Andreas Umland

After Ukraine’s 2013–14 Revolution of Dignity, much Western attention to Ukrainian domestic policies has been focused on the country’s “Europeanization” in the narrow and technical sense of the word, i.e. to its adoption of EU standards and legislation. In contrast, a parallel major transformation with no direct relation to Ukraine’s EU association and accession—a multidimensional local governance and territorial reform—has been receiving less journalistic and scholarly coverage. That is in spite of the fact that the gradual decentralization process that Ukraine’s first post-Euromaidan government started in April 2014 is an exceptionally far-ranging and already advanced transition. It redefines not only Ukrainian center-periphery interactions, but also state-society as well as government-citizen relations. This collected volume is one of the first of its kind and presents eleven narrowly focused research papers by Oleksandra Deineko, Melanie Mierzejewski-Voznyak, Maryna Rabinovych, Aadne Aasland, Max Bader, Igor Dunayev, Yuriy Palekha, Oleksii Sydorchuk, and the editors. The chapters illustrate specific problems as well as repercussions of Ukraine’s ongoing local governance reform ranging from fiscal governance to party politics as well as wartime challenges. https://www.ibidem.eu/en/Series/Society-Politics/Soviet-and-Post-Soviet-Politics-and-Society/Ukraine-s-Decentralization.html

I. Русские европейцы (10)
Геннадий Аляев, Татьяна Резвых
О политических «измах», сторонах и цветах:
два эмигрантских доклада С.Л. Франка 5
II. Антизападные политические течения в России
и их истоки (13)
Марлен Ларюэль
Зеркальные игры? Идеологические резонансы между
русским и американским консерватизмом 35
Наталия Юдина
Диаспора русских националистов: российские ультраправые
заграницей в посткрымский период 57
III. Контекст, развитие и значение Евромайдана:
краткие наблюдения и толкования (7)
Галина Зеленько
Украина как стратегический партнер: политические
изменения после Революции достоинства 71
Андреас Умланд
Постсоветский украинский правый радикализм в сравнительной
перспективе: преемственность и новации после Евромайдана 85
IV. Дискуссия и тоталитаризме
Леонид Люкс
Программные манифесты двойной тоталитарной революции ХХ века:
Основы XIX века Чемберлена и Что делать? Ленина 111
V. Страницы новейшей истории
Борис Хавкин
Нацистский план «Мадагаскар» и его предыстория 143
Игорь Баринов
По ту сторону русификации: семейство Ульрих и русское
революционное движение 149
VI. История культуры
Людмила Дымерская-Цигельман
Томас Манн и его Доктор Фаустус: роман о болезни нации 165
Мария Ларина
Метажанр утопии в современной русской и немецкой прозе 183
VII. Политология
Антон Писаренко, Андреас Умланд, Андре Хэртель
Специальная мониторинговая миссия ОБСЕ в Украине: работа СММ
на Донбассе и ее украинская критика в 2014-2019 гг. 193
VIII. Эссе
Михаил Блюменкранц
Метафизика свободы: Федор Достоевский, Владимир Соловьев и
Фридрих Ницше 223
Леонид Люкс
Краткие заметки к польскому дискурсу о России в XIX и ХХ вв. 233
Борис Хавкин
«Мы сделали все правильно»? Советско-германские договоры 1939 года 241
IX. Воспоминания
Анджей де Лазари
Как благодаря Янке и Анджею Валицким я оставил балалайку
и занялся идеями 251

Welche Herausforderungen erwarten deutschsprachige Fachkräfte bei der Annahme von Lehraufträgen an Universitäten ehemals staatssozialistischer Länder? Wie verhalten sich die dortigen Studierenden und wie reagieren sie auf ausländische Gäste? Welche Tipps können ehemalige oder derzeitige Lektoren in Osteuropa künftigen Gastdozenten an geisteswissenschaftlichen Lehrstühlen in Transformationsstaaten mit auf den Weg geben? Dieser zweite Band eines von der Robert Bosch Stiftung und dem Deutschen Akademischen Austausch Dienst (DAAD) geförderten Projektes konzentriert sich auf spezifische Probleme des Unterrichts an philologischen und geschichtswissenschaftlichen Fakultäten in jungen Demokratien. 17 Germanisten und Historiker reflektieren Lehrerfahrungen aus Osteuropa.
INHALT: Gregor Berghorn: Zum Geleit - Andreas Umland: Vorwort: Zum Fortgang des Projektes «Hochschullehre in Osteuropa» - Thomas Keith: Gastlektorinnen und -lektoren in Osteuropa: Unterrichten gegen Hindernisse - Joachim Rogall: Zwischen Bimber und Ritterschlachten: Als Stipendiat des DAAD und der polnischen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Polen Anfang der 80er-Jahre - ein Zeitbild - Matthias Bürgel: Zur Situation der Germanistik in Russland oder: Wer kann Dornröschen aus dem Schlaf erwecken? - Andreas Decker: Jenseits von Goethe und Schiller: Germanistik in Russland aus der Sicht eines deutschen Gastes - Marion Scull: Wo man noch wirklich staunen kann: Kulturvermittlung in Tatarstan - Nicole Stirnberg: Literaturgeschichte als Herausforderung: Schwierigkeiten und Lösungsansätze bei Vorlesungen zur Literaturgeschichte in der Republik Moldau - Antje Kirchhof: Deutsche Literatur in Kiew unterrichten: Studierende, Lehrstuhl und Boschlektorin - unvereinbare Ansprüche - Torsten Szobries: Textproduktion und -rezeption an der postsowjetischen Hochschule: Erfahrungen aus der Germanistik in Kasachstan - Dietmar Wulff: Wissenschafts- und Hochschulkultur in Russland am Beispiel der Geschichtswissenschaften - Karsten Brüggemann: Geschichte erleben und Geschichte lehren in Narva: Eindrücke von der neuen Ostgrenze Europas - Anuschka Tischer: Die akademische Geschichtswissenschaft in Lettland: Ein Erfahrungsbericht - Christian Rohr: Europäisches Mittelalter in Sibirien: Erfahrungen im Zuge einer Gastvorlesung in Novosibirsk - Jocasta Gardner: Geschichtsunterricht in Albanien - Christine Teichmann: Auf dem Weg nach Bologna: Osteuropäische Lehrerfahrungen aus der Perspektive der Hochschulforschung - Tim Peters: «Ostblock» ade? - Das (Hochschul-)Abenteuer Osteuropa.

