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We expand and transform our habitual agency with countless technologies most moments of the day. Our environments, bodies, thoughts and social interactions are thoroughly shaped and mediated by tapestries of interweaving layers of old and... more
We expand and transform our habitual agency with countless technologies most moments of the day. Our environments, bodies, thoughts and social interactions are thoroughly shaped and mediated by tapestries of interweaving layers of old and new technologies. Perhaps this intimate relation with technology is at the core of our humanity. But our relation to technology has also repeatedly been feared as a Faustian deal that will be the dystopian end of us, or—in more utopian viewpoints—will bring us beyond our earthbound finitudes toward virtual existences. What many agree on is that dramatic changes to our basic ecological and existential conditions are nearing. I suggest we should also look for such critical tipping points and phase shifts not just in our biological bodies and environments but also in the informational and behavioral environments we rely on in our intentional and habitual agency.
When thinking particularly about technologically mediated habitual agency an obvious place to start is with Don Ihde’s 4 classic human–technology relations. Interestingly, fellow post-phenomenologist Peter-Paul Verbeek has proposed new additional kinds of relations to e.g. “smart” and virtually “augmenting” technologies. While I find each of these analyses insightful, I worry that a focus on individual relations to particular spatio-temporally circumscribed artifacts falls short—or even obscures—some of the particular new challenges to our agency that networked, and data-driven smart technologies give rise to.
I will therefore attempt to broaden the focus to how our agency is scaffolded by not just particular technological artifacts, but by our understanding of the broader informational and behavioral environment. To do this, I start by introducing some core theoretical background ideas that will support a more contextual approach and then proceed to consider both the classic and newer post-phenomenological relations from this more contextual perspective.
The goal is not only to affirm the value of analyzing concrete technology relations but also to expand and contextualize the analyses. The latter is key if we want a post-phenomenological analysis that can help us understand how our habitual agency might be transformed as we come to live in increasingly “smart worlds”. These new data and algorithmically driven technologies not only transform our relation to a given context, but due to networked dataflows and “smart” decision-making (1) recursively act on us and (2) collapse and transcend the present context. This chapter will also highlight the uncertainties that informationally leaky and “smart” technologies introduce to our understanding of the kind of affordance space we are in and even what the expected outcomes of our actions will be. I suggest that technology relations with such effects might challenge some of the core contextual stabilities and informational segregations that our habitual agency have hitherto relied on. A further issue is if these new technological configurations challenge our habitual processes in ways we cannot easily adapt to. We certainly seem able to create new habits and adapt to these new technologies locally, but the new information flows, hidden audiences, and context collapses appear to challenge some conditions of agency that are typically out of sight, and the effects of which untraceably shows up well outside the present context. Overall, I shall argue that “smart” technologies can both expand and shrink our habitual agency—but that in terms of our ability to guide our action through various contexts in a perceived world something more fundamental appears to be breaking.
Most online platforms are becoming increasingly algorithmically personalized. The question is if these practices are simply satisfying users preferences or if something is lost in this process. This article focuses on how to reconcile the... more
Most online platforms are becoming increasingly algorithmically personalized. The question is if these practices are simply satisfying users preferences or if something is lost in this process. This article focuses on how to reconcile the personalization with the importance of being able to share cultural objects-including fiction-with others. In analyzing two concrete personalization examples from the streaming giant Netflix, several tendencies are observed. One is to isolate users and sometimes entirely eliminate shared world aspects. Another tendency is to blur the boundary between shared cultural objects and personalized content, which can be misleading and disorienting. A further tendency is for personalization algorithms to be optimized to deceptively prey on desires for content that mirrors one's own lived experience. Some specific-often minority targeting-"clickbait" practices received public blowback. These practices show disregard both for honest labeling and for our desires to have access and representation in a shared world. The article concludes that personalization tendencies are moving towards increasingly isolating and disorienting interfaces, but that platforms could be redesigned to support better social world orientation.
Our world is under going an enormous digital transformation. Nearly no area of our social, informational, political, economic, cultural, and biological spheres are left unchanged. What can philosophy contribute as we try to understand and... more
Our world is under going an enormous digital transformation. Nearly no area of our social, informational, political, economic, cultural, and biological spheres are left unchanged. What can philosophy contribute as we try to understand and think through these changes? How does digitization challenge past ideas of who we are and where we are headed? Where does it leave our ethical aspirations and cherished ideals of democracy, equality, privacy, trust, freedom, and social embeddedness? Who gets to decide, control, and harness the powers of digitization and for which purposes? Epistemologically, do most of us understand these new mediations-and thus fabrics-of our new world? Lastly-how is the new technological landscape shaping not only our living conditions but also our collective imaginary and our self-identities?
(Bonus material: a critique of the genesis myth of Western philosophy as well as of the exclusions and policing practices of both analytic and continental traditions)
In this chapter what I call the "backside" of habit is explored. I am interested in the philosophical implications of the physical and physiological processes that mediate, and which allow for what comes to appear as almost magic; namely... more
In this chapter what I call the "backside" of habit is explored. I am interested in the philosophical implications of the physical and physiological processes that mediate, and which allow for what comes to appear as almost magic; namely the various sensorimotor associations and integrations that allows us to replay our past experiences, and to in a certain sense perceive potential futures, and to act and bring about anticipated outcomes-without quite knowing how. Thus, the term "backside" is meant to refer both the actual mediation and the epistemic opacity of these backstage intermediaries that allow for the front stage magic. The question is if the epistemic complexities around sensorimotor mediation gives us valuable insights into the nature of human agency and further how it might begin to show us new ways to think of the mind as truly embodied yet not reducible to any finite body-as-object.
