Dunja Šešelja
Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Institute of Philosophy II, Faculty Member
- Philosophy of Science, Epistemology, Philosophical Logic, Argumentation, Formal Models, Philosophy, and 31 moreHistory of Geology, Rational Choice, Thomas S. Kuhn, Pluralism, Explanation, Scientific Reasoning, Epistemic Value, Epistemology of Disagreement, Tolerance, Rational Choice Theory, Scientific Practice, Theory Choice, Epistemic Justification, Coherence, Context of Pursuit, Theory Change, Consensus and Dissensus, Pursuit Worthiness, Social Psychology, Research Methodology, Science Policy, General Philosophy of Science, Peer Assessment, Philosophy of Science (Philosophy), History and philosophy of science (History), Propositional Attitudes, Scientific Progress, Reasonable disagreement, Epistemic Conservatism, History of Science, and Philosophy of Thomas Kuhnedit
- I'm a Professor for Social Epistemology and Reasoning in Science at the Institute for Philosophy II, Ruhr University ... moreI'm a Professor for Social Epistemology and Reasoning in Science at the Institute for Philosophy II, Ruhr University Bochum (RUB). I am also a member (on 25%) of the Philosophy & Ethics Group at TU Eindhoven. Together with Christian Straßer I lead the Research Group on Reasoning, Rationality and Science at RUB. I serve as an Editor-in-Chief of the European Journal for Philosophy of Science. My areas of expertise are social epistemology and philosophy of science, in particular formal modeling of scientific inquiry, social epistemology of scientific disagreements and controversies, and integrated history and philosophy of science.
Info about our research network on Simulations of Scientific Inquiry, funded by the DFG, can be found on this link: https://www.ssi.philosophie.uni-muenchen.de/index.html
Previously, I held visiting professorships at the University of Vienna and Ghent University, and postdoc positions at Ghent University, Ruhr-University Bochum, and at MCMP, LMU Munich (with which I am still affiliated as an external member), and served as a Steering Committee member of the European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA). Before taking the position at Ruhr University Bochum, I worked as an assistant professor at TU Eindhoven on a tenure track.
(Photo by ©RUB, Marquard)edit
Scientific disagreements sometimes persist even if scientists fully share results of their research. In this paper we develop an agent-based model to study the impact of diverging diagnostic values scientists may assign to the evidence,... more
Scientific disagreements sometimes persist even if scientists fully share results of their research. In this paper we develop an agent-based model to study the impact of diverging diagnostic values scientists may assign to the evidence, given their different background assumptions, on the emergence of polarization in the scientific community. Scientists are represented as Bayesian updaters for whom the diagnosticity of evidence is given by the Bayes factor. Our results suggest that an initial disagreement on the diagnostic value of evidence can, but does not necessarily, lead to polarization, depending on the sample size of the performed studies and the confidence interval within which scientists share their opinions. In particular, the more data scientists share, the more likely it is that the community will end up polarized.
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Scientific disagreements are an important catalyst for scientific progress. But what happens when scientists disagree amidst times of crisis, when we need quick yet reliable policy guidance? In this paper we aim to provide a normative... more
Scientific disagreements are an important catalyst for scientific progress. But what happens when scientists disagree amidst times of crisis, when we need quick yet reliable policy guidance? In this paper we aim to provide a normative account for how scientists facing disagreement in the context of 'fast science' should respond, and how policy makers should evaluate such disagreement. Starting from an argumentative, pragma-dialectic account of scientific controversies (Donato Rodríguez and Zamora Bonilla, 2013), we argue for the importance of 'higher-order evidence (HOE)', which has received insufficient attention in previous discussions on scientific disagreements and controversies, especially with regard to fast science. Moreover, we specify desiderata for scientifically relevant HOE. We use our account to analyze a recent disagreement on the aerosol transmission of the COVID-19 virus and evaluate the standpoints of the parties involved in the dispute.
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This chapter is devoted to robustness analysis, a common practice in modelling, where researchers vary features of a model and study the impact of changes on its behavior. After presenting the three most prominent types discussed in the... more
This chapter is devoted to robustness analysis, a common practice in modelling, where researchers vary features of a model and study the impact of changes on its behavior. After presenting the three most prominent types discussed in the philosophical literature, the chapter reviews the debate surrounding the epistemic role of this practice, focusing on the contested issue of its evidential import. The discussion highlights the multiple roles of robustness analysis, including the value of not establishing the robustness of a particular modeling result.
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The paper examines recent developments in agent-based modeling of scientific inquiry with a special focus on network epistemology. It provides a survey of different types of agent-based models (ABMs) studying network effects in scientific... more
The paper examines recent developments in agent-based modeling of scientific inquiry with a special focus on network epistemology. It provides a survey of different types of agent-based models (ABMs) studying network effects in scientific inquiry: ABMs based on bandit problems, ABMs based on epistemic landscapes and ABMs based on argumentative dynamics. It further presents models that study the impact of biased and deceptive researchers on the success of collective inquiry. The paper concludes with a discussion on the contribution of ABMs to the broader field of philosophy of science given their highly idealized nature.
