Francesco Orilia
University of Macerata, Filosofia e scienze umane, Faculty Member
- Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy Of Language, Ontology, Philosophy of Logic, Philosophical Logic, Metaphysics, and 13 moreMetaphysics of Time, Philosophy of Time, Logic And Foundations Of Mathematics, Intentionality, Philosophical Psychology, Negation, Metaontology, Philosophy, Meaning, Beliefs, Bertrand Russell, Definition, and Metaphysics of propertiesedit
- I studied at the University of Palermo (M.A. in philosophy, 1979) and at Indiana University (Ph.D. in Philosophy, 19... moreI studied at the University of Palermo (M.A. in philosophy, 1979) and at Indiana University (Ph.D. in Philosophy, 1986).
Since 1997 I teach at the Università of Macerata.
My main research interests are in analytic ontology and the philosophy of language, time, mind and logic.edit
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Published on demand by University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, MI, U.S.A., 1986 (pp. ix + 253) (DAI V47(08), SecA, pp3069. University Microfilms Order Number ADG86-28010. Philosophy) http://dissexpress.umi.com/dxweb#results... more
Published on demand by University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, MI, U.S.A., 1986 (pp. ix + 253) (DAI V47(08), SecA, pp3069. University Microfilms Order Number ADG86-28010. Philosophy)
http://dissexpress.umi.com/dxweb#results
(Abstract published in Computational Linguistics, 13, nn. 1-2, January-June 1987, pp. 157-158; available at
http://www.aclweb.org/anthology-new/J/J87/J87-1020.pdf) (see the attached file)
http://dissexpress.umi.com/dxweb#results
(Abstract published in Computational Linguistics, 13, nn. 1-2, January-June 1987, pp. 157-158; available at
http://www.aclweb.org/anthology-new/J/J87/J87-1020.pdf) (see the attached file)
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Traditionally, we distinguish between relations and their converses, e.g., above and below or before and after. This distinction poses a dilemma. Is a relation really distinct from its converse or are they one and the same? There are... more
Traditionally, we distinguish between relations and their converses, e.g., above and below or before and after. This distinction poses a dilemma. Is a relation really distinct from its converse or are they one and the same? There are contrasting arguments that favor one or the other reply, both of them in Russell, who first opted for the former (in Principles of Mathematics) and then for the latter (in Theory of Knowledge). Since then accounts of relations that side with one or the other option have flourished. A hybrid approach to properties and relations (attributes), according to which there are both sparse and abundant attributes is here offered as a way out of the dilemma: distinct converses are acknowledged at the semantic or propositional level of abundant attributes, and rejected at the truthmaker or ontological level of sparse attributes. A positionalist account of relations is also adopted, role positionalism, according to which positions are understood as roles, which are ontological or semantic counterparts of the thematic roles invoked in linguistics. In this way, distinct abundant converses differ because of the different roles involved in them, but they are intimately connected in that they correspond to a single sparse relation.
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This paper provides a critical analysis of Y. Dolev, Time and Realism (2007). It is argued that, in spite of a ‘post-ontological’ or ‘phenomenological’ official stance, Dolev's account of the present implicitly commits him to a form of... more
This paper provides a critical analysis of Y. Dolev, Time and Realism (2007). It is argued that, in spite of a ‘post-ontological’ or ‘phenomenological’ official stance, Dolev's account of the present implicitly commits him to a form of eternalism. A different account of the present is also defended, in line with a moderate version of presentism.
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This paper provides my earliest defense of fact infinitism, which exploits Bradley’s regress to provide an account of the unity of states of affairs. I wrote this paper in March 2003. It was never published, but was posted in my... more
This paper provides my earliest defense of fact infinitism, which exploits Bradley’s regress to provide an account of the unity of states of affairs. I wrote this paper in March 2003. It was never published, but was posted in my university internet site for a while and attracted some attention. Some people have even cited it in their publications. I have thus decided to make it available again.