As traditional public spaces rapidly change the question arises whether pervasive surveillance is actually compatible with the nature of individual agency. It is known that new and largely unregulated technologies often both erode old de... more
As traditional public spaces rapidly change the question arises whether pervasive surveillance is actually compatible with the nature of individual agency. It is known that new and largely unregulated technologies often both erode old de facto limitations of access, and erect new asymmetric barriers of knowledge, but how should we understand the harms of these new contexts? Based on our psychological and biological knowledge of social perception, embodiment and action choice it seems that these conditions present a toxic mix for our ability to gauge what I call our " relational privacy " , and thereby for our autonomous and purposeful action planning. If this functional analysis is right then boundless surveillance of our bodies and behaviors threatens rather than supports basic personal freedom and responsibility. However, in contrast to this analysis, the private-public dichotomy often implied in existing debates assumes that privacy concerns can be theorized without much attention to the functional and relational dynamics of our embodied agency. Building on among others Nissenbaum and Reidenberg's work, this chapter seeks to counter this tendency. Two conclusions stand out: Firstly, it seems that our action choices depend on the existence of limited contexts also in public, and thus actions in what we might term " unbounded contexts " are typically performed through some kind of denial. Secondly, abundant availability of data traceable to persons can not only undermine and coerce our choices, but even to a large extent completely bypass our current volitional action choices. Thus it seems that the contextual nature of our agency should be of utmost importance to political and legal privacy issues, and could usefully guide attempts to recreate more bounded public spaces.
Autism has been defined as a disorder of social cognition, interaction and communication where ritualistic, repetitive behaviors are commonly observed. But how should we understand the behavioral and cognitive differences that have been... more
Autism has been defined as a disorder of social cognition, interaction and communication where ritualistic, repetitive behaviors are commonly observed. But how should we understand the behavioral and cognitive differences that have been the main focus of so much autism research? Can high-level cognitive processes and behaviors be identified as the core issues people with autism face, or do these characteristics perhaps often rather reflect individual attempts to cope with underlying physiological issues?  Much research presented in this volume will point to the latter possibility, i.e. that people on the autism spectrum cope with issues at much lower physiological levels pertaining not only to Central Nervous Systems (CNS) function, but also to peripheral and autonomic systems (PNS, ANS) (Torres, Brincker, et al. 2013).  The question that we pursue in this chapter is what might be fruitful ways of gaining objective measures of the large-scale systemic and heterogeneous effects of early atypical neurodevelopment; how to track their evolution over time and how to identify critical changes along the continuum of human development and aging. 

We suggest that the study of movement variability—very broadly conceived as including all minute fluctuations in bodily rhythms and their rates of change over time (coined micro-movements (Figure 1A-B) (Torres, Brincker, et al. 2013))—offers a uniquely valuable and entirely objectively quantifiable lens to better assess, understand and track not only autism but cognitive development and degeneration in general. This chapter presents the rationale firstly behind this focus on micro-movements and secondly behind the choice of specific kinds of data collection and statistical metrics as tools of analysis (Figure 1C).
In brief the proposal is that the micro-movements (defined in Part I – Chapter 1), obtained using various time scales applied to different physiological data-types (some examples in Figure 1), contain information about layered influences and temporal adaptations, transformations and integrations across anatomically semi-independent subsystems that crosstalk and interact. Further, the notion of sensorimotor re-afference is used to highlight the fact that these layered micro-motions are sensed and that this sensory feedback plays a crucial role in the generation and control of movements in the first place. In other words, the measurements of various motoric and rhythmic variations provide an access point not only to the “motor systems”, but also access to much broader central and peripheral sensorimotor and regulatory systems. Lastly, we posit that this new lens can also be used to capture influences from systems of multiple entry points or collaborative control and regulation, such as those that emerge during dyadic social interactions.
What does it mean to be an aesthetic beholder? Is it different than simply being a perceiver? Most theories of aesthetic perception focus on 1) features of the perceived object and its presentation or 2) on psychological evaluative or... more
What does it mean to be an aesthetic beholder? Is it different than simply being a perceiver? Most theories of aesthetic perception focus on 1) features of the perceived object and its presentation or 2) on psychological evaluative or emotional responses and intentions of perceiver and artist. I propose that we need to look at the process of engaged perception itself, and further that this temporal process of becoming a beholder must be understood in its embodied, contextual and dynamic specificity. Through both phenomenological and neuroscientific explorations I analyze what is characteristic about a more “aesthetic stance” and argue that there is a certain asymmetry between beholder and beheld, which has to do with a disengagement of goal-directed action, and which allows for other kinds of perceptual involvement than in a more “practical stance”. It is a multi-disciplinary project integrating a sensorimotor notion of aesthetic affordances, 18th century philosophy, and large-scale brain network findings. What ensues is a new dynamic framework that hopefully can support fruitful interdisciplinary research of aesthetic perception.
