Papers and Articles by Cristina Fasone
German Law Journal, 2022
The new European economic governance has made the creation or reform of independent fiscal instit... more The new European economic governance has made the creation or reform of independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) compulsory, in particular for Eurozone countries. While these institutions have been subject to extensive investigation by the economic literature, a constitutional analysis of their prospective and actual impact on national legal systems is lacking. In fact, depending on their design and powers, they could alter the ordinary inter-institutional dynamics on budgetary decisions. IFIs could redress the marginalization of parliaments in budgetary procedures in so far as they are able to offer reliable and independent information from the executive, and should mechanisms of "comply or explain" be put in place. By contrast, in the event an IFI operates within the executive branch and is not autonomous in the exercise of its mandate, parliamentary accountability could be further jeopardized. IFIs could also affect democratic rule-making over the budget, should their technocratic determinations be able to replace those of the budgetary authorities. Through a comparative constitutional analysis and based on selected case studies-France, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands-the article aims to assess the constitutional impact of IFIs on parliaments and on the problem of information asymmetry on the budget.
The Journal of Legislative Studies, 2022
The article aims to assess how and why the EP played the role of EU democratic institution par ex... more The article aims to assess how and why the EP played the role of EU democratic institution par excellence in the procedures leading to the adoption of the antipandemic measures from February 2020 till February 2021: Which arguments has the EP sought to advance in the various stages, for what reasons, and how successful it was? Indeed, while it is undeniable that certain contextual elements – the nature of the crisis, the creation of EU debt and the EU competences affected – did play a role in the advancement of the EP’s agenda, it is argued here that in the aftermath of the pandemic the EP has managed to become more aware of its own institutional role compared to the previous financial crisis and to present itself as a truly supranational institution representing the whole European citizenry and committed to improving the transparency and the democratic accountability of the EU budgetary procedures.
Swiss Political Science Review (advance access), forthcoming in "“Democratic Challenges of Differentiated (Dis)Integration”, special issue edited by Sandra Kröger and Markus Patberg, 2021
The post-crisis reforms of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) have met with skepticism toward ... more The post-crisis reforms of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) have met with skepticism toward their democratic credentials. This certainly applies to the requirement to set up Independent Fiscal Institutions (IFIs). Drawing on Pettit’s model of republican legitimacy, this paper argues however that IFIs can indirectly increase the democratic character of national fiscal policy while preserving Member States’ autonomy. Such a democratic contribution is further facilitated by nationally differentiated implementation of the EU rules regarding the heterogeneous design and powers of IFIs. Based on a comparative analysis of selected Member States’ “elaboration discretion” in defining the organisation and the mandate of IFIs, the article highlights that these features reflect the variety of constitutional settings at domestic level. It is concluded that this heterogeneity amounts to a form of differentiated integration which allows for a better navigation of the trade-off between the persistence of fiscal policy externalities and the reduction in national autonomy.
in Parliamentary Affairs (advance access), forthcoming in "Representative Democracy in Danger? The Impact of Populist Parties in Government on the Powers and Practices of National Parliaments", special issue co-edited by Aleksandra Maatsch and Eric Miklin, 2021
The article analyses whether and how the activity of populist governments in Italy has affected t... more The article analyses whether and how the activity of populist governments in Italy has affected the performance of parliament’s legislative and scrutiny functions. The analysis covers the government of Five Star Movement (5SM) and the Lega as well as the coalition government made up of the 5SM, the Democratic Party and centre-left junior allies up to the COVID-19 outbreak. The article uses selected bills and decree-laws to investigate the impact on the legislative function, while question time sessions and committees of inquiry are examined as case studies on the scrutiny function. The analysis demonstrates that although ‘subversive’ constitutional and parliamentary conduct was already in place beforehand, when populists entered government in the 18th legislative term there was a worsening of a trend towards eroding representative democracy.
