

December 5, 1981

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*During a long and extraordinary discussion, the Polish Politburo deliberates over the grim state of affairs in the country. Jaruzelski later describes the atmosphere as “funereal.” The population is viewed as largely against the current leadership, Solidarity is a “total movement,” which makes the situation worse than in previous landmark crises in 1956 and 1970, and the opposition is seen as poised to take over power—legally. The Politburo mostly still opposes a military solution but is forced to consider a variety of extreme measures including disbanding the PUWP. Ultimately, the leadership grants Jaruzelski the power to make the final decision on martial law. Summing up, Jaruzelski states that it is “a horrible, monstrous shame for the party that after 36 years in power it has to be defended by the police. But there is nothing else left ahead of us.”*

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#### Agenda

1. Evaluation of the current situation, prognosis for further developments and conclusions resulting from it [the evaluation].
2. Various matters.

On point 1 on the agenda.

Information presented by Cdes. *Cz. Kiszczak* and *S. Ciosek*.

*Cde. S. Ciosek*—there are a series of grave tensions facing the line authorities—“S” [Solidarity]. The talks began at “S’s” request. We did not agree to discuss subjects such as: law and order, territorial self-government and elections to national councils. “S” demands discussion of matters related to: 1) exclusive and uncontrolled access to the mass media; 2) legal ratification of political changes; 3) economic reform. Consent to reform depends on consent to the first two conditions. Therefore, structural transformation is the price for consent to economic reform. Since the Presidium session in Radom,<sup>7</sup> “S” has completely resisted further talks since it considers them fruitless given that the government declared a provisional economic undertaking with respect to carrying out repressive actions when it was decided at the Seventh Plenum to accept a law on the use of extraordinary measures. [“S”] believes that this law cannot be introduced without terror. That is why [“S”] is threatening a 24-hour warning strike, and in the event [the

<sup>7</sup> A pivotal meeting of Solidarity’s NCC Presidium on December 3–4. See Document No. 78.

law] is introduced, a general strike that would last until success [is achieved]. “S” is highly critical of the temporary arrangement saying that it means erasure of the reform, that it jeopardizes the interests of the working people, and that [“S”] will not agree to a price change without reform.

They announced that they will not join the Front of National Accord [FNA] as they consider it a repainted FNU.

“S’s” minimal program addressed to the authorities is the following:

- an end to repression;
- consent to draft “S” into the military and CP [Citizens’ Police];
- withdrawal of the temporary arrangement;
- democratic elections to national councils at all levels, including in advance, to the NVC;
- union control over the economy and especially foodstuffs;
- a grant of broad authority (super-government) to the Civic National Council;
- a grant of full access to mass media for the Civic National Council.

These are the main conclusions of the Presidium declaration which are to be presented and approved at the NC [National Commission] session on the eighth of this month, during which we should expect a further sharpening of “S’s” position. Hence, this is a program of open political opposition, which has nothing in common with a trade union and which openly aims at a change of regime and takeover of power.

During the coming days we can expect:

- a mobilization of “S” membership masses to support the leadership’s resolution;
- signs that the membership masses are more radical than the leadership.

*Cde. Czesław Kiszcak*—the new elements of the situation are:

- intensified attacks by extreme “S” forces on the party and the government with the aim of taking over power. Resolutions passed by the Presidium deliberating in Warsaw and Radom, which included regional chairmen, prove that. Very radical resolutions were passed at the meeting of the Gdańsk region in the Lenin Shipyard on December 1. Wałęsa’s recent speeches are especially bellicose and aggressive (regarding the Social Council for the National Economy, access to mass media; for the first time he said that “confrontation will not happen without bloodshed”). The tone of other leaders’ speeches was equally aggressive and on the order of an ultimatum. They blackmail us with the threat of a general strike (Bujak, Rulewski, Kuroń). They use catchy slogans that their takeover of power will allow for stabilization of the situation and a speedy improvement of social conditions.

Premises concerning a sharpening of the course by the “S” extremists:

- paralyzing the idea of the FNA;
- intimidation of society, the Sejm, and government (against the possibility of approving the law on extraordinary measures);

- cementing of the union, but mainly of the leading “S” cells;
- confidence that the USSR will not intervene and that it will be possible to communicate with it over the heads of the party;
- Wałęsa’s egging on—“if he does not take a tough course then he will no longer be the president;”
- the true aim of the extremists to take power;
- the testing of society’s reaction to the sharpened course.

Local administrations and party organizations are being paralyzed more and more.

Confrontation with the authorities in the countryside is assuming different forms. The Independent Farmers’ Solidarity union allies with Solidarity in the cities as well as with other groups such as the Clubs of the Self-Governing Republic.

In academic circles the party is paralyzed, the IUS and “S” are very active.

The Church is very reserved with respect to the FNA. Glemp and Wałęsa met today.

From the evaluation of these facts it appears that the enemy is hastening the dismantling of state structures and a takeover of power.

In this situation it is necessary to act in a way that would make it impossible for the adversary to accomplish his program.

He suggests:

- with respect to legislative work: accelerate passage by the Sejm of the law on extraordinary measures (there is a fear that many deputies, under pressure, may vote against that law);
- pass a law on trade unions;
- consider ways to dismantle Solidarity cells in those factories and enterprises where their activity is especially aggressive, and to ban self-government in these factories and replace it with party-nominated self-government until a law is passed;
- decentralize decisions on procedures in case of the occupation of public buildings;
- consider de-legalization of the IUS as an unequivocally hostile organization; strengthen disciplinary activity toward students and cadres;
- within the framework of the law, increase repression against illegal groups, the CIP; arrest leaders of other anti-socialist groups;
- take decisive and preemptive administrative and [other] appropriate actions to secure the radio and television;
- in case of a general strike, introduce martial law throughout the country.

