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Data-driven Model-based Detection of Malicious Insiders via Physical Access Logs

Published: 18 November 2019 Publication History

Abstract

The risk posed by insider threats has usually been approached by analyzing the behavior of users solely in the cyber domain. In this article, we show the viability of using physical movement logs, collected via a building access control system, together with an understanding of the layout of the building housing the system’s assets, to detect malicious insider behavior that manifests itself in the physical domain. In particular, we propose a systematic framework that uses contextual knowledge about the system and its users, learned from historical data gathered from a building access control system, to select suitable models for representing movement behavior. We suggest two different models of movement behavior in this article and evaluate their ability to represent normal user movement. We then explore the online usage of the learned models, together with knowledge about the layout of the building being monitored, to detect malicious insider behavior. Finally, we show the effectiveness of the developed framework using real-life data traces of user movement in railway transit stations.

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Cited By

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  • (2024)A Review of Recent Advances, Challenges, and Opportunities in Malicious Insider Threat Detection Using Machine Learning MethodsIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2024.336990612(30907-30927)Online publication date: 2024
  • (2023)Insider Intrusion Detection Techniques: A State-of-the-Art ReviewJournal of Computer Information Systems10.1080/08874417.2023.217533764:1(106-123)Online publication date: 14-Feb-2023
  • (2021)A New Database Intrusion Detection Approach Based on Hybrid Meta-heuristicsComputers, Materials & Continua10.32604/cmc.2020.01373966:2(1879-1895)Online publication date: 2021
  • Show More Cited By

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  1. Data-driven Model-based Detection of Malicious Insiders via Physical Access Logs

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      Reviews

      Amos O Olagunju

      Employees with security clearance will perhaps continue to pose the ultimate security threat to businesses, organizations, and security researchers. What kinds of data and algorithms should be effectively used to monitor and thwart risky employees Cheh et al. offer some insights for identifying malicious insiders based on recorded physical access logs. The authors present a framework for portraying user actions, to identify different models for delving into user behavior via historical data. Two distinct Markov models are used to identify the physical pathways in use at railway transit stations. The security threat model identifies users with legal or illegal physical access to the station rooms. The malicious insider detection framework consists of components for discovering the spatial and temporal properties of user movement behavior, and then ascertaining and applying an appropriate model to guesstimate the likelihood of anomalous access in the railway system blueprint. The framework includes offline and online phases. In the offline phase, characterization of users based on their past movement behavior, and construction of models based on users' characteristics and past movement. The online phase computes the magnitude of uncharacteristic accesses by users. To evaluate the effectiveness of the advocated framework, the authors use data on the physical card accesses of 590 users to a railway station with 62 rooms. The information on several thousand physical accesses includes date and time, door code, user credential, and access type. The results of the data analysis reveal that the Markov model is effective in forecasting subsequent user movements based on historical physical accesses, and the unique pathways of users are appropriate for discovering regular and irregular movement behavior. The simulation results show the framework's reliability and competency. The authors present accurate and efficient algorithms for detecting normal and abnormal access to physical computer rooms and resources. System administrators and cybersecurity experts should read this insightful paper.

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      Information & Contributors

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      Published In

      ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation  Volume 29, Issue 4
      Special Issue On Qest 2017
      October 2019
      188 pages
      ISSN:1049-3301
      EISSN:1558-1195
      DOI:10.1145/3372492
      Issue’s Table of Contents
      Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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      Association for Computing Machinery

      New York, NY, United States

      Publication History

      Published: 18 November 2019
      Accepted: 01 January 2019
      Revised: 01 November 2018
      Received: 01 January 2018
      Published in TOMACS Volume 29, Issue 4

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      Author Tags

      1. Railway transportation system
      2. intrusion detection
      3. physical movement

      Qualifiers

      • Research-article
      • Research
      • Refereed

      Funding Sources

      • Advanced Digital Sciences Center from Singapore's Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR)
      • National Cybersecurity R8D Directorate
      • Maryland Procurement Office
      • Human-Centered Cyber-physical Systems Programme
      • National Research Foundation (NRF), Prime Minister's Office, Singapore, under its National Cybersecurity R8D Programme

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      Cited By

      View all
      • (2024)A Review of Recent Advances, Challenges, and Opportunities in Malicious Insider Threat Detection Using Machine Learning MethodsIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2024.336990612(30907-30927)Online publication date: 2024
      • (2023)Insider Intrusion Detection Techniques: A State-of-the-Art ReviewJournal of Computer Information Systems10.1080/08874417.2023.217533764:1(106-123)Online publication date: 14-Feb-2023
      • (2021)A New Database Intrusion Detection Approach Based on Hybrid Meta-heuristicsComputers, Materials & Continua10.32604/cmc.2020.01373966:2(1879-1895)Online publication date: 2021
      • (2021)BTDetect: An Insider Threats Detection Approach Based on Behavior Traceability for IaaS Environments2021 IEEE Intl Conf on Parallel & Distributed Processing with Applications, Big Data & Cloud Computing, Sustainable Computing & Communications, Social Computing & Networking (ISPA/BDCloud/SocialCom/SustainCom)10.1109/ISPA-BDCloud-SocialCom-SustainCom52081.2021.00055(344-351)Online publication date: Sep-2021
      • (2020)Impact and Key Challenges of Insider Threats on Organizations and Critical BusinessesElectronics10.3390/electronics90914609:9(1460)Online publication date: 7-Sep-2020
      • (2019)Introduction to the Special Issue on Qest 2017ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation10.1145/336378429:4(1-2)Online publication date: 18-Nov-2019

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