Peacebuilding and National Interests

Meeting the Challenge with a Model of Australian-Japanese Cooperation

A Research Report Supported by the

Australia-Japan Foundation

Strategic Research Institute of International Change

November 2010

Contents

Executive Summary

Planning for this research began in autumn 2008 with the Australia-Japan Foundation's support. A year and a half later, in April 2010, Japan's government and public became more aware of post-conflict peacebuilding because Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada chaired the open debate of the UN Security Council on this topic. Despite Japanese enthusiasm, however, the world continues to regard Japan's stance toward peacebuilding with a mixture of expectation and scepticism.

It is hardly necessary to state that a country like Japan can be secure only in a peaceful world or that security at home and peace in the world are necessary for businesses to profit abroad and contribute to prosperity. Yet, Japan lacks a philosophical-conceptual framework that connects peace abroad with the national interest. Foreigners, therefore, are sceptical of Japan's willingness to use its potential for building peace in the world.

In view of this atmosphere surrounding Japan, and the record of Australian-Japanese cooperation that began on the ground in East Timor and Iraq, these questions inspired this research:

1) Is Japan's current role in bringing peace to the world commensurate with its capabilities?
2) How does the rest of the world evaluate Australia's activism in peace operations?
3) How can Australia and Japan develop their cooperation in the future?

The research started with these hypotheses:

- Australia considers peace operations an instrument necessary for its own security and prosperity; has a clear philosophical-conceptual framework for them; and conducts PKO and peacebuilding missions as part of a national-level strategy.
- Japan has capabilities that it can direct toward peace operations but, for want of an overall strategy, the approach of the Japanese state as a whole is not trusted or evaluated highly abroad.
- If Australia and Japan established a system for cooperation in peace operations, then a combination of Australian brain (strategy) and Japanese body (deployable capabilities) would be capable of providing crucial public goods for international peace.

Interviews with experts and institutions in Australia and the United States confirmed them. The interviews brought into relief both the high international reputation of Australian peace operations and problems for Japan.

- Australia understands that the military is not the main element in most operations, and thus has emphasised flexible whole-of-government response and cooperation with civil society.
- In contrast to high regard for the Japan Self-Defense Forces, these experts are of the impression that Japanese police are passive toward deployment abroad. Regarding the deployment of

> military forces like the SDF, Japan's government and public tend to miss the big picture that their mission is to protect the beginning of the long process of building peace like a 'windbreak' or an orthopaedic cast.

Despite surface calm, threats to peace are advancing in many parts of the world, only to surface as crises. On the basis of findings from this research, I propose these measures urgently and call for prompt joint action by Australia and Japan.

Proposal One: Build on Australia-Japan Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) toward a model of peace operations. A piecemeal, reactive approach, as in other affairs, has put Japan's peace operations at an impasse. I propose Japan to build an original model of peace operations, through closer cooperation with Australia. To be specific, now that Japan has ACSA with both Australia and the United States, the three countries can cooperate to train military forces, police and civilian specialists for peace operations. I propose training them and conducting advanced research on peace operations at a new hub in Okinawa for peace operations worldwide, which might be called the Centre for International Peace Cooperation Action. Adding this role to one or more US military bases in Okinawa can be a way out of the impasse over the US military presence on the island.

Proposal Two: Hire Japan Self-Defense Forces retirees as police for international deployment. This step would turn Japanese police into a significant asset for peace operations. The direct benefit for the Japanese public is in strengthening the police at home despite the aging of Japan's population.

Proposal Three: Pay for peace operations out of an interagency 'national security budget'. Usually, the Japanese government requires each agency participating in a peace operation to pay the full cost of its part. Agencies have an incentive to minimise participation in peace operations. Thus, Japan has forgone operations that are feasible for the whole of government, and damaged the national interest. Japan needs to set aside a 'national security budget' for national-level operations abroad like peace operations and counter-piracy operations. Police, fire departments, local governments, NGOs etc. should be authorised to use this budget, not only the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces.

Again, the views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Australian government.

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President, Strategic Research Institute of International Change
November 2010

Part 1 Research-Based Conclusions and Proposals

1-1 Why Japan needs to get better at peace operations

Japan is not shy about professing to be a peaceful country. But is Japan's current role in bringing peace to the world commensurate with its capabilities? What if the rest of the world perceived Japan's vows as just so much talk? Do the Japanese people understand such mistrust to be even possible? In contrast, why does the international community have such a high opinion of peace operations by Australia?——These questions inspired this research.

Almost twenty years have passed since Japan began to contribute personnel to the international community's endeavour in pursuit of peace. In the summer of 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, Japan had been a member of the United Nations for more than three decades. Yet, it was more as an ally of the United States than as a member of the UN that Japan began considering participation in maintenance and restoration of peace.

The Japanese government proposed a 'UN Peace Cooperation Bill', which included provisions to enable the Japan Self-Defense Forces to provide combat services support for the coalition forces. The Diet rejected it by the end of 1990. The Kaifu cabinet at last despatched the Maritime Self-Defense Force's minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in 1991, after the ceasefire. During the crisis and the war, Japan contributed US$13 billion to the coalition. Japan's domestically-inspired hesitation at contributing people to the coalition drew its ire that Japan was willing to spend money but not to shed blood or even sweat. This trauma swung Japanese public opinion in favour of deploying the minesweepers, through the bandwagon fallacy instead of an argument from first principles.

After months of debate, the Diet enacted the International Peace Cooperation Law (Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace-keeping Operations and Other Operations) in 1992. Japan Self-Defense Forces, police and election officials served the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia.

Since then, Japan has deployed personnel, mostly from the JSDF, abroad for disaster relief (Japan Disaster Relief teams), humanitarian aid for refugees, disposal of chemical weapons from the Second World War, counter-piracy and other purposes in addition to UN peacekeeping operations.

In 2006, Japan amended the Self-Defense Forces Law to upgrade peace operations to a primary mission of the JSDF ('international peace cooperation activities', elaborated as 'activities that are determined to be instrumental in maintaining peace and security of the international society including Japan, and performed as a contribution to operations for international peace organised mainly by the United Nations and to promote other international cooperation activities'). Although Japan's inter-

pretation of its constitution has restricted the JSDF's missions by and large to rear echelon support, the JSDF has gained the trust of host country citizens, foreign militaries and the UN for accomplishing its missions with great skill and discipline. The JSDF provided a senior mentor to a course for African Union peacekeepers.

Yet, Japan's peace operations are not commensurate with its capabilities. Japan's government and public have not understood that Japan's security and prosperity require peace in the world. Japan can be secure only in a peaceful world; security at home and peace in the world are necessary for Japanese businesses to profit abroad and contribute to prosperity. Lack of a philosophical-conceptual framework about these connections has resulted in scepticism abroad that Japan's professed desire for peace is just so much talk.

In many cases, Japan's stove-piped government has prevented successive prime ministers from using the laws in place at the time to deploy the Self-Defense Forces for operations that would have met international standards of effectiveness. In peacebuilding, which the UN has emphasised greatly in recent years, reform and rebuilding of civil police demands large numbers of skilled police officers. International experts perceive Japan to be capable of substantial contribution here. But Japan has conspicuously sought to avoid deploying police abroad, ever since losing one on peacekeeping duty in Cambodia. Some Japanese NGOs are respected abroad, but Japan's stove-piped government has left untapped much potential for cooperation with them.

In contrast, Australia enjoys a high reputation for peace operations that is difficult to perceive in Japan, where people have not thought much about peacebuilding. Australia conducts peace operations strategically in the national interest, and innovatively, while remaining aware that it is a middle power and maintains a smaller military than it can afford to. Now, Australia is eager for close cooperation with Japan in peace operations, because of a clear sense of purpose that tapping Japan's potential for bringing peace to the world is in Australia's interest.

With assistance in establishing a research program from the Australian Embassy in Japan and financial support from the Australia-Japan Foundation, this research was conducted mainly by interviews in Australia and the United States with practitioners and experts in the UN, both countries' government agencies, and research institutes. This report will introduce, to a wide range of readers, Australia's peace operations and strategic thought and experts' evaluation of them. Then, through an overview of Japan's peace operations, the author seeks to arrive at a philosophical-conceptual framework, and to propose avenues of cooperation between Australia and Japan, and between both and third parties.

The research was conducted by Kazuhisa Ogawa, President of the Strategic Research Institute of International Change; and Takayuki Nishi and Kazuki Watanabe, Senior Research Fellows at the Institute. Nishi, who received his PhD in political science from the University of Chicago, gave the full measure of his ability in interpreting interviews, translating documents, and drafting and translating this report.

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1-2 Problems with Japan's peace operations

The interviewed experts' views of Japan's peace operations and their shortcomings and challenges clustered around three points.

1. They thought highly of the Self-Defense Forces, but were of the impression that Japan is reluctant to deploy police abroad.
2. Even with the deployment of the SDF, Japan's government and public lack the idea of using military forces to protect the beginning of the long process of building peace like a 'windbreak' or an orthopaedic cast. The Japanese do not understand fully what it means for Japan to participate in a peacekeeping force.
3. Both of the above reflect a profound problem: cognitive disconnect between peace operations and the national interest on the part of the Japanese government as well as the public.

Experts' comments on international deployment of police:

- The Japanese government may be overlooking that there are diverse ways to participate in peace operations. Many UN peacekeeping missions recruit unarmed police, not gendarmes. Search and rescue units of fire departments can accomplish much in a matter of days.――Mr Robert Perito, United States Institute of Peace; Ambassador James Dobbins, RAND
- If incentives like fast-track promotion, extra pay, and support for families of officers who fell in line of duty and for wounded officers are not enough to get Japanese police to deploy abroad, then the problem is one of persuading the public that deploying police in peace operations is important for Japan's national interest, and of changing the mindset of everyone in the police, fire services and the Coast Guard. ――Major General (Retd) Tim Ford, former Chief Military Advisor, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations; Dr Elsina Wainwright, New York University; Mr Robert Perito, United States Institute of Peace

Experts' comments on Japan's stance toward participation in UN Peacekeeping forces:

- UN PKF is a part of a peacekeeping mission, which is led by a civilian Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Thus, civilians control PKFs. Clearly, there is no way PKFs can choose to make war. Is this understood well in Japan? ――Mr David Haeri, UN DPKO
- PKFs must fulfil mandates like protection of civilians. They cannot accomplish their missions unless they can demonstrate the willingness to use force when necessary, contain confrontations, and restore humanitarian space. Peacekeeping operations need assets, not burdens; they need units whose national governments understand that they may use force. ――Major General (Retd) Tim Ford
- When a party to a conflict or some other militant group attacked a Ground Self-Defense Force unit abroad and nearby civilians with the aim of splitting the two, would the Japanese government be capable of explaining to the public why the GSDF fought back? This is the real test for

deploying the SDF abroad among civilian populations. Have the Japanese thought about rules of engagement in this context? ——Dr David Kilcullen, counterinsurgency expert and retired Australian Army lieutenant colonel

Experts' comments on peace operations' relationship to the national interest:

- When a mission succeeds, the country becomes stable and prosperous, which would also benefit the participating countries economically. Deployment of military and police forces not only gives them experience at their tasks, but is a great opportunity to build relationships with foreign counterparts. China deploys troops and police in peacekeeping with that in mind. Does Japan understand as much? ——Ms Beth Cole, United States Institute of Peace
- Few countries attempt to identify lessons from their experiences in stabilisation and reconstruction. Japan is not unusual in this respect. ——Ms Beth Cole, USIP; Dr Nora Bensahel, RAND

The meandering nature of Japan's path toward participation in UN peacekeeping forces requires an explanation. Two major constraints on Japanese participation in peace operations are ignorance about UN PKF's use of military forces to police parties to a conflict, and lack of logically coherent understanding of peace operations.

Following the Gulf War of 1991, the Japanese government perceived international expectations as a demand by the United States. Deploying the Self-Defense Forces to Cambodia became an end in itself. Japan ended up deploying them without a thorough explanation, for concerned Japanese citizens and several distrustful Asian countries, that deployment of the JSDF to a UN peacekeeping operation is essentially different from a conventional military operation, let alone launching a war of aggression. Even ten years later, in deploying the JSDF to Iraq in support of reconstruction, the Japanese government had not changed this short-termist stance. The Japanese government has relied on the JSDF's efforts and results on the ground to justify their deployments. Thus, Japanese participation in PKFs has been quite limited.

Before deploying the JSDF to Cambodia, the Miyazawa cabinet stated on 15 June 1992 that, 'in order to gain wider understanding and support' for the International Peace Cooperation Bill, the bill will classify six peacekeeping activities performed by military forces as 'core PKF operations' which Japan would not undertake until further legislation. The six were:

1. Monitoring of ceasefires, movement and withdrawal of military units and disarmament;
2. Presence and patrol in buffer zones;
3. Inspection of movement of weapons;
4. Collection, storage and disposal of abandoned weapons;
5. Support for parties to conflict in demarcating boundaries;
6. Support for parties to conflict in exchange of prisoners.

Thus, medicine (including disinfection) and rear echelon support such as transport, communication and engineering were the only peacekeeping activities allowed for the JSDF.

The same statement by Prime Minister Miyazawa, however, denied that PKFs 'seek to restore peace with coercive means', and did not rule out Japanese participation. The cabinet froze 'core PKF operations' in order to split domestic opponents of international deployment of the JSDF. What the cabinet should have done is to initiate a discussion based on the Japanese Constitution's vow to pursue world peace; Japan's longstanding diplomatic support for the UN, which reflects that constitutional ideal; and the reality of the military units that are performing the 'core PKF operations'. But Japan decided to freeze those activities without a discussion from first principles which would be understood internationally.

Because of this background, Japan has not been able to draw a line between operations that it can undertake fully on the basis of Japan's own principles and military operations that it cannot. Japan ended the freeze in December 2001. The reason recorded in Japan's 2002 Defense White Paper is, because of the JSDF's 'efforts [in PKF rear echelon support and disaster relief], domestic and international expectations have risen for Japanese contribution to efforts led by the UN for international peace'. Japan ended the freeze without passing judgment on whether the freeze was ever justified.

Because of this piecemeal approach, the end of the freeze in 2001 has not resulted in any deployment of the JSDF for 'core PKF operations'. In recent years, PKFs have had to demonstrate willingness to use weapons in defence of mandates like protection of civilians. Clearly, the end of the freeze on 'core PKF operations' is detached from reality, unless Japan took the reality of contemporary peacekeeping into account and revised thoroughly the five conditions, stipulated in 1992, which must be satisfied before a Japanese contingent may be despatched.

1-3 Why Australian-Japanese cooperation?

Why is Australia eager to cooperate with Japan in peace operations? Why would Japan benefit from cooperation with Australia? The author interviewed experts in Australia and the United States with these hypotheses in mind.

1. Australia values peace operations as a requirement for its own security and prosperity, and conducts them with a clear, conceptual and philosophical framework, i.e., national-level strategy.
2. Peace abroad bolsters security at home; security at home and peace in the world are necessary for Australia to prosper through foreign trade and investment.
3. For Australia, operations to strengthen the foundation of peace in the world are of direct strategic importance for the national interest.
4. Therefore, Australia seeks to integrate not only the Defence Force but whole-of-government, and NGOs, for peace operations.
5. Nevertheless, Australia's population of fewer than 23 million constrains the scale of operations and the capacity to implement knowledge.
6. In contrast, Japan , with which Australia has been deepening what has been a primarily economic relationship, acknowledges the importance of peace operations and has much potential for them, but has not had a strategic approach trusted or evaluated favourably abroad, because of the Second World War's impact on public opinion.
7. If these two countries established a system for cooperation in peace operations, then a combination of Australian brain (philosophy and strategy) and Japanese body (deployable capabilities) would be capable of providing crucial public goods for international peace.
8. Stronger cooperation of this kind would help stabilise the economy in many parts of the world, and bring further security and prosperity to Australia and Japan.

Interviews with experts confirmed the above hypotheses. Their evaluation of Australian peace operations and the author's inference about benefits for Japan follow. What stood out are Australian awareness of constraints like population and geography, and peace operations as a subset of whole-of-government response to achieve security and prosperity despite those constraints; and how this awareness drives efforts to formulate and implement whole-of-government strategies. The Australian approach is consistent with the essence of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*: 'If you do not know your enemies but do know yourself, you will win one and lose one'. Japan can learn much from it.

Evaluation of Australian peace operations and benefits for Japan

1. Australia has had to make the most of small numbers of people and small budgets.
2. Australia understands that the military is often only a small part of peace operations. Therefore, it is prepared for flexible response by whole-of-government and with civil society.
3. Australia is an innovator in the practice of security sector reform and protection of civilians.
4. Australia has much experience in coalition operations, and the coalitions it led in East Timor and Solomon Islands are among the most successful in peace operations.
5. Instead of resting on laurels of international appreciation, Australia keeps at capturing lessons. Japan can learn much from this approach.
6. Australia is more eager than ever for Japan to play a greater role in peacebuilding and international security.
7. UN peacekeeping operations are chronically short of police. Cooperation with Australia, the world leader in international deployment of highly skilled police, would help Japan catch up in this area and achieve results.
8. Australian-Japanese cooperation for building peace in Southwest Pacific island states would yield large returns from a relatively small additional investment of personnel and budget.
9. Many UN peacekeeping operations lack tactical (local) mobility and theatre reserve forces for deterring ceasefire violations. If Japan provided Ground Self-Defense Force helicopters and Australia provided infantry, their combination would solve both problems.
10. On the ground, parties to conflict tend to look down on PKFs that do not include units from developed countries. Then, deterrence is more likely to fail. Australian-Japanese cooperation in deploying their troops as peacekeepers would be a strong signal to parties to conflict that they would be better off honouring the ceasefire.

1-4 Proposals

Proposal One: Build on Australia-Japan Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) toward a model of peace operations. A piecemeal, reactive approach, as in many other affairs, has put Japan's peace operations at an impasse. I propose Japan to build an original model of peace operations, through closer cooperation with Australia. To be specific, now that Japan has ACSA with both Australia (as of May 2010) and the United States, the three countries can cooperate to train military forces, police and civilian specialists for peace operations. I propose training them at a new hub in Okinawa, which might be called the Centre for International Peace Cooperation Action.

CIPCA should cooperate with Australia's Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence, the US Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute, and the United States Institute of Peace to conduct advanced research on peace operations. CIPCA should also cooperate closely with research institutes in China, South Korea, and Taiwan to research ways to reduce tensions in East Asia.

Locating CIPCA in or near Nago City and using the US Marine Corps Bases Camp Hansen or Camp Schwab for training grounds and quarters would gradually change the nature of these long-standing bases into training bases for peace operations. Such a change would deepen the Japan-US alliance in a way consistent with Japan's professed desire for peace, and offers a way out of the impasse over the US military presence in Okinawa. The vision to set up CIPCA in Okinawa is informed by the author's longstanding dialogue with Okinawans of various political persuasions and relationships of mutual trust thus established. As a matter of course, neither the Australian government nor the Australia-Japan Foundation means to get involved in the delicate bilateral issue of US military bases in Okinawa.

Proposal Two: Hire Japan Self-Defense Forces retirees as police for international deployment. This research has brought into relief the passive stance of Japanese police toward peace operations. In order to change it, I propose a career path for JSDF retirees in which they would be trained as police and then employed by metropolitan and prefectural police as the pool for peace operations. JSDF retirees who have served as peacekeepers are likely to be willing to do so as police officers. When Japanese police forces participate in peace operations in this way, career police officers will begin to follow the JSDF retirees' example.

The direct benefit for the Japanese public is in strengthening the police at home, and helping maintain the Self-Defense Forces' personnel strength, despite the aging of Japan's population. Hiring JSDF retirees is a relatively economical way to boost the number of police officers, because they would cost less than a career police officer of the same age. The retirees' knowledge and judgment would boost the police forces' competence at home. Because police would be an attractive option for retirees, we can expect a virtuous cycle through the JSDF's morale and recruitment.

Proposal Three: Pay for peace operations out of an interagency 'national security budget'. Proposals for the Centre for International Peace Cooperation Action and employment of JSDF retirees as police for peace operations would be incomplete without proposing how to pay for them. Japan needs an interagency 'national security budget' for operations abroad in the national interest, most of all for peace operations.

For any expensive activity, an attempt to pay for it out of one agency's budget would threaten the agency's other missions. The likely result is that no agency does it, even if the cost were trivial for the entire government. The government misses an opportunity to advance the national interest. Japan's decision against deployment of JSDF helicopter units to Sudan and the Japanese police's passive stance toward peace operations are cases in point. Japan must overcome this stove-piping before it can bolster its own security and prosperity by becoming a leader in peace operations.

Therefore, Japan needs to set aside an interagency 'national security budget' for operations abroad in the national interest like peace operations and counter-piracy operations. Police, fire departments, local governments, NGOs etc. should be authorised to use this budget, not only the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces.

In order to allow the JSDF to manage both national defence and peace operations, procurement and operation and maintenance of assets that are useful for peace operations like early warning satellites, transport aircraft, aerial refuelling aircraft, transport ships and replenishment ships should be paid for in part from the 'national security budget'. In fiscal year 2010, the Ministry of Defense is spending 773.8 billion yen (A$10.3 billion) on procurement, 158.8 billion yen (A$2.1 billion) on R&D and 903.5 billion yen (A$12 billion) on training and operations. Subsidy of ten percent of these three expenses (183.6 billion yen, A$24 billion) from the 'national security budget' should allow the JSDF to build capabilities for both defence at home and support for peacebuilding abroad. Japan's National Police Agency, Fire and Disaster Management Agency and Coast Guard should be subsidised likewise.

Part 2 Why Australia Provides a World-Class Model for Peace Operations

What kind of country will be relevant as a model, as Japan increases the scale and areas of its peace operations? Japan has not contributed personnel commensurate with its massive economic power. Therefore, rather than the United States or another major power, a medium-sized industrialised country that has achieved results through ideas that are matched to its capabilities may be more relevant to Japan in creating its own philosophical-conceptual framework. A country that is building peace by combining organisations like the military, police and civil government strategically should be a model for Japan in overcoming stove-piped government and realise its potential. Moreover, a country that is positive toward cooperation with Japan, and shares values of freedom and democracy that are a goal of peacebuilding, support for the United Nations, interest in Asia Pacific, and if possible, alliance relationships would be a valuable partner. Australia meets all of these conditions.

2-1 Australian strategy reflects awareness of nation's relative size

No factor constrains Australia's relative material capabilities as much as its small population. At fewer than 23 million, its population is the smallest among the G-20 major economies. Nevertheless, Australia is in this group because its per capita wealth is among the greatest in the world. Of this population and wealth, Australia has devoted a relatively small amount to military power. First, comparisons of Australia's size with the rest of the world and with neighbouring countries are in order.

2-1-1 Middle power in the world and the Asia Pacific

One out of three hundred of the world's population lives in Australia. It is the 52nd most populous country in the world, after Syria. Compared to major neighbouring countries' population, Australia's is less than one tenth of Indonesia's, three and a half times Papua New Guinea's, and more than five times New Zealand's. Australia's annual rate of population increase (1.7 percent) is higher than the world average (1.2 percent) because of immigration. One in four Australian citizens was born abroad.

Australia's gross domestic product is nearly a trillion US dollars at the nominal exchange rate. This is one fifth of Japan and China's, about eighty percent larger than Indonesia's, and ranks thirteenth in the world.

Since 2001, Australia has spent 2.2 to 2.35 percent of the gross domestic product on defence.[1] This ratio is less than one half of the United States' and smaller than in the United Kingdom and France. It

[1]International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2004-2005*, p. 355; idem, *The Military Balance 2008*, p. 445; idem, *The Military Balance 2010*, p. 465.

is not especially high in the Asia Pacific region. The US Department of Defense published a document titled 'Allied Contributions to the Common Defense' annually from 1995 to 2003. According to the 2003 issue, categories in which Australia's contribution matched its working-age population and economic output were personnel and money for peacekeeping forces, and numbers of combat ships and combat aircraft.[2] Conversely, the category in which Australia's contribution was smallest relative to its potential was the personnel strength of its army. As of 2010, Australian Army regulars number 28,811. They constitute just over half of the Australian Defence Force's 57,276 active personnel, but they are few in absolute terms.[3] Australian defence experts describe the small size of the military by comparing it to the number of seats in stadiums like the Melbourne Cricket Ground, which seats 100,000.

2-1-2 Australia's role in an arc of small island states

Australia is a middle power in the world, but is larger than any neighbouring country except Indonesia by orders of magnitude. Except for New Zealand, the smaller neighbours are developing countries, and face obstacles to economic development like isolation from world markets and small populations scattered between islands. Some of these countries are also burdened by ethnic conflict, with persistent violence. These neighbours have historical ties with Australia. Thus, Australia emphasises peacebuilding and disaster relief in East Timor and states in the southwest Pacific.

East Timor lies 700 kilometres northwest across the Timor Sea from Darwin, the capital of Australia's Northern Territory. Australia recognised the annexation of East Timor by Indonesia under the Suharto regime, but supported self-determination from 1999. Both choices were motivated by geographical proximity. East Timor's population exceeded 1.13 million in 2009, according to the UN' s estimate.

Papua New Guinea gained independence from Australia in 1975, and now has 6.73 million people. This country consists of the eastern half of New Guinea and islands to its east, including Bougainville. At the nearest point, Papua New Guinea is only ten kilometres from the Torres Strait Islands in northeastern Australia. Solomon Islands (population 520,000) and Vanuatu (240,000) range southeast of Bougainville. Nauru (10,000), Kiribati (100,000), Tuvalu (10,000) and Fiji (850,000) are further east. The only sovereign states east of Fiji are Tonga (100,000) and the Independent State of Samoa (180,000). These nine states, Australia, New Zealand and its free associated states of Cook Islands and Niue, and the north Pacific states of Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia and Palau comprise the Pacific Islands Forum. This Forum and the Commonwealth have suspended Fiji because its military government has not shown an intention to restore democracy.

[2]Mark Thomson, 'Punching above our weight? Australia as a middle power', Australian Strategic Policy Institute, August 2005.
[3]Raspal Khosa, *Australian Defence Almanac 2010-11*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June 2010. ADF reservists number 20,018. Eighty percent of them, 16,018, are Army reservists. They deploy abroad too.

It is natural for Australia to seek neighbouring countries' stability. Australia has been involved constructively in close cooperation with New Zealand, which is also highly skilled at peacebuilding. Nevertheless, the sheer prominence of Australia's role and relative capability has occasionally caused friction in its engagement with smaller neighbours. By cooperating with Australia for a division of labour to fix this imbalance, Japan can contribute more to stability and development of these countries, several of which were battlegrounds of the Second World War.

2-2 Australia punches above its weight in peace operations

For more than sixty years, Australia has pioneered peace operations both inside and outside of UN peacekeeping operations, and has gained a high reputation and confidence internationally.

2-2-1 Pioneer of UN peacekeeping

As an Allied power in the Second World War, Australia played a major role in the founding of the UN. Foreign Minister H. V. Evatt, in office from 1941 to 1949, participated in drafting the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Upon the Indonesian War of Independence, Australia organised a commission of six states to monitor ceasefire, before the UN Security Council began the practice of authorising peacekeeping operations (PKOs). Thus, Australia can be said to have invented ceasefire monitoring by the UN.

For the next forty years, almost all UN PKOs focused on ceasefire monitoring. The first formal UN PKO began in 1950 to monitor the ceasefire line between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. Australia deployed soldiers to this mission from 1950 until 1985. Among the ongoing PKOs, Australia has been deploying military observers to the UN Truce Supervision Organisation in the Middle East (Israel and neighbours) since 1956, and police to the UN Cyprus Peacekeeping Force since 1964.

Thus, Australia has been a pioneer of UN PKO, but by 1987, it participated in only those two, with thirteen soldiers and twenty-three police. In the number of soldiers in PKOs and their ratio to the armed forces' strength, Australia's contribution became smaller than New Zealand, Canada and Nordic countries.[4]

The first turning point was the next few years. Because the Soviet Union became more cooperative in the UN, and several regional conflicts ended along with the Cold War, the demand for PKOs rose. In Australia, Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, who was in office from 1988 to 1996, promoted participa-

[4]David Horner, 'Australian Peacekeeping and the New World Order', in David Horner, Peter Londey and Jean Bou, eds., *Australian Peacekeeping*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 34-5.

tion. When the international community united to condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, heads of governments like Australia's Prime Minister Bob Hawke spoke of a New World Order in which states uphold the UN Charter. For the first time since the Vietnam War, Australia deployed combat forces overseas. These warships were the second foreign military force to arrive in the Persian Gulf after the invasion of Kuwait, and enforced the naval blockade of Iraq authorised by the UN Security Council.

There were not only more UN peacekeeping missions, but their missions changed, and Australian participation increased. In Namibia in 1989, the UN oversaw a state's transition to independence for the first time in decades. Australia deployed about 650 military engineers and election monitors. Then, the basic framework for the Cambodian peace process proposed by Foreign Minister Evans was realised as the Paris peace agreement. Consequently, the Australian Army's Lieutenant General John Sanderson commanded the military component of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, which itself was headed by Mr Yasushi Akashi. Australia contributed about 1,250 personnel to UNTAC, including communication and transport troops and civil police.

