Maria Brincker
University of Massachusetts, Boston, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Science, Phenomenology, Philosophy of Psychology, Social Cognition, Embodiment, and 388 morePerception, Decision Making, Philosophy of Biology, Embodied Cognition, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Cognitive development, Philosophy of Agency, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Social Interaction, Philosophical Anthropology, Free Will, Autism, Intentionality, Neurophenomenology, Mirror Neurons, Perception-Action, Situated Cognition, Developmental Psychology, Autism Spectrum Disorders, Theoretical biology, Sensorimotor integration, Henri Bergson, Jakob von Uexküll, James J. Gibson, Mental Representation, Autonomic Nervous System, Proprioception, Aesthetics, Intersubjectivity, Philosophical Psychology, Continental Philosophy, Philosophy of Psychiatry, Affective Neuroscience, Enactivism, Autopoiesis, Cognitive Sciences, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, Social affordances, Affordances, Affordance Theory, Emergence, Multimodal Interaction, Self-Organization, Action Research, Agency, Phenomenology of the body, Philosophy of perception, Philosophy of Time, New Materialism, Privacy, Robotics, Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy of Action, Action Theory, Aesthetic Experience, Science and Technology Studies, Philosophy of Technology, John Dewey, Charles S. Peirce, Motor Control, Causation, The Fact/Value Distinction, Consciousness, Theory of Mind, Human Motor Behavior, Ecological Psychology, Motor Development, Neurodevelopmental Disorders, Social Neuroscience, Autonomy, Noise, Multimodality, Teleology, Predictive coding, Sensorimotor Priors, Biological Psychology, Human Development, Information Technology, Complexity Theory, 4EA Cognition, Social Perception, Social Development, Philosophy of Science, Psychology, Metaphysics, Phenomenological Research Methodology, Extended Mind, Theory of Mind (Psychology), Cognitive Neuroscience, Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, Mind-body problem, Extended Cognition, Distributed Cognition, Process Philosophy, Cognitive Semiotics, Mirror neurons and Intersubjectivity, Phenomenology of Space and Place, Movement disorders, Interactivity, Intention, Cognitive Psychology, Clinical Neuroscience, Metaphysics of Mind, Merleau-Ponty, Aspergers and High Functioning Autism, Emotion, Bayesian statistics & modelling, Philosophy of Neuroscience, Automation, Cyborg Theory, Cognitive Architectures, Second Person, Timescales, Temporality, Intentional Action, Normativity, Prediction, Pluralism, Pattern Recognition, Evolutionary Biology, Sensorimotor contingencies, Enactive cognition, Embodied Intersubjectivity, Object Perception, Abstraction, Truth, Epistemology, Feminist Philosophy of Science, Data Privacy, Metacognition and its development, Metacogntion, Metacognition, Signal Processing, Cognition, Mental Representation and Content, Higher Order Thinking, Mental Models, Context, Motor Learning, Action-Perception Coupling, Sensorimotor Neuroscience, Mirror Neuron System, Motor Intentionality, Interactionism, Metaphysics of Time, Metaphysics of Causation, Free will and determinism debate, Appearance and Reality, Embodied Embedded Cognition, Self-Sensing, Self-regulation, Human Movement Science, Implicit Social Cognition, Mental time travel, False Belief Test, Mentalizing, Organism-Environment Interactions, Control, Sensory Integration, Representations, Relationality, Habitus, History of Philosophy, Movement, Representation, Naturalism, Sensory Systems, Privacy in Public, Evolution, Individuation, Human Evolution, Ethics of Technology, Humanities, Motor System, Embodied Social Cognition, False Belief, Embodied knowledge, Counterfactual Thinking, Relational Ontology, Umwelt, Social Systems Theory, Complex Adaptive Systems, Subjectivity, Values, The Self, Decision And Game Theory, Neuroscience, Autonomous Cognitive Agents, Research Methodology, Sensory Neuroscience, Embedded Systems, Complexity, Self Regulation, Neurodevelopment, Embodiment Theory, Predictive Analytics, Uncertainty, Active noise control, Peripheral Nervous System, Social Communication, Centre-Periphery Relations, 4E Cognition, Ethics, Political Philosophy, Moral Psychology, Research Ethics, Child Development, Intercorporeality, Philosophy of Medicine, Aesthetics and Ethics, Metaphysics of Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Responsibility, Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Information Ethics, Ethical decision making, Philosophy of Engineering, Group Dynamics, Ethical Theory, Feminist Theory, Pragmatism, Neuroethics, Recognition, Race and Racism, Critical Race Theory, Later Wittgenstein, DSM-5, Value Theory, Action Affordances, Perception and Action, Cognitive Neuropsychology, Social Cognitive Affective Neuroscience, Affordance, Human Computer Interaction, Philosophy Of Law, Philosophy of cognitive neuroscience, Semiotics, Psychiatry, Brain and Cognitive Development, Neurophilosophy, Time Perception, Mindreading, Friedrich Nietzsche, Mental Causation, Complex Systems Science, Agency Theory, Schizophrenia, Media Studies, Surveillance Studies, Robustness, Statistical Learning, Expectations, Sociology of Knowledge, Michel Foucault, Foucault power/knowledge - discourse, Complex Systems, Cognitive Ecology, Distributed Information Systems, Tacit Knowledge, Philosophy of Physics, Metaphilosophy, Philosophy of Systems Biology, Philosophy of Social Science, Social Ontology, Sensorimotor Approach, Social Cognitive Neuroscience, Social cognition (Psychology), Sensorimotor learning, Goal-Directed Action, Ecology, Human Perception and Performance, Social Philosophy, Philosophy of Art, Critical Theory, 19th and 20th-century European philosophy, Technology and Society, Second-Person Standpoint, Communication, Dynamical Systems, Material Engagement Theory, Actor Network Theory, Political Ecology, Social Representations, Cognitive Robotics, Feminist Epistemology, Knowledge Of Other Minds, Predictive Processing, Dynamical Systems Approach to Cognition, Frederick Douglass, Philosophy of information, Philosophy of the Subject, Predictive Sensory Processing, Biosemiotics, Values in Science, Free Energy, Origins of Life, History and Philosophy of Biology, Systems Biology, Life Sciences, Social Epistemology, Evolution of sociality, Early Childhood Development, Social Psychology, Bayesian Models of Perception, Self Organization, Deception / Lying (Deception Lying), Meaning Making, Behavioral Decision Making, Social Norms, Philosophical Methodology, Philosophy Of Language, Cybernetics, Francisco Varela, Autopoietic Systems, Neuroaesthetics, Personal and Moral Autonomy, Prosocial Behavior, Helping Behavior, Knowledge and Power, Action, Object Oriented Ontology, Cultural Theory, Ontology, Cultural Studies, Embodied Interaction, Modularity of Mind, Social Theory, Involuntary Movement, Sensory-motor adaptation, Relational Agency, Motor Cognition, Bayesian Inference, Autism Spectrum Treatment, New Media, Dispositions, Self-Knowledge and Self-Awareness, Privacy and Autonomy, Culture and Cognition, Social Sciences, Pierre Bourdieu, Marxism, Social Categorization, Stereotypes and Prejudice, Freedom, Free-Energy Principle, Visibility/invisibility, Precarity, re-afference principle, Philosophy of Nature, Online Privacy, Privacy and data protection, Surveillance, Panopticon, Gilbert Simondon, Digital Media, Disruptive Technologies, Philosophy of Computer Science, Postphenomenology, Big Data Analytics, Virtual Worlds, Virtual Reality, Critical Theory of Technology, Philosophy, Automation & COntrol, Property Law, Digitization, Democracy, Personalization, Facial Recognition, Privacy (Law), Social Control, Biopolitics, Sovereignty, Internet & Society, Sociology of Technology, Algorithms, Liberty, surveillance capitalism, Media Theory, Dynamic System, Modeling and Simulation, Freedom of movement, Common Ground, Shared Knowledge, Multi Agent System, Political Science, Addiction, and Operant Conditioningedit
- I study how various contextual factors dynamically ground and shape our minds and actions. The goal is the developmen... moreI study how various contextual factors dynamically ground and shape our minds and actions. The goal is the development of better theoretical frameworks for scholars, scientists and policy makers to work with. I also hope my work can highlight the empirical implausibility of the widespread mechanistic and disembodied assumptions of existing cognitive, psychiatric as well as legal and political models.
