Svoboda | Graniru | BBC Russia | Golosameriki | Facebook
Skip to main content
The non-human animal holds a significant position in Bergson’s work. However, because it often serves to illuminate other concepts – humanity, the élan vital – few studies have delved into Bergson’s animal philosophy. However, Bergson’s... more
The non-human animal holds a significant position in Bergson’s work. However, because it often serves to illuminate other concepts – humanity, the élan vital – few studies have delved into Bergson’s animal philosophy. However, Bergson’s conception of the animal as an instinctive but conscious being, distinct from humans but partaking, like them, in the élan vital, provides valuable philosophical tools to address contemporary challenges in ethology and evolutionary theory. The aim of this article is to analyse the paradoxical instinctive consciousness that Bergson attributes to animals, and to explore the contemporary implications of such a conception. To do this, I first examine the singular place of animals in Bergsonian philosophy in relation to humans and the élan vital, highlighting how Bergson steers clear of an anthropocentric approach. I then investigate how, through their consciousness, animals uniquely contribute to the creativity of the élan vital. This leads me to distinguish between two forms of animal consciousness in Bergson, one of which makes room for genuine non-human inventiveness. Finally, I analyse the contemporary stakes of this animal philosophy, demonstrating how Bergson’s approach allows ethology to rethink its methods and encourages a fresh consideration of the role played by non-human organisms in evolution.
Agency is a central concept in the organisational approach to organisms, which accounts for their internal purposiveness. Recent recognition of the active role played by organisms in evolution has led researchers to use this concept in an... more
Agency is a central concept in the organisational approach to organisms, which accounts for their internal purposiveness. Recent recognition of the active role played by organisms in evolution has led researchers to use this concept in an evolutionary approach. Agency is then considered in terms of ‘unintentional’ choice: agents choose from a given repertoire the behaviour most appropriate to their goal, with this choice influencing evolutionary pathways. This view, while allowing for the evolutionary role of the activity of organisms, presents two pitfalls. First, it restricts organisms’ agency by confining their choice within the bounds of a behavioural repertoire, and assuming their goals are dictated by natural selection. Second, this view, while claiming to eliminate the idea of intentionality, retains its structure: organisms are portrayed as rational entities, persistently pursuing specific goals. This leads us back to a teleological thinking, whose use in evolutionary theory has already been heavily criticised. This paper proposes a conception of biological agency which does not assume goal-directedness but considers agency as inventiveness. An organism will be said to be an agent if it is the triggering cause of behaviours falling outside the known repertoire and whose form can only be explained by the unique relationship between the organism and the environment. If these behaviours have implications in evolution, the agent will be considered an evolutionary agent. The merit of this approach is further validated by evidencing the significant role behavioural innovations play in evolution. Finally, the last section delves into the process of invention by examining animal play.
Bergsonian philosophy is not generally regarded as a true philosophy of biology. Bergson’s rejection of Darwinism, his silence on incipient genetics, and his unfortunate comparison of the movement of the élan vital with the duration of... more
Bergsonian philosophy is not generally regarded as a true philosophy of biology. Bergson’s rejection of Darwinism, his silence on incipient genetics, and his unfortunate comparison of the movement of the élan vital with the duration of consciousness led Bergson to be considered at best an outdated philosopher, at worst an enemy of science. However, if there is one thing that Bergson’s Creative Evolution grasped, and offered to biology, it is an understanding of the processual nature of evolution and of its consequences to conceive a causality that considers the efficacy of time in evolution. The aim of this chapter is to reassess Bergson’s philosophy of evolution to demonstrate its relevance for contemporary biology. First, I will study the relevance of Bergson’s epistemological critique of the theories of evolution under debate in his time. Then, I will provide an analysis of the concept of élan vital that will show its topicality to address some of the problems of contemporary biology. Finally, I will indicate the lessons that can be drawn from the élan vital for thinking of the causality at work in evolution. My purpose in this chapter is not only to show that the Bergsonian philosophy of life is not completely outdated, but it is to revaluate its importance in the history of biology and the philosophy of biology, while exploring the contemporary extensions of Bergsonian insights.