Wie funktioniert universitäres Lehren und Lernen in den postkommunistischen Staaten? Was unterscheidet west- und osteuropäische Hochschullehre und -strukturen voneinander? Was erwartet westliche Gastlektoren an einer Universität der ehemaligen Sowjetunion oder Ostmitteleuropas? Was können erfahrene Lektoren in Osteuropa künftigen Gastdozenten in den Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften mit auf den Weg geben? Dieser Band ist die erste Veröffentlichung dieser Art in deutscher Sprache. Er vereinigt Berichte, Untersuchungen und lehrmethodische Anleitungen von 15 ehemaligen und derzeitigen Gastdozenten, die hier ihre Beobachtungen, Reflexionen und Ratschläge zur Lehrtätigkeit an Universitäten im ehemaligen Ostblock wiedergeben.
INHALT: Andreas Umland: Einleitung: Der Sinn und die Grenzen dieses Projektes - Stefanie Stegmann: «Go East» - ich ging: Über universitäre Kulturen und eigene Selbstverständnisse - Helge Hellberg: Neue Markierungen und alte Fahrwasser: Geschichtswissenschaften in Riga - Guido Müntel/Stefan Gänzle: «Feind vor dem Tor»? Europastudien und Internationale Beziehungen in Kaliningrad - Sigrid Freunek: Ucit'sja, ucit'sja und nochmals ucit'sja: Einige Schlüsselbegriffe des russischen Hochschulbetriebs und was dahintersteckt - Franka Kühn: «Männer können einfach besser logisch denken»: Geschlechterrollen und Familienplanung in der Transformation - Michaela Klement: Einmal Saratov - Cambridge, bitte...: Eindrücke aus der russischen und britischen Universitätslandschaft - Cyrus Salimi-Asl: Strukturelle und kulturelle Rahmenbedingungen sozialwissenschaftlicher Hochschullehre in Kasachstan: Eine Problemauflistung - Silke Erdmann: «Spree wurde 1789 geboren» oder: Über den notwendigen Unterschied zwischen Landeskunde und Geographie - Andreas Goldthau/Oliver Schütt: Ursachen, Mechanismen und Auswirkungen von Korruption an russischen Hochschulen: Ein Fallbeispiel aus Sibirien - Silke Erdmann: Vernunftbehindert? Über Mut und die vielen kleinen Schritte - Hans Gutbrod: Wie vermittelt man Urteilskraft? Die Essaymethode an georgischen Universitäten - Katja Ezel: Der Einsatz von Planspielen im fremdsprachlichen Unterricht: Ein Erfahrungsbericht aus Polen - Tim Peters: Wahlbeobachtung in Tatarstan: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen politischer Projektarbeit im heutigen Rußland - Andreas Umland: Der Gastlektor zwischen Anpassung und Einmischung - Stefanie Stegmann: «Ich sitze auf gepackten Koffern»: Frustrations(in-)toleranzen von Sprach- und Kulturmittlern.

In 1996, the Russian Federation became a member of the Council of Europe. Two years later, the Russian parliament ratified the Council's major document - the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). These papers were presented at a conference at Yekaterinburg in spring 2001. The collection represents a snapshot of Russian and Western approaches to human rights protection at a moment when Russia was going through a first phase of adaptation of the political system created by Boris Yeltsin to the new modes of state-society relations being introduced by Vladimir Putin.
CONTENTS: Sergey Alexeyev on human rights and Modernity; Rainer Arnold on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; Valery Mikhailenko on ethnic separatism; Julia Kharlamova on the impossibility of an ECHR-implementation in Russia; Yekaterina Khodzhayeva on human rights discourses in Tatarstan's mass media; Anatoly Azarov on the Russians' knowledge about the ECHR; Manja Hussner on the incorporation of international treaties into Russian law; Marat Salikov on the Constitutional Court; Anton Burkov on the detention of mentally ill persons; Igor Shirmanov on ambiguities in Russian legal norms; Olga Selikhova on human rights issues in the regions; Olga Aleksenko on the Human Rights Commission of Rostov; Yelena Goncharova on the right to a fair trial; Tatyana Gladkova on the Sverdlovsk Oblast Ombudsman; Andrey Lyamzin on Yekaterinburg's detention system; Andreas Umland with Oxana Stouppo on Western policies towards Russia.

YULIYA YURCHUK, ANDREAS UMLAND: Introduction: New Studies on the Record and Remembrance of the OUN(b) in World War II
OLEKSANDR MELNYK: Ukrainian Nationalism, Soviet Power, and Legitimacy Contests in the Kyiv Region, 1941–44: Actors, Issues, and Interpretations
PER A. RUDLING: Managing Memory in Post-Soviet Ukraine: From “Scientific Marx-ism-Leninism” to the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, 1991–2019

Yuliya Yurchuk, Andreas Umland: Introduction: Studies in the Course and Commemoration of the OUN’s Anti-Soviet Resistance.
Grzegorz Motyka: NKVD Internal Troops Operations against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in 1944–45.
Oksana Myshlovska: History Education and Reconciliation: The Ukrainian National Underground Movement in Secondary School Curricula, Textbooks, and Classroom Practices (1991–2012).
Marian Luschnat-Ziegler: Observing Trends in Ukrainian Memory Politics (2014–2019) through Structural Topic Modeling.

Andreas Umland and Yuliya Yurchuk: Introduction: Discussing Ukrainian Historical Ultra-Nationalism in Comparative Perspective. 
https://ibidem-verlag.de/pdf/07-01-Intro_02.pdf.
Oleksandr Zaitsev: On Ustashism and Fascism: A Response to Critics.
Roger Griffin: Fascism, Ustashism, and the Ecumenical Application of Ideal Types.
Angel Alcalde: A New Turn: On the Need for a Transnational Interpretation of the Ustasa and OUN.
Stephen Shenfield: Accommodating "Stateless Nations" in the Conceptualization of Fascism.
Ivan Gomza: Gravity of Void: Remarks on the Structural Consistency and Empirical Validity of the Notion of "Ustashism."
Per Rudling: "Saving the OUN from a Collaborationist and Possibly Fascist Fate:" On the Genealogy of the Discourse on the OUN's "Non-Fascism."

Gergana Dimova, Andreas Umland: Introduction. Russia’s 2014 Annexation of Crimea in Historical Context: Discourses and Controversies -- Natalya Belitser: The Status of the Crimean Tatars in Ukrainian and International Law -- Alina Cherviatsova: The 1954 Transfer of Crimea: Debunking the Myth of a “Royal Gift” to Ukraine -- Maryna Rabinovych: How the Federal Republic Reacted to Russia’s Annexation of Crimea: Berlin’s Diplomatic Response and German Media Representations in 2014–2020

This is the third instalment in an ongoing series of thematic JSPPS sections dedicated to the memory and history of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and its military arm, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukr. abbrev.: UPA). The first two special sections focused on some contentious issues in the history and memory of the OUN and UPA and their comparatively informed interpretation. They tackled questions related to the historical, political, sociological, and ethical assessment of these organizations, and the contemporary use of their history against the background of the Russian-Ukrainian war since 2014. This section has similar general foci, yet deals in more detail—though, by no means, exhaustively!—with a particular subset of controversial topics in the history of the OUN and UPA, as well as issues surrounding their legacy for present day Ukraine, already touched upon by, among others, Igor Barinov in previous instalments. These articles provide additional observations and perspectives on both OUN(b) and OUN(m), and their complicated relationships to war-time fascism, in general, and German Nazism, in particular, as well as on the relation of the OUN’s ideology to the participation of some of its members in the Holocaust.

Форум новейшей восточноевропейской истории и культуры. 2018. T. 15. №№ 1-2. http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/forum/inhaltruss29.html.

Андреас Умланд:
Реставрационный и революционный империализм в политическом дискурсе России: сдвиг постсоветского идеологического спектра вправо и антизападный поворот Кремля.

Виктор Шнирельман:
Эзотерика Александра Дугина: возведение моста между эсхатологией и конспирологией.

Штефан Видеркер:
«Консервативная революция» à la russe? Опыт интерпретации евразийства в европейском контексте.

Сергей Мохов:
Бинарный код многополярности: теория международных отношений Александра Дугина и ее соотношение с «неоевразийской» доктриной.

Елизавета Гауфман:
«Победа будет за нами»: секьюритизация и коллективная память в российских медиа во время Евромайдана.

Михаил Минаков:
Новороссийский миф и транснациональность непризнанных постсоветских государств: амбивалентность промосковского сепаратизма.

Форум новейшей восточноевропейской истории и культуры. 2018. T. 15. №№ 1-2. http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/forum/inhaltruss29.html .
Политика памяти и интерпретация ОУН в постсоветской Украине.