In this period, the UN Security Council authorised the deployment of the US-led Unified Task Force in Somalia, where civil war was under way, to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid. From January to May 1993, Australia deployed in the southern city of Somalia and thereabout a task force of 1,366 troops formed around an infantry battalion. These Australians not only guarded shipments of aid, but also established legal institutions including 250 local police, courts and prisons, and arrested more than seventy bandits.[5] Instead of cutting deals with warlords to secure delivery of aid like the US military, the Australian task force restored order through a bottom-up process with tribal elders. Agriculture and trade recovered. More than nine hundred weapons were seized or turned in. Progress, however, did not outlast the Australian presence for long. According to Dr David Kilcullen, the counterinsurgency expert and Australian Army veteran, armed groups from areas that were not disarmed invaded Baidoa and killed those who had cooperated with the Australians. This tragedy provides a lesson for security sector reform.

Commitment to East Timor from 1999 became the largest turning point for Australian peace operations since the early 1990s. Australia led a multinational force for the first time. Although the host nation's government had agreed to intervention, local forces had to be deterred or compelled, and a large peacekeeping operation was necessary. Moreover, East Timor lapsed into civil war after the international community reduced peacebuilding efforts, necessitating another Australian intervention. From this case, Australia learned that premature retreat provokes danger, and has been patient with peacebuilding in Solomon Islands because of this lesson.

[5]LTCOL D.J. Hurley, 'Operation Solace', *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 104, January-February 1994, pp. 29-33.

The Appendix of this report includes the table 'Australian Peacekeeping Participation, 1947-2007', which summarizes fifty-six missions including those discussed above, from the edited volume *Australian Peacekeeping*.

2-2-2 International experts on Australian peace operations

Naturally, Australia's pioneering and diverse peace operations have gained international acclaim and confidence. Professor Jean-Marie Guéhenno, who was the UN Under-Secretary-General in charge of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) from 2000 to 2008, praised the Australian Army peacekeepers' 'professional work' in East Timor, even though he criticised the Howard government's reluctance to place them under UN command. Mr David Haeri, Chief of Best Practices Unit in the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division of UN DPKO, grouped Australia's contributions into three kinds: direct participation in PKO; leadership of discussions in the UN Headquarters to identify policy frameworks and problems; and leadership of multinational forces in its own region that originate in Australia's direct national interest and support UN operations. Mr Haeri interprets the Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence and its support for African Union as an intellectual 'multiplier' of Australia's limited resources in personnel and money. Dr William Durch of the Stimson Center, who drafted the Brahimi Report on UN peace operations, describes Australia's peace operations in its region as an outcome of a 'decision to live in the Asia Pacific as a multicultural country' and 'awareness that giving an impression of being a good neighbour is in the national interest'.

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development conducts peer reviews of its members' foreign aid policies and activities. Each member state is assessed every four or five years. Australia was reviewed most recently in 2008 by experts from the Irish and Portuguese governments. Their report points out that as 'one of the DAC member countries most surrounded by developing countries, including a number of fragile states, Australia has special responsibilities and specific challenges'. Generally, it gave high marks. As for policies and activities relevant to peacebuilding, the report praised Australia's 'integrated institutional system in a whole-of-government approach'; support to public sector capacity, law and justice systems, elections and public integrity systems; and humanitarian responses to disasters and conflict. In the last kind of activities, Australia is a leader in strengthening relationships between civilian and military actors. The report praised Australia's 'response to the Solomon Islands tsunami in 2007, as well as the joint training and policy development conducted with regional ASEAN militaries' as 'approaches consistent with international best practice' and expressed the expectation that the Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence (then planned with another name) will institutionalise them.[6]

[6] *Development Assistance Committee Peer Review of Australia*, Paris, OECD, January 2009, pp. 23-7, 94-5.

2-3 Australia seeks to join hands with Japan

Australia, a country with these accomplishments and reputation, has encouraged peace operations by Japan and sought its cooperation eagerly. Australia has been making do with human and financial resources an order of magnitude smaller than Japan. It is natural for Australia to perceive its national interest in getting Japan to apply its potential toward realising peace.

Japan and Australia had participated in the same UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, East Timor and elsewhere, but the turning point for cooperation in peace operations was the Australian Army's provision of security for the part of Iraq where the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force was supporting reconstruction. From January 2004, the Japan Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group purified water, supported medical institutions and repaired public works in Samawah, the capital of Muthanna province. Forces for the province's security were provided first by the Royal Netherlands Army and then the British Army. In April 2005, the Australian Army returned to Iraq for the first time in almost two years to take over this role from the British, and provided a secure environment until the Japan Ground SDF left Iraq in July 2006.

An Australian official said that the Howard government made a deliberate decision to cooperate with Japan in Iraq in order to encourage Japanese activities for international peace, encourage Japan to assume the role of a normal country in security and promote defence exchange with Japan.

By chance, Defence Minister Robert Hill, who supported Japan's reconstruction operation in Iraq by redeploying the Australian Army to Iraq, had opposed the deployment of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to Cambodia in March 1992, when he was the opposition's spokesman for foreign policy. He had said 'Japan should not seek a greater military role by brushing aside Asian nations' concern.'[7]

Following the cooperation in Iraq, Prime Ministers Howard and Abe signed the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation on 13 March 2007. The declaration pledged 'cooperation and consultation on issues of common strategic interest', cooperation against terrorism, stronger 'cooperation through the United Nations and other international and regional organisations and fora through activities such as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations' and as part of this cooperation, appropriate and stronger 'practical cooperation between their respective defence forces and other security related agencies'.

On the basis of the declaration, the two countries held the first Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations on 6 June, and agreed on 9 September 2007 on an action plan to implement it. As

[7]John Connor, 'Intervention and Domestic Politics', in Horner, Londey, and Bou, eds., *Australian Peacekeeping*, pp. 66-7.

examples of 'cooperation in international peace cooperation activities', the plan listed 'seminars relating to peacekeeping, studies on practical cooperation including logistics cooperation, exchange of information on disaster relief assets and capabilities, participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Desktop Exercise on Disaster Relief'. Most of the plan consisted of these kinds of working-level exchange of information and personnel. Among the items more closely related to operations is 'NPA [Japan's National Police Agency] to attend AFP's [Australian Federal Police] International Deployment Group pre-deployment training' listed separately under 'Peace Operations'.

Before the subsequent Australian federal election in 2007, Kevin Rudd, the Labor Party's leader, criticised several of Prime Minister Howard's foreign policies like participation in the invasion of Iraq and the return of the Australian Army to Iraq, but called Japan 'a force for good in the strategic stability of East Asia' and affirmed support for the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation.[8]

The Rudd government, which took office following this election, continued discussions with Japan at the political level. The Australian and Japanese governments modified the action plan when Prime Minister Rudd visited Japan on 15 December 2009. On 19 May 2010, they signed the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA). In this framework, the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the Australian Defence Force to exchange supplies and services when on training exercises, PKO, humanitarian operations in disasters and conflict, and evacuation of non-combatants. In short, it is the legal basis for Australian-Japanese cooperation in peace operations. Australia is the second country, after the United States, with which Japan has concluded an ACSA. The Appendix of this report includes the Joint Declaration of 13 March 2007, the action plan as modified in December 2009, and ACSA.

In order to ensure that the possibility of realising peace through Australian-Japanese cooperation like ACSA would be more than just discussions, this report aims for forward-looking proposals on the basis of an examination of characteristics of Australian peace operations.

[8]The Honorable Kevin Rudd, 'The Rise of China and the Strategic Implications for U.S.-Australian Relations', The Brookings Institution, 20 April 2007.

Part 3 The Idea of Planting a Military 'Windbreak' for Peace

Australia satisfies many conditions as Japan's partner in peace operations. In particular, it has a clear philosophical-conceptual framework and strategy for the use of the military instrument for securing the protection of civilians, which is a condition for peace operations. Thus, the possibility of matching the Australian Defence Force with the Japan Self-Defense Force is attracting expectations of international experts on peace operations. The Australian military first began paying attention in the 1950s to protection of civilians in a way relevant to peace operations. The turning point, however, for the ADF elevating it to what it calls a philosophical-conceptual framework was the deployment to East Timor from 1999.

3-1 New role of military forces demonstrated in East Timor

The Australian-led International Force East Timor (INTERFET) deployed as an enforcement measure by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, even though the Indonesian government had agreed to its deployment. Jakarta had proposed the referendum with East Timor's independence as an option and promised to maintain the territory's security, but local authorities and militias that did not accept independence resorted to widespread violence. Therefore, both INTERFET and the UN peacekeeping force (PKF) which took over needed to deter or compel opponents of the political solution militarily. Moreover, not all of the Indonesian armed forces accepted East Timor's independence. Any clash could escalate. Therefore, INTERFET needed to accomplish its mission without provoking opponents with any unnecessary use of force. Considering this difficult condition, it was epoch-making for INTERFET to have restored peace and security, supported the establishment of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), and provided humanitarian aid. The ADF was leading a multinational force for the first time, but prepared for it on very short notice.

3-1-1 Restoring security where the national government would not

When the UN Security Council authorises a military force to restore peace and security, the more necessary this measure is, the likelier it is that the host-nation government's acceptance of the Security Council resolution is not shared by elements of its armed forces or local security forces, which may threaten to resist the international force. In that case, three conditions are necessary to restore peace and security. First, rapid deployment shocks the potential enemy, denying them the opportunity to use force. Second, strategic reserve forces and alliances deter intentional and organised attack by those who were not shocked by the deployment. Third, accidental skirmishes are contained by junior leaders with good judgment about whether to use force. The Australian-led INTERFET satisfied all three.

The Indonesian occupation and annexation of East Timor failed to gain the support of most residents even after more than twenty years, and depended on repression. After the Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia and President Suharto resigned, major industrialised countries' governments also came to support self-determination. On 27 January 1999, Indonesia's President Habibie proposed a referendum with the two options of special autonomy status within Indonesia and independence on the ballot. Indonesia, the former colonial power Portugal, and the UN agreed on 5 May that the UN will administer the referendum and Indonesia will maintain security. Indonesian and East Timorese opponents of independence were already killing more than a few supporters of independence, but the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) registered 450,000 voters.

On 30 August, 98 percent of them voted. The high turnout implied that most votes were for independence. Therefore, opponents of independence resorted to violence. With the support of the Indonesian military, militias killed more than 1,000 people, and looted or burned most of the public buildings in the territory. People who evacuated within East Timor and those who were forcibly removed to West Timor and elsewhere in Indonesia were estimated to number more than 500,000.[9] Secretary-General Annan of the UN announced on 4 September that 78.5 percent of the votes were for independence. UNAMET local staff were killed, and the UN requested Australian assistance for evacuation. Some 2,500 people evacuated to Darwin, on the northern coast of Australia, by Australian and New Zealand transport aircraft.

The UN Secretariat had planned, in case East Timorese voters chose independence, to recruit a peacekeeping force for a transitional authority. Because of the organised violence, however, it became clear that a multinational force with a unified command and potent reserves needed to deploy and restore security. On 12 September, President Habibie announced that Indonesia would accept a UN PKF. Three days later, UN Security Council Resolution 1264 authorised Australia to lead a multinational force, and authorised participating states to use 'all necessary measures' to 'restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations'.

INTERFET first deployed Australian and New Zealand units rapidly to secure footholds and prepare for arrival of more troops from more countries. The commander and deputy commander, Major Generals Peter Cosgrove, Australian Army and Songkitti, Royal Thai Army, visited the senior Indonesian officer in East Timor, Major General Kiki Syahnakri, on 19 September to tell him that a battalion-sized unit would secure Dili, the capital, from the next day, and to ask for the use of the airport and port. On the 20th, after Australian, New Zealand, and British Special Air Service soldiers confirmed that the Indonesian units in the airport and port would cooperate, 1,500 troops arrived by Australian,

[9]UN Department of Public Information, 'East Timor—UNTAET Background', May 2002. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/UntaetB.htm .

US, British and New Zealand aircraft. They included the 3rd Brigade Headquarters and the 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (2 RAR), and took over air traffic control. On 21 September, the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR) and twenty-two armoured personnel carriers (APCs) landed in port, twelve helicopters arrived, and INTERFET had 3,000 troops in East Timor. By mid-November, INTERFET numbered 11,500, including 5,500 Australians.[10]

Nevertheless, the Indonesian Army, Navy, and Air Force were deployed in West Timor and elsewhere. Intelligence collected by Australian aircraft and US ships was not conclusive as to whether they would obey President Habibie. The Australian Defence Force kept F/A-18 fighters, F-111 fighter-bombers and aerial refuelling aircraft on alert in Australia to escort INTERFET ships. The US Navy contributed a cruiser to the convoy, and in October, sent two shifts of amphibious assault ships loaded with heavy-lift helicopters and Marines.[11] According to Dr Paul Dibb, "If thirty thousand Indonesian troops in West Timor attacked, then Australia would have had no option other than bombing Jakarta or attacking Indonesian Navy bases. The United States warned Indonesia to avoid that.' INTERFET was able to perform its mission safely because strategic reserve forces in Australia and alliance with the United States removed any advantage the Indonesian military might have gained from deliberate attack.

The other possible path to war was through escalation of accidental skirmishes with Indonesian troops or police. In order to avoid this danger, Australian Army junior leaders, who were likely to encounter these Indonesians, needed to understand that the entire operation's success or failure depended on their own decisions and actions. The militarily weaker side, like pro-Indonesian militias relative to INTERFET, would fight asymmetrically like guerrillas or terrorists. Also, by the 1990s, even East Timor's countryside was connected to the rest of the world through coverage by mass media. Therefore, the junior leader on the spot needed to make reasoned decisions that would withstand reporting by media and public scrutiny. A soldier of any rank who attracts the public's attention immediately becomes the nation's representative whose public image determines the entire operation's success. In January 1999, Commandant Charles Krulak of the US Marine Corps referred to frontline soldiers who can get into this kind of situation as the 'strategic corporal'.[12] The subtitle of that document, 'three block war', is from a lecture he gave in December 1997, which pointed out the reality of contemporary warfare that the same military unit may fight, monitor a ceasefire, and provide humanitarian aid on adjacent city blocks at the same time. Such was INTERFET's mandate.

[10]Alan Ryan, '"Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks"', Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2000, pp. 68-70, 78; David Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 13, 20-2.
[11]Ryan, '"Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks"', pp. 78-80; Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*, pp. 23-6, 31; Bob Breen, *Struggling for Self Reliance*, Australian National University E Press, 2008, pp. 136-7.
[12]Gen. Charles C. Krulak, 'The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War', *Marines Magazine*, January 1999.

In fact, on many occasions, Australian junior leaders avoided accidental skirmish or its escalation by restrained but firm response. Those cases are described in detail in a book titled *The World Looking Over Their Shoulders: Australian Strategic Corporals on Operations in Somalia and East Timor* by the Australian Army's Dr Bob Breen and Lieutenant Colonel Greg McCauley.[13]

For instance, Company C, 2 RAR set up checkpoints on Dili's main thoroughfare in the evening of 21 September, which was its second night in East Timor, with an order to detain anyone who was armed, not in uniform, and not carrying Indonesian military identification. An East Timorese territorial battalion of 500 to 600 men arrived on trucks loaded with loot. Individually, they fitted the order's descriptiton of men to be detained. They were accompanied by Indonesian officers and NCOs. A query went up from Lieutenant Casey, the platoon commander; through Major Bryant, the company commander; and Lieutenant Colonel Slater, the battalion commander; to Brigadier Evans, the brigade commander, who let the convoy go on toward West Timor. If a shot had been fired, the next step of escalation would have involved hundreds of Indonesian troops who were still in barracks in Dili.

On 10 October, the same Company C advanced to a bridge in Motaain, near the frontier with West Timor, accompanied by the Support Company's Major Kilcullen, who spoke Indonesian. Indonesian troops and police believed that the bridge was in West Timor, and fired on the Australians. Corporal Teong of Company C determined from the Indonesians' inaccurate fire that the Indonesians did not ambush the Australians intentionally, and fired back only one shot. The Indonesians stopped firing, and only one person, an Indonesian police officer, was killed in the skirmish. Major Kilcullen negotiated with the Indonesians, and the Australians were able to gather evidence like photographs and give their account of the incident to media.[14]

Australians junior leaders had to be firm as well as restrained toward pro-Indonesian militias. On 23 September, three hostages jumped off a truck carrying Indonesian soldiers, East Timorese territorial troops and militiamen, and asked Corporal Higgins for help. Militiamen on the truck wanted them back, but Corporal Higgins showed that he was ready to fight and waited for the truck to leave. The Australians had to be firm in such situations not only to uphold their humanitarian duty but also to persuade pro-independence FALINTIL guerrillas to maintain their unilateral ceasefire. The next afternoon, Brigadier Evans employed all infantry, APCs and helicopters that had arrived in East Timor to cordon Dili and arrest militiamen.

3 Squadron, Australian Special Air Service Regiment was the main element of INTERFET's special operations force, which was euphemistically known as 'Response Force'. In order to serve as liaisons with FALINTIL, one half of the company had learned Indonesian, and the other half Tetum. On 26

[13]Bob Breen and Greg McCauley, *The World Looking Over Their Shoulders: Australian Strategic Corporals on Operations in Somalia and East Timor*, Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2008.
[14]See also David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 106-45.

September, pro-Indonesian militiamen had assembled more than 2,000 displaced persons in Com, near the eastern end of East Timor, for deportation by sea to Indonesia. If INTERFET could not rescue them, FALINTIL was likely to resume fighting. Then, Indonesia would be able to argue that the conflict in East Timor was a civil war. The SASR soldiers, led by Major McMahon, arrested 24 militiamen at night without a shot being fired, thus freeing the displaced persons.[15]

The Indonesian armed forces left East Timor between 25 September and 31 October, and Indonesia renounced sovereignty over East Timor on 19 October. The UN Security Council resolved on 25 October to replace UNAMET with the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to guide the country toward independence.

Dr Breen and Lieutenant Colonel McCauley thus conclude their account of the last contact between pro-Indonesian militiamen and Australian soldiers, which happened near the border in February 2001:

> Sometimes corporals had to make decisions in split seconds after giving armed men a verbal challenge. ... Peacekeepers give their opponents the opportunity to decide on their response. Soldiers on a battlefield shoot to kill their enemy on sight. [155]

3-1-2 The first coalition operation led by Australia

As INTERFET deployed smoothly and began its mission, and Japan pledged US$100 million for the force, with priority on developing countries, more countries joined. Troops from Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States and Thailand were joined by those from Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, South Korea, Malaysia, Norway, the Philippines, Portugal and Singapore, for a total of twenty-two countries.[16]

Australia was leading a multinational force for the first time, except the South Pacific PKF, which deployed to Bougainville for three days in 1994. In that force, 250 ADF personnel supported 390 soldiers and police from Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu.

Partly for this reason, INTERFET headquarters sent liaison officers to ensure interoperability between national contingents, and attempted to simplify communications procedures by assigning each contingent a tactical area of responsibility. Even then, non-Australian units perceived cultural and linguistic gaps in planning, meetings and logistical support. Some of them complained of unilateral decisions by Australians, including the rules of engagement.[17] On this and other issues, the highest levels of com-

[15]David Horner, *SAS: Phantoms of War*, Allen & Unwin, 2002, pp. 482, 499-500.
[16]Ryan, '"Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks"', pp. 127-9.
[17]*Ibid.*, pp. 89-108.

mand may have been able to do more to help that which became INTERFET prepare by issuing appropriate orders.[18] Whether Australia has been able to learn lessons about the command of multi-national forces was to be tested in the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands from 2003.

Regarding this major turning point for Australian peace operations, public opinion about East Timor cannot be ignored as a reason Australia sought command of INTERFET. For the Australian public, East Timor was a region where an Australian combat operation in the Second World War had been assisted by the local people; where the Indonesian military allegedly killed Australian civilians around the time of invasion; and where successive Australian governments had compromised on or ignored values like fundamental human rights.

At the beginning of the Second World War in the Pacific, eastern Timor was neutral Portuguese territory, but the Netherlands and Australia occupied it first. Japan invaded Timor in February 1942. Australians fought as guerrillas in Portuguese Timor until December 1942, and tied down a Japanese division. According to Prime Minister Gusmão of East Timor, sixty thousand civilians perished. In October 1975, five television journalists from Australia (two of them Australian citizens) were killed in East Timor during an incursion by Indonesian forces. They became famous as the Balibo Five. An Australian journalist who went to East Timor to investigate their deaths was killed in December, at the beginning of the Indonesian invasion. Nevertheless, Australia recognised Indonesia's annexation of East Timor in 1979; no other state did. Successive Australian governments continued this unpopular policy on a bipartisan basis.

INTERFET accomplished its mandate to 'restore peace and security in East Timor' and turned over military command to UNTAET, which had a mandate to 'provide security and maintain law and order' toward independence. The remaining force became a UN PKF in late February 2000, with the Australian Army's Lieutenant General Michael Smith as the deputy commander. The ADF contingent shrank to 1,900 and then 1,600. Civil Military Affairs (civic action) became a major mission. When infiltration of pro-Indonesian militias increased from July to October 2000, the ADF contingent took charge of the western border area and responded.[19] The UN Transitional Administration ended and the Democratic Republic of East Timor (Timor-Leste) became independent on 20 May 2002. Australia was to learn new lessons from its activities in East Timor during the UNTAET period and afterwards.

[18]Breen, *Struggling for Self Reliance*, pp. 127-64.
[19]Michael G. Smith with Moreen Dee, *Peacekeeping in East Timor*, Lynne Rienner, 2003; Mitsuru Yamada, 'Higashi Timoru: kokka kensetsu to mingun kyoryoku' [East Timor: state-building and civil-military cooperation] in *Kokka kensetsu ni okeru mingun kankei* [State-building and civil-military relations], Tokyo, Kokusai Shoin, 2008.

3-2 The secret of the Australian Defence Force's skill in peace operations

How did the Australian military acquire the high level of skill it has shown in peace operations since the INTERFET intervention?

As an instrument for national security, military capabilities reflect factors that vary by each country like relative power, geography, political regime and history. Some capabilities require 20 years to build; thus, Australia's 2009 Defence white paper is subtitled 'Force 2030'. In fact, Australia's military capabilities from the late 1990s well into the 2000s were determined during the 'Defence of Australia era', which lasted until about 1997. Since the late 1990s, the ADF has increased the uses of the force created during the Defence of Australia era, and generated and spread advanced military thought to guide the building of future forces. Thus, we can expect the Australian Defence Force to become even better at the 'three block war' that creates a foothold for peace operations.

3-2-1 Traditionally small and skilled Army

We have seen that Australia's population is medium among countries of the world and smaller than many Asian countries. Historically, the population has increased as Australia exported wool and natural resources to Britain and other industrialised countries, but it was clearly too small to defend the entire continent of Australia by conventional military means. Military powers capable of invading Australia were far away, but great powers capable of sending reinforcements (first Britain, later the United States) were also far away, as were export markets.

Thus, Australians have historically thought of their country's security from a global strategic perspective. Since decades before colonies federated as the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901, they sent military units overseas to the British Empire's wars in exchange for British guarantee of Australia's security. Professors David Horner and Paul Dibb, both at Australian National University, refer to the strategy of gaining maximum security from a great power through minimum overseas deployment by Australia as the 'cynical policy'. This strategy required the small Australian ground forces deployed overseas to be of high quality.

In order to preserve that advantageous global order, and to maintain Britain's attention to Australia's security despite the rise of Japan, Australia made a large contribution to the Allied cause in the First World War. Out of a male population of fewer than 2.6 million, 330,000 fought overseas.[20] For the same reasons, Australia entered the Second World War in 1939, fighting in North Africa to which it

[20]Jeffrey Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 3d ed., Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 120; Australian Bureau of Statistics, 'Australian Historical Population Statistics', 2008.

sent a large part of its army. But then, Japan occupied Southeast Asia and islands north of Australia when Britain was not in a position to reinforce Australia. Thus, the British guarantee for Australia's security failed. Instead of the British, the US military arrived in Australia to launch the counter-offensive against the Japanese. In this war, almost a million Australians served in uniform, out of a population of seven million.

After the war, Australia resumed the so-called cynical policy with the United States as its partner, and fought in Korea and Vietnam. Australia also fought the communist insurgency in Malaya in the 1950s and helped defend Malaysia's part of Borneo from Indonesia from 1962 to 1966, both times as a part of a British-led force. Although the United States stayed out of both conflicts, the Australian government considered Malaya and Borneo, in maritime Southeast Asia, to be connected directly to Australia's security, and deployed Australian forces there as 'forward defence'.[21]

In Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam, the Australians fought insurgencies and infiltrations from borders. According to Dr David Kilcullen, counterinsurgency expert and retired Australian Army lieutenant colonel, the guerrilla war in Timor in 1942 against Japan influenced Australia's approach to the opposite side of warfare, of how to defeat guerrillas. In Malaya and Borneo, the Australians learned British 'hearts and minds' tactics, which aims to win over the people's 'hearts' (preferences) with civic action and political reform, and 'minds' (perception of which side is likely to win) by separating guerrillas from the people. In Vietnam, the Australian Army and the mainstream of the US Army fought guerrillas and trained South Vietnam's armed forces and police in contrasting ways. The 1st Australian Task Force relied less on artillery and air strikes, and emphasised patrols and ambushes by small units and deliberate searches of villages. The US Army trained the Army of the Republic of Vietnam mostly to fight a conventional invasion by North Vietnam, but the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam specialised in counterinsurgency.[22] In recent years, the US Army has acknowledged that the kind of tactics and training chosen by the Australians was more appropriate for Vietnam. At the time, there were too few Australians in Vietnam to influence the giant US military machine.

The Australian Defence Force reflects these traditions and Australia's national security strategy that followed the end of Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War.

[21]Defence Committee, 'Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy', January 1962 and October 1964, in Stephan Frühling, ed., *A History of Australian Strategic Policy Since 1945*, Department of Defence, 2009.
[22]Ian McNeill, *The Team: Australian Army Advisers in Vietnam 1962-1972*, Australian War Memorial, 1984.

3-2-2 Side benefits of the Defence of Australia policy

The Australian Defence Force in the late 1990s and the early 2000s was built in a period when successive governments believed that fighting a ground war alongside the US military was unlikely. In contrast to the priorities of that period, however, the ADF, especially Army, maintained and strengthened capabilities suitable for peace operations.

In an address in November 1969, US President Nixon called on allies to take responsibility for conventional defence, especially manpower. The United States became less likely to reinforce with ground troops a country where US forces were not deployed in peacetime. The Nixon Doctrine invalidated the assumption of Australia's forward defence policy in maritime Southeast Asia that a great power would participate. Forward defence policy was already less necessary than before because Suharto consolidated an anti-communist regime in Indonesia, and no longer viable in Australian public opinion because of conflation with the Vietnam War.

Australian governments in this period understood that defence effort in peacetime is necessary in order to obtain US military reinforcement when necessary; a basis for military build-up is necessary in case the strategic environment deteriorates; and in the near term, Australia needed to prepare for some kind of low-intensity conflict. But they did not understand what kind of capabilities Australia needed. Therefore, force planning by the Army, Navy and Air Force was disjointed.

What was obvious was that defence of the sparsely populated northern half of Australia required ingenuity. Between 1981 and 1985, the Army established three battalion-sized Regional Force Surveillance Units, recruited reservists from each area, including Australian Aborigines. The SAS Regiment trained them in reconnaissance, surveillance and guerrilla tactics.[23]

In 1985, Defence Minister Kim Beazley consulted Dr Paul Dibb, a Defence intelligence expert, about priorities for defence capabilities in a period with no immediate danger to Australia. China was not capable of projecting military power. Dr Dibb considered Indonesia, with its potentially destabilising factors of Islam and military dictatorship, as a potential threat, and examined what small-scale attacks on the Australian mainland, remote islands in the Indian Ocean, and Papua New Guinea would be like. As noted in several publications, the secret version of his report *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities* examined the kinds of capabilities that would be threatening to these territories, the warning time for their acquisition and use, and possible responses by Australia.[24]

[23]Horner, *SAS: Phantoms of War*, pp. 416-7.
[24]Also see Paul Dibb, 'The Self-Reliant Defence of Australia', in Roy Huisken and Meredith Thatcher, eds., *History as Policy*, ANU E Press, 2007, pp. 17-20; Paul Dibb and Richard Brabin-Smith, 'Indonesia in Australian Defence Planning', *Security Challenges* 3:4, November 2007, pp. 82-5.

The key concept of his strategy to defend Australia against a northern threat is to intercept attackers in the 'sea-air gap' with intelligence and surveillance, naval strike, and air defence. Mobile ground forces would defeat any enemy force that landed on the northern coast before it could establish a lodgement. Defence Minister Beazley released the public version of the report in 1986.

The 1987 Defence White Paper *Defence of Australia* gave this strategy the top priority, followed by the capability to respond to low-intensity crises in Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and eastern Indian Ocean. Missions in more distant regions, as in UN peacekeeping, were to be performed by forces built for the first two missions. Also, the Australian Defence Force will contribute to the stability of these countries and other Southeast Asian countries through military cooperation, combined training exercises, naval visits and strategic dialogue. Australia maintained this set of priorities at least until 1997.

