Dotan Leshem

+annex of tables and figures. Forthcoming June 4th, Columbia University Press
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"Leshem's important book makes a very powerful and original contribution to an increasingly significant discussion across different disciplines. Its consistency, erudition, and relevance for contemporary research into the theological "genealogy" of economy and government is impressive indeed." — Étienne Balibar, Professor Emeritus of Moral and Political Philosophy, Université de Paris-Ouest Nanterre (France) and Visiting Professor, Columbia University

"In my opinion this work is the most significant text so far in the field of what has come to be termed 'political theology.' Through his wide-ranging and careful scholarship, Leshem shows the extent to which a theological, Biblically-based dimension totally altered the operative categories of political virtue." — John Milbank, author of Beyond Secular Order: The Representation of Being and the Representation of the People

"This dazzling book takes us on an intellectual journey of rare substance. It demonstrates that our current predicament — the dominance of economic "rationality," the imperatives of growth — is at once newer and older, narrower and broader, than we have been taught. This is a humbling and teaching book that will change, that must change, the way we conceive of the economic in its relation to the political, the philosophical, the theological. An economist and a philosopher, Dotan Leshem writes with masterful intensity and compellingly calls for an extraordinary transformation, for an "ethical economy," for nothing less than a new political philosophy." — Gil Anidjar, author of Blood: A Critique of Christianity

Five short remarks at the beginning of the panel discussion at the Institute for religion, Culture and Public Life at Columbia University  presenting what the book is about.
Moderator: Gil Anidjar
Discussants: Daniel Colucciello Barber, Stathis Gourgouris
http://ircpl.org/event/the-origins-of-neoliberalism-a-panel-conversation/

This chapter contextualizes Foucault's lectures on neoliberalism in the overall oeuvre of the Collège de France lecture series. Returning to Foucault's inaugural lectures from 1970-71, I suggest they should be read as a series of genealogical inquiries into regimes of veridiction. They were intended to bring Nietzsche's project to completion by doing in history what Nietzsche had accomplished in philosophy: that is, writing the history of thought as a history of subjecting the will to know to the sovereignty of truth by showing how this knowledge forms a regime of veridiction when transcribed into power. This project was not only meant to free knowledge but, more importantly, to do so by surpassing the politics of truth. The project of writing the history of regimes of veridiction was to be completed by a series of lectures on the history of neoliberal governmentality, the prevailing prominent form of power. Foucault's lectures on neoliberalism suggest that this regime established in governmentality what he sought to do by writing its history: that is, by postulating a "conduct of conduct" that was not subjected to the sovereignty of any specific truth. In The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault described how this was done, both theoretically and technically. In economic theory it was achieved by releasing the market from being a site of veridiction, and by the way human capital frees homo economicus from the truth value imposed on it by the value of her labor. The same aim was achieved, as Foucault showed, by a change in the technologies of government and self: (1) through negative income tax, as a way of releasing the government of the poor from the regime that distinguishes between the "good" and the "bad" poor; and (2) the "anthropological erasure of the criminal" that brought about a "massive withdrawal with regard to the normative-disciplinary system." Looking both at the change in theory and in the two localized apparatuses of a new regime of knowledge indicates that neoliberalism performs a massive overhaul of liberal governmentality. Like Nietzsche in philosophy and Foucault in history, this is done by dissociating knowledge of government and truth, which goes hand-in-hand with disassociating the subject from its intrinsic truth. As I will suggest in part 3, which deals with critique, Foucault's research into the neoliberal 'post-truth' government led him, in the eighties, to look for a critical ethos of parrhesiastic truth-telling as a way out 1 of all forms of pastoral power.

Nearly every economist has at some point in the standard coursework been exposed to a brief explanation that the origin of the word "economy" can be traced back to the Greek word oikonomia, which in turn is composed of two words: oikos, which is usually translated as "household"; and nemein, which is best translated as "management and dispensation." Thus, the cursory story usually goes, the term oikonomia referred to "household management", and while this was in some loose way linked to the idea of budgeting, it has little or no relevance to contemporary economics. This article introduces in more detail what the ancient Greek philosophers meant by "oikonomia." It begins with a short history of the word. It then explores some of the key elements of oikonomia, while offering some comparisons and contrasts with modern economic thought. For example, both Ancient Greek oikonomia and contemporary economics study human behavior as a relationship between ends and means which have alternative uses. However, while both approaches hold that the rationality of any economic action is dependent on the frugal use of means, contemporary economics is largely neutral between ends, while in ancient economic theory, an action is considered economically rational only when taken towards a praiseworthy end. Moreover, the ancient philosophers had a distinct view of what constituted such an end—specifically, acting as a philosopher or as an active participant in the life of the city-state.