Георгий Касьянов:
Толкования ОУН и УПА в публичном дискурсе Украины 1990-х-2000-х гг.: от «реабилитации» к апологии.

Яна Примаченко:
Украинская историческая политика и Холокост: проблемы осмысления.

Мирослав Шкандрий:
Книга 'Вторая польско-украинская война' Владимира Вятровича:
искажения истории в публикациях директора УИНП.

Юрий Радченко:
Отношение ОУН к евреям: дискуссия без «совместных деклараций».

Форум новейшей восточноевропейской истории и культуры. 2017. T. 14. № 2. http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/forum/inhaltruss28.html

Формы героизации Степана Бандеры и его движения

Тимоти Д. Снайдер
Фашистский герой в демократическом Киеве: по поводу присвоения звания «Герой Украины» Степану Бандере в 2010-ом году

Ярослав Грыцак
Развитие украинской культуры памяти после 1991 года: пример Степана Бандеры

Оксана Мышловская, Андре Либих
Культ Бандеры до и после Евромайдана: топографический обзор памятников и мемориальных практик

Форум новейшей восточноевропейской истории и культуры. 2017. T. 14. № 1. http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/forum/inhaltruss27.html

II.1. ОУН в 1930-е годы и во время германо-советской войны 1941-1945 гг.

Олена Петренко
Игры в эмансипацию: женщины и ОУН в 1930-х годах

Джон-Пол Химка
Львовский погром 1941-го: немцы, украинские националисты и карнавальная толпа

Гжегож Россолински–Либе
«Украинская национальная революция» 1941-го года: дискурс и практика фашистского движения

Дмитрий Титаренко
Пресса Украины периода нацистской оккупации как фактор украинской националистической пропаганды

Михаил Тяглый
«Цыганский вопрос» в идеологии и практике украинского национального движения во время Второй мировой войны


II.2. Формы и последствия коллаборационизма ОУН с нацистской Германией

Кай Струве
Команда особого назначения «Львов», украинская милиция и т.н. «Дни Петлюры» 25-26 июля 1941-ого года

Пер Андерс Рудлинг
Обучение убийству: шуцманшафт батальон 201 и гауптман Роман Шухевич в Белоруссии в 1942-ом году

Игорь Баринов
Союзники или коллаборанты? ОУН и нацистская Германия в ходе оккупации Украины в 1941-1943 гг.

Юрий Радченко
Дневник нацистского идеолога и бюрократа Альфреда Розенберга: Холокост и «восточная политика» Третьего Рейха

Форум новейшей восточноевропейской истории и культуры. 2016. T. 13. № 2. http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/forum/inhaltruss26.html

I.1. Истоки и память о Волынской трагедии 1943-1944 гг.

Тимоти Д. Снайдер
Причины украинской этнической чистки поляков в 1943 году: региональный контекст и историческое значение Волынской трагедии

Гжегож Мотыка
Как классифицировать Волынскую трагедию в историческом и сравнительном контекстах? «Война в войне», геноцид и сталинские этнические чистки

Элеонора Нарвселиус
Волынь 1943-1944: украинские дискуссии о националистическом повстанчестве, поликультурных «вселенных» пограничья и польском региональном наследии

Юлия Юрчук
Прошлое под прицелом амнезии: память об ОУН и УПА в Волынском регионе на примере памятника Климу Савуру

Лукаш Адамский
Волынский негационизм как фактор, отягощающий польско-украинские отношения: анализ дискуссии 2016 года

I.2. Формирование идеологии ОУН в межвоенное время

Александр Зайцев
Идеология и политическая стратегия ОУН до 1939 года: возникновение и эволюция украинского интегрального национализма в межвоенное время

Иван Гомза
Каталитическая мобилизация радикальных украинских националистов во Второй Речи Посполитой: роль структуры политических возможностей

Ярослав Божко
«Новый национализм» Дмитрия Донцова: между интегральным национализмом и консервативной революцией

JOURNAL OF SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET POLITICS AND SOCIETY. Vol. 1, No. 1 (2015). Paperback. 334 pp. €34.00. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS: http://cup.columbia.edu/book/journal-of-soviet-and-post-soviet-politics-and-society/9783838207261
IBIDEM PRESS: http://www.ibidemverlag.de/Series/Journal-of-Soviet-and-Post-Soviet-Politics-and-Society/Journal-of-Soviet-and-Post-Soviet-Politics-and-Society.html

I. Антизападные идеологические течения в постсоветской России и их истоки (5)

I.1. Исторические корни современного русского ультранационализма

Франк Грюнер
"Борьба России против «чуждого элемента»: парадигма анти-космополитизма в российской и советской идеологии"

Михаил Суслов
"Кризис мессианства и вопрос о будущем России во взглядах Сергея Шарапова (1855-1911)"


I.2. Вариации антилиберализма в сегодняшнем российском обществе

Оксана Пахлевска
"Неоевразизм, кризис русской идентичности и Украина (Часть первая )"

Маркус Матыль
"Возникновение националистической контркультуры в постперестроечной России 1990-1998 гг."

Мартин Мюллер, Ирина Троцук
"Проект сильной России в элитном образовании путинского периода: взгляд с позиций постструктуралистской теории дискурса"


I.3. Ксенофобия и конспиролигия

Майкл Кирквудн
"Понятие идеологии в творчестве Александра Зиновьева"

Борис Степанов
"Как сделан Господин Гексоген: литературная конструкция идеологического радикализма и ее рецепция"

Николай Сайнаков, Илья Яблоков
"Теории заговора как часть маргинального дискурса (на примере создателей Новой хронологии Н.А. Морозова и А.Т.Фоменко)"

"Starting Post-Soviet Ukrainian Right-Wing Extremism Studies from Scratch: Guest Editor's Introduction." By Andreas Umland. "Ukrainian Integral Nationalism in Quest of a "Special Path" (1920s-1930s)." By Oleksandr Zaitsev. "Ultraright Party Politics in Post-Soviet Ukraine and the Puzzle of the Electoral Marginalism of Ukrainian Ultranationalists in 1994-2009." By Andreas Umland and Anton Shekhovtsov. "Right-Wing Extremism on the Rise in Ukraine." By Viacheslav Likhachev. "Social-Nationalists in the Ukrainian Parliament: How They Got There and What We Can Expect of Them." By Viacheslav Likhachev. "A Typical Variety of European Right-Wing Radicalism?" By Andreas Umland

"Varieties of Russian Exceptionalism in Putin's Russia: Guest Editor's Introduction

