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Academic writing on geoeconomics often neglects the lived experiences of local scale actors. This commentary develops the idea of ‘everyday geoeconomics’ to broaden the conceptual and methodological tools available to scholars when... more
Academic writing on geoeconomics often neglects the lived experiences of local scale actors. This commentary develops the idea of ‘everyday geoeconomics’ to broaden the conceptual and methodological tools available to scholars when examining state-led geoeconomic initiatives. Everyday geoeconomics includes a range of local responses to policies. It can be used to view these social practices as forms of text that are as important as formal, practical, popular texts referred to in critical geopolitics when analysing the spatial dimensions of economic change. Deemphasising lived experiences in geoeconomic work denotes the return of power/knowledge in human geography after its deconstruction within critical geopolitics. The commentary is enriched by reference to China's Belt and Road Initiative, a state policy held up as a model geoeconomic strategy. The work situates the Belt and Road Initiative in Oceania, where popular and academic debate has polarised around a statist discourse of China's presence as a positive or negative force. This polarisation relegates the lived experiences of residents and newly arrived Chinese as irrelevant to the Belt and Road and leaves us with an incomplete understanding about how those transactions and reactions are shaping global politics.
Since 2009, and over the following decade, Kashgar Old City—an historical space of Uyghur culture and Islam and home to 220,000 residents—was largely demolished and rebuilt for tourists. Today, Kashgar and the Xinjiang region are major... more
Since 2009, and over the following decade, Kashgar Old City—an historical space of Uyghur culture and Islam and home to 220,000 residents—was largely demolished and rebuilt for tourists. Today, Kashgar and the Xinjiang region are major conduits into Eurasia and have become critical nodes in China’s national tourism development and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While scholars have addressed the geoeconomics of BRI, we know much less about how contested spaces of Chinese development are securitized. Tourism, we argue, is increasingly enrolled into the state’s broader territorialization-by-securitization strategy. The tourist gaze—or the socio-spatial mediation of touristic experience and performance—is included in this strategic arsenal. In contested areas such as Xinjiang and Tibet, the tourist gaze is spatially deployed by the state as a biopolitical mechanism that facilitates the deepening territorialization of the region and coerces ethnic minority residents to perform a sanitized revisioning of their culture, history, and religion. This article draws on interviews with Uyghur former tour guides and residents of Xinjiang, critical analysis of English and Mandarin language popular media, and observations of congruent patterns of the securitization of tourism destinations as a state-strategy of territorialization in Tibet to demonstrate how the tourist gaze is deployed as a spatial mechanism of securitization and territorialization along the Silk Road Economic Belt in Kashgar. The article contributes to emerging scholarship on the growing role of tourism in broader practices of securitization and territorialization in China and beyond.
Anticipatory geographies are state-driven initiatives promoting economic hope through the language of rejuvenation, prosperity and connectivity. As a discursive process, anticipatory geographies reconfigure spaces and identities. These... more
Anticipatory geographies are state-driven initiatives promoting economic hope through the language of rejuvenation, prosperity and connectivity. As a discursive process, anticipatory geographies reconfigure spaces and identities. These narratives have proliferated in an age of intensified connectivity as states aim to imprint their political and economic visions. Oceania has become a site of multiple anticipatory geographies external and internal to the region with the presence of China as an enabling factor. In 2006, Fiji reintroduced a Look North policy to globalize economic connectivity placing Fijian agency at the centre, and in 2015, Beijing included Oceania into China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) framework. This work examines the processes when two anticipatory geographies meet. Adapting critical geopolitics, the research presents the findings of a critical discourse analysis of Chinese and Fijian texts referencing Look North and BRI. The work reveals the entanglement of anticipatory geographies in Fiji has generated a co-produced discourse of prosperity displaying continuity from Look North to the BRI. Although there is a shift toward defining the Sino-Fijian relationship through BRI, it does not signal an overwrite of an indigenous policy framework. I argue Look North has been 're-placed' into the BRI to co-produce a narrative that permits the ongoing articulation of Fijian interests. With the Belt and Road becoming the defining framework for China's relations with countries across Asia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Americas, this work suggests Fiji's handling of BRI's impact on its domestic spaces and policies is an indicator of how other states will reposition their promises of economic hope to civil society.
Anticipatory geographies are state-driven initiatives promoting economic hope through the language of rejuvenation, prosperity and connectivity. As a discursive process, anticipatory geographies reconfigure spaces and identities. These... more