How do we perceive the agency of others? Do the same rules apply when interacting with others who are radically different from ourselves, like other species or robots? We typically perceive other people and animals through their embodied... more
How do we perceive the agency of others? Do the same rules apply when interacting with others who are radically different from ourselves, like other species or robots? We typically perceive other people and animals through their embodied behavior, as they dynamically engage various aspects of their affordance field. In second personal perception we also perceive social or interactional affordances of others. I discuss various aspects of perceptible agency, which might begin to give us some tools to understand interactions also with agents truly other than ourselves or ‘‘perhaps agents’’ like present and future social robots. Robots have various kinds of physical and behavioral presence and thus make their agency—if we want to call it that—perceptible in ways that computers and other forms of AI do not. The largely dualist assumptions pertaining to the hidden bodies of traditional Turing tests are discussed, as well as the social affordance effects of such indirect interactions as opposed to interactions in physically shared space. The question is what role various abilities to reveal, hide and dynamically control the body and broader behavior plays in heterogeneous tech or machine mediated interactions. I argue that the specifics and richness of perceptible agency matters to the kind of reciprocity we can obtain.
Frederick Douglass, the abolitionist, the civil rights advocate and the great rhetorician, has been the focus of much academic research. Only more recently is Douglass work on aesthetics beginning to receive its due, and even then its... more
Frederick Douglass, the abolitionist, the civil rights advocate and the great rhetorician, has been the focus of much academic research. Only more recently is Douglass work on aesthetics beginning to receive its due, and even then its philosophical scope is rarely appreciated. Douglass’ aesthetic interest was notably not so much in art itself, but in understanding aesthetic presentation as an epistemological and psychological aspect of the human condition and thereby as a social and political tool. He was fascinated by the power of images, and took particular interest in the emerging technologies of photography. He often returned to the themes of art, pictures and aesthetic perception in his speeches. He saw himself, also after the end of slavery, as first and foremost a human rights advocate, and he suggests that his work and thoughts as a public intellectual always in some way related to this end. In this regard, his interest in the power of photographic images to impact the human soul was a lifelong concern. His reflections accordingly center on the psychological and political potentials of images and the relationship between art, culture, and human dignity. In this chapter we discuss Douglass views and practical use of photography and other forms of imagery, and tease out his view about their transformational potential particularly in respect to combating racist attitudes. We propose that his views and actions suggest that he intuitively if not explicitly anticipated many later philosophical, pragmatist and ecological insights regarding the generative habits of mind and affordance perception : I.e. that we perceive the world through our values and habitual ways of engaging with it and thus that our perception is active and creative, not passive and objective. Our understanding of the world is simultaneously shaped by and shaping our perceptions. Douglass saw that in a racist and bigoted society this means that change through facts and rational arguments will be hard. A distorted lens distorts - and accordingly re-produces and perceives its own distortion. His interest in aesthetics is intimately connected to this conundrum of knowledge and change, perception and action. To some extent precisely due to his understanding of how stereotypical categories and dominant relations work on our minds, he sees a radical transformational potential in certain art and imagery. We see in his work a profound understanding of the value-laden and action-oriented nature of perception and what we today call the perception of affordances (that is, what our environment permits/invites us to do). Douglass is particularly interested in the social environment and the social affordances of how we perceive other humans, and he thinks that photographs can impact on the human intellect in a transformative manner. In terms of the very process of aesthetic perception his views interestingly cohere and supplement a recent theory about the conditions and consequences of being an aesthetic beholder. The main idea being that artworks typically invite an asymmetric engagement where one can behold them without being the object of reciprocal attention. This might allow for a kind of vulnerability and openness that holds transformational potentials not typically available in more strategic and goal-directed modes of perception. As mentioned, Douglass main interest is in social change and specifically in combating racist social structures and negative stereotypes of black people. He is fascinated by the potential of photography in particular as a means of correcting fallacious stereotypes, as it allows a more direct and less distorted image of the individuality and multidimensionality of black people. We end with a discussion of how, given this interpretation of aesthetic perception, we can understand the specific imagery used by Douglass himself. How he tried to use aesthetic modes to subvert and change the racist habitus in the individual and collective mind of his society. We suggest that Frederick Douglass, the human rights activist, had a sophisticated philosophy of aesthetics, mind, epistemology and particularly of the transformative and political power of images. His works in many ways anticipate and sometimes go beyond later scholars in these and other fields such as psychology & critical theory. Overall, we propose that our world could benefit from revisiting Douglass’ art and thought.
The current rise of neurodevelopmental disorders poses a critical need to detect risk early in order to rapidly intervene. One of the tools pediatricians use to track development is the standard growth chart. The growth charts are... more
The current rise of neurodevelopmental disorders poses a critical need to detect risk early in order to rapidly intervene. One of the tools pediatricians use to track development is the standard growth chart. The growth charts are somewhat limited in predicting possible neurodevelopmental issues. They rely on linear models and assumptions of normality for physical growth data – obscuring key statistical information about possible neurodevelopmental risk in growth data that actually has accelerated, non-linear rates-of-change and variability encompassing skewed distributions. Here, we use new analytics to profile growth data from 36 newborn babies that were tracked longitudinally for 5 months. By switching to incremental (velocity-based) growth charts and combining these dynamic changes with underlying fluctuations in motor performance – as the transition from spontaneous random noise to a systematic signal – we demonstrate a method to detect very early stunting in the development of voluntary neuromotor control and to flag risk of neurodevelopmental derail.