By Andreas Umland

This second RPL edition on the idea of Russia's special path continues a series of M.E. Sharpe Russian translation projects devoted to the roots and varieties of post-Soviet anti-Western ideologies.  The issues dealt with in the previous and following papers translated from Russian have become even more topical than they were already in 2011 when the current translation project had been initiated. During the first half of 2012, Russian society, in general, and its educated classes, in particular, have become increasingly polarized, and divided into pro- and anti-Putin forces. Arguably, the crux of this confrontation comes down to the question of whether Russia should either continue its “special path,” or let herself be measured and criticized according to standards today common across Europe.
To be sure, there is a variety of distinct issues around which the recent conflict between the opposition and authorities has been developing including widespread corruption, manipulated elections, restrictions on the freedom of assembly, misuse of mass media reporting for propaganda purposes, and several others. Nevertheless, in a more general sense, one can interpret the political confrontation that has emerged already before Putin’s third presidential period within the context of the prime foci of the current translation project. The opposition wants Russia to become a "normal" country in the Western sense, whereas Putin and his supporters are claiming legitimacy for the current regime on the basis of Russia's alleged specificity or even uniqueness.
The following papers discuss a number of current ideological permutations, political implications and institutional effects resulting from a practical application of the idea of a “special path” to the peculiarly post-Soviet conditions of today Russia. Aleksandr Kubyshkin and Aleksandr Sergunin provide a succinct survey of the spectrum of Moscow’s foreign policy doctrines that can be seen as expressions of the idea of Russia’s special path. They concentrate on outlooks that have been labeled “neo-Eurasianist,” or “geopolitical.” They engage primarily in a classification of the various subtypes and hybrids of ideas exceptionalism in post-Soviet Russia. Kubyshkin and Sergunin also briefly list the main protagonists of these schools, and outline the evolution of non- or anti-Atlanticist world views during the post-Soviet period.
In my own article, I mention a number of effects that the Orange Revolution in Ukraine had on the political regime, official discourse and public opinion of Russia, since 2005. These repercussions, I argue, partly modified the nature of Putin’s political system making it somewhat distinct from traditional autocracy. I label this alteration “paratotalitarian,” in that it was reminiscent of certain features of totalitarian states, yet did not result in a real regime change from authoritarianism to totalitarianism. I also briefly touch upon some worrying developments in Russian public opinion which, under the influence of an upsurge of anti-Western propaganda in the Kremlin-controlled mass media after the Orange Revolution and in connection with the Russian-Georgian War of 2008, became pre-dominantly anti-American by the end of the last decade.
Emil’ Pain presents an in-depth investigation into Russia’s post-Soviet regime in both historical and comparative perspective. He focuses on classificatory questions and interpretational issues using as his starting points, among other sources, Freedom House scores for the post-Soviet republics. Pain distinguishes Putin’s political system not only from totalitarian ones, but also sees the Russian authoritarian regime as being, in distinction to, for instance, those of Belarus and Kazakhstan, not (yet) consolidated. He discusses the paradox of Russian traditionalism under the conditions of an absence of strong traditional ties in Russia. Pain also touches upon the rise of Russian nationalist xenophobia and the role of Stalinism in relation to the re-emergence of authoritarianism under Putin.
Aleksandr Melikhov, in his brief statement, makes an argument for the adoption of a soft version of an ideology of the “special path.” Such a strategy, Melikhov argues, would be more useful than a simple Westernization because it would both, find more support in the population and, in his opinion, help preventing the rise of a fundamentalist interpretation of the “special path.” In the following discussion between Boris Dubin, Lev Gudkov and Emil' Pain, Melikhov's challenge is taken up, and the role, for Russia, of the idea of a "special path" is analyzed in a lively debate. The three leading social scientist of Russia discuss the meaning and connotation that the word "special" (osobyi) has in today Russia, and whether Russia needs this concept in order to formulate her national idea. Gudkov, for instance, persuasively argues that the idea of a "special path" has played a negative role in Russia's modern history in that it provided a justification for authoritarian or even totalitarian conservatism and isoliationism as well as their stifling effects on Russia's socio-economic development. At best, the idea can play a constructive role as a mean of moral self-defense for peripheral countries that are in the process of a catch-up development.
All in all, the texts of these two special issues of RPL on Russia's "special path" provide a broad overview of the various notions, aspects and applications of one of the crucial ideas which are today used to legitimize Putin's authoritarian domestic and anti-Western foreign policies. The current Russian political system is, in distinction to some other East European and South Caucasian post-Soviet regimes, unlikely to open up any time soon. It will presumably survive for many years to come and may become even more radical in its suppression of internal opposition, intervention into civil society, and manipulation of Russian-Western relations. Against this background, one hopes that more such translation projects - focusing, for instance, on the most recent developments in Russia's political and intellectual scenes - will follow.
CONTENTS: "Varieties of Russian Exceptionalism in Putin's Russia: Guest Editor's Introduction" by Andreas Umland;  "The Problem of the 'Special Path' in Russian Foreign Policy: From the 1990s to the Early Twenty-First Century" by Aleksandr Kubyshkin and Aleksandr Sergunin; "Russia's New 'Special Path' After the Orange Revolution: Radical Anti-Westernism and Paratotalitarian Neo-Authoritarianism in 2005-8" by Andreas Umland; "Special Characteristics of the Post-Soviet Political Regime" by Emil Pain; "The 'Special Path' Ideology as an Instrument of Modernization" by Aleksandr Melikhov; "Does the 'Special Path' Ideology Contain the Potential for Modernization?: A Conversation" by Lev Gudkov, Boris Dubin and Emil Pain."

The Claim of Russian Distinctiveness as an Ideational Foundation for Putin's Neo-Authoritarian Regime: Guest Editor's Introduction

