


JFQ

Restore Hope



Special Ops



Commemorating World War II



Defense Organization



Medical Support



Presence

95 Summer

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...for those who served
1941-1945



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PHOTO CREDITS

The cover features a reproduction of a painting entitled *Air Transport in the South Pacific*—1943 by Sidney Simon (U.S. Air Force Art Collection); the four cover insets (clockwise, from top left) capture American and Thai special forces descending from a helicopter during *Cobra Gold '94* (Joint Combat Camera Center); M1A1 tank during *Bright Star '94* (U.S. Army/Jeffrey T. Brady); F-16D on patrol during *Roying Sands '94* (Combat Camera Imagery/Steve Thurow); and USNS *Comfort* in transit through the Panama Canal (U.S. Air Force/H. Cintron).

The background work of art replicated for the table of contents is *B-17 Base in England* by Peter Hurd (U.S. Air Force Art Collection); insets on these pages (from top left) include shoulder tabs and patch of a CARICOM force member (DOD/Greg Scott); a reproduction of a painting of a carrier launch during World War II entitled *Plane Director* by Paul Sample (The Life Collection of World War II Art/U.S. Army Center of Military History); operating room preparations during the Persian Gulf War (U.S. Navy/Joë Gawłowicz); and an American soldier taking an Iraqi prisoner of war during Desert Storm (DOD).

The back cover depicts a change of command at Tactical Assembly Area Liberty, Kuwait (55th Signal Company/Casey T. Smith).

4 A Word from the Chairman
by John M. Shalikashvili

7 The Case for Forward Deployment
by Hans Binnendijk

8 National Power and the Interagency Process
by George T. Raach and Ilana Kass

14 Restore Hope: Coordinating Relief Operations
by Jonathan T. Dworken

22 Joint Special Operations in Peace and War
by Wayne A. Downing

28 PSYOP and the Warfighting CINC
by Jeffrey B. Jones and Michael P. Mathews



JFQ FORUM

34 Commemorating World War II: A Final Reprise

36 Jointness and the Impact of the War
by David A. Armstrong

38 Fighting with Allies: The Debate Fifty Years On
by Russell F. Weigley

46 A War That Was Not Left to the Generals
by Eliot A. Cohen

50 The Meaning of World War II
by Williamson Murray

58 The Generation of 1945
by Ronald H. Spector

62 The Battle for Anzio
by William Woodruff

68 Soldier Art of World War II
by Peter Harrington

70 The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence
by David S. Yost



83 *Presence—Do We Stay or Do We Go?*

by James A. Lasswell

86 Problems in Defense Organization and Management

by Michael B. Donley

95 War Termination and Joint Planning

by Robert R. Soucy II, Kevin A. Shwedo, and John S. Haven II

102 Joint Medical Support: Are We Asleep at the Switch?

by Arthur M. Smith



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OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN

110 Carl Andrew Spaatz

FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

111 Letters to the Editor

IN BRIEF

114 The Joint Staff: Completing the Metamorphosis

by Mark C. Nesselrode

118 Which Way Joint Doctrine?

by Edward C. Ferriter

120 Atlantic Command's Joint Training Program

by Clarence Todd Morgan

124 Coalition Rules of Engagement

by Drew A. Bennett and Anne F. Macdonald

THE JOINT WORLD

126 Doctrine, Lessons Learned, and Education

128 Quarterly Survey of Periodical Literature



OFF THE SHELF

129 Desert Storm Warnings: A Book Review

by Grant T. Hammond

131 Squaring the Pentagon: A Book Review

by William H. Gregory

134 Cumulative Index (1994-95): Issues 5-8

POSTSCRIPT

136 A Note to Readers and Contributors

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A Word from the Chairman

World War I was the last time any nation equated war with glory. The causes of that war remain debatable today because the quarrels that ignited it were questionable and shallow even at the time. But once the spark was lit and Europe's armies were on the march, there was a mood of euphoria across the continent in anticipation of romance and adventure. When the fighting finally ground to a halt, when fighters were drowning in mud, stupefied by the unending slaughter, when the staggering losses on the Marne and Somme and at Ypres, Verdun, Mons, and Gallipoli were tallied, the world was stunned. The efficiency of the industrial age had reached the battlefield. Any vestige of glory that had existed in 1914 had long since been extinguished by the murderous fires of machine guns, mangling fury of modern artillery, suffocating barbarism of poison gas, and the strategy of attrition—the incomprehensible response of the generals to the new tools of war. When it was over, the only way to rationalize the carnage was to declare it the war to end all wars.

World War II was in so many respects even worse. Many more perished. But fundamentally it was different; it was not senseless. Its causes were genuine, compelling, terrifying. For countless millions it was a



Soldier Carrying Wounded Child
(Leyte, October 1944)
by Paul Sample.

World War II erased all doubt about the motives of aggressors

struggle for survival, a desperate clash between good and evil. Its causes were forged in the angry, base mind of a murderous maniac, and in response it brought out the best in our people. Unlike World War I when this conflict ended, when the death camps were opened for all to see and the remains of thousands of innocents were discovered in the killing fields of Nanking, any lingering doubt about why we fought was washed away. Eisenhower had been right. It was a crusade, a very righteous crusade at that.

If there is a lingering sense of fondness about the war that is why. If it spawned legions of heroes, that is because their courage and prowess went to a noble cause. If there is

a special place in our hearts for its veterans it is because we know that their cause was right.

But in many ways we would never be the same again. Just as World War I stripped away all innocence about the horrors of battle, World War II erased all doubt about man's potential for barbarity, the motives of aggressors, consequences of naivety, and cost of appeasement. Nobody emerged from this war talking foolishly about it as the war to end all wars.

We learned a lot about others. We witnessed the astonishing resolve of the British who for two years refused to succumb when even staunch admirers conceded that their cause was hopeless. We developed an infatuation with Winston Churchill that still endures. Quintessentially English, he was wise, principled, urbane, dogged, and brave. We watched Britain stoically bear night after night of terror bombing, devastating losses on land and at sea, and one setback after another, never giving in to the slightest doubt or hesitation. We fought beside their soldiers, so different from our own with a nonchalant valor and dry acceptance of success and failure alike.

France was humbled more terribly than ever before in its history, swiftly defeated by a kind of war it had tragically failed to anticipate. Yet waiting in exile was a stubborn, irascible colonel, one of the few who had seen what was coming and tried valiantly to get his countrymen to listen, who then led his men in their last battle of 1940 with great courage and skill. Charles DeGaulle was the epitome of his nation's character; noble, proud, unyielding, a patriot whose all-consuming faith in France was untainted by defeat or the shame of Vichy collaboration. As he argued vehemently and often during his exile, defeat was only a temporary setback. French patriots would resist with all their might; and once free, he said passionately, France would rebound with its pride and power more intact than in the past.

The Life Collection of World War II Art, U.S. Army Center of Military History

The Soviets began the war in league with the Nazis, cutting political bargains for their own gain. Then Hitler betrayed them, and they paid a terrible price for having foolishly made a deal with that particular devil. But once that episode passed, we came to admire the mystical devotion of a tough people who took the worst punishment the Nazis offered, accepting millions, then tens

It was an outsized war fought by outsized personalities

of millions of casualties, until we wondered if there were any Soviets left to fight back. But fight back they did. They swallowed one Nazi division after another, destroying each with whatever means was at hand, with the harshness of winter, tides of poorly armed yet courageous men and women, and soon enough with battle toughened, well led units equipped with thousands of tanks and cannons. And several months after the fighting in Europe was over, the same skillful Soviet forces attacked Manchuria, hurtling the Japanese back in a lightning attack. Sadly, as soon as the war ended, the Soviets returned to those same designs that had taken them into the war.

Then, of course, there were Germany, Italy, and Japan, our enemies in those terrible years. As we fought them we convinced ourselves that they were inhuman. But when we became their occupiers and watched them struggling to survive the miseries of defeat, living in cities and towns pounded into rubble, trying to care for refugees and families torn apart by the war, while enduring severe impoverishment and scarcities with courage and sacrifice, we were reminded that they were people with a great capacity for good, indeed that it had been human failings that had carried them to such a terrible fate. Soon new leaders and new faiths took root that brought out the best in them as well. In fact, as they recovered, we gained valuable insights into their very formidable qualities. Soon all three became close allies, nations that we have since proudly served beside.

We also learned a lot about ourselves. We had our own quintessential leader, FDR, whose magnificent grin, characteristic aplomb, and unforgettable rhetoric combined to capture our hearts and minds. He had a vision for both the Nation and the world. Born a Brahman, he loved the common man and democracy with all his spirit; and these two objects of his passions were the cornerstone of his vision. That is where he differed from European leaders, who were schooled to think about the world with their intellects, not their emotions. That is precisely why our alliance was such a great marriage, combining old and new, practicality and idealism, common sense and brilliant reasoning. That is what it took to win, and to prevail so successfully after the war.

This is the second time in as many years that World War II has been the theme of a forum in *JFQ*. In truth, part of every issue could be devoted to some aspect of the war and it would still be impossible to do credit to all that has been learned and experienced from that conflict. It was an outsized war fought by outsized personalities. At one point or another, either during or after the war, it really did bring out the best in all of us. We need to remember the remarkable character of the nations we today call our allies. They are magnificent in adversity. And we need also to renew our faith in ourselves. Neither we nor our allies have changed a whit. Were another war like it to erupt today, we would be just as persevering, valiant, and noble. That is our strength.

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Case for Forward Deployment

The 50th anniversary of World War II is an apt moment to consider the linkage between U.S. engagement overseas and a stable international system. Three times between 1914 and 1950, neutrality or disengagement led America to major conflict. Then we engaged globally, ultimately winning the Cold War. Now we are entering a new international environment and are wisely following the lessons of history with a national strategy of engagement.

The most critical military aspect of the engagement strategy is forward deployment. Post-Cold War reductions are nearly complete, and we now have about 285,000 personnel (or 17 percent of the active force) stationed overseas. That's down from 510,000 (23 percent) just five years ago.

But we are reminded by two articles in this issue that the debate over forward deployment continues. David Yost (in "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence") cites an opinion survey that shows about half of America's elite favors maintaining current troop levels in Europe while the general public is far more isolationist. He points out that the Frank amendment of last year would have cut our force levels drastically if Europe declined to greatly increase host nation support payments. In commentary by James Lasswell ("Presence—Do We Stay or Do We Go?")—a response to the new Air Force white paper, *Global Presence*, which appeared in *JFQ*, no. 7 (Spring 1995)—there is a strong case made for a continued naval presence overseas.

This is a debate that, given the history of this century, cannot be allowed to drift. We need a national consensus in favor of continued overseas deployment. But to achieve that consensus we need a clearer understanding of the role of forward deployed forces in the post-Cold War era.

During the Cold War the Armed Forces were deployed overseas as part of containment to deter attack by a known enemy. We relied heavily on rapid reinforcement to defend. Today we still maintain a presence in South Korea and the Persian Gulf for the same purpose. It is better to deter two major regional conflicts than to fight them. Such deployments are easy to justify.

The complex strategic environment for this era, however, requires a better explanation of the overseas deployment of 285,000 Americans in uniform. It is this more complex case that must be made to the public. It rests on the concepts of *reassurance*, *cooperation*, and *crisis response*.

Often even a token presence can serve like a cooling rod in a nuclear power plant. This is particularly true in Asia where a power balance among China, Japan, and the members of ASEAN has yet to be struck. Our roughly 100,000 military personnel sta-

tioned in East Asia stabilize the balance, reassure our friends, and prevent unnecessary regional military buildups. Most Asians recognize this more readily than Americans, which is why they wish us to stay and why Japan is willing to contribute a high level of host nation support. Reassurance also remains important in Europe where most want Germany to retain its non-nuclear status and defensive posture.

In a world of multilateral diplomacy and combined military operations, close cooperation with foreign forces is indispensable. Habits learned in NATO facilitated the establishment of the coalition for Desert Shield/Desert Storm around which the Arab states gathered. This cooperation is not only critical for the success of combined forces on the battlefield, but it also yields diplomatic capital. Bosnia has illustrated the correlation between force presence and influence in the contact group. Cooperation can benefit civil-military relations in transitional societies as the Partnership for Peace has demonstrated. And cooperation yields intelligence assets, such as early warning of terrorist threats against the Panama Canal. Forward deployment is crucial to forging patterns of cooperation without which American influence would rapidly decline.

Forward deployed forces are fundamental to America's ability to react to crises around the world which affect vital interests or humanitarian concerns. In Desert Storm about 95 percent of the airlift came via Europe. A review of 27 operations mounted between March 1991 and October 1994 reveals that more than half were staged from Europe. Some, like Able Sentry, contribute to preventive diplomacy. Without forward staging areas, America would be severely constrained.

Each service struggles with a portion of forward deployment. Many in the Army would prefer to bring home the two heavy divisions in Europe while only retaining a "reception center" infrastructure. There may be a case for replacing armor with more mobile light units. The Navy finds it increasingly difficult to retain a significant presence in the Caribbean, Mediterranean, Atlantic, Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf with a fleet two-thirds the size of a decade ago. As Marine Amphibious Units increasingly provide a mobile presence for crisis management, there do not seem to be enough to go around. Some within the Air Force advocate *virtual* as opposed to physical presence as a major contribution to our military capabilities.

As we assess the significance of deterring regional conflicts, reassuring allies, cooperating in multilateral actions, and responding to crises, the case for forward deployment becomes clear. We are deployed overseas to promote U.S. national interests first and those of our allies second. This should not be a difficult notion to get across to the American people.

HANS BINNENDIJK
Editor-in-Chief



National Power and the

Interagency Process

By GEORGE T. RAACH *and* ILANA KASS

Summary

Inhibitions about using force can distance the military from participation in interagency decisionmaking. As a result other instruments of national power may be exhausted before serious attention is given to the unique capabilities of the Armed Forces, and then only with a deep sense of having failed in employing other means. The interagency process, especially when military planners are involved throughout, can represent a significant force multiplier, but it suffers from deficiencies in methods, actors, and structure. Military officers, accustomed to a settled and demanding system of staff work, may be frustrated by governmental mechanisms which are known for elasticity and ambivalence. But the military should remain engaged in the interagency process both to make it more effective and to ensure that the military voice is heard at the table. Officers can educate the interagency community about military capabilities and, more importantly, about the limitations of force.

American strategic culture holds that military force is a last resort. As a people, we are not entirely comfortable with using force until the other instruments of national power—economic, diplomatic, political, and informational—have been wielded. Given our history, values, and ideals such reluctance is understandable. In this context, cautious use of force with its potential for vast destruction and loss of life reflects wise statesmanship.

This cultural bias, however, often isolates the military from the other instruments of power. In fact, some policymakers consider the use of force as an admission of foreign policy failure. As a result, force is regarded as a separate instrument that is somehow in-



National Military
Command Center.

compatible with other means. This perception of military power undermines efforts to achieve a more synergistic application of national power today with increasing frequency before as well as during crisis.

This article does not argue that force ought to be either a primary or an ordinary instrument of policy. While one can envision scenarios in which the Nation might strike preemptively, or prior to exhausting other means, they are exceptions to the rule. Employing combat power should virtually always be a final recourse. Nor is this article concerned with generating additional power. It does not suggest that future dangers will require new weapons systems or that diplomatic and economic techniques should be reshuffled and reprioritized. Rather, it is about enhancing power through the integrated and synergistic use of the various instruments of power. It begins with the premise that there must be a close, interdependent relationship among economic, diplomatic, and military instruments, and especially in crises. If the United States is to enjoy a measure of order and stability in the conduct of world affairs, this synergism must be routine, must occur across the spectrum of relations, and must be applied with vision and conviction.

The New Order of Crisis

Future crises are likely to differ significantly from those of the Cold War. When the focus was the Soviet Union, and the overarching doctrine of containment guided our actions, coordinated use of national power was usually effective. However, coordinated efforts since the Persian Gulf War have been uneven. Events of the last year or so indicate a worrisome loss of effectiveness in applying power synergistically.

A new world order, regardless of its form, brings with it a new order of crisis. Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and even Korea are all

crises of the new order which have been intricate and difficult to understand. By contrast the standoff against the Soviet Union was not only comprehensible but, given each side's capability to destroy the other, included a premium on avoiding extremes. Today such constraints rarely apply.

Coupled with the increased complexity of problems is a relative decrease in conventional military power. Reduction in the size of forces and the slowing of some high technology programs mean that there will be less decisive force, qualitatively and quantitatively. This relative decline in capability is more apparent when one contemplates force improvements underway in many other states and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

A low level of military superiority does not necessarily mean that power cannot be used decisively. However, when it is applied it may well be with greater risks and narrowed options. To compensate for a decline in U.S. strength and increase in that of potential adversaries requires innovative ways of bolstering the effectiveness of national power—both to deter and to win on the battlefield. Greater effectiveness calls for improved productivity in applying instruments of power and, in turn, requires better interagency dynamics in dealing with crises.

Power and Process

Force and combat *multipliers* often describe measures that improve effectiveness or productivity at reasonable cost. To exercise command and control more competently, improve the lethality or accuracy of fires, and develop new doctrines for employing forces are examples. In effect, multipliers allow commanders to do more without proportionate increases in force size or cost.

The term *multiplier* is particularly used to describe tactical or operational enhancements. To cope with future problems, a comparable multiplier is required at the strategic level. What might be called power multipliers are needed, and improving the interagency process to optimize instruments of national power is one way of bringing them to bear.

When working properly, the interagency process determines the national interests at stake, defines immediate- and long-term objectives, and considers the best ways of achieving ends with minimal risk. In an-

events indicate a worrisome loss of effectiveness in applying power synergistically

Colonel George T. Raach, USA (Ret.), is a member of the professional staff of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces; Ilana Kass is director of Russian studies and professor of military strategy at the National War College.

other light, this process is the mechanism which drafts, coordinates, and assesses national strategy and oversees its implementation. Ideally, it is a forum for creative and visionary use of national power, where participants look for opportunities to complement and enhance the capabilities that others bring to the table.

Yet based on most daily press accounts, the process is in disrepair. Within the government the degree of dysfunction depends on the agency's point of view. Still, in the course of numerous interviews with players from various agencies, there was no satisfaction expressed in the health of the interagency process.¹ What is supposed to happen, why it doesn't, and what professionals can do about it are issues worth exploring.

Structures and Fractures

On the face of it, the interagency process is designed to ensure that information and options are developed and passed up the line and that decisions and guidance are passed back down to the staffs which must write the orders and oversee their execution. A Presidential Review Directive, initiated by the National Security Advisor, defines the scope of the process, identifies interested agencies, and appoints an executive agent or lead agency.² This may be a cabinet agency like the Department of State or Defense or an organization like the Agency for International Development, which establishes the coordination process, sets the agenda, drafts policy recommendations, and conducts meetings. This lead agency also implements decisions unless that responsibility is passed to another organization.

The interagency hierarchy is designed to provide information and refine options while also allowing participants to voice opinions, offer recommendations, and for better or worse advance bureaucratic agendas. In theory, the action officers who operate informally or as members of task forces and special councils provide information to mid-level officials who comprise an interagency working group (IWG). Meeting at the direction of the lead agency, the IWG coor-

dinates issues, sifts through information, and passes analysis, together with policy options and recommendations, to the Deputies Committee.³

The committee includes relatively senior officials from various departments and agencies.⁴ It can usually make some decisions and members can agree to proposals affecting their departments or agencies. For the most part, the members are not experts on the problem at hand, but if their representatives to the IWG prepare them well, they usually have a sound grasp of the issues, risks, and likely outcomes. Initial responses to crises often result from the deliberations by the deputies, but for critical decisions the deputies defer to the principals.

The principals include departmental secretaries, senior officials, agency directors, and the National Security Advisor.⁵ Their meetings may directly involve the President and Vice President, or the results of meetings may be presented to them for approval.⁶ Decisions resulting from these meetings and approved by the President ought to lay down markers and commit all governmental offices to an agreed course.

While this description is somewhat simplified, it highlights the guidelines prescribed by the Clinton administration. In the main, it appears to be a sound approach to a complex business and to include those who control various instruments of power. Yet there are significant problems that affect the quality of decisions, the effectiveness of actions, and the ability to synchronize power.⁷ Fractures are evident on several levels involving process, personalities, and structure. For military officers used to a defined framework and clear-cut decisionmaking the interagency arena can be especially frustrating.

Unlike the structured coordination of military staffs, membership in the interagency process is not fixed and varies from crisis to crisis.⁸ On the one hand, this offers flexibility and facilitates tailoring a team to include those who are critical and exclude those who are not. On the other hand, it often means that those who participate in the process have little experience in crisis management and must operate in an unstructured environment which provides little compensating support. In the military

for military officers used to a defined framework the interagency arena can be especially frustrating

system position is important, while in the interagency process personalities are key.

Personalities can dominate interagency deliberations—especially if process management is ineffective—and personal or organizational agendas may take precedent over larger crisis-related issues.⁹ The result is often chaotic and disruptive. For example, policy papers are often presented for coordination on short notice, often late on Fridays, in what appear to be deliberate attempts to forestall detailed study and reasoned comment; or initiatives of limited value are advanced in ways that detract, often bypassing existing chains; or the time and energy of action officers, who ought to be providing pertinent information, are diverted to studies of dubious merit.

Structural and personality-dependent impediments work against the synergistic application of power. If lead agencies lack experience in setting goals and objectives or guiding interagency groups through the coordination process to specific policy recommendations, it may result in time-consuming meetings without agenda or purpose in which information is not refined and options are not developed. In some recent cases, the process has been so chaotic that the Deputies Committee has met before the IWG has focused the discussion or prepared the agenda. Failures of this sort produce tardy or poor decisions, which further complicates matters.

The feedback from decisionmakers to those who must develop implementing plans is often sparse or obtuse, indicating weaknesses in process and personalities. There have been occasions when action officers (and sometimes principals) who should have known about decisions reached up the chain were not informed in a timely manner. This inevitably results in wasting energy and falling behind in the time-sensitive matter of crisis management. The system never fully recovers and continues to lurch through the crisis. The initiative is thus invariably lost and reaction becomes the *modus operandi*.

Finally, lead agencies, responsible for making policy and decisions in the planning phase, may not have the resources and expertise to oversee implementation. This is especially true where operations involve large numbers of players working over consider-

able distances, under tight time constraints. Problems of implementation are also exacerbated when implementing instructions are couched in vague language open to different interpretations.

Can It Be Fixed?

Rather than focusing diplomatic, economic, and military power in complementary fashion, power is being diffused. Embargoes may be imposed, negotiations may take place, and there may be some vague idea that the military can be called on to accomplish an ill-defined purpose unrelated to the real problem except in a very general way. This is hardly synergistic action. It seems to fall more into the category of muddling.

On the surface, military players in the interagency process appear to be poorly positioned to improve it despite the fact that they stand to lose the most if the muddle becomes something worse. Some aspects of the process are unlikely to change much, and it is important to realize that at the outset. For example, to expect the civilian-dominated interagency process to remodel itself in the image of a military staff system is anticipating too much. Despite the fact that the military staff process works well, there is cultural resistance to surrendering flexibility and ambiguity that many see as necessary. Additionally, few are eager to subject their offices to an unfamiliar architecture which appears to threaten prerogatives of turf.

Nevertheless, if one accepts the unchangeable and works within certain parameters, several initiatives could begin to restore interagency relationships and transform the process into a power multiplier. First, although many military officers see the process as frustrating, burdensome, and counterproductive, withdrawal is exactly the wrong approach. The faults in the system are readily apparent and foregoing it is tempting. The interagency process will continue whether the military plays or not, however, and ultimately the Armed Forces must deal with the flawed results. Instead, officers should focus on making the system more effective. To do that, military staffs at all levels must be willing participants who understand the system and can work to improve it.¹⁰

military officers in the interagency process can contribute by asking the right questions

Understanding the system goes beyond a mere description of the mechanism. It includes knowing the personalities of players and their agendas and the rationale behind them. It means looking for points of agreement rather than bones of contention. An effective interagency process depends largely on trust among the participants, and developing trust depends on understanding and a willingness to help move the process along. What may be surprising to many in the military is that they usually know more about other agencies than those agencies know about DOD or about each other. The key is to build a robust base of knowledge and apply it in ways that enhance the process without attempting to control it.

Second, officers working in the process as members of OSD, joint, or service staffs must be willing to educate nonmilitary players about the capabilities and, especially important, the limits of military power, and also to market ideas and positions effectively. As the former Commander in Chief of U.S. Atlantic Command pointed out, "The necessary first step in shaping effective interagency groups is making known what skills and resources one brings to the table."¹¹

Education involves more than a list of what force can and cannot achieve. It must touch on relevant theory about how force is applied, how the military assists other departments and agencies in accomplishing common goals, how actions by other departments can pave the way for effective and efficient use of force, and how other agencies must decide where the role of the Armed Forces leaves off in order to translate battlefield results into politically relevant outcomes. Officers should not hesitate to help others understand what is feasible, what is not, and where cooperative use of power can be most effective. This requires not only knowledge but vision.

Both education and marketing must be approached in ways that gain the willing support of other members of the interagency process without undermining mutual trust. This is crucial. It is important to remember that by virtue of training and discipline military officers are accustomed to crisis and can

often operate more efficiently in crisis situations. This attribute should be used to inform, persuade, and assist other members in applying national power.

Third, while standing interagency working groups may be less commonly used today than they were four years ago, they should not be.¹² Working in isolation until the proverbial balloon goes up does not improve the process. Though few formal, standing IWGs have been constituted, this does not mean opportunities for informal coordination or forward-looking exchanges should go begging. Officers at all levels who are likely to be part of the interagency process should look for chances to form or participate in such groups. When that is not feasible, they should at least regularly seek out potential counterparts. Even if this results in nothing more than a handshake and exchange of telephone numbers, the system will be stronger for the effort. Having the measure of one's colleagues has great value.

Finally, military officers involved in the interagency process can contribute a good deal by asking the right questions. They must ensure at the outset that terms are properly defined and that every assumption makes sense. Dialect, if not language, differs from agency to agency, and it is important to overcome varying cultures at the beginning.

Other points for investigation include the process itself, the role of the military in the crisis at hand, and the degree of risk policymakers are willing to accept. Simply asking whether another agency has been consulted might be illuminating. For example, if there is concern over the use of economic power, inquiring if the Department of the Treasury and the National Economic Council (which is coequal to the National Security Council) have provided input may elicit a more potent concept. Similarly, inquiring into the details of the end state and specific military role in achieving it can open new vistas—as can queries about alternative courses of action in case of failure of the proposed approach. When a decision appears to be forthcoming, questioning whether or not the risks involved are fully understood will do much to assure proper force size and structure.

When decisions are made, questions must be asked to ensure that policies and concepts are stated in language that makes sense across the cultural lines of the agencies

which will implement them. No member should assume that something will happen perforce. That is not the history of crisis management or the interagency process. Collegial questioning serves to ensure that national power is focused and that the ends, ways, and means of strategy, as well as the risks of both action and inaction, are all fully considered.

As indicated at the outset, present predilections against the use of force may seem to banish military power to a distant, unwelcome, and misunderstood role. Yet global conditions suggest that this is the wrong solution. In fact, the synergistic use of all instruments of power, including force, can serve as a strategic power multiplier, and the interagency process is one way to achieve that end. But the interagency process is clearly broken.

Will the course suggested above resolve the myriad problems which plague the interagency process? Not entirely. However, simply allowing the process to drive itself deeper into chaos is not in the best interest of national security and sooner or later will lead to greater disasters. What is proposed is a beginning, albeit modest, to set the process on the way to improved effectiveness.

The amount of military power that can be brought to bear in the future will be relatively less as force levels are drawn down and threats become more sophisticated and intricate. At the same time, the risks and consequences of failure will be great. Unless instruments of national power are wielded effectively, efficiently, and in concert, the ability of the Nation to take unilateral action and to lead a coalition will be diminished.

Unlike the Cold War, there is no overarching policy to guide us. In these circumstances, the organized application of limited resources to achieve crucial objectives becomes more difficult and more important. Thus the interagency process, for better or worse, is a necessary mechanism. The military cannot revitalize the process itself, nor should it. However, the steps outlined above, though frustrating or unwelcome, can both reduce organizational stress and improve effectiveness to a level where all participants are engaged and revitalization becomes possible. Ultimately, such a renewal may be in the interest of the Armed Forces most of all, so it is up to them to begin. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ This article is based on research undertaken to define the quality of relationships among agencies and departments. Interviews were conducted with more than twenty officials from action officers to members of Deputies Committees.

² Presidential Decision Directives numbers 1 and 2 spell out the interagency process in the Clinton administration.

³ Membership on IWGs varies from action officers to assistant secretaries, depending on the importance of the issue. In some cases, a group is comprised of action officers who report to an IWG executive committee made up of assistant secretaries which, in turn, feeds into a Deputies Committee.

⁴ An NSC briefing listed the members of the Deputies Committee as the Deputy National Security Advisor, Deputy Assistant for Economic Policy, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, National Security Advisor to the Vice President, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

⁵ According to NSC sources, the usual principals include the National Security Advisor to the President, Secretaries of Defense and State, Ambassador to the United Nations, Director of Central Intelligence, Economic Policy Adviser, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

⁶ Sometimes this is done in a formal NSC setting, but often the venue is less formal.

⁷ While the leadership styles of some senior officials had an influence, several individuals interviewed indicated that the uneven quality of national security decisions over the past year were as much the result of a failed interagency process as of personalities.

⁸ Some argue that the process is not *process* at all, but merely the trappings of process. However, this does not square with actual workings, which suggests the problem is more a case of dysfunctional process than the absence of process.

⁹ Bureaucracies are inherently adversarial. But normal bureaucratic gamesmanship can be disruptive during crises when time for reasoned decisions is at a premium.

¹⁰ Relationships at action officer-level appear to be healthier than those at mid- or upper-level. Bureaucratic friction, though present, does not have the same hold that it does at upper echelons. Yet there is a downside as well. Officers who are detailed to civilian agencies must not allow themselves to be captured by the host agency, but rather should use their organizational skills to help focus that agency's effort.

¹¹ Paul David Miller, *The Interagency Process*, National Security paper 11 (Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1993), p. 12.

¹² During the previous administration, there were a number of standing interagency groups and several interagency coordinating bodies which met periodically, even when there were no crises on the horizon. This proved to be valuable and created the sorts of positive dynamics that facilitate responsive crisis management. While some standing working groups remain, their meetings are often infrequent, poorly attended, and unproductive.



RESTORE HOPE

Coordinating Relief Operations

By JONATHAN T. DWORZEN

Summary

Joint force commanders and their staffs can expect to be called on to coordinate with humanitarian relief organizations (HROs). Restore Hope in Somalia exposed problems between the military and relief agencies in everything from operational planning to organizational culture. Such difficulties in the future could endanger the mission if relations between JTF officers and relief workers are not more firmly established. The military operated under a U.N. mandate to create a secure environment in which humanitarian assistance could be delivered. In turn, some officers saw HROs as supporting the military in distributing food and perceived relief workers as disorganized do-gooders. HROs, on the other hand, saw their role as delivering supplies to the Somali people with military support. They found the military rigid and bureaucratic, unable to tackle the complexities of relief work, and consumed by a fear of “mission creep.” Both sides sparred over policies on security, convoys, and weapons confiscation because of deep institutional differences.



Medical civic action in Mogadishu.

U.S. Navy (Terry Mitchell)

How well do joint force commanders coordinate humanitarian assistance operations with relief organizations? In every relief mission from Provide Comfort in northern Iraq to Sea Angel in Bangladesh such coordination has been both necessary and extensive. It also has been difficult. Dealing with humanitarian relief organizations (HROs), an umbrella term which embraces various types of relief groups, can be rewarding as well as frustrating.

Operation Restore Hope in Somalia was no exception. Although military-HRO cooperation was sufficient to enable the military to accomplish its mission of improving security, and for HROs to provide relief, relations were strained. Each saw the other as uncooperative. This review of the relationship between the military and HROs in Somalia identifies ways in which JTF commanders can better coordinate with relief agencies. Since there are likely to be more military humanitarian assistance operations in the future, joint commanders can facilitate them by fostering cooperative relations with HROs. The question remains how.

The Military and HROs

With the fall of the Somali government in 1991, the country split into more than a dozen factions. Fighting among them and banditry created widespread starvation. To alleviate suffering HROs tried to deliver relief supplies but faced serious difficulties.¹ It was hard to get supplies to major ports in light of widespread fighting and general lawlessness. Some organizations delivered food to coastal towns by ship but then could not reach the interior where starvation was the worst. Airlifts could only haul a small amount of supplies, were extremely costly, and could only be made to secure areas. Cross-border HRO convoys from Kenya brought food to the towns of southwest Somalia, but not farther north. Problems in delivering food increased the rate of starvation (some 350,000 died prior to military intervention) and shaped the conduct

of subsequent relief operations as well as the course of military-HRO relations.

The United Nations sent a force to Somalia that was too small and limited by its mandate to end the violence. As the situation deteriorated, the Security Council authorized a U.S.-led military intervention. The Commander in Chief, Central Command, established JTF Somalia in December 1992 to mount Operation Restore Hope.² Its purpose, according to one HRO official, was to stop images of bloated babies and walking skeletons from appearing on American television. To do so, the JTF had to ensure that relief agencies could get supplies to those who needed them most.

From a JTF viewpoint there was a clear division of labor between the military and HROs. The former would create a secure environment in which to deliver supplies by protecting the HRO distribution system, from the ports and airfields where the supplies entered the country, to the road networks over which the supplies moved to distribution points. The latter would get the supplies in country, transport them overland, and distribute them. Thus, the mission statement was drafted carefully to reflect that ideal division of labor.

When directed by the National Command Authorities, CINCCENT will conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure major air and sea ports, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, to provide security for relief convoys and relief organization operations, and to assist the United Nations/non-governmental organizations in providing humanitarian relief under U.N. auspices.³

The JTF commander—who was the commanding general of the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF)—set up headquarters in Mogadishu and assumed control over all Marine and Army forces, various Air Force and Navy assets, and coalition troops from almost twenty countries. The JTF divided southern Somalia into eight areas, surrounding each major town that would serve as a distribution point, and later carving out a ninth area. The military called these areas “humanitarian relief sectors” rather than military sectors to emphasize the nature of the operation.

Overall the division of labor worked. The military secured the ports and airfields, ensured that HRO convoys were not attacked or looted by factions and bandits, repaired the

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as the operation improved security in general, the HRO presence almost doubled

road network, and guarded distribution points. Also, as the operation improved security in general, it was easier to provide relief

and the HRO presence almost doubled between December 1992 and March 1993.⁴ The relief agencies included both nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations like CARE, international groups like the Red Cross, and U.N. agencies like the World Food Program. They distributed food, ran clinics, and worked on long-term projects such as infrastructure, education, and agriculture which greatly lowered the death rate.

Humanitarian Operations Centers

When operational planning started, the JTF staff knew they would need to cooperate with HROs. To ensure close coordination they established humanitarian operations centers (HOCs) in Mogadishu and smaller ones in other sectors. Their general mission was to plan, support, and monitor the delivery of relief supplies.⁵ Each HOC had three supporting functions: to develop and implement relief strategy, coordinate logistic support for HROs, and arrange military support for relief agencies. The key to HOC success was the daily meeting among HROs and representatives of the military, United Nations, and a disaster assistance response team (DART)—specialists from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), U.S. Agency for International Development, to coordinate American relief efforts.

The official HOC organizational structure included a director, both a civilian and a military deputy, and associated groups. The director was a U.N. official on loan from the relief agency CARE. The civilian deputy was the DART leader and the military deputy was from the JTF. Core groups coordinated the efforts of HROs in areas such as agriculture and sanitation. A Standing Liaison Committee was, at least in theory, a policymaking forum for humanitarian relief affairs. The HOC director chaired the committee, and its members included representatives of the United Nations, JTF, DART, and HROs.

With few exceptions, however, members of HOCs did not answer to each other; instead they coordinated among themselves. HOC directors reported to the United Nations, civilian deputies to the U.S. Liaison Office (the State Department presence in Somalia) and to OFDA in Washington, military deputies to the JTF, and the HROs to their national headquarters. The resulting command relationship could be best depicted by overlapping circles rather than by a schematic diagram.

The Mogadishu HOC was both the national HOC and the HOC for the city's humanitarian relief sector. It was collocated with U.N. headquarters, not with JTF headquarters, because there was a reluctance to give HRO workers access to the JTF compound and because the United Nations, and not the U.S.-led JTF, had the overall task of organizing relief efforts in Somalia.

Each HOC had a civil-military operations cell (CMOC) manned by JTF officers and headed by the center's military deputy. CMOCs coordinated military support to relief groups by validating HRO requests for assistance and asking the JTF to task subordinate commands to fulfill requests. CMOC officers worked with DART officials, drawing on their expertise in managing humanitarian assistance and dealing with relief organizations.

Military-HRO Coordination

The military and relief agencies had to coordinate policy on various issues, of which three stand out: convoy escort, security for HROs, and weapons confiscation. One JTF staff member referred to these three issues as "the good, the bad, and the ugly." It was an apt characterization.

Convoy Escorts. On average the military escorted 70 convoys carrying 9,000 metric tons of supplies from Mogadishu inland each month. This ensured that relief reached those who needed it and was not looted. The effort also greatly decreased the cost of transport for HROs who had previously airlifted supplies or relied on highly paid, armed Somalis and expensive truck rentals. Convoys worked well, but communications problems arose because CMOCs were not located with the force headquarters that notified the appropriate commands to furnish escorts.

the JTF was trying to disarm warlords, bandits, and large segments of the population



U.S. Navy (Terry Mitchell)

Unloading equipment in Mogadishu.



DOO

Drilling for water, Somalia.

Security. HROs requested that the military provide security for their facilities against two different threats: continuing sporadic banditry and HRO guards themselves. The latter threat was due to the widespread banditry prior to military intervention when relief agencies hired guards for personal and compound security which, in many instances, was not voluntary—guards demanded to be hired or would attack compounds. For the same reason, HROs found they could not fire the guards. When relief

workers needed security, they contacted the local CMOC which notified JTF headquarters which in turn tasked U.S. or coalition forces to assist. Providing security was not easy, especially in Mogadishu. Communication problems were compounded by the fact that the city's CMOC, where incoming requests were received, was not collocated with JTF headquarters which directed support to HROs. Relief agencies were also widely dispersed. In Mogadishu alone they had 585 offices, residences, warehouses, feeding centers, and clinics that could require security.⁶

Weapons Policy. The most contentious issue was weapons confiscation.⁷ Most vehicles rented locally to deliver supplies came with armed drivers to protect them from bandits. To pick up supplies, HROs took vehicles into areas like ports and airfields which were controlled by the JTF. To deliver supplies, they had to cross humanitarian relief sector boundaries and pass checkpoints. At the same time, however, the JTF was trying to disarm warlords, bandits, and large segments of the population. Some soldiers had difficulty in distinguishing bandits from local HRO drivers and impounded any weapon they saw, including those belonging to HROs. Others, thinking that most drivers took the weapons home at night and became bandits, confiscated their weapons purposely.

The first solution to this problem was for the JTF to issue pink identification cards to HRO drivers in Mogadishu. But this proved to be ineffective since the cards lacked pictures, the military did not fully disseminate the rules, and the confiscation policy varied by sector. Marines continued to expropriate weapons. Without their weapons drivers would not operate the vehicles themselves nor allow relief workers to drive them unescorted. Several HROs were thus paying large sums for vehicles (upwards of \$2,500 a month) which remained idle as relief supplies went undelivered.

The JTF thus decided to issue blue identity cards—with photos to prevent fraud. HROs vouched for their Somali drivers who received these cards from CMOCs. Once issued, the drivers could enter ports and airfields, cross sector boundaries, pass daylight

roadblocks, and have limited numbers of weapons. The JTF disseminated the rules widely, but then the Marines initiated a new disarmament policy in Mogadishu which called for confiscating any visible weapon.⁸ When HRO vehicles passed checkpoints, marines would look inside, see weapons, and seize them. (The HRO drivers carried weapons in their laps for access; keeping them on cab floors or in car trunks would not have allowed them to defend their vehicles.)

Even with blue identity cards, marines confiscated many HRO weapons. During one week in Mogadishu, for example, 84 weapons were seized, 54 from HROs because they were visible. Relief agencies were upset since even if weapons were wrongly seized it took four days for them to be returned. The JTF eventually redefined the term *visible* to allow drivers to carry weapons in their laps and distributed new policy cards widely in early April. This clarified the policy on HRO weapons by indicating in which positions guards and drivers could carry them. Although putting such information on easy-to-read cards for the benefit of the military and relief workers appeared to resolve most problems, the cards were not circulated until immediately before the U.S.-led JTF transferred control of the operation to the newly formed U.N.-led military force.

Why the Problem?

There were more differences between the military and HROs in Mogadishu than in outlying areas because there were more military personnel and relief workers in the capital and the security situation was worse there than in other sectors. So marines in Mogadishu, not as familiar with individual HRO workers, focused on confiscating weapons more actively than elsewhere. But the weapons confiscation issue and other differences between the military and HROs reflected a deeper tension between the two communities which was attributed to a series of factors.

First, there was no clear military-HRO command relationship. No single organization had control over relief issues. While neither the military nor HROs could control the other's actions, this had been less of a problem previously where either the military or the relief agencies—under a U.N. organ or

DART—was in the lead with the other in a supporting role. But in Restore Hope neither one clearly had the lead. Military officers accustomed to command and control mechanisms and wiring diagrams were frustrated. They found operating with HROs under an assumption that a chain of command existed was like trying to put a square peg in a round hole. Instead, what was needed was constant negotiation with everyone involved at every step in the operation.

Second, JTF officers had differing views on the mission and the role of supporting HROs. The mission statement identified four objectives. The first two centered on improving security in general, the third on providing security for HRO convoys and activities, and the fourth on assisting agencies in delivering humanitarian relief. Some officers, especially those on the Marine and JTF staffs, held that the military was to assist HROs indirectly through overall security, thus allowing HROs to provide relief. Those with this view focused on the security aspect of the mission statement as a whole. Others, especially JTF officers on CMOC staffs, believed that the military was there to help HROs, directly and indirectly. They cited the final line of the statement (“to assist the United Nations/non-governmental organizations in providing humanitarian relief”) and stated that helping HROs was the basic reason for being in Somalia. Who was right? The intent was for the military to provide security, but the concluding phrase of the mission statement was added to give the JTF commander authority to do more if required, and it was meant to be permissive, not directive. Few JTF staff officers, however, were aware of this fact. The problem was not in gearing the mission toward the HROs, but rather disagreement over how much to assist them. Relief workers, used to military officers who cooperated with them, were frustrated by the attitude of JTF officers who believed in a more restrictive mission and viewed their agencies as intransigent.

Third, the Marines in Mogadishu were not as accountable to HROs as were forces located in outlying areas. There was no Mogadishu humanitarian relief sector because the local HOC was also the national HOC for all of Somalia. Thus JTF officers from I MEF manned the Mogadishu CMOC—the military side of HOC—and not officers from

many HROs held unrealistically high expectations of military support

the unit controlling the Mogadishu relief sector (1st Marine Division). In other sectors, in contrast, officers from local headquarters manned CMOCs. So if local forces confiscated weapons, their officers had to deal with HRO complaints and thus worked to avoid unnecessary seizures. In Mogadishu, however, Marine officers were to a certain extent insulated from HRO complaints.

Fourth, many HROs held unrealistically high expectations of military support, perhaps due to the significant help which was being provided in northern Iraq at that time. The relief agencies in Somalia expected the military to rid the southern part of the country of bandits and warlords so that they could provide humanitarian assistance. At least they thought the JTF should provide blanket security and allow them to keep their armed guards. But many of these agencies did not—or could not—take steps to help the military improve security, such as consolidating facilities in Mogadishu, firing Somali guards hired before intervention, and ensuring that their local drivers followed rules on carrying weapons.

Fifth, competition and hard working conditions led to high turnover rates among HROs. Many arrived after the military intervention and knew little about what had gone on beforehand and thus exaggerated the significance of differences. Also, since HROs must appear to be effective to raise funds, they sometimes compete rather than collaborate. This can make cooperation difficult.

Sixth, there was insufficient planning. In several instances the military and relief agencies failed to involve each other in decisions that required cooperative military-HRO operations. During cease fire and disarmament planning, for example, military officers committed agencies to provide relief at certain sites before coordinating the locations and the requirements with HROs. Similarly, agencies did not inform the military of their decision to establish soup kitchens in Mogadishu, even though the military may have been called upon to provide security. Why didn't they include one another in planning? The JTF officers took their plans and operations to be primarily military and saw HROs as occupying a supporting role.

And relief workers viewed their plans and operations as humanitarian and regarded the JTF as having a supplemental role. Neither side went out of their way to bring the other into their planning process until it was almost complete.

Organizational Culture

Many problems noted above could have been successfully overcome. They were not, in large part due to organizational culture. The way a group is organized and operated is a reflection of its culture—those values and methods of operation which characterize an institution. Militaries have characteristics that arise from a specific culture. They have rigid rules, hierarchical structures, planning systems, and processes for selecting experienced officers for positions of command in the field. HROs, in contrast, are flexible, independent, unstructured, and adaptive organizations that tend to employ young workers in the field.

There are good reasons why both types of organization have developed different cultures. The military needs certain qualities to function in combat. HROs face changing circumstances, rely on uncertain local support, work in difficult environments, and have small numbers of indigenous employees. They do not need military values and in fact could not operate with them. The military and HROs attract disparate people. Why do differences in organizational culture matter? For one thing, they make working together a challenge. Varied practices and dissimilar personalities can lead to misunderstanding. The military penchant for detailed planning, for example, made HROs believe that the JTF wanted to take over every aspect of the operation.

Perhaps more importantly differences in organizational culture create negative stereotypes. The military was frustrated by what they viewed as disorganization and waste growing out of a tendency not to conduct detailed planning. Individually, they saw relief workers as young, liberal, anti-military, academic, self-righteous, incompetent, expatriate cowboys who came to an area for a short time to “do good” without fully considering the consequences. Officers simply did not see women in their late-twenties with Berkenstock sandals and “Save the Whales”

T-shirts as experts worthy of consultation. At the same time, many relief workers saw military officers as inflexible, conservative, and bureaucratic. They found them insensitive to Somali suffering and viewed their concern over “mission creep” as obsessive, an excuse to do the minimum and go home.