I am generally sympathetic to embodied & enactive approaches to cognition and to ambitions of looking at processes as temporal and as materially, socially and historically situated, and of grounding higher cognition in more basic sensorimotor and somatic functions.
Within philosophy much of my research might be categorized as pertaining to philosophy of mind, action and neuroscience, but often it also concerns issues of epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics, disability, privacy and technology. I am interested in social environments and interactions and how various power structures and asymmetries affect the conditions of autonomy for individuals.
Omnipresent in my work is the oddly appendixed field of history of philosophy and I can proudly label most of my ideas as having a high degree of recycled material particularly from critical, continental, phenomenological & pragmatist traditions.edit
We expand and transform our habitual agency with countless technologies most moments of the day. Our environments, bodies, thoughts and social interactions are thoroughly shaped and mediated by tapestries of interweaving layers of old and... more
We expand and transform our habitual agency with countless technologies most moments of the day. Our environments, bodies, thoughts and social interactions are thoroughly shaped and mediated by tapestries of interweaving layers of old and new technologies. Perhaps this intimate relation with technology is at the core of our humanity. But our relation to technology has also repeatedly been feared as a Faustian deal that will be the dystopian end of us, or—in more utopian viewpoints—will bring us beyond our earthbound finitudes toward virtual existences. What many agree on is that dramatic changes to our basic ecological and existential conditions are nearing. I suggest we should also look for such critical tipping points and phase shifts not just in our biological bodies and environments but also in the informational and behavioral environments we rely on in our intentional and habitual agency.
When thinking particularly about technologically mediated habitual agency an obvious place to start is with Don Ihde’s 4 classic human–technology relations. Interestingly, fellow post-phenomenologist Peter-Paul Verbeek has proposed new additional kinds of relations to e.g. “smart” and virtually “augmenting” technologies. While I find each of these analyses insightful, I worry that a focus on individual relations to particular spatio-temporally circumscribed artifacts falls short—or even obscures—some of the particular new challenges to our agency that networked, and data-driven smart technologies give rise to.
I will therefore attempt to broaden the focus to how our agency is scaffolded by not just particular technological artifacts, but by our understanding of the broader informational and behavioral environment. To do this, I start by introducing some core theoretical background ideas that will support a more contextual approach and then proceed to consider both the classic and newer post-phenomenological relations from this more contextual perspective.
The goal is not only to affirm the value of analyzing concrete technology relations but also to expand and contextualize the analyses. The latter is key if we want a post-phenomenological analysis that can help us understand how our habitual agency might be transformed as we come to live in increasingly “smart worlds”. These new data and algorithmically driven technologies not only transform our relation to a given context, but due to networked dataflows and “smart” decision-making (1) recursively act on us and (2) collapse and transcend the present context. This chapter will also highlight the uncertainties that informationally leaky and “smart” technologies introduce to our understanding of the kind of affordance space we are in and even what the expected outcomes of our actions will be. I suggest that technology relations with such effects might challenge some of the core contextual stabilities and informational segregations that our habitual agency have hitherto relied on. A further issue is if these new technological configurations challenge our habitual processes in ways we cannot easily adapt to. We certainly seem able to create new habits and adapt to these new technologies locally, but the new information flows, hidden audiences, and context collapses appear to challenge some conditions of agency that are typically out of sight, and the effects of which untraceably shows up well outside the present context. Overall, I shall argue that “smart” technologies can both expand and shrink our habitual agency—but that in terms of our ability to guide our action through various contexts in a perceived world something more fundamental appears to be breaking.
When thinking particularly about technologically mediated habitual agency an obvious place to start is with Don Ihde’s 4 classic human–technology relations. Interestingly, fellow post-phenomenologist Peter-Paul Verbeek has proposed new additional kinds of relations to e.g. “smart” and virtually “augmenting” technologies. While I find each of these analyses insightful, I worry that a focus on individual relations to particular spatio-temporally circumscribed artifacts falls short—or even obscures—some of the particular new challenges to our agency that networked, and data-driven smart technologies give rise to.
I will therefore attempt to broaden the focus to how our agency is scaffolded by not just particular technological artifacts, but by our understanding of the broader informational and behavioral environment. To do this, I start by introducing some core theoretical background ideas that will support a more contextual approach and then proceed to consider both the classic and newer post-phenomenological relations from this more contextual perspective.
The goal is not only to affirm the value of analyzing concrete technology relations but also to expand and contextualize the analyses. The latter is key if we want a post-phenomenological analysis that can help us understand how our habitual agency might be transformed as we come to live in increasingly “smart worlds”. These new data and algorithmically driven technologies not only transform our relation to a given context, but due to networked dataflows and “smart” decision-making (1) recursively act on us and (2) collapse and transcend the present context. This chapter will also highlight the uncertainties that informationally leaky and “smart” technologies introduce to our understanding of the kind of affordance space we are in and even what the expected outcomes of our actions will be. I suggest that technology relations with such effects might challenge some of the core contextual stabilities and informational segregations that our habitual agency have hitherto relied on. A further issue is if these new technological configurations challenge our habitual processes in ways we cannot easily adapt to. We certainly seem able to create new habits and adapt to these new technologies locally, but the new information flows, hidden audiences, and context collapses appear to challenge some conditions of agency that are typically out of sight, and the effects of which untraceably shows up well outside the present context. Overall, I shall argue that “smart” technologies can both expand and shrink our habitual agency—but that in terms of our ability to guide our action through various contexts in a perceived world something more fundamental appears to be breaking.
