.8 percent respectively).

Throughout the course of the next 100 years (from 1881), the demographic experience of New Zealand's non-Maori population proved highly sensitive to economic and social factors and considerable variations in population growth rates occurred. The depression of the late 1880s saw a decline in population growth (from an average of 3.3 percent per annum in 1881–6 to 1.6 percent per annum in 1886–1891) brought about largely by a net migration loss of approximately 9,000 people. This was the first time in the history of the country that net emigration had occurred. Following a brief period of recovery in population growth rates during the 1890s and early 1900s there was again a reduction in growth rates during the period from 1911–1916 (refer Table 1.2). A major contributing factor was the reduced level of net immigration in response to the First World War.

A period of economic buoyancy following the First World War resulted in an upturn in population growth rates to around 2 percent per annum, but these were not sustained during the severe economic depression of the late 1920s and 1930s. In fact, significant declines in both levels of natural increase and net immigration during this period resulted in the lowest growth rates on record since official population statistics were first produced (refer Table

[1]All the non-Maori ethnic groups are treated as one population component here. The settlement patterns of the different groups included in the blanket non-Maori category are dealt with in Chapter 6.

1.2). While population growth again began to return in the late 1930s as the economic situation improved, this was short-lived. The advent of the Second World War brought about an increase in mortality, while the disruption of family formation, manifest in the postponement of marriages and childbearing, prevented the complete recovery of fertility levels to pre-Depression level. Gains to the population through net immigration were also insignificant.

TABLE 1.2: New Zealand Non-Maori population[1], successive population censuses, 1858–1986

Census date	*Population*	*Intercensal increase or decrease*		*Annual average percent*
		Number	*Percent*	
24 Mar 1858	59,413	..	..	..
1 Mar 1874	297,654	..	..	..
3 Mar 1878	412,465	114,811	38.57	8.16
3 Apr 1881	487,889	75,424	18.29	5.60
28 Mar 1886	576,524	88,635	18.17	3.34
5 Apr 1891	624,474	47,950	8.32	1.60
12 Apr 1896	701,101	76,627	12.27	2.31
31 Mar 1901	770,313	69,212	9.87	1.88
29 Mar 1906	886,000	115,687	15.02	2.80
2 Apr 1911	1,005,589	119,589	13.50	2.53
15 Oct 1916	1,096,228	90,639	9.01	1.73
17 Apr 1921	1,214,681	118,453	10.81	2.05
20 Apr 1926	1,344,469	129,788	10.69	2.03
24 Mar 1936	1,491,486	147,017	10.94	1.04
25 Sep 1945	1,603,586	112,100	7.52	0.81
17 Apr 1951	1,823,796	220,210	13.73	2.14
17 Apr 1956	2,036,911	213,115	11.69	2.21
18 Apr 1961	2,247,898	210,987	10.36	1.97
22 Mar 1966	2,475,760	227,862	10.14	1.93
22 Mar 1971	2,635,217	159,457	6.44	1.25
23 Mar 1976	2,859,348	224,131	8.51	1.63
24 Mar 1981	2,896,485	37,137	1.30	0.26
4 Mar 1986	..	..	..	..

[1] Excludes persons of half or more Maori descent

Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings, 1981. Vol. 8A. Department of Statistics, 1982

With the return of peace, New Zealand's non-Maori population began to grow at a more rapid pace. Relatively high levels of fertility and quite substantial net gains to the population through international migration ensured that high rates of population growth

exceeding or close to 2 percent per annum were sustained throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. Declining birth rates and a downturn in economic conditions in the late 1960s saw population growth rates fall to an average of 1.25 percent per annum during 1966–1971, bringing an end to the extended post-war period of rapid population growth.

Since the late 1960s radical changes in external migration trends and patterns have contributed to fluctuating rates of population growth. High levels of net immigration during the first half of the 1970s saw a recovery in population growth after the downturn of the 1966–1971 period to an annual average rate of 1.63 percent in 1971–6. Following 1976, a complete reversal in the direction of net external migration to net emigration resulted in a dramatic reduction in the rate of population growth. During the 1976–1981 intercensal period the non-Maori population grew at a rate of 0.3 percent per annum, the lowest on record for any intercensal period.

Future Prospects

The combined effect of falling birth rates and net emigration in most years since 1976 has ensured that population growth in New Zealand has remained slow. Unless there are radical and sustained changes in fertility levels or net external migration, which seem unlikely, population growth in New Zealand should remain slow in the foreseeable future. Official population projections indicate that by the year 2011 New Zealand's total population could number around 3.8 million, only 569,000 more people than were enumerated in the 1986 census (Department of Statistics, 1987c).

The Maori population is likely to continue to grow more rapidly than the total population, at least for the next 25 years. This is largely due to the younger age structure of the Maori population as against that of the total population (the Maori population has a higher concentration of women at the reproductive ages), and higher Maori fertility. In fact, unofficial projections of the Maori population (Pool, 1986) indicate that the number of persons of Maori descent in New Zealand could increase by 57 percent from 1986–2011. In other words, about two-fifths (40 percent) of the projected total population increase of 569,000 could be accounted for by Maori population growth over the next 25 years.

2 Fertility

Introduction

Current fertility levels in New Zealand are now lower than at any other time in its history. In 1985, the crude birth rate stood at 15.8 births per 1,000 of the population after having risen by a small margin (caused largely by a rise in the number of women in the prime reproductive ages) from the all-time low of 15.6 recorded in 1983. As in many other developed countries the decline in fertility rates commenced in the nineteenth century, was interrupted by a temporary upturn after the Second World War and has accelerated over the last few decades. In New Zealand the accelerated decline began after 1961 following the sustained period of comparatively high fertility known as the baby boom era. The decline in the crude birth rate was most pronounced from 1961–1978, falling by 40 percent. This reduction in fertility occurred amidst the demographic, social, economic and attitudinal changes of the 1970s that individually or collectively influenced fertility and its components during this period. Child bearing shifted to higher ages and was concentrated in a narrower band of ages of women, the contribution of ex-nuptial births to total fertility increased, and third and higher order births were curtailed with the development of a 2-child family norm.

This recent decline in fertility in New Zealand is characteristic of a number of other developed countries. The downturn in New Zealand fertility, however, started slightly later and the plateauing of the rate appears to be occurring at a higher level than in some other low-fertility countries. In New Zealand the total fertility rate (an estimate of the average number of children women will have) appears to have levelled off at 1.9 births per woman. In a number of countries in northern Europe the rate is below 1.7 births per woman (refer Table 2.1).

TABLE 2.1: Total fertility rates in low fertility countries, recent years

Country	*Total fertility rate*
Australia	*1.85 (1984)*
Canada	*1.68 (1983)*
Denmark	*1.40 (1984)*
France	*1.81 (1983)*
Federal Republic of Germany	*1.32 (1983)*
Japan	*1.74 (1982)*
New Zealand	*1.93 (1985)*
Norway	*1.66 (1984)*
Sweden	*1.61 (1983)*
Switzerland	*1.55 (1981)*
UK	*1.78 (1985)*
USA	*1.83 (1982)*

Source: Demographic Trends, 1987, Department of Statistics, 1987

Non-Maori Fertility Transition

The trend in total fertility in New Zealand described above, reflects primarily the non-Maori pattern, which is similar to that of other populations of European origin. The transition in non-Maori fertility commenced in the 1880s, and within 2 decades New Zealand's non-Maori population had gone from having one of the highest to one of the lowest crude birth rates in industrialised countries. A major shift upwards in the age of entering first marriage played the major role in the fertility decline, together with decreases in the proportions marrying and increases in fertility regulation within marriage, particularly in terms of limiting births. With late marriage a firmly established norm, the twentieth century saw a more gradual decline in non-Maori fertility to the very low levels of the Depression. In 1935 the total fertility rate was 2.05 births per woman, the lowest on record until that time. The baby boom of the late 1940s and 1950s followed, bringing with it an increase in the total fertility rate to a high of 4.14 births per woman.

At its peak in 1961 the total fertility rate was almost twice the 1935 level and exceeded the highest post-war peak rates in the developed world (3.9 births per woman recorded in Canada and Ireland). This period of high fertility involved a shift back to the 1880s pattern of younger and more universal marriages, along with a movement towards early childbearing, a shortening of birth

intervals and a trend away from childless marriages (Zodgekar, 1980). Exactly what economic and social factors generated these trends is not known.

The early 1960s marked the turning point in the post-war rise in non-Maori fertility. Since 1961 the total fertility rate has shown a downward trend, falling from 4.0 births per woman in 1962, to 3.0 in 1971, and further to 2.0 births in 1978. Since then the pace of fertility decline has slackened considerably, and appears to have levelled out at around 1.9 births per woman. In terms of long-term population replacement, non-Maori fertility in New Zealand fell below the replacement level in 1978 and has remained beneath this level since that year (Department of Statistics, 1987c).

The triggering mechanisms for the post-1961 decline in fertility are complex. There is no single factor which can explain the large decline or the current low levels. Changes in marital fertility, including both the postponement of childbearing and the fall in average family size, have possibly been a major influence. These changes have been associated with the increasing participation of women in the labour force, the greater use of efficient contraceptives (especially the IUD and the Pill) and the high incidence of sterilisation in New Zealand (Population Monitoring Group, 1984).

It has been suggested also that the increased incidence of de facto living may have had a depressive impact on fertility levels (Khawaja, 1985). The 1981 Census of Population data on cohabitation indicated that de facto unions comprised 6.2 percent of all unions (legal and otherwise) in 1981. Of women aged 20–24 years living in either a formal (legal) or informal union, 19.8 percent were living in a de facto union.

Many of these unions take the form of trial marriages. Such unions affect nuptiality and fertility trends and patterns through fewer legal marriages, delayed entry into legal marriages, fewer children and postponed childbearing. It is possible that what is reflected in the current low fertility levels is a fundamental change in attitude towards marriage and the family.

Maori Fertility Transition

The Maori fertility transition has been very different to that of the non-Maori. For as far back as estimates can be calculated it appears that Maori fertility was high. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s the

Maori crude birth rate varied within a narrow range, around a high level of 45 births per 1,000 of the population. The early 1960s mark the onset of the fertility decline, triggered probably by post-Second World War urbanisation and improvements in infant and childhood survivorship. During the ten years from 1962–1971 the total fertility rate declined slowly from 6.0 births per woman to 5.0 births per woman. The rate of decrease accelerated in the early 1970s, and the Maori total fertility rate plummeted to 2.9 births per woman in 1977, a level achieved by non-Maoris as recently as 1972. Subsequent declines in the total fertility rate for Maoris have been slower, and the rate seems to have levelled out in the 1980s at just above replacement level.

In a matter of 2 decades then, the Maori total fertility rate fell by 63 percent, or to below two fifths of its initial 1962 level. This is perhaps the most rapid transition for a national population anywhere in the world, outstripping even those experienced in many countries in South-East Asia and Latin America in recent times (Khawaja, 1985). It has caused a substantial narrowing of the gap between Maori and non-Maori fertility rates. In 1962 the average Maori family size, as implied by the total fertility rate, exceeded the non-Maori family size by 2.2 children per woman. By 1974 the difference had narrowed to just one child, and by 1982 to less than 0.5 children.

Non-Maori Fertility Patterns

The downward trend in non-Maori fertility this century has been accompanied by important changes in the ages at which women bear their children. From the relatively late pattern of childbearing of the pre-First World War and Depression era, the post-Second World War period saw a shift to early childbearing and close spacing of births, and fertility became heavily concentrated at the younger reproductive ages (below 30 years). By 1971, 43 percent of all births occurred to women below 25 years, up from 26 percent in 1943. The average age of childbearing of non-Maori women dropped from 29.3 years to 24.6 years over the same period.

Since the early 1970s there has been a shift back to traditional European reproduction patterns involving delayed childbearing. This is reflected in a progressive shift towards births to women in

their late twenties and early thirties (refer Table 2.2). Two important trends underline this shift. First, a significant reduction in the fertility of women aged 20–24 years. Since 1971, the number of births per 1,000 women in this age group has fallen by just over 50 percent, from 200 to 98. Second, from about 1978, a substantial rise in fertility rates at ages 27–37 years, which is probably a reflection of the 'making up' of the fertility of these women who put off having children in the 1970s. The increases ranged between 4 percent and 36 percent, with rates for women aged 29–34 years rising by at least 15 percent (Department of Statistics, 1987c).

These changes in the timing of childbearing have meant that, in common with the pattern prevalent in most developed countries, the 25–29 age group is now the prime one for childbearing. In 1985, 39 percent of all births to non-Maori women occurred at these ages. The pattern of age-specific fertility rates for non-Maori women indicates a high level of contraceptive efficiency, resulting primarily from oral and injectable hormonal contraception. Moreover, the very high levels of sterilisation rival those recorded in Canada and the United States.

TABLE 2.2: Maori and non-Maori age-specific fertility rates, 1964–1985

	Maternal age group (years)						
Year	*15–19*	*20–24*	*25–29*	*30–34*	*35–39*	*40–44*	*45–49*
			Maori population				
1964	127	375	288	192	138	64	7
1971	130	332	240	163	93	37	6
1981	96	178	124	64	25	8	1
1985	79	150	119	62	23	6	..
			Non-Maori population				
1964	51	230	225	131	65	19	1
1971	61	200	197	97	37	11	1
1981	30	116	149	70	20	4	..
1985	23	98	148	81	22	4	..

Source: Maori Statistical Profile 1961–86, Department of Statistics, 1986

Maori Fertility Patterns

Maori fertility levels and patterns have also changed substantially in recent years. Perhaps the most significant change has been the reduction since the early 1960s in childbearing among older Maori women, indicating increasingly high levels of family limitation at

these ages. In fact, today's fertility rates of Maori women in the 25–29 and 30–34 age groups are lower than those of non-Maori women.

Although declines in Maori fertility have also occurred at the younger reproductive ages, they have tended to be smaller than those occurring at age 30 and over. As a consequence, Maori fertility has become more heavily concentrated at younger ages. In 1985, women aged 15–24 contributed 52 percent of Maori fertility, compared with 46 percent in 1971. Whereas women aged 20–24 years had the highest birth rates in 1985. The incidence of births was also high among 15–19-year-olds—more than triple that of non-Maori women of the same age (refer Table 2.2).

Current Maori family formation strategies are similar to those of the non-Maori in the early 1970s—closer spacing at younger ages followed by limitation. This pattern often occurs amongst populations undergoing a rapid fertility decline, particularly through the limitation of family size by efficient means such as sterilisation and hormonal contraception. It is likely, therefore, that Maori fertility rates at younger ages will decrease towards non-Maori levels and possibly that levels at ages 25–34 years may increase to a limited degree (Pool 1986).

Trends in Ex-Nuptial Fertility

Although the great majority of New Zealand children are born to married couples, ex-nuptial births have been increasing in number and as a proportion of all births in recent years. In 1962, 5,227 births were registered as ex-nuptial, comprising barely 8 percent of total births. By 1985, the number of ex-nuptial births had risen to 12,921 and they accounted for 25 percent of all births.

The steady rise in the proportion of births which are ex-nuptial is in part a corollary of the large drop in marital fertility, and in part the result of a shift in societal values relating to marriage and reproduction. An indication of the last point is the substantial recent decline in the number of ex-nuptial conceptions which have precipitated marriage and have been followed by a nuptial live birth. Whereas 27 percent of first nuptial births in 1962 were ex-nuptially conceived, by 1985 the figure had fallen to 14 percent. Abortion has been shown to have played an insignificant role in this decline (Sceats, 1985). One factor which has undoubtedly played a role in the rise in ex-nuptial births is the growth in the

number of de facto partnerships. Whereas the majority of ex-nuptial births prior to the 1970s are likely to have been to women living without a partner, in recent times it appears that many are to women living with a partner as married (Department of Statistics, 1987c). This is reflected in the increasing age of mothers of ex-nuptial children. From 1971–1985 the average age of mothers of ex-nuptial children rose from 21.0 to 22.1 years.

Special mention should be made of the high incidence of ex-nuptial births among Maori women, especially young Maori women. In 1985, almost two-thirds (64 percent) of all Maori births were classified as ex-nuptial, and 33 percent of Maori ex-nuptial births were to women under 20 years of age. Moreover, Maori ex-nuptial births accounted for one third of all ex-nuptial births in New Zealand in 1985. The relatively high incidence of ex-nuptial births amongst the Maori population reflects in part the fact that customary marriages are not recognised as formal marriages in New Zealand, and that the ex-nuptial classification is based purely on a culturally defined view of marriage (Population Monitoring Group, 1985b). Thus the status of these children in Maori society may be rather different from that implied in non-Maori society.

These circumstances place many, perhaps a majority, of ex-nuptial births in a situation quite different from the social and health problem they have conventionally been conceived to be. They also stress the importance, for policy purposes, of dividing ex-nuptial births into those born to cohabitating mothers and those born to unmarried women living alone (Khawaja 1985).

Regional Differentials in Fertility

Differences in fertility levels between different regions in New Zealand have been evident for many years. In general, regions in the North Island have been characterised by higher fertility levels than those in the South Island. These differences have continued to persist into the 1980s, despite the fact that all regions shared in the national fertility decline during the 1970s. In fact, more rapid fertility declines in the South Island than in the North Island during the 1971–1981 period widened the fertility differential between the islands. In 1971 the total fertility rate in the North Island exceeded the South Island rate by 7 percent. By 1981 the gap had increased to 11 percent.

In the South Island, all regions except Southland recorded a total fertility rate below replacement level in 1981. The lowest rate of 1.7 births per woman was recorded in Canterbury, which is the most urbanised of the South Island regions. The situation was quite different in the North Island, where 11 of the 14 regions had total fertility rates above the replacement level. The 3 exceptions were Auckland, Manawatu and Wellington. Of these, Auckland and Wellington are highly urbanised and they contribute roughly half of the North Island's total births. It was largely because of the low fertility of these regions that the total fertility rate for the North Island was below replacement level in 1981.

In general, the high-fertility regions lie in the northern half of the North Island. They are typically rural areas and include most of the dairy farming districts as well as much of the rural Maori population. In 1981 the highest total fertility rate of 2.5 births per woman was recorded in the East Cape region. Tongariro, with 2.4 births per woman, recorded the next highest rate, followed closely by the Wairarapa, Taranaki and Waikato, all with a rate of 2.3 births per woman. The low-fertility regions typically comprise older well-established urban centres, such as Auckland, Canterbury, Central Otago and Wellington. All of these regions recorded total fertility rates either close to or below 1.9 births per woman in 1981 (refer Table 2.3).

In addition to regional differences in New Zealand fertility, significant fertility differentials exist between rural and urban areas, as well as between main urban areas (30,000 or more population) and smaller urban areas (1,000 to 29,999 population). These differentials have been evident in New Zealand as far back as records exist. In general, fertility is lower in urban than in rural areas, with fertility rates in smaller urban areas exceeding those in main urban areas. Significantly, the 1970s saw a steady widening in the latter differential. Whereas in 1971 the total fertility rate in smaller urban areas exceeded that in main urban areas by 16 percent, by 1981 the gap had widened to 23 percent.

It would appear that the fertility differential between main urban areas and smaller urban areas is a consequence of differences in family-building patterns. More specifically, women in smaller urban centres tend to begin childbearing earlier and have larger families than those in large urban centres. The present levels of fertility in main urban areas provide an indication of the future potential for decline in national fertility if urbanisation were to continue.

TABLE 2.3: Total fertility rates in local government regions, 1981

Local government region	*Total fertility rate*
Northland	2.26
Auckland	1.92
Waikato	2.27
Thames	2.16
Bay of Plenty	2.18
East Cape	2.54
Tongariro	2.36
Hawkes Bay	2.26
Taranaki	2.27
Wanganui	2.20
Manawatu	1.93
Wairarapa	2.30
Horowhenua	2.18
Wellington	1.94
Total, North Island	2.07
Marlborough	2.04
Nelson Bays	1.90
West Coast	1.96
Canterbury	1.70
Aorangi	2.08
Central North Otago	1.80
Clutha—Central Otago	2.00
Southland	2.22
Total, South Island	1.87

Source: Country Monograph Series No 12, Population of New Zealand, Vol 1, United Nations, 1985

Future urbanisation in New Zealand could well have the effect of lowering further the overall level of fertility.

Socio-Economic Differentials in Fertility

The existence of significant relationships between fertility and a host of socio-economic factors have been found in a number of low-fertility countries. From the fragmentary evidence available it appears that these differentials are also present in New Zealand. Data from the Population Census on the number of children born to ever-married women in New Zealand suggest a clear inverse relationship between the level of educational achievement of women in New Zealand and average family size. In 1971, ever-married women with a university qualification had a fertility level barely adequate for replacement (2.11 births per woman) while those with no formal qualifications averaged 2.69 births per

woman, a difference of 0.58 births per woman. This fertility differential existed amongst all age groups of women but was most marked among younger women, suggesting that the differential has increased in recent years. Later marriages, later childbearing, a better knowledge of and greater, more effective use of family limitation methods are some of the major ways in which more educated women control their reproductive behaviour.

Husbands' income level has also been shown to be related to family size in New Zealand. Generally, the lower the income the larger the average family size. There were 2 notable exceptions to this pattern in 1971. First, women whose husbands were in the highest income bracket had a slightly higher average family size than women whose husbands earned slightly less. Second, low income appears to have a dual effect on family size—it appears to promote large families, while it also seems to serve as a considerable disincentive to start a family.

An unsatisfactory aspect of research into the relationship of income and fertility in New Zealand is that it has assumed that the husband's income is a measure of the total financial resources of a family. With an ever-increasing number of women working full-time or part-time there is a probability that a couple may decide upon the number of children they want to have, bearing in mind their combined future income potential, as well as other aspirations.

Future Prospects

The future course of fertility cannot be predicted with certainty. The trend in fertility over the last 26 years has been, with the exception of a few minor aberrations, one of consistent decline. Several explanations for this have been offered in the recent literature on New Zealand fertility. It has generally been argued that economic and social changes such as reduced incidence of marriage, the development of alternative (de facto) living arrangements, postponement of marriage to later ages, greater access to more effective birth-control methods, the rising costs of raising a family and the changing roles of women have contributed to lowering of fertility. In the foreseeable future, couples should be at least as effective as today's couples in determining the timing and spacing of births and achieving their desired family size. Raising children is likely to continue to be costly, and society's views

towards working women and childless couples are likely to continue to become more liberal. It is most unlikely, therefore, that New Zealand fertility will return to its previous high levels. What is uncertain is whether women will combine childbearing with other roles, such as workforce participation, at greater levels in the future and still achieve an average family size of around 2 children, or whether fertility will continue to decline.

Among the range of possible scenarios for the future course of fertility in New Zealand, 2 have been identified as being more likely. The first is the maintenance of fertility at sub-replacement level. This scenario implies a slight making good of delayed births by women in their early thirties.

The second scenario is a gradual increase in fertility to about replacement level resulting from a levelling off in the decline in fertility at younger ages, together with a making good of delayed births by couples in their late twenties or early thirties. Because of the arrival at the reproductive ages of the large numbers born in the late 1960s and early 1970s, both scenarios would lead to an increase in births in the late 1980s, and a level between 51,200 and 59,700 births in 1996 (Population Monitoring Group, 1984).

3 Mortality

Introduction

In 1986, 27,045 deaths were registered in New Zealand, yielding a crude death rate of 8.25 per 1,000 of the population. This was slightly above the rate of 7.85 recorded in 1978, the lowest rate ever recorded in a general long-term trend of mortality decline since the late nineteenth century. In 1985 the life expectancy at birth was 70.9 years for males and 76.8 years for females: this represents increases of 16.5 and 19.5 years' life expectancy respectively since the 1880–1890 decade.

By global standards life expectancy in New Zealand is high, although not as high as in a number of similar countries overseas. Until recently New Zealand ranked highly amongst those countries with the lowest mortality levels and highest expectation of life. It has slipped behind however, due to the fact that life expectancies in New Zealand have not improved in recent years as much as in some other developed countries. In the early 1980s at least 14 countries had higher male life expectancy than New Zealand and at least 16 had higher female life expectancy. Comparisons with other countries indicate that infant mortality, the accident hump in the late teens and early twenties, and mortality at retirement ages are the major areas where there is room for further improvement in New Zealand (Department of Statistics, 1986d).