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This paper first discusses how Russell and Hochberg have addressed some phenomena of relatedness, notably relational order, in a similarly “positionalist” way, but by appealing to different sorts of formal relations: “positions” in... more
This paper first discusses how Russell and Hochberg have addressed some phenomena of relatedness, notably relational order, in a similarly “positionalist” way, but by appealing to different sorts of formal relations: “positions” in Russell’s case and “ordering relations” in Hochberg’s. After pointing out some shortcomings of both approaches, the paper then proposes an alternative view based on “o-roles,” which are, roughly speaking, ontological counterparts of the thematic roles postulated in linguistics. It is argued that o-roles are sort of middle-of-the-road entities in the sense that they have the virtues of positions and those of ordering relations, without having their respective vices. Some tentative ideas on which o-roles should be acknowledged are also put forward.
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This paper outlines a version of instantaneous presentism, according to which the present is a point-like instant, and defends it from two prominent objections. The first one has to do with the difficulty of accounting, from the point of... more
This paper outlines a version of instantaneous presentism, according to which the present is a point-like instant, and defends it from two prominent objections. The first one has to do with the difficulty of accounting, from the point of view of instantaneous presentism, for the existence of events that take time,
dynamic
events, which cannot be confined to a single instant. The second objection is of a Zenonian nature and arises once time is viewed as a continuum that can be subdivided ad infinitum. In response to the first problem, it is argued that the presentist can appeal to past and future instants as long as it is not assumed that there are events that occur at them. Once they are granted, one can then appeal to "past-oriented" and "future-oriented" properties such as *was P at t* (or *will be P at t*), where t is a past or future instant, in order to view dynamic events as occurring at the present instant. In response to the second problem, one must accept the idea that, as a new instant becomes present, there is no preceding instant which is immediately past. There can only be infinitely many past instants with increasingly lower degrees of pastness.
dynamic
events, which cannot be confined to a single instant. The second objection is of a Zenonian nature and arises once time is viewed as a continuum that can be subdivided ad infinitum. In response to the first problem, it is argued that the presentist can appeal to past and future instants as long as it is not assumed that there are events that occur at them. Once they are granted, one can then appeal to "past-oriented" and "future-oriented" properties such as *was P at t* (or *will be P at t*), where t is a past or future instant, in order to view dynamic events as occurring at the present instant. In response to the second problem, one must accept the idea that, as a new instant becomes present, there is no preceding instant which is immediately past. There can only be infinitely many past instants with increasingly lower degrees of pastness.
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It is customary in current philosophy of time to distinguish between an A- (or tensed) and a B- (or tenseless) theory of time. It is also customary to distinguish between an old B-theory of time, and a new B-theory of time. We may say... more
It is customary in current philosophy of time to distinguish between an A- (or tensed) and a B- (or tenseless) theory of time. It is also customary to distinguish between an old B-theory of time, and a new B-theory of time. We may say that the former holds both semantic atensionalism and ontological atensionalism, whereas the latter gives up semantic atensionalism and retains ontological atensionalism. It is typically assumed that the B-theorists have been induced by advances in the philosophy of language and related A-theorists’ criticisms to acknowledge that semantic atensionalism can hardly stand, but have also maintained that what is essential for the B-theory is ontological atensionalism, which can be independently defended. Here it is argued that the B-theorists have been too quick in abandoning semantic atensionalism: they can still cling to it.