Research Interests:
Neuroscience, Psychology, Clinical Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Developmental Psychology, and 69 more
Mirror neuron research has come a long way since the early 90’s, and many theorists are now stressing the heterogeneity and complexity of the sensorimotor properties of fronto-parietal circuits. However, core aspects of the initial... more
Mirror neuron research has come a long way since the early 90’s, and many theorists are now stressing the heterogeneity and complexity of the sensorimotor properties of fronto-parietal circuits. However, core aspects of the initial ‘mirror mechanism’ theory, i.e. the idea of a symmetric encapsulated mirroring function translating sensory action perceptions into motor formats, still appears to be shaping much of the debate. This article challenges the empirical plausibility of the sensorimotor segregation implicit in the original mirror metaphor. It is proposed instead that the teleological organization found in the broader fronto-parietal circuits might be inherently sensorimotor. Thus the idea of an independent ‘purely perceptual’ goal understanding process is questioned. Further, it is hypothesized that the often asymmetric, heterogeneous and contextually modulated mirror and canonical neurons support a function of multisensory mapping and tracking of the perceiving agents affordance space. Such a shift in the interpretative framework offers a different theoretical handle on how sensorimotor processes might ground various aspects of intentional action choice and social cognition. Mirror neurons would under the proposed “social affordance model” be seen as dynamic parts of larger circuits, which support tracking of currently shared and competing action possibilities. These circuits support action selection processes—but also our understanding of the options and action potentials that we and perhaps others have in the affordance space. In terms of social cognition ‘mirror’ circuits might thus help us understand not only the intentional actions others are actually performing—but also what they could have done, did not do and might do shortly.
Most of the free will debate operates under the assumption that classic determinism and indeterminism are the only metaphysical options available. Through an analysis of Dennett’s view of free will as gradually evolving this article... more
Most of the free will debate operates under the assumption that classic determinism and indeterminism are the
only metaphysical options available. Through an analysis of Dennett’s view of free will as gradually evolving
this article attempts to point to emergentist, interactivist and temporal metaphysical options, which have
been left largely unexplored by contemporary theorists. Whereas, Dennett himself holds that “the kind of
free will worth wanting” is compatible with classic determinism, I propose that his models of determinism fit
poorly with his evolutionary theory and naturalist commitments. In particular, his so-called “intuition pumps”
seem to rely on the assumption that reality will have a compositional bottom layer where appearance and
reality coincide. I argue that instead of positing this and other “unexplained explainers” we should allow for
the heretical possibility that there might not be any absolute bottom, smallest substances or universal laws, but
relational interactions all the way down. Through the details of Dennett’s own account of the importance of
horizontal transmission in evolution and the causal efficacy of epistemically limited but complex layered “selves,”
it is argued that our autonomy is linked to the ability to affect reality by controlling appearances.
Research Interests:
Evolutionary Biology, Interactionism, Theoretical Physics, Human Evolution, Philosophy, and 61 more
How and when do we learn to understand other people’s perspectives and possibly divergent beliefs? This question has elicited much theoretical and empirical research. A puzzling finding has been that toddlers perform well on so-called... more
How and when do we learn to understand other people’s perspectives and possibly divergent beliefs? This question has elicited much theoretical and empirical research. A puzzling finding has been that toddlers perform well on so-called implicit false belief (FB) tasks but do not show such capacities on traditional explicit FB tasks. I propose a navigational approach, which offers a hitherto ignored way of making sense of the seemingly contradictory results. The proposal involves a distinction between how we navigate FBs as they relate to 1) our current affordances (here & now navigation) as opposed to 2) presently non-actual relations, where we need to leave our concrete embodied/situated viewpoint (counterfactual navigation). It is proposed that whereas toddlers seem able to understand FBs in their current affordance space, they do not yet possess the resources to navigate in abstraction from such concrete affordances, which explicit FB tests seem to require. It is hypothesized that counterfactual navigation depends on the development of ‘sensorimotor priors’, i.e. statistical expectations of own kinestetic re-afference, which evidence now suggests matures around age four, consistent with core findings of explicit FB performance.
Research Interests:
Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Social Psychology, Developmental Psychology, and 84 more
Developmental disorders such as autism have generally been theorized as due to some kind of modular “deficit” or “dysfunction”—typically of cortical origin, i.e., failures of “theory of mind”, of the “mirror neuron system”, of “weak... more
Developmental disorders such as autism have generally been theorized as due to some kind of modular “deficit” or “dysfunction”—typically of cortical origin, i.e., failures of “theory of mind”, of the “mirror neuron system”, of “weak central coherence” or of the balance of “empathizing” and “systemizing”, just to list a few. The broad array of autonomic and sensorimotor differences experienced and reported by people with autism have by such theories typically been sidelined as “co-morbidities,” possibly sharing genetic causes, but rendered as incidental and decisively behaviorally irrelevant symptoms—surely disconnected from cognition.
This article entertains the idea that the development of cortically based mental processes and autonomous control relies on the complexities and proper function of the peripheral nervous systems. Through such an “embodied” lens the heterogeneous symptoms of autism invites new interpretations. We propose here that many behavioral-level findings can be re-defined as downstream effects of how developing nervous systems attempt to cope and adapt to the challenges of having various noisy, unpredictable, and unreliable peripheral inputs.