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Agent-based modelling has become a well-established method in social epistemology and philosophy of science but the question of what kind of explanations these models provide remains largely open. This paper is dedicated to this issue. It... more
Agent-based modelling has become a well-established method in social epistemology and philosophy of science but the question of what kind of explanations these models provide remains largely open. This paper is dedicated to this issue. It starts by distinguishing between real-world phenomena, real-world possibilities, and logical possibilities as different kinds of targets which agent-based models (ABMs) can
represent. I argue that models representing the former two kinds provide how-actually explanations or causal how-possibly explanations. In contrast, models that represent logical possibilities provide epistemically opaque how-possibly explanations (Šešelja et al., 2022). While highly idealised ABMs in the form in which they are initially proposed typically fall into the last category, the epistemic opaqueness of explanations they provide can be reduced by validation procedures. To this purpose, an examination of results of simulations in terms of classes of models can be particularly helpful. I illustrate this point by discussing a class of ABMs of scientific interaction and the claim that a high degree of interaction can impede scientific inquiry.
represent. I argue that models representing the former two kinds provide how-actually explanations or causal how-possibly explanations. In contrast, models that represent logical possibilities provide epistemically opaque how-possibly explanations (Šešelja et al., 2022). While highly idealised ABMs in the form in which they are initially proposed typically fall into the last category, the epistemic opaqueness of explanations they provide can be reduced by validation procedures. To this purpose, an examination of results of simulations in terms of classes of models can be particularly helpful. I illustrate this point by discussing a class of ABMs of scientific interaction and the claim that a high degree of interaction can impede scientific inquiry.
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The literature on epistemic responsibility has traditionally focused on justified belief formation and actions that lead to it. Similarly, accounts of collective epistemic responsibility have addressed the issue of collective belief... more
The literature on epistemic responsibility has traditionally focused on justified belief formation and actions that lead to it. Similarly, accounts of collective epistemic responsibility have addressed the issue of collective belief formation and associated actions. However, cases in which we face an epistemic harm that could be prevented only by a collective action, requiring an effort of an unorganized group,
have been left out of these discussions. Examples of collectively preventable epistemic harms include a premature abandonment of a promising research program within a given scientific domain, or the prevalence of pernicious biases in a certain field of study. In this paper we propose an account of collective epistemic responsibility,
which fills this gap. Building on Hindriks’ (2018) account of collective moral responsibility, we introduce the Epistemic Duty to Join Forces. Our theory provides an account of the responsibilities of scientists to prevent epistemic harms during inquiry. It also suggests
fruitful appli- cations to other discussions, such as those concerning epistemic injustice and epistemically pernicious groups.
have been left out of these discussions. Examples of collectively preventable epistemic harms include a premature abandonment of a promising research program within a given scientific domain, or the prevalence of pernicious biases in a certain field of study. In this paper we propose an account of collective epistemic responsibility,
which fills this gap. Building on Hindriks’ (2018) account of collective moral responsibility, we introduce the Epistemic Duty to Join Forces. Our theory provides an account of the responsibilities of scientists to prevent epistemic harms during inquiry. It also suggests
fruitful appli- cations to other discussions, such as those concerning epistemic injustice and epistemically pernicious groups.
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The history of the research on peptic ulcer disease (PUD) is characterized by a premature abandonment of the bacterial hypothesis, which subsequently had its comeback, leading to the discovery of Helicobacter pylori – the major cause of... more
The history of the research on peptic ulcer disease (PUD) is characterized by a premature abandonment of the bacterial hypothesis, which subsequently had its comeback, leading to the discovery of Helicobacter pylori – the major cause of the disease. In this paper we examine the received view on this case, according to which the primary reason for the abandonment of the bacterial hypothesis in
the mid-twentieth century was a large-scale study by a prominent gastroenterologist Palmer, which suggested no bacteria could be found in the human stomach. To this end, we employ the method of digital textual analysis and study the literature on the etiology of PUD published in the decade prior to Palmer’s article. Our findings suggest that the bacterial hypothesis had already been abandoned before the publication of Palmer’s paper, which challenges the widely held view that his study played a crucial role in the development of this episode. In view of this result, we argue that the PUD case does not illustrate harmful effects of a high degree of information flow, as it has frequently been claimed in the literature on network epistemology. Moreover, we argue that alternative examples of harmful effects of a high degree of information flow may be hard to find in the history of science.
the mid-twentieth century was a large-scale study by a prominent gastroenterologist Palmer, which suggested no bacteria could be found in the human stomach. To this end, we employ the method of digital textual analysis and study the literature on the etiology of PUD published in the decade prior to Palmer’s article. Our findings suggest that the bacterial hypothesis had already been abandoned before the publication of Palmer’s paper, which challenges the widely held view that his study played a crucial role in the development of this episode. In view of this result, we argue that the PUD case does not illustrate harmful effects of a high degree of information flow, as it has frequently been claimed in the literature on network epistemology. Moreover, we argue that alternative examples of harmful effects of a high degree of information flow may be hard to find in the history of science.
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In this paper I examine the epistemic function of agent-based models (ABMs) of scientific inquiry, proposed in the recent philosophical literature. In view of Boero and Squazzoni's (2005) classification of ABMs into case-based models,... more
In this paper I examine the epistemic function of agent-based models (ABMs) of scientific inquiry, proposed in the recent philosophical literature. In view of Boero and Squazzoni's (2005) classification of ABMs into case-based models, typifications and theoretical abstractions , I argue that proposed ABMs of scientific inquiry largely belong to the third category. While this means that their function is primarily exploratory, I suggest that they are epistemically valuable not only as a temporary stage in the development of ABMs of science, but by providing insights into theoretical aspects of scientific rationality. I illustrate my point with two examples of highly idealized ABMs of science, which perform two exploratory functions: Zollman's (2010) ABM which provides a proof-of-possibility in the realm of theoretical discussions on scientific rationality, and an argumentation-based ABM (Borg et al., 2017b, 2018a,b), which provides insights into potential mechanisms underlying the efficiency of scientific inquiry.