In this 'Defence of Australia era', the Army and Air Force built up bases in the north, moved some forces there, and increased their capacity to transport more forces and supplies there from the south-east. The Army was given less priority than the Navy and Air Force; its infantry battalions were reduced to six. The armoured brigade moved to Darwin on the northern coast. Dr Dibb, deputy secretary of Defence from 1988 to 1991, recalls 'The Army was most opposed to the Defence of Australia policy, but if Darwin had not been built up, it could not have deployed overseas as it did in East Timor.' The over-the-horizon radar network's purpose in Defence of Australia was surveillance of the sea-air gap with a small number of radars, but its capability to monitor the airspace over Timor was of great aid to INTERFET.

Dr Kilcullen criticises Defence of Australia as a 'fiction' that did not match either Australia's global interests or its record of overseas military deployments.[25] Nevertheless, he told the author, 'After Vietnam, which was an expedition against an insurgency, the Americans kept doing expeditions, but said they would no longer fight insurgencies. Australia decided not to do expeditions, but to fight irregular [conflicts] in Australia.' This remark implies that the Defence of Australia policy helped the Army retain its lessons and tradition of counterinsurgency, which requires defeating the insurgent's strategy by protecting the people instead of searching and fighting enemy combatants.[26] As demonstrated in East Timor, this counterinsurgency strategy is consistent with peace operations.

The small size of the Army in this period strengthened the tradition of compensating for it by training. Australian officials and experts are unanimous that Australian regular infantry are as skilled as US Army Rangers. According to Major General (Retd) Tim Ford, former Chief Military Advisor to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Australian Defence Force's view is that 'A good peacekeeper is a good warfighter'; in order to perform well as a peacekeeper, who is allowed to use

[25]David Kilcullen, 'Australian Statecraft', *Security Challenges* 3:4, November 2007, pp. 45-65.
[26]Also see David Kilcullen, 'United States Counterinsurgency: An Australian View', May 2005, http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/australianview.pdf .

only the minimum necessary force, one must be a skilled combatant in the first place. General Ford's view, 'as an Australian, westerner, and a soldier who values planning and decisiveness', of an excellent member of a peacekeeping force is one who is 'trained well as a soldier, knows his own skill well, has the right mindset toward the peacekeeping mission, understands the rules of engagement and the use of force, is prepared for various difficulties and casualties in the force, and can analyse risk.' He pointed out that peacekeeping forces require excellent junior leaders, and evaluated Australian junior leaders as 'flexible and used to being delegated authority'. Thus, strategic corporals are Australia's indispensable advantage in peacekeeping.

Because of the small number of people in the Australian Defence Force, most units in the Army must acquire more than one skill. There are not enough people to form specialised units, for example, for training foreign armies. In his book *Accidental Guerrilla*, Dr Kilcullen criticised the US military for defining Special Operations Forces in relation to General Purpose Forces instead of strategic missions demanded by the outside world. He shared with the author that he observed this because of his background as an Australian Army officer.

Thus, Australian soldiers who were trained as strategic corporals during the Defence of Australia era are conducting exemplary peace operations.

3-2-3 Innovative military thought is converging with peace operations

Whether in a peacekeeping operation or another military operation, failure by a strategic corporal can cause strategic defeat. In contrast, exploiting a strategic corporal's success to the entire operation's success is difficult without clear, systematic thought about concrete methods for restoring peace and security by military means. Therefore, the Australian Defence Force began in the late 1990s to develop and spread innovative military thought, and conceptualise the achievements and lessons from operations in East Timor and elsewhere. Major General (Retd) Peter Abigail, who served as the ADF's head of Strategic Policy and Plans and as Land Commander between 1996 and 2002, recalls 'For more than twelve years, the Army has been studying the nature of war and the nature of Australia's engagement with its neighbours.'

In 2002, the Department of Defence and the ADF published three documents that envision the future on the basis of the nature of wars that Australia is likely to fight and characteristics of Australia and the ADF. *Australian Approach to Warfare* argued, on the basis of geography, resources, innovation and characteristics of ADF personnel, that joint operations (Navy, Army and Air Force), manoeuvre warfare and coalition warfare suit Australia. Manoeuvre warfare seeks to take the fight out of the enemy by occupying a superior position and by the physical and psychological effects of fire from

that position. This manoeuvre depends on making decisions faster than the enemy, not just on the speed of physical movement. Manoeuvre is the opposite of attrition, which attacks where the enemy is strong. Thus, manoeuvre warfare offers the possibility of reducing casualties, especially civilians, through speedy conclusion.

Force 2020 sorts various operations from peacetime activities to major war into a spectrum. The closer an operation is to major war, the less likely it is, but the graver the consequences for Australia.

FIGURE 1: THE SPECTRUM OF OPERATIONS



As in General Ford's expression of the ADF's view as 'A good peacekeeper is a good warfighter', *Force 2020* argues 'Only a disciplined armed force capable of "high-end" warfighting has the necessary skills to contribute to the full range of possible contingencies and peacetime tasks in the spectrum of operations' and calls for 'maintenance of a warfighting ethos and a fighting spirit'.

Future Warfighting Concept gives concrete shape to the long-term vision of *Force 2020* by situating manoeuvre warfare in a conflict in physical, political, cultural and informational environments, as Multidimensional Manoeuvre. The ADF's idea of 'conflict as a violent clash of wills, as opposed to purely a clash of organised military forces' encouraged this development. The authors of *Future Warfighting Concept* say they 'expect to need ten to fifteen years to realise' Multidimensional Manoeuvre.

In order to build a force capable of implementing Multidimensional Manoeuvre, the Army directed Lieutenant Colonel Kilcullen to analyse the environment of contemporary conflict in which Australian land forces are likely to fight, and to propose a response. He reasoned that globalisation and US dominance in conventional forces are inducing enemies of the United States to seek 'asymmetric arenas and unconventional means'. Consequently, Australian land forces were also likely to fight in an environment complicated by the mingling of enemies and diverse civilians, physical terrain, and use of global media. Each side fights not only to control civilians directly, but also to get them and outside

publics to perceive its side as dominant and legitimate. As a response, LTCOL Kilcullen proposed deploying Combined Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) that integrate all elements of national power. The role of the military in them is to 'apply discriminating force to support whole of government efforts'. He titled this document 'Complex Warfighting' and submitted it in 2004.

Although 'Complex Warfighting' is about war as an ally of the United States, the role of the military therein is similar to the role of the military in a peacekeeping operation. According to General Ford, 'The main actor in a peacekeeping operation is the political process, not the military. The mission of the military is to support other people's activities.' His prescription that, therefore, 'Personnel on a peacekeeping operation must be professionals in their own duties and be capable of cooperating in professionals of other fields in a difficult environment' applies just as well to JIATF in 'Complex Warfighting'.

According to General Abigail, the Australian Army is changing its force structure in keeping with *Adaptive Campaigning - Future Land Operating Concept*, which it adopted in September 2009. The document's 'philosophical conceptual framework' calls for orchestrating effort along five lines of operations (joint land combat, population protection, information actions, population support, indigenous capacity building) to resolve conflict and advance Australia's national interests. General Abigail assesses that the spread of this idea has increased the importance of civil-military cooperation, which is advocated by Major General (Retd) Michael Smith. (General Smith retired as the deputy force commander of UN Transitional Administration East Timor and served as Austcare's CEO until 2008, when he became the founding executive director of the Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence.)

General Abigail gives much credit for concepts in *Adaptive Campaigning* to Major General John Caligari, the Army's head of Modernisation and Strategic Planning. General Caligari has served in Somalia as battalion operation officer, East Timor as PKF battalion commander, and Afghanistan as deputy commander of Australian forces. General Abigail points out that the ADF's thinking about the nature of war has advanced because 'Every senior officer of the Army has experienced every step of conflict from conventional war to reconstruction.'

In this way, the Australian Army has benefited from its small size. In the large US Army, even in the summer of 2007, four years into the occupation of Iraq, field and company grade officers had grounds to believe that too many generals were ignorant of counterinsurgency. For instance, Colonel H. R. McMaster, who became famous for securing the city of Tal Afar in northern Iraq in autumn 2005, was denied promotion to brigadier general for two years in a row by a committee of generals.[27]

[27]Fred Kaplan, 'Challenging the Generals', *New York Times Magazine*, 26 August 2007. His promotion was approved in 2008, when Gen. David Petraeus of Multi-National Force - Iraq chaired the committee.

In another comparison between the Australian and US armed forces, the philosophical conceptual framework of *Adaptive Campaigning* may remind some readers of the *Counterinsurgency* field manual adopted by the US Army and Marine Corps in December 2006. In the latter, five 'logical lines of operation' (combat operations/civil security operations, host-nation security forces, essential services, governance, economic development) are protected by information operations. The Australian Army's *Adaptive Campaigning*, which was adopted later, is more successful at distinguishing means and ends. Also, *Adaptive Campaigning - Future Land Operating Concept* occupies a higher place in the Australian Army's hierarchy of concepts than FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* in the US Army's, and is more like FM 3-0 *Operations*. Although this difference reflects the disparity between the two countries in resources and size of armed forces, it also shows that the Australian Army places more emphasis on restoring peace and security in complex environments.

3-3 Some peace operations require developed countries' military forces

Thus, the Australian Defence Force compensates for the small number of personnel not just with high technology, but with software for people from the training of the strategic corporal on the spot to a philosophical conceptual framework about the role of military power, and continues to evolve.

Developing countries contribute the vast majority of troops to UN peacekeeping operations (PKO).[28] For some purposes, however, developed countries' military forces are indispensable. For this reason, we can expect a combination of the ADF and the Japan Self-Defense Force to be capable of supporting UN PKO in an unprecedented way.

Mr David Haeri, chief of Best Practices Unit in the UN Department of PKO, explained, 'UN peacekeeping forces grew in the last ten years from 20,000 to 115,000 troops, but the demand for troops and the difficulty of missions have grown too', and gave reasons why practitioners and experts fervently wish for units from developed countries, including historical supporters of UN PKO like Australia, Canada and Nordic countries. First, developed countries are far more capable of support like logistics, communications and helicopters. Without rescue helicopters and communication systems, not even long range patrol over land is possible. Yet, the UN has not been able to deploy helicopters in Darfur. Second, contribution of soldiers by developed countries is a unique political signal to local forces: 'Cambodian factions perceived the deployment of Japanese forces as an expression of Japan's demand to obey the peace agreement. They saw that if they ignored Japan's wish, reconstruction would suffer. Cambodia stabilised. Peacekeeping forces with no developed countries are taken less seriously.' This perspective may be surprising for the Japanese public.

Professor Jean-Marie Guéhenno, who oversaw UN PKO for eight years as Under-Secretary-General, praised the work done in East Timor by the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force's engineers, and expressed the wish that developed countries 'contribute specialised capabilities like Japan, including police.' He pointed out two problems for many PKO missions, that they do not have theatre reserves to deter ceasefire violations, and that they are always short of tactical transport capabilities like helicopters. Professor Guéhenno suggested that Australian-Japanese cooperation could solve both by combining Australian special operations forces with the JSDF's air transport capability, on the basis of an agreement on the conditions of deployment and withdrawal.

[28]Pakistan (9,779), Bangladesh (8,681), India (7,941), Nigeria (4,971), etc. Total of UN DPKO missions and the Department of Field Support's political missions, as of 31 October 2009. Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2010*, Lynne Rienner, 2010, p. 133.

Part 4 International Deployment is a Major Mission of the Police

Australia is at the forefront of the world in deploying police to countries where law and order had collapsed, restoring security, and rebuilding the host nation's police force. The turning point for Australia in this sector was in 2003, when it launched a mission in Solomon Islands, with police in the lead, to restore security, rebuild the police, strengthen judicial institutions, and in the longer term, strengthen fiscal and administrative capacities. Australians were aware that this mission was for the long term, and that they would send police to other countries too. Therefore, in 2004, they established the International Deployment Group in the Australian Federal Police. The UN Secretariat gradually realised after 2000 the importance of police for peacekeeping and peacebuilding. But almost no country has a deployable police force like Australia's. Therefore, the UN has an urgent shortfall of the numbers and skills of police in peacekeeping operations.

4-1 Police are the main effort in Solomon Islands

Solomon Islands' weak administrative machinery was paralysed by ethnic conflict and organised crime, and law and order collapsed. The government of Solomon Islands asked Australia and the Pacific Islands Forum for assistance in securing the country, rebuilding law and order, and building a sustainable economy. Consequently, in July 2003, Australia launched the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), an interagency, multinational mission with police in the lead. RAMSI secured the people; neutralised armed factions; arrested and prosecuted major criminals; and made progress in rebuilding the Solomon Islands police force. Thus, RAMSI was able to start the long-term phase of the mission.

4-1-1 Why law and order collapsed

Because of multiple historical reasons, Solomon Islands has found it difficult to prosper as a stable, independent state. Britain proclaimed a protectorate over the islands in the 1890s, but did not build a strong colonial administration because its only political interests were to prevent the islands' annexation by other colonial powers, and to stop private businesses from kidnapping islanders to work on plantations in Australia and Fiji.[29] The construction of US military bases on the island of Guadalcanal during the Second World War and the move of the capital to Honiara on Guadalcanal induced people to move there from the island of Malaita. Solomon Islands gained independence from Britain in 1978, but natural resources interests corrupted the government, and economic development stalled. In 1988, a war of secession from Papua New Guinea began in the island of Bougainville, which is adjacent to Solomon Islands. Guadalcanal became a base of the secessionists. Mediation by Australia and New

[29]Elsina Wainwright, *Our Failing Neighbour*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June 2003, p. 19.

Zealand resulted in a truce in 1997, permanent ceasefire in 1998, and a comprehensive peace agreement in 2001. Guadalcanal, however, was left with the idea of solving conflicts of economic interests violently in the name of ethnic conflict.

Guadalcanal islanders who resented occupation and purchase of land by Malaitans formed the militia 'Isatabu Freedom Movement' (IFM) in 1998, and expelled twenty thousand Malaitans from the countryside to Malaita and Honiara. Malaitans in Honiara formed the 'Malaita Eagle Force' (MEF), recruited police officers to their side, and gained control of the capital city. In April 2000, Prime Minister Ulufa'alu asked Australia to intervene to help regain control of the situation, but was rebuffed, and was toppled in June in a coup d'état by police officers who supported the MEF. Solomon Islands avoided civil war because the National Parliament elected Prime Minister Sogavare immediately, and some factions signed a peace agreement in Townsville, Australia in October 2000. International peace monitors were despatched. In the following two years, however, the IFM controlled the countryside, and the police in Honiara recruited many MEF militiamen. The peace agreement did not stop criminal violence. Security continued to deteriorate, the government went bankrupt, and the economy shrank.

4-1-2 Australian-led multinational mission

Prime Minister Kemakeza, who succeeded Prime Minister Sogavare, asked Australia on 22 April 2003 for assistance to restore security and rebuild the economy. On 5 June, he received Prime Minister Howard's reply titled 'Framework for Strengthened Assistance to Solomon Islands'.[30] Australia would send people to rebuild the police force and strengthen courts, corrections, financial systems and other machinery of government, if Solomon Islands fulfilled conditions necessary for their success. Those conditions included broad support by elected officials and the public; formal request by the Governor-General; the Pacific Islands Forum's support; and grant of authority and immunity by the National Parliament. The Solomon Islands cabinet accepted them on 25 June, and the parties involved implemented them quickly.[31]

On 10 June, around the time Prime Minister Howard replied, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) published a proposal titled *Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of Solomon*

[30]'Framework for Strengthened Assistance to Solomon Islands: Proposed Scope and Requirements', in Submission by Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands Special Coordinator Tim George to Review of RAMSI, Foreign Relations Committee, National Parliament of Solomon Islands, September 2008. http://www.parliament.gov.sb/files/committees/foreignrelations/submissions/RAMSI-Sub.pdf .

[31]Wainwright, 'Responding to state failure', *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 57:3, November 2003, pp. 491-2; Facilitation of International Assistance Act, passed by the Parliament of the Solomon Islands 17 July 2003, assented to 21 July 2003; Agreement Between Solomon Islands, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa and Tonga concerning the Operations and Status of the Police and Armed Forces and Other Personnel Deployed to Solomon Islands to Assist in the Restoration of Law and Order and Security (Townsville, 24 July 2003), [2003] ATS17.

Islands.[32] Its main point for the short term was an Australian-led multinational Solomon Islands Rehabilitation Authority to control police and finance and stop violence and corruption. Donor countries would deploy a police force of 150 officers and judicial and correctional personnel. For the long term, up to ten years, the multinational mission would build 'capacity for effective government, by helping to build new political structures and security institutions, and helping to address underlying social and economic problems' at an average annual cost of A$85 million, half to be paid by Australia. As for why Australia should intervene, ASPI gave several reasons. A state that was not capable of enforcing law and controlling borders will soon become a 'petri dish for transnational threats' like organised crime, which in Solomon Islands' case is likely to spread to weak neighbours. Instability in the Solomon Islands would diminish Australia's standing in the world because major powers like the United States considered Australia responsible for the stability of southwest Pacific countries. Also, collapse of the state could result in a humanitarian disaster.

ASPI's proposal provided a blueprint, but the actual policy left police and finance under the Solomon Islands government, which incorporated personnel from Australia and elsewhere. The Australian government launched RAMSI because the problem was law and order, not the complete collapse of the state in civil war, and preventive intervention was likely to work.[33]

4-1-3 Decision on the spot for whole-of-government, multinational mission

On surprisingly short notice, the Australian authorities prepared to deploy an interagency multinational mission. The top three leaders of RAMSI had less than ten weeks' notice: Special Coordinator Nick Warner, a diplomat; Australian Federal Police (AFP) Assistant Commissioner Ben McDevitt, who led the police; and Lieutenant Colonel John Frewen, commander of the military component.[34] Other personnel and participating states were informed even later.

First, the relevant authorities' planners assembled in the AFP training centre in Majura, near Canberra, in order to achieve a common understanding of the mission. The Department of Defence, AFP, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), which still had officials in Solomon Islands delivering aid, were represented. The planners divided the long-term mission into three phases. In the commencement phase, RAMSI would restore law and order within six months by freeing Honiara from organised crime, starting criminal investigations, neutralising armed factions, seizing illegally owned firearms, and strengthening the police. In the consolidation phase in 2004, RAMSI would reform institutions. In the sustainability and self-reliance phase from 2005, capability development and training would make reform take root. The four

[32]Wainwright, *Our Failing Neighbour*.
[33]Michael Fullilove, 'The Testament of the Solomons', Lowy Institute for International Policy, May 2006, p. 8.
[34]Russell W. Glenn, *Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube*, RAND Corporation, 2007, p. 22.

Australian government organisations' representatives rehearsed the 'first minutes, days, and months' of the mission.[35]

The military component, Combined Task Force 635, numbered 1,800 soldiers, sailors and airmen, mostly Australian but also from New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga. The main force on land included four rifle companies. The Participating Police Forces (PPF) of 230 officers was from those five countries and Samoa, Vanuatu, Kiribati, Nauru, Cook Islands (a country in free association with New Zealand).[36]

4-1-4 Police restored law and order, with low-key military support

The first contingent of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands arrived in Guadalcanal on 24 July 2003, and Operation Helpem Fren began. 'Helpem Fren' means 'help a friend' in the Solomon Islands Pijin language. Adopting the deterrent effect of the US Navy amphibious ships in East Timor, HMAS *Manoora*, which carries helicopters and landing craft, appeared on the horizon just as Royal Australian Air Force C-130 transport aircraft touched down in Honiara International Airport.[37] The soldiers who disembarked from the first aircraft took defensive positions, but they were cheered by thousands of people.

Assistant Commissioner McDevitt sought out Solomon Islands police officers, who were in hiding, in order to have them patrol markets alongside AFP officers and thereby show that the Participating Police Force's mission was to support Solomon Islands police and work alongside them. Given that security was so poor as to require RAMSI's intervention, unarmed police could not patrol unless they could be backed up immediately by armed mobile police and infantry.[38] For this purpose, CTF 635's infantry, who numbered more than the PPF, camped in the airport and near the beach, where the Allies landed during the Second World War. Special Coordinator Warner's view of the 1,800-strong military component was:

> [W]e came in with a very large potent military force... We did that quite deliberately so that we didn't have to use military force during this operation, and it worked. We got the attention very quickly of the militants and the thugs and the criminals, and they made a very correct strategic decision—that is, that it was better to cooperate with us than to take us on.[39]

[35]*Ibid.*, p. 23, 62-3; Ben McDevitt, 'Operation *Helpem Fren*', *Australian Army Journal* 3:2, June 2006, pp. 69-70.
[36]Glenn, *Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube*, pp. 20-1.
[37]*Ibid.*, pp. 22-4. During the Second World War, this airport was fought over as the Henderson Field.
[38]McDevitt, 'Operation *Helpem Fren*', pp. 67, 70-1.
[39]Fullilove, 'The Testament of the Solomons', p. 17.

RAMSI's top priority in neutralising militias was the arrest of Harold Keke. He led the 'Guadalcanal Liberation Front' (GLF), which controlled the southern coast of the island. First, Assistant Commissioner McDevitt exchanged letters with him. Consequently, Keke met RAMSI's top three officials three times, and on 13 August, the twenty-first day of Operation Helpem Fren, surrendered aboard HMAS *Manoora*. While in custody, Keke wrote to subordinates and advised them to surrender. Thus, the Participating Police Force was able to neutralise the GLF through 'surrender by appointment.' CTF 635 was able to avoid jungle warfare in the GLF's home ground. RAMSI gained a reputation as a formidable opponent of militias. The GLF's disbandment deprived the other militias of the excuse that they need to stay armed for self-defence against the GLF.[40]

RAMSI collected guns through an amnesty over twenty-one days in August 2003 and confiscation afterward. RAMSI communicated to the people that it would find any hidden gun and impose a long prison term and a heavy fine for its owner. During the amnesty, destroying guns on the spot had three benefits. First, RAMSI was able to guarantee those who brought the guns that it was not giving the guns to their enemies. Second, ceremonies for destroying the guns were popular. Third, RAMSI did not have to store and guard the guns. In areas where militias and organised criminals had not got the message, infantry companies marched. During the amnesty, RAMSI collected 3,725 guns, 700 of them of military quality, and 300,000 rounds of ammunition. RAMSI collected more guns than it had estimated to exist in Solomon Islands. Crimes involving guns decreased sharply.[41]

Rebuilding of the Solomon Islands police had to begin with purges of officers who had supported militias and organised crime, or taken bribes. By the end of 2004, RAMSI fired 400 officers, or one in four, and arrested and charged 88 of them for corruption, murder or other serious crimes. The paramilitary branch implicated in the coup d'état of 2000 was disbanded. New police officers were recruited from all nine provinces of Solomon Islands and given higher education in Australia and New Zealand. Of the 30 recruited in 2006, 16 were women.[42] The Solomon Islands Police Force gave up firearms when citizens did, and RAMSI has not trained SIPF to use them.[43]

Deployment peaked from September to October 2003 at 2,250 including 1,800 military and 300 police. Then, by March 2004, the military presence reduced to 700, with the Pacific Islands Company as the only rifle company. In December 2004, only 60 soldiers were left. But on 22 December, AFP Protective Service Officer Adam Dunning was killed by automatic gunfire. Australia immediately reinforced CTF 635 with a rifle company and other troops, bringing its strength above 250.[44]

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[40]Ibid, p. 9; McDevitt, 'Operation *Helpem Fren*', pp. 74-6; Glenn, *Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube*, pp. 29-32.
[41]McDevitt, 'Operation *Helpem Fren*', pp. 76-7; Glenn, *Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube*, pp. 25-7.
[42]McDevitt, 'Operation *Helpem Fren*', pp. 78-9; Wainwright, 'How is RAMSI faring?' Australian Strategic Policy Institute, April 2005, p. 3.
[43]'RAMSI Says No Firearm Training for SIPF', 6 June 2008, http://www.ramsi.org/node/285 .
[44]Fullilove, 'The Testament of the Solomons', p. 8; Glenn, *Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube*, pp. 36-7.

Australia spent A$200 million on RAMSI in each of the first two years.[45] An Australian official assessed objectively that an advantage in conducting a mission like RAMSI is that Australia is 'large enough to deploy people, assets and resources at scale, but small enough that personal connections are ubiquitous and collegial habits maintained.'[46]

4-2 International Deployment Group formed in the Australian Federal Police

Because of RAMSI, the Australian Federal Police deployed a larger part of its personnel than did the Australian Defence Force. In early 2004, the Australian Federal Police had 4,732 officers (including the Australian Protective Service, which merged into the AFP that year) and deployed abroad 334 of them, more than seven percent. Meanwhile, the ADF deployed less than four percent abroad.[47] The Australian government responded by forming the International Development Group (IDG) in the AFP on 2 February 2004. A budget and a definite number of officers in the IDG would allow Australia to deploy police abroad systematically and continuously without hindering the AFP's domestic missions.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute's Dr Elsina Wainwright, who wrote the institute's proposal in 2003 for assistance to Solomon Islands, also proposed a basic plan for the IDG. In a paper titled 'Police Join the Front Line', she pointed out a gap in those capabilities necessary between military operations and development aid: restoration of law and order and building host-nation police forces. She called for new thinking: the government should give budget and personnel to the agency that suits the mission (police), instead of giving the mission to the agency with the most resources (military).

Dr Wainwright proposed establishing in the AFP a Peace and Assistance Operations Unit that can deploy officers flexibly on tours of one to two years. This requires 550 officers, including 200 core staff, 300 on rotation from other parts of the AFP, and 50 seconded from state (and territorial) police forces. She estimated the personnel, logistical and administrative support, infrastructure, equipment and training to cost $A120 million a year.

Indeed, the IDG started with an authorised strength of 550 officers (250 staff in Australia to support 300 deployable officers). The government planned to spend about $A1 billion over the first five years, and in 2006, authorised a total of 1,200 officers for the IDG, including an Operational Response

[45]Wainwright, 'How is RAMSI faring?' p. 7.
[46]Fullilove, 'The Testament of the Solomons', p. 13.
[47]Elsina Wainwright, 'Police Join the Front Line', Australian Strategic Policy Institute, February 2004, p. 3. After the Vietnam War, the ADF has deployed abroad significantly more than seven percent of its force only from September 1999 to March 2000, when INTERFET deployed in East Timor. Mark Thomson, 'The Final Straw', Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 2007, p. 2.

Group of 200 who could respond flexibly to riots.[48]

When the IDG was established, Australian Federal Police officers were monitoring the ceasefire in Cyprus, training host-nation police in East Timor and Nauru, and training Iraqi police in Jordan. The Appendix of this report includes the table 'AFP international peace support deployments, 1964-2007' from *Australian Peacekeeping*.

In June 2005, Prime Minister Howard opened the IDG's own training facility. One part is a mock-up of a village in a developing country, for scenario-based training. The mock village is rigged with CCTV cameras to record training sessions and enable instructors to provide trainees with feedback. This is in the same place as the AFP training facility in Majura, near Canberra, where representatives of Australian government agencies planned RAMSI. Because police from Pacific island countries train here for RAMSI, Australian police officers who train here can become acquainted with their countries' cultures.

From March 2007, pre-deployment training was extended to thirty-five days, with enriched content.[49] The first ten days are for unarmed combat and weapons familiarisation. The next sixteen days cover culture, human rights, mentoring and coaching skills, capacity and confidence building, communications skills, forensics, humanitarian assistance, and civil-military relations, as well as the Standard Generic Training Module, which is the minimum skill and knowledge the UN requires of police in peacekeeping. The final nine days are for scenario-based training in the mock village. Australian police officers may withdraw from international deployment during the training, or even afterward. The IDG deploys only those who wish, instead of people pulled in by quotas. The IDG's pre-deployment training is the first one in the world certified by the UN.

Dr Wainwright praises the Australian government's creativity and political entrepreneurship in establishing the IDG. One side of the creativity is in turning the unarmed or lightly armed police officer in blue uniform into a symbol of Australian peace operations. Because of Australia's size and wealth relative to neighbours in the southwest Pacific, it needs to be both capable of stabilising them by itself and show respect for their sovereignty. She emphasised to the author that, in deploying police as the main force to assist with law and order instead of the military, 'blue footprint, not green', Australia means to signal respect for sovereignty.

The political decision to establish the IDG left two problems unresolved: recruiting the required num-

[48]John McFarlane, 'The Thin Blue Line', *Security Challenges* 3:3, August 2007, p. 99.
[49]Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Australia's Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations*, August 2008, pp. 136-8; Australian Federal Police, 'Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry into Australia's Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations', March 2007, p. 12; Tim Dahlstrom and James Steedman, 'Full Spectrum Policing', in Horner, Londey and Bou, eds., *Australian Peacekeeping*, pp. 144-6.

ber of officers, and figuring out what the deployable personnel should do when they have returned. Some states were reluctant to second officers who wanted to deploy abroad. State police forces are responsible most of all for their states' security. In both the AFP and state police forces, officers who volunteer for international deployment tend to be either near retirement or young. Most mid-career people are raising families, and therefore tend not to volunteer to deploy abroad for a year or two at a time. Thus, it has been difficult for the IDG to combine mid-career officers with the young and the old for deployment. When secondees return from international deployment, they return to their state (and territorial) police forces. Increase in the IDG's personnel strength, however, raises its share within the AFP, necessitating ingenuity in rotation.