*Cde. Hieronim Kubiak*—in addition informs about a school strike in Lublin and about [the fact that] the voivode of Lublin signed an agreement which contradicts political directives and his own first declaration. The signed agreement grants program, management and consultative authority to the social council, *de facto* recognizes two illegal organizations (the Independent Scouts’ Union and the Federation of Polish Youth), and fully yields to “S’s” demands with respect to the academic history curriculum.

The voivode has abused his competences by signing such an agreement. After discussion with him, he declared that he is ready to publicly annul the agreement and resign from his post.

“S” considers the Lublin agreement to be an example worth spreading.

Conflict [...] in Radom—as a result of discussions, only one moot point remains—Professor Hebda’s removal (they suggest he take 3–4 weeks of vacation). Our instruction is unequivocal—we will not remove Professor Hebda.

*Cde. Włodzimierz Mokrzyński*—the practice of removing party organizations from factories is increasing. Another form of attacking the party is “S’s” refusal to cooperate within self-governments whose members include party people.

“S” is already actively preparing for elections, they are training agitators.

Pressures to come to a reckoning are not weakening within the party. Concrete and imposing actions are necessary on this issue. The PPO complains about weak direct links between the upper levels and members. They want individual contacts in small groups and not big meetings. We should use delegates of all levels for such contacts.

After the latest “S” resolutions there is a threat to the idea of the FNA. The Church’s stance is also ambiguous. It will back the stronger one.

What do party members expect, what do they demand?

- persistence in enforcing legal responsibility with respect to everyone equally, no matter their affiliation or position;
- the establishment of party workers’ council groups (if necessary they should be secret).

Directors of enterprises should be expected to precisely fulfill their responsibilities.

Immediately send *aktiv* groups to large factories (not only to 207).

Publicly condemn every violation of the statute by the “S” union.

Try to introduce a party representative in factories where workers’ self-government has not been elected yet, even if he has to resign from his party functions.

Reach every party member with all decisions and any information regarding economic reform.

Use recordings of “S” leaders’ speeches in a propaganda campaign.

*Cde. Tadeusz Porębski*—suggests collecting opinions on a provisional economic undertaking in large factories as there is talk that a provisional economic undertaking [represents] a break-down of the national economy.

He is against dividing the law on extraordinary measures into two parts.

The situation in the voivodeship—we cannot count on the reaction force of the party in large factories. At the moment, the party is the party committee [instancja], the *aktiv* and some of the masses waiting for what will happen next. In Wrocław, we can count on 2,000–2,500 people ready for anything out of 45,000 party members. The phenomenon of leaving the party is still taking place and the main cause given is fear and uncertainty about tomorrow. This phenomenon may increase. There are also other motives for returning [party] identification cards—a lack of faith in the party and whether it can take the country out of the current

situation. But one can also observe an attempt to consolidate the ranks, especially among the senior *aktiv*, in order to organize conspiratorial activity. The threat of provocation lies underneath. These 2,000–2,500 people who are ready for anything are only the left wing of the party, who are Marxists by intuition and belief. In the report there is an orientation toward the middle. We should demonstrate more decisive support for the *aktiv* on the left; this is a matter of principle. Every energetic activity by the authorities will strengthen that *aktiv*. Every concession causes a weakening of that *aktiv*; this should be taken into consideration.

Under current conditions, the slogan about cadre review is not good.

We need to realize the fact that gaining society's trust in the party requires 3–4 years. Society will become more trusting when we effectively resolve vital issues.

We can forget about our hopes for the collapse of Solidarity. We can take action in this direction but we cannot hope that it will lead to quick results.

Hitherto, we had three options for resolution of the situation:

- negotiations—compromise to end the conflict—a new increase in tensions;
- the idea for national reconciliation which, in the light of recent developments, is clearly fading;
- forceful actions.

I support the “carrot and stick” [*pałka i gołąbek*, literally cudgel and dove] method on legal grounds. The slogan of reconciliation alone is not enough nowadays; it is seen as our weakness. Therefore, a definitive act both for reconciliation and order is necessary. We need a different program if the force option is to be chosen; very class-like, socially accepted (a total struggle against speculation and theft, among other things).

We also need to know how we are going to act under conditions of a general strike, which seems to be inevitable.

At the last session, I said that the families of military personnel and CP [Citizens' Police] officers are secure in case of an extraordinary situation, but that the families of *aktiws* are not secure. We need to take care of that. I suggest the withdrawal of *aktiws* from factories; militarize and professionally retrain them and then they will defend themselves and their relatives.

*Cde. Tadeusz Czechowicz*—a conclusion can be drawn from the meetings that society does not believe the government and vice versa.

He suggests:

- obliging government representatives to frequent meetings directly with workers' crews in factories;
- organizing a meeting of representatives from 100 chosen factories to discuss basic matters related to an economic review and how the weight of the reform will be distributed;
- carrying on the ideological discussion in two phases; the first would be a discussion on reports in large factories and collection of remarks and motions as well as experiences, and the second would be their theoretical generalization during a plenary discussion;

- in our propaganda making use of the fact that the idea of the FNA is very appealing among women. Questions arise during meetings about the make-up of the initiative group;
- holding talks with representatives of our club and our allies to secure Sejm approval of the law on extraordinary measures;
- holding a teleconference with the first secretaries of the VC today.