By Andreas Umland

During the past years, M.E. Sharpe's Russian translation journals have devoted a number of their individual contributions as well as some special issues to the past and present of Russian anti-Westernism. For instance, Russian Studies in Philosophy (vol. 47, no. 1) published in 2008 a collection of essays on classical Eurasianism  while Russian Politics and Law (vol. 46, no. 4 & vol. 47, no. 1), in 2008  and 2009,  offered two special editions with research papers focusing on extremely right-wing tendencies in post-Soviet political and intellectual life. These themes were already politically topical at the end of the last decade. Yet, they have become even more salient during the last two years. Especially, since the return of Vladimir Putin to the post of President of the Russian Federation in 2012, non-nationalist modes of legitimation for Russia's re-centralized governmental system have been relegated to the back again.
During the presidency of Dmitrii Medvedev in 2008-2012, the promise of a state-led political, social and economic modernization - an idea already exploited, to a lesser degree, under Putin before - had come to the fore as one of the primary ideational foundations for a supposedly temporary semi-authoritarian governmental system. It appeared as if the duumvirate's peculiar form of rule was, by Medvedev and Putin, seen as a transitional stage on the way on Russia's gradual transformation into a "normal" liberal, rule-based and democratic state. According to that script, Putin's centralizing drive from 1999 to 2008 would have appeared as a politically illiberal intermezzo that was unavoidable in order to bring about an urgent consolidation of Russia's administrative system and civil society, after the chaos of the 1990s. Even the manifest escalation of anti-Americanism and various mobilizational measures, such as the creation of state-sponsored youth organizations, in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine of late 2004 could have, within such a scenario, be seen as pragmatic responses to certain destabilizing foreign and domestic impulses which could have threatened the eventually modernizing trajectory of Russia's post-Soviet developmental project.
However, since the announcement, in September 2011, of Putin's re-assumption of the post of RF-President and the impudent electoral falsifications in Moscow and other Russian cities, in December 2012, this narrative of Putinism has lost legitimacy not only as an adequate approach to a historical understanding of the Putin phenomenon in the context of Russia's specifically post-totalitarian situation. The growing confrontation, during 2012, between Putin and Co., on the one side, and the political opposition, civil society and non-conformist artists, on the other, illustrates that the story about Putin as a sort of second Peter the Great does also not fly with many Russians anymore. The officially announced aim of overcoming socio-political backwardness was contradicted by the distinctly pre-modern mode of returning the presidency from Medvedev back to Putin in 2011-2012 as well as the surprisingly primitive methods of falsifying the parliamentary elections of December 2012. Ever since, the peculiar "Putin System" that had emerged in the first decade of the new century has been in crisis, and the Kremlin's political technologists have been in search for a new mode of legitimation of their master's power. 
It is almost "natural" that the Russian authoritarian regime is, under such circumstances, turning to history and the experience of Russia's earlier autocracies. And it is also no surprise that the age-old idea of Russia's "special path" that, supposedly, not only sets her apart from the West, but also entails considerable conflict and, in the worst case, even military confrontation with certain Western countries is gaining popularity again with the current authorities as well as among their various supporters. Since the start of the new Russian protest movement in December 2011, the spread, among the pro-Putinist forces, of ideas about the Russian nation's cultural distinctiveness, historical mission, imperial destiny, Orthodox nature, Eurasian essence, and non-Western character, i.e. ideas closely linked to the vision of Russia's "special path," has been growing by the month.
Fortunately for Russian studies, Emil' Pain, professor of political science at the Higher School of Economics, started already before the latest developments, with the support of the Moscow offices of the Kennan Institute and Friedrich Naumann Foundation, an ambitious project that brought together a number of experts working on ideas of national distinctiveness in Russia and Germany.  On November 20th, 2009, he assembled a binational group of scholars and other researchers at St. Petersburg's Lermontov Library for the Sixth Starovoitova Readings that were devoted to the "Ideology of the 'Special Path' in Russia and Germany."  The literary critic and prolific journalist Aleksandr Arkhangelskii moderated the first session with papers by A. Melikhov, E. Zemskova, M. Maiofis, L. Luks, J. Zarusky, A. Dmitriev, A. Makushinskii, V. Vul'fovich, A. Kubyshkin, M. Gutbrod as well as Iu. Kantor. Pain led the second session consisting of papers by D. Travin, B. Dubin, myself, M. Sokolov, B. Firsov and Pain. Out of this meeting came the collected volume from which the papers of these two special issues of RPL have been drawn.
Sergei Magaril highlights in his broad historical survey some of the sources of Moscow's anti-Westernism, isolationism and provincialism within Russian intellectual, academic, civic and spiritual life. Aleksandr Verkhovskii and Pain provide an exhaustive overview of current ideological trends and political groups espousing the varieties of civilizational nationalism that see the Russian nation as the bearer of some larger supra-national mission. Boris Dubin presents an extensive investigation into the changes and continuities in Russian public opinion about an exceptional distinctiveness of Russia, if compared to other European and non-European nations.
These three papers provide already considerable insight into the origins and nature of contemporary permutations of the idea about Russia's "special path." In combination with the contributions to the following second special issue on the same topic, they constitute a comprehensive illustration for why anti-Western, sometimes radically right-wing ideas have been so tenacious and might become prominent again in Russia. Moreover, the English versions of these investigations have benefited greatly from the fact that their translator, Dr. Stephen D. Shenfield, is himself an accomplished researchers of Russian nationalism, and has thus approached the Russian-language originals of these texts with an especially deep understanding of their substance matter. This translation project should, therefore, contribute to a better understanding, in the West and elsewhere, of the multifarious theoretical foundations, deep historical roots, and varying political consequences of the idea of Russia's "special path."
CONTENTS: "The Claim of Russian Distinctiveness as Justification for Putin s Neo-Authoritarian Regime: Guest Editor's Introduction" by Andreas Umland; "The Mythology of the 'Third Rome' in Russian Educated Society" by Sergei Magaril; "The Myth of the 'Special Path' in Contemporary Russian Public Opinion" by Boris Dubin; "Civilizational Nationalism: The Russian Version of the 'Special Path'" by Aleksandr Verkhovskii and Emil Pain.

Andreas Umland

ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF THE RUSSIAN EXTREME RIGHT

Guest Editor's Introduction

The collection of articles in this issue of RUSSIAN POLITICS AND LAW is related to a previous examination of the post-Soviet extreme right in RUSSIAN POLITICS AND LAW (vol. 46, no. 4 [July 2008]), and a presentation in RUSSIAN STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY (vol. 47, no. 1 [Summer 2008]) of recent Russian interpretations of classical Eurasianism. Taken together, these three issues provide insight into the changing context, various sources and different permutations of a particularly virulent, and, arguably, consequential current of anti-Westernism in contemporary Russian intellectual and political discourse.
The five analyses of the Dugin phenomenon in post-Soviet society contained in the current issue sometimes compete with, but more often complement, each other. They all deal with the same object: Aleksandr Dugin, the political context of his activities, and his historical sources as well as – to a lesser degree – his followers, collaborators and competitors. It is telling that, despite such a relatively narrow empirical focus, these papers only rarely duplicate or overlap one other. In view of this circumstance, the purpose of bringing these closely related yet divergent interpretations of “neo-Eurasianism” together was threefold.
First, the papers illustrate the multifarious nature of post-Soviet “neo-Eurasianism,” and eclecticism of Dugin’s ideological worldview. Whereas Leonid Luks identifies in Dugin’s thinking and strategy continuities with inter-war Germany’s “Conservative Revolution,” Mikhail Sokolov interprets the Dugin phenomenon primarily as a specifically Russian variety of the so-called “New Right” in post-war Europe. While supportive of these viewpoints, Marlène Laruelle sets “neo-Eurasianism” initially, like Valery Senderov, within the context of classical Eurasianism and its revival in post-Soviet Russia. Whereas Senderov detects resemblances between classical and “neo-Eurasianism,” Laruelle finds more differences than similarities between these two intellectual movements, and discerns the most important congruence in their political behavior rather than ideology. My essay focuses on Dugin’s positive references to the varieties of inter-war fascism and, in particular, to German Nazism thereby introducing yet another comparative framework within which “neo-Eurasianism” can be viewed.
The issue thus demonstrates that an unambiguous classification of Dugin’s outlook and “neo-Eurasianism’s” nature is not an easy task. This is even more true in view of the fact that the present edition does not even present all relevant historical approaches to Dugin’s ideas. Among the major interpretative frameworks missing here are classical geopolitics, National Bolshevism and conspirological occultism – the latter understood as something yet to be differentiated from the esotericism of Integral Traditionalism on which Sokolov focuses.
The second purpose of this publication – similar to the motivations for producing the earlier RUSSIAN POLITICS AND LAW issue on the Russian extreme right – is to illustrate the emergence of a nascent international scholarly community that is trying not only to describe but also to understand current trends in Russian ultra-nationalism from a cross-cultural and diachronic perspective. This comparative approach is an advance in relation to most of the publications on Russia’s radical right of the 1990s that could often only chronicle the fast developments within the newly emerging anti-Western trends in a variety of sections of post-Soviet Russian society – party politics, the youth scene, high and popular culture, education, intellectual life, mass media, etc. – after the fall of the Soviet Union.
As in the case of the contributions to the earlier issue on the extreme right, the authors of this collection can regard themselves as lucky that their papers were translated from Russian, in an especially competent way, by one of the founding fathers of post-Soviet Russian right-wing extremism studies, Stephen D. Shenfield. Shenfield’s 2001 monograph RUSSIAN FASCISM: TRADITIONS, TENDENCIES, MOVEMENTS set, in several ways, the standard for later research in that he provided the first comprehensive as well as an especially dense intra- and internationally comparative study of the Russian radical right pushing our sub-field outside the realm of narrowly understood area studies. To be sure, Alexander Yanov’s brilliant 1995 survey WEIMAR RUSSIA AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT too can and should be regarded as a pioneering study that applied the comparative approach to the scholarly study of the post-Soviet Russian extreme right. Although Yanov demonstrated in his book (as he had in earlier publications) prophetic qualities, however, he could rely on an only slim body of primary and secondary sources that had been made available in the early 1990s. By 2001, in contrast, enough Russian and English literature – including the important 1998 monograph THE RUSSIAN QUESTION by Wayne Allensworth – was available to allow Shenfield to produce his in-depth investigation that has been informing and will continue, for years to come, to inform the international study of the Russian extreme right.
The articles in the current issue fall within this trend. The availability of high-quality English translations of them should contribute to further integrating our subfield into the larger disciplines of international studies of political extremism and neofascism. The effect of spreading the findings of Russian right-wing extremism studies to a wider public is here especially relevant with regard to the papers by Sokolov and Laruelle, which were previously published in two recently founded Russian print journals, AB IMPERIO and ACTA EURASICA/VESTNIK EVRAZII, that are available at only few Western libraries, despite their very high quality.
A final and related rationale for the present collection, as well the earlier issue on the extreme right, was to make the members of our subdiscipline and related fields better acquainted with their colleagues’ research. This goal is, of course, rather trivial, but re-stating this general purpose of academic publishing seems worthwhile in this particular case. In a 1997 review article (“The Post-Soviet Russian Extreme Right,” PROBLEMS OF POST-COMMUNISM, vol. 44, no. 4 [July-August 1997]) I lamented a tendency toward mutual ignorance among the different subdisciplines of Russian nationalism studies. Since then, some of the contributors to the subfield of Russian right-wing extremism have continued to suffer from a regrettable – and, arguably, unscientific – myopia. Those of us who have been following the stream of scholarly papers and books published on the Russian radical right in recent years might agree that, so far, there has been insufficient communication between, and sometimes plain disregard of, the various authors occupying our field. Therefore, we are no yet justified to call ourselves contributors to an academic subdiscipline. Perhaps, we should, instead, understand ourselves as belonging to an exclusive club of commentators, the members of which often still busy themselves with “re-inventing the wheel” rather than engaging in cumulative research based on previously published scholarly studies and on dialogue with colleagues working on the same or related topics. The current collection of articles should make a small contribution to overcome what was, in the 1990s, a still understandable childhood disease of post-Soviet Russian right-wing extremism studies but is now, in 2009, a situation that has become anachronistic.
CONTENTS: "Publisher's Note: Welcoming Dmitry P. Gorenburg to the Editorship of 'Russian Politics and Law';" "Issues in the Study of the Russian Extreme Right: Guest Editor's Introduction" by Andreas Umland; "A 'Third Way'—or Back to the Third Reich?" by Leonid Luks; "Neo-Eurasianism: Realities, Dangers, Prospects" by Valerii Senderov; "New Right-Wing Intellectuals in Russia: Strategies of Legitimization" by Mikhail Sokolov; "Pathological Tendencies in Russian 'Neo-Eurasianism': The Significance of the Rise of Aleksandr Dugin for the Interpretation of Public Life in Contemporary Russia" by Andreas Umland; "(Neo-)Eurasianists and Politics: 'Penetration' of State Structures and Indifference to Public Opinion?" by Marlène Laruelle.