Finally, with the JTF and HROs seeing one another as hostile, the job of CMOC officers became extremely difficult. To their peers they were suspect for working with HROs. Phrases like “going native” and “Stockholm syndrome” were often used to describe CMOC officers who also fared no better with HROs at the time. Representing JTF positions, such as following weapons rules, resulted in CMOC officers being regarded like the other officers who did not understand HROs.

most differences can only be handled indirectly by increased military-HRO interaction

Improving Relations

Though some problems can be addressed directly, most (especially overcoming differences in organizational culture) can only be handled indirectly by increased military-HRO interaction. To do so, a JTF commander facing a humanitarian assistance operation can take the following steps:

- ▼ Establish HOCs and CMOCs. Having the military and HROs in one place makes the job of coordination easier than moving liaison officers among various headquarters.

- ▼ Collocate HOCs and CMOCs with JTF headquarters to increase interaction, help the military and HROs learn more about their respective operations, and facilitate planning.

- ▼ Staff CMOCs with officers experienced in humanitarian assistance. Assigning such officers would allow JTF commanders to draw on their expertise.

- ▼ Involve officers from local military forces in CMOCs. Placing such officers there could make them responsive to HRO needs and ensure that they are not insulated from HRO complaints.

- ▼ Increase the stature of CMOCs and the visibility of HRO coordination. Giving CMOC directors the status and access accorded special staff section chiefs reporting to JTF commanders would demonstrate the importance of relations with HROs.

- ▼ Ensure clarity of mission. The mission statement, commander’s intent, policy guidance, et al. should make clear the role of humanitarian assistance, what priority the commander places on assisting HROs, and how the military relates to HROs.

- ▼ Ensure that the military and HROs both understand how the other operates. Soliciting information from relief workers and briefing them on doctrine, standard operating procedures, and capabilities could help form a basis of knowledge for cooperation.

- ▼ Involve relief organizations in military decisionmaking. Getting HRO input would help a JTF commander make better decisions and make HRO acceptance of military plans more likely.

- ▼ Ensure that JTF officers see relief agencies as partners. Stressing relations could help convince officers to take HROs seriously and not regard them as nuisances.

- ▼ Use the DART. Involving DART members in planning and operations would allow JTF officers to draw on their expertise and use them as intermediaries in dealing with HROs.

Tension between the military and HROs during Restore Hope had little operational impact. But in future missions, when more direct support to relief agencies may be needed or more serious threats may arise, coordination and cooperation must be closer. Military officers can improve this relationship. But relief workers have to meet them halfway. The efforts by a JTF commander to improve coordination with HROs is likely to yield greater cooperation. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ Frederick C. Cuny, “How the U.S. Military Could Assist Relief Operations in Somalia,” *Intertext*, August 1, 1992.

² For different views, see “JFQ Forum: Mission to Somalia,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 2 (Autumn 1993), pp. 37–70.

³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Somalia OPLAN,” p. 5.

⁴ UNITAF briefing, “Civil-Military Operations Cell,” March 1993.

⁵ Except where indicated information on HOCs and CMOCs is from a UNITAF briefing entitled “Humanitarian Operations Center,” January 1993.

⁶ UNITAF, “Civil-Military Operations Cell.”

⁷ UNITAF, “Differences between the Humanitarian Community and UTF and How to Resolve Them,” January 27, 1993; F. Lorenz, “Weapons Confiscation Policy during Operation Restore Hope,” unpublished paper, August 1993.

⁸ CJTF Somalia, 081200Z January 1993, “UTF Somalia—Commander’s Policy Guidance, no. 3 (Weapons Confiscation and Disposition).”

Joint Force Quarterly ESSAY CONTEST ON THE

Revolution in Military Affairs

To encourage innovative thinking on how the Armed Forces can remain at the forefront in the conduct of war, *JFQ* is pleased to announce the first annual “Essay Contest on the Revolution in Military Affairs” sponsored by the National Defense University Foundation, Inc.

The contest solicits innovative concepts for operational doctrine and organizations by which the Armed Forces can exploit existing and emerging technologies. Entries that most rigorously address one or more of the following questions will be considered for a cash award:

▼ The essence of an RMA is found in the magnitude of change compared with preexisting warfighting capabilities. How might emerging technologies—and the integration of such technologies—result in a *revolution* in conducting warfare in the coming decades? What will be the key measures of that change?

▼ Exploiting new and emerging technologies is dependent on the development of innovative operational concepts and organizational structures. What specific doctrinal concepts and organizations will be required to fully realize the revolutionary potential of critical military technologies?

▼ How might an adversary use emerging technologies in innovative ways to gain significant military leverage against U.S. systems and doctrine?

Contest Prizes

Winners will be awarded prizes of \$2,000, \$1,000, and \$500 for the three best essays. In addition, a special prize of \$500 will be awarded for the best essay submitted by either an officer candidate or a commissioned officer in the rank of major/lieutenant commander or below (or equivalent grades). A selection of academic and scholarly books dealing with various aspects of military affairs and innovation will also be presented to each winner.

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Contest Rules

1. Entrants may be military personnel or civilians (from the public or the private sector) and of any nationality. Essays written by individual authors or groups of authors are eligible.
2. Entries must be original and not previously published (nor under consideration for publication elsewhere). Essays that originate from work carried out at intermediate and senior colleges (staff and war colleges), service schools, civilian universities, and other educational institutions are eligible.
3. Entries must not exceed 5,000 words in length and must be submitted typewritten, double-spaced, and in triplicate. They should include a wordcount at the end. Documentation may follow any standard academic form of citation, but endnotes rather than footnotes are preferred.
4. Entries must be submitted with (1) a letter clearly indicating that the essay is a contest entry together with the author's name, social security account number (or passport number in the case of non-U.S. entrants), mailing address, telephone number, and FAX number (if available); (2) a cover sheet containing the contestant's full name and essay title; (3) a summary of the essay which is no more than 200 words; and (4) a brief biographical sketch of the author.
5. Entries must be mailed to the following address (facsimile copies will not be accepted): RMA Essay Contest, *Joint Force Quarterly*, ATTN: NDU-NSS-JFQ, Washington, D.C. 20319-6000
6. Entries must be postmarked no later than August 31, 1995 to be considered in the 1994-95 contest.
7. *JFQ* will hold first rights to the publication of all entries. The prize-winning as well as other essays entered in the contest may be published in *JFQ*.
8. Winners' names will appear in *JFQ* and the prizes will be presented by the President of the National Defense University at an appropriate ceremony in Washington, D.C.

Joint Special Operations



Patrol coastal class ship *USS Cyclone* with Dominican craft.

in Peace and War

By WAYNE A. DOWNING

U.S. Air Force (Eugene L. LaDoucer)

Summary

The experience of U.S. Special Operations Command over its eight-year history has surfaced five factors integral to the success of special operations: regional orientation; readiness; programming and budget; research, development, and acquisition; and command and control. In adjusting to the new security environment and changing threats, the special operations community is building on lessons from Panama, the Persian Gulf, and Haiti. For example, theater special operations commands provide regional CINCs with headquarters for planning. Mission criteria originally developed for Desert Storm are being institutionalized in doctrine to validate proposed operations: Is it appropriate? Does it support the campaign plan? Is it feasible? Are resources available? Will the outcome justify the risk? Such initiatives will ensure that special operations personnel effectively meet the challenge posed by two kinds of threats: nation-states with conventional forces and groups without a viable military or a clear national center of gravity.

Since it was founded in April 1987, the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has provided the Nation with special operations forces (SOF) that are arguably the most capable in the world. SOCOM trains, equips, and provides joint special operations capabilities to each regional CINC, American ambassadors and country teams, and governmental agencies. SOCOM ensures the combat readiness of

post-Cold War strategy requires a force that operates in a variety of environments

forces assigned and monitors the preparedness of SOF assigned to other commands. Unique among the unified commands, SOCOM manages its own program and budget and also conducts research, development, and acquisition (RD&A) of SOF-peculiar items. Lastly, the command maintains a proficient Reserve component which is fully integrated into the total SOF concept.

The command sets SOF priorities to meet the requirements of regional CINCs. It ensures that those priorities are supported by joint doctrine, planning, and training and that interoperability across the SOF community and compatibility with the equipment of all the services are maintained. To some, it may appear that SOCOM looks and acts like a fifth service. But it is not, and could not be, since its mission can only be accomplished with solid service support. Among other things, the services provide quality personnel, common equipment, base operating support, a good deal of the logistical sustainment, and critical core service skills training. This support allows SOCOM to focus on SOF-specific training and equipment as well as joint integration.

SOF provide an unprecedented range of capabilities including regionally oriented assets for operations other than war (OOTW), specially tailored JTFs for unique missions in peace and war, short-notice strategic strike forces for global deployment, and psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs (CA) capabilities for the entire range of military operations.

The SOCOM Experience

After eight years of carrying out our mission, we have derived a series of lessons, namely, regional orientation, readiness, programming and budget, RD&A, and command and control.

Regional Orientation. A post-Cold War security strategy that focuses on regional affairs, in war and OOTW, requires a force that operates effectively in a variety of environments. SOF has enhanced regional orientation and language proficiency in many units and reinforced the capability of others. Special Forces (SF) have always been language-qualified as well as regionally focused, and the regional orientation of PSYOP and CA units has been expanded. Selected members of the Navy's Sea, Air, Land teams (SEALs) receive language training for foreign internal defense (FID) missions, and Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) has formed a special operations squadron with appropriate language and regional training for FID missions. Because of the ability of SOF to work overseas, employment rates have steadily increased. In FY94 alone SOF operated in 139 nations, providing ambassadors and geographic CINCs with regionally-oriented support for country and regional development plans. In an average week some two to three thousand SOF operators are deployed on 150 missions in 60 to 70 countries.

Readiness. Another lesson is the importance of maintaining a consistent and high state of readiness. This is a function of concentrating on core missions, quality people, and a continuous, regionally-oriented, joint training program. It is a focused program that allows Army, Navy, and Air Force special operators to be ready to work together as a joint team, performing those tasks that they know and understand, as soon as they arrive in an objective area in peace, conflict, or war.

Programming and Budgeting. It is essential in fielding a preeminent force to have authority over programming and budget formulation and execution. The congressional mandate to manage a separate major force program (MFP 11) ensures visibility for SOF program requirements in DOD as well as Congress. Because of the growing utility of SOF in a world characterized by multiple regional challenges, SOF funding (about 1.2 percent of the defense budget) has remained

General Wayne A. Downing, USA, is Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command, and formerly headed U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

relatively stable which has allowed us to retain adequate forces. In fact, we have added two SF battalions oriented on the Caribbean and Africa to the active force since the end of the Cold War while, at the same time, eliminating two Reserve groups focused on Central Europe.

Research, Development, and Acquisition.

The fourth lesson is that RD&A authorities are essential to having the best equipped force in the world. MFP 11 facilitates the fielding of major systems that will take SOF into the 21st century with the most capable equipment available. Every C-130 platform has gotten an SOF-improved capability—that is, enhanced navigation, self defense, and communications. We are fielding the MC-130H Combat Talon II for long-range penetration which has increased cargo capacity and enhanced avionics. AC-130U Spectre gunships will offer SOF and conventional commanders a capability that can be strategically deployed to immediately attack more targets under more severe conditions than its predecessor. SF aviation is fielding the MH-60K and MH-47E, air-refuelable transport helicopters that provide superb short- and medium-range insertion capabilities under all weather conditions.

The Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) is replacing its Vietnam-era fleet of special boats. Modernization programs include a 10-meter rigid-hull inflatable boat and the Mark V special operations craft, a high-speed boat which can carry a platoon of (16) SEALs with an operational range of 500 nautical miles and a top speed in excess of 50 knots. Transportable in C-5 aircraft, the boats will dramatically enhance SEAL support. NAVSPECWARCOM has taken delivery of nine of thirteen planned naval ships that are particularly effective for coastal patrol and interdiction missions and transporting SEALs. The last major program under development is an advanced SEAL delivery system—a dry, submersible (or mini-) submarine—that will significantly increase the speed and range of clandestine insertion and extraction in hostile or denied waters.

Finally, SOCOM is implementing a command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C⁴I) master plan for restructuring architecture and the way in

which hardware will be procured and utilized to support the C⁴I system. In sum, we have revamped modernization based on a hard look at available funding and future needs which resulted in canceling 42 projects and reducing 24 others in scope. The approximately 200 programs that remain are affordable and will provide equipment essential to succeed in a dynamic, unpredictable environment. Just as important as major systems acquisitions is quick reaction procurement which gives us the ability to equip the force with commercially available, nondevelopmental items in a matter of weeks or days.

Command and Control. SOCOM has made notable advancements in command and control since 1987 that have focused on improving the integration of SOF and conventional forces. The history of special operations has repeatedly shown that SOF make their greatest contribution when they are fully integrated into the overall theater campaign plan, working in close cooperation with other joint forces. The most important improvement is the increased capabilities of theater Special Operations Commands (SOCs). These sub-unified commands provide regional CINCs with the headquarters to plan and control the employment of joint SOF in war and OOTW. Theater SOCs have formed joint special operations task forces several times, including for Promote Liberty in Panama, Desert Shield/Desert Storm in Southwest Asia, Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq, the humanitarian relief efforts in Rwanda, and, lately, multinational force training for Haiti. To support this growing role, SOCOM has manned theater SOCs at 100 percent of peacetime authorization and provided interim quick reaction communications. In addition, all theater SOC commanders are now flag officers.

A major step in integrating SOF effectively is the increased use of special operations coordination elements, special operations command and control elements within Army corps and conventional headquarters, special operations liaison elements with joint force air component commander headquarters, and naval special warfare task units with amphibious ready groups and,



AC-130U Spectre gunship.



Gunners feeding Bofors cannon

U.S. Air Force (Vic Owens)

U.S. Air Force (Charles Gohl)

New World Order

Probably the most profound challenge that we confront is dealing with two competing and different kinds of threat. One is a well-equipped nation-state, like Iraq, which requires high-tech capabilities that can quickly and precisely attack high-value targets and integrate coalition forces of diverse backgrounds, tasks which SOF accomplish extremely well.

But we also face threats which have no viable conventional military or clear national centers of gravity, as illustrated by Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. Here threats are subnational groups, disintegrating social structures, disease, and environmental degradation. Some classify them as fourth generation warfare. The forces that are needed to fight a nation-state are usually not appropriate to address these latter threats.

The task is to field sufficiently flexible, adaptable forces that can operate effectively against both kinds of threat. This is a substantial task and requires regionally oriented, culturally attuned, and highly ready forces with extensive experience. SOF provides outstanding capabilities to assist conventional commanders in meeting a challenge from another state or fourth generation warfare.

SOF can provide direct action, special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, PSYOP, and CA capabilities against other states to support a joint conventional campaign plan. Effectively integrated into that plan, special operations can act as a force multiplier for conventional forces by synchronizing coalition operations or providing coalition support teams to allied contingents. SOF language capabilities help communicate with other contingents, and their organic communications systems make SOF ideal links between multinational participants and coalition headquarters. SOF can also be used in an economy-of-force role by helping nations on the theater periphery to bolster their defenses, thus freeing U.S. conventional forces for the main effort.

more recently, carrier battle groups. All of these organizations have been used by conventional commands in several recent contingency operations to fully integrate SOF into operations.

Another step in integrating SOF into conventional operations is developing mission criteria. During the Gulf War, to provide guidance on planning and executing operations, Special Operations Command, Central (SOCCENT), developed mission criteria for proposed operations:

- ▼ Is this an appropriate SOF mission?
- ▼ Does it support the CINC's campaign plan?
- ▼ Is it operationally feasible?
- ▼ Are required resources available to execute?
- ▼ Does the expected outcome justify the risk?

These criteria were invaluable in mission planning and execution for the remainder of the war and are being incorporated into doctrine for SOF and conventional planners. In

addition, they provide a test for determining the feasibility of operations, ensure SOF are properly employed in theater or JTF campaign plans in peace and war, help to objectively evaluate missions, improve Joint Target

Coordination Board actions, and educate others to ensure realistic perceptions of SOF capabilities.

SOF provides outstanding capabilities in a challenge from another state or fourth generation warfare

The Tools

SOF is particularly useful in OOTW. FID, PSYOP, and CA can be critical components of a regional or country plan (crafted by the geographic CINC or ambassador for a specific country) designed to alleviate the problems that cause instability. Working with foreign governments, foreign militaries, and various civilian organizations, SOF can assist the host nation in creating programs that will prevent conflict. And if conflict does arise, SOF's knowledge of the area, its people, and its institutions, gained through frequent deployments to the locale, can provide valuable information to the geographic CINC as he devises his campaign plan.

Psychological Operations. New and dramatic challenges highlight the importance of one of our least known and least understood yet powerful assets—PSYOP. While it has been an element of military operations since World War II, PSYOP played a key role as a combat multiplier during Just Cause, and also gained prominence during Desert Storm. In the Gulf, PSYOP contributed to theater strategy by communicating the power of the U.S.-led coalition, strengthening economic and diplomatic sanctions, emphasizing Iraq's isolation, and conveying the destructive consequences of Saddam's refusal to comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions.

Some 29 million leaflets, radio broadcasts over 40 days, and 66 loudspeaker teams reinforced the effects of coalition combat power and helped

to encourage 70–80 thousand enemy soldiers to desert, defect, and surrender, thereby saving countless lives on both sides.

PSYOP has continued to be an important part of all major deployments. It paved the way for humanitarian assistance food drops in Bosnia and was a key contributor to the success of U.S.-led multinational efforts in Somalia. Leaflets and loudspeaker messages introduced U.S. forces to the country. Complemented by newspapers and radio these tools provided needed information and instruction, allayed fears, and underscored the humanitarian intent of the operation. But PSYOP staffs must be included in initial planning to tailor products to the goals of the joint commander and the target audience. PSYOP personnel must know the campaign

plan as well as the languages and cultures of each audience. Joint operations can be greatly enhanced when supported by carefully planned and executed PSYOP campaigns, a potential of the information age that is only beginning to be appreciated. PSYOP is a vital national asset that will only reach maturity when we channel its efforts through a national-level, interagency body to coordinate disparate elements of information warfare. A coherent theater information strategy and coordination mechanisms are needed as well.

Civil Affairs. Another facet of SOF that is gaining prominence is CA. A commander has a moral and legal obligation to protect civilians caught in a conflict. Often a root cause of conflict, especially in OOTW, is a failure of civil infrastructure to meet the needs of the population. In war, CA units can look after displaced persons and help to get the local infrastructure functioning again. In OOTW, they can help create a capable infrastructure or assist in times of natural disaster where the infrastructure has been overwhelmed. Some 97 percent of CA capabilities reside in the Reserve components. The skills needed to manage a country's infrastructure—sanitation, public transport, legal systems, and other public services—can only be maintained by people with similar civilian backgrounds. Highly skilled personnel from the Reserves have performed such jobs in Panama, the Persian Gulf, and Haiti.

Restore Democracy

The utility of SOF was evident in Haiti where they were integral to restoring democracy even before forces were committed. Four months earlier, extremely versatile new SOF patrol craft joined the fleet to enforce trade sanctions, capitalizing on their capabilities to operate near-shore and embark SEALs and rigid hull inflatable boat detachments. In five months of continuous operations the craft conducted 153 interdictions, 24 boardings, and multiple Dominican Republic patrols.

For two weeks before the introduction of troops, Air National Guard EC-130E Commando Solo PSYOP aircraft broadcast four-hour programs daily to reduce the volume of refugees leaving the country and create support for the return of President Aristide.

the utility of SOF was evident in Haiti even before forces were committed



SOF long-range reconnaissance patrol inside Iraq.

Some 900 hours of broadcasts were continued until ground broadcasts started. In the weeks prior to intervention, AFSOC aircraft delivered 8.4 million leaflets paving the way for the multinational forces and the return of Aristide.

The U.S. Atlantic Command SOC set up a training camp in Puerto Rico and coordinated support of international police monitors and multinational force contingents. Moreover, SOF had the lead in invasion planning. A number of units were involved, operating from the United States, a forward staging base, an aircraft carrier, and other facilities. They would have conducted forced entry operations to facilitate the follow-on introduction of conventional forces.

Once the island's occupation began, SF teams—fluent in French/Creole—were dispatched to restore civilian rule. Small teams operated in over 500 towns and villages, helping people set up police forces, courts, and government services to provide law and order and bolster democratic rule. Moreover, they resolved disputes, repaired utilities, prevented violence, offered medical aid, and conducted information campaigns. Other SF teams provided coalition support teams to foreign contingents in the multinational force and international police monitor force.

In addition, SOF personnel were instrumental in rebuilding the civil infrastructure. As was the case in the Persian Gulf, Reservists were called to active duty to offer expertise that exists only in Reserve CA units. To back up these lightly armed forces, other SOF assets, including AC-130 Spectre gunships, provided a rapid reaction force to persuade Haitian thugs not to run afoul of the peacekeepers. In total, nearly 400 mission hours were flown to support multinational forces;

many AC-130 crews and planes were from the Air Force Reserve. SOF had a significant quick reaction and show-of-force capability with ground-deployed Rangers, Air Force special operations aircraft, and a command and control headquarters. From the outset, SOF have been an integral part of our effort to restore democracy in Haiti, providing capabilities available nowhere else in the military.

As SOCOM moves into the 21st century, we will keep pace of the security environment. But in every phase of that evolution the focus will be on people. The most important ingredients of success are the personnel who we commit to diverse missions. We continually seek innovative ways to select the right people, train them, and develop them throughout their professional careers. The best piece of equipment will not accomplish the mission without the right person operating it, and the right person will find a way to succeed using almost anything at hand. All our programs assume that we will have the right people in the right place with the right training.

The range of capabilities, size, and strategic reach of SOF today are unmatched anywhere in the world and offer the Nation unparalleled capabilities to influence the international security environment. SOCOM is evolving in this environment. Instead of sticking to comfortable defense paradigms of the past, we are vigorously pursuing innovative ways to promote national security. We are developing equipment that will enable our most important asset, the operator, to perform in difficult exigencies. SOCOM has moved beyond the Cold War into a new environment in which we may not have all the answers but in which we possess unique and valuable capabilities.

JFQ

PSYOP and the Warfighting CINC

By JEFFREY B. JONES *and*
MICHAEL P. MATHEWS



Printing newspaper for Cubans at Guantanamo.

U.S. Navy (Wendy Hamme)

Summary

Psychological operations (PSYOP) is a multifaceted instrument of national power and influence that can deter or dissuade potential adversaries and reach a variety of audiences abroad in support of U.S. objectives. PSYOP can erode an enemy's will before the commitment of combat forces as well as facilitate humanitarian relief missions and the reconstitution of societies following conflicts. Economical yet very effective, it is extraordinarily adaptable in various regions and across diverse cultural and ethnic groups. To be efficacious in conflicts, PSYOP must be included in planning at the highest level from the outset; in peacetime, it merges with diplomacy, public affairs, and other tools of statecraft. Each service has organic capabilities to develop and furnish PSYOP products in support of joint force commanders. Much more than simply leaflets and loud-speakers, PSYOP in the final analysis can provide the warfighting CINC with an extremely imaginative and versatile force multiplier.

U.S. Navy (Wendy Hamme)

For Panamanian soldiers during Just Cause, U.S. psychological operations (PSYOP) was the voice of reason. In the Gulf War, PSYOP was millions of leaflets delivered by conventional means (artillery and aircraft) as well as more unusual ones (facsimile machines and bottles washed up on beaches). It meant 18 hours of daily Arabic broadcasts and 66 loudspeaker teams deployed at brigade level with coalition forces. For the Kurds in Provide Comfort, PSYOP was multifaceted media support of humanitarian relief. In Restore Hope, PSYOP was radio and press—known as *Rajo* (Hope)—that offered credible information to some 100,000 Somalis; and it was seven million leaflets that disseminated guidance on lessening anarchy and receiving aid. It was communication via tactical loudspeaker teams accompanying Army and Marine units as well as coalition forces. To U.S. diplomats in Central and South America and the Caribbean, PSYOP is an effective tool in drug interdiction and eradication, medical and engineer support, public information, disaster relief, the formation of professional armies, and promoting democracy. In former war-torn nations, it is an educational vehicle to publicize landmine awareness in schools and villages.

PSYOP therefore represents different things to disparate audiences, circumscribed only by the ingenuity of a commander. Implemented on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, it is more than leaflets and loudspeakers. It can be written, aural, and audiovisual, and take the form of action, advice, suggestion, common sense, and notably, truth. At a time of decreasing deployments, declining force structures, intermittent presence overseas, reduced security assistance, and growing demands on U.S. engagement, PSYOP is more important than ever. It is an asset in peace, war, and operations other than war

at a time of growing demands on U.S. engagement, PSYOP is more important than ever

(OOTW). Low-cost and high-impact, it is an instrument that can directly reach adversaries as well as other foreign audiences. In addition, PSYOP plays an indirect role by focusing the efforts of the U.S. Government—as well as allies, friends, and international organizations—on defusing crises, containing conflicts, or if deterrence fails, defeating an enemy in the shortest time with the least loss of life.

Capabilities

Before describing support to joint commanders, four kinds of PSYOP—namely, strategic, operational, tactical, and consolidation—must be defined. *Strategic* PSYOP includes international information activities to influence foreign attitudes which support U.S. objectives. It is carried out largely by civilian agencies but may utilize or be supported by military PSYOP assets. *Operational* PSYOP occurs prior to war, during war or OOTW, and at the end of operations in defined regions; it promotes campaign effectiveness. *Tactical* PSYOP is mounted in areas assigned to commanders in war or OOTW and supports tactical missions against opposing forces. *Consolidation* PSYOP is executed in foreign areas inhabited by enemy or hostile populations and occupied by U.S. forces, or in areas where U.S. forces are based.

The Armed Forces have capabilities to support national objectives with organic assets that can produce and disseminate PSYOP products. The Army has both active and Reserve component units to support training, conduct planning, and furnish advice. They are equipped and trained to execute strategic, operational, and tactical level PSYOP; support special operations; and carry out consolidation missions. Specifically trained units also support enemy prisoner of war missions. These units are assigned to the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), a major subordinate command of U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

Navy capabilities to produce audiovisual products are made available by Fleet Audiovisual Command, Pacific; Fleet Imagery Command, Atlantic; Fleet Combat Camera Groups; various film libraries; and Naval Imaging Command. A Naval Reserve audiovisual unit supports Atlantic Fleet. Fleet Tactical Readiness Group provides equipment and

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Joint Combat Camera Center (Raymond T. Conway)

UH-60 dropping leaflets during Cobra Gold '94.

technical maintenance support to conduct civil radio broadcasts, jam the AM frequency band, and respond to real-world missions and natural disasters. Navy assets have the ability to create documents, posters, articles, and other products. Capabilities ashore and afloat also can produce printed material.

The Marines have the capability to execute observable actions in support of psychological objectives through shore-based loudspeaker broadcasting, aerial leaflet dissemination, combat camera documentation, and use of motion picture projection and viewing equipment.

The Air Force has aircraft capable of supporting PSYOP across the operational continuum including several types specifically modified for this role. Air Force Special Operations Command is equipped with various aircraft for broadcasting and dropping leaflets. Four

EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard have PSYOP as a primary mission and can broadcast radio and television signals worldwide. An MC-130 Combat Talon force—based in the conti-

ental United States, Europe, and the Pacific—is equipped for leaflet operations. In addition to specialized assets, most aircraft can conduct PSYOP missions. For example, conventional airlift C-130s or rescue HC-130s can be configured to drop leaflets, and strike aircraft can dispense leaflets with M-129 leaflet bombs. Moreover, strike aircraft can conduct specific attack missions designed to dramatically reinforce messages presented by broadcasts, leaflets, etc.

PSYOP-related interagency support to commanders is normally accessed through CINC-approved strategic PSYOP or external information plans which are reviewed by unified command or JTF staffs. Through these documents the representatives of the National Command Authorities, Departments of State and Defense, U.S. Information Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, et

al. provide political and other forms of support for joint commanders.

Allocating Forces

Joint planning documents call for 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne), which is assigned to USACAPOC, to provide contingency support worldwide, normally through a PSYOP Task Force (POTF) under a joint commander. Based on the size of an operation, POTF headquarters are formed either from 4th Group headquarters for large operations or a regional PSYOP battalion headquarters for smaller ones. POTFs consist of regional, tactical, and dissemination assets, as well as enemy prisoner of war and Air Force and Navy capabilities as required. With the addition of assets from other services, such task forces are designated JPOTFs. Commanders of POTFs direct, coordinate, and deconflict theater or JTF PSYOP plans. Regional assets are retained at theater or JTF level while tactical assets may be attached to supported maneuver units as appropriate.

In peacetime, Reserve PSYOP units participate with active forces in integrated planning and training to prepare for regional conflicts or contingencies. In wartime, the Reserve component will mobilize and deploy the necessary forces to augment the active POTF and continue peacetime PSYOP programs in the absence of active forces. The Reserve will also task organize, mobilize, and deploy a POTF should a second regional contingency arise.

With recent changes in force structure and mission realignment, Reserve PSYOP groups are no longer aligned with or responsible for supporting specific theaters. Instead, 4th Group—the only active component group—is responsible for coordinating both active and Reserve support to CINCs with planning in peacetime, contingency operations, and war. To facilitate this effort there are forward detachments with three unified commands and Combined Forces Command (CFC) in Korea which provide J-3s with access to PSYOP expertise and capabilities.

Command and Control

Joint and service doctrine incorporates major PSYOP lessons from Panama and the Persian Gulf War and has been validated during recent contingency operations. The key

forward detachments with unified commands provide J-3s with PSYOP expertise and capabilities

principle is that all planning must be centralized at the highest levels because of the strategic and operational role of PSYOP to CINCs. POTFs work for CINCs and JTFs are formed for joint commanders through J-3s. POTFs are usually separate JTF components, like service and special operations, and do not come under the command and control of special operations forces (SOF) component commanders (unless the Joint Special Operations Task Force commander is senior).

PSYOP is critical in command and control warfare which is the integrated use of operations security, military deception, PSYOP, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, supported by intelligence, to influence, degrade, destroy, or deny information to adversary command and control capabilities and to protect friendly command and control against such actions. The employment of these separate disciplines is designed to cause an enemy to react in a manner deemed advantageous to achieve U.S. objectives. Integrating PSYOP with C²W planning from the outset will facilitate coordination with other components and ensure effectiveness by eliminating inconsistencies among the various elements. PSYOP is also the bridge to public diplomacy.

Taken together, direct PSYOP support to warfighting CINCs and JTF commanders and its integral relation to C²W may warrant serious consideration for inclusion as part of C² Battlefield Operating Systems rather than a subset of fire support. Its increased importance along with other conduits may also justify the creation of new information systems.

Campaign Planning

Driven by national and theater objectives as well as imperatives from a thorough mission analysis, a PSYOP campaign involves conducting programs, integrated with a CINC's operational plan, to achieve psychological objectives in support of the CINC's campaign objectives. In sum, it is sequencing and executing myriad activities designed to get measurable responses from specific target audiences. The desired result of the campaign's many thousands of distinct responses is the creation of conditions that will facilitate mission accomplishment for a supported commander.

In peacetime and OOTW, PSYOP campaigns that support CINCs take the form of an overt peacetime PSYOP program (P³). CINCs plan and conduct P³ to support objectives, interests, and theater plans in coordination with chiefs of mission. Programs are proposed by CINCs through CJCS who, in turn, refers them to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict for review and approval.

During contingencies, a PSYOP concept plan which is broad in scope is forwarded from the CINC to the Joint Staff for approval of overarching themes, objectives, and guidance, but not products. While the time required to get approval during Desert Shield was literally months, recent operations such as Restore Hope saw approval time reduced to a few days. Once the concept plan is approved, a more detailed theater campaign plan is developed along with supporting appendices. This plan and the resulting programs and products are approved by the joint commander and apply throughout the area of operations.

From Peace to War

To assist in day-to-day peacetime planning, each unified command (save for EUCOM) has permanently assigned PSYOP staff officers. As previously mentioned, 4th PSYOP Group also has forward support detachments at EUCOM, SOUTHCOM, PACOM, and CFC Korea headquarters. In coordination with regionally-oriented tactical battalions that routinely deploy to the theater, these 4th Group personnel are responsible for ensuring the currency of OPLANs and CONPLANS, facilitating the conduct of peacetime PSYOP programs, and coordinating exercise and crisis response support. Taking advantage of the Army's Redtrain program as well as other live environment training opportunities, those soldiers have also served with U.S. country teams in more than thirty countries in recent years. They have made unique contributions to achieving theater objectives under the guidance and direction of ambassadors, defense attachés, and officials. Finally, through a DIA-sponsored and CINCSOC-managed PSYOP studies program, CINCs and interagency users can access PSYOP expertise for peacetime and contingency-related analyses of situations in selected countries or regions.

While P³s are conducted with varying levels of support, there is a lack of a multifaceted, coordinated theater information strategy for unified commands to effectively leverage all available information assets. Theater strategies can be developed together with the CINC's political advisor, U.S. Information Service representative, and strategy and plans, intelligence, public affairs, staff judge advocate, and PSYOP officers. Information strategy must concentrate on proactive versus reactive efforts to: reduce sources of conflict; assist nations in the transition to democracy; increase international dialogue and understanding; build political,

PSYOP can assist in dissuading a potential adversary from taking actions inimical to the national interest

economic, military, medical, commercial, social, and educational bridges; limit the motivation and perceived legitimacy of those who possess weapons of mass destruction; emphasize the role of the military in a democracy; and highlight the constructive domestic uses of the military. The goals for theaters include information strategies, continuous coordinating mechanisms, and information crisis action teams to help defuse, contain, mitigate, or resolve unanticipated crises.

Planned and broadly implemented at the strategic level, PSYOP can assist in deterring or dissuading a potential adversary from taking actions inimical to national interests.

PSYOP officers assigned to the Joint Staff bridge interagency public diplomacy efforts as well as special efforts by other governmental agencies. PSYOP civilian and military planners can offer expertise and ensure coordination and synergy. As previously mentioned, through theater-approved strategic PSYOP or external information plans, CINCs can provide input that is region-specific to the national level. PSYOP Assessment Teams (POATs) can also deploy to unified commands to help develop such plans.

During an initial projection of combat power—by land, sea, or air—PSYOP is an important tool. Driven by national level guidance, integrated early in the planning process, augmented by the basis of a request from a CINC or JTF commander to JCS or SOCOM, and integrated with C²W, especially in support of deception planning and conditioning, PSYOP can magnify existing combat power, overcome potential vulnerabilities, and convey U.S. intentions.

Recent operations reveal that the most effective way to ensure the availability and adequate preparation of PSYOP assets occurs when joint commanders request activation of POTFs under their OPCON. This allows for rapid deployment and, if necessary, incremental augmentation of a POAT that is in theater. Beginning PSYOP and information preparation of the battlefield early is essential. Considerable work is required before additional combat power arrives. Prepositioning assets—up front in the time-phased force and deployment data—is critical to conducting PSYOP immediately on receipt of an execute order. The Commando Solo aircraft of the Air Force 193^d Special Operations Group are vital to joint commanders, enabling them to broadcast TV as well as AM, FM, and SW radio messages. Ground-based broadcast assets can augment these efforts on arrival. When authorized, a variety of leaflets is used, with themes from dissuasion and deadlines to safe conduct passes, coalition superiority, and surrender appeals. Tailored leaflets also significantly enhance the vulnerability of enemy concentrations. As the size of the commitment increases, additional tactical forces (including Reserve units) must be added to a POTF. In every instance, PSYOP-trained or supporting coalition expertise and forces are essential to maximize the overall impact.



U.S. Navy (Terry Mitchell)

Mobile loudspeakers in Somali market.

Combat Operations

During combat operations, PSYOP is a proven force multiplier, synchronized with land, sea, air, and special operations. Controlled through command channels and integrated by J-3, it magnifies U.S. and coalition combat power, especially in support of C²W, and degrades enemy combat power by persuading air defense units not to engage, air forces not to fly, and ground forces not to use their weapons—but instead to desert, defect, or surrender. In addition, PSYOP encourages civilians to escape advancing coalition forces (thereby clogging major supply routes). In conjunction with military police and interrogators, PSYOP specialists exploit prisoners of war, using volunteers to record radio and loudspeaker appeals to their compatriots.

As the tactical situation changes, PSYOP assets at corps and division level may need to be relocated. Such decisions are handled via command, not PSYOP channels. Corps-size echelons have PSYOP support elements to conduct planning and monitor subordinate tactical units.

PSYOP guidance and specified tasks pass through G3/S3 channels as part of the plans and orders process. Divisions have PSYOP support elements that coordinate with POTFs to meet the requirements of commanders. Since commanders normally will not have product approval authority, requests for products must be submitted to POTFs for approval by CINCs or JTF commanders. Brigades have PSYOP support elements consisting of three- to four-man headquarters and three to five tactical loudspeaker teams with three personnel each.

Coalition success, significant enemy loss or miscue, and indications of allied determination can be stressed by local, regional, and international PSYOP, public diplomacy, and public affairs. This can accelerate the collapse of an enemy with minimum collateral damage and loss of life.

During combat operations, PSYOP planners must prepare for what happens after hostilities end. Long-term U.S. interests are not well served if we do not think through the requirements and are ill-prepared to restore stability. A good plan developed beforehand can ensure that a long-term military

presence is not needed and that there are coalition partners available to help bear the burden. Promote Liberty in Panama, Task Force Freedom in Kuwait, the first year of Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq, and JTF-Southwest Asia all provide innovative illustrations of PSYOP in support of post-combat endeavors.

Based on experience over the last few years, what lessons can joint commanders draw? First, while the number of PSYOP personnel permanently deployed in various theaters is low, they provide access to a range of capabilities and expertise in peacetime, crisis, and war. They must be actively leveraged. Second, DOD-mandated peacetime PSYOP programs, which offer imaginative ways to further theater and national objectives, must be robust. Third, strategic PSYOP—engaged in concert with statecraft, public diplomacy, public affairs, and other activities—can defuse, deter, and contain conflict, encourage allied contributions, and influence target audiences both inside and outside a given area of conflict. The coordination of informational strategy results in synergy of the highest order. Next, early integration of PSYOP in the planning process and early deployment are critical. Prior to the arrival of combat forces, PSYOP assets can direct influential information at audiences in a zone of conflict. If the forces arrive late, they are of little value to a commander on the ground. Fifth, PSYOP is a force multiplier that yields a high return for a small investment. Always joint, combined, and multiagency, PSYOP supports conventional, unconventional, and coalition forces. Last, PSYOP forms an integral part of military operations and, as such, is the inherent responsibility of every commander. In sum, PSYOP is a proven combat multiplier and peacetime contributor to U.S. national security strategy.

JFQ

early integration of PSYOP in the planning process and early deployment are critical

The insets (clockwise, from top) are reproductions of *Field Hospital in Normandy* by Milton Marx (U.S. Air Force Art Collection); *The Fighting Hornet* by Tom Lea (The Life Collection of World War II Art/U.S. Army Center of Military History); *Barrage Balloon* by Alexander Brook (U.S. Army Center of Military History); and *We Move Again* (Anzio, 1944) by Edward A. Reep (U.S. Army Center of Military History).



COMMEMORATING

WORLD WAR II

A Final Reprise



The insets (clockwise, from top left) are *Clear the Deck* by Tom Lea (The *Life* Collection of World War II Art/U.S. Army Center of Military History); *P-38 Diving on an Me 109* by C. Ross Greening (U.S. Air Force Art Collection); *A Red Cross Leave Center in Australia* by Robert H. Laessig (U.S. Air Force Art Collection); and *Barbershop, Guadalcanal* (1944) by Aaron Bohrod (The *Life* Collection of World War II Art/U.S. Army Center of Military History). The background crossover reproduction is entitled *Objective of the 88th Division* (Italy, 1944) by Frank D. Duncan (U.S. Army Center of Military History).



*The Battle for Fox
Green Beach*
by Dwight C. Shepler.

U.S. Navy

and the Impact of the War

By DAVID A. ARMSTRONG

As General Colin L. Powell noted two years ago in introducing the inaugural issue of *JFQ*, the experience of World War II provided a foundation for jointness. Operations during the war clearly and repeatedly demonstrated the advantages of jointness and the penalties for failing to achieve it. At war's end, the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported jointness in principle.¹ The progress of jointness was slow, however. A review of JCS action in creating a post-war system of unified commands suggests that the wartime experience left an ambiguous legacy for the development of jointness.

Unified command of U.S. forces in Europe began with the establishment in June 1942 of the European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA), a joint command in which an Army officer exercised planning and operational control of assigned naval forces. Directed to cooperate with the British, ETOUSA commander Major General

Dwight D. Eisenhower was, however, to maintain U.S. forces as "a separate and distinct component of the combined forces." With a task that called for Army leadership, the prospect of American participation in coalition operations led to early agreement by the War and Navy Departments to establish a joint command in Europe.²

Jointness was strongest in face of the enemy or when necessitated by coalition operations. But even in war, it fell prey to inter-service rivalries and other concerns. In the Pacific, the lack of strong allied forces diminished coalition pressures to achieve unified command. Coupled with the special problems posed by the presence of General Douglas MacArthur, Army and Navy reluctance to trust their forces to the command of officers of another service led to separate theater commands. The Army promoted unity of

command by forces or functions while the Navy advocated achieving it geographically. While joint operations were routine in the Pacific, command of the entire theater had not been unified at the war's end.³

Dissatisfied by the separate command of Army and Navy forces in the Pacific, the Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, called in 1946 for creating a single command for the entire Pacific less Japan, China, Korea, and the coastal areas of Central and South America. Based on Oahu and supported by a joint staff, the commander would "exercise unity of command" of all U.S. forces in the theater. The Army and Army Air Forces countered the Nimitz initiative with a proposal to organize command based on the assignment of forces. The heart of the problem lay in establishing an organization that centralized control of forces without impinging on what the services considered basic prerogatives in the command of their respective forces.⁴

With joint planners split along service lines, JCS deferred action for almost six months. Finally, the Army Chief of Staff, General of the Army Eisenhower, revived the issue with a paper outlining command arrangements worldwide. That proposal was greeted by one from the Navy, and subsequent staff deliberations were complicated when the question of control over strategic air forces was raised by General Carl A. Spaatz, the Commander of Army Air Forces. In December, having seen nine staff papers on unified command in less than three months, General Eisenhower sought a compromise. Admiral Nimitz was similarly inclined. Including provisions that dealt with problems posed by the requirements of Far East Command under General of the Army MacArthur and of strategic air forces, the plan that emerged established a worldwide system for the unified command of U.S. forces under JCS control.



Approved by the President on December 14, 1946, the "Outline Command Plan" was the first unified command plan, a basic document of the joint system. Publication of the plan did not, however, resolve the issue of the organization of unified commands. The debate over organizing by geographic area versus forces and functions was to surface repeatedly in the joint arena during the decades of the Cold War.⁵

As the Chairman observes in this issue, the lessons of World War II are boundless. In the medley of original contributions that make up this JFQ Forum, various aspects of that conflict are presented as tribute to the soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen who fought as a team to lay the foundations of joint and combined warfare.

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NOTES

¹ See, for example, statements by Ernest J. King and Henry H. Arnold on the inside back cover of Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1991).

² Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, United States Army in World War II* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1953), pp. 196-97. Subsequent developments are covered in Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, United States Army in World War II* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1959), pp. 102-05, 270-74.

³ Louis Morton, *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, United States Army in World War II* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1962), pp. 361-63; Ronald H. Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun* (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), pp. xiii-xv, 540-43; Matloff, *Strategic Planning, 1943-1944*, pp. 525-26, 536; Grace Person Hayes, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II, The War Against Japan* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982), pp. 93-96, 476-79, 563-66, 586-95.

⁴ James F. Schnabel et al., *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1945-1947* (Washington: Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1979), pp. 171-77.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 177-86. The original commands were the Far East, Pacific, Alaskan, Northeast, Atlantic Fleet, Caribbean, and European. JCS also recognized the Strategic Air Command (SAC), an Army Air Forces command made up of units normally based in the United States and under a commander responsible to JCS. SAC was the first example of what later were known as specified commands. Control of the Bonin and the Marianas Islands was split with MacArthur controlling forces and local facilities, but having no responsibility for military or civil government or naval administration and logistics. The Cold War debate over unified and specified commands will be treated in *The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1993* (Washington: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint History Office, February 1995).

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London Underground
by Floyd Davis.

The Life Collection of World War II Art, U.S. Army Center of Military History

Fighting with Allies

The Debate Fifty Years On

By RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY

How epoch-making an event was World War II? In particular, fifty years after the close of that conflict—and several years after the end of the Cold War—can we still comprehend the great wartime strategic and operational debates between the principal Western Allies, the United States and Great Britain, and the ponderous import imputed to them, both at the time and in controversies among historians in the intervening decades?

After all, from Chester Wilmot's formative analysis of inter-allied controversy in his 1952 *The Struggle for Europe* onward,¹ perceptions of the relative wisdom or unwisdom of American versus British strategic and operational designs hinged upon the question of which took better into account the post-war Soviet threat to the security of democratic interests in Europe, and which was better calculated to counter that threat. Yet now the peril from the East has largely evaporated, and the rapid collapse of the Soviet

how much did it matter whether it was the Americans or the British who more accurately foresaw the Cold War

Union in 1991 suggests that the substance of the peril was never so great as the Kremlin's bristling facade led us to fear. So how much did it matter whether it was the Americans or the British who during the hot war of 1939–45 more accurately foresaw the Cold War?

