Notes

Introduction

1: It is worth noting in this context that a recent multi-volume compilation of articles on Wittgenstein has in its composite index only one reference to Kierkegaard. The reference is to a footnote in an article by a European Wittgenstein scholar, who there issues a general denial that anything about Wittgenstein's methods or aims has any relation to Kierkegaard's project. (Joachim Schulte (1986) 'Wittgenstein and Conservatism,' in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments, 4 vols., ed. Stuart Shanker, London: Croom Helm, 4:69n.)
2: S�ren Kierkegaard (1962) The Point of View for My Work as an Author: A Report to History, trans. Walter Lowrie, New York: Harper Torchbooks, p. 6.
3: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958) Philosophical Investigations, 3rd edn, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., sec. 127.
4: Norman Malcolm (1984) Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, 2nd edn, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 69.
5: S�ren Kierkegaard (1967-78) S�ren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, 7 vols, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, sec. 709 (X⁴ A 596). (The number in parentheses is the standard reference to the entry, from the Danish edition of the Papirer.)
6: Investigations, sec. 127.

1: Relevant Biography

1: G. H. von Wright (1974) Introduction to Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore, by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 1.
2: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1965) 'Wittgenstein's lecture on ethics,' Philosophical Review 74:4-5.
3: W. W. Bartley's infamous biography of 1973, Wittgenstein (Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott) attributes most if not all of this 'self-hatred' to the 'fact' that Wittgenstein was unhappily homosexual. The depth of his [125] despair and his conception of its overarching effect on his life and work suggest that Wittgenstein's moral condition could not have been totally determined by such a cause.
4: Norman Malcolm (1984) Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, 2nd edn, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 52.
5: Malcolm, Memoir, p. 98.
6: Malcolm, Memoir, p. 84.
7: Karl Britton (1967) 'Portrait of a philosopher,' in Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and His Philosophy, ed. K. T. Fann, New York: Dell, p. 60.
8: Hermine Wittgenstein (1981) 'My brother Ludwig,' in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections, ed. Rush Rhees, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, p. 5.
9: Malcolm, Memoir, p. 26.
10: Britton, 'Portrait,' p. 60.
11: Letter from Wittgenstein to Russell, dated 22.6.12., Letters to Russell, p. 10.
12: The phrase comes from Schopenhauer by way of M. O'C. Drury.
13: For example, see Malcolm, Memoir, p. 33.
14: Hermine Wittgenstein, 'My brother Ludwig,' p. 4.
15: According to Mrs. Eccles, the wife of a fellow student. Reported by Wolfe Mays (1967) 'Recollections of Wittgenstein,' in Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and His Philosophy, p. 88.
16: On this point see B. F. McGuinness, editor's appendix to Paul Engelmann (1968) Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein, With a Memoir, New York: Horizon Press, pp. 141- 42.
17: Bartley, Wittgenstein, p. 126.
18: Loos 'once said to Wittgenstein: "You are me!"' Engelmann, p. 127.
19: Hermine Wittgenstein, 'Family Recollections,' ch. VI, in Bernhard Leitner (1976) The Architecture of Ludwig Wittgenstein, New York: New York University Press, p. 23.
20: Quoted in Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin (1973) Wittgenstein's Vienna,New York: Simon and Schuster, p. 208.
21: Malcolm, Memoir, p. 78.
22: Malcolm, Memoir, p. 60.
23: Maurice O'C. Drury (1981) 'Some notes on conversations with Wittgenstein,' in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections, p. 91.
24: Friedrich Waismann (1965) 'Notes on talks with Wittgenstein,' trans. M. Black, Philosophical Review 74:16. Wittgenstein's religious understanding (as far as he expressed it) will be discussed at greater length in chapter 4.
25: Drury (1981) 'Conversations with Wittgenstein,' in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections, pp. 112ff.
26: Drury, 'Conversations,' p. 130.
27: Drury, 'Some notes,' p. 109.
28: Reported by Mrs. Bevan, the wife of the doctor in whose house Wittgenstein was staying. Malcolm, Memoir, p. 81.
29: Malcolm, Memoir, p. 81.
30: Engelmann, Letters, p. 79. [126]
31: S�ren Kierkegaard (1941) Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 147; cf. pp. 365ff.
32: Another possible source of this orientation is Tolstoy. In 1915 Wittgenstein acquired his exposition of the Gospels. This work reflects Tolstoy's interest in the simple life as a religious duty; but if Wittgenstein's position was influenced by the work, it certainly could not have been wholly inspired by it. The sequence of his further acquaintance with Tolstoy is not clear.
33: Letter from Bertrand Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell, December 20, 1919. In Letters to Russell, p. 82.
34: See for instance Postscript, pp. 359ff. Ironically, the Postscript is attributed to a monastic pseudonym, Johannes Climacus.
35: H. D. P. Lee (1979) 'Wittgenstein 1929-1931,' Philosophy 54:218.
36: Waismann, 'Notes on talks,' p. 13. Compare S�ren Kierkegaard (1985) Philosophical Fragments, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 37. Wittgenstein rejected this formulation only a year later (Waismann, p. 16); but this rejection seems to be an instance of the 'later' Wittgenstein failing to fully understand the possibilities of the 'earlier' position - of which more in subsequent chapters.
