Religion, Vol. 51, Issue 2, 2021, pp. 331-333.
This very impressive monograph is a detailed study of accounts of near-death experiences (NDEs) a... more This very impressive monograph is a detailed study of accounts of near-death experiences (NDEs) and how they function as esoteric religious discourse(s). Schlieter identifies six factors that coalesce to produce the NDE in the second half of the twentieth century: institutionalisation and medicalisation of death; drug experimentation to bring on psychedelic experiences; individualised religious experiences; the revival of esoteric discourses in the New Age; yoga and Indian ecstatic practices, mediated by Theosophy; and the popular “reception of the so- called Tibetan Book of the Dead” (p. xvii). Some factors are individual, but others are societal. It is more or less certain that a person’s orientation to death and any experience of being close to death is inevitably linked to their values and experiences of life. Schlieter’s argument is orderly, well-supported by research, and is presented in five sections. The primary mode of investigation is through the examination of texts that describe NDEs and similar/related instances of non-ordinary consciousness. Schlieter is very aware that accounts of experiences are not identical to the experiences, and that there is considerable latitude in the interpretation of accounts; he compensates by paying attention to “the narrative structure of the reports and the metaphors used” (p. xxxi).
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Papers by Jens Schlieter
conceptions of consciousness which presuppose a mind capable of
radiating empathy, love and compassion, thus, concepts of a mind
actually reaching other people's minds. These aspects, in conflict with Western readings of "protestant Buddhism," allow to illustrate philosophical views on consciousness, reality, and the "monadic self," which diverge from Western views on the limits of the mind and its subjective cognitive emotions.
transformative experiences, such as L.A. Paul, Taves, and Wierzbicka, this chapter argues for the relevance of religiosity for the understanding of what is it that makes experiences life changing. My thesis is that an understanding of the finite, mortal existence as (actually) ultimately infinite, immortal or part of a meaningful whole constitutes the quintessential transformative experience. Only such experiences can be understood as truly transformative and life changing. Furthermore, such experiences should always be
framed in an autobiographical background, which integrates them into a long line of earlier autobiographical experiences. Using various case studies, this chapter shows how intentionality and a pre-existing expectation of the transformation often play a crucial role in the evaluation of potentially transformative experiences. From this it concludes that even religious experiences—often believed to be instantaneous and unintentional—can always be traced back to an individual’s biography. Transformative experiences in this regard should be seen as resulting from accumulated knowledge (throughout one’s life) rather than being singular, one-time extraordinary events.
In the wake of the globalization of modern Western biomedicine and bioethics, Buddhists felt the need for moral action-guides that provide orientation in ethical dilemmas posed by modern biomedicine. Thus, in the 1980s, Asian Buddhists began to develop distinct Buddhist moral action-guides on issues of selective abortion, stem cell research, genetic enhancement, brain death and organ transplantation from brain-dead donors, and physician-assisted suicide. From the 1990s onward, they were joined by a growing number of Western scholars. Buddhist ethicists emphasize the importance of starting from venture points considerably distinct from Western bioethics: Firstly, they are traditionally less concerned with human dignity and human rights. Instead, with a focus on salvific cultivation, karma, and nonviolence, they predominantly reflect the moral quality of the actor’s intentions, leading to additional suffering in this life or the next. Secondly, bioethics, in harmony with Buddhist ethics in general, is understood as moral cultivation, which puts less emphasis on justification of ethics than on the quality of actual actions. Thirdly, on the one hand Buddhist bioethical reasoning includes aspects such as the harmful “self-centeredness,” while on the other hand it declares compassion to be the core value, including an awareness of the universal interdependence of all forms of sentient existence.