Wilmot set the terms for historical analysis of the Anglo-American strategic and operational debates. According to his version of the war in Europe, the United States had to provide most of the muscle for the defeat of Germany, but the British provided most of the experienced judgment in international affairs that realized the desirability of tailoring the conduct of the war not to military expediency alone but to considerations of the post-war balance of power. Unfortunately for the interests of the West, the diplomatically and strategically sophisticated British—especially Prime Minister Winston Churchill—proved unable to overcome the naive insistence of the Americans—in particular, President Franklin Roosevelt—on military strategy and operations which aimed at head-on assault of the enemy's Fortress Europe. The dual unhappy consequences of this situation were that the absence of Allied military subtlety probably prolonged the war, and that the inflexible focus on northwest Europe led to the sacrifice of opportunities to thwart Soviet expansionism elsewhere on the continent. Therefore, the Iron Curtain clanked down deep in central Europe.

An American rebuttal soon took shape, especially in two volumes published in the official *United States Army in World War II* series, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942* by Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, and *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944* by Maurice Matloff.² Primarily devoted to strategy as their titles indicate, but with consideration of operational decisions as well, both volumes argued that the American insistence on a direct strategy of the earliest possible cross-Channel assault



Sanctuary, Luxembourg
by Aaron Bohrod.

The Life Collection of World War II Art, U.S. Army Center of Military History

against Germany was not merely an expression of an American military tradition based on large-scale wealth and power and therefore favoring head-on confrontation as the most expeditious way to swift victory. The rebuttal indicated also that U.S. strategists, including military leaders, were not politically naive, but rather were thoroughly aware of the political implications of military actions. For that reason the Americans regarded a prompt Allied return to northern Europe as the best way of curbing Soviet expansion in the most valuable area of Europe, the industrial, urban northwest. In contrast, the British preference for peripheral nibbling at the German empire, especially in the Mediterranean, would have taken Anglo-American forces into military and political dead ends.

The lines of historical controversy over American direct versus British peripheral strategy and operations having become set early in the post-war years, the terms of the controversy became altered subsequently only in detail. Another official historian, James M. Leighton, argued that the wartime divisions between the Western Allies were not so wide as the historians made them seem and that greater emphasis should be placed on the essential and remarkable unity

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*P-51 Fighter Strip
Control Tower
(Normandy, 1944) by
Ogden Pleissner.*



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**the commemorations
of D-Day last year found
the lines of historical
controversy remarkably
unchanged**

of the Anglo-American alliance;³ but that view did not deter a continuing focus on wartime disputes rather than agreements, partly no doubt because disputes are more interesting, but mainly because the depths of the strategic and operational disagreements were profound in spite of all that bound the Allies together. The controversy did not always follow national alignments. A British historian, Michael Howard, was one of the first to argue that


the strategies of both allies had to be forced by wartime pressures into pursuit of what was expedient and possible, an argument that undermined the idea of a consistent Churchillian world view as the foundation of British strategy.⁴ Such vicissitudes aside, however, the commemorations of D-Day last year found the lines of historical controversy remarkably unchanged.⁵


A corollary to the disputes over the strategy of the cross-Channel invasion has boiled up over the operational issues of the campaign in northwest Europe following June 6, 1944. Here the British contention has been that the Americans' unsubtle,

head-on assault approach to warmaking persisted after the Overlord invasion at the insistence of the American Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, General Dwight Eisenhower on a broad-front offensive from France into the Low Countries and Germany. The British alternative, a narrow thrust into Germany proposed by General Sir Bernard Montgomery, would allegedly not only have ended the war earlier, but by doing so would have limited the westward extension of Soviet power and thereby strengthened the post-war geopolitical position of the West. Thus Chester Wilmot argued on behalf of superior British operational wisdom in his early post-war book, and again he set the terms of an enduring controversy.⁶ (Of course there is an internal contradiction in the British arguments. If it was so vital to conduct the European campaign after the cross-Channel invasion with the utmost dispatch, why was it not similarly important to launch the invasion with dispatch in the first place?)

Once again the American rebuttal has taken the form of arguments that, in spite of British experience, it was British soldiers at

*Queen Elizabeth
Arriving (The Clyde,
Scotland, 1944)* by
Byron Thomas.





*Tossing the Cans—
Atlantic Patrol (1941)*
by Tom Lea.

The Life Collection of World War II Art, U.S. Army Center of Military History

understand a sound operational plan bespoke an extreme of ingratitude that was unhappily all too characteristic of the British commander. To permit Montgomery to attempt Operation Market Garden, the airborne-plus-overland drive to the Rhine bridges at Arnhem in the Netherlands launched on September 17, Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force allotted to Montgomery's 21 Army Group the lion's share of Allied logistical support and the theater's only reserve force, the First Allied Airborne Army. The only support that

the time and British historians later who have been unrealistic in both military and policy assessments. Montgomery's proposals for a narrow-thrust invasion of Germany in the autumn of 1944 have been subjected to logistical analysis and found impractical in terms of Allied capabilities to support them.⁷ The narrow thrust, moreover, would not have been all that narrow, or it would have had no chance of wielding enough force to win. Montgomery had contemplated an offensive by some forty divisions, employing the U.S. First and Ninth Armies as well as the British Second and the Canadian First.⁸ With the great Belgian port of Antwerp not open

to Allied shipping until November 28—because of Montgomery's neglect in clearing passage to it from the North Sea after troops of British 30 Corps had entered it on September 4—

supplies still had to reach the front largely from Normandy, and the ability to sustain a forty-division punch into Germany much beyond the Rhine was simply nonexistent until Antwerp had been in full utility at least for several weeks.⁹

More than that, Eisenhower offered Montgomery every reasonable opportunity to execute his narrow-thrust design, and Montgomery's carping that Eisenhower did not and that the Supreme Commander failed to

Eisenhower did not proffer was a complete curtailment of fuel to the armies on the Allies' southern flank, the Third U.S. and, as Sixth Army Group arrived from southern France, the Seventh U.S. and First French. Montgomery proposed that to fully support a narrow-thrust offensive, the southern armies should be grounded, at least as far as support other than from southern French ports was concerned. To have done so would have virtually paralyzed the Third Army under Lieutenant General George Patton just as the enemy was about to launch a new concentration of Panzer forces to precipitate the largest-scale tank battles in the West thus far, the counterattacks in Lorraine on September 19–29. The Germans initiated these counterstrokes because they believed that the aggressive Patton, not Montgomery, posed the most severe threat. If Patton had been unable to maneuver in riposte, the level of the ensuing disaster would have been incalculable. Eisenhower had provided the single-thrust design all the support it was safe to give. To have followed Montgomery's complete prescription would have been folly.¹⁰

In any event it is hard to imagine how a more rapid Western push into Germany in the autumn of 1944 could have substantially altered the post-war balance between East and West. The boundaries of the occupation zones in Germany had been drawn in early 1944,

it is hard to imagine how a more rapid push could have substantially altered the post-war balance

when the Western armies had yet to land in northern Europe. The zonal boundaries had therefore anticipated that the Red Army would march deep into central Europe before the war ended. Even with the lateness of the cross-Channel invasion, and in spite of the failure to defeat Germany in autumn 1944 with a narrow thrust or by other means, the American forces eventually penetrated far into the prospective Soviet occupation zone. U.S. troops withdrew from much of Saxony and Thuringe after the war (two-fifths of what was to be the Soviet zone) to the zonal boundaries. A yet deeper penetration of the Soviet zone would have led to the same result.

The zonal boundaries drawn in February 1944 had placed Berlin inside the Soviet zone, although the German capital was to be occupied by the Allied powers, each with its miniature zone corresponding to a larger zone within the country. Roosevelt drew up his own occupation plan in 1943, proposing a large American zone in the northwest, the most strategically and economically important part of Germany, rather than in the southwest, to which the Americans were eventually relegated largely because their forces entered Germany on the right flank, south of the British. But in Roosevelt's plan, the American sector of Germany would have met the Soviet sector at Berlin, reaching the city directly. The final zonal boundaries were drawn principally by the British and the Soviets with American acquiescence when Roosevelt had grown sick and distracted. After these boundaries placed Berlin inside the Soviet zone, even the prospect of a Western capture of Berlin became relatively unimportant.¹¹

The British would have liked to have entered the German capital first as a final stimulus to their waning prestige, although they had had much to do with placing the city outside the Western zonal boundaries. The Ninth U.S. Army would have enjoyed the distinction of taking Berlin since it nearly came within its grasp. But such visions assumed that the Germans would go on fighting the Red Army much more seriously than they resisted the Western Allies in the last days of the war even with their capital as the prize, which was not necessarily so. Eisenhower decided instead that Berlin was not

worth the risk of high casualties if it could not be permanently retained. He thought it was worth more to placate the evident misconceptions and distrust of the Soviets and thus to do his part to head off a cold war following the hot war. The futility of such a hope as demonstrated by subsequent developments does not make his decision a bad one under the circumstances.¹²

Altogether, then, there is no good reason to believe that the conduct of the campaign from Normandy to the Elbe made any significant difference in the post-war balance of power between the Soviet Union and the West. No variants on Eisenhower's strategy and operations could have made the post-war Western position appreciably stronger or the Soviet position much weaker. In any event, Eisenhower gave the British and particularly Montgomery every reasonable opportunity to test their prescriptions for a more rapid Western advance.

But did the end of the Cold War not impose on all these grand old controversies about American versus British strategic and operational designs the stale flavor of antiquarianism, of irrelevance to the world of the 1990s? What did it matter how much of Europe the Soviet Union came to dominate by 1945 when the Soviet system of Eastern European satellites was to collapse in 1989 and the Soviet Union itself was to perish two years later?

It mattered a great deal for almost half a century, and it created a dangerous world in which the outcome now so gratifying to the West was not assured. Whatever circumstances aggravated bad feeling between the communist bloc and the West from 1945 to 1991 enhanced the possibility of nuclear war. That such a war did not occur by no means signifies that the peril was never real. The delay of two-and-a-half years between the U.S. entry into World War II in December 1941 and the ultimate execution of the central design of American strategy, the cross-Channel invasion, as late as June 1944 did more than any other aspect of the war to exacerbate Soviet suspicions of the West and thus assured there would be a cold war with its corollary danger of nuclear conflict. If a more prompt cross-Channel invasion could merely have mitigated Soviet distrust of the West, rather than allaying it altogether, such



Four Allied Soldiers
by Savo Radulovic.

U.S. Army Center of Military History

diluting the arrogance with which the Soviets came to regard themselves as the main actors in the defeat of Germany. That result should have also diluted the Soviet denigration of Western military prowess that consistently tempted Moscow toward adventurism during the Cold War years.

Our understanding of the truth about the respective merits of American and British policy, strategy, and military operations during the war matters because the architects of the British version of history persuaded many American soldiers and policymakers to accept their interpretation which injured the self-confidence of U.S. leaders during the Cold War and later. Americans struggled during the Cold War under the burden of believing that lack of wisdom in their hot war strategy and operations had much to do with creating Cold War predicaments. Of course they carried their Cold War campaigns to a successful conclusion. But a surer confidence that American decisions had rested on a foundation of sound and wise policy, strategy, and operational art during the war might have generated an assertiveness and optimism that could have made U.S. post-war policies even more successful and conceivably have brought the Cold War to an earlier end.

The truth about policy, strategy, and operations in World War II is that U.S. military and political leaders conducted the war with a soundness and maturity of judgment that were enviable, admirable, and in light of the genuine limitations of American experience, extraordinary. Rarely in history have a nation's military chiefs who began a war been so numerous in remaining in charge until the conclusion, with so few setbacks and so consistent a pattern of success along the way. Rarely have a nation's policymakers kept their eyes so firmly fixed on the appropriate objects of warfare and so ably adjusted military strategy to serve all policy objectives: the correct intention to defeat the Axis powers so completely and leave them so utterly malleable in Allied hands that there could be a virtual guarantee that neither Germany nor Japan could threaten the security of the world again; the persistent pursuit of partnerships and agreements that would lead to a post-war era conducive to U.S. and

a more likely scenario would still have reduced peril in the post-1945 world in proportion to the degree to which suspicion was mitigated.

And if nothing at all the West could have done during the war could have substantially affected post-war

**understanding the merits of
American and British policy,
strategy, and operations
during the war matters**

Soviet attitudes because paranoia was too deeply engrained in both Russian and Soviet history, then it yet remains true that an earlier cross-Channel invasion

should have carried the Western armies deeper into Europe by V-E Day. They most likely would have reached Berlin, thus strengthening the West in the post-war political balance and, perhaps most important,

global economic prosperity and to reasonable safety for political democracy; the rejection whenever America's allies permitted of military strategies of mere short-run expedience that would not contribute to the Nation's long-term interest.

Fifty years on it is long past time for us to recognize the wisdom of American policy-making, strategic planning, and operational direction during World War II, and to draw from that acknowledgment a self-confident assertiveness to fit U.S. leadership responsibilities in the post-Cold War world. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ Chester Wilmot, *The Struggle for Europe* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952). His influence is critiqued in Maurice Matloff, "Wilmot Revisited: Myth and Reality in Anglo-American Strategy for the Second Front," in Theodore A. Wilson, editor, *D-Day 1944* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), pp. 3–23, 340–41. Also bringing the historiography up to date in the same volume are Alex Danchev, "Biffing: The Saga of the Second Front," pp. 24–41, 341–45, and Gerhard L. Weinberg, "D-Day: Analysis of Costs and Benefits," pp. 317–18, 389–90.

² Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942. United States in World War II* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953); and Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944, United States Army in World War II* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959).

³ This view is offered by Kent Roberts Greenfield in *American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963), especially "Elements of Coalition Strategy," pp. 3–23, 122–24; and "American and British Strategy: How Much Did They Differ?" pp. 24–48, 124–26. Also James M. Leighton, "Overlord Revisited: An Interpretation of American Strategy in the European War, 1942–1944," *The American Historical Review*, vol. 67, no. 4 (July 1963), pp. 919–37. Leighton also helps inform Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940–1943, United States in World War II* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955), and Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943–1945, United States Army in World War II* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1968).

⁴ Michael Howard, *The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War* (New York, Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968).

⁵ In addition to the works cited in note 2, see the overviews of the historiography of the war's strategy (though not written specifically for the 50th anniversary observances) in David Reynolds et al., editors, *Allies at War: The Soviet, American, and British Experience, 1939–1945* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), particularly Alex Danchev, "Great Britain: The Indirect Strategy," pp. 1–26, and Mark A. Stoler, "The United States: The Global Strategy," pp. 55–78.

⁶ See note 1. On the impact of operational decisions on the post-war world, many of the same arguments advanced by Wilmot are put forth by Hubert Essame in *The Battle for Germany* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969).

⁷ The best succinct analysis is found in Martin van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 216–30. See also Roland G. Ruppenthal, *Logistical Support of the Armies. vol. 2, Logistical Limitations as the Arbiter of Tactical Planning. United States Army in World War II* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953–59), pp. 3–21.

⁸ Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G.* (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1958), pp. 239–42; Wilmot, *Struggle for Europe*, pp. 489–90, 528–31, 533–36; Charles B. MacDonald, *The Siegfried Line Campaign. The European Theater of Operations. United States Army in World War II* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1963), pp. 8–10.

⁹ For the entry into Antwerp by the 11th Armoured Division, see Wilmot, *Struggle for Europe*, p. 474; the date is confirmed by Ruppenthal in *Logistical Support*, vol. 2, p. 48, and MacDonald in *Siegfried Line Campaign*, p. 207. For the opening of the port, see *ibid.*, p. 229; Ruppenthal, *Logistical Support*, vol. 2, p. 110. For its importance, *ibid.*, pp. 13–14, 109–16.

¹⁰ For Eisenhower's support to Montgomery and Market Garden, see Ruppenthal, *Logistical Support*, vol. 2, pp. 8–15, and MacDonald, *Siegfried Line Campaign*, pp. 8–10, 119–23, 127–29. For the battles in Lorraine, see Hugh M. Cole, *The Lorraine Campaign. The European Theater of Operations. United States Army in World War II* (Washington: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1950), "The German Counterattack in the XII Corps Sector (19 September–1 October)," pp. 209–55.

¹¹ On occupation zones see Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World at War: A Global History of World War II* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 793–95, 804, 829–30; Cornelius Ryan, *The Last Battle* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), pp. 141–61; and on Roosevelt's plan, Weinberg, *A World at Arms*, pp. 794, 829–30; Ryan, *Last Battle*, pp. 141, 145–50, 154–61. For the withdrawal from the Soviet zone, see Weinberg, *A World at Arms*, p. 830.

¹² On Montgomery's hopes and plans to take Berlin, see Ryan, *Last Battle*, pp. 135–36, 139–40, 165, 199–202, 206–07; Charles B. MacDonald, *The Last Offensive. The European Theater of Operations. United States Army in World War II* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1973), pp. 341–42, 480; on Eisenhower's attitude toward Berlin, *ibid.*, pp. 339–42, 379, 384, 387, 395, 399, 405–06, 480, and Weinberg, *A World at Arms*, pp. 813–14.

A War That Was Not Left to the Generals

By ELIOT A. COHEN

There were two men at the top who really fought out and finally agreed on the major moves that led to victory. They were Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. They really ran the war . . . we were just artisans building definite patterns of strategy from the rough blueprints handed to us by our respective Commanders in Chief.

—William D. Leahy

Churchill would subject his generals to a merciless cross-questioning about military minutiae

It was more than a pious deference to senior politicians that led Admiral Leahy to give the credit for war leadership to Franklin D. Roosevelt and his great colleague, Winston Churchill. Rather, the sober truth was that Roosevelt, and to an even greater measure Churchill, exercised a directive, forceful control of a kind that most members of the defense establishment today would find unusual—and perhaps improper. They prodded subordinates, questioned their orders, and on occasion drove them into paroxysms of either anger or despair. Yet the end result was better strategy, not merely better democracy.

The most notable example of assertive control in the United States was FDR's insistence on invading North Africa in 1942, a move vehemently opposed by his main military advisors, General George C. Marshall

and Admiral Ernest J. King. Both favored an assault on occupied France in 1943, not a diversion to a secondary theater in 1942. Both suspected machinations by the British and were contemptuous of the President's argument that action somewhere in the European theater of operations—even North Africa—was essential to the politics supporting the strategy of Germany First. Yet Roosevelt was right. Indeed, he was even more correct than he knew, since it appears unlikely in retrospect

that an invasion in 1943 would have succeeded against a *Wehrmacht* not yet bled white by the Red Army or a *Luftwaffe* not yet shattered by the Army Air Forces and the Royal Air Force.

Churchill, who actually never overruled his generals in such a dramatic and irrevocable fashion, once remarked to one of the most valuable members of his wartime team, General Hastings Ismay, that the extent to which the generals had been discredited in World War I meant that in World War II their successors could not pretend to be professionally infallible.

In practice, this view did not translate into arbitrary reversals of the generals' orders by Churchill, or grand and impracticable designs of the kind in which Adolf Hitler indulged. But it did mean that Churchill would subject his generals and admirals to a merciless cross-questioning about military minutiae.

One illuminating example is that of Operation Victor, an anti-invasion exercise held in January 1941, which suggested that the British army would have a difficult time holding off a German onslaught. In March, after reading exercise reports, Churchill interrogated the Chiefs of Staff:

1. In the invasion exercise Victor two armoured, one motorised, and two infantry divisions were assumed to be landed by the enemy on the Norfolk coast in the teeth of heavy opposition. They fought their way ashore and were all assumed to be in action at the end of 48 hours.



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Taking Cover from Strafing Fire on Arawe Beach by David Fredenthal.

2. I presume the details of this remarkable feat have been worked out by the staff concerned. Let me see them. For instance, how many ships and transports carried these five divisions? How many armoured vehicles did they comprise? How many motor lorries, how many guns, how much ammunition, how many men, how many tons of stores, how far did they advance in the first 48 hours, how many men and vehicles were assumed to have landed in the first 12 hours, what percentage of loss were they debited with? What happened to the transports and store-ships while the first 48 hours of fighting was going on? Had they completed emptying their cargoes or were they still lying in shore off the beaches? What naval escort did they have? Was the landing at this point protected by superior enemy daylight fighter formations? How many fighter airplanes did the enemy have to employ, if so, to cover the landing places?

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Churchill observed sardonically, “I should be very glad if the same officers would work out a scheme for our landing an exactly similar force on the French coast at the same extreme range of our fighter protection and assuming that the Germans have naval superiority in the Channel.”

A spate of memoranda back and forth ensued, with the commander of British home forces, General Alan Brooke, stoutly defending the exercise and Churchill rebutting his arguments one by one. Two points stand out. First, in part based on his assessment of the difficulty of invasion Churchill was willing to risk diverting scarce armor to North Africa, where it could make all the difference in the spring and summer of 1941; second, he ultimately appointed the dour Brooke as the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and later as the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

The examples of Roosevelt's and Churchill's assertive civilian control could be multiplied. The American decision to aid Britain in 1940; the timing, weight, and direction of the Combined Bomber Offensive; the allocation of resources for combating the U-boat menace in the North Atlantic—all bore the imprint of assertive civilian leadership.

A great deal of friction resulted, and more than one senior military figure contemplated resignation in despair and outrage. Nor were the civilians always in the right: indeed, it is a mark of their good sense that they yielded, on almost all occasions, to military argument that met the test of massive and ruthless common sense. But the war was run by politicians who knew that the ultimate responsibility for victory or defeat rested with them, and who acted accordingly.

The current models of civil-military relations are very different. We think of either civilian micro-management, à la Vietnam, or a supposedly hands-off and out-of-the-way handing over of strategic responsibilities to the military in the Persian Gulf. Both views

are historically inaccurate, but what counts here is the legend more than the reality. A Roosevelt or Churchill would not have given a Westmoreland a free hand to pursue a wasteful, destructive, and politically unsustainable strategy of search and destroy, nor would he have allowed a Schwarzkopf to negotiate an armistice without guidance on the peace terms to be exacted at the end.

In part, the situation of World War II leaders was simply very different: the margin between success and failure was much narrower. American strategists of that war, unlike those of late, had to allocate military resources that were scarce and difficult to replace. The Army, after all, ended up deploying almost every available division overseas, leaving no strategic reserve in the United States. Here were real strategic choices.

Civil-military relations in the Axis states were either corrupted by one-man rule as in Italy and Germany or nonexistent as in Japan, a military dictatorship throughout



Fighter in the Sky (Solomon Islands, 1943) by Tom Lea.

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Landing Operations
by David Fredenthal.

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the war. Only among the Anglo-Saxon powers—and oddly, to a lesser extent, in Stalinist Russia—did civilians engage military subordinates in prolonged and orderly argument, a dialogue of unequals but a dialogue nonetheless. In the course of that dialogue civilians learned when to accept professional opinions proffered by their military subordinates and when to question or discard them. Indeed, their very understanding of professional judgment differed from that of today.

Roosevelt and Churchill knew full well that generals could, in the nature of things, make disastrous military mistakes, not merely political ones. They discriminated clearly between those generals whom they regarded as operationally talented and operationally incompetent and had no hesitation about sacking the latter. Both would have rejected the view, currently prevalent in some circles, that a politician can no

more exercise critical judgment about a campaign plan than about the procedure to follow for open heart surgery.

The upshot was civil-military relations fraught with conflict. Today commentators view conflict as something dysfunctional and dangerous, forgetting that it characterizes many successful governments at war. Who recalls, for example, that General William Tecumseh Sherman refused to shake the hand of Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton at the Review of the Armies held at the conclusion of the Civil War? No doubt the unequal, tension-ridden dialogue between civilian and military leaders took a heavy psychological, even physical, toll on the participants. But in the end it was an essential ingredient for victory—and in all likelihood will be so again in the future.

JFQ

Roosevelt knew that generals could make disastrous military mistakes, not merely political ones

World War II

THE MEANING OF



By WILLIAMSON MURRAY

One cannot look across the long, seemingly endless rows of crosses and Stars of David that dot the cemeteries at Omaha Beach, St. James, and elsewhere in Europe and the Pacific without a sense of the terrible cost of victory in World War II. The cold stone memorials underscore the ages of those whose lives war cut short at eighteen, twenty, twenty-four, thirty years—men who never again saw their families and homes. And as each year passes fewer and fewer visitors come to these lonely corners of America.

As the past recedes from memory to words printed on a page, historians will start to depict victory in that terrible conflict in soft, ill-measured words. They will suggest that our efforts were nothing more than the reverse side of a coin—that in fact there was little moral worth to the Allied cause, that for every German or Japanese war crime

there were similar American or British crimes (a Hamburg, Berlin, or Dresden), the refusal to bomb the rail lines to Auschwitz, the starvation of German POWs at the war's end, or Hiroshima—undoubtedly this summer we will hear ceaseless comments about dropping the atomic bomb on Japan as a “crime against humanity.”

These purveyors of moral equivalence are wrong. It is well that we realize, in considering its human cost, why the war was fought and why there is a moral dimension to the Allied victory. Perhaps nothing delineates the character of World War II better than the ambitions and actions of our opponents. Adolf Hitler aimed, in the words of one historian, at nothing short of “a biological world revolution”—the conquest of Europe and beyond, the enslavement of Slavs,



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Intersection in Tokyo
(Japan, 1946) by Hans
Mangelndorf.

behind the murderous execution of operational campaigns came ideological and racial baggage

the elimination of all differently abled, the extermination of European and possibly world Jewry, and the creation of a great Aryan empire that would rule from Gibraltar to the Urals and last “a thousand years.”¹ Japanese objectives were perhaps less coherent, but propaganda about a “Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere” suggests a dramatic plan to restructure Asia—including the enslavement of much of China, an effort that if not equal to the viciousness of Hitler’s “New Order” certainly did result in extraordinary crimes against humanity.

Thus, behind the murderous execution of operational campaigns came ideological and racial baggage in both the European and

Pacific theaters that made the war phenomenal even in the long, violent history of the human race. German attacks on Warsaw, Rotterdam, London, and Belgrade were out-and-out attempts to intimidate opponents into surrendering through the wholesale murder of civilians by airpower; and the *Luftwaffe* was highly successful, killing 17,000 Serbs in a single day.² In the late 1930s the Japanese lacked the capabilities for strategic bombing, but the “Rape of Nanking” illustrates Tokyo’s contempt for international law and the treatment of civilians at the outset of what eventually turned into its war against every ethnic group in Asia.

Moreover, from the outset German forces displayed a callousness toward both civilians and prisoners of war that represented a sharp break with the practices of World War I. The killing of over a hundred British POWs at Le Paradis in May 1940 was the first in a series of incidents involving the *Waffen SS*.³ The execution of Canadians by the murderous juvenile delinquents of the 12th SS Panzer Division, *Hitler Jugend*,⁴ the

slaughter of French civilians at Oradour-sur-Glan by troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Division, *Das Reich*,⁵ and the slaying of Americans at Malmedy by Peiper’s SS troops in late 1944⁶ typified behavior among Hitler’s ideological legions in the west. The east was another matter. As *Waffen SS* soldiers told the interviewer Max Hastings, Oradour-sur-Glan was small potatoes compared to what had happened in the east.

But the largest military crime—one that makes other incidents pale into insignificance—was the treatment of Soviet POWs by the *Wehrmacht*, not the SS. By the end of the 1941 campaign, the Germans claimed to have captured over 3.6 million Soviets in the great encirclement battles of Operation Barbarossa.⁷ What ensued was a calculated policy of starvation and murder, of which the infamous commissar order represented only the tip of the iceberg.⁸

Field Marshal Keitel received a memo in March 1942 indicating that of the approximately 3.6 million POWs captured in operations against the Soviet Union barely

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German Prisoners
(Paris, 1944)
by Floyd Davis.

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a hundred thousand were fit to work. The vast majority had already perished from starvation, exposure, or disease.⁹ By 1945 only a hundred thousand of the Soviets captured in 1941 had survived the maltreatment inflicted on them in work camps. Throughout the war, particularly in the 1941 campaign, the German army was delighted to undertake “special action” (*Sonderbehandlungen*) against East European Jews.¹⁰ Beyond the villainy of the military lay the ferocious crimes of the Nazi regime that resulted in the extermination of 6 million Jews solely on the basis of their race, the murder of 3 million Poles, and the death of more than 25 million Soviet citizens—a record unequalled even by Stalin and Mao.

Japanese crimes in the Pacific never reached the levels of German atrocities, though not for lack of trying. The “Rape of Nanking” set the standard for the Imperial Army’s conduct in China. Throughout the war the Japanese carried out extensive experiments in biological warfare, including live vivisections and dropping bubonic agents on Chinese villages.¹¹ One suspects, given the lack of control which Tokyo exercised, that the military would have unleashed terrible

plagues in China if it had developed the capabilities.¹² What Japan did inflict more generally on occupied Korea and China has yet to be fully examined by historians.

Thus, there was a moral as well as a strategic dimension to the war that the Allies waged in Europe and Asia. Unfortunately, only Churchill among the leaders of Western democracies had recognized in the 1930s that Nazi Germany represented a strategic as well as a moral threat to the survival of democratic values and regimes. But conventional wisdom had considered his views old fashioned and no longer relevant in a world where intelligent people recognized that war was no longer an instrument of statecraft. Even Churchill’s stirring words after the ruinous Munich agreement could not shake the government or citizens out of the complacent belief that surrendering Czechoslovakia “had achieved peace in our time.” The British continued a policy of appeasement for six months and refused to mobilize for the coming struggle. Because Europe was so far away American policymakers were even less willing to recognize the threat and support measures needed to prepare the Nation.



Navy Day (New York Harbor, 1945) by Julien Binford.

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Fortunately, geography and the enemy's stupidity permitted the Anglo-American powers to escape the full consequences of their folly. When France fell in 1940, Britain's position seemed hopeless. It was not. Churchill galvanized the will of a nation outraged by aggression.¹³ Fighter Command, under Air Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, provided that measure of effectiveness to keep Britain in the war and allow the United States more than a year to repair its considerable military deficiencies.

In 1941 the Germans turned a favorable situation against themselves. First they launched a great racial crusade against the Soviet Union, one that aimed not only at the extermination of Jews but the enslavement of Slavic peoples on Soviet territory.

Ironically, the ferocity and ruthlessness with which the Nazis waged ideological war drove the Soviet peoples to support Stalin's criminal regime which many of them would have been delighted to overthrow.

In the end Barbarossa also foundered on intelligence misestimates and logistic mistakes that still take one's breath away. An August 1941 quotation from the diary of General Franz Halder, chief of the general staff, suggests the extent of the Nazi intelligence failure:

The whole situation makes it increasingly plain that we have underestimated the Russian colossus, who consistently prepared for war with that utterly ruthless determination so characteristic of totalitarian states. . . . At the outset of the war, we reckoned with

about 200 enemy divisions. Now we have counted 360. These divisions are not armed and equipped according to our standards, and their tactical leadership is often poor. But there they are, and if we smash a dozen of them, the Russians simply put up another dozen. The time factor favors them, as they are near their resources, while we are moving farther and farther from ours. And so our troops . . . are subject to the incessant attacks of the enemy.¹⁴

**the defeat of the Axis
required the use of force
that more squeamish times
have found repugnant**

The logistic mistakes accumulated from the first step into Russia to wreck what little chance the Germans might have had to overthrow Stalin's regime in 1941. Quite simply, even as winter approached in November 1941 and every step in the advance on Moscow prevented the Germans from building up supply dumps to meet the trials of a Russian winter or even from moving winter clothes to the front, Halder could only idly hope that perhaps it would not snow until January.¹⁵

The evidence suggests that the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, followed shortly by Hitler's declaration of war on the United States, sealed the fate of the Axis. Certainly that was how Churchill saw the strategic situation in December 1941 before meeting with Roosevelt in Washington. But whatever economic and military advantages America, Britain, and the Soviet Union had over Germany, Japan, and Italy, victory could only come after great land, sea, and air campaigns with terrible casualties. Given the nature of the opposition, there was no other road.

Moreover, the defeat of the Axis required the use of force in a fashion that more squeamish times—when the fundamental *survival* of the West was less directly threatened—have found repugnant. The combined bomber offensive against Germany is perhaps the prime example; critics of that great Anglo-American effort have seized on its supposed immorality in killing and maiming hundreds of thousands of “innocent” Germans as well as its supposed lack

PBY Halt to Rest
(Norfolk, 1942)
by Paul Sample.



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All Aboard for Home
by Joseph Hirsch.



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of effect. In fact, that effort was not pretty; it did lead to the death of civilians. And it did not reach the over-optimistic goals which its advocates had intended.

But the bomber offensive was essential to winning the war in Europe: it broke the back of the *Luftwaffe*, and without that achievement it is doubtful whether Allied forces would have made a lodgement on the French coast.¹⁶ It wrecked the transport system, a key element in the success of the Normandy landings. It diverted more than 10,000 high velocity anti-aircraft guns and half a million soldiers to the defense of the Reich—assets that would definitely have played a more useful role on the battlefield. It had a direct impact on the morale of German civilians, although how that impact actually translated into an Allied advantage is difficult to calculate. It wrecked the German oil industry and from summer 1944 on had a significant impact on the mobility of German ground forces.¹⁷ Finally, the destruction that it wreaked on the transportation network in fall and winter of 1944 prevented

the Nazis from making a last stand among the ruins of the Thousand Year Reich.¹⁸ Consequently, it is clear that the strategic bombing of Germany was as vital to victory as the battles on the Eastern Front, or the struggle to control the sea lanes of the North Atlantic, or Allied ground operations in Western Europe after June 6. There was nothing pretty or redeeming about the effort itself; but there was *no other choice*.

Similarly, when it comes to dropping the atomic bomb on Japan, one must look beyond the horror of that event to examine what other courses of action were available. The argument that the enemy was ready to surrender at that point in the war, to put it bluntly, is virtually unsupported by the evidence except in unrealistic proposals that the Japanese foreign ministry sent to Moscow but which it was careful not to inform its military masters about because of the consequences.

By August 1945 the American military had determined on an invasion of the Home Islands that would begin with Kyushu. The estimates provided by MacArthur's command appear to have been unrealistic in

light of Okinawa and Iwo Jima, especially when intelligence already indicated that the Japanese were concentrating most of their forces on Kyushu along southern beaches where landings would occur.¹⁹ But even MacArthur's estimates, however low they appear in retrospect (approximately 40,000 killed and 200,000 total casualties), were equivalent to the casualty level suffered by the Army from Normandy to the Bulge.²⁰ As one historian pointed out, any President who allowed U.S. forces to suffer such casualties without first using the atomic bomb would have faced immediate impeachment given the political realities of 1945.²¹

But the most terrible results of a refusal by America to use the bomb would have impacted on the Japanese themselves. Fighting on Kyushu would have visited a terrible fate on that island's peasant population, and not only would the fighting have killed tens of thousands, but starvation in the Home Islands as well as mass suicides aided and abetted by the Japanese military (as happened on Okinawa) would have swollen the

number of civilian casualties. Finally, one might also note that prolonged combat on Kyushu would undoubtedly have resulted in Soviet operations against Hokaido and perhaps the main island itself with a resulting Soviet zone of occupation in the north that would have had a devastating impact on post-war Japan.

The terrible war on which the survival of democracy depended did not halt the endless struggles that Thucydides foretold in *The Peloponnesian War*; but democratic values survived and, under the leadership of the United States, those values were maintained throughout another great contest that lasted almost to the end of this century. But the great victories of 1945 and 1989 were attributable to the will of America to defend its values and traditions with the lives of its young men and women. The long white rows of markers in Arlington and cemeteries across Europe and the Pacific bear mute testimony to that courage and dedication. **JFQ**

*Awaiting Take-off,
Aleutians by Ogden
Pleissner.*



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NOTES

¹ See MacGregor Knox, "Conquest, Foreign and Domestic, in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany," *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 56, no. 1 (March 1984), pp. 1–57.

² In the case of Belgrade, Operation Gericht (Punishment) killed some 17,000 Serbs. On German attitudes toward strategic bombing at the beginning of the war, see Williamson Murray, *German Military Effectiveness* (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing, 1992), pp. 39–52.

³ At Le Paradis soldiers of the SS *Totenkopf* Division killed no fewer than 110 members of the Royal Norfolk Regiment, but the authorities never investigated the incident. George H. Stein, *The Waffen SS, Hitler's Elite Guard at War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 76–78.

⁴ Guides to Normandy indicate that 18 Canadian bodies were found at Abbe d'Ardennes, headquarters of the 12th SS Panzer Division outside Caen. A recent visit to the site revealed that 27 bodies now have been discovered, and according to a local construction foreman the number goes up each year.

⁵ See Max Hastings, *Das Reich, The March of the 2nd SS Panzer Division through France* (London: Papermac, 1993) for a further discussion of the murderous activities of the division as it moved north from Toulouse to Normandy.

⁶ Peiper and fellow criminals were condemned to death by an American military court, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment through the efforts of Senator Joseph McCarthy and they were then almost immediately released by the post-war West German government.

⁷ The Soviets, not surprisingly, contested that number, but even their figures suggest that millions of their soldiers fell into German hands during the course of the campaign.

⁸ For details on the savage treatment of Soviet POWs by the German army during the war, see Kristian Streit, *Keine Kameraden, Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1979).

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁰ On the German army's enthusiastic support for the final solution see Horst Boog et al., *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*, vol. 4, *Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1983), pp. 413–51; Jürgen Förster, "Hitler's War Aims Against the Soviet Union and the German Military Leaders," *Militärhistorik Tidshrift* (1979), pp. 83–93; Christian Streit, "The German Army and the Policies of Genocide," in *The Policies of Genocide: Jews and Soviet Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany*, Gerhard Hirschfeld, editor (London: German Historical Institute, 1986).

¹¹ See Peter Williams and David Wallace, *Unit 731: Japan's Secret Biological Warfare in World War II* (New York: Free Press, 1989).

¹² One of the most disgraceful post-war decisions was not to bring those Japanese involved in bacteriological warfare to trial. Instead the authorities decided to enlist their help in the American program. This undoubtedly raised the suspicion of the Chinese and explains why they accused the United States of using such weapons during the Korean War.

¹³ No one at the time foresaw how extraordinary German actions would be in the war. One historian argues that London could have reached an acceptable accommodation with Berlin in 1940 to save the empire. But Churchill dragged Britain down a road of slavish surrender to American interests—one that inevitably spelled destruction of the empire. What such an argument misses, of course, is the nature of Hitler's regime and that any accommodation, as Vichy France illustrates, would have led to a surrender of the British soul. For an exposition of this position, which reveals how far historians can be removed from reality, see John Charmley, *Churchill: The End of Glory: A Political Biography* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1993).

¹⁴ Franz Halder, *The Halder War Diaries, 1939–1942*, Charles Burdick and Hans Adolf Jacobsen, editors (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1988), entry for August 11, 1944, p. 506.

¹⁵ Klaus Reinhardt, *Die Wende vor Moskau, Das Scheitern der Strategie Hitlers im Winter 1941/1942* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1972), p. 140.

¹⁶ For a detailed exposition of the combined bomber offensive, see Williamson Murray, "Reflections on the Combined Bomber Offensive," *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen*, vol. 51 (1992), Heft 1.

¹⁷ For example, when the Soviets hit Silesia in January 1945 the Germans had 1,800 tanks to defend the province, but no fuel. As a result most of Silesia fell into Soviet hands in less than a week. Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany*, vol. 3 (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1962), p. 239.

¹⁸ See in particular Alfred C. Mierzejewski, *The Collapse of the German War Economy, 1944–1945; Allied Air Power and the German National Railway* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988).

¹⁹ It is more likely that the level of ferocity and losses would have replicated Okinawa. But instead of 200,000 casualties, America would probably have suffered as much as twice that among its ground and naval forces.

²⁰ Americans in the Pacific had fewer illusions about the level of casualties in an invasion of the Home Islands than MacArthur's staff or historians born years later. See Paul Fussell, "Thank God for the Atomic Bomb: Hiroshima, A Soldier's View," *The New Republic* (August 22–29, 1981), pp. 26–30.

²¹ Peter Mazlowski, "Truman, the Bomb, and the Numbers Game," *Military History Quarterly*, vol. 7, no. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 103–07.

JFQ is grateful to the U.S. Army Center of Military History for the loan of most of the World War II art reproduced in this issue and, especially, to Marylou Gjernes, Chief of the Army Art Activity, and Verne E. Schwartz, Visual Reference Specialist, for their support in obtaining items from the *Life* collection of World War II art.


When I went to war I thought that soldiers were old men. It was not until long after . . . that it came over me that the Army was made up of what I should now call very young men.

—Oliver Wendell Holmes



The Generation of 1945

By RONALD H. SPECTOR



Camouflage Face by
Tom Lea.

The Life Collection of World War II Art, U.S. Army Center of Military History

In the same way that it was hard for the college students in Holmes' audience at Harvard University thirty years after Appomattox to imagine him and his comrades "upon whose heads the white shadows have begun to fall" as the youthful soldiers many of them had been, it is difficult for us to think of the veterans of World War II as real people, as "very young men," some still in their teens, not a few from families still struggling with the effects of the Great Depression, and for whom the military was their first real job. Today they are all ten feet tall and have become not so much individuals as icons of patriotism.

Just as it is difficult to see the heroes honored at Normandy and other commemorations as real people, it is even harder to recall the mood of the country in 1941. Many older Americans, the parents and grandparents of the GIs who were about to be committed to battle, shared an uneasy belief that they had somehow botched it, that their generation had lost the chance to build a world where peace and freedom would prevail, and that their children would now have to pay the price. Anthropologist Margaret Mead worried that perhaps "the moral debauches of the last



twenty years left congenital scars on the children's souls which no medicine can cure nor scalpel remove. . . . We must be able to look them in the eye and say, 'We failed you because we lied to you, forcing ourselves and you to believe that we had no part in the way in which the world was getting steadily worse.'"

Along with the guilt was a nagging anxiety that the new generation might not be up to the task. "Many observers considered us a lost generation and feared we might collapse if summoned to some crucial battlefield," recalled James Michener. Many veterans of World War I looked at the new cohort of American soldiers and feared they had been softened by the antiwar ideas of their

overindulgent mothers during the 1930s. "Our men who had to do the fighting didn't want to fight," concluded one veteran war correspondent. "They had been told in the all-important

first ten years and in their teens that it was not necessary to fight. Our men just wanted to go home."

The campaigns of 1942 and 1943 quickly erased these doubts. Indeed by the end of the war the GI had become a universal American symbol of courage and prowess. Later writers might point out that the Russians had fought and defeated a larger number of German troops than Americans were ever to face in western Europe and that it was Australians, not Americans, who first turned back the tide of Japanese land offensives in the southwest Pacific. Analysts might use graphs, charts, and statistics to illustrate that the Germans were actually more effective fighters. To most Americans that was all unimportant and uninteresting detail. For them the U.S. conduct of the war soon became and was long remembered as the norm of how wars ought to be fought. The GI of World War II also became the model of what was expected of a fighting man.

Soldiers in the Vietnam era, most of them children of World War II veterans, were seldom unaware of the implicit comparison between their own exasperating, seemingly intractable war and the glorious achievements of their fathers.

Tim O'Brien served in Vietnam with the 23^d Infantry Division. In World War II that division had relieved the Marines on Guadalcanal, fought under MacArthur in Bougainville, and played a major role in General Robert Eichelberger's campaigns in the southern Philippines. In Vietnam, O'Brien writes, the men of the Americal division "did not know the feeling of taking a place and keeping it. No sense of order and momentum. No front, no rear, no trenches laid out in neat rows, no Patton rushing for the Rhine, no beachheads to storm and win and hold for the duration. They did not have targets, they did not have a cause. On a given day they did not know where they were . . . or how being there might influence larger outcomes." During the Vietnam War the Americal soldier was best known not for Guadalcanal or Bougainville but for My Lai. Everybody knew, or at least said, that Vietnam was a different kind of war. Yet it may have been a half-conscious desire to repeat the great deeds of World War II that somehow contributed to that quixotic undertaking and increased the frustration level when events never followed the old script.

Whether the World War II generation was really the most successful in American history as soldiers, they were undoubtedly the most successful as veterans. In every field, from classics to corporate law, from play-writing to plasma physics, they quickly assumed positions of leadership, often transforming entire industries, research fields, and professions—or creating new ones. This transformation of society by veterans began almost immediately after the end of the war. The GI Bill of Rights, one of the most notable pieces of welfare legislation in U.S. history, provided job training and homes for millions of veterans and allowed millions more to attend college. Before the advent of the veteran, colleges and universities were places where a handful of young men and women went because of wealth and family tradition. The influx of veterans who often

by the end of the war the GI had become a universal American symbol of courage and prowess

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**Platoon Commander
and Sherman Tank**
by Albert Gold.



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went on to positions of leadership in academe changed higher education from a limited enterprise for the well-to-do into the meritocracy it still claims to be today.

What if anything did this generation have in common? Most of them were far too busy to be introspective, but those who considered the question usually had the same

answer, a dedication to service, to something greater than making a living. *Time* magazine had an editorial about the men and women of our age. They called us the "Take Charge Generation," wrote Harry Crosby, a former

command navigator with the 100th Bomb Group, and later a highly successful teacher of writing at Iowa and Harvard. "I don't know about that. If I were asked to list any one quality which characterized my associates from the 100th it would be their continued dedication to public service." Alvin

Chester, who commanded a destroyer escort in both theaters and later headed a thriving shipping conglomerate, wrote disparagingly in his memoirs of "the wheeling and dealing of the greedy 1980s." He recalled a time when "decency prevailed and greed was not the driving force. I had the good fortune to have experienced a time when I shared the company of individuals who subordinated their own interests to those of their comrades in arms."

This commitment to public service, it might be argued, was passed on to the children of the World War II generation. Baby-boomers certainly did not feel the same obligation as their fathers to serve in the military. Quite the opposite. Yet many of the crusades of baby-boomers, with all their self-righteous nuttiness, resulted in solid achievements and advancement in areas such as civil rights, the environment, and women's status, thus continuing to express commitment to bettering the Nation in ways different from their parents. The children of World War II veterans themselves are now entering middle age, and may be the last generation to believe that making money is not necessarily life's highest goal.

The younger generation—born in the 1960s and 1970s—are less likely than their parents or grandparents to be deceived by spurious causes, but they are unlikely to make any sacrifices either. Rather than joining the military or protesting against military service they are content to hire others to take care of that distasteful necessity. In contrast to the impassioned protests of the 1960s, most student demonstrations in recent years have focused on a lack of parking for their late model cars.