In the eyes of the biologist Jacques Monod, Bergson is “the most illustrious promoter of a metaphysical vitalism” revolting against rationality. This interpretation, not exclusive to Monod, is often accompanied by the accusation that... more
In the eyes of the biologist Jacques Monod, Bergson is “the most illustrious promoter of a metaphysical vitalism” revolting against rationality. This interpretation, not exclusive to Monod, is often accompanied by the accusation that Bergson’s vitalism would be teleological, and maybe even mystical – this last idea being reinforced by the success that Bergson receives among the spiritualists. This understanding of Bergsonian philosophy led to his disrepute among scientists. Even today, despite the renewed interest in Bergson’s reflections on science, he is not considered a philosopher of science. And the popular (textbook) opinion is still that his élan vital is a spiritual principle at the origin of all living things and even of all reality: Bergson is considered a vitalist using biology to develop a spiritualist metaphysics, which makes him acceptable to philosophers but not to scientists.
Yet, Bergson’s position is ambiguous. Even though he criticises the intellectualist paradigm of science, which he claims is unable to comprehend the living, and proposes a form of vitalism, the philosophy of Creative Evolution may be regarded as a true philosophy of biology. However, some texts make the status of his vitalism problematic, such as The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, in which the élan vital is integrated into a reflection on the divine. The aim of this paper is to disentangle what, in Bergson, can or cannot be considered as a philosophy relevant to science, by trying to clarify the label ‘vitalist’ that has so commonly been assigned to him, often pejoratively. This will involve examining the link between his vitalism and the spiritualism he has been credited with. Contrary to Olivier Perru who has proposed an excellent analysis of Bergson’s vitalism but focusing only on Creative Evolution, I will study his different works, to show that Bergson’s position shifts according to the subjects under study: before Creative Evolution, Bergson develops a form of spiritualism; in Creative Evolution, he proposes a form of vitalism that may not be clearly related to his spiritualism; finally, I argue that, in The Two Sources, the distinction is not so clear and that his vitalism itself may indeed become spiritualist. His spiritualism transforms according to his works and the meaning of his vitalism changes in return. I hypothesise that Bergson is a vitalist-opportunist: there are several forms of vitalism Bergson, that have neither the same ontological status nor the same function, according to the purpose of the moment. This is not to say that Bergson changes his theory completely. Each time, the élan vital is intimately related to duration. But in this paper, I will focus on the shifts in meaning in order to distinguish between what belongs to a properly biological vitalism and what belongs to a spiritualist metaphysics.
Bergson offers an epistemological critique of Darwin’s theory that focuses on his gradualism: for Darwin variation is “minute”, and Bergson glosses “insensible.” His main argument is that if variations are insensible, they cannot confer... more
Bergson offers an epistemological critique of Darwin’s theory that focuses on his gradualism: for Darwin variation is “minute”, and Bergson glosses “insensible.” His main argument is that if variations are insensible, they cannot confer an advantage to the organism and therefore be selected. Yet, for Darwin, the selected variation is not insensible: to be selected, it must be beneficial to its bearer in the struggle for existence. This article aims at understanding the origin of this misunderstanding by tracing the history of this critique. To do this, we will study Bergson’s sources, showing that his interpretation of Darwin is in line with the critique of many biologists at the turn of the 20th century, albeit in a confused way. This will lead us back to the origin of this critique: the work of Mivart. In this study, we wish to reveal the anchor of the Bergsonian interpretation in the debates of his time, and the shifts from the traditional exposition of the argument that led Bergson to formulate this false paradox. This article will also analyze more precisely the counterexample of the “analogy of structure” to show that, despite Bergson’s misunderstanding, he did point to actual limits of the Darwinian theory.