The current assessment of behaviors in the inventories to diagnose autism spectrum disorders (ASD) focus on observation and discrete categorizations. Behaviors require movements, yet measurements of physical movements are seldom included.... more
The current assessment of behaviors in the inventories to diagnose autism spectrum disorders (ASD) focus on observation and discrete categorizations. Behaviors require movements, yet measurements of physical movements are seldom included. Their inclusion however, could provide an objective characterization of behavior to help unveil interactions between the peripheral and the central nervous systems. Such interactions are critical for the development and maintenance of spontaneous autonomy, self-regulation and voluntary control. At present, current approaches cannot deal with the heterogeneous, dynamic and stochastic nature of development. Accordingly, they leave no avenues for real-time or longitudinal assessments of change in a coping system continuously adapting and developing compensatory mechanisms. We offer a new unifying statistical framework to reveal re-afferent kinesthetic features of the individual with ASD. The new methodology is based on the non-stationary stochastic patterns of minute fluctuations (micro-movements) inherent to our natural actions. Such patterns of behavioral variability provide re-entrant sensory feedback contributing to the autonomous regulation and coordination of the motor output. From an early age, this feedback supports centrally driven volitional control and fluid, flexible transitions between intentional and spontaneous behaviors. We show that in ASD there is a disruption in the maturation of this form of proprioception. Despite this disturbance, each individual has unique adaptive compensatory capabilities that we can unveil and exploit to evoke faster and more accurate decisions. Measuring the kinesthetic re-afference in tandem with stimuli variations we can detect changes in their micro-movements indicative of a more predictive and reliable kinesthetic percept. Our methods address the heterogeneity of ASD with a personalized approach grounded in the inherent sensory-motor abilities that the individual has already developed.
Largely aided by the findings of the so-called ‘mirror neurons’ the attention to motor activity in action observation has exploded over the last two decades. The idea that we internally ‘mirror’ an observed action by covertly reproducing... more
Largely aided by the findings of the so-called ‘mirror neurons’ the attention to motor activity in action observation has exploded over the last two decades. The idea that we internally ‘mirror’ an observed action by covertly reproducing a version of it has lead to a new strand of implicit simulation theories of action understanding. The basic idea of this sort of simulation theory is that perception of others actions automatically activate our own covert action representations, and then that we can use this shared action representation to understand various aspects of the observed action and possibly infer the goal and/or intentions of the observed agent or maybe predict upcoming actions. There is some disagreement among researchers and theorists as to the function of motor ‘simulation’. It is debated whether it serves as the basis for low-level ‘mind-reading’, i.e. ascription of intentions and various mental states to others (Gallese 2003, 2004, 2007. Gallese & Goldman 1998, Goldman in press, Hurley 2005) or whether the function of the simulation is purely related to understanding the action itself (Jeannerod 2006) or maybe related to anticipating upcoming actions (Kilner et al 2004, Csibra 2005, Prinz 2006). 
What seems to be assumed in most of these simulation theories is that the default role of the motor system in social perception is to ‘mirror’ the observed action or that it is only related to the observed action and not my own action motives and plans. It is these basic assumptions of the passivity of motor resonance that I would like to challenge. The question is whether it is misleading to conceptualize motor resonance simply as a mirroring simulation where we covertly ‘echo’ the observed action? Many studies of the functional properties of mirror neurons (MN) and motor facilitation during perception seem to point to a more complex role of the motor system in action perception (di Pellegrino 1992, Gallese et al 1996, Rizzolati & Craighero 2004). This has recently led to some proposals trying to reinterpret the function of motor activity during action perception and in social situations from a simple mirroring process to an anticipatory process (Kilner et al 2004, Csibra 2005, Prinz 2006) – or simply to abandon the idea of simulation altogether (Gallagher 2007). I think these are interesting proposals, but inspired by historic approaches to motor resonance and recent studies I would like to venture a hypothesis of an even more proactive, context and motivation dependent role of motor activity during action perception (Newman-Norlund et al. 2007, Schie et al. In press, Cheng et al. 2007, Keysers & Perrett 2004, 502). Motor resonance during object perception is by many researchers thought of in terms of affordances; i.e. what the object affords the observer to do (Grèzes et al. 2003). My question is why we should not – albeit extra social levels of complexity - see motor resonance during social perception in a similar way, as potential action sketches ‘afforded’ by own present motivational, senori-motor and perceptual situation. My point is not that we never ‘simulate’ or covertly imitate observed actions, but rather that it is questionable why we should think of this as the default process in normal interactive social contexts. Covert imitation might only take place during special cases of action observation where we exactly take on a passive spectator attitude, and that we therefore might need a broader theory of motor resonance that also explains normal active and interactive cases of action perception. Accordingly, I suggest that experimental paradigms with single observers in one-way social situations often carry an ‘imitation bias’, and that we are in dire need of more research of actual interactive social perception. I conclude that theories of motor resonance in social perception as a passive ‘mirroring’ or low-level simulation are faced with serious empirical challenges, and that the motor system might serve a much more proactive role in social cognition than previously thought.