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Formal models of scientific inquiry, aimed at capturing socio-epistemic aspects underlying the process of scientific research, have become an important method in formal social epistemology and philosophy of science. In this introduction... more
Formal models of scientific inquiry, aimed at capturing socio-epistemic aspects underlying the process of scientific research, have become an important method in formal social epistemology and philosophy of science. In this introduction to the special issue we provide a historical overview of the development of formal models of this kind and analyze their methodological contributions to discussions in philosophy of science. In particular, we show that their significance consists in different forms of 'methodological iteration' (Elliott, 2012) whereby the models initiate new lines of inquiry, isolate and clarify problems with existing knowledge claims, and stimulate further research. Throughout the last two decades philosophical discussions on scientific inquiry have increasingly utilized formal models. This has been especially fruitful for the investigation of social aspects of scientific inquiry, such as the division of cognitive labor, the epistemic effects of scientific interaction, the impact of biases on scientific research, etc. To this end a variety of formal models have been developed, from analytical ones to computer simulations in the form of agent-based models. One of the main advantages of formal approaches is that, in principle, they can help us to gain a precise understanding of the underlying issues and to form normative generalizations that are difficult to obtain in view of traditional methods (such as, for example, historical case studies). Nevertheless, models frequently come with a high degree of idealization and simplification, which may impede their reliability concerning actual scientific practice. This poses the question, to which 1
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A column on recent developments in agent-based modeling of scientific inquiry: https://blogs.kent.ac.uk/thereasoner/files/2019/06/TheReasoner-136.pdf
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This paper examines lessons obtained by means of simulations in the form of agent-based models (ABMs) about the norms that are to guide disagreeing scientists. I focus on two types of epistemic and methodological norms: (i) norms that... more
This paper examines lessons obtained by means of simulations in the form of agent-based models (ABMs) about the norms that are to guide disagreeing scientists. I focus on two types of epistemic and methodological norms: (i) norms that guide one's attitude towards one's own theory, and (ii) norms that guide one's attitude towards the opponent's theory. Concerning (i) I look into ABMs that have been designed to examine the context of peer disagreement. Here I challenge the conclusion that the given ABMs provide a support for the so-called Steadfast Norm, according to which one is epistemically justified in remaining steadfast in their beliefs in face of disagreeing peers. I argue that the proposed models at best provide evidence for a weaker norm, which concerns methodological steadfastness. Concerning (ii) I look into ABMs aimed at examining epistemic effects of scientific interaction. Here I argue that the models provide diverging suggestions and that the link between each ABM and the type of represented inquiry is still missing. Moreover, I examine alternative strategies of arguing in favor of the benefits of scientific interaction, relevant for contemporary discussions on scientific pluralism.
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Recent studies of scientific interaction based on agent-based models (ABMs) suggest that a crucial factor conducive to efficient inquiry is what Zollman, 2010 has dubbed ‘transient diversity’. It signifies a process in which a community... more
Recent studies of scientific interaction based on agent-based models
(ABMs) suggest that a crucial factor conducive to efficient inquiry is what Zollman, 2010 has dubbed ‘transient diversity’. It signifies a process in which a community engages in parallel exploration of rivaling theories
lasting sufficiently long for the community to identify the best theory and
to converge on it. But what exactly generates transient diversity? And
is transient diversity a decisive factor when it comes to the efficiency of
inquiry? In this paper we examine the impact of different conditions on
the efficiency of inquiry, as well as the relation between diversity and efficiency. This includes certain diversity-generating mechanisms previously proposed in the literature (such as different social networks and cautious decision-making), as well as some factors that have so far been neglected (such as evaluations underlying theory-choice performed by scientists). This study is obtained via an argumentation-based ABM (Borg et al., 2017, 2018). Our results suggest that cautious decision-making does not always have a significant impact on the efficiency of inquiry while different evaluations underlying theory-choice and different social networks do. Moreover, we find a correlation between diversity and a successful performance of agents only under specific conditions, which indicates that transient diversity is sometimes not the primary factor responsible for efficiency. Altogether, when comparing our results to those obtained by structurally different ABMs based on Zollman’s work, the impact of specific factors on efficiency of inquiry, as well as the role of transient diversity in achieving efficiency, appear to be highly dependent on the underlying model.
(ABMs) suggest that a crucial factor conducive to efficient inquiry is what Zollman, 2010 has dubbed ‘transient diversity’. It signifies a process in which a community engages in parallel exploration of rivaling theories
lasting sufficiently long for the community to identify the best theory and
to converge on it. But what exactly generates transient diversity? And
is transient diversity a decisive factor when it comes to the efficiency of
inquiry? In this paper we examine the impact of different conditions on
the efficiency of inquiry, as well as the relation between diversity and efficiency. This includes certain diversity-generating mechanisms previously proposed in the literature (such as different social networks and cautious decision-making), as well as some factors that have so far been neglected (such as evaluations underlying theory-choice performed by scientists). This study is obtained via an argumentation-based ABM (Borg et al., 2017, 2018). Our results suggest that cautious decision-making does not always have a significant impact on the efficiency of inquiry while different evaluations underlying theory-choice and different social networks do. Moreover, we find a correlation between diversity and a successful performance of agents only under specific conditions, which indicates that transient diversity is sometimes not the primary factor responsible for efficiency. Altogether, when comparing our results to those obtained by structurally different ABMs based on Zollman’s work, the impact of specific factors on efficiency of inquiry, as well as the role of transient diversity in achieving efficiency, appear to be highly dependent on the underlying model.