Research Interests: Information Technology, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Action, Philosophy of Technology, and 15 moreTechnology, Behavioral Sciences, Action Research, Phenomenology, Information Communication Technology, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Ecological Psychology, Surveillance, Behavioral Ecology, Postphenomenology, Affordances, Smart spaces, Agency, Automation, and Don Ihde
Most online platforms are becoming increasingly algorithmically personalized. The question is if these practices are simply satisfying users preferences or if something is lost in this process. This article focuses on how to reconcile the... more
Most online platforms are becoming increasingly algorithmically personalized. The question is if these practices are simply satisfying users preferences or if something is lost in this process. This article focuses on how to reconcile the personalization with the importance of being able to share cultural objects-including fiction-with others. In analyzing two concrete personalization examples from the streaming giant Netflix, several tendencies are observed. One is to isolate users and sometimes entirely eliminate shared world aspects. Another tendency is to blur the boundary between shared cultural objects and personalized content, which can be misleading and disorienting. A further tendency is for personalization algorithms to be optimized to deceptively prey on desires for content that mirrors one's own lived experience. Some specific-often minority targeting-"clickbait" practices received public blowback. These practices show disregard both for honest labeling and for our desires to have access and representation in a shared world. The article concludes that personalization tendencies are moving towards increasingly isolating and disorienting interfaces, but that platforms could be redesigned to support better social world orientation.
Research Interests: Cultural Studies, Algorithms, Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, Epistemology, and 15 morePhilosophy of Technology, New Media, Design, Privacy, Digital Media, Surveillance Studies, Personalization, Digital Media & Learning, Ecological Psychology, Social Epistemology, Affordances, Racial Profiling, Fiction, Video Streaming, and Shared Knowledge
(Bonus material: a critique of the genesis myth of Western philosophy as well as of the exclusions and policing practices of both analytic and continental traditions)
Research Interests:
In this chapter what I call the "backside" of habit is explored. I am interested in the philosophical implications of the physical and physiological processes that mediate, and which allow for what comes to appear as almost magic; namely... more
In this chapter what I call the "backside" of habit is explored. I am interested in the philosophical implications of the physical and physiological processes that mediate, and which allow for what comes to appear as almost magic; namely the various sensorimotor associations and integrations that allows us to replay our past experiences, and to in a certain sense perceive potential futures, and to act and bring about anticipated outcomes-without quite knowing how. Thus, the term "backside" is meant to refer both the actual mediation and the epistemic opacity of these backstage intermediaries that allow for the front stage magic. The question is if the epistemic complexities around sensorimotor mediation gives us valuable insights into the nature of human agency and further how it might begin to show us new ways to think of the mind as truly embodied yet not reducible to any finite body-as-object.
Research Interests: Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Pragmatism, Cybernetics, Embodied Cognition, and 15 moreEmbodiment, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Biosemiotics, Mediation, Intentionality, Charles S. Peirce, John Dewey, Action Theory, Affordances, Intentional Action, Sensorimotor integration, Habits, Materiality, Mind-body problem, and Embodied and Enactive Cognition
As traditional public spaces rapidly change the question arises whether pervasive surveillance is actually compatible with the nature of individual agency. It is known that new and largely unregulated technologies often both erode old de... more
As traditional public spaces rapidly change the question arises whether pervasive surveillance is actually compatible with the nature of individual agency. It is known that new and largely unregulated technologies often both erode old de facto limitations of access, and erect new asymmetric barriers of knowledge, but how should we understand the harms of these new contexts? Based on our psychological and biological knowledge of social perception, embodiment and action choice it seems that these conditions present a toxic mix for our ability to gauge what I call our " relational privacy " , and thereby for our autonomous and purposeful action planning. If this functional analysis is right then boundless surveillance of our bodies and behaviors threatens rather than supports basic personal freedom and responsibility. However, in contrast to this analysis, the private-public dichotomy often implied in existing debates assumes that privacy concerns can be theorized without much attention to the functional and relational dynamics of our embodied agency. Building on among others Nissenbaum and Reidenberg's work, this chapter seeks to counter this tendency. Two conclusions stand out: Firstly, it seems that our action choices depend on the existence of limited contexts also in public, and thus actions in what we might term " unbounded contexts " are typically performed through some kind of denial. Secondly, abundant availability of data traceable to persons can not only undermine and coerce our choices, but even to a large extent completely bypass our current volitional action choices. Thus it seems that the contextual nature of our agency should be of utmost importance to political and legal privacy issues, and could usefully guide attempts to recreate more bounded public spaces.
Research Interests: Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Social Psychology, Computer Science, Algorithms, and 104 moreInformation Technology, Constitutional Law, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Political Philosophy, Ethics, Philosophy of Agency, Philosophy of Action, Philosophy of Technology, Perception, Moral Psychology, Technology, Media Studies, Social Sciences, Corporate Social Responsibility, Decision Making, Action Research, Human Rights, Privacy, Digital Media, Individuality, Social-Ecological Systems, Mobile Technology, Embodied Cognition, Political Science, Surveillance (Sociology), Social Cognition, Embodiment, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Philosophy Of Law, Surveillance Studies, Civil Rights, Privatisation Of Public Space, Rational Choice, Behavioral Decision Making, Social Media, Personal and Moral Autonomy, Context, Decision Support Systems, Optimization techniques, Michel Foucault, Computer Security, Autonomy, Practical Reasoning, Action Theory, Bentham, Democracy, Science and Technology, Anonymity, Moral Philosophy, Social Perception, Knowledge and Power, Individuation, Practical Rationality, Information Security and Privacy, Surveillance, Hannah Arendt, Privacy (Law), Security and Privacy, Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Public Space, Affordances, Liberty, Philosophy of Action (Philosophy), Social Responsibility, Surveillance and Control, Danah Boyd, Foucault power/knowledge - discourse, Social affordances, Rationality, Social Control, science and technology studies (STS), Public Services, Intentional Action, Action Affordances, Panopticism, Philosophy of action and theory of rationality, Online Privacy, Privacy and data protection, Freedom, Individualization, Data Privacy, Culture and Context, Constitutional Rights, The digital panopticon, Jeremy Bentham, Coercion, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, Denial, Panopticon, Architecture and Public Spaces, Security and Surveillance, Philosophy of Law, Nudge, ring of Gyges, Shared Space, Asymmetrical Power Relations, Coercive Control, Helen Nissenbaum, Public Policy, Science and Technology Studies, Contextual integrity, reasonable expectation of privacy, and Perceptible agency
What does it mean to be an aesthetic beholder? Is it different than simply being a perceiver? Most theories of aesthetic perception focus on 1) features of the perceived object and its presentation or 2) on psychological evaluative or... more
What does it mean to be an aesthetic beholder? Is it different than simply being a perceiver? Most theories of aesthetic perception focus on 1) features of the perceived object and its presentation or 2) on psychological evaluative or emotional responses and intentions of perceiver and artist. I propose that we need to look at the process of engaged perception itself, and further that this temporal process of becoming a beholder must be understood in its embodied, contextual and dynamic specificity. Through both phenomenological and neuroscientific explorations I analyze what is characteristic about a more “aesthetic stance” and argue that there is a certain asymmetry between beholder and beheld, which has to do with a disengagement of goal-directed action, and which allows for other kinds of perceptual involvement than in a more “practical stance”. It is a multi-disciplinary project integrating a sensorimotor notion of aesthetic affordances, 18th century philosophy, and large-scale brain network findings. What ensues is a new dynamic framework that hopefully can support fruitful interdisciplinary research of aesthetic perception.