4-3 Shortfalls of numbers and skills of police in UN peacekeeping operations

Establishment of the International Deployment Group is significant also for setting Australia in the same direction as the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), which was commissioned by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2000. This comprehensive report made recommendations on twenty aspects of UN peace operations. It made these five about civilian police personnel.[50]

> (a) Member States are encouraged to each establish a national pool of civilian police officers that would be ready for deployment to United Nations peace operations on short notice, within the context of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System;
> (b) Member States are encouraged to enter into regional training partnerships for civilian police in the respective national pools, to promote a common level of preparedness in accordance with guidelines, standard operating procedures and performance standards to be promulgated by the United Nations;
> (c) Members States are encouraged to designate a single point of contact within their governmental structures for the provision of civilian police to United Nations peace operations;
> (d) The Panel recommends that a revolving on-call list of about 100 police officers and related experts be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days' notice with teams trained to create the civilian police component of a new peacekeeping operation, train incoming personnel and give the component greater coherence at an early date;
> (e) The Panel recommends that parallel arrangements to recommendations (a), (b) and (c) above be established for judicial, penal, human rights and other relevant specialists, who with specialist civilian police will make up collegial "rule of law" teams.

Australia's IDG surpassed recommendations (a) through (d). Even when the government at the time

[50]Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, pp. 55-6.

was dismissive of the UN regarding the Iraq War, Australian thought and practice about peacekeeping and peacebuilding matched the ideas of those who were seeking to make the most of the UN.[51]

For almost six years after the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia ended in September 1993, the number of civil police in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) stayed at roughly 3,000 or fewer. When the UN began the Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in June 1999 and the Transitional Administration in East Timor in October 1999, the number jumped to almost 8,000. There were fewer than 5,000 UN civil police when missions in Kosovo and East Timor shrank, but deployment to Haiti and Africa increased rapidly from 2004. At the end of 2009, civil police on UN operations totalled 12,791 worldwide. At that point, PKO with the largest numbers of civil police were in Darfur (UNAMID) with 4,575 police, Haiti (MINUSTAH) with 2,025 and East Timor (UNMIT) with 1,517. Roles of UN police expanded from the traditional ones of observing and reporting through various degrees of direct involvement in the local people's security, and through various degrees of support for improving or building host-nation police.[52]

According to the Stimson Center's Dr William Durch, who drafted the Brahimi Report, the authorised strength of civil police in UN PKO worldwide exceed 16,000 (i.e. current deployments fall 20 percent short), and considering rotations, the UN needs 20,000 a year. But almost no member state provides civil police in the necessary quality and numbers.

Since 2000, the UN has recruited and deployed police not only individually, but also in Formed Police Units of 125 to 140 in order to fill the gap in capabilities between the military PKF and individual police. In 2009, more than 45 percent of UN civil police were in FPU. But according to Dr Durch, the compensation system used by the UN until February 2010 gave states the wrong incentives in terms of getting them to contribute competent FPU. The UN Secretariat was in such a hurry to deploy FPU that it did not examine FPU contributions in terms of whether they have operated as FPU in their home countries or in terms of members' qualifications. Also, the UN paid FPU members less than individual police and through their governments. The UN appeared to save money, and governments were able to take a cut of the pay, but this system did not give governments an incentive to contribute competent FPU.

It would be surprising if anywhere near a majority of FPU contributed under this system were capable of performing missions. In 2008, the Police Division of UN DPKO inspected all thirty-eight deployed FPU for proficiency in firearms, public order management, operability of equipment, and command

[51]RAMSI is not a UN PKO, but Secretary-General Annan and the Security Council welcomed it in August 2003. Wainwright, 'Responding to State Failure', p. 495; Fullilove, 'The Testament of the Solomons', p. 14.
[52]William J. Durch, 'United Nations Police Evolution, Present Capacity and Future Tasks', prepared for the GRIPS State-Building Workshop 2010, 27-28 January 2010, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo, rev. 10 March 2010.

and control. Fourteen were adequate to good in all categories, but nine were seriously deficient, and one was a danger to its own members.

Dr Durch points out that even when recruiting individual police, the UN has mainly relied on financial incentives of governments and police officers in developing countries. Therefore, the UN has found it difficult to find competent instructors and advisers. The Stimson Center has found that, in UN PKO between 1989 and 2007, individual police did not deploy in the authorised number until an average of nine months after authorisation by the Security Council.[53] Meanwhile, in the field, police powers were exercised either by no one or by those who did not want rule of law and sought to establish their own arbitrary rule.

The shortfalls of numbers and skills of UN civil police are not entirely the fault of member states. According to Dr Durch, for two years after the Brahimi Report was released, the UN Secretariat's attitude was that 'everything is fine with police,' and six more years passed until the UN acknowledged the necessity to integrate reform of the military, police and judiciary. For example, after the UN rebuilt the police in Haiti and left the country in 2000, the unreformed parts of Haiti overwhelmed the police and rendered it powerless to resist the rebellion of 2004.

If states implement the Brahimi Report's recommendations, then UN DPKO's limited capability to manage and support deployment of police would be a bottleneck. Even if states pooled police for international deployment and informed the UN, too few people (about fifty) are available in DPKO to process the information while managing and planning deployments.[54] Dr Durch emphasises the weakness of the UN's capability to support deployments of police by comparison to the International Deployment Group of the Australian Federal Police. In UN PKO, the ratio of deployed police to management and support personnel is 100:1 or 400:1. In Australia's IDG, the equivalent ratio is 3:1.[55] This difference shows how carefully the Australians have planned.

[53]Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt and William J. Durch, 'Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law', Henry L. Stimson Center, November 2007, pp. 39-41, 85.
[54]Ibid., p. xiv.
[55]Durch, 'United Nations Police Evolution, Present Capacity and Future Tasks', p. 15.

4-4 Why the United States finds it difficult to deploy police abroad

Why are UN peacekeeping operations utterly short of police capabilities? If countries with more resources than Australia like the United States and Japan trained police in commensurate numbers and deployed them with adequate support from the rear, then the world would not be so short of police capabilities necessary for peacekeeping and security sector reform (SSR). This section discusses reasons why the United States has been far from a 'world police' in terms of deploying police overseas. Even in Afghanistan and Iraq, where it has been imperative for US political goals to maintain security and reform the security sector, the United States has been able to deploy only token police capabilities. This report discusses in detail later problems in peace operations by Japanese police and ways to overcome them.

US experts agree on three points about the current inadequacy of overseas deployment by police forces in the United States. First, the US does not have a national police, and organisations and functions of police are highly segmented. Second, the US military, which has been attempting to secure communities and conduct SSR abroad, are knowledgeable about only a small part of police work. Third, contractors that train foreign police forces for the US government have become especially unreliable in recent years.

Regarding the absence of a national police force that the US government can order to deploy abroad, Dr Durch of the Stimson Center pointed out to the author that state and local police that have deep roots in American communities are segmented into 18,000 police forces, and getting any of them to cooperate for international deployment would be a challenge. Mr Robert Perito of the United States Institute of Peace points out that the role of community police in suppressing insurgency and terrorism after military interventions is similar to that in fighting violent crime because of the vital importance of the local community's support and cooperation. But, he points out, because the US federal government has no community police force, it does not have a force it can deploy for any of those missions abroad. The US Department of Justice's agencies like the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and the United States Marshals Service are too specialised to assume the role of community police.[56] Thus, the US government lacks knowledge and experience of community police.

The absence of a federal police force also means the absence of a ministry of interior mandated to maintain the police force on a nationwide basis. Thus, US attempts to reform or rebuild foreign countries' interior ministries have often lacked concreteness; this is a weak point in US-led SSR. He

[56]This is another difference with Australia, where the AFP is responsible for the Australian Capital Territory (Canberra). Mr Perito was a US Foreign Service officer, where his last assignment was director of the Office of International Criminal Justice, and then, from 1995 to 1991, provided guidance and direction for the US Department of Justice's contributions to PKO in Haiti, Bosnia, East Timor and Kosovo.

attributes the inadequacy of reform of the Iraqi Interiror Ministry to US ignorance of the ministry's roles and steps necessary for reform.

Colonel John Bessler of US Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) was in charge of training Afghan military and police in the western part of the country from June 2008 to August 2009. In the same period, Professor Raymond Millen of PKSOI served as a senior mentor in the Afghan Ministry of Defense. From their experience, they acknowledged that the absence of a US national police force was a disadvantage for peacekeeping abroad; pointed out that the US Army soldiers have been taught only a part of police work, and that contractors for civil police services have not been reliable; and therefore, evaluated that the author is right to be interested in overseas deployment of police.

US reliance on contractors for civil police abroad is problematic. Mr Perito points out that the best trainers of foreign police are instructors in police academies of the donor country. That is a logical conclusion from the importance of competent community police for suppressing threats to peace. But the United States uses contractors because, according to Dr Durch, of a vicious cycle in which contractors hire people who are being trained by the US and host-nation governments, thus compelling the US government to outsource training to them.

In the past, US contractors deployed competent retirees from US military and police forces. Mr Perito recalled that 800 Americans, almost all of them contractors, served in Kosovo from 1999 to 2000 and constituted more than ten percent of the UN police there. Generally, they were skilled. Nine years later in western Afghanistan, however, DynCorp was training both the Afghan National Police and the elite Afghan National Civil Order Police in only eight weeks. According to Colonel Bessler, because most trainees were illiterate, almost all of the training was about arrest techniques, guarding of buildings, and other physical techniques, with no training in rule of law or forensics. He was troubled that 'Eight weeks of training and second-grade reading level are not enough for community police.'

In the nine years since the 9/11 attacks, the United States and western European countries have concentrated their international police capabilities in Afghanistan and Iraq. They were no longer available for UN missions elsewhere. Thus, the number of skilled UN civil police declined. In December 2001, half of the top ten contributors of UN civil police were developed countries, and the United States ranked second. By December 2009, developed countries dropped out of the top ten.[57] As noted above, developing countries contribute almost all the Formed Police Units. In contrast, developing countries have sharply decreased participation in UN PKO overall, except for Portugal's continuous involvement in East Timor. In early 2010, according to Mr Perito, 1,700 Americans were training police in Afghanistan as contractors, but only 88 Americans were serving as UN civil police.

[57]Durch, 'United Nations Police Evolution, Present Capacity and Future Tasks', pp. 10-1.

Nevertheless, the United States contributes significantly to peacekeeping and stability operations. For instance, since 2005, the United States has supported the Italian Carabinieri's Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, and thereby contributed to training more than 2,000 police trainers from 29 countries. This project is part of the Global Peace Operations Initiative, which supports training and deployment of peacekeepers, mainly by African countries. Under GPOI, the United States has trained and equipped 81,000 military peacekeepers. The United States also subsidises the annual Pirap Jabiru seminar on peacekeeping, which is organised by the Australian Defence Force and the Royal Thai Armed Forces and expanding its international participation and topics every year.

This report examined challenges to the United States' capability as a 'world police' for three reasons. First, the US approach to international deployment of police has had repercussions on the supply of competent civil police to UN peacekeeping operations. Second, understanding the condition under which the United States has taken this approach is necessary for expanding Australian-Japanese cooperation in peace operations to include the United States. Third, because Japanese taxpayers are paying the salaries of Afghan police officers, they need to understand the requirements for improving their returns in the form of Afghanistan's security. Greater understanding of all three issues is an important step toward peace.

Part 5 Australia Learns Lessons to Remain at the Forefront of Peace Operations

International Force East Timor and the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, both of which were led by Australia, succeeded in restoring order and fulfilled medium-term objectives. Yet in both countries, crises broke out in spring 2006 and demonstrated sustainability of order as a challenge for peacebuilding. In response, the Australian Senate examined all Australian peace operations, and concluded that further effort toward a whole-of-government, whole-of-nation approach is basic to overcoming challenges. As its major instrument, the Senate called for the establishment of a think tank, 'Asia Pacific Centre for Civil-Military Cooperation'. The Senate's report on this inquiry called on 'the whole-of-government sector involved in peacekeeping operations to develop and strengthen a culture of learning, improvement and accountability.' This idea is shared by the Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations, a project unique in the world. In these recent years, the United States also sought the counsel of many in order to draw lessons about stabilisation and reconstruction, but faced unique challenges of implementation.

5-1 Lessons of the crises in East Timor and Solomon Islands

On 20 May 2002, East Timor gained independence after UN Transitional Administration. Over the following three years, the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) helped build administration and law enforcement, and a PKF continued to provide for external and internal security. Meanwhile, from March 2002 to June 2004, Japan provided the only military engineer unit. Up to 2,300 Japan Self-Defense Forces personnel served there. The Australian Defence Force withdrew in May 2004, except instructors for the East Timorese military (Timor-Leste Defence Force) and liaison officers to UNMISET. From May 2005, the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) continued to build the host nation's capability in administration and law enforcement, albeit without a PKF.

But in February 2006, out of the Timor-Leste Defence Force's strength of fewer than 1,500 troops, more than one third deserted their barracks, claiming discrimination against troops from the western part of the country. They were fired in March. In late April, these former soldiers and their supporters marched in Dili, the capital, and clashed with the TLDF. They demanded President Gusmão to dismiss Prime Minister Alkatiri and dissolve the TLDF. On 24 May, the government requested Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Portugal to deploy military forces. Australia deployed 2,000 soldiers as the main force of the International Security Force.[58]

Prime Minister Alkatiri resigned on 26 June, and Foreign Minister Ramos-Horta succeeded him. Peace and order improved in August, and Australia withdrew part of its force. On 25 August, UN

[58]COL John Hutcheson, 'Lessons of 2006', *Australian Army Journal* 4:2, June 2007, pp. 96-7.

Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was established as a PKO, but Australia maintained command of the ISF. In 2010, 400 of the ISF's 550 troops were Australians.[59]

The likelihood of a crisis like the one in spring 2006 had been warned by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's Dr Wainwright four years before, on the day East Timor became independent.[60] She pointed out that the police component of the UN Transitional Administration (UNTAET) had focused on maintaining security until the country's independence and fallen behind on training East Timorese police. At the same time, she criticised the East Timorese plan for the TLDF for being too large considering that conventional defence of the territory is unrealistic, and unaffordable. That kind of an army was likely to have too much time on its hands, and intervene in internal security and politics. But even the planned force was too small to satisfy all the former FALINTIL guerrillas who wanted to serve. The international community had not recovered after East Timor's independence the shortfalls in effort pointed out by Dr Wainwright.

Solomon Islands held a general election in April 2006 under international supervision. But when the new Parliament elected Prime Minister Snyder Rini, riots broke out in Honiara. Although no one was killed, Chinatown was destroyed, and many RAMSI police officers were wounded. In response, Australia, New Zealand and Fiji reinforced police and an Australian rifle company. The riots ended when Prime Minister Rini resigned on 4 May. RAMSI's military component shrank again to about 150 personnel, at which size it has stayed since.[61]

According to Dr Wainwright, Australia learned two lessons from these crises in East Timor and Solomon Islands. First, closer coordination between the Australian Federal Police and the Defence Force was urgent. Second, peacebuilding takes years. If peacekeepers rush to the exit, then the country will become unstable again, and they will have to return and stay longer than if they had not left. Countries that are participating in an assistance mission need to stabilise the feelings of the people through a sustainable political regime and jobs for young people, and watch over the transition from restoration of security to economic development.

The 2006 East Timorese crisis broke out soon after Australia and the international community reduced most of its support activities. In Solomon Islands, Australia launched RAMSI aware that it will be a long engagement. Today, seven years later, state-building continues in law enforcement and judiciary, economic reform, and administrative capacity, with RAMSI improving its methods.

[59]'Current ADF Commitment', http://www.defence.gov.au/op/eastTimor/commitment.htm .
[60]Wainwright, *New Neighbour, New Challenge*, ASPI, 20 May 2002, pp. 21-6.
[61]Hutcheson, 'Lessons of 2006', p. 95; James Dobbins et al. [Nora Bensahel], *Europe's Role in Nation-Building*, RAND Corporation, 2008, pp. 190-2; 'Operation ANODE', http://www.defence.gov.au/opEx/global/opanode/index.htm .

Dr Nora Bensahel, an expert at the RAND Corporation on stability operations and coalitions of the willing, wrote the chapter on Solomon Islands in the RAND series on nation-building. She told the author that INTERFET and RAMSI rank in a class of their own in terms of coordination among participating countries, for which she credits Australia. At the same time, she assesses that the 'Solomon Islands case shows that even if you do everything right in a small country, there is no guarantee that the initial results will last.'

Not even best practices work all the time. The world demands ceaseless evolution of peace operations.

5-2 The Australian Senate examined all aspects of peace operations

On 8 November 2006, the Australian Senate referred an 'Inquiry into Australia's Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations' to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, for report by 16 August 2007. The inquiry is the Senate's response to the increasing complexity and widening scope of peacekeeping, some of them discussed above, and to the evolution of thought and practice in the UN and elsewhere.

> The changing nature of Australia's involvement in peacekeeping operations and the implications for the Australian Defence Force, AusAID, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Federal Police and other departments and agencies likely to be called on to assist a peacekeeping operation, with particular reference to:
> a. the policy framework, procedures and protocols that govern the Government's decision to participate in a peacekeeping operation, for determining the conditions of engagement and for ceasing to participate;
> b. the training and preparedness of Australians likely to participate in a peacekeeping operation;
> c. the coordination of Australia's contribution to a peacekeeping operation among Australian agencies and also with the United Nations and other relevant countries; and
> d. lessons learnt from recent participation in peacekeeping operations that would assist government to prepare for future operations.

The committee solicited papers on these issues publicly. Eighteen NGOs and academic institutions, eleven experts, six Australian government agencies and five foreign governments submitted papers. The committee held seven hearings from July to September 2007. After three delays, the written report was released on 1 August 2008 by Senator Mark Bishop, the committee chairman. Meanwhile, following the federal election of 24 November 2007, the Rudd Government of the Australian Labor Party replaced the Howard Government of the centre-right Coalition.

The report is 417 pages long with six parts. Part I reviewed the changing nature of Australian peace operations. In response, Part II proposed five criteria for Australian participation in peace operations:

* clearly identifiable and achievable objectives;
* adequate resources and level of commitment to meet these objectives;
* proper legal underpinnings;
* force protection that matches the needs on the ground;
* an exit strategy.

The exit strategy called for by the committee is not only about dates or end-states. It requires a 'struc-

tured plan for achieving the stated objective' and 'milestones or benchmarks against which progress toward' sustainable peace can be measured. These means enable accountability to the Parliament.

Part III examined arrangements for preparation by government agencies and NGOs, and coordination between them, in terms of the 'whole-of-government, whole-of-nation approach'. Regarding interoperability between the Australian Defence Force and the Australian Federal Police, the committee pointed out that there is a gap between their capabilities because AFP tends not to think of placing operations, which consists of multiple tasks, within the context of a campaign, and because of disparate methods of assessing threats. The committee recommended them to improve interoperability for international deployment by training and exercising together and developing joint doctrine. The committee also determined that the AFP needed a 'basic understanding of ADF planning methodologies and military culture', and advised seconding ADF personnel to AFP's IDG.

Regarding civil-military cooperation, the committee suggested improvements in, for instance, joint pre-deployment training by the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), the Australian Council for International Development (AFCID, a council of NGOs) and the ADF. Part IV of the report, which is about Australia's partnerships with host countries, other participating countries and the UN, made recommendations in the same spirit. Part V pointed out shortcomings in safety, health and welfare of ADF and AFP personnel who have deployed on peace operations, and proposed measures to rectify them.

The two major recommendations came in Part VI. As the report's executive summary put it, both were for 'developing and improving the whole-of-government policy on, and coordination of, Australia's engagement in peacekeeping.' One of the two also concerned civil-military policy and coordination, including NGOs.

Part VI recommended first a publication of a white paper on peacekeeping. Because no policy document shows how to conduct a peace operation with a whole-of-government approach, 'production of a white paper would provide the government and its relevant agencies with the opportunity to review their policies and practices and to better understand how their activities contribute to the whole-of-government effort.' The committee also emphasised that the white paper would require the government to explain policies and give detailed information to the public about all kinds of peace operations. The Australian government, however, has not yet implemented the recommendation about the white paper on peacekeeping.

The other recommendation, to found a national institution for research, education and training on peace operations, came to be reflected in government policy as the Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence.

5-3 Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence will capture lessons

In a paper submitted to the Senate committee and in a hearing by the committee, Major General (Retd) Tim Ford, former chief military advisor to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, proposed gathering personnel from the whole of government, including the ADF and the AFP, in one place for consistent research, education and training for operations. Major General (Retd) Michael Smith, former deputy force commander of UNTAET and then CEO of Austcare (an NGO), argued that the institution should be founded outside the military chain of command; be informed by institutions that exist in the UN and several countries; and emphasise cooperation with Australia's near neighbours.

Although government agencies' responses to the report's numerous recommendations were mixed, Labor's victory in the federal election of November 2007 set the direction. Colonel (Retd) Mike Kelly, who wrote the party's pledge to establish an 'Asia Pacific Centre for Civil-Military Cooperation', was elected to the House of Representatives, and was appointed the Parliamentary Secretary for Defence Support. Colonel Kelly saw firsthand in Somalia and Iraq the ill effects of stove-piped activities by the Australian government, and retired from the Army in order to solve the problem as an elected official.

The Senate committee welcomed the Rudd Government's proposal for an 'Asia Pacific Centre for Civil-Military Cooperation' and requested a wider scope for its mandate. Along with a 'national repository of information on peacekeeping and Australian peacekeepers', the Centre should also be a regional centre of excellence for building capacities of Australia's near neighbours. The government did not, however, conduct a scoping study of institutions in Canada or Germany for research and training in peace operations.

Prime Minister Rudd opened the Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence in Queanbeyan, near Canberra, on 27 November 2008. The Centre's name changed from the 'Asia Pacific Centre for Civil-Military Cooperation' in Labor's campaign pledge not only because of its role as a regional centre of excellence, but also because 'civil-military cooperation' (CIMIC) connotes a military viewpoint of getting others to work for the military's objectives. This distinction is especially important because the Centre reports to the Department of Defence.

The Centre hit the ground running even before the opening ceremony. From 5 to 6 November 2008, it hosted, with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Third Asia-Pacific Conference on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations (APC-MADRO). General Smith, the Centre's founding executive director, served as the Australian co-chair. Since 2005, Australia has been working with OCHA and regional countries to develop guidelines for the 'Facilitation of Foreign

Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations in the Asia-Pacific Region', with the aim of gaining national governments' endorsement in 2010.

The theme of APC-MADRO matched the Centre's four major responsibilities, namely, development of a conceptual framework for whole-of-government response to conflict and disasters overseas; developing doctrine and facilitating training; capturing lessons from research; and development of cooperative international relationships. The Centre will carry them out for the four focus areas of disaster management, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction; peace and stabilisation operations; conflict prevention; and governance and rule of law. The conceptual framework for the Australian government is already accepted at the working level.

For education and training in Australia, the Centre hosts seminars on civil-military cooperation and provides courses for civilian officials, the ADF, the AFP and the University of Sydney' s graduate school. The Centre helps the ADF Academy teach courses on public relations and ethics. The biennial Australian-US military exercise Talisman Saber has been gradually incorporating CIMIC since 2005, and the Centre participates here too.

For international education and training, the Centre emphasises protection of civilians in conflict zones, and is drafting guidelines for that purpose with the African Union. When the author visited the Centre, General Smith, the executive director, was in Addis Ababa for a conference. Later, from 27 to 28 April 2010, the Centre hosted the Challenges Forum, the world's premier conference of experts on peace operations, with protection of civilians as the theme. Two hundred and twenty experts gathered in Queanbeyan from the UN and more than 30 countries, and discussed vigorously what various stakeholders in PKOs can do immediately to improve practice in the field.

Like most organisations in Australia, the Centre is surprisingly small in size. It opened with only five people. Even today, with the Centre's activities well under way, the staff number only fifteen, most of them secondees from AusAID, the AFP, the Department of Defence, the ADF, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Attorney-General's Department and Emergency Management Australia. To compensate for the small number of staff, the Centre emphasises joint research with institutions outside Australia.

Dr Jim Rolfe, the deputy director of the Centre on secondment from the New Zealand Ministry of Defence, granted that 'Australia's current policies and operations are not necessarily the best possible, and we don't know everything about how they should be done,' and then showed confidence: 'But we know there are problems. We have a firm belief that we will get to a better way in a few years.'

5-4 The United States' search for wisdom and its challenge of implementation

We have seen that Australia is capturing lessons and refining peace operations. We also need to examine efforts made by the United States to improve its operations for stabilising and rebuilding countries affected by conflict. The first US government organisation for this purpose, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), was established in the Department of State. It took years to get off the ground, for want of power relative to existing bureaucracies, budget that it can direct, and theoretical support for its work. Its malfunction shows that greater understanding of necessary conditions of peacebuilding does not guarantee success. The US Army, which has been put at the forefront of stability operations by the lack of alternative organisations, sought counsel far and wide to update doctrines. The community of practice that took charge of this task then produced a manual for civilians titled *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*. It emphasised correctly that an understanding of necessary conditions is not a panacea against the massive challenge described in the manual.

5-4-1 Lessons of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

In Iraq under US occupation, collapse of public security prevented recovery of essential infrastructure, and multiple insurgencies and terrorist campaigns broke out. Americans understood that they needed to get better at coordinating non-military efforts for stabilisation and reconstruction. In response to Congress, Secretary of State Powell established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in his department.[62]

Its thirty-seven staff came from the State Department; the US Agency for International Development; Departments of Defense, the Treasury, and Justice; the Central Intelligence Agency and elsewhere. In order for S/CRS to function, the president needed to issue a directive to authorise the secretary of State to lead and coordinate the preparation, planning and execution of US government activities for reconstruction and stabilisation. But this directive (NSPD-44) was not issued for nearly a year and a half, until December 2005.

Nevertheless, S/CRS stated work, and developed three instruments. The Interagency Management System is a concept for coordinating policy and managing programs. The Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation is a set of criteria for triggering whole-of-government planning, and procedures for that planning. The third instrument developed by S/CRS is the Civilian Response Corps (CRC).

[62]Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker and Heather Peterson, *Improving Capability for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, RAND Corporation, 2009, pp. 33-46; Hiroshi Tsukada, 'Beikoku ni yoru funsogo katsudo no kadai' [Challenges for post-conflict activities by the United States], *Refarensu*, no. 666, July 2006, pp. 186-8.

The CRC consists of active, standby and reserve components. In the active component, up to 250 full-time US government employees are ready to deploy within 24 hours. In the standby component, up to 2,000 full-time US government employees are ready to deploy within 30 days for up to six months. The standby component consists of up to 2,000 US citizens with special skills from outside the federal government. In the first half of July 2010, the active and standby components reached a total of 1,000 personnel.[63]

What hobbled S/CRS were misconceptions in the proposal for founding it, and lack of support for implementation. The hindsight of one proponent of founding S/CRS, Ms Beth Ellen Cole at the United States Institute of Peace, is that locating the office under the Secretary of State deprived it of the ability to coordinate departments and agencies outside State forcefully. In contrast, the UK Stabilisation Unit coordinates the Department for International Development, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, and the Ministry of Defence from the outside, and the system in Denmark is similar to the UK. Another difference with European governments is that Congress did not give S/CRS a discretionary budget, under either the Bush or Obama administrations. According to Ms Cole, S/CRS could not persuade Congress with a theory about the instruments it developed, including the Civilian Response Corps. She points out that S/CRS needed a capstone doctrine based on lessons about when deployments and planning processes succeed, like *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*.

The RAND Corporation's Dr Bensahel points out that, within the US Department of State, authority to implement policy resides in bureaus in charge of regions and functions, and S/CRS ranked lower than them. She believes that S/CRS would have functioned better if USAID were given more independence and S/CRS were placed there.

This status of S/CRS within the US Department of State has been demonstrated in the field, in Afghanistan. According to Ms Cole, in 2009, S/CRS staff took a proposal on stabilisation to Afghanistan and obtained signatures from General McChrystal, who was the commander of ISAF and US Forces Afghanistan, and US Ambassador Eikenberry, but were turned out of the country by embassy officials. Thus, although S/CRS has barely gotten off the ground, it seems to be hobbled by the sheer size of other US government organisations.

Australia is setting up an Australian Civilian Corps of up to 500 personnel to assist stabilisation and recovery in countries affected by natural disaster or conflict, to be fully operational by 2011. This Corps will be located in AusAID, similarly to the location Dr Bensahel prefers for S/CRS. The cabinet

[63]Hillary Rodham Clinton, 'Remarks to the Civilian Responders Workshop', 15 July 2010. http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/144648.htm .

approves the Corps' deployment on the basis of request by the host country or the UN. Prior planning for deployments will involve secondees from the Department of Defence, the AFP and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. A high level Strategic Guidance Committee of representatives from Defence, the Attorney-General's Department, Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Treasury oversees the Corps.[64]

5-4-2 How will the US Army's new doctrine matter?