DPCE Online, 2019
The article explores the main features of Canadian federalism from a European perspective, lookin... more The article explores the main features of Canadian federalism from a European perspective, looking at Canada as an "importer" and an "exporter" of federal solutions. First, it considers the relationship between federalism and constitutional amendment formulas. Second, it analyses the division of competences between the federation and the provinces under the Constitution Act and the case law of the Supreme Court of Canada. Third, the article deals with the composition and powers of the Senate as a problematic element for the functioning of the federation. Fourth, it moves on to explore intergovernmental relationships as a key element of the Canadian asymmetric federal arrangement. Finally, it reconstructs and elaborates on the failed attempts of Quebec to secede and how the threat of federal disintegration has been addressed. The article concludes that, despite having being "obscured" by other federations, like the United States and Germany, as a benchmark for federal solutions, Canada has become an increasingly popular federal model and shows features and challenges similar to some regional and federal countries in the old continent, when viewed through the lens of a European observer.
by Cristina Fasone, Andreas Orator, Giuseppe Martinico, Francesco Cherubini, Giorgio Repetto, François-Xavier Millet, Alessia Fusco, Miryam Rodríguez-Izquierdo Serrano, Mihail Vatsov, Clelia Lacchi, Pierre-Vincent Astresses, and Eleonora Paris
The Treaty of Lisbon and in particular the early warning mechanism (hereinafter EWM) have drawn t... more The Treaty of Lisbon and in particular the early warning mechanism (hereinafter EWM) have drawn the attention of many scholars as concerns the ability of national parliaments to influence EU law-making and the substance of EU legislation, the nature of this new power, and finally the implications of the introduction of this new mechanism for the relationship among
parliaments. However, the effects of the Treaty of Lisbon’s provisions on the transparent operations of national parliaments have been largely disregarded. Indeed, besides aiming to put the EU legislative competence under control, one of the original intents of the procedure, firstly conceived during the Convention on the future of Europe, was to bring the EU legislative process closer to national polities. Such an objective became even more important after the result of the Dutch and the French referenda on the Constitutional Treaty. Given the fact that the EU institutions are traditionally perceived by EU citizens as detached from their local and particular interests, the involvement of national parliaments at the very early stage of the European legislative process would have helped to make these procedures more understandable to them.
The paper aims to analyse the effects of the new Treaty of Lisbon’s provisions – and especially
the EWM - on national parliaments and, more specifically, on how they promote the idea of Open
government. No obligations for national parliaments to improve the transparency of their activities directly stem from the EU Treaties provisions on the EWM, in part because this requirement would probably have encroached upon the Member States’ constitutional autonomy. Nonetheless Protocol no. 1 and Protocol no. 2 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon support such a development when they ask for the direct transmission of all EU draft legislative acts and documents, once translated, to national parliaments, and leave open to each national parliament the opportunity to consult regional parliaments with legislative powers in the EWM.
Indeed, it appears that the provisions contained in the new Treaty have brought some changes in how national parliaments and governments operate as regards the disclosure of information dealing with the EU policy-making for civil society participation. The paper is based on a comparative legal analysis of the Italian and Spanish Parliaments and their developments as more ‘open parliaments’ on EU matters in the light of the EU Treaties’ innovations.
This paper analyses if and how the position of national parliaments has changed after the adoptio... more This paper analyses if and how the position of national parliaments has changed after the adoption of
Euro-crisis measures and their first enforcement and tries to draw some conclusions on whether these
changes are just temporary or, rather, are likely to endure in the long term and hence to represent a
permanent transformation of national constitutional systems. The paper challenges the mainstream
assumption that the powers of national parliaments in budgetary procedures have been annulled. It is
argued that once the ratification/application and implementation of the most contested Euro-crisis
provisions – Fiscal Compact, European Stability Mechanism Treaty and rescue packages – have taken
place, in reaction to the most acute phase of the crisis, the combination of national and EU rules, for
example on the European Semester are likely to preserve the budgetary powers of national parliaments
compared to the pre-crisis period. Parliamentary passivity does not derive, or at least not primarily,
from the Euro-crisis legal measures; rather from the political context that the Euro-crisis has triggered.