Anticipatory geographies are state-driven initiatives promoting economic hope through the language of rejuvenation, prosperity and connectivity. As a discursive process, anticipatory geographies reconfigure spaces and identities. These narratives have proliferated in an age of intensified connectivity as states aim to imprint their political and economic visions. Oceania has become a site of multiple anticipatory geographies external and internal to the region with the presence of China as an enabling factor. In 2006, Fiji reintroduced a Look North policy to globalize economic connectivity placing Fijian agency at the centre, and in 2015, Beijing included Oceania into China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) framework. This work examines the processes when two anticipatory geographies meet. Adapting critical geopolitics, the research presents the findings of a critical discourse analysis of Chinese and Fijian texts referencing Look North and BRI. The work reveals the entanglement of anticipatory geographies in Fiji has generated a co-produced discourse of prosperity displaying continuity from Look North to the BRI. Although there is a shift toward defining the Sino-Fijian relationship through BRI, it does not signal an overwrite of an indigenous policy framework. I argue Look North has been ‘re-placed’ into the BRI to co-produce a narrative that permits the ongoing articulation of Fijian interests. With the Belt and Road becoming the defining framework for China's relations with countries across Asia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Americas, this work suggests Fiji's handling of BRI's impact on its domestic spaces and policies is an indicator of how other states will reposition their promises of economic hope to civil society.
Since 2017, the Chinese government’s internment campaign of Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples has prompted unprecedented interest in human rights issues in Xinjiang. Academia, non-governmental organizations, and the Uyghur community in the... more
Since 2017, the Chinese government’s internment campaign of Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples has prompted unprecedented interest in human rights issues in Xinjiang. Academia, non-governmental organizations, and the Uyghur community in the United States have responded with an upswing of activism urging states to protect Uyghurs in China and overseas through policy and legislation. The United States administration and Congress have been the most vocal about internment in Xinjiang. Legislative measures, such as the UHRP and UIGHUR Acts offer a framework to sanction Chinese officials responsible for human rights abuses in Xinjiang and mobilize U.S. law enforcement to end harassment of Uyghur-Americans demonstrating the parallels between activism and state action. The UHRP and UIGHUR Acts are the first meaningful responses to human rights issues in Xinjiang; however, the pursuit of legal accountability should not become captive to changing strategic ambitions.
The Xinjiang work Forum convened in May 2010 set out an ambitious package of economic reforms in the wake of unrest in Urumchi, Xinjiang, in July 2009. The reforms can be interpreted as a tacit admission of economic failures in the... more
The Xinjiang work Forum convened in May 2010 set out an ambitious package of economic reforms in the wake of unrest in Urumchi, Xinjiang, in July 2009. The reforms can be interpreted as a tacit admission of economic failures in the region, especially the capacity of the Great Western Development Drive to bring economic prosperity to all ethnicities. However, the formation and implementation of Xinjiang work Forum policies followed patterns evident in the formation and implementation of the Great western Development Drive and many centrally driven economic initiatives before it; namely, non- participatory, lacking in monitoring mechanisms and filled with traditional approaches of Han Chinese management of minority affairs. while the first two patterns occur frequently in Chinese government development planning nationwide, the third pattern is not as prevalent, and in Xinjiang it has exacerbated tensions. This makes development planning in Xinjiang distinct from many other parts of the country. attention to local conditions and local expertise is all the more acute in such situations. although the final assessment on Xinjiang work Forum policies is pending, the continuance of exclusionary practices makes it difficult to predict anything other than a new cycle of building Uyghur frustrations over economic conditions.
In the People’s Republic of China, the Great Western Development Drive has been promoted as a solution to the economic inequalities that exist between the eastern and western regions of the country. Although the initiative has overt... more
In the People’s Republic of China, the Great Western Development Drive has been
promoted as a solution to the economic inequalities that exist between the eastern and western regions of the country. Although the initiative has overt economic objectives, these are accompanied by political objectives of internal security in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, an area also known as East Turkestan. The Great Western Development Drive also works in conjunction with China’s economic and political objectives for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. As a bridge to the markets of Central Asia, the Great Western Development Drive in East Turkestan has built an infrastructure with which China can export goods and import natural resources. Greater economic cooperation between Central Asia and China has also permitted the silencing of Uyghur dissent in Shanghai Cooperation Organization member states. The net result of China’s expansion into Central Asia for Uyghurs in the region and in East Turkestan has been economic and political marginalization, most notably in the visible exclusion from the policies and projects of the Great Western Development Drive.