In the 1980s, pioneering scholars of Buddhist bioethics Shōyō Taniguchi and Pinit Ratanakul began to outline ethical foundations of Buddhist bioethics. While both suggested that Buddhist ethics are in principle capable of providing orientation in all forms of bioethical dilemmas, their approaches differed considerably, for example regarding the duty of doctors to disclose fatal diagnoses. Dissent on this duty, which is emphasized by Ratanakul but relativized by Taniguchi, reflects not only cultural differences but also the latter’s inclusion of Mahāyāna Buddhist ethics of the bodhisattva’s “skillful means.” Based on a famous Western approach, Ratanakul was the first to outline a system of four principles or duties of Buddhist bioethical reasoning: veracity, noninjury to life (ahiṃsā), justice, and compassion (karuṇā). However, it was a Western scholar, Damien Keown, who in 1995 presented the first book-length treatise to cover almost all major bioethical issues, from embryo research to euthanasia for the terminally ill. Keown argued for a neo-Aristotelian virtue-ethics approach and distilled three basic goods from Buddhist canonical texts. This helped to modernize and transform Buddhist ethics into an operational system of Buddhist bioethics. It is argued that there is an equivalent to human dignity in Buddhism, namely the infinite capacity to participate in goodness, or the potential to reach buddhahood. In this vein, the function of human rights lies in providing a suitable environment for individuals to gradually realize this potentiality. Well into the new millennium, more works on Buddhist ethics appeared in which Western scholars of Buddhism included Tibetan Mahāyāna ethical reasoning (Karma Lekshe Tsomo), reconstrued Buddhist ethics as consequentialism (Charles Goodman), or explored the global variety of Buddhist ethical reasoning (Peter Harvey). Probably the most important contemporary controversy in Buddhist bioethics pertains to the question whether killing out of compassion can in certain circumstances be justified. According to a traditional evaluation of cetanā (intention), it has been argued that the intention to kill cannot coexist with a compassionate intention, whereas others concluded that in regard to both embryonic life and the treatment of terminally ill patients there is room for ethically justifiable options. During the 2010s the global as well as Buddhist discourse on bioethics saw a certain consolidation, but will likely gain momentum again—for example, should genome-edited babies become common practice.
Explaining the rise of moralizing religions: a test of competing hypotheses using the Seshat Databank, by
Peter Turchin, Harvey Whitehouse, Jennifer Larson, et al.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/2153599X.2022.2065345?src=
Big Gods and big science: further reflections on theory, data, and analysis
Peter Turchin, Harvey Whitehouse, Jennifer Larson et al.,
https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2022.2065354
Testing the Big Gods hypothesis with global historical data: a review and “retake”
Harvey Whitehouse et al., https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2022.2074085
conceptions of consciousness which presuppose a mind capable of
radiating empathy, love and compassion, thus, concepts of a mind
actually reaching other people's minds. These aspects, in conflict with Western readings of "protestant Buddhism," allow to illustrate philosophical views on consciousness, reality, and the "monadic self," which diverge from Western views on the limits of the mind and its subjective cognitive emotions.
transformative experiences, such as L.A. Paul, Taves, and Wierzbicka, this chapter argues for the relevance of religiosity for the understanding of what is it that makes experiences life changing. My thesis is that an understanding of the finite, mortal existence as (actually) ultimately infinite, immortal or part of a meaningful whole constitutes the quintessential transformative experience. Only such experiences can be understood as truly transformative and life changing. Furthermore, such experiences should always be
framed in an autobiographical background, which integrates them into a long line of earlier autobiographical experiences. Using various case studies, this chapter shows how intentionality and a pre-existing expectation of the transformation often play a crucial role in the evaluation of potentially transformative experiences. From this it concludes that even religious experiences—often believed to be instantaneous and unintentional—can always be traced back to an individual’s biography. Transformative experiences in this regard should be seen as resulting from accumulated knowledge (throughout one’s life) rather than being singular, one-time extraordinary events.
In the wake of the globalization of modern Western biomedicine and bioethics, Buddhists felt the need for moral action-guides that provide orientation in ethical dilemmas posed by modern biomedicine. Thus, in the 1980s, Asian Buddhists began to develop distinct Buddhist moral action-guides on issues of selective abortion, stem cell research, genetic enhancement, brain death and organ transplantation from brain-dead donors, and physician-assisted suicide. From the 1990s onward, they were joined by a growing number of Western scholars. Buddhist ethicists emphasize the importance of starting from venture points considerably distinct from Western bioethics: Firstly, they are traditionally less concerned with human dignity and human rights. Instead, with a focus on salvific cultivation, karma, and nonviolence, they predominantly reflect the moral quality of the actor’s intentions, leading to additional suffering in this life or the next. Secondly, bioethics, in harmony with Buddhist ethics in general, is understood as moral cultivation, which puts less emphasis on justification of ethics than on the quality of actual actions. Thirdly, on the one hand Buddhist bioethical reasoning includes aspects such as the harmful “self-centeredness,” while on the other hand it declares compassion to be the core value, including an awareness of the universal interdependence of all forms of sentient existence.