Thus any analysis of the role of parliaments in the Eurozone crisis has to take into account
parliamentary institutions ‘in context’, which are influenced by the peculiar political and economic
situation of each country. Far from being a uniform category, national parliaments in the Eurozone
crisis show asymmetries and a significant variety of positions and powers, since their role depends
primarily on national constitutional arrangements.
This paper aims to analyse whether and to what extent Euro-crisis law – a mix of international, E... more This paper aims to analyse whether and to what extent Euro-crisis law – a mix of international, European and national measures adopted in reaction to the Eurozone crisis – has affected constitutional case law in three Eurozone countries receiving financial support or assistance and provided with a Constitutional Court: Italy, Portugal, and Spain. The paper identifies elements of continuity and innovation in the rulings of the three Courts compared to the pre-crisis period by looking at how constitutional judges ‘manage’ social rights and regional autonomy, and how they develop their constitutional reasoning. It is argued that, contrary to expectations because of the new fiscal constraints and although with some remarkable differences, Euro-crisis case law is usually in continuity with the past rulings of these Constitutional Courts and this is due both to legal elements – like access to the Court, its composition, the appointment of judges, the effects and timing of decisions, and the standards for review – and non-legal elements – like the economic situation and changes occurring in the political context.
The Eurozone crisis and the following reaction on the part of the European and national
institut... more The Eurozone crisis and the following reaction on the part of the European and national
institutions are deemed to have severely undermined parliamentary prerogatives and their role as
budgetary authorities. Such outcome has occurred in a context where the inter-institutional balance
within the EU Member States, in particular the relationship between the legislative and the
executive branches of government, for a long time has been reshaped by the process of European
integration in favour of the executives.
The aim of the paper is to assess whether the Eurozone crisis has really led to a marginalization of
national parliaments; or, rather, according to the measures adopted at European and national level, it
can be seen as an opportunity for legislatures to redefine their functions in the constitutional system
and to strengthen their position.
The paper will be based on a comparative analysis of the impact of the reform of economic
governance in the EU on national parliaments in three Eurozone countries – Italy, Portugal, and
Spain – which have benefited from measures of financial support or assistance from the EU-IMF,
although each of them to a different degree. The reaction and legal adaptation of the three national
parliaments to new financial constraints has also been affected by the peculiar feature of the form of
government and by the role played by other national institutions, e.g. courts and fiscal councils.
Can Fiscal Councils Enhance the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union? A Comparative Analysis (with Elena Griglio), in B. de Witte, H. Héritier, A.H. Trechsel (eds.), The Euro Crisis and the State of European Democracy, Fiesole, EUI, RSCAS and EUDO, 2013, p. 264-305 (sections 1, 3, 4)
Uploads
Papers and Articles by Cristina Fasone
parliaments. However, the effects of the Treaty of Lisbon’s provisions on the transparent operations of national parliaments have been largely disregarded. Indeed, besides aiming to put the EU legislative competence under control, one of the original intents of the procedure, firstly conceived during the Convention on the future of Europe, was to bring the EU legislative process closer to national polities. Such an objective became even more important after the result of the Dutch and the French referenda on the Constitutional Treaty. Given the fact that the EU institutions are traditionally perceived by EU citizens as detached from their local and particular interests, the involvement of national parliaments at the very early stage of the European legislative process would have helped to make these procedures more understandable to them.
The paper aims to analyse the effects of the new Treaty of Lisbon’s provisions – and especially
the EWM - on national parliaments and, more specifically, on how they promote the idea of Open
government. No obligations for national parliaments to improve the transparency of their activities directly stem from the EU Treaties provisions on the EWM, in part because this requirement would probably have encroached upon the Member States’ constitutional autonomy. Nonetheless Protocol no. 1 and Protocol no. 2 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon support such a development when they ask for the direct transmission of all EU draft legislative acts and documents, once translated, to national parliaments, and leave open to each national parliament the opportunity to consult regional parliaments with legislative powers in the EWM.