Since 2006, the visibility of the Chinese state, companies, and people in Fiji is more noticeable. Often framed as an indicator of China’s global imprint and as a threat to regional order, Chinese state presence, nevertheless, is at the... more
Since 2006, the visibility of the Chinese state, companies, and people in Fiji is more noticeable. Often framed as an indicator of China’s global imprint and as a threat to regional order, Chinese state presence, nevertheless, is at the invitation of the Fijian government. Since its economic and diplomatic isolation after the 2006 coup, Fiji has enlisted Chinese capital to fund infrastructure projects and to boost foreign investment, especially under the Belt and Road Initiative. The agency in relation to “traditional” partners through leverage on China has been a key state adaptation, enabling a more assertive Fiji on the global stage. However, self-reliance discourses inform Fijian civil society and Fijians are asking questions to the FijiFirst administration about transparency and ownership of projects led by Chinese companies. These two articulations of sovereignty often remain separate, and Fiji’s China question has transformed from one centred on tensions between Suva and “traditional” powers to one that incorporates how the Fijian state and civil society will reconcile the benefits and challenges of a long-term Chinese presence.
This work analyzes how Papuan/Melanesian narratives of self-reliance in an era of decolonization in Oceania rationalize and contest Chinese investments in the state and civil society domains. The case study shows that both supporters and... more
This work analyzes how Papuan/Melanesian narratives of self-reliance
in an era of decolonization in Oceania rationalize and contest Chinese investments in the state and civil society domains. The case study shows that both supporters and opponents of Chinese investment at the Ramu Nickel Mine in Papua New Guinea build their claims around self-reliance. The state actors present Chinese investment as an alternative to and autonomy from Papua New Guinea’s traditional donor, Australia. In contrast, the civil society demonstrates agency by rejecting China’s “neo-colonial” attitude towards local natural resources. These self-reliance
discourses translate into different practical outcomes. For example, Chinese financing enables the state to demonstrate new assertiveness regionally and on the global stage, especially regarding critical issues, such as the climate crisis. On the other hand, civil society makes modest gains from Chinese companies, which indicates that in the future Chinese interventions will be forced to consider local interests more carefully
and negotiate with sub-state actors. Tensions in responses to Chinese investment from the civil society and the state not only reveal different visions of the future for Papua New Guinea but also translate into conceivable patterns across the Oceania region as China increases its aid and investment presence.
My contribution on the Open up the West campaign is an attempt to situate the Uyghur in contemporary state development planning and is a call for a more human centered development approach from Chinese authorities. Marginalization among... more
My contribution on the Open up the West campaign is an attempt to situate the Uyghur in contemporary state development planning and is a call for a more human centered development approach from Chinese authorities. Marginalization among the Uyghur from the benefits of China’s economic progress has its roots in any number of ‘majority’ culture perceptions of the ‘minority;’ however, grassroots-led contributions to decision making on development policies in the Uyghur region could lead to more equitable outcomes. As in many instances though, listening can be more difficult than speaking out and the Chinese government’s willingness to be introspective and open is what is most critically at stake.
My chapter, Resolving Uyghur Conflict through a Participatory Rights-based Approach to Development, looks at how a rights-based approach to development cross-cuts the various seams of contention between the Chinese government and the... more
My chapter, Resolving Uyghur Conflict through a Participatory Rights-based Approach to Development, looks at how a rights-based approach to development cross-cuts the various seams of contention between the Chinese government and the Uyghur grassroots. Through genuine and meaningful participation in decision making at the community and regional level, Uyghur concerns may effectively be mainstreamed into Chinese policy making.
Football plays a vital role in establishing a sense of identity for the Uyghur people.
Review of Struggle by the Pen: The Uyghur Discourse of Nation and National Interest, C.1900-1949 by Ondřej Klimeš.
An online review by Henryk Szadziewski (Uyghur Human Rights Project) of my monograph (2013): The Art of Symbolic Resistance: Uyghur identities and Uyghur-Han relations in contemporary Xinjiang (Brill Academic Publishing).
Research Interests:
With Cecil, W. and Saluga, S.
Also co-authored with Shawna Yang Ryan
The situation of the Uyghur minority in north-west China became even more precarious in 2013
China's plan to transform the heart of Uyghur culture, learning and urban settlement - Kashgar old city - is well underway. The fact that the Uyghurs themselves have no voice in this process gives the experience a wider significance.
The growing bonds between central Asian states and China have a human-rights cost for Uyghurs across the region.
The violent protests of July 2009 in Urumchi revealed deep-rooted problems in Beijing’s policy towards the Uyghur people of Xinjiang region in China’s far west. The path to resolution can only be unblocked by acknowledging the Uyghurs’... more
The violent protests of July 2009 in Urumchi revealed deep-rooted problems in Beijing’s policy towards the Uyghur people of Xinjiang region in China’s far west. The path to resolution can only be unblocked by acknowledging the Uyghurs’ right to speak.
