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- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Michele Piccione, 2022. "The Emergence of Enforcement," Working Papers gueconwpa~22-22-08, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Anderlini, L. & Felli, L. & Piccone, M., 2022. "The Emergence of Enforcement," Janeway Institute Working Papers 2222, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Anderlini, L. & Felli, L. & Piccone, M., 2022. "The Emergence of Enforcement," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2250, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Michele Piccione, 2023. "The Emergence of Enforcement," Working Papers gueconwpa~23-23-06, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
- Caitlin Brown & Martin Ravallion, 2023.
"Inequality and Social Distancing during the Pandemic,"
The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 21(3), pages 679-702, September.
- Caitlin S. Brown & Martin Ravallion, 2022. "Inequality and Social Distancing during the Pandemic," NBER Working Papers 30540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Martin Ravallion & Caitlin Brown, 2022. "Inequality and Social Distancing during the Pandemic," Working Papers gueconwpa~22-22-09, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
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More about this item
Keywords
Jungle; Power Structures; Enforcement; Rule of Law.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- K19 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Other
- K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
- K49 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Other
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EVO-2024-05-20 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2024-05-20 (Game Theory)
- NEP-LAW-2024-05-20 (Law and Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2024-05-20 (Microeconomics)
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