La crise écologique nous met face à un double constat : celui de la puissance extraordinaire de notre technique, en même temps que celui de notre impuissance à résoudre les problèmes qu’elle a engendrés. Ce paradoxe nous renvoie plus... more
La crise écologique nous met face à un double constat : celui de la puissance extraordinaire de notre technique, en même temps que celui de notre impuissance à résoudre les problèmes qu’elle a engendrés. Ce paradoxe nous renvoie plus profondément à la question de notre place au sein du vivant : nous nous vivons comme une espèce à la fois à part du fait de notre pouvoir incommensurable avec celui des autres espèces, et profondément dépendante du reste du monde vivant. La théorie de l’évolution a contribué à ce statut paradoxal, en faisant de l’humanité l’aboutissement tout temporaire d’une histoire naturelle qui nous précède et nous dépasse. Cependant, nous continuons d’aborder les défis écologiques avec une approche surplombante et techniciste qui révèle aussi bien notre optimisme qu’une certaine incapacité à remettre en question notre rapport au vivant. À partir d’une interrogation sur l’histoire, l’objectif de cet article est précisément de questionner les présupposés théoriques et pratiques de notre réponse à la crise écologique, présupposés qui découlent d’une conception erronée de la place de l’humain dans le monde vivant. Cela implique d’étudier l’enracinement comme la spécificité de notre histoire dans l’histoire naturelle. Dans cet article, en nous appuyant sur la philosophie de Bergson et de Ruyer, nous montrons que l’intrication bien comprise entre histoire humaine et histoire évolutive doit nous conduire à prendre acte de notre profonde continuité et dépendance à l’égard du vivant, en particulier dans nos solutions à la crise actuelle, mais doit aussi nous inviter à envisager la spécificité proprement humaine d’un possible retour à la fois collectif, réflexif et critique sur nos pratiques dans la biosphère, cette prise de conscience ayant la particularité de pouvoir changer la direction de l’histoire humaine, et donc aussi celle des autres vivants.
Neo-Darwinism, through the combination of natural selection and genetics, has made possible an explanation of adaptive phenomena that claims to be devoid of metaphysical presuppositions. What Bergson already deplored and what we explore... more
Neo-Darwinism, through the combination of natural selection and genetics, has made possible an explanation of adaptive phenomena that claims to be devoid of metaphysical presuppositions. What Bergson already deplored and what we explore in this paper is the implicit finalism of such evolutionary explanations, which turn living beings into closed and static systems rather than understanding biological evolution as a process characterized by its interactions and temporal openness. Without denying the heuristic efficiency of the explanation resting upon natural selection, we analyze what it leaves out and what remains to be explored: the unpredictability of the evolutionary process. We will therefore study the role of contingency in evolution, as Stephen J. Gould proposed, but we will also consider the causality specific to the living world that makes it impossible to reduce it to a simple algorithm, as proposed by Daniel Dennett among others, but that it is really a creative causation, or creative spiral.
Biology seems to present local and transitory regularities rather than immutable laws. To account for these historically constituted regularities and to distinguish them from mathematical invariants, Montévil and Mossio (Journal of... more
Biology seems to present local and transitory regularities rather than immutable laws. To account for these historically constituted regularities and to distinguish them from mathematical invariants, Montévil and Mossio (Journal of Theoretical Biology 372:179-191, 2015) have proposed to speak of constraints. In this article we analyse the causal power of these constraints in the evolution of biodiversity, i.e., their positivity, but also the modality of their action on the directions taken by evolution. We argue that to fully account for the causal power of these constraints on evolution, they must be thought of in terms of normativity. In this way, we want to highlight two characteristics of the evolutionary constraints. The first, already emphasised as reported by Gould (The structure of evolutionary theory, Harvard University Press, 2002), is that these constraints are both produced by and producing biological evolution and that this circular causation creates true novelties. The second is that this specific causality, which generates unpredictability in evolution, stems not only from the historicity of biological constraints, but also from their internalisation through the practices of living beings.