Non-Maori Transition

Mortality trends amongst New Zealand's non-Maori population have paralleled those in industrialised nations generally. In 1876 New Zealand non-Maoris had probably the highest life expectation in the world and had already exceeded 60 years by 1906 (Pool, 1985). Since then mortality levels have undergone a long systematic downward movement. The reduction in mortality was most rapid during the last 2 decades of the nineteenth century, and was

most marked at younger ages. Subsequent declines have been more gradual.

While non-Maori mortality levels have been declining for more than a century, the decline has not always been continuous. In the 1960s and early 1970s mortality rates stabilised, particularly amongst males, as they did in many other developed countries. This appears to be a result of contemporary lifestyle (over-nutrition, smoking, alcohol) and also possibly of some persons who have 'artifically survived' infancy through medical intervention (Population Monitoring Group, 1984). Whichever factor operated, there has been an improvement in mortality levels since the mid-1970s, again mirroring a trend occurring overseas. From 1975–7 and 1984 the male expectation of life increased by 2.2 years compared with an increase of only 0.8 years between 1965–7 and 1975–7, and no improvement between 1955–7 and 1965–7. The rate of improvement in female life expectancy has also accelerated over the past 10 years (Population Monitoring Group, 1985b). The expectation of life at birth for non-Maori males in 1985 was 71.2 years and for females 77.1 years. In other words, females are expected to outlive males by about 5.9 years, which is approximately 6 months less than in 1975–7.

Maori Transition

The Maori mortality transition has been very different from that of the non-Maori population. From extremely low levels of life expectancy in the nineteenth century (below 25 years), there was a rapid improvement in the early twentieth century, due at least in part to the primary health care programmes of Maori medical practitioners. By 1926, the level of Maori life expectation had increased to over 40 years. Changes were gradual from 1926–1945, after which a rapid increase occurred. In just 10 years, from 1946–1956, Maori life expectation at birth increased by 8.4 years for males and 10.7 years for females. Around 50 percent of the overall decrease in Maori mortality during this period came from a rapid decline in the incidence of tuberculosis (Pool, 1985). As with the non-Maori population, a temporary plateau occurred in the late 1960s, but since then there has once again been improvements. Between 1975–7 and 1985 the life expectation at birth for Maori males increased from 63.3 to 67.3 years, while that for Maori females increased from 67.7 to 71.2 years.

Non-Maori Age Pattern of Mortality

While the months after birth tend to be a high-risk period, the probability of dying amongst non-Maori people in New Zealand is low at the younger ages and increases in the latter stages of life. This pattern is reflected in the percentage distribution of deaths by age. In 1985, 2 percent of all non-Maori deaths occurred in the first year of life, 1 percent occurred at ages 1 to 14 years, and 4 percent from the ages of 15–34 years. It is at middle age that these percentages increase rapidly. Thus 20 percent of deaths occurred between the ages 35–64 years, and 73 percent occurred with persons aged 65 years and over (Department of Statistics, 1987c).

The decline in non-Maori mortality since the late nineteenth century has occurred for all age groups and for both sexes. The most impressive improvements however have been in the youngest age groups, particularly amongst infants. The infant mortality rate decreased from 71.4 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1901 to 10.2 in 1985. Most of the fall in the infant mortality rate was, until the 1950s, due to the decline in post-neonatal deaths (deaths after the first month of life). Since then, however, post-neonatal rates have remained virtually unchanged and most of the subsequent decline in infant mortality has been attributable to the decline in neonatal deaths (deaths under 4 weeks of age). (Refer Table 3.1.) Today non-Maori neonatal rates lie within the lower to middle range for developed countries. The situation with regard to post-neonatal mortality, however, is less favourable. The lack of decline in non-Maori rates over the last 30 years as against the achievements of the so-called Anglo-Saxon populations, has meant that non-Maori post-neonatal mortality is now high by comparison with similar overseas countries. In 1985 the non-Maori rate of 5.6 per 1,000 live births was double that found in northwestern European countries, such as the Scandinavian-nations and the Netherlands, despite the fact that in the 1950s the rates were roughly the same (around 6.0 deaths per 1,000 live births) (Population Monitoring Group, 1985b).

Beyond the first year of life the relative magnitude of the decline in mortality (since 1901) has tended to be larger for females and to vary inversely with age, ranging from 90 percent for pre-school children (1–4 years) to 33 percent for the oldest group (75 years and older). A major feature of the improvements in life expectancy since the mid-1970s is that they have occurred in large part as a

TABLE 3.1: Neonatal and post-neonatal mortality in New Zealand, 1941–1983

	Maori		*Non-Maori*	
Period	*Neonatal*	*Post-neonatal*	*Neonatal*	*Post-neonatal*
1941–45	21.8	77.4	20.0	9.5
1946–50	25.5	53.3	17.3	6.6
1951–55	23.2	46.0	14.8	6.1
1956–60	19.7	33.2	13.8	5.8
1961–65	15.2	21.2	12.6	5.5
1966–70	12.7	15.0	10.9	5.2
1971–75	11.2	10.6	9.8	5.4
1976–80	9.2	10.9	6.9	5.7
1985	4.9	10.4	4.6	5.6

Sources: Country Monograph Series No. 12, Population of New Zealand, Vol 1, United Nations 1985
Vital Statistics 1985, Department of Statistics, 1987

result of mortality declines at the retirement ages. For instance, between 1975–7 and 1984 life expectation at birth for non-Maori females increased by 2.2 years. Of this, 1.4 years were gained through a decline in mortality at ages 55 years and over. But whereas the reduction in child mortality (below 5 years) contributed 0.5 years or more to the overall increase in life expectancy at birth between 1955–7 and 1965–7, this had dropped to 0.3 years in the most recent interval (Population Monitoring Group, 1985b). These recent improvements in adult survivorship have come later than in northwestern Europe. The experience there suggests that after a period of accelerated improvement there could be a deceleration.

Increasingly in New Zealand, more and more non-Maori people are surviving up to and through ages 70–84 years. This has had only a marginal affect on the ratio of males to females at older ages. Females continue to outnumber males especially at ages above 75 years. In 1986 there were 171 females for every 100 males aged 75 years and over in New Zealand. In 1976 the ratio stood at 175. As the lifestyles of men and women continue to become closer it may be expected that differences in mortality between the sexes might diminish and result in more balanced sex ratios at older ages.

Maori Age Pattern of Mortality

The general features of the age-sex pattern of mortality for the Maori population are much the same as those for the non-Maori

population, except that the distribution of deaths by age is more heavily skewed toward the younger age groupings, a reflection in part of the more youthful age structure of the Maori population. In 1985, 8 percent of all Maori deaths occurred in the first year of life, 3 percent occurred at ages 1–14 years, and 10 percent between the ages 15–34 years. A further 42 percent of deaths occurred at ages 35–64 years, and 37 percent among persons aged 65 years and over (Department of Statistics, 1987c). The mortality levels of the Maori population are higher at most ages than those of the non-Maori population. This should not however mask the fact that a substantial reduction in Maori/non-Maori mortality differentials has occurred in recent years.

Much of the improvement in Maori life expectancy this century, like that of the non-Maori, has been as a result of rapid declines in mortality at the younger ages, particularly at infancy. In 1939 the recorded level of Maori infant mortality was 115 per 1,000 live births. Since then a dramatic decline in infant mortality has been experienced by the Maori population. By 1985 the rate stood at 15 per 1,000 live births. The rapid Maori infant mortality decline was brought about initially through low-cost medical technology such as antibiotics in association with improvements in living standards and the extension of social welfare programmes. Reinforcement came from the rapid declines in fertility which occurred in the late 1960s and the 1970s.

Since the late 1970s, decreases in neonatal infant mortality, which is normally expected to respond to high-technology and high-cost health service delivery, contributed more to the decline than might be expected. By contrast, post-neonatal infant mortality, which is more amenable to control by medical, nutritional and childcare improvements has fallen much less rapidly (refer Table 3.1). While levels of neonatal mortality among the Maori population now approximate those of the non-Maori population, the Maori post-neonatal mortality rate remains about double the non-Maori rate (refer Table 3.1).

The most notable improvements in Maori mortality in very recent years have occurred at the adult ages, and more particularly the older adult ages (60 years and over). Improvements in survivorship at these ages during the first half of the 1980s were much greater among the Maori than non-Maori population (refer Table 3.2). Even with these improvements, however, survivorship levels between the 2 populations are still far apart, particularly in middle

and old age (refer Table 3.3). Although socio-economic factors are undoubtedly important determinants of this ethnic differential—proportionately more Maori than non-Maori people receive low incomes—socio-cultural differences almost certainly play a major role as well. Genetic susceptibility, by contrast, is thought to play a very limited part.

TABLE 3.2: Changes in survivorship at older ages, 1980–2 to 1985

	Percentage change in average number living in age group			
	Maori		*Non-Maori*	
Age group (years)	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*
60–64	13.5	8.2	0.6	0.3
65–69	19.7	13.4	1.4	0.5
70–74	30.8	21.9	2.4	1.0
75–79	44.3	24.3	4.1	1.1
80–84	56.3	8.2	5.1	2.9
85 and over	3.6	1.2	5.1	−1.6

Source: The New Zealand Population: Change, Composition, and Policy Implications, Population Monitoring Group Report No. 4, New Zealand Planning Council 1986

Mortality by Cause of Death

The control of infectious and parasitic diseases has played a leading part in the long-term decline in mortality in New Zealand. With the elimination of most of these diseases as causes of death, degenerative diseases, often associated with ageing, have become the major causes of death in New Zealand. In 1985, the most frequent causes of death were diseases of the circulatory system, including ischaemic heart disease (26 percent), cancer (22 percent) and cerebrovascular disease (10 percent) which together accounted for almost three fifths of total deaths. Other major causes of death were diseases of the respiratory system, and motor vehicle and other accidents, which accounted for a further 15 percent of total deaths (Department of Health, 1987b).

The relative importance of these major causes of death varies both by age and ethnic group (refer Table 3.4). Degenerative diseases become increasingly important with age. Ischaemic heart disease, the major killer, begins to appear as a major cause of death in the 45–64 year age group and the age-specific death rates due to this cause increase markedly in the subsequent age groups. This

TABLE 3.3: Comparative survival of Maoris and non-Maoris, 1985 mortality experience

	Percentage of persons born who survive to this age			
	Males		*Females*	
Exact age (years)	*Maori*	*Non-Maori*	*Maori*	*Non-Maori*
5	98.0	98.7	98.4	98.9
15	97.8	98.3	98.1	98.6
25	96.4	96.8	97.8	98.0
45	91.4	93.7	94.0	96.1
55	83.2	88.6	86.8	92.7
65	64.1	75.1	72.7	84.7
75	37.5	49.0	50.5	66.9
85	10.8	15.8	13.9	34.9

Source: New Zealand Abridged Life Tables 1985, Department of Statistics (unpublished)

disease also becomes increasingly important relative to other diseases in the middle and old age. Thus, in 1985 ischaemic heart disease accounted for 36 percent of male deaths and 18 percent of female deaths in the 45–64 year age group, as against 10 percent and 5 percent for the respective sexes in the 25–44 year age group. Mortality from ischaemic heart disease has shown a downward trend since 1977; the 1985 male rate stands out as the lowest on record in recent years. The lower level of Maori mortality from ischaemic heart disease compared to non-Maori mortality from this cause, reflects the much younger age structure of the Maori population. Age-standardised rates show that in real terms Maori death rates from ischaemic heart disease are higher than non-Maori rates.

TABLE 3.4: Selected Major Causes of Death, 1985

Cause of death	Age group (years) 15–24 M	15–24 F	25–44 M	25–44 F	45–64 M	45–64 F	65 & over M	65 & over F	Standardised rate M	Standardised rate F
					Rate per 100,000 Population					
					Maori					
Ischaemic heart disease	–	–	29.6	10.5	450.6	189.8	1508.4	1380.1	232	142
Cancer of lung	–	–	–	7.9	144.4	63.3	726.3	169.5	92	28
Cancer of breast	–	–	–	18.4	–	57.5	–	121.1	–	24
All other cancers	2.8	2.8	34.9	34.1	219.5	201.3	1089.4	581.1	159	97
Cerebrovascular disease	–	–	2.7	13.1	80.9	109.3	558.7	508.5	68	66
Respiratory disease	8.3	2.8	13.4	10.5	121.3	126.5	1396.6	1016.9	159	121
Motor vehicle accidents	55.4	14.0	72.6	15.7	40.4	23.0	27.9	24.2	42	16
All other accidents	36.0	2.8	26.9	–	17.3	11.5	27.9	24.2	25	9
Diabetes mellitus	–	–	–	2.6	57.8	92.0	335.2	363.2	47	51
Chronic rheumatic heart disease	–	5.6	10.7	13.1	34.7	51.8	55.9	–	13	15
All other causes	41.6	11.2	53.7	39.4	265.7	201.3	1257.0	1186.4	235	180
Total, all causes	144.0	39.3	244.6	165.3	1432.7	1127.1	6983.2	5375.3	1073	748
					Non-Maori					
Ischaemic heart disease	0.4	–	15.9	4.4	397.4	111.2	2123.3	1398.3	219	101
Cancer of lung	–	–	2.8	1.2	98.9	44.5	383.9	94.3	44	15
Cancer of breast	–	–	–	11.5	–	76.8	–	145.4	–	27
All other cancers	6.3	6.3	29.8	26.2	238.0	168.2	1115.0	655.1	130	82
Cerebrovascular disease	0.4	1.6	4.8	4.1	52.3	40.9	698.3	803.7	59	54
Respiratory disease	5.2	4.7	5.1	2.8	71.9	52.4	1066.8	684.3	95	52
Motor vehicle accidents	75.7	25.4	28.8	11.7	17.4	11.1	36.6	18.8	29	13
All other accidents	27.5	3.5	21.7	3.7	24.5	4.3	87.7	116.7	25	11
Diabetes mellitus	–	0.4	1.6	0.5	15.3	10.4	96.5	66.7	10	6
Chronic heart disease	–	0.4	1.2	1.8	5.7	7.9	17.5	21.9	3	4
All other causes	39.0	17.2	44.5	26.7	159.0	101.5	1160.3	1083.5	160	113
Total, all causes	154.4	59.4	156.2	94.6	1080.4	629.2	6785.8	5088.9	772	476

Source: Mortality and Demographic Data 1985, National Health Statistics Centre, Department of Health, 1987

Deaths from cancer have edged up in recent years, increasing from 20 percent of all deaths in 1975 to 22 percent in 1985. As with ischaemic heart disease, the incidence of cancer increases with age. Amongst persons aged 65 years and over, cancer accounts for around 1 in 5 deaths, a higher proportion for men than for women. Lung cancer remains the leading cause of cancer death in males, with the rate for Maori males being more than double that for non-Maori males. For females, breast cancer continues to be the leading form of the disease, although lung cancer has shown the biggest rise in recent years. In fact, among Maori women lung cancer has caused more deaths than breast cancer in 14 of the last 20 years. The overall number of women dying from lung cancer rose by 69 percent, from 196 in 1976 to 331 in 1985. This follows a world-wide trend and one that is generally accepted as being associated with cigarette smoking (Department of Health, 1983a).

Deaths due to cerebrovascular disease have a similar age pattern to other degenerative diseases, becoming more prominent at the older ages. Since 1970–4 the incidence of death from cerebrovascular disease has shown a marked decrease at most ages. This has been true for both males and females. The largest percentage decreases in death rates from this cause have been in the 45–54 year age group for males and the 40–44 year age group for females.

While the degenerative diseases are most prevalent in the older age groups, motor vehicle accidents and other violent causes, such as other accidents and suicide, largely determine the mortality level among the younger age groups. Motor vehicle accidents account for almost half (46 percent) of all deaths in the 15–24 year age group. The sex differences in deaths due to motor vehicle accidents are considerable. In the 15–24 years' age group, the male death rate in 1985 of 73 deaths per 100,000 males exceeded the female rate of 24 deaths per 100,000 females by a ratio of 3 to 1. Despite the recent introduction of random breath testing, death rates due to motor vehicle accidents show no signs of declining.

Among infants the main causes of death are cot death or sudden infant death syndrome, respiratory illness and gastroenteritis. These have all been associated with life style factors. Cot death is the leading cause of death in both Maori and non-Maori babies and has shown an upward trend since the late 1970s (refer Table 3.5). Moreover, the incidence of cot deaths in New Zealand is high by the standards of other developed countries. The cot death rate in New Zealand in the early 1980s was more than double the rate

recorded in Australia. The cause or causes of cot death have not been satisfactorily identified and must be investigated further if post-neonatal deaths are to be reduced.

TABLE 3.5: Cot deaths, 1980–5

Year	*Maori*	*Non-Maori*	*Total*
		Rate per 1,000 live births	
1980	6.4	3.8	4.1
1981	6.2	4.1	4.4
1982	6.9	4.0	4.4
1983	8.1	4.5	4.9
1984	9.9	4.3	5.0
1985	7.9	3.7	4.2

Source: Mortality and Demographic Data 1985, National Health Statistics Centre, Department of Health, 1987

Differential Mortality

The overall national mortality level masks differences that exist between various strata of society. In addition to major differentials by age, sex and ethnic group discussed in the preceding sections, others can be identified according to region, occupation and various social variables. These differences reflect environmental, social, economic and other factors that directly or indirectly affect health and chances of survival.

Regional Differentials

The risk of dying in New Zealand varies from region to region. At the broadest level of regional disaggregation, South Islanders have a higher mortality than North Islanders. However, their relative disadvantage in longevity has diminished steadily over the last 2 decades, due mainly to a greater decline in their mortality rates. In fact, South Island mortality rates for both male and females at ages below 60 years (except in the first year of life) were generally lower in 1980–2 than those for the North Island. Taken overall, the North-South differentials have now reached a point where they are almost negligible (Department of Statistics, 1985b).

Despite the convergence in North-South differentials in mortality, considerable differences in male and female life expectancy and in standardised death rates between local government regions still persist. In the case of males, expectation of life in 1980–2 varied

from 71.2 years in the Nelson Bays region to 67.7 years in the East Cape. Thames Valley had the highest expectation of life for females at 77.1 years, while the East Cape had the lowest (74.4 years). In addition to the East Cape region, which had the lowest longevity for both male and females, 4 other regions stood out on account of their low life expectancies. These were Tongariro, Wanganui, West Coast and Southland. Most of these regions recorded expectations of life 1 year or more lower than those for New Zealand as a whole. Moreover, in the case of males the life expectancy at birth for the East Cape and West Coast regions was lower than the figure recorded for New Zealand males ten years ago (68.6 years). Similarly, three regions (Tongariro, East Cape and West Coast) experienced female life expectancy close to or lower than the New Zealand figure (74.6 years) recorded a decade ago.

Investigation into the factors underlying these variations indicates that about 60 percent of the variation can be explained by three factors, namely: degree of urbanisation; percentage of the population aged 16 years and over that is married; and percentage of the population 15 years and over with no secondary school education. Regions which are more urbanised and have a higher percentage of their adult population married and well educated are more likely to have lower mortality than other regions (Department of Statistics, 1985b).

The lower mortality rates in more urbanised regions, a feature of many industrialised countries, may be at least partly due to the better provision of specialised medical services and easier access to doctors in cities and urban centres than in more remote and isolated areas of the country.

Occupational and Social Differentials

As in many other countries, there is evidence in New Zealand of a strong association between mortality and occupation. Workers in professional and administrative occupations have been found to have lower mortality than those in mining and transport and communication occupations. Sales workers have the lowest mortality rate of all workers in New Zealand. It has been suggested that this may be because sales workers are least prone to risk or stress (Zodgekar, 1979). Occupational differentials operate in several ways, but two main factors are important. First, certain jobs are hazardous and this element constitutes a greater risk in the lower

occupational categories. Secondly, occupation largely determines income, and income is a major determinant of the level of living and health care (Pearce, Davis, Smith and Foster, 1983).

Lifestyle differences may also play a role in occupational differentials in mortality. For instance, in New Zealand regular smoking is lowest in professional and technical occupations and highest in unskilled and semi-skilled occupations. Other lifestyle differences directly related to income differences, such as housing, nutrition and general living and working conditions are also believed to be important in mortality differences between occupations (Pearce, Davis, Smith and Foster, 1983).

Differences in mortality experience also exist with regard to marital status. In general, mortality levels are lower for married males and females than for the single, widowed or divorced. Differences between married and other categories increase with age and are also greater among males than females (Zodgekar, 1979). Reasons for these differences, which are characteristic of many populations around the world are not clear but are likely to be related to the fact that marriage is a form of selection of healthier persons. In addition, the companionship afforded by marriage may provide some survival advantage, particularly in older age.

Future Prospects

The determination of future mortality rates is problematical. Comparisons of mortality rates in New Zealand with those in several low-mortality countries indicate that there is scope for further reductions in mortality in New Zealand. However, it will be mortality changes occurring among adults that will have the most effect on life expectation. Recent years have witnessed a significant improvement in survivorship rates over a wide range of adult ages for both Maoris and non-Maoris. If these improvements continue, they will result in an increase in the size of all elderly age groups, the effect being greatest among the oldest.

Even with improvements in mortality rates over the next few years, there is likely to be a steady rise in the annual number of deaths, from 27,000 in 1986 to over 40,000 in 2016. This will occur because of the large number of people entering the older ages (Department of Statistics, 1987c).

There are a number of questions surrounding future trends in mortality in low-mortality countries. Common to them is the

extent to which the incidence of degenerative diseases with age can be controlled or arrested by intervention or by personal lifestyle. How effective in deferring the onset of biological decay and in reducing the incidence and fatality of degenerative diseases can changes in personal lifestyle be, and to what extent can such changes be induced through health, education and government policy initiatives?

4 International Migration

Introduction

International migration has been a major feature of New Zealand's history, shaping both its social and economic character. The last few decades have witnessed some major and unprecedented changes in migration levels and patterns. The rates of migration have increased significantly and there have been dramatic shifts in the direction of migration balances. The preponderance of immigrants coming from the British Isles has decreased and migration to and from Australia has become the largest. Since the 1970s New Zealanders returning from overseas have made up a relatively large share of immigrants. Pacific Island Polynesian migration has also developed and has become a significant feature of migration flows into and out of New Zealand (Farmer, 1979).

International migration normally refers to the migration of individuals across the borders of a sovereign state; in this chapter it is used to refer to overseas migration since it includes the movements of the residents of the Cook Islands, Niue and the Tokelau Islands who are New Zealand citizens. With the exception of the section on Pacific Island Polynesian migration, which deals with total migration flows, the chapter is concerned specifically with long-term (12 months or more) and permanent movement into or out of New Zealand. The use of a declared intention to stay or depart for 12 months or more as the criterion for differentiating between short-term visitors and immigrants and emigrants follows international procedure. But the method is not without its limitations. Declarations by international travellers on their arrival and departure cards about overseas travel and residence plans are statements of intent. Plans frequently change, from long-term intentions to short-term ones and vice versa. The exact impact of such changes on the migration statistics is difficult to measure.

Migration Trends

Historically, New Zealand has been a migrant-receiving country. In most periods since European colonisation began the number of arrivals has exceeded the number of departures. Peak periods of immigration occurred in the 1860s, 1870s, early 1900s, in the 1950s and in the early 1970s. For the most part emigration has been important only in times of economic recession. It became a matter of widespread public concern in the late 1960s and again in the late 1970s when New Zealand recorded high levels of net emigration.

