38

Hydriaceæ.

March 1838.



PLATO'S

APOLOGY OF SOCRATES, CRITO,

AND PHÆDO.

WORKS BY THE REV. C. S. STANFORD, A. M.

In 8vo. price 10s. 6d.

PLATO'S APOLOGY OF SOCRATES, CRITO, and PHÆDO, in Greek, with the Latin version of FICINUS, and numerous English Notes.

"It is fortunate that such a work has fallen into the hands of an editor, possessing the varied acquirements requisite for its illustration. Mere scholarship is the least of Mr. Stanford's merits; he possesses a high sense of moral beauty, and an intimate familiarity with the mazes of metaphysical investigation. It has rarely been our fortune to meet a Classical Work so ably edited as these dialogues; they are equally valuable to the Scholar and the Philosopher, and both will derive pleasure and profit from Mr. Stanford's labours."—*Athenæum.*

In 12mo, price 5s. 6d. cloth,

OVID'S FASTI, with numerous English Notes.

Dublin: Printed for WILLIAM CURRY, Jun. and Company. Sold by all Booksellers.

PLATO'S

K Two or more Works

APOLOGY OF SOCRATES, CRITO,

AND PHÆDO.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK,

BY

CHARLES STUART STANFORD, Clk. A.M.

LATE SCHOLAR OF TRINITY COLLEGE.

DUBLIN.

WILLIAM CURRY, JUN. AND COMPANY,

9, UPPER SACKVILLE-STREET.

MDCCCXXXV.

Dublin, Printed by J. S. Folds, 5, Bachelor's-Walk.

PREFACE.

THE following translation being intended to accompany the Edition of Plato's Apology, Crito, and Phædo, lately published, with English Notes by the same author, it has been thought unnecessary to reprint the arguments of the dialogues, or to illustrate them by any further comment.

The attention of the translator has been principally directed towards preserving, as far as lay in his power, the style and spirit of his author; and while it has been his object on

the one hand to avoid that literal adherence to the original which would infallibly render the translation uninviting to the general reader, he has, it is hoped, on the other, kept the text sufficiently in his view to suit the particular purposes of the academic student.

Towards the explanation of such obscurities as occur in the course of the work, he has in very few instances applied his own unassisted powers. Among the many distinguished scholars, of whose labours he has availed himself, the name of Victor Cousin deservedly ranks foremost. The version of this elegant and correct translator has been of the most essential service to him throughout.

But in those parts of the original of which the peculiar doctrines of the Platonic Philosophy form the subject, the translator felt that he had a discretion to exercise. He has taken

considerable pains to unfold without actual paraphrase the more subtle intricacies of the arguments for the immortality of the soul. These arguments required his closest attention; although those who are acquainted with this part of the philosopher's system are aware that they are too often trivial in proportion as they are perplexing, and sometimes indeed appear to be wrapped in a veil of scholastic mysticism for the purpose of concealing their intrinsic deficiency.

Of the Phædo, however, the nobleness of the design, the importance of the subject, and the steady process of reasoning carried on throughout, must still continue to render it what it has ever been, the admiration of the enlightened world. It is unjust to measure the genius of the ancients, or the works of antiquity, by the standard of modern

advancement; and it is as impossible to look without respect upon this monument of all that the most sublime *philosophy* could effect, as to refrain from rejoicing, that on its ruins has since been reared a structure as superior to the ancient edifice in grandeur and proportion, as heaven and divinity tower above man and the proudest of his works.

18, TRINITY COLLEGE,
October 20th, 1835.

THE

APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

---

1. I know not, Athenians, how far you have been influenced by my accusers; for my part, from the confidence with which they spoke, I almost ceased to recognise myself; and yet, in a word, they have said nothing true.

But one, in particular, of the many falsehoods which they told, I wondered at in them; that, wherein they asserted, that you ought to beware lest you should be misled by me, as being one of eloquent address. For this, their having felt no sense of shame at the prospect of their immediate and positive conviction, when I shall appear in no respect whatever competent to speak, seemed to me the greatest effrontery in them, unless, perchance, they call one eloquent who speaks the truth. For if this is what they mean, I indeed

would allow that I am an orator, though not according to their fashion, for they, as I assert, have hardly spoken any truth, but you shall hear the whole truth from me.

Not by any means, Athenians, an address brilliant in sentiment and expression, neither set off by rhetorical ornament; but you shall hear an unprepared reply, and in unstudied phrase; for I confide in the justice of what I say, and let none give heed to anything besides. Nor would it suit my time of life, my countrymen, to appear before you, like a stripling with an elaborately-wrought harangue; wherefore, Athenians, I earnestly entreat and implore of you, if you should hear me pleading my defence in such language as I was wont to use at the tables in the Forum, where, as elsewhere, many of you have been my auditors, not to be surprised or dissatisfied at this; for the case stands thus—I have now for the first time come before the tribunal, aged seventy years and more; I am, therefore, utterly unused to the form of language here. In like manner, then, as you would have indulged me, were I really a stranger, in the use of that language and method in which I had been reared, I make of you this just request, as it appears to me, to wave the style of my expression, it may be probably in some degree worse, probably better—but to investigate this only, and direct your attention to this, whether what I say is just or not; for such is

the duty of the judge, but of the speaker to declare the truth.

2. First then, Athenians, I am justified in defending myself against the earliest falsehoods advanced against me, and my earliest accusers, then against the latest, and their latest advocates. For many have accused me to you, now very many years ago, asserting nothing true, whom I dread yet more than Anytus and his party, although they too are formidable enough. But the former are more so, Athenians, who laying hold of many of you in childhood sought to persuade you, and brought against me an utterly false charge, to the effect— "that there is a certain Socrates, a subtle man, a speculator in celestial matters, and who also scrutinizes all things under the earth, and makes the worse appear the better reason." Those who have spread this report abroad are my dangerous accusers, men of Athens, for their hearers imagine that those who seek after such knowledge disavow the existence of the gods. Further, these accusers are numerous, and for a long time now have urged their imputations; moreover, they have addressed themselves to you at that period of life in which you were most credulous, in childhood, and while some were on the verge of youth, absolutely prosecuting a suit in the absence of the accused, there being none to appear in defence.

But the most unreasonable part of the whole

proceeding is, that it is impossible for me to learn and tell their names, except that there is a Comedian amongst them. But as many as influenced by a spirit of envy and detraction, have persuaded you, and those too who having been themselves convinced have influenced others, all these are most perplexing to deal with; for it is not possible to bring forward any of them here, nor to confute any, but it is altogether necessary to contend, as it were, with a shadow, in the course of my defence, and to examine (for the purpose of confutation,) while there is none to reply. Take it then for granted, as I assert, that my accusers are twofold, some who impeached me lately, and others whom I mention as having done so long since; and feel satisfied that I ought to rebut their charges first, for you heard them criminating me first, and to a far greater extent than those of late.

Be it so. I must now, Athenians, enter upon my defence, and endeavour in so limited a time to remove from your minds this unfavourable impression which you have so long retained. I could wish that such were the result, if in any degree it were better so for you and me, and that in my vindication I could accomplish something more advantageous still; but this I deem to be difficult, nor am I at all unaware to what extent it is so; but let this nevertheless proceed as the Deity may please, I must obey the law, and make my defence.

3. Let us, then, take into consideration from its source, what the accusation is, whence this calumny has arisen against me, confiding in which Melitus has now advanced this indictment. Well—what were the terms in which those who charged me falsely, expressed their slanderous imputations?—for it is necessary to read their information upon oath, as it were of public accusers—"Socrates acts criminally, and is officiously inquisitive in his examination of those things which are under the earth and in heaven, and makes the worse appear the better reason, and teaches others to do likewise." Of some such nature is the accusation, for such you have witnessed yourselves in a comedy of Aristophanes, a certain Socrates carried about there, saying that he walks the air, and indulging in a good deal of similar buffoonery, of which I understand nothing whatever. And I do not say this to disparage such knowledge, (as that mentioned above,) if any one is skilled in such; let me not be accused by Melitus upon so grave a charge; but for my part, Athenians, I am not all conversant with matters of this kind. But I call upon many amongst yourselves to testify this for me, and I require of you to instruct and inform each other on this point, as many of you as have at any time heard me in familiar converse; and there are many such amongst you. Declare then to each other, if any one of you has ever heard me, in any degree whatever, discussing such

subjects, and hence you shall learn that of a like character to this are the other charges which they allege against me.

4. But neither is any of these things at all founded in fact, nor if you have heard from any that I endeavour to instruct men, and exact payment from them, is this in any respect true ; since this appears indeed to me to be a highly honorable thing, if one should be as competent to instruct mankind as Gorgias of Leontium, Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis. For any of these, travelling through whatsoever cities, is capable of persuading the young men, who had it in their power to attach themselves gratuitously to any of their own fellow citizens they pleased, having resigned all intercourse with them, to associate with the former, giving them money, and to make acknowledgment of their obligations besides.

There is another also, a native of Paros, an accomplished character, of whose sojourning here I was apprised ; for I happened to visit an individual, who has expended more money upon the sophists than all the rest together, Callias the son of Hipponicus. I put the question then to him, for he had two sons—" Callias," said I, " if your sons were colts or calves, we would have selected a master for them, and remunerated his endeavours to make them comely, and serviceable in their proper qualities ; and this man should have been one of

those conversant with horses or tillage; but now since they are men, what kind of master do you intend selecting for them? Is there any one who is fully conversant with that kind of virtue which befits a man and a citizen? (social and political virtue)—for I imagine that you have meditated on the subject, being the father of sons.—Is there," said I, "any such person or not?"—"Beyond a doubt," he replied—"Who is he then," said I, "and of what country? and for what sum does he give his instructions?" "Evenus," he replied, "the Parian; for five minæ." And I deemed Evenus happy, if in reality he is possessed of such an accomplishment, and teaches so admirably; consequently I also should have plumed and prided myself, had I a competent knowledge of such subjects, but I have not any such, Athenians.

5. Perhaps one of you may now interrupt me with "What is the nature of your conduct, Socrates? —whence have these calumnies against you arisen? for had you not busied yourself more remarkably than any one else, this opinion and report would never thereupon have spread so widely, had not you, (as I say,) pursued a different course from that of the majority. Acquaint us then, what this proceeding of yours is, that we may not pass a precipitate judgment upon you." He who addresses me thus, in my opinion speaks fairly, and I shall endeavour to shew you what it is which has caused

this imputation and reproach. Observe now; and though to some of you perhaps I may appear to jest, be well assured I shall disclose the truth complete.

For no other cause except a certain kind of wisdom, Athenians, have I incurred this imputation. What is the nature of this wisdom?—It is perhaps merely human; for in this I really seem to be well skilled. But those whom I mentioned just now, are gifted probably with a greater than human wisdom; else I have nothing more to say, for I am not myself accomplished in it, and whoever asserts it tells an untruth, and reports it in order to bring odium upon me. And do not cry out against me, Athenians; not though I should appear to say something strange; for I will not give upon my own authority what I am going to acquaint you with; but I will refer it (for confirmation) to one whose statement deserves your respect. For whether I have any such wisdom, and of what nature it may be I shall adduce the god at Delphi to testify before you.

You are doubtless, familiar with the name of Chærephon; he was my companion in early life, was in terms of friendly intercourse with the majority of you, joined you upon your (recent) exile, and returned with you again. You are also aware of Chærephon's character, how zealous he was in every thing he undertook. Upon the occa-

sion of his having visited Delphi once, he ventured upon inquiring of the oracle; and do not express displeasure at what I say, my friends, for he asked if there was any one wiser than me? Upon this the Pythian priestess announced, that there was none wiser. His brother here will testify to the truth of this, since he is dead himself.

6. But consider on what account I tell you this; it is because I am about to inform you whence this calumny against me arose. Upon hearing this response of the oracle, I reasoned with myself thus: What does the deity mean at all? or what enigma does he propose? for I am not conscious of being wise in any degree, great or small, what then does he mean by saying that I am the wisest of all? for he does not surely utter an untruth; it is not allowable for him. During a long time, then, I was at a loss to comprehend his meaning; at last, after considerable difficulty, I had recourse to an investigation of this oracular response, of the following nature:—I visited one of those who were in public repute for their wisdom; as in such a case, if in any, being likely to confute the response, and to convince the oracle that, Such a man is wiser than me, while you said, I was more so than all. Upon examining this man, then,—I have no occasion to mention him by name, but he, whom observing narrowly I had been so influenced as I describe, was one of those engaged in state affairs;—and con-

versing with him, the man appeared to me to be wise in the opinion of very many others, but especially so in his own, while in fact he was not so. I thereupon endeavoured to prove to him that he imagined, forsooth, he was wise, but no more; and I consequently became odious both to him and to many of those who were by. Having left him, I proceeded to reason thus with myself;—I am indeed wiser than this man; for neither of us in truth appears to be familiar with what is truly good, but he imagines he knows what he is ignorant of, while I, as I am ignorant, do not suppose myself to be otherwise. In this trifling particular then, I appear to be wiser than him, inasmuch as I do not think that I know what I do not know. I went next to another of those reputed to be of the wiser sort, and arrived at the very same conclusion. Hence I incurred both his dislike and that of several besides.

7. After this I still continued my progress, perceiving indeed, and lamenting, and terror-stricken, that I had become thus odious; nevertheless it seemed incumbent that I should deem the interest of the deity of paramount importance, and that I should consequently, while investigating the sense of the oracle address myself to all who were in any degree esteemed for their knowledge. And, by the Dog, Athenians, for I must declare to you the truth—I came to some such conclusion as this; those who

enjoyed the highest reputation appeared to me, scrutinizing them according to the standard laid down by the deity, to be nearly the most deficient; while others, appearing to be of a far inferior class, were (possessed of an intelligence) more suitably adapted for the acquisition of sound sense. It is expedient then that I should lay before you the course of my wanderings, engaging as I did in a kind of toilsome search in order that I might find the prediction incontrovertible as it concerned me.

Next after the statesmen, I betook myself to the poets, the tragedians, dithyrambists, and such like, as in their case being likely to detect myself in the very fact of being their inferior in knowledge. Upon taking up such of their poems as appeared to me to have been most elaborately finished, I took them to task for their meaning, in order that I might at the same time derive some information from them. I am ashamed, my friends, to tell you the truth; but yet it must be told—in a word, all who were present could have given a more satisfactory explanation of the works, than those very persons who had themselves composed them. I soon formed this judgment, then, in the case of the poets, that they are not guided by (deliberate) wisdom in their works, but are influenced by a natural inspiration and enthusiasm similar to that of soothsayers and seers. For these indeed express themselves with copiousness and grace, but comprehend not anything

of what they say. The poets appeared to me to lie under the influence of such an affection as this, at the same time that I observed them, on account of their poetic faculty, imagining themselves in other respects also the wisest of mankind, in which they were not. I then took leave of them with the impression that I was their superior, in the same way as I had been of the statesmen.

8. At last I had recourse to the artificers; for I was conscious to myself that I knew simply nothing of the arts, but I was persuaded that I should find them possessed of considerable and consummate knowledge. And in this I was not deceived, for they knew things which I was ignorant of, and in this respect they were wiser than me. Still, Athenians, the worthy artizans seemed to me to have fallen into the same error as the poets; each, on account of the skilful exercise of his art, laid claim to the most competent knowledge on other affairs of the deepest importance, and this perverseness threw their real ability in the shade. Hence I inquired of myself, in behalf of the oracle, whether I should prefer to continue as I am, without sharing in their knowledge and partaking of their ignorance, or should subject myself to both, as they combine them. I made answer then to myself and the oracle, that it were better for me to continue as I am.

9. In consequence of this investigation, I in-

curred abundant enmities of the harshest and most distressing character, so that many calumnies took rise from them, and this name was affirmed of me, that I was a wise man; for those present, on all occasions, imagine that I am knowing in those things in which I unmask another's ignorance. But, as yet, Athenians, the Deity in reality appears to be wise, and to signify this by his oracular response, that human wisdom is of little or no value. And he appears to have used the expression not in reference to Socrates, but to have made use of my name, setting me forward as an example, as if he would say—This is the wisest man amongst you, who, like Socrates, has come to the determination that he is actually unworthy of any claim to wisdom. Still, then, going about, I am engaged in the same search and scrutiny, as the Deity directs, in case I should think that amongst the citizens or strangers there is any wise; and when the contrary seems plain to me, in support of the Deity I prove that he is not so. It is by reason of this occupation that I have not had leisure to interest myself, in any respect, in the affairs of the state, nor yet in my own; but I am reduced to the greatest poverty on account of my serving the God.

10. But, in addition to this, a number of young men accompanying me of their own free will, (belonging to the wealthiest classes, who have most abundant leisure) take delight in hearing men

argued with, and they frequently themselves follow my example, and essay to argue with others. And I imagine that they consequently find a plentiful supply of individuals who think that they know something, while they are possessed of little or no knowledge. Hence those who are confuted by them are incensed with me, not with themselves, and they give out that "Socrates is a most abandoned character, and is corrupting the youth." And when one asks them, by what conduct, or what discipline on his part, they can make no reply; they really do not know; yet lest they should seem to be at a loss, they have recourse to these obvious imputations upon all philosophers, "that he busies himself in celestial matters, and about things under the earth, and disbelieves in the gods, and makes the worse appear the better reason." They would not, however, I think, be contented to tell the truth, that they are convicted of an affectation of knowledge, but know nothing. Inasmuch then, as they are intriguing, vehement, and persevering, expressing themselves in orderly and specious terms with respect to me, they have succeeded in filling your ears with their inveterate and jealous calumnies.

From amongst their number, Melitus, Anytus, and Lycon have stood forward against me; Melitus being annoyed on the poets' account; Anytus on that of the artizans and statesmen; Lycon on that of the rhetoricians. Wherefore, as I said at the

outset, I should be surprised if I were enabled to remove, in so short a time, this scandalous imputation of such long existence. This, men of Athens, is the real state of things, and I unfold it to you without the least degree of concealment or prevarication, although I am aware that by this very course I subject myself to odium; a sufficient proof that I am stating the truth; that such is the nature of the calumny against me, and such its origin, and, whether you investigate the matter now or hereafter, so shall you find it to be.

11. With regard, then, to the charges which my earliest accusers have alleged against me, let this defence suffice you; but I shall now essay to acquit myself to Melitus, the respectable character, and patriotic, as he calls himself, and the later accusers. Let us then, again, take up their bill of indictment, as they belong to a different class; it runs someway thus—"Socrates," it says, "acts illegally, corrupting the youth, and not believing in the gods which the state sanctions, but in other strange divinities." Such is the nature of the charge, but let us examine it in each particular. It asserts that I act illegally in corrupting the youth. But I say that Melitus, men of Athens, acts illegally in jesting too seriously, by rashly putting men upon trial while he affects to take an interest in and be anxious about matters in which he never, at any time, felt the slightest concern. But that this is the case, I shall endeavour to prove to you.

12. Come now, Melitus, answer me this; do you not consider it of high importance that the youth should be made as virtuous as possible?

MELITUS—I do.

SOCRATES—Well now, tell the judges who it is that improves them; for it is evident you know, since it concerns you so nearly; because, having detected me in corrupting them, as you say, you impeach and accuse me here. But come, say and explain to the judges who it is that improves them. Observe, Melitus, you are silent, and unable to reply. Does not this appear to you a shameful proceeding, and a sufficient assurance of what I assert, that you never took any interest in such matters? Tell me, friend, who improves them?

MELITUS—The laws.

SOCRATES—Good sir, this is not what I ask; what man is it that improves them?—who, no doubt, was in the first instance well acquainted with the very thing you mention, the laws.

MELITUS—The judges here present.

SOCRATES—How say you, Melitus, are these capable of instructing and improving the youth?

MELITUS—By all means.

SOCRATES—Whether are they all so without exception, or are some so and others not?

MELITUS—All without exception.

SOCRATES—You speak well, by Juno, and of a great abundance of useful instructors. But, further, do the hearers who stand by improve them or not?

MELITUS—They do.

SOCRATES—What of the senators?

MELITUS—They do, likewise.

SOCRATES—But, Melitus, do those who attend the popular assemblies corrupt the youth, or do they also all, without exception, improve them?

MELITUS—They also improve them.

SOCRATES—It appears then, that all the Athenians contribute to their moral beauty and integrity, except me, but I alone corrupt them. Say you so?

MELITUS—This I most resolutely assert.

SOCRATES—You convict me then of great ill-fortune. But answer me, does it appear to you the same in regard to horses; do all men contribute to their improvement, and one only deteriorate them? or on the exact contrary, is there one only, or very few, capable of improving them, and those horse-breakers? But if the majority should interfere with the habits and management of the horses, they spoil them. Is not this the case, Melitus, both with regard to horses and all other animals whatsoever? Doubtless it is so, whether you and Anytus deny or admit it; for great indeed should be the good fortune of the youth if one only were to injure, while all the rest advantage them. But in truth, Melitus, you have sufficiently proved that you never were solicitous about the interest of the youth, and you clearly evince your own unconcern by your

having never taken any of those things to heart on account of which you are impeaching me.

13. Tell me further, Melitus, in the name of Jupiter, whether it is preferable to associate with good or evil citizens?—answer me, friend, for I propose a simple question. Are not the evil perpetually devising some mischief towards their closest intimates, but the good some benefit?

MELITUS—By all means.

SOCRATES—Is there any one who would rather be injured than obliged by his friends? Answer, for the law enjoins you to reply. Does any one wish to be injured?

MELITUS—No, truly.

SOCRATES—Come now; whether do you impeach me as a corrupter of the young, and disposing them the more to vice, voluntarily or involuntarily?

MELITUS—Voluntarily doubtless.

SOCRATES—What now, Melitus; are you at your time of life so much wiser than I am, at my advanced age, as to be aware that the evil are always planning some detriment towards their most familiar friends, and the good some advantage, but I have arrived at such a degree of stupid ignorance as not to know that if I should dispose any of my intimates mischievously, I am in danger of sustaining some damage from him; therefore, I voluntarily, as you assert, bring this so great evil to pass? I do not believe you, Melitus, in this;

neither, I think, would any other human being. But I either do not corrupt them, or if I do, it is against my will, so that in both cases you speak an untruth. But if I undesignedly corrupt them, of such involuntary errors it is not the usage to impeach one here; but, having taken him apart, to instruct and admonish him, for it is evident that when I am properly informed, I shall refrain from acting as I did without design. But you shunned and were unwilling to meet and set me right, and you summon me here where it is customary to cite those who require correction, not admonition.

14. This, at least, men of Athens, is now manifest, as I said, that Melitus never at any time felt the slightest concern in this business. But tell me, Melitus, in what manner say you that I corrupt the youth? Is it not evidently according to the letter of the indictment, by teaching them not to believe in the deities which the state sanctions, but in other strange divinities? Say you not that I corrupt them teaching them so?

MELITUS—Most positively I say so.

SOCRATES—In the name of those same deities of whom we are now speaking, Melitus, answer me, and those present, still more distinctly; for I cannot understand whether you say that I teach them to believe in some certain deities, (in which case I am a believer in the gods, and am not a downright atheist, nor am guilty in this particular,)

not, however, those which the state believes in, but others; and such is the charge you bring against me, of introducing others, or do you say that I am a complete unbeliever in the gods myself, and teach others to be so too?

MELITUS—This is what I say, that you acknowledge no gods at all.

SOCRATES—Admirable Melitus! wherefore say you this? Do not I, like other men, acknowledge the sun and moon to be deities?

MELITUS—No, by Jupiter, Athenians, he does not; for the sun, he asserts, is a stone, and the moon an earth.

SOCRATES—You imagine, my dear Melitus, that you are accusing Anaxagoras, and you thus throw a slight upon the judges in supposing them so unskilled in letters as not to know that the writings of Anaxagoras of Clazomene are replete with discussions of this nature. And the young, forsooth, learn from me what they have occasional opportunities, at the expense of a drachma at most, in the theatre, of ridiculing Socrates for, if he should affect them to be his own, besides their being so very absurd. But, in Jove's name, do I actually appear to you to disavow the existence of any god?

MELITUS—You do not avow any god, by Jupiter, not in any degree whatever.

SOCRATES—In this, Melitus, you appear to discredit yourself. To me, Athenians, this man

seems to be excessively insulting and intemperate, and to have brought this indictment forward evidently through impertinence, wantonness, and presumption. For he resembles one composing a riddle, and proving it thus; whether will Socrates, the Wise, now discover that I am jesting, and contradicting myself, or shall I deceive him, and all the rest besides? For he seems to me to contradict himself in the indictment, as if he said, Socrates acts illegally, disavowing the gods, and avowing the gods;—this surely shows a trifler.

15. Consider with me now, my friends, how far he seems to say so; but do you, Melitus, answer me, and you, judges, as I besought you at the outset, remember not to be displeased with me if I proceed with this discussion in my usual manner.

Is there any man, Melitus, who believes that there are things relating to mankind, but does not believe that there are men? Let him reply, judges, and let him not bluster on extraneous topics. Is there any one who does not believe that there are horses, but believes that there are things pertaining to them? Or one who does not believe that there are flutists, but admits that there are things relating to the flute?—there are none such, my good friend; since you do not choose to reply, I make answer both to you and all present. But answer, at least, what follows—Is there any one who believes

in things relating to dæmons, and does not admit that there are dæmons?

MELITUS—There is not.

SOCRATES—How obliging you are, in having scarcely answered me, when forced to it by those present. You assert, then, that I both acknowledge and teach things relating to dæmons, whether of recent or ancient date; but, by your own admission, I acknowledge what relates to dæmons, for you swore to this effect in the bill of indictment. But if I admit what relates to dæmons, there is an absolute necessity for my believing in dæmons; is it not so? Surely yes, for I set you down as conceding it, since you do not reply. Do we not look upon dæmons as deities, or the offspring of deities? Say you so or not?

MELITUS—We do.

SOCRATES—Therefore, since I believe in dæmons, as you say, if dæmons indeed are gods at all, this is the very point on which I charge you with proposing riddles and diverting yourself, saying that I who do not acknowledge the gods, on the contrary, do acknowledge them, since I acknowledge dæmons. But if dæmons are the spurious offspring of deities, either by nymphs or any others, as they are reputed, what man would believe that there were the sons of gods, but not gods? For it would be equally absurd, as if one were to believe that there were mules, the offspring of horses or asses, but

would not believe in the existence of horses or asses. But, Melitus, you have undoubtedly preferred this indictment either to sound me, or from being at a loss what real crime you could allege against me. There is no possibility, however, of your persuading, by any means, a man with even a moderate share of sense, that the same individual can believe in the attributes of dæmons and divinities, and disbelieve the existence of dæmons, gods, and heroes themselves.

16. That I am innocent then, Athenians, according to the indictment of Melitus, seems to me to require no elaborate proof; enough has been already said. But with regard to what I said, in the first instance, that there was a strong feeling of hostility against me, and widely extended, be assured this is the fact. And this it is which shall cause my conviction, if indeed I am convicted, not Melitus, or Anytus, but the slander and envy of the many, which have prevailed against numbers of other excellent characters, and shall still, I think, prevail against them, for there is no danger of this stopping with me.