In the summer of 2004, when the US Department of State established S/CRS, the leaders of the Department of Defense were being briefed by the Defense Science Board about stabilization and reconstruction. The board's 2004 Summer Study emphasised that both departments need to identify this as a core competency and establish an 'extraordinarily close working relationship' with each other, with the Department of State leading non-military aspects of stabilization and reconstruction.[65] But more than a year passed until Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England signed, in November 2005, a directive (DoDD 3000.05) that his department should emphasise stability operations as much as combat operations.[66]

According to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Janine Davidson, who oversaw its implementation from 2007 to 2008 as the director for stability operations, the essence of the directive is that the 'US military has been doing this throughout history, will always be doing it, and it is not anyone else's job, because no other agency in the US government is capable of it yet.'

Dr Davidson recalls that she saw the 'Department of Defense as a system and looked for nodes to push to promote change.' She worked 'from the top down and the bottom up' to infiltrate the directive. From the top down, she got leaders of the department and the armed forces to mention it often, and wrote it into major documents like the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review. Bottom-up change was swift because soldiers on the spot understood firsthand the importance of stability operations. According to Dr Davidson, the slowest to change were middle-ranking officers who were too busy to read documents and too old to go to school. As a scholar, she has argued that an organisation reacts to failure by changing itself or by avoiding missions similar to the failed one, depending on whether it sees that mission as legitimate and feasible. She saw her theory in action.

Among military operations that have as their objective security of civilian populations instead of destruction of the enemy military forces, the US Army first revised its doctrine for counterinsurgency,

[64]AusAID, 'The Australian Civilian Corps', 2010. http://www.ausaid.gov.au/acc/pdf/accbrochure.pdf .
[65]Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities.
[66]Meanwhile, the deputy secretary of Defense and the under secretary of Defense for policy were replaced.

which it was conducting in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US Army Combined Arms Center, then led by Lieutenant General David Petraeus, produced the field manual *Counterinsurgency* with input from non-government experts and journalists as well as the field, and adopted it in December 2006. This field manual attracted enough attention from the public to be published in 2007 by the University of Chicago Press. The higher-ranking field manual *Operations* was also revised with the concept of full-spectrum operations, in which every campaign combines offensive, defensive and stability operations, and was adopted in February 2008.

Along this line, the US Army distilled a theory of stability operations. In October 2007, Lieutenant General William Caldwell of the Combined Arms Center gained the agreement of other government agencies and several NGOs to work on this theory together.[67] General Caldwell started with the five areas of stabilisation suggested by S/CRS: (1) security; (2) justice and reconciliation; (3) humanitarian assistance and social well being; (4) governance and participation; (5) economic stabilisation and infrastructure. He linked them to the Army's tasks, and thereby sought unity of effort with the Department of State. USAID contributed the concept of the 'fragile-states spectrum' of failed, failing and recovering states that may be subject to intervention and stabilisation. Writers of the US Army field manual *Stability Operations*, led by Lieutenant Colonel Steven Leonard, travelled from the Combined Arms Center in Kansas to Washington to seek NGOs' comments on their draft. This discussion was facilitated by the US Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP).[68] The manual promotes the 'comprehensive approach' of seeking common ground and unity of effort with diverse organisations outside the US government. The process of producing it upheld this ideal. The US Army adopted the field manual *Stability Operations* in October 2008. It also attracted public attention, and was published in 2009 by the University of Michigan Press.

In her introduction to the Michigan edition, Dr Davidson points out that this US Army field manual includes diverse tasks because the US government is still far from being able to deploy civilians overseas in adequate numbers and skills, and that policymakers and Congress are responsible for this situation. This view is common in the US Army.

According to Dr Joseph Collins, who was the deputy assistant secretary of Defense in charge of stability operations and peacekeeping from 2001 to 2004, US government agencies have made great progress in their willingness to cooperate and in understanding each other's missions, but not in the allocation of people and budget. USAID had 15,000 professionals during the Vietnam War, but in

[67]LTG William G. Caldwell IV and LTC Stephen M. Leonard, 'Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations', *Military Review* 88:4, July-August 2008, pp. 56-63.
[68]According to Beth Cole, 'An Open Door', *PKSOI Bulletin* 1:1, October 2008, p. 5, the participants were InterAction (alliance of NGOs), World Vision, Mercy Corps, Save the Children, Refugees International, International Rescue Committee, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

early 2010, it had only 2,000 people, with management of contracts as their main task.

Obviously, publication of the US Army field manual *Stability Operations* did not change this weakness of other US government agencies, and did not give the military the capability to conduct this mission by itself. Therefore, experts who participated in producing the field manual were already compiling a manual for civilians titled *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*. The USIP and PKSOI developed it. The USIP's Ms Cole took charge. Professor William Flavin of PKSOI was the only man among the eight writers.

They were aware of the US military's five tools for thinking and planning: (1) doctrine as a guiding principle; (2) a lessons learned system; (3) a planning system for applying doctrine; (4) an education and training system; (5) systems to support soldiers in the field. The *Guiding Principles* manual's purpose is to begin making up for their absence among civilian US government agencies.

The US Army field manual *Stability Operations* and the civilian manual *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* share a strategic framework oriented to five end states: (1) safe and secure environment; (2) rule of law; (3) stable governance; (4) sustainable economy; (5) social well-being. *Guiding Principles* identifies seven principles that must guide actions toward any of the end states:

1. Host nation ownership and capacity
2. Political primacy, i.e. emphasis on the effect of decisions and actions on the possibility of political settlement of conflict
3. Legitimacy
4. Unity of effort
5. Security
6. Conflict transformation, i.e., abandonment of violent means of conflict
7. Regional engagement, i.e. emphasis on the effect of decisions and actions on relations between the host nation and its neighbours.

A picture of the strategic framework, which combines geometrically the five end states, necessary conditions that are unique to each end state, and the seven cross-cutting principles, is included in the *Guiding Principles* manual as a poster. The manual is a 240-page paperback bound to be carried easily, and is available as a mini CD too.

Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction not only lists necessary conditions, it also describes in detail trade-offs between objectives, gaps in knowledge, and challenges to implementing best practices. In search of wisdom about all those elements, the manual's authors collected documents from all over the world about experiences in peacebuilding, and then visited institutions in the

United States, Europe and the UN for discussions with experts.

The US civil-military community of practice has sought the counsel of many in order to make the United States more capable at stabilization and reconstruction, especially stability operations by the military, under its own leadership. Americans are capturing lessons into manuals and attempting to build capabilities to implement them flexibly, because they recognize the massive challenge of implementation.

5-5 Official history as a means of accountability at home

The Australian government has commissioned the Australian War Memorial to produce an Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations in five volumes. Australia will be the world's first country to publish a comprehensive history of its peace operations. This look-back aims not only to improve future operations, but also to explain to the public the significance of operations that Australia has conducted at taxpayers' expense, even at the cost of peacekeepers' lives, and gain their understanding.[69]

Australia has published official histories of military operations four times in the past, for the First and Second World Wars, the Korean War and 'Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1975'. The new series on peace operations is scheduled to begin publication in 2010. The provisional titles, topics and authors of each volume of the Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations are as follows.[70]

Volume I, *The Long Search for Peace*, begins in Indonesia in 1947 and covers PKO that began during the Cold War. Its author is Dr Peter Londey, a lecturer at the Australian National University. Volume II, *Australia and the 'New World Order': From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement, 1988-1998*, deals with missions that began between 1988 and 1991 until UN missions that originated in the Gulf War reached an impasse in 1998. The author of this volume is Professor David Horner at the ANU, who is the Official Historian and general editor of this series. Volume III, *Australian Peacekeeping in the Era of Humanitarian Intervention*, covers PKO that began in 1992 and later, except those in the South Pacific. Its authors are Dr John Connor, associate professor at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, and Dr Bob Breen, research fellow at the ANU. Dr Breen is also writing Volume IV, *Australian Good Neighbour Operations in the South Pacific, 1980-2005*. Volume V, *In Their Time of Need: Australia's Overseas Emergency Relief Operations*, was added later

[69]Thirteen Australians have died while on peacekeeping operations since 1966. Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia's Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations, p. 383.
[70]Australian War Memorial, 'Official History of Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post - Cold War Operations', http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/peacekeeping/index.asp .

by increased interest in disaster relief after the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami of 2004. Its author is Dr Steven Bullard, a senior historian at the Australian War Memorial.

Regarding the meaning of 'Official History', the Memorial promises the 'history is official only in the sense it has government support and that the team has access to all relevant government records. What the historians write is not subject to censorship of any kind, except for reasons of national security.'[71] Exceptionally, the government excludes operations in East Timor since 1999, Afghanistan since 2001, and Iraq since 2003 from research for this series.

In order to learn about Australian ways of thinking behind both the official history series and overseas emergency relief operations, the author interviewed Dr Bullard. Before he joined the Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations, Dr Bullard researched the Pacific War using his fluent Japanese and managed the Australia-Japan Research Project, which is sponsored by the Australian War Memorial and the Japanese Embassy in Canberra.

At the time of the interview, Dr Bullard had a list of seventy-six military deployments overseas for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In eight of them, between 1963 and 1979, Australian military units deployed in Asian countries at war or in war's aftermath to bring relief supplies, transport refugees, or provide medical care. Other cases are not related to armed conflict.

Australian capabilities and organisation for overseas emergency relief operations changed in the mid-1980s. Dr Bullard criticises the Defence of Australia policy, which considered only states as threats, as 'old security ideas', but assessed that the ADF became more suitable for emergency relief abroad because its 'force structure changed to emphasise small-scale conflicts and situations.'

The Natural Disaster Organisation was transferred from the Department of Defence to the Attorney-General's Department in the mid-1980s, in response to the development of civilian organisations. Thus reorganised, Emergency Management Australia (EMA) became responsible for coordinating whole-of-government response. The coordination arrangements are detailed in the Australian Government Overseas Disaster Assistance Plan (AUSASSISTPLAN). In ordinary times, the EMA plans for overseas disaster assistance on the basis of request by AusAID. In emergency, EMA leads a task force of the Department of Defence; the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; AusAID; the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the Department of the Treasury at the department secretary level. Because of Australia's involvement in South Pacific security issues, elected officials understand overseas disaster relief to be a matter of course.

This image of a government that has overcome stove-piping, and united behind overseas operations,

[71] Australian War Memorial, 'Official histories', http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/ .

embodies the strategic thought that peacebuilding is in Australia's national interest.

According to Dr Bullard, some ADF officers at first 'believed that disaster relief and peacekeeping are not their primary missions, but experience in whole-of-government operations let them overcome that belief. The ADF caught up with the broader ideas of security that followed the end of the Cold War.' The ADF thus considers island states near Australia to be the main area for disaster relief, and has designated field hospitals and supplies for immediate airlift. At the same time, Australian experts on disaster management share the view that civilians should do what they can, and would rather not rely on the ADF more than necessary.

In Volume V of the Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations, Dr Bullard not only describes past operations. For the larger operations for disaster relief, he is developing an objective measure of success and failure. The criteria are immediate effectiveness and efficiency of the deployment; current state of recovery; impact on politics in the host country; and impact on host country's relations with Australia. The volume also describes changes in Australian capabilities, organisation and response.

With this official history series, Australia is stepping to the world's forefront in one more aspect of peace operations: accountability to its own citizenry.

Part 6 Japan's Problems, and How Australia Can Help

6-1 The Japanese have not thought of military forces as a 'windbreak'

In 2003, Japan's annual white paper on defence spent nine pages summing up the first ten years of Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping operations. During the decade from 1992, Japan laid the foundations of activities for building peace abroad. The major turning point in this period was the amendment of the International Peace Cooperation Law in 2001 to allow peacekeepers to use weapons to defend 'individuals who have come under their control during the performance of duties'.

The first decade of Japanese peacekeeping

Japan's first peacekeepers were Self-Defense Force personnel who served in Cambodia from 1992. In reviewing ten years of peacekeeping operations, the white paper *Defense of Japan 2003* excerpted the prescription by the Chief Cabinet Secretary's Advisory Group on International Cooperation for Peace, which was chaired by Yasushi Akashi, the former Under-Secretary-General of the UN.

> It is an urgent challenge for Japan to cooperate more actively, more comprehensively and more flexibly for international peace, and this challenge should be positioned as a fundamental duty of our nation. The followings are proposed to promote systematic revisions, and specific policy enhancement and expansion. (Following are excerpts of proposals related only to the Defense Agency and the SDF.)
>
> ○ A legal framework needs to be established urgently to implement more flexible international peace cooperation work.
>
> • On five principles for Japan's PKO participation, if having to secure ceasefire accords between warring countries or having to secure consent from warring countries to PKO participation does not make sense, the SDF could still participate in PKO if there were a resolution by the U.N. Security Council, for example.
>
> • The scope of international peace cooperation activities in which the SDF can participate should be expanded to include duties concerning escort operations and the use of weapons against attempts by forceful means to block SDF personnel from executing their PKO duties (so-called B-type activities).
>
> • The SDF should be allowed to take part in a U.N. Standby Arrangements System, which is aimed to make U.N. PKO activities more flexible. [72]

Defense of Japan 2003 recounts the SDF's activities in Cambodia:

[72]Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2003*, Inter Group, Tokyo, 2003, p. 267. Subsequent references are indicated by page numbers.

Japan's participation in the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) from September 1992, marked the opening of a new era for Japan's efforts for international peace. Under the UNTAC operation, the SDF sent engineering units and personnel in charge of monitoring a ceasefire agreement. Also civilian police officers and officials were despatched to Cambodia to monitor elections.

An engineering battalion of about 600, sent from the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) as the first batch of Japan's PKO participation in Cambodia, camped at Ta Keo and engaged in PKO for about six months. Their major assignment included repairing the war-torn road networks and bridges, such as National Highway Route 2 and Route 3, providing water, fuel, food, medical services and accommodation to sections comprising UNTAC, as well as transport and storage of goods for these sections.

The achievements made by the GSDF battalion included having repaired roads with [sic] totaling about 100 kilometers and about 40 bridges. Senior liaison officers of the GSDF battalion were sent to the headquarters of UNTAC, and served as liaison and coordinating officers between UNTAC and the GSDF battalion while engaging in information gathering.

The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) assisted the GSDF battalion by helping it transport goods and materials at the beginning of the mission and at the time of redeployment, and also by supplying essential goods to its camp during the PKO mission. The MSDF used six transport ships to transport 23 vehicles while the ASDF flew 59 planes and used about 400 ASDF personnel, airlifting a total of 440 tons of goods and materials for the GSDF battalion. In addition, the MSDF helped provide accommodation and meals for the battalion.

During the PKO mission by the SDF, one officer sent from Japan for UNTAC operations was killed. The tragedy occurred at a time when the domestic situation in Cambodia was becoming tense ahead of an election that would choose lawmakers for a parliament charged with establishing the Constitution. In response to the incident, the GSDF battalion, during the election campaign period, exchanged regional information as such information would be also necessary in repairing roads and bridges. The battalion also transported food, water, and other daily necessities to UNTAC officials in charge of monitoring the elections.

The second contingent of the GSDF battalion, which was of the same scale as the first batch, continued to engage in PKO until September 1993. [259-60]

The International Peace Cooperation Law, which provided the legal authority to deploy the SDF to Cambodia, was enacted after Japan deployed minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in 1991. As UN peacekeeping operations became more important in the world after the Cold War, participation by Japan became a national challenge, and the legislation passed in June 1992. The three major issues in Diet were whether participation in PKOs amounted to 'use of force' prohibited by the Japanese Constitution; the relationship between the UN force commander's authority over deployed SDF units

and the national command authority of the Director-General of the Defense Agency; and whether neighbouring countries would understand Japan's motives for deploying the SDF overseas.

The law left three issues for resolution in the future. The first was a freeze on 'core PKF operations'. The government judged that more understanding and support in Japan and abroad were necessary before Self-Defense Force units could conduct those activities. The law imposed a freeze on six 'core PKF operations' until further legislation: monitoring ceasefire relocation, withdrawal or demobilisation of armed forces; stationing and patrol in buffer zones and similar demarcated areas; inspection or identification of transportation of weapons and parts; collection, storage or disposal of abandoned weapons and parts; assistance in the designation of ceasefire lines and similar boundaries; and assistance in prisoner exchanges.

Second, in the Self-Defense Forces Law, international peace cooperation activities were added to Chapter VIII, Miscellaneous Regulations, as a secondary mission of the SDF.

Third, regarding which organisation should deploy, some pointed to differences between peacekeeping and the SDF's main mission of defending Japan, and argued that a specialised organisation was necessary either outside or inside the SDF. Japan decided that peacekeepers should remain members of the SDF and draw on the SDF's self-sufficient capabilities. Organisation within the SDF remained open to change.

The five principles for Japanese participation

The International Peace Cooperation Law stipulated five conditions that must be satisfied before a Japanese contingent may be despatched: ceasefire in place; consent of the parties to the conflict; impartiality; suspension or termination of participation if any of the above conditions ceases to be satisfied; and limitation of the use of weapons to the minimum necessary to protect life or person of the personnel. The five principles are now sometimes perceived as an obstacle. But in 1992, they were necessary for assuring the international community of Japan's benign motive for deploying the SDF to Cambodia.

Amendments to International Peace Cooperation Law

Since then, Japan has eased some of the International Peace Cooperation Law's restrictions. In 1998, the senior officer on the scene was authorised to order the use of weapons, except when danger to life or body is imminent and there is no time to await such orders. Until then, individual SDF personnel were responsible for the use of weapons. The major turning point came in December 2001 with the end of the freeze on SDF units' participation in 'core PKF operations', such as monitoring of ceasefire and disarmament, stationing and patrolling in buffer zones, inspection at checkpoints, and disposal of abandoned weapons. Until then, SDF peacekeepers were restricted to rear echelon support like medi-

cine, transport, communications and construction. Also in December 2001, the purposes for which SDF peacekeepers may use weapons were enlarged to include defence of 'individuals who have come under their control during the performance of duties' and defence of the SDF peacekeepers' own weapons and equipment.

Expansion of personnel and equipment for peacekeeping

Enactment and amendment of the International Peace Cooperation Law advanced the training and equipment of peacekeepers. SDF officers and other personnel study peace operations. Officers who are likely to deploy were trained in countries more experienced in peacekeeping like Nordic countries. The SDF has sought actively to participate in discussions and training exercises abroad about PKO, and absorbed knowledge and know-how. On missions with Japanese contingents, the SDF has sought contributed officers to mission headquarters for the sake of close communication. In order to let deployed personnel focus on their missions, the SDF has supported their families back home. As for equipment, those necessary for life in the field like field kitchens, water purifiers and tents, and those necessary for medical missions like portable field surgical hospitals were upgraded, and backed up with systems for deploying them on peace operations.

Despatch of Self-Defense Force Officers to UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

In 2000, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations recommended increase in the number of personnel in the DPKO. In response, Japan amended a law on personnel and despatched one Ground SDF officer in November 2001 to the Military Planning Service in DPKO's Office of Military Affairs, where he contributed to policies and plans.

Japanese public became more supportive

As the Self-Defense Forces proceeded with peace operations, the Japanese public became much more aware of the nature of the missions. According to the Cabinet Office's triennial survey of public opinion on the SDF and defence issues, in fiscal year 1993, immediately after the deployment to Cambodia, 48 percent of respondents supported or were 'somewhat supportive' of 'participation in future UN peacekeeping operations' and 31 percent opposed or were 'somewhat opposed'. In 2002, after the terrorist attacks in the United States, 70 percent supported or were 'somewhat supportive' and only 13 percent opposed or were 'somewhat opposed'. On the basis of this public opinion, *Defense of Japan 2003* declares:

> The SDF's activities for international peace cooperation are now so fully understood by people and are also anticipated so much that these missions have become one of their main activities. ... The SDF's engagement in international peace cooperation has advanced so much that it is no longer regarded as a novice in this area. [263, 266]

This table from *Defense of Japan 2009* summarises the SDF's peace operations since Cambodia.

Fig. III-3-1-7
International Peace Cooperation Activities by SDF

Duration	International Peace Cooperation Activities (Type of activities)	Region
Sep. 1992 – Sep. 1993	Cambodia (U.N. peacekeeping operations)	Southeast Asia
May 1993 – Jan. 1995	Mozambique (U.N. peacekeeping operations)	Africa
Sep. 1994 – Dec. 1994	Rwanda (International humanitarian assistance)	Africa
Feb. 1996 –	The Golan Heights (U.N. peacekeeping operations)	Middle East
Nov. 1999 – Feb. 2000	Timor Leste (International humanitarian assistance)	Southeast Asia
Oct. 2001	Afghanistan (International humanitarian assistance)	Central Asia
Feb. 2002 – Jun. 2004	Timor Leste (U.N. peacekeeping operations)	Southeast Asia
Mar. 2003 – Apr. 2003	Iraq (International humanitarian assistance)	Middle East
Jul. 2003 – Aug. 2003	Iraq (International humanitarian assistance)	Middle East
Mar. 2007 –	Nepal (U.N. Peacekeeping operations)	South Asia
Oct. 2008 –	Sudan (U.N. Peacekeeping operations)	Africa

Bold frame: Ongoing international peace cooperation activities

Overseas disaster relief

Along with peacekeeping, disaster relief by the Self-Defense Forces has won acclaim abroad. Since enacting the Japan Disaster Relief Team Law of 1987, Japan has provided emergency relief for major disasters, especially in developing countries, upon request, mainly through the Japan International Cooperation Agency. The SDF has supported it since 1992, when the law was amended. Based on the SDF's accomplishments within Japan, the SDF's role in disaster relief has focused on medicine, including emergency treatment and disinfection; local transport of supplies, patients and personnel by helicopters; water purification; and long-range transport of personnel, supplies and equipment by aircraft and amphibious ships. The Ground SDF is prepared to provide its self-sufficient capabilities for medicine, transport and water supply. Readiness for overseas disaster relief rotates between one of the Ground SDF's five armies every six months. The Maritime SDF's Self Defense Fleet and the Air SDF's Air Support Command stand by to transport personnel and materiel. This table from *Defense of Japan 2009* summarises the SDF's disaster relief operations.

Fig. III-3-1-12
International Disaster Relief Operations and Others by the SDF

Duration	International Disaster Relief Operations and Other	Region
Nov. 1998-Dec. 1998	International disaster relief operations in response to a hurricane that hit Honduras	Latin America
Sep. 1999-Nov. 1999	Transportation of necessary resources for international disaster relief operations in quake-hit northwestern Turkey	Middle East
Feb. 2001	International disaster relief operations in response to a major earthquake in India	South Asia
Dec. 2003-Jan. 2004	Transportation of necessary resources for international disaster relief operations in quake-hit southeastern Iran	Middle East
Dec. 2004-Mar. 2005	International disaster relief operations after a large-scale earthquake off Indonesia's Sumatra Island and consequent tsunami in the Indian Ocean	Southeast Asia
Aug. 2005	International disaster relief operations for a Russian mini-submarine accident off Kamchatka Peninsula in Russia	North Pacific
Oct. 2005-Dec. 2005	International disaster relief operations in response to a major earthquake in Pakistan and other countries	South Asia
Jun. 2006	International disaster relief operations in response to a major earthquake in central Java Island in Indonesia	Southeast Asia

Lesson from Cambodia (1): Building roads in areas safer than contractors'

Japanese discussion of participation in peacekeeping began in 1992, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, with deployment of the SDF to Cambodia as an end in itself. Without the deployment, Japan would miss another chance to show that it was a responsible member of the international community. On the other hand, Japan's Asian neighbours regarded the prospect of overseas deployment of the SDF with mistrust. Thus, Japan adopted the expedient measure of freezing 'core PKF activities' in which infantry dominate, and limited the contingent to two thousand troops by the odd logic of 'avoid alarming neighbouring countries, but not so small as to hinder activities'.

But a troublesome issue transpired and cast doubt on Japan's approach to peace operations. A Japanese contractor planned to repair and build roads and bridges, just like SDF engineers, but in a more dangerous area near a region controlled by the Khmer Rouge. The Japanese firm planned to work on Route National 6A, which was closer to Khmer Rouge areas than RN 2 and RN 3, with Japanese official development assistance to be channelled by the Grant Aid Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Economic Cooperation Bureau.

Although this plan was not implemented while the Self-Defense Force deployed in Cambodia, it was a direct challenge to the Japanese government's position that SDF engineers were repairing and building roads and bridges in Cambodia because the SDF was the only Japanese organisation capable of the task. Behind this issue was disagreement among Japanese at the time about peace operations,

which extended even into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Until then, the main instrument of Japanese foreign policy was economic aid under the Economic Cooperation Bureau's leadership. But other MOFA officials who sought to increase Japan's international influence by deploying the SDF on peacekeeping operations brought senior Liberal Democratic Party legislators on board for deployment to Cambodia. The contract for the private business to work in an area between the SDF and the Khmer Rouge was a counterattack by the economic diplomacy faction.

Lesson from Cambodia (2): No aviation, no mine clearance

Although unknown to all but a few, senior Japanese officials considered deployment of aviation units as a likely option alongside engineer units in mid-April 1992, when the Japanese began to discuss participation in peacekeeping more specifically. The Ground SDF was one of the world's several largest rotary wing air forces in the world, with about 400 helicopters. In Cambodia, helicopters were very much in demand for aerial survey, transport of materiel and people, and medical evacuation. When Mr Yasushi Akashi, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, visited Japan in mid-June 1992, he agreed with the author on this point.

But bureaucrats who did not want to rock the boat claimed 'Helicopters are conspicuous and remind people of armed helicopters in movies about the Vietnam War like *Apocalypse Now* and *Platoon.* Besides, helicopter units and engineer units would exceed two thousand people between them.' Furthermore, experts were looking forward to the Ground SDF's engineers to clear some of the five million mines left in Cambodia soil, but Japan chose not to because 'Accidents in mine clearance would provoke the Japanese public to oppose deployment of SDF as peacekeepers.' In fact, aviation and mine clearance were missions in which the SDF, and no other Japanese organisation, were capable. The result of this bureaucratic passivity was a not-so-funny joke in which military engineers worked in areas safer than contractors.

Lesson of assistance to Rwandan refugees: Should Japan take one machine gun or two?

In September 1994, Japan deployed a contingent of 260 personnel, mostly from the Ground SDF, to Zaire in response to the massive flow of refugees following the Rwandan civil war. The Air SDF deployed aircraft and 118 personnel to Nairobi to support the contingent in Zaire. The Rwandan Refugees Assistance Unit treated an average of more than 30 outpatients a day totalling some 2,100, and conducted about 70 surgeries, while dealing with diseases that are rare in Japan like cholera and malaria. The unit disinfected toilets of refugee camps, transported disinfectants, educated refugees to prevent malaria and exterminate lice, and purified an average of 1,200 tons of water a day totalling some 70,000 tons. The air contingent flew C-130H aircraft between Nairobi and Goma to transport members and supplies of the Refugee Assistant Unit, UN HCR and NGOs. The transport aircraft flew the trip, which is one thousand kilometres one way, almost every day until December 1994 for a total of 98 runs. They transported a total of 3,400 people and 510 tons of cargo.

The Refugees Assistance Unit was dealing with consequences of the Rwandan civil war, which was notorious for mass killings. The unit faced tense security conditions. *Defense of Japan 2003* recalls:

> As the local security situation was unstable, the SDF unit turned to Zaire's military to help ensure the protection of its personnel from possible Armed Attack. The unit's members also carried weapons when necessary, and wore bulletproof vests and steel helmets when they went out. In addition, at their camps, members tightened security by piling up sandbags as shields against possible attack whenever night fell, as no single night passed without the sound of gunshots being heard. [262]

Nevertheless, the Japanese Diet astounded the world by debating seriously whether the Rwandan Refugee Assistant Unit should be allowed to take only one machine gun or allowed two. As is well known, a machine gun can suppress the enemy only by firing continuously in long or short bursts. On the other hand, it breaks down easily by, for instance, jamming. Without a spare machine gun, the Japanese contingent could have been massacred. Japan began peace operations while persuading a public opinion that lacked basic knowledge like this.

Japanese peace operations in the 21st century: Toward strategy and philosophy

As recounted above, Japanese peace operations began with mine clearance in the Persian Gulf and the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia, and accumulated results in Mozambique, Zaire, the Golan Heights, East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, Nepal and Sudan. Self-Defense Force officers have been serving in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Japan Disaster Relief teams have deployed to Honduras, Turkey, India, Iran, Indonesia (Sumatra and Java), Russia (Kamchatka), Pakistan and Haiti. Deployments for 'war on terror' and reconstruction of Iraq are especially noteworthy for challenging Japan formulate a strategy and philosophy of peace operations.