The post-Second World War period has been characterised by marked fluctuations in permanent and long-term immigration. The long-term trend, however, has been of gradual increase. From 1945–1968, immigration occurred mainly as a result of various displaced person, labour force and family settlement policies pursued by various governments. It was also affected by economic and political conditions, both in New Zealand and in traditional source countries. As a result of a sharp drop in immigration during the economic recession of 1968–9, which resulted in departures exceeding arrivals by a significant margin, Government made a special attempt to recruit immigrants. This resulted in one of the heaviest periods of permanent and long-term immigration in New Zealand's history during the early 1970s; also a period during which immigration to Australia was curtailed. In a matter of only four years, from 1972–5, over 100,000 people were added to New Zealand's population through net immigration.

In the mid-1970s the Government took measures to reduce the inflow of immigrants. These measures, which coincided with a downturn in the economy, resulted in a period of extraordinarily high net emigration; during the three years 1978–1980 net emigration totalled over 70,000. This was popularly interpreted as a sudden outflow, but in fact was due to the continuation of a long-term trend in emigration, coupled with a sharp decline in immigration.

Since the early 1980s migration trends and patterns have altered radically. The number of people leaving New Zealand on a permanent and long-term basis, which had increased at an accelerated pace since the early 1960s (climbing from 12,700 in 1962 to over 81,000 in 1979) started to decline.

In a matter of 5 years, from 1979–1984, the number of permanent and long-term departures fell by almost 47,000. At least part of the decline in the number of New Zealand residents departing permanently or long-term can be attributed to the erosion of the young adult (highly mobile) age groups that supplied a disproportionately large share of the emigrants during the late 1970s.

The level of permanent and long-term immigration during the 1980–4 period was somewhat lower than in the early 1970s—a reflection of the regulation of the inflow by immigration officials and the evaluation by prospective immigrants of opportunities in New Zealand. Nevertheless there was a gradual increase in the number of permanent and long-term arrivals over the period, from 40,800 in 1979 to 45,800 in 1983. This increase is attributable, at least in part, to the return of New Zealanders who had migrated in the late 1970s.

Latest figures indicate a reversal in the migration pattern since the mid-1980s. Emigration has increased and immigration decreased. In the year ended 31 March 1986, over 23,000 more people left New Zealand on a permanent and long-term basis than in 1984. Similarly, about 5,000 fewer people arrived to live in New Zealand than in 1984. The result was a net loss of 21,600 people in 1986, compared with a net loss of 8,000 in 1985 and a net gain of 6,600 in 1984.

Trans-Tasman Migration

Historically, most of New Zealand's European settlers came from the United Kingdom and, until the late 1960s, New Zealand had its largest exchange of migrants with Britain. Since the early 1970s, however, exchanges of migrants between New Zealand and Australia have tended to dominate external migration trends. Transtasman migration by New Zealand and Australian citizens is unrestricted, except that (since mid-1981) New Zealand or Australian citizens entering Australia from New Zealand require a valid passport.

In the last 10 years about one third of immigrants to New Zealand have come from Australia and less than one fifth from the United Kingdom. Also, over half of all people departing from New Zealand have gone to Australia. Numerous information flows across the Tasman have kept New Zealand's population well

informed about Australia's higher real incomes and more varied opportunities.

As a consequence of the growing volume of transtasman migration over the last decade there are now quite sizeable communities of New Zealanders in Australia and, to a lesser extent, Australians in New Zealand. In 1981 approximately 176,700 New Zealanders were living in Australia (a 97 percent increase between 1976 and 1981), representing 1.2 percent of the total population and 6 percent of overseas-born Australians. Over two fifths (42 percent) of these had been in Australia for less than 3 years. The number of Australian-born in New Zealand in 1981 was 43,800, a decline of 7 percent from 1976. Nevertheless, Australians were the third largest overseas-born group, ranking just behind Pacific Island Polynesians and forming 1.4 percent of the usually resident population and 9.4 percent of the usually resident overseas-born.

A notable feature of the transtasman migration flow in the 1980s has been the presence of large numbers of young Maori people leaving New Zealand permanently or for a long term. This is reflected in a net migration loss of 8,100 Maori people from New Zealand during the 1981–6 period. There are now large communities of Maoris living in Australia, especially in Sydney, although the exact numbers are difficult to determine. As a result of this recent out-migration there is a potential for some Maori return migration.

Pacific Island Polynesian Migration

Pacific Island Polynesian migration has been a visible element of international migration to New Zealand over the past 15 years. Migration of Polynesians to New Zealand gradually increased after the Second World War in response to a labour shortage in New Zealand and a perceived labour surplus in the Polynesian countries; migration from the islands to New Zealand was seen to be of mutual benefit to both societies. It was not until the 1970s, however, that the size of the Polynesian migration flow really became significant. Demand for labour in New Zealand's expanding economy, coupled with limited wage employment prospects in the Islands, created the necessary conditions for extensive population movement between Polynesia and New Zealand. Although much of this movement was short-term, there was a substantial net gain to New Zealand's population from Polynesia from 1971–76. The

imposition of stricter immigration controls in 1974, followed by an economic recession and rising unemployment in New Zealand resulted in a marked reduction in the size of the migration flow during the remainder of the decade. From 1976–1981 there were 6,948 more Polynesian arrivals than departures, compared with 23,622 in the 1971–76 period.

Since 1981 there has been a return to substantial net migration gains. Between 1 April 1981 and 31 March 1986, the surplus of arrivals over departures in the Polynesian migration flows exceeded 14,800 people. These people added the equivalent of 30 percent to the total Polynesia-born population enumerated in New Zealand in the 1981 census. The relevant contribution this migration made to the Polynesian population (both Polynesia- and New Zealand-born) enumerated in 1981 was 18 percent.

The Polynesian migration flows of the 1980s contain a much higher proportion of New Zealand residents than was the case at the height of the immigration boom in the 1970s. Almost 40 percent of the arrivals in 1985–6 who had been born in Samoa were people with New Zealand-resident status, compared with only 24 percent in 1974. In the case of the Tonga-born arrivals in 1985–6, the proportion who were New Zealand residents was 24 percent (compared with 4 percent in 1974), while for those born in the Cook Islands, Niue and the Tokelaus, the New Zealand-resident group was 46 percent of total arrivals (26 percent in 1974).

Among the New Zealand-resident component of the Polynesia-born population, there have been more people leaving than arriving each year since 1971. In large part this represents a net flow of Polynesians back to the Islands (permanent and long-term emigration of Polynesia-born New Zealand residents totalled 1,121 in the year ended 31 March 1986). However, there is also an important transtasman dimension to the movement overseas of Pacific Islanders with residence rights in New Zealand (Bedford, 1986).

Effects of International Migration

Impact on Population Growth

International migration has added over 780,000 people to New Zealand's population since 1840, accounting for almost a quarter of the country's total population growth. Much of the contribution of net immigration to population growth occurred during the early

years of European colonisation. Since the Second World War net immigration has been a relatively small component of New Zealand's population growth (around 15 percent).

The overall impact of net immigration on the growth of the population has been especially small since the 1970s. The total net gain of 103,775 from 1971–6 was almost cancelled out by a net loss of 108,498 from 1976–1981. In 1978–9 the migration losses were so large that for the first time in New Zealand's history, apart from the war years of 1916 and 1941–43, New Zealand's population declined in size. A significant turnaround in the external migration balance during the early 1980s, which resulted in net migration gains during the 3 years 1983–5, was mainly responsible for New Zealand's larger increase in population during the 1981–6 intercensal period (131,347), compared with the 1976–1981 period (46,354).

Effects on Age Composition

Migration in and out of New Zealand has always been highly age-selective. In general, immigration has been associated with the creation of a youthful population, while emigration has included a substantial component of older return or ongoing migrants. The influx of a large number of young-adult immigrants has not only affected the size and growth of the population in these age groups, but has also influenced population growth through raised crude birth rates, lowered crude death rates and higher rates of natural increase. Since 1945 New Zealand's immigration policy has increasingly favoured young-adult immigration. As a consequence, the proportion of immigrants aged 15–24 years has increased substantially, while the proportion aged 45 years and over has decreased (refer Table 4.1).

Emigration from New Zealand over the last 2 decades has displayed an even greater concentration of emigrants at ages 15–24 years. Between 1972 and 1975–6 no less than 43.1 percent of people leaving New Zealand for 1 year or longer were aged 15–24 years (refer Table 4.1). The net loss of 127,474 New Zealand residents aged 15–24 years between 1966–7 and 1985–6 was so large that New Zealand recorded a net loss of 68,619 permanent and long-term migrants between 1946–7 and 1985–6 at ages 15–24 years. This loss reflects both the strength of the emigration climate that exists for young New Zealanders to travel overseas for an extended period, and the large size of the age group resulting

TABLE 4.1: Permanent and long-term migrants by age, 1946–7 to 1985–6 (percentage distribution)

March years	*Age group (years)* 0–14	15–24	25–44	45 and over	*Total*
			Immigrants		
1946–47 to 1950–51	18.1	20.9	42.7	18.4	100.0
1951–52 to 1955–56	18.3	23.7	43.6	14.5	100.0
1956–57 to 1960–61	20.3	24.2	40.2	15.3	100.0
1961–62 to 1965–66	21.9	27.8	35.8	14.5	100.0
1966–67 to 1970–71	22.4	29.0	34.7	13.9	100.0
1971–72 to 1975–76	23.7	29.2	36.5	10.6	100.0
1976–77 to 1980–81	20.2	30.9	39.4	9.5	100.0
1981–82 to 1985–86	22.3	25.7	42.7	9.2	100.0
			Emigrants		
1946–47 to 1950–51	15.8	22.3	41.7	20.3	100.0
1951–52 to 1955–56	16.9	23.8	42.0	17.3	100.0
1956–57 to 1960–61	19.1	26.9	39.4	14.6	100.0
1961–62 to 1965–66	20.0	33.4	33.9	12.7	100.0
1966–67 to 1970–71	20.5	39.3	30.9	9.3	100.0
1971–72 to 1975–76	17.5	43.1	30.6	8.8	100.0
1976–77 to 1980–81	19.1	38.8	34.4	7.8	100.0
1981–82 to 1985–86	18.0	39.1	34.5	8.5	100.0

Sources: Country Monograph Series No.12, Population of New Zealand, Vol. 1, United Nations, 1985
Demographic Trends, 1987, Department of Statistics, 1987

from New Zealand's high levels of fertility in the 1950s and 1960s. Substantial return emigration since the early 1980s has helped to replenish New Zealand's depleted young adult groups. Older emigrants, however, including overseas-born persons, are less likely to return.

Effects on Sex Composition

The sex composition of the population has always been affected by international migration flows. For many years the general dominance of male immigrants contributed to a marked preponderance of males in New Zealand's population. Since the Second World War, however, migration flows have been characterised by an increased female component. Despite this, males have continued generally to outnumber females among permanent and long-term immigrants. More females than males departed from New Zealand on a permanent and long-term basis throughout the early part of

the post-war period. In the mid-1960s, however, the forces influencing male emigration seem to have increased, and the sex ratios of the emigrants rose sharply to exceed the preponderance of males among immigrants (refer Table 4.2).

During the 1980s males have outnumbered females among permanent and long-term arrivals and departures in each age group except 15–24 years. Young women were apparently more inclined than young men to travel internationally, although there has been a slightly greater dominance of females among the arrivals aged 15–24 years (84 males per 100 females between 1981–2 and 1985–6) than among the departures (92 males per 100 females). The preponderance of males in the international migration flows has been greatest among the arrivals and departures aged 25–44 years (116 and 125 males per 100 females respectively).

TABLE 4.2: Sex composition of permanent and long-term migrants, 1946–7 to 1985–6

March year	*Males per 100 females*	
	Immigrants	*Emigrants*
1946–47 to 1950–51	98.0	87.9
1951–52 to 1955–56	113.6	94.2
1956–57 to 1960–61	102.0	100.0
1961–62 to 1965–66	103.1	98.8
1966–67 to 1970–71	99.8	110.3
1971–72 to 1975–76	107.6	109.3
1976–77 to 1980–81	106.8	112.1
1981–82 to 1985–86	103.7	105.4

Sources: Country Monograph Series No. 12, Population of New Zealand, Vol 1, United Nations, 1985
Demographic Trends, 1987, Department of Statistics, 1987

Spatial Effects

The migration flows to and from New Zealand have had a very uneven impact on the geographic distribution of the population. In general, the distribution of immigrants has been influenced, and to a considerable degree determined by, 3 sets of factors. The first of these has been their possession or lack of certain specific skills or other economic resources and the location of appropriate employment opportunities. A second set of factors has been the effect of immigration policy requirements, notably the sponsorship system for family reunification whereby new arrivals have been drawn to certain areas where they have subsequently tended to reside with or

close to kinsfolk or close friends. The third set of factors concerns the frequently observed desire among immigrants to maintain their social and cultural identity, which is more easily achieved under conditions of close residential proximity and which may be encouraged by a host population's negative attitudes, prejudices and discriminatory behaviour (Zodgekar, 1986).

Throughout this century the majority of immigrants to New Zealand have tended to settle in the North Island. In 1986, about 82 percent of the overseas-born were living in the North Island, as against 73 percent of the New Zealand-born. The impact of immigration has been greatest in the Auckland and Wellington urban areas—the North Island's most important ports of entry and concentrations of industries employing high proportions of immigrants. In 1986, almost a quarter (23.6 percent) of Auckland's usually resident population and about a fifth (20.8 percent) of Wellington's population had been born outside New Zealand. These proportions were considerably higher than those in the other main urban areas of New Zealand. Indeed, in no other main urban area in 1986 did the overseas-born component exceed the national average of 14.9 percent. Relatively small numbers of immigrants have settled in New Zealand's smaller urban areas or in rural areas. In the census-defined secondary and minor urban areas and in rural areas, the percentages of overseas-born people in the usually resident population in 1986 were 10.9, 9.3 and 8.2 percent respectively.

This pattern of geographical distribution is much more pronounced among some immigrant groups than others. Pacific Island Polynesian immigrants, in particular, stand out an account of their high concentration in Auckland and Wellington. In 1986, almost two thirds of usually-resident Pacific Island-born immigrants lived in Auckland. The concentration of the other major birthplace groups in Auckland ranged from 39.0 percent for British-born to 28.3 percent for those born in the Netherlands. Asians, Pacific Islanders and Continental Europeans were the most concentrated groups in Wellington, and the Australian and British-born were the least concentrated.

Effects on the Labour Force

Over the years international migration has influenced the size and composition of the New Zealand labour force by adding or removing workers with certain age, sex, skill and other characteristics. In

the post-Second World War period the impact of immigration on the labour force has been to a large extent determined by the timing of the immigrants' arrival in New Zealand in relation to the growth of the population of working age and to the cyclical progression of the economy. In the immediate post-war period the arrival of even a relatively small number of young working-age immigrants was beneficial because of the slow growth of the source population for the labour force after the absence of immigration during the war and the low birth rates during the 1930s. In the early 1970s the impact of the much larger influx of young-adult immigrants on the age structure of the labour force was quite different; the local labour force had a high growth rate because of the large number of post-war baby boom labour-market entrants, and it was also influenced by the increased numbers of working women.

In general, emigration has caused less disturbance to the labour market than immigration since 1945. The losses to the labour force have been highly concentrated in the young working-age groups, particularly the 20–24 years' group, and have been especially marked in the female labour force. The activity rates of female emigrants unlike those of male emigrants, are much higher than those of the comparable age groups in the population of New Zealand as a whole. The impact of emigration is often temporary because much of the movement is of young people travelling overseas on a working holiday or for 2 or 3 years' overseas experience. Permanent losses to the labour force are more likely to occur among older and overseas born emigrants. The high emigration rates during 1966–7 to 1969–1970, 1976–7 to 1981–2 and in the period since 1984–5 have played a role in keeping New Zealand's unemployment rates relatively low; while it is not the unemployed who migrate, the emigration of workers who voluntarily quit their job feeds through the labour market. The high emigration rates have also created a demand for skilled workers to implement New Zealand's economic restructuring programme.

Throughout the post-war period international migration has been a source of flexibility enabling employers to respond more quickly to changes in the level and composition of demand than would have been possible in the absence of migration. In the 10-year period following the Second World War immigrants were generally less skilled than emigrants. Subsequently, the skills of immigrants and emigrants have been broadly similar. From

1971–6 the overseas-born component of New Zealand's population made a substantial contribution to structural changes in employment in New Zealand. In most of the major industry categories the growth of the overseas-born labour force exceeded that of the total labour force. The relatively rapid growth in the white-collar services of finance, insurance, business services, and community and social services were particularly marked among the overseas-born population (Zodgekar 1986). From 1976–1981, every major industry group among the overseas born labour force, except community, social and personal services, declined, in size as the overseas-born population responded to the recession in New Zealand with above-average rates of emigration.

Future Prospects

Projection of trends in international migration is extremely difficult because of the many political and economic influences in operation, both within and outside New Zealand. In the past these influences have resulted in substantial fluctuations in migration. A further imponderable affecting immigration to New Zealand is the return migration of the New Zealand-born and their spouses and–or dependents. With the passage of the post-war baby boom generation to older ages at which they will be involved in family formation, there could well be a decrease in the number of movements abroad classified as permanent and long-term, but really involving travel over several years (Pool, 1986).

In April 1987 a new Immigration Bill was passed in Parliament. The new Bill replaces the Immigration Act (1964) and is a substantially revised version of a Bill introduced to the House of Representatives by the National Government in 1984. Under the new Bill, national origin as a factor in immigrant selection has been abolished, the consideration of skills demands from developing countries has been dropped, the Occupational Priority List has been made more responsive to labour-market shortages, and a specified limit on the number of dependents that can accompany an occupational immigrant has been removed. In addition, a policy initiative to encourage immigration of entrepreneurs seeking to invest in business and development in New Zealand, introduced in 1978, has been broadened in scope.

In terms of their potential impact on immigrant flows in the short-term, the most important policy changes contained in the

Bill are those concerning migrant source areas and entry of entrepreneurs. The abolition of national origin as a factor in immigrant selection has widened the range of people and countries from which occupational immigrants can be selected, and this could result in some diversification in the ethnic composition of immigrant flows. However, requirements that prospective migrants have adequate English language skills, and that they are interviewed by New Zealand consular staff or their representatives before departure for New Zealand will serve to restrict entry from some parts of the world.

Entrepreneur immigration has been given much higher priority than in the past, and restrictions on type of investment and nature of business have been removed. There is thus scope for a considerable increase in entrepreneur immigration once the more flexible provisions governing this type of entry to New Zealand are known overseas.

5 Population Age Structure

Introduction

At the turn of the century 36.3 percent of New Zealand's population was less than 15 years of age and the median age of the population (the age at which half of the population is younger and half older) was 21.1 years. In 1986, the median age of the population was 28.9 years, a consequence of a declining proportion of the population at the younger ages and a rise at the older ages. The 45-and-over age group in 1896 comprised 16.8 percent of the total population and in 1986 it had risen to 28.9 percent.

While there have been ups and downs in the median age since the turn of the century, the trend has been of gradual increase. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s the ageing process accelerated. Official projections indicate that the proportion of the population aged 14 years and under will continue to decline and that aged 65 and over will increase. The median age of the population will rise to about 32 years by the year 1991 and to about 39 years by the year 2011.

In a world perspective, New Zealand's population structure is that of a developed country, having a comparatively low proportion of children and a comparatively high one of aged persons. When compared with Europe, however, New Zealand has a higher proportion of its population in the younger age group (0–14 years) and a lower proportion in the older age group. Our structure is similar to that of Australia, Canada and the United States though the proportion aged 0–14 years is slightly higher in New Zealand (refer Table 5.1).

TABLE 5.1: Age distribution of total population by regions of the world and selected countries, 1985[1]

Region	Age group (years) 0–14	15–64	65 and over	Total
	Percent of total population			
Africa	45.1	51.8	3.0	100.0
Latin America	38.4	57.2	4.4	100.0
North America	22.9	66.3	10.8	100.0
East Asia	29.1	64.6	6.3	100.0
South Asia	39.5	57.3	3.2	100.0
Europe	20.8	66.7	12.5	100.0
Oceania	22.7	64.8	12.5	100.0
Soviet Union	25.0	65.6	9.4	100.0
World Total	33.6	60.5	5.8	100.0
More Developed	22.4	66.6	11.1	100.0
Less Developed	37.2	58.6	4.2	100.0
Selected Countries—				
Australia	24.0	66.0	10.0	100.0
New Zealand[2]	24.7	65.0	10.3	100.0
United Kingdom	18.6	66.4	15.0	100.0
Canada	22.5	68.3	9.2	100.0
United States	22.9	66.1	11.0	100.0
Sweden	17.8	65.3	16.9	100.0

[1]Projected
[2]Estimated as at 31 March 1985

Sources: United Nations Demographic Indicators of Countries: Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1980, United Nations, New York, 1982
Demographic Trends 1987, Department of Statistics, 1987

The Changing Age Structure of New Zealand's Population

The age structure of the population at any given time is the result of the combined influence of past trends in fertility, mortality and migration. Variations in these components have altered the proportion of New Zealand's population in various age groups at different points in time. They have also resulted in contrasting age structures between different ethnic groups.

The Non-Maori Population

The non-Maori population has been growing older for most of the last 100 years. This transition from youth to maturity, which is far

from complete, has occurred largely as a result of declining fertility levels.

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, high fertility levels coupled with large-scale immigration of predominantly young adults resulted in a very youthful population structure. In 1878, for instance, the median age of the non-Maori population was 19.7 years, and 89.3 percent of the population was less than 45 years of age. Significantly, children (0–14 years) comprised over 40 percent of the total population, a level associated nowadays with some developing countries.

Falling fertility levels during the closing decades of the nineteenth century had the effect of substantially reducing the child component of the non-Maori population, and producing a rapid expansion in the adult population. By the Great Depression of the 1930s, the median age of the population had risen to 28.9 years, with the proportion of the population aged 45 years and over at 27.9 percent, having increased from 16.4 percent in 1906. The ageing process was, however, soon to be reversed due to increases in the levels of births following the Second World War and the effects of a large-scale immigration programme during the 1950s and 1960s.

By the 1961 Population Census the impact of the post war baby boom on the non-Maori age profile had become evident, with the proportion of the childhood population (0–14 years) having risen to 31.9 percent from the 1936 level of 24.4 percent. The baby boom which followed the low 1930s birth levels created a bulge in the non-Maori population profile which is still evident. In 1971 the bulge was most pronounced in the 5–14 years' age group and by 1986 was greatest in the 15–29 year age group. In 1971 the median age of the population had fallen to 26.9 years.

The period since 1971 has been one of rapidly declining fertility and mortality, with fertility rates falling to levels below those of the 1930s and mortality rates declining at most ages. As a result of these trends, especially the decline in fertility levels, the ageing of the non-Maori population has been quite rapid. This is evident in the declining prominence of the child component of the population. From a peak of 31.9 percent in 1961, children comprised 22.1 percent in 1986. Despite this reduction in the proportion of children in the non-Maori population, their numbers increased by 89,300 between 1961 and 1976, from 716,700 to 806,000, but have since declined to 630,600 in 1986.

The bulk of the proportional decline in the child population has been absorbed into the working ages (15–64 years) where the proportions increased between 1961 and 1986 from 59.0 percent to 66.0 percent, a numerical increase of approximately 560,000. This increase has occurred primarily among the younger working ages (below 45 years) and is a direct consequence of the ageing of the large post-war baby boom generation. It is noteworthy that the population of working age comprised a larger element in 1986 than at any other time since the Second World War.

The elderly (65 years and over) have not increased greatly as a proportion of the total population over the past 25 years (from 9.1 percent in 1961 to 10.7 percent in 1986). However, in numerical terms their growth over the period has been significant, the numbers classified as elderly increasing by 144,288, from 205,323 to 349,611. As the elderly have become an increasingly large group a change in the balance between young and old in the population has become a significant feature. In 1961 there were 286 elderly for every 1,000 children, by 1986 this had risen to 445 elderly per 1,000 children.

Maori Descent Population

The Maori population structure is distinguishable from that of the non-Maori chiefly by its youthfulness. Throughout most of this century the Maori population has been characterised by a higher concentration of people at younger ages, primarily because of its high level of fertility. Indeed, throughout the 50 year period 1926–1976 the child component (0–14 years) of the Maori population consistently exceeded 43 percent, reaching 50.3 percent in 1966. In 1961, when the impact of fertility was greatest, over 20 percent of the population was less than 5 years old.