In the 1980s, pioneering scholars of Buddhist bioethics Shōyō Taniguchi and Pinit Ratanakul began to outline ethical foundations of Buddhist bioethics. While both suggested that Buddhist ethics are in principle capable of providing orientation in all forms of bioethical dilemmas, their approaches differed considerably, for example regarding the duty of doctors to disclose fatal diagnoses. Dissent on this duty, which is emphasized by Ratanakul but relativized by Taniguchi, reflects not only cultural differences but also the latter’s inclusion of Mahāyāna Buddhist ethics of the bodhisattva’s “skillful means.” Based on a famous Western approach, Ratanakul was the first to outline a system of four principles or duties of Buddhist bioethical reasoning: veracity, noninjury to life (ahiṃsā), justice, and compassion (karuṇā). However, it was a Western scholar, Damien Keown, who in 1995 presented the first book-length treatise to cover almost all major bioethical issues, from embryo research to euthanasia for the terminally ill. Keown argued for a neo-Aristotelian virtue-ethics approach and distilled three basic goods from Buddhist canonical texts. This helped to modernize and transform Buddhist ethics into an operational system of Buddhist bioethics. It is argued that there is an equivalent to human dignity in Buddhism, namely the infinite capacity to participate in goodness, or the potential to reach buddhahood. In this vein, the function of human rights lies in providing a suitable environment for individuals to gradually realize this potentiality. Well into the new millennium, more works on Buddhist ethics appeared in which Western scholars of Buddhism included Tibetan Mahāyāna ethical reasoning (Karma Lekshe Tsomo), reconstrued Buddhist ethics as consequentialism (Charles Goodman), or explored the global variety of Buddhist ethical reasoning (Peter Harvey). Probably the most important contemporary controversy in Buddhist bioethics pertains to the question whether killing out of compassion can in certain circumstances be justified. According to a traditional evaluation of cetanā (intention), it has been argued that the intention to kill cannot coexist with a compassionate intention, whereas others concluded that in regard to both embryonic life and the treatment of terminally ill patients there is room for ethically justifiable options. During the 2010s the global as well as Buddhist discourse on bioethics saw a certain consolidation, but will likely gain momentum again—for example, should genome-edited babies become common practice.
Explaining the rise of moralizing religions: a test of competing hypotheses using the Seshat Databank, by
Peter Turchin, Harvey Whitehouse, Jennifer Larson, et al.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/2153599X.2022.2065345?src=
Big Gods and big science: further reflections on theory, data, and analysis
Peter Turchin, Harvey Whitehouse, Jennifer Larson et al.,
https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2022.2065354
Testing the Big Gods hypothesis with global historical data: a review and “retake”
Harvey Whitehouse et al., https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2022.2074085
Joseph Azize, in Numen 66 (2020), 5-6, 611-5
Egil Asprem, in Journal of Contemporary Religion 34 (2019), 382-4
Markus Altena Davidsen, in Reading Religion (2019), http://readingreligion.org/books/what-it-be-dead;
Gregory Shushan, in Journal of Near-Death Studies 38, 2 (2020), 101-131; Simon Cox, in Aries, 20, 2 (2020), 299-302
Bruce Wollenberg, Theology and Science, 2020, DOI: 10.1080/14746700.2020.1825198;
Michael Nahm, Journal of Parapsychology 84, 2 (2020), 314-317
Носачев Павел (Pavel Nosachev), НАРРАТИВНЫЙ ПОДХОД К ИЗУЧЕНИЮ ОКОЛОСМЕРТНОГО ОПЫТА. Рец. на: Schlieter, … (Narrative Approach to the Study of Near Death Experience: Review of …); 162-168
Mitherausgeber: Jens Schlieter und Tina Lauer
Darüber sprachen Isabel Laack (Universität Tübingen), Jonathan Fine (Weltmuseum Wien), Samuel Bachmann (Historisches Museum Bern) und Jens Schlieter (Universität Bern) bei einem Roundtable-Gespräch im Rahmen der Ringvorlesung zum Thema Provenienzforschung an der Universität Bern.
In this episode, we discuss definitions of Near Death Experiences, how one might study reports of such experiences from a critical study of religion perspective, how such reports are related to modern societal developments such as ‘secularization’, individualization, and advances in medical science, as well as the impact of ‘religious’ meta-cultures upon these reports and the potential ‘religious’ functions they appear to serve.