Editor’s Introduction
ANDREAS UMLAND

Although Russian nationalism has become a major force in post-Soviet politics and, arguably, an issue of current world affairs, it remains an understudied subject in such disciplines as comparative politics, contemporary history, and international relations as well as a minor theme in regional and cultural studies. Thanks, above all, to the impressive output of the researchers of Moscow’s Panorama and SOVA Centers – Galina Kozhevnikova, Vladimir Pribylovsky, Aleksandr Verkhovsky, Nikolai Mitrokhin, Viacheslav Likhachev, and others – there now exists a large collection of empirical data on Russian right-wing extremist groupings, trends, and leaders. In contrast, the hermeneutic interpretation, comparative assessment, scholarly conceptualization, and theory-driven explanation of these phenomena continue to lag behind the state of international research into, for instance, West European ultra-nationalist politics.
It is a fortunate coincidence that the most important book on the post-Soviet extreme right, the acclaimed monograph Russian Fascism published by M. E. Sharpe in 2001, has been authored by none other than Stephen Shenfield, who translated the articles in this issue. In his groundbreaking study, Shenfield set the standards for such research in a number of ways. His book provides exceptionally detailed and dense descriptions of the persons and groupings in question. He made exemplary use of a wide variety of Russian and English language primary and secondary sources. And, last but not least, he presented the first well-informed, elaborate attempt to apply to contemporary Russian phenomena a major generic concept from international right-wing extremism studies -- namely, “fascism.” For these reasons, Shenfield’s monograph will continue to exert crucial influence on the analysis of post-Soviet affairs, and may be considered a seminal work for the emerging sub-field of Russian right-wing extremism studies.
The five texts that follow were originally published in four Russian scholarly journals between 2005 and 2008. They can be seen as answers to or elaborations of questions that Shenfield first raised in his book. In the first two selections, I apply Roger Griffin’s conceptual apparatus for the study of generic fascism to an interpretation of Russian National Unity (RNU), Aleksandr Dugin’s “neo-Eurasianist” movement, and Vladimir Zhirinovskii’s idea of Russia’s “last dash to the South.” Referring to the findings of Griffin and other comparativists on the international radical right, I attack some “commonplaces” in reports on post-Soviet ultra-nationalism. First, I argue that the mimetic character and historic context of RNU’s neo-Nazism implies that this organization should be seen as a social or sub-cultural rather than fully political phenomenon. Second, I point out the undoubtedly fascist nature of the Dugin phenomenon while questioning the adequacy of descriptions of Dugin as a “neo-Eurasianist” and suggesting tactical rather than ideological reasons for Dugin’s demonstrative embrace of classical Eurasianism. Finally, I argue that Zhirinovskii, often perceived merely as a political clown, is also the propagator of an essentially fascist plan to bring about Russia’s rebirth through her revolutionary expansion to the South.
The next article was published in Russian as recently as February 2008, and approaches post-Soviet society and culture from a historical-analogical perspective. A leading specialist on totalitarianism and contemporary Central and East European history, Leonid Luks synthesizes a wide array of findings from German, Russian, and English studies – including some relevant primary sources – in order critically to assess the degree to which post-Soviet Russia resembles Germany’s abortive first democracy of 1918-33. Luks avoids both traps into which previous analyses have fallen: he is neither alarmist nor blind concerning some obvious resemblances between the post-imperial, crisis-ridden and subverted semi-democracies of interwar Germany and today’s Russia. Instead, Luks soberly lists the similarities and dissimilarities, displaying considerable erudition concerning the modern political history of both countries. On the basis of his comprehensive overview, Luks comes to the conclusion that, while there is sufficient likeness between Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia to make their comparison an informative intellectual endeavor, a number of weighty differences make it altogether unlikely that Russia’s post-Soviet managed democracy will end in the same way as Germany’s first attempt to democratize.
In the concluding two papers on the political style and rhetoric of Russia’s radical nationalist movement, Mikhail Sokolov focuses on RNU, which he regards (somewhat diverging from my assessment) as an important segment of Russia’s ultra-right spectrum. Before embarking on empirical analysis, Sokolov presents the sophisticated theoretical lenses through which he observes various public statements and behavior by RNU activists. Sokolov succeeds in identifying and explaining, in a revealing way, RNU’s stylistic peculiarities not only thanks to his explicitly theory-driven interpretation, inspired in large measure by Pierre Bourdieu, but also through his frequent juxtaposition of the traits of RNU with those of its “rivals” within Russia’s nationalist spectrum. Above all, he contrasts RNU with Eduard Limonov’s National-Bolshevik Party, which, while sharing a number of ideological suppositions with RNU, was even in the 1990s a markedly different public actor. Sokolov also shows that, counter-intuitively, RNU was not an organization dominated by paranoid people, but developed a discourse that had a certain coherence of its own.
Although the five contributions to this issue were written by scholars with different disciplinary backgrounds – political science, history, and sociology, respectively – these analyses are all informed by a decidedly comparative approach. The first two papers use generic concepts developed outside Russian studies to conceptualize post-Soviet phenomena. Luks’ broad survey provides a far-reaching cross-cultural and diachronic juxtaposition of two defective democracies. Sokolov’s articles actively engage in revealing intra-national comparison, and apply sociological theory to Russian phenomena. It is to be hoped that scholarly inquiry into Russian ultra-nationalism will in the future be further integrated into the larger field of international right-wing extremist and fascist studies.
CONTENTS:  "Guest Editor's Introduction" by Andreas Umland; "Conceptual and Contextual Problems in the Interpretation of Contemporary Russian Ultranationalism" by Andreas Umland; "Zhirinovsky's 'Last Thrust to the South' and the Definition of Fascism" by Andreas Umland; "'Weimar Russia?' Notes on a Controversial Concept" by Leonid Luks; "Russian National Unity: An Analysis of the Political Style of a Radical-Nationalist Organization" by Mikhail Sokolov; "Class as Ethnicity: The Rhetoric of the Russian Radical-Nationalist Movement" by Mikhail Sokolov.