This chapter deals with the way our psychology and actions a scaffolded by their environment but also the tensions that can appear between individual and environment, both at the level of biology and culture. The chapter is grounded in an... more
This chapter deals with the way our psychology and actions a scaffolded by their environment but also the tensions that can appear between individual and environment, both at the level of biology and culture. The chapter is grounded in an analysis of the early 20th century theoretical biologist Jacob von Uexkull and his notion of "Umwelt" or "surround world". But also raises the question of whether organisms fit their environment as neatly as Uexkull and many later thinkers have proposed or assumed.
With his 1896 book Matter and Memory Henri Bergson foreshadowed many of the ideas of the contemporary embodied/enactive approach to cognition. He conceptualizes in this work various cognitive abilities in regards to their utility towards... more
With his 1896 book Matter and Memory Henri Bergson foreshadowed many of the ideas of the contemporary embodied/enactive approach to cognition. He conceptualizes in this work various cognitive abilities in regards to their utility towards action, and underlines the importance of sensori-motor integration and coordination both in regards to various forms of perception but also as it pertains to the different types of memory and what we would now call semantic knowledge.
However, he also makes the offhanded suggestion that language should be seen as an artificially constructed motor system and thus he suggests that like our regular motor system language functions as a tool to interpret perception and as a determining framework for our actions. It is this claim that I shall focus on in my paper. I think there are a series of interesting implications in this idea of language as a constructed motor system, especially given the wider theoretical context of sensory-motor integration grounding cognition. Firstly, I shall discuss to what extent these are empirically plausible ideas, but further also how the idea of language as an extended motor system blurs the border between the individual and the social, between biological and social cognition, body and environment etc. and thus how it could contribute to an integration of traditional cognitive science and neuroscience with social and cultural approaches to cognition.
The discovery of so-called ‘mirror neurons’ - found to respond both to own actions and the observation of similar actions performed by others - has been enormously influential in the cognitive sciences and beyond. Given the self-other... more
The discovery of so-called ‘mirror neurons’ - found to respond both to own actions and the observation of similar actions performed by others - has been enormously influential in the cognitive sciences and beyond. Given the self-other symmetry these neurons have been hypothesized as underlying a ‘mirror mechanism’ that lets us share representations and thereby ground core social cognitive functions from intention understanding to linguistic abilities and empathy. I argue that mirror neurons are important for very different reasons. Rather than a symmetric ubiquitous or context- independent mechanism, I propose that these neurons are part of broader sensorimotor circuits, which help us navigate and predict the social affordance space that we meet others in. To develop both the critical and positive project I analyze the interpretive choices and the debate surrounding the mirror neuron research and show how the field is marred by highly questionable assumptions about respectively motor and social cognition. The discovery of mirror neurons - and the sensorimotor circuits of which these neurons are a part – actually empirically challenge many of these tacit assumptions. Findings of sensorimotor goal representations at levels of abstraction well beyond actual sensory information and kinetic movements challenge the idea of motor cognition as primarily output production. Additionally, the focus on 3rd person mindreading of hidden mental states is misguiding the field of social cognition. Much ‘mind-reading’ seems rooted in sensorimotor representations and a developmentally primary 2nd person understanding of actions and the mental lives of others, which precisely breaks the assumed dichotomy between mind and behavior. I propose a Social Affordance model where parallel fronto-parietal sensorimotor circuits support representations not just of other people’s actions but of the overall social affordance space. It is a process that monitors concrete goals and teleological possibilities that the environment affords respectively oneself and other present agents. With this model I hypothesize that the complex spectrum of sensorimotor integrations are indeed essential not only to normal action choice calibration but also to social cognitive abilities, as the sensorimotor teleological representations let us relate to others and understand their action choices in a shared pragmatic and intentional context.
Research Interests:
Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Action, and 62 more
Anderson suggests that theories of sensorimotor grounding are too narrow to account for his findings of widespread “reuse” supporting multiple different cognitive “task domains.” I call some of the methodological assumptions underlying... more
Anderson suggests that theories of sensorimotor grounding are too narrow to account for his findings of widespread “reuse” supporting multiple different cognitive “task domains.” I call some of the methodological assumptions underlying this conclusion into question, and suggest that his examples reaffirm rather than undermine the special status of sensorimotor processes in cognitive evolution.
Research Interests:
The theoretical biologist von Uexküll presented in the early 20th century view of animal and human experience, which through its insistence on relational concepts such as those of “Umwelt” and “functional tones” in many ways can be seen... more
The theoretical biologist von Uexküll presented in the early 20th century view of animal and human experience, which through its insistence on relational concepts such as those of “Umwelt” and “functional tones” in many ways can be seen as an antidote to traditional disembodied and non-contextual philosophical perspectives, and it has been influential particularly in German philosophy, semiotics and more recently in embodied approaches to cognition. Here I discuss Uexkull’s basic ‘functional circle’ schema, which illustrates the idea that both simple and complex organisms must be understood by their actual functional surrounding world (Umwelt). In the investigation of how meaning and goal-directedness can be seen in the organism-surrounding world relation, I will discuss the importance of Uexküll’s idea that the world is experienced as having functional tones – affordances – that relates to the organism's bodily needs and abilities. The body's generalized action history is via the functional tones brought to new situations, and it allows us a practical and forward-looking recognition of the surroundings. But new, unique environmental meetings also constantly change the body's readiness. I argue that in every world meeting there is a dynamic negotiation and mini-conflict resolution, which leeds to a critique of Uexküll’s rather individualistic and inflexible idea of subjective and closed surround worlds that seamlessly intersect. To make sense of Uexkülls basic relational insight, we must rather understand our fundamental openness, dynamic variability and peculiar human intersubjective relations and attraction. Developmental and sociological insights are included to suggest that the objectifying capability of humans might in a broader perspective be understood as based on intersubjective, temporal and bodily involved processes. The point here is that the disembodied hermit understanding of homo sapiens is turned upside down. It appears that the individualistic human ideal in the battle to marginalize the body, women, and vulnerability have succeeded in misunderstanding the relational nature of our humanity and the very ability of objectification and cultural creation.