Perhaps one may say then—Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of having prosecuted such a pursuit as this, from which you incur the peril of immediate death? To such I would offer, in reply, a reasonable suggestion, to this effect—You do not, friend, say wisely, if you imagine that the man whose

services are of the slightest value, should take into account the risk of life or death, and should not have this only in view, when he does anything, whether he is acting justly or unjustly, and the part of an upright or a dishonest man. For, according to your argument, those demigods who fell at Troy should be but worthless characters; the son of Thetis too, amongst the rest, who had such an utter contempt of danger, when compared with the submission to disgrace, that when his mother, who was a goddess, spoke to him in his impatience to put Hector to death, something to this effect if I remember—"My son, if thou should'st avenge the death of thy friend Patroclus, thou thyself shalt die, for quick," she says, "on Hector's death thy doom attends." But he, hearing this, despised the peril of death, and being far more afraid of living like a coward and not avenging his friends, replies, "Let me then quickly die when I have punished the guilty, that I may not abide here by the beaked ships, contemptible, a burden to the ground." Think you that he cared for death or danger?—For thus, in truth, it is, Athenians, in whatever post one has placed himself, either judging it himself to be the more honourable, or has been placed by his commander, there, in my opinion, he ought to stay, and brave the danger, not taking death or anything else into account in comparison with shame.

17. I should have acted a strange part, then, Athenians, if, when your generals, whom you appointed to command me, had assigned me my post, at Potidæa, Amphipolis, and Delium, I then remained where they directed, like as any other would do, and braved the risk of death, but when the deity, as I felt and understood, had enjoined upon me the necessity of leading a philosophical life, examining both myself and others, I should in such a case have abandoned my post through dread of death or anything else. Strange should it indeed have been, and, with justice truly might one charge me then before the tribunal with unbelief in the gods, in consequence of my disobedience to the oracle, my apprehension of death, and my imagining myself to be wise when I really was not so. For the fear of death, my friends, is nothing else than to appear to be wise when one is not so, since it is the appearing to know what one is ignorant of. No one knows indeed but that death is the greatest of all blessings to man, but all dread it as if they knew well that it is the worst of evils. And how is not this the veriest reprehensible ignorance, that one should think that he knows what he does not? But I differ perhaps from the majority, in this; and if I should affirm that I am, in any case, wiser than another, it is in this, that having no competent knowledge of the realms below I do not suppose that I have any; but to act illegally,

and to disobey one's superior, either god or man, I know to be wicked and discreditable. I shall never then, at any time, be afraid of, or avoid what, for all I know, may be blessings, sooner than those evils of which I am conscious that they are so. Wherefore, not if you were to dismiss me now—through your mistrust of Anytus, who said that I either should not come before you at all, or when I did so, that it was impossible for you not to sentence me to death, telling you that if I escaped, your sons, proceeding to put in practice the discipline of Socrates, would be utterly destroyed—if, I say, you were to address me in such terms—"Socrates, we will not yield now to Anytus, but set you free, on this condition however, that you no more engage in this system of inquiry, nor act the philosopher, but if you should be detected still in the same pursuit you shall die"—if, as I said, you would dismiss me on such terms, (I would not avail myself of your indulgence, but) I would say to you, "Athenians, I respect and cherish you, but I will obey the deity rather than you, and while I live and have the power, I shall never cease acting the philosopher, exhorting and instructing any of you I may chance to meet, accosting you in my usual mode, to this effect—Most excellent of men, since you are an Athenian, belonging to the most noble state, and in the highest repute for wisdom and fortitude, are you not ashamed of

your anxiety for riches, that they may abound to you, and for glory and honour, while you have no care nor concern for knowledge and truth, and the soul how it may become most perfect?—And should any of you call this in question, and assert that he does feel this concern, I will not at once let him go, nor turn away from him, but I will question, examine, and prove him, and if he should appear to me not to be possessed of virtue, but to say that he is, I shall reproach him for setting the least value upon what deserves the most, and the highest upon that which is least worthy. Thus shall I act, by young and old, according as I meet them, by stranger and citizen, but the rather by my fellow-citizens, since you are the more closely allied to me, for this, be assured, the deity directs. And I am persuaded that no greater blessing has befallen your state than my good service to the god, since I go about intent upon nothing else than to persuade you, both young and old, neither to be solicitous for the body, nor for riches, prior to, or so zealously as for the soul, that it may be most perfect; explaining to you that virtue is not the result of wealth, but that wealth and all other human blessings, in public and private, are the result of virtue. If then, by such counsels I corrupt the youth, they must be mischievous indeed, but if any one says that I give any other advice than this, he talks idly. Therefore would I say, Athenians, either yield to

Anytus, or do not; either acquit me, or do not, since I shall not alter my course, not though I were to die many deaths.

18. Do not cry out against me, men of Athens, but continue to comply with the request I made you, that you would not express disapprobation at what I say, but would attend, for I am satisfied you shall be improved by your attention. I am going indeed to broach some other topics at which you will be likely to murmur, but by all means refrain from this. Be assured then, if you should doom me to death, being such an one as I describe myself, you will not injure me more than yourselves. For neither Melitus, nor Anytus, could harm me; they have not the power, convinced as I am that it would not be permitted for the better man to be injured by the worse. He might condemn, banish, or degrade me, and such he, or any other, may look upon perhaps as serious evils, but I do not regard them so, far more (do I regard this as an evil), to adopt the course which he is now pursuing in his attempt to put a man illegally to death. Now, therefore, Athenians, I am far from pleading my own cause, as one might imagine, but I am pleading yours, lest in condemning me you should offend in any wise against the gift of the deity to you. For, if you condemn me, you shall not readily find another such, evidently, (however ludicrous it may be to say so,) affixed to this state by the deity, as to

a large and noble steed, rather lazy on account of its size, and requiring to be excited by a gad-fly, in which character the god appears to have attached me to the state, as one who, urging, advising, and reproving each one amongst you, shall never cease throughout the day, in all places, to attend upon you. Such another, then, my friends, shall not easily be found, so, if you take my counsel, you will spare me. But you, perhaps, irritated like those who are aroused when drowsy, attacking me, would, in submission to Anytus, unthinkingly condemn me; then you should slumber on for the remainder of your lives, unless the deity through concern for you, would send some other (like myself). That I, however, am such as should be likely to be conferred by the god upon the state, you may infer from this; it is not consistent with the ordinary course of human conduct that I should have neglected all my own affairs, and that I am for so many years now, allowing all disregard of my domestic concerns, while I am ever occupied with your interests, visiting each of you privately, like a father or elder brother, and urging you to the anxious pursuit of virtue. And if, from such a course, I were deriving any profit, and pressing these admonitions upon you as a matter of emolument, I should still have had some good excuse for this. But now you see yourselves that the accusers, who advanced so unblushingly all the other charges,

were incapable of having the effrontery to produce a witness, and assert that I ever exacted or demanded money. And I produce, as I think, a competent testimony in proof that I speak true, my poverty.

19. Perhaps, however, it would appear incongruous in me to give such advice in private, going about and intermeddling in the affairs of others, while I want the courage to face your public assemblies and consult for the interest of the state. The cause of this you have oftentimes, and in many places, heard me explain; I am conscious of a kind of divine and tutelary influence, which Melitus, in derision, has made a part of his impeachment; but this commenced in my childhood, being, as it were, a kind of voice which, wherever it is used, always diverts me from that which I purpose to perform, but never impels me at any time. This it is which opposes my interference in affairs of state, and full wisely it appears to me to do so. For, be assured, Athenians, if I had long ago essayed to involve myself in state affairs, I should have been ruined long since, and should have in no wise profited either you or myself. And do not be displeased with me for telling the truth, since no man ever shall be secure who makes a serious opposition to you or any other body of people, and who prevents the course of iniquitous and illegal procedures, abounding in a state; but it is

incumbent upon one who is in reality the champion of justice, even if for a short time he is likely to be personally safe, to live in a private and not in a public capacity.

20. But I shall adduce important proof of this; not words, but what you most appreciate, facts. Hear then what has happened me, that you may know me to be incapable of any concession to the prejudice of justice through dread of death, while by refusing to concede, I at the same time seal my doom. I shall say what may to you seem impertinent and petulant, yet is strictly true. Never, Athenians, was I engaged in any magisterial office; but I was a senator, and my Antiochean tribe chanced to be that which supplied the Prytanes when you decided, in violation of the law, as you all agreed on subsequently, upon condemning, in a body, the ten generals who had not taken on board those who perished in the sea-fight. I alone of the Prytanes, at that time, opposed you, to prevent your doing anything contrary to the laws, and voted against you. And while your orators were eager to denounce and drag me off, and you encouraged them and cheered them on, I thought it the rather incumbent upon me, with the law and justice on my side, to brave the danger, than, dreading imprisonment or death, to side with you in your unrighteous purpose. And this occurred in the time of the commonwealth. But when the oligarchy arrived,

the Thirty having sent for me with four others, to attend at the Tholus, commissioned us to bring Leon from his native Salamis that he might be put to death, (and many such commissions did these same enjoin on numbers of persons, with intent to contaminate as many as possible by a partnership in crime.) Upon that occasion I shewed that I did not care (if it be not too coarse a term to use) one particle for death, but my whole concern was to avoid engaging in anything so iniquitous and impious. For that government, powerful as it was, did not scare me into the execution of an illegal act, but when we came out of the Tholus, the four went to Salamis, and brought back Leon, while I returned home forthwith. I should probably have lost my life for this had not that government been soon broken up; in favour of all which you have abundant testimony.

21. Think you then, that I should have survived for so many years, had I embarked in public life, and, acting as became an upright man, I had espoused the cause of justice, and deemed it, as I ought, of the first importance? Far from it, Athenians; nor would any other man either. But through the whole course of my life if ever I took a part in public affairs, I shall be found to be such, (and precisely the same in private,) as never to have made a concession of any kind to the prejudice of justice, either in favour of any other, or of

any of those whom my calumniators assert to be my disciples. I never at any time was the preceptor of any one; but if one chose, whether young or old, to attend to me while I spoke and was engaged in the business of my mission, I never, on any occasion, refused him. Neither do I converse with any one when I receive money for it, and when I do not, decline conversing; but to the rich and poor alike I offer myself to be questioned, and an opportunity of hearing what I propose should one prefer to answer me. Whether any of them proves to be a respectable character or not, I could not with justice be deemed responsible, who never took charge of their instruction, nor taught them at all; but if any one asserts that he has learned or heard anything in private from me which all the rest of you have not, be assured he does not tell truth.

22. What then is the reason that some are delighted to sojourn with me for so long a time? Observe, Athenians, I told you the whole truth; because they are pleased when they hear those confuted who imagine themselves to be wise but are not so, for the exposure is amusing. But the discharge of this duty has been, as I said, enjoined me by the deity, both by oracles, dreams, and every manner in which any other divine decree ever assigned to a man any duty whatsoever. This is the fact, Athenians, and easily confirmed; for if I am corrupting some of the youth, and have cor-

rupted others, it were fitting, surely, in case any of them as they became more advanced in life were made aware of my having designed some mischief against them in their youth, that coming forward personally, they should accuse me and demand my punishment. But if they were not inclined, some of their own kindred, (fathers, brothers and other relatives,) should now call it to mind, if any of the members of their family ever suffered any injury at my hands. And many of them I observe are present here; Crito, in the first place, my familiar friend and belonging to my tribe, the father of this Critobulus. Next, Lysanias, of Sphettus, the father of Æschines; then Antiphon of Cephisus, father of Epigenes; besides these other individuals whose brothers were on the same intimate footing with me; Nicostratus, son of Theosdotidus, the brother of Theodotus, (and Theodotus indeed is dead, so that he could not entreat his brother for me,) and Paralus, the son of Demodocus, brother to Theages, Adimantus, too, the son of Aristo, brother to Plato, here present, and Æantidorus, brother to this Apollodorus. Many others I could name, some one of whom Melitus ought by all means to have produced as a witness, in the course of his statement; but if he forgot it then, let him produce such an one now; I give him full permission; and let him say whether he has anything of the kind to adduce—You shall find it to be the direct opposite

of this, my friends; that all are ready to lend their aid to me, the corrupter, the designer of mischief, as Melitus and Anytus call me, against their closest kindred. Those who have been injured, would have perhaps some excuse for defending me, but their relatives, men advanced in life, and uninjured, what other excuse have they for protecting me, except that good and just one, that they are conscious of the falsehood of Melitus, and my sincerity?

23. Well then, my friends; what I am enabled to say in my defence, is nearly comprised in these and similar proofs. But perhaps some one of you may take it ill, calling his own case to mind, if being engaged in a trial of far inferior importance to this, he prayed and implored the judges with very many tears, bringing his children forward in order to be the more tenderly pitied, and others of his relatives and friends, while I have recourse to nothing of the kind, and that too, when I am involved, to all appearance, in the most imminent danger. Perhaps then, some one upon such consideration would be more obstinately prejudiced against me, and, incensed at this very conduct of mine, would give his vote under the influence of anger against me. If any one amongst you should be so disposed—I do not indeed presume that there is,—I think I might urge upon him a reasonable argument to this effect: "Good friend, I also have some domestic ties, and, to borrow Homer's lan-

guage, I have not sprung from a tree or a stone, but from a human stock, wherefore I have near relatives, and three sons beside, Athenians, one grown up, and two young boys, nevertheless I shall not bring one of them forward and implore you to acquit me." Why then shall I not do so? Not through self-sufficiency Athenians, nor through any disrespect towards you, for whether I am undaunted or not at the prospect of death, is quite a different question, but with regard to my own character, to yours, and that of the whole state, it does not seem to me to be creditable to act in any such manner, especially at my time of life, and with such a reputation, whether true or false. It is then a settled point that Socrates excels in some respect the generality of mankind; if, therefore, those amongst you who appear to excel in wisdom, fortitude, or any other quality whatever, shall prove to be such, as I have on many occasions observed some when brought to trial, how degrading it should be; having the repute of eminence indeed, but acting most unaccountably, imagining that they shall suffer something fearful if they die, as if they would be immortal in case you should not sentence them to death. Such persons appear to me to bring discredit on the state, so that any stranger might suppose that those of the Athenians who are preeminent in virtue, and whom their fellow-citizens exalt to magisterial offices, and other dignities,

that those, I say, differ in no respect from women. Conduct like this, Athenians, we ought not to pursue, who are held in some estimation, nor if we were inclined to do so, should you permit it; but you should make this manifest, that you will be much more inclined to condemn one who enacts such doleful tragedies, and makes the state contemptible, than one who quietly awaits your award.

24. But, putting character out of the question, it does not appear to me to be equitable that one should supplicate a judge, nor that he should escape by such entreaty, but that he should enlighten and persuade; since the judge does not sit for the complimentary dispensation of justice, but to form his decisions upon it. And he has sworn that he will not act by favour to such as he may please, but that he will decide conformably to the laws. It is by no means then, becoming in us to habituate you, nor in you to become habituated to perjury, for neither of us would act rightly. Do not then, suppose, Athenians, that I ought, of necessity, to adopt such a course with you, which I believe to be neither fair, just, nor dutiful, as well upon all other occasions, by Jove, as now in particular, when I am indicted for impiety by Melitus here. For were I to adopt this method of persuasion, and by my entreaties to wrest you from the tenor of your oath, I should distinctly instruct you in a disbelief of the gods, and should obviously, though on my defence,

accuse myself of disavowing them. But such is far from being the case; for I believe in them more firmly than any of my accusers, and to you and the deity I leave it to decide with regard to me, as is likely to be most conducive to my interest and yours.

[Here the question having been put to the vote, the majority of the judges declare Socrates guilty of the charges preferred by Melitus, whereupon he resumes—]

25. To prevent my complaining of what has occurred, in your having condemned me, a variety of other circumstances contribute, besides (this especial one) that this result has not come unexpected upon me; but I am much more moved at the number of votes on either side, for I did not calculate upon so small a difference, but an excessive one. Now, however, it appears, had three votes merely fallen to a different side, I should have been acquitted. And acquitted I have been, as it seems to me, so far as Melitus is concerned, and not only acquitted, but it is obvious to every one, that had not Anytus and Lycon come forward to join in the accusation against me, he should have been liable to a fine of a thousand drachms, not having obtained a fifth part of the suffrages.

26. This man then awards the penalty of death against me. Be it so; but what penalty* shall I

* The accuser proposed in the indictment, in cases where the punishment had not been prescribed by law, the penalty which he judged proportionate to the offence. If the accused was found guilty, however, he had the privilege of selecting the penalty to which he might choose to submit, but this was still subject to the sanction of the court.

assign, in your behalf, against myself? Obviously such an one as I deserve; what punishment or fine, then, do I deserve, because during my life I have not remained quiet, but disregarding what the multitude pursues, wealth, household, military commands, civil influence, public offices, and the conspiracies and factions arising in the state, with the impression that I am possessed of too much integrity to ensure my security by having recourse to such, I did not, thereupon, aim at that which having attained to, I was not likely to be of any service to you or to myself; but I aimed at this, attaching myself to each of you in private, to confer upon you, as I conceive, a most important benefit, in endeavouring to persuade each of you to take no interest in his own affairs, previous to the concern which he ought to feel about himself, how he might become the best and wisest; neither to be anxious about the affairs of the state in preference to the state itself, and so to exercise over other things likewise a care of the same kind. What, then, such being my character, do I deserve? Some acknowledgment, Athenians, if I must form the estimate, in reality, according to my deserts; and such an acknowledgment as would be suitable to me. What is suitable then, to a needy man, a benefactor, who requires to be left at leisure for the purposes of your instruction? There is nothing so suitable as to support an individual of this kind,

in the Prytaneum, much more so (in this instance) than if one of you had come off victorious, at the Olympic games, with the single horse, with a pair, or a team, for such an one only makes you to *seem* happy, but I, to *be* so, and he is not at a loss for his support, but I am. If, therefore, I must make an estimate of my deserts conformably to justice, I hold myself worthy of this, of support in the Prytaneum.

27. Perhaps, in addressing you thus, I appear to express myself with a like presumption as on the subject of pity and supplication; but such is not the case, Athenians, it is this rather; I am persuaded that I never injured any man designedly, but I cannot convince you of this, for we have occupied but a short time in our discussion, otherwise, I imagine, if the same law prevailed with you, as among other people, not to devote one day only but several to the trial of a capital charge, you might have been persuaded; but it is not easy now, in a short space of time, to do away with inveterate calumnies. Being, however, fully satisfied that I never injured any one, I have no idea of injuring myself, and admitting, to my own prejudice, that I am deserving of some punishment, and sentencing myself to something of the kind. Through fear of what should I be induced to do so? Is it lest I should suffer what Melitus assigns me, which I profess to know not whether it is good or evil? Shall I, instead of it, choose something which

I know to be an evil, and amerce myself with this? —Shall I choose a prison?—But why need I pass my life in a jail, in continued subjection to the established authorities, the Eleven?—Shall I say a fine, and to be imprisoned until I discharge it? But this amounts to what I have just said before, for I have no means of discharging it (and therefore should remain in jail).—Shall I sentence myself to exile? for perhaps you would sanction me in this. A strong hold indeed the love of life should have upon me, Athenians, were I so unwise as to be unable to reflect that you, my own fellow-citizens, could not endure my lectures and conversations, but so burdensome and odious were they that you require now to be delivered from them;—shall strangers, then, contentedly endure them? Far from it, Athenians. A noble life indeed, for me, exiled at such an age, to live wandering from city to city, and expelled (by turns) from each! For I know well that wherever I go the young will gladly hear me speak, as they did here; and if I repulse them, they will drive me out, with the consent of their seniors; but should I not repulse them, their fathers and kindred will proscribe me upon their account.

28. Probably some one may say, "Can you not, Socrates, when banished from amongst us, lead a silent and a peaceful life?" This is the most difficult point to convince some of you upon; for if I

say that this amounts to disobedience to the deity, and therefore it is impossible to remain quiet, you will not believe me, as if I were jesting with you. If I say, again, that it is a most important advantage to a man to hold converse daily upon virtue, and such other subjects as you have heard me discussing, and examining myself and others upon, (but a life without such examination is not worth living,) you will credit me still less in asserting this. Such, however, is really the case, though it is not easy to convince you.

In fine, I have not been accustomed to consider myself as deserving of any evil. Were I possessed of money I should have amerced myself in such a sum as I could afford to pay, for then I should have suffered no detriment, but now I cannot do so, for I have not the means, unless you are satisfied to impose such a fine upon me as I may have the ability to discharge. I might probably be able to pay a mina of silver; therefore I amerce myself in such a sum. But Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus urge me to fine myself thirty minæ, Athenians, and they promise to be my bail; therefore I fine myself so much, and these shall be your creditable security for the amount.

[Here the judges vote upon the penalty, and Socrates is condemned to death. He continues—]

29. For the sake of a brief space of time, Athenians, you shall incur from those who wish to revile your

state the imputation and reproach of having sentenced Socrates, the wise man, to death; for those who are anxious to upbraid you will assert that I am wise, even though I am not. Had you then waited a little while, this should have happened in its natural course, for you observe my age, that life is far spent, and the season of death at hand. I say this, not to all, but to those of you who have condemned me to die. But I address this also to the same. You think, perhaps, that I have been convicted from a deficiency in arguments such as I could have persuaded you by, had I thought it incumbent on me to make every exertion by word and deed to escape from punishment. Far from it, I have been convicted, not indeed from a deficiency in arguments, but in assurance and impudence, and from my disinclination to address you in such a strain as should have been most acceptable to you to hear, had I wept and bewailed, and said and done many such things, unbecoming as I assert, in me, but such as you have been accustomed to observe in others. However, I neither thought that I ought at that stage of the proceeding, to commit any ignoble act, to avert impending danger, nor do I now repent of having so conducted my defence, but I much prefer to die after the defence I have made, than to owe my life to any other. For neither upon trial, nor in battle, would it be becoming in me or in any one, to devise, by having

recourse to every expedient, an escape from death. In battle, indeed, it frequently appears that one may escape from death by throwing away his arms, and imploring the mercy of his pursuers. There are many modes besides, in every danger, of escaping death, if one has the assurance to leave no means untried. But (take heed) lest this be not the difficulty, my friends, to avoid death, but the far greater difficulty to avoid disgrace, for it runs with greater speed than death. And now I, indeed, as being slow, and far gone in years, am overtaken by the more tardy of the two; but my accusers, alert and keen as they may be, by the swifter, by disgrace. And I am departing hence, doomed at your hands to death, while they are doomed by truth to the reproach of iniquity and guilt, and I abide by my sentence, and so do they. Such was the course perhaps this matter ought to have, and I am persuaded that it is so best.

30. But I am desirous, O ye who have condemned me, to presage to you the result of this proceeding; for I am now in that critical state in which men prophesy, when they are about to die.* To you who have so sentenced me to death I say, that after my decease a far more bitter penalty shall overtake you than that to which you have devoted

* See an interesting discussion on this subject in Sir H. Halford's Essays, Essay vi. p. 81, in which he alludes to the particular instance as above.

me. For this you have now done expecting to be freed from the necessity of submitting to an examination of your mode of life. But far otherwise, I assure you, shall be the result. Many more shall come forward to examine (and confute) you, whom I was keeping back, though you were unconscious of it, and they shall prove so much the more difficult to deal with, inasmuch as they are younger, and you shall have the more abundant cause for irritation. If indeed you imagine that by putting men to death you will deter any one from reproaching you with your evil lives you do not think rightly, for such a plan for escaping (censure) is not at all efficacious nor fair, but this is the best plan, and most feasible, not to put a check upon others, but to make one's self as unexceptionable as possible. To you, then, who have condemned me, having predicted so much, I retire.

31. But while the Eleven are engaged, and previous to my setting out for the place where I am to die, I would gladly confer with those who were for acquitting me, upon what has now befallen me. Bear with me, then, for so long, for there is nothing to prevent our mutual converse while time allows, and I am anxious to shew you, as being my friends, the meaning of this which has just occurred to me. To me, then, judges, for were I to call you so, I would but name you as you really deserve, there has happened something strange. That familiar

warning voice of my guardian genius upon every former occasion was assiduous in its attendance upon me, and in very trifles ever firmly withstood me as often as I was on the point of acting incorrectly; now, however, there has befallen me what any one would imagine to be, and is actually considered as the very extreme of evil. But neither at my setting out in the morning from home did this signal of the god oppose me, nor when I came before the tribunal here, nor in anything which I meditated to say in the course of my address, although upon many occasions, in several of my discourses it checked me while in the very act of speaking. But, on the present occasion, during the course of this procedure, it has not opposed me in what I have either done or said. What then do I suppose to be the cause of this? I shall tell you; this event seems to have happened in the light of a blessing to me, nor do we, by any possibility, estimate the matter justly, as many of us as imagine death to be an evil. One striking proof of this, in my mind, is, that it is impossible but the customary signal should have interfered, if I were not likely to have been happy in the result.

32. But let us take this view of the subject which affords the strongest hope that death is a blessing. It must be either of two things; either the dead are annihilated, and have no perception of anything whatever, or, as it is said, a certain change

takes place, and a removal of the soul from one situation to another. If, then, there is no perception of any kind, but death is like a sleep in which the slumberer has no dreams, it should be an amazing gain. For I imagine that if any one were obliged—having selected the particular night during which he slept without dreaming, and contrasted with this the other nights and days of his life—were obliged, I repeat, to consider and say how many days and nights he had passed, during his existence, better and more agreeably than that night, I think that not only a private person, but the Great King should find such as the latter so few as to be easily reckoned in comparison with the days and nights of a different character. If death, then, be anything of this kind, I count it gain, for so all time (after death) appears to be no more than one continued night. If, on the other hand, death be a departure from hence to some other region, and what is said be true, that all who die inhabit there, what greater blessing, judges, can there be than this? For if upon one's arrival in Hades, after he has been delivered out of the hands of those who profess to be judges here, he should find those who are really judges, and who are said to exercise their functions there, Minos, for instance, and Rhadamanthus, Æacus, Triptolemus, and as many others of the demigods as led a righteous life, should the departure thither be thought meanly of? What

price would any of you set upon an opportunity of conversing with Orpheus, Musæus, Hesiod and Homer? For my part I should submit to many deaths, if all this be true, and welcome to me indeed should be a sojourn where I might meet Palamedes, Telamonian Ajax, and any other of the ancients who died by an unjust award; contrasting, (as I should,) my own casualty with theirs, I should have, I think, no unpleasing task. But I should find it most delightful to devote my life there to an examination and scrutiny similar to what I put in practice here, to discover who amongst them was wise, and who thought he was, but was deceived. How much would one of you give, judges, for a discussion with him who conducted the grand expedition against Troy, or with Ulysses, or Sisyphus, or those numberless others whom one might mention, both men and women, whom to confer with there, and associate with, for the purpose of discussion and inquiry, should be inconceivable happiness. Neither, indeed, on such a pretext as the present, do those abiding there put any to death; but besides that they are more happy in other respects than those here, they are especially so in this that death has no more dominion over them, if indeed what is said be true.