War on terror

From December 2001, months after the attacks in the United States, the Maritime SDF replenished at sea US, UK, French, German, Pakistani and other naval ships engaged in maritime interdiction of terrorism. By replenishing the vessels' fuel, their helicopters' fuel and water, this Japanese operation has allowed them to perform their mission at sea without returning to port for replenishment. Thus, it won acclaim from the countries involved. UN Security Council Resolutions 1776 (September 2007) and 1833 (September 2008) expressed appreciation for the many countries' contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom, including its maritime interdiction component.

After almost six years, replenishment at sea by Japan was interrupted in November 2007 because the government was not able to renew the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law on time. The operation resumed in January 2008. But when the Democratic Party of Japan's Hatoyama cabinet took office in September 2009, it announced that it would let the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law

expire on 15 January 2010. The Maritime SDF left the Indian Ocean.

From November 2001 until the operation ended, the Maritime SDF deployed a total of 13,300 sailors, 27 replenishment ships, 44 escort ships and 2 other ships. They replenished ships from twelve countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Pakistan, Canada, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Greece and Denmark) with marine fuel 939 times (510,000 kilolitres), helicopter fuel 85 times (1200 kilolitres) and water 195 times (11,000 tonnes).

Japanese Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group

Japan Self-Defense Forces supported reconstruction of Iraq through recovery and construction of public works such as schools and roads, water purification and medical assistance from December 2003 on the basis of the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. The Ground SDF operated in Muthanna province for two and a half years from January 2004 to June 2006. The Air SDF provided transport to the Ground SDF contingent, the UN and Multi-National Force - Iraq for five years from December 2003 to November 2008. The following table from *Defense of Japan 2009* describes the Ground SDF's activities and accomplishments. The Air SDF transported some 46,500 people and 673 tons of supplies on 821 flights.

Reference 49. GSDF Activities Based on Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, and Their Results

Activities	Description	Action	Results
Medical Activities Since February 2004	○Activities by GSDF medical personnel at four hospitals including Samawah General Hospital · Training and advice to local medical doctors regarding diagnosis methods and treatment policy · Training and advice on use of medical equipment supplied by Japan ○Technical training of ambulance personnel in Al-Muthanna Province ○Medical support including technical training for management of pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical warehouses	Medical technique support provided a total of 277 times	★Newborn infant mortality rates in Samawah reduced to one-third with development of basic medical infrastructure ★Improved ability of emergency medical services
Water Supply Activities Since March 2004	○Water purification and supply to water supply vehicles in Samawah camp Water supply activities by GSDF completed with start-up of water purification facility installed close to the camp under ODA program on February 4, 2005	About 53,500 tons of water supplied to a total of about 11.89 million people	★Stable access to clean water made possible
Public Facility Restoration and Construction Since March 2004	○Repair of walls, floors, electric circuits and others of schools in Al-Muthanna Province	Completion of 36 facilities	★Improvement of facilities at about one-third of schools in Al-Muthanna Province, resulting in improvement of educational environment
	○Groundwork and pavement of roads to be used by local citizens	Completion of groundwork at 31 locations	★Greater convenience with construction of major roads important for daily life
	○Repair works for other facilities · Medical clinic (Primary Health Center) · Nursing facilities and low-income residential housing in Samawah · Water purification facilities in Warka and Rumeitha · Uruk ruins, Olympic Stadium and other cultural facilities	Completion of 66 facilities	★Improvement of quality of life and culture for citizens of Al-Muthanna Province
Local Employment	○Local businesses mobilized for restoration and development of public facilities ○Local citizens recruited for interpreting and garbage collection at the base camp	Up to some 1,100 jobs created per day for total of 490,000 people	

The authors of *Defense of Japan 2009* praise their own brethren who served in Iraq:

> Personnel contributions by the SDF and assistance through ODA are together promoted as "two wheels of a cart." SDF contributions have obtained visible outcomes, such as the establishment of a democratic government in Iraq, improvements in security conditions and progress in reconstruction by the Iraqi people themselves; these achievements have been highly appreciated by the international community, including Iraq itself.
>
> The SDF's concrete practices of international cooperation activities which are based on daily training, succeeded in contributing to the reconstruction of Iraq, and played a steady role in international efforts in Iraq with the reliance of foreign nations. [285]

Reconstruction assistance by Japan Self-Defense Forces, however, required security in Muthanna province. Because of domestic reasons, Japan did not mandate the Ground SDF contingent to maintain security in its area. Therefore, Japan relied on members of Multi-National Force - Iraq. The Royal Netherlands, British and Australian Armies maintained the province's security in that order. Shortly after the war against Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, Australia had withdrawn almost all its forces from Iraq. But the Australian government decided in February 2005 that ground forces will deploy to Iraq in order to support the Japanese humanitarian and reconstruction assistance operation, and to train Iraqi security forces. The Australian Defence Force's Al Muthanna Task Group consisted of about 450 personnel, including an infantry company, a cavalry squadron (mechanised company) and a support company. From April 2005, three rotations deployed to the province. After the Japanese Ground SDF contingent departed, the Task Group relocated to the neighbouring Dhi Qar province in July 2006. Renamed as the Overwatch Battle Group (West), the ADF contingent served there until June 2008.

On the basis of this experience in Iraq, which was gained through cooperation with the ADF, the Japan Self-Defense Forces were able to refine their performance in Sudan and Nepal, and gained the credibility and confidence to provide a senior mentor to the peacekeeping training centre in Cairo.

UN Mission in Sudan

On 24 October 2005, the Japanese government provided two Self-Defense Force officers to UNMIS headquarters in Khartoum and despatched another to its embassy in Sudan as the defence attaché. The UN Security Council established UNMIS in response to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by the government of Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army. Almost ten thousand people serve in UNMIS, which monitors the ceasefire and helps the two sides implement the peace agreement. In addition to the military component, UNMIS has a civilian component which supports elections and coordinates humanitarian assistance. One of the SDF officers in UNMIS headquarters is a logistics staff officer in the military headquarters' Logistics Planning Office. The other, an intelligence staff officer, manages the database in the Intelligence Analysis Office of the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

UN Mission in Nepal

In March 2007, Japan despatched six Ground SDF officers to UNMIN. Following the civil war, Nepal's new government and the Maoists signed the Comprehensive Peace Accord in November 2006. By the Nepalese government's request and the UN Secretary-General's recommendation, UNMIN was established in January 2007. The Japanese team of six military monitors has been replaced every twelve months. They monitor weapons and cantonment of soldiers at seven Maoist camps and Nepali Army bases. In addition, the Japanese Ministry of Defense and the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters of the Cabinet Office have two liaison officials each in UNMIN for liaison with local agencies and to gather information.

Mentors for the peacekeeping training centre in Egypt

In November 2008, as a result of sixteen years of experience in peace operations, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force despatched two lecturers to the Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA). They gave lectures on the importance of building relationships with the local populations for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance operations. In order to reach trainees who are not familiar with civil-military cooperation, they included specific case studies from the SDF about the operation in Iraq and disaster relief in Japan and abroad, to the acclaim of the trainees and CCCPA staff.

Subsequently, Japan despatched a Ground SDF major general to CCCPA in May 2009 as a senior mentor. He supervised a tabletop exercise of peacekeeping and advised the trainees from Africa and elsewhere. In May 2010, a female SDF officer lectured in CCCPA about the SDF's operations in Iraq and East Timor.

Japan increases deployable capability

Especially noteworthy for Japanese peace operations is the establishment of the Central Readiness Force in the Ground SDF in March 2007. This formation of 4,200 personnel includes the 1st Airborne Brigade, the Central Readiness Regiment, the Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit, 1st Helicopter Brigade and other units to respond rapidly to attacks by guerrillas and special operations forces. The CRF includes the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit, which educates and trains Ground SDF personnel for peace operations. From August to September 2008, the CRF and the Air SDF's Air Support Command carried out a field training exercise with the aim of improving their ability to deploy elements of the CRF rapidly for peace operations.

In March 2010, the JDSF Joint Staff College opened its International Peace Cooperation Center. It teaches personnel from the SDF, other government agencies and elsewhere about peace operations, and engages in public relations about the SDF's peace operations. In January 2010, after the earthquake in Haiti, the Central Readiness Regiment deployed there as the advance party.

Japan equips the SDF for peace operations

The Self-Defense Forces are acquiring equipment to enable peace operations. The Ground SDF is preparing for adverse environments by acquiring vehicles with bulletproof windshields and run-flat tires, large-capacity generators, and more powerful engines for CH-47 heavy-lift helicopters. The Maritime SDF's amphibious transport ships and destroyers are the basis of Japan's capability to transport and operate helicopters abroad. Larger helicopter-carrying destroyers are on the way. In order to operate fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft effectively overseas, the Maritime SDF is also studying how to make the Maritime Air Command and Control System portable and more independent of bases in Japan. The Air SDF is acquiring satellite telephones and other equipment for maintaining air-ground communications in diverse environments.

Mental health care

In order to endure that deployed personnel can focus on their missions, in mental and physical health, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have taken measures to ease the anxiety of deployed personnel and their families in Japan. Teleconferencing and exchange of video messages keep them in touch. Briefing sessions inform families of their loved ones' missions. Family support centres and family counselling rooms are available too. Pre-deployment training of SDF personnel includes stress reduction techniques. Contingents deploy with SDF personnel who have been trained as counsellors. When necessary, psychiatrists visit abroad, or sickened personnel return to Japan.

Developments toward a general law for peace operations

As the Self-Defense Forces continued to accumulate results in peace operations, The Diet began debating the necessity of a general or permanent law for peace operations that fall outside of traditional UN peacekeeping and disaster relief. Each time Japan deployed the SDF abroad for operations other than those two kinds, it enacted a Special Measures Law. This is not a way to respond rapidly, or to show the international community that it can count on Japan for peace operations. Therefore, vigorous debate followed. In August 2006, the Liberal Democratic Party's subcommittee on defence policy accepted an 'International Peace Cooperation Bill' as a basis for debate within the party. In June 2008, the project team of the LDP and Komeito (then the governing coalition) on a general law for peace operations settled on an interim report. That project team agreed that the general law should stay within the current Constitution, and that civilian control should be ensured through measures like the Diet's approval for deployments. The interim report left open explicitly for further discussion a few issues. One was whether to expand missions beyond ceasefire monitoring and humanitarian and reconstruction operations to include guarding and escorting persons other than Japanese. Another was whether Japan can participate in peace operations that have not been approved by the UN Security Council.

Peacekeeping and disaster relief in Haiti

The deployment of the Japan Self-Defense Forces to Haiti in January 2010 after the earthquake showed the degree of maturity of Japan's peace operations. The SDF deployed only eight days after the UN Secretary-General's request and one day after the defence minister's order. Several years ago, the SDF would have needed two months to deploy a contingent of similar size. Organisational and individual factors accelerated the Japanese deployment to Haiti. The Central Readiness Force had matured enough for immediate deployment. The director of the Ground Staff Office's Defense Policy and Programs Department was Major General Koichiro Bansho, who commanded the Ground SDF's first contingent in Iraq. Japan did all it could to deploy the SDF to Haiti because it had just withdrawn replenishment ships from the Indian Ocean, and wished to soften the impact of that decision on the international community's perception of Japan's reliability as a contributor to international peace and security. The Japanese government decided quickly to hire from Ukraine the giant transport aircraft Antonov An-225 and An-124. The Japan's capability for peace operations has matured to an extent.

In Haiti, dispute over President Aristide's re-election in 2000 was followed by four years of political and social turmoil in the country culminating in the coup d'état against him in February 2004. The UN Security Council established the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in June 2004. Its PKF included some 7,000 troops and 2,000 police from forty-seven countries. About 1,900 civilians and UN volunteers from Haiti and abroad served in MINUSTAH. The UN Security Council mandated the mission to ensure a secure and stable environment, including support for police reform; to support political processes like elections; and to promote human rights, including by monitoring and reporting on the human rights situation.

Then, on 12 January 2010 (13 January in Asia and Australia), a catastrophic earthquake of magnitude 7.0 struck Haiti. According to the donors' conference in March, 222,570 people were killed, 310,928 were wounded, 869 went missing, and economic damage amounted to US$7.75 billion. MINUSTAH lost the Mission Chief, Hédi Annabi, his deputy Luiz Carlos da Costa, and Acting Commissioner of police, Doug Coates.

The Japanese government deployed a Disaster Relief team of 25 personnel from 16 to 26 January in Léogâne, 40 kilometres west of Port-au-Prince. From 23 January, a medical team of 100 personnel from the 13th Brigade of the Ground Self-Defense Force operated in Léogâne, whether they treated 2,954 patients by 13 February. Meanwhile, the Air SDF provided air transport from 17 January to 6 February, especially to the medical team from Japan International Cooperation Agency.

Because of the urgent situation, Japan deployed personnel, mostly from the Ground SDF, in the following manner. The UN had requested governments to deploy disaster relief capabilities within two weeks. Military organisations like the SDF, which need endurance for long-term operations, start

moving slowly for the most part. But the SDF's response to the earthquake in Haiti was remarkably swift of foot. Lining up the SDF's response with the UN and the Japanese government's responses shows its speed.

13 January: Earthquake in Haiti (Dates are in Japanese standard time in this timeline.)
19 January: UNSC Resolution 1908 enlarges MINUSTAH and calls on states to deploy units
25 January: Japan informs UN headquarters that it would deploy SDF engineer units. Minister of Defense directs SDF chiefs of staff to prepare
27 January: Japan sends a fact-finding team of three personnel, including one from International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, Cabinet Office
29 January: UN headquarters requests Japan formally to deploy SDF engineer units
5 February: Cabinet approves 'Haiti International Peace Cooperation Activities Implementation Plan', and gives 'JSDF Action Order on Implementation of Haiti International Peace Cooperation Activities'

Hence, the Ground SDF's first contingent of about 160 personnel departed the next evening, most of them on a VIP aircraft of the Air SDF. They arrived in Florida in the evening of 6 February (local time). Thirty-four of them proceeded to Port-au-Prince the next morning by the Air SDF's C-130H aircraft, followed soon by the rest. The Ground SDF planned to first deploy about 200 members of the Central Readiness Force, who can deploy rapidly. Once in Haiti, they would get to work quickly as engineers, both for disaster relief and to build a camp for themselves and later Japanese contingents. The first set of earth-moving equipment departed Narita in the evening of 9 February by chartered An-124 aircraft. It arrived in the Dominican Republic on 11 February and entered Haiti over land. Other heavy equipment was flown by chartered An-225 aircraft.

The Ground SDF's Northern Army, which provided the second Japanese contingent, prepared quickly with measures like emergency maintenance of equipment. The second contingent embarked on chartered aircraft and ships about a month after the order of 5 February, gradually replaced the first contingent in Haiti, and began full-scale engineering work. The second contingent comprised about 350 engineers (190 for work on UN projects, 160 to support the contingent itself) with about 150 vehicles. The engineers are armed with pistols, rifles and machine guns for self-defence. Their work includes removal of rubble in the Port-au-Prince area, preparation of ground for displaced persons camps, road repair and construction of simple facilities. Ground SDF engineers will work in Haiti until 30 November 2010.

To support Ground SDF contingents, the Maritime SDF provided a transport unit of about 540 sailors on an amphibious transport ship, a replenishment ship and a destroyer. The Air SDF provided two C-130H transports, a U-4 (Gulfstream IV) utility aircraft, a KC-767 aerial refuelling aircraft, and a VIP aircraft (Boeing 747-400), flown and maintained by about 200 airmen.

Giving up deployment of helicopters to Sudan

Despite the evolution described above, Japan still must solve many problems in order to realise its potential for peace operations. The Japanese decision not to deploy helicopters to Sudan is a case in point. The Japanese government announced it on 13 July 2010: 'Because deployment of units and operation of helicopters in Sudan would be extremely challenging, we made an overall judgment not to deploy' Self-Defense Force units to the UN Mission in Sudan. Since the Democratic Party of Japan came to power in autumn 2009, the government considered deployment of SDF units to the UN peacekeeping operation in southern Sudan. The government was seeking an alternative way for the SDF to contribute to international peace and security, now that it was ending the refuelling mission in the Indian Ocean. The Ground SDF, however, regarded this prospective mission warily from the beginning. The Ground SDF's heavy-lift helicopter has hardly any armour and is vulnerable to ground fire. The current International Peace Cooperation Law allows for lethal fire only to avoid imminent harm to self and others, i.e. not until the SDF unit was already under fire.

Counter-piracy measures near Somalia

Currently, counter-piracy operation is a large part of Japan's international peace cooperation activities.

By 2005, pirates armed with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades were committing crimes against ships in the Gulf of Aden near Somalia. The European Union began Operation Atalanta in December 2008 to escort the World Food Program's ships and patrol these waters. NATO began its operation against piracy in March 2009. States that have deployed naval vessels to waters near Somalia include United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece, Denmark, Russia, India, China, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Yemen and Kenya.

Among the ships that sail the Gulf of Aden, some two thousand a year are sailing to or from Japan or owned by Japanese firms. These waters are vital for Japan because of the traffic between Europe and the Middle East on the one hand and East Asia on the other. As a stopgap measure pending new legislation, the Japanese government ordered the SDF on 13 March 2009 to undertake maritime security operations per Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.[73] Two destroyers, *Sazanami* and *Samidare*, deployed first. They had the legal authority to take non-coercive measures like calling out suspicious vessels with long range acoustic devices and checking on situations with helicopters. Two P-3C patrol aircraft joined them a few months later.

In June 2009, the Law on Punishment of and Measures against Acts of Piracy enabled the government to escort ships that have no ties to Japan and to use weapons to stop pirate ships.

[73]The cabinet decides, the prime minister approves, and the minister of Defense orders.

The air contingent based in Djibouti includes the Maritime SDF's patrol aircraft, Ground SDF units to guard them, and an Air SDF unit of C-130H and U-4 aircraft for transporting equipment and parts. Thus, it is the first joint unit deployed abroad by Japan. Eight Coast Guard officers are aboard the two destroyers in order to exercise police powers over pirates like arrest and investigation. In July 2010, Japan began building a base inside Djibouti Airport. The Japanese have been renting space in a US military facility distant from their aircraft's parking space. Their base would allow the Japanese to stay for the long term. The Japanese government also began considering legislation to enable replenishment at sea of foreign ships that are countering piracy; if it were enacted, Japan would deploy a replenishment ship.

Disaster relief continues

As noted, the Self-Defense Forces continues its record of accomplishment in overseas disaster relief. The SDF has capabilities necessary for disaster relief activities like (1) medicine, including emergency treatment and disinfection; (2) local transport of supplies, patients and personnel, especially by helicopters; (3) water purification; and (4) long-range transport of personnel, supplies and equipment by aircraft and amphibious ships. The Ground SDF maintains the ability to conduct disaster relief with self-sufficiency. The Central Readiness Force and one of the Ground SDF's five armies can deploy units at any time. The Maritime SDF's Self Defense Fleet and the Air SDF's Air Support Command stand by to transport personnel and materiel. Upon the earthquake in Java in May 2006, the SDF provided medical support at the request of the Indonesian government. Japanese medics treated a total of about 3,800 patients, inoculated about 1700 people, and disinfected 4,300 square metres.

The military's role as a windbreak, an orthopaedic cast or a splint

We have reviewed how the Japan Self-Defense Forces has accumulated experience and results, and acquired sophisticated capabilities, in almost twenty years since setting foot in Cambodia.

Nevertheless, in terms of engagement in peacebuilding by Japan as a whole, major problems remain with the social and political environment around the SDF. One is immaturity of public opinion. The other is stove-piped government. Immaturity of public opinion leads to absence of philosophy and even absence of national-level strategy, and thereby damages national interests and threatens the people's security. The next section of this report describes in detail the current state of stove-piping in the Japanese government where it affects peace operations.

Immaturity of public opinion was most obvious when Japan deployed the Self-Defense Force in late 2003 to support reconstruction of Iraq. Much of Japanese public opinion consists of people who believe that the only purpose of military organisations is to launch wars and kill. This perception is

not likely to inspire ideas about how to control military organisations soundly and appropriately, and to use them as a tool for building peace.

Certainly, military organisations should not be the main force for reconstruction of Iraq or any other country. If infrastructure is not being built by contractors and electric power companies, then there is no hope for nation-building. But when the state has disappeared and social order has broken down, as in Iraq from 2003, unarmed foreign civilians cannot be the main force of reconstruction from the beginning. Hardly any civilian would volunteer. On the other hand, if reconstruction were delayed, chaos would continue, endangering even neighbouring countries.

What to do in such a situation is obvious: deploy an organisation that can withstand danger, i.e. military organisation like the Japan Self-Defense Force, to lay the foundations of reconstruction and hand over to civilian organisations as soon as possible. In the entire process of reconstruction, activities by military organisations may be as small as ten percent, but that ten percent is indispensable. The author expressed this role of the military as an ‘orthopaedic cast’ or ‘splint’ for protecting a broken bone while it heals. Dr David Kilcullen, the eminent counterinsurgency expert and Australian Army veteran, expressed the identical idea about the military’s role as a ‘windbreak’ for protecting seedlings of peace. Surely this is the philosophy for using military organisations to realise peace.

There is a persistent argument that, even for peace operations, deployment of military organisations would create a cycle of violence. But those who make this argument have never answered what would shut down a cycle of violence. To get to the point, military organisations that are not controlled soundly by democratic processes can exacerbate a cycle of violence, but those that deploy under thorough civilian control in the essential sense can function as a compelling force to resist and shut down raging violence. Argument by cycle of violence is an irresponsible and immature argument that ignores democracy and civilian control.

Freeways are divided by a median strip because, even though Japan’s Road Traffic Law assumes that drivers believe other drivers obey the law, that kind of trust does not help when an oncoming car veers into your lane at highway speed. Those who demand sending medical teams and water well drillers instead of soldiers are correct as far as safe and secure areas are concerned. But neither medical outreach nor drilling is possible amidst raging violence. As a matter of sequence, median strips and windbreaks are necessary to create a safe environment. Then, casts and splints can be applied to restore order while helping the local communities with medicine and wells. Even countries that opposed the invasion of Iraq in 2003 have deployed military organisations there later to support reconstruction with this kind of philosophy.

Proposal for a Japanese model of peacekeeping forces

In Japan, the role of the Self-Defense Forces' units in UN peacekeeping operations is still controversial whenever one deploys. Their deployment to PKFs under the model proposed below should not be controversial.

Overseas deployment of military organisations tends to provoke opposition in Japan that they are going to war. Although Japan has made progress in winning neighbouring countries' understanding about deployments for peace operations, opposition to 'Japanese military expedition' might return whenever their relations with Japan worsen. On the other hand, forgoing participation in peacekeeping forces would deprive the Japanese contingent of the ability to function as a compelling force to shut down the cycle of violence, and reduce the benefit of deployment.

Given these domestic and foreign public opinions, self-regulation by the following three principles should facilitate full-scale participation in PKFs by Japan. First, demarcate clearly between regular PKFs on one hand and peace enforcement forces, multinational forces and Chapter VII UN forces on the other with a definition of organisations and weapons that a PKF may have. Even if this definition were unique to Japan, it would be satisfy its purpose if it the rest of the world found it logical. Second, domestically, refine conditions for participation like the five principles from 1992, and clarify criteria for use of weapons through strict rules of engagement. ROEs are a means of extending civilian control to the lowest levels of the PKF contingent and avoiding needless conflict. Third, Japan will despatch the Self-Defense Forces' most senior officers to the UN Security Council's Military Staff Committee and fully engage in the committee's work on peacekeeping operations, but not on other military operations. Japan will fully participate in the use of military organisations to police parties to a conflict, but not in use of force in a military operation against an enemy.

What distinguishes a PKF, which uses a military organisation to police parties to a conflict, from other forces like peace enforcement forces that conduct military operations? What demarcates the two? A clue is in the organisation of infantry divisions like those of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force as well as the US Army before its reorganisation into brigade combat teams. Japanese infantry regiments and US infantry battalions in those divisions can attack modern ground forces effectively only when they are reinforced themselves as combined arms teams with strike capabilities, with spears, not only shields.

The Ground SDF's 2nd Division, which has up to 7,000 troops, is a good example. Its combat arms units are three infantry regiments, a tank regiment, an artillery regiment, an air defence artillery battalion, a reconnaissance unit, and an aviation unit. They are supported by an engineer battalion, a communications battalion, a chemical defence unit and a logistics support regiment, which includes weapons, supply, transport and medical units. In order to generate the capability to attack combined

arms formations, the division reinforces each infantry regiment with the strike capabilities of a tank company, an artillery battalion and an anti-tank helicopter unit to organise three regimental combat teams. This organisation with 'spear' is necessary for any operation to defeat a modern ground force and seize territory, whether or not the operation is under UN command.

In contrast, PKFs for policing parties to a conflict usually involve no combat arms other than infantry. Armed only with weapons organic to infantry units, those PKFs are not capable of seizing territory from modern ground forces. Figuratively, they have shields but no spears. Japanese infantry regiments are equipped with pistols, rifles, light and heavy machine guns, 84- and 106- millimetre recoilless rifles (being replaced by anti-tank guided missiles), and 81- and 120- millimetre mortars. These weapons are fundamentally defensive. Recoilless rifles and portable anti-tank guided missiles are for repelling an attack by tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles at close range. Mortars repel an attack by infantry or combined arms by forcing the attackers to disperse. The ranges of these infantry weapons do not exceed that of the heavy mortar. They are like shields.

Thus, in an armed conflict, PKFs armed only with infantry weapons can function only like riot police in body armour. They are clearly within the limits of the Japanese Constitution. The Ground SDF engineer battalion in Cambodia, which was armed only with pistols and rifles, were like police constables with nightsticks.

Nevertheless, the Japanese have engaged in fruitless debate over deployment of the Self-Defense Forces to PKFs without understanding the latter's difference with peace enforcement forces, multi-national forces and Chapter VII UN forces. This debate will end when Japan demarcates clearly between unreinforced infantry regiments and regimental combat teams, and designates the former as the basis for participation in PKFs. Japanese infantry will deploy with weapons organic to their regiments, but not necessarily all of them. The number and kinds of weapons would depend on the mission.

Understanding about rules of engagement will prevent recurrence of the farcical debate over whether to take one machine gun or two on the mission to assist Rwandan refugees. Essentially, ROEs define the basic framework of the use of force like triggering conditions and limits to firepower. Each country has ROEs for the purpose of limiting excessive use of force by military organisations and establishing civilian control. The rules encompass the whole range from protocols for the commander-in-chief's order to initiate or respond to hostilities to the firing of weapons at the front.

Japan should deploy the Self-Defense Forces by this 'Japanese model of peacekeeping forces'.

6-2 Japan needs to overcome stove-piped government

6-2-1 Can Japanese police live up to their reputation?

The Police White Paper's odd description

The author has a high opinion of Japanese police and trusts them. They are not only trusted firmly as an organisation by the Japanese people, they are of high international repute. The author has a good impression of the National Police Agency's annual white paper too. Thoroughly modest, it describes facts dispassionately without boasting.

Just one point is disturbing. Description of peace operations by Japanese police is so meagre as to appear intentional, and gives the impression of avoiding references to specific cases. In relation to this report's theme of Japan's role in peacebuilding, this deficit poses the question of whether Japanese police can meet the international community's high expectation of them.

In particular, the annual White Papers on Police devote unusually little space to what must have been a tragedy of historic proportions for the entire organisation: the casualties among Japanese civil police in the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia from 1992 to 1993. As a matter of course, Japanese mass media devoted them much coverage as the top news item. For example, the morning edition of the *Mainichi Shimbun* on 5 May 1993 began:

> Early afternoon on 4 May, five Japanese civil police serving in the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) were attacked by an unidentified armed group. One died, and four were wounded. They were stationed in Ambel village, Banteay Mean Cheay province in the northwest near the Thai border. They were patrolling with UNTAC's Netherlands Marine Corps escorts in a convoy of six vehicles, including civil police vehicles, on Route Nationale 691.
>
> More than ten attackers fired several B40 anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades at the lead vehicle. When the convoy stopped, they raked it with assault rifle fire. The Netherlands Marines fought back, but the attack was intense. Assistant Police Inspector Haruyuki Takada, age 33, of Okayama Pref. Police died on the scene. Assistant Police Inspector Kazuharu Yagi, 37, Miyagi Pref. Police, and Police Sgt. Eizaburo Taniguchi, 32, Ishikawa Pref. Police were wounded severely and evacuated by helicopter to the Bhumibol Air Force Hospital in Bangkok, where they were treated. Police Inspector Hiroshi Kawanobe, 44, and Police Sgt. Nobuaki Suzuki, 34, both of Kanagawa Pref. Police, were wounded lightly, as were five Netherlands Marine Corps escorts. ...

This was the second incident in which Japanese working for UNTAC died in the country. In April 1993, Mr Atsuhito Nakata, 25, a UN volunteer, was shot and killed.