Від 2014 року й особливо від 2022-го Москва здійснює обурливу політику масштабного примусового переміщення та депортації українських цивільних осіб, включно з десятками, якщо не сотнями тисяч дітей, серед яких є й тисячі неповнолітніх і підлітків без супроводу їхніх дорослих законних опікунів. https://krytyka.com/ua/articles/iak-rosiia-prymusovo-vyvozyt-ukrainskykh-ditei-bez-suprovodu

В конечном итоге, наибольший вызов для Украины и для дружественных ей государств состоит в усилении потенциала устрашения, политического защитного механизма и способности государства оказывать сопротивление в отношении дальнейших — в узком смысле слова — агрессивных действий со стороны России. http://www.pravo.mgimo.ru/?q=perevod/ukraina-shest-scenariev-ee

L'expérience des républiques post-soviétiques en matière d'accords de sécurité avec Moscou montre que les pourparlers russo-ukrainiens de 2022 avaient peu de chances d'aboutir. Plusieurs réflexions de politiques ou d'experts sur les négociations russo-ukrainiennes de février-avril 2022 au Bélarus et en Turquie ont été publiées ces derniers mois. https://desk-russie.eu/2024/07/05/un-accord-a-istanbul-aurait-il-pu-apporter-la-paix.html

Seit über zwei Jahren führt Russland seinen Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine. Er zeigt beispielhaft die Strategie des Kremls im Umgang mit unbotmäßigen postsowjetischen Nachbarstaaten: Das Repertoire reicht von politischem Druck über hybride Kriegsführung bis hin zur militärischen Invasion. Damit ist auch der geopolitische Konflikt zwischen Russland und dem Westen um die europäische Sicherheitsordnung in eine neue Phase eingetreten. https://www.bpb.de/themen/kriege-konflikte/dossier-kriege-konflikte/216281/ukraine/

A posztszovjet köztársaságok tapasztalatai a Moszkvával kötött biztonságpolitikai megállapodásokkal kapcsolatban olyanok, hogy a 2022-es orosz-ukrán tárgyalásoknak kevés esélye volt a sikerre. Az elmúlt hónapokban számos politikai vagy szakértői reflexió jelent meg a 2022 február-áprilisában Fehéroroszországban és Törökországban folytatott orosz-ukrán tárgyalásokról. Bár ezek a hozzászólások új részleteket és érdekes perspektívákat tartalmaznak, a legtöbbjük vagy teljesen figyelmen kívül hagyja, vagy nem szerepel kiemelten Moszkva siralmas teljesítménye a volt szovjet köztársaságokkal kötött politikai és biztonsági megállapodások végrehajtása terén. A békés alternatív történelem esélyeiről szóló közelmúltbeli viták nagy része nem veszi figyelembe a múltbeli tapasztalatokat, és hallgatólagosan feltételezi, hogy a Kreml betartana minden aláírt megállapodást. Ez a feltételezés ellentétes a hasonló helyzetekben megfigyelhető orosz magatartással. A volt szovjet köztársaságokkal kötött, biztonsággal kapcsolatos megállapodások kulcsfontosságú cikkeinek Moszkva általi teljesítése-nem is beszélve azok szelleméről-katasztrofális. https://fuhu.hu/elhozhatta-volna-a-beket-egy-isztambuli-megallapodas/

Az orosz-ukrán háború külföldi megfigyelői egyöntetűen egyetértenek abban, hogy annak mielőbb véget kell vetni.  Az ukránok többsége nem ért egyet ezzel. Ma valószínűleg sok orosz nem bánná, ha leállítaná a mészárlást. https://fuhu.hu/melyik-ut-vezet-bekehez/

Neither the overcoming of the Tsarist-Communist empire nor the formation of democratic nation states is yet completed, in the post-Soviet area. Decentralization may do the trick - or, at least, be one of the principal instruments in achieving these daunting tasks.

This chapter examines the core aspects of the post-2014 decentralization reform: local amalgamation and fiscal decentralization. Taken together, these two policies radically changed the division of responsibilities and finances at substate scales and aided Ukraine's territorial consolidation. The 2019 shift of the balance of power in Kyiv did not alter the reform's trajectory. Indeed, the newly elected President Zelenskyy fostered, as we show, implementation of the reform by approving the previously drafted laws on decentralization whose progress had stalled prior to 2019-2020. Evidence of this commitment was the policy of merging rayons (upper subregional units) that was quickly implemented once nationwide local amalgamation was completed.

The local governance reform in Ukraine that started after the Revolution of Dignity has gained increasing international attention. However, the origins and determinants of the reform often remain unclear or, worse, misunderstood. The transformation of Ukrainian center-periphery relations is sometimes seen as driven by foreign factors, such as Kyiv's Association Agreement with the EU or the Minsk Agreements with Russia. This chapter aims to remedy this gap and to explain the prehistory of the post-Euromaidan decentralization reform. To better understand the historic roots of Ukraine's recent decentralization, we briefly consider the legacy of previous reform efforts aimed at both improving multilevel governance and introducing more meaningful self-government. To be sure, these earlier attempts, as reported below, were for the most part abortive. However, these efforts are still important to understand not only the background and sources of the present transitions, but also their nature and prospects within the context of Ukraine's post-Soviet political life and public administration. https://www.ibidem.eu/en/Series/Society-Politics/Soviet-and-Post-Soviet-Politics-and-Society/Ukraine-s-Decentralization.html

This volume seeks to contribute to the emerging body of English-language analytical literature on Ukraines decentralization. It explains why the reform started, how it proceeded in 2014-2020, and how its first deliverables have affected state capacity, party politics, and territorial cohesion. Over the last years, at first, domestic experts have, in Ukrainian language, examined Ukraines local gov-ernance structure and decentralization reform, discussing its successes and failures. https://www.ibidem.eu/en/Series/Society-Politics/Soviet-and-Post-Soviet-Politics-and-Society/Ukraine-s-Decentralization.html

A partial Russian acceptance of Ukraine regaining its mainland territories yet leaving Crimea as a consolation prize to Moscow would be unacceptable for Kyiv. It would also be an unsustainable solution for the Kremlin. To keep Crimea as an isolated exclave far away from other Russia-controlled lands would neither economically, nor strategically make much sense for Moscow. Nevertheless, many non-Ukrainian observers see Crimea as an object of negotiation and a potential compromise instrument. The peninsula is neither.