*Cde. Zofia Grzyb*—supports the motions presented by *Cde. Kiszczak*. In relation to the necessity to prepare for a general strike she suggests immediately:

- taking weapons away from factory guards (they are mainly members of Solidarity);
- securing special production (e.g. the Walter Institute in Radom);
- strengthening security forces and the CP (there are many open positions at the local police headquarters in Radom);
- ensuring the security of the party *aktiv* and its families. The *aktiws* in the factories are asking when they will be provided with support, and if simultaneous action by *aktiws* and security forces is possible. The *aktiws* are asking if it is possible to isolate especially active and dangerous representatives of the extremists in advance;
- in relation to students' strikes—considering drafting them into military service;
- when necessary and possible, appointing press spokesmen in the voivodeship and local committees.

*Cde. Florian Siwicki*—informed about the course of the Committee of Defense Ministers' session of the Warsaw Pact member-states in Moscow.<sup>8</sup> About Polish matters at the session—great apprehension. Criticism of the party and authorities for weak counteraction. Concern about further developments. It was emphasized that the situation in Poland weakens the defense abilities of the WP (transit is more difficult, anti-Soviet propaganda, disruption of deliveries to which Poland is obligated). More radical forms of struggle with the counter-revolution were suggested. The methods used so far will not bring results and may lead to a larger tragedy.

He supports all motions raised by *Cde. Kiszczak*. The situation is special. "S" revealed its intentions and decisiveness in its attempt to take over power. It set its directions and agenda of actions.

And if that is the case, then we also need to fix our intentions and work out a plan of action against "S", including radical ones anticipating their actions. This cannot only be a counteraction from which we would retreat. We should also move to anticipatory actions. Starting today, begin artillery propaganda preparation of society.<sup>9</sup> Make counter-revolutionary activity openly known, make them realize what a tragedy it can lead to and that those who do not take this into account will bear the consequences.

<sup>8</sup> See Document No. 79.

<sup>9</sup> In other words, prepare the way with a "barrage" of propaganda.

Confirm to a greater degree the implementation of the Fourth CC Plenum resolution in the form of both agreement and battle, that is—both the unification of patriotic forces and the simultaneous fight with our enemies. Strengthen the party on that platform; win over those who are straddling the issues.

He suggests convening a session of the Sejm as soon as possible and implementing the law on extraordinary powers for the government. He is against the division of the law into two parts. He suggests not broadcasting the entire session of the Sejm; the session should be restricted.

Cadre review—one can conclude from the suggestions of the Military Operation Groups that many people in the administration at lower levels should be replaced. This should be selective and peaceful but apparent. This will strengthen the influence of the authorities.

*Cde. Stanisław Opalko*—in large factories 90 percent of the crews are in “S”; often first secretaries of the FC are in it as well. Party members are intimidated. It is difficult to convince them to destroy anti-party and anti-state flyers and posters. He suggests giving consideration to dissolving party organizations which are taken over by “S”.

In Tarnów, “S. W.”<sup>10</sup> members continue to occupy a building demanding the removal of the voivode from his post simply because he has worked in the party apparatus before.

The FNA—he feels there is no need to prolong the discussion. If “S” refuses to join, then work without its participation.

People demand concrete information about the enemy and their activity.

The party *aktiv* is intimidated. “S” creates squads of 20 people that are armed and act with absolute obedience and discipline. Therefore we should modify the plans of the [CC] Organizational Department to correspond to the current situation (regarding self-defense).

We should immediately take care of social matters in the factories. Many workers did not receive protective clothing and shoes for a long time because there was no one to take care of it.

The party organizations in many factories have not held meetings in months. The situation is similar in the countryside.

People ask why we do not bring an end to school and student strikes.

At the meetings there are voices demanding a separation from Wałęsa’s begging appeal for help to those abroad.

People still bring up the issue of settling accounts.

We should quickly begin preparations for self-defense of the *aktiv* and their families, and defense of party and state buildings.

*Cde. W. Jaruzelski*—what actions does *Cde. Opalko* suggest in the Tarnów voivodeship and with which forces? How [can we help] and what kind of help is needed? What can he [the voivode] do on his own?

<sup>10</sup> *Solidarność Wiejska*, Rural Solidarity, later renamed Solidarity of Individual Farmers (*Solidarność Rolników Indywidualnych*).

*Cde. Stanisław Opalko*—suggests discussions with those occupying the building.

*Cde. W. Jaruzelski*—we will not get far if we count on the military taking care of everything while the party only calls for radical measures. Did the VC draw conclusions regarding the party organizations which did not meet for months?

*Cde. Zbigniew Messner*—paralysis of the party is a result of the overall situation in the country. People are dispirited by the economic situation and the increasing impertinence of the adversary. There is a complete lack of action in the basic party cells. If it were necessary to dissolve them for that reason, then many would have to be dissolved. There are also active people who are ready for a great deal but they look to the leadership. Nonetheless, this is a normal reaction for a Marxist party. The Fourth and Sixth CC Plenums gave the party a big push. If we spoil that, then the party will fall apart and a new one will be formed based on forums. Therefore, we must persistently enforce the resolution of the Fourth Plenum regarding self-proclamation, beginning with the CC members. The delegation from Katowice wanted to demand at the Fourth Plenum the removal of all “S” members from the CC.

We cannot have delusions that society is ready to support us. The average citizen has a highly critical attitude, is anti-state and anti-Soviet, and wonders why the authorities who have warned multiple times about the unrelenting defense of socialism are not doing anything.

If we persistently act within the framework of constitutional rights, we can win over the part of society that is tired of anarchy and lawlessness.

Reform—the economy needs the introduction of reforms, this is not in doubt. But under war conditions (the existence of controls, weak procurement, and an imbalance in the means of production) we should approach it carefully. There is the threat that in the first quarter basic industrial branches (metallurgy) will break down.

Cadres—this is not the time for verification. Many cannot handle the pressures anyway and leave on disability or early retirement.

The situation in higher education—the IUS forces are significant. If we want to break down students’ strikes with force; then in many cases it will be necessary to expel students together with provosts and cadres. The situation is similar with the high school system.