James Michener, writing about veterans of the Pacific theater soon after the war, accurately foresaw the situation which has now come to pass.

They will live a long time, these men of the South Pacific. They had an American quality. They, like their victories, will be remembered as long as our generation lives. After that, like the men of the Confederacy they will become strangers. Longer and longer shadows will obscure them until their Guadalcanal sounds distant on the ear like Shiloh and Valley Forge.

JFQ

**this commitment to
public service was passed
on to the children of the
World War II generation**

I remember the battle for Anzio as the most brutal in which I fought during World War II. I also remember it as the most futile; for fifty years its futility has haunted me.



The Battle for Anzio

By WILLIAM WOODRUFF

The story begins in the summer of 1943 when Allied victories in North Africa and Sicily made it necessary to redefine strategy in the Mediterranean. Because Great Britain looked upon the Mediterranean differently than the United States—it was after all a life-line of empire—its influence gradually predominated. America was more concerned with invading Western Europe and sought to limit its adventures in the Mediterranean.

Before long-term Allied strategy could be agreed to, the British Eighth Army invaded

Italy across the Straits of Messina. Regardless of intentions, once started the Italian campaign took on a life of its own. By the fall of 1943 Allied armies had reached the German Gustav Line anchored on Cassino. Beyond that was the Liri valley leading to the prize—Rome. In spite of desperate Allied attacks to break through to Rome, the German line held. Stalemate ensued.

To break the deadlock, a plan was hatched in early December 1943 at Marrakech to make an amphibious landing (code named Shingle) at the port of Anzio-Nettuno, 80 miles north of the Gustav Line and 35 miles south of Rome. The task force



Itri, Italy by Tom Craig.

The Life Collection of World War II Art, U.S. Army Center of Military History

was expected to secure a beachhead and push twenty miles inland to the Alban Hills. Once in possession of the hills, it could outflank the German Tenth Army, disrupt the road and rail links joining the southern German front and Rome, capture Rome, and thus shorten the war.

The British—including General Sir Harold R.I.G. Alexander, deputy Allied commander in chief, Mediterranean Theater, and General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff—favored the plan while the Americans—including Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, commander of Fifth Army, and Major General John P. Lucas, whom Clark named the task force commander shortly before the battle—were lukewarm. Clark and other Americans felt that Fifth Army was already exhausted from the casualties suffered on the southern front and that adequate transport and forces for such a hazardous operation could only be obtained by weakening Overlord. Arguments against Shingle prevailed and the plan was shelved.

But unconvinced of the wisdom of this action, Prime Minister Winston Churchill promptly revived the plan, devoting himself to it with Herculean energy. Eisenhower thought him “almost exclusively responsible” for the Anzio invasion.¹ With the cooperation of President Roosevelt and a reluctant General George C. Marshall, a Churchill-directed conference in Tunis on December 25, 1943 decided that the invasion would take place after all. Responsibility for Shingle was assigned to the 36,000-strong U.S. VI Corps, chiefly comprised of the British 1st and American 3^d Infantry Divisions under Fifth Army. The U.S. 1st Armored Division would follow immediately after a beachhead was established. Several days prior to the invasion, a new offensive would be launched against the Gustav Line. The two fronts were to be linked within seven days. Frantic preparations for the landing followed.

In the early hours of January 22, 1944, with the 1st Infantry Division under Major General W.R.C. Penney on the left and 3^d Infantry Division under Major General Lucian

K. Truscott² on the right, the task force landed at Anzio-Nettuno against minimal opposition.³ By nightfall Lucas had managed to establish a lightly-held semi-circular line around the port. With most of his forces ashore, he prepared for the counterattack he was sure would come. It did not, which was just as well, for the bulk of Shingle’s armor—the 1st Armored Division—had been delayed by a shortage of landing craft and rough seas. On the second day of the landing, knowing that the Allied attempt to break through the Gustav Line two days earlier had failed, Lucas cautiously began to move his troops inland.

Almost at once VI Corps ran into trouble. On January 23 units of the 3^d Infantry Division headed for Cisterna clashed with German units on the Allied right flank. The 1st Infantry Division met with resistance in the center and on the left. Two days after the landing more than 40,000 German troops faced the Allies. By January 31, by which time the invading forces had reached their farthest penetration, the number had doubled.

By the end of January the stage was set for what proved to be one of the bloodiest battles on the western front. In the battles for Aprilia (the factory), Cisterna, and Campoleone, heavy losses were suffered on both sides. To take and hold Aprilia, some Guards units were decimated. The attack by the 3^d Division on the night of January 30 resulted in the massacre of the 1st and 3^d Ranger battalions. The battle for Campoleone ended disastrously as the enemy cut off the Allied salient.

By February 4–5, under hammer blows from the German Fourteenth Army led by General Eberhard von Mackensen, VI Corps had been forced into retreat. By mid-February a quarter of a million men were locked in deadly combat on the Anzio plain. On one occasion, the battle had to be halted to bury the dead. Extraordinary courage and heroism were displayed by friend and foe; neither would yield. Several times the Germans almost broke through to the sea. Without Allied artillery on land and at sea, as well as the crushing blows delivered by Allied planes, they might have succeeded. Yet overwhelming Allied superiority in the air did not prove decisive.

The Anzio nightmare continued day after day, night after night, until the troops could no longer stand. They could neither

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**by the end of February
neither side had the
strength to deliver a
knock-out blow**

go forward nor back. Yet to stay where they were was to invite death from the hills. Nowhere was there safety. Nothing was still; terror was everywhere. By the end of February (by which time the beachhead had shrunk to four miles wide and five miles deep) neither side had the strength or the reinforcements to deliver a knock-out blow.

By early March the battle had been fought to a standstill; it became as static and deadly as the trenches of World War I. It was at this point that Clark relieved Lucas and replaced him with Truscott. Not until the end of May did the renewed offensives in the south and at Anzio force the enemy to retreat from both fronts to positions north of Rome. The pathetic (perhaps unnecessary) struggle for supremacy in Italy went on for eighteen more months. Anzio was forgotten. After the war Churchill never had difficulty in ascribing the debacle to American ineptitude.

It is usual, especially among British historians, to place the responsibility for the failure of the Anzio campaign at General Lucas' door. It is argued that Lucas failed to take advantage of the surprise he had achieved. Instead of racing for the Alban Hills, he frittered away precious time in his bunker by the sea. The unprecedented toll of lives (75,000 killed, wounded, and missing) was the price paid for his initial timidity.

Far from frittering away precious time, my experience was that the task force was committed from the moment it landed, not least in trying to disentangle itself from the confusion that such a landing entails. For me the whole of the first day was taken up in disembarking, consolidating our position around the port, and (having learned en route from Naples that considerable German forces awaited us in the vicinity of the beachhead) feverishly preparing to withstand the expected German counterattack. On D+3, with Lucas having protected his

base, my brigade moved five to six miles inland to the area of the overpass (eventually our last line of resistance) which straddled the Anzio-Albano road. Before us a formidable dark-gray mass of hills covered the horizon. The next day we advanced three miles to Carroceto where we were forced to withdraw. I emerged unscathed from that engagement, though a shell blast tore every button off my battledress. Others were less fortunate. For my brigade the agony of Anzio had begun.

There was no talk in those first three days of "dashing for the hills" or "racing across the plain." Such phrases were only used by armchair warriors with no knowledge of the battlefield. To have dashed for the hills would have been suicidal. On D+2 I sat in a ditch with a captured German tank officer who told me that the invasion had come as no surprise and that we would shortly be wiped out. There were people who thought that Lucas might have been more daring on the first and second day, but I know of no one at the time who suggested a headlong race to the hills, especially since we knew that the Allied offensive in

the south against the Gustav Line—on which everything turned—had stalled.

Regardless of whether Lucas was overcautious or not, I believe that the Anzio campaign was doomed from the outset. The task allotted to him exceeded realistic expectations. He was not given the necessary infantry and armor to accomplish what Shingle intended. His opinion on what was needed was never sought. Had Patton led us, the outcome would have been the same except that the killing ground would have been closer to the hills. Had we had ships to land five divisions instead of two (including an armor division on D-Day) the story might have had a different ending. More than anything else, the lesson of Anzio was too little, too late.

Shingle began with a flawed battle plan: it took too little account of the enemy's options or responses; it assumed—one might say gambled⁴—that the Germans would be



W.D. John W. Kramer (Italy, February 1944) by Tom Craig.

The Life Collection of World War II Art, U.S. Army Center of Military History

German Tank and Crew, St. Lo—1944 by Ogden Pleissner.



The Life Collection of World War II Art, U.S. Army Center of Military History

thrown off balance. Everything we knew about the German commander Kesselring disproved such an assumption. He neither panicked on word of the invasion nor hesitated to implement a contingency plan known as Case Richard. The German reinforcement was unusually swift. Everything we had learned about the Germans—especially at Salerno—told us that this was how they would react.

Even if Lucas had been given adequate forces to reach the hills and had accurately assessed Kesselring's reactions, the plain before the Alban Hills was definitely the wrong place to fight such a battle, especially in winter. In the planning stages too little attention was given to the terrain.

Yet I know from bitter experience that it was terrain that repeatedly defeated both sides. With flooded deep ditches, gullies, canals, tank traps, bottomless mud, and bogs, it is hardly possible to imagine worse terrain in which to fight, especially in mist

and pouring rain. With only a sparse network of narrow roads, it proved to be the worst possible place for armor. On one occasion the 1st Armored Division lost 24 tanks in trying to pull each other out of the mud.

The more I study Shingle the more I am convinced that it failed not due to a lack of courage on the part of any GI or Tommy, who were beyond praise, but because of weakness at the top of the command structure. The instructions regarding Shingle that Alexander gave to Clark were very different from the instructions Clark gave Lucas. Alexander had required Clark to secure the Alban Hills and to be ready to advance on Rome. Clark required neither of Lucas, probably realizing that Alexander was expecting more than he and Lucas could deliver. The differences were not argued out: they were ignored.

Clark's tendency to go his own way, regardless of what his British chief ordered, reflected the unfortunate divisiveness between

Shingle failed because of weakness at the top of the command structure

*Polish Officer's Tent
(Cassino, Italy, 1944)*
by Frank Duncan.



U.S. Army Center of Military History

American and British commanders in theater (but not among the men). Clark was undoubtedly an Anglophobe, while Penney was critical of Lucas. Truscott and Major General Ernest N. Harmon of 1st Armored Division had little time for Penney. At the top, Shingle was the work of a divided, ineffective command. Clark's description of Alexander as a "peanut" and a "feather-duster"⁵ was well known but wide off the mark. Alexander may have failed to ensure that his orders were carried out, but his courage as a soldier was never in doubt. On one occasion, his head covered only by a cloth cap, he left our forward trench which was under fire, walked slowly across the exposed rubble-strewn ground, surveyed the enemy, and sauntered back. We were impressed. If he'd done that every day, we'd have won the battle.

More damaging than Alexander's inability to control his team was the encouragement he gave Churchill when he should have been restraining him. There was no basis for Churchill to be optimistic. Of the risks of Shingle he was largely ignorant.

Alexander was not. Except for Allied superiority in the air, Churchill's predictions proved to be wrong on every count. Alexander should have joined others who alerted Churchill to the hazardous nature of the operation, including Brigadier Kenneth Strong, G-2, Allied Forces Headquarters;⁶ Admiral Sir John D. Cunningham, Allied naval commander in chief, Mediterranean;⁷ and Rear Admiral Frank J. Lowry, Allied naval commander of Shingle. Anzio was not a failure because senior commanders did not know better, but because commanders like Alexander did not speak up or their advice was rejected.

I believe that Lucas has been much maligned. General Marshall thought so too. Lucas did what he was supposed to: conquer, consolidate, and advance. Warned by Clark not to stick out his neck, he

fought the Germans to a standstill. His so-called caution may well have saved the Allies from annihilation. The task given him was as impossible as the one given us.

While I think there is much to be said in Lucas' favor, I also think that he was the wrong man for the job. I was young then, but I'd seen enough battle to realize that he was not the man to lead a wildcat mission. He didn't put fire into anybody's belly. I spoke to him once when we were preparing for the invasion and twice on the beachhead, but I never saw him at the front. The British troops called him "Father Christmas." Critics have argued that he did not know what he was doing. The vital weakness that I observed was not that he did not know what he was doing, but that he did not believe in what he was doing.

Anzio was Valley Forge without Washington. We had no single commander with whom to identify, no mystique for which to fight. The absence of an inspiring leader, coupled with the lack of a definite plan, could only have one outcome—demoralization. To fight and to achieve nothing was deadening.

Alexander and Clark were no better than Lucas in providing leadership. They were *chateau* generals, appearing rarely and always dressed as if on parade. To my knowledge,

**wherever blame is placed,
Anzio was a tragedy
from beginning to end**

neither of them slept at the front one night. They arrived, made a quick tour, and were off. I think it embarrassed them to witness a tragedy of their own making. I once visited their headquarters at Casserta Palace and was dumbfounded by the luxury. There were not only beds, movies, and messes, but sheets. If I lived in a palace, I too would have taken a very different view of sleeping in a freezing, water-filled foxhole. On the beachhead we didn't need Churchill to tell us we were a "stranded whale."

Wherever blame is placed, the battle for Anzio was a tragedy from beginning to end. At the last, in spite of Alexander's intentions set out at a conference at Headquarters AAI on April 2, 1944 that Fifth Army would "break out of the Anzio beachhead and advance on Valmontone," when the breakout came Clark took the fastest route to Rome. He achieved what he had always wanted, to be the first one there. The price was the survival of the German Tenth Army and prolonging the war in Italy. He earned the wrath of every senior commander (American and British) of VI Corps.

I have pondered the battle for Anzio for half a century. It should never have been fought.⁸ Relative to what it achieved, its cost was atrocious. Like Gallipoli, Anzio was tinged with a fatal futility. Because of this it will find a lasting place in the annals of war.

In *Vessel of Sadness* I tried to recapture the essence of Anzio's tragic moment of time; of General Lucas I wrote:

An old General going back
God knows he'd tried,
A German lance broken,
Massacre averted, the line held.
But not victory.
Guns on the Alban hills
Looking down on men in the mud.
The thrower thrown.

An old General going back,
To hear them say:
Why didn't you get on the hills?
They'd show him with colored pencils and flags
What he should have done.
But it wasn't like that.
A band of steel, constant crisis, ditches full of
corpses, first tanks burned to a cinder.

An old General going back, not bitter, sad,
Convinced that he'd been sent on a damn-fool
mission,
Ill-prepared, frantically launched, too many cooks
brewing a broth of overwhelming disaster.
Divided counsel, risks uncalculated, advice
rejected.
Hellespont, dice in a can.
In the German, not terror roused, panic caused,
But anger, heroism, and resistance.
Bluff called, the long chance lost.

An old General going back,
To strike his flag,
And watch clever men refight his battle
With their slippers on, writing under the warm
glow of a desk lamp,
Their bottoms warm, roasted by the fire,
Detached, removed, cozy.
They would tell him
And he would weep, for man.⁹

I believed that then; I still do.

JFQ

NOTES

¹ See Harry C. Butcher, *My Three Years with Eisenhower* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), p. 494.

² See Lucian K. Truscott, *Command Missions* (New York: Dutton, 1954).

³ Unknown to Lucas, while embarkation was taking place in Naples, Generalfeldmarshall Albert Kesselring, German commander in Italy, had shifted the 29th and 90th Panzer Grenadier Divisions from the Rome area to Cassino to bolster the southern front. He had been encouraged to do so by Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the head of German intelligence, who assured him that there was "not the slightest sign" of an invasion within the next four to six weeks.

⁴ See Martin Blumenson, *Anzio: The Gamble that Failed* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1963).

⁵ Quoted by Carlo D'Este, *Fatal Decision: Anzio and the Battle for Rome* (New York, HarperCollins, 1991), p. 62. The original source was Clark's diary.

⁶ According to Brigadier Strong, Shingle "could not achieve a decisive success in the face of the opposition that could be expected." He indicated that its success relied on a breakthrough at Cassino which he thought would not be obtained. See Sir Kenneth Strong, *Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence Officer* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969), p. 125.

⁷ Admiral Sir John D. Cunningham, Allied Naval Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, stated, "You know, Prime Minister [Churchill], this operation is fraught with great risks." Quoted by Carlo D'Este, *Fatal Decision*, p. 98, from oral history interview of Lord Harding (Department of Sound Records, Imperial War Museum).

⁸ The most recent assessments of the battle for Anzio are Carlo D'Este, *Fatal Decision*, and Dominic J. Caraccilo, "Assault on Anzio," *VFW*, vol. 72, no. 5 (January 1994), pp. 14 and following.

⁹ William Woodruff, *Vessel of Sadness*, with a foreword by Martin Blumenson (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978; Washington: Brassey's, forthcoming).

Soldier Art of World War II

By PETER HARRINGTON



Arawe, New Britain (December 1943)
by David Fredenthal.

The Life Collection of World War II Art, U.S. Army Center of Military History

full range of combat operations on land, at sea, and in the air.

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor thousands of men enlisted in the Armed Forces, including many artists. Assigned to camps and bases across the Nation they applied their talents to painting murals which transformed drab barracks, day rooms, mess halls, and service clubs. This soldier art was fostered by the Office of War Information's

Bureau of Publications and Graphics which issued a pamphlet entitled *Interior Design and Soldier Art* on how "to surround military personnel with a cheerful and attractive environment, reflecting the traditions, accomplishments, and high standards of Army life." Among its larger projects were those carried out at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and Keesler Field, Mississippi.

Interest in war-related art also took root outside the Armed Forces. By February 1942 the Office of Emergency Management had organized an exhibit at the National Gallery in Washington in which 2,582 works on the theme of war and defense were submitted by over a thousand artists. Soldier art competitions were held around the country and in April 1942 *Life* magazine announced a competition whose entries were to "relate

to scenes connected with the artist's experiences while on active duty with the Armed Forces." This was the first time that a national magazine had taken an active part in promoting soldier art. In fact, *Life* had commissioned artists in 1941 to represent how America was preparing for war. The artists involved were Tom Lea, Floyd Davis, Fletcher Martin, Byron Thomas, and Paul Sample. The subjects of Lea's works, for instance, ranged from soldiers in training to scenes of North Atlantic naval patrols. Military pictures by other artists such as Griffith Baily Coale of the Navy and Barse Miller were also reproduced in *Life*.

The first service art program was established by the Navy in September 1942 when Coale, along with Dwight C. Shepler, William F. Draper, Albert K. Murray, and Mitchell Jamieson, were commissioned to "record dramatic incidents in combat areas." Within months the Army began to plan a similar program. In November the Corps of Engineers started to compile the names of those artists deemed suitable to work in theater. This program, organized under the auspices of the War Department Art Advisory Committee (WDAAC) to supervise war art units, was "taken over" by leading artists and museum administrators in 1943. The committee included artists George Biddle and Henry Varnum Poor and the writer John Steinbeck, who suggested that writers accompany artists in the field to describe events. Some 23 soldier-artists and 19 civilian artists were selected, and by early May the first units were in the Pacific and Alaska. Greeted with enthusiasm by theater commanders, including Generals Eisenhower and MacArthur, they started to document fighting as well as other

Peter Harrington is curator of the Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection at the Brown University Library and author of *British Artists and War: The Face of Battle in Paintings and Prints: 1700-1914*.

aspects of military life, while on the home front WDAAC geared up for exhibits and publications to showcase their work. Unfortunately, this enthusiasm was not shared by members of Congress who cut off funds for the program effective August 31, 1943. Nonetheless, the six-month program resulted in 2,000 pieces of art representing wartime activities around the world.

News of the cancellation of the Army program was a devastating blow to artists, many of whom did not learn about it until late July, and triggered disparaging editorials in art journals. In "Congress Fumbles the Ball" (*The Art Digest*, August 1943), Peyton Boswell admitted that while no enemy soldier had been killed by an artist's brush, "it is also true that the country was in line to receive a lot of good art reporting for its comparatively small outlay—paintings that would have constituted an irreplaceable pictorial history of the war."

In North Africa artists discovered that George Biddle had decamped for Sicily where he was enjoying a new role as a *Life* artist. The executive editor of *Life*, Daniel Longwell, had visited Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy on hearing of Congress's decision and offered to employ some artists. Seventeen civilian artists, including David Fredenthal and Aaron Bohrod who had been in the Pacific, were recruited on relatively cheap contracts by the magazine while the military provided their transportation and billeting. *Life's* action in effect saved the program and for two years these artists produced an extensive assortment of paintings and drawings at the front. Only one artist, Lucien Labaudt, was lost when his plane crashed en route to China in late 1944.

For artists not hired by *Life* there were alternatives, and several continued to create images of the

war while serving in units. One joined *Collier's* while others like Henry Varnum Poor just went home. Jack Levine spent 20 months on Ascension Island with Special Services as a sergeant responsible for movies and books. Edward Reep no sooner arrived in Algiers than he got orders from Eisenhower giving him command of five artists attached to Fifth Army in North Africa and Italy. Similarly, after the Southwest Pacific unit had been told of the end of the Army program, MacArthur decided to keep the artists. Based in Manila, the unit was comprised of Frede Vidar, Sidney Simon, and Barse Miller, who traversed the Philippines, China, Japan, and Korea. Other veterans of the 1943 program, including Manuel Bromberg, Olin Dows, and Albert Gold, made up the nucleus of an Army combat art program under the Historical Branch, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, authorized by Congress in 1944 after the worth of soldier art had been revisited. They covered D-Day preparations and the Normandy invasion as well as the drive into Germany and other operations. The program was terminated by the Military Appropriations Act of 1945.

While some programs were ended due to the liquidation of the Section of Fine Arts in the Graphic Division of OWI, Congress could not stifle artistic creativity, and war-inspired art exhibits continued to draw large crowds. In July 1943, 125 eye-witness war paintings done for *Life* went on show at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York prior to a national tour. Earlier a wartime organization of art groups, Artists for Victory, Inc., announced a contest entitled "America in the War" in which artists could compete for prizes of \$800 in war

bonds. The competition closed in August and its fruits were exhibited in 24 cities beginning that autumn. *Life* was not the only private employer of wartime artists. Abbott Laboratories of Chicago, in collaboration with the Office of the Surgeon General, commissioned 12 artists, including Robert Benney, Howard Baer, and Joseph Hirsch, to cover efforts of the Army Medical Staff. Previously Abbott had contracted for several artists to depict naval aviation.

On Pearl Harbor Day in 1960 Henry R. Luce gave the *Life* war art collection to the Nation. Consisting of 1,058 paintings done by 27 artists, it was valued at more than a million dollars. The collection was added to paintings from other programs and works commissioned by Abbott Labs. There are around 6,000 original pieces of art depicting World War II in the Army Art Collection today which is held by the U.S. Army Center of Military History, and the Navy Department has some 8,000 works. Although the Marine Corps did not have an official art program, several artists were commissioned to paint combat scenes. While some of this work belongs to the Marine Corps Historical Center, a number of artists retained their pictures. The Air Force art collection has the smallest graphic representation of the war since many paintings done by members of the Army Air Corps became part of the Army collection, though a number were later transferred to the Air Force.

Overall these works provide vivid impressions of the millions of soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen who we remember during this 50th anniversary of the end of World War II. **JFQ**

Convoy by Ben Oda.

U.S. Army Center of Military History

France, 1917.



U.S. Army Military History Institute

The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence

By DAVID S. YOST

The future of U.S. overseas military presence cannot be properly assessed without going back to first principles. It is essential to examine the historical pattern and purposes of presence; domestic economic and political factors likely to affect overseas commitments; the future security environment, including possible requirements for U.S. action; the changing nature of warfare; and the basic choices that we will face as our policies stop coasting on the residual inertia of the immediate post-Cold War era.

These choices will ultimately concern how to conduct sensible policies and strategies within a broad approach of overseas engagement. This article argues that disengagement could not satisfy U.S. national security objectives. If the United States is to be guided by a prudent assessment of its strategic position, it must accept responsibilities for continuing engagement in the management of international security affairs. Moreover, it is urgent to place the debate on overseas presence in a broad, long-term context. Some recent discussions of presence have been based on a short-term perspective—no more than a few years—and influenced by intra-alliance burden-sharing disputes or interservice competition for resources. Decisions on presence must be reached in light of larger choices about security commitments, economic interests, national purposes, and grand strategy.

Historical Overview

Prior to 1898, the Nation deployed almost no land forces in peacetime outside the territory that became the continental United States, except for token forces in Alaska after its purchase from Russia in 1867.¹ For most of the 19th century, U.S. forces did not have to go overseas to engage external presence challenges. Central preoccupations were economic progress, national cohesion, and continental expansion. The adversaries in ensuring freedom of navigation or realizing the

the main historic thrust of U.S. isolationism was to keep clear of war in Europe

“manifest destiny” of the Nation included Britain, France, Spain, Mexico, and American Indian tribes. Overseas military operations consisted primarily of brief expeditionary actions in North Africa and the Mediterranean, the Caribbean and Central America, and Asia. Some operations were small in scale but relatively prolonged (for instance, the First Barbary War against Tripoli, 1801–05), while others had significant consequences (such as opening Japan to international trade in 1853–54).²

These operations were facilitated by naval detachments that cruised far from North America almost continuously, such as the Mediterranean (1801–07; 1815–61), European (1865–1905), East India (1835–61), and Asiatic (1866–1902) squadrons. With a few exceptions (such as Yokohama, Nagasaki, Hong Kong, Macao, Gibraltar, Port Mahon, Spezia, and Villefranche), the Nation was reluctant to establish depots or shore facilities abroad, and foreign ports were used on a minimal basis. Navy policy called for employing floating storeships anchored at rendezvous points.³

The turning point came in 1898, partly because of the annexation of Hawaii—the treaty of 1887 had granted America the right to establish a base at Pearl Harbor—and partly because of the Spanish-American War, through which Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines were acquired. Moreover, America obtained part of Samoa in 1899 from

Britain and Germany. As a byproduct of the war with Spain, Cuba in 1903 leased Guantanamo Bay indefinitely. Also in 1903, Washington recognized the independence of Panama and gained control of the Canal Zone in perpetuity.⁴

The Spanish-American War was also significant because it (and the Venezuelan boundary crisis, 1895–96) inaugurated an era of U.S. interventionism in Latin America. President Theodore Roosevelt declared a “corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904 that asserted a national right to assume “an international police power” in “flagrant cases of . . . wrong-doing or impotence” in the Western Hemisphere. The United States intervened repeatedly in Cuba, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. Some interventions were prolonged (for example, Haiti, 1915–34, and Nicaragua, 1912–33, almost continuously). Franklin D. Roosevelt’s noninterventionist “Good Neighbor” policy in 1933 marked the end of this phase.

The main historic thrust of U.S. isolationism was to keep clear of war in Europe, a policy that was sustained until World War I. American forces were sent to Europe in 1917–18 for combat and post-war occupation duties (in Germany until 1923), and to Siberia and northern Russia for intervention (1918–20) in the Russian civil war. After these events associated with World War I, however, overseas deployments of ground forces were mainly limited to areas acquired or leased at the turn of the century. In 1939 about a quarter of the Army was assigned outside the continental United States (20,000 in Hawaii, 17,000 in the Panama Canal Zone, 4,000 in the Philippines, 900 in Puerto Rico, and 400 in Alaska) while the Navy was based at Guantanamo Bay, Samoa, Guam, Hawaii, the Canal Zone, the Virgin Islands, and the Philippines. The Navy regularly cruised the international waters of the Caribbean and elsewhere, however, and the United States based troops and ships in China (including gunboats on the Yangtze) continuously from 1912 to 1941.

After Hitler’s *Blitzkrieg* victories in 1940 the United States reached agreements with Britain and other nations on bases overseas, including Newfoundland, Iceland, Greenland, and Bermuda. Then, after entering World War II with the Japanese attack on

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Pearl Harbor in 1941, Washington acquired an array of overseas bases and facilities in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Asia. Despite rapid post-war demobilization, occupation kept U.S. forces in Europe and East Asia (especially in Austria, Germany, Japan, and Korea) during the onset of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Crises in Berlin, Greece, Iran, and Czechoslovakia, and the Korean War led to many U.S. commitments, which required retaining and upgrading much of the World War II base structure.

By the eve of the Korean War in 1950, the 12 million Americans who had been under arms during World War II had been reduced to 953,000, with 328,000 overseas. The latter included 122,000 in Europe, 150,000 in Japan, and only 500 in South Korea. (American and Soviet occupation forces had been withdrawn from Korea by mid-1949.) The Korean War resulted in a huge expansion of the Armed Forces. The highest level of U.S. military strength (and overseas deployments) during the war came in 1953, when the combat stopped. As shown in the accompanying chart, overseas deployments remained relatively high in the 1950s and 1960s, with a quarter to a third of all active forces serving in some 35 countries, mainly in Europe and East Asia.

The decline in overseas bases and force levels began in the late 1960s. The causes included technical factors—for instance, improvements in command, control, communications, and intelligence; the shift from medium-range B-47s to long-range B-52s; and increased numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs for strategic nuclear deterrence—as well as political events in France, Okinawa, Libya, and Vietnam. As the chart shows, substantially fewer personnel served at home or abroad after the Vietnam War. Various factors explain this decline, including the emphasis of the Nixon Doctrine on more balanced burden-sharing in alliance relations, reduced defense spending, and the move to the all-volunteer force (which created a smaller, costlier personnel system). The 1970s saw further reductions, with partial disengagement (Spain, Thailand, and the Philippines) or total withdrawal (Morocco).

The overall force levels overseas nonetheless remained remarkably consistent through the 1980s, with a brief surge during the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War.


The end of the Cold War in 1989–91 led to substantial cutbacks in U.S. force structure and overseas deployments. The drawdown has been most dramatic in Europe, where two-thirds of all the bases have been closed and forces have been pared from 341,000 in 1989 to 109,000 in 1995. The reduced threat and the sense of diminished need for overseas deployments seem to have encouraged and justified withdrawals hastened by other factors (for example, the departure from the Philippines in 1991–92 after the unfavorable votes in the Manila Senate and the eruption of Mount Pinatubo).

Historical Purposes

The United States has deployed forces overseas for many purposes short of war. Prior to World War II these included protecting commerce and trade routes, deterring and punishing piracy, enhancing prestige, cultivating relations with foreign governments, restoring order, guaranteeing the collection of debts, and defending American citizens and interests during regional upheavals.

The primary justification for FDR's first base accords in 1940 was U.S. forward defense. Overseas deployments can provide early warning of aggressive actions and furnish opportunities for prompt response and defense in depth. Moreover, they facilitate the organization of coalitions for collective defense against aggression and multilateral enforcement of international law. Another purpose has thus been post-war occupation to enforce peace settlements, including disarmament and political reeducation (as in Austria, Germany, Japan, and Korea following World War II). The restrictions on Iraq since the Gulf War—including those enforced under Provide Comfort and Southern Watch—offer a contemporary example of efforts to uphold a peace settlement.

Owing in part to its interest in deterring—and, if necessary, fighting—adversaries far from North America, the United States has made numerous security commitments. Its forces have thus helped protect host countries against coercion or aggression, as well as allies without a continuing military presence such as Norway, Denmark, and



Source: Department of Defense, *Worldwide Manpower Distribution By Geographical Area* (1953–94; various reports).

France. The United States has given credibility to security commitments by placing these forces (and, in many cases, accompanying dependents) at risk overseas.

In backing its commitments with forces abroad, the United States has reassured nations that might otherwise seek nuclear weapons or other exceptional capabilities. Overseas presence has thus supported non-proliferation. Besides, it has—by making political will manifest—contributed to broad goals of deterrence, war-prevention, political and economic stabilization, and influence in regional balance of power configurations across Europe, East Asia, and the greater Middle East. These purposes support larger goals, such as supplying an enduring framework of confidence for trade and (at least in some regions) democratization efforts.

Moreover, bases in Europe and East Asia have provided essential logistical support for forces operating far beyond the host countries, as in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Overseas presence has also offered: means to cultivate relationships with foreign governments to improve prospects for U.S. access to key facilities during crises; resources for exercises and other bi- and multinational activities (including foreign military sales) that maintain interoperability; opportunities for

joint and multinational training in specific climate or terrain conditions and combat zones; and facilities for maintaining and protecting air and sea lines of communication and for ensuring orderly air and maritime traffic control and freedom of navigation in international waters and straits.

Since the late 1980s overseas presence has also become a major element in operations other than war—peace operations, embargoes, no-fly-zone enforcement, nation-building, arms control, democratization, civil-military education, et al. Special operations forces, moreover, participate in unobtrusive foreign internal defense programs that protect societies from anarchy, subversion, and insurgency, and that promote human rights and civilian control of the military.

U.S. forces were deployed at their highest levels after World War II in three conflicts—the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf Wars. In situations short of actual combat during the Cold War, the largest concentrations were in Europe, particularly Germany. This was understandable, given that the bulk of Soviet military power was in Europe, including Russia west of the Urals, with the best-equipped forces massed in Germany. In view

economic and demographic trends will constrain the capacity to maintain forces abroad

of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the withdrawal of former Soviet forces from Central and Eastern Europe, the continuing shift in U.S. overseas commerce from a transatlantic to a transpacific emphasis, the increase in military and economic potential in Asia (notably in Japan, China, and India), and the dangerous situation in Korea, the continued concentration of U.S. forces in Asia might appear more likely than the retention of significant force levels in Europe. But the Gulf War and subsequent events have shown a continuing interest in Middle East oil. The political obstacles to prepositioning equipment and basing forces in large numbers in this region constitute one of the many arguments for sustaining the U.S. military presence in Europe.

Domestic Factors

Economic and demographic trends will constrain U.S. defense spending and the capacity to maintain a large defense establishment, including forces abroad. It will probably be hard to arrest the continuing decline in defense spending underway since 1985 for several reasons: pressures to reduce the deficit; possible tax cuts (or at least a reluctance in Congress and the White House to raise taxes); and growth in entitlements (Social Security, Medicare, et al.) and interest payments on the deficit. These payments will be about \$257 billion in FY96 (16 percent of the Federal budget), and almost equal to defense spending (\$262 billion). Medicare and Medicaid will total \$271 billion while Social Security will amount to \$351 billion. Some project that spending on Medicare and Medicaid will grow at a 7 percent annual rate in real terms in 1995–2000, in part because of increased demand due to the continued growth of the elderly population. During 1983–93, defense spending fell from 6.3 percent to 4.7 percent of GNP, and it is expected to decline further.⁵

In this budgetary context (absent a major international crisis), decisionmakers may perceive financial incentives to further reduce deployments overseas or to demand more host nation support from foreign governments. In this regard the debate in the House of Representatives in 1994 on the

Frank amendment was noteworthy. It called for reducing authorized end strength for NATO Europe unless host nations paid 75 percent of nonpersonnel costs (on the model of the agreement with Tokyo). Without the compliance of our allies, the amendment would have cut strength to 25,000 personnel in Europe and reduced end strength worldwide. The Frank amendment was approved in the House by a vote of 268 to 144, and arguments in its favor were essentially economic—equity in burden-sharing, deficit reduction, and economic competitiveness.⁶

Economic arguments and domestic preoccupations take on greater political significance at times when no serious threat is on the horizon. The sense of a challenge to vital U.S. interests that justified an extensive overseas presence during the Cold War seems to be in decline. The lack of a galvanizing ideological as well as military threat to NATO or world security has raised doubts in the minds of many Americans about the need for much of the remaining overseas presence.

A recent survey of American elites found that “almost half of the Influentials would keep U.S. troop strength in Europe at the 100,000-man level. . . . More than one-third . . . would cut significantly below the 100,000-man level, however, and more than one in ten favor bringing the U.S. force home entirely.” In contrast, the survey reported “a strong two-thirds majority . . . favored keeping U.S. troop strength in South Korea . . . at 39,000 men.”⁷

The same survey found noteworthy differences between U.S. elites and the general public in foreign policy priorities and with regard to the possible use of force:

The Influentials were clearly prepared to send American fighting men to honor long-standing U.S. commitments and protect vital interests. By margins of about two-thirds or more, they would support the use of American forces to defend Saudi Arabia against Iraq, South Korea against North Korea, and Israel against Arab invaders. . . . Compared to the Influentials, the public appeared willing to go to war for almost nobody. The exception was to fight Iraq (53 percent approve, 40 against). . . . The public was strongly against fighting on behalf of South Korea (63 percent versus 31 percent), and marginally against fighting for Israel (48 percent versus 45 percent).⁸

At both the elite and popular levels, the determination to exercise greater caution and selectivity in accepting security commitments overseas—even of a limited and humanitarian nature—appears to have grown, especially after the 1992–94 Somalia intervention.⁹

Americans looking for rationales to cut overseas commitments have found inspiration in the long history of U.S. isolationism. Some cite John Quincy Adams: “America goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.”¹⁰ Indeed, George F. Kennan, the author of the famous “X” article on containment which appeared in 1947, has argued that the principles outlined by Adams are relevant today. Kennan now advocates a “principle of nonintervention” and suggests that “The best way for a larger country to help smaller ones is surely by the power of example.”¹¹ Others propose disengaging from Cold War security commitments and exercising greater restraint in intervening or assuming obligations overseas,¹² adding to the plurality of viewpoints on U.S. international security policy.

The Future Security Environment

The increasing caution about overseas commitments has also stemmed from a resurgence of ethnic conflicts in Europe, Africa, the former Soviet Union, and elsewhere—complex, intractable, age-old antipathies that seem impossible for outsiders to resolve at a reasonable cost and that do not appear to involve vital American interests. The potential security environment, including possible requirements for U.S. military action, is nonetheless far more complex than this general impression.

To begin with, overseas bases may not be as readily available as they were during the Cold War. Political and social trends

Osan Air Base, Korea.



U.S. Air Force (Jim Steele)

Macedonia.



Combat Camera Imagery (Efrain Gonzalez)

abroad may make it more costly and difficult for the United States to maintain bases, facilities, and burden-sharing and host-nation support arrangements in specific countries and regions. In a number of nations there seems to be a growing sentiment that foreign bases amount to a derogation of sovereignty, and sometimes anti-Western or anti-American feelings are concentrated against such installations. There is no longer a convincing Soviet threat to persuade host governments to put up with a politically sensitive U.S. military presence.

Moreover, it became apparent in the 1970s and 1980s—particularly in Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Japan—that greater consensus, coordination, and combined action would be needed for the United States to be able to use the facilities. The obligation to get permission from a foreign country before taking military action has seemed irksome to some American officials

and members of Congress and has reinforced interest in disengagement, unilateralism, and autonomous military capabilities less dependent on foreign facilities. Specific cases differ, however. The desirability of U.S. presence for general regional stability or immediate security needs may be rapidly reassessed, depending on circumstances. Base access may be directly related to the degree of perceived threat and consequent need for help. For example, Iraq's action in August 1990 led to a prompt revision of Saudi policies on foreign military presence. Since the Gulf War some U.S. equipment has been repositioned in Kuwait, complementing facilities in Oman, Bahrain, and elsewhere.


In surveying probable sources and types of conflict—challenges for overseas presence and power-projection capabilities—it is useful to consider a range of scenarios and critically evaluate forecasts about the future security environment. For example, Robert Kaplan's provocative article, "The Coming Anarchy," draws on Martin van Creveld's *The Transformation of War*, and both are subject to the same criticisms: overstating the

decline of the nation-state and underestimating the prospect for large-scale power competitions and conflicts in coming decades.¹³

A recent book by Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky contains a useful point of departure for thinking about the international situation at hand. They contend that the industrial democracies of North America, Western Europe, East Asia, and the South Pacific constitute "zones of peace," with political systems favoring compromise, tolerance, consensus-building, and power-sharing. The rest of the world consists mostly of "zones of turmoil," burdened by poverty and either actual or latent ethno-national struggles. Although the industrial democracies are economic competitors and often differ over how to deal with conflicts in the "zones of turmoil," and although some assert national autonomy on a Gaullist model, there is no prospect of armed conflict among them in the foreseeable future.¹⁴

This study may nonetheless understate the importance of continuing U.S. engage-

Major Active Air Unit Locations (as of June 30, 1994)



Source: Armed Forces Information Service, *Defense 94 Almanac*.

the potential for large-scale conflict in Europe should not be underestimated

ment for political stabilization in Europe and East Asia and the vast differences between the regions. East Asia lacks institutions comparable to NATO, the European Union, and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Democratic institutions are, for the most part, less firmly established. The economic dynamism of specific rising powers is such that—given the unresolved territorial disputes and historical grievances—the region seems much more “ripe for rivalry” than Europe. According to Aaron Friedberg, “While civil wars and ethnic strife will continue for some time to smolder along Europe’s peripheries, in the long run it is Asia that seems far more likely to be the cockpit of great power conflict.”¹⁵

The potential for large-scale conflict in Europe should not be underestimated, however. Though clashes in the former Yugoslavia and the Caucasus have been contained so far, both could lead to wider wars with greater involvement by external powers, including Islamic countries. Russia could present greater uncertainties, owing in part to the risk that democratization efforts could fail and the Russian federation could break apart. Anarchy and civil war, or confrontations with states such as Ukraine, could draw in other powers and result in major conflicts.

Long-term assessments of the international scene should take other risks into account. For example, a depression could lead to a sharper decline in U.S. defense spending as well as overseas presence and engagement, in conjunction with a rise in protectionism and the formation of antagonistic trading blocs, even within supposed “zones of peace.” Anti-Western as well as anti-U.S. ideologies vehemently articulated in some Islamic and East Asian circles could give new purposes to those bent on the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction—leaders who seem to be motivated mainly by regional ambitions and insecurities. Relatively fragile communications and energy infrastructures in America as well as other advanced societies in zones of peace could become targets for adversaries from zones of turmoil, risks that could be incentives for closer cooperation—and continued U.S. engagement and overseas presence.

Some speculation has focused on the possibility of facing new military peer competitors. Owing to its rapid economic growth—according to some, its GNP could exceed our own in 25 years—China is seen as a potential military peer competitor of the United States if it can avoid civil war and maintain its cohesion. Speculative long-term analyses have also mentioned Russia under dictatorship, Japan after events such as Korean unification and U.S. disengagement, and even India if it could gain greater political and social cohesion. Even if they did not become peer competitors, some observers suggest, such countries might become “niche competitors” with substantial capabilities in certain areas—for instance, land-based sea control—or, at least, sea denial (to counter foreign naval forces in littoral areas).

The Changing Nature of Warfare

New methods of combat could well alter overseas presence requirements, especially if a revolution in military affairs (RMA) is underway or imminent. Although various definitions of the concept are in circulation, it is generally agreed that an RMA requires the combination of advanced weapons and associated systems based on new technologies, innovative operational concepts, and astute organizational adaptations. The result of such a revolution is a basic change in the character and conduct of operations, with substantially increased combat effectiveness.

Specialists do not agree on the identification of previous RMAs but offer examples such as the standardization of parts for large-scale arms production, plus mass conscription (1789–1815); the railroad, telegraph, and rifled weaponry (1850–71); and the internal combustion engine, aircraft, radio, radar, carrier air, and strategic bombing (World Wars I and II). During the interwar period Germany was the most farsighted and adept in preparing for land warfare, including coordinating airpower for ground support, while Japan and the United States both exploited carrier aviation and developed concepts and organizations for long-distance operations and amphibious attacks.

If a new RMA is at hand, it may be based on advances in at least three areas of technology:

- ▼ information systems to gather, process, and disseminate data about targets and plans as

well as to deny data to an enemy and thus create an “information gap” or “information dominance”

- ▼ extended-range, highly accurate conventional munitions

- ▼ simulations techniques to train forces and develop new capabilities and operational concepts. It is generally agreed that such a revolution might have greater effects on mid- to high-intensity conventional warfare than on low-intensity conflicts or “operations other than war,” and that mastering the new capabilities (with the requisite new organizations and operational concepts) could take twenty to fifty years.¹⁶

Changes foreseen by current assessments of a new RMA remain to be demonstrated, and some observers have reservations about these assessments.¹⁷ If such a revolution was realized, it would put a high premium on jointness—that is, a closer integration of capabilities to exploit information and long-range precision-strike systems in virtually simultaneous and multidimensional land, sea, air, and space operations.

changes in high-intensity conflict may imply reduced need for forward bases

Operational and organizational innovations could include improved forces dedicated to strategic mobility, information dominance, space control, forcible entry, long-range precision attacks, air superiority, and strategic and theater defense.

Some implications for overseas presence would flow from the probability that an enemy might also obtain new capabilities. In that event, perhaps in 2015–20, prepositioned equipment, ports, airfields, ammunition stockpiles, and infrastructure could become large fixed targets, highly vulnerable to long-range precision-strike attacks. Some speculate that an enemy with extensive surveillance and target-acquisition capabilities might monitor the oceans far offshore and make U.S. carriers vulnerable to precision-guided missiles in some situations.¹⁸

In other words, future planners may find incentives to cut forces overseas, including naval forces in littoral areas, to lessen the risk of losses in preemptive attacks. Alternatively, to operate in range of enemy strike systems, U.S. forces might need improved mobility, stealth, deception, and active defenses—and enhanced means of preemptively neutralizing surveillance, command and control, and strike systems. Some envisage arsenal ships

armed with long-range precision-guided missiles and other strike systems that would imply a drastically reduced need for a huge logistical infrastructure ashore, with reloads, personnel support facilities, and so forth.

Mobility, dispersion, deception, stealth, electronic warfare, and active defenses might be better sources of protection—and wiser investments—than costly permanent installations. It might be desirable to increase investment in maritime prepositioning and to investigate the potential merits of dispersed, “transitory,” low-cost facilities as well as the sustainability of defenses for a smaller number of permanent bases. Overall, changes in high-intensity conflict may imply reduced needs for forward bases and prepositioning ashore but call for maintaining access to foreign-operated facilities. Low-intensity conflict, crisis management, and overseas presence activities comparable to those in recent years might, however, be conducted with assets little different from those today. Requirements for temporary but prolonged overseas basing in support of specific operations might also emerge.