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The paper presents an agent-based model (ABM) of scientific interaction aimed at examining how different degrees of connectedness of scientists impact their efficiency in knowledge acquisition. The model is built on the basis of Zollman's... more
The paper presents an agent-based model (ABM) of scientific interaction aimed at examining how different degrees of connectedness of scientists impact their efficiency in knowledge acquisition. The model is built on the basis of Zollman's (2010) ABM by changing some of its idealizing assumptions that concern the representation of the central notions underlying the model: epistemic success of the rivaling scientific theories, scientific interaction and the assessment in view of which scientists choose theories to work on. Our results suggest that whether and to which extent the degree of connectedness of a scientific community impacts its efficiency is a highly context dependent matter since different conditions deem strikingly different results.
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In this paper we examine the epistemic value of highly idealized agent-based models (ABMs) of social aspects of scientific inquiry. On the one hand, we argue that taking the results of such simulations as informative of actual scientific... more
In this paper we examine the epistemic value of highly idealized agent-based models (ABMs) of social aspects of scientific inquiry. On the one hand, we argue that taking the results of such simulations as informative of actual scientific inquiry is unwarranted, at least for the class of models proposed in recent literature. Moreover, we argue that a weaker approach, which takes these models as providing only 'how-possibly' explanations does not help to improve their epistemic value. On the other hand, we suggest that if ABMs of science underwent two types of robustness analysis, they could indeed have a clear epistemic function, namely by providing evidence for philosophical and historical hypotheses. We illustrate our point with an example of a model— building on Zollman's (2010) ABM—which we apply to a concrete historical case study.
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The question whether increased interaction among scientists is beneficial or harmful for their efficiency in acquiring knowledge has in recent years been tackled by means of agent-based models (ABMs) (e.g. Grim, 2009; Grim et al., 2013;... more
The question whether increased interaction among scientists is beneficial or harmful for their efficiency in acquiring knowledge has in recent years been tackled by means of agent-based models (ABMs) (e.g. Grim, 2009; Grim et al., 2013; Zollman, 2007, 2010). Nevertheless, the relevance of some of these results for actual scientific practice has been questioned in view of specific parameter choices used in the simulations (Rosenstock, O'Connor, and Bruner, 2016). In this paper we present a novel ABM that aims at tackling the same question, while representing scientific interaction in terms of argumentative exchange. In this way we examine the robustness of previously obtained results under different modeling choices.
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In this paper we present an agent-based model (ABM) of scientific inquiry aimed at investigating how different social networks impact the efficiency of scientists in acquiring knowledge. The model is an improved variant of the ABM... more
In this paper we present an agent-based model (ABM) of scientific inquiry aimed at investigating how different social networks impact the efficiency of scientists in acquiring knowledge. The model is an improved variant of the ABM introduced in [3], which is based on abstract argumentation frameworks. The current model employs a more refined notion of social networks and a more realistic representation of knowledge acquisition than the previous variant. Moreover, it includes two criteria of success: a monist and a pluralist one, reflecting different desiderata of scientific inquiry. Our findings suggest that, given a reasonable ratio between research time and time spent on communication, increasing the degree of connectedness of the social network tends to improve the efficiency of scientists.
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In this paper we present an agent-based model (ABM) of scientific inquiry aimed at investigating how different social networks impact the efficiency of scientists in acquiring knowledge. As such, the ABM is a computational tool for... more
In this paper we present an agent-based model (ABM) of scientific inquiry aimed at investigating how different social networks impact the efficiency of scientists in acquiring knowledge. As such, the ABM is a computational tool for tackling issues in the domain of scientific methodology and science policy. In contrast to existing ABMs of science, our model aims to represent the argumentative dynamics that underlies scientific practice. To this end we employ abstract argumentation theory as the core design feature of the model.
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60042-0 56.
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60042-0 56.
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In this paper I examine the problem of inconsistency toleration in the context of scientific pluralism. I argue that, first of all, the notion of inconsistency toleration has to be qualified with respect to the evaluative attitude that... more
In this paper I examine the problem of inconsistency toleration in the context of scientific pluralism. I argue that, first of all, the notion of inconsistency toleration has to be qualified with respect to the evaluative attitude that one takes towards a given scientific theory or theories. Second, I show which types of inconsistency toleration are compatible with two major approaches to scientific pluralism, the so-called modest and the radical one. In view of this I suggest some points of demarcation between these two approaches.
(Appeared in the special issue of Humana.Mente "Beyond Toleration? Inconsistency and Pluralism in the Empirical Sciences" edited by Luis Estrada-González and María del Rosario Martínez-Ordaz)
(Appeared in the special issue of Humana.Mente "Beyond Toleration? Inconsistency and Pluralism in the Empirical Sciences" edited by Luis Estrada-González and María del Rosario Martínez-Ordaz)
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Many philosophers of science consider scientific disagreement to be a major promoter of scientific progress. However, we lack an account of the epistemically and heuristically appropriate response scientists should have towards opposing... more
Many philosophers of science consider scientific disagreement to be a major promoter of scientific progress. However, we lack an account of the epistemically and heuristically appropriate response scientists should have towards opposing positions in peer disagreements. Even though some scientific pluralists have advocated a notion of tolerance, the implications of this notion for one’s epistemic stance and, more generally, for the scientific practice have been insufficiently explicated in the literature. In this paper we explicate a characteristic tension in which disagreeing scientists are situated and on this basis we propose a notion of epistemic tolerance.