He supports *Cde. F. Siwicki’s* and *Cde. Cz. Kiszczak’s* motions in their entirety—act preemptively, introduce martial law if necessary; we should not be ashamed, we cannot passively watch the system fall apart because in a few weeks there will be nobody who can introduce martial law and nobody who might be interested in it.

*Cde. Marian Orzechowski*—assumption—no matter what we do, “S” will persistently aim at accomplishing its goal. New, aggressive slogans have appeared in “S’s” propaganda.

Our strategic goal is to defend socialism. But it is not possible to achieve that without the trust of a part of the working class and without retaining the party as an instrument for accomplishing that goal.



The substance of our actions after September had a political nature; this was at odds with the adoption of forceful solutions. For many months the state did not use enforcement measures with which it is legally and constitutionally empowered. By doing so we acquired doubts about the state's ability to offer peace and security for its citizens. The dismantling of the party that is taking place is a result of such behavior. The consequence of this within the party is a misunderstanding of the substance of the Sixth CC Plenum resolution (the law on extraordinary measures) which is recognized as a violation of social agreements.

The strategic goal of the adversary is clear. But how do we assess his actions during the coming days? What are his weaknesses and strengths? Why can we draw the conclusion that consolidation around extremist forces is taking place (as we know about the NCC Presidium session in Radom)? Do we have a full assessment of the enemy's forces, plans and means for the coming days? A majority of society supports Solidarity.

Dangerous points for us are:

- a full-time “S” *aktiv*, which is ready for anything and which incites itself and its surroundings; these are young people who create irrational moods among society;
- the CIP—an assault and counter-revolutionary force, ready for anything, the basis for establishment of “S” squads;
- the IUS—in April this year it was still a weak organization but today it is a massive force able to bring students into the streets.

The majority of the working class does not back us, but it does in part.

Therefore we are standing at the Rubicon—we will either overcome it or we will have to maintain the status quo.

In that connection, we should accentuate the following slogans in our propaganda and actions:

- we want to rescue the state as it is, which Solidarity wants to destroy;
- we want to do anything to avoid civil war, which “S” is aiming for;
- the Front for National Reconciliation is a strategic slogan, which is accurate in every situation.

We have to anticipate the enemy's actions on a global scale; on the scale of voivodeships, with our own forces as well.

Neutralize the CIP and IUS, and rid Solidarity of its leadership at the center. These will be the first of those preemptive actions. When undertaking them we should predict how “S” will react to them as a whole. How are we going to react if “S” calls a general strike? To what degree can we count on the security forces and the CP (“S” is directing destructive activities in those circles). Which *aktiv* in the party can we count on? How large is it? Cde. Porębski mentioned that in Wrocław he counts on 2,000–2,500. I think that we can count on one-third of the party membership, but they need to feel a force behind them.

Self-determination—it's about time functional party members left “S” since it is clear that it is a political party. Dangerous views are surfacing that at the bot-

tom ranks party members and “S” will reach agreement if the CC and NC do not set upon each other.

We also need to know how internal allies will react to our actions. We cannot count on them; our tougher actions are not in their interest.

*Cde. Stanisław Ciosek*—Wałęsa and his advisers are already saying loudly that confrontation is inevitable. They warn that the “S” NC which meets in Gdańsk will go farther than the Presidium in Radom. Wałęsa is also threatening that he will go his own way. However, this is an illusion. They are counting on the resolution on extraordinary measures not being approved by the Sejm. They are preparing to place huge pressures on the deputies. At the same time they are looking for compromises based on the “three” (1/3 of us and 2/3 of them).

The weak points of “S” are:

- miscalculating society’s reaction;
- counting on the West;
- weak operational-technical preparation;
- not taking our resistance into consideration.

*Cde. Czesław Kiszczak*—what is Solidarity planning to do?

- break further talks and divert responsibility onto the party and the government;
- prepare a general strike;
- establish self-governments to substitute for temporary authority, and hasten elections to the Sejm (in May);
- escalate attacks on the authorities with the motto “no support for Jaruzelski’s government,” and attack Cde. Olszowski for his appearance at “Ursus;”
- ten TV programs on economic reform [presented] in a way that will completely discredit the authorities;
- prepare cadres to take over power;
- introduce to the Sejm a draft election procedure;
- assure the USSR the minimum of interests in Poland—their guarantee is Solidarity and not the party and government;
- not allow passage of the resolution on extraordinary measures;
- attack the Sejm (Stelmachowski: half the Sejm are “leading officials with soft bellies”).

Roughly, these are “S’s” plans for the nearest future.

*Cde. Kiszczak*’s answer to the question of whether the security service is able to perform the tasks it was assigned: Yes, it is able to; however, it is under great pressure from the adversary, who deceitfully says, “the MI and CP are good, only the parasites need to be removed.” The apparatus is ready to perform assignments except for special cases. The action at the Firefighters’ Academy, where nobody resigned despite awareness of the dangers, supports [this assumption].

*Cde. Hieronim Kubiak*—the party’s line since the Ninth Congress is correct. Even if a forceful confrontation takes place we do not have anything other than this line. This line is attacked so strongly because it was and is correct. It is expressed by a poster war, starvation marches and various modes of discrediting

the party and the authorities; all of this is meant to cut society off from the party. We were attacked immediately for the FNA initiative because it was aimed at society. That is why we have to continue this line persistently.

However, why did this line prove ineffective? Because:

- we fought too long for this line inside the party;
- we took over the adversary's tactic—small steps in defense of socialism.

This is how we lost a lot of time, which the adversary has taken advantage of. It is beneficial that the adversary has revealed himself; he does not pretend anymore; he attacked all axioms of the system's stability and openly talks about upheaval. Therefore, it will now be easier to attack the adversary.