37: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1967) Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. Cyril Barrett, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 70. (In this work square brackets represent composite collations and editorial guesswork.) Wittgenstein's understanding of the connection of 'proof' and 'picture' is explored in chapter 4.
38: S�ren Kierkegaard (1987) Either/Or, 2 vols., trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2:266-70.
39: Drury, 'Some notes,' pp. 102-3.
40: O. K. Bouwsma (1986) Wittgenstein: Conversations 1949-1951, ed. J. L. Craft and Ronald E. Hustwit, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., p. 46.
41: Malcolm, Memoir, p. 106. Malcolm indicates that Wittgenstein had read the Postscript (p. 60).
42: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1980) Culture and Value, trans. Peter Winch, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 31e-32e (1937) (In references to this posthumous collection, the date given is the year in which Wittgenstein composed the entry).
43: Culture and Value, p. 38e (1940).
44: S�ren Kierkegaard (1978) Two Ages, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 61, 68.
45: S�ren Kierkegaard (1955) On Authority and Revelation: The Book on Adler, trans. Walter Lowrie, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 159-60.
46: S�ren Kierkegaard (1971) Christian Discourses, trans. Walter Lowrie, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 11. [127]
47: Culture and Value, p. 53e (1946).
48: Janik and Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna, p. 24.
49: K. E. Tran�y (1976) 'Wittgenstein in Cambridge 1949-51, some personal recollections,' in Essays on Wittgenstein in Honor of G. H. von Wright, Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., pp. 12-13.
50: Walter Lowrie (1962) Kierkegaard, New York: Harper Torchbooks, pp. 10-11.
51: Walter Lowrie's assertion that Kierkegaard often thought of himself under the name 'Ludwig' is surely worthy of no less nor more than a footnote - which is in fact what he accords it. See his note to S�ren Kierkegaard (1941) Judge for Yourselves!, trans. Walter Lowrie, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 194.
52: It must be noted that this failure to travel was not due to financial problems; Kierkegaard, like Wittgenstein, had a rich inheritance (and unlike Wittgenstein he did not hesitate to spend it on luxuries). Nor was it due to any social constraints; others in his circle, such as Hans Christian Andersen, travelled widely in Europe. But Denmark suited Kierkegaard, and travel did not.
53: S�ren Kierkegaard (1962) The Point of View for My Work as an Author: A Report to History, trans. Walter Lowrie, New York: Harper Torchbooks, p. 100.
54: 'For that I myself possess a more exact and purely personal interpretation of my life is a matter of course.' The Point of View, p. 98n.
55: Lowrie's works could perhaps be called an 'indirect communication' insofar as he allows Kierkegaard to say what Lowrie wants(!). His method of working certainly is that of 'assembling reminders.'
56: S�ren Kierkegaard (1943) Edifying Discourses, 4 vols, trans. David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson, Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Publishing House, 1:3,5.
57: S�ren Kierkegaard, S�ren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, 7 vols, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, sec. 5874 (VII¹ A 5).
58: The Point of View, p. 76.
59: Journals and Papers, sec. 5430 (II A 805). Lowrie dates the 'earthquake' to 1830.
60: Journals and Papers, sec. 5431 (II A 806).
61: It is perhaps fortunate that W. W. Bartley has not written a biography of Kierkegaard; surely the talk of a 'thorn in the flesh,' causing sin- and guilt-consciousness, and which he once asked his physician about, to see if 'the discordancy between the bodily and the psychical in my constitution could be removed so that I might realize the universal [i.e. marriage]' (Lowrie, Kierkegaard, p. 405), is excellent prima facie evidence of Kierkegaard's homosexuality!
62: Lowrie, Kierkegaard, p. 239.
63: S�ren Kierkegaard (1983) Repetition, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 142-5.
64: Journals and Papers, sec. 6388 (X¹ A 266).
65: The Point of View, pp. 105-38. [128]
66: Journals and Papers, sec. 1959 (X³ A 413).
67: Journals and Papers, sec. 5368 (II A 347).
68: Journals and Papers, sec. 5324 (II A 228).
69: Authority and Revelation, pp. 118-20. Kierkegaard published only an abridgement of this work which did not mention Adler. This passage is from the few pages Kierkegaard added when he published the brief discussion 'Of the difference between a genius and an apostle.'
70: Although no one would deny (given their respective contexts) that Kierkegaard's was a Christian religious experience and Wittgenstein's was not, it is interesting to note that neither this report of the aftermath of an experience nor Constantin Constantius's parody of mystical experience (Repetition, p. 173) mention any specifically Christian content.
71: The Point of View, pp. 49-50.
72: A 'Knight of Faith' (in 'Religiousness B') ought to have been able to be at once married and 'in the service of the Higher.' So Kierkegaard's break with Regine confirms the state of his religiousness.
73: The Point of View, p. 75.
74: The Point of View, p. 6.
75: Postscript, p. 132n.
76: The Point of View, pp. 71-2.
77: Repetition, p. 135.
78: Journals and Papers, sec. 6192 (IX A 142).
79: Malcolm, Memoir, p. 83.
80: Wittgenstein did not think of this moral demand as a constraint; even under the burden of his incomplete task, he still had a 'wonderful life.' Kierkegaard's description of the Knight of Faith's freedom from worldly burdens comes to mind. So does Wittgenstein's house, with its strange combination of strict design and free feeling.