This chapter examines the topicality of Bergson's philosophy of evolution. Because of his rejection of Darwinism, his scientific approximations and his metaphorical style, Bergson was never truly considered a philosopher of science.... more
This chapter examines the topicality of Bergson's philosophy of evolution. Because of his rejection of Darwinism, his scientific approximations and his metaphorical style, Bergson was never truly considered a philosopher of science. Biologists as philosophers of biology no longer refer to Bergson since the second half of the twentieth century, i.e., the advent of the Modern Synthesis. At best Bergson's poetic talents are praised, but rarely the penetration of his intuitions. In this text, this qualification that defines Bergson as a poet is taken seriously. The status of the Bergsonian images, and more specifically the status of the élan vital, is analysed. It is argued that the élan vital is less a literary image than a true "fluid concept", whose heuristic scope is brought to light today through the discoveries and problems raised by contemporary biology.
ANALYSE : Henri Bergson n'a pas bien été accueilli par la communauté des biologistes. Pourtant, sa philosophie est un garde-fou contre le mécanisme de la théorie de l'Evolution, qui est en réalité un finalisme «honteux», souligne la... more
ANALYSE : Henri Bergson n'a pas bien été accueilli par la communauté des biologistes. Pourtant, sa philosophie est un garde-fou contre le mécanisme de la théorie de l'Evolution, qui est en réalité un finalisme «honteux», souligne la philosophe des sciences Mathilde Tahar, qui note que les questions que l'auteur de L'Evolution créatrice pose à la biologie sont plus actuelles que jamais. Agrégée de philosophie, Mathilde Tahar est enseignante et doctorante en philosophie de la biologie à l'Université Toulouse Jean-Jaurès et au Museum National d'Histoire Naturelle, où ses recherches portent sur Bergson, Darwin et l'évolution. Elle présente dans iPhilo les enjeux de sa thèse.

© 2016 iPhilo et ses auteurs, tous droits réservés. L'ensemble des articles publiés dans le journal est accessible gratuitement sur le site iPhilo.fr.
De Darwin à Gould, ce n’est pas seulement la théorie de l’évolution qui connaît des changements de structure, mais la conception du vivant elle-même qui évolue. Dans les ajustements de la théorie proposés par Gould, il y a une véritable... more
De Darwin à Gould, ce n’est pas seulement la théorie de l’évolution qui connaît des changements de structure, mais la conception du vivant elle-même qui évolue. Dans les ajustements de la théorie proposés par Gould, il y a une véritable transformation, non seulement de la « charpente », mais des postulats de la théorie, qui n’ont plus le même sens, ou plus la même place (pour ne donner qu’un exemple : c’est le cas du gradualisme, postulat fondamental chez Darwin). Ces changements épistémologiques ont une portée philosophique et plus précisément métaphysique, forte. En effet, ils supposent une sortie du mécanisme causal linéaire de l’environnement sur le vivant, et ainsi l’introduction d’un potentiel proprement créateur de la vie (qu’on trouve notamment chez Gould, dans la notion de « réserve exaptative »).
Research Interests:
Là où Bergson critiquait l’idée de désordre pour comprendre le « finalisme vrai » de la vie, c'est-à-dire le sens, la cohérence du mouvement de l’élan vital vers toujours plus de progrès, nous proposons au contraire de repenser le... more
Là où Bergson critiquait l’idée de désordre pour comprendre le « finalisme vrai » de la vie, c'est-à-dire le sens, la cohérence du mouvement de l’élan vital vers toujours plus de progrès, nous proposons au contraire de repenser le désordre pour sortir de l’aporie du finalisme bergsonien et mettre en lumière le vrai mouvement de l’évolution du vivant, mouvement sans direction cohérente interne, mais qui n’est toutefois pas chaotique. Nous espérons par là pouvoir faire se rencontrer la philosophie de Bergson et les sciences contemporaines, sans ignorer toutefois les limites et les nuances qu’il faudra apporter à cette rencontre.