We should not concede anything right now, especially the regulation on trade unions, which can hasten the process of corrosion of trust in "S" among the lowest cells. We also cannot give up on the regulation on extraordinary measures. Hence, according to the Sixth CC Plenum both these regulations [are] parallel. We cannot have delusions—"S" extreme [resort] to force will react with force.

As a correct line, the line of the Ninth Congress makes it possible to maintain the party and the *aktiv*. All necessary staff actions should be taken to protect the *aktiv* and their families.

General strike—if it takes place, we will not be able to survive long. That is why I believe that when a general strike is declared, [we] should reach out for state constitutional rights and declare martial law.

*Cde. Stefan Olszowski*—we have wasted about ten days again. We assumed that both resolutions would be in the Sejm around December 5–6. This was our grave mistake. The situation is dramatic as never before. Confrontation is inevitable (perhaps already in January).

He suggests introduction of both regulations—on trade unions and on extraordinary measures. We have to act lawfully, within the entire scope of the law, as a lawful government.

Detailed consultations between the first secretary of the CC and the allies are indispensable.

A special group for cadre matters should be convened.

For some time, stop official price fluctuations.

Meet with the first secretaries of the VC in the next few days.

*Cde. Marian Woniak*—the economic situation is very difficult. There is a threat that beginning in January 1982 meat rations will fall to 2.9 kilograms; there is no soap or detergents on the market. If western loans are cut off, where will we get, beginning on January 1, 1982, 400 million dollars that is needed to start industrial production?

Based on TGO<sup>11</sup> motions we need to change immediately those regional authority cells which must be at our disposal.

<sup>11</sup> *Terenowe Grupy Operacyjne*—Local Operational Groups—were military groups deployed in the countryside.

*Cde. Stanisław Kociołek*—the *aktiv* together with the military were directed at the [work] establishments. *Aktiv* groups for political work (destroying flyers, attaching posters) and for self-defense are being formed.

In connection with strikes in universities we should exert strong pressure on those leaderships which supported the strike—the Church provided a certain support and “S” provided full [support]. The semester is lost. Provosts from Warsaw universities do not respect the recommendations given by the mayor of Warsaw although they improvise in the role of mediators. The use of enforcement in the universities would be impossible at the moment. It is better to let the strike “decay”—it does not enjoy society’s sympathy.

The Mazowsze region is enforcing strike readiness in response to the action at the Firefighter’s Academy.

The market—supplies of household articles are catastrophic; speculation is out of control.

The party—a lot of potential strength is still embedded within it. I do not fully agree with *Cde. Kubiak*’s opinion. The theory of an easy approach was a mistake; [i.e.] the practice of dismantling the party from the right wing and from the position of horizontal liquidation and from the position of horizontal structures liquidation by people such as *Lamentowicz* or *Iwanów*. There is one possible orientation—Marxist–Leninist, which will take all conditions into consideration—an orientation against the recidivism of social democracy. Politburo members should define their views on party consolidation and the party’s left [wing]. This is necessary.

Counting on reconciliation with “S” has proved to be a delusion. “S” rejected the idea of an FNA. [The idea] should still be current; it is an idea in favor of perspective.

He calls for immediate commencement of preparations for introducing martial law and especially for preparing the party to act under those conditions. It is an urgent matter.

*Cde. Jan Głowczyk*—he supports approval of the law on extraordinary measures which would unfortunately take place on the anniversary of the December [1970] events. He supports all other motions raised by *Cde. Kiszczak*. He believes that *Wałęsa* is playing an independent role. At the same time we should direct our propaganda in a way that will blame the adversary for the results of introducing the law. He suggests talks with the Church; make them understand all the results.

He suggests preparing emergency methods for managing the economy.

Confrontation is the axis of politics; it is unavoidable. If we do not find courage, its costs may be high.

Remember about security not only for the party *aktiv* but also for trade associations.

*Cde. Jan Łabęcki*—understood *S. Kociołek*’s presentation as contrary to the resolution of the Ninth Congress. If we undermine this line, then which one should we concentrate on?

He suggests suspending price and apartment fee increases at this time.

In justifiable cases, replace incompetent and unreliable representatives of the administration.

“Zero” hour is approaching. “There are calculations of injustices in the Motherland...,” now we need to put these aside. Begin consolidation of the party around the resolution of the Ninth Congress, to defend socialism. A large role is given to the Politburo, but how is it [arrayed]—is it divided or not? We cannot even suggest that. We have a great responsibility for the system, for peace in Europe.

We need to have a plan of action ready for “zero” hour. The opposition will not let it go. It has revealed its goals. We should skillfully take advantage of this, polarize social sympathies. The extremists have hidden out in large factories. This is the new quality of the situation. Party lines are melting in these factories. We need to estimate who else we can count on in these factories. The use of force will cause a division of society. The FNA—this is our argument, do not retreat from that. I have changed my mind regarding the possibility of a division in “S”.

Some sort of extraordinary solution for the economy could change the situation, something like the July Manifest. Confrontation is inevitable (*Cde. M. Milewski*—what does *Cde. Łabęcki* have in mind when talking about a plan of action for “zero” hour?).

Military upheaval, that is what I have in mind. Military upheaval with [all the] marks of the sole authority. Perhaps also the dissolution of the party and the creation of a communist party; but these are only theoretical assumptions.

*Cde. Mieczysław Rakowski*—we are facing a choice for a new strategy that will decide the future of the country. This cannot be decided by one person but by the whole collective which governs the country. This requires a uniform view. The leadership group does not have a uniform view on that strategy. I am attacked myself by both “S” and a segment within the party.