2: Methodology

1: This is certainly not to imply that there is no connection between the two periods. See chapters 4 and 5 for a fuller exploration of this connection.
2: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958) Philosophical Investigations, 3rd edn, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., sec. 109.
3: S�ren Kierkegaard (1962) The Point of View for My Work as an Author: A Report to History, trans. Walter Lowrie, New York: Harper Torchbooks, p. 6 (and many other references in his works).
4: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1960) The Blue and Brown Books, 2nd edn, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960, p. 64.
5: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1974) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, New York: The Humanities Press, sec. 4.112, secs. 4.114-4.115.
6: S�ren Kierkegaard (1985) Philosophical Fragments, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 37. Compare Moore's report on Wittgenstein: 'He said . . . that we had to follow a certain instinct which leads us to ask certain [129] questions, though we don't even understand what these questions mean; that our asking them results from "a vague mental uneasiness," like that which leads children to ask "Why?". . . .' From G. E. Moore (1954-5) 'Wittgenstein's lectures in 1930-33,' Mind 63-64, no. 253, p. 27.
7: The Point of View, p. 6.
8: S�ren Kierkegaard (1941) Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 178n.
9: The Point of View, p. 59. In fact, Kierkegaard's polemic is redoubled, since New Testament Christianity is already a polemical lifestyle, established over against the world. See S�ren Kierkegaard (1967-78) S�ren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, 7 vols, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, sec. 3336 (XI¹ A 156).
10: S�ren Kierkegaard (1968) The Concept of Irony, with Constant Reference to Socrates, trans. Lee M. Capel, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1968, p. 279.
11: Investigations, sec. 127.
12: Tractatus, sec. 4.1212.
13: Paul L. Holmer (1980) 'Wittgenstein: "saying" and "showing",' Neue Zeitschrift f�r Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 22:224.
14: Investigations, sec. 1.
15: Investigations, sec. 119.
16: Investigations, sec. 499.
17: Postscript, p. 107.
18: Paul L. Holmer (1955) 'Kierkegaard and religious propositions,' Journal of Religion 35:135.
19: Postscript, pp. 164-7.
20: Moore, 'Wittgenstein's lectures,' 253:26-7.
21: Holmer, 'Wittgenstein: "Saying" and "Showing",' p. 224.
22: This example is mentioned in Investigations, sec. 144; a longer explanation is given in Ludwig Wittgenstein (1970) Zettel, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, sec. 461.
23: Investigations, sec. 121.
24: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1979) Remarks on Frazer's 'Golden Bough,' trans. Rush Rhees, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, p. 1e.
25: The Point of View, p. 27.
26: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1969) On Certainty, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe, New York: Harper Torchbooks, p. 2e.
27: Maurice O'C. Drury (1981) 'Some notes on conversations with Wittgenstein,' in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections, ed. Rush Rhees, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, p. 93.
28: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1979) 'Letters to Ludwig von Ficker,' trans. Bruce Gillette; in Wittgenstein: Sources and Perspectives, ed. C. G. Luckhardt, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 92.
29: 'Letters to Ficker,' pp. 94-5. The negative part of Wittgenstein's method is clearly reminiscent of the via negativa of theology. But I know [130] of no evidence to settle the question whether he had studied the classic sources in this area.
30: Wittgenstein's complaint about Kierkegaard's prolixity is worth recalling here. He was 'most likely to agree' (he did agree, by his own statement) with the goal of the project, but just this agreement could make him impatient with it, since it was not pitched at his level.
31: The gap between derivation and final form implies a danger for the author. He might lose track of the derivation, and thus later be at a loss to explain just what the point of each remark was. Indeed this seems to have been the case with Wittgenstein and the Tractatus. During 1929, Frank Ramsey discussed some points in this work with him. He admitted 'more than once' to having forgotten the exact meaning of statements. (Reported by Moore, 'Wittgenstein's lectures,' 249:3.) This is of course not to suggest that Wittgenstein later had trouble with the central concepts of the Tractatus; but the terse propositions are so tightly packed with meaning, derived from a long discourse and a complex context, that it would be surprising if he could unpack them exactly as originally intended.
32: Investigations, p. ix^e.
33: Investigations, sec. 133.