Since 1971 the rapid and sustained decline in Maori fertility has had a major impact on the age structure of the Maori population, producing effects similar to those that have occurred in other former high-growth populations as they have gone through rapid fertility transitions. The overall changes in the age structure produced by the fertility decline are epitomised in the median age, which increased from 15.3 years in 1971 to 18.8 years in 1986.

With regard to particular age groups, the greatest change over the last 15 years has been a marked reduction in the proportion of children in the Maori population. In the period between the 1971 and 1986 population censuses, children (0–14 years) group

declined from 49.1 percent of the population to 38.5 percent. This reflected an absolute decline in the numbers under 15 years during the 1976–1986 period of 13,257 (from 168,357 to 155,100), a reduction which was spread through all 5-year age groups in the under-15 category.

Commensurate with the decline in the proportion of children in the population has been an expansion in the population of working age. From a share of 49.0 percent of the total population in 1971, adults from 15–64 years showed a consistent proportional increase to 58.7 percent in 1986. The increase was especially pronounced at the younger working ages. In fact, by 1986 the age group 15–29 years included over 129,400 people or nearly one third of the Maori population. This was considerably more than the 30–49 years' age group, which despite covering a broader agespan had a much smaller share (19.8 percent) of the population. The 50–64-year-olds comprised a further 6.8 percent of the working age population. In total, 236,860 Maori people were aged 15–64 years in 1986, over 125,000 more than in 1971.

A further trend, implicit in the above, has been the growth in the population of Maori women of reproductive age. In 1971, Maori women aged 15–49 years comprised 21.6 percent of the total population, but by 1986 this proportion had increased to 26.3 percent. In absolute numbers this represented an increase of 57,100. Moreover, in 1986 61.6 percent of these women were in the peak childbearing ages (under 30 years). This represents a substantial potential for increased births both currently and in the immediate future. Whether this will be realised, however, depends on trends in Maori fertility.

Despite the increasing adult component of the Maori population, the elderly still form a very small proportion of the total. Those 65 years and over comprised 2.8 percent of the Maori population in 1986, up from 1.9 percent in 1971. This was a numerical increase of 6,658, from 4,433 to 11,091.

Although the age structure of the Maori population has altered significantly in recent years, it still contrasts sharply with that of the non-Maori population. The sustained high-fertility rates of earlier decades have resulted in larger proportions of the Maori population in each age group under 30 years compared with the non-Maori population. This difference is evident in the median age of the Maori population—12.8 years below that of the non-Maori population in 1986.

Pacific Island Polynesian Population[2]

The Pacific Island Polynesian population in New Zealand, like that of the Maori population, has a youthful age structure but with some significant differences. Compared with the Maori population, the Polynesian population has a larger proportion in the 25–44 years' age group, and a relative deficit in the elderly group. In 1986, 32.5 percent of the Polynesian population in New Zealand was aged under 14 years, the working age population comprised a further 65.1 percent, and the elderly (65 and over) made up just 2.4 percent of the total.

The age structure of the Pacific Island population reflects the importance not only of fertility but also of immigration, and it is to this phenomenon that the most significant differences from the Maori population are attributable. The largest numbers of Polynesian immigrants are young adults, reflecting the age selectivity of Pacific Island Polynesian migration. This is highlighted by the relatively large share of the population aged 20–39 years (38 percent), and the high proportion of women of reproductive age (30 percent).

Sub-National Variations in Age Structure

Considerable variations in population-age structure occur from place to place in New Zealand. These variations reflect the differential impact of fertility, mortality, and external and internal migration on local populations.

One of the most fundamental distinctions occurring at the subnational level is between urban and rural populations. The age structures of these populations in 1986 were noticeably different. The rural population had a larger proportion in the under-15 years' age group (28.5 percent compared with 23.3 percent for the urban population), but a relative deficit at ages 65 years and over (7 percent compared with 11 percent for the urban population). This pattern has been a consistent feature of population structure in New Zealand throughout most of this century. It reflects higher rural fertility, on the one hand, and an apparent preference amongst the elderly for urban living, on the other.

Variations in age structure are also apparent between different regions in New Zealand. Auckland and Wellington, for instance,

[2] Refers to people solely of Pacific Island Polynesian origin.

show the effects of internal and external migration, with high proportions of their populations in the working age groups (15–64 years), but with relatively low proportions of children (0–14 years) and elderly (65 years and over) groups. Several regions are identifiable by their youthful population structures—a reflection of their relatively high fertility levels. Northland, the Bay of Plenty, Tongariro, and the East Cape fall into this category. All are characterised by proportions in excess of the national average in the 0–14 years' age group, and relatively low proportions in the 15–64 years and 65 years and over groups. By contrast, a number of other regions have significantly older age structures because of net outward migration. These regions—which include Aorangi, Coastal North-Otago, Canterbury, the West Coast and Wanganui—have relatively high proportions of their populations in the 15–64 years and 65 years and over age groups. They have lost some of their potential for natural increase because young reproductively active adults (and older teenagers) form above-average numbers of those leaving for other regions.

Future Prospects

In considering future trends in age structure it is important to note that much of what is projected to occur is pre-determined by the age structure of the existing population. For instance, those people who will make up New Zealand's elderly population at the turn of the century are already born. Future trends in age structure can therefore, be projected with a degree of certainty, at least in the short-term.

Given the current age profile of New Zealand's population, it is clear that barring a major demographic upheaval ageing will continue until well into next century. Indeed, the process will accelerate in about 2020 as the baby boom generation begins to enter old age. An indication of this shift in the overall age composition of the population towards the older ages is provided by the increase in the median age. In 1986 the median age of 28.9 years was the highest it had been since the 1950s. The projected median age of 31.6 years in 1991 would be higher than at any previous date since population records were first kept in New Zealand. By 2011 the median age could be 38.8 years and still rising.

The ageing of the population over the next 25–30 years will produce substantial changes in the size of different age groups,

both in numerical and proportional terms. The child population (0–14 years) is expected to decline as a proportion of the total population—from 24.4 percent in 1986 to 18.5 percent by the year 2011. This will represent a substantial reduction in child numbers of 85,385, from 794,985 in 1986 to 709,600 in 2011. Further subdivision of this group into the 0–4 years' and 5–14 years' groups reveals that there will be a brief upsurge in the youngest ages in the early 1990s as a result of increased births because of greater numbers of young adults in the main reproductive ages. This effect will be carried forward into the 5–14 age group in the late 1990s and the early twenty-first century.

With regard to the population of working age (15–64 years), the number is expected to increase from 2.12 million in 1986 to 2.63 million in 2011. This represents a proportional increase throughout the period from a 65.1 percent share of the total population in 1986 to 68.6 percent in 2011. Substantial changes within the working-age population are also imminent. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the labour force-entrant group (15–24 years) is projected to decline from 17.9 percent of the total population in 1986 to 13.1 percent in 2011 (an absolute decline of 81,390 people), while the older working ages will experience substantial growth. The increase in numbers in the 25–44 years' age group is expected to peak around the turn of the century when 1.17 million people or about 31.9 percent of the total population will be in these ages. Thereafter, a gradual decrease in numbers is expected. The oldest sector of the working age group (45–64 years) is not expected to alter significantly until the 1990s. From a share of 18.4 percent of the total population in 1986, it is projected to rise to 18.7 percent in 1991, then to 20.3 percent in 1996 and to 27.0 percent in 2011.

The elderly group (65 years and over) which currently makes up about 10 percent of the total population is expected to increase its share to around 13 percent by 2011. In numerical terms this will be an increase of approximately 149,186 people over the 1986–2011 period, from 342,114 to 491,300. The younger elderly (65–79 years), who in 1986 comprised the majority of the elderly, are expected to increase by about 33 percent over the next 25 years, to 370,500 by 2011. This would be an increase in the proportion of the total population in this group from 8.5 percent in 1986 to 9.7 percent in 2011. The older elderly (80 years and over) comprise a

much smaller group, numbering around 64,700 in 1986. Significantly, however, the relative growth in this group between 1986 and 2011 is expected to be more rapid than in any other. The older elderly are projected to number almost 120,800 in 2011, an increase of about 87 percent on the 1986 number. This substantial increase will be reflected in their share of the total population, which will rise from 2.0 percent in 1986 to 3.2 percent in 2011.

Maori and Pacific Island Populations

Unofficial projections of the Maori population indicate that the changes noted above for the total population will be both marked and accelerated for the Maori population (Pool and Pole, 1984). Over the next 25 years the child component of the Maori population is projected to decline both proportionately and absolutely, while growth in the adult age groups is projected to be rapid. Indeed, the labour force-entrant (15–24 years), middle-adult (25–44 years) and older (60 years and over) age groups are projected to grow at double the rate of the total population during the period to 2011. At ages 65 and over the growth is projected to be in excess of 300 percent.

Although there are at present no authoritative projections for the Pacific Island Polynesian population, changes over the next few decades may well have many of the elements noted already for the Maori population but exaggerated by the effects of large-scale immigration in recent years (Population Monitory Group, 1986).

6 Ethnic and Cultural Diversity

Introduction

Contemporary New Zealand society is dominated by cultural traditions which emanate from Europe, especially from the British Isles. Yet less than 200 years ago, New Zealand had a population and cultural heritage that was wholly Polynesian. An enduring feature of New Zealand's cultural demography for at least 1,000 years has been a connection with Polynesia. Flows of people between island countries in the south-eastern Pacific, especially, and New Zealand have persisted through the 140 years of European settlement and domination. New Zealand's contemporary cultural and ethnic diversity comes mainly from its Maori and Pacific Island Polynesian groups.

Of the 3,261,783 people enumerated in New Zealand in the 1986 Population Census, 80.1 percent were of European origin, more particularly from the British Isles, but including also Dutch, Yugoslav, German and other nationalities. The next largest group was the indigenous Maori population, a people related to Pacific Polynesians. This group made up 12.4 percent of the total population. Third was Pacific Island Polynesians, most of whom had immigrated to New Zealand since the Second World War or were the offspring of those who had. They comprised around 3.5 percent of New Zealand's population in 1986. There were in addition small numbers belonging to other non-European groups, mainly Chinese and Indian; none of these made up a significant component of the total.

Historical Trends

Over the last 140 years the ethnic and cultural composition of New Zealand's population has been successively shaped and

reshaped by three main demographic processes: international migration; natural increase; and intermarriage between members of different groups. By far the most important of these processes has been international migration.

The first New Zealand settlers, the Maoris, are believed to have arrived some time between AD900 and AD1350. They were followed much later in the 1840s, by the first European settlers, who were predominantly from the British Isles, but included also small numbers of Dutch, Germans and French.

Following the development of the gold fields in the South Island in the 1860s there was a massive influx of settlers from Australia (mainly of British origin) and, near the end of the gold rush, Chinese. The Chinese were the first non-European settlement group (other than the Maori) of any size in New Zealand. From the early 1880s Chinese immigration was limited by the imposition of a poll tax. Although there was some further recruitment by chain migration, natural increase became the main factor in the subsequent growth of the Chinese population in New Zealand.

In the 1870s, the cultural diversity of New Zealand's population was further increased by massive immigration from the British Isles, and on a lesser scale from Germany, Bohemia and Scandinavia. The lower rates of net immigration in subsequent years saw some decline in this process of cultural diversification. However, three specific groups have had a major impact on New Zealand society.

The first of these is the late nineteenth century immigrants from the Adriatic's Dalmation Coast. They formed the basis of one of the larger European ethnic groups of non-British Isles origin, and initially were heavily concentrated in northern New Zealand. They have contributed significantly to the development of horticulture.

The second group is composed of settlers from India who began arriving in the early twentieth century, initially to work on drainage schemes. Indian migration to New Zealand did not really become significant, however, until after the First World War. Between 1920 and 1960 the Indian population increased from about 200 to 11,600. Since the early 1960s the Indian population has been augmented by the arrival of persons of Indo-Fiji origin, many of whom have come to New Zealand as students and who have entered a range of professions.

The third group consists of refugees from Europe who came in the 1930s and during the Second World War. Most were Jews and Poles. This movement intensified after the war, and over the past 40 years New Zealand has accepted small groups of refugees from a wide range of countries.

Throughout the early twentieth century there were also further waves of migration from the British Isles and Australia, a movement that was to grow substantially and one which continued to be the main source of immigrants until the mid-1970s. Following the Second World War there was also an important migratory movement from the Netherlands. Today most of those of Dutch descent in New Zealand were born here.

Since the early 1960s the cultural and ethnic diversity of New Zealand's population has been further enhanced by the massive inflow of Pacific Island Polynesians and the high growth rate of the New Zealand Maori population relative to that of the total population. A substantial increase in refugee immigration to New Zealand since the late 1970s has also contributed to a more diverse multicultural population.

New Zealand Maori Descent Population

Between 1961 and 1986 the Maori-descent population increased its share of the total New Zealand population from 8.4 percent to 12.4 percent. This growth occurred as a result of this section of the population's much more rapid rate of growth relative to the total population. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the Maori-descent population recorded growth rates more than double those of the total population (refer Table 6.1). Although there has been a marked deceleration in the growth of the Maori-descent population, especially since the mid-1970s, its average annual growth rate is still well above that of the total population—0.9 percent during 1981–6 compared with 0.5 percent for the total population.

Several factors have contributed to the more rapid rate of growth of the Maori-descent population relative to that of the total population. Firstly, their fertility levels have been much higher. Whereas substantial fertility declines were experienced by the total population in the early 1960s, this was not the case with the Maori population until a decade later. Maori fertility still remains above that for the total population, although it is now declining at a faster rate. A second significant factor has been a survival boom

TABLE 6.1: Growth of the Maori descent and total populations of New Zealand, 1961–1986

Census	*Maori-descent population* Number	*Maori-descent population* Average annual growth rate	*Total population* Number	*Total population* Average annual growth rate
1961	202,535	...	2,414,984	...
1966	249,867	4.2	2,676,919	2.1
1971	290,501	3.0	2,862,631	1.3
1976	356,847	4.1	3,129,383	1.8
1981	385,524	1.5	3,175,737	0.3
1986	403,185	0.9	3,261,783	0.5

Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings, Maori Volumes 1961–86, Department of Statistics

which began earlier this century and has steadily reduced Maori to non-Maori mortality differentials. Thirdly, the Maori population has experienced a lower rate of net emigration than the total population over the last 25 years.

Two other factors affecting the growth of the Maori-descent population are Maori–non-Maori intermarriage and inter-ethnic mobility. There is a high level of intermarriage between the Maori and non-Maori populations. Its effect is to increase the relative size and growth rate of the Maori-descent population at the expense of the non-Maori descent population. While there are no data collected on the incidence of intermarriage between Maoris and non-Maoris, some insight into the prevalence of intermarriage in recent years can be gleaned from Population Census data. Between the 1971 and 1981 censuses, the proportion of under 15-year-olds of Maori descent who had one parent of non-Maori descent rose from 34 percent to 45 percent. Conversely, the proportion of children whose parents were both of half-or-more Maori descent fell from 59 percent to 47 percent, while those whose parents were both of full Maori descent declined from 43 percent in 1971 to 27 percent in 1981 (Department of Statistics, 1985b).

Inter-ethnic mobility refers to the movement of people between ethnic groups, usually from lower-status minority ethnic groups into higher-status ethnic groups in association with upward mobility. It is consistent with the general notion of integration (Pool, 1977; Brown 1983). The extent of inter-ethnic mobility between the Maori and non-Maori populations over the last 2 decades is not known.

Pacific Island Polynesians

The past 25 years have seen a tremendous growth in the population of Pacific Island Polynesians in New Zealand. From a total of 14,340 in 1961, the Polynesian population increased more than 8-fold to around 115,000 in 1986. Significantly, the growth of the Pacific Island Polynesian population during the 1960s and 1970s outstripped that of all other ethnic groups in New Zealand. Indeed, during most intercensal periods over the last two-and-half decades the New Zealand-resident Polynesian population has recorded growth rates approximately 3 times higher than those of the Maori-descent population and more than 6 times higher than those of the total population (refer Tables 6.1 and 6.2). As a result, the Pacific Island Polynesian share of the total New Zealand population has increased from 0.6 percent in 1961 to around 3.5 percent in 1986. The share is even higher in certain parts of the country, particularly in certain suburbs in Auckland and Wellington, due to the high concentrations of the Polynesian population.

The rapid growth of the Pacific Island Polynesian population in New Zealand over the past 25 years has occurred as a result of high levels of natural increase and net immigration. Initially, substantial immigration of young people from the New Zealand Dependencies and independent island nations in the South Pacific was the main reason for the growth of this population in New Zealand. During the 1961–6 and 1966–1971 intercensal periods international migration accounted for 64 percent and 60 percent respectively of the overall growth of the population. Unprecedentedly high levels of net immigration of Pacific Island Polynesians to New Zealand during the early 1970s resulted in international migration accounting for over three quarters of the 29,466 increase in this population in New Zealand from 1971–6.

In the latter half of the 1970s, in a less-favourable economic climate, the net inflow of Pacific Island Polynesians to New Zealand fell sharply (from 23,622 in 1971–6 to 6,948 in 1976–1981) and natural increase became a much more important process influencing Polynesian population growth. In the 1981 census, 45 percent of the 90,787 people who classed themselves as Pacific Island Polynesian, and who were usually resident in New Zealand, had been born in New Zealand.

The 1980s have seen a return to substantial net migration gains from Polynesia. Between 1 April 1981 and 31 March 1986 there

TABLE 6.2: Growth of the Pacific Island Polynesian population in New Zealand, 1961–1986

Census	*Number*	*Average annual growth rate*
1961	14,340	...
1966	26,271	12.1
1971	40,918	8.9
1976	70,384	10.8
1981	90,787	5.1
1986	115,000[1]	4.7

[1]Provisional

Source: Country Monograph Series No. 12, Population of New Zealand, Vol. 1, United Nations, 1985

were 14,856 more arrivals than departures in the Polynesian migration flows. These people added 30 percent to the Polynesia-born population enumerated in New Zealand in the 1981 census. The relevant contribution this migration made to the Polynesian population (both Polynesia- and New Zealand-born) enumerated in 1981 was 18 percent. Thus international migration in the 1980s remains a very important determinant of growth in this component of New Zealand's population.

Refugees

The growth in refugee immigration to New Zealand over the past 10 years has been a further factor contributing to New Zealand's growing ethnic diversity. Since 1975 more than 7,500 refugees have been resettled in New Zealand. While the numbers involved are still very small in comparison with total migration flows to and from New Zealand, they are considerable compared to the size of previous refugee inflows.

Traditionally European refugees have formed the vast majority of refugees who have settled in New Zealand. Since the late 1970s, however, the number of European refugees admitted has been greatly surpassed by the number of Indo-Chinese refugees. Altogether, about 7,000 Indo-Chinese refugees have been resettled in New Zealand since 1975, accounting for over 90 percent of the total refugee intake. This reflects not only the increasing number of Third World refugees in the world, but also what is thought to be the culmination of the resettlement approach to solving refugee

problems and the special interest New Zealand has in assisting refugees from the South-East Asian and Pacific regions.

It is estimated that Indo-Chinese people comprise around 0.2 percent of New Zealand's total population. They include people from a variety of cultural groups, including Kampuchean, Laotian, Vietnamese, Vietnamese-Chinese and other mixed-race groups.

In addition to Indo-Chinese refugees, New Zealand's refugee intake over the last 10 years has included small numbers of Chilean, Russian, Jewish, East European and Assyrian refugees. While none of these has formed a significant component of the total they have each contributed towards a more diverse multicultural population in New Zealand.

7 Geographic Distribution of Population

Introduction

By world standards, New Zealand's population density of about 12 persons per square kilometre is low. However, it must be remembered that population settlement in New Zealand is greatly affected by the nature of the land and climate. Mountains, lakes and rough hill country cover 75 percent of the country, restricting settlement to about 25 percent of the land area. A better notion of the country's population density can be gained by basing the computation on usable land area. This gives an average population density of about 19 persons per square kilometre.

Over the last 100 years two major trends relating to the geographical distribution of the population have been strikingly evident: a growing concentration of population in the north of the country, and an increasing proportion living in urban areas.

Regional Distribution

In pre-European days and until 1860 most of New Zealand's population lived in the North Island. The South Island became the more populated island during the last 4 decades of the nineteenth century, largely as a result of considerable net inflows following the discovery of the Otago goldfields. Since 1900, however, when the populations of the 2 islands were roughly equal, the North Island's share has increased steadily. By 1986, 74 out of every 100 people in New Zealand were located in the North Island. This growing imbalance in North-South population distribution reflects net internal migration from the South Island to the North Island, higher natural increase rates in the North Island and greater settlement of overseas immigrants on the North Island.

Since the mid-1940s the centre of gravity of New Zealand's population has steadily moved further towards the north of the country, and growth has become increasingly concentrated in the Auckland region. Between 1981 and 1986 population growth in this region accounted for 45 percent of the total population growth in New Zealand. By 1986, 1 out of every 4 people in New Zealand lived in the Auckland region, and its population (887,448) exceeded that of the entire South Island for the first time.

Although much the greatest population increase has occurred in metropolitan Auckland, a number of other regions have experienced relatively rapid rates of growth in recent years. Northland and the Bay of Plenty are particularly notable in this regard. Their growth rates during the 1981–6 intercensal period were faster than that of Auckland, nearly triple and double the national growth rate respectively, and more than double the growth rates of most other regions. Thames Valley, Horowhenua and Clutha-Central Otago also grew more rapidly than Auckland, while Nelson and Marlborough experienced more rapid population growth than the national average. These same regions also recorded some of the highest growth rates during the 1976–1981 period (refer Table 7.1).

Population growth in the country's remaining 14 regions in the southern half of the North Island and in the South Island has been much slower. They all recorded growth rates below the national average during 1981–6, with the result that their share of total population declined. Four regions—Wairarapa in the North Island and Aorangi, Coastal North Otago and Southland in the South Island—recorded absolute decreases in their populations during 1981–6 for the second successive intercensal period. Aorangi had the largest and most rapid population decrease, but 80 percent of this was directly attributable to the termination of hydro-construction based at Twizel. Southland's population decrease was more than four times as large as in the 1976–1981 period. This region had much the largest, and the most rapid 1981–6 population decline if the exceptional effect of Twizel on the Aorangi figure is excluded, and was larger and more rapid than most of the 1976–1981 regional decreases.

The decreases in the Wairarapa and Coastal North Otago regions during 1981–6 were much lower than during the late 1970s.

Several regions although recording population increases from 1981–6, grew more slowly than in the late 1970s. Tongariro, East

Cape and Manawatu fall into this category. By contrast, a number of other regions where population decreased during the second half of the 1970s had increases in numbers of residents during 1981–6. Notable amongst these is the West Coast, which recorded population growth for only the second time since 1951. The populations of Taranaki and Canterbury increased significantly during 1981–6 compared with their earlier decreases. Wanganui and Wellington also had population increases, but smaller than their earlier decreases.

Overall, the South Island had a population decrease of more than 8,000 people during the late 1970s, the first absolute decline in numbers for several decades. However, the population increased by about 13,000 during 1981–6, restoring the South Island total to about 5,000 more than its mid-1970s population. The North Island population increased by nearly 120,000 people, and this was more than 90 percent of the total population growth during 1981–6.

A number of factors have influenced the pattern of regional growth over the last decade. While differences in fertility, mortality and age structure effects have all been significant, most of the variation has been attributable to the differential impact of migration. Of major significance in this regard has been regional employment growth and the increasing importance of retirement migration. In Northland, the Waikato, Tongariro, Aorangi and Clutha-Central Otago the effect of large-scale project employment has been a major influence. Agricultural employment and retirement migration have stimulated population increase in the Bay of Plenty, offsetting what appears to be either a decrease or slow growth in employment in that region. Retirement migration has also been an important factor in the high-growth regions of Horowhenua, Nelson Bays and Clutha-Central Otago. Auckland's growth reflects employment growth in a range of services despite some reduction in manufacturing employment. Both Wellington and Canterbury have experienced employment decreases in services and manufacturing employment, with Wellington having much the larger employment decrease overall (Population Monitoring Group, 1985a,b).