33. It is incumbent, then, upon you, judges, to entertain good hopes regarding death, and to impress this one truth upon your minds, that no evil

can befall an upright man through life, nor after death, nor are the concerns of such a man neglected by the gods. My present position is not the result of chance, but it is evident to me that to die and be delivered from my cares is gain. On this account the divine signal did not divert me from my purpose, and I bear no malice to those of you who accused, nor to those who condemned me. And yet it was not with a view to my good, but with design to injure that they impeached and sentenced me; in this they are to be blamed.

I ask but so much then;—when my sons grow up, punish them by such harassing discipline as I employed with you, if they should appear to value wealth, or anything, in preference to virtue; and if they should affect to be what they are not, rebuke them, as I rebuked you, for neglecting their true interests, and presuming to aim at a distinction which they do not deserve. If you act thus, both I and my sons shall have found justice at your hands.

But it is now time to depart—for me, to die; for you, to live; but which to the happier destiny, the Deity alone can tell.

CRITO,

OR, THE DUTY OF A CITIZEN.

CHARACTERS IN THE DIALOGUE,

SOCRATES, CRITO.

CRITO,

OR, THE DUTY OF A CITIZEN.

CHARACTERS IN THE DIALOGUE,

SOCRATES, CRITO.

---

1. SOCRATES—Why have you come so very early, Crito? Is it not yet but dawn?

CRITO—No more indeed.

SOCRATES—What time is it nearly?

CRITO—The very point of day-break.

SOCRATES—I am surprised that the keeper of the prison was satisfied to admit you.

CRITO—He has become familiar with me on account of my frequent recourse here; besides, he has received some kindness at my hands.

SOCRATES—Are you but just now come in, or long since?

CRITO—Pretty long since.

SOCRATES—Why did you not awake me then, instead of sitting quietly by?

CRITO—Because I should not, by Jove, myself

have wished to suffer want of rest besides such great affliction. But I am surprised this some time past, to perceive how sweetly you repose, and I purposely did not awake you that you might pass as quietly as possible what remains of your life. And many a time as I have, ere this, through the course of your existence, deemed you blest in your disposition, I do so most of all in your present distress, from the calmness and resignation with which you bear it.

SOCRATES—Surely, Crito, it should but ill assort with age so far advanced as mine, to chafe at the necessity of death.

CRITO—Yet, Socrates, others equally advanced in years are involved in like calamities, and age does not free them from displeasure at their lot.

SOCRATES—It is so. But why did you come so early?

CRITO—Charged with tidings, Socrates, by no means, as I judge, sorrowful to you, but to me and all your friends, both painful and oppressive, and which I, as I think, shall take the most to heart of all.

SOCRATES—What tidings? Has the vessel returned from Delos, upon whose arrival I must die?

CRITO—It has not yet returned, but I think it will arrive to-day, according to the report of some travellers from Sunium, who left it behind them there. It appears, from what they say, that it

shall arrive this day, and to-morrow, Socrates, it is ordained that you shall die.

2. SOCRATES—In a good hour, then, Crito; so let it be, if it so please the gods. But I do not think it will arrive to-day.

CRITO—Whence do you conjecture this?

SOCRATES—I shall tell you; I must die the day subsequent to that on which the vessel arrives.

CRITO—So they say who regulate such matters.

SOCRATES—I do not think then that it will arrive this coming day, but to-morrow; and I conjecture this from a dream I had this very night, a little before you arrived, wherefore you seem to have wisely avoided waking me.

CRITO—Of what nature was the dream?

SOCRATES—A woman, beautiful and graceful, clad in a radiantly white robe, seemed to approach me, to call me by name, and say, "Socrates, in three days hence you shall arrive at fertile Phthia."

CRITO—How strange a vision, Socrates!

SOCRATES—So clear too, Crito, as I think.

3. CRITO—Extremely so. But even now, dearest Socrates, obey me and save yourself, since if you die, not one calamity only shall befall me; but besides my having lost a friend, such as I never may obtain again, I shall, further, seem to many who do not thoroughly know both, to have neglected

when I might have preserved you, had I been willing to encroach upon my wealth. And what more disreputable character could there be than this, namely, to appear to value money above one's friends? For the many will not be persuaded that you were yourself disinclined to escape from hence, although we urged you eagerly to do so.

SOCRATES—But what concern have we, my faithful Crito, for the opinion of the many, when the wisest class, whom we should the more appreciate, shall be made aware of the real state of things?

CRITO—Yet, Socrates, you see that it is necessary to give heed to the opinion of the many. The very circumstances of the immediate case evince the capability of the many to accomplish not the slightest only, but the most serious mischief, when one is in disfavour amongst them.

SOCRATES—Would that they were capable, Crito, of effecting the most serious mischief, that so they might (in turn) effect the greatest good. It were well if so. But they are incapable of either, for they have no influence either in making one wise, or the contrary, but act at random.

4. CRITO—Such is the case indeed. But answer me this, Socrates, are you not solicitous on my account, and that of your other friends, lest, in event of your escaping from this the informers may involve us in trouble, as having secretly conveyed you hence,

and we should be compelled in consequence, either to forfeit our entire personal estate, or a very considerable sum, or submit to some other penalty besides. If you dread any such result bid adieu to your fears, for we are justified in braving this danger for your safety's sake, and greater still if need be. Let me persuade you then, and do not go against me.

SOCRATES—I am concerned upon this and many other accounts, Crito.

CRITO—Be concerned then, no further, for the amount is not large which some are willing to receive, and bear you away in safety hence. Do you not observe, besides, with regard to the informers how little expensive they are, so that it requires no great outlay to treat with them? But my resources are at your disposal; fully sufficient, I imagine, for our purposes. Further, if through your anxiety for me you think you should not make use of my money, there are foreigners at hand here who are ready to supply you. One of them, Simmias of Thebes, has brought the requisite sum for this particular purpose; Cebes, besides, and several others are ready to come forward. Wherefore, as I said, do not through any apprehension of this kind despair of your safety, neither let that which you said before the tribunal give you any annoyance, that if you went out of the city you should not know what to do with yourself. In all the various

quarters towards which you may direct your steps men will respect and cherish you, but if you wish to visit Thessaly, I have kind friends there who will appreciate you, and so provide for your security that not one in Thessaly shall molest you.

5. Moreover, Socrates, you do not seem to me to pursue an equitable course in betraying yourself when you might be preserved, and in hastening the progress of your destiny which your enemies would press, and have pressed, in their eagerness to destroy you. Besides, in my judgment, you appear to betray your sons also, whom you will depart from and abandon when it is in your power to rear and educate them, so that, as far as you are concerned, they must abide by whatever may befall them; but they shall naturally encounter the lot which is familiar to the destitute state of the fatherless. Surely one should either not have sons at all, or else he should endure throughout the task of nurture and instruction; but you appear to me to prefer the most indolent course, while it is incumbent on you to make choice of that which a man of integrity and virtue would adopt, professing as you do to have made virtue the main concern of your whole life. Wherefore both upon your account and upon ours, who are your friends, I am ashamed lest this whole procedure may appear to have been brought about through want of manliness in us; the bringing of the suit before the court, upon which

you entered an appearance which was in your power to avoid, the very mode in which the trial was conducted, and, to crown all, this absurd termination to the business, your seeming to have escaped from our grasp, through indolence and timidity on our part, who made no more efforts for your safety than you did for yourself, when the thing was practically possible had we been of the slightest use. Take care, therefore, Socrates, lest, along with the detriment, we should, as well as you, incur disgrace. Consider, then,—or rather it is no longer time for considering, but the plan must be already formed. There is but one plan then, for all arrangements must be completed against the coming night, and if we tarry longer, the thing becomes utterly impracticable. By all means, therefore, Socrates, comply with my design, and do not thwart me.

6. SOCRATES—My worthy Crito, your zeal is highly commendable were it tempered with discretion, otherwise the greater it is, so much the more distressing it becomes. We must consider, then, whether we ought to act thus or not, since not upon this occasion merely, but at all times I have been so disposed as to listen to nothing else within me, except to that reason which, upon consideration, shall appear to me the best. But those principles which I advanced in argument before, I cannot now reject, when this casualty has befallen me, for

they present themselves with scarcely any alteration, and I respect and reverence them as before. Should we be unable to furnish any better than these at the present time, be assured that I shall not give up to you, not though the power of the multitude should make still further exertions to scare us, like children, visiting us with imprisonment, death, and confiscation of goods. How then shall we most fitly deliberate on this subject? By resuming, in the first instance, the argument which you urge respecting opinion, whether upon every occasion (previously) this was justly contended or not, that we ought to pay regard to some opinions, and to others not. Or was this justly contended before I was required to die, while it now appears to have been idly urged for argument's sake, and in reality was but silly jest. But I am anxious, Crito, to consider the matter along with you, whether it should appear in altered guise to me when circumstanced as I am now, or in the same, and whether we shall renounce it, or be guided by it.

It was said, as I imagine, generally by those who were reputed to speak seriously, in some such terms as I used just now, that of the opinions which men hold some should be deemed of consequence and others not. In the name of the gods, Crito, does not this seem to you to be said wisely? For you, in all human probability, are remote from all danger of dying tomorrow, and no impending

ill can lead your judgment astray. Consider, then, does it not seem to you to be full wisely said that we should not respect all the opinions of mankind, but some we ought, and others we ought not? Nor yet indeed the opinions of all men, but of some men truly, and not of others. What say you? Is it not wisely so laid down?

CRITO—Wisely indeed.

SOCRATES—Therefore we should respect the good, but not the bad?

CRITO—Even so.

SOCRATES—But do not the good proceed from the wise, and the bad from the foolish?

CRITO—How should they not?

7. SOCRATES—Come now; how did we further treat such points as these? Whether does a man who practises athletic exercises, and is wholly intent upon them, attend to the praise, censure, and opinion of every one, or of that one person only, whoever may be the medical adviser or preceptor?

CRITO—Of the one only.

SOCRATES—He must dread the censures then, and court the praises of that one person only, and not of the multitude.

CRITO—Evidently.

SOCRATES—He must so conduct and exercise himself, therefore, and eat and drink, as seems fit to the one individual who has both authority

and intelligence, rather than to all the rest taken together.

CRITO—It is so.

SOCRATES—Well, then. In case he should disobey this one individual, and disregard both his opinion and his praise, while he respects the approbation of the multitude, and of the unintelligent, shall he not be liable to some evil?

CRITO—How should he not be so?

SOCRATES—What then is this evil? Whither does it tend? And on what part of the disobedient shall it fall?

CRITO—On the body evidently, for this it destroys.

SOCRATES—You say well. Such then is the case with regard to all things else, not to enumerate them all. And now, in the case of justice and injustice, disgrace and reputation, good and evil, regarding which we are consulting at present, whether ought we to give heed to the opinion of the multitude, and stand in awe of it, or to the opinion of one, if such an intelligent person there be, whom we should reverence and respect above all others, whom if we obey not we shall impair and injure that which was progressively improving by justice, and wasting by its opposite. Is there anything in this?

CRITO—I am convinced of it, Socrates.

8. SOCRATES—Come, now; if we deteriorate that which is improved by what is wholesome, and wasted by its opposite, in consequence of our disobedience to the opinion of the intelligent, can life be enjoyed when that is impaired? But that to which I allude is the body, is it not?

CRITO—Yes.

SOCRATES—Can life, then, be enjoyed with a miserable and disordered body?

CRITO—By no means.

SOCRATES—Can we enjoy life, then, when that is impaired which injustice weakens, but justice sustains? Or do we imagine that to be of less importance than the body, whatever it is belonging to us about which justice and injustice are concerned?

CRITO—Certainly not.

SOCRATES—But of far greater importance?

CRITO—Far greater.

SOCRATES—Therefore, my excellent Crito, we are not on any account to feel so solicitous about what the multitude may say concerning us, but what the arbiter of justice and injustice may say, who is one individual, the truth itself. So that in the first instance, you do not propose this wisely, laying it down as a principle that we are to regard the opinion of the multitude upon what is just, upright, and honorable, and their opposites. But one might ask, perhaps, have the multitude the power of putting us to death?

CRITO—Evidently one might answer that they had.

SOCRATES—You speak true. But, my good friend, this subject which we have just discussed, seems to me to resemble the former one; and to this direct your attention again, whether we abide by this determination or not, that it is not life which is to be considered of the highest importance, but to live well.

CRITO—We still abide by this.

SOCRATES—But do we persist, or not, in believing that to live well amounts to living conformably to honour and justice?

CRITO—We persist in believing so.

9. SOCRATES—From what has been admitted, therefore, this consideration arises, whether it be just or not that I should endeavour to depart from this without leave of the Athenians; and should it appear to be just, let us make the effort, if not, let us give it over. With regard, then, to the considerations about the outlay of money, about opinion, and the rearing of children, beware lest such considerations prove in reality to belong to the multitude who rashly put men to death, and would bring to life again, if they could, with as little reason. But we, since reason requires it so, must consider nothing else than what we just now discussed, whether we shall both act fairly, those who lead, and we who are led hence, in making

acknowledgments by money and thanks to those who are to rescue me from this; or shall we, in truth, act criminally in adopting such a course; and if we should so appear to act unjustly, observe that we are not to take into account the death that must result from our remaining and keeping quiet here, nor any other suffering whatever, in preference to the injustice of the act.

CRITO—You appear to me to speak wisely, Socrates, but see what we are to do.

SOCRATES—Let us reason the matter together, my good friend, and if in any point you can contradict me while I speak, do so, and I shall give up to you; otherwise, my excellent Crito, forbear to press the same subject so often upon me, that I ought to depart from hence against the will of the Athenians, since I attach all due importance to your efforts to convince me to act so, but not when it is against my inclination. Look, then, to the beginning of our consideration, if it has been stated with sufficient fulness, and try to answer what is asked as effectively as you think possible.

CRITO—I shall try indeed.

10. SOCRATES—Say we, then, that we ought by no means to act unjustly with design, or that in some respects we should, in others we should not? Or is injustice under any circumstances neither correct nor fair, as has been frequently admitted between us before?—as was said too just now. Or

have all our previous admissions been done away with during these few past days, and have we, at such an advanced time of life, while engaged mutually in such serious discussions, been long blind to the truth, that we differ in nowise from children? Or does the case stand beyond all question as it was stated then, whether the multitude allow it or not, and whether we must suffer a greater or milder punishment, still an unjust act is, in every way, criminal and base in him who commits it? Do we agree to this or not?

CRITO—We do.

SOCRATES—Therefore we ought by no means to act unjustly.

CRITO—Surely not.

SOCRATES—Neither ought the injured person to retaliate, as the multitude imagine, since it is not allowed to act unjustly.

CRITO—It appears not.

SOCRATES—What then? Should one be guilty of an injury or not?

CRITO—Certainly not, Socrates.

SOCRATES—Well; is it just or otherwise that one who receives an injury should return evil for evil, as the multitude direct?

CRITO—By no means just.

SOCRATES—For there is no difference between doing mischief to any one, and acting unjustly.

CRITO—You say truly.

SOCRATES—One should not, therefore, retaliate upon or injure any person whatever, no matter what he may suffer at his hands. And take care, Crito, while you admit this, lest you concede anything contrary to your (real) opinion, for I am aware that to a few only this appears, and is likely to appear correct. Between those, therefore, who are agreed that it is, and those who are determined otherwise, there is no common purpose, but they must despise each other, observing the results of their separate resolves. Observe, now, carefully, whether you unite and coincide in opinion with me, and we shall commence our deliberations from this point, that it is in no case consistent with rectitude, either to inflict an injury or to retaliate, or that one who is ill-used should revenge himself requiting evil for evil; or do you dissent and disagree from this principle? My sentiments indeed, were such long since, and are so still, but if you have determined otherwise speak and inform me; should you, however, abide by our former conclusions, hear what follows.

CRITO.—I abide by them, and coincide with you; say on then.

SOCRATES.—I say, then, in continuation, or ask rather, whether that should be done which one may have admitted to another to be just, or should it be evaded by a fraud?

CRITO—It should be done.

11. SOCRATES—Observe now what follows. If we were to depart from hence without permission of the state, are we behaving badly to any, and to those whom, least of all, we should so treat, or not? And are we abiding by the standard of justice which we established, or not?

CRITO—I cannot answer what you require, Socrates, for I do not comprehend you.

SOCRATES—View it in this light, then. If while we were preparing to run away, or by whatever name it is to be called, from hence, the laws and commonwealth itself were to approach, and standing by me, to accost me thus, "Say, Socrates, what is it you intend to do? Are you meditating anything else by this proceeding of yours, than the destruction both of us, the laws, and the entire state, as far as lies in your power? Or do you imagine it possible for that state any longer to exist without subversion, in which the judgments that are passed avail nothing, but are cancelled and destroyed by those in a private station?" What answer shall we make, Crito, to these, and such like remonstrances? For any one, but an orator especially, might plead with great eloquence in behalf of that violated law, which ordained the ratification of public judgments. Shall we say to them, that the state has acted unjustly towards us, and unfairly issued its award? Shall we say this, or what else?

CRITO—This, certainly, Socrates.

12. SOCRATES—What, then, if the laws were to rejoin, "Socrates, has this compact been made between us that you would abide by the decisions which the state may pronounce?" If, then, we were to express surprise at what they said, they would perhaps continue, "Socrates, wonder not at what we say, but answer, since you are accustomed to adopt the style of question and reply. Come now, what charge have you to make against us and the state, that you aim at our destruction? Were we not in the first instance the cause of your existence, for through our instrumentality your father took your mother to wife, and begot you? Tell, therefore, those laws amongst us, relating to the marriage ceremonies, if you blame them, in any respect, for a tendency to evil?" I would answer, that I did not blame them. "But do you blame those which regarded your support when born, and the discipline with which you were instructed? Or did these laws amongst us, appointed for this special purpose, make an unwise injunction, when they imposed upon your father the duty of your literary and gymnastic education?" I would reply that they made the injunction wisely. "Well, then, after you were thus born, reared, and educated, could you in the first place assert that you are not our offspring and our slave, yourself and ancestors alike? And if

you are so, think you that justice lies so evenly between us, that whatever we attempt to do to you, you deem it lawful for you to requite the same? In the case of your father, or master, if you chanced to have one, there would not be an equal right, on your part, to inflict in turn what you had suffered, neither if you were rebuked, to retort again, nor if struck to return the blow, nor to do anything of the kind; shall it then be allowed you, in the case of your country and the laws, if, with the impression that justice requires it, we aim at your destruction, that you should in turn attempt the ruin of us, the laws, and your country, as far as you are able; and in so doing, will you assert that you are acting with justice on your side—you who are the unfeigned advocate of virtue? Or are you sufficiently wise so as not to be aware that your country is more honourable, venerable, and sacred, than your mother, father, and all your predecessors together; that it is in greater repute with the gods, and well-judging men; that it is incumbent on you to reverence, yield to, and conciliate your angered country sooner than your sire, and you must either persuade her otherwise or execute whatever she enjoins, and suffer should she ordain you to suffer, uncomplainingly, whether you are to be beaten or put in bonds, or if she leads you to the field, to run the risk of wounds or death. This also you must do, justice will have it so, and you

must never flinch, retreat, nor abandon your post, but in the field, at the tribunal, and everywhere you must act as the state and your country requires, or convince her in what else her just right consists. But it is not lawful for one to show violence to his mother or father, and still less to his country." What answer shall we make to this, Crito; that the laws speak truth or not?

CRITO—I think they do.

13. SOCRATES—"Observe now, Socrates," the laws perhaps might say, "if we assert this with any truth, that you do not aim at acting justly by us in what you now essay to do. For we having given you existence, reared, and instructed you, having freely imparted all the good things which we possibly could, both to you and all your fellow-citizens, nevertheless proclaim, by the very grant of the indulgence to any of the Athenians who may desire to use it, as soon as he has arrived at the years of discretion, and become acquainted with the business of the state and us, the laws, that it is lawful for him, having collected his effects, to depart whithersoever he pleases. And none of us, the laws, interferes with, nor forbids any one from departing, if he please, to a native colony, if we and the state do not satisfy him, or if he prefer having set out in another direction, to travel into a foreign country, from going to whatever place he likes, bringing all his effects. But whichever of

you continues to abide with us, observing in what manner we conduct our judicial proceedings, and our mode, in other respects, of governing the state, we already assert that such an individual has virtually agreed with us to adopt that course of action which we may direct, and we further assert that he who disobeys us is guilty of a threefold crime; of rebellion against us who are the authors of his being, against us who have reared him, and that having agreed to submit to us he neither does so, nor does he persuade us that we are acting unjustly if we do anything without a sufficient warrant; while, in truth, we merely propose ourselves for public consideration, and never rigidly enjoin upon any one a compliance with what we suggest, but when we afford him a choice of two things, either to convince us of error, or to do as we ordain, he still rejects them both."

14. "To such charges we say, Socrates, that you should be liable, if you accomplish your design, and that too not less than any other Athenian, but the most so of all." If, then, I were to ask, for what reason? They might probably with justice retort upon me, and say that of all the Athenians I had especially engaged in a compact of this nature with them. For they would express themselves to this effect, "We have, Socrates, most ample testimony in favour of this, that both we and the state were pleasing to you; otherwise, of all the

Athenians, you never would have fixed your abode here, had it not been particularly agreeable to you; besides, you never upon any occasion departed from the city to be present at the public spectacles, except once that you went to the Isthmian games, nor in any other direction whatever, except upon military service; neither did you ever undertake a tour, as most other men do, nor did you even feel an anxiety to be acquainted with any other state or other laws, but we and our state sufficed you; such was the warmth with which you made choice of us and consented to be subject to our administration, besides that you reared your children in this state in proof that it fully contented you. Moreover, during the very trial it was in your power to sentence yourself to exile if you pleased, and to do at that time with the approval of the state what you now attempt against its will. But at that time indeed you prided yourself upon being indifferent whether you were doomed to die, and preferred, as you said, death to banishment; whereas you feel no shame at these professions now, nor do you scruple attempting to destroy us, the laws; you are acting too the part of a most profligate slave in endeavouring to make your escape contrary to the compact and convention pursuant to which you agreed to be governed. First, then, answer this, if we speak true or not, in saying that you consented to be governed by our will, in fact, not in

words?" What answer shall we make to this, Crito? Can we do anything else, but admit it to be the case?

CRITO—It must be admitted indeed, Socrates.

SOCRATES—"What else," they would continue, "are you doing than violating these covenants and engagements, at the same time that you did not contract them through compulsion, nor induced by fraud, nor forced to make up your mind in a short time, but through a course of seventy years, during which it was in your power to depart from hence, if we were disagreeable to you, and the contracts appeared to you unfair. But you neither evinced a preference for Lacedæmon nor Crete, which you on various occasions asserted to be governed by good laws, nor for any other of the Grecian or Barbarian states; you have more rarely gone abroad from this state even than the lame, the blind, or any other cripple, so particularly with you beyond the rest of the Athenians did both the state find favour and ourselves, to wit, the laws. For to whom could a state without laws recommend itself? But will you now refuse to abide by your engagements? If you will be advised by us, Socrates, you will abide by them, and will not make yourself contemptible by your abandoning this state.

15. "For look now, if you transgress and offend against them, what advantage will you effect for yourself or your friends; that they shall also incur

the risk of banishment and exile from the state, or else confiscation of their property, is in a measure certain. But you, should you betake yourself to any of the neighbouring states—to Thebes or Megara, for they both enjoy an excellent legislature—shall arrive in the first instance as an enemy to their government, and all who feel an interest in their states will regard you with suspicion, believing you a profaner of the laws, besides you will confirm the opinion of the judges, so that they shall appear to have formed their decision correctly, for whoever is a corrupter of the laws there is a strong likelihood of his being a corrupter of youth likewise, and of weak-minded men. Whether then will you avoid the cities that are wisely ruled, and the most upright of mankind? And acting thus will you set any worth on life? Or will you approach them and have the effrontery to discuss with them—what subjects Socrates? Is it like those here, to the effect that virtue and justice, usages and laws, are of the highest value to mankind? Think you not that such conduct should be unseemly in Socrates? You must believe it so.

"But you will keep clear of all such places, and make for Thessaly and Crito's friends; for there licentiousness and rioting abound, and they perhaps, would gladly hear of your ridiculous escape from jail, clad in some (novel) robe, or in a hide, or such other disguise as fugitives are accustomed to

assume, having completely changed your own deportment. But will no one reproach you because in your old age, with, in all probability, a brief remaining space to live, you had the assurance to be so tenaciously desirous of life, in violation of the gravest laws? Perhaps not, if you should not offend any one, but if you should, you shall hear much to humble you; you shall live besides in awe of and subserviency to all; how else employed than revelling in Thessaly, as if you had gone thither to a feast? But your discourses upon justice and every other virtue, where shall we look for them?

"Perhaps for your children's sake you wish to live; that you may rear and educate them? What now? Will you transfer them to Thessaly to bring them up and instruct them, making aliens of them, that they may owe you this service too? Or is such not your object, but being brought up here shall they be reared and taught more carefully while you survive, though holding no communication with them? But your friends will take care of them? Will they do so if you travel into Thessaly, and not do so if you take the road to death? If there be any use in those who say they are your friends, we must believe they will.

16. "But Socrates, in obedience to us, your foster-parents, set no value upon your family or your life, or anything in preference to justice, in

order that when you shall have descended to the Shades you may have all this to urge in your defence before the judges there. For neither in this life, if you pursue the course proposed, does any thing good, just, or pure seem likely to result to you or any of your friends, nor shall you fare better in the life to come. But now you are departing, if indeed you do depart, from life unjustly dealt with, not by us, the laws, but by men; whereas if you escape from hence having so discreditably repaid wrong for wrong and evil for evil, having violated your own contract and covenant with us, and injured those whom least of all you should, yourself, your friends, your country and us, we shall be both incensed against you while you live and our brethren, the laws in the realm beneath, shall not receive you kindly there, knowing that you essayed as far as in you lay, to ruin us. Let not Crito then persuade you to adopt what he proposes rather than what we suggest."

17. Be assured, my kind Crito, that I seem to hear remonstrances like these, as Cybele's votaries appear to hear the music of the flutes; in my ears too, the sound of these suggestions is murmuring now, and precludes my hearing any thing besides. Be sure then, as far as I have formed my resolution now, that any thing you say against it, you shall urge in vain; yet if you suppose you shall be able to prevail at all, speak on.

CRITO—Socrates, I can say no more.

SOCRATES—Forbear then, Crito, and let us shape our course this way, since thus the deity directs.

PHÆDO,

OR,

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

CHARACTERS IN THE DIALOGUE.

ECHECRATES, PHÆDO, SOCRATES, APOLLODORUS, CEBES, SIMMIAS, CRITO, THE OFFICER OF THE PRISON.

PHÆDO,

OR,

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

CHARACTERS IN THE DIALOGUE.

ECHECRATES, PHÆDO, SOCRATES, APOLLODORUS, CEBES, SIMMIAS, CRITO, THE OFFICER OF THE PRISON.