Even with a new RMA, some continuing purposes of overseas presence will require forces abroad, on land or at sea—for instance, to maintain relations with foreign governments and militaries, partly to improve prospects for access to facilities; demonstrate security commitments; and support broader missions such as political stabilization, deterrence, and war-prevention. But presence will probably continue to decline from Cold War levels for political, economic, and military-technical reasons, perhaps without clear-cut strategic decisions in the near term.

Grand Strategy Choices

Although deliberate decisions about overseas deployments and security commitments may be evaded or postponed, the United States will eventually face fundamental choices. It will not be possible to coast indefinitely on the inertia of the immediate post-Cold War era, cutting forces and spending on a percentage basis while trying to retain all the essential elements of past policies.

It was pointed out in 1986 that World War II and subsequent Cold War commitments put the United States “in an unprecedented position of geopolitical extension,”



USS Shreveport,
Norway.

U.S. Navy (Franklin P. Call)

with virtually global deployments. This position is difficult to maintain on logistical grounds, given the need to protect sea and air lines of communication, overseas bases, and related assets; costly to sustain because of the expense of overseas basing, reinforcement capabilities, extended deterrence, C³I, and support facilities; and dangerous to retain, in that overseas commitments imply the risk of being drawn into foreign wars, including nuclear conflicts.¹⁹

It was also pointed out in 1986 that “Virtually the only way in which this country is ever likely to become involved in a nuclear conflict would be in support of one of the overseas commitments which we took on forty years ago. If avoiding nuclear war were the sole objective of our foreign policy, the critical first step would undoubtedly be to withdraw from these responsibilities and to bring our forces home.”²⁰ Exactly this sort of argument for disengagement is now made in some circles, justified not only by the end of the Cold War but also by increased risks of nuclear proliferation.²¹

Aaron Friedberg suggested that America’s unprecedented overseas engagements would be “hard to justify over time to a democratic polity,” given its isolationist traditions. As a result, U.S. policymakers have had to provide justifications for the “effort, expense, and danger of intervention and

continuing engagement.” Three approaches have been available:

- ▼ an “explicitly imperial” rationale—glory, economic gain, even a “civilizing mission”
- ▼ power politics—preserving a favorable balance of power and securing national interests
- ▼ ideology—America’s duty “to oppose an inimical political creed or to promulgate its own beliefs.”

Except for the era of the Spanish-American War, Friedberg observed, Americans have been reluctant to see their nation as an imperial power. A combination of power politics and ideology has usually provided the rationale for involvement in war and overseas commitments in this century.²²

The argument can be made that U.S. security commitments and military presence in Europe and East Asia help to prevent local arms races and power competitions and thus diminish the risks of war. The political stabilization function may, however, become less and less credible in domestic politics. In effect, the argument is that U.S. involvement helps to prevent or postpone arms competitions and conflicts between major powers in Eurasia. Ultimately, such wars may take place—perhaps in fifty or a hundred years. American politicians and commentators may ask whether lessening the possibility of such major-power regional wars is worth the expense and security risks involved.

Such questions draw attention to the crossroads America faces. As Friedberg asked in 1986:

How could the case for continuing U.S. engagement best be made? . . . Presumably the truest, and one hopes therefore the most persuasive, argument will involve again a blending of ideology (both positive and negative) and power politics. Perhaps it will also have to include an appeal from necessity, which has a somewhat unfamiliar ring to American ears. However difficult the course on which we embarked forty years ago and however distant its end, the alternatives to it are all likely to be far worse.²³

Engagement versus Disengagement

In broad terms the Nation faces a choice between continuing engagement and disengagement. As the figure suggests, continuing engagement would imply an enduring and central U.S. role in meeting challenges to international security. The United States would

Engagement versus Disengagement

	Continuing Engagement	Disengagement
<i>Basic U.S. Role</i>	Remain at center of international security management efforts	Concentrate on immediate security needs
<i>U.S. Posture Overseas</i>	Provide extended deterrence and other types of protection and support (including intelligence) to allies and key security partners	Withdraw from extended deterrence and cut other security commitments and partnership activities (including intelligence-sharing)
<i>Near-Term Costs</i>	The more difficult course to pursue politically, owing to domestic priorities and the short-term analysis tendency in U.S. politics	Perhaps the course of least resistance in domestic politics—less costly in the near term, with fewer immediate risks
<i>Long-Term Implications</i>	Lower probability of regional conflicts among major powers, but continued immediate risks	Higher probability of major-power regional conflicts owing to renationalization and greater multipolarity, and more nuclear proliferation, with the risk of the United States being drawn into war on unfavorable terms

thus maintain extended deterrence and other protection and support to key allies and security partners, and corresponding capabilities including global surveillance and power-projection assets. This would represent a more difficult course in U.S. domestic politics, because it would involve a higher level of immediate costs and risks. But it might substantially reduce prospects for major-power regional confrontations and thus markedly lessen long-term costs and risks. The alternative of disengagement would be less costly in the near term, after the United States absorbed the initial cost of withdrawing and disbanding forces, transporting and storing equipment, and closing bases. But disengagement could radically increase long-term risks. Long-standing alliances could break down, perhaps in a surprisingly rapid “renationalization” of defense policies; regional power vacuums and arms competitions could emerge; nuclear proliferation could accelerate; and power configurations unfavorable to U.S. security interests could arise.

Some prominent Americans have underscored the U.S. role as a guarantor and stabilizer to prevent unwanted outcomes. For example, in August 1991, after the attempted coup in Moscow, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney warned that disengaging from our alliance commitments could cause destabilization by encouraging nuclear proliferation:

If I look at Germany or . . . Japan, I see two nations that I hope will continue to be close allies of the United States. . . . I would think [that] if the United States cuts back so much that all we can do and all we can talk about is defending the continental United States, we'll create an incentive for other nations that do not now feel the need to develop their own nuclear arsenals to do so.²⁴

Similarly, shortly before joining the Clinton administration, Walter Slocombe, who currently serves as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, wrote:

A unified Germany would not readily rely indefinitely on a British or French deterrent. The practical issue, therefore, is whether there will be U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe—or German ones. So long as there is a reluctance to see German nuclear weapons, there will be a strong case for an American nuclear guarantee made manifest by the presence of nuclear weapons nearby.²⁵

In February 1995, Joseph Nye, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, indicated that one of the purposes of forward presence in the Asia-Pacific region is to “discourage the emergence of a regional hegemon,” adding that “[the] United States has the capability, credibility, and even-handedness to play the ‘honest broker’ among nervous neighbors, historical enemies, and potential antagonists.”²⁶

One must distinguish between different models of disengagement and various outcomes of reduced involvement in Eurasian power configurations. What might the U.S. military posture look like under a disengagement approach that was nonetheless oriented to defending immediate and longer-range security interests? The defensive perimeter would naturally include Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. territories in the Pacific and the Caribbean and might extend to the mid-Atlantic and the northern part of South America, to protect access to Venezuelan oil. Investments in intelligence, space, ballistic missile and air defenses, and nuclear forces would have to continue and perhaps be increased to compensate for greater instabilities

the damaging consequences of disengagement might take years to develop

and risks in key regions. America would still need airlift, sealift, maritime prepositioning, power projection, and interventionary capabilities that, in turn, might need to be improved to compensate for a lack of forces, equipment, and installations prepositioned forward ashore. It is not clear whether the financial savings would be significant in relation to the increased risks to national interests, such as overseas allies, economic and security partners, and key resources—to say nothing of the greater potential for major-power regional rivalries and wars, absent the U.S. engagement as a stabilizer and balancer.

While disengagement options would require extensive analysis, one might also postulate a *comprehensive* disengagement rather than a *partial* disengagement as outlined above. This would imply a far smaller military establishment; a defensive perimeter limited to territorial possessions; continued or increased investments in intelligence, space, ballistic missile defense, air defense, and nuclear forces; and greatly reduced airlift, sealift, power-projection, and interventionary capabilities. In this hypothesis, a withdrawal from the greater Middle East might be justified by the emergence of hydrogen fuels or other substitutes for oil, new oil deposits, and greater conservation measures. More generally, the advocates of a U.S. withdrawal from Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East might appeal to arguments such as the following: commerce will continue in the economic self-interest of the trading

partners; arms competitions, wars, and other struggles among regional powers do not engage vital national interests; peace is “divisible,” contrary to the rhetoric of those who would entangle the United States in the Eurasian balance of power; and America can best serve democracy by minding its own business, addressing its domestic problems, and serving as a good example.

Such arguments may gain political potency and should not be dismissed as shortsighted or as half-truths without due analysis. The military posture and national security strategy postulated under either a partial or comprehensive disengagement appear, however, to pose greater long-term risks than being immediately engaged and well-positioned to shape the international security scene. The damaging consequences of disengagement might take years to develop, but there can be little doubt about their nature. Crisis response actions and overseas commitments and deployments are scrutinized abroad for signals of the risks that America is prepared to accept and the behavior that it is likely to oppose. U.S. disengagement could be destabilizing because some nations might seek to acquire new capabilities (including nuclear arms) and establish new coalitions to substitute for partnership with the United States.

Fundamental choices are involved: To what extent can the United States sustain over the long term the task of serving as a central leader in world security management, one of the strongest guardians of international order in the U.N. Security Council, and a key stabilizer and balancer inhibiting new major-power regional rivalries and conflicts? The limits to America’s resources and the nature of its interests argue for international engagement, renewing the key alliances, and pursuing skillful, long-term efforts to maintain alliance cohesion and military interoperability and effectiveness. For its own security, the Nation must promote an international security environment which is pervaded by confidence in its military credibility and in America’s political sagacity and staying power.

The United States should be resolute in upholding its commitments to key security partners. Backed by overseas presence and

other capabilities, these commitments contribute to a structure of stability and order (albeit imperfect). This structure will be necessary, for the foreseeable future, to promote vitality in the world economy, sustain democratic reform, organize collective action against aggression and other threats (such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), and ensure America's own security and prosperity. Uncertainty about our political will and priorities over the long term can only be addressed through persuasive and steadfast leadership. Doubts about the wisdom of continuing our overseas engagement would, of course, be compounded by political and strategic blunders. Hence, perhaps even more than in the past, U.S. leaders will have incentives to cultivate discernment and to exercise selectivity in the face of specific military challenges. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ Special thanks are owed to members of the overseas presence working group sponsored by the Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School. The historical section benefitted greatly from the advice of Frank Schubert, Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Among the best sources on overseas presence are George Stambuk, *American Military Forces Abroad* (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1963) and Robert E. Harkavy, *Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982).

² For background, see Ellen C. Collier, ed., *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–1989* (Washington: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, December 4, 1989).

³ Paolo E. Coletta, ed., *United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985), pp. 115–21, 202–06.

⁴ This arrangement was modified by treaty in 1978. The United States agreed to withdraw all its forces by the end of the century, but with (1) a permanent right to return to defend the canal against any external threat to its neutral service to the ships of all nations and (2) a guarantee that U.S. warships would have a right to expeditious passage in emergencies.

⁵ The data in the last sentence of this paragraph may be found in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1993–1994* (Washington: Government Printing Office, February 1995), p. 87. The Office of Management and Budget furnished the rest of the data in this paragraph.

⁶ *Congressional Record* (May 19, 1994), pp. H3736–46. No comparable amendment was passed in the Senate. In August 1994 the House-Senate conference committee approved a defense authorization bill for FY95 that substantially qualified the Frank amendment. The level of roughly 100,000 as the authorized end strength for Europe was retained for the end of FY96; but the Frank

amendment goal to have our European allies pay at least 37.5 percent of the stationing costs by that date was adopted by the conference committee.

⁷ Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press, *America's Place in the World: An Investigation of the Attitudes of American Opinion Leaders and the American Public about International Affairs* (Washington: Times Mirror Company, November 1993), pp. 37–38.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 26.

⁹ See, among other sources, Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, "Arms and the People," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 6 (November/December 1994), pp. 47–61.

¹⁰ John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State, address on July 4, 1823, cited in George F. Kennan, "On American Principles," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995), p. 118.

¹¹ Kennan, *ibid.*, pp. 123, 125.

¹² See, for example, Ronald Steel, *Temptations of a Superpower* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).

¹³ Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 273, no. 2 (February 1994), pp. 44–76; Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991).

¹⁴ Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1993).

¹⁵ Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," *International Security*, vol. 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/1994), p. 7.

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¹⁷ A.J. Bacevich, "Preserving the Well-Bred Horse," *The National Interest*, no. 37 (Fall 1994), pp. 43–49; and Carl H. Builder, "Looking in All the Wrong Places?" *Armed Forces Journal International* (May 1995).

¹⁸ Barbara Opall, "China Sinks U.S. in Simulated War," *Defense News* (January 30, 1995), pp. 1, 26.

¹⁹ Aaron L. Friedberg, "America's Strategic Position," *Parameters*, vol. 16, no. 4 (Winter 1986), pp. 30–36.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

²¹ See, for example, Ted Galen Carpenter, "Closing the Nuclear Umbrella," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 2 (March/April 1994), pp. 8–13.

²² Friedberg, "America's Strategic Position," pp. 36–38.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

²⁴ Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, address to the American Political Science Association, August 29, 1991, p. 8–1 of text furnished by the Department of Defense.

²⁵ Walter B. Slocombe, "The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in a Restructured World," in Patrick J. Garrity and Steven A. Maarenen, eds., *Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World: Perspectives from Europe, Asia, and North America* (New York: Plenum Press, 1992), p. 63.

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PRESENCE—

Do We Stay or Do We Go?

By JAMES A. LASSWELL

America maintained an unprecedented level of its military strength overseas for over forty years—from a quarter to a third of the Armed Forces. The primary purpose was to contain the Soviet Union. This rationale is now gone leaving defense intellectuals to debate how to protect our interests in a new era. The naval camp contends it can be achieved by *forward presence*—keeping some combat forces abroad. The continental camp argues that it can be accomplished with *virtual presence*—forces based in the United States but capable of rapidly responding to overseas crises. This is the difference between being engaged on the world scene and a return to Fortress America.

What Now?

Form follows function in overseas presence as elsewhere. That presence was structured to oppose a specific land power in the Cold War, the Soviet Bloc. U.S. presence abroad during that period—excluding the Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars—averaged about half a million. Of those, almost 400,000 were Army and Air Force personnel who directly countered threats in Europe and Korea. Naval forces made up the balance, supporting Europe and Korea on the maritime flanks. And they handled uncertain threats—some 80 percent of the crises to which the Nation responded from 1945 to the end of the Cold War. As the Soviet threat receded, so did land-based presence in Europe. Force levels there dropped from

340,000 in 1989 to under 100,000 today. On the other hand, naval presence remains about the same as it was during the Cold War, just under 100,000. Why? While the certain threat went away, the uncertain ones did not.

Now an intense competition for resources among the services prompts the question: does the systematic naval presence stay or does it go? The new Air Force white paper *Global Presence* (published in the last issue of *JFQ*) proposes replacing “the cop on the beat” with virtual presence, satellite coverage of key areas backed by CONUS-based bombers and troop transports responding on warning. Still others maintain that defense attachés, mobile training teams, and ground units deployed for allied exercises are an effective overseas presence. In essence, these alternatives are all CONUS-based strategies indicative of isolationism.

The more important question is what does the Nation seek to achieve on the world scene? If we choose a strategy that is not supportive of that, the costs could be higher than realized.

What was a by-product of the Cold War now becomes the primary reason for maintaining forces overseas—a liberal world economy. It developed behind the walls of containment, with the oceans—under the aegis of a forward Navy—as the unifying medium. North America, Western Europe, and East Asia account for three-quarters of the gross world product. Accordingly, the National Security Strategy seeks enlargement, incorporating Cold War outsiders in this economy, on the premise that prosperity will bring regional stability.

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The world economy that came out of the Cold War is vulnerable to post-Cold War disorder. Absent a threat, the international community is becoming increasingly susceptible to fragmentation. The symptoms are all too apparent: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rogue states, the rise of national rivalries, deteriorating states, ethnic unrest, and mass refugee migrations. The world economic system is susceptible to disorder as demonstrated by the 1987 Gulf Tanker War, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the recent collapse of the Mexican peso.

Why Forward?

U.S. military presence remains central to the regional stability on which the expansion and enlargement of the world economy depends. A 1992 survey of American embassies around the Mediterranean indicated unanimous agreement on the deterrent value of our presence. East Asian nations want our presence for the same reason. American presence deters since it represents the might of the only superpower. As Admiral William A. Owens, USN—the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—recently wrote, “Any potential opponent must assume that it cannot win a military confrontation with the United States.”¹

American presence is a critical thread holding together an otherwise fragmenting world

Overseas presence is real, as opposed to hypothetical, use of CONUS-based forces. “Any potential opponent of the United States contemplating a *fait accompli* strategy,” Owens continues, “is likely to see greater risk if U.S. forces are visibly present than if they are not.” The initiative rests more with on-the-scene forces. They can readily influence events in contrast to the reactive nature of CONUS-based forces. And if this forward presence fails to deter, it becomes the “tip of the spear,” the enabler for follow-on forces.

The efficacy of presence is readily apparent. Many nations in Asia want America to remain the countervailing power in the face of an ascendant China. In the Mediterranean, U.S. presence keeps rogue states such as Libya in check. In addition, the rescue of noncombatants from Liberia in 1990 and, in particular, from Somalia in 1991 largely relied on the proximity of naval forces. And

when presence failed to deter Iraq, U.S. carriers covered the initial airlift to Saudi Arabia.

American presence is a critical thread holding together an otherwise fragmenting world. Its interactions engage allies and friends in cooperative security efforts. When sustained over time, it builds interoperability among forces. It sets the stage in crises for successful coalitions which are ad hoc in nature. Operation Desert Storm succeeded largely because of four decades of allied work in NATO. Moreover, a credible American combat presence provides a nucleus around which the forces from other nations can coalesce.

Why Naval?

Clearly, presence is critical to the security environment. But while many nations want the United States to remain in their region, most do not want foreign troops on their soil even in times of crisis, as has been often seen. American presence will withdraw increasingly from Eurasian shores to the decks of vessels operating in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and western Pacific. Naval forces, which accounted for a fifth of our overseas presence in the Cold War, are expected to reach half after 2000. Future naval presence will involve more than just crisis response, which is how most people view it today. As Owens notes, “Naval forces will increasingly be seen as representative of the entire range of U.S. military power.”²

While naval presence may be out of sight and mind for most Americans, its visibility to others means it plays a greater role in deterrence. As always, deterrence depends on an opponent receiving, understanding, and heeding an intended signal. “We perceived the U.S. Navy as more psychologically impressive,” a former Soviet admiral stated, “since the U.S. Air Force maneuvers were not so obvious.”³ Conversely, the British relied on overflights to demonstrate their interest in the Falklands prior to the 1982 Argentine invasion.

With the diffusion of nuclear power, forward-deployed naval forces will be a more credible deterrent. The threat posed by U.S. strategic weapons may be seen by lesser nuclear states as too disproportionate to be credible. Accordingly, deterrence will shift

toward conventional weapons with greater accuracy and lethality, launched by forward-postured carrier air and Tomahawk land-attack missiles.⁴ Deterrence may also depend on ship-based theater missile defenses.

Engaging and enlarging cooperative security efforts will be done increasingly through naval presence. Their success in crisis depends on building confidence in military capabilities, as well as interoperability, beforehand. But many nations do not have the domestic political capital to allow U.S. forces on their turf for exercises, not to mention for operations. In the words of the Chief of Naval Operations, "Naval overseas presence may be the best way to establish military-to-military relationships with many of these new nations . . . they welcome the contact with the United States but do not want to be smothered by it."⁵ Largely because of this, the Navy participated in 163 combined exercises involving 58 nations in 1994.

The most unappreciated reason for naval presence is freedom of the seas. The seas remain unrestricted to global trade and strategic mobility largely because of the Navy. This is more than a nod to Mahan. Under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS) regional waters are more militarized and some 82 countries have claimed excessive territorial seas. Unless contested, these claims might be regarded as valid through acquiescence. Since the advent of LOS in 1982, such claims have been operationally challenged more than 200 times, primarily by the Navy, and as a result 12 nations have formally rolled back their claims.⁶

What If We Don't?

Those who advocate CONUS-based strategies may not be considering the consequences of an increasingly fragmented world. After the continuous presence of American forces in a region, many nations would likely regard reduction or withdrawal as a diminishing of U.S. interest. Their anxieties are likely to be manifested in forms of protectionism not realized before.

The link between a reassuring presence and liberal trade must not be ignored. It is unlikely that a nation would raise trade barriers without concern over the withdrawal of U.S. forces by an angry American public.

This appears to have influenced Japan's rejection of the Malaysian proposal for a strictly Asian political-economic forum that excluded the United States. But American military withdrawal means removing a key incentive to discouraging the formation of trading barriers and blocs. Consider the disintegration of the world economy into trading blocs where competition might turn adversarial.

Also consider a world without U.S. presence, one in which security concerns drive nations to acquire nuclear weapons. Asia is a prime example. Faced with a nuclear-armed China, Japan would likely seek a nuclear arsenal if our presence was retracted. If Japan went nuclear, so could most of East Asia. Maintaining or abandoning overseas presence may mean the difference between nuclear proliferation being constrained or unconstrained. Those who believe presence can be provided with less than credible combat power—such as mobile training teams or defense attachés—may find that they have offered up hostages to hostile nations and groups.

Overseas presence is the price a superpower pays for doing business in a relatively safe and secure world. There is no short-cut. Presence means either being there or not. It is the difference between engagement and isolation. If we choose the latter option, it is likely to lead to a more dangerous world that is far more costly than maintaining overseas presence today. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ William A. Owens, *High Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted World* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), p. 12.

² *Ibid.*, p. 38.

³ Stanley B. Weeks, "U.S. Naval Forward Presence in the Cold War: Perceptions of Former Soviet Elites" (Science Applications International Corporation, November 1994).

⁴ Joint Strategic Planning Staff, "The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the New World Order," Report of the Science Advisory Group, October 1991, p. 26.

⁵ Presentation by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, September 20, 1994.

⁶ CJCS Instruction 2420.01, August 16, 1993, enclosure B, "Illegal Maritime Claims"; DOD Representative for Ocean Policy Affairs memorandum, subject: "Excessive Maritime Claims," March 23, 1995.

Problems of Defense Organization and Management

By MICHAEL B. DONLEY

Congress is asking if strategy, management, and organizational trends are on track

In February 1993 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) completed a triennial report required by law on the roles, missions, and functions of the Armed Forces which contained 29 specific recommendations. But Congress expressed dissatisfaction with the report, finding that the "allocation of roles and missions among the Armed Forces may no longer be appropriate for the post-Cold War era," and that realignments may be essential for efficiency and effectiveness in light of lower defense budgets. The FY94 Defense Authorization Act therefore included a provision

for the creation of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces to review allocations of roles, missions, and functions, evaluate alternatives, and recommend change. This article looks at current issues of defense organization as well as relevant trends in defense management.

Agreeing on appropriate terms of reference is an important starting point for a discussion of defense organization and management. *Roles, missions, and functions* may be considered terms of art in that they have special significance in this context. They are

not necessarily well defined or consistently applied in the defense community, however, and their meaning can at times overlap. A degree of discrimination can nonetheless be achieved by synthesizing the usage found in CJCS reports, JCS Pub 1-02 (*Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*), and Title 10 of the U.S. Code.

For the purpose of this review:

▼ Roles are the broad, enduring purposes for which organizations are established in law.

▼ Missions are broad tasks, combined with a description of purpose, indicating action to be taken; considered generally as integrating many activities around a common theme or purpose. (Missions are tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to combatant commanders.)

▼ *Functions* are powers, duties, and responsibilities; considered generally as intended activities.

Usually such definitions are helpful; but they are likely to fall short in distinguishing all the activities and relationships at issue among DOD components. The subjects and multiple levels of detail in the CJCS report show the difficulty in separating “roles, missions, and functions” from general challenges to defense organization and management. Previous debates on roles, missions, and functions have also been heavily laden with issues of strategy, plans, doctrine, and resource allocation. Just after World War II, for example, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal observed that “until the Joint Chiefs have completed their joint strategic plans, there is no solid foundation on which to base a meaningful assignment of roles and missions.”

The commission’s charter has reinforced this view. Among other things, it was tasked to:

▼ “review the types of military operations that may be required in the post-Cold War era,” taking into account “official strategic planning”

▼ “define broad mission areas and key support requirements for the U.S. military establishment as a whole”

▼ “develop a conceptual framework for organizational allocations” among the military departments and combatant commands.

In addition to reviewing terms of reference and the charter, historical and political contexts are also important. In the evolution of defense organization since 1947 the commission is perhaps the most significant congressional initiative since the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act to advance fundamental questions about *who* does *what* and *why*. And, in a strategic environment which is vastly different from that of the mid-1980s, with a budgetary squeeze, the congressional charge for a new look at roles, missions, and functions could serve many purposes. In a general sense Congress is asking if strategy, management, and organizational trends are on track and what must be done to get greater combat effectiveness and peacetime efficiency out of a smaller defense establishment. Such issues demand well-developed perspectives on DOD organizational structure and its components. Therefore, this article is concerned primarily with roles and functions.

Organization and Management

DOD is a large, highly complex organization that is not easy to compare to other executive departments or private enterprises. It is a product of history (our own and that of other countries), technology, legislation, et al. The effectiveness of its components is often seemingly intertwined with the success or failure of individuals who lead them and vice versa. Nevertheless, the purpose and intent behind defense organization can be discerned in law and regulation, and its development traced over the course of the last five decades.

Congressional Intent. The purposes for creating a new military establishment are outlined in a “Declaration of Policy” in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 401):

In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide . . . a Department of Defense, including the three military departments of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide that each military department shall be separately organized under its own secretary and shall function under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide for their unified direction under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense but not to merge these departments or services; to provide for the establishment of unified or

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Newport Conference,
August 1948.



U.S. Navy

specified combatant commands and a clear and direct line of command to such commands; to eliminate unnecessary duplication in the Department of Defense, and particularly in the field of research and engineering by vesting its overall direction and control in the Secretary of Defense; to provide more effective, efficient, and economical administration in the Department of Defense; to provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces but not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the Armed Forces nor an overall Armed Forces general staff.

The “Declaration of Policy” does not reflect everything that has been done to shape organization, though changes such as the Goldwater-Nichols Act were presented as “consistent with” and adding emphasis to its basic purpose. The declaration contains broad objectives for the establishment of DOD such as “unified direction” and “effective, efficient, and economical administration”; words and phrases found later throughout the statute (such as “under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense”); and at least three prohibitions—not to merge the services and not to create a single “chief of staff” or “general staff.” It also reveals bureaucratic tensions that existed in 1947 and also later between central and decentralized au-

thority. Overall, however, the rambling nature of this declaration needs support by organizational structures and relationships established in law and regulation to clarify congressional intent.

Making Sense of Various Elements. Title 10 [chapter 2, 111(b)] organizes DOD into ten basic components:

- ▼ Office of the Secretary of Defense
- ▼ Joint Chiefs of Staff
- ▼ Joint Staff
- ▼ defense agencies
- ▼ DOD field activities
- ▼ Department of the Army
- ▼ Department of the Navy
- ▼ Department of the Air Force
- ▼ unified and specified combatant commands
- ▼ such other offices, agencies, activities, and commands as may be established or designated by law or by the President.

Yet a careful reading of the law and DOD Directive 5100.1 shows that these components are divided into three major elements:

1. *The roles and functions related to the unified authority, direction, and control of the Department*

of Defense are vested in the Secretary of Defense, assisted by his staff (the Office of the Secretary of Defense) and the defense agencies and field activities which report to them.

Law and regulation are particularly clear in the ultimate authority and responsibility of the Secretary of Defense. He is charged with providing DOD components with guidance on national security objectives and policies for preparing programs and budgets, as well as policy guidance for the Chairman concerning contingency planning. The Secretary is in the chain of command and is responsible for the effective, efficient, and economical administration (including the assignment of defense agencies and field activities to his staff or CJCS); and all components—including military departments—are subject to his authority, direction, and control.

2. The roles and functions of joint military advice, strategic planning, and the integration and direction of combatant forces are vested in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (headed by the Chairman), the Joint Staff, and the unified and specified combatant commands.

CJCS responsibility for joint military components is very clear. He presides over JCS, controls the Joint Staff, and is assigned no less than 52 principal functions under DOD Directive 5100.1 which are independent of the corporate responsibility of the Joint Chiefs to provide military advice. At the direction of the Secretary (as authorized in law), CJCS functions within the chain of command, serves as spokesman for CINCs, and is responsible for their oversight. While he has no command authority, the Chairman may aptly be described as the day-to-day manager of the CINCs as well as the Secretary's "first phone call" on issues involving combatant commands.

3. The roles and functions of organizing, training, and equipping forces are the responsibility of the military departments (that is, the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force).

The military departments are separately organized and administered under their respective secretaries, who are in the chain of command for purposes other than the opera-

tional direction of forces which are under CINCs. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the common functions of these departments fall into four groups. *Organizing* includes recruiting, mobilization, and demobilization. *Training* includes doctrine, procedures, tactics and techniques, and support for joint training. *Equipping* includes research and development, supply, maintenance, and "construction, outfitting, and repair of equipment." The fourth function is the general *administration* of these activities including servicing forces; developing policies, programs, and budgets; carrying out construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings; and managing real property. Overall, through these functions, the role of each department is to prepare and maintain ready, mutually supporting forces (including Reserves) for assignment to combatant commands.

In sum, the purposes of defense organization as outlined in law and regulation, as well as the roles and functions of many DOD components, are best understood under three major elements:

- ▼ unified direction, authority, and control
- ▼ joint military advice and planning as well as integrated employment
- ▼ organization, training, and equipping administered generally on the basis of land, sea, and air forces.

While a good deal of congressional interest has focused on duplication among the services, higher level issues among three primary elements—the Office of the Secretary of Defense, joint military components, and military departments—are also important. Most DOD components and activities have roots in them, and basic issues of defense organization and management involve appropriately balancing them and the way that roles and functions intersect or overlap. Moreover, organizational and bureaucratic history can best be understood in the context of how these elements developed.

Organizational History

The period from 1947 to 1960 was formative as the legitimacy of centralized control slowly increased. The management and oversight responsibilities of the Secretary developed in functional organizations beginning with the comptroller and expanding to

the Chairman may be described as the day-to-day manager of the CINCs

the general counsel, R&D, supply and logistics, personnel, health affairs, et al. The strengthening of joint military perspectives went beyond coordination among the Joint Chiefs in post-war theaters of occupation to a new system of unified and specified combatant commands. And statutory responsibilities for operational control of forces shifted from military departments and service secretaries to JCS, combatant commanders, and the Secretary. This period can be characterized as a struggle between central authorities and long-standing (previously autonomous) military departments.

The authority that the Secretary acquired in this formative period was asserted throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. Management processes (in particular, the planning, programming, and budgeting system and the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council) shifted broad resource allocation responsibilities to OSD, and growth of defense agencies and field activities was initiated to promote efficiency in areas of common supply and support. Both of these trends further eroded the influence of the military departments. As a result of these trends and the Vietnam War, familiar interservice rivalries were less prominent than friction with OSD over the importance and quality of joint advice as well as the role of civilians in operational planning. Overall, this was an era of civil-military competition.

The 1970s and 1980s produced a progressive rebuilding of bridges between OSD and JCS in matters of strategy, policy, and resource allocation. It also saw growing joint influence in DOD management processes. The authority of the Secretary over DOD activities was reinforced, as was OSD staff control over defense agencies. The role of CJCS was strengthened by the assignment of numerous duties and responsibilities independent of the corporate JCS, and CINCs gained further control over their component forces. The influence of the military departments continued to decline in comparison to OSD and joint military components, but the responsibilities of civilian appointees in service headquarters were broadened. In sum, those organizations at the highest levels—OSD, CJCS, and CINCs—were substantially strengthened during this period.

The review conducted by the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed

Forces shares similarities with earlier debates. Interservice issues seem much the same, for example: how to separate Air Force and Army responsibilities for theater aerospace defense and ground support; how to distinguish between Army and Marine Corps contingency or expeditionary responsibilities; and how to properly allocate airpower responsibilities across the services. Each issue involves the assignment of responsibilities and forces among the military departments. As in 1948, this review occurs in a period of strategic reassessment and reductions in spending. But the context of these and other issues has been greatly changed by history and operational experience, technology, and organizational developments. A quick comparison will illustrate the magnitude of this change.

When Secretary Forrestal took the Joint Chiefs to Key West in March 1948 (seven months after passage of the National Security Act) the military departments were still the dominant players in what was then the National Military Establishment. The Secretary had little institutional stature, almost no staff, and only a rudimentary organizational plan for his office. The Joint Chiefs were seen as representatives of service interests; and the Joint Staff was weak and beholden to individual JCS members. A new outline command plan was less than 15 months old and JCS did not as yet have a chairman.

In contrast to Forrestal's situation in 1948, incremental changes have profoundly altered the balance of power (that is, the roles and functions) among DOD components. Today the Secretary has all the authority and standing that law can provide, a large staff, and 45 years of operational and management precedents that have weakened the independence of the military departments and strengthened joint military components and perspectives. JCS is headed by a powerful Chairman recognized under law as the principal military advisor who controls the Joint Staff, oversees a vital system of unified commands, and exercises increasing influence over the allocation of resources.

The extent to which the 1948–49 roles and missions debate was really a continuation of the 1946–47 debate over organization and post-war strategy, as Forrestal noted, deserves elaboration. The roles and

missions debate of the late 1940s, played out in bureaucratic struggles over the first DOD organizational directives, had much to do with contrasting perspectives of how the services would fight the Soviet Union. Each service jockeyed for position as the Nation's "primary force in being" by arguing the wisdom and feasibility of strategic bombing and carrier air, and by wrestling for control (and debating impacts) of new technologies. Eventually, these volatile arguments came down to a programmatic competition and to a false choice between weapon systems—the Air Force B-36 bomber and the proposed Navy "super carrier."

Strategy is an issue today. The collapse of the Soviet Union has caused a rethinking of defense requirements across the board, and despite the Base Force and the Bottom-Up Review the resulting adjustments may not yet be complete. But the process for deciding strategy is more joint than ever and is no longer dominated by the military departments. Likewise, the development of major new technologies and weapon systems is increasingly influenced by

the strategic environment calls for flexibility, and doctrine for force employment emphasizes jointness

joint requirements and an acquisition process managed by OSD. Joint processes are emerging to develop strategic plans, define mission areas, identify essential tasks, and validate requirements. Thus, while there may be disagreement over the direction of a new military strategy, changes in structure and processes since 1948 leave little doubt that the Secretary and Chairman are responsible for deciding its content.

Moreover, if in 1948 the chain of logic (from strategy to roles and missions and programs) was strategic bombing to long-range nuclear delivery and the B-36, there as yet appears to be no compelling analogy in 1995. Congress invited the commission to establish such linkages if and where they seem warranted, but it is not clear that any simple alternatives have emerged to form the basis for radically new directions in strategy. And it is wholly unlikely in today's environment that such alternatives would gain support if developed around limited, one-dimensional, single-service capabilities. Cold War and

post-Cold War experience reveals the broad range of political-military circumstances and geographic locations to which the Nation may commit its forces in a variety of combinations. The strategic environment calls for flexibility, and doctrine for force employment emphasizes jointness. As underscored in Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*:

The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team. This does not mean that all forces will be equally represented in each operation. Joint force commanders choose the capabilities they need from the air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces at their disposal. The resulting team provides joint force commanders the ability to apply overwhelming force from different dimensions and directions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents. Effectively integrated joint forces expose no weak points or seams to enemy action, while they rapidly and efficiently find and attack enemy weak points. Joint warfare is essential to victory.

Changes in structure, process, and doctrine may explain why the definition of a mission as outlined in recent CJCS reports is a "task assigned to a CINC." This is a departure from 1948 when missions were assigned to military departments which had responsibility for operations, and given a weak joint system, competed for dominance in making strategy. Such changes underscore the major importance of roles and functions—the balance among OSD, joint military components, and the military departments—and the need for careful attention in current debates. In fact, many contemporary issues can be accurately framed within the context of this three-way relationship.

Aligning Roles and Functions

Where should the line be drawn between OSD and service responsibilities? Many longstanding problems are embedded in managing support functions common to all three departments, like medical, personnel, financial management, C⁴, base engineering, commissary, et al. In these areas a basic tension exists between the responsibility of the Secretary for "effective, efficient, and economical administration" of DOD and the intentional structure of "three military departments . . . separately organized." On issues of support or administration, OSD sees the military departments potentially doing business three different ways and thus seeks a better solution. As outlined in the conference report to

The Secretary accepting the report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces on May 23, 1995.



DOD (R.D. Ward)

the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the law intends generally for the Secretary to have “sole and ultimate power within the Department of Defense on any matter on which the Secretary chooses to act,” giving him broad authority to reorganize DOD activities without changing statutory arrangements. Yet the practical problems of balancing the assignment of responsibilities among the DOD components must be addressed, involving careful distinctions among concepts such as policy review and oversight, management, resource allocation, administration, and program execution. These have been key problems in the reduction and streamlining of defense infrastructure.

During the early 1990s, as common support functions were consolidated, in part through the Defense Management Review, the roles of OSD and military departments became subject to confusion in areas such as contract management, financial management, medical programs, and personnel management. This oversight grew into hands-on program and resource management, with more authority migrating to OSD officials, and responsibilities for day-to-day

execution split between newly created defense agencies and further diminished military departments. As a result, the principle of maintaining authority and responsibility together within clear chains of command has been progressively and broadly compromised (a problem also common in defense acquisition). Moreover, the result could be the consolidation of support functions to the extent that combat and support forces would be separately administered in peacetime, and OSD-run agencies would be primary providers of support in war. There is little evidence that the implications of such an action have been thoughtfully considered.

It is also notable that the appropriate alignment of responsibilities for support functions is not limited to debate between the military services and OSD, as illustrated by the 1990–91 case of depot maintenance. In this instance, OSD determined that closer interservice coordination of the reduced depot workload would not yield sufficient savings and efficiency. The resulting proposal for a depot maintenance agency (under the then Assistant Secretary of Defense, Production and Logistics) so concerned the services that it was greeted by a counterproposal for a Unified Depot Maintenance

nance Command under CJCS. This classic roles and functions debate begs the question of whether depot maintenance is to be regarded, in relative terms, as a business/management activity or a function of combat support. It is, of course, a combination of both; but the issue of reducing depot maintenance capacity and apportioning management and operational responsibilities among OSD, joint military components, the military departments, and the private sector is unresolved.

How should responsibilities be divided between joint military components and the military departments? Two current issues offer examples. First is the division of responsibilities between these elements in the areas of operational planning and doctrine. While the joint military structure (in particular CJCS and CINCs) is responsible for preparing contingency plans, much of the competence and doctrinal expertise concerning employment of land, sea, and aerospace forces (generally, but not exclusively, from single-service perspectives) is found in the three military departments. The role of Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, in developing the CENTCOM air campaign plan in the Gulf War is a case in point. As joint agencies such as the Joint Warfighting Center are strengthened the question of appropriate divisions of labor with the departments will be

there are questions about “exceptional cases”—the Reserve components and Special Operations Forces

more prominent. Likewise, the strengthened role of CJCS in resource allocation raises the issue of how much of the programming and budgeting assets in the military departments and OSD should be duplicated by the Joint Staff or combatant commands. It is not clear how the CJCS prerogative to develop alternative program and budget proposals (under section 153a, 4c) will be exercised.

How should roles and functions be divided between OSD and JCS? Since both law and DOD directives intend that JCS function as the “military staff” of the Secretary of Defense, he must apportion responsibilities between his staff and JCS. The recent debate surrounding the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) under the Vice Chair-

man is evidence that major issues are at stake concerning the balance of responsibilities between the military departments and JCS in developing requirements, programs, and budgets. And it raises questions on the respective roles of civilian and military staffs in providing advice on priorities to the Secretary, in particular on the role and function of JROC versus that of the Assistant Secretary for Strategy, Requirements, and Resources and the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation. It also addresses the relationship between the council and the Defense Resources Board. While there is no doubt that the Secretary is responsible for strategy, policy, and unified direction of DOD, the structure and process for making decisions about resource allocation—although a matter best left to the Secretary’s discretion—also deserve careful consideration from a roles and functions perspective.

In addition to the above issues, which address the juncture of responsibilities among OSD, joint military components, and the military departments, there are unresolved issues *within* each. With respect to OSD and JCS, in particular, it can be argued that issues of internal functions and responsibilities should be handled at the discretion of their respective leaders. This is more difficult in the military departments, however, since Title 10 provides for both military and civilian staffs within the same departmental headquarters. The Goldwater-Nichols Act addressed some of those issues in 1986, but current (and contrasting) models for managing acquisition as well as financial and manpower affairs in the departments reveal that there is unfinished business and that a further rationalization of civilian and military responsibilities would lead to greater efficiencies.

Finally, beyond addressing roles and functions *among* and *within* the essential elements of DOD, there are questions about the status of “exceptional cases”—areas of law where Congress created unique relationships. Two examples worthy of special note are the Reserve components and special operations forces (SOF).

The Reserve components—which include the Army and Air National Guard—have a long heritage combining the tradition of state militias and citizen-soldiers with important national plans and assumptions about mobilization. A thorough review

of roles, missions, and functions should ask what the Nation needs from the Reserve components—basic questions that are long overdue. What should be their role in a post-Cold War strategy, within both the DOD management structure and the Federal-state relationship with regard to the Guard? Is current Total Force policy sufficient to define this role? Is there a way to depoliticize the Reserve components and to develop a modern management approach that could more efficiently meet Federal requirements for mobilization and state needs for augmented public safety and disaster relief? If we were starting with a clean slate in the late 20th century, would we establish Federal Reserves as well as multiple National Guards?

SOF administrative responsibilities are addressed differently under law than those of other combatant commands. Congress gave head of agency responsibilities to a CINC (for example, for programming, budgeting, and equipping), dividing authorities generally assigned elsewhere to the military departments. One must ask whether such an alignment and concentration of authority and resource allocation responsibility in a combatant commander is an exception to the general practice, should be adjusted, or could be used as a model for defense reorganization.

The evolution of defense organization combined with both a new strategic environment and resource constraints provide a rich menu of defense management issues. Thinking about DOD in terms of its three essential elements can provide a useful framework for discussion. A key issue is whether the underlying organizational structure remains clear or is being clouded by “exceptional cases” and a long series of piecemeal adjustments lacking coherence or vision.

The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces can make a significant contribution by presenting its findings in ways that provide management principles that can be used by the Secretary and Congress to make recommendations or subsequently resolve roles, missions, and functions issues; clear a path for the DOD leadership to settle issues internally before Congress intervenes; and offer the Secretary and Chairman an agenda for the methodical review of defense organization and management.

Among the broad paths available for review, issues related to general roles and functions deserve special emphasis. Such points raise fundamental questions about the core responsibilities of OSD, joint military components, and the military departments; how management and command relationships between combatant forces and supporting infrastructure can be approached, balancing combat effectiveness and peacetime efficiency; and the state of civil-military relations. The House National Security Affairs Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee as well as the Secretary and Chairman are responsible for shaping defense organization. If the DOD leadership does not attend to higher order issues, current trends may lead to a further blurring of roles and functions among the essential elements of DOD. Without a thoughtful assessment of the primary roles and functions outlined in Title 10 we may lose perspective on *who* is responsible for *what*, a true duplication and diffusion of effort may result, and the fundamental purposes of those organizations established in law may be easily forgotten. **JFQ**



War Termination and Joint Planning

By ROBERT R. SOUCY II,
KEVIN A. SHWEDO, *and*
JOHN S. HAVEN II

Surrender ceremonies
in Tokyo Bay,
September 2, 1945.

U.S. Army

While attending the Armed Forces Staff College, the authors took part in an exercise called Certain Challenge which exposed them to strategic and operational concerns at the Joint Staff level. One lesson of the exercise was the importance of guidance from the National Command Authorities (NCA) on how to end a war. That guidance was lacking throughout the planning process during the exercise and had a ripple effect of uncertainty since, absent an end-state with specific criteria, the crisis procedures were left without a unifying theme. What is more, volume one of Joint Pub 5-03, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (Planning Policies and Procedures)*, did not provide us with guidance on how to integrate and analyze criteria for the termination of a conflict.

Even step-by-step crisis action checklists which are part of the joint operation planning and execution system (JOPES) lack clarity on the subject of war termination. One is not reminded to consider termination criteria. It is reasonable to assume that timely development and continuous revision of criteria should be integrated into all phases of JOPES, yet there is a void in guidance. The issue which confronted us was whether this gap is real or the result of our unfamiliarity with joint doctrine.

The lack of clear guidance on war termination criteria is confirmed by recent operations in the Persian Gulf and Somalia as well as through an examination of joint doctrine. Concern over this issue—from Clausewitz to a range of other prominent theorists of war—speaks to its historical as well as contemporary relevance.¹ While no one can predict how a conflict will end, Clausewitz knew the effect that chance has on conflict,²

but asserted that the primary characteristic of war was its nature as a political tool and not chance itself. He wrote:

*If we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it. . . . The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment . . . is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking. . . .*³

That test involves two factors: that war is a deliberate instrument of policy and that it varies with given situations. War, in essence, reflects the motives of policymakers.⁴ This is important because it reveals that although war is in the realm of chance, it is more fundamentally a province of policymakers who must inform manipulators of violence—that, is military commanders—what they want from war and how to end it. Surprisingly ending war receives scant attention: “The fact is that of the three categories of the spectrum of conflict,” writes Harry Summers, “war termination has been virtually ignored. In our fascination with the means of strategy, we have neglected the study of its ends—those objects which will lead directly to peace.”⁵

Why does the United States fail to prepare for the end of war? Finding a definitive answer to that question may prove elusive. Russell Wiegley has suggested that the American way of war follows a strategy of annihilation.⁶ If so, this approach could predispose us to destroy an enemy force while blinding us to other means of achieving objectives. Furthermore, inflexibility can lead an adversary to fight harder and prolong conflict. As Sun Tzu mused, a desperate foe should not be pressed too hard, especially if he is returning home, because he will probably fight to the death.⁷ A bloody battle of little strategic or political import is a double tragedy.