TABLE 7.1: Population change in local government regions, 1981–6

Region	Population 1981[1]	Population 1986[2]	Change 1981–86 Numerical	Change 1981–86 Percentage	Change 1976–81 Percentage
North Island—					
Northland	113,994	126,999	13,005	11.41	6.79
Auckland	824,408	887,448	60,040	7.25	3.93
Thames Valley	54,343	58,665	4,322	7.95	3.06
Waikato	221,850	228,303	6,453	2.91	1.65
Bay of Plenty	172,480	187,462	14,982	8.68	7.59
Tongariro	40,089	40,793	704	1.75	2.07
East Cape	53,295	53,968	673	1.26	1.57
Hawkes Bay	137,840	140,709	2,869	2.08	2.33
Taranaki	103,798	107,600	3,802	3.66	–1.48
Wanganui	68,702	69,439	737	1.07	–1.38
Manawatu	113,238	115,500	2,262	2.00	2.39
Horowhenua	49,296	53,592	4,296	8.71	2.06
Wairarapa	39,689	39,608	–81	–0.20	–3.22
Wellington	323,162	328,163	5,001	1.55	–1.88
South Island—					
Marlborough[3]	36,172	38,225	2,053	5.67	2.70
Nelson Bays	65,934	65,648	3,714	5.63	2.46
West Coast	34,178	34,942	764	2.23	–1.84
Canterbury	336,846	348,712	11,866	3.52	–0.59
Aorangi	84,772	81,294	–3,478	–4.10	–2.94
Coastal-N. Otago	138,164	137,393	–771	–0.56	–4.94
Clutha-C. Otago	45,402	48,771	3,369	7.42	4.28
Southland	107,905	104,618	–3,287	–3.05	–0.67
North Island	2,319,184	2,438,249	119,065	5.13	2.40
South Island	850,758	863,603	12,845	1,51	–0.97
Remainder[4]	5,795	5,232	–563	–9.71	7.59
New Zealand	3,175,737	3,307,084	131,347	4.17	1.48

[1]Population enumerated on 24 March 1981
[2]Population enumerated on 4 March 1986
[3]The 1981 total for Marlborough has been adjusted to exclude 1,385 army personnel present on defence force exercises on census night
[4]Included here are people enumerated on offshore islands and on board ships on census night, including Great Barrier and Chatham Islands
Source: Local Authority Population and Dwelling Statistics, 1986. Census of Population and Dwellings, Department of Statistics, 1986

Urbanisation

Urbanisation, the other major historical trend shaping the distribution of New Zealand's population, dates back to before the turn of the century. It has been characterised not only by an increasing concentration of population living in urban places (places with

populations of 1,000 or more), but an increasing proportion of population in larger urban centres. At the 1986 census, 84 percent of population lived in urban places, and 68 percent lived in New Zealand's main urban areas (places with 30,000 people or over). A major feature of the overall pattern of urbanisation in New Zealand in recent decades has been the growing ascendancy of Auckland metropolitan area as the major centre of population concentration. In 1986, it accounted for a quarter of New Zealand's population, as against 15 percent in 1921.

In view of New Zealand's long history of increasing concentration of population in urban places, it is of some interest to note that at the 1981 and 1986 censuses there was virtually no change in the urban (83.8 percent) and rural (16.2 percent) shares of population. This indicates that over the last decade the rural population increased at approximately the same rate as the total and urban populations, giving a 1981–6 rural population growth of approximately 26,000 people.

Much of the apparent growth in the rural population can be explained by the location of particular industries: it is not true rural population growth in the sense of people engaged in farming and closely related activities living what are popularly regarded as rural lifestyles. For instance, a large part of the Marsden Point oil refinery construction labour force was classed as living in rural areas at the time of the 1986 census. This accounted for a significant part of Northland's rural population increase since 1981 (Population Monitoring Group, 1986).

Significantly, not all parts of New Zealand have shared equally in the recent rural population growth. While some rural areas have grown rapidly and some at a more modest pace, others have shown only small population increases or have recorded absolute declines. Rural population growth during 1981–6 was strongest in the north of the North Island (between Manganui County in Northland and Opotiki County in the Bay of Plenty; in the north-west of the South Island (in Golden Bay, Waimea and Buller counties); and in Central Otago (in Lake and Vincent Counties). Population losses occurred in most counties on the East Coast, in the Wairarapa and in the central regions of the North Island, as well as in Marlborough and much of the southern half of the South Island.

Turning to the urban population, while as a proportion of total population it changed little between the 1981 and 1986 censuses, some classes of towns grew faster and some slower than the

national average. Metropolitan Auckland accounted for nearly 40 percent of total urban population growth, increasing its share of total population. By contrast, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin grew more slowly than the national average and therefore decreased their share of total population. The 13 main urban areas in the 30,000–100,000 population range accounted for about 20.5 percent of the total New Zealand population enumerated at the 1981 and 1986 censuses. Urban areas in the 10,000–29,999 range slightly decreased their share, while towns in the 1,000–9,999 range slightly increased their share of the total population.

The generally faster growth of the northern North Island and slower growth of the South Island is reflected in the growth rates of particular classes of urban areas. Non-metropolitan urban areas and towns in the 1,000–9,999 population range in the northern North Island had generally more rapid growth than those in the southern North Island, which in turn grew more rapidly than those in the South Island. Southern North Island secondary urban areas (the 10,000–29,999 range) had more rapid population growth than those in the northern North Island, though only through the effect of a single urban centre, Kapiti. Of the five South Island secondary urban areas, only Blenheim showed an increase in population.

Ethnic Pattern of Settlement

The geographic distribution of the Maori population has changed in a significantly different way to that of the total population. The Maori population has always been concentrated in the North Island. In the mid-1920s, 95 percent of Maoris lived in the North Island, and nearly three quarters in the northern North Island. Since then, there has been a significant shift to the southern North Island and the South Island. Despite this drift south, which stands in marked contrast to the northwards drift of the total population, two-thirds of Maoris still live in the northern North Island, where in some regions they represent more than 20 percent of the total population. This compares with about 12 percent nationally.

The most striking change in the settlement pattern of the Maori population, however, has been its extremely rapid urbanisation. Maori rates of urbanisation have been the most rapid of an indigenous population anywhere. The proportion of the Maori population living in urban areas increased from barely a quarter in 1945,

to more than half in the early 1960s and to three quarters by the mid-1970s. In 1981 the proportion stood at 79 percent, almost equal to that of the total population. Coupled with the rapid rates of urbanisation is the fact that an increasing proportion of Maoris, probably a majority, have been born and raised in urban areas. A significant feature of the Maori pattern of urban settlement is the relatively high proportion living in smaller urban centres. Approximately 2 in every 10 Maoris live in urban centres with populations below 10,000, as against 1 in 10 non-Maoris (Department of Statistics, 1985b).

Another noteworthy aspect of the pattern of Maori population distribution is the high level of concentration in urban centres. Urban residential concentration of Maoris has been determined by the recent nature of their urbanisation (chain migration is in evidence), low incomes and institutional intervention in the housing market. In the 1950s Maoris tended to concentrate in the inner-city rental areas, but now most Maori households move directly to the outer suburbs, especially those close to industrial employment. The capitalisation of the family benefit and the construction of low-cost state housing and Department of Maori Affairs housing has facilitated Maori home ownership in the outer suburbs. The socio-economic status of many Maoris has generally prevented them from buying into the best suburbs, and they are also under-represented in those middle-class suburbs built before the Second World War and prior to Maori urbanisation.

The settlement pattern of Pacific Island Polynesians in New Zealand differs from that of the Maori and of total population. Since its start Polynesian migration has been essentially to urban centres in New Zealand. In 1945 three quarters of the locally resident Pacific Island Polynesians were living in the main urban areas. By 1981 the proportion had increased to 93 percent, making Pacific Island Polynesians the most highly urbanised group in New Zealand.

The high urban concentration of Polynesians in New Zealand stands in sharp contrast to conditions on the Islands. Over 70 percent of Tongans, Samoans and Cook Islanders are rural residents in their island homes; in Tokelau and on Niue there are no towns and everyone lives in villages. High levels of urban concentration in New Zealand reflect radical changes in residential environment, housing and amenity provision, social space and occupation structures for the different Polynesian ethnic groups.

The largest urban concentration of Pacific Island Polynesians is found in Auckland. In 1981, 64 percent of Polynesians in New Zealand were resident there. Like the Maori population, Pacific Island Polynesians are highly visible in selected parts of urban areas, a consequence of chain migration and of their concentration in low-income groups. But this pattern of urban residential concentration appears to be changing though, as New Zealand-born and educated Polynesians become more numerous in the housing and job markets. Occupational and residential mobility is generating dispersal of Polynesians, a trend first apparent in the late 1970s, and one that is likely to accelerate in the 1980s as the significance of immigration from the Islands in the growth of New Zealand's Polynesian population decreases in relation to natural increase.

Future Prospects

Major changes to the distribution of New Zealand's population are highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. Projections of regional population change indicate a continuation of the general northward drift of population and a greater concentration of population in the North Island, especially its northern half.

Most regional population growth during the period to 2006 is projected to occur in the Northland, Auckland, Waikato and Bay of Plenty regions. Thames Valley, Hawkes Bay, Taranaki, Manawatu and Canterbury are projected to have moderate growth during this period, while the West Coast, Aorangi and Coastal North Otago are projected to have a population decline (Department of Statistics, 1987c).

Whether the upturn in rural population growth experienced during the late 1970s and early 1980s will continue is unclear. In some developed countries, such as the United States and Britain, a resurgence in rural population growth has been in operation for more than a decade with no signs of a reversal. In others, such as Norway, the resurgence was shortlived. In New Zealand the trend appears to be associated with the location of industry, resort–retirement activity, and a growing preference for country living (although in many cases this may involve commuting to jobs in urban areas).

8 Internal Migration

Introduction

New Zealanders are highly mobile. Migration statistics from the 1981 census indicate that over two fifths of the population aged 5 years or older and usually resident in New Zealand in 1981, had made at least 1 change of address within New Zealand over the previous 5 years. The internal movement of people, in particular from the South Island to the North Island and from rural to urban areas, has played an important role in shaping the broad pattern of population distribution in New Zealand. While the northward drift of population continues, rural-urban relocation has become less important in recent years than redistribution between major urban centres.

Migration Patterns

Most changes of residence in New Zealand in recent years have involved relatively short-distance moves. For instance, over two thirds of all moves between the 1976 and 1981 censuses were to another residence in the same region. Short-distance moves of this type are especially common in the larger urbanised regions (Roseman and Crothers, 1984). They are believed to be largely a response to changes in individual or family circumstances, such as getting married, increasing family size or death of a spouse, or to upward social mobility entailing the purchase of a new house of better quality, greater size or better location than the former one.

Movement over longer distances, defined as between regions, has been much the smaller component of residential mobility in New Zealand. Shifts between regions in the 1976–1981 intercensal period were less than half as numerous as those within regions. Despite being less important in numerical terms, movement between regions is more important than that within regions in

shaping the broad pattern of population distribution in New Zealand.

During the 1971–6 and 1976–1981 intercensal periods, net population flows in New Zealand generally favoured regions located in the northern part of each island, confirming a long-established tendency of a general northward drift of population (refer Table 8.1). With the exception of Horowhenua, which is becoming an important retirement zone, the highest-growth areas from internal migration over the 1971–1981 decade have been Northland, Auckland and Bay of Plenty in the north of the North Island, and Nelson Bays in the north of the South Island. All four regions increased their net migration gains from 1971–6 to 1976–1981. Not only was population growth from internal migration concentrated in selected regions during the 1970s, but net losses were also regionally concentrated. Nine regions—6 in the North Island and 3 in the South Island—experienced net migration outflow during both the 1971–6 and 1976–1981 intercensal periods. Furthermore, 5 of these regions Taranaki, Wellington, Wairarapa, West Coast and Coastal North Otago—experienced greater net outflow during 1976–1981 than during 1971–6, suggesting that population losses from migration during the 1970s became increasingly concentrated in these regions. Taken overall, the North Island made a net population gain from the South Island of 8,259 during 1976–1981, up from 3,724 during 1971–6.

Contrary to what net migration flows might suggest, internal migration in New Zealand is not a one-way process; for every migration stream moving in one direction, there is usually a well-developed counter-stream. Thus, the net population gain or loss to any region is usually only a small imbalance when compared with the number of migrants moving into or out of a region, suggesting that migrants have differing perceptions of the opportunities in an area. Consequently, no matter how attractive an area is, there are always people who see the grass as greener elsewhere and move on. During the 1970s uneveness of population flows in most cases favoured regions to the north. Southland lost to Otago, Otago lost to Canterbury, Canterbury lost to Wellington, Wellington lost to Auckland and Auckland lost to Northland. A greater majority of the regions in the southern North Island also lost population to their northern neighbours.

TABLE 8.1: Net migration by local government regions, 1971–1981

Local government region	*Net migration 1971–1976*	*1976–1981*
Northland	933	2,391
Auckland	10,350	16,347
Thames Valley	852	276
Bay of Plenty	5,223	7,410
Waikato	405	–1,779
Tongariro	–2,379	–465
East Cape	–2,604	–1,272
Hawkes Bay	1,137	216
Taranaki	–1,797	–2,391
Wanganui	–2,793	–2,022
Manawatu	168	111
Horowhenua	3,405	1,077
Wellington	–7,953	–9,642
Wairarapa	–1,200	–2,124
Nelson Bays	1,506	1,686
Marlborough	840	366
West Coast	–837	–1,050
Canterbury	1,962	648
Aorangi	726	–2,346
Clutha-Central Otago	–1,356	609
Coastal North Otago	–1,842	–4,422
Southland	–4,737	–3,582

Source: Inter-Regional Migration in New Zealand, 1971–1981, Department of Statistics, 1986

Throughout the 1971–1981 decade Auckland played an important role as the focal point for much of the inter-regional migration, gaining population at the expense of most other regions. Wellington region, which contains the cities of Lower Hutt and Upper Hutt, and Petone Borough as well as the capital was the second major destination for migrants. Its function appeared to be that of a population redistribution centre, gaining population mainly from the South Island regions, and sending migrants to most North Island regions. The 4 largest destinations for migrants from Wellington during the 1970s were in descending order: Auckland, Horowhenua, Bay of Plenty and Hawkes Bay. Canterbury region, the third major destination for migrants, performed a similar function in the South Island as Wellington in the North Island.

Another major feature of inter-regional migration in New Zealand is that most movement has occurred between neighbouring regions, paralleling the experience of other countries. During the 1971–6 and 1976–1981 intercensal periods, 15 of the country's 22 regions received one third of their in-migrants from, or sent one third of their out-migrants to, the adjacent regions. For at least 8 regions—Northland, Thames Valley, Tongariro, Horowhenua, Waikato, West Coast, Aorangi and Clutha-Central Otago—the corresponding proportion was over a half. The major flows over long distances were almost always between regions that contained major urban centres.

While the major features of inter-regional migration in New Zealand over recent years can be readily identified, the underlying causal factors are much more difficult to determine. It is difficult to draw parallels between even the economic status of a region and net in—and out-migration, because current economic conditions are only one of a number of factors which contribute to the direction and magnitude of migration streams. Factors such as climate; job, educational and recreational opportunities; health facilities; social and cultural activities; crime rates; housing; family and relatives; and even the physical attractiveness of an area all have an effect on a person's decision to migrate there (Crothers, 1981).

Typically, regions losing population in unequal exchanges exhibit the following characteristics: no large urban centre; little or no economic growth; poorer climate to that of neighbouring regions; limited job opportunities for school leavers; and a significant proportion of population living in rural areas. In marked contrast, regions gaining population are those mainly located in the northern half of each island and are generally characterised by mild climates and prosperous business communities.

Rural to Urban and Inter-Urban Migration

Movement from rural to urban areas, is perhaps the most long-standing and well-documented internal migration flow in the history of New Zealand. It dates from the closing decades of the last century, and has been the primary agent of change underlying the relocation of population from the mainly rural location of the Victorian period to the highly urbanised distribution of the 1980s (in 1986 84.0 percent of the population lived in urban places of 1,000 or more people).

In broad terms rural to urban migration, or urban drift as it has sometimes been called, has been attributable to lack of opportunities in rural areas and perceived opportunities in urban centres, particularly the larger metropolitan centres. Developments in farming and primary industries have contributed to this trend through modernisation of production and processing, amalgamation of farm holdings, and relocation and centralisation of some processing industries. As well as these, substitution of contracting and co-operative organisation for hired labour, increased efficiency of transportation of goods and people, and the consequent redundancy of widely dispersed service functions (such as retailing, schooling and medical care) have also been major contributors.

Although a small but sustained flow of people from rural to urban places is still evident, it is nowadays less important numerically than the flow of persons between the nation's larger urban places. Some insight into the nature and magnitude of urban-to-urban migration in New Zealand can be gained from looking at population exchanges between the seven major urban centres of the country, sometimes referred to as statistical divisions. These centres, which contain populations of 75,000 or more, have grown largely as a result of migration (Department of Statistics, 1986b). Because of the wider economic and social opportunities offered by these centres, they attract skilled and unskilled workers and families from a wide range of areas. In general, the larger the centre the greater the propensity to move there.

A significant feature of population exchanges between major urban centres during the 1970s was the increasing importance of the northward streams, and a substantial decline in the size of the southward counter-streams. This mirrors the overall pattern of population movement in New Zealand. Auckland statistical division was the destination of the largest number of out-migrants from each statistical division, with the exception of Dunedin, and it made net population gains from all statistical divisions. Its net gain of 12,639 in 1976–1981 was 71 percent higher than during 1971–6, with almost half being at the expense of Hamilton and Christchurch.

At the other end of the scale, Dunedin, the southernmost statistical division, lost to all other statistical divisions during the 1970s—its net out-migration during 1976–1981 exceeded that during 1971–6 by 1,132 or 58 percent. Almost half of Dunedin's total net population loss of 3,069 during 1976–1981 was to its

immediate northern neighbour Christchurch, a fifth to Wellington and a slightly smaller proportion to Auckland. In turn, Christchurch statistical division lost to all North Island divisions, the largest loss being to Auckland, followed by Wellington. This northward drift extends to Wellington, which lost 2,000 more people during 1976–1981 than during 1971–6—6,045 against 4,048. Wellington lost population to all its northern neighbours, including Palmerston North, from which it had gained during 1971–6.

Overall, all statistical divisions except Auckland and Napier-Hastings recorded net losses during 1976–1981. The net population losses from Hamilton, Palmerston North and Wellington Statistical Divisions were due chiefly to their relatively large net population losses to Auckland, which tended to completely offset their gains from other statistical divisions.

Population exchanges between statistical divisions played a major role in inter-regional migration in New Zealand during the 1970s. For example, net in-migration from other statistical divisions accounted for over three quarters of the Auckland region's net gain from other regions during 1976–1981. Similarly, over half of the Hawkes Bay region's small gain was due to that statistical division's gain from other ones. Conversely, between two thirds and three quarters of the net out-migration from the Waikato, Wellington and Coastal North Otago regions was due to the net outflow from their respective statistical divisions to other ones. If the analysis was to be extended to cover other main urban areas, the role of urban-to-urban migration in inter-regional migration would be even greater.

Maori Migration

The migration experience of the Maori population in New Zealand has varied from that of the total population in several important ways. First and foremost, the rural-to-urban movement of the Maori commenced much later than that of the total population. It only really became significant after 1945, and in the space of just 2 decades transformed the Maori population from a mainly rural to a predominantly urban one. The urbanisation of the Maori, which was in part precipitated by government policies which emphasised the urban location of new housing and opportunities for job training, is thought to be one of the most rapid on record

for an ethnic minority anywhere. The extent of the urbanisation of Maoris (in 1986 81.0 percent lived in urban places of 1,000 or more) is approaching the high level achieved in the total population.

The rural-to-urban movement of Maori people continued through the 1970s, albeit at a slower pace than in the preceding two decades. The largest net inflows were to South Auckland, Christchurch, Porirua, Hamilton and Western Auckland urban areas. But not all Maori migration during the 1970s, was to the towns. A new trend to emerge was a movement from urban areas back to the ancestral marae in the countryside (Stokes, 1979). This was particularly noticeable among older city Maori, many of them survivors of an earlier generation of rural-to-urban migrants, although more recent evidence suggests it has become more widespread (Bedford and Pool, 1985). It has been suggested that this return movement is symptomatic of some reassessment by Maori generally of ethnic cultural institutions, the role of land in Maori culture, and the Maori place in New Zealand society (Heenan, 1985).

A further internal migration flow of significance has been the continued exodus of Maori people from areas of traditional settlement like Northland, the East Coast and South Auckland. This has been a longstanding trend, and has been accompanied by a net movement of Maori population to both urban and rural places in the South Island. Its effect has been to increase the proportion of the South Island population which is Maori, from 5 percent in 1966 to 7 percent in 1981.

Characteristics of Migrants

Not all New Zealanders are equally mobile. Those who migrate tend to be heavily concentrated in the young-adult age groupings, and in the early phases of career and family life cycle. Men and women in their late teens, twenties and early thirties are the most mobile groups, with peak mobility being achieved at ages 20–29 years. Beyond the age of 30 the likelihood of moving declines more or less continuously to old age. There is, however, some evidence of an increase in propensity to move at ages coinciding with retirement (60–64 years) and again among very old women. Despite this, the elderly still remain the least mobile section of the population.

Migration is also occupationally selective. White-collar workers, particularly those in professional and technical, administrative and managerial and service occupations generally have the highest mobility, with most other groups having fairly average mobility. Agricultural workers are the only group with particularly low mobility, partly on account of property ownership and ties to land. The high mobility of white-collar workers is probably related to career orientations, migration often being a necessary step in promotion and social advancement. Promotions and transfers within and between large organisations play a major part in the careers of many people. It is likely therefore that organisations are responsible for initiating substantial flows within New Zealand.

9 Labour Force

Introduction

The New Zealand full-time labour force[3] has grown quite considerably in the post-Second World War period. During 1945–1981, it more than doubled in size, increasing from 662,740 to 1,331,210 in total. By 1986, it had increased even further to 1,448,523. This growth has come about for three main reasons. Firstly, there has been the effect of the post-war baby boom, seen in the growing number of young people entering the labour market. Secondly, there has been a big increase in the number of women entering (and re-entering) the workforce. Thirdly, external migration has played an important role in the growth of the labour force.

While the labour force has grown throughout the post-war era, the rate at which it has increased has fluctuated. In particular, there was rapid growth of nearly 2 percent annually from 1951–6 and over 2 percent annually in the years between 1961–6 and 1971–6. Lower rates of growth were recorded during the recession of the late 1960s and during the second half of the 1970s. However, from 1981–6, growth in the labour force picked up again to record an average annual rate of increase of 1.7 percent (refer Table 9.1).

By far the most important contributor to the growth of the labour force in the post-Second World War period has been natural increase, which is the result of growth in the population of working-age whereby the numbers entering the labour force exceed those retiring from it (Population Monitoring Group, 1985). This has occurred largely as a result of the entry of the first products of the post-war baby boom into the labour force. For example, from 1951–1961, just over 52,000 teenagers aged 15–19 joined the working-age population. Over the 1961–1971 period,

[3]Persons aged 15 years and over working 20 hours or more per week including those persons unemployed and seeking work.

TABLE 9.1: Growth of the New Zealand full-time labour force 1945–1986[1]

Census	*Total full-time labour force*	*Average annual growth rate (%)*
1945	662,740	–
1951	740,496	1.85
1956	816,852	1.96
1961	895,363	1.84
1966	1,026,039	2.72
1971	1,118,835	1.73
1976	1,272,333	2.57
1981	1,331,210	0.90
1986	1,448,523	1.69

[1]Persons aged 15 years and over working 20 hours or more per week including those unemployed and seeking work

Sources: Country Monograph Series No. 12, Population of New Zealand, Vol. 2, United Nations, 1985

Provisional National Summary Statistics, Series C, Report 1, Department of Statistics, 1987a

the first members of the post-war baby boom reached working-age, increasing the size of the working-age population by around 78,600. In the 1971–1981 period, a further 58,800 young people joined the working-age population (Department of Statistics, 1985b).