Instead of describing the attack on Japanese police in detail, however, the 1993 White Paper on Police did not refer to it in the Introduction, and gave only this terse account in the main text:

United Nations Peacekeeping Operation — The Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations was enacted on 16 June 1992, and entered into force on 10 August. The purpose of this law is to set forth a domestic framework for appropriate and speedy cooperation for United Nations peacekeeping operations and other operations, and thereby enable active contribution by Japan to international peace efforts centring upon the United Nations. Subsequently, the cabinet adopted the ordinance to establish the Cambodia International Peace Cooperation Corps and the Cambodia International Peace Cooperation Assignment Implementation Plan on 8 September. The latter stipulated the deployment of 75 members of the Corps with the status of police officers to Cambodia for the purpose of participating in the United Nations peacekeeping operation as it concerns advice, guidance and monitoring of police administration. These 75 members departed Japan on 13 October for a nine-month tour. After arriving in country, they were trained by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in Phnom Penh for one week. Then, they were stationed in various parts of Cambodia and, under the direction of UNTAC's civil police division and alongside police officers from more than 30 countries worldwide, are performing missions like advice, guidance and monitoring of local police officers.
Note: On 4 May 1993, Japanese police members of the Corps were attacked by an armed group in Banteay Mean Cheay province in northwestern Cambodia. One died in the line of duty. Four were wounded, some severely.

Then, deployment to Cambodia vanished from the White Paper

In the next year's (1994) edition of the White Paper on Police, the description of the casualties in Cambodia became a mere formality:

(4) United Nations Peacekeeping Operation. On the basis of the Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations, 75 members of the International Peace Cooperation Corps with the status of police officers deployed to Cambodia from October 1992. In 4 May 1993, one Japanese police member of the Corps was killed in the line of duty, and four were wounded, some severely, in an attack by an armed group. Nevertheless, the other personnel completed their mission and returned to Japan by 8 July.

Suspiciously, the 1995 edition does not mention the deployment to Cambodia at all.

In 2000, after Japan's first deployment of civil police to East Timor, the White Paper did not mention the deployment to Cambodia:

Contribution to International Peace Cooperation Activities. On the basis of the Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations, six members of the East Timor International Peace Cooperation Corps from the National Police Agency (three civil police and three liaison officers) were despatched to Indonesia. Under the direction of the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), they performed the mission to advise, guide, and monitor local police.

Most oddly, the 2004 White Paper on Police devoted a chapter to 'The Track Record of Fifty Years of Japanese Police and New Developments' without mentioning peace operations. The 2005 edition mentioned civil police in UN peacekeeping operations and the deployment to Cambodia, but not the casualties:

> (4) Civil Police Activities in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Japanese Police deploys members to the civil police activities conducted by the UN after armed conflict. Since the Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations entered into force in 1992, Japan deployed 75 police officials to Cambodia that year and 3 to East Timor in 1999. They provided advice and guidance to local police and monitored the appropriateness of local police activities, because reconstruction of police functions is indispensable to recovery of each state or territory.
>
> The National Police Agency is examining how to participate in UN peacekeeping operations on the basis of the characteristics of Japanese Police.

The White Papers do not mention at all the third deployment of Japanese civil police to East Timor. A press release by the National Police Agency is the only public source of information. According to the press release, the NPA deployed two shifts of two civil police and one liaison officers between January 2007 and February 2008, who 'did all they can to support the rebuilding of the East Timorese National Police (PNTL), left behind great achievements like an original textbook for police, and were evaluated highly by the government of East Timor and the UN.'

Given this low priority, there are editions of the White Paper on Police with not even a separate chapter on international activities. Yet, Japanese police have been cooperating internationally. Every annual edition describes cooperation with the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol), despatches of technical experts and overseas disaster relief. Evidence for the Japanese police's interest in international cooperation is that Mr Toshinori Kanemoto, who headed the international affairs department of the NPA, served as Interpol's president from 1996 to 2000.

In fact, the only activities where Japanese police shrink from providing officers are on scenes where they need basic knowledge or experience of military affairs. In those operations, international civil police need to interact with guerrillas, paramilitaries or regular armed forces, not just ordinary criminals. Japanese police have assumed that they will not conduct operations abroad. They have avoided activities related to military affairs so much that they did not train with the Self-Defense Forces until after 2001, when counter-terrorism became a pressing need. Thus, Japanese police have naturally hesitated to deploy internationally. Of course, the trauma in Cambodia made them even more reluctant. Mentioning that tragedy in annual White Papers would not help police forces recruit those young people who seek careers in police for the sake of stability.

Lesson from East Timor: Hide rank insignia

This episode may be difficult to believe for readers who are familiar with the international deployment of police, but it shows the extent to which Japanese police have assumed that they would conduct operations only in Japan. The purpose of recounting it here is to help Japanese police meet international standards and assume an important role in peacebuilding.

In 1999, when Japanese civil police were serving in East Timor for the first time, a picture that was hardly believable in terms of prevailing international views about personal protection appeared on television news. Members of Japan Self-Defense Forces and US Forces Japan could not believe what they were seeing. Mr Atsuyuki Sassa, a former police executive and an authority on crisis management, recalled feeling the same.

Japan had despatched three civil police to the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) for the referendum on East Timor's independence. Although the voting was peaceful, when it transpired that more votes were likely cast for independence, pro-Indonesian militias attacked UN facilities in addition to locals. The three Japanese police were withdrawn earlier than planned, and returned to Japan on 9 September.

Anyone with some knowledge of military affairs or crisis management would have prayed for the safety of the Japanese civil police on television. The senior officer, a chief superintendent, was walking in the airfield with rank insignia with two stars on his shoulders. In armed forces, two stars denote a major general, a high-value target for any hostile sniper. Mr Sassa yelled at the officer in the television screen to take off his shirt and hide the rank insignia. Camouflaging rank insignia is common sense for armed forces. Even if the airfield were fenced off, no senior officer would show his rank insignia beside the evacuation aircraft if he were aware of the effective range of sniper rifles. The picture from East Timor demonstrated that Japanese police lacked this kind of basic knowledge of firearms.

No interagency training until 9/11

Japanese police organisations are ignorant about firearms because they have kept the Self-Defense Forces at an arm's length. They hardly interacted before the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. The 2006 White Paper on Police reports what is new:

> By July 2005, every metropolitan and prefectural police and the corresponding Ground SDF formations conducted a joint table-top exercise about close cooperation in case of public security operations against armed spies and other events ...
>
> In September 2004, the National Police Agency and the Defense Agency built on previous joint table-top exercises and other achievements, and formulated 'Guidelines for Joint Response against Armed Spies and Other Events'. ...

> In October 2005, Hokkaido Prefectural Police and the Ground Self-Defense Force's Northern Army conducted their first joint field exercise, on the basis of their joint table-top exercise. ...
> The police have been closely coordinating the security of nuclear power stations with the Coast Guard since the simultaneous terrorist attacks in the United States ...

In short, until September 2001, Japanese police organisations have been operating on the basis of what they knew without considering whether they met international standards. Thus, when a prefectural police force conducted a table-top exercise with the Ground SDF for the first time, they could not communicate the movement of terrorists. The SDF used grid coordinates that were designed to enable accurate strikes by artillery and aircraft. The police called out Japanese addresses based on city districts and city blocks, as if they were patrolling in squad cars.

The Japan Coast Guard, then called the Maritime Safety Agency, trained with the Maritime SDF for the first time in autumn 1999. In March of that year, both organisations used force in an attempt to stop what appeared to be a North Korean spy ship in the Sea of Japan. Five decades had passed since the Maritime Safety Agency was established.

Ignorance of basic facts about firearms

In December 2001, the Japan Coast Guard patrol vessel *Amami* exchanged fire with a North Korean spy ship in the East China Sea, whereupon the latter's crew scuttled their ship in China's exclusive economic zone. Japan raised the North Korean ship from the sea floor in September 2002, after negotiating with China for months. Meanwhile, in May 2002, the Japan Coast Guard exhibited in the lobby of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism the bridge of the patrol vessel *Amami*.

Military experts were surprised by the locations of bullet holes in *Amami*'s bridge. Most of the holes were from 7.62 millimetre rounds, probably for the Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifle designed in the Soviet Union. Some other holes appeared to be from 12.7 millimetre heavy machine gun rounds. There were holes inside the bridge: 7.62 millimetre rounds had penetrated both a low 'armour plate' outside the front of the bridge and the steel plate of the bridge itself. This 'armour plate' consisted of two steel plates, each three or four millimetres thick, for a total of less than one centimetre. Penetration of this plate and the plate of the bridge implied that the rifle rounds were relatively destructive mild steel rounds popular with military forces that have adopted Kalashnikovs, not full metal jackets encased in brass.

Most surprising for military experts was the state of the Japan Coast Guard's knowledge of firearms. If the JCG had some basic knowledge, then it would have made sure that the 'armour plate' would withstand 7.62 millimetre rounds. That was the simplest measure for shielding *Amami*'s bridge, although far from sufficient.

For reference, here is the kind of basic knowledge about the penetrative power of firearms that law enforcement agencies like the Japan Coast Guard need. In the Ground Self-Defense Force, the author trained with the US M1 rifle, which fires 7.62 millimetre rounds with a lethal range of 500 metres. A regular full metal jacket bullet fired from an M1 penetrates 13 millimetres of steel armour at 100 metres. 7.62 millimetre rounds adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in the 1970s penetrates 10 millimetres of steel armour at 300 metres, and even at 700 metres, Soviet armoured vehicles' aluminium armour plate with a thickness of 15 millimetres. This NATO round would penetrate an H-beam easily at 100 or 200 metres, even though it is not a special armour-piercing bullet.

Sniper rifles are effective at longer ranges; the author trained with a US sniper rifle with an effective range of 600 metres. Their bullets are more powerful, and sniper scopes are mounted on them to support aiming. The majority of sniper rifles in use in the world fire 7.62 millimetre rounds to effective ranges of 600 metres for average sniper rifles, or 800 meters for the Dragunov, which is made in Russia. The Ground SDF continued to use the 7.62-millimetre calibre Type 64 rifle as the sniper rifle, even after replacing it with the 5.56-millimetre calibre Type 89 as the assault rifle. Some sniper rifles are of 5.56 millimetre calibre, but are used against unobstructed targets about 200 metres away.

Large-calibre sniper rifles like the US Barrett M82A1 are used against obstructed targets or the thickest bulletproof glass in limousines (49 millimetres). This rifle is 12.7-millimetre calibre and weighs 13.4 kilograms. It is effective against humans at 1,600 metres and against vehicles and aircraft at 2,400 metres. In the Gulf War of 1991, the US Army destroyed an Iraqi armoured vehicle at 2,400 metres, and killed an Iraqi commander at 1,093 metres, with M82A1's. Its bullet penetrates 25 millimetres of steel armour at 300 metres and 13 millimetres at 1,200 metres. One of M82A1's users is the US Federal Bureau of Investigation's Hostage Rescue Team, to which Japanese police look up as a model. This rifle backed up the commando raid in April 1997 that ended the hostage crisis in the Japanese ambassadorial residence in Peru. Law enforcement agencies need this much basic knowledge of firearms.

Japan Coast Guard classified the RPG-7 as a heavy weapon

When Japan finally joined counter-piracy operations in the waters near Somalia, the Japan Coast Guard showed again that it fell short of international standards of basic knowledge and expertise as a law enforcement organisation, just as much as the National Police Agency.

At first, both the Ministry of Defense and the Japan Coast Guard sought to avoid deployment. The former claimed that counter-piracy was the Coast Guard's mission. The Coast Guard pleaded lack of capability. The author thinks highly of the JCG and calls for giving it more resources. But in order to capture lessons for peace operations, we must scrutinise the JCG commandant's arguments to Diet

about why the service cannot counter piracy in the western Indian Ocean.

The Japan Coast Guard gave three arguments about replenishment of patrol vessels. First, because only one JCG vessel is large enough to operate for a long time, replenishment is necessary. Second, replenishment at sea is not possible, because the JCG does not have replenishment ships, and patrol vessels are not equipped to receive fuel from the Maritime Self-Defense Force's replenishment ships. Third, the JCG does not have enough personnel to operate a base in a nearby country like Djibouti. The second argument would be moot if several patrol vessels took turns refuelling in port. As for the third argument, if the Japan Coast Guard deployed vessels to counter piracy, then it would have every right to demand other agencies to provide personnel to operate a base.

As for pirates' weapons, the JCG commandant classified their most powerful weapon, the RPG-7 anti-tank rocket-propelled grenade, as a 'heavy weapon' against which response is difficult. But the RPG-7 falls to the ground at 920 metres, and is effective against armoured targets for less than 200 metres. By international classifications, it is a 'light weapon'. The argument that Japan's unarmoured ships are vulnerable to RPG-7 is not realistic. If the projectile hit an armoured ship, its blast will penetrate three centimetres of armour. Only amateurs would approach a suspected pirate ship within the range of that weapon. The Maritime Self-Defense Force's principle of 'deter and avoid' is correct.

The Japan Coast Guard asked for a brand new armoured patrol vessel, which would take five years to build, because some tasks like arrest of pirates require lining up against a ship occupied by pirates. A fighting organisation, however, should adapt by applying protective material like aramid fibre (Kevlar) in the thickness needed, to vulnerable parts of patrol vessels. The argument that JCG patrol vessels are incapable of damage control because their internal structure is for merchantmen, not warships, is very much exaggerated when pirates are the threat.

The commandant raised the possibility that the Japan Coast Guard would fail to share information with foreign navies because they have not worked together in the past. But the first report of an attack by pirates would be transmitted by satellite telephone to the Combined Maritime Forces and European Union Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR), and posted on websites. Neither a history of cooperation nor a Tactical Digital Information Link is necessary for the counter-piracy mission.

Besides, other countries send navies instead of coast guards for two reasons. First, most of them do not have coast guards that are capable of expeditions. Second, many of these warships are countering not only piracy but also transnational terrorists' use of the same waters. Japan has participated in the second mission mainly through replenishment. The Japan Coast Guard is the world's second largest, and is a leader of the campaign against piracy in the Strait of Malacca. Deployment to the western Indian Ocean is a natural extension.

Based on the evidence and logic given here, Japan could have responded differently in early 2009 to the rise of pirate attacks. The Japan Coast Guard has thirteen large patrol vessels with one or two helicopters aboard. The first step would have been to deploy several of them, gather information with helicopters, and warn any suspicious craft that nevertheless approach, with warning shots from the patrol vessel's automatic cannon if necessary. As noted, the patrol vessels can take turns getting replenished in ports of the Indian Ocean. Because pirates may deploy heavier weapons, Japan would have had to take the second step in about a month: maritime security operation by the Maritime Self-Defense Force. Both steps would have bought time for the third step, which is new legislation. These three steps would have comprised a whole-of-government response.

The Japan Coast Guard is second to none in rescue capability. Its Special Rescue Team flies by helicopter through typhoon-force wind blowing at 37 metres per second. The same organisation classified the RPG-7 as a 'heavy weapon', not because of any timidity on the Coast Guardsmen's part, but because of the parent ministry's (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism) desire to avoid complications that might result from deploying the Coast Guard, and because of ignorance about firearms.

Research Institute for Peace and Security's proposal for police

Regarding Japanese police's passive stance toward peace operations, an authoritative Japanese think tank has also published a proposal brimming with concern. The Research Institute for Peace and Security, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Defense, released a report titled 'Towards More Substantial International Civil Police Activities by Japan'. Its diagnosis of Japan's current stance is similar to this report's in many ways. In brief, its proposals are.

(1) Give greater emphasis to civil police activities within the Japanese police's international activities. Do not avoid deployment to post-conflict countries or distant countries.
(2) Japan's international civil police activities should specialise in support for police reform.
(3) Give a clear basis in Japanese law to civil police activities.
(4) Establish a system for deploying personnel to civil police activities.
(5) Support comprehensively the recipient countries' civil security sector reform.

Proposals (1) and (4) are identical to the international community's expectation and wish for Japan regarding peacebuilding:

(1) The National Police Agency's three categories of international activities by Japanese police are, (i) transfer of knowledge and technology; (ii) civil police activities; (iii) disaster relief. Japanese police are not as active in (ii) civil police activities as in the others. Japan should deploy personnel more actively as civil police. For that aim, Japan should consider seriously, with due attention to the conditions on the ground, the possibility of deploying personnel to post-conflict countries.

Japan should also consider positively participation in distant regions like Africa, not just nearby Asian countries.

(4) Urgent measures to bolster the system for deploying personnel to civil police activities include (i) creation of a roster of personnel who are qualified or wish to deploy; (ii) development of pre-deployment training programs; (iii) use of retired police officers; (iv) despatch of personnel to UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation's Police Division. Also, Japan should make a greater effort to train police for overseas deployment through language training and other means.

Japan is considering deployment of trainers for Afghan police. In order to deploy units of personnel on scene for peace operations, however, Japan needs the kind of whole-of-government effort and legislation recommended below.

6-2-2 Stove-piped government hinders the use of the Japan Self-Defense Forces

Lesson from Iraq: Why the initiative to restore the Mesopotamian Marshes disappeared

Stove-piped government deprived Japan of a major opportunity to contribute to stabilisation and reconstruction of Iraq. The Self-Defense Forces planted seedlings, but they withered because the rest of the Japanese government did not help.

When the Ground Self-Defense Force was working in southern Iraq, the author proposed restoration of the Mesopotamian Marshes as the overarching design of Japan’s support for reconstruction of Iraq. The Koizumi cabinet and Komeito, a party governing in coalition, made some effort toward implementtation.

The Mesopotamian Marshes began shrinking gradually in the 1970s, mostly because dams were built upstream, then rapidly in the 1990s, because Saddam Hussein diverted water in order to deny Shi‘ite people of the region a sanctuary. The UN Environment Programme warned in 2001 that 90 percent of the marshes had dried up, and so will the rest by 2008. Some called it the world’s largest deliberate destruction of the environment.

The work for restoration would have been simple, consisting of large, labour-intensive earth-moving projects to reverse diversion of water and improve farmland. If conducted as a rush project for the first two to three years, employing four shifts of ten thousand labourers at each site, each site would create forty thousand jobs. Twenty-five sites would create a million jobs.

Unemployed Iraqis were a vast pool of labour for militias and insurgents. Labour-intensive projects like restoration of the marshes would shrink this pool and improve security. This basis of reconstruct-

tion would not only help protect the Japan Self-Defense Force personnel deployed in Iraq, but would help protect the private sector when they participate in reconstruction, thus further stabilising Iraq.

At the time, however, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan neither conceived an overarching design nor researched prospective areas for farmland improvement; it claimed that the research would take a year and a half, but the Ground SDF unit in Iraq completed the research in ten days. Rather than lose face by letting the SDF proceed with the project, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stunted the project to a contribution of 120 million yen (A$1.5 million) to the UN Environment Programme. Even though the initiative to restore the Mesopotamian Marshes included transmission of Japanese know-how of post-war recovery, stove-piped government prevented effective use of the 600 billion yen (A$7.5 billion) in taxpayers' money that had been set aside to support Iraq's reconstruction.

Lesson from Haiti: forgotten heavy-lift helicopters outside Ground SDF

The Japan Self-Defense Forces are not free of stove-piping either. Upon the earthquake in Haiti in January 2010, the UN asked states for three kinds of military units: infantry for security; engineers to clear rubble and repair roads; and heavy-lift helicopters. Because of various constraints, deployment of Japanese infantry was out of the question. On the other hand, the Ground SDF operates about 500 helicopters, 54 of them CH-47 Chinooks for heavy lifting. Japan could have deployed 4 Chinooks easily.

But the Ground SDF had had a troubling experience with deploying Chinooks by ship, in disaster relief in Sumatra in early 2005. Their rotors do not fold together. In order to transport a Chinook by ship, rotors must be removed upon departure and assembled upon arrival. Then, a test flight is necessary. All this seemed too inefficient. Furthermore, in 2005, the Japanese Chinooks operated from the deck of an *Osumi* class amphibious transport ship of the Maritime SDF, but these ships were not available for an expedition in early 2010.

The Japan Self-Defense Forces, however, had helicopters that can be shipped with rotors intact. The Maritime SDF operates ten MH-53E mine counter-measure helicopters. They have been developed to be based aboard ships, and would fit easily in chartered cargo ships. Japan could have deployed MH-53E's without all their mechanics because the US Navy and Marine Corps were operating the same model in Haiti. Some Maritime SDF officers argued in favour of deploying MH-53E's, but their voice was lost in the stove-pipes. Thus, Japan wasted an asset.

6-2-3 Overcoming stove-piping requires national initiative

In order for Japan to have a clear strategy for realising its stated goal of peace, overcome the seemingly inevitable stove-piping of its government, and thereby become a leading practitioner of peace operations, Japan urgently needs to institute national initiatives. The first is to establish the capability to form and coordinate whole-of-government policies. The second is to raise the capabilities of agencies that (must) participate in peace operations like the police to international standards. This means exposing them to their most competent foreign counterparts, especially through sophisticated combined training exercises.

Japanese National Security Council did not see the light of day

Japan did make an effort to create a command post capability in the government in the form of a National Security Council. Upon taking office in autumn 2006, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe strove to found a Japanese NSC in order to enable his office's leadership in adaptive formulation of strategy in diplomacy and national security, and to strengthen his office's capability to aggregate and evaluate intelligence. He appointed former environment minister Yuriko Koike as his special advisor in charge of this project. Prime Minister Abe appointed experts to a 'Council on Strengthening Kantei's National Security Functions' with former deputy chief cabinet secretary Nobuo Ishihara as the chair, and Kazuhisa Ogawa, the author of this report, as a member. Based on this council's final report, the Abe cabinet submitted legislation for establishing a National Security Council to Diet in April 2007. Here are main points of the council's final report and the cabinet bill.

Outline of the Final Report of the Council on Strengthening Kantei's National Security Functions

[NSC's Role as the Command Post.] Japan faces the development of nuclear weapons and abduction of citizens by North Korea, and terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have become global threats. Japan does not have a system for forming and planning policies comprehensively and strategically about wide-ranging issues of diplomacy and national security. Kantei must lead and indicate comprehensive and long-term national objectives. The ministries and agencies must implement individual policies along those objectives.

[Composition of the Command Post.]

1. A New Deliberative Body. The current Security Council of Japan has its responsibilities limited to Defense policy and responses to armed attack situations. It also has many members. Therefore, it is not capable of substantive and adaptive deliberation. Cabinet shall establish a National Security Council, which reports to it and absorbs the function of the Security Council of Japan.

NSC will discuss (i) basic policies on major issues of diplomacy and national security; (ii) major foreign and national security policies that involve more than one ministry or agency; (iii) basic policies for responding to grave situations like armed attack situations. Cabinet will decide ultimately in a cabinet meeting.

Members are the prime minister (chair), chief cabinet secretary and ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense. The chair summons other ministers as necessary. The special advisor to the prime minister for national security affairs will attend regularly. Chief of Staff, Joint Staff and others concerned will attend when necessary. Matters for which the Security Council of Japan is responsible now like the National Defense Program Outline and armed attack situations will be discussed by its current members [i.e. including the ministers of Finance; Land, Infrastructure and Transportation; Economy, Trade and Industry; and Internal Affairs and Communications; and the chairman of the National Public Safety Commission]. NSC will meet at least twice a month. NSC may establish specialised councils at the cabinet level or below.

2. Special Advisor to the Prime Minister. The prime minister will always have a special advisor for national security affairs. The special advisor will report periodically to the prime minister and communicate closely.

3. Secretariat. The secretary general will attend regularly. The special advisor to the prime minister for national security affairs may serve as the secretary general at the same time. In principle, an assistant chief cabinet secretary (either Foreign Policy, or National Security and Crisis Management) will serve as the NSC deputy secretary general (vice-ministerial rank) at the same time. The secretariat will consist of ten to twenty full-time staff. The secretariat will recruit actively from self-defense officials. The secretariat may include experts and researchers from outside government, and may retain a few experts as advisors.

4. Close Cooperation with the Intelligence Community. The director of cabinet intelligence and intelligence officials in ministries and agencies will provide regularly intelligence needed by NSC. The special advisor to the prime minister for national security affairs and the secretary general should be briefed periodically by the director of cabinet intelligence and attend the latter's briefings of the prime minister.

5. Protection of Secrets. Severe punishment of leakers and recipients of secrets must be legislated. A system for thorough protection of secrets is necessary, including especially serious obligations for NSC members, secretariat and those briefed by them.

[The Road Ahead.] This Council expects the government to submit the necessary legislation to the current regular session of Diet and achieve its passage.

Prospects for the bill's passage took a turn for the worse, however, because the Liberal Democratic Party suffered a severe defeat in the House of Councillors election in July 2007, and opposition parties gained a majority there. Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, who succeeded the Abe cabinet, withdrew the bill that would have amended the Security Council of Japan Act and established the Japanese NSC. The Fukuda cabinet decided that the existing framework was sufficient to strengthen Kantei's leadership in forming and planning foreign and national security policies, even without an NSC. The conventional wisdom is that Prime Minister Fukuda sought to eradicate 'Abe's colour'.

Emergency Management Agency in Democratic Party of Japan's Manifesto

The Democratic Party of Japan has acknowledged the necessity of a national command post capability in crisis management, even though it does not promote a Japanese NSC up front. The party has included the establishment of an Emergency Management Agency (Japanese FEMA) in manifestos.

> DPJ Manifesto for the 2005 House of Representatives Election
>
> 2-6 Enact an Emergency Basic Law and establish an Emergency Management Agency to enable prompt response to emergency situations
>
> (1) Enact an Emergency Basic Law during next year's ordinary Diet session
>
> We will enact an Emergency Basic Law (tentative name) during the next ordinary Diet session, thereby establishing the definition of emergencies and setting out provisions for respect for basic human rights, obligations of national and local authorities, the role of the Diet, and other relevant matters.
>
> (2) Build capacity for quick response to emergencies
>
> Establishing an Emergency Management Agency (similar to the Federal Emergency Management Agency of the US), we will build capacity for quick response to emergencies such as armed attacks, terrorism, and major natural disasters.

> DPJ Manifesto for the 2009 House of Representatives Election
>
> 48. ... Strengthen the crisis management system, in particular by establishing a "Crisis Management Agency" (provisional title) to ensure speedy rescue of victims, contain damage and maintain urban functions in major disasters.

When the Democratic Party of Japan assumed power, it appointed a senior legislator as the minister in charge of founding a National Strategy Bureau, and started the bureau as the National Strategy Office. This is an evidence for DPJ government's awareness of the necessity of a national command post capability, starting with an Emergency Management Agency. The DPJ manifesto for the 2010 House of Councillors election under Prime Minister Naoto Kan did not include crisis management, perhaps because the election followed Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's sudden resignation. Nevertheless, as the Democratic government stabilises, it will likely restore the Japanese FEMA's priority.

'Let your beloved child go on a journey'

The second national initiative to create the basis for Japan to become leading practitioner of peace operations is to compel Japanese government agencies to measure themselves against their most competent foreign counterparts, especially through sophisticated combined training exercises.

Among organisations that are responsible for the security of the Japanese state and society, only the Self-Defense Forces meet international standards of its sector. The JSDF meet those standards for a

reason. If the JSDF were not capable of joint training exercises with their US military allies, then they would have no reason to exist. The JSDF deters attack on Japan by training with the Americans, who train the way they fight. The Japanese have an apt proverb, 'Let your beloved child go on a journey'. According to *Defense of Japan 2009*, the Self-Defense Forces conducted thirty-three combined training exercises with the US military just between April 2007 and March 2008, as in the following table. The number of combined training exercises probably exceeds a hundred if we include small-unit exercises and table-top exercises that do not appear in the white paper.

Japanese law enforcement agencies on land (police) and at sea (Coast Guard) have conducted many worthy international exchanges but, for the various reasons described above, their international activities in fields that require them to show coercive capabilities have tended to be perfunctory.

People everywhere have noticed that trying to measure up to more competent outsiders is a way of improving their own performance. Chinese military power has attracted attention because of modernisation based on twenty-one years of double-digit growth in China's military expenditures. Yet, the Chinese military's deployments abroad are motivated by a strategy to improve its own capabilities through observation and interaction. The 2009 edition of the annual report, *Military Power of the People's Republic of China* by the US Department of Defense, puts it this way:

> China's global military engagement seeks to enhance its national power by improving foreign relationships, bolstering its international image, and assuaging concerns among other countries about China's rise. The PLA's global activities also contribute to its transformation through the acquisition of modern weapons, improved operational experience, and professionalization due to access to critical management practices, operational doctrine, and training methods. [54]

Japanese law enforcement agencies have been unenthusiastic about peace operations, but not because of any lack of courage. Rather, the Japanese state, lacking a command post capability, has not been able to set the conditions for the law enforcement agencies to meet international standards for their sector's roles in peace operations. This author believes firmly that, through a whole-of-government initiative, Japanese law enforcement agencies will win the world's trust as leading practitioners of peace operations, sooner rather than later.