Research Interests: Neuroscience, Emotion, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Aesthetics, and 49 morePerception, Art, Action Research, Audience Studies, Mirror Neurons, Philosophy of Psychology, Visual attention, Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Embodiment, Visual perception, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Audience and Reception Studies, Perception-Action, Attention, Everyday Aesthetics, Neuroaesthetics, Context, Affordance Theory, Executive Functions (Cognitive Neuroscience), Aesthetics and Ethics, Aesthetics and Politics, Immanuel Kant, Philosophy of perception, Cognitive Neuroscience, Visual Arts, Enactivism, Beauty, theories of, Affordances, Sensorimotor Neuroscience, Affect, Visual Art, Sensorimotor integration, Beauty, Aesthetic Experience, Stance, Images, Mirror Neuron System, Brain Networks, Neuroscience of Aesthetic Perception, Resting State, Default Mode Networks, Disengagement, Kant (aesthetics and the Third Critique), Large Scale Brain Dynamics, Organism-Environment Interactions, Sensorimotor Approach, Beholder, Neurosciences, and Beholder-Beheld
How do we perceive the agency of others? Do the same rules apply when interacting with others who are radically different from ourselves, like other species or robots? We typically perceive other people and animals through their embodied... more
How do we perceive the agency of others? Do the same rules apply when interacting with others who are radically different from ourselves, like other species or robots? We typically perceive other people and animals through their embodied behavior, as they dynamically engage various aspects of their affordance field. In second personal perception we also perceive social or interactional affordances of others. I discuss various aspects of perceptible agency, which might begin to give us some tools to understand interactions also with agents truly other than ourselves or ‘‘perhaps agents’’ like present and future social robots. Robots have various kinds of physical and behavioral presence and thus make their agency—if we want to call it that—perceptible in ways that computers and other forms of AI do not. The largely dualist assumptions pertaining to the hidden bodies of traditional Turing tests are discussed, as well as the social affordance effects of such indirect interactions as opposed to interactions in physically shared space. The question is what role various abilities to reveal, hide and dynamically control the body and broader behavior plays in heterogeneous tech or machine mediated interactions. I argue that the specifics and richness of perceptible agency matters to the kind of reciprocity we can obtain.
Research Interests: Robotics, Neuroscience, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Social Psychology, and 101 moreComputer Science, Artificial Intelligence, Robotics (Computer Science), Human Computer Interaction, Information Technology, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Philosophy of Action, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Technology, Perception, Technology, New Media, Social Sciences, Decision Making, Autonomous Cognitive Agents, Action Research, Mobile Robotics, Digital Media, Social-Ecological Systems, Applied Statistics, Mobile Technology, Cognition, Interaction Design, Embodied Cognition, Social Cognition, Social Interaction, Uncanny Valley, Autonomous Robotics, Humanoid Robotics, Theory of Mind, Embodiment, Phenomenology, Computer-Mediated Communication, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Perception-Action, Truth, Information Communication Technology, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Motor Control, Metaphysics of Mind, Ecological Psychology, Deception / Lying (Deception Lying), Deception Detection, Extended Mind, Computer Mediated Communication, Multimodal Interaction, Affordance Theory, Modeling and Simulation, Autonomy, Phenomenology of the body, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Computer Science, Social Robotics, Social Presence, Implicit Social Cognition, Theory of Mind (Psychology), Multimodality, Embodied Embedded Cognition, Artificial Inteligence, Social cognition (Psychology), Probability and statistics, Kinesthetics, Somatosensory Neuroscience, Philosophy of cognitive neuroscience, Descartes, Embodiment Theory, Embodied and Distributed Cognition, Affordances, Sensorimotor Neuroscience, Social Cognitive Affective Neuroscience, Embodied Interaction, Simulation, Alan Turing, Predictive Analytics, Dualism, Social affordances, Deception, Turing Test, Sensorimotor integration, Autonomous Robots, Noise, Modularity of Mind, Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, Humanoid robots, Robots, Mindreading, Mind/body Problem, Mind-body problem, Technological affordances, Embodied knowledge, Sensorimotor learning, Reciprocity, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, Action Planning, Non-dualism, Presence/absence, Sensorimotor Approach, Science and Technology Studies, and Perceptible agency
Mirror neuron research has come a long way since the early 90’s, and many theorists are now stressing the heterogeneity and complexity of the sensorimotor properties of fronto-parietal circuits. However, core aspects of the initial... more
Mirror neuron research has come a long way since the early 90’s, and many theorists are now stressing the heterogeneity and complexity of the sensorimotor properties of fronto-parietal circuits. However, core aspects of the initial ‘mirror mechanism’ theory, i.e. the idea of a symmetric encapsulated mirroring function translating sensory action perceptions into motor formats, still appears to be shaping much of the debate. This article challenges the empirical plausibility of the sensorimotor segregation implicit in the original mirror metaphor. It is proposed instead that the teleological organization found in the broader fronto-parietal circuits might be inherently sensorimotor. Thus the idea of an independent ‘purely perceptual’ goal understanding process is questioned. Further, it is hypothesized that the often asymmetric, heterogeneous and contextually modulated mirror and canonical neurons support a function of multisensory mapping and tracking of the perceiving agents affordance space. Such a shift in the interpretative framework offers a different theoretical handle on how sensorimotor processes might ground various aspects of intentional action choice and social cognition. Mirror neurons would under the proposed “social affordance model” be seen as dynamic parts of larger circuits, which support tracking of currently shared and competing action possibilities. These circuits support action selection processes—but also our understanding of the options and action potentials that we and perhaps others have in the affordance space. In terms of social cognition ‘mirror’ circuits might thus help us understand not only the intentional actions others are actually performing—but also what they could have done, did not do and might do shortly.