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Research Interests: Presentism and Realism
Castañeda’s guise theory is a peculiarly interesting Neo-Meinongian approach, in virtue of its bundle-theoretic and anti-representationalist features. But it also has some problematic aspects. It crucially relies on a series of... more
Castañeda’s guise theory is a peculiarly interesting Neo-Meinongian
approach, in virtue of its bundle-theoretic and anti-representationalist
features. But it also has some problematic aspects. It crucially relies on a
series of sameness relations, such as consubstantiation or consociation,
but this list is incomplete. Moreover, guise theory is hindered by its view
of the sameness relations as forms of predication alternative to what may
be called, following Plantinga, standard predication. This paper thus
proposes a revised version of guise theory that acknowledges two
additional sameness relations and standard predication.
approach, in virtue of its bundle-theoretic and anti-representationalist
features. But it also has some problematic aspects. It crucially relies on a
series of sameness relations, such as consubstantiation or consociation,
but this list is incomplete. Moreover, guise theory is hindered by its view
of the sameness relations as forms of predication alternative to what may
be called, following Plantinga, standard predication. This paper thus
proposes a revised version of guise theory that acknowledges two
additional sameness relations and standard predication.
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I shall explain the notions of propositions and states of affairs as they are understood in the current ontological debate and I shall briefly relate them to similar notions in Aristotle and some Medieval authors. In contrast with the... more
I shall explain the notions of propositions and states of affairs as they are understood in the current ontological debate and I shall briefly relate them to similar notions in Aristotle and some Medieval authors. In contrast with the point of view of some philosophers (e.g., the early Russell, Castañeda and Gaskin) who identify propositions and states of affairs, I shall argue that they need to be sharply distinguished. I shall then move on to a problem for propositions and, above all, states of affairs, known as
Bradley's regress, and hint at discussions of this or analogous puzzles in the philosophical tradition before Bradley. Finally, I shall present my own approach to this issue, Fact Infinitism, focusing on why it would have been hardly acceptable before ontology came to have the Cantorian conception of the infinite at its disposal.
Bradley's regress, and hint at discussions of this or analogous puzzles in the philosophical tradition before Bradley. Finally, I shall present my own approach to this issue, Fact Infinitism, focusing on why it would have been hardly acceptable before ontology came to have the Cantorian conception of the infinite at its disposal.
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There are many data suggesting that we should acknowledge fictional entities in our ontological inventory, in spite of the paraphrasing strategies that Russell’s theory of descriptions can offer. Thus the realist attitude toward fictional... more
There are many data suggesting that we should acknowledge fictional entities in our ontological inventory, in spite of the paraphrasing strategies that Russell’s theory of descriptions can offer. Thus the realist attitude toward fictional entities of Meinongian and artifactualist accounts may seem well-motivated. Yet, these approaches infringe the Russellian “robust sense of reality.” A different realist account is proposed here, one that is compatible with the Russellian “robust sense of reality” in that it identifies fictional entities with denoting concepts, understood as properties of properties.
Research Interests: Ontology and Fictionality
Dynamic events such as a rolling ball moving from one place to another involve change and time intervals and thus presumably successions of static events occurring one after the other, e.g., the ball’s being at a certain place and then at... more
Dynamic events such as a rolling ball moving from one place to another involve change and time intervals and thus presumably successions of static events occurring one after the other, e.g., the ball’s being at a certain place and then at another place during the interval in question. When dynamic events are experienced they should count as present and thus as existent from a presentist point of view. But this seems to imply the existence of the static events involved in them. This in turn seems to imply that there exist past and perhaps even future static events. Therefore, there is a problem for presentism. A possible way out for the presentist is proposed, based on allowing for time-indexed past-oriented and future-oriented properties. One may raise objections regarding the ontological status of these properties and the commitment to past and future objects and times that they seem to bring with them, but these objections can be put to rest.
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... Swoyer 1999; for qualms about an explanatory recourse to properties, see Quine 1961, 10; Quinton 1973, 295). ... To fix ideas, we will note several of the most common explanations philosophers have asked properties to provide (for a... more
... Swoyer 1999; for qualms about an explanatory recourse to properties, see Quine 1961, 10; Quinton 1973, 295). ... To fix ideas, we will note several of the most common explanations philosophers have asked properties to provide (for a longer list see Swoyer 1999, §3). ...