This article tackles Giorgio Agamben's critique of Michel Foucault's genealogy of governmentality in two ways: first, by presenting an alternative model of the relations between pastoral and theological economy and, second, by conducting a genealogy of the former as revealed in the state of exception, when canon law is suspended. Following the author's genealogy of oikonomia in the state of exception, he argues that politics and economy are distinct from one another by virtue of the fact that the primary relation of the latter is one of inclusion while that of the former is one of exclusion. Finally, the author traces three of oikonomia's prolific qualities in the operation of governmentality in civil society and of market
economy: (i) its inclusiveness; (ii) the constant representation of the irreconcilability of law and authority; and (iii) its operation by accommodating to the ways of the governed.
Link: http://tcs.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/06/27/0263276414537315.full

In response to Hannah Arendt’s claim that the social realm originates with the modern age, this article argues for its roots in the early Christian, ecclesiastical concept of oikonomia or economy. The first part shows how economy first exceeded the oikos (household) into the public sphere within the society of Christian believers. The second part focuses on the passage from ecclesiastical economy to political economy that coincides with the emergence of modernity. The last section concludes by emphasizing the continuity between ecclesiastical and political economy, despite the phenomenon of secularization.

The article argues that the idea that the moral persona cannot be stripped from the human mode of being is implied by Arendt's claim that the holes of oblivion do not exist. By equating the moral persona with the human mode of being, this interpretation casts Arendt as offering a new concept of secularization that enables a re-conceptualization of the economy of human nature as described by the Church Fathers. Based on a comparative analysis of the Jewish, Christian, and Arendtian persona of the witness, the article argues for a new political philosophy that i) posits morality as ontologically prior to utility when it comes to the economy, and ii) proposes a return to the different modes of "begetting on a beautiful thing by means of body and soul" enumerated by Diotima.

As Aristotle states in both Politics and the Nicomachean Ethics, his goal was to establish the polis as the sole community in which one is able to live a happy life. To substantiate this claim, he presented three criteria: i) the level of self-sufficiency achieved by the community; ii) the level of plurality that appears in it; and iii) the extent to which its principle of action is guided by virtue. The paper argues that Aristotle's presentation of the level of economy's self-sufficiency relative to politics is inconsistent. Considering the plurality that appears in the various human communities, it addresses the puzzle of why Aristotle insists that the political community, and not the economic one, exhibits greater plurality, and proposes that the economic and political communities are most clearly differentiated by the virtue demonstrated in them: soundness of mind in the economy, and fortitude in politics. reexamination of her understanding of the modern human condition. Based on my findings, I show how the description of the virtue of soundness of mind as the governing virtue of the economic community alters Arendt's description of the 'rise of the social' in the modern age, and how it  redefines the task now facing contemporary political philosophers who wish to reconstitute the distinction between politics and economy.

This essay juxtaposes two senses given to the concept of “market economy”: economizing the market, as suggested by Aristotle, and marketing the economy, as suggested by modern economists. The essay argues that Aristotle identified the market as arousing excessive desires in people, and by doing so it poses a threat to the mere existence of the polis. As suggested, the solution offered by him was economizing the market by subjecting it to the mode of sound-minded conduct. By following the different definitions of prominent modern economists to the scope and method of economic science, I argue that what Aristotle did not foresee was that the economy may be marketed by prudently economizing bodily desires as self-aroused by the market. Juxtaposing Aristotelian and market economy sheds light on the fact that we are free to choose between vicious and virtuous economy. Whether practicing economic virtue or its corresponding vice, prudence is kept unharmed, and both the sound-minded and the licentious person are liable to slip into some sort of bondage.