The amount of bloodshed and violence in a conflict has a bearing both on the war and the peace that follows:

*The modern desperation in war produces a bitter legacy. . . . All sides harbor bitter feelings because of widespread death and destruction. The losing side agonizes over how much it gave and how much it lost. The winner resents the suffering endured in relation to the objectives achieved. . . . Winning a better state of peace after a modern war may be the most difficult of all tasks.*⁸

why does the United States fail to prepare for the end of war?

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U.S. Navy (Tony Joseph)

UNISOM troops leaving for home under United Shield.

As difficult as winning that state may be, it must be approached with an understanding of the consequences of considering war and peace in isolation. They are linked; actions in one affect the other. Based on the literature it appears that there is one key connection between them, namely, the termination phase, that is grasped by the Nation. But recent conflicts demonstrate that, while we may understand the concept of war termination, we have difficulty applying it.

Historical Perspective

After identifying a potential flaw in the joint crisis planning process, we tested our insights against those of military planners in the Gulf War and Somalia. We had to establish definitions for two key concepts, end-state and war termination, before drawing conclusions. We chose to use John Fishel's definition of end-state. He said it is "what the leadership desires the battlefield and the surrounding political landscape to look like when the war is over. . . . Moreover, end-states suggest descriptions, in fairly great detail, of the goals of national policy."⁹

Termination objectives "define the intended manner of conflict termination and the required military and diplomatic achievements to obtain it."¹⁰ War termination criteria thus seem not only to establish the conditions for a cease-fire, but also help commanders and planners prepare for what follows combat operations.

On August 5, 1990, three days after Iraq invaded Kuwait, President Bush articulated the following objectives to Congress: "immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad."¹¹ As diplomatic, economic, and limited military means failed to achieve those objectives, he ordered that the objectives be accomplished through offensive military action. According to one analyst, the coalition leaders tried to think the conflict through from start to finish: "Bush and the other allied leaders were careful to em-

phasize that the winning of the war had to be followed by winning the peace."¹²

The initial combat phase of Desert Storm was fought from the sky. Coalition aircraft struck targets in the theater for a month to prepare for the ground phase. Once started, the ground effort moved quickly. In 72 hours "the coalition was about to accomplish . . . two key objectives—Iraqi army out of Kuwait and reestablishment of the legitimate government."¹³ General Powell found the reports of carnage disturbing and told General Schwarzkopf that a cease-fire could not be far away. He also relayed his concerns to the President. Lawrence Freedman wrote, "Politically the President had to judge whether the extra advantage to be gained by finishing off the remaining Iraqi units was worth the political costs of the continuing carnage. [NSC staff member] Richard Haass later observed, using an American football analogy, 'We didn't want to be accused of piling on once the whistle had been blown.' If the war ended on a sour note, this could complicate post-war politics. For these reasons the President was now inclined to conclude the war."¹⁴

Some analysts discovered that the desire to end the war raised a problem for the coalition: "Once the basic objective of the

**mutual understanding
between policymakers
and commanders requires
constant attention**

war—evicting Iraq from Kuwait—was accomplished, there was no clear post-war path for the coalition to follow.”¹⁵ One observer also found confusion on the post-war path that the Nation should take: “The U.S. Government . . . suggested another political objective for Kuwait that was not at all reflected in the end-state derived by the military planners. This objective was to move the Kuwaiti government to a more democratic mode.”¹⁶ And there was more confusion in the air. Fishel went on to note that public rhetoric by President Bush caused some concern about whether the removal of Saddam Hussein had become one of the criteria for war termination.¹⁷

Somalia illustrated the troubled relationship between political leaders and field commanders in crises. The commander of the 10th Mountain Division, for instance, had difficulty in obtaining specific guidance from NCA about ending the operation. In an article describing the lessons of that experience, he observed that he and his staff drafted proposed end-states to forward up the chain for approval and also fashioned criteria to determine if the desired end-state could be achieved.¹⁸ Mutual understanding between policymakers and commanders requires constant attention.

Doctrine

Before analyzing joint doctrine, and specifically JOPES, one must briefly consider the joint doctrine system. It is relatively new and still incomplete with many publications in development. It uses keystone volumes as foundation guidance for major areas of doctrine. Most joint planning guidance is contained in Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, and Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. JOPES is a subset of multiple volumes in the 5-0 series. A look at Joint Pub 5-0 and Joint Pub 3-0 with regard to termination criteria is revealing.

First, Joint Pub 5-0 does not discuss termination criteria or how they are related to the end-state and planning military operations. It focuses on basic principles and concepts of joint planning and describes the organization and structure for conducting deliberate and crisis action planning.¹⁹ Anyone using JOPES and in need of clarification

on termination criteria will not find it in Pub 5-0. Joint Pub 3-0 stands out by comparison.²⁰ War termination was much on the minds of its authors and is covered in considerable detail. Planners are reminded to blend termination criteria into initial planning and strategy formulation prior to operational activity, to wit:

*Properly conceived conflict termination criteria are key to ensuring that victories achieved with military force endure . . . it is fundamentally important to understand that conflict termination is an essential link between national security strategy, national military strategy, and posthostility aims—the desired outcome.*²¹

Further, there is guidance on when to consider criteria:

*Before forces are committed, [a JFC] must know how NCA intend to terminate the operation and ensure its outcomes endure, and then determine how to implement that strategic design at the operational level [emphasis added].*²²

Pub 3-0 offers clear guidance on the relevance of war termination criteria in joint planning. Since anyone who finds Pub 5-0 lacking has another source, why worry about deficiencies in the JOPES manual? Is the answer to simply to look up the guidance in another publication? The short response is no. A better answer requires understanding the JOPES role in national planning.

JOPES is much more than a manual. It is an elaborate system run by many people who use procedures, publications, and automatic data processing to integrate NCA policy decisions with military planning and execution at national, theater, and supporting organizational levels. JOPES supports this integration by facilitating actions during deliberate planning or crisis action planning. Deliberate planning “is a cyclic process carried out in peacetime to develop and refine plans to be used in wartime.” It is a detailed, intricate five-phase process which can take 18 to 24 months.²³ Yet nowhere in the chapters on deliberate planning is the critical nature of war termination criteria discussed. This is not a serious problem because of the long timeframe involved; planners have plenty of opportunity to refer to Joint Pub 3-0 and all the pertinent information in other doctrinal

publications while developing their deliberate plans.

A crisis, on the other hand, requires a different process, because there is a threat against U.S. interests that develops rapidly and may call for a military response.²⁴ Crisis action planning, according to Pub 5-03.1, “provides for the rapid and effective exchange of information and analysis, the timely preparation of military [action] for consideration by crisis procedures, and the prompt transmission of NCA decisions to supported military commanders.”²⁵ Commanders use options previously developed by deliberate planning if possible to solve crises quickly, but such plans have major shortcomings. JOPES points out that deliberate planning is done for *hypothetical* crises and relies “heavily on assumptions regarding the political and military circumstances [which] make it improbable that any contingency plan will be usable without modification.”²⁶ In a crisis, military staffs are faced with a serious, rapidly developing situation for which they must produce a plan that takes into account the realities of a particular problem, not a hypothetical incident. Moreover, they may not have a lot of time to consult the keystone doctrinal manuals.


JOPES helps alleviate the tremendous pressure in a crisis by building a six-phase process with a checklist of actions for anticipated problems. Are clear instructions given on formulating war termination criteria and a coherent strategy around them? Are criteria articulated and passed on to operational commanders? Unfortunately the answer to both questions is no; much guidance is given, but little concerns conflict termination. For example, phase two of crisis action planning is crisis assessment. This phase “[begins] with a report from a supported commander and ends with a decision by the NCA or the Chairman . . . to develop possible military COAs.”²⁷ Joint planners are not advised at this critical time to ask NCA about their concept for terminating a war or crisis. They are instead advised to review plans, coordinate noncombatant evacuation with the Department of State, review legal obligations, evaluate rules of engagement, update strategic lift, and redirect intelligence gathering, et al.²⁸ Such actions are important but

so are conflict termination issues. Prompting to begin a dialogue between NCA and the Joint Staff is not found in this part of JOPES.

Guidance also is not on the supported commander's checklist. The JOPES checklist does not lead supported commanders to query the Joint Staff, CJCS, or NCA about interwoven courses of action that they develop with certain termination criteria. They are told to take the same types of actions as the Joint Staff.²⁹ Even guidance given by NCA through CJCS at the end of the crisis assessment phase does not foster dialogue on termination issues. The Chairman's warning order, according to the JOPES format, contains general guidance on assumptions, a generic remark about political constraints, and the requirement for a concise mission statement. Other guidance is given on courses of action, operational security and deception, psychological operations, intelligence and counterintelligence, civil affairs, et al., but nothing specific about termination criteria.³⁰

The subject is never explicitly mentioned in phase two. Nor is it raised in phases three, four, or five. Only with phase six (execution) and publication of the execute order does the concept appear. JOPES guidance states that CJCS “takes actions needed to effect a quick and successful termination of the crisis.”³¹ This information, however, is in the basic chapter on crisis planning and not the checklist. In the latter, CJCS is advised to assess the *accomplishment of objectives* and the supported commander to *replan or terminate the operation*.³² This is the first explicit mention of crisis termination and comes after all previous phases—situation development, crisis assessment, COA development and selection, and execution planning—are finished. Despite being urged to integrate termination criteria early, the guidance given to commanders and planners in a pressure-filled crisis situation consists of only two references in the final execution phase.

The advice of James Reed, special assistant to the Secretary of the Army, is appropriate: “War termination has been a neglected topic for doctrinal development . . . current operational doctrines display a serious blind spot with regard to the issue of conflict termination.”³³ His proposal includes seven guidelines for ending the doctrinal silence on war



guidelines for ending the doctrinal silence on war termination: backward-planning and conditions planners should work toward

U.S. Army (Case D. Trejo)

Discussing cease fire terms, March 3, 1991.

termination, two directly related to this discussion: backward-planning and clearly defining the conditions military planners should work toward. He trusts this would “prompt increased communication between the civilian and military leadership . . . to ensure congruence between operational objectives and the larger policy aims of a campaign.”³⁴

A review of the theory, literature, issues, and doctrine leads to the following conclusions:

- ▼ Winning the peace is as important as winning the war and calls for judicious application of force and knowing when to stop fighting.

- ▼ Current joint doctrine used for deliberate planning (especially Joint Pub 3-0) adequately sensitizes planners to the concept of war termination criteria.

- ▼ The practical application of the concept in crises—as seen in the Persian Gulf War and Somalia—seems haphazard.

- ▼ The absence of initial or updated political guidance about termination criteria in a crisis can be critical. Such gaps may require commanders to alter the tempo of operations at critical times to allow for guidance to be developed or to improvise their own. Such unilateral military actions may be counterproductive because they reverse the critical flow between political guidance and the application of military force.

- ▼ The current system for crisis action planning in JOPES does not highlight the need for the Joint Staff to facilitate the dialogue between NCA and operational military commanders on war termination criteria, nor does it mandate the

formulation and issuance of specific guidance to the military commanders.

- ▼ Such criteria, once developed, must be constantly reassessed by all parties involved as the situation evolves.

Responses to conflict must be planned and conducted to enhance prospects for long-term peace and stability. One dimension is knowing when, where, and how to stop hostilities. There is a gap in the current JCS planning guidance, however, that may result in planners overlooking the importance of this factor during a fast moving crisis. Therefore, new guidance needs to be added to each phase of the JOPES crisis action planning system sections of the manual as follows:

- ▼ *phase one (situation development)*—guidance that the theater commander’s assessment should incorporate thoughts on how to resolve the situation

- ▼ *phase two (crisis assessment)*—guidance that CJCS should query NCA about termination criteria and to include NCA termination guidance in the warning order to facilitate the supported commander’s backwards planning

- ▼ *phase three (COA development)*—first, guidance that theater commander must use the termination criteria from warning order to develop possible COAs; second, CJCS will evaluate the CINC’s estimate and recommended COA using the termination criteria before submission for NCA approval

▼ *phase four (COA selection)*—guidance that CJCS should reconfirm the termination criteria with NCA; CJCS should also review the criteria in either the planning order or the alert order to the theater commander

▼ *phase five (execution planning)*—guidance that the theater commander reevaluate the COA selected by NCA in terms of the reconfirmed termination criteria; CINCs should, situation permitting, bring any shortfalls or limitations to the attention of CJCS and NCA before entering the next phase

▼ *phase six (execution)*—guidance that CJCS monitor the situation for potential changes in the applicability of current termination criteria and communicate them to all concerned parties.

The above recommendations will ensure that termination criteria are considered throughout the crisis planning process. Until then, we will enter every crisis with a built-in handicap. The time to change JOPES to address this void is now.

JFQ

NOTES

¹ A search revealed 37 books and articles from the mid-1980s with an accelerating interest in the 1990s.

² See Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 101 and following.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 87–88.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

⁵ Harry G. Summers, Jr., “War: Deter, Fight, Terminate; The Purpose of War is a Better Peace,” *Naval War College Review*, vol. 39, no. 1 (January–February 1986), p. 19.

⁶ Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. xxii.

⁷ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 109–10.

⁸ Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, *The Eagle's Talons: The American Experience at War* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1988), p. 34.

⁹ John T. Fishel, “Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm” (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 31, 1992), p. 59.

¹⁰ Armed Forces Staff College, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1993*, AFSC Pub 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. I-I-41.

¹¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress* (Washington: Government Printing Office, April 1992), p. 19.

¹² Ronald Dannreuther, “The Gulf Conflict: A Political and Strategic Analysis,” *Adelphi Papers* no. 264 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992), p. 57.

¹³ Lawrence Freedman, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 403.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 404.

¹⁵ James Blackwell, Michael J. Mazarr, and Don M. Snider, Center on Strategic and International Studies Study Group on Lessons Learned from the Gulf War, *The Gulf War—Military Lessons Learned* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 47.

¹⁶ John T. Fishel, “Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue,” p. 61.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

¹⁸ S.L. Arnold, “Somalia: An Operation Other than War,” *Military Review* (December 1993), p. 34.

¹⁹ Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations* (Washington: Government Printing Office, May 1993). It is important to note that this is still in the proposed stage of doctrine development and subject to change; as currently structured it provides only very generic guidance.

²⁰ Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington: Government Printing Office, September 9, 1993). Chapter 2 fails to mention war termination criteria or post-conflict concerns, but there are numerous references elsewhere beginning with a three-page discussion on p. III-30.

²¹ Joint Pub 5-03.1, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System*, Volume 1, *Planning Policies and Procedures* (Washington: Government Printing Office, August 4, 1993), p. I-1. Five volumes and supplements address various aspects of JOPES. Only volume 1 covers the minimum content for crisis action planning procedures which should address the areas where war termination criteria would fall if it had been properly covered. See pp. I-2 and I-4.

²² *Ibid.*, p. III-2.

²³ Class notes from AFSC Pub 1, p. 6–4.

²⁴ This paraphrases the definition of crisis found in Joint Pub 5-03.1, volume 1, p. V-1.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. V-1.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. V-1.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. A-2-1.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. A-2-1 to A-2-2.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. A-2-2 to A-2-3.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, all of Annex C.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p.V-15.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. A-6-1 to A-6-2.

³³ James W. Reed, “Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning,” *Parameters*, vol. 23, no. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 41–42.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 49–50.



Joint Medical Support:

Medical transport aircraft at Ramstein.

U.S. Air Force (Chris U. Putman)

Are We Asleep at the Switch?

By ARTHUR M. SMITH

The terrorist bombing of the Marine barracks at Beirut airport in 1983 prompted a detailed evaluation of the medical structure available to support similar incidents as well as a conflict in Europe. Some of the medical capabilities probed were command and control, casualty evacuation, regulating procedures, facilities capabilities, the transition from routine peacetime to contingency operations, and efficacy of readiness planning. While no life was lost that could have been saved, if the ratio of killed to wounded had been reversed, with more than 200 in need of treatment rather than only half that number, the system might have failed. Has the intervening period enabled us to assess such shortcomings, adapt to a new security environment, and offer prompt, consistent care?

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Analyses of the Beirut bombing revealed deficiencies in readiness caused by shortages in personnel, evacuation assets, and materiel, as well as lack of joint planning for their wartime use.¹ Such deficiencies were attributable to the low priority that medical readiness is given in planning, programming, and budgeting. Recommendations included greater investments in basic readiness resources and refinement of mechanisms for effecting command and control over wartime support and operating those assets. A worldwide reassessment of contingency medical capabilities ensued, and a template of principles for implementing joint support of combat operations evolved.² Then Operation Desert Storm provided an opportunity to reassess progress in meeting readiness goals in contrast to the medical support provided in response to the Beirut tragedy.

Deployment

After Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, Saudi Arabia requested assistance and U.S. Central Command (CENT-

COM) tasked the services to provide specific medical support. By most accounts, units that were deployed provided adequate care. In the eyes of analysts from Capitol Hill, however, if the war had started earlier or lasted longer, or if the number of casualties had matched the predictions, the care would have been grossly inadequate.³

While the Navy sent the units requested, casualty predictions were double what they were intended to handle. For instance, hospital ships designed to receive up to 100 casualties per day for a sustained period were told to anticipate between 200 and 300; and combat zone fleet hospitals capable of receiving 80 casualties per day were actually expecting 200. Under those projections, there would have been shortages in Navy and Air Force units, although they were staffed to their authorized levels. Critical shortages would have occurred among general and orthopedic surgeons, anesthesiologists, nurse anesthetists, operating room nurses, and non-medical support personnel.

Within Navy fleet hospitals and Air Force air transportable hospitals, noncombat

medical needs in support of a continuous flow of sick call patients put a heavy demand on medical services. Females, for example, comprised 6 percent of deployed naval personnel, yet only one gynecologist was assigned to the deployed hospitals, and no space or examination table was allocated in the fleet hospitals for gynecologic examination. Similarly, there were insufficient Air Force gynecologists. Also lacking during the buildup phase were sufficient orthopedic specialists, since members of all services incurred bone, joint, ligament, and tendon injuries which required specialized care. While medical units had some sick call supplies and equipment, their inventories could not accommodate the demand. Thus some patients were evacuated to distant facilities, often for long periods.

Prior to ground operations, hospital ships and fleet hospitals were told to expect that up to 15 percent of casualties would be contaminated. No service had units designed or staffed to handle large numbers of such casualties. Fleet hospitals did not even have decontamination stations.

Training

To support combat operations medical training is focused on teaching individual skills and preparing units to perform wartime tasks. Individuals must manifest not only medical expertise but basic combat skills. Likewise, medical units must train to perform fundamental military activities as units rather than as individuals with varied skills. Units must also perform "militarily unique" medical roles in combat. In an echeloned medical support structure, for example, surgical care of wounds must be done incrementally, at differing facility levels, instead of total care at one hospital. This would mean having extensive personnel and logistic resources in forward combat areas which is not feasible.

Realistic field training with wartime equipment is critical for preparing medical personnel to fulfill their mission in a no-warning situation. Yet the DOD inspector general believes the services have failed to provide it.⁴ Following the Gulf War, GAO revealed that many medical personnel had limited training in their military specialties or coping with a new environment. Individuals in deploying units were often unaware

many medical personnel had limited training in their military specialties

of their wartime assignments, particularly junior officers and enlisted personnel. Poor oversight of compliance with mandatory basic training requirements for officers caused deployment delays until those requirements were met.

Many naval medical personnel lacked basic military skills in the Gulf and were adjudged as ill-prepared to serve in the fleet hospitals, hospital ships, and Fleet Marine Force hospital facilities. Those stationed on *Mercy* and *Comfort*, for example, cited training deficiencies in shipboard skills such as firefighting, damage control, mass casualty evacuation, abandon ship procedures, and chemical, biological, and radiological defense. Prior to deployment, fewer than half were trained in those areas, and three quarters had no prior shipboard experience. Furthermore, less than a fifth of the active duty personnel with the First Fleet Hospital were trained to construct and operate a fleet hospital, much less practice medicine under field conditions.

Unlike hospital ships with state-of-the-art equipment, fleet hospitals had technology from the 1970s and early 1980s. Thus, most of their personnel had not trained with the aged equipment before arriving in-theater, contributing to a pervasive belief that care would be inadequate. Moreover, many personnel had never, or not recently, treated trauma patients, and a majority had not completed training in combat casualty care.⁵ In addition, few fleet hospital and hospital ship personnel were trained in patient decontamination and treating chemically contaminated casualties. The Navy estimated that less than 10 percent of its physicians being deployed could treat such casualties, but luckily the buildup allowed them to complete an acceptable level of medical and operational training.

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the DOD inspector general noted that: "The First Marine Expeditionary Force surgeon expressed concern over the training of Navy medical forces that were deployed to the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). The surgeon said that Navy corpsmen, doctors, and nurses who augmented FMF did not have the operational training to be immediately effective. As he stated, 'Thank goodness we had five to six weeks to get everyone trained prior to the war's beginning.'"⁶ Indeed, not all corpsmen, physicians, and nurses who augmented FMF

were Field Medical Service School (FMSS) trained. In addition, some corpsmen certified as field medical technicians had never served with FMF. Thus their familiarity with Marine operations was limited. A Navy physician with a Marine tank battalion stated that his battalion aid station (BAS) personnel had limited experience in the transport, assembly, and disassembly of the station in the field. "The most valuable lesson that I learned," he indicated, "is that we must be willing to train during times of peace as we will operate during times of conflict."⁷

Many Army medical personnel were also adjudged unfamiliar with equipment and facilities used by field hospitals and units. Due to inaccessibility of field equipment, they had not trained on deployable medical systems which they would use in contingencies. Following Desert Storm, the CENTCOM surgeon remarked, "The . . . overwhelming emphasis on peacetime health care conflicted with the training and readiness of Army clinical personnel to provide the best medical care to large numbers of casualties in the combat zone."⁸ Moreover, air transportable hospitals in the Gulf were supplied with older generations of equipment. Consequently, extensive training on the hospital gear was conducted for Air Force personnel in-theater.

Mobility

During the 1970s and early 1980s various studies and joint exercises confirmed the need for standardized deployable facilities. As developed, the deployable medical systems (DEPMEDS) consist of standardized unit modules (operating rooms, laboratories, radiology suites, etc.) that can be transported and configured into field hospitals. Although DEPMEDS modules now comprise a large portion of DOD war reserve equipment, there remain problems with their mobility, support equipment, and policy guidance.

While DEPMEDS strategic mobility is paramount to all services, each has differing tactical requirements. The Army needs a considerable amount of tactical mobility since its field hospitals support advancing combat forces. To move a 60-bed mobile army surgical hospital (MASH), for example, requires organic transport to haul 63 containers configured in fifty 40-foot truckloads.

Many hospitals lacked trucks and handling equipment for such a move, which meant that only part of the bed capacity and surgical capability of a MASH could go forward as the ground war began. As a result—due to the speed of the battle—more than 40 percent of bed capacity was left behind in order to allow MASH units to be positioned to provide surgical support early. Furthermore, some units were not fully mobile even when there were adequate trucks because the fifty 40-foot vehicles could not keep up with the combat forces and had to wait until the engineers built roads.⁹

Communication

Shortfalls in communication during the Gulf War degraded the casualty receiving mission, compromised personnel and patient safety, and hampered contact between treatment facilities and control elements. These problems were primarily related to divergent capabilities and limitations at the inter- and intra-service levels. Medical units could not communicate with control elements, one another, supported combat units, or supporting logistics units. While moving into Iraq, some field hospitals had no method of communicating with combat and evacuation units for several days.

Dialogue between medical units and between the different levels of care (for example, from aeromedical evacuation units to field hospitals) was difficult due to the mix of radio equipment and the use of commercial and tactical telephone systems. Without communication capability, Army field hospitals and some Air Force facilities frequently had no forewarning of the number or type of casualties. The only warning some hospitals had was when aeromedical evacuation helicopters landed with patients. Helicopters and hospitals could not communicate with each other; the former had FM radios with a range of only 20 miles and the latter had AM radios with only line-of-sight capability that when used near a battlefield could be traced by the enemy.

Similar communication problems were identified during Urgent Fury and Just Cause, and in subsequent joint exercises

such as Proud Eagle, Reforger, and Team Spirit. Although DOD has tried to field interoperable and reliable equipment for combat units, no comparable effort was made for medical units. In 1986 the Secretary of Defense issued a policy for fully equipping the first to fight (deploy) regardless of component. While both XVIII and VII Corps met the criteria, those medical units were not equipped with adequate communication equipment.

When Desert Shield began in August 1990 the communication equipment was inadequate. The services had not identified or subsequently resourced their requirements. For example, tables of organization and equipment for Army contingency hospitals cited a need for AM and FM radios. While FM radios were listed, hospitals had a lower priority than combat units and rarely received them. Moreover, the services have acquired communication equipment that is not interoperable. These problems will continue until the commitment is made to a joint, interoperable communication system that includes medical units.¹⁰

Evacuation

Prompt and well-planned casualty evacuation requires matching patient needs and treatment facilities. It assures that hospitals are not over- or underutilized, which is essential when numerous facilities are available. In the Persian Gulf War patient regulating systems did not provide effective oversight of casualties. Communications problems were the greatest limitation. Troops could not talk to ambulances. Radios used by medical regulators had operating ranges of 15 miles in a corps area 250 miles deep and 100 miles wide. Therefore ambulance crews, using similar equipment, could not communicate with most evacuation regulators or hospitals and took patients to facilities whose locations they knew, not to those best suited to the needs of patients.

One air ambulance crew reported flying directly to a hospital over enemy tanks and infantry after picking up casualties. If it had been a shooting war the aircraft and its crew might have been lost for want of directions.¹¹ To overcome communication problems, both VII and XVIII Corps had air ambulances making repeated round trips between a designated forward collection

patient regulating systems did not provide effective oversight of casualties

point and a drop-off area in the rear near hospitals. As a medical officer with a Marine tank battalion noted, "The locations of higher echelon field medical facilities were not even available at the battalion or division level!"¹²

In the Gulf War, the Air Force—as lead service for joint theater medical regulating—was to provide the communications system to regulate the movement of patients to appropriate facilities. A report by the Air Mobility Command stated that communications problems resulted in 43 percent of patients landing at the wrong airport which required their rerouting.¹³ In sum, the inability of regulators to manage evacuation could have led to underusing some hospitals and overwhelming others, a tragedy if the casualties had met projections. Even automated systems were not standard, interoperable, or available in all theaters and could not track individual patients. Each service had its own system, and the incompatibility of systems severely limited interservice communication.

Moving patients under medical supervision to or between treatment facilities by military or military chartered transport is known as medical evacuation. While all the services maintain tactical and strategic aircraft for combat and combat support, the Army and Marines provide most tactical ground and helicopter lift for medical evacuation. The primary Air Force medical mission is in-theater fixed wing aeromedical intra- and intertheater evacuation. Problems arose in Desert Storm with ground ambulances and helicopters in tactical evacuation of patients. Ground ambulances often could not be used because of rugged terrain, lack of navigational equipment, and distances between hospitals and front lines. Even for air evacuation units long distances required refueling. Air ambulances landed near ground vehicles to request fuel or directions to fuel supplies.

Lacking organic aeromedical evacuation assets, the Navy depends on returning (retrograde) aircraft that are primarily assigned combat support missions other than medical as transportation of opportunity for moving casualties to hospital ships and fleet hospitals. But such aircraft may be scarce, and the ability of ships to receive and treat casualties can be limited by transport difficulties. Indeed, Army and Marine medical officials noted the inadequacy of short

range helicopters in the Gulf. This shortfall was partly due to the fact that Navy aeromedical needs were never previously levied on the Army and Marine Corps, so the services did not program for them. As noted by the Navy, "Lack of dedicated tactical aeromedical evacuation capability in naval services would have created difficulties had the theater matured as expected..."¹⁴

Patients brought to underway hospital ships must be transported by helicopter. Due to ship design, access by sea is not considered reliable. In rough seas, ship-to-ship patient transfers can be unsafe. Helicopter transport to hospital ships was problematic in the Persian Gulf because each ship had only one landing pad, helicopter capacities were limited, and the ships had to stay out of harm's way. As a result the distance and travel time would have increased. Hospital ships might not have been fully used to treat mass casualties, therefore, even if combat had continued.

Further shortfalls in Air Force aeromedical evacuation assets could have affected patient care as well. One after-action report stated that because of insufficient aircraft, the predicted flow of casualties would have overwhelmed the system. Furthermore, even if aircraft were identified, shortfalls existed in crews and in-flight equipment. As the Air Force surgeon general noted, "We were fortunate that the medical evacuation system was not taxed in Desert Shield/Desert Storm." Substantial shortages in strategic and tactical aeromedical evacuation would have materialized.¹⁵

Shortfalls in aeromedical evacuation assets were not new. They were identified in Reforger '87 and Wintex '88 and '89. During Wintex in Europe, lack of dedicated aeromedical evacuation paralyzed the entire combat zone until 3,000 casualties could be moved.¹⁶ Furthermore, while the Air Force was responsible for evacuating casualties, most hospitals lacked sufficient personnel and equipment for patient care during flights. Under an Air Force requirement, a hospital unit sending a patient needing constant attention had to provide an in-flight medical attendant and specialized equipment



existing medical mobilization plans lacked a substantial joint perspective

USNS Comfort during Desert Storm.



MASH surgery during Provide Promise.



Caring for injured Marine in Beirut.

U.S. Navy (Joe Gawlowicz)

such as ventilators or cardiac monitors. The Air Force required service medical units to have equipment and supplies to last five days for each patient evacuated, as well as monitoring personnel. In addition, two fleet hospitals were to care for patients at evacuation staging sites. These requirements were not anticipated by Navy units; consequently, they were never included in the fleet hospital and hospital ship authorization levels. Finally, had the casualty rates approached predicted levels, the inventory of ventilators, intravenous fluids, medications, blankets, litters, and other items would have been rapidly exhausted.

Logistics

One opinion held in the Gulf was that prepositioned medical packs were not appropriately managed and updated. An air transportable hospital, for example, ordered to relocate after being established, set up a second time using a different prepositioned package. While the first package had been in place only two years, equipment was missing, batteries had exceeded their storage life, critical chemicals for lab areas were missing, and medicines and other supplies were outdated. The second package, although newer, lacked ventilators, cardiac monitors, and microscopes. Another hospital spent \$1.5 million on local purchases to replace articles in its prepositioned package.

Navy control of medical equipment and supplies prior to and during Desert Storm/Desert Shield was also inadequate and medical units had incompatible supplies. For example, cartridges did not fit surgical guns and film did not match x-ray machines. Equipment and supplies in fleet hospitals were often not packed according to the manifest, making field assembly time-consuming. Materiel from different functional areas was packed together, and in one case materiel that belonged in one or two containers was dispersed among thirty. Short shelf-life items such as intravenous fluids and sterile and pharmaceutical supplies were either expired or in limited supply.

Air Force hospitals found that lab chemicals in some prepositioned packs could not be used with available equipment. Some dated back to the 1950s, others were missing. A critical shortage of aeromedical evacuation kits would have hindered patient movement had casualties been heavy. Furthermore, some critical items had not been properly maintained and were not based on current equipment lists. A report described the program at one location as "a major medical disaster."¹⁷

The inspector general reported that contingency medical logistics support was hampered by trouble with the single integrated medical logistics manager (SIMLM) system.

Under this concept, one service is responsible for primary medical logistics support to all DOD customers in a specified geographic area. In the Gulf, Army medical supply and ophthalmic maintenance (MEDSOM) units—the basic logistics structure for the SIMLM mission—did not possess adequate personnel or material handling equipment and mobility for the support requirements.¹⁸

Army MEDSOM units, for example, did not carry sufficient supplies of service-unique items including various non-standard, state-of-the-art items used by hospital ships. Fleet hospitals and even a Marine tank unit BAS also experienced shortages. Authorized medical resupply cans routinely arrived partly filled or empty.¹⁹ Inadequate communications and incompatibility between the Navy and Army supply systems further rendered Army SIMLM supply support insufficient for naval needs which resulted in increased order and shipping times. Consequently, the Navy got only half of its supplies through SIMLM.

The reasons for the SIMLM failure included poor planning, misunderstood requirements, and an inadequate support structure. A CENTCOM report noted that “Without a clearly defined task organization that is concurred with by all components, and a concept of standard operational doctrine, the MEDSOM (used as the quasi-SIMLM) will remain a haphazard organization requiring coordination and compromise with the components each and every time deployed. In a rapidly developing theater, the valuable time and effort to do this cannot be afforded.”²⁰

Policy and Planning

A general lack of joint medical planning can hamper resource sharing and create confusion over responsibilities. In 1984, for example, the Zimble report noted that no joint comprehensive plan for service assets existed. The service plans were described as “stovepipe documents” which bore little relation to each other. This resulted from a tendency of each component’s medical service to support personnel of its own line units in a vacuum, as well as a lack of joint command medical staffing to arbitrate. There was no mechanism for cross-service

sharing in peacetime, coordinating service operations in wartime, nor resolving inconsistencies among the components’ plans.

The DOD inspector general reported in mid-1993 that existing medical mobilization plans did not generally reflect changes in planning scenarios, force structure, or medical support policies. It further alleged that the plans were dated, lacked a substantial joint perspective, and went largely untested and unvalidated. Medical personnel requirements likewise did not reflect changes arising from Desert Storm (for example, newer operational doctrine and the continuation of the peacetime health care mission in contingencies). The report predicted problems if the Joint Staff and unified commands do not ensure that all components can realistically fulfill medical support requirements. Insufficient oversight has led to inaccurate data, incomplete readiness information, and unrealistic plans (many pre-dating changes in the threat). But the report acknowledged that such deficiencies did not lead to degradation of medical support in Desert Storm, no doubt because of the substantial time between mobilization and the start of offensive operations.²¹

The report further noted that operational planning had not promoted efficient use or sharing of medical assets. CENTCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM did not plan for integrated medical support but instead tasked service components to care for their own personnel. CENTCOM and EUCOM plans even tasked the services to provide their own patient evacuation. These inconsistencies have persisted largely because of poor testing of medical systems during joint exercises and inadequate service oversight of mobilization plans for contingency hospitals and medical treatment facilities.

Joint exercises generally provide realistic combat training and evaluation of fighting forces. According to the inspector general these exercises tend to include only token medical participation and cannot validate readiness. Although medical units have periodic in-house training, large-scale interservice exercises do not exist. Limited participation leaves commanders without independent validation of medical unit capabilities, readiness, or risks. Unless the medical community is more active in joint exercises, planners will remain unable to assess readiness and train-

ing requirements. They will also have little foundation for making tradeoffs when an operational demand arises.²²

Joint planning and contingency utilization of triservice medical assets takes practice. In the final analysis the Armed Forces must ensure more realistic medical unit participation in exercises. This should include interservice medical participation, interaction with combat and support units, communication with control of supported and supporting units, and enough patients to validate patient care and movement concepts.

Professional medical personnel must also meet basic and field training requirements, which is usually left to medical treatment facility commanders. Being responsible for in-house patient care and staff readiness—including field training—these commanders may not always comply with operational training requirements. Since hospitals receive resources based on their annual output (commonly known as medical care credit units), commanders have a substantial incentive to keep credit units high and the cost of Champus low by retaining their medical staffs in-house.

How have we done since the Beirut disaster? History will ultimately adjudge whether we have been asleep at the switch, but the cost of medical readiness remains an unpopular issue among those who seek peacetime budget cuts. Medical preparation and training for combat, however, are akin to an insurance policy. When not needed, it seems to be a formidable expense; but if needed, one wonders why the coverage was not greater. The Armed Forces expect and deserve adequate medical care, especially in combat. The certainty of it has motivated troops to victory; its lack has reduced their will to fight and created the potential for disaster on the battlefield. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ U.S. Department of Defense Medical Readiness Review Group, "Medical Readiness Planning in the U.S. European Command" [Zimble report] (Washington: Government Printing Office, April 18, 1984). For an examination of the bombing of the Marine barracks, see U.S. Department of Defense, "Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act" (Washington: Government Printing Office, December 20, 1983).

² U.S. Department of Defense, Medical Readiness Review Group, "Medical Readiness Status in the United States Pacific Command" (Washington: Government Printing Office, June 1, 1984); "Capabilities of U.S.

Forces to Provide Medical Care and Evacuation in the European Theater," DOD IG audit report 87-048, November 17, 1986.

³ U.S. General Accounting Office, "Operation Desert Storm: Full Army Capability Not Achieved," GAO/T-NSIAD-92-8, GAO/NSIAD-92-175; "Operation Desert Storm: Improvements Required in the Navy's Wartime Medical Care Program," GAO/NSIAD-93-189; "Operation Desert Storm: Problems with Air Force Medical Readiness," GAO/NSIAD-94-58; "Medical Readiness Training: Limited Participation by Army Medical Personnel," GAO/NSIAD-93-205.

⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, "Medical Mobilization Planning and Execution," DOD IG report 93-Ins-13.

⁵ Erwin F. Hirsch, "Were Naval Medical Forces Prepared?" *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 118, no. 7 (July 1992), pp. 93-95; Donald Trunkey, "Lessons Learned," *Archives of Surgery*, vol. 128 (March 1993), pp. 261-64.

⁶ DOD IG report 93-Ins-13, p. 71.

⁷ R.J. Burke, "Medical Support for U.S. Marine Corps Armored Battalion: Problems Encountered During Operation Desert Shield/Storm/Cease Fire and Some of Their Solutions," paper presented at the Seventh Conference on Military Medicine, "The Spectrum of Medical Support to Operation Desert Shield/Storm," April 13-15, 1992.

⁸ D.G. Tsoulos, "Preparing the Theater Army Medical System for War," paper presented at the Seventh Conference on Military Medicine.

⁹ GAO/NSIAD 92-175, p. 40.

¹⁰ DOD IG report 93-Ins-13, pp. 119-26; GAO/NSIAD 92-175, pp. 46-47.

¹¹ GAO/NSIAD 92-175, p. 47.

¹² Burke, "Medical Support."

¹³ GAO/NSIAD 94-58, p. 10.

¹⁴ DOD IG report 93-Ins-13, p. 150.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

¹⁷ GAO/NSIAD 94-58, p. 6.

¹⁸ U.S. General Accounting Office, "Operation Desert Storm: Army Medical Supply Issues," GAO/NSIAD-93-206; "Desert Shield/Storm Logistics: Observations by U.S. Military Personnel," GAO/NSIAD-92-26; GAO/NSIAD 92-175; DOD IG report 93-Ins-13, p. 127.

¹⁹ Burke, "Medical Support."

²⁰ DOD IG report 93-Ins-13, p. 130.

²¹ DOD IG report 93-Ins-13.

²² *Ibid.*; U.S. General Accounting Office, "Joint Military Operations: DOD's Renewed Emphasis on Interoperability Is Important but not Adequate," GAO/NSIAD-94-47; "Operation Desert Storm: War Offers Important Insights into Army and Marine Corps Training Needs," GAO/NSIAD-92-240; "Operation Desert Storm: Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate Active and Reserve Support Forces," GAO/NSIAD-92-67.

General Carl Andrew Spaatz

(1891–1974)

Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

VITA

Born in Boyertown, Pennsylvania; graduated from Military Academy (1914); commissioned in the infantry; Schofield Barracks (1914–15); aviation school, San Diego (1915–16); 1st aero squadron (punitive expedition, Mexico) and 3^d aero squadron, San Antonio (1916–17); 31st aero squadron, American aviation school, and 2^d pursuit group, France (1917–18); assistant air service officer, Western Department, California and Texas (1919–20); Kelly Air Field (1920–21); air officer, 8th Corps Area (1920); 1st pursuit group, Ellington and Selfridge Fields (1921–24); Air Corps Tactical School, Langley Field (1924–25); office of the chief of the Air Corps (1925–29); commanded refueling flight near Los Angeles for 150 hours, 40 minutes, and 15 seconds (1929); Rockwell and March Fields (1929–33); chief of training and operations (1933–35); Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth (1935); Langley Field (1936–39); assistant executive to chief of the Air Corps (1939); special military observer, England (1940); chief, plans division, and chief, air staff, Army Air Forces (1940–42); Army Air Force Combat Command (1940); 8th Air Force; Army Air Forces, European Theater; 12th Air Force; Northwest African Air Force; Mediterranean Allied Air Forces; U.S. Strategic Air Forces, Europe (1942–44); Air Force Headquarters; U.S. Strategic Air Forces, Pacific; attended surrenders at Rheims, Berlin, and Tokyo (1945); Commander of Army Air Forces (1946–47), and subsequently the first Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (1947–48); died at Walter Reed Army Medical Center.



Portrait by
Thomas E. Stephens.

U.S. Air Force Art Collection

With reference to the unification compromise, I suppose there will always be a controversy over who got what out of the agreement. The fact that each interested party feels that the other got the best break is probably the strongest argument in favor of the soundness of the agreed scheme. So far as the Air Force is concerned, we will . . . achieve the position of independence and parity with the other services. I feel that the aircraft, air facilities, and air functions not under the Air Force are at least under a top authority who can insure that they are not misapplied or used to establish a basis of encroachment on the proper activities of the Air Force. We believe that the agreement . . . will be a forward step for the Air Force and will represent marked progress in the operating efficiency and economy of our Armed Forces.

—Letter from “Tooe” Spaatz to
“Hap” Arnold cited in
*Master of Airpower: General Carl A.
Spaatz* by David R. Metz

Letters . . .

An Army Message . . . From the Sea

To the Editor— As the only Army officer deployed with an amphibious ready group (ARG), I participated in the first “workups” by the Navy for deployment (on the west coast) of an ARG and a carrier battle group (CVBG). One of my duties was preparing the daily air tasking order (ATO) as the helicopter coordinator for an embarked tactical air control squadron (TACRON) detachment. To put it mildly, it was interesting to write a Navy-Marine air schedule. The highlight was a six-month deployment aboard *USS Peleliu* for operations that included Continue Hope and Quickdraw off Somalia as well as Distant Runner, a noncombatant evacuation operation in Burundi.

As a team the CVBG and ARG have an awesome amount of firepower. They can provide a quick-reaction, one-two punch in remote trouble spots around the world. CVBGs and ARGs did not typically work together in the past because the former focused on fighting the Russians in open-ocean nuclear war and the latter conducted training and deployments separately. As with any new doctrine or concept, there are challenges to overcome. It was interesting to observe the Navy leadership wrestling with command and control issues. Who is the supported and who is the supporting commander? How is the composite warfare command structure modified and will it change once command and control of the operation is phased ashore? Many of the same issues and struggles are encountered in integrating service capabilities through a joint task force (JTF).

Interoperability between the carrier Navy and the amphibious Navy is an evolving process. By the end of our workups we had a superior fighting force and follow-on CVBG/ARG teams are getting better. As a member of a TACRON, I learned the synergy of bringing a carrier air wing to the amphibious fight. With submarine and air threats, an ARG simply cannot go into battle alone. The CVBG/ARG team is a lethal package that can rapidly project combat power ashore and defeat the enemy below the surface, on the surface, and in the air.

—Major Paul R. Disney, USA
TACRON 11
Naval Air Base, Coronado

Corps Business

To the Editor— I am writing with regard to Richard Hooker’s article, “America’s Two Armies,” which appeared in *JFQ* (Autumn/Winter 1994–95). My dissatisfaction with this fundamentally distorted article starts with the thesis that: “We have two services which see their core business as sustained land operations.” The Marine Corps has a legislated mission and force structure that is distinct from the Army’s. Built into its legislatively-mandated role is the requirement for a combined arms force composed of *both* air *and* ground components to engage in, seize, and defend advanced naval bases incident to prosecuting a naval campaign. The capabilities needed to execute these tasks, such as artillery or tanks, might lead the uninformed to think there is a deliberate attempt to build redundant forces. These capabilities and systems are consistent with the mandated role and function of the Marines and are not intended to compete with the Army. It is difficult to envision that the Corps with only 271 tanks poses a threat to the Army’s 7,000 tanks and 20,000 armored vehicles. In short, the Marine Corps *is not* in the business of sustained land operations nor does it see itself as such.

The business of the Marines as defined by Congress in the aftermath of the Korean conflict arose from the need for a force-in-readiness that is highly mobile, constantly ready, and applicable across a broad spectrum of possible contingencies “to prevent potential conflagrations and to hold full-scale aggression at bay while the American Nation mobilizes.” In creating a force to suppress international disturbances, it was determined that a balanced, combined arms team in a high state of readiness was required.

From this strategic assessment and design, Hooker finds a “propensity of the Marine Corps to wage sustained land combat.” It is true that the Corps provided forces for World War I and II as well as Korea and Vietnam. Much of this combat was fought on land, and for sustained periods. But the reason such forces were ordered into action and operated for extended periods is more a function of their initial use in crisis response and the lack of preparedness.

If there is a propensity it is an expectation by the National Command Authorities for prompt and exacting mission execution. This performance, whether in crises requiring a delicate balance of political actions and military force or in full expeditionary warfare with ground and air forces, has been a standard of excellence which our national leaders expect as a byproduct of the particular role and function of the Marine Corps.

Contrary to Hooker’s assertion, the Army, by either law or custom, *does not* exist “to win the Nation’s wars.” Historically, the Army has failed to meet the initial test of combat. By law, the Army conducts prompt, sustained land combat, generally as part of a joint or combined force. By custom, all services contribute to joint operations in successfully prosecuting war. By custom and law, one service is expected to be at a very high state of readiness to prevent or contain such conflicts.

—Frank G. Hoffman
Committee on Roles and
Missions of the Armed Forces

To the Editor— I compliment the authors of two articles which were published in the Autumn/Winter 1994–95 issue of your journal, Richard Hooker for “America’s Two Armies” and Thomas Linn and C.P. Neimeyer for “Once and Future Marines.” Yet while their arguments are well put, both articles contain a number of flaws and, thus, cannot be considered as definitive.

For instance, while Hooker presents a reasoned case on why the Marines should revert to being the Nation’s amphibious force, he fails to consider whether the modernized tanks and MLRS requested by the Corps will be required for amphibious assaults in the 21st century. In addition, he does not acknowledge that the law stipulates that the Marine Corps should perform other tasks *as directed* by the President. While that may mean that the Marines should take on sustained land combat or expeditionary missions, it casts doubt on the extent to which the law allows them to perform what some regard as “Army missions.”