Indeed, it appears that the provisions contained in the new Treaty have brought some changes in how national parliaments and governments operate as regards the disclosure of information dealing with the EU policy-making for civil society participation. The paper is based on a comparative legal analysis of the Italian and Spanish Parliaments and their developments as more ‘open parliaments’ on EU matters in the light of the EU Treaties’ innovations.
Euro-crisis measures and their first enforcement and tries to draw some conclusions on whether these
changes are just temporary or, rather, are likely to endure in the long term and hence to represent a
permanent transformation of national constitutional systems. The paper challenges the mainstream
assumption that the powers of national parliaments in budgetary procedures have been annulled. It is
argued that once the ratification/application and implementation of the most contested Euro-crisis
provisions – Fiscal Compact, European Stability Mechanism Treaty and rescue packages – have taken
place, in reaction to the most acute phase of the crisis, the combination of national and EU rules, for
example on the European Semester are likely to preserve the budgetary powers of national parliaments
compared to the pre-crisis period. Parliamentary passivity does not derive, or at least not primarily,
from the Euro-crisis legal measures; rather from the political context that the Euro-crisis has triggered.
Thus any analysis of the role of parliaments in the Eurozone crisis has to take into account
parliamentary institutions ‘in context’, which are influenced by the peculiar political and economic
situation of each country. Far from being a uniform category, national parliaments in the Eurozone
crisis show asymmetries and a significant variety of positions and powers, since their role depends
primarily on national constitutional arrangements.
institutions are deemed to have severely undermined parliamentary prerogatives and their role as
budgetary authorities. Such outcome has occurred in a context where the inter-institutional balance
within the EU Member States, in particular the relationship between the legislative and the
executive branches of government, for a long time has been reshaped by the process of European
integration in favour of the executives.
The aim of the paper is to assess whether the Eurozone crisis has really led to a marginalization of
national parliaments; or, rather, according to the measures adopted at European and national level, it
can be seen as an opportunity for legislatures to redefine their functions in the constitutional system
and to strengthen their position.
The paper will be based on a comparative analysis of the impact of the reform of economic
governance in the EU on national parliaments in three Eurozone countries – Italy, Portugal, and
Spain – which have benefited from measures of financial support or assistance from the EU-IMF,
although each of them to a different degree. The reaction and legal adaptation of the three national
parliaments to new financial constraints has also been affected by the peculiar feature of the form of
government and by the role played by other national institutions, e.g. courts and fiscal councils.
parliaments. However, the effects of the Treaty of Lisbon’s provisions on the transparent operations of national parliaments have been largely disregarded. Indeed, besides aiming to put the EU legislative competence under control, one of the original intents of the procedure, firstly conceived during the Convention on the future of Europe, was to bring the EU legislative process closer to national polities. Such an objective became even more important after the result of the Dutch and the French referenda on the Constitutional Treaty. Given the fact that the EU institutions are traditionally perceived by EU citizens as detached from their local and particular interests, the involvement of national parliaments at the very early stage of the European legislative process would have helped to make these procedures more understandable to them.
The paper aims to analyse the effects of the new Treaty of Lisbon’s provisions – and especially
the EWM - on national parliaments and, more specifically, on how they promote the idea of Open
government. No obligations for national parliaments to improve the transparency of their activities directly stem from the EU Treaties provisions on the EWM, in part because this requirement would probably have encroached upon the Member States’ constitutional autonomy. Nonetheless Protocol no. 1 and Protocol no. 2 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon support such a development when they ask for the direct transmission of all EU draft legislative acts and documents, once translated, to national parliaments, and leave open to each national parliament the opportunity to consult regional parliaments with legislative powers in the EWM.