34: A recent book by S. Stephen Hilmy (1987) The Later Wittgenstein, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, contains an extended discussion of the question whether the aphoristic style of the Investigations was intentional (pp. 15-25). Hilmy's conclusion is that Wittgenstein did want to write a 'normal' book, and that - no matter how complex the phenomena under discussion - the burden of the Investigations could in principle have been expressed in such a book. Nevertheless, the 'assembled' style does lend itself to the presentation of an assemblage of reminders. It certainly was Wittgenstein's 'working' style.
35: Journals and Papers, sec. 649 (VIII² B 81), pp. 269, 272.
36: Journals and Papers, sec. 650 (VIII² B 82).
37: Tractatus, pp. 3, 5.
38: Tractatus, sec. 6.13.
39: Unlike logic, valuations of the world can nevertheless change. This is an important difference! (In the Investigations, logic has the same status as values: 'standing fast' yet without metaphysical necessity.)
40: Postscript, p. 87.
41: Tractatus, sec. 6.13, sec. 6.421.
42: The fact that the essential parts of the Tractatus system are not self-containing (that nonsense has at least a maieutic use) ought to have been a clue to the positivists, that their idea of a self-containing verificationism would turn out to be futile.
43: Tractatus, sec. 6.54.
44: For example, Investigations, sec. 128. Whether this position is in agreement with the Tractatus position or not is a nice question - since there theses were advanced, but only as a temporary scaffolding around the putatively self-supporting crystalline reality. (Shades of Kierkegaard's critique of the systematists who build palaces and dwell in hovels!) [131]
45: Remarks on Frazer's 'Golden Bough,' p. 9e. Compare Investigations, sec. 122.
46: Investigations, sec. 123.
47: Investigations, sec. 255. Kierkegaard says of 'the sickness unto death' that it nevertheless does not result in death, but continues indefinitely. How like Wittgenstein's philosophical sickness, which consists in being unable to stop philosophizing!
48: Investigations, sec. 133.
49: Investigations, sec. 109.
50: Investigations, sec. 111. James C. Edwards cites the discussion of 'nobody on the road' from Through the Looking-Glass as an example of an extended grammatical joke. See James C. Edwards (1982) Ethics Without Philosophy: Wittgenstein and the Moral Life, Tampa, FL: University Presses of Florida, pp. 120-1.
51: Norman Malcolm (1984) Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, 2nd edn, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 27-8.
52: Investigations, sec. 260. The point is that there is no room for such an external category as 'belief' here. (See chapter 3.) One recent commentator who has noticed Wittgenstein's use of sarcasm is Fergus Kerr. There are several references in his (1986) Theology After Wittgenstein, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
53: Investigations, sec. 464.
54: Investigations, sec. 38.
55: Investigations, sec. 664.
56: An excellent discussion of the uses of 'grammar' in the later philosophy is Debra Aidun (1982) 'Wittgenstein, philosophical method and aspect-seeing,' Philosophical Investigations 5:106-115. The puzzlement expressed by Moore in his 'Wittgenstein's lectures' is also very instructive about the unusual nature of Wittgenstein's use of this term.
57: Investigations, sec. 254. 'I am inclined to say . . .' is a common expression in the later works and notes.
58: Remarks on Frazer's 'Golden Bough,' p. 9e.
59: At least, this is true in my experience. Wittgenstein uses the similar example of ability to continue a series. Many of the variety of possible ways of getting the next number in an algebraic series suggested in Investigations, sec. 151 have parallels in the ways one might attempt to solve a crossword.
60: Investigations, p. 193e.
61: He also speaks of rousing traditional Christian theological concepts from their 'enchanted sleep,' restoring their 'lost power and meaning.' Journals and Papers, sec. 4774 (II A 110), sec. 5181 (I A 328); cf. notes on 'Theologians, theology,' 4:737.
62: Investigations, p. x^e.
63: Tractatus, p. 3.
64: S�ren Kierkegaard (1948) Purity of Heart is To Will One Thing, trans. Douglas V. Steere, New York: Harper Torchbooks, p. 177ff.
65: Journals and Papers, sec. 6700 (X³ A 628). [132]
66: Gregor Malantschuk, notes to 'Individual' in Journals and Papers, 2:597-8.
67: The Point of View, second note on 'The individual,' p. 124.
68: The Point of View, first note on 'The individual,' p. 110.
69: The Point of View, second note on 'The individual,' pp. 128-36.
70: The Concept of Irony, pp. 213-14.
71: 'Letters to Ficker,' p. 92.
72: S�ren Kierkegaard (1962) Of the Difference Between a Genius and an Apostle, trans. Alexander Dru, New York: Harper Torchbooks, p. 96.
73: For instance, see Ludwig Wittgenstein (1967) Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. Cyril Barrett, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 48.
74: For example in Moore, 'Wittgenstein's lectures,' 253:19-20.
75: Lectures and Conversations, p. 28.
76: Quoted in Hilmy, The Later Wittgenstein, p. 21.
77: See Hilmy, The Later Wittgenstein, pp. 10-13, for a discussion of the dangers inherent in such a 'hypertextual' or 'radically contextual' interpretation of Wittgenstein's work.