Research Interests: Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, and 59 morePhilosophy of Agency, Philosophy of Action, Philosophy of Science, Perception, Philosophical Psychology, Research Methods and Methodology, Decision Making, Action Research, Research Methodology, Mirror Neurons, Philosophy of Psychology, Human Motor Behavior, Cognition, Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Social Cognition, Social Interaction, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Perception-Action, Motor Control, Intentionality, Affordance Theory, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Implicit Social Cognition, Social Perception, Cognitive Neuroscience (in Cognition/Cognitive Development), Multimodality, Embodied Embedded Cognition, Cognitive Neuroscience, Social cognition (Psychology), History and Philosophy of the Human Sciences, Teleology, Philosophy of cognitive neuroscience, Affordances, Action-Perception Coupling, Social Cognitive Neuroscience, Philosophy of Neuroscience, Human Movement Science, Sensorimotor Neuroscience, Social Cognitive Affective Neuroscience, Embodied Interaction, Social affordances, Sensorimotor integration, Modularity of Mind, Mirror neurons and Intersubjectivity, Cortical network, Mirror Neuron System, Social Communication, Affordance, Embodied knowledge, 4E Cognition, Motor System, The Fact/Value Distinction, Sensorimotor learning, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, Goal-Directed Action, Sensorimotor contingencies, Sensorimotor Approach, and Sensorimotor Priors
Most of the free will debate operates under the assumption that classic determinism and indeterminism are the only metaphysical options available. Through an analysis of Dennett’s view of free will as gradually evolving this article... more
Most of the free will debate operates under the assumption that classic determinism and indeterminism are the
only metaphysical options available. Through an analysis of Dennett’s view of free will as gradually evolving
this article attempts to point to emergentist, interactivist and temporal metaphysical options, which have
been left largely unexplored by contemporary theorists. Whereas, Dennett himself holds that “the kind of
free will worth wanting” is compatible with classic determinism, I propose that his models of determinism fit
poorly with his evolutionary theory and naturalist commitments. In particular, his so-called “intuition pumps”
seem to rely on the assumption that reality will have a compositional bottom layer where appearance and
reality coincide. I argue that instead of positing this and other “unexplained explainers” we should allow for
the heretical possibility that there might not be any absolute bottom, smallest substances or universal laws, but
relational interactions all the way down. Through the details of Dennett’s own account of the importance of
horizontal transmission in evolution and the causal efficacy of epistemically limited but complex layered “selves,”
it is argued that our autonomy is linked to the ability to affect reality by controlling appearances.
only metaphysical options available. Through an analysis of Dennett’s view of free will as gradually evolving
this article attempts to point to emergentist, interactivist and temporal metaphysical options, which have
been left largely unexplored by contemporary theorists. Whereas, Dennett himself holds that “the kind of
free will worth wanting” is compatible with classic determinism, I propose that his models of determinism fit
poorly with his evolutionary theory and naturalist commitments. In particular, his so-called “intuition pumps”
seem to rely on the assumption that reality will have a compositional bottom layer where appearance and
reality coincide. I argue that instead of positing this and other “unexplained explainers” we should allow for
the heretical possibility that there might not be any absolute bottom, smallest substances or universal laws, but
relational interactions all the way down. Through the details of Dennett’s own account of the importance of
horizontal transmission in evolution and the causal efficacy of epistemically limited but complex layered “selves,”
it is argued that our autonomy is linked to the ability to affect reality by controlling appearances.
Research Interests: Evolutionary Biology, Interactionism, Theoretical Physics, Human Evolution, Philosophy, and 61 moreMetaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Philosophy of Action, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Physics, Philosophy of Biology, Perception, Pragmatism, Metaphysics of properties, Decision Making, Action Research, Research Methodology, Philosophy of Psychology, Pattern Recognition, Metaphysics of Time, Real-time Systems, Digitization, Control, Biology, Causation, Process Philosophy, Metaphysics of Mind, Mental Causation, Evolution, Metaphysics of Science, Charles S. Peirce, Action Theory, Philosophy of Time, Process Philosophy (Peirce, Whitehead), Naturalism, Free Will, Daniel Dennett, Metaphysics of Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Theoretical biology, Time and Change, Emergence, Reductionism, Compatibilism and incompatibilism, Presuppositions, Temporality, John Horton Conway, Metaphysics of Causation, Noise, Determinism, Real Time Embedded Systems, Freedom, Critiques of the metaphysics of substance, Atomism, Real Time, Biological Reductionism, Free will and determinism debate, Grounding, Non-Reductionism, Relational and process ontologies, Materialist Reductionism, Appearance and Reality, Philosophy of Biology and Evolution, Metaphysics of Time and Change, Game of Life, and Relational Properties
How and when do we learn to understand other people’s perspectives and possibly divergent beliefs? This question has elicited much theoretical and empirical research. A puzzling finding has been that toddlers perform well on so-called... more
How and when do we learn to understand other people’s perspectives and possibly divergent beliefs? This question has elicited much theoretical and empirical research. A puzzling finding has been that toddlers perform well on so-called implicit false belief (FB) tasks but do not show such capacities on traditional explicit FB tasks. I propose a navigational approach, which offers a hitherto ignored way of making sense of the seemingly contradictory results. The proposal involves a distinction between how we navigate FBs as they relate to 1) our current affordances (here & now navigation) as opposed to 2) presently non-actual relations, where we need to leave our concrete embodied/situated viewpoint (counterfactual navigation). It is proposed that whereas toddlers seem able to understand FBs in their current affordance space, they do not yet possess the resources to navigate in abstraction from such concrete affordances, which explicit FB tests seem to require. It is hypothesized that counterfactual navigation depends on the development of ‘sensorimotor priors’, i.e. statistical expectations of own kinestetic re-afference, which evidence now suggests matures around age four, consistent with core findings of explicit FB performance.
