Department of Philosophy

Existentialism mainly lacks an ethical theory, because it is subject-centered.
So for instance the duty to decide and the responsibility for one's decisions are strictly and solely bound to each single subject. There seems to be no (theoretical) connection between the single subjects. Nevertheless there is a common way of acting which follows from the subject‘s reaction to the existential challenges like the own‘s or other‘s death, fear, illness or pain. But it is an insight of the philosophy of language that every way of acting produces its own dependent Weltbild consisting of a common ground of undoubted beliefs (including values). In conclusion, every individual way of getting along with the world finally leads to a change of the Weltbild and thereby influences the common values. Finally, the Weltbild is dependent on the subject‘s intention of acting. So an ethics of motives seems to suit best existentialism.

The concept of the dignity of man has often been attacked as being a loose concept. This has its reasons in the fact that the dignity of man is usually construed either as referring to a certain object called “dignity” or as being dependent on common agreement (consensus). In both cases serious objections can be made since on the one hand the existence of an object as the dignity of man seems quite hard to proof and on the other hand consensus is no appropriate criterion to establish the meaning of a concept, because it is quite arbitrary. Moreover, the dignity of man is a concept that conversely is intended to influence the way a society establishes concepts itself. Thus, both ways of explaining the meaning of the dignity of man seem to fail.
The philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and especially his thoughts on language games and family resemblance might lead the way to a reliable foundation of the dignity of man. First of all Wittgenstein has shown that the meaning of a word is its use in the language. From that it follows that all concepts gain their meaning in dependence on the respective language-users. In this way concepts are not arbitrary, in spite of their meaning coming from some kind of consensus.  That is because in Wittgenstein´s view it is not the language that adjusts to the world, but the language that in some way makes the world. In his early work he pointed out that the borders of one`s language are the borders of one`s world. So it is the society that construes to some degree the world they live in. In such a world, for instance, it is a big difference whether a concept like that of the dignity of man exists or not. With this said it is still not quite clear why and how the concept of the dignity of man could make its way into a language. A possible explanation could be derived from some thoughts of the German philosopher Hans Blumenberg. He invented the concept of an “absolute metaphor” (absolute Metapher). Usually metaphors, he says, can be translated into the concepts they stand for, they are just a kind of picture. Such metaphors can at least be understood after being translated into concepts. Absolute metaphors, Blumenberg states, cannot be resolved into concepts – they gain an independent existence. For instance the way the concept of light is bound to truth is an absolute metaphor. Phrases like “shedding light on” or “to illuminate facts” elucidate (sic!) Blumenberg`s point. I will argue that the concept of the dignity of man is such an absolute metaphor. It does not refer to an object in the world, but it also does not solely depend on an arbitrary consensus. People “invented”, so to speak, this absolute metaphor to structure their world picture. The dignity of man is an answer to the question, what man is (or at least, what people want him to be).

There has been a long dispute concerning the status of ethical sentences. Are they empirical or, if not, merely conventional? This question is important, because for instance from a ethical conventionalism a ethical relativism would follow challenging the whole concept of moral obligation.
Wittgenstein’s epistemological remarks help to understand the role of ethical sentences within our life.

In his Philosophical Investigations (PI) Wittgenstein claims that „the meaning of a word is its use in the language“ (PI §43). The word’s use emerges from the practice it is connected with within a language game (PI, §7). While they are doing certain things the language-gamers („as they go along“, PI, §83) invent concepts and also rules  to use them correctly initially within primitive language games. Although these concepts are linked to the empirical world via the common practice, the use and therefore the meaning of the concepts itself are conventional. The meaning of ethical sentences or concepts also has its origin in such language games.
There are certain kinds of sentences. Empirical sentences (a) tell us something about the world. They can be doubted, validated, and in consequence turn out to be right or wrong. Distinct from empirical sentences are grammatical sentences (b) (Wittgenstein refers to them as „nonsens“). They explain how to use words correctly, like: „Every rod has a length“ (PI, §251). These sentences can neither be doubted nor validated nor turn out to be right or wrong. However, the point of On Certainty (OC) is that there are sentences (c) which can be formally doubted like „I have two hands“, but which, in fact, are never doubted, because it would be completely strange to do so. There is no reason to doubt these sentences. They are self-evident. Finally there are sentences (d) which are empirical, but haven’t been validated by the individual yet so that he believes them, because someone told him so or he learned them.
Especially c-, but also d-sentences constitute a world-picture. A world-picture is not true or false, because „I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false“ (OC, §94). The sentences which constitute the world-picture „might be part of a kind of mythology“ (OC, §95). Thus, „an entire mythology is stored within or language“ (Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, 133). Speaking a language therefore always means working on one’s world-picture – the way one sees the world.