The Chinese authorities’ continuing demolition of the urban heartland of Uyghur society is also the outward face of a deeper dispossession
(2019). Detained and Disappeared: Intellectuals Under Assault in the Uyghur Homeland, Uyghur Human Rights Project, March 25. https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/Detained-and-Disappeared-Intellectuals-Under-Assault-in-the-Uyghur-Homeland.pdf.
(2019). The Persecution of the Intellectuals in the Uyghur Region Continues. Uyghur Human Rights Project. January 28. https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/UHRP_UPDATE-ThePersecution_ofTheIntellectuals-in-the-Uyghur-Region.pdf.
(2018). The Persecution of the Intellectuals in the Uyghur Region: Disappeared Forever? Uyghur Human Rights Project, October 22. https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/UHRP_Disappeared_Forever_.pdf.
(2018). The Mass Internment of Uyghurs: “We want to be respected as humans. Is it too much to ask?” Uyghur Human Rights Project, August 23. https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/MassDetention_of_Uyghurs.pdf.
(2018). “Another Form of Control”: Complications in obtaining documents from China impacts immigration processes and livelihoods for Uyghurs in the United States, Uyghur Human Rights Project, July 10.... more
(2018). “Another Form of Control”: Complications in obtaining documents from China impacts immigration processes and livelihoods for Uyghurs in the United States, Uyghur Human Rights Project, July 10. https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/Briefing_Another_Form_of_Control.pdf.
Research Interests:
Paper for Indo-Pacific Area and Silk Roads: The New World Strategies, November 5-7, University of French Polynesia, Tahiti. Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W0E5n1km53I.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an ‘anticipatory geography’ of trade routes centered on China. Proposed in 2015, the ‘Southern Leg Maritime Silk Road’ includes the Pacific Islands region into the BRI network as its only eastward... more
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an ‘anticipatory geography’ of trade routes centered on China. Proposed in 2015, the ‘Southern Leg Maritime Silk Road’ includes the Pacific Islands region into the BRI network as its only eastward projection. China’s regional economic interventions are increasingly defined by BRI narratives in practical geopolitics, even though the initiative’s objectives remain undefined. Some Pacific Island states, such as Fiji and Papua New Guinea, have welcomed BRI as integral in encouraging more Chinese investment in the local economy. This chapter initially surveys the extent of BRI projects and discourses in Oceania and how BRI is changing the dynamics of China’s relationship with Pacific Island Countries. Subsequently, the chapter focuses on Fiji and how Chinese companies there, whether leveraging BRI financing or private investment, are becoming legible to the Chinese state as more economic interventions become branded as ‘Belt and Road.’ The expansion of an ‘ambiguous’ BRI narrative in the Pacific Islands enable a cohesive umbrella to Chinese aid and investment in the region in contradiction to criticisms of disjointedness leveled from regional powers, such as Australia. If Chinese companies at one time were “bringing the state with them” (Brant 2013), the Chinese state is now laying claim to those projects.
In this paper, I highlight how the geographic extent of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) stretches into the Pacific Islands and the broader implications of this extension for the region. After the 2006 coup in Fiji, Prime Minister... more
In this paper, I highlight how the geographic extent of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) stretches into the Pacific Islands and the broader implications of this extension for the region. After the 2006 coup in Fiji, Prime Minister Bainimarama adopted a ‘Look North Policy’ on the islands. Look North balances external aid and investment between traditional donors and trading partners and non-traditional ones, such as China. The rationale was to support Fiji’s finances in the face of scaled diplomatic and economic sanctions by traditional donors. Since Look North, China has become Fiji’s largest overseas investor and aid donor. As Chinese economic reach has grown in Fiji, there has been a discourse shift from Look North to the BRI in Fijian media and government statements. The emerging imbalance in the dynamics of Chinese-Pacific Islander relations has incorporated discourses of islander independence from traditional donors and created grassroots fears of Chinese dominance. Drawing on a critical discourse analysis of Fijian media, I argue that ‘levels of subjective globalization’ (Steger and James, 2013) are articulated through ontologies, imaginaries, and ideologies, which reflect broader changes in the global political economy because of the growing presence of China in Fiji’s economy. I also illustrate how state-led economic frameworks are an attempt to cleanse geopolitical shifts with discourses of development (Lyotard, 1979). This work contributes to evolving scholarship on local experiences of the BRI and theories of an assertive regionalism in the Pacific Islands.
Panel Moderator
Panelist
Keynote Speaker
The emphasis on Western regional development adopted in 2000 illustrated Chinese foresight in tackling spatially imbalanced development in the PRC. The policy was conceived in the State Council, indicating the seriousness of the issue... more
The emphasis on Western regional development adopted in 2000 illustrated Chinese foresight in tackling spatially imbalanced development in the PRC. The policy was conceived in the State Council, indicating the seriousness of the issue among the central leadership.