Keywords: disagreement, tolerance, pluralism, rationality
Keywords: disagreement, tolerance, pluralism, rationality
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""Throughout the first half of the twentieth century the research on peptic ulcer disease (PUD) focused on two rivaling hypothesis: the “acidity” and the “bacterial” one. The latter was dismissed during the 1950s only to be revived with... more
""Throughout the first half of the twentieth century the research on
peptic ulcer disease (PUD) focused on two rivaling hypothesis: the “acidity” and the “bacterial” one. The latter was dismissed during the 1950s only to be revived with Warren’s and Marshall’s discovery of Helicobacter pylori in the 1980s. In this paper we investigate why the bacterial hypothesis was abandoned in the 1950s, and whether there were good epistemic reasons for its dismissal. Of special interest for our research question is Palmer’s 1954 large-scale study, which challenged the bacterial hypothesis with serious counter-evidence, and which by many scholars is considered as the shifting point in the research on PUD. However, we show that:
1. The perceived refutatory impact of Palmer’s study was disproportionate to its methodological rigor. This undermines its perceived status as a crucial experiment against the bacterial hypothesis.
2. In view of this and other considerations we argue that the bacterial hypothesis was worthy of pursuit in the 1950s.""
peptic ulcer disease (PUD) focused on two rivaling hypothesis: the “acidity” and the “bacterial” one. The latter was dismissed during the 1950s only to be revived with Warren’s and Marshall’s discovery of Helicobacter pylori in the 1980s. In this paper we investigate why the bacterial hypothesis was abandoned in the 1950s, and whether there were good epistemic reasons for its dismissal. Of special interest for our research question is Palmer’s 1954 large-scale study, which challenged the bacterial hypothesis with serious counter-evidence, and which by many scholars is considered as the shifting point in the research on PUD. However, we show that:
1. The perceived refutatory impact of Palmer’s study was disproportionate to its methodological rigor. This undermines its perceived status as a crucial experiment against the bacterial hypothesis.
2. In view of this and other considerations we argue that the bacterial hypothesis was worthy of pursuit in the 1950s.""
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"The aim of this paper is to offer an account of epistemic justification suitable for the context of theory pursuit, that is, for the context in which new scientific ideas, possibly incompatible with the already established theories,... more
"The aim of this paper is to offer an account of epistemic justification suitable for the context of theory pursuit, that is, for the context in which new scientific ideas, possibly incompatible with the already established theories, emerge and are pursued by scientists. We will frame our account paradigmatically on the basis of one of the influential systems of epistemic justification: Laurence Bonjour’s coherence theory of justification. The idea underlying our approach is to develop a set of criteria which indicate that the pursued system is promising of contributing to
the epistemic goal of robustness and of developing into a candidate for acceptance. In order to realize this we do not have to introduce entirely new criteria but rather restrict the scope of Bonjour’s standards in such a way that they can be used for an
evaluation of the “potential coherence” of the given epistemic system. For example, the standard of consistency can be weakened in a way that allows for inconsistent theories to be evaluated as worthy of further pursuit."
the epistemic goal of robustness and of developing into a candidate for acceptance. In order to realize this we do not have to introduce entirely new criteria but rather restrict the scope of Bonjour’s standards in such a way that they can be used for an
evaluation of the “potential coherence” of the given epistemic system. For example, the standard of consistency can be weakened in a way that allows for inconsistent theories to be evaluated as worthy of further pursuit."
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Review article
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Abstract argumentation has been shown to be a powerful tool within many fields such as artificial intelligence, logic and legal reasoning. In this paper we enhance Dung’s well-known abstract argumentation framework with explanatory... more
Abstract argumentation has been shown to be a powerful tool within many fields such as artificial intelligence, logic and legal reasoning. In this paper we enhance Dung’s well-known abstract argumentation framework with explanatory capabilities. We show that an explanatory argumentation framework (EAF) obtained in this way is a useful tool for the modeling of scientific debates. On the one hand, EAFs allow for the representation of explanatory and justificatory arguments constituting rivaling
scientific views. On the other hand, different procedures for selecting arguments, corresponding to different methodological and epistemic requirements of theory evaluation, can be formulated in view of our framework.
scientific views. On the other hand, different procedures for selecting arguments, corresponding to different methodological and epistemic requirements of theory evaluation, can be formulated in view of our framework.
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"The revolution in geology, initiated with Alfred Wegener’s theory of continental drift, has been the subject of many philosophical discussions aiming at resolving the problem of rationality underlying this historical episode. Even though... more
"The revolution in geology, initiated with Alfred Wegener’s theory of continental drift, has been the subject of many philosophical discussions aiming at resolving the problem of rationality underlying this historical episode. Even though the debate included analyses in terms of scientific methodology, applications of concrete accounts of epistemic justification to this case study have been rare. In particular, the question whether Wegener’s theory was worthy of pursuit in the first half of the twentieth century, that is, in its early development, remained open or inadequately addressed. The aim of this paper is to offer an answer to this question. The evaluation of Drift will be done by means of an account of theory evaluation suitable for the context of pursuit, developed in [Seselja and Strasser, 2011]. We will argue that pursuing the theory of continental drift was rational, i.e., that it was irrational to reject its pursuit as unworthy.
References:
Dunja Seselja and Christian Strasser (2011), Epistemic Justification in the Context of Pursuit, special issue of Synthese "Is Science Inconsistent?" ed. by Peter Vickers and Otávio Bueno."
References:
Dunja Seselja and Christian Strasser (2011), Epistemic Justification in the Context of Pursuit, special issue of Synthese "Is Science Inconsistent?" ed. by Peter Vickers and Otávio Bueno."