3: Problems of Interpretation

1: Wittgenstein uses the concept 'game' to demonstrate the idea of 'family resemblance,' so of course the counter-example of solitaire or 'patience' comes to mind. But - to ask a Wittgensteinian question - why do we admit of the idea of 'cheating' at solitaire?
2: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1970) Zettel, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, sec. 458.
3: Compare the status of logical and ethical statements in Wittgenstein's (1974) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, New York: The Humanities Press. There 'nothing can be said' due to the framework nature of these fields (and not, as the positivists would have it, because something fails to exist).
4: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1980) Culture and Value, trans. Peter Winch, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, p. 9e. This note was made in 1931, well before the Investigations had reached even preliminary form, and the conception carries through in the various 'later' works.
5: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958) Philosophical Investigations, 3rd edn, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., sec. 247.
6: This sequence also can be understood in connection with the material about private language learning - the 'baby Crusoe' debate. That is a relatively separate strand, having more to do with the section on rules and going on.
7: The index of the Investigations lists ten separate phenomena which are explicitly claimed not to be mental processes! In this connection see also chapter 7 of Norman Malcolm (1986) Nothing is Hidden, New York: Basil Blackwell.
8: Investigations, sec. 260. [133]
9: Investigations, sec. 288.
10: Investigations, sec. 289. (An anti-positivist statement if ever there was one!)
11: Zettel, sec. 472. In this entry and sec. 488, Wittgenstein makes an attempt at writing down some of what 'we all know' about the use of psychological terms.
12: Investigations, sec. 293.
13: Investigations, sec. 307.
14: On this point see for instance G. E. Moore (1954-5) 'Wittgenstein's lectures in 1930-33,' Mind 249:6-9.
15: Investigations, sec. 304. See also S. Stephen Hilmy (1987) The Later Wittgenstein, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, ch. 2.
16: The 'definition' of meaning as use is given in Investigations, sec. 43. But the German phrase which has been translated as 'it can be defined thus' is 'dieses Wort so erkl�ren.' Wittgenstein is not defining 'meaning,' but explicating the employment, or use (Ben�tzung), of the word. The model of definition is precisely what he is rejecting, and it would be horribly ironic to try to define it out of existence!
17: Zettel, sec. 273. Compare sec. 606.
18: Anyone who believes in human free will must apparently admit some non-physical causality in human thinking. (Wittgenstein goes so far as to imply that 'causal efficacy' is a concept that does not apply in the human mind.)
This suggestion also has ramifications for artificial intelligence research. If the human mind does not function causally, then one could not make a 'thinking machine' which duplicated its processes. (But that would not show that there could be no mechanical creation which behaved with enough of a family resemblance to 'intelligence' that we would wish to extend the term to include it.)
19: J. F. M. Hunter (1968) 'Forms of life in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations,' American Philosophical Quarterly 5:4:233-43.
20: See Hilmy, The Later Wittgenstein, pp. 179-84, for a representative sample.
21: Peter Winch (1979) 'Understanding a primitive society,' in Rationality, ed. Bryan R. Wilson, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 107-111.
22: Hilmy, The Later Wittgenstein, p. 189.
23: Investigations, sec. 65. Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1960) The Blue and Brown Books, 2nd edn, New York, Harper Torchbooks, p. 81.
24: Investigations, sec. 23.
25: Investigations, sec. 373; compare Zettel, sec. 717.
26: Investigations, p. 226e.
27: Zettel, sec. 173. The thought is expressed many times in similar words.
28: The line comes from Goethe's Faust, part I. It appears in a note, written in 1937, and published in Culture and Value, p. 31e; and again in Wittgenstein's (1969) On Certainty, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe, New York: Harper Torchbooks, sec. 402, written in 1951. It also appears, in a remarkably different context, as the final phrase of Freud's Totem and Taboo (1913). [134]
29: Again see Malcolm's comments in chapter 8 of Nothing Is Hidden (1986), New York: Basil Blackwell.
30: Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Is understanding religion compatible with believing?,' in Rationality, pp. 62-77. Sociological investigation of other cultures is of course not the same problem as investigation of religion by non-believers. But the analogies between these two games are fairly close, and there is general agreement that the comparison is valid.
How one understands this argument depends largely on the scope one gives to the two concepts 'language-game' and 'form of life.' MacIntyre makes Christianity a totally different form of life from Western science, so he can claim there is no contact at all. On the other hand, his principle interlocutor, Peter Winch, argues that even Nuer religion is merely a different language-game within a 'limiting' common form of life, that of 'humanity.' (See Winch, 'Understanding a primitive society'.)
Winch's view is closer to that suggested in the discussion above, though both suffer from the tendency to see the two concepts as denoting objective facts, rather than suggesting fruitful ways of seeing.
31: On the possibility that such investigations could make us understand the historical development - and the question whether this matters to the importance of the beliefs - see Wittgenstein's (1979) Remarks on Frazer's 'Golden Bough,' trans. Rush Rhees, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, especially pp. 8e and 16e.
32: The idea also has the interesting corollary that Western scientists (who believe in their disciplines) could never understand what they are doing!
33: '(The philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas. That is what makes him into a philosopher.)' Zettel, sec. 455.
34: Wittgenstein's 'tip of the hat' to religion is another example of such an opening. In this connection it is also worth recalling Malcolm's idea that 'there was in him the possibility of religion.' Kierkegaard's ideas on 'paradox' in religion, which relate here, will be explored in the next chapter.