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States of affairs involving a non-symmetric relation such as loving are said to have a relational order, something that distinguishes, for instance, Romeo’s loving Juliet from Juliet’s loving Romeo. Relational order can be properly... more
States of affairs involving a non-symmetric relation such as loving are said to have a relational order, something that distinguishes, for instance, Romeo’s loving Juliet from Juliet’s loving Romeo. Relational order can be properly understood by appealing to o-roles, i.e., ontological counterparts of what linguists call thematic roles, e.g., agent, patient, instrument, and the like. This move allows us to meet the appropriate desiderata for a theory of relational order. In contrast, the main theories that try to do without o-roles, proposed by philosophers such as Russell, Hochberg, and Fine, are in trouble with one or another of these desiderata. After discussing some alternatives, it is proposed that o-roles are best viewed as very generic properties characterizable as ways in which objects jointly exemplify a relation. This makes for exemplification relations understood as complex entities having o-roles as building blocks.
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Some fictional stories are conveyed with both words and pictures. This paper proposesan account of how this is possible. It does so by (i) viewing stories as propositions and (ii) indicating a way in which a propositional content can be... more
Some fictional stories are conveyed with both words and pictures. This paper proposesan account of how this is possible. It does so by (i) viewing stories as propositions and (ii) indicating a way in which a propositional content can be attributed to a picture. The account avoids a commitmentto a domain of fictional characters or Meinongian objects by a recourse to denoting concepts. Howeverthis aspect of the proposal could be easily modified, if desired
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A version of Bradley's regress can be endorsed in an effort to address the problem of the unity of states of affairs or facts, thereby arriving at a doctrine that I have called fact infinitism. A consequence of it is the denial of the... more
A version of Bradley's regress can be endorsed in an effort to address the problem of the unity of states of affairs or facts, thereby arriving at a doctrine that I have called fact infinitism. A consequence of it is the denial of the thesis, WF, that all chains of ontological dependence are well-founded or grounded. Cameron has recently rejected fact infinitism by arguing that WF, albeit not necessarily true, is however contingently true. Here fact infinitism is supported by showing that Cameron's argument for the contingent truth of WF is unsuccessful.
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In basic ontology philosophers dispute inter alia about the nature of properties and events.Two main rival views can be identified in the current debate. According to universalism, properties are universals and events are structured... more
In basic ontology philosophers dispute inter alia about the nature of properties and events.Two main rival views can be identified in the current debate. According to universalism, properties are universals and events are structured entities involving as constituents (in a typical case) a particular, a property qua universal and a time. In contrast, according to tropism, properties are tropes, abstract particulars that can also be viewed as events. This paper analyzes the resources that these two doctrines can offer in an attempt to construct a non- reductivist physicalist account of the mental that accommodates multiple realizability without falling prey to epiphenomenalism (in short, NENRP). The tropist resources allow for success by means of a strategy leading to a non- unitarian doctrine. This rules out the unitarian idea, according to which creatures with important physical differences can still have the very same experiences. This tropist strategy can be “simulated” in a version of universalism, with the same non-unitarian consequences. However, from the perspective of another, more natural, version of universalism, one can perhaps find another avenue for NENRP, which brings with it a unitarian point of view. The resulting approach strongly suggests, in contrast to one based on tropism, the possibility of something like self-acquaintance as understood by philosophers such as Russell or Chisholm. In sum, the paper shows ways in which basic ontology matters in philosophy of mind.
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In line with much current literature, Bradley’s regress is here discussed as an argument that casts doubt on the existence of states of affairs or facts, understood as complex entities working as truthmakers for true sentences or... more
In line with much current literature, Bradley’s regress is here discussed as an argument that casts doubt on the existence of states of affairs or facts, understood as complex entities working as truthmakers for true sentences or propositions. One should distinguish two versions of Bradley’s regress, which stem from two different tentative explanations of the unity of states of affairs. The first version actually shows that the corresponding explanation is incoherent; the second one merely points to some prima facie implausible consequences of the explanation it stems from, e.g., that there are infinite explanatory chains and that, for any given fact, there are infinitely many facts involving exemplification relations of increasing levels. But these consequences can be swal- lowed after all, thereby leading to the acceptance of a doctrine which may be called fact infinitism, a doctrine adumbrated in a well-known discussion of relations by Meinong.