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The aim of this paper is, on the one hand, to critically investigate Kuhn’s stance on the assessment of the pursuit worthiness of scientific theories, and, on the other hand, to show the actuality of some of Kuhn’s points on this issue,... more
The aim of this paper is, on the one hand, to critically investigate Kuhn’s stance on the assessment of the pursuit worthiness of scientific theories, and, on the other hand, to show the actuality of some of Kuhn’s points on this issue, in view of their critical analysis. To this end we show that Kuhn presents certain tools, which may help scientists to overcome communication breakdowns when engaging in the process of rational deliberation regarding the question whether a theory is worthy of further pursuit. These tools are persuasion, translation and interpretation. However, we argue that the perspective of epistemic semantic monism present in Kuhn’s work obstructs the full applicability of these tools. We show that dropping this perspective makes the notions of persuasion and interpretation more fruitful, and moreover, allows for a pluralism of scientific theories and practices that complements the pluralism based on disagreement among scientists, emphasized by Kuhn.
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The aim of this paper is to disambiguate between different notions of pursuit worthiness regarding scientific inquiries. To this end we propose a unifying pattern of pursuit worthiness: “It is rational for Y to pursue X if and only if... more
The aim of this paper is to disambiguate between different notions of pursuit worthiness regarding scientific inquiries. To this end we propose a unifying pattern of pursuit worthiness: “It is rational for Y to pursue X if and only if pursuing X is conducive of the set of goals Z.” By showing in which ways variables X, Y , and Z can be changed, we present different notions of pursuit and pursuit worthiness. With respect to variable X, we distinguish the pursuit of scientific theories, epistemic objects, and technological developments. With respect to variable Z, we distinguish between epistemic and practical pursuit worthiness. Finally, with respect to variable Y, we distinguish between individual and communal pursuit worthiness. By means of these distinctions we are able to explicate some of the major ambiguities underlying the concept of pursuit of pursuit worthiness, as well as to shed light on some confusions in philosophical literature that have resulted from their neglect.
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The paper challenges a recent attempt by Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen to show that since Thomas Kuhn’s philosophical standpoint can be incorporated into coherentist epistemol- ogy, it does not necessarily lead to: an abandonment of rationality... more
The paper challenges a recent attempt by Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen to show that since Thomas Kuhn’s philosophical standpoint can be incorporated into coherentist epistemol- ogy, it does not necessarily lead to: an abandonment of rationality and rational interparadigm theory comparison (Thesis 1), nor to an abandonment of convergent realism (Thesis 2). Leaving aside the interpretation of Kuhn as a coherentist, we will show that Kuukkanen’s first thesis is not sufficiently explicated, while the second one entirely fails.
With regards to Thesis 1, we argue that Kuhn’s view on
inter-paradigm theory compar- ison allows only for (what we shall
dub as) “the weak notion of rationality”, and that Kuukkanen’s
argument is thus acceptable only in view of such a notion. With
regards to Thesis 2, we show that even if we interpret Kuhn as a
coherentist, his philosophical standpoint cannot be seen as
compatible with convergent realism since Kuhn’s argument against it is not “ultimately empirical”, as Kuukkanen takes it to be.
Key words: Thomas Kuhn, Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen, Coherentist
epistemology, Rationality, Theory choice, Convergent realism.
With regards to Thesis 1, we argue that Kuhn’s view on
inter-paradigm theory compar- ison allows only for (what we shall
dub as) “the weak notion of rationality”, and that Kuukkanen’s
argument is thus acceptable only in view of such a notion. With
regards to Thesis 2, we show that even if we interpret Kuhn as a
coherentist, his philosophical standpoint cannot be seen as
compatible with convergent realism since Kuhn’s argument against it is not “ultimately empirical”, as Kuukkanen takes it to be.
Key words: Thomas Kuhn, Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen, Coherentist
epistemology, Rationality, Theory choice, Convergent realism.
Research Interests:
Conceptualizing scientific revolutions by means of explicating their causes, their underlying structure and implications has been an important part of Kuhn's philosophy of science and belongs to its legacy. In this paper we show that such... more
Conceptualizing scientific revolutions by means of explicating their causes, their underlying structure and implications has been an important part of Kuhn's philosophy of science and belongs to its legacy. In this paper we show that such “explanatory concepts” of revolutions should be distinguished from a concept based on the identification criteria of scientific revolutions. The aim of this paper is to offer such a concept, and to show that it can be fruitfully used for a further elaboration of the explanatory conceptions of revolutions. On the one hand, our concept can be used to test the preciseness and accuracy of the these conceptions, by examining to what extent their criteria fit revolutions as they are defined by our concept. On the other hand, our concept can serve as the basis on which these conceptions can be further specified. We will present four different explanatory concepts of revolutions – Kuhn's, Thagard's, Chen's and Barker's, and Laudan's – and point to the ways in which each of them can be further specified in view of our concept.