This article reviews ancient texts dedicated to the art of economics, narrating how the master was to manage his wife, slaves and things. The discourse on the economy of things focuses on defining the proper limits of wealth. The economy of the slaves included multiple technologies of classification, management and supervision that were to guide the master and the matron in their ‘use’ of slaves. The wife was a freeborn member of the polis who was doomed to spend her entire life in the economy as a governed subject who partakes in government only within the confines of the oikos.

History of Economics Society 2014 Best Article Award

Committee: Mary Morgan, Viviane Brown, and Carlos Suprinyak

Citation:

"Dotan Leshem’s paper “Oikonomia Redefined” provides a fascinating interpretation of the notion of ‘oikonomia’ in ancient Greek texts. The paper unpacks the notion of ‘oikonomia’ to distinguish between the excess or abundance that comes from nature and the surplus that may accrue to the household with prudent management, and argues that the ‘good life’ comes from particular uses of that surplus, namely those uses considered wise by that society, rather than pursuit of surplus per se.  It offers an enlightening analysis about the ancient economy; but, in raising foundational questions about the nature of economic activity and the role such plays in the larger society, the commentary also
incorporates a moral dimension.  It is this moral dimension that provides both broad possibilities for insightful reflections on the economics of other periods and new conceptual resources for understanding the present."

The article reviews the uses of the term ‘oikonomia’ in Greek-speaking antiquity and illustrates how the term was used in all spheres of human existence and in various arts and sciences, usually denoting the prudent dispensation of the field resources. In this era the arts and sciences also received their own economies, and the term oikonomia, designating in most cases the prudent management of resources, appears in political theory, military strategy, law, finance, medicine, literary criticism, architecture, music, history and rhetoric. Among all the spheres, arts and sciences that were economized, the story of oikonomia in the field of rhetoric is at the center of this article’s attention. As shown, the concept of oikonomia took an intermediate form between the realm of thought – that is, the domain of philosophy – and the realm of public speech – the domain of politics.

Dotan Leshem’s paper “Oikonomia Redefined” provides a fascinating interpretation of the notion of ‘oikonomia’ in ancient Greek texts. The paper unpacks the notion of ‘oikonomia’ to distinguish between the excess or abundance that comes from nature and the surplus that may accrue to the household with prudent management, and argues that the ‘good life’ comes from particular uses of that surplus, namely those uses considered wise by that society, rather than pursuit of surplus per se.  It offers an enlightening analysis about the ancient economy; but, in raising foundational questions about the nature of economic activity and the role such plays in the larger society, the commentary also incorporates a moral dimension.  It is this moral dimension that provides both broad possibilities for insightful reflections on the economics of other periods and new conceptual resources for understanding the present.

Dans un billet datant de bientôt cinq ans faisant partie de ma série sur les expressions qui me tapent sur les nerfs et portant sur les sophismes étymologiques (soit des arguments fondés sur l’étymologie d’un mot), je donnais entre autres comme exemple l’utilisation de l’étymologie du mot «économie», soit le mot grec oikonomia, pour montrer que les économistes ont donné un sens bien différent à ce mot de celui que lui donnaient les Grecs anciens, soit l’administration d’une maison.

En plus, du fait que la plupart des mots n’ont plus le sens qu’ils avaient à l’origine, sait-on vraiment ce que les Grecs anciens voulaient dire par «administration d’une maison»? Une courte étude que j’ai lue récemment, intitulée What Did the Ancient Greeks Mean by Oikonomia? (Qu’est-ce que les anciens Grecs veulent dire avec «oikonomia»?) répond justement à cette question.

L’étymologie de l’étymologie

L’auteur de cette étude, Dotan Leshem, explique que pour les Grecs anciens, «oikos» ne prenait pas seulement le sens d’une maison ou d’un ménage (household), mais aussi celui d’une propriété ou d’un domaine (de même que l’écologie n’est pas la science de la maison, mais celle de l’habitat ou même de la Terre). Ainsi, l’oikonomia n’était pas vraiment l’administration d’un ménage ou d’une maison, mais bien celle d’une propriété, propriété qui était la base de l’économie de l’époque, l’endroit où on produisait les biens pour l’ensemble de la famille élargie, incluant les esclaves. Même si ce sens n’est pas celui qu’on donne à l’économie actuelle, il en est drôlement plus près que ce qu’on envisage par la simple administration d’une maison!