Research Interests:
La science contemporaine ayant largement corroboré l’hypothèse darwinienne, donnant ainsi tort à Bergson, il peut paraître inutile de s’intéresser à la critique proposée dans l’Evolution créatrice. L’enjeu de notre étude va être de voir... more
La science contemporaine ayant largement corroboré l’hypothèse darwinienne, donnant ainsi tort à Bergson, il peut paraître inutile de s’intéresser à la critique proposée dans l’Evolution créatrice. L’enjeu de notre étude va être de voir en quoi, bien que Darwin échappe à la critique bergsonienne, il est judicieux de solliciter Bergson pour, d’une part, approfondir notre compréhension de Darwin, et d’autre part l’actualiser à la lumière des découvertes de la génétique contemporaine.
Research Interests:
Bergson affirme que la séparation des corps vivants, leur individualité est la réalité concrète même. Il ne s’agit en aucun cas d’une division par l’intelligence et par la perception qui l’accompagne, en fonction de l’utilité (la... more
Bergson affirme que la séparation des corps vivants, leur individualité est la réalité concrète même. Il ne s’agit en aucun cas d’une division par l’intelligence et par la perception qui l’accompagne, en fonction de l’utilité (la perception dessinant sur la matière les actions possibles du corps) : dans ce cas-là on a une individualité posée. On a au contraire une individualité de l’être vivant lui-même par lui-même, une individualité qui s’accomplit par le corps au lieu d’être perçue par lui. Bergson précise par ailleurs que ce n’est pas tant qu’il y a une individualité du corps vivant, qui serait comme une entité fixe, mais c’est une tendance à l’individualité. Il s’agit d’une définition tout à fait nouvelle de l’individualité, qui n’a rien à voir avec l’individualité des corps inertes, qui n’a rien à voir non plus avec la définition de l’individualité dans la philosophie classique, définie comme unité close et présentant des caractères permanents, définition tout à fait inadaptée à la réalité mouvante qu’est la vie. C’est cette redéfinition qui va nous intéresser dans notre étude, dans la mesure où au premier abord l’individualité dans le vivant nous paraît paradoxale.
Que Bergson parle d’individualité dans le cas du vivant paraît triplement paradoxal : d’une part du fait de l’unicité de l’élan vital de départ qui paraît en contradiction avec la division absolue de ses productions, ensuite du fait de la durée, donc des changements comme réalité du vivant qui paraît être en contradiction avec la permanence supposée dans la définition classique de l’individualité ; enfin parce que, chez Bergson, il semble que l’individualité trouve une prolongation dans la conscience et le “caractère”, alors que l’individualité est supposée être le pendant biologique de la personnalité.
Research Interests:
In the eyes of the biologist Jacques Monod, Bergson is “the most illustrious promoter of a metaphysical vitalism” revolting against rationality. This interpretation, not exclusive to Monod, is often accompanied by the accusation that... more
In the eyes of the biologist Jacques Monod, Bergson is “the most illustrious promoter of a metaphysical vitalism” revolting against rationality. This interpretation, not exclusive to Monod, is often accompanied by the accusation that Bergson’s vitalism would be teleological, and maybe even mystical – this last idea being reinforced by the success that Bergson receives among the spiritualists. This understanding of Bergsonian philosophy led to his disrepute among scientists. Even today, despite the renewed interest in Bergson’s reflections on science, he is not considered a philosopher of science. And the popular (textbook) opinion is still that his élan vital is a spiritual principle at the origin of all living things and even of all reality: Bergson is considered a vitalist using biology to develop a spiritualist metaphysics, which makes him acceptable to philosophers but not to scientists.
