Kelli D Potter
I am an Associate Professor of Philosophy, Utah Valley University, where I am also an Associate Director of Religious Studies. I was a founding member of the Society for Mormon Philosophy and Theology. My research foci are transfeminism, philosophy of religion, and (sometimes) the philosophy of logic.
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In this paper, I re-examine the positivist arguments against religious belief hoping to persuade the reader that the above account of the positivist critique of religious belief is incomplete. There are, in fact, two distinct positivist criticisms of religious belief both of which accomplish the same goal: deflating religious belief. The verificationist argument is the most famous and accomplishes this goal by eliminating cognitive content. But verificationism fails and so does this argument. However, the second argument deflates religious belief in a less drastic way. This is what I call the indeterminacy argument. According to this argument, the cognitive content of religious belief is indeterminate. I re-examine texts by A.J. Ayer, Rudolf Carnap, John Wisdom and Anthony Flew in order to make my case for the existence of this alternative positivist critique of religious belief.
In the final section of this paper, I argue that the indeterminacy argument is cogent and that it accomplishes the original goal of logical positivism with respect to religious belief: deflation. Here I treat the notion of deflation and the positivist's motivation for taking this approach to religious belief. I argue that the indeterminacy argument is independent of the verification/falsification arguments. Finally, I suggest that the indeterminacy argument undermines the Realist approach to religious belief.
In this paper, I re-examine the positivist arguments against religious belief hoping to persuade the reader that the above account of the positivist critique of religious belief is incomplete. There are, in fact, two distinct positivist criticisms of religious belief both of which accomplish the same goal: deflating religious belief. The verificationist argument is the most famous and accomplishes this goal by eliminating cognitive content. But verificationism fails and so does this argument. However, the second argument deflates religious belief in a less drastic way. This is what I call the indeterminacy argument. According to this argument, the cognitive content of religious belief is indeterminate. I re-examine texts by A.J. Ayer, Rudolf Carnap, John Wisdom and Anthony Flew in order to make my case for the existence of this alternative positivist critique of religious belief.
In the final section of this paper, I argue that the indeterminacy argument is cogent and that it accomplishes the original goal of logical positivism with respect to religious belief: deflation. Here I treat the notion of deflation and the positivist's motivation for taking this approach to religious belief. I argue that the indeterminacy argument is independent of the verification/falsification arguments. Finally, I suggest that the indeterminacy argument undermines the Realist approach to religious belief.