35: Investigations, sec. 23.
36: Investigations, sec. 201.
37: David Pears has an interesting perspective on Wittgenstein's attempts to keep philosophy separate from science. See his (1986) Ludwig Wittgenstein, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 179-98.
38: The multi-layered nature of Wittgenstein's analysis is again evident here. The deed which shows understanding - the 'seeing' - can only be done by people, not philosophical sayings. See chapter 2.
39: Kierkegaard makes a similar point concerning the difficulty - which presupposes the possibility - of living in two spheres. 'Diplomats and police agents' are his examples. (S�ren Kierkegaard (1941) Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 365.) According to him, it is the Christian's task constantly to live in two spheres, maintaining an [135] absolute relation to the absolute telos and a relative relation to relative ends.
40: On Certainty, sec. 174.
41: In fact, this edition has recently been available in mass-market bookstores, accompanied by a blurb describing it as 'one of the greatest fictional seductions'!
42: The 'system' of the Kierkegaardian stages has actually been displayed in chart form on the end papers of a book.
43: While Wittgenstein was primarily concerned with classifying the possibilities of such a scheme, though he worked with it too, Kierkegaard used the scheme - though he classified parts of it too.
44: Henry Allison (1967) 'Christianity and nonsense,' Review of Metaphysics 20:432-60.
45: For instance, see Alistair McKinnon (1967) 'Kierkegaard: "Paradox" and Irrationalism,' Journal of Existentialism (Spring).
46: Postscript, p. 504.
47: Compare Investigations, sec. 252.
48: Postscript, p. 86.
49: Here Wittgenstein's emphasis is in the opposite direction, although he notes the same phenomena as does Kierkegaard. Wittgenstein stresses that 'well-foundedness' is not an everyday criterion; thus everyday life is secure. Kierkegaard's emphasis on this point is designed to gain a foothold whereby a transition away from everyday life might be suggested (as well as to deny 'scientific' analysis its counterclaims).
There is also some question as to the compatibility of Kierkegaard's term and category 'appropriation-process' with Wittgenstein's understanding of the nature of an ability (which is mostly latent). Some part of the resolution of this problem will be undertaken in the next chapter.
Kierkegaard's analysis here appears to depend on a metaphysics which Wittgenstein would repudiate. His remarks in Zettel, sec. 59ff. point out the dangers in 'this comparison: a man makes his appearance - an event makes its appearance. As if an event now stood in readiness before the door of reality and were then to make its appearance in reality - like coming into a room.' Further reflection on this difference of opinion might turn on the following points: 1) the point of Kierkegaard's discussion is not a metaphysical one; 2) the philosophical sections of the Postscript go beyond what 'can be said' existentially about reality; 3) there is a genuine difference here.
50: This attempt to guide oneself absolutely by a worldly scheme might be subsumed under the category 'ethical' - but it would still remain to show the philosophers that they ought to understand themselves under this category.
51: Compare Wittgenstein's statements on the point of the Tractatus.
52: Kierkegaard was well aware of the possibility that the meaning of words can be dependent on the game in which they are used. See chapters 4 and 5 for a fuller exploration of this awareness.
53: MacIntyre's analysis of Kierkegaard's 'ethical' in (1981) After Virtue, Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, pp. 38-43, does in fact take this [136] line. MacIntyre accuses Kierkegaard of hollow irrationality and pure relativism. (It is interesting to notice that MacIntyre's critiques of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein are very similar.)
54: Zettel, sec. 144. Wittgenstein appends the single word 'Theology' to this entry.
The published translation, 'How words are understood is not told by words alone,' is a fine example of the applicability of this comment to translation. The doubling of Wort has been maintained, but the important difference in the sense is lost.
55: S�ren Kierkegaard (1967-78) S�ren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, 7 vols, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, sec. 4056 (XI² A 106).
56: S�ren Kierkegaard (1941) Judge for Yourselves!, trans. Walter Lowrie, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 207.
57: Journals and Papers, sec. 1914 (X⁴ A 556); Judge for Yourselves!, p. 207.
58: Journals and Papers, sec. 1915 (X⁴ A 626).
59: S�ren Kierkegaard (1943) Edifying Discourses, 4 vols, trans. David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson, Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Publishing House, 2:7.
60: James 1:22 (Revised Standard Version).
61: Edifying Discourses, 2:84-85.
62: Kierkegaard's own 'maieutic' project has required that his inwardness - his ultimate intent - be hidden, but this is not the 'hidden inwardness' which he criticizes. His hiding was for a particular Christian purpose, and not for the sake of convenience. See Journals and Papers, sec. 2125 (X³ A 334).
63: S�ren Kierkegaard (1962) Works of Love, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, New York: Harper Torchbooks, pp. 26-7.
64: Works of Love, p. 23.
65: Works of Love, p. 33.
66: Works of Love, pp. 100-3. The parable is found in Matthew 21:28-31.
67: Works of Love, pp. 346-50.
68: For an extended explication of this idea as it applies to Kierkegaard's work in general, see O. K. Bouwsma (1984) 'Notes on Kierkegaard's "The Monstrous Illusion",' in Without Proof or Evidence, ed. J. L. Craft and Ronald E. Hustwit, Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, pp. 73-86.
69: The recognition of a Christian is made more problematic by the fact that it is not the Christian's purpose to be recognized as such. The exemplary 'Knight of Faith' in Fear and Trembling does not deal externally in specifically Christian words. The fulfilling of the law is not in terms of words, but of deeds informed by the Word.
70: S�ren Kierkegaard (1983) Fear and Trembling, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 37.
71: Postscript, pp. 438-9.
72: An obvious example is the vast number of volumes expended by religious mystics in the attempt to speak the ineffable and to aid others in experiencing it.
73: Tractatus, sec. 6.54.