Research Interests: Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Social Psychology, Developmental Psychology, and 84 morePhilosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Action, Philosophy of Science, Perception, Prediction-based Decisions & Planning, Implicit learning, Metacognition and its development, Mirror Neurons, Philosophy of Psychology, Early Childhood Education, Human Motor Behavior, Motor Learning, Motor Development, Cognition, Autism Spectrum Disorders, Distributed Cognition, Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Child Development, Social Cognition, Theory of Mind, Embodiment, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Embedded Systems, Prediction, Metacognition, Cognitive Neuropsychology, Context, Social Neuroscience, Ecological Psychology, Affordance Theory, Motion Analysis, Developmental Social Psychology, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Imagination, Implicit Social Cognition, Theory of Mind (Psychology), Context Based Learning, Embodied Embedded Cognition, Cognitive Neuroscience, Learning and Cognition, Enactivism, Early Childhood, Prosocial Behavior, Affordances, Sensorimotor Neuroscience, Helping Behavior, Embodied Interaction, Memory, Simulation, Higher Order Thinking, Pretend Play, Predictive Analytics, Counterfactual Thinking, Social affordances, Proprioception, Children, Navigation, Embodied Social Cognition, Sensorimotor integration, False Belief, Action Affordances, Mirror neurons and Intersubjectivity, Mental time travel, Mental Models, False Belief Test, Embodied Intersubjectivity, Predictive coding, Enactive cognition, Counterfactuals, Metacogntion, Affordance, Neurodevelopmental Disorders, Mentalizing, Embodied knowledge, Sensorimotor learning, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, Sensorimotor contingencies, Sensorimotor Approach, Typical Development, Theory of Mind Debate, Abstract Thinking, and Sensorimotor Priors
Largely aided by the findings of the so-called ‘mirror neurons’ the attention to motor activity in action observation has exploded over the last two decades. The idea that we internally ‘mirror’ an observed action by covertly reproducing... more
Largely aided by the findings of the so-called ‘mirror neurons’ the attention to motor activity in action observation has exploded over the last two decades. The idea that we internally ‘mirror’ an observed action by covertly reproducing a version of it has lead to a new strand of implicit simulation theories of action understanding. The basic idea of this sort of simulation theory is that perception of others actions automatically activate our own covert action representations, and then that we can use this shared action representation to understand various aspects of the observed action and possibly infer the goal and/or intentions of the observed agent or maybe predict upcoming actions. There is some disagreement among researchers and theorists as to the function of motor ‘simulation’. It is debated whether it serves as the basis for low-level ‘mind-reading’, i.e. ascription of intentions and various mental states to others (Gallese 2003, 2004, 2007. Gallese & Goldman 1998, Goldman in press, Hurley 2005) or whether the function of the simulation is purely related to understanding the action itself (Jeannerod 2006) or maybe related to anticipating upcoming actions (Kilner et al 2004, Csibra 2005, Prinz 2006).
What seems to be assumed in most of these simulation theories is that the default role of the motor system in social perception is to ‘mirror’ the observed action or that it is only related to the observed action and not my own action motives and plans. It is these basic assumptions of the passivity of motor resonance that I would like to challenge. The question is whether it is misleading to conceptualize motor resonance simply as a mirroring simulation where we covertly ‘echo’ the observed action? Many studies of the functional properties of mirror neurons (MN) and motor facilitation during perception seem to point to a more complex role of the motor system in action perception (di Pellegrino 1992, Gallese et al 1996, Rizzolati & Craighero 2004). This has recently led to some proposals trying to reinterpret the function of motor activity during action perception and in social situations from a simple mirroring process to an anticipatory process (Kilner et al 2004, Csibra 2005, Prinz 2006) – or simply to abandon the idea of simulation altogether (Gallagher 2007). I think these are interesting proposals, but inspired by historic approaches to motor resonance and recent studies I would like to venture a hypothesis of an even more proactive, context and motivation dependent role of motor activity during action perception (Newman-Norlund et al. 2007, Schie et al. In press, Cheng et al. 2007, Keysers & Perrett 2004, 502). Motor resonance during object perception is by many researchers thought of in terms of affordances; i.e. what the object affords the observer to do (Grèzes et al. 2003). My question is why we should not – albeit extra social levels of complexity - see motor resonance during social perception in a similar way, as potential action sketches ‘afforded’ by own present motivational, senori-motor and perceptual situation. My point is not that we never ‘simulate’ or covertly imitate observed actions, but rather that it is questionable why we should think of this as the default process in normal interactive social contexts. Covert imitation might only take place during special cases of action observation where we exactly take on a passive spectator attitude, and that we therefore might need a broader theory of motor resonance that also explains normal active and interactive cases of action perception. Accordingly, I suggest that experimental paradigms with single observers in one-way social situations often carry an ‘imitation bias’, and that we are in dire need of more research of actual interactive social perception. I conclude that theories of motor resonance in social perception as a passive ‘mirroring’ or low-level simulation are faced with serious empirical challenges, and that the motor system might serve a much more proactive role in social cognition than previously thought.
What seems to be assumed in most of these simulation theories is that the default role of the motor system in social perception is to ‘mirror’ the observed action or that it is only related to the observed action and not my own action motives and plans. It is these basic assumptions of the passivity of motor resonance that I would like to challenge. The question is whether it is misleading to conceptualize motor resonance simply as a mirroring simulation where we covertly ‘echo’ the observed action? Many studies of the functional properties of mirror neurons (MN) and motor facilitation during perception seem to point to a more complex role of the motor system in action perception (di Pellegrino 1992, Gallese et al 1996, Rizzolati & Craighero 2004). This has recently led to some proposals trying to reinterpret the function of motor activity during action perception and in social situations from a simple mirroring process to an anticipatory process (Kilner et al 2004, Csibra 2005, Prinz 2006) – or simply to abandon the idea of simulation altogether (Gallagher 2007). I think these are interesting proposals, but inspired by historic approaches to motor resonance and recent studies I would like to venture a hypothesis of an even more proactive, context and motivation dependent role of motor activity during action perception (Newman-Norlund et al. 2007, Schie et al. In press, Cheng et al. 2007, Keysers & Perrett 2004, 502). Motor resonance during object perception is by many researchers thought of in terms of affordances; i.e. what the object affords the observer to do (Grèzes et al. 2003). My question is why we should not – albeit extra social levels of complexity - see motor resonance during social perception in a similar way, as potential action sketches ‘afforded’ by own present motivational, senori-motor and perceptual situation. My point is not that we never ‘simulate’ or covertly imitate observed actions, but rather that it is questionable why we should think of this as the default process in normal interactive social contexts. Covert imitation might only take place during special cases of action observation where we exactly take on a passive spectator attitude, and that we therefore might need a broader theory of motor resonance that also explains normal active and interactive cases of action perception. Accordingly, I suggest that experimental paradigms with single observers in one-way social situations often carry an ‘imitation bias’, and that we are in dire need of more research of actual interactive social perception. I conclude that theories of motor resonance in social perception as a passive ‘mirroring’ or low-level simulation are faced with serious empirical challenges, and that the motor system might serve a much more proactive role in social cognition than previously thought.