External migration has played an important role in regulating the size and growth of the New Zealand labour force. Fluctuations in net migration, resulting in losses and gains to the New Zealand labour force, have occurred a number of times over the last 30 years. Gains from immigration were especially important during the immediate post-war period. Indeed, had it not been for the effect of external migration the labour force would have declined in size. The period 1945–1966 was marked by relaxed immigration controls. These, combined with buoyant economic conditions encouraged a high level of immigration into New Zealand. Net migration losses occurred in the 1966–1971 intercensal period followed by gains during 1971–6. In more recent years, big losses of economically active migrants occurred in the late 1970s, followed by some net gains in the early 1980s. Since 1984, the migration balance has turned to a net loss. Because of the age selectivity of emigration, a large proportion of the net losses to the labour force have occurred in the younger age groups. Forty-three percent of the migration loss of 69,000 to the labour force in the 1976–1981

period was in the 15–24 year age group. Transtasman flows now account for around half of New Zealand's external migration and consequently are a significant contributor to fluctuations in the New Zealand labour force, caused by net migration.

The third area of change, and one which has had a major social effect, has been changes in labour force participation. Over most of the period 1945–1986, declining labour force participation rates of males have acted as a growth-reducing agent. For females, however, participation rates have increased and have been the most important factor in the growing size of the female labour force since 1961. The main reason for the increased participation rates of females has been the substantial increase in participation by women aged over 30 years (Zodgekar, 1985).

Patterns of Labour Force Participation by Age and Sex

Trends and patterns in labour force participation reveal a range of diversity over different ages. Overall, during the post-war period there has been a decline in the percentage of young people in the labour force. Women, in particular those aged 30 and over, have increased their participation. Men aged 55 years and over have played a decreasing role.

Declines in labour force participation at younger ages (15–19 years) have been due to the growing tendency to stay on longer at school. This has been linked with decreasing opportunities for paid work in recent years. Young people, it would seem, are remaining at school to avoid the risk of unemployment and to acquire more qualifications and skills which will help them find a job (Catherwood, 1985). While in 1951, 7 in every 10 teenagers in the 15–19 year age group were in the full-time labour force, by 1981 this had declined to 5 in every 10 (Department of Statistics, 1985b). This figure remained unchanged in 1986.

The growing involvement of females in the labour force has been one of the most significant developments in the post-war period. Whereas only 29.1 percent of females aged 15–64 were actively engaged in the labour force in 1945, by 1981 the proportion had increased to 45.8 percent. In 1981 there were about 525 women for every 1,000 men in the labour force—an increase from just over 200 women per 1,000 men in 1951. Until recently, most women in the labour force were aged under 25 years. Nowadays

there are many older women. This is reflected in the rise in the median age of females in the full-time labour force, from 27 years in 1951 to 32 years in 1981. Moreover, there has been a large increase in the number of married women in employment. Increased participation of married women in the labour force has been an important factor in the overall increase in the labour force participation of women. Marked changes in marriage and childbearing patterns have progressively made it easier for women to gain employment outside the home (Zodgekar, 1985; Department of Statistics, 1985b).

For many women, the responsibilities associated with being a mother restrict their involvement in the paid workforce. The younger the age of the youngest child, the less likely is the mother to be engaged in paid work. In 1981 for example, 80 percent of mothers with a child under 1 year old were not engaged in paid work. For those mothers with a 5-year-old child, about 60 percent were not in paid work (Social Monitoring Group, 1985).

The participation rate of older workers (55–64 years) peaked in the early 1970s. Since then there has been a loss of workers in this age group from the full-time labour force. The decline in participation of older workers is predominantly a male phenomenon. Over the 1971–1981 decade, the proportion of men aged 60–64 years who were in paid work fell from two thirds to under a half. For those 65–69 years of age, the fall was from one third to under a fifth. Explanations for the decline in male participation at ages 55 years and over have not yet been researched very well in New Zealand. However, several reasons for the decline have been suggested. One is the tighter employment conditions which are believed to be encouraging earlier retirement. When labour is scarce, older workers may be encouraged to remain in their jobs and delay retirement, but the opposite is now more likely to be the case. The universal availability since 1977 of national superannuation at age 60 may also have been a factor encouraging withdrawal from paid work (Department of Statistics, 1985b).

Patterns of Labour Force Participation by Ethnic Group

Growth in the labour force, particularly between 1971 and 1981, was accompanied by a growing ethnic diversity. The Pacific Island Polynesian labour force had the greatest growth over this period,

more than doubling in size from 16,550 in 1971 to just over 35,000 in 1981. The Maori labour force increased its size in 1981 by almost half of what it was in 1971 from 70,900 to almost 104,200. The residual group (including Europeans, Chinese, Indians and others) grew by about a sixth of its 1971 size. In 1981, 1 in every 10 workers was either Maori or Pacific Island Polynesian. Maori and Pacific Island Polynesian workers tend to be much younger than other members of the workforce, reflecting the younger overall age structure of these two populations. In 1981, two fifths of all Maori workers were aged between 15 and 24 years. Pacific Island Polynesian workers were more heavily concentrated in the middle years (25–44 years).

The likelihood of participating in the labour force varies substantially from one ethnic group to another. Participation rates of Maori males are generally lower than non-Maori males except for the young (15–24 years) and the old (70 years and over) age groups. Higher labour force participation by 15–19 year old Maori males reflects the shorter time spent in formal education. The reasons for the lower participation of Maoris aged 25–59 are complex. Included among these are factors such as health differentials and attitudes towards seasonal and part-time work (Population Monitoring Group, 1984).

Maori women are less likely than women from other groups to work full—time. They tend to join the labour force at an earlier age, again reflecting less time spent in formal education. They also withdraw at a younger age. Reasons for this would include a tendency to undertake family commitments at a younger age. While social and cultural differences are part of the overall cause, economic factors such as occupational limitations and higher unemployment among Maori women may also be involved.

Pacific Island Polynesian women have the highest participation rates in the full-time labour force of all women. As with other ethnic groups, their labour force participation dips in the peak childbearing years from 20–34 years. However, in the years following their labour force participation increases to a level in excess of any other ethnic group (Department of Statistics, 1985b; Population Monitoring Group, 1984; Poot and Brosnan, 1982).

Trends in Labour Market Structure

Industry

Changes within the industrial structure of the New Zealand labour force over the last 30 years have seen a consistent decline in the importance of primary industries. The rise in the importance of the tertiary or service-sector industry group has been very pronounced over the same period. In 1951, almost 47 percent of the New Zealand workforce was employed in the service sector. By 1981, this had risen to almost 55 percent (Thompson, 1985; Department of Statistics, 1985b).

The decline in the relative share of the labour force working in primary industries has been a long-term trend; moving from an overall share in 1945 of 22 percent to about 12 percent in 1981 (a slight rise from 1976 when it was 10.8 percent). Secondary industries have been declining in importance since the mid-1960s after having climbed in relative importance since the mid-1930s. This decline, however, has been slight; in the region of 3 or 4 percent over the last 20 years (Thompson, 1985).

Males still dominate certain industries. These include agriculture, forestry and fishing; and mining and manufacturing. However, the preponderance of males in these industries has declined over the 1970s. Although women do not dominate any particular industry sector, they tend to be concentrated more in the service industries, such as wholesale and retail trade; finance, insurance and business services; and community, social and personal services. The latter has been a major growth area for female employment, with large gains being made particularly in the 1971–6 intercensal period. In the laundry, cleaning and domestic services' industry group, a traditionally female-dominated area, an absolute decline in numbers occurred during 1971–1981, the only one of the community services industries to record such a decline.

Occupation

Overall, there have been some major changes in the distribution of the actively engaged between major occupation groups since 1951. The proportion of workers in professional and technical occupations has increased quite substantially, from 7.8 percent in 1951 to 14.3 percent in 1981, while the proportion in primary occupations (agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting) has declined from 18.8 percent in 1951 to 11.4 percent in 1981. Sales occupations now

account for a slightly smaller share of the workforce (9.9 percent in 1981 compared to 10.2 percent in 1951) while service occupations have increased their share (from 7.9 percent in 1951 to 8.3 percent in 1981). Occupations in the production sphere still make up the largest share of the workforce, although they too have declined during 1951–1981, from 40.2 percent to 35.7 percent of the actively engaged (Thompson, 1985).

The occupational structure of males and females differs markedly. This is a feature of many other western developed nations. Males predominate in production-type occupations (nearly 45 percent of male workers were in the production occupation group in 1981). Primary workers formed the second-largest occupational group among males in 1981 (Thompson, 1985).

In contrast, women are heavily concentrated in clerical occupations. Nearly a third of the female labour force were in these occupations in 1986. Women are also highly represented in sales occupations and professional/technical occupations (particularly nursing and teaching). However, there is some evidence of women now entering non-traditional occupations. The proportion of women in many occupations requiring high qualifications has also increased. For example, from 1971–1981, the proportion of women who were physicians increased from 7 to 14 percent; general practitioners from 6 to 12 percent; lawyers from 2 to 9 percent; and higher education and university teachers from 17 to 23 percent (Department of Statistics, 1985a,b).

Maori and Pacific Island Polynesian workers are still heavily concentrated in occupations requiring few or no formal qualifications. These are typically production work, transport operation and labouring occupations. They were more than twice as likely as members of other ethnic groups to be in production occupations in 1981, yet only a fifth as likely to be in professional/technical and managerial occupations. In general terms, the movement of Maori and Pacific Island Polynesians into professional and technical occupations during the 1970s was slower than for other ethnic groups. By 1981, changing economic conditions that ushered in higher unemployment also influenced trends in the changing occupational structure of the workforce. In particular, the trend towards higher proportions of Maori males and females in professional occupations was held in check (Department of Statistics, 1985b; Thompson, 1985).

Studies have found that, even controlling for age and education, Maori and Pacific Island Polynesian workers still earn less than non-Polynesians, suggesting that Maoris and Pacific Island Polynesians are either discriminated against or are unwilling to offer themselves for certain occupations (Hill and Brosnan, 1984).

Employment status

The major change in recent years with regard to employment status (refer Table 9.2) has been the dramatic rise in the number of unemployed. From a total of 6,900 in 1961, the number of unemployed rose to just over 16,100 in 1971, and to over 60,250 in 1981. By 1986, over 108,700 people stated on their census forms that they were unemployed. This amounted to 6.9 percent of the labour force, up from 4.5 percent in 1981.[4] This rise in unemployment has affected various sectors of the community in different ways. Differences in unemployment rates between Maori and non-Maori are a graphic display of this. In 1986 the unemployment rates for Maori males and females were 12.2 percent and 19.3 percent respectively. The comparable rates for non-Maori males and females were 4.4 percent and 8.0 percent respectively. (Refer to Chapter 14 for further detail.)

Other changes in the employment status of the workforce since 1951 have included an increase in the proportion of wage and salary earners, from 78.2 percent in 1951 to 82.1 percent in 1981. Employers and self-employed persons declined from 9.3 percent and 10.7 percent respectively in 1951, to 5.9 percent and 7.0 percent in 1981. By 1986, however, this pattern reversed with employers and the self-employed making up 6.8 percent and 9.3 percent of the workforce, while wage and salary earners were a much lower proportion than in 1981—75.8 percent of the total (Thompson, 1985). The increase in the proportion of employers and self-employed persons may be related to the changing economic environment since 1984. However, this is an issue which requires further research.

Increased pressure on the job market, particularly through the loss of jobs for wage and salary earners, accompanied by a marked rise in the proportion of the unemployed has possibly forced an increasing number to take up work on own their account or as an

[4]Because of a change in the question on unemployment between the 1981 and 1986 population censuses, growth in 1981–1986 unemployment is almost certainly overestimated.

employer. A rise in the proportion working as an unpaid assistant in a family business may also reflect this increased pressure on the job market (Thompson, 1985).

TABLE 9.2: Employment status of the New Zealand workforce, 1951–1986

Year	*Employer*	*Own account*	*Wage and salary*	*Unemployed*	*Relative assisting*
1951[1]	9.4	10.7	78.2	1.3	0.4
1976[1]	6.6	7.2	83.8	2.1	0.3
1981[1]	5.9	7.0	82.1	4.5	0.5
1986[2]	6.8	9.3	75.8	6.9	1.2

[1]Persons working 20 or more hours, plus persons unemployed and seeking work
[2]Persons working one or more hours, plus persons unemployed and seeking work
Sources: Country Monograph Series No 12, Population of New Zealand, Vol. 2. United Nations, 1985
Provisional National Summary Statistics, Series C, Report 1, Department of Statistics, 1987

Education Level

Generally speaking, there has been an overall trend towards a more educated labour force. In 1976, three quarters of the full-time labour force had not attended formal education higher than secondary school. By 1981, this proportion was down to 65 percent. Only a small proportion of those who continue their education beyond secondary school level go to university. The majority undertake some training at technical institutes or training colleges. The proportion of the population in the education system attending university increased from 4.2 percent in 1971 to 5.4 percent in 1981; in absolute numbers this represented an increase of about 15,400 persons (from 37,600 to 53,000), an increase that has overwhelmingly been the result of the baby boom generation coming through the education system.

Increases in attendance have also occurred in the Technical Correspondence Institute (up from 15,456 in 1971 to 30,091 in 1981), and in part-time attendance at technical institutes (from 14,701 in 1971 to 35,849 in 1981). Overall, continuing education of this kind accounted for over 14 percent of the population in the education system in 1981, up from 11.0 percent in 1971.

Despite increased numbers enrolled at universities and technical institutes, participation in tertiary education in New Zealand is disturbingly low by international standards. Students from the lower

end of the socio-economic scale tend to be underrepresented in universities. Many of them are found in technical institutes and the like, where training is more oriented towards trade certification and other similar courses (McDonald, *et al,* 1985).

Education level tends to be reflected to a degree in industry and occupational groupings. For instance, the finance, insurance and business services industry group comprises the highest proportion of workers with a university-level education (about 20 percent of workers in this industry group had a university education in both 1976 and 1981). The community, social and personal services industry group had the next highest level of university education. With regard to occupational groups, employees in the professional/technical category are the most educated. The services; agricultural, forestry and hunting; and production, transport and labouring occupation groups contain much smaller percentages of people with university-level training. While 38.2 percent of professional/technical workers in 1981 had university training, those in services; agriculture, forestry and hunting; and production occupations with university training amounted to 3.9 percent, 6.9 percent and 2.0 percent respectively.

Young people entering the workforce today are generally better qualified than their predecessors. The tightening of the job market, particularly affecting those people with no qualifications or skills, has meant that more young people are staying on longer at school to avoid unemployment, and to obtain qualifications to enable them to compete in the job market. Since 1979, participation rates of 15-, 16- and 17-year-olds in education have increased, particularly in regard to enrolments at secondary school. For instance, 16-year-olds increased their participation rate in secondary school from 65.7 percent in 1979 to 71.3 percent in 1983. Participation in tertiary education also increased over the same period but to a lesser extent (Catherwood, 1985).

Maori and Pacific Island Polynesians have also improved their overall level of educational attainment. Length of attendance at secondary school has improved, with the number of young Maori and Pacific Island Polynesian students staying on till the sixth and seventh form increasing, particularly for Pacific Island Polynesians. Attendance at tertiary level education has also improved substantially, especially at those institutions specialising in vocational training such as polytechnics and community colleges. Comparisons over age groups highlight this improvement. For example, in

1981 nearly 17 percent of Maori and 21 percent of Pacific Island Polynesians aged 20–24 years had remained at secondary school to the sixth and seventh form level. For the 25–44-year-olds, the levels had been about 9 percent for both ethnic groups. Comparisons with the rest of the population, however, show that such groups remain behind in regard to formal educational qualifications. The exact reasons are not clear but may include education level of the parent, low income, cultural background and values, and different aspirations (Department of Statistics, 1985b; Catherwood, 1985).

Part-time Work

One of the major growth areas of the labour market over the last 15–20 years has been in the number of part-time workers (part-time workers are those who work less than 30 hours per week). Between 1971 and 1981 the number of part-time workers increased by almost 73 percent, from almost 110,000 persons to just over 190,000 persons. By 1986, the number had increased by a further 53 percent, to over 289,000 workers.

By 1986 they made up 20 percent of the total employed labour force. The Household Labour Force Survey showed that in the March 1987 quarter just over 302,000 persons were part-time workers. One out of every 5 employed in 1987 was working part-time, compared with just 1 in 10 in 1971.

The great majority of part-time workers are women. In 1987, nearly three quarters of part-time workers (73 percent) were women. Among women, those aged 30–44 year contribute the major source of part-time labour, accounting for about one third of part-time workers. It would seem that at least some women who retire from full-time work to raise families return to the workforce in a part-time capacity. Over 80 percent of female part-time workers are married or previously married. A little over half of male part-timers are married or previously married. For males, part-time work is undertaken mainly at the beginning and end of working life. While part—time work for older males may be seen as a transition to retirement, for young workers it is part of the transition from school to work. Most teenage part-time workers are also full-time students, either at school or a tertiary institution. As more young people remain at school, it appears an increasing proportion are also seeking to earn by part-time work.

Participation rates in the part-time labour force for different ethnic groups suggest that part-time work is less common for Maori workers and even less so for Pacific Island Polynesian workers. Results from the March 1987 quarter of the Household Labour Force Survey showed that 6 percent of Maori males and 15 percent of Maori females worked part-time. A slightly smaller proportion of Pacific Island Polynesians, (5 percent of males and 10 percent of females) worked part-time. Participation rates for all other groups were higher, at 7 percent for males and 20 percent for females. The low participation of Pacific Island Polynesians in part-time work relative to members of other ethnic groups is directly related to their greater tendency to work full-time.

Part-time workers very often work in low-status, low-paying jobs predominantly in community, business and personal service industries and in trade industries. Those which provide services such as health and welfare, amusement and recreation, and retail trade account for 62 percent of all part-time workers, compared with just 41 percent of full-time workers. The extensive use of part-time workers in service and trade industries results from the need of these industries to offer services to customers during evenings and other times that are not readily staffed by full-timers; as well as supplementing full-time staff during peak periods.

In other industries, such as mining, electricity, building and transport where operations are generally conducted in 1 or more 8-hour shifts, the usefulness of part-time workers is more limited. This is reflected in the very low proportions of part-timers employed in these industries. While 20 percent of all employees work part-time, only 4 percent of employees in the electricity industry, 6 percent in mining and about 12 percent in transport, building and manufacturing industries are employed part-time. The concentration of part-time workers in the service and trade industries is mirrored in their occupational distribution, with over a third of part-time workers being in sales occupations.

A number of part-time workers make up what are known as the underemployed. These are persons who for various reasons are able and willing to work full-time (30 hours or more per week) but are not doing so because they cannot find the right sort of work, would prefer to work more hours but cannot in their present employment, or have family responsibilities. There are many other reasons too. Results from the March 1987 quarter of the Household Labour Force Survey showed that 14 percent of part-time

workers would prefer to work a different number of hours. Of these, nearly three quarters (72 percent) wanted more hours of work. One third claimed they could not find suitable full-time work, while almost one third again claimed there was no other suitable part-time work available. Nearly 10 percent cited family responsibilities. Overall, about 1 in 10 part-time workers in the March 1987 quarter were underemployed workers.

Future Prospects

Official projections of the labour force suggest that as New Zealand moves into the twenty-first century, the labour force will be a progressively ageing one. This will occur largely as a result of the movement of the baby boom generation through the labour force. In future years, the number of new entrants to the labour force should decline and hence will not make up as large a proportion of the labour force as they do now. Comparisons of the age structure of the New Zealand labour force in 1986 with that projected for 2011 suggest that the 15–24 year age group (the labour force entrants) will decline as a proportion of the labour force from 26.3 percent to 18.3 percent.

Those in the 25–39 year group (the early middle years) will also decline, from 37.7 percent to 32.5 percent of the labour force. The major change will come in the 40–59 year age group which will increase from 32.0 percent of the labour force in 1986 to 45.5 percent in 2011. Almost half of the New Zealand labour force will be aged 40 years and over in 2011 (Department of Statistics, 1987a, unpublished, 1982).

Trends in recent years have shown that although the numbers in the 60 years and over age group have been increasing, their rate of participation in the labour force has been declining. Between 1986 and 2011, their share of the labour force is projected to fall from 4.0 percent to 3.7 percent. Overall, the net result of these changes in the labour market may be shortages in the lower ranks of the labour force, coupled with a surfeit in the middle to senior management ranks. Particularly in regard to the supply of labour, this is a situation that will have a marked impact on the labour market, for example, through influencing retirement patterns and in the competition for jobs.

10 Marriage and Marriage Dissolution

Introduction

Patterns of marriage and marriage dissolution in New Zealand have changed appreciably over the last 100 years. By far the biggest changes have occurred in the post-Second World War period. Over the earlier part of this period the proportions of young men and women marrying rose to unprecedented levels, and the age of marriage plummeted. Since the early 1970s, however, these trends have reversed. Young New Zealanders have been marrying later. It is likely some may also be bypassing formal marriage altogether. Hand in hand with this movement away from early and almost universal marriage has been a rise in marital breakdown leading to separation and divorce. This has replaced widowhood as the major factor in marital dissolution.

Trends in First Marriage

The last 20–25 years have seen a pronounced change in marriage trends and patterns in New Zealand. Young New Zealanders appear to have abandoned the carefree attitude to marriage that reached its height in the late 1960s and early 1970s and to have adopted a much more cautious approach to matrimony. This is reflected in the steady and continuous rise in the proportions of young people remaining unmarried. Whereas in 1971 63 percent of men and 36 percent of women aged 20–24 had never been married, by 1986 this had increased to 84 percent and 66 percent respectively. A similar upward shift in the proportions of men and women in the 25–29 and 30–34 age groups remaining unmarried is also evident (refer Table 10.1).

TABLE 10.1: Proportions of men and women aged 20–34 who have never married, 1971 and 1986

Census	*Age group (years)*		
	20–24	*25–29*	*30–34*
		Males	
1971	62.9	22.2	11.8
1986	84.2	44.2	19.9
		Females	
1971	35.5	10.9	6.0
1986	65.6	28.3	12.5

Sources: Census of Population and Dwellings, 1971 Ages and Marital Status, Department of Statistics, 1974
Census of Population and Dwellings, 1986
Provisional National Summary Statistics; Department of Statistics, 1987

This apparent decline in the popularity of early marriage is also reflected in the increasing age at which men and women are marrying. Women marrying for the first time in 1985 were on average 2.8 years older than their 1971 counterparts; their average age at marriage increased from 21.2 years in 1971 to 24.0 years in 1985. The trend away from younger marriage has been equally pronounced for males. Their average age at first marriage was 26.4 years in 1985, up from 23.7 years in 1971.

It is difficult to be sure yet of the extent to which this decline in formal marriage at younger ages represents a bypassing of marriage altogether. It is likely that a growing number of young New Zealanders may be choosing to live in a de facto marriage situation as an alternative or prelude to formal marriage. Available data lend support to this. In 1986, 86,421 people under the age of 35 reported on their census forms that they were living in a de facto relationship, almost 22,000 more than in 1981.

However, not all young unmarried New Zealanders live in de facto relationships. For many young men and women the trend toward later and less universal marriage may represent a change in the pattern of decision-making regarding marriage, whereby increasing numbers of couples are choosing to delay marriage for a variety of reasons. These would include the desire of more and more women to establish careers, force of economic circumstances and the decision to delay childbearing to a later age.

Trends in Marriage Dissolution

Contemporaneous with the general downturn in marriage has been a rapid increase in the numbers and proportions of marriages ending in divorce. It would appear that separation and divorce have now replaced widowhood as the main factor in marital dissolution. While the proportion of widowed persons in the adult population has remained fairly static over the last 30 years at around 7 percent, the proportion of separated and divorced persons has risen sharply—collectively, from 2 percent in 1956 to 8 percent in 1986.