Indeed, it appears that the provisions contained in the new Treaty have brought some changes in how national parliaments and governments operate as regards the disclosure of information dealing with the EU policy-making for civil society participation. The paper is based on a comparative legal analysis of the Italian and Spanish Parliaments and their developments as more ‘open parliaments’ on EU matters in the light of the EU Treaties’ innovations.
Euro-crisis measures and their first enforcement and tries to draw some conclusions on whether these
changes are just temporary or, rather, are likely to endure in the long term and hence to represent a
permanent transformation of national constitutional systems. The paper challenges the mainstream
assumption that the powers of national parliaments in budgetary procedures have been annulled. It is
argued that once the ratification/application and implementation of the most contested Euro-crisis
provisions – Fiscal Compact, European Stability Mechanism Treaty and rescue packages – have taken
place, in reaction to the most acute phase of the crisis, the combination of national and EU rules, for
example on the European Semester are likely to preserve the budgetary powers of national parliaments
compared to the pre-crisis period. Parliamentary passivity does not derive, or at least not primarily,
from the Euro-crisis legal measures; rather from the political context that the Euro-crisis has triggered.
Thus any analysis of the role of parliaments in the Eurozone crisis has to take into account
parliamentary institutions ‘in context’, which are influenced by the peculiar political and economic
situation of each country. Far from being a uniform category, national parliaments in the Eurozone
crisis show asymmetries and a significant variety of positions and powers, since their role depends
primarily on national constitutional arrangements.
institutions are deemed to have severely undermined parliamentary prerogatives and their role as
budgetary authorities. Such outcome has occurred in a context where the inter-institutional balance
within the EU Member States, in particular the relationship between the legislative and the
executive branches of government, for a long time has been reshaped by the process of European
integration in favour of the executives.
The aim of the paper is to assess whether the Eurozone crisis has really led to a marginalization of
national parliaments; or, rather, according to the measures adopted at European and national level, it
can be seen as an opportunity for legislatures to redefine their functions in the constitutional system
and to strengthen their position.
The paper will be based on a comparative analysis of the impact of the reform of economic
governance in the EU on national parliaments in three Eurozone countries – Italy, Portugal, and
Spain – which have benefited from measures of financial support or assistance from the EU-IMF,
although each of them to a different degree. The reaction and legal adaptation of the three national
parliaments to new financial constraints has also been affected by the peculiar feature of the form of
government and by the role played by other national institutions, e.g. courts and fiscal councils.
The analysis is carried out using the comparative law methodology, and, in particular, the so-called “prototypical case logic”, employed by Ran Hirschl, in selecting the case-studies. Five “models” have been identified in order to consider parliamentary organisation, especially the committee system, and the form of government: the U.S. Congress, the British, French, Italian and the European Parliaments. The inclusion of the European Parliament, and, therefore, of the European Union, is justified by its distinctive features: first of all, although it has a different nature, the European Union’s aspiration to mirror the functioning of nation states by combining national constitutional traditions in a new and creative way makes it a suitable model (in its constant tension between fused and separated power systems) for investigation; secondly, particularly after the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament has become a truly powerful institution, with regard to its legislative and oversight powers; thirdly, the European Parliament, mirroring the European Union, is the result of a combination of national parliamentary traditions which aims to make a potentially cumbersome decision-making process rapid and effective.
Trying to develop the arguments raised by constitutional law scholars in the Twentieth century further, it is argued that, in the new century, not only should the mere existence of parliamentary standing committees be considered, but also the way in which “committee systems” are shaped and function. The term “committee system” encompasses the coherent and rational organisation of standing and specialised committees, in their mutual relationship, in their relationships with other parliamentary bodies and with the executive. After the definition of what a committee system is, and their historical origins in the five legal orders, the analysis is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the strength of the five committee systems, initially examining their discipline in terms of the number of committees, their size, appointments, internal organisation, party influence, transparency and resources, and then taking the procedural and organisational tools for inter-committee co-ordination into account as well as their autonomy with regard to other parliamentary bodies. The second part considers committee systems in their relationship with the executive branch, and, in particular, the presence of the executive in the committee system; the status of the opposition; how the agenda of committees is defined; the acknowledgement of veto or decision-making powers to committees; and the way in which committees exercise their legislative and the oversight functions.
