Optimal dynamic risk sharing when enforcement is a decision variable
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- Koeppl, Thorsten V., 2007. "Optimal dynamic risk sharing when enforcement is a decision variable," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 34-60, May.
- Thorsten V. Koeppl, 2005. "Optimal Dynamic Risk Sharing When Enforcement Is A Decision Variable," Working Paper 1050, Economics Department, Queen's University.
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Cited by:
- Xavier Mateos-Planas & Giulio Seccia, 2013. "Consumer Default with Complete Markets: Default-based Pricing and Finite Punishment," Working Papers 711, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Latchezar Popov, 2014. "Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(1), pages 195-222, September.
- Koppl, Thorsten V., 2006.
"Risk sharing through financial markets with endogenous enforcement of trades,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 1987-2014, November.
- Thorsten V. Koeppl, 2004. "Risk Sharing Through Financial Markets With Endogenous Enforcement Of Trades," Working Paper 1048, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- Koeppl, Thorsten Volker, 2004. "Risk sharing through financial markets with endogenous enforcement of trades," Working Paper Series 319, European Central Bank.
- Thorsten V. Koeppl, 2004. "Risk Sharing through Financial Markets with Endogenous Enforcement of Trades," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 326, Econometric Society.
- Beth Allen, 2006. "Market games with asymmetric information: the core," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(2), pages 465-487, October.
- Camera, Gabriele & Gioffré, Alessandro, 2014.
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- Camera, Gabriele & Gioffré, Alessandro, 2013. "Game-theoretic foundations of monetary equilibrium," SAFE Working Paper Series 32, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
- Antinolfi, Gaetano & Carli, Francesco, 2015.
"Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 105-119.
- Gaetano Antinolfi, 2012. "Costly Monitoring, Dynamic Incentives, and Default," 2012 Meeting Papers 892, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Ascari, Guido & Rankin, Neil, 2007.
"Perpetual youth and endogenous labor supply: A problem and a possible solution,"
Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 708-723, December.
- Ascari, Guido & Rankin, Neil, 2004. "Perpetual youth and endogenous labour supply: a problem and a possible solution," Working Paper Series 346, European Central Bank.
- Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin & Thorsten V. Koeppl, 2007.
"The Poor, The Rich And The Enforcer: Institutional Choice And Growth,"
Working Paper
1150, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- Erwan Quintin & Cyril Monnet & Thorsten Koeppl, 2008. "The Poor, the Rich and the Enforcer: Institutional Choice and Growth," 2008 Meeting Papers 281, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2008. "The poor, the rich and the enforcer: institutional choice and growth," Working Papers 0801, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
- Xavier Mateos-Planas & Giulio Seccia, 2013. "Consumer Default with Complete Markets: Default-based Pricing and Finite Punishment," Working Papers 711, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Xavier Mateos-Planas & Giulio Seccia, 2014. "Consumer default with complete markets: default-based pricing and finite punishment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(3), pages 549-583, August.
- Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2008. "Efficient institutions," Working Papers 08-33, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2014. "Efficient contract enforcement," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(1), pages 161-183, January.
- Jonathan Pogach, 2010. "Efficient Auditing and Enforcement in Dynamic Contracts," 2010 Meeting Papers 572, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Florin Bidian & Camelia Bejan, 2015.
"Martingale properties of self-enforcing debt,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(1), pages 35-57, September.
- Bidian, Florin & Bejan, Camelia, 2011. "Martingale properties of self-enforcing debt," MPRA Paper 36609, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 12 Feb 2012.
- Xiao, Tiaojun & Yang, Danqin, 2009. "Risk sharing and information revelation mechanism of a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain facing an integrated competitor," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 196(3), pages 1076-1085, August.
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More about this item
Keywords
limited commitment; risk sharing; third-party enforcement;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
- K49 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Other
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