The increasing incidence of divorce has been especially pronounced since 1961. The number of divorces jumped from 1,733 in 1961 to 8,590 in 1981, to reach a peak of 12,395 in 1982. Since 1982 the number of marriage dissolutions has declined. A total of 8,607 divorces were granted in 1985, 30.6 percent fewer than in 1982. The divorce rate (number of divorces per 1,000 marriages), which almost trebled from 3.23 in 1961 to 9.07 in 1980, increased further to a post-war high of 17.20 in 1982 before falling to 11.8 in 1985. It should be noted that prior to the introduction of the Family Proceedings Act 1980, proceedings for divorce were complicated by the existence of up to 15 separate grounds for divorce. The proceedings were often costly and could extend over a long period before decrees absolute were granted. This tended to discourage some couples from seeking a divorce. With the introduction of the new act, making the sole grounds for divorce the irreconcilable breakdown of the marriage, divorce proceedings have been made less restrictive and less expensive. Part of the increase in the number of divorces in the two years immediately following the passing of the act can be put down to a catchup phase in divorce proceedings (Pool, 1986).

Divorce figures reveal only part of the picture on marriage breakup. De facto relationships do not require any legal separation or divorce agreement, so that accurate figures on the breakup of such relationships cannot be had. It has been suggested that de facto marriages may break up twice as frequently as formal unions (Social Monitoring Group, 1985). Separation after legal marriage, likewise, does not require formal court proceedings if uncontested, although many separation orders are drawn up in law. It has been calculated that for every separation requiring a court order, there are at least 3 that are not contested (Social Monitoring Group,

1985). What is certainly clear is that separation as a means to ending an unsatisfactory marital relationship has become more commonplace. The growing number of separated people in the New Zealand population, from about 26,000 in 1971 to just over 90,000 in 1986, lends credence to this point.

Characteristics of Marriages Ending in Divorce

About three quarters of all divorces in any year are between couples who have been married less than 20 years and about one third are between those married less than 10 years. Most divorces occur among couples who have been married 5–9 years, followed by those married 10–14 and 15–19 years. This ordering has remained unchanged for the last quarter of a century. What has changed, however, particularly in more recent years, has been the rise in the proportion of marriages ending in divorce after less than 5 years. The increasing proportion of divorces among shorter marriages (refer Table 10.2) has undoubtedly been a consequence of the changes in the divorce laws. It has been estimated that the average duration of a marriage is approximately 14 years (Social Monitoring Group, 1985).

TABLE 10.2: Divorces by duration of marriage, 1961–85

	Percentage distribution of divorces by duration of marriage at date of decree or order							
Calendar year	*Under 5*	*5–9*	*10–14*	*15–19*	*20–24*	*25–29*	*30 and over*	*Total*
1961	6.6	26.8	23.0	16.6	12.6	7.2	7.3	100.0
1971	11.1	30.4	19.4	12.5	12.6	7.6	6.4	100.0
1981	6.3	29.1	24.2	15.8	11.7	7.3	5.5	100.0
1985	10.0	26.0	22.5	17.5	10.8	6.9	6.4	100.0

Source: Demographic Trends, 1987, Department of Statistics, 1987

The incidence of divorce in New Zealand, as in a number of other countries such as the United Kingdom and Canada, is closely related to age at marriage. In particular, early marriage, usually in close conjunction with pre-marital conception, is related to divorce later in life. Recent years have seen a decrease in the probability of ex-nuptial conception in New Zealand. This has been especially true for ex-nuptial conception followed by precipitated marriage. Couples now marry much later on average than they did from

1945–1972. It is likely, therefore, that divorce will decline in New Zealand, as it has in the United States (Pool, 1986).

Marriages where one or both of the partners are non-white are also believed to be at higher risk of break-up (Social Monitoring Group, 1985). Census data lend support to this, showing that the Maori population has a higher proportion of separated and divorced persons than the non-Maori population. In 1981, one in every 12 Maoris aged over 15 years was either separated or divorced as against just over 1 in 16 non-Maoris. Even after taking into account age differences between the two populations, the Maori population continues to be characterised by a proportionately larger number of separated and divorced persons. It is difficult to say why this is so. Socio-cultural factors are undoubtedly important. In 1981, a disproportionately large number of Maoris indicated they lived in a de facto relationship. Hence, a number of those who are divorced may in fact live in an informal marriage situation. Maoris may also have a lower rate of remarriage among the divorced population, preferring to stay single.

Other factors which have been shown to heighten the risk of marriage breakup include low educational attainment by both parents and low socio-economic status of the husband (Social Monitoring Group, 1985).

Trends in Remarriage

In view of the rise in the number of divorces over the last 25 years, it is perhaps not surprising to find that an increasing proportion of marriages in recent times have involved a partner or partners who had been married previously. In 1985, 23 percent of all brides and 25 percent of all grooms were marrying for a second or subsequent time. This compares with 11 percent and 12 percent respectively in 1971.

A high proportion of divorcees remarry almost immediately on getting divorced, with two thirds being married within 10 years. The trend toward earlier marriage during the immediate post-war years, together with this tendency to remarry soon after divorce have undoubtedly been important factors underlying the decline in the average age of remarriage during the 1960s and 1970s. In the 20 years from 1961–1981, the average age of remarriage for divorced men dropped from 42 to 40 years.

For female divorcees, the average age declined from 38 to 36 years (Department of Statistics, 1987c). Since the early 1980s, however, the average age of remarriage of divorced men and women has increased, mirroring the recent trend toward later-age first marriage.

Divorced persons have a higher remarriage rate than widowed persons (Pool, 1986). Even when adjusted for age this remains true. The proportion of the divorced male population that remarries in a given year is approximately 5 times greater than remarriage among the widowed male population. Among females, a divorcee is about 11 times as likely to remarry as a widow. As could be expected, the average age of remarriage is lower for divorced people (refer Table 10.3).

TABLE 10.3: Age-adjusted remarriage rates and average age at remarriage, divorced and widowed population, 1975

	Remarriage rate[1]		*Average age at remarriage*	
Marital status	*Males*	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*
Divorced	108	83	34	35
Widowed	37	35	57	51

[1]Per 1,000 in marital status group
Source: Population and Social Trends, National Housing Commission, 1986

De Facto Marriage

The 1981 Census of Population and Dwellings was the first to include a question on de facto marriage. Nearly 88,000 persons or 4 percent of all New Zealanders aged 15 years and over indicated on their census forms in 1981 that they were living in a de facto union. By 1986, the number had risen to just over 114,000 persons, or 4.6 percent of the total population aged 15 years and over.

About 6 in every 10 people who lived in a de facto union in 1981 were under 30 years of age, and over a quarter were aged between 20 and 24 years. This remained largely unchanged in 1986. De facto marriage, however, is not a lifestyle confined to the young. In 1986, 46 percent of de facto partners were aged 30 years or older.

Despite the rise in the number of people living in de facto marriages during the 1981–6 intercensal period, the proportion of the

population at different ages opting for this lifestyle remains relatively small for both sexes and at all ages. In 1986, as in 1981, at ages other than the twenties, less than 1 in 20 persons lived in a de facto marriage. In the most common age group for de facto living, the twenties, approximately 1 in every 10 persons lived in a de facto relationship in 1986. This was the same as in 1981 (Department of Statistics, 1985b; Department of Statistics, 1987a).

While persons who have never married make up the largest number of people in de facto unions (over 40 percent) the likelihood of being a partner in such a union is greater for divorced, separated and widowed persons. This is true for all age groups, but more particularly for the younger groups. Taking the 25–29 year age group as an illustration, approximately 1 in every 3 divorced persons in 1981 was living in a de facto marriage. By contrast, only 1 in 10 persons in this age group who had never been married lived in a de facto union.

De facto marriage is more common among Maori than non-Maori people. An explanation for this is possibly related to the fact that the Maori population has a younger age structure, but more importantly to the fact that de facto marriage has been a cultural norm for the Maori people for many years. It therefore has a much wider acceptance as an option to formal marriage than might be the case in other populations.

Overall, analyses of the census data on de facto marriage suggest that except for the fact that de facto partners tend to be younger than married people and to live in rental accommodation, they do not form a distinct subgroup (Department of Statistics, 1985b).

11 Family and Household Structure

Introduction

Household composition and family structure have undergone fundamental demographic and sociological changes in New Zealand during the post-war period. In particular, these changes have been marked by a rise and fall in the prominence of the conventional New Zealand family of a husband, wife and dependent children. Concomitant with this has been a rapid growth in the number of single-parent households, as well as a steady increase in households occupied by persons living alone and couples on their own. Overall, the trend has been towards smaller households and smaller families— a combination of delays in the birth of first children, fewer children overall, and changes in marriage patterns.

Growth in the Number of Households

The majority of New Zealanders (about 95 percent) live in private households. These are households that comprise a single person or a small group of persons who form a durable unit. Typical among these are a family group living together; two or more families sharing a household; an unrelated group of persons; or one person living alone. The number of these households in New Zealand has grown steadily over the last 30 years, from 419,000 in 1945 to 1,078,000 in 1986; a massive increase when viewed from an historical perspective. Up until 1976, the average annual growth rate in private households ranged between 2.3 and 2.9 percent. In recent years, however, this has slowed. The average annual growth rate over the 1981–6 period was the slowest of the post-war period—1.5 percent or about 75,000 households in total. Despite this decline, the private household growth rate during 1981–6 was still about double the population growth rate.

Growth in the number of private households normally comes about in 3 ways: through, net family formation, as in a couple setting up a new household; non-family household formation, such as a group of individuals starting a flat; and undoubling, where a previously existing household breaks into 2 or more family households through, for example, marital breakdown or young people leaving home and setting up on their own.

In the years immediately following the Second World War, much of the increase in the number of households in New Zealand was due to net family formation. During the 1970s household growth resulting from this process slowed, and an acceleration in the numbers of households formed through non-family formation and undoubling occurred. This change in the relative importance of the various determinants of household formation is reflected in the increasing proportion of households maintained by never married, separated and divorced persons, and a corresponding decline in the proportion maintained by married people (refer Table 11.1). While the sociological underpinnings of this expansion in households maintained by unmarried people are not fully understood, the demographic influences can be readily identified. Principal amongst these are the trend toward later marriage and the increased incidence of marital breakdown.

TABLE 11.1: Marital status of household occupiers, 1971 and 1981

	Percentage distribution of household occupiers	
Marital status	*1971*	*1981*
Never married	8	12
Married	77	66
Separated	2	5
Widowed	11	12
Divorced	2	4
Total	100	100

Sources: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings, 1971 Households, Families and Fertility, Department of Statistics, 1975

New Zealand Census of Population and Dwelling, 1981 Households and Families, Department of Statistics, 1984

Changes in Household Size

Over the last two decades considerable changes have occurred in the size of New Zealand households, reflecting changes in the

demographic and social behaviour of the population. In general, the trend has been to smaller household groupings as the size of both family households and non-family households has declined. The average number of persons per household decreased from 3.6 in 1961 to 3.4 in 1971, 3.2 in 1976 and to 3.0 in 1986.

The reduction in household size is also evident in the distribution of households by number of occupants (refer Table 11.2). Although the most commonly occurring household size in New Zealand is that of 2 persons, by far the fastest growing category has been that of single-person households. One- and 2-person households now account for almost half (48 percent) of all those in New Zealand compared with just over a third (35 percent) in 1961. Households containing 5 persons or more, relatively common in the 1960s, accounted for 18 percent of households in 1981. These larger households, precipitated in the past by larger families and a greater tendency of households to contain lodgers and relatives, are becoming less and less prominent.

TABLE 11.2: Changes in household size, 1961–1981

	Percentage of households by number of occupants					
Year	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5 and over*	*Total*
1961	11.4	24.2	17.7	18.6	28.1	100.0
1971	14.1	26.4	16.5	17.7	25.3	100.0
1976	15.6	27.9	16.1	18.5	21.9	100.0
1981	18.4	29.2	16.4	18.1	17.9	100.0

Sources: Population of New Zealand, Country Monograph Series No. 12, Vol. 2. United Nations, 1985

Census of Population and Dwellings, 1981 Households and Families, Department of Statistics, 1984

The shrinking in the overall size of New Zealand households is also evident among Maori households. Between 1971 and 1981 the average size of Maori households declined from 5.1 to 4.2 persons per household. Despite the decreasing size of Maori households they are still on average larger than other New Zealand households, which had an average of 2.9 persons per household in 1981. The relatively high average size of Maori households is to a large extent due to the existence of larger family sizes, and a greater tendency to live in extended and multi-family households. In 1981, 39 percent of Maori households comprised 5 or more members, more than double the proportion for total households (18 percent).

The overall trend of a decrease in the size of New Zealand households has occurred for a number of reasons. First and foremost has been the substantial increase in the proportion of households consisting of 1 person. Second, the size of families has been getting smaller; and third, there has been a steady increase in the number of households comprising couples with no children. These are mainly young couples who have deferred childbearing and older couples whose children have left home.

Household Type

The myriad of changes that have impinged on New Zealand society over recent decades have resulted in substantial changes in the relative importance of different types of household structure. The overall trend has been away from the traditional value of familial dependence towards more people living alone or in single-parent families (refer Table 11.3). This trend is to some extent related to the decrease in the proportion of families where persons in addition to the nuclear family are present, and is also related to an age-structure change towards greater proportions of people in older age groups and hence (because of widowhood or divorce) living alone without dependent children.

One-Person Households

One of the most pronounced changes in the living arrangements of New Zealanders during the last 15–20 years has been the increase in the number of persons living alone. One-person households accounted for 18 percent of all households in 1981, as against 14 percent 10 years earlier. In absolute terms, the number of New Zealanders usually living alone rose from about 105,000 in 1971 to 169,000 in 1981.

Women make up the majority of lone dwellers. Sixty-one percent of all people living alone in 1981 were women, and well over half (58 percent) of these women were aged 65 or older—the majority of them widows. In contrast men living on their own, were more often aged 45–64 than 65 and over, and were more likely to be bachelors than widowers. Males were also present in much greater numbers and proportions in the younger age ranges (under 20, 20–24, and 25–44) than were females (refer Table

TABLE 11.3: Household type distribution, 1966–1981

Household type	*Percentage of permanent private households* 1966	1971	1976	1981
One family only	60.4	60.6	59.3	55.3
One family, child absent				
One family, parent permanently absent	8.6	8.9	9.6	10.6
One family, parent temporarily absent				
Total single family	69.0	69.5	68.9	65.9
One family plus others	11.1	9.5	7.7	7.8
Two families	0.9	1.2	1.3	1.3
Two families and others	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3
Total other family	12.5	11.0	9.4	9.5
Non-family, related and non-related	6.0	5.3	5.8	6.1
Permanent single person	12.5	14.1	15.6	18.5
Single person, others absent				
Total non-family	18.5	19.4	21.4	24.6
Total, all households	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Population of New Zealand, Country Monograph Series No 12, Vol 2, United Nations, 1985

11.4). In other words, in New Zealand living alone is predominantly a lifestyle of elderly widowed women, and middle-aged bachelors.

The greatest increase in the numbers of persons living alone over the last decade has occurred in the older (65 and over) age group

TABLE 11.4: Persons living alone, 1971 and 1981 on census night

Census	*Age group (years)* 15–19	20–24	25–44	45–64	65 and over
			Males		
1971	690	3,010	10,140	15,160	12,830
1981	1,600	6,510	21,920	22,100	20,380
			Females		
1971	440	1,550	4,770	23,690	41,010
1981	1,470	4,600	11,650	29,920	65,730

Source: Population Perspectives '81, New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings, 1981, Department of Statistics, 1985

(refer Table 11.4). Part of this increase in the number of elderly persons occupying one-person households reflects the growth in the number of elderly persons in the population, particularly elderly women who have outlived their husbands. Much of the increase, however, has been due to the greater tendency of older

people to live alone. This tendency has been especially marked amongst elderly women. For instance, whereas 29 percent of women aged 65 and older lived on their own in 1971, by 1981 the proportion had increased to 37 percent. It has been suggested that this trend has been facilitated by deliberate government policy to provide suitable low-maintenance, low-cost pensioner housing units (Cameron, 1985). In view of the inevitable growth in the size of the elderly population in the coming decades, together with the growing propensity of elderly people to live alone, it is likely that we will see a rapid increase in the number of single-person households in the foreseeable future.

While in absolute terms the greatest increase in the number of persons living alone has occurred among the elderly, some of the most rapid rates of increase have been recorded among the young. In the 10 years from 1971, the numbers of persons living alone in New Zealand increased by just over 60 percent. So did the numbers of elderly persons living alone, while the numbers of young adults (aged under 25 years) living alone more than doubled. Changes in the numbers of young people, together with the increased likelihood that they are unmarried, account for part of this growth. However, the larger part of the increase cannot be explained by demographic shifts within the population and must reflect a real change in attitudes and choices of young New Zealanders in recent years.

A close look at the characteristics of young men living alone reveals little to distinguish them from their counterparts in other household types. Young women who live alone, however, form a more distinctive group. Their incomes are well above those of women in general, and they are more likely to have undergone tertiary training (Department of Statistics, 1985b). It would appear that a greater investment in higher education by women living alone has provided them with access to higher paying jobs, allowing them a choice of housing not shared by others.

Non-Family Households

Non-family households comprise only a small proportion of total households, a proportion which has not changed significantly since 1966 (refer Table 11.3). In 1981, 6 in every 100, or about 61,000 households were of the non-family type.

Non-family households generally denote a particular phase in the life of New Zealanders. Young adults form a large portion of these households, during the years between leaving their parents homes and the forming of their own family homes. To illustrate, in 1981 half of all people living in a non-family household were under 25 years of age; most described themselves as flatmates. As age advances, non-family living not only becomes less common but its form changes. Whereas flatting is the most common form of non-family living among younger adults, at older ages non-family households are more likely to be formed when a single man or woman takes in a lodger, border, housekeeper, or perhaps some relative as a companion (Department of Statistics, 1985b).

Although the number of non-family dwellers grew steadily during the 1970s, from 106,300 in 1971 to 148,900 in 1981, the potential for growth was much greater than actually occurred. Indeed, during 1976–1981 the number of people living in a non-family household actually declined when compared to the number who could have chosen this form of living (Department of Statistics, 1985b). The information available suggests that non-family living is not favoured long-term by many New Zealanders, and that they will not choose this lifestyle if there are available alternatives.

Family Households

In 1981, 3 in 4, or about 757,000 households, were the family type. These contained around 775,000 families. Overall, about 81 percent of New Zealanders were living as members of families on census night in 1981, as against 82 percent 15 years earlier (refer Table 11.5).

While the proportion of the population living in families has changed little in recent times, the experience of family living in New Zealand has been altered by a variety of demographic and social changes. The changes gaining most prominence and widest note have been those leading people away from the conventional New Zealand family of two parents and their child or children, towards other forms of family life.

'Conventional' Two-Parent Families

Households comprising a husband, wife and children make up a decreasing number and proportion of New Zealand households.

TABLE 11.5: Persons living in families, 1966–81

Living arrangement	*Percentage of the total population living in families*			
	1966	*1971*	*1976*	*1981*
Persons of all ages living in families	82	..	83	81
Adults (20+ years) living in families	..	..	79	76
Persons of all ages living in family households	87	87	86	84
Adults (20+ years) living in family households	..	..	81	80

Source: Population Perspectives '81; New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings, 1981, Vol. 12, Department of Statistics, 1985

Between 1976 and 1981 households of this type declined in number by about 11,000. In 1976, they accounted for about 50 percent of all family households, but by 1981 this proportion had fallen to 46 percent.

In addition to becoming fewer in number, households comprised of a couple plus children have become smaller in size, as 1- and 2-child families have gained in popularity. The proportion of 2-parent family households with 3 or more children dropped sharply from 29 percent in 1971 to 21 percent in 1981. Although larger families are becoming a less visible feature of New Zealand society, they are relatively more common in certain parts of the country and among certain groups in the population. Large families are more likely to be found in rural than in urban communities, in Maori and Pacific Island Polynesian households and in households maintained by unemployed persons. Census data indicate that large family households have lower incomes on average than other households. Indeed, it has been shown that income adequacy is strongly related to the number of children in afamily (Social Monitoring Group, 1985).

Among 2-parent family households, couples with pre-school children stand out as a particularly important group. Compared with families in general, they are less likely to own their own homes, and more likely to be concentrated at the lower end of the income distribution. In 1981, almost two thirds (64 percent) of families with a child under 5 had an income of $10,150 or less, as against 50 percent of all families. Mothers of young children have also been found to have less leisure time and a lower level of physical and mental health than mothers of older children (Social Monitoring Group, 1985).

One-Parent Families

The fastest growing family type in the recent past has been the single-parent family. From about 55,000 in 1971, single-parent families grew in numbers to 70,000 by 1976 and 90,000 by 1981. At this time (1981), about 1 in every 8 families was a one-parent family, and 8 percent of the population were members of such a family. It is important to note that these figures refer to living circumstances at a particular time. In reality people move into and out of single-parent families, so that many more will have passed through such families than might be suggested by the figures. It has been estimated that over a third of children in New Zealand will spend some time in a 1-parent family before the age of 16 (Social Monitoring Group, 1985).

The rapid growth of single-parent families in New Zealand in recent times is largely attributable to the rising incidence of divorce and separation. As recently as 1976, marriage ending through the death of a spouse was the major factor in single parenthood. By the beginning of the 1980s separation and divorce, resulting in part from high levels of pre-marital conception and precipitated marriage by young adults in the 1960s and early 1970s, had become much more important factors. Indeed, from 1976–1981 separation and divorce increased the number of single parent families by about 18,900.

A further factor promoting the recent increase in single-parent families has been unmarried motherhood. From a total of 4,640 in 1976 the numbers of never-married single mothers more than doubled to 9,470 in 1981 as they became more inclined to keep children who in earlier times would have been placed for adoption.

As separation, divorce and ex-nuptial birth have replaced spouses' death as the major factor in the formation of single-parent families, single parents today are more likely to be young and have dependent children in their care. A disproportionately large number of single parents are Maori women. Single-parent families have lower incomes, fewer amenities, and are less likely to own their own homes than families in general. (For a fuller discussion on single-parent families refer Chapter 13.)

Husband and Wife Families

Husband and wife only households have been the other major growth area in family households in recent times. Between 1971 and 1981 the number of households consisting of a husband and

wife alone with no other persons present increased from about 154,000 to 206,000. By 1981, these households accounted for 27 percent of family households, compared with 24 percent 10 years earlier. About 1 in every 5 adults aged 15 years and older was a member of a husband-and-wife-only household at the time of the 1981 Census.

This rise in the number and proportion of households occupied by couples on their own reflects in part the general ageing of New Zealand's population. During the 1970s large numbers of women entered the age range where childrearing is complete or no longer an option. From a total of 198,000 in 1971, the group of women aged 60 years and over increased by about 27 percent to reach 251,200 in 1981. New Zealand men are also living longer extending the length of time elderly couples can expect to live together before one partner dies. Added to these changes elderly couples are less likely to be sharing their homes with other people. During 1971–1981 the proportion of elderly couples who had children with them appeared to decline steadily. So too did the numbers sharing their homes with persons other than their children. Two factors would appear to be important here. First, variations in the ages at which different groups of the elderly completed their childbearing several decades previously: women now approaching old age will have completed childrearing earlier in their life cycles than those who were elderly in previous decades. And second, improvements in the economic fortunes of both young and old, allowing different generations of a family to maintain separate households.

The other main factor facilitating the increase in husband-and-wife-only households has been the rapid growth in numbers of young couples aged between 25 and 44 living alone. Households occupied by such couples increased in number by approximately 70 percent from 1971–1981. This is partly an age-structure effect, reflecting the movement into adulthood during the 1970s of large numbers of people born during the post-war baby boom. But 2 other factors are important: the increasing numbers of young couples who have decided to postpone having children until later in their marriages or who have decided to remain childfree; and the growth in numbers of post-parental couples aged in their late thirties or early forties.