I will engage in a polemic with *Cde. Kociołek*. I believe that our policies since the Ninth Congress cannot be characterized as concessions with respect to “S”. We did not concede in many matters—resolution no. 199 RM,<sup>12</sup> the strike in Lubogór; we did not concede on the matter of access to the mass media for “S”, neither on the matter of the strike at the WSI,<sup>13</sup> in Radom, nor in Żyrardów. There were also defeats but they were not of a decisive nature. The aggressiveness of “S” is among other things a response to our actions. Therefore we cannot say that we only have a series of defeats in our column. We also cannot remain in the world of illusion, e.g. our evaluation of the situation in the trade associations. They are sick, just like the whole party.

The possibilities for a policy of reconciliation have already been exhausted. Our partner considers the fight with us to be his program. We believed that we

<sup>12</sup> Resolution 199 of the Council of Ministers (RM—Rada Ministrów) concerned extra pay for work in the coal mines on Saturdays.

<sup>13</sup> *Wyzsza Szkoła Inżynierska*, College of Engineering.

would force him into limited co-responsibility. “S” does not want that. Dividing Solidarity into extreme and moderate lines is a mistake. Such a division does not exist. The “S” leadership forces really believe that they can take over power. They conclude that the USSR will not enter [Poland] and that it will accept their guarantees. The “S” leadership moved from a masked union and social movement to an opposition party with counter-revolutionary features. It picks arenas of confrontation that are not comfortable for us (elections to councils, the Sejm, party organizations in factories, foodstuff control). The concept of a Civic Economic Council is a concept backed by the Church which indeed means a counter-revolutionary government with Czartoryski, Wielowieyski and Stelmachowski.<sup>14</sup> We cannot agree to that.

I am afraid that the next phase of the counter-revolution will be the use of force by the adversary. It is an inevitable process. I have brought this to our attention before. The squads, which always appear at the culminating point, have already surfaced on city streets. This is a new qualitative fact. At the moment calling for respect for law and order is pointless. This does not work with these groups. A considerable part of society is split in two—it covets order but at the same time it does not come out against those who violate it. We are losing day after day. The opposition will not give up the fight. It has already launched certain mechanisms.

The fact that the opposition has revealed itself is a new and favorable [development] for our case. We should take full advantage of that. We can expect that during the coming days drastic actions will be taken against us. At the same time we have to enforce the idea of national reconciliation.

For the coming days and weeks, work out a few directed political slogans and a document that will clearly take “S’s” slogans into consideration in our presentations and publications. The resolution approved by the “S” NC Presidium in Radom is a shock to me. It does not leave any room for compromise and brings us to a new phase.

The second direction of operations are force centers. The leadership should establish a few working groups which will immediately prepare concepts for action, including political ones, for “zero” hour, so that there is no improvisation. We need to know which social forces will support us. The guiding idea for this concept should be:

- defense of the state;

<sup>14</sup> Paweł Czartoryski was a professor of history and law. Andrzej Wielowieyski was a journalist for the Catholic monthly *Więź* and secretary of the Warsaw Club of Catholic Intelligentsia (KIK). Andrzej Stelmachowski was a law professor at the University of Wrocław and University of Warsaw, and president of KIK. All three were Solidarity members. Czartoryski and Wielowieyski’s families were also part of the old nobility, so the implication is that the Civic Economic Council would be under the influence of the aristocracy and the Church.

- defense of the endangered survival of the nation;
- implementation of the goals of the Ninth Congress and of economic reform.

In the near future, implement necessary changes in the administrative cadres (do not touch the technical one).

The law on extraordinary measures—even if it is passed by the Sejm, it will be by a slight majority. Then there will be the claim that a rump parliament passed a law for the party. Such a law should not be passed after giving it [all that] attention; it should be done instantly. Talks with deputies are pointless, the majority of them are under pressure and they are simply afraid. Therefore we need to decide which actions to take.

*Cde. Kazimierz Barcikowski*—agrees with the general assessments presented so far. He suggests:

- calling a conference of VC first secretaries for December 8;
- holding a session of the Commission for Cooperation of the Party and Political Parties to present our assessments;
- guiding the resolution on trade unions through to approval by the Sejm (it is not fully agreed upon, differences relate to military matters and the period for which strikes should be banned);
- after approval of the resolution on trade unions implementing the resolution on banning strikes;
- a resolution to delay elections.

Approve the resolution on trade unions and the Teachers' Charter at the Sejm session on December 11–12. Call the next Sejm session for December 17 and approve resolutions on the ban on strikes and on the delay of elections to national councils at that session.

The resolution on extraordinary measures—it would make sense to implement it only when bans resulting from the resolution on trade unions prove unsuccessful in this matter. We should expect that Catholic deputies and social democrats in the Sejm will oppose the resolution; we also do not know how the UPP will behave (*Strużek* made critical remarks). The majority of our club will vote in favor of the resolution but non-party deputies and those related to them—we do not know how [they will vote]. In this situation, the resolution may be approved by a slight majority, but it might also be rejected. This would be a great defeat for the party and the government.

*Cde. Józef Czyrek*—in the past, all sorts of crises were solved not by the expansion of democracy but by the extraordinary strengthening of authority, by the introduction of dictatorship. In 1956 and in 1970 we were able to control the situation without that. Today this is not going to happen because we are dealing with a total movement that believes it can take over power legally, that is confident of support from the West, and that even counts on agreement with the USSR. This movement, being a composition of various political and ideological forces, has assumed the status of a national movement. This makes [an attempt to] break it more difficult. This movement discounts and deepens the economic crisis (this is a new feature); it continues in the feedback with the international situation.

What should we do in this situation?