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There have been attempts to derive anti-haeccetistic conclusions from the fact that quantum mechanics (QM) appeals to non-standard statistics. Since in fact QM acknowledges two kinds of such statistics, Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac, I... more
There have been attempts to derive anti-haeccetistic conclusions from the fact that quantum mechanics (QM) appeals to non-standard statistics. Since in fact QM acknowledges two kinds of such statistics, Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac, I argue that we could in the same vein derive the sharper anti-haeccetistic conclusion that bosons are bundles of tropes and fermions are bundles of universals. Moreover, since standard statistics is still appropriate at the macrolevel, we could also venture to say that no anti-haecceitistic conclusion is warranted for ordinary objects, which could then tentatively be identified with substrates. In contrast to this, however, there has been so far no acknowledgement of the possibility of inclusivism, according to which ontological accounts of particulars as widely different as those can possibly coexist in one world picture. The success of the different statistics in physics at least calls for a revision in this respect.
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This paper examines the challenge that the argument known as "Bradley's regress" poses to the friends of states of affairs (facts), in its requesting an explanation of the existence of a fact as a unitary whole in addition to its... more
This paper examines the challenge that the argument known as "Bradley's regress" poses to the friends of states of affairs (facts), in its requesting an explanation of the existence of a fact as a unitary whole in addition to its constituents. All the main theoretical options, short of denying that there are facts, are considered. It is argued that only two of them are viable, namely a "Brute fact approach", according to which the existence of a fact cannot be explained with the typical tools of ontologists, and "Fact infinitism", according to which, for any given fact, one should posit for explanatory purposes an infinite number of distinct states of affairs involving exemplification relations of higher and higher levels. Fact infinitism is defended against various objections and it is suggested that it should be preferred to the brute fact approach by those who are not too shy in vindicating for ontology a role, alongside with the empirical sciences, in the task of postulating entities in order to achieve explanations.
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This original and enticing book provides a fresh, unifying perspective on many old and new logico-philosophical conundrums. Its basic thesis is that many concepts central in ordinary and philosophical discourse are inherently circular and... more
This original and enticing book provides a fresh, unifying perspective on many old and new logico-philosophical conundrums. Its basic thesis is that many concepts central in ordinary and philosophical discourse are inherently circular and thus cannot be fully understood as long as one remains within the confines of a standard theory of definitions. As an alternative, the authors develop a revision theory of definitions, which allows definitions to be circular without this giving rise to contradiction (but, at worst, to “vacuous” uses of definienda). The theory is applied with varying levels of detail to a circular analysis of concepts as diverse as truth, predication, necessity, physical object, etc. The focus is on truth, and hope is expressed that a deeper understanding of the Liar and related paradoxes has been provided: “We have tried to show that once the circularity of truth is recognized, a great deal of its behavior begins to make sense. In particular, from this viewpoint, the existence of the paradoxes seems as natural as the existence of the eclipses” (p. 142). We think that this hope is fully justified, although some problems remain that future research in this field should take into account. The following assumptions constitute the typical background in which the truth paradoxes arise: (i) classical first-order logic, (ii) a language allowing for self-reference, and (iii) the “semantic” Tarskian schema: (TS) T ‘A’ ↔ A (where ‘T’ is the truth predicate, and the single quotes are a nominalization device applicable to sentences; for simplicity, we only consider homophonic versions of TS). This background can be seen as somehow part of our ordinary linguistic and conceptual background and yet, to avoid inconsistency, one or more of these assumptions must be suitably weakened. The classical, Tarskian strategy is to forbid self-reference, whereas the fixed-point approaches stemming from the work of Saul Kripke (1975) and Robert Martin and Peter Woodruff (1975) weaken the logic..