In short, the rising prominence of the husband-and-wife-only household is the product of several trends: the general ageing of

the population, which has shifted large numbers into the ages at which life without children is likely; changes in birth patterns amongst young adults; and an affluence which allows more choice as to whether housing will be shared with others or not. Over the next decade the number of households occupied by couples whose children have left home will almost certainly increase, and the number occupied by childless couples decrease.

Other Family Households

The proportion of households which might be classed as alternative (not one-family-only) decreased from 12.5 percent of all family households in 1966 to 11.0 percent in 1971, and 9.8 percent in 1976, but rose again to 12.6 percent in 1981. The decrease was actually due to the decrease in households containing persons in addition to a single family, multi-family households increased over this period.

Multiple- or extended-family living tends to be much more common among Maoris than non-Maoris. This is most probably so for a number of reasons. Cultural reasons are undoubtedly important, particularly in regard to extended family living. Socio-economic reasons are also likely to have been important in the growth of multiple-family living. While in 1981 25 percent of Maoris lived in a family household with other persons, only 12 percent of non-Maoris did so. These would be family households with other relatives (such as grandparents or cousins) present, or with other unrelated persons. Similarly, Maoris had higher proportions living in households containing two or more families—12 percent compared with 3 percent for non-Maoris.

Pacific Island Polynesians in New Zealand also have a relatively high incidence of extended-and multiple-family living. Just under a third (31 percent) of Pacific Island Polynesian households fell into the other family category (family households plus others, and 2 or more families in the 1 household) in 1981. This relatively high tendency toward extended- and multiple-family living amongst Polynesians is reflected in larger than average households. Pacific Island Polynesian households contained an average of 4.7 members in 1981, compared with 3.2 for other households.

Non-Private Households

Private households account for the great majority of the New Zealand population. Non-private households make up the balance. Non-private households are made up of groups of people living in institutions and group living quarters that cater for a large number of generally unrelated people. Examples are hotels, motels, hospitals, rest homes, hostels and boarding houses. In 1981, almost 5 percent of the total population were living in a non-private dwelling of one sort or another.

Traditionally, non-private dwellings have tended to be populated by more men than women. In 1966, about 60 percent of the residents in group situations were male. Through the 1970s this dominance declined as an increasing number of elderly women moved into rest homes and hospitals, and more women in their teens and early twenties moved into training institutions. By 1981, women made up 44 percent of all residents of non-private dwellings.

12 Children

Introduction

Over the last 100 years New Zealand's population has been undergoing a long and gradual transition from youth to maturity. One of the most obvious effects of the transition has been a decline in the relative share of children in the population. The decline has been especially pronounced since the early 1970s. In 1971 children aged 0–14 years comprised almost a third (31.9 percent) of the total New Zealand population, but by 1986 the proportion had declined to less than a quarter (24.4 percent) of the total. Never before has the child proportion been so low. In the past, children under 15 years of age have rarely comprised less than 30 percent of the total population.

The decline in the child component of New Zealand's population has occurred primarily as a result of declining birth rates. These have had the effect of reducing the proportion of children relative to adults in the population. The marked drop in the proportion of children since the early 1970s reflects the movement of the baby boom generation out of the 0–14 age group into the working ages, and their replacement by smaller proportions of children resulting from the sharp fall in fertility since 1961.

Future trends in the child component of the population will depend primarily on the future course of fertility. Given a continuation of the significant social and economic changes experienced in recent decades, such as the reduced incidence of marriage, the development of alternative living arrangements, postponement of marriages to later ages, improved contraceptive technology, liberalised divorce laws and increases in the participation of women in the labour force it is most unlikely that New Zealand fertility will return to its previous high levels. A continuation of sub-replacement-level fertility would mean that the child proportion of the population would remain low over the next few decades. Indeed, official projections indicate that the proportion of children will

continue to decline over the next 25 years, from the 1986 level of 24.4 percent to about 18.5 percent in the year 2011.

Age Structure

An important aspect of the declining prominence of children over the last two decades has been the substantial reduction in actual numbers of children. Since 1966 the number of children aged 0–14 years has decreased by 77,414, from 872,399 to 794,985. This decline has spread through each of the age groups comprising the under-15 category, and is of particular importance in the context of provision of facilities and services for children.

The most marked decline in child numbers has occurred among the pre-school age group (0–4 years). From a peak of 306,643 in 1966, the pre-school population has declined steadily in numbers. By 1986, 0–4 year olds numbered 249,075, almost 57,600 fewer than in 1966 (306,643), and comprised 7.6 percent of the total population. This proportion was lower than the previously recorded low level of 7.8 percent in 1936.

Declines in the numbers of children aged 5–14 years did not become apparent until the late 1970s. Between the 1976 and 1986 censuses, the 5–14 year age group recorded a numerical decrease of around 85,400, from 631,331 to 545,910. By 1986 children aged 5–14 years accounted for 16.7 percent of the total population, compared with 20.3 percent 10 years earlier.

Official projections for the 0–4 and 5–14 age groups indicate that there will be a brief upsurge in the youngest ages in the early 1990s as a result of increased birth numbers consequent upon greater numbers of young adults in the main reproductive ages. This effect will be carried forward into the 5–14 age group in the late 1990s and the early twenty-first century. By the year 2011 it is projected that children aged 0–14 years will number around 709,600, approximately 85,400 fewer than in 1986. At this time (2011) the numbers of children could decline almost to equal the numbers of elderly (60 years and over) for the first time ever in New Zealand.

Ethnic Composition

At present, children of Maori descent comprise a disproportionately large share of New Zealand's child population. In 1986

Maori children numbered 155,100 and accounted for almost a fifth (19.5 percent) of the total population of 0–14 year olds; this compares with an overall representation of Maoris in the total population of 12.4 percent. The relatively high representation of Maoris in the child component of New Zealand's population is explained by 3 main factors: the higher fertility levels of Maori compared with non-Maori women; the greater concentration of Maori women at the prime reproductive ages; and the high level of Maori and non-Maori intermarriage in recent decades (Bedford and Pool, 1985).

Despite the high fertility potential of the Maori population—a consequence of the heavy concentration of Maori women in the main reproductive ages—the population of Maori-descent children is not expected to change substantially over the coming decade. It has been projected that by the turn of the century Maori-descent children will number about 157,000 (around 2,000 fewer than in 1986), and account for approximately 20.1 percent of the total population of 0–14 year olds in New Zealand (Pool, 1986).

Living Arrangements

The vast majority of children in New Zealand—about 9 in every 10—are born into families with 2 parents. Of particular importance however, is the number of children born into single-parent families. This has increased substantially in recent years as unmarried mothers have become more inclined to keep children who in earlier times would have been placed for adoption. Indeed, the experience of being born into a single-parent family is now more common than ever in New Zealand's history (Carmichael, 1983). In 1981 there were 9,470 single-parent families maintained by women who had never been married—almost double the number recorded in 1976 (4,640). Typically, children in these families are raised by young mothers with limited resources—over a quarter of the mothers in 1981 were aged under 20 years, and about 61 percent were less than 25 years old.

Of those children born into 2-parent families, not all remain in these families for the remainder of their childhood. Some subsequently experience a change of family circumstances, often as a result of a marriage breakup, leading them to spend time in a single-parent family. Over the last 15 years the rise in the incidence of marital separation and divorce has increased the number

of families disrupted by a marriage breakup, shifting large numbers of children out of 2-parent families and into 1-parent families. This is reflected in the rapid growth in numbers of single parent families maintained by a separated or divorced parent. These families totalled 45,810 in 1981, an increase of about 18,900 on the 1976 number. It should be noted that these figures relate to particular points in time. In reality families move into and out of single-parent situations, so that many more families will have experienced such a situation than might be suggested by the evidence available. Overall, it has been estimated that about 38 percent of children born in 1977 could expect to spend some time in a 1-parent family by the age of 16; and that well over half of the children born into a 1-parent family, or one where the parents are not legally married, could expect to experience at least 2 changes of family circumstances (change from 1 to 2 parents or vice versa) by the same age (Social Monitoring Group, 1985).

The likelihood of experiencing life in a single-parent family varies between different ethnic groups. It is particularly high for Maori children. At the time of the 1981 census around 18 percent of Maori children under the age of 15 years were living in 1-parent families, compared with fewer than 12 percent of non-Maori children (refer Table 12.1). The higher Maori proportion is due to the higher levels of ex-nuptial fertility for Maori women; the greater incidence of marital separation and divorce among the Maori population; and the higher likelihood of widowhood of Maori men and women compared to their non-Maori counterparts (Department of Statistics, 1985b).

TABLE 12.1: Percentage of Maori and non-Maori children of different ages living in one-parent families, 1981

Age group of child (years)	*Maori population*	*Non-Maori population*
0–4	17.7	9.0
5–9	17.7	11.2
10–14	17.9	12.1

Source: Maori Statistical Profile, 1961–86, Department of Statistics, 1986

The growing numbers of New Zealand's dependent children experiencing life in single-parent families is of particular significance when viewed in relation to the many social and economic disadvantages suffered by these families. Overwhelmingly, single-parent families are headed by women (about four fifths in 1981)

and these women are likely to be younger than were the heads of single-parent families in the past (Carmichael, 1983). The evidence suggests that the standard of living of single-parent families today is considerably lower than that of two-parent families. This is reflected in lower incomes, access to fewer amenities (such as a car, phone or washing machine), and lower levels of home ownership of single-parent families (Mowbray and Khan, 1984). Furthermore, single parent families have been associated with a variety of other social trends, many of which are viewed as unfavourable. These include juvenile crime, low educational attainment, financial stress and a high susceptibility to ill health and accidents (Social Monitoring Group, 1985). It is not clear, however, how social and economic factors operate in these trends.

Education

In New Zealand educational attendance is compulsory between the ages of 6 and 15 years. Before they start compulsory education at primary school, however, many children obtain pre-school educational experience from a range of institutions including kindergartens, playcentres, Te Kohanga Reo and childcare centres.

The demand on the services of pre-school institutions has grown steadily since the early 1970s. This is reflected in increased enrolments and in the proliferation of formal and informal schemes. A total of 88,344 children were enrolled in early childhood care and education services of all types in late 1983. The largest categories were free kindergarten (45 percent) and playcentres (16 percent).

The main area of growth in pre-school education over the last two decades has been in kindergartens. Despite declining birth numbers enrolments in kindergartens have increased by about 72 percent since 1970. Other types of pre-school services whose enrolments have risen include childcare centres, family daycare and Te Kohanga Reo. Playcentre rolls on the other hand, have declined by over ten percent since 1970. Informal playgroups and community-based pre-school groups have also seen a drop in numbers of children involved in recent years.

At present, the proportion of pre-school children enrolled in pre-school institutions in New Zealand stands at about 48 percent at 2½ years of age, 53 percent at 3 years old and 85 percent at 4 years old. On the surface these figures compare well internationally, especially for 4-year-olds. However, they are somewhat

inflated by the tendency of some children to use 2 or more services at the same time. It has been suggested that the true figures for enrolment are probably closer to a third of 3-year-olds and two thirds of 4-year-olds (Social Monitoring Group, 1985).

Despite the growing numbers of children enrolled in early childhood services, there is still a significant proportion of children who start primary school without any pre-school experience of an educational nature. In New Zealand, as overseas, it has been shown that children from higher socio-economic groups make more use of pre-school services than other groups. Those least likely to receive continuous pre-school education from the age of 3 years include Maori and Pacific Island Polynesian children; children from large families; children from families with low incomes or depressed living standards and children with less well educated mothers (Department of Statistics, 1985b; Social Monitoring Group, 1985).

Although schooling is not compulsory until 6 years of age, in practice most children are enrolled at school as soon as they reach their fifth birthday. Some children have needs which require special educational programmes. These needs may arise from physical disabilities, such as impaired sight or hearing, or from learning difficulties related to social, psychological or behavioural problems. The education system provides a wide range of alternatives aimed at meeting the special needs of these children. While most special needs programmes are provided within the normal day-school structure, in some cases children are referred to special residential schools. Of the 9,773 pupils who were in special educational settings during 1983, only 867 (9 percent) were in special residential schools. This reflects the current educational policy of mainstreaming wherever possible.

The proportion of Maori and Pacific Island Polynesian children in special educational programmes for children with learning difficulties is high and has risen in recent years. For instance, in a review of special education in the late 1970s it was found that the incidence of Maori children in special classes in normal schools was 4 times greater than expected (Social Monitoring Group, 1987). The reasons why the proportion of Maori and Polynesian children in special education settings is so high is not clear. It has been suggested that the learning difficulties of these children may reflect inadequate access to primary health care and good quality pre-school education; or selective definitions of educational attainment

and ability based upon cultural mis-understanding and racial stereotyping (Social Monitoring Group, 1987).

Criminal Offending

The number of children (under 15 years of age) appearing in the Children and Young Persons Courts for offences against the law has ranged between 1,800 and 2,000 since 1980. The pattern of juvenile offending as measured by Children and Young Persons Court appearances increases with age, rising sharply between 13 and 14 years. This sharp rise can be explained to some extent by procedural factors. There is a greater tendency to use a complaint action (involving parents) rather than prosecute 13-year-olds.

Male teenagers account for a large share of Children and Young Persons Court appearances; 4 in every 5 offenders in 1984 were males under the age of 15 years. For both males and females, unlawful taking of property is the leading type of offence. Over three quarters of all cases involving juvenile offenders (under 15 years of age) in 1984 concerned stealing. The next most common types of offences, each accounting for under 6 percent of cases, were wilful damage, violence against the person and offences against good order. This pattern of offences has not changed greatly over recent years.

Juvenile offending is higher among Maori than non-Maori teenagers, and is particularly high among Maori boys. Almost half (46.5 percent) of all offenders under 15 years in 1984 were Maori boys. Together, Maori boys and girls accounted for 60 percent of Children and Young Persons Court appearances in that year. The high incidence of juvenile offending among Maoris has been shown to be related to race and socio-economic status—members of lower socio-economic groups have a higher risk of both offending and reoffending (Fergusson *et al*, 1975). Several reasons have been suggested for this. For instance, official agents may react differently or in a biased manner toward non-Europeans. As the majority of offences are concerned with property, different cultural values may be operating to cause a mismatch in the way offences are viewed. However, it is also possible that further, less measurable factors are operating, including socio-economic inequities and the breakdown of traditional values and sanctions, due to urbanisation and subsequent dislocation.

In addition to offenders against the law, the Children and Young Persons Court deals with complaints relating to children. These include complaints of neglect or ill-treatment of children, truancy, children beyond control or failure to exercise parental duty. By far the largest number of complaints coming to the attention of the courts each year are of children beyond control. Complaints of this type accounted for 44.1 percent of the 1,845 complaints dealt with in 1984. The main outcome of beyond control complaints are supervision orders and committing the child to the care of the Department of Social Welfare. Over 73 percent of the complaints were dealt with in this way in 1984.

A high proportion of children judged beyond control are Maori children—45.5 percent in 1984. Once in Department of Social Welfare care, Maori children are much more likely to be admitted to some form of institutional care than their non-Maori counterparts. The Ministerial Advisory Committee report on institutional racism (1985) showed that 62 percent of children in residential homes in the Auckland area were Maori. Further, the population in institutions who are Maori appears to have been rising. In 1959, Maori children made up 25 percent of boys admitted to the Owairaka Boys Home. By 1969 the proportion had risen to 70 percent, and by 1978 to 80 percent (Social Monitoring Group, 1987).

Morbidity and Mortality

Vulnerability to ill health is particularly high in the first 12 months of a child's life. This is reflected in admission rates to hospitals which are high for infants but decline rapidly with increasing age. Total infant admission rates have risen about one third since 1978. The reason for the increase is unclear. It seems unlikely that it is due to real changes in health, though this cannot be excluded. It appears more likely that the increase is due to changes in medical practice. This explanation is supported by the fact that the average length of stay per patient has decreased from 6.8 days in 1978 to 5.3 days in 1984, whilst the ratio of re-admissions to first admissions appears to have increased. This indicates that although young children are staying for shorter periods of time per admission, their chances of being re-admitted in the same year have increased (Social Monitoring Group, 1987).

Hospitalisation is more likely if an infant is a male, and extremely likely if an infant is Maori. The admission rate of Maori infants to public hospitals has been consistently twice the non-Maori rate for a number of years, and has been increasing. In 1984, for instance, there were 8,417 hospital admissions of Maori infants for every 10,000 Maori infants. The comparable figure for non-Maoris was 3,726 for every 10,000 non-Maori infants. Maori admission rates are especially high for acute respiratory infections, pneumonia and chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (including asthma).

The main causes of deaths in under 1-year-olds in New Zealand are cot deaths or sudden infant death syndrome, respiratory illness and gastroenteritis. These have all been associated with lifestyle factors. Cot death is the leading cause of death for both Maori and non-Maori babies. (A more detailed discussion of infant mortality trends is included in Chapter 3.)

Health problems decrease sharply after infancy. The hospitalisation rate drops dramatically for both Maori and non-Maori children. However, considerable differences between male and female, and Maori and non-Maori rates persist. Hospitalisation remains more common for boys and Maori children, and this applies for almost all conditions. Respiratory disorders are major reasons for the admission of young children to hospitals. In 1985 acute respiratory infections, other diseases of the upper respiratory tract, pneumonia and chronic obstructive pulmonary disorders accounted for 25.3 percent of all admissions of children aged 1–14 years. With increasing age however, accidents, fractures and lacerations are more frequently the reasons for admission. Together these incidents account for almost a quarter of the children aged 5–14 years, admitted to public hospitals each year.

Accidents, particularly motor vehicle accidents, are a major cause of childhood mortality in New Zealand. Amongst pre-school children, accidents accounted for 41 percent of all deaths in 1985. Congenital anomalies are the second leading cause of death in this age group (16 percent in 1985). Although not usually considered a childhood disease, malignant neoplasms (cancer) are the main non-accidental cause of death of children aged 1–4 years.

The 5–14 year age group has the lowest mortality of all age groups in the population. This is an age when many have passed the stage of early childhood and birth-related diseases but have not

entered the age group with higher mortality due to work environment and motor vehicle accidents. Still, at this young age, accidental death is the principal cause of death, accounting for almost half of all deaths (47.8 percent in 1985), followed by cancer.

Health Care

Children in New Zealand are entitled to a range of specific types of routine health care checks at certain ages. It is important that these checks are repeated at different ages because some handicaps are more easily detected at certain ages than at others and defects such as vision and hearing may change as the child grows older. The proportion of infants reported to be examined in the first year of life by doctors is high at birth but declines sharply thereafter. At birth, 80–100 percent of infants are screened but at 9 months old fewer than a quarter have the recommended medical examination (Department of Health, 1983a).

Immunisation against various illnesses is also recommended for children at different ages. In 1977, national and district immunisation levels were unacceptably low. Since then the national percentage of children immunised has improved for almost all scheduled immunisations (Department of Health, 1983a). Despite this overall improvement, however, low rates still persist among certain groups. These include children belonging to non-European and 1-parent families, and families with depressed living standards (Social Monitoring Group, 1985).

13 Solo Parents

Introduction

One of the most widely discussed changes in family life in recent times has been that of the rise in 1-parent families. Solo-parent families are not a new phenomenon in New Zealand. It has been suggested that last century and early this century it was probably at least as common for children to have a parent die as it now is for them to have legally married parents separate (Carmichael, 1983). Solo parenthood can come about in three different ways: through marital breakdown (either separation or divorce); through an ex-nuptial birth; or through widowhood. Whatever the cause, solo parenthood is a situation, not a status. Many solo parents were once married and will remarry. In recent years, it has been the increase in the number of marital breakdowns as well as a rise in the number of ex-nuptial confinements that have contributed most to the growth in numbers of people experiencing life in single-parent families in New Zealand.

Growth in Single Parent Families

Between 1971 and 1981 the number of single-parent families grew at a much faster rate than families in general. From around 50,000–55,000 in 1971, the number of 1-parent families (with a permanently absent parent on census night) rose to 70,000 in 1976 and further still to about 90,000 in 1981. At that time (1981) solo-parent families made up about 12 percent of all families in New Zealand (refer Table 13.1).

Underlying this rapid growth in numbers of single-parent families have been several important demographic trends. First and foremost among these has been the rise in the number of marital breakdowns resulting in part from high levels of pre-marital conception and precipitated marriage by teenagers and young adults in the

TABLE 13.1: One parent families 1976–1981

One-parent families	*1976*	*1981*
Number of families	70,000	89,960
Average number of members per family	2.9	2.8
Number of persons living in families	203,000	252,000
Percentage of usually resident population living in families	7.0	8.0

Source: Population Perspectives '81, Department of Statistics, 1985

1960s and early 1970s. This carried with it the potential for shifting large numbers of persons out of 2-parent families and into 1-parent families. At the beginning of the 1970s, divorces had increased to about 6,000 per year. A liberalisation of the divorce laws in 1980 eased the path to formally ending a marriage. In absolute numbers, the 1970s saw a very big increase in the population who were divorced. While in 1971, some 11,000 men and 15,000 women were divorced persons, in 1981 their numbers had risen to 26,000 men and 34,000 women (Department of Statistics, 1985b).

Marital breakdown resulting in separation only of the marriage partners has been a further source of 1-parent families, as one household has undoubled to create 2 new households, either of which has had the potential to be a 1-parent family household. During the 1970s, the rate of marital separation increased, so that in 1981 3.5 percent of the population 16 years and over were permanently separated, up from 1.4 percent in 1971.

The formation of 1-parent families during the 1970s was further promoted by a general increase in the average age of first marriage and changes in attitudes and practices in regard to ex-nuptial births and adoptions. In general terms, fewer married couples available to have children, and more unmarried women at risk of having ex-nuptial births, has meant more 1-parent families. In 1971, a total of 9,000 births were classed as ex-nuptial. By 1985, this had risen to 12,921 births despite a fall in the overall birth rate during this time. As the number of ex-nuptial births increased, fewer of these babies were made available for adoption. Whereas in 1971 around 3,000 adoptions of ex-nuptial children took place, by 1981 ex-nuptial adoptions totalled little more than a third of this figure. Much of the increase in ex-nuptial births, as well as the fall in adoptions, can be attributed to the increase in de facto marriage and its wider

community acceptance. Nevertheless, the choice of many unmarried women to keep their babies has been facilitated by changed social attitudes towards unmarried motherhood, coupled with changes in social welfare support structures, particularly the introduction of the domestic purposes benefit in 1973.

Another factor in the creation of the 1-parent family is widowhood. During the 1970s the proportion of the population who were widowed remained relatively stable. While widowhood has remained a source of solo parent families, it cannot be said to have added substantially to the increase in the number of solo-parent families over the past decade.

One further trend which has perhaps promoted the growth of 1-parent families in recent times has been the decline in remarriage of widowed and divorced persons. For both men and women, the likelihood of remarrying fell during the 1970s—except for widowed women who, showed no change in their propensity to remarry (Department of Statistics, 1985b).

Demographic Characteristics

Solo-parent families comprise a small proportion of all families. Their importance revolves around the fact that they are disproportionately represented among families with dependent children.

In 1981 solo parents represented 8 percent of all family households, but 14 percent of households with dependent children; up from 10 percent in 1976.

Particularly noteworthy with regard to solo parents is the fact that they do not form a homogeneous group but fall into 3 distinct categories, distinguished by stage of life cycle. Firstly there are mothers of ex-nuptial children—the majority of these unmarried mothers are under 25 years old and many have pre-school children. Secondly, there are mothers and fathers who have become solo parents through marital breakdown. They are older on average than mothers of ex-nuptial children and more likely to have children of school age. The third group comprises widows and widowers who are much older—about two thirds are aged 40 and older. Not surprisingly, their children tend to be older than those of solo parents in the first two groups (refer Table 13.2).

As separation, divorce and ex-nuptial births have become increasingly important, relative to widowhood in the formation of solo-parent families, single parents have become more likely to be