[137]

4: Implications for Religion

1: All of the references to religion are consistent in one respect: there is no indication of disdain for, or positivistic dismissal of religion. This fact comes as a surprise to many.
2: S�ren Kierkegaard (1941) Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 540.
3: S�ren Kierkegaard (1967-78) S�ren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, 7 vols, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, sec. 4550 (X² A 299).
4: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1974) Philosophical Grammar, trans. Anthony Kenny, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 370.
5: Previous considerations of Wittgenstein and religion have of course also entailed particular understandings of his methodology. A low estimation of the relevance of his work for religion would follow quite naturally from some of these understandings.
6: See chapter 2.
7: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1974) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, New York: The Humanities Press, pp. 3, 5.
8: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1965) 'Wittgenstein's lecture on ethics,' Philosophical Review 74:8.
9: Journals and Papers, sec. 96 (III A 235), sec. 97 (V B 53:23).
10: Tractatus, sec. 6.51; compare Ludwig Wittgenstein (1970) Zettel, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, sec. 458.
11: 'Lecture on ethics,' p. 11.
12: S�ren Kierkegaard (1980) The Concept of Anxiety, trans. Reidar Thomte and Albert B. Anderson, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 155-62. Compare S�ren Kierkegaard (1985) Philosophical Fragments, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 83.
13: Friedrich Waismann (1965) 'Notes on talks with Wittgenstein,' trans. M. Black, Philosophical Review 74:13.
14: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958) Philosophical Investigations, 3rd edn, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., sec. 499.
15: 'Lecture on ethics,' p. 9.
16: Waismann, 'Notes on talks,' p. 16.
17: Investigations, sec. 119.
18: Investigations, sec. 373.
19: Investigations, sec. 373, sec. 371.
20: Zettel, sec. 717.
21: Certainly the 'Lecture on ethics' is performing a grammatical redefinition of the concept 'ethics'!
22: Tractatus, sec. 6.44; 'Lecture on ethics,' p. 11.
23: Tractatus, sec. 6.45.
24: S�ren Kierkegaard (1955) On Authority and Revelation: The Book on Adler, trans. Walter Lowrie, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 7.
25: Authority and Revelation, p. 6. [138]
26: As one 'without authority,' Kierkegaard specifically refuses to make accusations of heresy.
27: Authority and Revelation, p. 13.
28: Tractatus, sec. 6.421.
29: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1977) Remarks on Colour, trans. Linda L. McAlister and Margarete Sch�ttle, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, sec. I-58.
30: Remarks on Colour, sec. III-79.
31: Concept of Anxiety, p. 157.
32: Tractatus, sec. 6.422.
33: Tractatus, sec. 6.43.
34: Investigations, sec. 133.
35: Tractatus, sec. 6.521.
36: S�ren Kierkegaard (1983) Fear and Trembling, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 38-39.
37: Fear and Trembling, p. 36.
38: Tractatus, sec. 6.521, sec. 6.54.
39: Investigations, p. 227e. See also sec. 584 (and various other references).
40: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1980) Culture and Value, trans. Peter Winch, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, p. 32e (1937).
41: Remarks on Colour, sec. III-317.
42: Zettel, sec. 144.
43: Zettel, sec. 141.
44: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1967) Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. Cyril Barrett, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 55.
45: Zettel, sec. 160.
46: Zettel, sec. 373.
47: Lectures and Conversations, p. 54; compare Zettel, sec. 378-9.
48: 'Lecture on ethics,' p. 11.
49: Lectures and Conversations, p. 62.
50: Lectures and Conversations, p. 53.
51: Culture and Value, p. 53e (1946).
52: Culture and Value, p. 64e (1947).
53: The closest Wittgenstein comes to making such an appeal is: 'Go on, believe! It does no harm.' (Culture and Value, p. 45e [c. 1944]). Oddly, this looks like Pascal's Wager. But the pseudo-rational choice of religion suggested by the Wager does not square with Wittgenstein's other remarks on religion or beliefs in general.
54: Lectures and Conversations, pp. 54-5.
55: Journals and Papers, sec. 6224 (IX A 208).
56: Journals and Papers, sec. 653 (VIII² B 85:7). See the notes on 'Reduplication,' 3:910.
57: Journals and Papers, sec. 3049 (VIII¹ A 331).
58: S�ren Kierkegaard (1987) Either/Or, 2 vols., trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2:57.
59: Fergus Kerr (1986) Theology After Wittgenstein, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 28-31. [139]
60: Waismann, 'Notes on talks,' p. 13.
61: Journals and Papers, sec. 8 (X² A 592).
62: Fragments, p. 42.
63: Culture and Value, p. 85e (1950).
64: Postscript, p. 179n. The following exchange between Norman Malcolm and Wittgenstein may throw some light on this formulation. Malcolm (quoting[?] Kierkegaard): 'How can it be that Christ does not exist, since I know that he has saved me?' Wittgenstein: 'You see! It isn't a question of proving anything!' (Norman Malcolm [1984] Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, 2nd edn, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 59). See (1941) For Self-Examination, trans. Walter Lowrie, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 87ff, for a passage of which this might be a paraphrase. See also Journals and Papers, sec. 3615 (X⁴ A 210).
65: S�ren Kierkegaard (1941) Thoughts on Crucial Situations in Human Life, trans. David F. Swenson, ed. Lillian Marvin Swenson, Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Publishing House, p. 111.
66: Postscript, p. 174.
67: Investigations, p. 223e.
68: As has been suggested above, only a dissolution can be of any use in this problem.
69: Culture and Value, p. 86e (1950).
70: Investigations, p. 180e.
71: Lectures and Conversations, p. 54.
72: Culture and Value, p. 83e (1949).
73: S�ren Kierkegaard (1980) The Sickness Unto Death, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 131.
74: Culture and Value, p. 72e (1948).
75: Culture and Value, p. 80e (1949).
76: This metaphorical tension is present between language-games in general. Whenever the same word is used in varying circumstances, there will be some disanalogy - some limits to the application of the metaphor implied by the use of the term. See Investigations, p. 188e.
77: 'because the search says more than the discovery' Zettel, sec. 457.
78: Postscript, p. 97.
79: Investigations, sec. 133.
80: Of course, his ethics is in turn based on aesthetics. It might be more settling to say that his work displays recurring themes. Certainly personal responsibility is one of these.
81: In 1930, Wittgenstein remarked to M. O'C. Drury: 'For a truly religious man, nothing is tragic.' (Maurice O'C. Drury (1981) 'Some notes on conversations with Wittgenstein,' in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections, Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 122.) Cf. Kierkegaard's remarks on the difference between the religious and the tragic in Fear and Trembling, p. 59.
82: This is explicitly admitted by Alvin Plantinga. He remarks that theists may find evil a problem; but this is not the 'problem of evil' which might lead to disbelief or show the logical inconsistency of theism. 'Such a [140] problem calls, not for philosophical enlightenment, but for pastoral care.' See (1977) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, pp. 64-65. His suggestion presupposes a discouraging gulf between philosophy of religion and religion.
83: Ernest Gellner, Cause and Meaning in the Social Sciences, quoted in Alan Keightley (1976) Wittgenstein, Grammar and God, London: Epworth Press, p. 109.
84: Compare Nietzsche's idea: 'Truth is the kind of error without which a certain species of life could not live. The value for life is ultimately decisive.' From (1968) The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, New York: Vintage Books, sec. 493.