- work out a plan to avoid civil war;
- defend the idea of the FNA, even without the participation of “S”;
- use a double tactic—the force of argument and the argument of force;
- act in support of consolidation of the party, engage in major work with the party base centered on the resolutions of the Fourth and Sixth CC Plenum;
- make society realize that if “zero” hour comes, neither the party nor the authorities will bear responsibility;
- prepare all political structures including the party for working under martial law conditions;
- prepare a plan of action for the period following martial law;
- secure political and economic relations with allies.

The socialist states expect us to take the initiative and prove to be persistent in the fight against the adversary.

The expectations of the capitalist states differ depending on their interests in Poland. On the one hand we should stimulate their interest in stabilizing the situation in Poland but at the same time we should secure our economic interests.

If the use of extraordinary measures takes place, try not to let it adversely affect our interests abroad; try not to let it cost us much.

*Cde. Jerzy Romanik*—agrees with all motions. There is no hope left for reconciliation among society. Party [representatives] in factories are intimidated. Everybody expects decisive action; the sooner the better. Coal miners talk about it in meetings, even those from “S”. My factory executed a plan on November 26; sixty percent of the self-government consists of party members. Perhaps in such factories the confrontation should take a different course. Everybody is aware that we will not achieve anything through legal measures.

*Cde. Albin Siwak*—supports Cde. M. Rakowski’s motion regarding the establishment of special groups. [Siwak] does not agree with [Rakowski’s] assessment of the situation in the trade associations; there are weaker and stronger cells, just as in the party.

In relation to anticipated developments, he believes that the CC structure should not include “S” members (Arent, Ciechan).

He supports the opinions and motions of Cdes. Siwicki and Kiszczak unequivocally.

From the most recent meetings in the field:

- there is definite approval for an action at the WSOP in Warsaw;
- [there is an] increased effort by the “S” canvassers to torpedo the regulations on trade unions and on extraordinary measures, and to dismiss party organizations from factories;
- there are voices [in favor of] dismantling those PPO’s that implement the “S” line;
- in reasonable cases, replace field administration;
- expand VRCP units and train them with weapons;
- [there is] criticism of student strikes and high school youth.



*Cde. Miroslaw Milewski*—the action at the Firefighters' Academy was carried out perfectly. You cannot always assure positive results without any injuries when acting decisively. Our entire repressive action is based on the fact that we assume we can respond in a similar way to every "S" action. By employing repression hastily we could create effects for which we are not prepared.

We need to be aware that the introduction of martial law in any form will affect everyone. We will need to make sure to defend the state and nation, even at the cost of ourselves or our dear ones. Therefore we need to prepare mentally for both the external and internal consequences and effects. We need immediately to make the governments of the capitalist states and the communist parties aware of the "S's" program, its objective of confrontation and its adventurism.

Currently, we need persistently to carry out actions resulting from the resolutions of the Fourth and Sixth CC Plenums. Do not make it seem as though the situation is very tense [or that we are] waiting for "zero" hour. And if it comes then, what is next? We cannot exclude the possibility that the time and place of confrontation will be chosen by the adversary. During the coming days, the tension level may fall, but do not let that deceive you.

We agreed at the last PB [session] that the Sejm will convene on December 4–5 and that both resolutions will be considered. Yesterday we found out that the Sejm will convene on December 12 and 17 and that the resolutions will be considered separately. What will the CC members think about that? We are late again and because of that, among other things, the law on extraordinary measures has no chance of passing.

He agrees with all proposals and motions raised by Cdes. Siwicki and Kiszczak. The explanation for our actions: the defense of a socialist state and nation, and security for citizens in winter.

*Cde. Kazimierz Cypryniak*—the fight for the system has entered the final phase. Every attempt to strengthen authority will meet resistance. The adversary has concluded that the balance of forces is to his advantage.

He agrees with all motions by Cde. Kiszczak and Cde. Porębski.

Confrontation is inevitable and we must prepare for it. For a year and a half we have been saying that we want to solve the crisis through political means and that the *aktiv* is acting on this assumption. Some have left party principles altogether in their desire to provide themselves with minimal security. Acceptance of the theory of the inevitability of confrontation means triggering other activities in the party. Establish groups that will work out ways and means of action in extraordinary situations, namely:

- leading the party under extraordinary conditions;
- making approaches toward Solidarity;
- planning for a positive reaction to society.

Give the law on extraordinary measures a voice among society.

*Cde. Florian Siwicki*—every comrade has emphasized that confrontation is inevitable, that time is to our disadvantage and that we should look for various

options that would gain popular support for us. This is contradictory because it has been set aside again for later.

If we are to accept the theory that confrontation is inevitable, then we should have a plan of action that anticipates developments.

It is proposed to convene the Sejm on December 17 and approve two resolutions: for a ban on strikes and for delaying elections to councils. This proposal needs to be reconsidered as it also contradicts the entire discussion and the motions.

*Cde. Wojciech Jaruzelski*—one can sense a general convergence of the key evaluations, an awareness of the threat and danger, and the resulting conclusions in the comrades' statements. The crisis has reached its peak. The counter-revolutionary forces have bluntly revealed their intentions. We must make use of this fact.

We have spoken bitterly about the situation in the party, that this is the last chance to save at least that part of it which is able to act and which is identified with its legacy. We must strengthen the party at every level according to the criteria for [achieving] readiness to fight with the enemy.

In the nearest future we need to act in a way that will allow us to join the confrontation imposed by the adversary from the best vantage point. Not even one step backward. Do not waste any opportunity to confirm the decisiveness and determination of the party to defend the principals of a socialist state. We need to define in which situations we can immediately act offensively; we need to confirm our determination.

[An example of] such a situation is the decisive defense of the party in the factories. The party should defend itself as a political force. Unfortunately, the working class does not defend it. How did this happen? Now is not the time to evaluate that. Therefore, decisively demonstrate a readiness to defend the place and role of the party in a socialist factory.