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This 8 minute talk points to the role of context at multiple levels of life and culture, as well as the tensions this contextuality creates for scientists and philosophers who would have preferred the world to be simpler. However, if the... more
This 8 minute talk points to the role of context at multiple levels of life and culture, as well as the tensions this contextuality creates for scientists and philosophers who would have preferred the world to be simpler. However, if the world is not composed of timeless atoms interacting according to timeless laws, and if contexts do matter to what things inherently are and what they can become, then we need to stop pretending "ceteris paribus" and start studying exactly how each context matters. This is a call for a new kind of science that does not stick its head in the sand. One that faces the epistemolological, ethical & political complexities of both the natural world and our own creative and technological transformations of it.
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With his 1896 book Matter and Memory Henri Bergson foreshadowed many of the ideas of the contemporary embodied/enactive approach to cognition. He conceptualizes in this work various cognitive abilities in regards to their utility towards... more
With his 1896 book Matter and Memory Henri Bergson foreshadowed many of the ideas of the contemporary embodied/enactive approach to cognition. He conceptualizes in this work various cognitive abilities in regards to their utility towards action, and underlines the importance of sensori-motor integration and coordination both in regards to various forms of perception but also as it pertains to the different types of memory and what we would now call semantic knowledge. However, he also makes the offhanded suggestion that language should be seen as an artificially constructed motor system and thus he suggests that like our regular motor system language functions as a tool to interpret perception and as a determining framework for our actions. It is this claim that I shall focus on in my paper. I think there are a series of interesting implications in this idea of language as a constructed motor system, especially given the wider theoretical context of sensory-motor integration groundi...
We are living in a time of radical digital change. Disruptions to the status quo are celebrated. Most of us are in certain respects at least enamored by some of the new technological tools and possibilities. How these changes should be... more
We are living in a time of radical digital change. Disruptions to the status quo are celebrated. Most of us are in certain respects at least enamored by some of the new technological tools and possibilities. How these changes should be understood remains unclear and controversial. Digital realms have turned the neat divisions of disciplines upside down and given ample evidence for the importance of new thinking about complex contemporary challenges. Rapid developments in digitalization in virtually every area of human life has fractured established divisions between fields of philosophy. Insightful philosophical analyses of the new digital challenges may require reinventing philosophical methods and categories which cut across traditional fields of ethics, political philosophy, epistemology and metaphysics. Epistemological tools and ways of comprehending specific changes in the current world need to be developed as digitalization influences interactions between individual human beings, advances the digital structures of social media and digital economies, and alters grounding assumptions of democratic rule. For these reasons contributions are invited under the open ended theme of Philosophy and Digitalization. Our hope is that such contributions will offer original ways to consider and assess the implications of the digital era for humans existentially, for our roles as responsible citizens, and our abilities to act as cognizant beings and so on. Contributions on issues such as privacy, 'fake news', 'swarming' of public opinion prompted by social media, and broader epistemic behavioral patterns, structures of digital economies, challenges for democracy and social life, as well as basic questions about the nature and interrelations between the analog and the digital are welcome. Reflecting on how to philosophize about digitalization will create and reshape inquiries about human understanding and our place in the world.
Movement variability has emerged as a critical research component in the field of neural motor control. This chapter explains why movement variability can be seen as such a rich resource for studying neural development and ASD. This... more
Movement variability has emerged as a critical research component in the field of neural motor control. This chapter explains why movement variability can be seen as such a rich resource for studying neural development and ASD. This cannot be done without a framework for understanding the relationship between neural control, movement and movement sensing. Thus in the process of explaining why we should study movements several analytical and empirical aspects of motor-sensed variability from self-generated actions are recast, as are their putative role in the development of motor-sensory-sensed maps of external stimuli present in social settings. Overall, the Chapter offers a new lens for the research and treatments of neurodevelopmental disorders on a spectrum. In particular, disorders such as Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) giving rise to different social manifestations are discussed within the renovated unifying framework of kinesthetic reafference using the new micro-movements data type paired with new accompanying analytics. 2
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The current rise of neurodevelopmental disorders poses a critical need to detect risk early in order to rapidly intervene. One of the tools pediatricians use to track development is the standard growth chart. The growth charts are... more
The current rise of neurodevelopmental disorders poses a critical need to detect risk early in order to rapidly intervene. One of the tools pediatricians use to track development is the standard growth chart. The growth charts are somewhat limited in predicting possible neurodevelopmental issues. They rely on linear models and assumptions of normality for physical growth data - obscuring key statistical information about possible neurodevelopmental risk in growth data that actually has accelerated, non-linear rates-of-change and variability encompassing skewed distributions. Here, we use new analytics to profile growth data from 36 newborn babies that were tracked longitudinally for 5 months. By switching to incremental (velocity-based) growth charts and combining these dynamic changes with underlying fluctuations in motor performance - as the transition from spontaneous random noise to a systematic signal - we demonstrate a method to detect very early stunting in the development of voluntary neuromotor control and to flag risk of neurodevelopmental derail.