The definition of four types of committee systems (“weak”, “partially influential”, “strong”, and “predominant”), according to their level of specialisation, mutual co-ordination and autonomy vis-à-vis other parliamentary bodies, and then of four different forms of government based upon the features of the committee systems and their relationship with the executive (“insignificant”, “majoritarian”, “consensual”, and “decisive”) aims to explain how each committee-system model fits into a constitutional legal order, and thereby determines certain characteristics. Otherwise, the adoption of a non-corresponding committee system can be dysfunctional for the performance of the form of government and can cause schizophrenic effects for the determination of the general political directions and priorities (“indirizzo politico”). This is what happened, during the first forty years of the Italian Republic (1948-1992), when a form of government based upon a “decisive” committee system operated in the presence of “the confidence relationship” between the Parliament and the executive, further enhancing the fragmentation of the indirizzo politico. Indeed, especially in parliamentary forms of government, the organisational features, functions and powers of standing committees as a system strongly influence the stability of the executive.
Given the ability of parliamentary committee systems to shape the form of government, albeit in combination with other elements – such as the provision of the “confidence relationship” – it would seem appropriate to protect and eventually enhance standing committees, as well as their co-ordination, through ad hoc legislative provisions and the amendment of parliamentary rules of procedure. Only a “strong” committee system is capable of striking an effective balance between politics and the technical constraints of legislation, and between transparency and the informality of decision-making processes, of dealing with public policies that have become more and more cross-sectional, of contributing to the definition of a unitary and coherent “indirizzo politico” amongst the different policy sectors, and of making the executive-legislative relationship more balanced, especially when the oversight powers of standing committees have been re-inforced.
"
This Summer Program intends to cope with one of the challenges parliaments are currently facing: the impact of new technologies on their organization, procedures and outputs as to strike the difficult balance between transparency, privacy and security. One the one hand, the ICT revolution has prompted enhanced openness and accessibility to parliamentary activity; on the other hand, increased transparency can affect the traditional way parliamentary deliberation takes place, especially in committees, and they way certain sensitive information are treated, in particular when issues concerning privacy and security are at stake. In other words, while new technologies are providing Parliaments with new avenues to re-connect their role to the instances of citizens and civil society, tools of e-democracy and transparency at any cost might not be necessarily desirable for the effective functioning of Parliaments.
During the course, the following questions will be addressed: Does enhanced transparency of parliamentary business comes at the expense of effectiveness of decision-making in Parliament? How and to what extent do new technologies influence the way Parliaments cope with privacy and security concerns? Finally, has the ICT revolution increased or impaired the representative capacity of Parliaments?
http://sog.luiss.it/graduate-and-summer-programs/summer
and were in many Member States at best kept informed and rarely involved in daily EU af airs.
With the Lisbon Treaty and its introduction of the Early Warning System (EWS), as well as
the Political Dialogue initiated by former Commission President Barroso, NPs have now
become full actors in the EU. h rough the Political Dialogue, they can express their opinion
on the Commission Annual Work Programme and inl uence the Commission’s agenda.
Now, through control of the respect of the principle of subsidiarity, and provided that their
reasoned opinions attain the dei ned thresholds, they can potentially strike down an existing
proposal. However the EWS leads to NPs still being constrained to a limited, reactive role:
as ‘quasi veto-players’ and not one of ‘agenda-setter’. Recent developments in favour of the
introduction of a ‘green card’ would change this situation profoundly as NPs would eventually
be able to prompt the Commission to make legislative proposals on their behalf. h is article
sheds light on the evolving role of NPs in EU policymaking from the Lisbon Treaty onwards,
from veto players to proactive institutions committed to the good functioning of the EU.