I will argue that ethical sentences are no grammatical sentences (b) as it is possible to doubt them. But they are also no empirical sentences (a) as they do not tell us anything about the world (Lecture on Ethics)
As a subclass of (c) they constitute our world-picture und therefore the way we see the world and react to it. Though, ethics is less a system of prescriptions, but rather an constant struggle for how we want to live. In this sense Wittgenstein’s early comment: „The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man“ (TLP, 6.43) becomes understandable.

The concept of the dignity of man has often been attacked as being a loose concept. This has its reasons mainly in the fact that this concept is usually construed either as referring to a certain object or as being dependent on common agreement (consensus). In both cases serious objections can be made since on the one hand the existence of an object as the dignity of man seems quite hard to proof and on the other hand consensus is no appropriate criterion to establish the meaning of a concept, because it is quite arbitrary. Moreover, the dignity of man is a concept that conversely is intended to influence the way a society establishes concepts itself. Thus, both ways of explaining the meaning of the dignity of man seem to fail.
The philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and especially his thoughts on language games and family resemblance might lead the way to a reliable foundation of the dignity of man.
According to Wittgenstein there are certain kinds of sentences. Empirical sentences (a) tell us something about the world. They can be doubted, validated, and turn out to be right or wrong. Distinct from empirical sentences are so called grammatical sentences (b). They explain how to use words correctly, like: „Every rod has a length“ (PI, §251). These sentences can neither be doubted nor validated nor turn out to be right or wrong. However, the point of On Certainty (OC) is that there are sentences (c) which can be formally doubted like „I have two hands“, but which, in fact, are never doubted, because there is no reason to doubt them. They are self-evident. Finally there are sentences (d) which are empirical, but haven’t been validated by the individual yet so that he believes them, because someone told him so or he learned them.
Especially c-, but also d-sentences constitute a world-picture. A world-picture is not true or false, because „I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false“ (OC, §94). The sentences which constitute the world-picture „might be part of a kind of mythology“ (OC, §95). Thus, „an entire mythology is stored within or language“ (RFGB, 133). Speaking a language therefore always means working on one’s world-picture.

I will argue that ethical concepts like especially the dignity of man are a subclass of (c). As „absolute metaphors“ (Blumenberg) they constitute our world-picture und therefore the way we see the world and react to it. Though, ethics is less a system of prescriptions, but rather a constant struggle for how we want to live. In this sense Wittgenstein’s early comment: „The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man“ (TLP, 6.43) becomes understandable notably with regard to the dignity of man.

According to Wittgenstein's claim that our "seeing a thing as" is strongly dependent on what he calls "world-picture" and vice versa, motion pictures present "surveyable representations" of our world-picture and therefore influence the way we see the world. Insofar as understanding means to see coherences, motion pictures help humans understand world-pictures. But the insights imparted by motion pictures are not of a mere cognitive kind, since motion pictures do not present arguments. By making use of imaginative identification they have such an impact on humans that they directly "embody" insights and thereby changing what is accepted as knowledge within a world-picture.

According to a dogma mainly set up by Heidegger and Horkheimer/Adorno technology prevents the humans from reflecting their own situation in the world. Revealing the conditions of being is not only every humans main task, but even that of philosophy and art. From this point of view the motion picture taken to be merely a piece of technology is not of any worth philosophically and also not considered as art. This dogma is false. It is derived from the assertion that a motion picture has only technical aspects. Indeed it would be impossible to produce it without technology. But a film expresses it‘s director‘s view of the world. This is not systematically different from what an author or composer does with his works. A Film can show why and how artifacts are used and thereby reveal and maybe explain what I call an artifact‘s history of sense. This makes a view of the world understandable