5: Echoes and Repercussions

1: S�ren Kierkegaard (1941) Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 72.
2: Postscript, p. 332n.
3: S�ren Kierkegaard (1980) The Concept of Anxiety, trans. Reidar Thomte and Albert B. Anderson, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 142.
4: S�ren Kierkegaard (1967-78) S�ren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, 7 vols, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, sec. 649 (VIII² B 81), par. 14.
5: S�ren Kierkegaard (1948) Purity of Heart is To Will One Thing, trans. Douglas V. Steere, New York: Harper Torchbooks, pp. 178-82.
6: Journals and Papers, sec. 6224 (IX A 208).
7: As is remarked in the notes to 'Redoubling' in the Journals and Papers (3:908), for Kierkegaard the ultimate expression of this reduplication is the self's synthesis in religious faith.
8: Karl Britton (1967) 'Portrait of a Philosopher,' in Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and His Philosophy, ed. K. T. Fann, New York: Dell, p. 58.
9: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1980) Culture and Value, trans. Peter Winch, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, p. 61e (1947).
10: Culture and Value, pp. 61e-62e (1947).
11: S�ren Kierkegaard (1987) Either/Or, 2 vols., trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1:32.
12: G. E. Moore (1954-5) 'Wittgenstein's lectures in 1930-33,' Mind 253:26-27.
13: S�ren Kierkegaard (1985) Philosophical Fragments, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 36.
14: Moore, 'Wittgenstein's lectures,' 253:26.
15: S�ren Kierkegaard (1983) Fear and Trembling, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 123.
16: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958) Philosophical Investigations, 3rd edn, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., sec. 133.
17: Friedrich Nietzsche, quoted in George Allen Morgan (1941) What [141] Nietzsche Means, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 19.
18: Nietzsche, quoted in Morgan, What Nietzsche Means, p. 24.
19: Further comments on this point may be found in the work of O. K. Bouwsma. See for example his (1982) 'A new sensibility,' in Toward a New Sensibility, ed. J. L. Craft and Ronald E. Hustwit, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, pp. 1-4.
20: Maurice O'C. Drury (1981) 'Some notes on conversations with Wittgenstein,' in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections, ed. Rush Rhees, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, p. 171. In addition to this quotation from King Lear, he thought of the phrase 'You'd be surprised!'
21: S�ren Kierkegaard (1941) Judge for Yourselves!, trans. Walter Lowrie, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 187-8.
22: S�ren Kierkegaard (1943) Edifying Discourses, 4 vols, trans. David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson, Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Publishing House, 4:119.
23: Kierkegaard has constantly in view another kind of 'fact' entirely: the positing of man by God. Here there may be a large difference between the two authors. The epistemological and ontological status of the 'fact' of man's dependency would be the subject for a long treatment. See chapter 4 for a brief discussion of his remark that God is 'a postulate' - a non-metaphysical fact? - for the believer.
24: Moore, 'Wittgenstein's lectures,' 249:5.
25: See chapter 3.
26: Note that for Wittgenstein, in contradistinction to some interpreters and/or borrowers of his work, 'language' is an extension of 'the deed,' rather than most 'deeds' being an extension of language - 'the language of dance,' 'the language of facial expression,' and so forth.
27: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1975) Philosophical Remarks, trans. Raymond Hargreaves and Roger White, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 8.
28: Postscript, p. 178.
29: See chapter 3.
30: Fear and Trembling, p. 123.
31: Friedrich Nietzsche (1968) The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, New York: Vintage Books, sec. 481.
32: Fragments, p. 83.
33: Friedrich Nietzsche (1974) The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann, New York: Vintage Books, sec. 299.
34: Michael Polanyi (1958) Personal Knowledge, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, p. 311.
35: Investigations, sec. 133; emphasis added.
36: The systematic appearance of the Tractatus belies the personal struggle that underlay it, as well. This struggle is clearly shown in his notebooks and letters from the time when he was writing it. And it also caused headaches for those (like Russell) who tried to follow its development.
37: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1969) On Certainty, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe, New York: Harper Torchbooks, sec. 174.
38: Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 315. Commitment looks like more than certainty; the word stresses the active dimension of the choice. This puts Polanyi closer to Kierkegaard (whose name does not appear in Personal Knowledge). [142]
39: Journals and Papers, sec. 5100 (I A 75), written August 1, 1835 - the most famous Gilleleie entry.
40: Postscript, p. 306.
41: Journals and Papers, sec. 4550 (X² A 299).
42: Terence Penelhum has expressed just this frustration - that his airtight proofs in the field of natural theology should fail to convince. (For example, in his comments on George Mavrodes' paper 'The Prospect for Natural Theology,' presented in the meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers at the 83rd Annual Meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, Boston, MA, December 27, 1986.)
43: It is astonishing that Polanyi does not make more explicit use of Wittgenstein's work, although he does mention that work briefly in Personal Knowledge.
44: Anthony C. Thiselton (1980) The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description with Special Reference to Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, and Wittgenstein, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, p. 392.
45: Thiselton, The Two Horizons, pp. 406-7.
46: S�ren Kierkegaard (1980) The Sickness Unto Death, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 13.
47: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1974) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, New York: The Humanities Press, sec. 5.62.
48: Tractatus, sec. 5.631.
49: Tractatus, sec. 5.641.
50: Sickness Unto Death, p. 14.

6: Now I Can Go On!

1: Maurice O'C. Drury (1981) 'Some notes on conversations with Wittgenstein,' in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections, ed. Rush Rhees, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, p. 124.
2: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1974) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, New York: The Humanities Press, sec. 5.62: 'der Sprache, die allein ich verstehe.' In this context, arguments over the appropriate translation - 'the only language which I understand,' 'the language which I alone understand' - appear misplaced; both seem appropriate and necessary.
3: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958) Philosophical Investigations, 3rd edn, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., sec. 88.
4: Drury, 'Conversations,' p. 182.