The current assessment of behaviors in the inventories to diagnose autism spectrum disorders (ASD) focus on observation and discrete categorizations. Behaviors require movements, yet measurements of physical movements are seldom included.... more
The current assessment of behaviors in the inventories to diagnose autism spectrum disorders (ASD) focus on observation and discrete categorizations. Behaviors require movements, yet measurements of physical movements are seldom included. Their inclusion however, could provide an objective characterization of behavior to help unveil interactions between the peripheral and the central nervous systems. Such interactions are critical for the development and maintenance of spontaneous autonomy, self-regulation and voluntary control. At present, current approaches cannot deal with the heterogeneous, dynamic and stochastic nature of development. Accordingly, they leave no avenues for real-time or longitudinal assessments of change in a coping system continuously adapting and developing compensatory mechanisms. We offer a new unifying statistical framework to reveal re-afferent kinesthetic features of the individual with ASD. The new methodology is based on the non-stationary stochastic pa...
In the drive toward institutionalization, Writing Across the Curriculum (WAC) programs have had a tendency to standardize WAC practices, making them less flexible than they were first intended to be. As a result, when faculty,... more
In the drive toward institutionalization, Writing Across the Curriculum (WAC) programs have had a tendency to standardize WAC practices, making them less flexible than they were first intended to be.  As a result, when faculty, particularly those new to WAC, express hesitation or skepticism, their concerns are often dismissed as resistance.  Interviews with Writing Intensive (WI) course instructors, year-long partnerships with WI faculty across disciplines, and a recent semester-long faculty development workshop revealed instances of faculty “resistance,” which lead us not only to re-evaluate “resistance,” but also to consider what guidelines facilitate broader and deeper engagement with WAC.  Based on our unique experience as doctoral Writing Fellows in the WAC program at the Borough of Manhattan Community College of the City University of New York, we argue that so-called “resistances” are often justified criticisms and concerns in regard to implementing WAC under given institutional, disciplinary, departmental, and personal constraints.  If we listen and respond to these criticisms and concerns, they become means to facilitate faculty engagement with WAC.  Based on our findings, we re-assert the premise that WAC practices and programs must be flexible (a) to accommodate the conditions under which faculty teach and (b) to encourage ownership of WAC, which together promote deep-rooted pedagogical change, which is the ultimate goal of most WAC programs.
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The current rise of neurodevelopmental disorders poses a critical need to detect risk early in order to rapidly intervene. One of the tools pediatricians use to track development is the standard growth chart. The growth charts are... more
The current rise of neurodevelopmental disorders poses a critical need to detect risk early in order to rapidly intervene. One of the tools pediatricians use to track development is the standard growth chart. The growth charts are somewhat limited in predicting possible neurodevelopmental issues. They rely on linear models and assumptions of normality for physical growth data – obscuring key statistical information about possible neurodevelopmental risk in growth data that actually has accelerated, non-linear rates-of-change and variability encompassing skewed distributions. Here, we use new analytics to profile growth data from 36 newborn babies that were tracked longitudinally for 5 months. By switching to incremental (velocity-based) growth charts and combining these dynamic changes with underlying fluctuations in motor performance – as the transition from spontaneous random noise to a systematic signal – we demonstrate a method to detect very early stunting in the development of voluntary neuromotor control and to flag risk of neurodevelopmental derail.
Research Interests:
We define a new data type that integrates fluctuations in temperature readings with fluctuations in motor performance. This bundle of signals related to the autonomic and sensory-motor systems, allows us to better explore and identify... more
We define a new data type that integrates fluctuations in temperature readings with fluctuations in motor performance. This bundle of signals related to the autonomic and sensory-motor systems, allows us to better explore and identify motion signatures that have the potential to be physiologically relevant to both the peripheral and central nervous systems (PNS and CNS). The temperature and the motion (acceleration and gyroscopic) signals are simultaneously registered at the same sampling resolution, 128Hz. The sensors output temperature readings related to several temperature types: skin surface temperature, ambient temperature and temperature related to the battery's energy consumption indicative of the amount of actively generated motion output. The higher the amount of actively generated movements, the more battery energy is drawn, and thus the higher the temperature is (on average). Yet, because there is also adaptation between the person's skin surface and the sensor's surface, the temperature readings fluctuate. Importantly, temperature readings have been found to fluctuate differently if the person is actively vs. passively moving. Specifically, slow rates of change in temperature fluctuations correspond to passively generated motions (as when the person is moved and not generating large motions.) In contrast, actively self-generated motions, particularly those which are larger and more systematic, result in higher rates of change in temperature fluctuations. These temperature fluctuations can therefore be captured and analyzed to provide an indication as to of the amount of adaptive motion from self-generated movements that the individual
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