The CC organizational and administrative section will prepare a concrete plan of action and present it on the seventh of this month.

Immediately publish the analysis of the State Council regarding the party's right to act in factories.

Intensively develop preparations for extreme situations.

Immediately use materials from the NC Presidium in Radom in the media.

Gain social approval for public statements regarding the imminent danger to the state and nation. Make the party and society aware that the party is carrying out a second revolution and that only the party is able to fight with the evil that harasses society. The party is defending the class interests of the working people at this historic point.

Cadres—protect the party and administrative apparatus and remove those who are incapable and compromised. The majority of the administration work honestly and generously. Make decisions based on the TGO proposal (to be prepared by Cde. M. Janiszewski).

The Church—unfavorable reassessments are being made, which we should take into consideration. This is not a third force but one that is tightly associated with “S”.

Colleges—if an extraordinary situation takes place during the course of strikes at colleges, it should be considered by its results. Hold talks at once with provosts and teaching cadres. Make them aware of the unpredictable results of strikes in light of the NC Presidium resolution.

Economic matters—immediately assess the scope of aid and operations in case internal and external supplies are cut off (Cde. M. Woźniak).

Evaluate the situation and anticipate precautions for transport and communications (Cde. F. Siwicki).

Take necessary actions to secure the radio and television.

Use different methods of bringing the military closer to society.

Secure the *aktiv*, families, and buildings. The CC administrative and organizational divisions will define the forms and scope of this protection. But most of all, expect self-defense.

Immediately direct CC and VC representatives to the factories.

Work out the topography of the situation—where is “S” behaving properly and where badly, especially in large factories.

Protect the passing of resolutions in the Sejm. If otherwise impossible, pass the law on extraordinary measures through an extraordinary procedure.

In the nearest future, meet with allies and representatives of trade and autonomous associations in order to make them aware of the situation and the dangers, and to gain support.

Increase appearances of members of the leadership in the mass media.

Through the mediation of government press spokesmen, take an official position on the resolution of the “S” NC in Radom. Develop this subject into a vast propaganda campaign.

Introduce a state of work alarm and 24-hour duty at every level of the party and administrative apparatus.

We will have to make decisions of the highest responsibility. I have enough experience to fight dramatically for what can be saved. I counted on the workers’ class instinct. Unfortunately we proved to be too weak and incapable; we did not work to our full ability. We made mistakes in our decisions and assessments. There was good will and [still] is.

It is a horrible, monstrous shame for the party that after 36 years in power it has to be defended by the police. But there is nothing else left ahead of us. We need to be ready to make the decision that will allow us to save what is fundamental.

Part of the *aktiv* lives under the myth of martial law; part of the administration lives under the myth of reform. These myths need to be filled with the substance of an *aktiv* ready to act decisively and [we should] not count only on the force of the military and police and on the fact that martial law and reform will miraculously change everything.

The P[U]WP fought for power. Today one cannot see the will to fight in the party. The party is paralyzed by mistakes and that is its tragedy.

We need to be aware that if we cannot rouse people in factories, then martial law in itself will not change anything. Therefore we cannot give in to the myths. It is most important to know how to rouse people during this extraordinary situation; how to arm the party and trade associations. This is a cardinal matter.

In an extraordinary situation, the initial operations of the military and CP must be followed by actions by the local *aktiv* that correspond to the situation, to necessity and to conditions.

We will not make the final decision at today's PB session. We have considered the concept. Staff work must be continued, and decisions will be made at the optimal time and within a political framework. A concrete decision, the time and place, and the methods will depend on many circumstances—on the adversary's actions and on the support of domestic allies.

Multi-layered action is necessary, not waiting for "zero" hour and the staffs to achieve their goal. We need comprehensive preparation so that the confrontation, if it takes place, will happen at the lowest cost. We need to make it seem, inside and outside the country, that we are acting rightfully and with deep awareness of our responsibilities. Do anything not to [give the impression that] martial law is our operating concept, but that on the contrary we are doing everything to avoid that confrontational state. Society needs to be convinced that even radical measures are there so that a confrontation does not take place, so that two sides are not fighting. Talking about confrontation is a scandalous political and psychological mistake. It is not we who want confrontation but our adversary.

The Politburo familiarized itself with the following materials:

- the plan for implementing assignments resulting from the resolution of the Sixth PUWP CC Plenum;
- the resolution of the State Council regarding legal defense of the actions of political organizations;
- the actions undertaken by the PUWP Voivodeship Committee in Radom;
- the note regarding dates of the Sejm sessions in December 1981;
- the stance of the NC Presidium and the chairmen of the NSZZ Solidarity regional boards agreed to in Radom;
- the declaration of the NC Presidium and chairmen of the NSZZ Solidarity regional boards, which supports the protests in academic circles.

The Politburo approved motions regarding personnel without discussion [*obiegitem*]:

- the dismissal of Cde. Henryk Sobieski from the position of PPR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Republic of Venezuela and the Republic of Guyana and extraordinary representative and minister plenipotentiary in the Republic of Haiti;

- the dismissal of Cde. Zygmunt Pietrusiński from the position of PPR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Republic of Ecuador;
- the dismissal of Cde. Janusz Zabłocki from the position of PPR ambassador to the Republic of Lebanon;
- the approval of Cde. Mieczysław Włodarek for the position of PPR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Republic of Venezuela and the Republic of Guyana and minister extraordinary and plenipotentiary in the Republic of Haiti.

Recorded by: Andrzej Barzyk  
Bożena Łopatiuk

*[Source: Tajne Dokumenty, pp. 549–569. Translated by Magdalena Klotzbach for the National Security Archive.]*