Linn and Neimeyer see the Marines as the Nation’s expeditionary force, but their argument is supported by many undocumented quotes which suggests the quotes may be taken out of context. The more subtle assertion that the Corps represents the American way of war while the Army has forgotten its roots is inaccurate, unfair, and irrelevant—particularly when roles and functions are the real issue. The argument is weakest in claiming that the Marines always have been intended to be an expeditionary force and basing that claim almost exclusively on statements by former Commandants, Secretaries of the Navy, et al. That the Marines should be the Nation’s expeditionary force—since they historically define themselves as such—eludes all logic.

Regardless, both articles inform debate on the complementary nature of service capabilities.

—LTC Robert E. Johnson, USA
Springfield, Virginia

Tales Out of School

To the Editor—I can't imagine a more sure-fire way of ruining Professional Military Education (PME) than by adopting the main proposal offered by Robert Kupiszewski in "Joint Education for the 21st Century" (see *Out of Joint*, *JFQ*, Spring 1995). "I propose," the author states, "forming a joint command to oversee every aspect of education . . ." If one's aim is to fertilize arrogance, nurture dogma, and instill *perfect knowledge*, then no surer path to its accomplishment could be envisioned.

Congress was well aware of that danger in crafting the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It did not, as the article contends, "[place] responsibility for PME under the Chairman" as a "major step toward unity of command . . ." What the law did do was assign CJCS "coordinating authority" for education policy. All of us who have been in the joint community for any length of time know the precise difference between that authority and other forms of command. The law states that the Chairman shall be responsible for "formulating policies for coordinating the military education and training of members of the Armed Forces [emphasis added]." CJCS can write policies to ensure that the services properly coordinate the training and education of their soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. And, by the bye, the Secretary of Defense had better sign these coordinating policies if they are to be followed since, as the law states, *the Chairman is not in the chain of command*.

More importantly, competition, diversity of opinion, multiple approaches, and broad fields of investigation—all of which sound very American, very market-oriented, and very characteristic of the unique strengths of our Nation—constitute the essence of good education, inside or outside the military. Imagine putting the president of Harvard in charge of all the engineering schools in the country and then expecting in ten years to find a single competent engineer in the United States. Picture that scenario and you have the major defect in the article's formula for future education in the Armed Forces. Consolidation does not produce "the same level of excellence"; rather it will guarantee the same level of mediocrity. And the saints preserve us if training is to be placed under the same czar which Kupiszewski seems to be suggesting. Education and training are like Mozart and cordite: normally they are not mixed since their purposes are antithetical.

—COL Lawrence B. Wilkerson, USA
Deputy Director
Marine Corps War College

To the Editor—Robert Kupiszewski's article covers a range of PME issues and offers some far-reaching, even revolutionary proposals. Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act the Armed Forces have made steady progress in integrating jointness into education, training, and operations. *JFQ* itself symbolizes the emergence of joint culture.

The Chairman is responsible for coordinating education by law. Cooperation between the joint community and services has significantly improved the quality and scope of joint education and, since 1991, service war and staff colleges have been accredited by CJCS to provide joint education.

Beside improving current education, attention has been given to the year 2000 and beyond. In October 1994, CJCS named a panel of cross-functional, flag-level representatives to review the PME system and its ability to prepare joint warfighters in the future. The panel concluded that the commitment to joint matters has continued to evolve since Goldwater-Nichols was enacted into law.

Joint acculturation is occurring among members of the Armed Forces earlier in their careers because of increased emphasis on joint training and exercises. As a result officers arrive at staff colleges with a greater appreciation of other services which enhances the joint environment that is so vital to learning. The panel also recommended that the PME framework be expanded to include every level—viz., precommissioning, primary, intermediate, and senior—and that certified resident intermediate and senior education be designed to fulfill educational requirements for Joint Specialty Officers to prepare them for joint assignments immediately upon graduation from a joint or service PME institution.

Jointness is not a panacea. Efforts to inculcate jointness into training, education, and operations should not lose sight of the primary importance of proficiency in the roles and missions of one's own service. The balance between joint and service education is paramount to organizing educational oversight bodies. Efficiencies can be gained by consolidating and collocating colleges and headquarters, but at what cost? Furthermore, creating greater capacity at colleges would not necessarily result in more officers being educated, because only a finite number of officers can attend college and satisfy other mission requirements.

—Brig Gen David E. Baker, USAF
Deputy Director, Joint Staff,
for Military Education

Presence Is in the Beholder's Eye

To the Editor—As an Air Force officer assigned to CENTCOM, I read "Global Presence" (see *JFQ*, Spring 1995), the new Air Force white paper, with interest. It is incomplete and appears to be an extension of the strategic bomber versus carrier battle group debate. My views on presence have been shaped by the unique situation faced by CENTCOM. The command is located 7,000 nautical miles from its AOR, with relatively few permanently assigned or forward based forces, in a volatile region where the United States has vital national interests.

As "Global Presence" notes, presence is situational, and there is consequently no single, universally correct type of presence forces required. That said, the white paper does not discuss key aspects of military presence. The utility of presence, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. What's missing? Certainly visibility, lethality, and nonmilitary dimensions of presence warrant more consideration. Presence serves at least two objectives which are critical to regional stability: as a deterrent to would-be aggressors (and early defensive force if deterrence fails) and as a means of access—a foot in the door to support various national interests beyond military crisis response.

For a force to be a deterrent it must be seen as a credible threat to hostile acts by a potential enemy. The perceptions of credibility to a target audience (friend or foe) is at the heart of forward presence. To a sophisticated foe, vulnerable to long-range strategic attack, it may be sufficient to periodically move forces into its radar/sensor coverage. It becomes evident that the United States is there, concerned and capable. To other audiences, over-the-horizon/low visibility or occasional presence may be less threatening to foes and less reassuring to friends.

In addition to visibility, lethality of forward presence forces is key to deterrence as well as essential during initial defense. This is particularly true when attempting to delay/disrupt an attack, buy time to deploy, and bring to bear adequate force capability for decisive defeat of an aggressor. Again, this is threat/target dependent. A flyover of B-2s in Somalia would not have been nearly as effective as a deterrent/response capability as an amphibious ready group steaming over the horizon with the appearance of AC-130s and helicopter gunships.

Credible forward presence, as a symbol of commitment to allies and friends, is at the heart of access and future international cooperative efforts whether they be economic or collective crisis response. In an era of declining forces, there is a high probability that operations in the

future will be multinational. Seeds of collective security are planted by forward presence forces that nurture military-to-military relationships. Bilateral and multilateral relations, in turn, are built on a history of cooperation in exercises, security assistance, etc., which depend on forward deployed forces.

Air Force strategic forces have significant presence value, but not universally and not to the exclusion of other force packages. These force packages should be handcrafted—designed for the appropriate level of visibility and lethality—to send the intended message of deterrence/reassurance that best supports the theater strategy. Let's be joint.

—Col Ronald E. Dietz, USAF
Chief, Policy and Strategy
CENTCOM

Augmenting the JFACC

To the Editor—Maj Gen Hurley is right on target in “JFACC—Taking the Next Step” (*JFQ*, Spring 1995) when he identifies the need for a trained cadre on the CINC's air component staff. In this regard I suggest we are overlooking a potential source of trained cadres or augmentation staffs—the Reserves.

Dedicated Reserve staffs could be trained and prepared to mobilize or deploy in keeping with current continued readiness. They could augment exercise JFACC staffs during annual training and drill with their component air command and control agencies. Moreover they could drill with agencies of other services to further enhance their knowledge and skills.

Such staffs need not be service specific. Consideration should be given to forming joint Reserve individual mobilization augmentee detachments at the headquarters of every warfighting CINC. The Reserve forces have proven that they can perform professionally and efficiently in responding to crises. A JFACC augmentation staff mission seems almost made to order.

—Col Steven C. Morgan, USMCR
Commanding Officer
Reserve Support Unit
MCABWEST El Toro

Engineering Blinders

To the Editor—I thank Chris Golden for his comments (see “From the Field and Fleet,” *JFQ*, Spring 1995) on my article, “Software Warfare: The Militarization of Logic,” which appeared in the Summer 1994 issue of *JFQ*. Nobody is suggesting modifying code *on the fly* in the battlefield. Software adaptability—logical mobility—comes in many ways, of which the user-screen interface, artificial intelligence, and code modifications are just some of the options. Software complexity is indeed inevitable, however you define it, which is why we need overarching doctrine to guide us through the maze. But my article was about the big picture, not engineering detail—an attempt to trigger a realization that software is the powerhouse of the Revolution in Military Affairs. It is to this wider horizon that I would encourage my engineering colleagues to lift their gaze. More than ever it is necessary for software engineers to recognize the power of what they create at the keyboard and to become fully engaged in current operational debates. They must realize that they are participants in a grand process of change every bit as important as that triggered by mechanization and electronics. That is the real meaning of software warfare—it delineates the new era of warfare. Software engineers will be needed in future war and the wider their perception of what is going on operationally, the greater will be the demand for their talents. But they must be prepared to think sideways and for major changes in the business of software production.

The costs of software production on overstretched budgets are already staggering and the engineering-oriented approach to solving the crisis has got us nowhere. Look at the ever-growing list of project failures in which software is cited as the principal cause (further spectacular failures are on the way). The West is busy procuring fighter aircraft so technologically “advanced” that can hardly be flown. The time is long overdue to ask—what's it doing for us and how about getting some economy of effort out of software? Remove the engineering blinders that condemn software to the domain of “experts.” There's no such thing in this game. Bring principles of war to bear on the problem. At present the focus is on information. But information has always been critical—as much to the Romans as to us. Information does not underpin the RMA; what has really changed is the ability to process information—using software—and to apply it at the sharp end with weaponry that is also under software control. Increasingly battlefield information and weapons can be linked directly in an automated loop. The trick is how to do this with maximum speed, effectiveness, and

flexibility. That is the key to understanding the future of war. If we get the basic thinking about the possibilities of 1990s warfare clear as Guderian did in the 1930s, it is but a few doctrinal steps to having control over the real motor of the RMA.

—Sqn Ldr Peter C. Emmett, RAF
Defence Research Agency
Ministry of Defence

Wargaming and Stimulation

To the Editor—I was gratified to see that my article on the “Future Directions for Wargaming” generated the three thoughtful letters in your last issue (see “The Fog of Wargaming,” *JFQ*, Spring 1995, pp. 102–03). Such interesting comments deserve a response.

First, an apology to CDR M.K. Murray. Painting with a broad brush frequently spatters the innocent. I have a deep and abiding respect for Naval War College's long history of resisting the siren song of sexy new technology. Its effort to remain true to that tradition while aggressively attacking the problems of the future is an object lesson for every DOD wargaming activity.

William Cooper points out inherent tensions in using gaming to train operators on systems and procedures. If indeed the intent of BFTT precludes controllers from allowing the fog of war to “fall too thickly” because “the result would be incorrect and invalid operational training,” then some other means of educating players about real world effects of mistakes and uncertainties must be found. But I am puzzled over how a realistic fog of war could ever be incorrect and invalid.

Finally, Edward Marks maintains that PKO games “teach the wrong lessons.” Games do not teach, they help players learn. Improperly designed games, managed and controlled primarily to *play* the game (“in a rush to deploy the ‘big battalions’”) almost always lead down the garden path to a proverbial dung heap of false lessons. If you buy the scenario, you buy the farm. But the fault is not with gaming. It is *not* the case that “wargaming is inappropriate to multinational operations.” The Dutch have been using gaming since 1992 to explore political-military issues. No, the problem lies not in wargames but in how gamers apply them. If you must distort reality to either meet an arbitrary “training imperative” or fall “into step with approved doctrine,” then it is time to reexamine your training and doctrine.

—Peter P. Perla
Center for Naval Analyses

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The Joint Staff: Completing the Metamorphosis

By MARK C. NESSELRODE

Prior to 1870 the German general staff developed organizational principles and studied logistics, wargames, and planning. The staff was comprised of the best and brightest officers in the Prussian army. After a rigorous education, they served on the general staff, then returned to enhance operational units.¹ Under Helmuth von Moltke, the general staff forged the army into a premier force through superior technology, training, and strategic planning.² Similar attributes are found in our service staffs, theater commands, and Joint Staff today. The mission statement of the Joint Staff even incorporates a number of principles espoused by the German general staff.³

C⁴I for the Warrior

The information explosion presents opportunities unequalled since the industrial revolution. A nation that visualizes and pursues the potential of information systems and communications will ultimately dominate the economic and military environments. The battlefield use of railroads along with the advanced arms deployed by the German army in the late 19th century pale in comparison to military capabilities for integrated data systems and instant worldwide communications today.⁴

Doctrine exists to define new technologies and integrate them into combat, logistics, and intelligence. CJCS memoranda (such as MOP 58) and design documents (such as the *Command Center Design Handbook*) provide guidelines on interoperability, automatic data processing (ADP) architecture, and command center design.⁵ While doctrine

and policy exist to guide technological improvements, there are obstacles to joint operations of global proportions. One is the inability of joint and service operations centers to communicate in an integrated multimedia mode with theater commands. The worldwide military command and control system (WWMCCS) has been our chief communications system. Though better than having no system at all, it is cumbersome and cannot exchange data that is not in a rigid format. Yet with the exception of secure telephones and radio communications, WWMCCS was the only common capability during Desert Storm.

A growing number of communications satellites, fiber optic technology, and high data rate transmission are harbingers of real-time communications for voice, video, and data. The joint worldwide intelligence communications system (JWICS) improves teleconferencing between theater command centers and the Pentagon. Action officers in command centers worldwide rely on video, graphic, and digital data in order to manage crises. This data aids in accurately and rapidly determining force, logistics, and lift requirements. Presentations using state-of-the-art displays enable senior leaders to review, select, or reject options.

Action officers can stop transcribing mountains of data into charts and carrying them from one office to another. Technology exists to link offices, command centers, or units from terminal to terminal. Only parochialism precludes such instant communication.⁶ While each service utilizes connectivity and internal data exchange (for instance, ships, aircraft, and submarines use the Naval Tactical Data Link), there is a reluctance to share data. U.S. Transportation Command must know material requirements for forces deploying overseas. Similarly,

supporting commands, operations centers, and intelligence agencies should share data. Decision briefings require video, graphic, and digital data that should be compatible for transfer from terminal to terminal.

Incorporating service-wide connectivity for all communications media may appear simple, but it is not. The services have moved to make ADP systems interoperable. Only noncompliance with CJCS policies prevents such connectivity. Even in the Pentagon it is not possible to exchange the full range of data among operations centers. Software, protocols, and architectures used by the services and Joint Staff are often incompatible, especially in sharing data with theater or operational commanders.

Security is the common argument used to limit access to such information. But automatic data processing network management together with existing security badge technology can prevent unauthorized access to highly classified data. Security is the least serious obstacle to implementing joint connectivity and data exchange.

The Joint Staff, in concert with the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), has the technical expertise as well as the authority to bring both the services and theater commanders into compliance. The renovation of the Pentagon offers an excellent chance to install a state-of-the-art data network. JCS has approved collocating the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and service operations centers. This is an opportunity to establish layered security zones for personnel and information exchanges. A number of corporate headquarters have built extremely flexible data processing networks which permit access to multiple security levels.

Commander Mark C. Nesselrode, USN, is the prospective commanding officer of *USS Oldendorf* and has served in the Operations Directorate (J-3), Joint Staff.

If the services were to implement the architecture and protocols necessary to permit access from one center to another and from terminal to terminal, two immediate benefits could be realized: data of practically any bandwidth could be exchanged, greatly enhancing operations by the services and Joint Staff; and the notion that separate ADP systems enhance service identities and relevance would be overcome. Once communication in the Pentagon is conducted in this way, resistance by theater operations centers and service commands would be inexcusable given the budgets required to support the necessary software or architectural changes. Such a transformation can be achieved because commercially available technology meets standards for interoperability and compatibility.

The Joint Staff can direct DISA to address interoperability and compatibility and to propose cost-effective, near-term solutions. Approval of a solution would affirm the need for all services to move quickly and in unison in resolving one of the most vexing issues facing the Armed Forces.

Information Technology

Advanced aids or smartware will extend tabletop gaming to policymakers.⁷ Commanders could select and review scenario options without engaging combat forces. The ability to predict conflict outcomes using a tabletop method is limited but is immediately available and merits prompt implementation. The cost of engaging multiple combat commanders, the Joint Staff, and services in worldwide wargaming is becoming prohibitive. The development of games at the U.S. Army War College and its projected connectivity to major Army commands is a precursor to the needed connectivity among service, theater, and Joint Staff command centers.

Consolidating capabilities enhances efficiency. The ownership of systems and programs requires that the Joint Staff arbitrate disputes.⁸

Theater commanders submit integrated priority lists to the Joint Staff that can serve as the basis for service priorities. Theater-unique requirements that differ from service-unique requirements must be resolved. Through joint oversight, the Logistics Directorate (J-4) and the Force Structure, Resources, and Acquisition Directorate (J-8) are ideally suited to coordinate service input for all programs. In fact, J-4 may have the greatest potential to lead the military into the 21st century. Acquisition, procurement, repair, and transport are all areas that require reform and integration. The Logistics Directorate must be aware of maintenance and support requirements for new systems.

Dwindling R&D funding, rising manufacturing costs, and restricted budgets are compelling reasons to abandon service programs for joint ones, including fighter/attack aircraft, gun systems, and helicopters.

Service-unique capabilities—such as deep strike aircraft for the Air Force,⁹ high speed, heavy lift amphibians for the Marine Corps, and surface combatants, submarines, sealift, and aircraft carriers for the Navy—present other considerations. In addition, the Army must be able to conduct land warfare with heavy forces and sustain them inland. The specialized industrial base needed to underpin such systems may not be amenable to consolidation.

Common Training: A Hard Choice

Many training problems need resolution. For example, an initiative to train all rotary wing pilots at one site is being pursued.¹⁰ The syllabus would separate pilots to teach specialized skills such as shipboard landing qualifications. The benefit of pilots from all services training together early in their careers is inestimable. But it is not enough.



U.S. Air Force (Jim Steele)

The service academies have unique missions which provide the education that their graduates will require well into the next century. The need to imbue service traditions and culture as well as specialized skills is not in question.¹¹ The point is whether there is any essential difference in engineering and history degrees awarded at West Point, Annapolis, Colorado Springs, or Grotton. Consider the officer accession process used by the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) in Japan. The MSDF academy offers a common undergraduate program for all branches. Upon graduation, candidates proceed to service-specific training at facilities such as the naval officers school at Eta Jima. In the case of the U.S. military, existing institutions could provide four-year, baccalaureate programs for a specific number of candidates. Summer training could enable candidates to sample various services or choose specific training. Then follow-on, service-specific training would be conducted at the appropriate institution. As the military decreases in size, it is logical that all prospective officers, regardless of accession source (that is, from service academies, Reserve Officer Training Corps, and officer candidate programs) also receive advanced training such as the surface warfare officers' basic course at these institutions.

The senior service colleges need a more radical approach. Do curricula substantially vary from one to another? If the intent of the colleges is to develop strategic and operational thought with a joint foundation, the colleges should be consolidated under the aegis of the National Defense University. The number of officers requiring joint education is greater than any one campus can accommodate. The existing colleges would have a single focus and provide a similar education for all officers regardless of service. The Prussian war academy institutionalized combat efficiency by ensuring that in a given situation different staff officers, educated to a common fighting doctrine, would arrive at approximately the same

employment of available forces. In addition to personnel, this system depended on conformity to a common fighting doctrine and operational procedure.¹² This is what is required today for the Armed Forces.

The era when a single service could prepare for war by exclusively featuring its strengths and platforms is gone. Officers must be able to understand cultural biases, operational capabilities, and weaknesses of the other services with which they will train and fight as a team.

The Joint Staff and theater command staffs are substantially different today than they were a decade ago. The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 required that officers get a joint education to be competitive for command and promotion, and that those promoted to flag rank after January 1994 must have had a joint duty assignment. This has positively affected the quality of the personnel and planning of the Joint Staff. Its roster now represents the best of each service.

The Way Ahead

Marginal interoperability success in Grenada confirmed what had been evident since 1947. The services were fragmented, independent organizations that had neither kept abreast of national priorities nor learned the necessary lessons.¹³ Goldwater-Nichols provided an impetus for change. It is a superb foundation for implementing substantive changes in the Joint Staff.¹⁴ The Chairman has a stronger role and the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), provides him with a legitimate deputy. Both the Operational Planning and Interoperability Directorate (J-7) and J-8 address readiness and budget issues of concern to all services. Finally, officers assigned to the Joint Staff must meet strict rules on tour-length and qualifications, measures that have already borne fruit operationally.

Of particular interest is the role of VCJCS as chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process.¹⁵ Supported by the

Joint Staff, the JROC process is the foundation for planning, budgeting, requirements review, interoperability, force integration, and prioritization. But to achieve force integration and interoperability under JROC requires organizational changes. An alternative is to subordinate service chiefs to CJCS while allowing combatant commanders to retain their current status. (A similar change would be warranted for service secretaries vis-à-vis the Secretary of Defense.)

If service chiefs were subordinate to CJCS, various elements of each staff could coordinate with other services through the Joint Staff. Programs requiring interoperability would be identified and evaluated accordingly. Electronic connectivity would reduce the time to process actions. The top-heavy structure of Pentagon staffs would be reduced. The overall effect of the subordination of service staffs would reduce the size and the seniority of all staffs. The time devoted to preparing and reviewing actions would be cut down.

The joint oversight process would be enhanced because of the necessity for each service to coordinate budget and program requirements early. The joint action process would be a forum for the services and theater commanders to ensure interoperability. Adherence to the joint oversight process would permit consideration of programs that were service-unique and require justification in terms of the value added to the Armed Forces. Likewise, candidate programs for consolidation would be scrutinized by the services and Joint Staff prior to presentation and approval.

Few issues raised here are either new or startling. Unfortunately, the services have resisted fundamental change to such an extent that it is unlikely Congress will be content with marginal adjustments in the present structure. To paraphrase a cry often heard at the Naval Academy, "Time, tide, and formation wait for no man!" Time is running out for efforts to streamline the services into an effective joint force. It is therefore recommended that:

IN BRIEF

▼ Service chiefs and service staffs should be subordinate to CJCS. All reductions in the Joint Staff should be stopped and manning requirements adjusted for it to carry out the planning, doctrinal, logistical, and other functions needed to implement the concepts discussed above.

▼ A concerted effort must be made to comply with industry standards consistent with the complex, redundant, and unique requirements for global command and control as mandated by the Joint Staff. ADP, communications, and information systems must be compatible with all service operations centers, theater command centers, service staffs, and NMCC at a minimum.

▼ The acquisition objectives found in the report to the President, "A Quest for Excellence," must be implemented to preserve service-unique capabilities.¹⁶ If the industry standard or minimal modifications make products acceptable to all the services, then their interests must be subordinated to the need for interoperability, maintainability, and affordability.

▼ JROC, the budget process, and national military strategy must be interlocking pieces of a single supporting effort. Data exchange, connectivity, maintenance, acquisition, and depot repair must be subjected to JROC. There is no other means to ensure that systems or families of systems will have a fair hearing and compete against all other warfighting requirements.

The United States lost many of its first battles in past wars. The Nation is unlikely, and would be imprudent, to remove itself from the international scene. There will inevitably be another first battle. The military has proven that it need not lose that engagement. The vision, intelligence, and ability to effect changes beyond the scope of those already legislated rest with the Armed Forces. Their unique capabilities deserve enhancement to guarantee combat effectiveness. The Joint Staff must complete the metamorphosis initiated by Goldwater-Nichols and capitalize on the technological revolution underway to lead us into the 21st century. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ Spenser Wilkinson, *The Brain of An Army: A Popular Account of the German General Staff* (Westminster: Archibald Constable, 1895), pp. 43–60.

² Arden Bucholz, *Moltke, Schlieffen and Prussian War Planning* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 57.

³ Walter Goerlitz, *History of the German General Staff* (New York: Praeger, 1953), pp. 15–49.

⁴ Goerlitz, *History*, p. 58.

⁵ The Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Directorate (J-6) is working to standardize C⁴I, including command center design. The Operations Directorate (J-3) is working on standardizing command centers as lead agency for Pentagon renovation as it applies to both NMCC and service operations centers. MOP 58, JCS Instruction 6212.1, and *Command Center Design Handbook* (DISA) support standardization as do initiatives for information management being led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

⁶ Interview with Carl H. Builder, U.S. Army War College, April 7, 1994. He stressed that the parochialism of the Navy and the changes that were evident in the policies of that service when certain communities (for example, submarine, surface warfare, or aviation) were dominant on the service staff.

⁷ Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington: Government Printing

Office, September 9, 1993), p. III-40, considers rehearsals on the operational level with computer-aided simulations. Joint Pub 3-02.8, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations* (Washington: Government Printing Office, October 1992), p. XII-4, references the expanding use of computer simulations to enhance amphibious operations and ensure operational security. Research is being done that would permit evolutions such as predicting enemy force locations.

⁸ Builder, *Roles and Missions*.

⁹ CJCS, *Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1993), pp. III-13 through III-15.

¹⁰ CJCS, *Roles, Missions, and Functions*, p. xvi.

¹¹ Builder, *Roles and Missions*.

¹² Bucholz, *Moltke*, p. 53.

¹³ Richard A. Gabriel, *Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), p. 199.

¹⁴ The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433, 99th U.S. Congress, October 1, 1986, pp. 25–31.

¹⁵ See CJCS, JROCM-052-92: Administrative Instruction, July 6, 1992, for a description of the mission and the members of JROC.

¹⁶ President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, *A Quest for Excellence*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, June 1986), pp. xxi-xxx.

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—The New York Times
(May 19, 1995)

JFQ

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Which Way Joint Doctrine?

By EDWARD C. FERRITER

While the Armed Forces must be prepared for a range of operations, they will henceforth have less time to prepare for individual missions. During the 1980s a large number of forces were forward deployed. As we downsize, more and more forces will return to stateside bases. In the future the military will rely on critical mobility assets for regional conflicts. But unfortunately, as forward presence draws down, combatant commanders (CINCs) have less time to organize these "responsive" forces for combat. It is doctrine, particularly joint doctrine, that provides the vehicle with which to shape forces into a single fighting team.

The individual services view doctrine from various perspectives. The term *doctrine* may be considered new to some, but the concept is not. The Navy has always projected seapower with a solid foundation of principles, traditions, and practice, although it has not previously formalized much of this thought in written doctrine. The Navy is now developing overarching doctrine which can best be characterized as "a common body of operational thought." Doctrine gives commanders standards for a common, effective approach to warfare.

It is likely that the military of the future will be a joint warfighting team. Both manpower and resource constraints, coupled with limited types and numbers of weapons, not to mention congressional direction, have made a joint approach mandatory. We cannot afford duplication of effort, nor can we afford *not* to have enough capability to accomplish the mission. This means that complementary systems, weapons, and

munitions must be developed. The issue is not whether we will fight jointly, but whether we have doctrine to make joint warfare successful. Does joint doctrine support the synergism of capabilities that makes for success in combat? The present joint doctrine system needs help to make this a reality.

Joint doctrine does not currently get enough attention. Development takes too long, is too cumbersome, and is parochial. Joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) are rarely *joint*. They are usually less tactical in nature and more of a broad restatement of policy and guidance or lists of individual platform capabilities. Service and even multi-service TTP, on the other hand, normally do achieve tactical relevance.

Significant steps are being taken to improve this situation, however, with each service now focusing on doctrinal issues. The Navy and Marine Corps stood up the Naval Doctrine Command in Norfolk in 1993. The Air Force Doctrine Center was formed at Langley Air Force Base near Norfolk in 1994. Both collaborate closely with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, also located in Norfolk, and the Marine Corps Combat Development Center at Quantico. Each of these activities has a section devoted to joint matters, and their proximity constitutes what is known as the "Tidewater connection." Moreover, the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) was established in Norfolk and combines the efforts of the Joint Doctrine Center and the Joint Warfare Center.

JWFC has tremendous promise but also faces potential pitfalls. The center must support the operational needs of warfighters. If JWFC gets mired in the bureaucracy that has characterized joint doctrine in the past it will fail. The center will focus on sophisticated modeling and simulation to support joint training,

particularly at the JTF level. But advanced simulation technology needs to address the tactical level as well. JWFC or another agency must emphasize this lower level of doctrine and JTTP.

The Joint Training Analysis and Simulation Center established at U.S. Atlantic Command is another positive step. Designed to integrate the training, modeling, and wargaming systems of the individual services, this center will impact on doctrine development through concept evaluation. For example, complementary forces combined under various battle scenarios can be tested before going to the field. Joint doctrine can be evaluated in joint computer guided exercises, but again the JTTP level must not be left out.

There are several key tangible steps that can improve the joint approach to warfighting.

First, there must be continued initiatives in the area of joint doctrine. Joint doctrine is not easy or fun. Military professionals may prefer to drive tanks, ships, and planes, but joint doctrine provides the basis for the teamwork needed to win with those tanks, ships, and planes. Quality people with career potential will be needed to take on tough doctrinal problems.

Second, efforts to streamline doctrine development must be renewed. A responsive system would instill confidence and strengthen resolve to make it work. The process is agonizingly slow and an average of three years to develop a joint publication is unacceptable. With concentrated effort a joint pub can be completed in 12 months. But when a joint document cannot reach final approval within 18 months, it reflects fundamental flaws in the proposed concept and should be revamped or canceled.

Third, the issue of parochialism must be addressed. Service perspectives are essential, but parochialism

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IN BRIEF

cannot be allowed. Joint doctrine must quickly identify common ground that is found in service doctrine. Then that commonality must underpin JTTP which are derived from doctrine.

Fourth, joint pubs should be written by joint organizations. The biggest shortcoming in the current development of joint doctrine is the "lead agent" concept. When a publication is proposed, one service is assigned as lead agent and then produces the first draft of the doctrine. Even with the best of intentions, the first draft invariably favors the lead agent's perspective. A better idea is to have a joint command, such as JWFC or ACOM, bring together subject matter experts from the individual services and other doctrine centers to develop an initial draft. Several activities produce service, multi-service, and joint documents

in this way. Written from a joint perspective, the draft identifies common ground and provides a basis for agreement on joint doctrine.

Fifth, combat forces must be provided with JTTP that link joint capabilities. Some of the work done by the Army in the combat arms approach to battlefield warfare could serve as a model for team synergy. The Army fights using a *combined arms team* in the simultaneous application of forces—combat, combat support, and combat service support. JWFC should be the focal point of JTTP integration and concentrate exclusively on combat issues for both JTFs and the tactical level.

Finally, obstacles to new ways of looking at joint issues must be removed. It may be time, for example, to form a joint command at unit (battalion, ship, squadron) level. Jointness normally occurs at command and control (headquarters)

level. The services form, fund, and operate forces at unit level. A test program under a joint command at unit level, however, may provide a vehicle to test new and sometimes unpredictable approaches to jointness. This concept will make many uncomfortable. Loss of control by the services, budget difficulties, and the perception that the unit would become a loose cannon highlight problems with the concept. But for a relatively small cost, the payoffs could be high.

The goal of joint doctrine is to combine the strengths of all the services to achieve success in combat. The world has changed. The Armed Forces operate in a very different geopolitical and operational environment than they did five years ago and changes will continue to occur. The foundation of a more effective joint doctrine system will allow the military to be ready for whatever missions the future holds. **JFQ**

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
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Atlantic Command's Joint Training Program

By CLARENCE TODD MORGAN

Our new strategy demands forces that are highly skilled, rapidly deliverable, and fully capable of operating effectively as a joint team . . .

—GEN Colin L. Powell, USA¹

Changes to the unified command plan in 1993 directed that the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (CINCUSACOM), integrate and conduct joint training of all forces based in the continental United States (CONUS). U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) was assigned combatant command authority over Forces Command (FORSCOM), Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT), Marine Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT), and Air Combat Command (ACC) as service components, forces which comprise fully three-quarters of the Armed Forces. As a result, ACOM implemented a joint training program (JTP) to significantly enhance the capability of U.S. forces to deploy and operate immediately on arrival overseas. This article describes these joint training responsibilities, the scope of ACOM joint training, and the various tiers of training and their implementation. It also addresses ACOM reorganization to meet new requirements, the training facility necessary to accomplish the program, and the transition to new exercises and training.

CINCs have full authority and responsibility to train assigned forces. As the largest joint force provider to regional CINCs, ACOM trains CONUS-based forces in joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTPs) for deployment anywhere in the world. In addition, ACOM continues to conduct distinct theater exercises focused on these unique missions. The

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five-year defense program (FYDP) planning for 1995–99 provides detailed training guidance to CINCs, especially CINCUSACOM. It puts greater emphasis on joint and combined exercises and training to stress interoperability and joint warfighting doctrine and prepare joint force commanders (JFCs) and staffs for crisis and contingency operations. Together with the other CINCs, Joint Staff, and services, ACOM trains and conducts exercises in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, counterdrug, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance operations. Current guidance stresses using technology (including simulations) to improve training at a reduced cost. Such training is designed to achieve efficiency and full effectiveness through distance learning, distributed simulation, and leveraging existing service component and other joint training and exercise programs.

Three Tiers of Training

ACOM JTP enriches joint and service component training and exercise programs, where appropriate, with scheduling coordination and sponsorship for increased joint participation. It also includes specific joint task force (JTF) training tailored for CONUS-based joint forces that emulates portions of the Army's battle command training program (BCTP) and CINCEUR JTF training. ACOM JTP consists of three tiers as outlined in table 1.

ACOM service components conduct tier 1 training to meet unit- and force-specific training requirements at service standards. ACOM will monitor schedules for these events to preserve their integrity and ensure deconfliction and/or coordination with joint training.

Tier 2 includes diverse activities such as LANTFLT/MARFORLANT fleet exercises, ACC exercises (Quick Force, Sand Eagle), and FORSCOM exercises (Roving Sands, Market

Table 1. ACOM Long-Range Joint Training Program

Tier 3 (Joint Operational)

COMMANDER AND STAFF TRAINING

Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3
Academic Training Seminars	JTF OPORD Development Exercise	CAX/CPX CINC, JFC Components

Tier 2 (Joint Operational/Tactical)

JOINT FIELD TRAINING Component Staffs/Forces

Tier 1 (Service Operational/Tactical)

SERVICE COMPONENT TRAINING Forces

Source: Adapted from ACOM J-7A briefing, "ACOM Joint Training Program," March 15, 1994.

Rangers jumping during Agile Provider.

Square) as well as other initiatives. Tier 2 activities are usually executed by a sponsoring service component. Utilizing tier 1 exercises to generate tier 2 opportunities for resource efficiency is a primary goal. The tier 2 objectives are derived from tactical joint mission essential tasks (JMETs) and service-specific operational and tactical mission essential tasks. ACOM sets tactical JMETs to be attained by components and the components nominate specific tier 1 exercises to accomplish them.²

ACOM conducts tier 3 training with a focus on JFCs and staffs and objectives derived from operational-level JMETs. Potential JFCs come from XVIII Airborne Corps, III Corps, Eighth Air Force, II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and Second

Fleet. These commanders will serve as JFCs in the tier 3 program approximately once every two years. The JTF components will be drawn from among eight Army divisions; six Navy carrier battle groups; 2^d Marine Division, Air Wing, and Force Service Support Group; three Marine Expeditionary Units; and eight Air Force fighter wings and five bomber wings. Both a joint force air component commander (JFACC) and a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) will also normally be assigned.

The new JTP training initiative breaks with previous CONUS-based training and resides in tier 3 activities under three phases. Phase 1 uses academic instruction structured as seminars, briefings, or interactive computer learning to train JTF staffs. Topics include responsibilities and functions of a joint staff, joint planning, joint doctrine, and JTTPs. The JFC guides the academic design and sets training objectives. ACOM provides a team of subject matter experts, appropriate training materials, and a retired flag officer to mentor the academic training. The instruction will be structured toward three distinct audiences: executive level for senior officers, action officer level for staff officers, and noncommissioned officer level for staff support personnel. Phase 1 is one week in duration and is conducted at either the JFC's home station or another location of his choosing.

Phase 2 has the JFC and his components develop a crisis action operation order (OPORD) concentrating on JTF planning, joint doctrine, and JTTPs. A joint training team and senior mentor assist with the training objectives. The JTF staff, with component liaisons, assembles at its home station or the ACOM Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center (JTASC) for one week to develop a plan. JTF components develop supporting plans at locations selected by the ACOM component commanders in conjunction with their training programs. All planning uses a crisis situation based on a real-world scenario.

Phase 3 uses a computer-assisted command post exercise (CAX/CPX) to execute the JTF staff OPORD previously developed in phase 2. This phase lasts between seven and ten days and normally includes participation by a CINC, joint intelligence center, JFACC, JFC, JSOTF, and JTF components. The JTF staff conducts phase 3 at its home station or JTASC, and components participate from home stations or other facilities. Primary emphasis is on planning procedures, decisionmaking, and the application of joint doctrine and JTTPs. ACOM continues to provide joint training support as in phases 1 and 2. The CAX/CPX will generally use a confederation of service models to challenge the JTF in exercising virtually any aspect of joint warfare. It also uses a real-world scenario with real terrain and threat data bases. A professional opposing force (OPFOR) with an observer/controller group supports the training.³

JTP Implementation

An accurate definition of joint training requirements is needed to design an effective JTP. To identify requirements each regional CINC will rely on JMETS derived from assigned theater missions and plans, which will be compiled into a master list called the joint mission essential task list (JMETL). This will become the design basis for a regional CINC's joint training program. In order for ACOM to train its CONUS-based forces for deployment to the forward-based CINCs their JMETS must be a driving factor in the JTP's structure. When two or more CINCs identify the same JMETS as a requirement it becomes a common joint task. ACOM will use common joint tasks as a baseline JMETL for training in tiers 2 and 3.⁴

ACOM will plan its JTP by hosting quarterly exercise and training scheduling conferences to provide deconfliction and coordination for the three tiers and ultimately produce the ACOM joint training master plan. The Joint Staff's annual worldwide joint exercise scheduling conference will furnish the mechanism to ensure that the ACOM JTP fits the CJCS overall training and exercise


scheme. The worldwide conference will produce the CJCS joint training master schedule, which includes all CINC joint training plans.

Joint training execution encompasses a range of academic and exercise activities which include traditional field exercises, hybrid exercises with live play in the field and constructive or virtual simulation, CPXs in synthetic environments, academic seminars, briefings, and computer-aided instruction. Field training exercises (FTXs), advanced distributed simulation, academic training, and seminar wargames will all play a role in the ACOM JTP. In order to train as we will fight, JTTPs will guide JTP execution.⁵ Joint command, control, communication, computer, and intelligence (C⁴I) equipment and procedures will be used and logistics support will be modeled.

JTP evaluation is critical to overall effectiveness. The assessment must ask if the training objective—meeting specific JMETS—is being successfully achieved. Joint readiness assessment will use reports by regional CINCs, the joint after action reporting system (JAARS), and the status of resources and training system (SORTS) as measuring devices. Objective evaluation can provide the impetus for program improvement and increase overall joint readiness.

ACOM has reorganized to successfully execute its expanded joint training responsibilities. A joint training directorate was created to ensure forces are highly skilled, rapidly deliverable, and fully capable of operating as a joint team on arrival. A Director for Joint Training is responsible for joint force exercise and training development, resource allocation, management, and assessment. He also supervises the review, coordination, development, promulgation, and application of joint doctrine, joint universal lessons learned, and JTTPs ensuring that maximum value is attained from joint force integration.⁶

ACOM J-7 is organized into exercise (J-71), training and doctrine (J-72), and analysis and simulation (J-73) divisions. J-71 coordinates JTP



Agile Provider '94.

U.S. Navy Combat Camera (Robert N. Scoggin)

communication and computer capacity for advanced distributed simulation, distance learning, and teleconferencing with components or on-site computer exercises and training. This will provide JFCs and their staffs with assets to conduct all phases of tier 3 training in one location using actual C⁴I facilities in exercise spaces.

scheduling, monitors CJCS-directed NATO and bilateral exercises, and documents and reports or corrects deficiencies in exercises and operations. It also maintains a schedule of tier 2 component activities to identify and enhance mutual training opportunities and lower costs.

J-72 has overall responsibility for tier 3 training. Its joint training teams develop, execute, and maintain tier 3 phase 1 academic training as well as design and direct phases 2 and 3. The teams provide observer/controllers and arrange for a professional OPFOR to support phase 2 and 3 exercises. J-72 also manages doctrinal issues, develops and promulgates ACOM JTTPs, coordinates the application of JAARS, and assists in the design and evaluation of CONUS joint exercises and training.

J-73 is a focal point for joint modeling and simulation. It has the expertise, analytical tools, and facilities necessary to conduct analysis, modeling, and computer simulation. J-73 supplies the analysis and simulation support for tier 2 and 3 training. Also, it evaluates operational and concept plans in support of J-5, maintains theater-wide analysis and simulation capability, and coordinates analytical studies with J-3 on adaptive force package deployment, employment, and force mixes.

In support of the new J-7 directorate, a state-of-the-art JTASC will be created with an initial reduced training capability slated for operation in January 1996. It will have a

By FY97, JTASC will routinely host three JTF tier 3 training cycles each year, have the capability to conduct JTF mission rehearsals to support crisis action preparations, and provide simulation support for tier 2 FTXs.⁷

Exercise and Training Transition

JTP implementation is changing previous training methodologies. Ocean Venture has been canceled and Agile Provider (AP) '94 is probably the last exercise of its kind. Funding previously used for ACOM-sponsored major field exercises will be divided between tier 2 activities for added participation and tier 3 training. This will allow greater opportunities for service component participation in tier 2. Additional financial assets shifted to tier 3 will enable more people to participate in joint staff training. Rather than a single staff gaining experience in an expensive annual FTX, three staffs will undergo tier 3 training each year at less cost.⁸

AP '94 served as a partial transition from previous CINC-sponsored annual FTXs toward the future JTP. In addition to traditional planning conferences, AP '94 included an ACOM seminar wargame and crisis action planning exercise (CAPEX). The ACOM staff held a seminar wargame in the autumn of 1993 with component, JFC, and JTF staff participation. The wargame explored

AP '94 force deployment, employment, and sustainment issues and produced a CINC-level draft OPORD for later JTF-level campaign planning at CAPEX. This experience provided outstanding staff warfighting training, enhanced coordination, and exercised staff crisis action procedures. The JTF CAPEX was held in January 1994 at Camp Lejeune with the commanding general, II MEF, as JFC. Much like planned tier 3, phase 2 training, the JFC staff met in one location and developed an OPORD based on a given scenario. Staff and component liaison teams greatly benefitted from being able to meet and work together, solidifying the staff prior to the FTX.

Both the wargame and CAPEX exposed divergent experience levels among staff members in joint operations and the staff planning process. These experiences illustrated the need for tier 3, phase 1 academic training to reach a common level of knowledge and understanding. CAPEX, unlike tier 3, phase 2 training, was constrained by actual unit training in May 1994, planned by each service for AP '94. Linking the staff exercise and live ground FTX limited the possible courses of action (COAs) available to staff planners because of unit availability as well as fiscal, geographic, and environmental constraints. This limitation drove the development of a fictitious scenario that melded widely separated training areas at Camp Lejeune and Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. At the Camp Lejeune CAPEX debrief, the JTF chief of staff recommended that future scenarios be devised to fully maximize JTF staff training with portions of those scenarios designed for suitable unit field training.

The AP '94 seminar wargame and CAPEX offered the first opportunity to conduct limited joint training. J-71 provided the control group and acted as higher headquarters staff. In this role, J-71 coordinated and facilitated the required intelligence and scenario support for the CAPEX from ACOM. J-72 acted as primary observer for the exercise and documented JTF staff interaction and functions. Data were collected to

IN BRIEF

support AP '94 after action reviews and lessons learned. J-73 provided analytical and computer simulation support at Camp Lejeune for the JTF staff. During OPORD development, various COA options were discussed and J-73 did a comparative analysis of options using a joint conflict model. This model acted as a high resolution joint combat simulation under controlled conditions and produced quantitative results allowing the JTF staff to compare the impact of various COA options. The J-7 participants in this exercise all gained valuable experience and a glimpse of the future JTP.

After AP '94, the next step in JTP implementation was Unified Endeavor (UE) '95. This was the first developmental tier 3 CAX/CAPEX. The phases were as follows: phase I, academic training (January 1995); phase II, OPORD development (February 1995); and phase III, plan execution (April 1995). The 1994 aggregate level simulation protocol (ALSP) confederation of models acted as exercise driver for the phase III CAX/CPX via distributed simulation architecture transmitted to the JFC and component commanders at their home stations (see table 2 for participants).

The confederation linked service models listed in table 3. The exercise scenario was set in Southwest Asia and included a JTF with two reinforced heavy divisions, a reinforced composite wing, MEF forward, carrier battle and amphibious ready groups, and special operations forces. The opposing forces fielded seven divisions and supporting combined arms. UE '95 was a training and technical success as well as a proof of principle for the JTF tier 3 initiative.

Numerous lessons from UE '95 are being used in the planning for UE '96-1 which is well underway and scheduled for September, October, and November 1995.

The ACOM joint training program will enhance operational capabilities, increase service interoperability, and provide a higher state of joint readiness. It will be an effective, efficient, and flexible way to conduct

Table 2. Phase III CAX/CPX Participants

Command	Training Role	Training Location
U.S. Atlantic Command	CINC	Norfolk, Virginia
III Corps	JFC	Fort Hood, Texas
CCDG 12	NAVFOR	Portsmouth, Virginia
II Marine Expeditionary Force	MARFOR	Camp Lejeune, North Carolina
III Corps (-)	ARFOR	Fort Hood, Texas
Eighth Air Force	AFFOR	Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana
1 st Brigade, 87 th Division	OPFOR	Birmingham, Alabama



Table 3. Phase III CAX/CPX Service Models

Model	Warfare Area
Corps Battle Simulation (CBS)	ground
Air Warfare Simulation (AWSIM)	air
Research, Evaluation, and Systems Analysis (RESA)	naval air, surface, and subsurface
Tactical Simulation Model (TACSIM)	intelligence
Joint Electronic Combat-Electronic Warfare Simulation (JECEWSI)	electronic warfare



joint training which is less costly and better than the available alternatives. The program is designed to accommodate current technology and incorporate new capabilities as they are developed. Existing service component exercises will continue to provide opportunities to train jointly. The JTP tier 3 initiative will train additional staffs in extremely important skills that heighten the ability to fight as a team. Joint warfare is critical in realizing the greatest return from limited resources. We must train as we intend to fight, and the ACOM JTP provides the means to reach that goal.