Yet, Bergson’s position is ambiguous. Even though he criticises the intellectualist paradigm of science, which he claims is unable to comprehend the living, and proposes a form of vitalism, the philosophy of Creative Evolution may be regarded as a true philosophy of biology. However, some texts make the status of his vitalism problematic, such as The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, in which the élan vital is integrated into a reflection on the divine. The aim of this paper is to disentangle what, in Bergson, can or cannot be considered as a philosophy relevant to science, by trying to clarify the label ‘vitalist’ that has so commonly been assigned to him, often pejoratively. This will involve examining the link between his vitalism and the spiritualism he has been credited with. Contrary to Olivier Perru who has proposed an excellent analysis of Bergson’s vitalism but focusing only on Creative Evolution, I will study his different works, to show that Bergson’s position shifts according to the subjects under study: before Creative Evolution, Bergson develops a form of spiritualism; in Creative Evolution, he proposes a form of vitalism that may not be clearly related to his spiritualism; finally, I argue that, in The Two Sources, the distinction is not so clear and that his vitalism itself may indeed become spiritualist. His spiritualism transforms according to his works and the meaning of his vitalism changes in return. I hypothesise that Bergson is a vitalist-opportunist: there are several forms of vitalism Bergson, that have neither the same ontological status nor the same function, according to the purpose of the moment. This is not to say that Bergson changes his theory completely. Each time, the élan vital is intimately related to duration. But in this paper, I will focus on the shifts in meaning in order to distinguish between what belongs to a properly biological vitalism and what belongs to a spiritualist metaphysics.
Participation à l'édition du texte de ces cours. Jacques Brunschwig (1929-2010) fut l'une des grandes figures des études antiques en France dans la seconde partie du siècle dernier. Les leçons ici présentées, dispensées sur plusieurs... more
Participation à l'édition du texte de ces cours.
Jacques Brunschwig (1929-2010) fut l'une des grandes figures des études antiques en France dans la seconde partie du siècle dernier. Les leçons ici présentées, dispensées sur plusieurs années, restituent d'une manière claire et rigoureuse la métaphysique d'Aristote, sa physique ainsi que sa logique. Attentives à l'argumentation souvent sinueuse du Stagirite, elles offrent aussi bien à l'étudiant qu'au spécialiste une élucidation vivante, patiente et stimulante des textes aristotéliciens.
Research Interests:
La postérité a globalement retenu Bergson comme un vitaliste spiritualiste ayant peu à apporter aux discussions scientifiques. Au sein même de la recherche bergsonienne, la tradition interprétative s’est concentrée sur la psychologie de... more
La postérité a globalement retenu Bergson comme un vitaliste spiritualiste ayant peu à apporter aux discussions scientifiques. Au sein même de la recherche bergsonienne, la tradition interprétative s’est concentrée sur la psychologie de Bergson, sa théorie de la perception, son anthropologie, sa métaphysique, … mais peu sur ses propositions physiques ou biologiques. Depuis quelques décennies cependant, les travaux conjoints de chercheuses et chercheurs de différents pays – que Tano Posteraro prend le soin de citer méthodiquement – ont permis de mettre en lumière la fertilité de la pensée bergsonienne pour la philosophie des sciences.  L’ouvrage de Posteraro s’inscrit dans ces recherches nouvelles, en se donnant comme objectif de démontrer, à rebours de la tradition interprétative, que Bergson propose une philosophie de la biologie, que l’on peut rapporter de façon systématique, et qui est pertinente pour la biologie contemporaine. Ces différentes thèses sont articulées autour d’une analyse originale du texte de Bergson qui repose sur une approche méréologique de la métaphysique bergsonienne, rayonnant notamment autour des concepts de virtuel et de tendance – dont la compréhension se ramifiera à travers l'analyse des concepts d’image, individualité, finalisme, convergence canalisation, …
Mark Sinclair offers in this book one of the first commentaries in English on the philosophy of Ravaisson, an author who is little read today and who nevertheless marked a whole generation of philosophers, especially French. This book... more
Mark Sinclair offers in this book one of the first commentaries in English on the philosophy of Ravaisson, an author who is little read today and who nevertheless marked a whole generation of philosophers, especially French. This book sheds light on how the Ravaissonian concept of habit takes on a metaphysical rather than psychological meaning that has a great influence on French philosophy at the beginning of the twentieth century. It also shows in what extent habit plays the role of method in the philosophy of Ravaisson. Concerning this last point, Sinclair not only offers us an internal commentary on Ravaisson but also tries to see how his philosophical approach sheds light on contemporary issues. Mark Sinclair wishes to highlight the metaphysical dimension of habit in Ravaisson's philosophy. Habit is characterized by inclination, which, according to Ravaisson, is at the root of both will and action: all dispositions, capacities, powers are to some degree a function of inclination or tendency. And since nothing exists in the world without dispositions or capacities, nothing exists without inclination. The aim of Mark Sinclair's book is therefore to show how Ravaisson proposes an original idea of inclination without necessitation, an idea of non-mechanical inclination. This way of conceiving a non-mechanical causality, a tendency which would be the very being of beings, leads to the reformulation of great philosophical problems: the problem of the link between the mind and the world, the problem of action, the problem of causality (theory of causation and metaphysics of powers). Ravaisson, when he speaks of inclination and tendency in habit as a disposition, a virtue, can serve to enlighten and develop some contemporary problematics, just as they may illuminate Ravaisson's philosophy.