Les premières apparitions du terme «oikonomia» dans les textes grecs datent d’environ 800 ans avant notre ère et parlaient entre autres de la production agricole et de sa gestion souvent confiée à la femme du propriétaire (bien trop occupé à philosopher pour accomplir ce genre de tâches…). Les textes suivants qui utilisaient ce terme insistaient sur l’importance pour les propriétaires d’assurer l’autosuffisance (ou de l’autarcie) de leur «oikos», méprisant le commerce de leur production. Dans ce sens, on peut dire que la notion d’oikonomia ne couvrait qu’une partie de l’ensemble de l’économie de l’époque, mais une partie importante.

L’économie et l’oikonomia

Il y a donc de grandes différences entre l’économie et l’oikonomia, mais elles sont loin d’être celles qu’on imaginait entre l’économie actuelle et l’administration d’un ménage (ou d’une maison). Par exemple, alors que la discipline économique actuelle se prétend supérieure aux autres sciences sociales (voir notamment ce billet qui élabore sur le sentiment de supériorité des économistes), la notion d’oikonomia s’appliquait non seulement à la gestion rationnelle des propriétés, mais aussi à celle de la théorie politique, de la stratégie militaire, du droit, des finances, de la médecine et même de la critique littéraire, de l’architecture, de la musique, de l’histoire et de la rhétorique. Mais, d’autres différences sont encore plus fondamentales.

L’économie actuelle repose en bonne partie sur la notion de la rareté («l’économie est l’affectation de ressources rares à des usages alternatifs» ). Au contraire, les Grecs anciens considéraient que les biens étaient abondants. Ils voyaient trois dimensions à l’oikonomia : «[traduction] le royaume spirituel de la philosophie, le royaume héroïque de la politique et le développement économique». L’objectif de ce dernier était «d’obtenir les moyens nécessaires pour l’existence et pour générer un excédent qui permet l’exercice des deux autres dimensions [la philosophie et la politique] qui sont jugés dignes de l’homme». Et, pour atteindre cet objectif, l’oikonomia doit générer des surplus, soit en augmentant la production ou en modérant la consommation (frugalité).

Ceux qui avaient réussi à philosopher ont ensuite étudié laquelle de ces deux options était la préférable pour un homme respectable. Comme la nature produit l’abondance, la question est de savoir ce qu’on va faire avec nos surplus. Aristote prétendait qu’il est naturel d’utiliser cette abondance pour satisfaire aux besoins de la population (et même des pauvres et des esclaves), mais qu’il est contre-nature d’amasser une richesse excessive (surtout en s’engageant dans le commerce de cette abondance). Pour un philosophe, vouloir plus que de pouvoir satisfaire à ses besoins de base et à ses désirs naturels qui lui permettent d’exercer la philosophie est une mauvaise chose.

Pour les économistes actuels, la rationalité se traduit par la maximisation de l’utilité (ou du bien-être), sans aucune considération éthique (un dollar provenant de la vente d’armes ou du fait de soigner une personne malade reste un dollar et a donc la même valeur). La rationalité de l’oikonomia est au contraire basée sur l’éthique et seulement sur l’éthique :

«l’approche économique de comportement humain des Grecs de l’Antiquité ne part pas de l’hypothèse que les désirs ne peuvent pas être comblés et que la rareté et les compromis [tradeoffs] sont inévitables. Au lieu de cela, ils ont établi que l’oikonomia de la maximisation de l’utilité était contraire à l’éthique, et ils méprisaient ceux qui agissaient avec cet objectif.»

Selon Xenophon, les personnes qui agissent ainsi sont des «esclaves menés par des maîtres extrêmement rudes. Certains sont menés par la gourmandise, d’autres par la fornication, certains par l’ivresse, et d’autres par des ambitions folles et coûteuses qui ont contrôlé cruellement tous les hommes qu’elles ont tenu en leur pouvoir». On voit que les anciens Grecs considéraient que la rationalité économique est de consommer de façon frugale et de toujours viser à ce que ses objectifs soient valables. Ils distinguaient quatre façons d’utiliser les surplus de production. La première est de les réinvestir dans l’économie pour générer encore plus de croissance : cette utilisation était assimilable à de l’esclavage, car la personne qui agit ainsi embarque dans un engrenage dont elle ne sortira jamais. Les trois autres façons d’utiliser les surplus ont été mentionnées auparavant (le texte est parfois répétitif), soit de s’en servir pour consacrer sa vie à la philosophie, à la politique (utilisations glorifiées et jugées rationnelles) ou au luxe (utilisation condamnée et considérée irrationnelle).