Western Development as implemented in Xinjiang focused upon natural resources extraction and infrastructure
construction for the transport of natural gas and oil. In addition, burgeoning transportation links began to connect this remote region with eastern China and the ex‐Soviet Central Asian states.

Since the inception of this Western Development, scholars such as Chaudhuri (2005) and Cao Huhua (2010) have indicated an intra‐regional imbalance in development rates in Xinjiang. In general, the resource rich north has recorded higher per capita GDP than the largely agrarian south. While the 2010 Work Forum did offer tax breaks and state assistance to the south, a component that boosts human capacity would augment development policy.

This paper proposes an approach to development in Xinjiang’s south that incorporates a greater role for the region’s grassroots. The benefits of community participation in development implementation and decision‐making are well covered in the development literature. However, in line with China’s pattern of governance,the work suggests that a grassroots‐state partnership in the development process will offset the imbalance in rates of economic growth in Xinjiang. The Work Forum initiated a program of “pairing assistance” between China’s wealthier provinces and Xinjiang’s poorer municipalities. This program has the potential to train Xinjiang’s grassroots leaders toward self‐sufficiency in order to decide on community development priorities. In addition, neighborhood and village committees are building participatory mechanisms to ensure local decisions are filtered up and questions on implementation are voiced.

The presentation, working from a theoretical perspective, concludes that closer relations between state officials and grassroots communities serve harmony and stability in Xinjiang. The increased sense of ownership, responsibility and citizenship created through a grassroots‐state partnership also offer a compelling strategy to combat poverty in southern Xinjiang.
Panelist
During three years of residence in the Xinjiang, the author watched and played soccer with Uyghurs. In televised international games involving China, Uyghur spectators, in the privacy of their own homes, would gleefully receive any... more
During three years of residence in the Xinjiang, the author watched and played soccer with Uyghurs. In televised international games involving China, Uyghur spectators, in the privacy of their own homes, would gleefully receive any Chinese loss and bemoan any Chinese win. The opportunity to watch soccer games involving Chinese national teams also presents Uyghurs with the chance to offer resistance to the Chinese government by joking about the Chinese team and commentary during the game.

The paper attempts to gain an understanding of Uyghur national identity in the PRC through an examination of soccer. A key question of the work is: do China’s national soccer teams offer Uyghurs an opportunity to establish a hierarchy of identities that range from Uyghur to Turkic to Muslim to Chinese citizen?

