Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village

NOTES INTRODUCTION BEFORE REALISM AND LIBERALISM 1. Stanley Hoffmann, “A Retrospective on World Politics,” in Ideas and Ideals, ed. Linda B. Miller and Michael Joseph Smith (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), p. 9. 2. “Capitalization is used to indicate that Realism is a specific school, and that it would be possible to be a realist—in the sense of examining reality as it really is—without subscribing to Realist assumptions.” Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989), p. 68 n. 17. 3. For the recent spread of democracy, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 4. Samuel P. Huntington, “The West Unique, Not Universal,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 6 (November–December 1996), p. 43. For a brief overview, see Daniel H. Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “The Nature and Sources of Postwar Western Political Order,” Review of International Studies 25, no. 4 (fall 1999), pp. 179–96. 5. For the ‘dangerously naive’ argument, see George Kennan, American Diplomacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). For the ‘disingenuously selfserving ’ argument, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001). As a result of the intellectual hegemony of “Continental Realism,” United States foreign policy has a “hayseed image,” producing “the fascinating paradox that the foreign policy traditions, practices, and institutions of the world’s most successful country encounter a near-universal yet strangely incoherent contempt.” Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World (New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 27 and 34. 6. Leading statements of Liberal triumphalism, emphasizing ideas and economics , are Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); and Michael Mandelbaum, The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Public Affairs, 2002). Among Realist skeptics are Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: Norton, 2003); and Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: Norton, 2000). 7. The major intellectual assault on the American Liberal international program of abridging anarchy has come not from Realists (who mainly believe that international organizations, regimes, and law do not have much real consequence ), but rather from ‘neoconservatives’ (whose ideas and commitments are clearly contained within modern Liberalism), who believe such international arrangements do have real consequence and systematically oppose them because NOTES TO INTRODUCTION 280 they restrain American power and autonomy. For the most systematic assault on Liberal internationalism, based on a reading of early modern political thought sharply at odds with the one offered here, see Jeremy A. Rabkin, Law without Nations? Why Constitutional Government Requires Sovereign States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). For a trenchant critique, see Andrew Moravcsik , “Conservative Idealism and International Institutions,” Chicago Journal of International Law 1, no. 2 (autumn 2000). For a spirited statement by an American neoconservative on the growing transatlantic divisions, see Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Random House, 2003). 8. Arms control receives no mention in Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). For a full assault, see Colin S. Gray, House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992). 9. Jonathan Haslam characterizes his recent history of modern Realist thought as “the study of power” in contrast to “the study of liberty” provided by Quentin Skinner in his magisterial history of early modern political thought. My aim here is to provide a study of liberty dealing with power. No Virtue Like Necessity: Realist Thought in International Relations since Machiavelli (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 1–2; and The Foundations of Modern Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). 10. For short, I shall refer to this set of arguments as ‘structural-materialist security theory,’ the project of understanding the relationships between different authoritative political arrangements (structure), different material contexts composed of geography and technology (material), and security-from-violence (security ). Both material contexts and political arrangements are ‘structural’ in the broad social science sense of the term, but to avoid conflation of the material with the political, I shall speak of ‘structure’ as short for ‘authoritative political arrangements’ (or lack thereof). 11. In part, this may be a consequence of the fact that such regimes were...