D’autres différences notées par l’auteur sont moins favorables aux Grecs anciens. Par exemple, ils considéraient l’esclavage tout à fait éthique, ce qui est à tout le moins plus rare de nos jours. Ils n’accordaient aucun droit aux femmes, même si c’était souvent elles qui administraient l’«oikos» (comme mentionné auparavant). Pourtant, c’est essentiellement en raison du travail des esclaves et des femmes que les «citoyens» à part entière pouvaient se permettre d’avoir des surplus et de les consacrer aux activités nobles, comme de philosopher ou de faire de la politique.

L’auteur discute par la suite de la possibilité de joindre la vision éthique de la rationalité économique des Grecs anciens avec celle des promoteurs des droits civiques et de l’égalité entre les citoyens et les esclaves, et entre les hommes et les femmes. Pour lui, l’approche des capabilités conçue par Amartya Sen et peaufinée par Martha Nussbaum (voir ce billet à ce sujet) serait une des meilleures façons de le faire. Pour Sen, les capabilités sont les possibilités pour une personne de transformer des biens en liberté et de choisir la vie qu’elle veut mener. Cela dit, l’auteur ne prétend pas que ce soit la seule façon d’y parvenir. Il conclut que l’ajout d’une dimension éthique aux objectifs économiques actuels remettrait en question la recherche de la croissance comme une fin en soi et que le concept d’oikonomia, dépouillé de ses caractéristiques déplorables, peut servir de modèle à cette fin.

Et alors…

Ce texte m’a plu pour de nombreuses raisons. Tout d’abord, il confirme mon aversion envers les sophismes étymologiques. Ensuite, il sait bien nuancer les aspects positifs et négatifs de la société grecque ancienne, trop souvent idéalisée. Finalement, il montre que, en faisant reposer l’économie sur un concept philosophique différent de celui de l’utilitarisme (qui est à la base de l’économie classique et néo-classique), on peut parvenir à mieux concentrer nos activités économiques sur des objectifs qui tiennent compte de l’éthique et de la recherche d’une vie saine, balayant du même coup l’économisme sans âme actuel.

Hace un par de semanas comenzamos el segundo cuatrimestre de este curso académico. Tras estudiar microeconomía en navidades (algún@s con más éxito que otr@s), ahora los alumnos deben centrarse en la macroeconomía. La mayor parte de l@s lector@s, y esperemos que a estas alturas también de los alumnos, están familiarizados con la palabra economía. Pero, ¿cuál es su origen? Al igual que la mayor parte de las palabras que utilizamos (puedes ver una parodia sobre esto), la economía proviene de la palabra griega oikonomía (ο’ικονομία), la cual a su vez se compone de dos palabras: oikos, que se traduce generalmente como hogar, y nemein, que se traduce como “gestión y dispensación”.

En un reciente artículo, Dotan Leshem ha explorado con más detalle lo que los antiguos filósofos griegos entendían por oikonomía. En la antigua Grecia, el oikos hacía referencia a un hogar, pero no sólo en el sentido de una unidad de consumo familiar, sino en un sentido de estado. Un oikos era también una unidad de fabricación, que suministraba a las familias de sus propias necesidades, y que en muchos casos, incluía a los esclavos en el seno de la familia.

A medida que la “polis” (la política) se convertía en un elemento central para la nobleza de la época, el término oikonomía entró a formar parte de la esfera política y a convertirse en objeto de reflexión filosófica. Desde el año 332 a.C. hasta aproximadamente el 200 a.C., se escribieron textos dedicados a la administración del hogar en las principales escuelas filosóficas griegas. Estos textos se dirigían a los varones, que gobernaban las familias y seguían los valores de la aristocracia terrateniente. Estos textos llevaban implícita una aprobación acrítica de la esclavitud y el sometimiento de las mujeres, una valorización de la autosuficiencia de los hogares y por ende, un cierto desprecio sobre el comercio. En resumen, la oikonomía únicamente trataba de las actividades sociales y económicas que tenían lugar dentro de los límites del oikos.

