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My bibliography Save this paperTime Consistency in Dynamic Bargaining: The Role of Committees as Substitutes for Commitment
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Cited by:
- Montoro, Carlos, 2007.
"Monetary policy committees and interest rate smoothing,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
19752, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Carlos Montoro, 2007. "Monetary Policy Committees and Interest Rate Smoothing," CEP Discussion Papers dp0780, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Emanuel Kohlscheen, 2010.
"Sovereign risk: constitutions rule,"
Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 62-85, January.
- Kohlscheen, Emanuel, 2005. "Sovereign Risk : Constitutions Rule," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 731, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Kohlscheen, Emanuel, 2005. "Sovereign Risk: Constitutions Rule," Economic Research Papers 269624, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Emanuel Kohlscheen, 2006. "Sovereign Risk: Constitutions Rule," 2006 Meeting Papers 25, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Francesco Salsano, 2005. "Monetary Policy in the Presence Of Imperfect Observability Of The Objectives Of Central Bankers," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0523, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
- Carlos Montoro, 2007. "Why Central Banks Smooth Interest Rates? A Political Economy Explanation," Working Papers 2007-003, Banco Central de Reserva del PerĂº.
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Keywords
Time Consistency; Voting; Committees;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2004-08-02 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MIC-2004-08-02 (Microeconomics)
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