---

1. ECHECRATES—Were you in personal attendance, Phædo, upon Socrates, on that day in which he drank the hemlock in prison, or did you hear of the matter from another?

PHÆDO—I was there myself, Echecrates.

ECHECRATES—What was the purport of his conversation before he died, and what was the manner of his death?—for I should be glad to hear, since none of the citizens of Phlius at all frequent Athens at present, nor has any foreigner arrived here from thence, for a long time, who could give any more distinct account than that he died from

the draught of poison, but of the attendant circumstances he could say nothing.

PHÆDO—Did you not hear of the trial either how it proceeded?

ECHECRATES—Yes; one brought me intelligence of this, and I am surprised that as it terminated some time since, he appears to have died so long subsequent to it. How did this happen, Phædo?

PHÆDO—Owing to accident, Echecrates; for the poop of the vessel which the Athenians are accustomed to send to Delos chanced to be crowned upon the day preceding the trial.

ECHECRATES—What does this vessel mean?

PHÆDO—It is the same, as the Athenians say, in which Theseus once set out with fourteen in the flower of youth, for Crete, whom he managed to preserve, and was also saved himself. They made a vow, it is said, to Apollo upon that occasion, that in event of their preservation they would dispatch a solemn deputation to Delos, which, ever since then, up to the present time, they send out yearly in honour of the god. When they commence the celebration of this ceremony then, the usage is, during the interval between the arrival of the vessel at Delos, and its return hither, to purify the city and to allow no public execution; but this interval is at times of some duration, when the

winds are unfavourable. The commencement of the embassy is notified by the priest of Apollo crowning the poop of the ship, and this happened as I mentioned, on the day preceding the trial. On this account Socrates had a long interval in prison, between the trial and his death.

2. ECHECRATES—But, Phædo, what were the particulars of his decease? What was said, and done, and which of his intimates were present with him? Or did the Eleven prevent their attendance, and did he die forsaken by his friends?

PHÆDO—By no means; there were some, indeed several, present.

ECHECRATES—Be pleased now to give me the most distinct possible account of each particular, unless you have some business on hands.

PHÆDO—I am quite at leisure, and shall endeavour to tell you all, for to call Socrates to mind, both speaking himself and listening to another, is ever most delightful to me.

ECHECRATES—Even such as yourself, Phædo, have you to listen to you; but try, with all possible accuracy, to enumerate to me everything.

PHÆDO—In truth I was strangely affected upon my arrival. No feeling of compassion struck me, as one who stood by to witness the last moments of a dearly familiar friend, for the man appeared to me, Echecrates, at perfect ease, both in his

manner and discourse, with such an intrepid and noble bearing he met his death; so much so, that it struck me he was not descending to the Shades but by divine direction, and that he, if ever there were one, should be blest in his arrival there. For this reason I was not moved, in any degree, to the compassion which would be natural to one present at a scene so sorrowful, nor yet did I experience the pleasure, as when we were engaged, according to our custom, in philosophical pursuits, although our discourse partook of some such character, but an altogether unaccountable affection seized me, and a species of unusual, mixed feeling, compounded alike of pleasure and of pain, upon reflecting how very soon he was about to die. And all present were almost similarly disposed, now indeed smiling, and again in tears, but one especially amongst us, Apollodorus; you doubtless know the man and his character.

ECHECRATES—How should I not?

PHÆDO—He indeed resigned himself entirely to these emotions, and the rest, with myself, were perturbed alike.

ECHECRATES—But who besides were present, Phædo?

PHÆDO—Of our countrymen this Apollodorus was present, Critobulus and his father Crito; besides Hermogenes and Epigenes, Æschines and

Antisthenes. There were also Ctesippus of the Paianian tribe, Menexenus, and some others of our countrymen; but Plato, I believe, was ill.

ECHECRATES—Were any strangers present?

PHÆDO—Yes; Simmias of Thebes, Cebes and Phædondes, and from Megara, Euclides and Terpsion.

ECHECRATES—Tell me: Were Aristippus and Cleombrotus there?

PHÆDO—No truly; they were said to be in Ægina.

ECHECRATES—Was any one else present?

PHÆDO—I believe those whom I mentioned were almost all that were present.

ECHECRATES—Well now; what was the subject of your conversation?

PHÆDO—I shall endeavour to narrate to you every thing from the commencement. We were constantly in the habit, both the rest and myself, of visiting Socrates on the preceding days; assembling together at the tribunal where the trial took place, for it was contiguous to the prison, we used to wait every day until the prison was opened, conversing with each other, for it was not opened very early; but as soon as it was so we went in to Socrates and generally passed the day with him. Upon that occasion we assembled at an earlier hour, because on the preceding day, when we were going out of the prison, we understood that the vessel had ar-

rived from Delos, upon which we agreed to return as early as possible on the following day to the usual place. We did so; and the gaoler who used to admit us, coming out, requested us to wait and not seek for admission until he should direct; "For," said he, "the Eleven are unbinding Socrates, and acquainting him that he must die to-day." But after a little time he returned and desired us to enter.

When we had come in we found Socrates just unfettered, and Xantippe—you know her—sitting beside him with his little son. As soon as she observed us she wept aloud, and expressed herself in the customary manner of her sex, saying, "Socrates, now for the last time your friends converse with you and you with them." Upon which Socrates, looking at Crito, said, "Crito, let some one conduct her home." And some of Crito's retinue led her away weeping and lamenting bitterly.

But Socrates sitting up in the bed, bended his leg and rubbed it with his hands, and while doing so, observed, "How strange, my friends, this thing appears, to be which mankind calls pleasure, and how wonderfully it is disposed towards that which seems to be its opposite, pain; since they are not inclined both to befall a man at once, but should any pursue and attain the one, he is almost invariably compelled to admit the other, as if they being two were connected by one head. And it seems to me

that if Æsop had turned his mind to this he would have composed a fable to the effect that the deity being anxious to reconcile those contending principles, when he failed in the attempt, joined their heads together, so that whomsoever the one should visit the other arrives with immediately after. Even so it appears to me, since I suffered pain in my leg before by reason of the chain, but pleasure seems to have followed in succession now."

4. Upon this Cebes rejoined, "By Jove, Socrates, you have done well to remind me, for several others have asked me already, and Evenus very lately, respecting the poems you have composed, your versification of Æsop's Fables, and the Hymn to Apollo, with what object you wrote them after you had come here, having never executed anything of the kind before. If you are at all concerned then in my being enabled to give Evenus an answer when he questions me again, for I know well he will do so, tell me what I am to say." Socrates replied, "Tell him the truth Cebes, that I did not write them with a view to any competition with him, or his productions, for this I knew should not be any easy task, but investigating the purport of certain dreams, and acquitting my conscience if this perchance were the branch of the liberal arts which they enjoined me to attend to. But the dreams were of the following character: the same vision came repeatedly during the course of my past life,

appearing at various times under various forms, but always with the same injunction, "Socrates, adopt and cultivate the liberal arts." And I indeed imagined that it was animating and encouraging me, as those who cheer on racers at the games, to continue the pursuit in which I had been previously engaged; and that in like manner the vision urged upon me the course in which I was engaged; that is, the study of the liberal arts, since philosophy indeed is the most refined of the liberal arts, and I was intently occupied in this. But now, when the trial was over, and the festival of the deity was delaying my death, I thought that in case the vision had intended by its frequent injunctions the composition of popular poetry, I should not disobey but attempt it. For I deemed it was safer not to depart from hence before I had acquitted my conscience in the composition of some poems in obedience to the dream. Consequently, I first composed one on the deity whose festival was at hand; but after this token of respect to the god, with the impression that it became a poet, if he aspired to the name, to write fictions and not true narratives, besides my not being skilled in the fabulous, I, upon this account, turned into verse the first which occurred of those fables of Æsop which I remembered and was well acquainted with.

5. "Tell this then, Cebes, to Evenus, and wish him health and strength, and say, that if he is wise,

he will follow me; but I depart as it appears this day, for the Athenians ordain it so." Upon this Simmias replied, "What is this Socrates which you enjoin upon Evenus? I have often met the man before now, and from my general conception of his character he certainly will not willingly take your advice."—"But," said Socrates, "is not Evenus a philosopher?" "To me he seems so," answered Simmias. "Therefore," said he, "both Evenus shall be willing, and every one who participates worthily in this study of philosophy; he shall not certainly, however, lay violent hands upon himself, for this, as it is said, is not to be allowed." Upon saying this he let his legs down from the bed on the ground, and sitting in this posture he proceeded with the remainder of the discussion.

Cebes inquired of him then, "How, Socrates, say you this, that it is not allowable for one to lay hands upon himself, but that a philosopher should be desirous of following one who is going to die?" "What, Cebes," said he, "have not you and Simmias been informed on such subjects after your familiar intimacy with Philolaus?" "Not very distinctly, Socrates." "But I merely speak of these things from hearsay," added Socrates; "what I happen then to have heard there is no objection to my telling. For it is perhaps especially suited to one who is on the eve of departing to another world, to inquire into, and speculate upon his

migration thither, of what nature we suppose it to be. What else could one engage in during the time that intervenes till sunset?"

6. "Why then, Socrates," said Cebes, "do they say that it is not allowable for one to dispatch himself? For I have heard, as you asked just now, both from Philolaus when he was in the habit of intercourse with us, and from some others beside, that it was not right to do this; but I never heard anything distinctly from any one on the subject." "You must pursue your inquiry then," said Socrates, "for perhaps you might hear (what you wish). Probably, however, it shall appear strange to you if this alone, of all things, is unexceptionably true (that death is better than life), and that never at any time, as is the case with the rest of human affairs, it should occur that at some times and to some persons only, death is better than life. But it appears strange to you, perhaps, that it is not lawful for those men to whom death is preferable, to confer this favor upon themselves, but that they must await another benefactor." Upon this Cebes, with a gentle smile, speaking in the dialect of his country, said, "I swear by Jupiter it seems so." "And indeed," said Socrates, "at first sight it would appear to be unreasonable; still it has, perhaps, some good grounds. The maxim conveyed in the mysteries, upon this subject, to the effect that we of the human race are in a species of prison, and that it is

unlawful to set one's self at liberty and escape from it, seems to me too affected and by no means easy to penetrate. This, however, appears to me to be urged with good reason, that the gods are our guardians, and that we mortals are part of the household property of the gods. Do you agree with me or not?" "I do," replied Cebes. "Therefore," he continued, "if one of your slaves were to put himself to death without your having signified to him that you wished him to die, should you not be indignant at him, and if you had any means of punishment should you not inflict it?" "Certainly," replied Cebes.—"Perhaps then in this point of view it is not unreasonable to insist that one should not dispatch himself before the deity imposes upon him a necessity of the kind, such as he has imposed at present upon me."

7. "But," said Cebes, "this appears natural enough. With respect, however, to what you said just now, that philosophers should show a ready inclination to die; this seems to be absurd, if what we lately admitted is good sense, that the deity is our guardian, and that we are his servants. For that the wisest individuals should feel no dissatisfaction at their departure from this tutelage in which the best of all possible governors, the gods, direct them, is quite against reason. Since no one surely imagines that when he is thus set at liberty he will take better care of himself; some senseless being

might perhaps be so convinced that he ought to fly from his master, and would not reflect that he should not abandon a good one, but by all means continue to abide with him, consequently he would inconsiderately leave him, while the rational man would be anxious to remain for ever with one superior to himself. Thus, Socrates, the direct contrary of what was just now allowed is likely to be the case; for it becomes the wise to feel dissatisfied at death, but the foolish to rejoice."

Socrates, hearing this, appeared to be delighted at the ingenuity of Cebes, and turning his eyes towards us, observed, "Cebes is always starting some points, and is not at all disposed at once to give in to what one has asserted." "But, Socrates," said Simmias, "to me, now, Cebes appears to urge something of importance; for with what object would men who are really wise fly from those masters who are better than themselves, and thoughtlessly abandon them? Cebes also seems to me to direct his argument against yourself, because you bear so quietly your abandonment of us, and those good governors, as you yourself admit, the gods."

"You speak fairly," said Socrates, "and I understand you to mean that I should enter upon my defence in this case as at the tribunal."

"Exactly so," Simmias replied.

8. "Come now," Socrates resumed, "let me

essay to plead my cause more persuasively than I did before the judges. For, Simmias and Cebes, were it not that I believe I shall arrive amongst other deities, both wise and good, and further, amongst men who have departed this life, far better than those here, I should be wrong in feeling no discontent at death; but now you are well aware that I expect to arrive amongst good men; yet I would not altogether insist upon this; that I should fall in, however, with admirable masters, the gods, be assured that I should insist on this, if on anything else of the kind. Wherefore I am not equally discontented (as if I thought the matter were otherwise,) and I indulge in good hopes that there is something which survives to those who die, and that, as was said long since, it is far better for the good than the evil."

"What then, Socrates," said Simmias, "do you meditate departing from us, reserving this consideration to yourself, or would you impart it to us also? For this blessing seems to me a common concern to both, and it shall serve, at the same time, as your defence, if you should convince us of what you assert."

"I shall endeavour to do so," he replied; "but let us, in the first place, attend to Crito here, and see what it is that he, for some time now, seems anxious to say."

"What else, Socrates," said Crito, "than what

the person who is to minister the poison to you told me sometime since, that I should tell you to argue as little as possible. For he says that those who engage in dispute become too warm, and one should not let anything of the kind interfere with the progress of the poison, otherwise, those who did so were sometimes compelled to take two or three draughts."

Socrates replied, "Take your leave of him, and let him attend to his own peculiar province, to supply two draughts, or even three, if it be so required."

"Indeed," said Crito, "I knew you would speak nearly to this effect, but he is troubling me this some time." "Do not mind him," said Socrates.

"But I wish now to unfold to you, as being my judges, the reason why a man, who has in good earnest devoted his life to philosophy, appears to be full of confidence when on the eve of death, and to cherish a favourable hope that he shall secure the greatest possible blessings in another life, after he shall have departed from this. How, then, should this be so, Simmias and Cebes? I shall endeavour to explain it.

9. "As many as engage with sincerity in the study of philosophy, appear to leave all others in the dark as to the fact of their applying themselves diligently to no other object than dying and death.

If this be true, it surely were absurd throughout their entire life to have nothing else in view but this, and when it had come to feel dissatisfied at what they had formerly so earnestly desired and studied to attain." Upon this Simmias, smiling, said, "By Jove, Socrates, you have made me smile, being by no means at present inclined to do so. For I imagine that the multitude, if they heard this observation, would suppose that it had been justly made in reference to philosophers, and would agree unanimously with you, our own fellow-countrymen in particular, that true philosophers have a desire for death, and they have not left them (the multitude) indeed in the dark as to the fact of their deserving it."

"And they would say the truth, Simmias, with the exception of their not being left in the dark; for they are quite ignorant in what sense true philosophers desire to die, and in what sense they merit it, and what kind of death. But let us, taking leave of them, address ourselves to each other. Do we imagine death to be anything?" "Something, surely," rejoined Simmias.

"Whether is it anything else than the separation of the soul from the body? And is this death, the body being apart by itself, disunited from the soul, and the soul disunited from the body, existing apart by itself? Is death anything but this?"

"Nothing else than this," he replied.

"Observe now, my good friend, whether you and I agree in our view of the case, for from hence I think we shall come to a better understanding on the subject of our inquiry. Does it seem to you to be consistent with the character of a philosopher to be solicitous about pleasures, as they are called, of this kind, eating and drinking for instance?

"By no means, Socrates," replied Simmias.

"Well, then; about the pleasures of love?

"Not at all."

"Well; does such a character appear to you to hold in estimation any other bodily luxuries?—for example, the possession of distinguished robes, sandals and other personal ornaments; whether does he appear to you to value or despise it, at least so far as absolute necessity may not require him to use them?"

"A true philosopher," said Simmias, "appears to me to hold them in contempt."

"Are you, therefore, wholly of opinion that the concern of such a character is not about the body, but that as far as he can, he stands apart from this, and is altogether devoted to the soul?"

"I am so."

"In matters of this kind, then, is it not in the first place the philosopher evidently, who above all other men, principally absolves the soul from its communion with the body."

"So it appears."

" And the generality of mankind, Simmias, are of opinion, that he who has no pleasure in such things, and does not partake of them, deserves not to live, but that he makes a close approach towards death who feels no concern in any of those pleasures which arise from the body."

" You say so with great truth."

10. " But what of the acquisition of wisdom; is the body an obstacle or not, if one should take it along with him as a partner in his search? What I mean to say is this: do the sight and hearing convey any certainty to mankind, or are they such as the poets incessantly report them, who say that we neither hear nor see anything as it is? And if, indeed, of our corporeal senses these are neither accurate nor distinct, scarcely could the rest be so, for they are all far inferior to these. Do they not seem so to you?"

" They do, indeed."

" When, then," said Socrates, " does the soul attain to the truth? For when it attempts to investigate anything along with the body, it is plain that it is then led astray by it."

" You say true."

" Is it not then by reasoning, if by anything, that reality is made manifest to the soul?"

" Certainly."

" But it reasons most effectually when none of the corporeal senses harass it, neither hearing, sight, pain, or pleasure of any kind; but it retires as

much as possible within itself, and aims at the knowledge of what is real, taking leave of the body, and as far as it can, abstaining from any union or participation with it."

"Even so."

"Does not the soul of the philosopher in this instance, therefore, shew the greatest contempt for the body, and shrink from it, while it seeks to be left alone to itself?"

"It appears so."

"What, then, do you say of what follows, Simmias? Do we assert that justice is anything or not?"

"We say that it is, by Jove."

"And beauty and goodness also?"

"Why not?"

"Did you ever see anything of the kind with your eyes?"

"Never," replied Simmias.

"Have you laid hold of them with any other of your bodily senses?—but I am speaking (not of goodness and beauty only, but) generally, of magnitude, health, strength, and in a word, of the essence of every thing, that is, the real existence of each—whether is their truest character discovered by means of the body, or does the case stand thus; that whoever amongst us prepares with the greatest caution and accuracy to reflect upon that particular thing by itself about which he is inquiring, he

must make the nearest approach to a knowledge of it ?"

" By all means, indeed."

" Would he then accomplish this with the least possible alloy, who comes with the aid of the purest reflection to the investigation of every essence, neither employing the sight in the process of reflection, nor bringing in any other sense to share in the process of reasoning, but who using reflection alone and unalloyed, endeavours to investigate every reality by itself and unmixed, abstaining as much as possible from the use of the eyes, and in a word, of every part of the body, as confounding the soul, and preventing, when united to it, its attainment to wisdom and truth ? Is not such an one, if any, likely to arrive at what really exists ?"

" You speak, Socrates," answered Simmias, " with amazing truth."

11. " It is necessary therefore," Socrates resumed, " that in consequence of all this a certain impression must strike those who are genuine philosophers, of such a nature that they would express themselves mutually to this effect :—A by-path, as it were, appears to conduct us, (out of the common track,) with reason for our guide, in this research ; because so long as we are encumbered with the body, and our soul is contaminated by so great corruption, we shall never fully attain to that which we desire,

but this we assert to be the truth. For the body imposes upon us innumerable constraints on account of its necessary support—moreover, should any maladies befall it, they too impede the ardent pursuit of truth, while it fills us up with lusts, desires, fears, chimeras of every kind, and unbounded folly; so that, as is truly observed, there is never, in fact, any possibility by reason of it of our progressing in wisdom. Besides, it is nothing else except the body, and its appetites, that occasions wars, seditions, and contentions; since all wars originate with us through the passion for amassing wealth, and we are compelled to acquire it on account of the body, slaves as we are to our attendance on it; so that owing to the body, and by reason of these its affections, we have no time to spare for philosophy.

"But the last and worst of all is, that if we should obtain any spare time from it, and turn our attention to the investigation of any subject, obtruding itself suddenly, on all occasions, in the midst of our research, it causes disturbance and commotion, and confounds us so that we are disqualified by it for the discernment of the truth. In reality, then, it has been demonstrated to us, that if we are ever likely to arrive at a clear intelligence of anything we must be separated from the body, and contemplate with the soul itself all objects as they are; and then, in all likelihood, we shall enjoy

that wisdom which we desire and profess to be enamoured of, when we have departed from this life, as the argument points out, but not while we live here. For if it is impossible to have any clear intelligence in conjunction with the body, one of two things must follow, either that it is in no case practicable to acquire knowledge, or it is so after death, for then the soul shall be apart from the body, completely independent, but not before. While we are living also, as it appears, we shall make the nearer advances to knowledge the more that we avoid all connection and union with the body—unless when absolute necessity requires—shrink from the contagion of its nature, and keep ourselves pure from its pollutions until the Deity himself shall absolve us from its influence. Thus being undefiled, delivered from the irrationality of the body, in all likelihood we shall be classed with others of a similar stamp, and we shall of ourselves, have cognizance of every unmixed essence; but this is probably the truth, since it is not allowed the impure to be conversant with what is pure. Such, Simmias, are the expressions which I believe to be incumbent on all true lovers of wisdom to use amongst each other, and the opinions they should entertain; does it not seem so to you?"

"By all means, Socrates."

12. "Therefore," he continued, "if this, my

friend, be true, there are great hopes for one who shall arrive where I am setting out for now, that there, if any where, he shall acquire this abundantly on account of which I have endured such great anxiety during my life past; so that this departure which has been prescribed me now abounds for me in favourable hope, as it should for any Athenian who deems his mind to have been so regulated that it was the same as cleansed from its impurity."

"Such is indeed the case," said Simmias.

"But does not the purification consist in this, as was observed in an early stage of the discussion, in separating the soul as much as possible from the body, and inuring it to gather and collect itself independently from all parts of the human frame, and to dwell, so far as it can, both at the present and through all future time completely by itself, ransomed as it were from the shackles of the body.

"Certainly so."

"Is this, therefore, called death, this deliverance and separation of the soul from the body?"

"By all means," said Simmias.

"But the true philosophers alone are mainly desirous at all times to set it free, as I asserted; and this is the identical study of philosophers, the deliverance and separation of the soul from the body, or is it not?"

"So it seems to be."

"Therefore, as I said at the outset, should it appear ridiculous for a man who throughout his existence had so studied to live as if on the very confines of death, to feel annoyed as soon as it had actually come?—Should not this be absurd?"

"How not?"

"In fact then, Simmias, true philosophers are earnestly intent on death, and to them, of all mankind, death is least formidable. But judge from this. If they shew an unqualified hostility against the body, and are desirous to keep the soul entirely by itself, but when the time for this arrives they should give way to dread and discontent, should not their folly be extreme, since they would not depart delighted to that place where on their arrival they have the prospect of attaining to that which they were enamoured of through life—but they were enamoured of wisdom,—and of being liberated from any further association with that to which they were averse? Whether, for the sake of human objects of affection, wives and sons deceased, have numbers of their own free choice desired to descend to Orcus, induced by this very hope of seeing and living together there with those for whom they longed; and shall one who is seriously enamoured of wisdom, and who has strongly entertained a similar expectation that he could find it no where else deserving of the name

except in Orcus, be indignant at the approach of death, and depart thither in displeasure? We must suppose that he would gladly go, my friend, if he is indeed a philosopher, for he will be firmly convinced of this, that no where else but there shall he find wisdom unalloyed. If this be so, as I declared just now, should it not be the height of folly in such a man to be afraid of death?"

13. "It should be so, by Jove," replied Simmias.

"Therefore," he resumed, "should not this be a sufficiently strong proof against a man whom you observed to be dissatisfied when about to die, that he was not a lover of wisdom but of the body. But the same man is perhaps a lover of riches and honours, and looks to the attainment of one or the other of these, or probably both."

"The case stands altogether as you state it."

"Does not fortitude then so called, Simmias, chiefly belong to those who are disposed to the study of philosophy?"

"By all means."

"So likewise that temperance, which even the multitude call by its right name, and which consists in not being transported by the passions, but moderating them with coolness and composure, does it not chiefly belong to those alone who hold the body in contempt, and live in the study of philosophy?"

"Necessarily so."

"For if," he continued, "you are inclined to reflect upon the fortitude aud temperance of others, they shall appear to you absurd."

"How so, Socrates."

"Are you not aware," he replied, "that all others reckon death amongst the great evils?"

"Certainly they do."

"Is it then through dread of greater evils that the brave amongst them endure death, whenever they do so?"

"It is so."

"Therefore all, except the philosophers, are courageous through the act and principle of fear; and yet it is strange enough that one should be courageous through fear and timidity."

"It is surely."

"What then; are not those of well regulated morals amongst them affected thus?—Are they not temperate through a kind of intemperance; and impossible as we assert this to be, nevertheless it so happens that they have an affection similar to this—that which arises from their senseless temperance; for, dreading to be deprived of other pleasures, which they anxiously desire, they abstain from some while they are under the dominion of others, and though they call it intemperance to be governed by pleasures of any kind, yet it happens to be the case with them, that while under the control of pleasures generally, they merely exercise a control

over some. But this is analagous to what was said just now, that in a manner they are made temperate through intemperance."

"So it seems, indeed."

"My dear Simmias, let us beware lest this be not a correct exchange with virtue, the reciprocating of pleasures with pleasures, pains with pains, and fear with fear, the greater too with the less, like pieces of money, while wisdom is the only sterling coin for which we ought to exchange all things; and for this, and with it, all things in reality are bought and sold, both fortitude, temperance, and justice; and true virtue, in sum, is inseparable from wisdom, whether pleasures, fears, and all things else of the kind, are present or absent; but where they are distinctly separated from wisdom, and mutually interchanged for each other, take care lest this species of virtue be not a mere semblance, and, in reality, servile, while it possesses nothing sound or sincere, whereas true virtue is a complete purification from all the passions, and temperance, justice, fortitude, and wisdom itself, form the prelude, as it were, to this cleansing from pollution. Wherefore, these celebrated characters who established our initiatory ceremonies appear to have had no mean understanding, but, in fact, to have obscurely hinted long since that whoever descends to Orcus uninitiated and uncleansed, shall grovel in mire; but he who is purified and initiated

upon his arrival there, shall abide with the gods. For, say those who preside at the mysteries, *Many indeed bear the wand, but the inspired are few;* and these latter are, in my judgment, none other than the true philosophers, to be enrolled with whom I left no means untried, so far as I was competent through life, but in every way endeavoured to effect it. Whether I directed my endeavours right, and at all prevailed, I shall know distinctly, if the Deity should please, when I shall have descended there, some short time hence as it appears to me.

"Such is the defence I make to you, Simmias and Cebes, for my naturally feeling no displeasure or discontent at taking leave of you and those who are in authority over me here, being convinced that I shall there, no less than here, fall in with excellent masters and friends; but with the multitude this obtains no credence. If then, in the course of this explanation, I appear more deserving of belief to you than to the judges of Athenians it is well."