Acorde a los anteriores escritos, la vida del cabeza de familia (o oikodesptes) se circunscribía a tres dimensiones: la filosofía, la política y la economía. El papel de la dimensión económica era asegurar los medios necesarios para la existencia y para generar un excedente que permitiera sustentar las otras dos dimensiones. El excedente generado por la oikonomía estaba por tanto destinado a permitir que el cabeza de familia pudiera participar en la política y dedicarse a la filosofía. De esta manera, se consideraba que el cabeza de familia permitía a aquellas personas de su oikos participar en la vida de la polis (de la ciudad-estado), y en el pensamiento filosófico.

Esta lógica giraba en torno a tres conceptos: abundancia, racionalidad económica y excedente. La abundancia se consideraba que era un atributo de la naturaleza, a la cual se suponía capaz de satisfacer con creces las necesidades de todos los seres si era gestionada racionalmente. El excedente, por su parte, era resultado del comportamiento racional del cabeza de familia, es decir, aquel excedente de la naturaleza que no se utilizaba para asegurar la existencia familiar. De este modo, los antiguos filósofos pensaban en la oikonomía como una esfera en la que el hombre, que vivía en un entorno de abundancia de medios, debía adoptar una disposición ética en su racionalidad económica que le permitiera hacer frente a sus necesidades y generar excedentes que alimentaran a las esferas filosófica y política.

Es en este momento cuando las reflexiones de Jenofonte y de Aristóteles introdujeron un cambio significativo a la manera en la que se comprendía la economía. Para éstos, el oikos era percibido como una asociación entre la matrona y el cabeza de familia que tenía como objetivo no sólo la existencia, sino una existencia feliz. De todos los actores económicos de la antigua Grecia, la matrona mostraba el mayor parecido con el “homo economicus” contemporáneo. En primer lugar, la matrona era la responsable de gobernar el interior del oikos, debido a su solidez de pensamiento, en la que estaba al mismo nivel que el cabeza de familia, e incluso se consideraba que podía sobresalir respecto a él. En segundo lugar, la matrona pasaba la mayor parte de su tiempo en el oikos, al ser excluida de la esfera pública de la política y la filosofía.

A pesar de que el excedente (o superávit) de la antigua oikonomía se generaba debido a la esclavitud y la negación de los derechos de los ciudadanos a las mujeres, ésta también contemplaba ciertos juicios éticos. Ciertamente, deberíamos ser capaces de identificar una variedad de bases éticas para una economía moderna sin la necesidad de recurrir a la esclavitud o a la negación de derechos humanos y civiles. En este sentido, el autor concluye que el análisis económico debería incorporar un debate ético, de tal forma que la racionalidad económica sea definida en términos de la mejor manera de acercarse a los objetivos que se desprendan de un marco ético acordado. Este marco ético podría poner en duda la consecución de algunos objetivos económicos nacionales como un fin en sí mismos.

Al igual que en la antigua Grecia se produjo una transición que equiparara a los agentes de un oikos, no estaría de más que los “cabezas de familia” del pensamiento económico moderno pudieran también evolucionar incluyendo una ética articulada en torno al propósito humano en la práctica de la vida económica.

In this paper I tried to enrich the pre-modern history of political theology by adding the work of Francis Dvornik to the debate that stemmed from Erik Peterson wholesome critique of Carl Schmitt. As I tried to show, the first denotation of political theology was revealed in Hellenic political theory. As described, it was based on three paradigms, namely: the king is God; the king is the image of God; The king is the animated law. then, I followed its Christianization which reached its peak in Justinian’s code  when the latter two paradigms -  of the king as the image of God and as the animated law - were kept but at bay, sort of speak, with the emergence of economic theology to which political theology is subjected. Lastly, I claimed that political theology was first secularized in the turn of the ninth century, when The Iconodules denied the king the image of god, And the akribists declared that the king is no longer the animated law.