Research Interests:
This paper discusses the methodological problem of critical analysis of modern socio-political paradigms, attempting to reveal methodological mistakes which most critiques make, and aiming to construct an analytical structure that should... more
This paper discusses the methodological problem of critical analysis of modern socio-political paradigms, attempting to reveal methodological mistakes which most critiques make, and aiming to construct an analytical structure that should enable avoiding them. Each analysis must start with some (hermeneutical) perspective, and therefore, with some criteria. While socio-political discourses of the modern world are based on variety criteria, common values – such as freedom, justice, truth – being polysemantic, cannot be taken as universal principles, they require additional criteria to be defined. Consequently, a final position for critical analysis, i.e. a final meta-aproach, is not possible. Furthermore, stating a foundation of such a final position would directly lead to a new ideological approach, closed to any critique. Thus, the analysis should be based on a pluralism of criteria and have an ability to become an object of the next critique within the same methodological perspective. The structure of critical analysis based on these principles would consist of three principal steps: construction, critique and alternative construction, with each alternative construction being the object of a new critique. Hence, an analysis can follow a vertical line (from construction to critique), and a horizontal line (according to the pluralism of criteria as starting and self-reflecting points of each analysis). This sketch seems to be similar to Popper’s schema: Problem —Tentative Solution — Error Elimination — New Problem, which is used to describe the method of development of science in general. Thus, the author is questioning validity of Popper’s approach applied to critical analysis of socio-political discourses. Essential differences between Popper’s theory and the methodological sketch given in this paper imply that Popper’s approach is in this case inappropriate. Furthermore, methodology for critical analysis of socio-political discourses, which satisfies requests set at the beginning of the paper, is closer to the bases of Feyerabend’s epistemological anarchism, which is radically opposite to Popper’s critical rationalism.
Keywords
ANALYSIS; DISCOURSE; SOCIO-POLITICAL; METHODOLOGY; CRITIQUE; KARL POPPER; PAUL FEYERABEND
Keywords
ANALYSIS; DISCOURSE; SOCIO-POLITICAL; METHODOLOGY; CRITIQUE; KARL POPPER; PAUL FEYERABEND
Slides from a talk at MCMP, LMU Munich (June 27, 2018)
Research Interests:
Slides from the "Intensive Course for Philosophy Graduate Students: Computer Simulations and Numerical Experiments in Philosophy of Science" (http://www.csb.eu.com/PSCSNE2018/index.html), University of Belgrade, May 7-12, 2018. Part 1:... more
Slides from the "Intensive Course for Philosophy Graduate Students: Computer Simulations and Numerical Experiments in Philosophy of Science" (http://www.csb.eu.com/PSCSNE2018/index.html), University of Belgrade, May 7-12, 2018.
Part 1: General introduction to ABMs as a tool employed in social sciences and philosophy; Introduction to ABMs of scientific interaction.
Part 2: Argumentation-based ABM of scientific inquiry (ArgABM)
Part 3: Zooming in on ArgABM (https://github.com/g4v4g4i/ArgABM)
Part 1: General introduction to ABMs as a tool employed in social sciences and philosophy; Introduction to ABMs of scientific interaction.
Part 2: Argumentation-based ABM of scientific inquiry (ArgABM)
Part 3: Zooming in on ArgABM (https://github.com/g4v4g4i/ArgABM)
Research Interests:
Slides of our talk presented at the Conference of the European Network for the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (ENPOSS), Kraków, September 20-22 2017.
The code of our model can be found at https://github.com/daimpi/SocNetABM
The code of our model can be found at https://github.com/daimpi/SocNetABM
Research Interests:
A talk at EPSA-17 with some new results
Research Interests:
Talk at MCMP, LMU Munich on April 26, 2017 presenting joint work with AnneMarie Borg, Daniel Frey and Christian Straßer
Research Interests:
Workshop: Agent Based Modelling across Social Science, Economics, and Philosophy, October 21 - October 22, 2016 Abstract: In this talk we present an agent-based model (ABM) of scientific inquiry as a tool for investigating how different... more
Workshop: Agent Based Modelling across Social Science, Economics, and Philosophy, October 21 - October 22, 2016
Abstract:
In this talk we present an agent-based model (ABM) of scientific inquiry as a tool for investigating how different social networks impact the efficiency of scientists in acquiring knowledge. In contrast to other existing ABMs of science, our model aims to represent the argumentative dynamics that underlies scientific practice. To this end we employ abstract argumentation theory as the core design feature of the model. This helps to avoid a number of problematic idealizations which are present in other ABMs of science and which impede their relevance for the actual scientific practice.
Abstract:
In this talk we present an agent-based model (ABM) of scientific inquiry as a tool for investigating how different social networks impact the efficiency of scientists in acquiring knowledge. In contrast to other existing ABMs of science, our model aims to represent the argumentative dynamics that underlies scientific practice. To this end we employ abstract argumentation theory as the core design feature of the model. This helps to avoid a number of problematic idealizations which are present in other ABMs of science and which impede their relevance for the actual scientific practice.
Research Interests:
Workshop "The Place of Inconsistent Science in Scientific Pluralism", 5-6 September, UNAM, Mexico
Research Interests:
Workshop: Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation 5 (PSX5), 22-23 September 2016, Belgrade, Serbia
Research Interests:
Second London Philosophy of Science Graduate Conference Programme,
UCL Department of Science and Technology Studies
UCL Department of Science and Technology Studies
Research Interests:
Cologne Summer School 2016 with Thomas Kelly – Rationality, Objectivity, Disagreement
Research Interests:
Workshop "Model(ing) Controversies in Science", March 15 & 17, 2016, National University of Singapore (NUS), Singapore
Research Interests:
At the University of Oxford, the Department for Continuing Education, a weekend school "The Inconsistency of Science", 9-10 January 2015.
Research Interests:
17 December, 18:00
Presented at LogiCIC Workshop 2015 "Reasoning in social context", November 26-28, 2015, Amsterdam.
Research Interests:
University of Bayreuth, 1 December 2015. Abstract: A number of recent attempts at understanding the normative aspects of the division of cognitive labor via agent-based models (ABMs) have suggested that increased information flow among... more
University of Bayreuth, 1 December 2015.