The work encompasses not only Uyghur attitudes inside the PRC, but also the development of a Uyghur national identity outside of the PRC. In exile, Uyghurs have been able to develop Uyghur nationalism by using soccer as a vehicle for mobilization and identity formation. Uyghurs in exile often use their opposition to the PRC government to build a Uyghur identity that is in essence ‘not Chinese’. National symbols, such as flags and anthems, are prevalent in international soccer, and Uyghur exiles invoke these to illustrate their separateness from China.

The paper discusses both active and passive interfaces with soccer; participation in soccer tournaments has been utilized by the Chinese state and Uyghur exiles to develop allegiances among Uyghur youth. Lastly, the work will look at how competing narratives of the history of the game in Xinjiang are representative of the broader divergence between Uyghur and Chinese versions of regional history. Such different accounts explain a great deal about the present Uyghur distrust of adopting identities resonant of the Chinese state.
A grassroots approach to economic and social development has increased in prominence in recent development studies discourse and practice. The approach is characterized by a community-led monitoring of state commitments to development,... more
A grassroots approach to economic and social development has increased in prominence in recent development studies discourse and practice. The approach is characterized by a community-led monitoring of state commitments to development, which have been defined in international and domestic legal instruments. A grassroots approach to development theoretically brings together the state and civil society in realizing common goals.

This presentation seeks to understand how ethnic minority non governmental actors in China can partner, and have so far partnered, with the Chinese state to operationalize a grassroots approach to economic and social development in the context of the “Open Up the West” campaign.

The case study of the presentation is the experience of the Uyghur ethnic minority in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region during the “Open Up the West” campaign (2000 to the present). The “Open Up the West” campaign is a Chinese government initiative to realize developmental equality in China’s western regions; therefore, it offers the prospect of assessing the participatory framework of state-led development interventions in an ethnic minority environment, as well as the local response to development planning. In turn, the political challenges to the “Open Up the West” campaign in Xinjiang present the opportunity to understand how ethnic minorities are able to encourage improved state performance in economic and social development.

The presentation draws upon primary and secondary sources. The presenter’s experiences of leading education projects in Xinjiang and of conducting research in the field are discussed. In addition, data from contemporary research by other scholars is offered to provide a rigorous examination of the subject.

The presentation concludes with a proposed outline for instituting a partnership between the state and ethnic minority communities that fosters a consultative process in realizing the goals of the “Open Up the West” campaign. This outline also offers a grassroots and multi-stakeholder approach to understanding contemporary responses to the “Open Up the West” campaign, in addition to, a path to promoting local engagement in Chinese state-led initiatives.
Report Launch
Panel Moderator
A rights-based approach to development has increased in prominence in recent development discourse and practice. The approach is characterised by the empowerment of marginalised people through the realisation of human rights; human rights... more
A rights-based approach to development has increased in prominence in recent development discourse and practice. The approach is characterised by the empowerment of marginalised people through the realisation of human rights; human rights which have been defined and legally represented in the international instruments of the United Nations system. The inherent participatory nature of a rights-based approach to development therefore brings together the work of non-governmental human rights and development organisations.

While a rights-based approach to development is an emerging field in development studies, this dissertation questions its assumptions by detailing through a case study the efforts of state-led development initiatives to realise rights. It also seeks to understand how nongovernmental actors can partner with the state, especially in authoritarian contexts, to operationalise a rights-based approach to development.

A legal framework and an operational framework are drawn from development literature to assess the rights successes of state-led development initiatives and the opportunities for encouraging a rights-based approach to development in marginalised communities. The case study of the dissertation is the experience of the Uyghur ethnic minority in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of The People‘s Republic of China in the Great Western Development Drive era. The Great Western Development Drive, which is the Chinese government‘s attempt to realise rights and developmental equality in its western regions, offers the prospect of assessing the effects of a state-led development initiative on a marginalised people. In turn the shortfalls of the Great Western Development Drive present the chance to understand how marginalised people can partner with the state to offset state failure to bring developmental equality and realise rights. The work mainly draws upon secondary sources; however, the author‘s experience of education projects in Xinjiang and some original research are also presented.

The dissertation concludes that partnership of the state, through consultative interventions sensitive to international human rights instruments, and the non-governmental sector, by means of a rights-based approach to development, offers a comprehensive and multistakeholder method to poverty alleviation.