14. Upon Socrates having thus expressed himself, Cebes rejoined, "All else that you have said, Socrates, appears to me to be advanced with reason, but those observations upon the soul, meet amongst mankind with the strongest disbelief, (being afraid as they are,) lest on its departure from the body, it should no longer exist, but should perish, and be annihilated upon the same day on which a man dies; and being dispersed immediately on its

separation and egress from the body, like a breath or smoke, it should vanish, and have no further being; otherwise, if it existed anywhere independent, concentered within itself, and removed from the sphere of those evils which you have enumerated just now, great indeed, and cheering should be the hope that that which you say is true. But this requires, probably, no small persuasiveness and proof, that the soul of a deceased man exists, and is capable of certain faculties and reflection."

"You say true, Cebes;" replied Socrates, "but what are we to do? Are you willing that we should converse together upon these points, as to the probability that the case stands thus or not?"

"For my part," said Cebes, "I should gladly hear what opinion you entertain upon them."

"I do not imagine," answered Socrates, "that any one, not if he were even a comic poet, would now say that I am trifling, and conversing upon extraneous subjects. If you approve then let us examine the question."

15. "But let us examine it in this point of view, whether the souls of the deceased survive in Orcus or not. There is indeed an old tradition which we have called to mind, that souls which set out thither from hence do survive, and return hither again, and come to life from death. If this be so, then, that the living are reproduced from the dead, must it not be that our souls are in existence there?

For if they existed no longer, they could not surely be reproduced; and in support of the truth of this it will be sufficiently strong testimony if it appears palpably clear, that the living are produced from no other source whatever than from the dead. If such be not the case, we must recur to other proofs."

"I agree with you," replied Cebes.

"Do not then," he continued, "examine this matter merely in reference to mankind, if you are anxious to understand it more distinctly, but in reference to all animals and plants, and whatever things, in sum, are generated; let us direct our attention to all, and see if they are, without exception, produced in no other way than contraries from contraries, in the case of those which have any such opposite quality, as, for example, fair is the contrary of foul, justice of injustice, and so in ten thousand other instances. Let us then consider this, whether it is absolutely necessary in the case of as many things as have a contrary, that this contrary should arise from no other source than from a contrary to itself. For instance, when any thing becomes greater, must it not follow, that from being previously less it subsequently became greater?"

"Yes."

"So too, if anything becomes less, shall it become so subsequent to its being previously greater?"

"Such is the case," said Cebes.

"And weaker from stronger, swifter from slower?"

"Certainly."

"Well then; if anything becomes worse is it from better, and if juster from more unjust?"

"Why should it not?"

"We are then sufficiently assured of this, that all things are so produced, contraries from contraries?"

"Sufficiently so."

"But further; is there something of this nature in them; for instance, two stages of generation between each pair, as all contraries imply two extremes, from the one to the other, and from the other back again to it? For between the greater and the less intervenes the process of increase and diminution, and do we, therefore, call the one the act of increasing, and the other that of diminishing?"

"Yes," said Cebes.

"So, therefore, with the act of separating and of mixing, of growing cold and growing warm, and all things similarly, even though we should not have names to designate them by at times, still must they not in fact be at all times so disposed as to be produced from each other and that their generation should be reciprocal?"

"By all means," replied Cebes.

16. "What then," said he, "has life any contrary, as sleeping has its contrary, waking?"

"Certainly."

"What is it?"

"Death."

"Are not these then produced from each other, since they are contraries, and the stages of generation between them are two, since they are two themselves."

"How should it be otherwise?"

"I shall tell you then," said Socrates, "one combination of contraries amongst those which I mentioned just now, both itself and its stages of generation, but do you tell me the other. I say then, that sleeping is one thing, and waking another, and that waking is produced from sleeping and sleeping from waking, and that the stages of their generation are, the one falling asleep, and the other awakening. Is this sufficiently clear or not?"

"Quite so indeed."

"Do you now tell me likewise in regard to life and death. Do you not say that death is the contrary of life?"

"I say so."

"And that they are produced from each other?"

"Yes."

"What then is that which is produced from life?"

"Death," said Cebes.

"And that which is produced from death?"

"I must allow," said Cebes, "to be life."

"Then, Cebes, from the dead are living things, and living men produced?"

"It seems so," he replied.

"Therefore," said he, "our souls exist in Orcus, (after death.)"

"I think so."

"Of their stages of generation then, is not one, at least, obviously distinct? For dying is surely an intelligible idea, is it not?"

"Certainly it is," said he.

"How then," he continued, "shall we do? Shall we not oppose in turn to this, the contrary process of generation, but shall nature fail in this? Or must we allow some process of generation contrary to dying?"

"By all means."

"What is it then?"

"Reviving."

"Therefore," said he, "if reviving is granted, this should be the process of generation from the dead to the living, namely, reviving?"

"Certainly."

"We allow then in this way that the living are produced from the dead, no less than the dead from the living; but such being the case, it appeared to me to furnish adequate proof that the souls of the deceased exist somewhere, from whence they return again to life."

"Such, Socrates, appears to me to be the necessary result from what has been admitted."

"Observe now, Cebes, that we have not, in my

judgment, made these admissions without reason; for if those things which are produced, were not continually to alternate with each other, as if revolving in a circle, but the generation were direct from the one (contrary), merely to its opposite, nor should take a circuit and come round again to the first, are you aware that all things at last should assume the same figure, submit to the same affection, and cease to be produced at all?"

"How say you this?"

"There is no difficulty in comprehending what I say; but if, for instance, falling asleep be granted, and that awaking, which is produced from sleeping, were not to alternate with it, be assured that all things coming to an end, would render the fable of Endymion a mere jest, and he should no longer be considered of importance because all things else should be influenced by an affection such as he was, by sleep; further, if all things were confounded together, and never divided asunder, the theory of Anaxagoras should soon be realised, *all should be chaos*. Thus, my dear Cebes, if all things which had partaken of life should die, and when dead should remain in the same state of death, and not revive again, should there not be an unavoidable necessity that everything should perish at last, and nothing revive? For if living things were produced from anything else (than what had died,) and those living things should die, what remedy would there

be against all things being finally destroyed by death?"

"None whatever, Socrates, in my mind;" answered Cebes, "but to me you seem to speak the clearest truth."

"Such," said he, "Cebes, the case unquestionably seems to me, and that we do not acknowledge these things under the influence of delusion, but there is in reality, a reviving and producing of the living from the dead, a surviving of the souls of the deceased, and happiness for the good, but misery for the evil amongst them."

18. "And indeed," rejoined Cebes, "according to that argument, if a true one, which you are in the habit of advancing so frequently, that our knowledge is nothing else but reminiscence, according to this, I say, we must have learned at some former period what we remember now. But this is impossible, unless our souls existed before they appeared in this mortal guise; so that in this way the soul appears somewhat immortal."

"But Cebes," rejoined Simmias, "what proofs have you of this? Remind me; for I do not well recollect just now."

"To comprise all," answered Cebes, "in one most admirable argument, (it is proved thus) because when men are questioned, if one puts the questions fairly, they describe things as they really are; yet if they had not innate discernment, and right

reason they should be quite incapable of this. Further, if one were to try them with geometrical figures, or any thing else of the kind, he has the clearest evidence that the case is so."

"If you do not give in to this Simmias," said Socrates, "see if you will coincide with us upon considering the subject thus. You hesitate to admit that knowledge, so called, is reminiscence?"

"I do not hesitate indeed," said Simmias, "but I require to be made sensible of this very thing, which is the subject of the argument, namely, to be reminded: and though from what Cebes commenced to say, I even now nearly remember and am inclined to agree, nevertheless, I would now hear how you essay to argue the subject."

"In some measure thus;" he replied, "we allow doubtless, that if one be reminded of anything, he must have known it at some time before."

"Certainly."

"Do we allow this also, that when knowledge comes after a certain manner, it is reminiscence? But the manner I speak of is this; if one who has either seen, or heard, or has perceived by any other sense, some one object, should not only have a knowledge of this, but should form a notion of another of which the knowledge was not the same, but quite distinct, do we not with justice affirm that he remembered that of which he so received the notion?"

"How do you mean?"

"Thus, for example; the cognizance of a man is quite different from that of a lyre."

"Why not?"

"Are you aware then, that lovers, when they see a lyre, a piece of dress, or any thing else which their favorites are accustomed to use, are thus affected; they recognise the lyre, and form in their minds the image of the girl to whom the lyre belonged? But this is reminiscence; just as any one seeing Simmias is as constantly reminded of Cebes, and so in ten thousand similar instances."

"Ten thousand indeed, by Jove," said Simmias. "Therefore," he continued, "is not reminiscence something of this nature, especially when one is thus affected with regard to these things which he has forgotten in the lapse of time, and from having lost sight of them."

"By all means," he replied.

"Well then;" said Socrates, "is it the case that one who sees a horse in a painting, and a lyre likewise, is reminded of a human being and that one who sees Simmias in a painting is reminded of Cebes?"

"Certainly so."

"And must not one who sees Simmias in a painting, call to mind Simmias himself?"

"It is so indeed," he replied.

19. "Does it not happen then according to all

this, that reminiscence arises partly from similitude, and partly from contrast?"

"It does so."

"But when one remembers any thing from similitude, is it not necessary that he should be still further affected, so as to consider whether this as far as regards the likeness, comes short in any respect or not, of that which he remembered?"

"Necessarily so," he replied.

"Observe now," he continued, "if this be so. Do we allow any such thing as equality. I do not mean as between one log or stone, and another log or stone, nor anything of the kind, but something else distinct from all these, equality in the abstract,—do we allow that there is anything of this kind or not?"

"Truly, by Jove, we do allow it," said Simmias, "and to a very great extent too."

"Do we understand what that abstract equality is?"

"Certainly," he said.

"Whence did we derive our knowledge of it? Was it not from what we spoke of just now, that seeing logs or stones or some other objects equal, from these we formed the notion of the former, which is quite distinct from these? Does it not appear to you to be distinct? Consider the matter thus. Do not stones which are equal, and logs which are at times the same, appear at one time to be equal, and another time not?"

"Certainly."

"What then? That which is equal in itself does it ever appear unequal, or does equality seem inequality?"

"Never, Socrates, at any time."

"Therefore," said he, "those things which are equal, and equality in the abstract are not the same."

"By no means do they appear so to me, Socrates."

"Nevertheless," he continued, "from those equal things, which are quite distinct from that abstract equality, have you not formed your notions and derived your knowledge of it?"

"You say very truly," he replied.

"From some similitude, therefore, or dissimilitude in them?"

"Certainly."

"But," said he, "it makes no difference. When looking at one thing, then, you form from the sight of it the notion of another, whether like or unlike, of necessity that very process must be reminiscence."

"No doubt."

"But what of the following?" he resumed. "Are we affected in any such wise with regard to the equality of the logs, or the equal things which we spoke of just now? Do they appear to us to be equal as equality in itself is, or do they fall short of it in any degree so as not to be such as equality in itself is, or in no degree whatever?"

"They fall short in a great degree indeed," he replied.

"Do we therefore allow that when one, upon seeing any object, has perceived that it aims (as this object which I look at now) at being like to some other existing object, but falls short of it and cannot become any thing such as it is, since it is far inferior to it, it is necessary for one perceiving this to have known beforehand that to which he asserts it to bear a resemblance, but still to be far short of a complete one?"

"It must be so."

"What then? Are we similarly affected or not, with regard to objects that are equal, and equality in the abstract?"

"We are by all means so."

"Therefore we must have had a previous knowledge of equality before that time when having first seen equal objects, we perceived that all these aimed at a resemblance to equality, but came short of it."

"Such is the case."

"But we allow this also that it is impossible to have formed a perception of, or to perceive this by any other means than by the sight, touch, or some other of the senses; for I assert the same of all."

"It comes to the same thing, Socrates, as far at least as regards that which the argument tends to establish."

"But we must perceive, then, by the senses, that

all things which come under the senses aim at this abstract equality, and are at the same time inferior to it; or how else shall we say it is?"

"It is even thus."

"Therefore, before we began to see and hear, and use our other senses, we must have had knowledge of the nature of this abstract equality, if we were likely so to refer to it those equal objects which come under the senses, as to conclude that they all aimed at being such as the former, but fell short of it far."

"This is a necessary consequence, Socrates, of what was said before."

"Do we not then after our birth immediately see and hear, and exercise our other senses?"

"Assuredly."

"But previous to the exercise of these, as we said, we must have had a knowledge of equality?"

"Yes."

"Therefore we must have had it, as it appears, before we were born?"

"It seems so."

20. "If, then, having received this knowledge before we were born, we were born with it, should we not have known both previous to our birth, and immediately after, not only what is equal, and greater and smaller, but all things of the kind? For our present discussion is not rather on the subject of equality than on that which is beautiful

in itself, good, just, and holy, and in a word, about all things upon which we set the seal of real existence, both in the questions which we ask, and the replies which we return. So that we must have had knowledge of all these before we were born."

"Such is the case."

"And if having once attained to it we did not as constantly lose it, we should be always born with this knowledge, and retain it always through life; for *to know* is this, to retain knowledge when one has received it and never to lose it. Do we not call this oblivion, Simmias, the loss of knowledge?"

"Assuredly we call it so, Socrates."

"But if having attained to it before we are born we lose it at our birth, and afterwards when we exercise our senses upon such things, we recover the knowledge which at one time we previously possessed, would not that which we call learning be the recovering of our own proper knowledge? And if we said that this was *to remember*, would we call it by its proper name?"

"Certainly."

"For this seemed possible, for one having perceived anything by the sight or hearing, or exercise of any other sense, to form a notion of something different from this, which he had forgotten, and to which this approached nearly as a contrast, or similitude. Wherefore, in a word, one of two things must occur; either we are all born possess-

ing this knowledge, and we retain it through life, or those whom we set down as learning after, do nothing else than remember, and knowledge must be reminiscence."

"Such, Socrates, is certainly the case."

21. "Which of the two then, Simmias, do you choose? That we should be born with this knowledge, or subsequently remember what we had previously known?"

"At present, Socrates, I am unable to choose."

"What now? Can you choose in this case, and what is your opinion concerning it? Can one who has the knowledge give an account of what he knows, or not?

"There is a strong necessity for it, Socrates."

"Do all men appear to you to be competent to give an account of those things which we were speaking of just now?"

"I could wish they were," said Simmias, "but I am far more apprehensive that at this time to-morrow there will be no longer any one here who can do this with effect."

"Do not all men then Simmias, seem to you to be acquainted with those things?"

"By no means."

"Do they remember, then, what they once learned?"

"It must be so."

"When did our souls attain to this knowledge? Not surely, since we were born into the world."

"Assuredly not."

"Previously then?"

"Yes."

"Therefore, Simmias, our souls existed before they appeared in this human form, separately from the body, and were possessed of intelligence."

"Unless, perhaps, we receive this knowledge, Socrates, at our birth; for this period yet remains."

"Be it so, my friend; but at what other period (than this) do we lose it? For we are not born with it indeed, as we admitted just now. Do we then lose it at the very moment we receive it? Or can you mention any other time?"

"Not at all, Socrates; I was not aware that I was saying what imports nothing."

22. "Does the case then stand thus between us, Simmias?* If those things which we are constantly

* "Il faut donc tenir pour constant, que si toutes ces choses que nous avons toujours dans la bouche existent veritablement, je veux dire le bon, le bien, et toutes les autres essences du même ordre, s'il est vrai que nous y rapportons toutes les impressions des sens, comme a leur type primitif, que nous trouvons d'abord en nous mêmes; et s'il est vrai que c'est a ce type que nous les comparons, il faut necessairement, dis je, que, comme toutes ces choses-la existent, notre ame existe aussi, et quelle soit avant que nous naissions: et si ces choses-là n'existent point, tout notre raisonnement porte à faux." V. Cousin, Œuvres de Plat. t. i. p. 229-30.

It is to be observed, that in the course of this argument, the existence of the subject is to be taken as identical with the ex-

speaking of really exist, the beautiful, the good, and every essence of a similar kind, and to such we refer all those objects that come under the senses, being aware that these essences had a previous existence and were our own, and with them compare these objects, it follows of necessity that as these exist, so our souls also exist before we are born; but if these do not exist, then has this argument been urged in vain. Is such the case, and is there an equal necessity that these objects should exist and our souls also before we are born, and if not the former neither the latter?"

In the highest degree Socrates," said Simmias, "there seems to be this necessity, and the argument has an excellent tendency in establishing that our souls exist in like manner previous to our being born, as also the essence of which you are speaking now. Since for my part I hold nothing to be so evidently clear as this, that all such things to the utmost certainty exist, both the beautiful, the good, and the rest which you mentioned just now; and so far as I am concerned, the case is sufficiently proved."

"But how does it strike Cebes," said Socrates, "for we must convince Cebes too."

istence of its essence. If then the subject exists, its essence exists, and if its essence exists, and the soul had attained to a knowledge of it before birth, consequently the soul has a pre-existence, the point which Socrates wishes in the first instance to prove.

"Just as satisfactorily," replied Simmias, "as far as I can judge, although he is the most pertinacious of mankind in his mistrust of argument. Still I think that he has been sufficiently convinced of this, that our souls existed before we were born."

23. "Whether when we die, however, it shall still exist, does not appear to me, Socrates, to have been demonstrated, but that question raised by the multitude, which Cebes mentioned just now, lest at the same time with the decease of the man, the soul should be dispersed, and this should be the end of its existence, is still in the way. For what is to prevent its being born indeed, and made up from some place or other, and existing before it merged into the human body, but when it departs and is separated from this, then to die itself and be destroyed?"

"You say well, Simmias," said Cebes, "for but half, as it were, of what is necessary appears to have been proved, that our souls existed before we were born; but it is requisite to prove further that whenever we die, it shall exist no less than before we were born, if the demonstration is to be made complete."

"This has been demonstrated indeed, Simmias and Cebes," said Socrates, "already, if you are satisfied to connect together this argument with that which we concluded on before, that every thing living is produced from the dead. For if the soul has a pre-existence, and it is necessary that on

its birth and entrance into life, it should be produced from no other source whatever than from dying and being dead; how must it not of necessity exist even after death, since it must needs be reproduced? That which you require then has been already proved."

24. However, both you and Simmias appear to me as if you would gladly examine into this argument at still greater length, and that you entertain a childish fear lest the wind should in good earnest disperse and dissipate the soul on its departure from the body, especially if one should not happen to die in a calm, but in anything of a great storm."

"Endeavour then," said Cebes smiling, "to convince us, as if we really dreaded this, or rather as if we entertained no such dread at all, although perhaps, there is within us something of the child, which fills us with such fears. Let us then endeavour to persuade it not to be afraid of death, as of unsightly spectres."

"You must soothe it by charms then," said Socrates, "until you have subdued its fears by them."

"Whence then, Socrates, shall we procure a charmer skilful in such arts, now that you are leaving us?"

"Greece is wide indeed, Cebes;" he answered, "in which such skilful men abound, but there are also many barbarian countries, all of which you

ought to search through, seeking such a charmer, sparing neither wealth nor toil, since there is nothing upon which you could more suitably expend your money. But it is necessary that you should yourselves examine into the matter amongst each other, for you could not perhaps, easily find any more competent than you are, to enter on this office."

"This shall be done indeed," said Cebes; "but let us return from whence we digressed, if so it please you."

"It pleases me indeed; how should it not?"

"You speak fairly," said Cebes.

25 "Therefore," says Socrates, "we ought to put to ourselves a question of this nature, what is that to which it is suitable to undergo this affection, that of being dispersed, and for what have we reason to fear lest it should be so affected, and for what have we not? And next to consider which of the two the soul is, and thence to feel confident or alarmed in behalf of our souls?"

"You speak truly," said Simmias.

"Whether then is it suitable to that which has been compounded, and that which is naturally compound, to be thus affected, to be dissolved in the same manner in which it was compounded; but if there be anything simple, to this alone, if anything, it is unsuitable to be thus affected?"

"So it seems to me to be," said Cebes.

"Therefore, whatever things continue always the same, and in the same condition, these above all is it natural to regard as simple, but those things which are variable and never the same, that such should be compound?"

"So at least it appears to me."

"Let us then," he continued, "return to the subject of the former part of our discourse. This essence, which in the course of our questions and answers, we defined by saying that *it is*, whether is it always in the same condition and the same, or is it variable? Whether too, do absolute equality, absolute beauty, and every absolute essence which really exists, admit of any change whatever? Or is every one of those essences which really exists, a simple and unmixed existence, always in the same condition and the same, and does it never in any degree whatever allow of any alteration?"

"They must remain in the same condition and the same, Socrates," replied Cebes.

"But what are we to say of those many beautiful things,* for instance human beings, horses, garments, or anything else whatever of the kind, whether they are equal or beautiful, or of all things synonymous with such? Whether do they continue the same, or, in direct contrariety to the former,

* As distinguished from the essences themselves, for instance, beauty, equality, &c.

are they, in a word, never at any time the same, neither with themselves nor with each other?"

"Such is their contrariety;" said Cebes, "they never are secure from change."

"These latter then you might either touch, or see, or perceive by any other of the senses, but the former, which remain the same, it is impossible to apprehend in any other way than by reflection, and such as these are invisible and concealed from sight."

26. "You assert," said Simmias, "what is strictly true."

"May we then suppose," he continued, "two species of existences, the one visible, but the other invisible?"

"Let us suppose them," he answered.

"And that the invisible is always the same, but the visible never at any time so?"

"Let us," said he, "suppose this also."

"Come now," he continued," is any thing else the case than that one part of us consists of body and the other of soul?"

"Nothing else," he replied.

"To which of the two, then, shall we say that the body bears the greater resemblance, and is the more closely allied?"

"To the visible," said he, "as must be plain to every one."

"But what of the soul? Is it visible or invisible?"

"It is not visible to mankind at least, Socrates," he answered.

"But we were speaking surely of what is visible, and what is not so according to the nature of man. Or do you think it was with a view to any other?"

"It was according to the nature of man."

"What then do we assert of the soul? That it is visible or invisible?"

"Invisible."

"Is it then immaterial?"

"Yes."

"Does the soul therefore bear a greater resemblance to the immaterial than the body, but the latter resemble more the visible?"

"It is imperatively so, Socrates."

27. "Did we not likewise lay this down a short time since, that when the soul makes use of the body to investigate any thing, either by the sight, hearing, or any other sense—for to consider any object through means of the senses, is the same as through means of the body;—it is then indeed forced by the body in the direction of those things which are for ever subject to change, upon which it becomes distracted and confused, and reels as if inebriated, because it is involved in matters of this kind?"

"It is certainly so."

"But when it considers any subject by itself, does

it proceed in the direction of what is pure, everlasting, immortal, and immutable, and as if closely allied to this, does it abide with it ever when it is left to itself and is empowered to do so, and is it relieved of its distraction, and as being placed in connection with things like itself, is it always identical, and unchangeable with regard to them? And is this condition of the soul called wisdom?"

"You speak, Socrates," said he, "with the utmost fairness and truth."

"To which species of the two, then, both from what was said before, and that just now, does the soul appear to be more like and the more closely allied?"

"Every one, Socrates," he replied, "even the dullest would in my mind allow from this mode of investigation, that the soul in every respect bears a greater resemblance to that which is always the same, than to that which is not."

"But what of the body?"

"It more resembles the latter."

28. "But view it also in this light; that when the soul and body are together, nature enjoins submission and obedience on the one and on the other authority and command. In this light again, which of the two seems to you to resemble the divine, and which the human? Does it not appear to you that the divine is naturally adapted to govern and guide, but the human to be governed and to serve?"

"So it seems."

"Which, then, does the soul resemble?

"It is evident, Socrates, that the soul resembles the divine, but the body the human."

"Observe then, Cebes, if such be our conclusion from all that has been said, that the soul bears the strongest resemblance to that which is divine, immortal, intelligent, uniform, indissoluble, always the same and identical with itself; but that the body resembles most that which is human, mortal, unintelligent, multiform, soluble, and at no time identical with itself. Can we object to this conclusion, my dear Cebes, that it is not fairly drawn?"

"We cannot, Socrates."

29. "What then? When these things are so, is it not natural for the body to be speedily dispersed, and for the soul to be altogether indissoluble, or very near it?"

"Why not?"

"You perceive, then," said he, "that when a man dies, that part of him which is visible, the body which is exposed to the sense of sight; that which we call the corpse, whose nature it is to be dissolved, to fall asunder and be dissipated, does not immediately undergo any of these affections, but lasts for a tolerably long time, and particularly so if he should die with his body in full vigour, and at a similarly healthy time of life. For when the body has*

* The Greek word so translated is opposed in sense to the term rendered "to fall asunder," above.

collapsed and been embalmed, like those who are embalmed in Egypt, it lasts nearly entire for an inconceivable time. But some parts of the body, even though it should decay, the bones for instance, sinews, and every thing of a similar nature, are, nevertheless, in a word, incorruptible; are they not?"

"Yes."

"Is the soul, then, the invisible, that which departs into a region of like nature with itself, excellent, pure, into that which is Hades in good earnest, to abide with a good and wise deity, (whither if God will, my own soul too must soon depart,) is this soul of ours, I say, being such in itself and in its nature, on its separation from the body straightway, as the multitude say, likely to be dissipated and destroyed? Far from it, my dear Simmias and Cebes; the case is much more likely to stand thus: if indeed it shall have departed pure, bringing with it nothing belonging to the body as having no voluntary communication with it through life, but flying from it and gathered up within itself as making this its constant care,—but this means nothing else than to philosophise aright, and in reality to study how to die composedly. For would not this (to philosophise right) be studying how to die?"

"By all means indeed."

"Therefore being so disposed, does it go hence to that which resembles itself, which is invisible, divine,

immortal, and wise; on its arrival at which, its condition is one of perfect happiness, being set far apart from error, ignorance, fears, unbridled passions, and the rest of human miseries; and, as is said of the initiated, abiding really for ever with the gods? Must we say that it is so, Cebes, or otherwise?"

30. "We must allow it to be so," said Cebes, "but, in my opinion, if it shall have departed from the body polluted and impure, in consequence of its constant communication with the body, its subservience and attachment to this, and its being imposed on by it, and by its desires and pleasures, so far as to imagine that there is nothing real except what is corporeal, which one may touch and see, eat and drink, and make use of for sensual purposes; but that which is obscured from the sight, and invisible, which is intellectual and comprehensible by the aid of philosophy, being inured to the hatred, terror, and abandonment of this, think you that a soul which is so disposed, would be likely to depart independent and uncontaminated?"

"Not by any means," he replied.

"But enmeshed by the corporeal, which familiar intercourse and union with the body has naturalized to it by continued communication and great assiduity."

"Certainly."

"This, then, my friend, we must regard as oppressive, earth-formed, and visible, of which a soul

of such a character being possessed, is weighed down, and forced back again into the visible world through dread of the invisible and of Hades, to linger as they say, about the sepulchres and tombs, round which some shadowy phantoms of souls have been seen, such spectres as these souls present which have not departed pure from life, but retaining a portion of that which is visible on account of which they are seen themselves."

"This is very likely, Socrates."

"Most likely, Cebes; and further, that these are not the souls of the good, but of the evil; which are compelled to wander about such places, to make atonement for their former wicked mode of life. And they wander about for so long until, at the instigation of the corporeal part which accompanies them, they are again inclosed in a body."