Depuis vingt ans, on observe un regain des études bergsoniennes, venant d'une part de la publication de l'édition critique, d'autre part de l'apparition de nouvelles approches interprétatives, notamment dans le monde anglo-saxon. Ces... more
Depuis vingt ans, on observe un regain des études bergsoniennes, venant d'une part de la publication de l'édition critique, d'autre part de l'apparition de nouvelles approches interprétatives, notamment dans le monde anglo-saxon. Ces nouvelles approches partent pour la plupart de l'idée de durée comme efficace du passé dans le présent et émergence de nouveauté, idée proprement bergsonienne, pour en analyser les conséquences dans différents domaines philosophiques. Dans Interpreting Bergson : Critical essays, les éditeurs Alexandre Lefebvre et Nils F. Schott, en rassemblant les analyses critiques de différents auteurs sur des aspects très hétérogènes de la philosophie bergsonienne visent à donner un aperçu de ces nouvelles recherches et, par là aussi, une vue d'ensemble de l'oeuvre de Bergson.
Sur certains sujets, Claude Bernard a paru esquisser des intuitions, qu’il n’a pas développées, ou sur lesquelles il nous semble qu’il ait maintenu une large part d’implicite, voire de « flou ». C’est le cas notamment du concept de... more
Sur certains sujets, Claude Bernard a paru esquisser des intuitions, qu’il n’a pas développées, ou sur lesquelles il nous semble qu’il ait maintenu une large part d’implicite, voire de « flou ».
C’est le cas notamment du concept de liberté qui semble embrasser différents sens en fonction des textes auxquels on se réfère. S’il paraît que Claude Bernard souhaite maintenir une frontière nette entre la physiologie qu’il propose et les questionnements métaphysiques, certains de ses développements semblent à la limite de la science et de la philosophie, limite qui apparaît floue et qui par conséquent peut conduire à une certaine confusion dans les interprétations. Il nous semble que l’œuvre de Bergson permet de clarifier la pensée bernardienne, bien qu’elle procède de façon inverse : allant de la conceptualisation philosophique à la confrontation aux données scientifiques, plutôt que de l’étude physiologique au questionnement philosophique. Ces deux auteurs proposent de mettre en lien la complication croissante des organismes, qui semble en faire des machines de plus en plus déterminées, avec l’émergence d’une liberté de plus en plus importante laissée à ces organismes. Claude Bernard, lui, propose d’abord de penser la liberté comme indépendance qu’un organisme peut acquérir eu égard aux circonstances externes grâce à la complication de son milieu intérieur. Mais il semble également qu’il lie cette indépendance physiologique à la possibilité d’un libre-arbitre voire d’une liberté proprement morale. Mais le lien entre ces différents sens de liberté sont peu clairs chez Claude Bernard. De ce point de vue, se référer à Bergson semble pouvoir nous éclairer : dabs Matière et mémoire, il montre explicitement comment la complexité physiologique permet non seulement une certaine indépendance de l’organisme eu égard à son milieu, mais ouvre aussi à la possibilité de choix, et par là, à la conscience qui permet l’émergence d’une liberté réellement morale.