Research Interests: Neuroscience, Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy, and 53 morePhilosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Agency, Philosophy of Action, Philosophy of Science, Perception, Philosophical Psychology, Research Methods and Methodology, Cognitive Architectures, Action Research, Research Methodology, Human Perception and Performance, Cognitive development, Mirror Neurons, Philosophy of Psychology, Human Motor Behavior, Motor Learning, Cognition, Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Social Cognition, Theory of Mind, Perception-Action, Motor Control, Cognitive Neuropsychology, Social Neuroscience, Metaphysics of Mind, Affordance Theory, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Philosophy of perception, Implicit Social Cognition, Social Perception, Theory of Mind (Psychology), Cognitive Neuroscience (in Cognition/Cognitive Development), Cognitive Neuroscience, Philosophy of cognitive neuroscience, Affordances, Action-Perception Coupling, Philosophy of Neuroscience, Social Cognitive Affective Neuroscience, Social affordances, Sensorimotor integration, Modularity of Mind, Action Affordances, Mirror neurons and Intersubjectivity, Mirror Neuron System, Theory of Mind (ToM) / Empathy / Emotion Recognition., Perception and Action, Modularity, Affordance, Action Perception, Mind Reading, Theory of Mind Debate, and Mirror Neuron Systems
This chapter deals with the way our psychology and actions a scaffolded by their environment but also the tensions that can appear between individual and environment, both at the level of biology and culture. The chapter is grounded in an... more
This chapter deals with the way our psychology and actions a scaffolded by their environment but also the tensions that can appear between individual and environment, both at the level of biology and culture. The chapter is grounded in an analysis of the early 20th century theoretical biologist Jacob von Uexkull and his notion of "Umwelt" or "surround world". But also raises the question of whether organisms fit their environment as neatly as Uexkull and many later thinkers have proposed or assumed.
Research Interests: Semiotics, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Perception, and 21 morePhilosophical Anthropology, Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Social Cognition, Embodiment, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Perception-Action, Context, Ecological Psychology, Meaning, Theoretical biology, Umwelt, Jakob von Uexküll, Affordances, Social affordances, J. J. Gibson, Friction, W.E.B. Du Bois, The Fact/Value Distinction, Organism-Environment Interactions, and Double Consciousness
With his 1896 book Matter and Memory Henri Bergson foreshadowed many of the ideas of the contemporary embodied/enactive approach to cognition. He conceptualizes in this work various cognitive abilities in regards to their utility towards... more
With his 1896 book Matter and Memory Henri Bergson foreshadowed many of the ideas of the contemporary embodied/enactive approach to cognition. He conceptualizes in this work various cognitive abilities in regards to their utility towards action, and underlines the importance of sensori-motor integration and coordination both in regards to various forms of perception but also as it pertains to the different types of memory and what we would now call semantic knowledge.
However, he also makes the offhanded suggestion that language should be seen as an artificially constructed motor system and thus he suggests that like our regular motor system language functions as a tool to interpret perception and as a determining framework for our actions. It is this claim that I shall focus on in my paper. I think there are a series of interesting implications in this idea of language as a constructed motor system, especially given the wider theoretical context of sensory-motor integration grounding cognition. Firstly, I shall discuss to what extent these are empirically plausible ideas, but further also how the idea of language as an extended motor system blurs the border between the individual and the social, between biological and social cognition, body and environment etc. and thus how it could contribute to an integration of traditional cognitive science and neuroscience with social and cultural approaches to cognition.
However, he also makes the offhanded suggestion that language should be seen as an artificially constructed motor system and thus he suggests that like our regular motor system language functions as a tool to interpret perception and as a determining framework for our actions. It is this claim that I shall focus on in my paper. I think there are a series of interesting implications in this idea of language as a constructed motor system, especially given the wider theoretical context of sensory-motor integration grounding cognition. Firstly, I shall discuss to what extent these are empirically plausible ideas, but further also how the idea of language as an extended motor system blurs the border between the individual and the social, between biological and social cognition, body and environment etc. and thus how it could contribute to an integration of traditional cognitive science and neuroscience with social and cultural approaches to cognition.
The discovery of so-called ‘mirror neurons’ - found to respond both to own actions and the observation of similar actions performed by others - has been enormously influential in the cognitive sciences and beyond. Given the self-other... more
The discovery of so-called ‘mirror neurons’ - found to respond both to own actions and the observation of similar actions performed by others - has been enormously influential in the cognitive sciences and beyond. Given the self-other symmetry these neurons have been hypothesized as underlying a ‘mirror mechanism’ that lets us share representations and thereby ground core social cognitive functions from intention understanding to linguistic abilities and empathy. I argue that mirror neurons are important for very different reasons. Rather than a symmetric ubiquitous or context- independent mechanism, I propose that these neurons are part of broader sensorimotor circuits, which help us navigate and predict the social affordance space that we meet others in. To develop both the critical and positive project I analyze the interpretive choices and the debate surrounding the mirror neuron research and show how the field is marred by highly questionable assumptions about respectively motor and social cognition. The discovery of mirror neurons - and the sensorimotor circuits of which these neurons are a part – actually empirically challenge many of these tacit assumptions. Findings of sensorimotor goal representations at levels of abstraction well beyond actual sensory information and kinetic movements challenge the idea of motor cognition as primarily output production. Additionally, the focus on 3rd person mindreading of hidden mental states is misguiding the field of social cognition. Much ‘mind-reading’ seems rooted in sensorimotor representations and a developmentally primary 2nd person understanding of actions and the mental lives of others, which precisely breaks the assumed dichotomy between mind and behavior. I propose a Social Affordance model where parallel fronto-parietal sensorimotor circuits support representations not just of other people’s actions but of the overall social affordance space. It is a process that monitors concrete goals and teleological possibilities that the environment affords respectively oneself and other present agents. With this model I hypothesize that the complex spectrum of sensorimotor integrations are indeed essential not only to normal action choice calibration but also to social cognitive abilities, as the sensorimotor teleological representations let us relate to others and understand their action choices in a shared pragmatic and intentional context.
Research Interests: Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Action, and 62 morePhilosophy of Science, Perception, Philosophical Psychology, Research Methods and Methodology, Cognitive Architectures, Action Research, Research Methodology, Methodology, Cognitive development, Mirror Neurons, Philosophy of Psychology, Human Motor Behavior, Motor Learning, Cognition, Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Social Cognition, Theory of Mind, Embodiment, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Perception-Action, Henri Bergson, Motor Control, Cognitive Neuropsychology, Context, Metaphysics of Mind, Ecological Psychology, Intentionality, Affordance Theory, Action Theory, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Philosophy of perception, Social Perception, Theory of Mind (Psychology), Cognitive Neuroscience, Teleology, Comparative psychology, Affordances, Action-Perception Coupling, Sensorimotor Neuroscience, Temporality, Simulation, Social affordances, Sensorimotor integration, Modularity of Mind, Mirror neurons and Intersubjectivity, Cortical network, Mirror Neuron System, Mindreading, Social Communication, Action-perception links, Perception and Action, Modularity, Affordance, Motor Intentionality, Embodied knowledge, Action Perception, The Fact/Value Distinction, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, Sensorimotor Approach, Mirror Neuron Systems, and Second Person Perspectives
Anderson suggests that theories of sensorimotor grounding are too narrow to account for his findings of widespread “reuse” supporting multiple different cognitive “task domains.” I call some of the methodological assumptions underlying... more
Anderson suggests that theories of sensorimotor grounding are too narrow to account for his findings of widespread “reuse” supporting multiple different cognitive “task domains.” I call some of the methodological assumptions underlying this conclusion into question, and suggest that his examples reaffirm rather than undermine the special status of sensorimotor processes in cognitive evolution.