31. "But they are involved, as is natural, in similar dispositions to those which they may have indulged in during their former life."

"What kind of dispositions do you mean, Socrates?"

"That those, for instance, who have been devoted to the exercise of gluttony, insolence and intemperance, and who have taken no thought to check them, should be clothed with the form of asses, and such like beasts, is natural enough; do you not think so?"

"You say what is highly probable indeed."

"But that those who have set the highest price upon injustice, tyranny, and violence, should be clothed in the forms of wolves, hawks, and kites. Into what shape else can we say that such should merge?"

"Without question, into such shapes as these," said Cebes.

"Is it then evident in all other instances whither each soul departs according to the similarity of its practices?"

"It is evident," he replied; "how should it not?"

"Are not those therefore," said he, "the happiest amongst this class and do they not proceed into the happiest region, who have practised those popular and social virtues which they call moderation and justice, which result from habit and exercise independently of philosophy and reflection?"

"In what respect are these the happiest?"

"Because it is probable that they shall transmigrate* into a like social and civilized class; of bees perhaps, or wasps, or ants, or even back again into the same human species, and upright characters shall be produced from them."

"Probably so."

* "If Pythagoras' transanimation were true, that the souls of men transmigrate into species answering their former natures, some men must live over many serpents."

BROWN'S VULGAR ERRORS.

32. "But it is not lawful for any one, but one who has practised philosophy, and departed completely pure from life, to arrive at the rank of the Gods; (not for any) except the true philosopher. On this account my friends Simmias and Cebes, those who philosophise aright abstain from the gratification of all the bodily appetites, persevere in doing so, and do not resign themselves to them; not being apprehensive of the loss of property, and of poverty, as the multitude are, and the avaricious; nor dreading the disgrace and disrepute of a low estate, like those who aspire after civil offices and dignities, do they on that account stand aloof from them."

"Surely it would not become them to act otherwise, Socrates," said Cebes.

"Assuredly not, by Jove," he replied, "wherefore they who have some concern for their souls, who do not pass their lives in the culture of the body, bidding adieu to all the rest, do not proceed in the same route with them, as being ignorant whither they are going, but impressed with the conviction that resistance should not be offered to philosophy, to the deliverance and purification she affords them, they submit to her direction, and follow her whithersoever she leads the way."

33. "How so, Socrates?"

"I shall tell you," said he. "The lovers of wisdom are aware that philosophy having taken to

herself the soul, which was obviously shackled down and cemented to the body, and compelled to view objects through this as through a dungeon, but not of and by itself, which lay grovelling too in utter ignorance; and having observed the influence of this prison-house, how eagerly it is directed towards making the prisoner, as far as possible, a party concerned in rivetting his own chains;—the lovers of wisdom, I say then, are aware that philosophy having taken to herself their souls when in this state, gently admonishes and endeavours to liberate them, showing that the observation of objects by the aid of the eyes is replete with illusion, and that likewise by the aid of the ears, and the other senses, and advising a disengagement from these, so far as it may not be absolutely necessary to use them, and urging a concentrating and condensing of the soul within itself, and besides a distrust of everything else except itself with regard to whatsoever real, independent essence it may of itself perceive, but whatsoever it may observe, by any other means (than itself), which varies according to those variable means, is in no wise to look on it as true; since such indeed is sensible and visible, but what the soul itself perceives is intelligible and immaterial. The soul of the true philosopher, then, convinced that it ought not to withstand this deliverance, abstains accordingly from pleasures, desires, griefs and fears, so far as it is able, reflecting

that when one yields to the excess of joy, fear, sorrow, or desire, he suffers not in consequence merely such evil as one might suppose to result from sickness, or extravagance in gratifying his appetites, but that which of all evils is the gravest and the worst, this he suffers and is not conscious of it."

"What is this, Socrates?" said Cebes.

"That the soul of every man is compelled to give way to the extremes of joy and grief, and further, to the impression that this on account of which it is so strongly affected, is most real and most true, though it is not so. But things like these are principally visible things, are they not?"

"Certainly, indeed."

"Is the soul, when under the influence of such affections, then chiefly shackled by the body?"

"How so?"

"Because every pleasure and pain, with a nail as it were, nails and fastens it to the body, and makes it of the nature of the body, while it believes those things to be true which the body asserts to be so. For, from its conformity of opinions, and identity of pleasures, with those of the body, it is forced, I imagine, to become identified with its manners and habits, insomuch, that it never can arrive in Hades pure, but must always depart polluted by the body, so that it speedily sinks again into another body, and grows again as if it had

been sown, whence it is deprived of all communion with that which is pure, unspotted, and divine."

"You say most truly, Socrates," said Cebes.

34. "On this account then, Cebes, the true lovers of wisdom are temperate and firm, not for the reason which the multitude give. Do you agree with them?"

"Surely I do not."

"No truly. But the soul of the philosopher would adopt this line of reasoning, and would not imagine that philosophy indeed ought to set it free, and when she did so, that it should resign itself again to pleasures and to pains, to bind it down and make her service void, as if engaged upon a kind of Penelope's web, but with her plan reversed; on the contrary, calming the passions to rest, taking reason for its guide, being ever intent upon this, the contemplation of what is true, divine, and unchangeable, and being nourished by it, it thinks that while it lives it ought to live conformably, and when it departs from life, having attained to that which is congenial to and like itself, it shall be released from mortal miseries. From such a regimen as this, Simmias and Cebes, we have no cause to fear that the soul, having attended to it strictly, should dread, lest falling asunder at its departure from the body, it should be dissipated and dispersed by the winds, and exist no more."

35. After Socrates had thus expressed himself, silence ensued for a considerable time, and both Socrates himself, as he appeared, was engaged in meditation upon the subject that had been so discussed, as were also many amongst ourselves. But Cebes and Simmias were conversing for a while together, and Socrates observing them, asked, "What think you of what has been said? Does it appear to have been urged with sufficient effect? For it still presents many doubts and objections, if one would pursue them in adequate detail. If then, you are engaged in the consideration of any other subject, I have nothing to say; but if you entertain any doubts upon this, do not hesitate yourselves to express and enumerate them, if you think the subject could be placed in a more effective point of view, and to call me in also to your assistance, if you imagine that with my aid you shall have better success."

And Simmias replied, "Indeed, Socrates, I shall tell you the truth. For some time past each of us being in doubt, is pushing forward and urging the other to question you, on account of our anxiety to hear indeed, and at the same time a hesitation to give you any trouble, as it may not be agreeable to you in your present distress."

Hearing this, he smiled sweetly, and said, "How strange, Simmias! With difficulty, indeed, could I persuade other men that I do not regard my

present condition as a calamity, when I am unable to convince even you; but you are apprehensive lest I should be more morosely disposed now than during the former portion of my life. It seems, too, that I appear to you inferior in the art of divination to the swans, who when they perceive that they must die, though given to song before, then sing the most of all, delighted at the prospect of their departure to the deity whose ministers they are. But mankind say falsely of the swans that it is through dread of death, and assert that they sing from grief, bewailing their decease, and do not reflect that no bird sings when it is hungry, or cold, or afflicted with any other pain, not even the nightingale, or swallow, or hoopoe, which sing, they say, a dirge-like strain for grief; but neither do they appear to me to sing for grief, nor swans, but as pertaining to Apollo they are skilled in the divining art, and having a foreknowledge of the bliss in Hades, they express their joy in song on that day rather than at any previous time. But I believe myself to be a fellow-servant of the swans, and consecrated to the same divinity, and that I am no less gifted by my master in the art of divination, nor am I departing life with less good grace than they. On this account, then, you ought to speak and ask me what you please, while the Athenian Eleven give you leave."

"You say well;" said Simmias, "and I shall

tell you whence my doubts arise; and he, too, how far he rejects what has been urged. To me it appears, Socrates, and perhaps to you with regard to such matters, that it is either impossible or very difficult to arrive at certainty in the present life, at the same time that it shews a very imbecile character not to examine in every way into what is said concerning them, so as never to desist until one is quite exhausted in the extent of his research. For in regard to such matters it is necessary to accomplish some one of these things; either to learn from others how they stand, or find out upon investigation by one's self, having laid hold on the very best indeed of human reasonings, and the least likely to be confuted, to sail through life embarking in this, as one who risks himself upon a raft, unless one could effect a safer and less hazardous passage in a more secure conveyance, that of some heaven-sent reason. For my part, then, I shall not be ashamed to question you, as you propose, nor shall I have to blame myself in time to come, because I did not now say what my opinion is. For, Socrates, when I consider both by myself and with Cebes what has been said, it does not at all appear to me to have been adequately proved."

"Perhaps, my friend," said Socrates, "your views are just; but say where the inadequacy lies."

"In this, I think," said he, "that one might use the same argument in respect to harmony, and

a lyre and its chords, that the harmony indeed in a well-tuned lyre is something invisible, incorporeal, very beautiful and divine, but the lyre itself, and its chords, are bodies, and corporeal, compound, earthly, and akin to mortality. When any one, then, has broken the lyre, or cut or rent the chords, were he to insist upon the same line of argument as you, he should assert it to be necessary for that harmony still to exist, and not have been destroyed; for there could be no possibility that the lyre should still exist with its chords torn asunder; and the chords too, which are mortal, (should exist) but that the harmony of like nature with and allied to the immortal and divine, should perish, being destroyed prior to that which is mortal; but he should assert (I say) that the harmony must still exist somewhere, and that the woodwork and the strings should be decayed before it suffered any change. I think that you have yourself too, Socrates, perceived this, that we suppose for the most part the soul to be something of this nature, that our bodies being, as it were, set in order, and evenly balanced by heat, cold, dryness, and moisture, our souls are a mixture of some such qualities, and a harmony arising from them, when they are duly and justly combined with each other. If, then, the soul is a harmony, it is evident that when our bodies are immoderately relaxed, or overstrained by diseases or any other ills, the soul must

immediately perish, divine as it is, like other harmonies, both those of musical sounds, and those which result from all the works of skilful artizans, but the relics of each individual body must last for a long time until it has been burned or decayed. Consider now what answer we shall make to this argument; if one should require it to be admitted that the soul being a mixture of those qualities in the body, is the first to perish in that which is called death?"

37. Upon this, Socrates looking steadfastly at us, as he generally used to do, and smiling, said, "In truth, Simmias speaks justly. If there is one among you then more ready than me, why did he not answer him? For he seems to have impugned the argument with no mean success. However, it appears to me that we ought to hear from Cebes yet before we make our answer, what charge he has to make against the argument, that during the interval we may consult what we shall say, and then when we have heard them, either to give up to them, if they seem to speak reasonably, or if not, to support the argument. Come then, Cebes," he continued, "tell what it is that perplexed you, so as to occasion your mistrust."

"I shall tell you," replied Cebes. "The argument seems to me to remain in the same place, and to be liable to the same objections which we made before. For, that our souls existed before they

merged into this human form, I do not deny to have been very interestingly, and if it be not too fulsome to add, most convincingly proved; but that it exists anywhere after we die, does not so clearly appear. I do not indeed give in to the objection of Simmias, that the soul is not stronger and more durable than the body, for it seems to me to excel by far all things of the kind. "Why then," might the argument say, "do you still disbelieve, when you see that on the death of the individual, that which is weaker still exists? But it does not seem necessary to you that the more durable should be still during this interval preserved." Observe, if I urge anything of weight in answer to this; but, as it appears, I too, as well as Simmias, must avail myself of an illustration of some kind. This subject seems to me to be treated in like manner as one would advance a similar argument in the case of an aged weaver deceased, and say that the man has not perished, but exists probably somewhere, and as a proof, should adduce the garment which he wore and had woven himself, which was safe, and had not been destroyed; and if one were to doubt him, he would ask whether of the two is the more durable—the human species or the garment which is constantly wanted and worn; but when one answers that the human species is far more durable, he would imagine that it had been proved beyond all question that the man is alive, since that which is less durable was not destroyed.

But I do not think that it is so, Simmias; and attend now to what I say. Every one must suppose that one who asserted this, asserted an absurdity. For this weaver having worn out and woven many such garments, perished subsequently to these, however numerous, but prior I imagine to the last, and yet the man is not on this account, inferior to and frailer than the garment. But the soul, I think, might admit of this same illustration in reference to the body, and any one who applies a similar argument to them would seem to me to express himself correctly, to the effect that the soul is something durable, but the body frailer and more transitory. But he would further say, that every soul wore out a number of bodies, especially if it lived many years; for if the body is in a state of decline and decay while the man is still alive, but the soul is always weaving anew that part which is worn out, it must follow, of necessity, that when the soul perishes it must have its last garment then, and be destroyed previous to this alone; but on the destruction of the soul, the body must then display the weakness of its nature, and quickly rot away. Wherefore it is not by any means right for one to place implicit faith in this argument, and to feel confident that when we die our souls still exist somewhere. For if one should concede to another who insisted upon still more than you, admitting to him that not only did our souls exist before we were

born, but that when we die, there is nothing to prevent the souls of some from existing, and being likely to exist, and being repeatedly born and dying again, for so strong is it by nature, that the soul can bear up against repeated births;—conceding this, I say, he would not yet allow but that it becomes exhausted after a number of births, and perishes at last altogether in some one of the deaths. But he would say that no one was aware of the precise death and precise dissolution of the body which occasion the destruction of the soul, for it is impossible for any one of us whosoever to be made sensible of it. If this be so, it applies to every one who is bold at the approach of death, that he entertains this confidence on foolish grounds, unless he can prove that the soul is absolutely immortal and incorruptible; otherwise it follows of course, that one who is on the eve of death must be alarmed on his soul's account, lest it should perish altogether on its immediate disunion from the body."

38. Upon this, all of us who were listening to what they said, were, as we afterwards told each other, most unpleasantly affected; because they seemed to disturb our minds anew, after we had been fully convinced by the preceding arguments, and to reduce us to a mistrust not only of the pre-established reasonings, but of what was likely to be urged in future, on the grounds of our being

ncompetent judges, or the uncertainty of the facts themselves.

ECHECRATES.—By the Gods! Phædo, I make all allowance for you; for, in some degree, a like reflection strikes myself. What reasoning shall we trust henceforward, since that which Socrates advanced, with such strong semblance of conviction, has now lost all claim on our belief? For this doctrine, that our souls are a kind of harmony, makes a wonderful impression on me at all times as well as now, and it reminded me, as it were, while being developed, that such had been a previous impression of my own. Wherefore I require, as if at the very commencement, some other argument which shall convince me that the soul does not die with the dead. Tell me, then, in the name of Jove, how Socrates followed up the argument?—and whether he, as you say of yourselves, was obviously disconcerted, or not so, but calmly bore the argument out?—and did he do so efficiently or imperfectly? Tell me everything as accurately as you can.

PHÆDO.—In truth, Echecrates, often as I admired Socrates, I was never more delighted than in being with him on that occasion. That he was able to make a reply is not, perhaps, so surprising; but this I was particularly struck with in the first instance—the pleasure, affability, and approbation, with which he attended to the argument of the young men; in the next place, his sharpness in

perceiving how we were affected by their objections; then how skilfully he applied his remedies—recalled us when, as it were, routed and overcome—and encouraged us to accompany him in a concise consideration of the subject.

ECHECRATES.—How was that?

PHÆDO.—I shall tell you. I was sitting beside the bed, upon a low seat; but he was sitting somewhat higher than I was. Stroking my head, then, gently, and taking hold of the hair which fell down my neck—for he was accustomed, on occasion, to amuse himself so with my hair—he said, "To-morrow, perhaps, Phædo, you will cut off these comely locks."

"Likely so, Socrates," said I.

"Not, if you take my advice."

"What would you have me do?" said I.

"To-day," he replied, "I shall cut off mine, and you these locks of yours, in case our argument should perish, and we prove unable to revive it. Were I, too, you, and the argument were to escape me, I should bind myself by oath, like the Argives, never to allow my hair to grow until I gained the victory in my contest with the argument of Simmias and Cebes."

"But," said I, "Hercules himself, even, is said not to have been a match for two."

"Call upon me, then, as an Iolaus," said he, "while it is yet daylight."

" I do call upon you, then," I replied, " not as Hercules upon Iolaus, but Iolaus upon him."

" It will come to the same thing," said he.

39. " But, first of all, let us beware, lest we meet with some mischance."

" What mischance," said I.

" That," he replied, " of becoming haters of reasoning, as some become haters of men, since there is no greater mishap than this for one to meet with, to hate reasoning. But the hatred of reasoning and hatred of mankind arise from a similar source. For the latter arises in the mind from an excessive and artless confidence in any one, and the impression that a man is altogether sincere, upright and honest; then, after a little, the discovery that he is vicious, faithless, and changing with the occasion. When one has frequently experienced this, especially at the hands of those men whom he believed to be his dearest and most familiar friends, in the end, after numerous disappointments, he hates the whole race, and is convinced that nothing upright whatsoever is in existence at all. Do you not think that this feeling arises so ?"

" Certainly," I replied.

" Is it not a shame, then," he continued—" and plain, too, that such a person endeavours to deal with mankind without any judgment on human affairs ; for, if he had dealt with them with judg-

ment, such as it really is he should have felt the case to be, that the excessively good and evil are but few in either extreme; but the middle class is very numerous."

"How do you mean?" said I.

"Just as in the case," replied he, "of things that are small and large in extremes. Do you think that there is anything more rare than to discover a man, a dog, or anything whatsoever which is great or small in extremes? Or, again, swift or slow, beautiful or ugly, white or black? Do you not perceive that of all such things the extremes are rare and scarce, but the means are plentiful and abundant."

"It is certainly so," I replied.

"Think you then," he continued, "if a trial were proposed for a prize in vice, that, in such a case, but very few would appear pre-eminent?"

"It is likely so," said I.

"Very likely;" he replied; "yet reasonings do not in this particular resemble the case of mankind, for I merely in this instance was following as you led the way; but so far they bear a resemblance, as in the case where one yields assent to an argument as true, without any judgment in reasoning, and it appears to him a little after to be false, standing to reason at one time and not so at another, and again changing and variable; and especially in the case of those who are conversant with sophistical

reasonings, you are aware that in the end they imagine themselves to have become the wisest of all, and alone to have perceived that neither in material things is there any thing perfect or certain, nor in (abstract) reasonings, but that all existing things are absolutely, like the Euripus, subject to a continual flux and reflux, and never remain in any place for any time."

"What you say," I remarked, "is strictly true."

"It should, surely, then, Phædo," said he, "be a deplorable grievance, if, when a true, certain and intelligible mode of reasoning actually exists, yet in consequence of one's falling in with such a description of arguments as while they remain the same, appear still to be true at one time and at another not, he should not lay the blame upon himself nor upon his own want of judgment, but in the end through vexation should gladly transfer all censure from himself upon the arguments, and pass the remainder of his life in hatred and abuse of them, while he is blinded to the truth and knowledge of what really exists."

"By Jove," said I, "it is grievous indeed."

40. "In the first place, then," said he, "let us beware of this, and let us not be persuaded that there is a chance of there being nothing sound in arguments, but much rather that we are not yet in sound condition, but must exert ourselves with

manly resolution and energy to become so, you and the rest indeed on account of your whole life to come, but I on account of death itself, since I am in danger of deporting myself at present upon the very subject in question, not as a philosopher but as a caviller, like those who are exceedingly uninformed. For they, when they are disputing about anything, pay no attention to the bearings of the question on which the argument is based, but make this their principal object, the point of view in which what they have laid down shall appear to those present. And I seem to myself to be likely to differ from such on the present occasion merely in so far; for I shall not endeavour to affect that what I say shall appear to those present to be true, unless the conviction should arise incidentally, but how it shall appear to wear the strongest character of reality to myself. For I am reflecting, my beloved friend, (and observe with what partiality to myself,) that, if what I assert be true, it is well to be persuaded of it; but, if there is nothing that survives the dead, I shall yet, for the period previous to my death, on this account, occasion less annoyance to those present by my complaints. This state of ignorance, however, shall not continue long—it would be bad if so—but in a little time hence shall come to an end. Thus prepared, Simmias and Cebes, I proceed to bear my argument out; but do you, if you will take my

advice giving little heed to Socrates but much rather to the truth, if I appear to you to express what is true, agree to it; but, if not, by every argument oppose it, taking good care that I shall not, having deceived at once both myself and you, depart, like the bee, having left a sting behind."

41. "But, to proceed," he continued. "Remind me, in the first place, of what you said, in case I should appear to have forgotten it. Simmias, then, as I judge, is in doubt, and fears lest the soul, although it is more divine and beautiful than the body, should perish before it, as being in the similitude of a harmony. But, Cebes, indeed, seemed to allow me this, that the soul is more durable than the body, yet nobody knows but that the soul, after the repeated wearing out of several bodies, and having left the last body, then perishes itself; and that this very thing is death, the destruction of the soul, since the body is always in a state of decay. Is this, Simmias and Cebes, what we are to enquire into?"

They both agreed that it was.

"Whether, then," he continued, "do you reject all the preceding arguments, or some of them indeed, and not others?"

"Some we do," they replied, "and others we do not."

"What say you, then," said he, "with regard to that argument in which we asserted that knowledge is reminiscence; and that such being the case,

our souls must, of necessity, have existed somewhere before they were imprisoned in the body?"

"For my part," replied Cebes, "I was wonderfully convinced by it then, and I still cling to it closer than to any other."

"And I indeed," said Simmias, "am possessed by the same feeling, and should be much surprised if I ever entertained a different opinion upon this subject."

Upon which Socrates remarked, "But you must, my Theban friend, entertain a different opinion if this impression be firmly fixed with you, that harmony indeed is something compounded, and that the soul, like a kind of harmony, is composed of the concordant qualities of the body. For you will not surely allow yourself to say that the harmony existed, duly compounded, prior to the existence of these materials from which it should have been composed. Or will you approve of your asserting this?"

"By no means, Socrates," he replied.

"Do you observe, then," he continued, "that this is the natural consequence of what you assert when you say that the soul existed before it merged into the human form and body, but that it is composed of what does not yet exist? However, this harmony of yours is not anything like to that to which you compare it, but the lyre and the chords,

and the tones, as yet discordant, come into existence first, and last of all, the harmony is produced and perishes the first. How shall this proposition then accord with the former ?"

" Not in any way," replied Simmias.

" And yet," he resumed, " if it is the rule in any other argument, surely one regarding harmony should not admit of discord ?"

" It is right that it should not," said Simmias.

" This argument of yours, then," said he, " is not in perfect accord; but observe, which of the two propositions do you prefer; that knowledge is reminiscence, or the soul a harmony?"

" The former by much, Socrates," he replied, " for the latter arose in my mind independently of any demonstration, in consequence of a kind of verisimilitude and speciousness, from which source the opinions of many are derived; but for my part, I am convinced that the arguments which establish their demonstrations by means of verisimilitudes, both in geometry and all other instances, are futile, and especially deceptive, should one be not upon his guard against them. But the argument respecting reminiscence and knowledge has been advanced upon a principle well deserving of assent. For in this way our soul was said to exist previous to its merging into the body, since to it belongs the essence which bears the name

of* *that which is.* This principle I have, I am persuaded, fully and fitly admitted; it follows then, as it would appear, of necessity, that I must neither allow myself nor any other to assert that the soul is a harmony."

42. "What if you view the question in this light, Simmias," he continued, "does it appear to you to be suited to harmony, or to any other composition to be otherwise disposed than those materials are from which it is produced?"

"By no means."

"Nor yet to do or suffer anything contrary to what those materials do or suffer."

He agreed.

"It is not therefore suitable for harmony to take the lead of those things of which it is composed, but to follow them."

He consented.

"It is then far from being the case, that harmony is contrariwise produced, or sends forth sounds or in any respect is opposed to its component parts."

"Far from it," he replied.

"What then?" said he, "Is not every harmony naturally so far a harmony as it has been duly arranged?"

* "La doctrine de la réminiscence et de la science est fondée sur un principe solide, le principe que nous avons avancé plus haut, que notre ame existe necessairement avant que d'entrer dans le corps, puisqu'elle a en elle, comme sa propriété, cet ordre de notions fondamentales qui constituent l'existence et en portent le nom."—V. Cousin. Œuvr. de. Plat. i. p. 265.

"I do not understand you," said he.

"Whether," said he, "if it should be more fully and effectively arranged, supposing such a case possible, should not the harmony be fuller and more effective, but if it were in an inferior degree, and less efficiently so, should not the harmony be inferior and less efficient?"

"Certainly."

"Is this then the case with regard to the soul, that, even in the least degree possible, one soul is more fully and effectively this very thing, a soul, or in an inferior degree and less efficiently so than another?"

"Not by any possibility," he replied.

"Come now, by Jove;" said he; "is one soul said to be possessed of intelligence and virtue, and to be good, and another of ignorance and vice, and to be evil? And is this said with reason?"

"With reason, no doubt."

"What shall any one of those who pronounce the soul to be a harmony assert those things to be which exist in the soul, virtue and vice? Will they call the one harmony and the other discord; and assert the one soul, the good, to be duly attempered, and to contain within itself, being a harmony, a second harmony, but the other to be itself discordant and to contain no second harmony in it?"

"For my part," said Simmias, "I cannot say so; but it is plain that the advocate of the principle would assert something of the kind."

"But," said he, "it has been already admitted that one soul is not more or less a soul than another; and this amounts to an acknowledgment that one harmony is not more fully and effectively, nor in an inferior degree, nor less efficiently a harmony than another. Is it so?"

"Certainly indeed."

"And that a harmony which is neither in a greater nor in a less degree a harmony, is not in a greater or a less degree arranged to becomeso. Is this the case?"

"It is so."

"But that which has not been in a greater or a less degree so arranged, does it partake of harmony in a greater or less degree, or has it a just proportion?"

"A just one."

"Therefore, when one soul is not this very thing, a soul, in a greater or less degree than another soul, it has not been in any respect more or less harmonized?"

"Even so."

"But such being its condition, it cannot partake in a greater degree of harmony or discord than another?"

"Certainly not."

"But again, when such is its condition, can one soul partake to a greater extent of vice or virtue than another, if vice indeed be discord, and virtue harmony?"

"It cannot."

"But the rather, Simmias, according to right reason, no soul at all shall partake of vice, if indeed it be a harmony. For a harmony which is essentially this very thing, a harmony, never at any time could partake of discord."

"Assuredly not."

"Neither indeed could a soul, which is essentially a soul, of vice."

"How could it, indeed, from what has been already established?"

"According to this mode of reasoning, then, shall all the souls of all animals be equally good, provided they are equally disposed by nature to be this very thing, souls?"

"So, Socrates, it seems to me at least."

"Think you," he continued, "that such a position could be fairly urged, and that our reasoning should be subject to such inferences, if the hypothesis be true that the soul is a harmony?"

"Not by any means," he replied.

43. "What, then;" said he, "of all these things which are in man, is there anything else except the soul which you assert to exercise supreme authority, especially when it is a prudent one?"

"Nothing else."