Abstract:
A number of recent attempts at understanding the normative aspects of the division of cognitive labor via agent-based models (ABMs) have suggested that increased information flow among scientists is not necessarily beneficial for the efficiency of the scientific community in acquiring knowledge. Most prominently, Kevin Zollman has developed models which show that efficient knowledge acquisition by a scientific community requires either that the information flow among scientists be restricted or that scientists have extreme beliefs regarding their
pursued hypotheses. This conclusion poses a direct challenge to some of the central ideas in the literature on scientific diversity,
according to which interaction among scientists should be encouraged since it is conducive to scientific objectivity even if scientists do not hold extreme or biased views towards their respective inquiries.
In this paper I argue that i) Zollman's model rests on some
unwarranted assumptions about how scientists evaluate their hypotheses and how they respond to new evidence; and that ii) there are good reasons to suppose that changing these assumptions would significantly affect the results of the models relevant for the epistemic significance of interaction among scientists. I will illustrate my points by the same case study that Zollman uses to motivate his approach: the research on causes of peptic ulcer disease.
Finally, I show that similar problems can be identified in other ABMs that have been used to suggest that unrestricted information flow among scientists may be epistemically detrimental. While my arguments primarily aim to undercut the conclusions drawn from these ABMs, I also point to directions in which ABMs can be adjusted so that these problems are resolved.
Abstract:
A number of recent attempts at understanding the normative aspects of the division of cognitive labor via agent-based models (ABMs) have suggested that increased information flow among scientists is not necessarily beneficial for the efficiency of the scientific community in acquiring knowledge. Most prominently, Kevin Zollman has developed models which show that efficient knowledge acquisition by a scientific community requires either that the information flow among scientists be restricted or that scientists have extreme beliefs regarding their
pursued hypotheses. This conclusion poses a direct challenge to some of the central ideas in the literature on scientific diversity,
according to which interaction among scientists should be encouraged since it is conducive to scientific objectivity even if scientists do not hold extreme or biased views towards their respective inquiries.
In this paper I argue that i) Zollman's model rests on some
unwarranted assumptions about how scientists evaluate their hypotheses and how they respond to new evidence; and that ii) there are good reasons to suppose that changing these assumptions would significantly affect the results of the models relevant for the epistemic significance of interaction among scientists. I will illustrate my points by the same case study that Zollman uses to motivate his approach: the research on causes of peptic ulcer disease.
Finally, I show that similar problems can be identified in other ABMs that have been used to suggest that unrestricted information flow among scientists may be epistemically detrimental. While my arguments primarily aim to undercut the conclusions drawn from these ABMs, I also point to directions in which ABMs can be adjusted so that these problems are resolved.
Research Interests:
at the CLMPS (Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science) in Helsinki, Finland, 3-8 August 2015.
Research Interests:
at the 8th Munich-Sydney-Tilburg (MuST) Conference on "Objectivity in Science" at Tilburg University, The Netherlands, 10-12 June 2015 Abstract: A point often made in the literature on scientific pluralism is that interaction among... more
at the 8th Munich-Sydney-Tilburg (MuST) Conference on "Objectivity in Science" at Tilburg University, The Netherlands, 10-12 June 2015
Abstract:
A point often made in the literature on scientific pluralism is that interaction among scientists is a necessary condition for scientific objectivity. This stance has been challenged by Kevin Zollman. In view of a game-theoretic model Zollman has argued that an efficient acquisition of scientific knowledge requires either a restriction of the information flow among scientists or the scientists having extreme beliefs regarding their pursued hypotheses. In this paper I challenge some basic ideas underlying Zollman’s model by showing that it is based on unwarranted assumptions about how scientists evaluate their hypotheses and how they respond to new evidence.
Abstract:
A point often made in the literature on scientific pluralism is that interaction among scientists is a necessary condition for scientific objectivity. This stance has been challenged by Kevin Zollman. In view of a game-theoretic model Zollman has argued that an efficient acquisition of scientific knowledge requires either a restriction of the information flow among scientists or the scientists having extreme beliefs regarding their pursued hypotheses. In this paper I challenge some basic ideas underlying Zollman’s model by showing that it is based on unwarranted assumptions about how scientists evaluate their hypotheses and how they respond to new evidence.
Research Interests:
at the Philosophisches Seminar, University of Zurich, Switzerland
Research Interests:
Supervisors: Prof. Dr. Erik Weber, Ghent University; Prof. Dr. Joke Meheus, Ghent University. Reading Committee: Prof. Dr. Tim De Mey, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Ghent University; Prof. Dr. Theo Kuipers University of Groningen; Prof.... more
Supervisors: Prof. Dr. Erik Weber, Ghent University; Prof. Dr. Joke Meheus, Ghent University.
Reading Committee: Prof. Dr. Tim De Mey, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Ghent University; Prof. Dr. Theo Kuipers University of Groningen; Prof. Dr. Thomas Nickles, University of Nevada at Reno; Prof. Dr. Dagmar Provijn, Ghent University; Prof. Dr. Maarten Van Dyck, Ghent University.
The manuscript available upon request.
Reading Committee: Prof. Dr. Tim De Mey, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Ghent University; Prof. Dr. Theo Kuipers University of Groningen; Prof. Dr. Thomas Nickles, University of Nevada at Reno; Prof. Dr. Dagmar Provijn, Ghent University; Prof. Dr. Maarten Van Dyck, Ghent University.
The manuscript available upon request.