JFQ

NOTES

¹ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Report on the Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1993), p. III-4.

² Briefing by James C. Sherlock, ACOM, J-7A, "USACOM Joint Training Program," January 24, 1994.

³ CINCUSACOM Message, "USACOM Joint Task Force Training Program," DTG 050423 JAN 1994, p. 3.

⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Universal Joint Task List, October 25, 1993, p. i.

⁵ U.S. Atlantic Command, Implementation Plan, October 1, 1993, p. D-1-1.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Briefing by Walter Brentano, MITRE Corporation, January 24, 1994, pp. 7-9.

⁸ Sherlock, "USACOM Joint Training Program."

Coalition Rules of Engagement

By DREW A. BENNETT and ANNE F. MACDONALD

Coalitions must overcome many obstacles.¹ Developing rules of engagement (ROE) is one. ROE are tools that coordinate the use of force, orchestrate a campaign, synergize an effort, ensure compatibility among dissimilar partners, control escalation, and underpin political objectives. The coordinated use of force on land, at sea, and in the air can be the difference between winning and losing.² A commander must establish ROE that are neither restrictive nor permissive, that do not leave their forces either vulnerable to attack or inhibit judgment, and that do not inadvertently harm political or operational objectives. The intricacy of this issue is evident as one considers coalition members of varying capabilities, perspectives, agendas, forces, ideologies, and cultures.

How should rules be developed and by whom? Should a single commander or country draft them? Should each nation establish its own? Should an existing international organization such as the United Nations determine them? What are the guiding principles of ROE?

Coalitions can be divided into two categories: standing and ad hoc. A standing coalition is grounded in an existing agreement (such as the North Atlantic Alliance), wherein a majority of the forces involved have planned and trained together for combined operations. An ad hoc coalition is one in which the forces have not worked together, regardless of whether it is sanctioned under a U.N. mandate, hasty treaty, or other arrangement.

After the Persian Gulf War and with the downsizing of U.S. forces, coalition warfare has received greater attention. While the world is no longer bipolar, it is increasingly interdependent. Unilateral action is not the preferred or likely way of war. The desire for international legitimacy, basing rights, additional forces, increased diplomatic power, and greater economic leverage is a strong incentive to operate alongside other countries with shared interests.

Rules of engagement are "directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered."³ They facilitate guidance on the use of force. Generally, they address when, where, against whom, and how force can be used.⁴ Rules may be permissive as illustrated by the following cases: a unit may use whatever force it deems necessary to defend itself against a hostile act or hostile intent (*how* and *when*); military aircraft of country X operating in a specified area will be considered hostile (*when* and *against whom*); and shoot first and ask questions later (*when*). Or rules may be restrictive: do not fire unless fired upon (*when*); unattended munitions, mines, and booby traps are forbidden (*how*); do not fire until you see the whites of their eyes (*when* and *against whom*). ROE balance the objectives and concerns of those who establish them with the judgment and capabilities of those who must execute them.⁵

The sources of ROE are domestic law, national security policy, operational concerns, and international law.⁶ Domestic law affects how militaries are organized and equipped, where they may operate, and even how they are employed. Japan, for example, with the world's third largest defense budget, cannot permit its forces to conduct offensive

operations under its constitution.⁷ National security policy spells out how forces may provide security, for example, by declaring "no first use" of nuclear weapons. Operational concerns become a factor when a commander attempts to control damage to friendly forces or neutral aircraft and ships. Finally, rules should ensure that international law is not violated. They are affected by the law of armed conflict as contained in the Hague and Geneva Conventions and the right to self defense under the U.N. Charter.⁸

ROE also can be seen as a means of controlling a nation's shift along a conflict continuum. On one end is peace, followed by crisis, then limited war, and finally total war. In this model, the rules have three general purposes: political, military, and legal.⁹ The political purpose prevents military operations from expanding beyond political objectives, as affirmed by Clausewitz's dictum that war is an extension of politics by other means. Nations will use ROE to deter war, isolate conflict, and prevent escalation to total war. This is why states abide by them in peacetime. Such rules may halt the pursuit of enemy forces into a third nation to contain a conflict. Those which control weapons of mass destruction serve a political purpose. The military purpose of ROE is mission accomplishment. A commander applies the rules to guide his subordinates on using force to seize objectives. He must balance aggressive action and the right to self-defense against losing public support, provoking a more powerful enemy, or fighting at an unfavorable time or place. ROE are intended to prevent violations of domestic and international laws and must consider, for example, the concept of proportionality and the selection of criteria for targeting.

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Various factors affect ROE development, including humanitarian issues, actions by higher authorities, concern for risks, and technological capabilities.¹⁰ ROE may be influenced by issues such as limiting collateral damage or casualties. This may demand pin-point accuracy and surgical strikes. Actions by higher authority will influence the development of rules. Interaction between senior government officials and military leaders is complex. The degree of confidence, skill, and expertise involved in these relations will determine whether ROE development is micro- or macro-managed. Moreover, restrictive rules may be developed to minimize risks of personnel becoming POWs or hostages. Technology may influence ROE in various ways. A small air force and poor communications require different rules than a large air force and advanced communications. In addition, technology determines how far off a target can be detected and engaged, and thus how much time the on-scene commander has to decide.

Before specifying the exact rules of engagement for a coalition, it is helpful to consider the principles that influence their development: unity of purpose, negotiation, commonality, flexibility, adaptability, and simplicity.

The glue that holds coalitions together is unity of effort, not necessarily unity of command. Unity of effort implies that political and military objectives are harmonized and that a coalition is devoted to mission accomplishment. If coalition partners agree to a combined commander, such as in NATO, so much the better. As the Gulf War demonstrated, however, a single commander does not always lead a coalition. Moreover, a coalition may be quickly formed, given its mission, and forced to develop ROE with only limited planning. Cooperation overcame this obstacle in Provide Comfort. Under these circumstances, a commander may find that emphasizing and nurturing the coalition's commitment to the objective is especially critical.

Developing coalition ROE requires negotiation and consensus, not dictation. All members must be represented. A commander must create an atmosphere in which coalition members will set aside sovereignty issues and make concessions to benefit the final ROE.

The goal in coalition ROE development is commonality. Ideally, a single set of rules that applies to all coalition members in the theater of operations is better understood, easier to implement, and increases interoperability. A commander may find significant advantage in ROE that accommodate the lowest common denominator. But he must also realize commonality is not always achievable but may only serve as a starting point for ROE development.

If commonality cannot be achieved, flexibility is key. Accommodation and work-arounds may be needed because of irreconcilable differences in national equipment, doctrine, capabilities, or political objectives. Separating forces or tasks geographically or functionally, as in the case of Desert Storm, may resolve such issues.

ROE change with the situation. Coalitions must transition from peacetime rules designed to deter hostilities to wartime rules designed to win. A commander must have a means to constantly evaluate ROE and promulgate necessary changes quickly. In contrast to Provide Comfort, which successfully adapted ROE from those used in Desert Storm, the coalition participating in Restore Hope was plagued by a lack of adaptability.

Coalition ROE must be judged against the overriding principle of simplicity. One summary of this principle provides the following advice:

- ▼ make them clear and brief
- ▼ avoid excessively qualified language
- ▼ tailor the language to the audience
- ▼ separate them by job description
- ▼ assure they are easily understood, remembered, and applied.¹¹

Simplicity is even more important in coalitions, such as Restore

Hope, when forces are called upon to make split-second decisions. For a set of rules to be understood by troops who speak different languages and come from different cultures, they must be simple.

The principles outlined above can help coalitions develop workable ROE. While following them will not guarantee victory, ignoring them will invite failure. With these principles, a coalition commander may find it easier to develop rules given the membership, mission, and circumstances of a coalition, thereby dramatically increasing the chance of success. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ The authors are indebted to Colonel Abdulaziz N. Abaykan, Saudi Air Force, a classmate at the Armed Forces Staff College, for his insights on coalition warfare.

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Doctrine

JOINT DOCTRINE
WORKING PARTY

U.S. Space Command hosted the 15th Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP) meeting at the U.S. Air Force Academy on April 4–5, 1995. Projects underway in the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), Joint Staff, were briefed to include work on a revised hierarchy of publications; a professional desk library; and consolidating, revising, and reformulating current joint doctrine pubs.

The Operations Directorate (J-3), Joint Staff, briefed a proposal to combine joint command and control warfare and information warfare (IW) in Joint Pub 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare*. This initiative was originally raised at a JDWP meeting last autumn, and J-33 subsequently reported on it to the group. There was a consensus that development of a joint pub on command and control warfare should proceed and that IW doctrine should be addressed in the future. There was emphasis on the need for a chapter in Joint Pub 3-13 to establish the linkage between command and control warfare and IW architecture. Because it is a relatively new concept, development of doctrinal pubs on IW was deferred pending further guidance. Another information brief will be provided at the next JDWP meeting to track development.

The Joint Warfighting Center proposed that Joint Pub 3-02, *Amphibious Operations*, and Joint Pub 3-02.1, *Landing Force Operations*, be combined by placing doctrine in Joint Pub 3-02 and retaining Joint Pub 3-02.1 for tactics, techniques, and procedures. In addition, information found in Naval Warfare Publications 22-2 and 22-3 would be deleted and redundancies between the pubs would be eliminated. On a related note, a recommendation was made to seriously examine the continuing need for Joint Pub 3-18, *Forcible Entry Operations*.

JDWP gave unanimous approval to a proposal by the Naval Special Warfare Command to staff a program directive on Joint Pub 3-06, *Doctrine for Joint Riverine Operations*, to clarify its scope and purpose.

ACOM recommended changing the title and focus of Joint Pub 3-01.6, *Joint Air Defense Operations/ Joint Engagement Zone (JADO/JEZ)*, to fully cover fighter engagement zone or missile engagement zone (FEZ/MEZ) procedures. JDWP agreed unanimously to change the title to *Joint Air Operations* and thoroughly incorporate these procedures into the publication.

The Operations Directorate (J-3), Joint Staff, proposed consolidating the 3-50 series of pubs on search and rescue. This calls for preparing an edition of Joint Pub 3-50 that covers overarching doctrine on personnel recovery; restructuring Joint Pubs 3-50 and 3-50.1 (National SAR Manual) as Joint Pub 3-50.1, volumes 1 and 2; combining Joint Pubs 3-50.2 and 3-50.21 as Joint Pub 3-50.2; and retaining Joint Pub 3-50.3 unchanged. The Air Force is lead agent for Joint Pub 3-50; the Joint Services SERE Agency and the Air Force Doctrine Center are primary review authorities.

In addition, information briefings were presented on the Joint Targeting Control Board, Joint Doctrine Futures Project, Joint Special Operations Forces Institute, defense transportation system 2010, and inclusion of combat camera capabilities in joint doctrine. The next JDWP meeting is scheduled for October 1995 with the Joint Warfighting Center serving as the host. **JFQ**

PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVES

Over the last year, the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) has initiated an effort to assist joint forces in planning, training, and preparing for peace operations. Three products

have resulted: *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, a peace operations database, and a compilation of peace operations tasks for inclusion in the universal joint task list.

The *Commander's Handbook* was developed in concert with both U.S. and allied military organizations as well as governmental and non-governmental organizations. The draft of this work, which was circulated among flag officers and the joint doctrine community for review, has drawn positive reactions. The handbook will be distributed this year and also be made available through the Joint Electronic Library (JEL).

A JEL peace operations database has been created which contains policy, doctrine, articles, lessons learned, etc., from joint, service, and multinational sources. It contains over 14,000 pages of text which can be accessed on-line (dial-up). A significant byproduct of the database is a special CD-ROM version for distribution to selected agencies. The database will eventually include results from other peace operations and related initiatives such as JTF mission training plans developed by ACOM. Publications, articles, and lessons learned are still being accepted and all suggestions are welcome. A classified database is being created for access via the classified JEL which is under development. It also will be available in a limited distribution CD-ROM.

The last product was a review of universal joint tasks. Research and analysis resulted in a list of joint tasks, with definitions, for use by joint forces in the preparation and conduct of future peace operations. JWFC efforts addressed specific voids and provided proposed changes and additions for use in the Universal Joint Tasks List, JSM 3500.14.

The overall result of this effort is a comprehensive and accessible set of tools for planning and conducting peace operations. For further details contact the Joint Warfighting Center, Ingalls Road (Bldg. 100), Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651-5000. **JFQ**

Lessons Learned

UNOSOM II

The CENTCOM joint after action report (JAAR) on U.N. Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) II is being incorporated in the master joint universal lessons learned system (JULLS) database. The interim and final CENTCOM JAARs are the official joint reports on UNOSOM II. The final JAAR contains 53 individual JULLs covering a wide range of topics, some of which are briefly highlighted below. It also contains the TRANSCOM interim report and the MARFOR SOM summary report for JTF Somalia.

In May 1993 operations in Somali were transferred from U.S. control under the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to the United Nations under UNOSOM II. The mandate had been expanded by Security Council resolution 814 to include all of Somalia, disarming factions, and nation building. In support of UNOSOM II, COMUSFOR SOM was tasked to provide the deputy commander of UNOSOM II with selected headquarters personnel, limited combat support, and a quick reaction force (QRF). Following the ambush of a UNOSOM II weapons site inspection in June 1993, the Security Council established a new mission with passage of resolution 837 which directed that appropriate action be taken to hold those responsible accountable and also authorized that all necessary measures be taken against them. After the adoption of this resolution, U.S. forces moved to the operational forefront with the deployment of Task Force Ranger to Somalia in August 1993. The CENTCOM JAAR (Secret) summary JULL briefly discusses the events leading to the engagement in October 1993 in which 18 Americans were killed and 75 wounded. The withdrawal of U.S. forces was carried out by the end of March 1994. (United Shield, the pull out of U.N. forces from Somalia which was concluded on March 3, 1995, will be covered by a separate CENTCOM JAAR.)

Individual lessons include detailed discussions of logistics, TRANSCOM operations, SHF ability afloat, ammunition supply, convoy communications, policy on utilizing Reserve volunteers for operations other than war, and joint integration of medical evacuation. Classified JULLs cover force protection, communications, QRF, and airspace control in littoral areas. Specific information on C⁴I is found in some JULLs. Concerns associated with U.N. transportation requests, funding arrangements, and food procurement are also documented.

Of particular interest to joint staffs are lessons on developing a JTF headquarters nucleus; JTF staff designation and assignment; requirements for mission statement and planning guidance; and early planning efforts. While many issues identified during operations in Somalia have been rectified, others are common to most contingency JTF staffs and planning efforts. Regarding JTF headquarters, it is found that staffs should be formed from headquarters trained and experienced in joint operations and not formed from division staffs. The report states that corps headquarters are much better suited for functioning at the operational level. Division

staffs do not have the requisite expertise in joint doctrine as well as in joint tactics, techniques, and procedures that is required by a JTF nucleus formed and deployed in crisis action conditions. It also indicates that JTF personnel were not assigned early enough to participate in the planning process nor pre-trained as a functional staff to effectively execute the communications plan.

Early efforts at component level were hampered by unfamiliarity with JOPES crisis action planning which suggested a need for more detailed doctrine. Another observation cites the lack of a joint staff mission statement and planning guidance early in the decisionmaking process which resulted in unclear command relationships and responsibilities of supporting commands. There is a recommendation to establish liaison early in the planning cycle at higher headquarters to monitor decision-making and ensure clear guidance on the mission, troops/time available, specific command relationships, and allocation of critical resources.

Another source on this subject is being developed by the Peacekeeping Institute at the U.S. Army War College and will be named for the Deputy Commander UNOSOM II and Commander, U.S. Forces Somalia. The "LTG Montgomery After Action Report on Somalia" will be available in both classified and unclassified versions. While this report will not be an official document, it promises to be an important compilation of lessons presented from a JFC's perspective. In addition, the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University has published a monograph entitled *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* under the auspices of the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), Joint Staff. The work is focused primarily on the operational level of joint warfare. Written by COL Kenneth Allard, USA, it draws on a multitude of sources, including the master JULLS database.

—Contributed by
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Joint Staff

JFQ

... new from the
INSTITUTE FOR
NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

*Somalia Operations:
Lessons Learned*
by Kenneth Allard



Washington: National Defense University
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For sale by
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JFQuarterly Survey of Periodical Literature

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DESERT STORM WARNINGS

A Book Review by

GRANT T. HAMMOND

Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War

by Robert H. Scales, Jr., et al.
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993.
435 pp. \$115.00

The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf

by Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995.
551 pp. \$27.95
[ISBN 0-316-32172-9]

These two books on the Persian Gulf War are radically different. One is the official Army history while the second is a journalistic post-mortem written in the same genre as *Commanders* by Bob Woodward. Although both promise *ground truth*, we are left with very different impressions of what happened and why. They reinforce the maxim that in war, truth is the first casualty. One ignores many questions and failures raised in a host of other works; the other is a more engaging account, the more informative as well as the more useful and important of the two books.

Certain Victory is an odd work. The effort to produce it began shortly after the Gulf War and at least one version, far more critical, was abandoned. General Scales and his team of officers put together a work that is basically operational in focus with far more tactical detail than strategic perspective. Massaged for one year by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, it was pasted together in distinct pieces for various purposes. The senior leader-

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ship of the Army got what it wanted, but less than it deserved. The book was not published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History, but under the auspices of the Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. In the first chapter and conclusions, the text wallows in effusive prose and shameless self-promotion of Army doctrine and prowess. Elsewhere, it combines aspects of a *Festschrift* in honor of Generals Vuono and Sullivan with vignettes by Bradley drivers, tank gunners, and infantrymen.

Certain Victory purports to describe how revised doctrine as practiced in the Gulf War and the success that training and reequipping after Vietnam brought about. We are treated to reviews of AirLand Battle, the expanded role of realistic training, the "big five" systems (namely, the Abrams, Bradley, Apache, Blackhawk, and Patriot). The Army was radically transformed in the wake of Vietnam. But it would never have undergone that change under the inspiration of books like this.

A host of questions are raised by this book. Some are mentioned, but others are not. Few are assessed in detail. Among those cited are communications problems with older model short-range radios and dependence on satellite communications, difficulties in resupply on the move, and a disinvestment in UAVs. Other issues—such as how we might have supplied the requisite water and POL if had not been in theater already, sustained a longer ground campaign, and dealt with a 28 percent friendly fire rate, or why VI Corps stopped its advance at night if time was critical and the inability to adapt rapidly to changing battlefield conditions—are not. The chapter describing the attack on the Iraqis is entitled "The Great Wheel." Both the name and the reality strongly question doctrinal commitment to agility and initiative. Phase lines and synchronization rule all along with lousy weather, an enormous appetite for fuel and ammunition, and poor communications.



U.S. Air Force (Dean W. Wagner)

The general tone of *Certain Victory* is more like cheerleading than careful analysis. Sadly, demonstrating success by the destruction of weapons (a variation on the body count as a measure of merit) cannot camouflage the fact that we won a battle, not a war. Iraq was expelled and the government of Kuwait restored. But neither the Republican Guard nor Saddam's WMD capability was destroyed. Despite the changes showcased by the Gulf War in *Certain Victory*, one is struck by the verities of continuity. Time, terrain, and weather were greater obstacles than the Iraqis.

The complete destruction of the Republican Guard was identified by General Schwarzkopf as the "*main operational objective*." One gets the impression that if destruction of the Republican Guard is repeated often enough, the reader will ignore the reality that it was not destroyed. Despite Schwarzkopf's assurance to the media in the briefing at the end of the war that "the gate is closed" and the Republican Guard could not escape, that was not true and at least half of it did. VII Corps did not occupy Safwan, the site selected for cease fire negotiations, much to the embarrassment of all concerned. The somewhat disingenuous epigraph to *Certain Victory* is a quote from Sun Tzu's *Art of War*: "In war, then, let our great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns." We had a short campaign, but we did not get a usable victory—no better peace but rather a *status quo ante bellum*.

The Generals' War is written by the military correspondent for *The New York Times* and a retired Marine three-star general. It pulls few punches and draws sweeping conclusions worthy of further assessment. The authors tell us that jointness is largely a myth—that each service planned and fought its own war in its own way. While the services developed their own plans, a lack of careful monitoring, according to Gordon and Trainor, caused problems later in the war. During the planning process, we overestimated our enemy, likely casualties, needs, and effectiveness right to the end of the war. Perhaps this is a legacy of the Cold War—the inflation of threats, budgets, and capabilities is a hard habit of mind to break.

A good deal of the book is based on interviews and privileged, even classified information. The authors give vivid insights into the personalities of Powell, Schwarzkopf, Horner, Glosson, Waller, Franks, McCaffrey, Yeosock, and others, and also vignettes on debates, temper tantrums, disputes, and briefings that occurred during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Powell seems more the politician and even pacifist than one might expect. They also document that as good as the air campaign was, it had many flaws. Discriminate warfare through airpower worked better in theory than in practice.

On the significance of the Battle of Khafji, a key element of the book, the authors stretch the evidence to make their point. They claim that the two-day series of border engagements at the end of January was the “defining moment in the Persian Gulf War.” They argue that this was both tactical and strategic and designed to cause American casualties in large numbers, that Schwarzkopf failed to grasp what it signified about Iraqi capabilities, and that in failing to revise his plans, Khafji set the stage for the escape of the Republican Guard one month later. This has appeal but to infer that an accurate assessment of the Iraqi army and its fighting skills could have been drawn at the time seems to rely more on hindsight than

logic. It certainly was not, as they entitle the chapter, “The Mother of All Battles.”

The threatened Marine amphibious attack on Kuwait is rightly characterized as “deception by default.” But the change in plans for an attack from the south—which required reconstituting a huge logistics base in a new position, planning of a new axis of advance, etc.—showed skill and ingenuity. The attack, once launched, proceeded faster and more effectively than anticipated. The success of the Marines was one of the reasons for the discontinuity and mistiming of the left hook. What failed in a basic sense was the very concept of synchronization so cherished by the Army. The coordination of the ground war and the difficulties encountered fall at the feet of Schwarzkopf who was dual hatted as CINC and the ground component commander—and who was positioned 300 miles to the rear of the initial FEBA.

The plan developed to trap and destroy the Republican Guard, the major military objective, was flawed from the outset. The distances, fuel and ammunition consumption rates, and such were known well in advance. The pace of the advance to various phase lines was carefully calculated. Gordon and Trainor go further. The Army plan to destroy the Republican Guard was designed to take seven to ten days but got less than five. Even then the pace could have been faster. VII Corps synchronized the advance to its slowest unit and stopped at night. Still worse, General Franks, the major ground force combat commander in contact, spoke directly with Schwarzkopf only once during the ground war. Though the hundred hour war was in many ways a public relations gambit (shorter than Israel's Six Day War, Schwarzkopf quipped), the general retreat of Iraqi forces began only 39 hours after the main attack. Phase line “Victory” was 27 miles from Basra and the main highway north, but it was to be the limit of advance. VII Corps turned east too quickly and then stopped too soon.

As Schwarzkopf presented his famous “Mother of All Briefings” assuring the press and the world that “the gate is closed,” it was apparent to field commanders that the bulk of the Republican Guard was being allowed to escape. Instead of peace, we gained a truce of indeterminate duration. Although General Waller, deputy CINC, told Schwarzkopf “You have got to be bullshitting me” when informed of the decision, no one seriously questioned, let alone challenged it. Deployments on the ground were unknown, the site selected for negotiations was not in coalition hands, and no serious discussion of war termination criteria had occurred. We just stopped and declared victory.

What Gordon and Trainor show is that many flag officers are hidebound, risk averse, and unable to give or accept constructive criticism. They command by virtue of rank and temperament. Schwarzkopf's tirades were so well known that most felt lucky to survive briefings in his presence unscathed, rather than saying what perhaps should have been said. Work-arounds were devised for personalities as well as problems and each deferred to those of higher rank without a full brief for opposing opinions. Everyone burnished his own record. In that sense, the book is perfectly titled for it shows much of the infighting, attitudes, tirades, and problems of a generals' war.

The book takes the services to task for not candidly assessing their respective performances and for publicly ignoring many problems which they encountered. All sought to take advantage of the war to showcase their prowess and get favorable publicity. They also ducked major problems in their self-assessments. Such criticisms is needed in order to avoid a “Gulf War Syndrome” of undeserved praise and success that could be every bit as destructive as the “Vietnam Syndrome” of defeat and demoralization.

Unfounded, at times unbounded, puffery and self-promotion bespeak a tendency that is a tragic flaw in much of the American military. That flaw is the general re-

luctance to accept criticism and, more importantly, the inability to make objective self-assessments. This is highlighted by a comment Schwarzkopf made to a meeting of the Marine high command after the war.

Watch out what you say. Why do I say that? Because we have people interviewing everyone they can get their hands on. They are out writing their books. Just think of the reputation of the United States military, what it is today, compared to what it was six months ago. I think we ought to be very proud of what we did here, and don't allow those bastards to rob us of that.

Such an attitude does a disservice to the Nation. So too does a presumption that patriots come only in uniforms.

Writing military history is not a stale academic enterprise, nor should it be a public relations ploy. Accounts of what happened—both how and why—depend on the context of the times, the perspectives taken, the evidence available, and the skill of the authors. No one work contains the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. But the effort to distill as much as possible from an examination of the past is vitally important to our present understanding and future capabilities. As General Sir William Butler reminded us, “The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards.” We can ill afford either. **JFQ**

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SQUARING THE PENTAGON

A Book Review by
WILLIAM H. GREGORY

Reinventing the Pentagon: How the New Public Management Can Bring Institutional Renewal

by Fred Thompson and L.R. Jones
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers,
1994.
298 pp. \$29.95
[ISBN 1-55542-710-3]

The title *Reinventing the Pentagon* seizes on a current all-purpose buzz word epitomized by Vice President Gore's report on reengineering the Federal bureaucracy and a movement sweeping local and state government to improve efficiency. Yet the authors, both academics, do not attempt to reinvent the Pentagon in the synoptic sense, starting with force structure or roles and missions. Rather their summons to restructure, not simply deregulate, focuses on narrower, specific areas: the reinvention of defense budgeting, the relationship between DOD and Congress, the acquisition process, and defense accounting. Nonetheless, their approach is valuable. They raise prickly issues about the effectiveness of DOD administration. Is the defense establishment overstuffed now that the Cold War is over? They think that it is—and was long before the demise of the Soviet Union.

A proxy for the book's thesis comes in its story of Germany and France after World War I. Under of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was forced to cut military spending, reduce its officer corps to one-fifteenth of its pre-war size, and scrap its weapons and equipment. Although France outspent Germany on defense in the next two decades, Germany was more selective in its

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military leadership, more versatile, imaginative, and rigorous in training, and more dependent on research, development, and new weapons because it lacked old ones. The bloated French military structure collapsed in mere months in 1940 under the onslaught of a leaner and better trained German force.

Is there a parallel between France and Germany after World War I and the United States at the end of the Cold War? The authors say there is and have a point. Acquisition, a perennial source of horror stories, is dissected once more in their answer.

The systems command of every service is huge. And, according to Thompson and Jones, their personnel are chronically underemployed. Micromanaged by Congress, organizational bloat leads them to more controls and paperwork for industry—at greater cost. Myriad factions in these organizations are able to participate at each point in the government where a project can be vetoed. To keep everyone on board a given project, all potential participants are given a piece of the action. Requirements proliferate, driven by diverse doctrines and interests. The net result is the spinning out of extravagant operational requirements, gold-plated designs, and unnecessary elaboration of subsystems by the functions responsible for them.

Acquisition is only one splinter in a larger plank. Going back to the origin of the problem, the authors charge that DOD has never clarified administrative boundaries and has not resolved the issue of centralization versus decentralization. Instead, the Pentagon alternated between delegating authority to the military departments and centralizing it in the hands of the Secretary of Defense.

Unlike the success of the Strategic Air Command which had a sharply defined mission and resources, DOD got off on the wrong foot. Unification initially was ill-defined and management policy swung back and forth like a pendulum. Then Robert S. McNamara super-centralized the military. While

the authors credit him with considerable accomplishment, as in tough decisions on force structure, his five-year planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) degenerated into the triumph of process over purpose. The DOD structure bloated and lost its way.

Centralizing authority in McNamara's hands left commanders without authority to carry out their missions. Inevitable administrative failures spawned more detailed procedures to avoid their recurrence. The latter applied especially to weapons acquisition. More regulations led to extended development cycles. As the authors argue, over-staffing and make-work drove costs inexorably higher for equipment that often faced obsolescence when it was fielded. That Congress, which had deferred to the executive branch on defense policy from 1930 to 1960, should go deeper and deeper into micromanagement was understandable as mutual trust vanished in an ever thickening gumbo. Legislation proliferated, eventually measured by the foot rather than the page and further constraining discretion and initiative. Management grew layer upon layer and the system clogged up.

Congress and budgets bulk large in *Reinventing the Pentagon*. Granting that restructuring the budgeting process collides with the trend in Congress over the last two decades toward more detailed line-item control over defense spending, the authors urge that Capitol Hill opt for more permissive budgeting. The Pentagon should emulate private-sector capital budgeting.

This would upset settled congressional practices such as dabbling in cash-flow scheduling by emphasizing outlays rather than broad program approval through new obligational authority. Theoretically this idea has strong points, because it makes Congress a board of directors instead of line managers. Yet outlays are the basis for calculating the deficit, now accepted as a fact of life; and they reflect checks for local contractors. Congress would not deemphasize outlays casually.

A second, more radical step would throw out the President's budget, which the authors say Congress now treats as little more than a policy statement. Instead, projects should be approved once and reconsidered only as events dictate. Obligational authority should be granted throughout the life of a project, a giant step toward funding and industrial stability but also a strong dose for a Congress grown accustomed to annual detailed approvals.

A third equally drastic change would adopt mission budgeting. "Congressional budgeting should focus on significant changes in operations, activities, and equipment," the authors contend. "It makes no sense for Congress to look at every purchase contemplated by the entire Federal Government every year." In defense mission budgeting, combatant commands and some defense agencies might operate under permanent authority. Force structure or combat supplies would need congressional authority, as would major hardware investments. Obligational authority would be permissive, not mandatory, implicitly favoring management decentralization and greater discretion at the operating level.

Radical as these ideas sound, they are not new. "Congressional budgeting has traditionally been permissive, continuous, and selective rather than comprehensive and repetitive," the authors say. "In essence, these changes would restore the congressional budget process that existed prior to the Budget Act in 1921, which established a comprehensive annual executive budget for the entire Federal Government, created what has become the Office of Management and Budget, and at the same time reduced congressional power."

There are excellent insights as well as historical perspectives in *Reinventing the Pentagon*, particularly in acquisition and the plethora of financial management systems the DOD controller is currently attempting to consolidate and improve. The book's greatest values are twofold. One is the comprehensive survey of the literature on defense manage-

ment and its failings reaching back to World War I. There is a wonderful Navy memo complaining about congressional overprescription of detail which sounds contemporary but is dated 1915. For anyone seeking solutions to what the authors identify as longstanding problems, past analyses and proposed solutions are there. It also raises in forthright terms the unpleasant realities that the military must face in the stand-down from a virtual wartime structure to a much less pervasive threat environment. The questions are simple but admittedly difficult to deal with.

Private companies have been cutting their work forces and cleaning up outdated systems. Their employees have suffered and cynicism has eclipsed the company man. Thompson and Jones argue that the government must face the same painful process, and in today's climate excuses about the difficulty of the job will not be accepted. The November 1994 election, which took place after this book was published, reflected the distress over the inability of government to down-size.

McNamara brought the kind of top-down strategy found in policy books to the Pentagon, the quest for an Olympian view, a master plan, one final convincing solution. His elegant ideas had to march into the real world and be carried out by real people. Olympian fiats are chronically misunderstood or overtly opposed by those who must do the work. As the authors of *Reinventing the Pentagon* point out, fiat did not work for McNamara any more than legislative edicts were able to fix acquisition. Thus the best insight of *Reinventing the Pentagon* is into over-centralization and overcontrol in removing discretion from, and not demanding good judgment by, the working level. The book cites Gore's report with approval which has a message. Enfranchise workers who can deal with a solution one brick at a time. If the top-down approach has failed, try the bottom-up.

Comprehensive research can be a drawback when it diffuses one's experience to consensus by citation. Frederick Thompson teaches public management in the Atkinson Graduate School of Management at Willamette University and L.R. Jones teaches financial management at the Naval Postgraduate School. They draw some tales from the trenches although they have moved beyond academe and authorities. One is their story of a small firm building low-technology trailers for the Army. Smallness notwithstanding, the company had separate production lines for its military and commercial business because it was the easiest way to deal with Federal accounting standards and reporting. Commercial manufacturing time, drawing down bare-bones just-in-time inventory, was less than 36 hours with immediate delivery. Military inventories were 25 times higher at one point, which pushed up overhead costs. Army inspection at each stage of manufacture and insistence on delivery in batches lengthened cycle time and added to overhead. Direct labor costs were about the same for military and commercial work, but military overhead costs were double. The story had a happy ending. With the help of an Army contracting officer, the firm was designated an exemplary facility, exempt from direct oversight under DOD policy. The company was able to adapt many of its commercial practices to military work, a concrete case of the kind of crossfeed that Secretary of Defense William J. Perry is trying to introduce to acquisition on a grander scale.

Not that the authors expect a totally happy ending to restructuring the Pentagon. Progress in acquisition? They quote a senior Navy official: "Everybody is still falling over everybody else. I just don't see any real changes." Even more abstruse is the relationship between Congress and DOD. In a hopeful sign, Congress has been more receptive to the Gore report, at least before the 1994 election, than it was to those of either the Grace or the Packard Commissions. In the coming era of retrenchment, furthermore, Congress has political self-preserva-

tion as a reason to distance itself from responsibility for unpleasant Pentagon force structure and equipment decisions.

To counter those who say the gulf between Congress and the executive branch is too deep to span, Thompson and Jones cite the fifty-year period of military micromanagement by the British Parliament in the 17th century. It ended when a

militarily competent monarch relaxed his suspicion of the House of Commons and renewed permissiveness in lawmaking. While the authors reached back into history for a parallel, they end on an optimistic note: what happened before can happen again. Difficult as the challenge may be, this reader hopes that history does repeat itself. **JFQ**

1995 CJCS ESSAY COMPETITION

The 14th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Strategy Essay Competition was conducted on May 24–25, 1995 at the National Defense University. This competition challenges students from both intermediate and senior colleges to write on an aspect of international security, defense policy, or military affairs, with special emphasis on joint matters.

WINNING ESSAY

Commander Frank C. Borik, USN (Air War College)
"Sub Tzu and the Art of Submarine Warfare"

DISTINGUISHED ESSAYS

Commander Lawrence G. Downs, Jr., USN (Air War College)
"Digital Data Warfare: Using Malicious Computer Codes as a Weapon"

Hon K. Lee, Department of State (National War College)
"China in the 21st Century: America's Greatest Strategic Challenge"

James F. Lindner, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (Naval War College)
"Pax Americana Part II: Theoretical and Practical Considerations for a Future American Grand Strategy"

Timothy M. Savage, Department of State (Industrial College of the Armed Forces)
"One Hand Clapping: Systemic Change and U.S. Policy Toward Europe After the Cold War"

Lieutenant Colonel Jon Moilanen, USA (Army War College)
"Engagement and Disarmament: A U.S. National Security Strategy for Biological Weapons of Mass Destruction"

Lieutenant Colonel James C. Pearson, USAF (Air War College)
"Mid-Course Corrections for the National Security Adviser"

Lieutenant Colonel Jeannette K. Edmunds, USA (Army War College)
"Organizing Logistics for Peace and War: The Essentiality of a Trained Joint Logistics Support Command Headquarters"

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph H. Daves, USA (Army War College)
"American Global Logistics and Peace Operations"

Lieutenant Colonel James W. Dowis, USAF (Air War College)
"Maintaining U.S. Nuclear Infrastructure in the 21st Century: A Different Challenge"

Cumulative Index (1994–1995)

ISSUES 5–8: CONTRIBUTORS

- Adolph, Robert B., Jr.*
Why Goldwater-Nichols Didn't Go Far Enough, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 48–53
- Armstrong, David A.*
Jointness and the Impact of the War, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 36–37
- Bacevich, A.J.*
Civilian Control: A Useful Fiction?, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 76–79
- Ballard, John R.*
Joint Task Forces: A Bibliography, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 121–26
- Barry, Charles L.*
NATO's Bold New Concept—CJTF, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 46–54
- Bennett, Drew A.*
Coalition Rules of Engagement, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 124–25
- Benson, Sumner*
Shaping Arms Export Policy, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 84–91
- Binnendijk, Hans*
Asia-Pacific Challenges, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 6–7
Assessing U.S. Strategic Priorities, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 10–17
Forward Deployment, no. 8 (Summer 95), p. 7
Rethinking European Security, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 6–7
- Budura, Vic*
Joint Space Doctrine: Catapulting into the Future, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 71–76
- Canby, Steven L.*
Roles, Missions, and JTFs: Unintended Consequences, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 68–75
- Cerjan, Paul G.*
Service Identities and Joint Culture, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 36–37
- Cha, Young-Koo*
South Korea's Defense Posture, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 26–31
- Choi, Kang*
South Korea's Defense Posture, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 26–31
- Clawson, Patrick*
Assessing U.S. Strategic Priorities, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 10–17
- Cohen, Eliot A.*
A War That Was Not Left to the Generals, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 46–49
- Cole, Bernard D.*
Struggle for the Marianas, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 86–93
- Cossa, Ralph A.*
Asian Multilateralism: Dialogue on Two Tracks, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 32–36
- Cronin, Patrick M.*
Asia-Pacific Challenges, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 6–7
Japan's Emergent Security Policy, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 20–22
- Dallaire, R.A.*
UNAMIR: Mission to Rwanda, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 66–71
- Donley, Michael B.*
Building a New Defense Consensus, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 18–27
Problems in Defense Organization and Management, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 86–94
- Downing, Wayne A.*
Joint Special Operations in Peace and War, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 22–27
- Dworken, Jonathan T.*
Restore Hope: Coordinating Relief Operations, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 14–20
- Edmondson, Charles M.*
Writing Joint Doctrine, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 109–10
- Emmett, Peter C.*
Software Warfare: The Militarization of Logic, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 84–90
- Ferriter, Edward C.*
Which Way Joint Doctrine?, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 118–19
- Flores, Susan J.*
JTFs: Some Practical Implications, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 111–13
- Fogleman, Ronald R.*
Global Presence, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 94–99
- Freedman, Lawrence*
Britain, NATO, and Europe, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 8–17
- Genschel, Dietrich*
Russia and a Changing Europe, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 24–35
- Goodale, Richard W., Jr.*
Planning for War: A System, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 106–10
- Gray, Colin S.*
The Limits of Seapower: Joint Warfare and Unity of Conflict, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 52–61
- Gregory, William H.*
Squaring the Pentagon: A Book Review, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 131–33
- Hammond, Grant T.*
Desert Storm Warnings: A Book Review, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 129–31
- Harrington, Peter*
Soldier Art of World War II, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 68–69
- Haven, John S., II*
War Termination and Joint Planning, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 95–101
- Hines, Scott M.*
Standing Down a Joint Task Force, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 111–13
- Hitchen, Ralph M.*
Cutting Defense: Method Instead of Madness, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 91–94
- Hitt, Franklin D., Jr.*
Why Goldwater-Nichols Didn't Go Far Enough, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 48–53
- Hooker, Richard D., Jr.*
America's Two Armies, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 38–46
- Hurley, Marcus*
JFACC—Taking the Next Step, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 60–65
- Johnson, W. Spencer*
Under Four Ensigns: A Book Review, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 125–27

Johnson-Freese, Joan

Joint Space Doctrine: Catapulting into the Future, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 71–76

Jones, Jeffrey B.

PSYOP and the Warfighting CINC, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 28–33

Kass, Ilana

National Power and the Interagency Process, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 8–13

Katz, Douglas J.

Unity of Control: Joint Air Operations in the Gulf—Part Two, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 59–63

Kievit, James

Learning from Rwanda, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 105–08

Krause, Michael D.

Getting to Know Jomini: A Book Review, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 126–28

Kuehl, Daniel T.

Roles, Missions, and Functions: Terms of Debate, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 103–05

Kupiszewski, Robert B.

Joint Education in the 21st Century, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 72–76

Lasswell, James A.

Presence—Do We Stay or Do We Go?, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 83–85

Lawrence, K. Scott

Joint C² Through Unity of Command, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 107–10

Leurs, Michael

Joint Doctrine: New Pubs, Old Controversies, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 111–13

Linn, Thomas C.

Once and Future Marines, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 47–51

Macdonald, Anne F.

Coalition Rules of Engagement, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 124–25

Macke, Richard C.

A Commander in Chief Looks at East Asia, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 8–15

Mallard, Philippe H.

France's European Priority, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 18–23

Mathews, Michael P.

PSYOP and the Warfighting CINC, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 28–33

Metz, Steven

Learning from Rwanda, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 105–08

Miller, Charles E.

Roles, Missions, and Functions: Terms of Debate, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 103–05

Millett, Allan R.

The Korean War: A Review Essay, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 119–26

Montaperto, Ronald N.

The PLA: In Search of a Strategic Focus, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 16–17

Moore, George M.

Joint Space Doctrine: Catapulting into the Future, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 71–76

Morgan, Clarence Todd

Atlantic Command's Joint Training Program, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 120–23

Murdock, Clark A.

Mission-Pull and Long-Range Planning, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 28–35

Murray, Williamson

The Meaning of World War II, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 50–57

Neimeyer, C.P.

Marines as an Endangered Species: A Book Review, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 121–22

Once and Future Marines, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 47–51

Nelson, Michael A.

Unity of Control: Joint Air Operations in the Gulf—Part Two, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 59–63

Nesselrode, Mark C.

The Joint Staff: Completing the Metamorphosis, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 114–17

Nicula, Gail

Joint Task Forces: A Bibliography, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 121–26

Okonogi, Masao

Assessing the U.S.-North Korea Agreement, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 23–25

Owens, Mackubin Thomas

Civilian Control: A National Crisis?, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 80–83

Owens, William A.

JROC: Harnessing the Revolution in Military Affairs, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 55–57

Pendley, William T.

America and the Asia-Pacific Region, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 37–42

Perla, Peter P.

Future Directions for Wargaming, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 77–83

Poulin, B.

UNAMIR: Mission to Rwanda, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 66–71

Raach, George T.

National Power and the Interagency Process, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 8–13

Ryan, Donald E., Jr.

Implications of Information-Based Warfare, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 114–16

Scheina, Robert L.

Argentine Jointness and the Malvinas, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 95–101

Shalikhshvili, John M.

A Word From the Chairman, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 4–5; no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 4–8; no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 4–5; no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 4–6

Shwedo, Kevin H.

War Termination and Joint Planning, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 95–101

Simon, Jeffrey

Partnership for Peace: Stabilizing the East, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 36–45

Smith, Arthur M.

Joint Medical Support: Are We Asleep at the Switch?, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 102–09

Soucy, Robert R., II

War Termination and Joint Planning, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 95–101

Spector, Ronald H.

The Generation of 1945, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 58–61

Stiles, Charles W.

Why Goldwater-Nichols Didn't Go Far Enough, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 48–53

Stucky, Scott W.

Joint Operations in the Civil War, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 92–105

Sullivan, Brian R.

Joint in Spite of Themselves:
A Book Review, no. 7 (Spring 95),
pp. 129-31

Mediterranean Warfare in 3D:
A Book Review, no. 5 (Summer 94),
pp. 122-25

Szafranski, Richard

**When Waves Collide: Future
Conflict**, no. 7 (Spring 95),
pp. 77-84

Tertrais, Bruno

France's European Priority,
no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 18-23

Todd, David F.

**Cutting Defense: Method Instead
of Madness**, no. 5 (Summer 94),
pp. 91-94

Viccellio, Henry, Jr.

**The Joint Challenge to
Interservice Training**, no. 7
(Spring 95), pp. 43-47

Weigley, Russell F.

**Fighting with Allies: The Debate
Fifty Years On**, no. 8 (Summer 95),
pp. 38-45

Westenhoff, Charles M.

Why We Need an Air Force, no. 6
(Autumn/Winter 94-95), pp. 62-67

Whitlow, J.L.

JFACC: Who's in Charge?, no. 5
(Summer 94), pp. 64-70

Widnall, Sheila E.

Global Presence, no. 7 (Spring 95),
pp. 94-99

Willmott, H.P.

**Operation Downfall: A Book
Review**, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter
94-95), p. 127

Wilson, Thomas R.

**Joint Intelligence and Uphold
Democracy**, no. 7 (Spring 95),
pp. 54-59

Woodruff, William

The Battle for Anzio, no. 8
(Summer 95), pp. 62-67

Yost, David S.

**The Future of U.S. Overseas
Presence**, no. 8 (Summer 95),
pp. 70-82

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
In Memoriam

U.S. Casualties in World War II

	Army ¹	Navy	Marine Corps	Total ²
Number Serving	11,260,000	4,183,466	669,100	16,122,566
Battle Deaths	234,874	36,950	19,733	291,557
Other Deaths	83,400	25,664	4,778	113,842
Wounds Not Mortal	565,861	37,778	68,207	671,846

¹ Includes Army Air Forces.

² Period from December 7, 1941 to December 31, 1946.



*Brig. Gen.
Roosevelt's Grave
(Normandy, 1944)
by Fletcher Martin.*



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