Research Interests: Neuroscience, Cognitive Science, Evolutionary Psychology, Human Evolution, Philosophy, and 20 morePhilosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Perception, Cognitive Architectures, Action Research, Research Methodology, Philosophy of Psychology, Cognition, Adaptation, Perception-Action, Evolution, Adaptive Reuse, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Cognitive Neuroscience, Action-Perception Coupling, Evolution and Human Behavior, Philosophy of Neuroscience, Sensorimotor integration, Modularity of Mind, and Perception and Action
The theoretical biologist von Uexküll presented in the early 20th century view of animal and human experience, which through its insistence on relational concepts such as those of “Umwelt” and “functional tones” in many ways can be seen... more
The theoretical biologist von Uexküll presented in the early 20th century view of animal and human experience, which through its insistence on relational concepts such as those of “Umwelt” and “functional tones” in many ways can be seen as an antidote to traditional disembodied and non-contextual philosophical perspectives, and it has been influential particularly in German philosophy, semiotics and more recently in embodied approaches to cognition. Here I discuss Uexkull’s basic ‘functional circle’ schema, which illustrates the idea that both simple and complex organisms must be understood by their actual functional surrounding world (Umwelt). In the investigation of how meaning and goal-directedness can be seen in the organism-surrounding world relation, I will discuss the importance of Uexküll’s idea that the world is experienced as having functional tones – affordances – that relates to the organism's bodily needs and abilities. The body's generalized action history is via the functional tones brought to new situations, and it allows us a practical and forward-looking recognition of the surroundings. But new, unique environmental meetings also constantly change the body's readiness. I argue that in every world meeting there is a dynamic negotiation and mini-conflict resolution, which leeds to a critique of Uexküll’s rather individualistic and inflexible idea of subjective and closed surround worlds that seamlessly intersect. To make sense of Uexkülls basic relational insight, we must rather understand our fundamental openness, dynamic variability and peculiar human intersubjective relations and attraction. Developmental and sociological insights are included to suggest that the objectifying capability of humans might in a broader perspective be understood as based on intersubjective, temporal and bodily involved processes. The point here is that the disembodied hermit understanding of homo sapiens is turned upside down. It appears that the individualistic human ideal in the battle to marginalize the body, women, and vulnerability have succeeded in misunderstanding the relational nature of our humanity and the very ability of objectification and cultural creation.
Research Interests: Semiotics, Evolutionary Biology, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Perception, and 31 moreSituated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Functional Morphology, Social Cognition, Embodiment, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Embedded Systems, Perception-Action, Discrimination, Context, Evolution, Meaning, Normativity, Teleology, Theoretical biology, Umwelt, Jakob von Uexküll, Affordances, Action-Perception Coupling, Social affordances, German Philosophy, Perception and Action, J. J. Gibson, Friction, Philosphical Anthropology, W.E.B. Du Bois, The Fact/Value Distinction, Umwelt Theory, Double Consciousness, DuBois, and Jacob Von Uexküll
This 8 minute talk points to the role of context at multiple levels of life and culture, as well as the tensions this contextuality creates for scientists and philosophers who would have preferred the world to be simpler. However, if the... more
This 8 minute talk points to the role of context at multiple levels of life and culture, as well as the tensions this contextuality creates for scientists and philosophers who would have preferred the world to be simpler. However, if the world is not composed of timeless atoms interacting according to timeless laws, and if contexts do matter to what things inherently are and what they can become, then we need to stop pretending "ceteris paribus" and start studying exactly how each context matters. This is a call for a new kind of science that does not stick its head in the sand. One that faces the epistemolological, ethical & political complexities of both the natural world and our own creative and technological transformations of it.
Research Interests: Genetics, Neuroscience, Psychology, Cognitive Science, Gender Studies, and 38 morePhilosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Ethics, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Biology, Technology, Humanities, Design, Cyborg Theory, Research Methodology, Situated Cognition, Social Cognition, Embodiment, Complexity, Context, Ecological Psychology, Feminism, System Dynamics, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Rationalism, Individualism, Theoretical biology, Reductionism, Rationality, Human nature, Culture and Context, Gender Differences, Organism-Environment System, Modularity, Atomism, Biological Reductionism, The Fact/Value Distinction, Dynamic Systems and Control, Organism-Environment Interactions, Gene Regulation and Epigenetics, Organism environment System, and Anti-reductionism
Research Interests: Sociology and Philosophy
With his 1896 book Matter and Memory Henri Bergson foreshadowed many of the ideas of the contemporary embodied/enactive approach to cognition. He conceptualizes in this work various cognitive abilities in regards to their utility towards... more
With his 1896 book Matter and Memory Henri Bergson foreshadowed many of the ideas of the contemporary embodied/enactive approach to cognition. He conceptualizes in this work various cognitive abilities in regards to their utility towards action, and underlines the importance of sensori-motor integration and coordination both in regards to various forms of perception but also as it pertains to the different types of memory and what we would now call semantic knowledge. However, he also makes the offhanded suggestion that language should be seen as an artificially constructed motor system and thus he suggests that like our regular motor system language functions as a tool to interpret perception and as a determining framework for our actions. It is this claim that I shall focus on in my paper. I think there are a series of interesting implications in this idea of language as a constructed motor system, especially given the wider theoretical context of sensory-motor integration groundi...
Research Interests:
We are living in a time of radical digital change. Disruptions to the status quo are celebrated. Most of us are in certain respects at least enamored by some of the new technological tools and possibilities. How these changes should be... more
We are living in a time of radical digital change. Disruptions to the status quo are celebrated. Most of us are in certain respects at least enamored by some of the new technological tools and possibilities. How these changes should be understood remains unclear and controversial. Digital realms have turned the neat divisions of disciplines upside down and given ample evidence for the importance of new thinking about complex contemporary challenges. Rapid developments in digitalization in virtually every area of human life has fractured established divisions between fields of philosophy. Insightful philosophical analyses of the new digital challenges may require reinventing philosophical methods and categories which cut across traditional fields of ethics, political philosophy, epistemology and metaphysics. Epistemological tools and ways of comprehending specific changes in the current world need to be developed as digitalization influences interactions between individual human beings, advances the digital structures of social media and digital economies, and alters grounding assumptions of democratic rule. For these reasons contributions are invited under the open ended theme of Philosophy and Digitalization. Our hope is that such contributions will offer original ways to consider and assess the implications of the digital era for humans existentially, for our roles as responsible citizens, and our abilities to act as cognizant beings and so on. Contributions on issues such as privacy, 'fake news', 'swarming' of public opinion prompted by social media, and broader epistemic behavioral patterns, structures of digital economies, challenges for democracy and social life, as well as basic questions about the nature and interrelations between the analog and the digital are welcome. Reflecting on how to philosophize about digitalization will create and reshape inquiries about human understanding and our place in the world.