(Bucharest: European Institute of Romania, 2024), pp. 74-75. http://ier.gov.ro/en/news/editorial-release-from-synergy-to-strategy-in-the-black-sea-assessing-opportunities-and-challenges/

Це дослідження доповнює звіт Дослідницької служби Європейського парламенту від квітня 2023 року та інші розслідування насильницького переміщення та депортації українських дітей Росією з 24 лютого 2022 року. На основі цитат українських посадовців обговорюється природа цієї тривожної проблеми, виклики, що постали для України та міжнародної спільноти, а також можливі шляхи їх вирішення. Наведено реакція України на депортацію, а також перші реакції іноземних урядів та неурядових організацій до кінця 2023 року. https://hvylya.net/analytics/290118-primusove-vivezennya-rosiyeyu-ukrajinskih-ditey-bez-suprovodu

Три нарратива объясняют недоразумение, которое сохраняется вот уже 10 лет. Они сформированы в основном глобальной дезинформационной кампанией Москвы о захвате Крыма и интервенции на Донбассе. Некоторые до сих пор придерживаются ранней линии российской пропаганды, от которой впоследствии отрекся сам Кремль. Будто бы отделение Крыма от Украины, а также всплеск боевых действий на Донбассе, последовавший вскоре, были обусловлены местной динамикой, а не иностранным вмешательством. https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/columns/2024/03/26/7447796/

Это исследование в сентябре 2023 года было заказано подкомитетом Европейского парламента по правам человека (DROI) и дополняет отчет по той же теме Исследовательской службы Европарламента (EPRS) от апреля 2023 года, как и другие расследования насильственного перемещения и депортации украинских детей Россией с 24 февраля 2022 года. На основе цитат украинских чиновников доклад обсуждает природу проблемы, возникшие вызовы для Киева и Брюсселя, а также возможные пути их решения. Приведена реакция Украины на депортацию, а также первые отклики иностранных правительств и неправительственных организаций. На этом фоне представлены различные рекомендации для действий Европейского Союза и других международных заинтересованных сторон. Политические рекомендаций основываются на интервью с экспертами в Киеве и призваны запустить процесс не только репатриации незаконно перемещенных детей, но и восстановления справедливости. https://www.kasparovru.com/material.php?id=65D2535BA50F3&section_id=444F8A447242B

This survey was first published by the European Parliament in February 2024 and complements an April 2023 European Parliamentary Research Service report as well as other investigations into Russia’s forcible displacement and deportation of Ukrainian children since 24 February 2022. The nature of this disturbing issue and the challenges posed together with possible solutions are discussed here, on the basis of numerous quotes from Ukrainian officials. Ukrainian reactions to the deportations are listed as well as the first foreign governmental and non-governmental responses. Against this background, various recommendations are presented for action to the European Union and further international stakeholders. https://sceeus.se/en/publications/russias-forcible-transfers-of-unaccompanied-ukrainian-children-responses-from-ukraine-the-eu-and-beyond/

Ukraine and Russia’s constitutions, their hawkish publics, Crimea’s peculiar situation, and Eastern European skepticism about Moscow’s long-term intentions all make a negotiated peace extremely unlikely. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-diplomacy-can%E2%80%99t-end-ukraine-war-209268

On 13 November 2023, a workshop was organised on behalf of the Human Rights Subcommittee focusing on the forcible transfer and deportation of Ukrainian children by Russia, which has taken place since 2014 and vastly intensified since the full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022. Ukrainian, EU and third country diplomatic and political efforts to stop the deportations and repatriate children were looked at, along with initiatives by the civil society. The workshop examined the investigations and cases brought before national and international jurisdictions against state actors and individual perpetrators. Challenges on political, legal and practical fronts were scrutinised, leading to recommendations for what the EU could do to help bring the children back. One of the experts shed light on the situation of civilians in the occupied Ukrainian territories more generally. This report brings together the background briefings prepared for the workshop and a summary of the debate with Members, academics, experts from the civil society and EU representatives. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_STU(2024)754442

Es gibt min­des­tens sechs Umstände, die einen Kom­pro­miss zwi­schen Kyjiw und Moskau behin­dern: Die heu­ti­gen Ver­fas­sun­gen und innen­po­li­ti­schen Ver­hält­nisse der Ukraine und Russ­land, die beson­dere Rolle der Krim sowie das his­to­ri­sche Gedächt­nis in Ost­mit­tel­eu­ropa. Jedes dieser sechs Hin­der­nisse für einen Waf­fen­still­stand ist für sich genom­men hoch. Ihr kom­bi­nier­ter Ein­fluss auf Ent­schei­dungs­trä­ger in Moskau und Kyjiw ist groß. https://russlandverstehen.eu/de/warum-diplomatie-den-krieg-nicht-beenden-kann-umland/

Les observateurs de la guerre russo-ukrainienne s'accordent à dire qu'elle devrait prendre fin dès que possible. La plupart des Ukrainiens sont tout à fait d'accord. Aujourd'hui, de nombreux Russes, on s'en doute, ne verraient pas d'inconvénient à ce que le carnage cesse. Pourquoi alors n'y at -il toujours pas-et n'y aura-t-il probablement pas de sitôt-de fin négociée de la guerre ? https://desk-russie.eu/2024/01/13/pourquoi-la-diplomatie-ne-peut-pas-mettre-fin-a-la-guerre-russo-ukrainienne.html

Si la transition du poutinisme 1.0 est désordonnée, voire violente, il est peu probable que le poutinisme 2.0 en soit l’aboutissement. Cependant, on peut d’ores et déjà affirmer que la pénurie institutionnelle de la Russie est potentiellement dangereuse pour toutes les parties concernées. Les Russes et les non-Russes doivent se préparer à un processus de succession désordonné. Le régime politique russe sera, d’une manière ou d’une autre, différent du régime actuel. https://desk-russie.eu/2023/11/25/le-poutinisme-apres-poutine.html

Наиболее очевидным и непосредственным фактором риска для путинского правления является российско-украинская война. Если она будет проиграна, то легитимность Путина и его режим окажутся под угрозой и могут рухнуть. https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/columns/2023/11/30/7430914/

У статті виокремлено ключові фактори, які уможливили зниження проявів конфліктного потенціалу відносин між цент ром і периферією в Україні і дозволили їм зробити внесок у підвищення стійкості держа ви у 2022−2023 рр. Для аналізу динаміки конфліктного потенціалу відносин по лінії центр-периферія використано теорії інститу ціоналізму раціонального вибору (Rational Choice Institutionalism) та соціально-політично го поділу. У статті виокремлено ключове джерело проявів конфліктного потенціалу від носин між центром і периферією в Україні у минулому: патерн політичної конкуренції між центральними політичними акторами, який дозволяв використовувати їм свої ад міністративні повноваження для змін під поряд кування регіональних політичних акторів задля зміцнення власних позицій у центрі. https://ipiend.gov.ua/publication/politychni-doslidzhennia-2023-2-6/

Western states – especially Germany and France – tacitly supported the overt Russian chal‐lenge to the European security order. Berlin and Paris pressured Kyiv to implement the inconsistent provisions of the Minsk Agreements with their questionable sequences and consequences. Moscow was not sanctioned for its violations of the agreements, subversion of basic principles of international law and democracy, and uncooperative attitude in the negotiations.
ISPK-Studien zur Konfliktforschung 5