"Whether by yielding to the bodily affections, or by resisting them?—I mean, for instance, as in the case of heat and thirst besetting the body, by

urging it in an opposite direction, not to drink, and when hunger besets it not to eat; in innumerable other examples, besides, we observe the soul resisting the bodily affections. Do we not?"

"Certainly we do."

"But did we not allow, in the course of our previous reasonings, that the soul, if it were a harmony, could not breathe any tones at variance with the tension, relaxation, vibration, and any other affection to which the elements were liable of which it was composed, but should follow them, and never at any time become their guide?"

"We did admit it;" he replied; "how should we do otherwise?"

"What then? Does it not seem to us to act an opposite part now, in its control of all those qualities of which one might pretend it was composed, in its resisting them through the whole course almost of life, and exercising authority in every way over them; punishing some more severely and with pains, (according to the principles of the gymnastic and healing art,) but others more mildly; rebuking indeed in part, but in part suggesting warnings to the desires, the angry passions, and the fears, as if, being a distinct existence, it conferred with another object distinct from itself? Something like what Homer has represented in the Odyssey, when he speaks of Ulysses, who, 'Striking his breast, in such terms chid his heart, Bear up,

my heart; thou hast already borne much worse.' Think you that Homer composed this with the impression that the soul was a harmony and capable of being led by the bodily affections, and not as being competent to lead and govern them, and as being something far more divine in its nature than is consistent with a harmony?"

"By Jove, Socrates, I agree with you."

"Therefore, my excellent friend, it is by no means correct to assert, that the soul is a kind of harmony; for, as it appears, we should not agree with Homer, the divine poet, nor with ourselves."

He allowed that it was so.

"Very well;" resumed Socrates; "as it would seem, the Theban Harmonia has been sufficiently reconciled. But, with regard to Cadmus, how and by what course of reasoning shall we satisfy him?"

"You appear to me," said Cebes, "to be likely to invent some means; at least you have succeeded in this argument against the harmony strangely contrary to my expectation. For, while Simmias was explaining on what points he doubted, I wondered much if one could be able to do anything with his arguments; however, he appeared in the most unaccountable manner to shrink from the very first onset of your reply. So that I should not be surprised if the same thing should befall the argument of Cadmus."

"My good friend," said Socrates, "speak not in

such a laudatory strain, lest some envious power should overturn the argument I am about to urge. These matters, indeed, shall be the province of the gods, but let us, 'advancing hand to hand,' like Homer's heroes, try if you advance anything of consequence. But this is the sum of what you seek after;—You require that our souls should be proved to be imperishable and immortal, if a philosopher, on the eve of death, full of confidence and expectation that after his decease he shall be far happier than if he had died having passed through any other life (than that of a philosopher), is to entertain this confidence on wise and prudent grounds. But the demonstration that the soul is something potent and divine, and that it was yet in existence before we were born ourselves, you say there is nothing to prevent all this from signifying, not that the soul is immortal, but only that it has a long duration, and pre-existed for an immeasurable time, and was both conversant with, and engaged in the execution of many things; yet nothing the more was the soul immortal, but its very entrance into the human body, like a disease, was the very origin of its decay, so that it passes through this life in misery, and perishes finally in that which is called death. But, you assert, it makes no difference whether the soul is united to a body once or frequently, as far as regards our several apprehensions; for it is right that he should

feel afraid, unless he is a fool, who is not fully aware and cannot advance a satisfactory argument in favour of the immortality of the soul. Such, Cebes, I think is the character of your objections, and I purposely make frequent repetition of them, that nothing may escape us, and, if you wish, you may add to or take from them."

Upon which Cebes observed, "For my part, at present, I neither wish to subtract from, nor add to them; but they are just what I would urge."

45. Socrates then, after some delay, and pondering somewhat to himself, said, "You inquire, Cebes, into no easy matter, for it is absolutely necessary to discuss the origin of generation and corruption. I shall then, if you please, recount to you how I was affected myself upon these subjects, then if any thing that I say should appear available to you, you shall adopt it to produce conviction in the matter of your discourse."

"I wish, indeed," said Cebes, "to hear you."

"Attend then, as I intend to tell you. When I was a young man, Cebes, I had a wonderful fondness for that wisdom which they call a knowledge of nature. For this appeared to me to be a consummate wisdom, to be acquainted with the causes of every thing, why it is produced, why it perishes, why it continues in existence; and I used to turn my attention constantly from side to side upon my first investigation of such questions as

these,—whether, when heat and cold are in a state of corruption, as some asserted, then animated beings are produced, whether it is owing to the blood that we think, or, whether it is owing to air or fire, or to none of these things, but it is the brain which produces the sensations of hearing, sight, and smell, and from these arise memory, and opinion, and from memory and opinion, in a state of rest, in the same manner, knowledge is produced. Upon considering, further, the decay of these things, and the affections incidental to the heavens and the earth, I looked upon myself at last as so unsuited to this investigation that nothing could be more so. But of this I shall give you satisfactory proof; for the things which I formerly with certainty knew, as far at least as I appeared to myself and to others, I was then, in consequence of this investigation, so utterly blinded to, that I lost all knowledge of what I supposed myself to be acquainted with before in many other particulars, besides that of the mode of the growth of man. For previous to this I had supposed it evident to every one that it was owing to eating and drinking; since when by reason of nourishment flesh has been added to flesh, bones to bones, and so, in like manner, to every thing else has been added what is of similar nature to it; then the bulk which is (originally) small becomes afterwards great, and thus a man of little size proceeds to become large.

Such were my opinions then—Do I not seem to you to have entertained them justly?"

"To me, at least, you do," said Cebes.

"But consider the matter still further. I supposed myself sufficiently ascertained of the fact, when a man of large stature stood by one of small, that he exceeded him by a head, and so with one horse and another; and still more obviously than this, ten appeared to me to exceed eight by the addition of two, and two cubits to exceed one cubit by an excess of half."

"But now," said Cebes, "what is your opinion on these matters?"

"I am far, by Jove, from thinking," he replied, "that I am in any degree conversant with the cause of these things, who cannot satisfy myself even in this—whether, when to one a person has added one, that one to which it was added has become two; or, that one added, and that to which it was added have become two, on account of the addition of the one to the other. For I wonder if, when each of them was separate, each separately was one, and they were not then two. But when they are joined together, this is the cause of their becoming two, namely, their conjunction by being approximated to each other. Neither, indeed, if any person should divide one (from the other), can I yet be persuaded that this, on the other hand, is the cause, namely, their division, of their becoming

two. For this is quite an opposite cause to the former of their becoming two; since then it was because they were mutually conjoined, and added the one to the other; but now it is because the one is divided and separated from the other. Neither am I persuaded yet, according to this system of inquiry, that I know why one is * one, nor in a word, anything else, why it is produced, perishes, or exists; but I proceed to compound at random some other system, while I by no means approve of this."

46. " But having heard a certain person reading once in a book, as he said, by Anaxagoras, to the effect that it is Mind which regulates and is the cause of all things, I was, indeed, delighted with such a theory of causation; and it appeared to me in a manner to be quite just, for Mind to be the cause of everything; and I supposed, if such were the case, that the regulating Mind sets all things in order, and disposes them severally in such a mode as they may best abide in. Should one, then, desire to investigate the cause of everything, how it is produced, or perishes, or exists, he must find out this respecting it, in what manner it is best for it either to exist, or, in any other way, to be passively

* The reader will please to correct an error, overlooked in the proof, in the note appended to the Greek text, where, for *how one becomes two*, should be read *becomes* (or *is*) *one*. A few similar oversights may be found in the course of the original work, which care has been taken here to amend.

or actively affected; but, from this mode of consideration, a man must look to nothing else, so far as concerns himself and others, but what is most excellent and the best. Besides, it is necessary for this same person to be acquainted with what is worst, since the knowledge of both one and other is the same. With such impressions, I was delighted to think that I had found an instructor to my mind, Anaxagoras, in the cause of things existing, and that he would explain to me, in the first instance, whether the earth is flat or round, and, when he had explained this, would develope the cause and necessity of its form, going upon the principle of all things being for the better, and consequently that it should be such, for the better, as he would describe it; and, further, if he asserted that it occupied the centre, that he would unfold how it is for the better that it does so; and, if he would make all these things clear to me, I was fully prepared so as to require no more any other species of cause. With regard to the sun, I was, in like manner, determined to make enquiry; and with regard to the moon and the rest of the planets, their mutual velocity, revolutions, and other affections, in what manner, on occasions, it is best for each of them to be affected, both actively and passively. For I never at all supposed that, when he had declared those things to be controlled by Mind, he would adduce any other cause in their case than that it is so best

for them to be arranged as they are; I thought, therefore, that he, ascribing a cause to each thing in particular, and all things in common, would explain in full what was best for each and the general good of all. And I should not, for a great consideration, have parted with my hopes; but, having taken up the work with the greatest earnestness, I perused it as hastily as I could, that I might the sooner be acquainted with the best and the worst.

47. "I was baffled, however, in this wonderful hope, when, in the course of my study, I observe the man making no use whatever of Mind, nor adducing any causes for the regulation of all things, otherwise than assigning the air, atmosphere and water, as causes; besides many other things equally absurd. And to me he appeared to bear the closest resemblance to one who would say, 'Socrates commits all his actions through the operation of Mind;' and, upon attempting to explain the causes of my several actions, would assert, in the first instance, that the reason why I am now sitting here is because my body is composed of bones and sinews, and the bones are hard indeed, and have their diaphyses separately, one from the other; but the sinews are capable of tension and relaxation, enfolding the bones along with the flesh and skin, which binds them together; when the bones, then, play freely in their joints, the extension and contraction of the sinews give me the power of bending my

limbs, and for this reason I am sitting here now in such a posture; and again, he would assign other causes of a like nature for my conversing with you, alleging as causes the sound of the voice, the air, and the faculty of hearing, omitting all mention of the real causes, that since the Athenians thought it better to condemn me, on this account it appeared preferable to me to sit here, and the more honest course to stay and endure the penalty they have prescribed, since, by the Dog, these sinews and bones should have been long ago in Megara or Bœotia, borne thither with the impression that it would be for the best, had I not judged it to be more upright and honorable to undergo whatever punishment the state might direct in preference to escaping by flight like a slave. But to denominate such things causes is exceedingly absurd; yet, if one were to say, that without having such things as bones and sinews, and such like, as I am possessed of, I should not be able to do what I pleased, he would assert the truth; but to assert that it is through them that I effect what I do, and so far act under the influence of mind, and not from the choice of what is best, should be the highest and most palpable absurdity. For how silly is it that one should be incapable of distinguishing that the real cause is one thing, and that, without which the cause could not ever be a cause, is another; which the majority, feeling for, as it were, in the

dark, appear to me, while they call it by a name quite foreign from the true, to designate as the very cause itself. Wherefore, one indeed, encompassing the earth with a vortex of the heavens, makes the earth to remain fixed (in the centre), while another supports it like a broad kneading-trough upon the air, as a base; but the power by which these things are so maintained in the best possible way in which they could be disposed, this they neither inquire into, nor do they suppose that it involves a kind of superhuman skill, but they imagine that they have found a more powerful, a more enduring, and a more comprehensive Atlas than this; and what is really excellent and suitable, they believe to be incapable of uniting and combining anything whatever. I should therefore have gladly become the disciple of any one, in order to understand the nature of a cause like this; but when I was disappointed of it, and could not find it out of myself, nor learn it from another, would you wish me to show you, Cebes, in what manner I set about a second voyage for the discovery of this cause?"

"Most anxiously I wish it," he replied.

48. "It seemed to me," he continued, "subsequently, when I had exhausted myself in the investigation of things existing, that I should beware lest I should be affected like those who regard attentively an eclipse of the sun; for

some destroy their sight unless they look at its reflection in water, or some similar medium. With some such feeling then was I impressed, and I feared lest I should altogether be blinded in my soul while examining objects by the sight, and endeavouring to grasp them with each of the senses. I thought then that I should have recourse to the reasons of things, and discover in them the truth of their existence. Perhaps, however, this similitude does not hold good to the full extent of the comparison; for I do not altogether admit that he who considers things in their reasons, is contemplating them more by means of images than he who contemplates them in their effects; I proceeded then in the following way, to lay down, on every occasion, that principle which I judge the most incontrovertible, and whatever things shall appear to me to coincide with this I set down as true, as well in causation as in the case of all things else, but whatever things do not coincide as false. But I am anxious to explain to you more clearly what I mean, for I do not think you understand me now."

"No, by Jove," said Cebes, "not well."

49. "Yet," he continued, "I am not saying anything new, but what always upon other occasions, and in our past discussions, I have never ceased to say. For I proceed to try and explain to you that species of cause which I have concerned myself about, and revert to those much talked of

subjects with which I also set out, supposing that there is beauty in the abstract, goodness, greatness, and all such things, which if you grant me and allow to exist, I hope from hence to discover and demonstrate to you the cause of the immortality of the soul."

"Then come to your conclusion at once," said Cebes, "as I grant you this."

"Observe now," he continued, "what follows from the preceding; if you agree with me on the subject. For it appears to me if there is anything else beautiful besides beauty itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than because it partakes of that (abstract) beauty; and so I assert of every thing. Do you agree to such a kind of cause as this?

"I do," he replied.

"I do not yet," he resumed, "understand, nor am I able to conceive those other subtle causes; but if one were to account to me for the beauty of anything, either from its blooming colour or figure, or anything else of the kind, I bid adieu to extraneous reasons, for I am confounded by all such, but I simply, artlessly, and foolishly perhaps, confine myself to this, that nothing else renders it beautiful but either the presence or participation of that (abstract) beauty, or by whatever means and in whatever manner it is communicated, for upon this I do not yet insist, but merely that through beauty all things beautiful are made so. Since this appears

to me to be the safest answer to make to myself and any other also; and holding firmly by this I do not think that I shall ever fall, but that it is safe for me, and every person whosoever to reply, that through beauty things beautiful are made so. Does it not seem so to you?"

"It does."

"And that through magnitude great things are great, and greater things greater; and through parvitude things less are less?"

"Yes."

"Nor yet would you approve if any said that one is greater than another by the head, and that the less is less by this very same; but you would maintain that you mean nothing else than that every one thing greater than another is greater on no other account than that of magnitude; and on this account, its magnitude, it is greater, but the less is less on no other account than its parvitude, and on this account, its parvitude, it is less; dreading, I imagine, lest any argument of a contrary kind should oppose you, in case you should assert any one to be greater and less by the head, (to the effect that,) in the first instance, the greater is the greater, and the less is the less, owing to the very same thing; and in the next place, that the greater individual is the greater in consequence of the head which is small, but this were indeed a wonder for one to be great owing to something small. Would you not be afraid of this?"

Upon which, Cebes, smiling, replied, "I should indeed."

"Would you not be afraid to say," he continued, "that ten is more than eight by two, and owes its excess to this, and not to number, and on account of number? And that two cubits are greater than one cubit by half, and not from magnitude? For the fear is the same."

"Certainly," he replied.

"What, then? When to one has been added one, would you not hesitate to say whether the addition is the cause of being two, or the division when it has been divided? And would you not loudly insist that you are not aware of any other mode whatever in which each thing exists than by a participation in the essence peculiar to each, of which it partakes, and in this case you are not aware of any other cause of their becoming two, except a participation in duality, of which that must partake which is likely to be two, and in unity whatsoever is likely to be one, but these divisions and additions, and such other subtleties you would bid adieu to, leaving replies upon such matters to wiser than yourself; and would you, being in dread, as the proverb says, of your own shadow and inexperience, clinging firmly to the security which the principle affords, make answer accordingly? But should any one attack this self-same principle, would you not take leave of him, and decline to answer until you had considered the con-

sequences derived from it, whether they agree or differ from each other? And when you should be required to enter upon an explanation of it, would you render it in this manner, by laying down another further principle, whichever may appear the best of the more general, until you have arrived at some satisfactory result, and would you not, at the same time, avoid making confusion, like the contentious disputants, in treating of the first cause and its consequences, if you were anxious to attain to the truth of things? For those disputants have no consideration, perhaps, nor concern about this subject; since they are quite contented, while in their wisdom they throw all things into a general disorder, to be nevertheless competent to please themselves; but you, if you really belong to the class of philosophers, would act, I imagine, as I advise."

"You speak most truly," replied Simmias and Cebes together.

ECHECRATES.—By Jove, Phædo, they said so justly; for he seems to me to have explained the subject with wonderful clearness to one of even limited intelligence.

PHÆDO.—Such, indeed, was the impression, Echecrates, of all present.

ECHECRATES.—And such our own, though absent then, at hearing your recital now.

50. But what was the subject of the subsequent discourse?

PHÆDO.—As I remember, when these concessions had been made him, and it was admitted that every idea actually exists, and that other things participate in them so as to receive their name, he afterwards asked, "If you assert these matters to be so, whether, when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates but less than Phædo, do you not then affirm that both magnitude and parvitude are in Simmias?"

"I do."

"Do you allow, however," said he, "that Simmias' exceeding Socrates is not actually true, as it is said to be in words? For Simmias is not adapted by nature to exceed him in consequence of his being Simmias, but of the magnitude which he has; nor, again, does he exceed Socrates, because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has parvitude in comparison with his magnitude."

"True."

"Neither, indeed, is Simmias exceeded by Phædo, because Phædo is Phædo, but because Phædo has magnitude in comparison with the parvitude of Simmias."

"Such is the case."

"Thus, then, Simmias has the name of being both small and great, since he is between the two, surpassing the parvitude of the one by his magnitude, but yielding to the other a magnitude which surpasses his own parvitude."

Upon this he said with a smile, "I appear to express myself with the accuracy of a written contract, but still things are as I say."

Cebes agreed.

"But I urge them for this reason, because I wish you to be of the same opinion with myself. For it appears to me not only that magnitude itself is never disposed to be at the same time great and small, but that the magnitude also in ourselves never admits the small, nor is disposed to be surpassed; but one of the two cases occurs, either that it retires and withdraws upon the approach of its contrary, the small, or ceases to exist when it has actually come; but it is not disposed, abiding and admitting parvitude, to be any thing else than what it was before, as I, for instance, having sustained the reception of parvitude, and still continuing to be the same person that I am, am this small person, but that which is great, while it is so, never endures to be small. In like manner the small in us is not disposed at any time to become or to be great, nor any other of things contrary, while it continues to be what it was, to become and be its contrary at the same time, but it retires, indeed, or perishes in this contingency."

"Thus in every way," said Cebes, "it appears to me."

51. Then some one of those present, (but who he was I do not clearly recollect,) when he heard

this, said, " In the name of the gods was not the very contrary of what is now asserted laid down in the previous part of the discussion, that the greater is produced from the less, and the less from the greater, and this positively is the mode of generating contraries from contraries ? But now it seems to me to be asserted that this never can be so."

Upon which, Socrates, having moved his head forward and listened to him, said, " You have reminded me like a man, however you do not observe the distinction between what is advanced now and what was so then. For then it was argued that a contrary thing is produced from a contrary ; but now that contrariety itself can never become its own contrary, neither that which is in ourselves, nor that which is in nature. For, then, my friend, we were speaking of those things which involve their contraries, calling them by the name of the former; but now we are speaking of those former (contrary essences), by reason of which, being inherent, the things so called retain their name; but those we never at any time asserted to be disposed to admit of mutual generation." At the same time, looking at Cebes, he said, " Have any of these things he mentioned troubled you at all ?"

" I am not disposed to be so," said Cebes, " although I by no means deny that there are many things which perplex me."

" We plainly, then," said he, " agreed to acknow-

ledge this, that a contrary can never be its own contrary."

"By all means," he replied.

52. "But observe further if you will agree with me in this. Is there any thing you call heat and cold?"

"Certainly."

"The same as snow and fire?"

"Assuredly not."

"Is heat then something different from fire, and cold something different from snow?"

"Yes."

"But this, I think, is evident to you, that snow, while it is snow, can never, having admitted heat, as we said before, continue to be what it was, snow and hot, but on the approach of heat it will either give way to it or be destroyed."

"Certainly so."

"And fire, on the other hand, on the approach of cold must either give way to it or be destroyed, nor can it ever endure, having admitted cold, to continue to be what it was, fire and cold."

"You say true," said he.

"It happens, therefore," he continued, "in respect to some of such things, that not only the same idea is always designated by the same name, but something else too, which is not indeed the former, but retains its form always so long as it exists. But perhaps what I mean will be still clearer in the

following example. The odd (in numbers) must always bear this name which now we give it; must it not?"

"Certainly."

"Must it alone of all things bear this name, for I ask you this also, or is there anything else which is not the same as the odd, yet which we must designate by this name, as well as by its own, because its nature is such as that it never can at any time dispense with the odd? Such I assert to be the case with the number three and many other numbers. But observe now regarding the number three; does it not appear to you that it must be designated always by its own name, as well as by that of the odd, which is not the same as the number three? But still such is the nature of the number three, five, and the entire half of number, that not being the same as the odd, each of them is yet always odd. On the other hand, two, four, and the other whole series of number, though not the same as the even, are nevertheless each of them even. Do you allow this or not?

"How should I not," he replied.

"Observe now," said he, "what I wish to prove. But it is this, that not only do contraries appear not to receive each other, but as many things also as though not contrary to each other always involve contraries, such do not either appear to receive that idea which is contrary to the idea existing in them-

selves, but on its approach they perish or recede. Shall we not insist that the number three should perish first, and submit to anything else whatever, before it would endure while it was yet three to become even?"

"Certainly, indeed," said Cebes.

"Nor yet," said he, "is the number two the contrary of the number three."

"Surely not."

"Therefore, not only ideas that are contrary do not await the approach of their contraries, but some other things also do not endure the approach of those which are really contraries."

"You say very truly," he replied.

53. "Do you wish then," he continued, "if we can, that we should define what the nature of these things is."

"Certainly."

"Would they then be such as to compel whatever they occupied, not only itself to retain its own idea, but always that of something which is itself a contrary?"

"How do you mean?"

"As we said just now. For you are doubtless aware that whatever the idea of three may have occupied, it is not only necessary for that to be three, but odd besides?"

"Certainly."

"At such, we say now, the idea * contrary to the form which effected this, can never at all arrive."

"No, surely."

"But did the idea of odd make it so?"

"Yes."

"And contrary to this is the idea of even?"

"Yes."

"The idea of even then shall never arrive at being three."

"Never surely."

"Therefore three has not any share in even?"

"Not any."

"Three, then, is uneven?"

"Yes."

"That, therefore, which I proposed to determine—what things they are which, though contrary to any contrary, yet do not admit it, as for instance now the number three, though not being the contrary of the even, does not the more admit it, for it always brings a contrary against it, as the number two to the odd, fire to cold, and in many other examples—see now if you determine thus, not only that a contrary does not admit a contrary, but that also which brings any contrary against whatever it approaches, can never, at any time, receive the contrary of that which is so brought. But think over

* The idea, or form, contrary to that which made three to be three and odd also; that is, the idea of even can never arrive at anything like odd.

it again, for it is profitable to give it constant attention. Five will not admit the idea of even, nor ten, its double, the idea of odd ; this double too, indeed, which is itself contrary to something else, will not, nevertheless, admit the idea of odd, no more than three-halves, the half, the third, and all such like will admit the idea of the whole, if you follow and agree with me in opinion that the case is so."

" Most distinctly," replied he, " I follow and agree with you."

54. " But, answer me again as from the beginning ; and do not reply in the same terms of my question, but in different, after my example. I say this, because I perceive, besides the certain mode of answering which I spoke of at first, another certainty (in answering), arising from what has just been said. For, if you were to ask me, owing to the existence of what in the body it shall be warm, I shall not make you that safe, unlearned answer, that it is owing to heat, but a more subtle one from what has been laid down just now, that it is owing to fire ; nor if you should ask me, owing to the existence of what in the body, shall it be sick ? I will not answer that it is owing to disease, but to a fever ; nor if, owing to the existence of what in number, it shall be odd ? I will not say, owing to oddness, but to unity, and so on. But observe now if you sufficiently understand what I mean."

" Quite so," he replied.

" But, answer me," he continued, " owing to the existence of what in a body shall it be a living body ?"

" To the existence of soul," he replied.

" Is this then invariably the case ?"

" How should it not ?" said he.

" Whatever, therefore, the soul may have occupied, does it always bring it life ?"

" It does, indeed," he replied.

" Is there anything contrary to life or not ?"

" There is," said he.

" What is it ?"

" Death."

" Therefore, the soul can never, at any time, admit the contrary of that which it always brings with it, as has been allowed from previous proof ?"

" And most convincingly," said Cebes.

55. " What, then ? What do we now call that which does not admit the idea of the even ?"

" Odd," replied he.

" And that which does not admit the just, nor the graceful ?"

" The one ungraceful, and the other unjust."

" Be it so. But by what name do we call that which does not admit death ?"

" Immortal."

" Does the soul, then, not admit death ?"

" No."

" Is the soul, therefore, immortal ?"

" Immortal."

" Be it so," said he. " Shall we say then that this has been now demonstrated ? Or how think you of it ?"

" Most satisfactorily, Socrates."

" What, then, Cebes ?" he continued. " If it is necessary that the odd must be imperishable, must not the number three be imperishable ?"

" Why not ?"

" If, then, that which is without heat must of necessity be imperishable, when any one applies heat to snow, should not the snow withdraw safe and unmelted ? For it could not, indeed, be destroyed, nor yet would it stay to admit the heat."

" You say truly," he replied.

" In like manner, I imagine, if that which is without cold were imperishable, when one should move any cold body to the fire, it should never be extinguished nor destroyed, but should depart quite whole."

" It must be so," said he.

" Must we not," he continued, " express ourselves in like manner in regard to that which is immortal ? If, indeed, that which is immortal is also imperishable, it is impossible for the soul to perish, when death comes against it ; for, from what has been already laid down, it shall not admit death, nor become dead, just as three, we said, shall never be even, nor yet the odd (be even), nor

shall fire be cold, neither, indeed, the heat that is in the fire. But some one may say, granting that the odd does not become even on the approach of the even, as has been allowed, what is there to prevent, on the annihilation of the odd, the even succeeding in its stead? With one who urged such an objection, we cannot contend that it is not annihilated, for the odd is not imperishable, otherwise if we established this, we could have easily argued, that on the approach of the even, the odd, and the three (merely) disappear; and so we could have argued with regard to fire, heat, and the rest. Could we not?"

"Certainly, indeed."

"And so now, consequently, with regard to the immortal; if we allow it to be imperishable, the soul, in addition to its being immortal, must be imperishable likewise; otherwise we must have recourse to another argument."

"But there is no necessity," said he, "as far as regards this at least; for scarcely could anything reject decay if that which is immortal and eternal shall endure it."

56. "The Deity, indeed," said Socrates, "and life itself, and if there is anything else immortal, must be confessed by all to be at no time annihilated."

"By all men, indeed, by Jove," said he, "and still more, as I imagine, by the gods."

"Since, then, the immortal is also incorruptible, must not the soul, since it is immortal, be likewise imperishable?"