A partir de la lecture croisée de ces deux auteurs sur le problème de la liberté, nous nous sommes proposé d’interroger le rapport de la philosophie et de la science chez ces deux auteurs. C’est, il nous semble, en sollicitant le concept bergsonien d’intuition qu’on peut comprendre le point de contact de ces deux disciplines, en tant que l’intuition est un travail de synthèse qui permet d’aller au-delà des systèmes de pensée (qui s’ils soient scientifiques ou philosophiques) et conduit ainsi à la compréhension d’un phénomène qui ne se laissait pas appréhender par les théories déjà faites.
Research Interests:
Bergson offers an epistemological critique of Darwin's theory that focuses on the question of variation. In Darwin's view, variation is accidental, i.e. not directed: it is natural selection that shapes adaptation by favouring organisms... more
Bergson offers an epistemological critique of Darwin's theory that focuses on the question of variation. In Darwin's view, variation is accidental, i.e. not directed: it is natural selection that shapes adaptation by favouring organisms that carry advantageous variation. While Bergson emphasizes the improbability that random variations will accumulate in such a way as to produce an organ as sophisticated as the eye, this is not the focus of his criticism. Bergson refutes above all Darwinian gradualism: for Darwin the variation is “minute”, and Bergson glosses “insensible”. The latter goes so far as to speak of “the Darwinian theory of insensible variations”. His argument is based on the idea that if these variations are insensible, they cannot confer an advantage to the organism and therefore be selected. Bergson refers to a section of the Origin of Species, where the formation of the eye is explained by the selection of "extremely slight and gradual" variations. However, for Darwin, variation is by no means insensible: indeed, we read that the variation retained is the one that "cause[s] the slight alteration" that is an "improvement… natural selection will pick out". Where does such a semantic shift come from in this scrupulous and faithful reader that Bergson usually is? One cannot assume this is just a lexical clumsiness, since Bergson uses this expression five times in Creative Evolution, and in fact it is the main argument for his rejection of Darwinism: "if the variations ... are ... insensible, some good genius ... must be appealed to ... in order to preserve and accumulate these variations, for selection will not look after this". Our hypothesis is that Bergson's interpretation was influenced by a 1903 article by Albert Dastre - a biologist to whom Bergson refers in Creative Evolution - entitled "A New Theory of Species". In this text, Dastre makes several objections to the Darwinian theory, including the fact that the benefit of small variations "would itself be too insignificant to give rise to selection"; "the main criticism” that must be levelled at Darwin is that he “brings out the considerable change that creates a new species ... from insensible changes". Although he attributes this thesis to Hugo de Vries, the latter never explicitly uses this expression. On the other hand, Dastre refers, among other biologists resistant to Darwinism, to St. George Jackson Mivart who, in On the genesis of species, proposes an indictment against the Darwinian theory based precisely on the impossibility of selecting an insensible variation. Mivart's idea is "that the spontaneous variations upon which [Darwin’s] theory depends are individually slight, minute and insensible”. He attempts to demonstrate the absurdity of this proposition with a range of examples, including the formation of the eye, which he presents in terms that strongly recall those of Bergson a few years later: "these complex… co-ordinations could never have been produced by infinitesimal beginnings, since, until so far developed as to effect the requisite junctions, they are useless. …The difficulties with regard to the eye have been well put by Mr. Murphy, especially that of the concordant result of visual development springing from different starting-points and continued on by independent roads". The point here is to give a history of the Bergsonian approach of Darwin, following the successive shifts that transformed the very slight variations upon which natural selection acts into insensible ones that, by definition, cannot be selected. We will therefore attempt to trace the history of this false paradox that led Bergson to such a misunderstanding of Darwinian theory that it fell into "almost complete discredit" (Monod) among many biologists in the second half of the twentieth century.