An Invited talk on "The Origins of Neoliberalism: Modeling the Economy from Jesus to Foucault" at the Department of Religion, Princeton University.
In it, I focused on how economy's migration from oikos to ecclesia and then to the market are reflected in: 1. The economic triad of Abundance - Prudence - Surplus and 2. the human trinity of economy-politics-philosophy

This paper discusses some of the qualities of that liminal sphere created by the practice of what is formally known as the principle of economy. This is done by reconstructing three pivotal moments in its pre-modern history. The first is found in the First Canon of Basil the Great. Here, the principle of economy's sphere of application is demarcated as the space extending between the relative boundaries of the Church, defined by Canon Law, and its absolute boundaries, beyond which lie only heretics. The second moment is the letters of Cyril of Alexandria, who discusses economy as a means to a higher end, which is practiced when circumstances prove that the gain from acting economically is greater than following Canonic rules. The third pivotal moment appears in Eulogius. In the summary of his treatise dedicated to the principle of economy (found in Photius' Bibliotheca), Eulogius introduces and classifies further regulations for the various applications of that principle, accompanying each category with its own "manual."

The paper  predates Hanna Arendt’s "rise of the social" from modernity to late antiquity.
The first part demonstrates that economy first exceeded the oikos into the public sphere within the society of Christian believers, followed by a discussion of how economic activity is organized in time and in space according to the Christian conception.
The second part focuses on the passage from ecclesiastical economy to political economy which coincides with the emergence of modernity,  indicating how this transition relates to the process of the Church’s expropriation of its property.
The concluding part suggests that although the process of secularization of society involved a radical transformation in the nature of economic activity that occurred within society, several structural characteristics of this realm remained intact. In addition to the continuation of these structural aspects, it argues that the principle of movement that inspirits ecclesiastical economy was adopted by political economy from its outset.

Following a short history of the concept of oikonomia in pre-Nicean Christianity, I present theoretical and pastoral models that were articulated in the period between Nicea (325) and Chlacedon (451). The theoretical models were used to define the modes by which divinity is made present in the world while the pastoral mimesis of the mirror was used to promote the economy of salvation.
An audio recording of the talk is available at: https://soundcloud.com/chssedinburgh/dotan-leshem?in=chssedinburgh%2Fsets%2Fhuman-business-network-modes-of-representation

The presentation argues that:  1. Neoclassical economics and neoliberal politics are not the same thing and draws some distinctions between the two . 2. Neoclassical economics became subservient to neoliberal politics, as demonstrated in both micro and macro economics 3. A possible explanation is that neoliberalism is a well-founded system of thought, and as long as it is mathematically consistent, progressive neoclassical economists will aim at delivering. 4. It is useful to borrow methods from other disciplines when rethinking economics. This is demonstrated by using a psychoanalytic method and genealogical reasoning.
Video Recording: http://livestream.com/accounts/284788/rethinkingeconomics-culaw/videos/61946030
from the 6th min.

Suppose that Classical, Christian and Liberal economic theory hold that the human condition of excess is dealt with a disposition of prudence that generates surplus and that In all three being human is modeled as an economic creature (zoon oikonomikon/homo economicus) who prudently economize an excess that surpasses human rationality, and suppose that this encounter generates a surplus that humans may artfully oversee.
Suppose also that each system of economic thought attributes a different archeh (origin of /rule over) to excess and that Classical philosophers attributed it to the circularity of nature; The Fathers of the Church believed that God the Father is the Arche; and in political economy and economics it is assumed to be embedded in human unsaturated desires and in the objects desired. And although they all agree that humans acquire a prudent disposition in their engagement with excess, the ancients supposed that acquiring this disposition was a mater of ethical choice while the modern economists take human rationality for granted.
Suppose then that pre-Christian economic art challenged the surplus generated by the economization of natural excess into leisure time (scholeh) freeing the oikodespotes to participate in politics and engage in philosophy; Pastoral economy challenges divine-human surplus back into the society of believers in Christ economy, and macroeconomics is mainly about the generation of economic growth.
If all that happen to hold some merit then we may step outside the institution of calculating capitalism and assess the rules that govern excess and the nature of the surplus generated by capitalist calculations as I will try to do in my presentation.

FOUCAULT ON CHRISTIANITY The extent of Michel Foucault engagement with Christianity has only recently came to light with the publication of his lectures from the early 1980s. In this course, we will appreciate the originality of Foucault's critical account of Christianity and examine the major role it occupied in his thought on subjects such as sexuality, governmentality, truth telling, confession, judicial forms and the crucial role he ascribed to Christianity in forming the history of the present.