"There is strong necessity for it."

"Therefore, on the approach of death to man, that which is mortal of him dies, as it appears; but that which is immortal departs safe and incorrupt, having withdrawn from death."

"So it appears."

"Unquestionably, then, Cebes," said he, "the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls shall, in reality, exist in Hades."

"I cannot, for my part, Socrates, say anything against this, nor refuse consenting to your arguments. But if Simmias here, or any other has aught to say, it were better not be silent, since I know not to what other time, beyond the present, one could defer it, if he wished to speak or hear further on such subjects."

"Nor yet am I," said Simmias, "disposed at all to dissent from what has been said; however, from the grandeur of the subject of our discussion, and my low estimate of human weakness, I am forced to remain still (to a degree) incredulous upon the matter in debate."

"You do not, Simmias," said Socrates, "speak on other things only, but on this also well, and credible as these first principles may be, they must yet be reviewed with greater care; and when you

have sifted them sufficiently, you will, as I imagine, adopt my course of reasoning, as far as it is possible for man to do so, and if once this very case becomes distinctly plain you will inquire no further.

"You speak true," said he.

57. "But it is right, my friends," he continued, "for us to reflect that since the soul is immortal it requires our anxious care, not merely for this interval which we call life, but always; and we must now suppose the danger to be great should one neglect it. For if death were a deliverance from every thing, it should be great gain for the wicked to be delivered, by death, at once from the body and their iniquity along with the soul; but now, since the soul appears to be immortal, it can have no other refuge nor safety from evil except in remaining as good and wise as possible. For the soul descends to Orcus with nothing else but the results of its mode of discipline and education, which are said to be either of the greatest advantage or injury to the departed, at the very outset of his journey thither. But it is thus said; that each man's demon who was assigned to him while living, proceeds to conduct him, after death, to a certain place where they must assemble together for judgment, and proceed to Orcus, accompanied by that guide upon whom it was enjoined to lead them there from hence. But having there received their deserts, and remained for the time prescribed, the guide

conducts them back again after many and long revolutions of ages. But the passage is not such as the Telephus of Æschylus describes it; for he says, 'It is a simple path that leads to Orcus;' but to me it appears to be neither simple nor one, for there had been no need of guides since no one could possibly go astray when there is but the one road. But it seems now to have numbers of sections and circuits; I say this from conjecture, in consequence of the funeral sacrifices and ceremonies here. The soul then that is temperate and wise, follows willingly its guide, and is fully conscious of its immediate destiny; but that which has a passionate desire for the body, as I said before, clinging to it devotedly for a long time, in a visible quarter, after violent resistance and intense suffering, is forcibly, and with difficulty, led away by its appointed demon. But on its arrival amongst the other souls, impure indeed and guilty of some such crime as the participation in unrighteous murders, or the commission of any such iniquities as are similar to them, and the work of congenial souls, every one flies and turns away from it with aversion, and shrinks from becoming either its fellow-traveller or guide, but it strays about involved in utter perplexity, until a certain period has elapsed, on the expiration of which it is of necessity carried into an abode suitable to it; but the soul that has led a pure and well-regulated life,

having the gods for associates and guides, proceeds to inhabit a region adapted to each like itself."

58. "But there are many and wonderful regions in the earth, and it is itself, neither in regard to its nature or magnitude, such as it is supposed by those who are in the habit of describing it, as I have heard a certain person declare."

Upon which, Simmias said, "How do you mean, Socrates? For I have heard a good deal respecting the earth; not, however, those things which you are persuaded of, so that I would gladly hear them."

"But, indeed, Simmias, it does not seem to me to require the art of Glaucus to narrate what these things are; but to prove them true seems to me more difficult than is consistent with the art of Glaucus, and I should, perhaps, be just as incompetent to do so, as even had I the knowledge the remaining portion of my life appears to be inadequate to the extended nature of the subject. What I am persuaded, however, that the form of the earth is, and what its different regions, there is nothing to prevent my telling."

"But this," said Simmias, "is enough."

"I am convinced then," he continued, "in the first place, that if the earth is of a spherical form in the centre of the universe, it has no need of air, nor any other sustaining force to prevent its falling, but the similitude of the universe on all sides to

itself, and the equilibrium of the earth itself is quite sufficient to support it; for anything in a state of equilibrium being placed in the centre of something like itself, cannot incline more or less to any side, but being alike on all sides remains unmoved. This I am in the first place convinced of."

"And justly," said Simmias.

"Besides," said he, "that it is of considerable size, and that we are inhabiting a very small portion of it, from Phasis as far as the pillars of Hercules, dwelling by the sea like ants or frogs about a marsh; and that there are many others in different directions who inhabit numbers of such regions as our own. For in every direction round the earth there are numerous cavities, diversified both in their shape and size, into which water, clouds, and air flow together; but the pure earth itself rests still in the pure firmament, in which are the stars, and which the majority of those who are accustomed to treat of such subjects call by the name of æther, of which the former are but the grounds, and are perpetually flowing into these cavities of the earth. Therefore, that we are unconscious to ourselves of our inhabiting the cavities of the earth, and imagine that we are dwelling upon its surface, just as if one who lived in the midst of the bottom of the sea were to suppose that he was living on the sea, and observing the sun and the rest of the planets through the water, would ima-

gine the sea to be sky, but owing to indolence and imbecility should have never arrived at the surface of the sea, nor, having risen and emerged from the sea, have beheld the region here, how much purer and more beautiful it is than that with them, nor should have ever heard of it from one who had beheld it. But we are just affected the same way, for while dwelling in some cavity of the earth we imagine that we live upon its surface, and call the air sky, as if through this, being the firmament, the planets moved. And this amounts to our being incompetent, through imbecility and indolence, to arrive at the upper part of the air, since if one were to ascend to its surface, or reach it by the assistance of wings, he should behold on his emerging, —as with us the fishes emerging from the sea observe what is here—so, I say, one should behold the things that are there, and if our nature were capable of enduring the sight, one should perceive that that is in reality the heavens, in reality the light, and in reality the earth. For this (our) earth, indeed, and stones, and the whole region here, are decayed and corroded, as things are in the sea by the brine; and nothing at all worthy of consideration exists in the sea, nor, in a word, has it any thing perfect, but there are submarine caverns, and sand, and slime in abundance, and filth wherever there may be earth also; and they are not in any degree to be compared with the spe-

cimens of the beautiful with us. But the things formerly spoken of would appear, on the other hand, still further to excel the things with us. Whence, if we are to tell a pleasing fable, Simmias, it is worth while to hear what kind the things are on the surface of the earth, beneath the firmament."

"In truth, Socrates," said Simmias, "we would gladly hear this fable."

59. "In the first place then, my friend, this earth is said to be similar in its appearance, should one survey it from above, to balls made of twelve pieces of differently coloured leather, variegated, marked out with dyes, of which the colours which the painters use are like samples. But there the whole earth consists of such, and far more brilliant and chaster than those here; for one part of the earth is purple, of wonderful beauty, another golden, a third, so far as it is white, whiter than chalk or snow, besides its being made up in like manner of other colours, and those more numerous and beautiful than we have ever seen. And these its very cavities too, filled as they are with water and air, shew a kind of colour, refulgent amid the diversity of other colours, so that it presents one continually variegated aspect. But in this earth, being such as I describe, are produced analogous plants, trees, flowers, and fruits; and the mountains and stones have both polish and transparency, and the more beautiful colours; of which these

well-known little stones here which are so highly prized are merely fragments, cornelian, jasper, emeralds, and all such like. But there is nothing there which is not of this character, and still more beautiful than these. And the reason of it is, because those stones are pure, and neither corroded nor decayed, like these here, by rottenness nor brine, which descend here together, and produce deformity and disease in the stones, the earth, and other things, in animals and even plants. But the earth itself is adorned with all these things, and with gold, moreover, and silver, and other matters of the kind. For they are naturally conspicuous, being many in number, and large, and on all sides of the earth, so that to behold it is a sight to make spectators blest. But there are many other animals upon it besides men, who inhabit partly the central portion of the earth, partly live bordering on the air as we do on the sea, and partly on the islands near the mainland, which the air surrounds; in a word, that which with us and for our necessities is water and sea, is air with them, while our air is their æther. But their seasons are of such a temperature, that they are exempt from disease, and live for a much longer period than those here, and excel us in sight, hearing, wisdom, and all such like, by as great an interval as the air surpasses water, and the æther air in purity. And they have temples of the gods, and shrines in which the

gods in reality abide, and colloquial intercourse, oracular responses, visions of the gods, and such like communications take place between the one and the other. Besides the sun, the moon, and stars are seen by them such as they really are, and the rest of their felicity is conformable to this."

60. "And such is the nature of the whole earth, and those things around the earth; but there are in it, throughout its cavities, many places around its entire compass, some deeper and broader than this region wherein we are dwelling, others deeper and having a more narrow aperture than this region of ours, and others of a more shallow depth and broader. But all these are mutually perforated under the earth in various directions, some with more narrow, and others with broader openings; they have conduits also, by which means a vast body of water flows from one cavity into another, as into basins, as also perennial rivers of enormous size under the earth, and waters hot and cold; moreover fire in great quantities, and large streams of fire, many too of liquid mud, some thinner and some more miry; like the streams of mud which precede the burning torrent of lava in Sicily, and the torrent of lava itself; with which, further, these places severally are filled, to whichever each time the overflow may chance to come. But all these move up and down, as it were from a kind of libration existing in the earth. And this

libration is owing to a certain innate property in the earth. Among the chasms in the earth, there is one especially large, which penetrates quite through the entire earth; this Homer makes mention of, speaking of it as 'Far removed, where there is a profound abyss beneath the earth;' which elsewhere he, as well as many others of the poets, have called Tartarus. Into this chasm, then, all the rivers flow together, and issue forth from it again; and each of them partakes of the nature of that earth, whatever its kind, through which they flow. But this is the reason of all the streams issuing out from thence and flowing in, because this liquid mass has neither bottom nor base. Hence it librates and fluctuates up and down, and the air and wind around it do the same; for they accompany it both when it moves with violence towards the upper and towards the lower parts of the earth; and as in the case of persons respiring, the wind being in constant motion is continually breathed out and drawn in, so there also, the wind partaking of the movements of the liquid mass occasions fearful and tremendous storms by its exits and its entrances. When, therefore, the water rushing with violence descends into that place which is called the lower region, then having passed through the earth it flows into the beds of the rivers there, and fills them up in the manner of those who pump up the water from the hold of a ship; as soon then as it leaves

the region there, and turns its course this way, it fills the beds of the rivers here again, and when they have been filled, they flow through the channels and through the earth, and arriving at those places into which severally they make their way, they cause seas, lakes, streams, and fountains. But when they sink into the earth again from thence, some, indeed, having encompassed places of greater size and number, and others fewer places, and of less extent, they are emptied into Tartarus again, some far deeper down than they were drawn up, and others at less depth, but they are all emptied below the point of their * discharge. And some, indeed, issue out exactly opposite their point of† influx, and others at the same side; there are some too which, having described a complete circle, coiling either once or oftener around the earth, like serpents, when they have descended as low as possible empty themselves into Tartarus again. But it is possible to descend in either direction as far as the centre, and not beyond it; for in either direction an ascent is presented to the rivers on both sides."

61. "The rest of the rivers, indeed, are numerous, large, and of various descriptions; but amongst these many there are four rivers in par-

* i. e. Their discharge from Tartarus, into the different channels through the earth.

† i. e. Their influx into Tartarus.

ticular, of which the largest truly, which flowing outermost encompasses the earth, is called Ocean; but on the opposite side to this, and with a contrary current flows Acheron, which traverses several other desert regions, and finally, sinking under the earth, empties itself in the Acherusian lake, where the souls of numbers of the dead descend, and having remained there for a destined period, some for a longer and others for a shorter duration, they are sent back again into the generations of animals. But the third river issues forth between these two, and close to its point of issue it falls into a vast region blazing with enormous fires, and makes a lake larger than our sea, boiling up with water and slime; thence it proceeds in a circular course, turbid and muddy, and making the compass of the earth it reaches, among other places, the extremity of the Acherusian lake, without mixing, however, with its waters; but after a variety of windings beneath the earth, it is discharged into the depths of Tartarus. And this is the river which they call Pyriphlegethon, whose burning currents emit with violence forcibly separated portions (of the river) in whatever part of the earth they may be. But opposite to this the fourth river empties itself first into a region awful and wild, as they say, of the colour of cyanus, which (region) they call Stygian, and the lake which the river makes by its discharge, Styx. And being emptied here, and

endued by the water with a mischievous efficacy, penetrating the earth, it proceeds by a circular course to meet Pyriphlegethon, and encounters it in the Acherusian lake, at the opposite extremity; neither does the water of this river mingle with any other, but having made a compass of the earth, it empties itself into Tartarus, opposite to Pyriphlegethon; but the name by which the poets call it is Cocytus."

62. "These things then being so, as soon as the dead arrive at that region whither his dæmon carries each, in the first place those who have led an upright and a holy life, and those who have lived otherwise are judged. And those who appear to have led a course of life between the two, proceeding to Acheron, and embarking in those conveyances they have, arrive in them at the (Acherusian) lake, and there abide; and when they are purified and have suffered the penalty of their iniquities, if any of them has committed such, they are absolved; they also obtain the reward of their good deeds, each according to his deserts; but those who appear to be incurable on account of their enormous offences, who have committed either many and flagrant sacrileges, or many murders in contempt of justice and the law, or any other similar crimes, these a suitable destiny precipitates into Tartarus, whence they never at any time come forth. But those who appear to have committed remediable indeed but great

offences, having, for instance, used some violence under the influence of anger, towards father or mother, or who have become homicides in consequence of any other similar impulse, and when they have repented lead a different life, such must, of necessity, be plunged into Tartarus, and after that they have been so and remained there for a year, the wave casts them forth; the homicides, indeed, into Cocytus, but the parricides and matricides into Pyriphlegethon; and when borne along by those rivers, they have arrived at the Acherusian lake, there they entreat and call aloud, some upon those whom they have slain, others upon those whom they have offended, and they implore and beseech of them by name, to allow them to enter upon the lake, and to receive them, and if they obtain their leave, they enter upon it, and rest from their sufferings, but if not, they are borne back into Tartarus, and thence again into the rivers, and they never cease from suffering thus until they have appeased those whom they wronged; for this punishment was ordained them by the judges. But whoever may appear to be eminently distinguished for a holy life, these are they who being delivered from those places in the earth, and discharged as it were from dungeons, ascend into a pure abode above, and dwell upon the surface of the earth. And as many of these same as have been completely purified by

philosophy, both live throughout all future time without bodies and arrive at still more beautiful abodes than the former, which it is not easy nor have we at the present sufficient time to describe."

63. "But on account of these matters which we have considered, Simmias, we are bound to make every exertion for the acquisition of virtue and wisdom during life; for the prize is glorious, and the hope is great."

"To insist, however, that these things are just as I have described them, becomes not an intelligent man; that either these, however, or something else of the kind, are the circumstances affecting our souls and their abodes, since the soul appears to be assuredly immortal, this appears to me to be both becoming and worth one's while, who so thinks, to run the risk of the belief; for the hazard is honorable, and it is one's duty to apply as charms such impressions to himself, wherefore I am now for so long a time protracting this discourse. On account of these things, then, that man must have good hopes about his soul who, during life, has bid adieu to all the other pleasures and ornaments of the body as quite extraneous, convinced that they aggravate the evil, but has concerned himself about knowledge, and having adorned his soul, not with extraneous but with its own proper decoration, temperance, justice, fortitude, freedom, and truth, so awaits with patience his passage to Hades, prepared to

depart whenever fate may summon him. You then, Simmias and Cebes, and the rest, shall depart each of you at some future time; but fate now summons me, as a tragic writer would say, and it is almost time for me to adjourn to the bath; for I think it better to drink the poison when I have bathed, and not trouble the women to wash a corpse."

64. When he had expressed himself thus, Crito said, "Be it so, Socrates; but what directions do you leave for them or me on the subject of your children or any other matter, by attending to which we may act most agreeably to you?"

"Such as I am always impressing upon you, Cebes," he replied; "nothing more; that by taking care of yourselves, you shall adopt a course of conduct most agreeable to me and to mine and to yourselves, even though you should make no such promise now; but if you disregard yourselves, and are unwilling to order your life, as in a beaten track, according to what has been established now and at a former time, no matter how many promises you may have made at the present time, you shall effect nothing the more."

"We shall exert ourselves then," said he "to act as you advise; but how shall we bury you?"

Upon this, smiling gently and looking round on us, he replied, "My friends, I cannot persuade Crito that I am the actual Socrates who is now conferring with you and arranging the several

subjects of discussion ; but he thinks that I am the person whom he shall behold, a short time hence, a corpse, and he asks how he must bury me. But the argument which I urged at such length and for so long a time, to prove that when I shall have drunk the poison I shall abide with you no more, but shall take my departure hence for the happy state of the blessed, this I appear to press on him in vain, while I console by it, at the same time, both you and myself. Enter then into security for me to Crito of an opposite character to that which he gave the judges. For he, indeed, went security for my stay ; but be you my sureties that I shall not remain after I die, but shall take my departure, that Crito may bear the matter more easily, and may not, when he sees my body either burned or interred, be troubled on my account as if I suffered something dreadful, nor say at my funeral that he is laying out Socrates, or bearing him forth, or burying him. For, be assured," said he, " my excellent Crito, that to use improper terms is not only culpable as far as regards itself, but it also works some mischief to our souls. I must be of good heart then, and direct you to bury my body, (not myself,) and to bury it in such a way as may satisfy you and you think to be most consistent with the laws."

65. When he had said this, he arose and went into a certain chamber to bathe, and Crito accom-

panied him, but he directed us to wait for him. We remained then at one time conversing upon and reviewing the subjects discussed, and again speaking of our misfortune, how severely it had befallen us, fully conscious that being deprived as it were of a parent we should pass like orphans all our future life. But when he had bathed and his children were brought to him—for he had two little sons and one grown up—and his kinswomen had arrived, having conversed with them in presence of Crito, and given them the directions he wished, he desired the women and children to depart and he returned to us himself.

And it was now near sunset; for he had delayed a long time inside. But when he came back from the bath, he sat down, and did not afterwards speak much; and the officer of the Eleven came and stood beside him and said, "Socrates, I shall not reproach you at least with what I condemn in others, their being indignant with and execrating me, when at the command of the magistrates I direct them to drink the poison. But I have found you upon all other occasions during the time of your imprisonment, the most noble, mildest, and most excellent of men who ever entered here, wherefore at this time, too, I am well assured that you will not be angry with me but with those who are to blame, for you know well who are so. Now, therefore, since you are aware what I have come to announce, farewell, and try to bear what is inevitable

with all possible resignation." Upon this, bursting into tears, he turned away and withdrew.

And Socrates looked towards him and said, "And you, too, farewell, we shall do as you direct." At the same time (turning to us) he said, "How kindly polite this man is; during the whole time (of my imprisonment) he used to visit me, and converse with me occasionally, and proved one of the worthiest of men; how heartily, too, does he lament me now. But come, Crito, let us attend his bidding, and let some one bring the poison, if it has been ground; if not, let the man grind it."

Crito replied, "But I think that the sun is still upon the mountains, and has not sunk as yet. Besides, I am aware that others are in the habit of drinking the poison very late, after they have been commanded to drink it, when they have supped and drunk very freely, and some of them after they have enjoyed the society of those they love. Do not then be in haste; for there is yet time."

And Socrates answered: "Naturally those persons whom you mention, Crito, act this part; for they imagine that they shall be gainers by so doing, and for my part I shall avoid with equal reason acting thus; for I expect to be no otherwise a gainer by drinking the poison a little later, than to appear ridiculous in my own eyes, if still anxious to live, and sparing that of which no more exists. But go," said he, "obey, and do not thwart me."

66. When Crito heard this, he made signs to an attendant standing near; and the attendant went out, and after a delay of some time, he returned with the person who was to administer the poison, who carried it ready ground in a cup; and, when Socrates saw the man, he said, "Well, now, good friend, what must I do, for you are conversant with these matters?"

"Nothing," he replied, "but walk about when you have drunk the poison until you feel a weight in your legs, then lie down, and so the poison will work of itself." At the same time he held out the cup to Socrates, and he took it, and with the utmost cheerfulness, Echecrates, without the slightest sign of fear or change in his complexion or his face, but looking steadfastly as he was accustomed on the man, he said, "What say you of this cup with regard to our making a libation to any one? Is it lawful, or not?

"We grind just so much, Socrates," he answered, "as we think sufficient for a draught."

"I understand;" said he; "but surely it is both lawful, at least, and expedient to pray to the gods that our journey may be happy hence to them, which I earnestly implore indeed, and may such be the result." And having so said, raising the cup at the same time to his lips, he drained it with the greatest coolness and unconcern.

And for a time, indeed, the greater number of us were just able to refrain from tears, but when we saw him drink and finish the draught, we could do so no longer, but in spite of myself the tears flowed copiously, so that I covered my face and grieved for myself, not at all indeed for him, but at my own misfortune in having lost so dear a friend. Crito stood up to retire rather sooner than I did, as he had not been able to forbear from tears. But Apollodorus even before this never ceased weeping, and then, too, bursting out into lamentation, bewailing and complaining, he pierced the heart of every one present except Socrates himself. But he said, "What are you doing, my admirable friends! On this account chiefly I dismissed the women in order that they might not commit such foolishness; I have heard, too, that one should die with auspicious language. Be still then and be firm."

Upon hearing this we were ashamed, and checked our tears. But when he had walked awhile, as soon as he said his legs grew heavy, he lay down on his back, for so the man directed him. At the same time he who administered the poison taking hold of him, examined after some interval his feet and legs, and then pressing his foot hard asked if he felt it, and he said not. Afterwards he did the same again with his legs; and so going higher up he showed us that he was growing cold and stiff. He then touched him himself, and said

that when the chill reached his heart then he should die. Already the region of the lower belly had grown cold, and having uncovered his face, for he was covered with a garment, he said,—the last words too which he uttered,—"Crito, we owe a cock to Æsculapius; pay it, and by no means neglect it."

"It shall be done;" said Crito; "but see if you have any other charge to give."

When he was asked this, he made no further answer; but after a little time he stirred and the attendant uncovered him, and his eyes were fixed; but Crito observing this closed his mouth and eyes.

67. Such was the death, Echecrates, of our friend; a man, the very best of those of whom we had experience then, and moreover the most sensible and just.

THE END.

Dublin: Printed by JOHN S. FOLDS, 5, Bachelor's-Walk.

WORKS PUBLISHED BY

WILLIAM CURRY, JUN. AND COMPANY,

DUBLIN.

COLLEGE AND SCHOOL BOOKS.

I.

PLATO'S APOLOGY of SOCRATES, CRITO, and PHÆDO, with the Latin Version of FICINUS, and numerous English Notes. By the Rev. C. S. STANFORD, A.M. 8vo. 10s. 6d. cloth.

II.

ELEMENTS of EUCLID, the First Six Books, with Notes. By Dr. ELRINGTON, tenth edition, 7s. Boards.

III.

ANALYTICAL TRIGONOMETRY, intended as an Appendix to Simson's Trigonometry. By WM. HARTSHORN, A.M. 8vo. 1s. sewed.

IV.

GREEK TESTAMENT, (the Gospels and Acts, being the Historical Books,) with English Notes and a Lexicon. By the Rev. E. J. GEOGHEGAN, Editor of Xenophon, &c. &c. One thick vol. 12mo. 7s. 6d. bound.

V.

HOMER'S ILIAD. Books 1 to 8, carefully printed from the Text of Heyne, with copious English Notes, and a Preliminary Dissertation on the Greek Digamma. By D. SPILLAN, A.M. 8vo. 9s. boards.

VI.

A GREEK GRAMMAR. On a new and systematic plan, according to the Analytic Method. By the Rev. THOMAS FLYNN, A.M. *New edition, improved.* 3s. 6d. bound.

VII.

A CHART of GREEK GRAMMAR. By the Rev. WILLIAM BURGH, A.M. 1s. 6d. on a sheet.

VIII.

OVID'S FASTI, with very numerous English Notes. By the Rev. C. S. STANFORD, A.M. 12mo. 5s. 6d. cloth.

IX.

THE FIRST THREE BOOKS of LIVY, with English Notes. By JAMES PRENDEVILLE, Scholar of Trinity College, Dublin. Third edition, corrected. 12mo. 5s. 6d. bound.

X.

THE FOURTH and FIFTH BOOKS, on the same plan, and by the same Author. 12mo. 5s. bound.

XI.

SELECT SATIRES of JUVENAL, with a Paraphrase and Notes in English. By JOHN HAWKSWORTH, LL.D. Head Master of the Feinaiglian School, Luxembourgh. 12mo. 4s. bound.

XII.

INITIATORY EXERCISES in the LATIN LANGUAGE, extracted from Classic Authors, and arranged progressively; together with a System of Rules, Explained and Illustrated, completely developing the principles of Latin Syntax. By THOMAS PHILLIPS, A.M. 12mo. 2s. 6d. bound.

XIII.

THE METRES of TERENCE explained. By the Rev. RICHARD HOBART, A.M. 8vo. 1s 6d.

XIV.

VIRGIL'S GEORGICS, translated into English Prose. By ISAAC BUTT, A.B., M.R.I.A., late Scholar of Trinity College. 12mo. 3s. cloth.

XV.

A LATIN GRAMMAR. By the Rev. THOMAS FLYNN, 12mo. 1s. 6d. bound.

XVI.

A CHART OF LATIN GRAMMAR. By the Rev. WILLIAM BURGH, A. M. 1s. 6d. on a sheet.

XVII.

A SYNOPSIS OF ROMAN ANTIQUITIES; or a comprehensive account of the City, Religion, Politics, and Customs of the Ancient Romans, with a Catechetical Appendix. By JOHN LANKTREE. New edition, plates, 18mo. 3s. bound.

"This is an excellent little Book, and admirably adapted for the use of all the younger Students at Schools."—*Edinburgh Literary Journal.*

XVIII.

A SPELLING BOOK, on a New Plan, containing all the common Words in the language; to which is prefixed an Introduction, in three Parts exhibiting—I. The Sounds of the Letters—II. The Quantities of the Syllables—III. A Rythmical Classification of Words, with an Appendix, containing several useful Tables. By the Rev. RICHARD ROE, A.M. 12mo. 1s. 6d.

THEOLOGICAL TEXT BOOKS.

I.

NEWLAND'S (REV. THOMAS) ANALYSIS OF BURNET on the Thirty-nine Articles, with notes. 12mo. 9s. 6d. cloth.

II.

HOBART'S (REV. RICHARD) ANALYSIS OF BUTLER'S ANALOGY. Small 8vo. 4s. cloth.

III.

HOBART'S (REV. RICHARD) ORDINATION QUESTIONS 12mo. 1s. 6d.

IV.

DEAN GRAVES' LECTURES ON THE PENTATEUCH. Fourth edition, 8vo. 14s. cloth.