Reference 46. Record of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY 2007

Joint Exercise

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	U.S.	
Japan-U.S. joint exercises (Command post exercise)	January 15 - January 27, 2009	Camp Ichigaya, USFJ Yokota Base, locations, etc. of other units participating in the exercise	Joint Staff Office, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, GSDF/MSDF/ASDF Staff Offices, Regional Armies, Central Readiness Force, Signal Brigade, Ground Material Control Command, Self Defense Fleet, Regional District Units, Communications Commands, MSDF Maritime Material Command, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, JASDF Air Communications and System Wing, Air Material Command, SDF Command and Communication Squadron, etc. Approx. 1,900 personnel	Joint Staff Office, US Army Japan, US Naval Force Japan, US Marine Corps in Japan, etc. Approx. 500 personnel	Training for joint operations

GSDF

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	U.S.	
Combined command post exercise (YS-54)	July 11 - July 22, 2008	Fort Shafter in Hawaii, United States	Ground Staff Office, Eastern Army, etc. Approx. 120 personnel	General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, U.S. Army Japan, Approx. 100 personnel	Training for coordinate operations
Joint training across job types in the US	September 24 - November 4, 2008	Yakima Training Center, etc. in Washington, United States	6th Division Approx.430 personnel	1st Legion 1 battalion major unit Approx. 200 personnel	Training for bilateral actions
Field training with US Marine Corps Part 1	November 28 - December 15, 2008	Aibano maneuver area, etc.	13th Brigade Approx. 200 personnel	3rd Marine Expeditionary Force 1 troop major unit Approx. 220 personnel	Training for bilateral actions
Combined command post exercise (YS-55)	December 1 - December 14, 2009	JGSDF Camp Asaka	Ground Staff Office, Eastern Army, etc. Approx. 4,500 personnel	General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific; Headquarters, US Army in Japan, etc. Approx. 1200 personnel	Training for coordinate operations
Field training with US Marine Corps Part 2	January 12 - January 23, 2009	Iwateyama maneuver area, etc.	9th division Approx. 170 personnel	3rd Marine Division 1 troop major unit Approx. 150 personnel	Training for bilateral actions
Field training in the US Iron Fist (F)	December 15 - February 19, 2009	Camp Pendleton in California, United States	Western Army Infantry Regiment Approx. 220 personnel	1st Marine Expeditionary Force Approx. 350 personnel	Training for response to outlier invasion
Field training with US Army Part 1	January 26 - February 3, 2009	Oyanohara Training Area, etc.	8th Division Approx. 720 personnel	25th Infantry Brigade, Cavalry Battalion (Louisiana State Soldiers) Approx. 310 personnel	Training for bilateral actions
Field training with US Army Part 2	March 2 - March 11, 2009	Hokkaido Maneuver Area, etc.	11th Brigade Approx. 350 personnel	149th Infantry Brigade, Infantry Battalion (Kentucky State Soldiers) Approx. 280 personnel	Training for bilateral actions

MSDF

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	U.S.	
Special minesweeping training	July 17 - July 29, 2008	Mutsu Bay	Vessels: 25 Aircraft: approx.12	10 Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel	Mine sweeping training
Special medical training	November 6, 2008	US Marine Yokosuka Base and SDF Yokosuka Hospital	Yokosuka District Unit, etc. Approx. 70	Yokosuka Naval Hospital, etc. Approx. 170	Medical training
Special training for base security	November 17 - November 19, 2008	In US Marine Yokosuka Base and Yokosuka Port	Yokosuka District Unit Approx. 170	US Marine Yokosuka Base Military Police Approx. 40	Training for cooperation for base security
Anti-submarine special training	December 4 - December 7, 2008	Ocean area around Okinawa	Vessels: 1 Aircraft: a few	Vessels: 8 Aircraft: a few	Anti-submarine training, etc.
Anti-submarine special training	January 26 - February 1, 2009	Ocean area from off Tokai to off Shikoku	Vessels: 10 Aircraft: 20	Vessels: 1	Anti-submarine training
Anti-submarine special training	February 9 - February 12, 2009	Ocean area around Okinawa	Vessels: 7 Aircraft: approx. 7	Vessels: 12 Aircraft: approx.10	Anti-submarine training, etc.
Command post experience	March 9 - March 19, 2009	Naval War College (US)	MSDF staff, etc. Approx. 40	Command Headquaters, US Naval Force Japan Approx. 40	Training in coordinated training

ASDF

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	U.S.	
Interceptor training	April 22, 2008	Airspace surrounding Okinawa and temporary airspace for training	Aircraft: 4	Aircraft: 4	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Air defense training	May 12 - May 16, 2008	Airspace east of Misawa, airspace west of Akita and temporary airspace for training Off Komatsu airspace	Aircraft: 15	Aircraft: 4	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Air defense combat training, Base Air defense training (Red Flag Alaska)	May 28 - June 26, 2008	Eielson Air Force Base and Elemendorf Air Force Base in Alaska and their surrounding airspace	Aircraft: 7	Aircraft: 0	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of tactical skills
Fighter combat training	July 23 - August 1, 2008	Airspace east of Misawa and airspace west of Akita	Aircraft: 4	Aircraft: 4	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training	September 2 - September 4, 2008	Airspace west of Kyushu and off Shikoku airspace	Aircraft: 4	Aircraft: 2	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Air defense combat training	November 18, 2008	Airspace surrounding Okinawa	Aircraft: 12	Aircraft: 9	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training	December 1 - December 5, 2008	Off Komatsu airspace	Aircraft: 4	Aircraft: 4	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training	December 8 - December 12, 2008	Airspace west of Hokkaido and airspace east of Misawa	Aircraft: 4	Aircraft: 4	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training, Air defense combat training, Air-to-suface shooting training (Corp, North, Guam)	January 20 - February 24, 2009	Andersen Air Base and Ferallon De Medinilla Range and the surrounding airspace in Guam, U.S.	Aircraft: 10	Aircraft: 11	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Rescue training	February 9 - February 13, 2009	Ukibaru Jima Training Area and marine area/air space surrounding the training area	Aircraft: 4	Aircraft: 3	Training in joint operation; Enhancement of tactical skills
Fighter combat training	February 23 - February 27, 2009	Airspace west of Kyushu and off Shikoku airspace	Aircraft: 6	Aircraft: 4	Enhancement of bilateral action capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training	March 13 - March 19, 2009	Airspace surrounding Okinawa	Aircraft: 2	Aircraft: 2	Enhancement of bilateral action capability; Enhancement of combat skills

6-3 Can Japan follow through on its vow to seek peace? Can Japan act on lessons?

6-3-1 Japan's pursuit of peace and security lacks a conceptual framework

Japan has not produced a philosophical-conceptual framework about peace operations, and has not overcome stove-piped government, because it has lacked awareness that peace in the world a necessary condition for Japan's own security and prosperity. Japan can be secure only in a peaceful world; security at home and peace in the world are necessary for Japanese businesses to operate abroad. Without peace in the world and security at home, there is no prosperity. But this connection has not been intuitive for Japanese. Therefore, they have not been bothered by the imbalance of claiming to be a peaceful country and being unenthusiastic about peace operations.

To put it in a less than scientific way, this lack of awareness originated in the geography of an insular country protected by the seas. Japan was not occupied militarily by a foreign power until summer 1945. The Japanese have not had to sense that skilful diplomacy was necessary for national survival. They have not been subject to competitive selection against indifference to the world's trends.

This characteristic of Japan is not exclusive to diplomacy, but has direct consequences within Japan in fields like security and crisis management, where the government and other actors need to perform at the level of their most competent international counterparts. Before proposing how the Japanese state can become capable of following through on its vow to seek peace, we shall briefly examine two cases that represent Japan's lack of a philosophical-conceptual framework about peace and security.

Japan's conspicuous absence from international summit against terrorism

On 11 March 2005, the first anniversary of the Madrid train bombings, which killed 191 people, the Club of Madrid hosted the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security in the city. Upon participating as an expert, the author was struck by Japan's absence. Five hundred leaders and experts from all over the world assembled in one place and held workshops about ending terrorism, but three people in my group and a minister in the Japanese embassy in Paris, who travelled at his own expense and furlough, were the only Japanese who attended. The Japanese embassy in Madrid did not even send staff to gather information, although the ambassador attended at the very end. No Japanese leader attended the service in remembrance of the train bombings. The world's leading corporations sponsored the workshops, except Japanese firms.

King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Zapatero of Spain presided over the summit. The keynote speaker was UN Secretary-General Annan, and panel discussions included President Karzai of Afghanistan, Prime Minister Bondevik of Norway, High Representative Solana of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, President Iglesias of the Inter-American Development Bank and Mr

George Soros. Many countries were represented by current or former heads of states and governments, or by cabinet ministers. Former US President Clinton cancelled at the last minute for surgery, but the summit truly had an all-star cast from the world.

Participation and sponsorship for this kind of international summit on ending terrorism are worthy contributions to peace, as much as deployment of the Japan Self-Defense Forces to some peace-keeping operations. Furthermore, Japan, where nerve gas was used in a terrorist attack for the first time, has as much responsibility to lead the world's discussion on how to end terrorism as the United States, which suffered the 9/11 attacks, and Spain, which suffered the train bombings. Japan's absence from Madrid showed that neither Japan's government nor society understood this. This situation cannot but be described as a lack of philosophy or systematic thought. The author felt acutely that Japan could not avoid loss of confidence by the international community unless it changed. Participants' gaze toward Japan was cold: 'Japan's talk of peace or elimination of terrorism is just talk. Why should it have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council?'

Without systematic thought, Defense could not refute label as 'wasteful government program'

Upon taking office in autumn 2009, Japan's Democratic government set up the Government Revitalization Unit to sort out wasteful programs. The public has rightly praised this process for grilling independent administrative agencies that are hotbeds of sinecures for retired bureaucrats. Naturally, the latter were thrown into confusion. But something was odd. Recipients of government funds were represented by their sectors' authoritative people, but they could not answer questions 'from the people's perspective' posed by Renho (a backbencher who became famous in this role and became the minister of Government Revitalization in the Kan cabinet), as in 'Why do you need to build the world's fastest supercomputer?' Funding for that project was restored after Nobel laureates protested, but its recipients could not dispel the impression that they have been spending billions of yen in taxpayers' money without systematic thought.

The same is true for the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces. The Government Revitalization Unit rejected increase in the Ground SDF's personnel and funding for the Ground SDF Public Relations Center. One cannot but conclude that the Ministry of Defense and the JSDF, who could not explain their necessity clearly, lacked strategy, systematic thought or philosophy.

Against increase in personnel, the Government Revitalization Unit's line of attack was 'We are reducing government personnel across the board, and cannot exempt the SDF.' The defenders needed to show that organisations for securing the state and society are in an interdependent, layered division of labour, and that the current strength of the Ground SDF is too small to uphold it. In order to secure the state and society, the government must clarify the division of labour between two pillars to ensure that they function, and be capable of coordinating them so that the pillars do not become stove-pipes.

The first pillar is the Self-Defense Forces. The second consists of police, fire departments, the Japan Coast Guard, other ministries and agencies and local governments. In case of external attack, including major terrorist attacks, the SDF responds to the threat, and the other pillar protects citizens, mostly within Japan, as in evacuation. On the other hand, in disaster relief, police, fire departments, the Coast Guard, other ministries and agencies and local governments are the main responders. The SDF back them up with their unique ability to commit large numbers of people and equipment. This is the vertical structure of the pillars.

Within the Self-Defense Forces' pillar, the Ground SDF provides the foundation of territorial defence, and the Maritime and Air SDF prepare to meet aggression in their domains. The Self-Defense Forces make possible the activities of police, fire departments, the Coast Guard, other ministries and agencies and local governments that are of direct importance to daily life. Taxpayers and their representatives need to look squarely at this interdependence, instead of seeing each part through a straw and debating which is more important. The interdependence among the Self-Defense Forces is that the Ground SDF protects the bases of the Maritime and Air SDF, and the latter's defence of the Japanese archipelago as a whole protects the Ground SDF. Regardless of the high technology of the Maritime and Air SDF's weapons, they will be neutralised by a small number of commando raids unless their ports and airfields were protected by the Ground SDF.

Electricity, the lifeblood of the state and society, would not be secure without the Ground Self-Defense Force. Important facilities like nuclear power stations are guarded by elite police units. They may be enough for deterring most attacks. From the perspective of special operations forces, however, there is no guarantee that they would not be overrun by surprise attack. Even so, if Ground SDF special operations forces were in the background, then the enemy would hesitate to attack the police. The key to deterring this kind of attack is to demonstrate preparedness to counterattack immediately.

The cabinet should compute the personnel strength of the Ground SDF necessary for the security of the state and society, and ask the people whether they would fund it or let the Ground SDF fall short. Experts in foreign countries generally agree that the minimum size of the 'Japanese Army' is 250,000 troops. The current force numbers barely 140,000. Without an increase, the Ground SDF will eventually have no place for new recruits, and would not be able to perform missions.

Regarding the Public Relations Center, the Ministry of Defense and the Ground SDF should have explained that it is a point of contact with citizens, and that peacetime confidence-building with the citizenry through public affairs is a basic idea of maintaining an appropriate and healthy military organisation through civilian control. The JSDF's public affairs is not mere PR for the benefit of the organisation itself.

6-3-2 Proposal One: Build on Australia-Japan Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement toward a model of peace operations

Part 6 of this report has described an impasse reached by Japan's conduct of peace operations and other security policies without systematic thought or philosophy. Yet, a way out of this impasse is in sight. The way goes through the building of an original model of peace operations, through closer cooperation with Australia.

Upon the Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations (2+2) on 19 May 2010, the Australian and Japanese governments signed the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement, which enables the Australian Defence Force and the Japan Self-Defense Forces to exchange supplies and services. Australia is the second country, after the United States, with which Japan has concluded an ACSA.

Increasingly, the ADF and the JSDF have opportunities to work together on scene in UN peace-keeping operations (PKO) and disaster relief. But in East Timor and elsewhere, the JSDF did not have the legal authority to transport Australian personnel and supplies. Therefore, Australia sought an ACSA with Japan. The agreement allows for exchange of supplies like food, water and fuel as well as cooperation in tasks like transportation, maintenance, and medical care in PKO, disaster relief and training exercises, and thus allows more efficient operations.

In contrast, the ACSA between Japan and the United States also applies to operations to defend Japan and US forces in Japanese territory. The Australia-Japan ACSA is limited to peacetime cooperation, but the Japanese chief cabinet secretary issued a statement that provision of parts for equipment like aircraft and ships under this agreement is exempt from Japan's ban on arms exports. In July 2010, the Japanese government stated that it intends to conclude an ACSA with South Korea, with which Japan is cooperating in relief and recovery of Haiti from the earthquake, by the end of the year.

In order for Japan to develop the ACSA with Australia into a model at the core of global peace operations, I propose that Japan cooperate with Australia and the United States to train military forces, police and civilian specialists for peace operations, and conduct advanced research, at a new hub in Japan which might be called the Centre for International Peace Cooperation Action. Japan should develop CIPCA as a partner of Australia's Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence and the US Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute, and promote their trilateral cooperation.

I propose locating CIPCA in Nago City or thereabout in northern Okinawa. Assumption by northern Okinawa of a role as a global centre of peacebuilding may enable an effort to overcome the impasse over the US military presence in Okinawa. In that endeavour, CIPCA should cooperate with the United States Institute of Peace and research institutes in China, South Korea and Taiwan. This effort

would be a part of ‘peaceful re-orientation of the Japan-US alliance’, a concept proposed by the author since 1992. It envisions deepening the alliance, which Japan chose for its own security, into more of an international public good that represents the spirit of the preamble to the Constitution of Japan, which pledged action to realise world peace.

Also in northern Okinawa (Onna Village), the Japanese government is developing the Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology (OIST). This is intended as a world-class, international graduate university that would contribute to advancement of science and technology, and develop Okinawa as an intellectual centre of Asia Pacific, thereby helping Okinawa’s economy become self-supporting. In July 2010, Dr Jonathan Dorfan, director emeritus of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, was named its president-elect.

OIST is a wonderful project; it should contribute much to Okinawa’s future. Yet, the Centre for International Peace Cooperation Action can be just as valuable by becoming a global centre of peacebuilding, thereby reforming the Japan-US alliance as more of an international public good for realising peace, thus making Japan’s region more secure. In this way, CIPCA can generate within Okinawa a means for overcoming the impasse over the US military presence on the island.

For basic ideas to guide its activities, the Centre for International Peace Cooperation Action might make use of the US Federal Emergency Management Agency’s systematic thought about emergency management. It is a cycle of mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. In the response phase, by a state governor’s request and the US president’s order, FEMA coordinates the whole-of-government response. It has the expertise necessary to tailor the appropriate response to limit damage. In ordinary times, FEMA trains emergency managers and conducts research. Peacebuilding has much in common with FEMA’s overall cycle.

Locating the ‘Centre for International Peace Cooperation Action’ in Nago or thereabout would mean using the US Marine Corps Bases Camp Hansen or Camp Schwab for training grounds and quarters. The nature of these long-standing bases will gradually change into training bases for peace operations. Such a change would symbolise ‘peaceful re-orientation of the Japan-US alliance’, and be part of a concrete solution in which US military bases in Okinawa would cease to be a ‘base issue’. Twenty-six years of dialogue with Okinawans of various positions toward the US military presence, and relationships of mutual trust with them, have convinced the author that such a solution would be viable. A wide swath of Okinawa's leading citizens accept favourably the common understanding that, given the impracticality of abrogation of the Japan-US alliance or secession by Okinawa, the best realistic solution is step-by-step management of the US military presence toward greater consistency with the spirit of the preamble to the Constitution of Japan.

6-3-3 Proposal Two: Hire Japan Self-Defense Forces retirees as police for international deployment

Founding of a Centre for International Peace Cooperation Action in Okinawa in cooperation with Australia and the United States and its development as a global centre for peace operations would be a touchstone of Japan's growth into a state capable of fulfilling its vow to seek peace.

On a related note, I propose a completely new concept for overcoming the passive stance of the Japanese police toward peace operations: a career path for JSDF retirees in which they would be trained as police and then employed by metropolitan and prefectural police as the pool for peace operations. JSDF retirees who have served as peacekeepers are likely to be willing to do so as police officers. Japan needs career police officers to deploy too, but when Japanese police forces participate in peace operations in this way, career police officers are likely to begin to follow the JSDF retirees' example.

Employment of JSDF retirees as police officers would strengthen the police in Japan and maintain a safe society despite the aging of Japan's population. These are the policy's direct effects.

1. Hiring JSDF retirees is a relatively economical way to boost the number of police officers, because they would cost less than a career police officer of the same age. (See Proposal Three on budget measures for international deployment.)
2. The retirees' knowledge and judgment would boost the police forces' competence.
3. Japan would retain a pool of trained personnel for peace operations.
4. Because police would be an attractive option for retirees, we can expect a virtuous cycle through the JSDF's morale and recruitment.

For reference, the following is the current state of personnel in Japanese police forces and the Japan Self-Defense Forces. According to the 2009 White Paper on Police, the authorised strength of police in the 2009 Japanese fiscal year is 290,640 with 7,660 in the National Police Agency and 282, 980 in metropolitan and prefectural police. In recent years, nearly 10,000 officers have retired every year. In the 2008 fiscal year, 7.6 times as many people took employment examinations for police, thus halting a decline in the intensity of this competition.

Also in the 2009 Japanese fiscal year, the Japan Self-Defense Force's authorised strength was 248,303 (with actual strength of 228,536), consisting of 152,212 in the Ground SDF (actual 140,251), 45,585 in the Maritime SDF (actual 42,431), 47,138 in the Air SDF (actual 43,652) and 3,368 in the Joint Staff Office (actual 2,202). Every year, about 4,800 officers, warrant officers and NCOs retire and about 4,100 privates, seamen and airmen do not renew their contracts and leave the forces. Most JSDF retirees can serve as police for many years before they approach the police retirement age of 60. The

JSDF's retirement ages are 56 for colonels and Maritime captains, 55 for officers of lower rank, 54 for warrant officers and senior NCOs (E-8 and E-7) and 53 for junior NCOs (E-6 and E-5). Privates, seamen and airmen who leave the forces are about 30 years old at most.

6-3-4 Proposal Three: Pay for peace operations out of an interagency 'national security budget'

Proposals for the Centre for International Peace Cooperation Action and employment of JSDF retirees as police for peace operations require a completely new concept for their budgets. The Japanese government should set aside an interagency 'national security budget' and fund at least peace operations with it. As noted above, peace in the world is a necessary condition for security and prosperity of Japan. Therefore, the title of 'national security budget' that is not limited to the Ministry of Defense is appropriate for funds used across the whole of government to secure the whole of Japanese state and society.

The absence of an interagency national security budget distorts ministries' incentives away from the national interest. The author experienced this consequence in the case of Japan's consideration of acquisition of early warning satellites.

In mid-May 2009, Mr Masamitsu Naito, a Democratic Party of Japan member of the House of Councillors, asked the author to give a lecture to his party's space policy project team, chaired by Mr Yoshihiko Noda, about the possibility of Japan acquiring early warning satellites in the future, in light of the North Korean ballistic missile launches on 5 April. (Mr Naito became deputy minister of Internal Affairs and Telecommunications when the DPJ came to power. Mr Noda became minister of Finance in the Kan cabinet.) Three weeks later on 10 June, the author lectured for an hour from 5:30 pm about 'Early Warning Satellites: Requirements for Japan' in the House of Councillors office building, and then took questions from Diet members and DPJ policy staff for another hour.

To prepare this talk, the author asked a leading Japanese general trading firm and the Ministry of Defense for briefings about the current state of US early warning satellites. The briefing by the trading firm's executive in charge of satellites was positive and to the point, although this is a matter of course given the possibility of deals. The content was the best one could hope for in Japan.

In contrast, the Ministry of Defense's attitude was puzzling. Because of the ministry's relationship with the author, the briefers were the division chief at the centre of defence policy and the official in charge of early warning satellites. But the ministry's explanation seemed out of date by a decade compared to the trading firm. It belaboured elementary or obsolescent facts like early warning satellites

orbiting the earth on geostationary orbits 36,000 kilometres above the equators to monitor ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests with infrared sensors. The author's first impression was that the ministry did not give the best briefing it could because the author was preparing a lecture for the space policy project team of the Democratic Party of Japan, which was then an opposition party. The author learned that the ministry's stance was negative because of a completely different reason.

Before an explanation of the negative stance of the Japanese Ministry of Defense, a description of contemporary early warning satellites, especially those of the United States, is in order. Russia is the only other state that operates early warning satellites, but the US system is far more advanced than commonly assumed. Since the 1960s, the United States has launched forty-seven early warning satellites to geostationary orbits, most for the Defense Support Program, to watch for ballistic missile attack by the Soviet Union and any other enemy and monitor nuclear test. Currently, the United States operates six DSP satellites each, with three satellites each focusing on the northern and southern hemispheres. Since 2008, the United States has been replacing the DSP with the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS). Three SBIRS satellites will be operational by the end of 2010.

SBIRS is ten times more capable than the DSP in its sensor's sensitivity, five times in the speed of response to commands from the earth, five times in accuracy of estimates of missiles' launch sites, and ten times in estimates of missiles' impact points. Furthermore, SBIRS has three new capabilities. One is provision of data about the location of threats to missile defence systems. Another is technical intelligence about flight characteristics of missiles and rockets. The third is theatre assessment to support operations. The DSP watched and warned. SBIRS performs across the range of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).

The last function of theatre assessment in support of operations will become indispensable for performing peace operations safely. The most modern early warning satellites have evolved to the point where they can contribute to informing peace operations on the ground, not just warning against ballistic missiles or monitoring nuclear tests. Clearly, they will have a major role in the aftermath of terrorist attacks and disasters.

The Japanese Ministry of Defense must have been aware of this potential of early warning satellites. What, then, explains its negative stance? The author learned later that the ministry feared spending hundreds of billions of yen on those satellites out of its fixed budget. In fiscal year 2010, the ministry is spending, out of its total budget of 4.6826 trillion yen (A$62 billion), 2.0850 trillion yen (44.5%) on payroll and food, 773.8 billion yen (16.5%) on procurement of equipment, 158.8 billion yen (3.4%) on R&D, 134.3 billion yen (2.9%) on facilities, 114.6 billion yen (2.5%) on housing and clothing, 903.5 billion yen (19.3%) on training and operations, 436.5 billion yen (9.3%) to compensate communities near bases, and 76 billion yen (1.6%) on other expenses. From this budget, the ministry is

already paying for expensive weapon systems like missile defence and new fighter aircraft. If early warning satellites were added, the whole edifice of future defence capability may as well crash.

Indeed, the decision, described above, not to deploy a helicopter unit to the UN Mission in Sudan, may have been influenced by a concern that the cost of deployment, to the tune of 10 billion yen (A$133 million), may be subtracted from current procurement programs. For any administrative organ, not just the Japanese Ministry of Defense, an attempt to pay for an expensive activity out of its budget will run into the same problem of threatening its other missions. The likely result is that no agency does it, even if the cost were trivial for the entire government. The government misses an opportunity to advance the national interest. This problem is certainly in the background of the Japanese police's passive stance toward peace operations.

Japan must overcome this stove-piping before it can bolster its own security and prosperity by becoming a leader in peace operations. Therefore, the author pointed out to the space policy project team of the Democratic Party of Japan the need to think in terms of an interagency 'national security budget'. It should pay for operations abroad in the national interest like peace operations and counter-piracy operations. Police, fire departments, local governments, NGOs etc. should be authorised to use this budget, not only the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces.

In order to allow the JSDF to manage both national defence and peace operations, procurement and operation and maintenance of assets that are useful for peace operations like early warning satellites, transport aircraft, aerial refuelling aircraft, transport ships and replenishment ships should be paid for in part from the 'national security budget'. In fiscal year 2010, the Ministry of Defense is spending 773.8 billion yen (A$10.3 billion) on procurement, 158.8 billion yen (A$2.1 billion) on R&D and 903.5 billion yen (A$12 billion) on training and operations. Subsidy of ten percent of these three expenses (183.6 billion yen, A$24 billion) from the 'national security budget' should allow the JSDF to build capabilities for both defence at home and support for peacebuilding abroad. Japan's National Police Agency, Fire and Disaster Management Agency and Coast Guard should be subsidised likewise in order to develop their capabilities for peace operations.

The Democratic Party of Japan legislators were open to this idea when I proposed it three months before they came to power.

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The author is bringing this report to the public almost one year after the change of governing parties in Japan. The world is watching whether Japan can follow through on pursuit of peace, which Japan has vowed ever since the Second World War ended. The world is also watching whether Japan can act on lessons of almost twenty years of its own peace operations, which began with the deployment of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf and participation in the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia. In order to meet the international community's expectations and pursue national interests at the same time, Japan needs to implement the above proposals, not least the establishment of a Centre for International Peace Cooperation Action in cooperation with Australia and the United States, instead of just contributing personnel and money when asked. Now is the time to show pursuit of peace as Japan's face to the world.

In conclusion, the author would like to express deep thanks to Mr Richard Andrews, Minister-Counsellor at the Australian Embassy in Japan; Mr Bruce Miller, former Minister-Counsellor at the Embassy; Ms Michiyo Horita, Manager at the Australia-Japan Foundation; and others on the Australian side. Without the Australia-Japan Foundation's support, the author could not have conceived the proposals here. In this sense, Australia and Japan are already cooperating for peace operations, and have started to point a way toward bringing peace to the world.

Appendix 1. Australian Peacekeeping Participation, 1947–2007

Name of Operation	Acronym	Theatre	Dates of Australian Involvement	Approx. average or maximum no. of Austs involved at any one time	Estimated total no. of Australians in mission	Main role of Australians
UN Consular Commission		Indonesia	1947	4	4	military observers
UN Committee of Good Offices	UNGOC	Indonesia	1947–49	up to 15	30	
UN Commission for Indonesia	UNCI	Indonesia	1949–51	up to 19	40	military observers
UN Commission on Korea	UNCOK	Korea	1950	2	2	military observers
UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	UNMOGIP	Kashmir	1950–85	up to 18	200	military observers and air transport
UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea	UNCURK	Korea	1951	1	1	military observers
UN Truce Supervision Organization	UNTSO	Middle East (Israel and neighbours)	1956–present	12	400	military observers
UN Operation in the Congo	ONUC	Congo	1960–61	8	8	medical
UN Temporary Executive Authority	UNTEA	West New Guinea	1962–63	11	11	helicopters supporting humanitarian aid
UN Yemen Observation Mission	UNYOM	Yemen	1963	2	2	military observers
UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	UNFICYP	Cyprus	1964–present	12–50 police	1,185	maintenance of law and order
UN India−Pakistan Observation Mission	UNIPOM	India/ Pakistan	1965–66	3	3	military observers

Appendix 1 (*cont.*)

Name of Operation	Acronym	Theatre	Dates of Australian Involve-ment	Approx. average or maximum no. of Austs involved at any one time	Estimated total no. of Australians in mission	Main role of Australians
UN Disengagement Observer Force	UNDOF	Israel/Syria	1974	a few seconded from UNTSO	0	military obser-vers detached from UNTSO
UN Emergency Force II	UNEF II	Sinai	1976–79	46	320	monitoring a ceasefire between Israel and Egypt
UN Interim Force in Lebanon	UNIFIL	Lebanon	1978	4	6	military obser-vers detached from UNTSO
Commonwealth Monitoring Force	CMF	Zimbabwe	1979–80	152	152	monitoring Rhodesian forces, cantonment of guerrillas, and return of civil-ian refugees
Multinational Forces and Observers	MFO	Sinai	1982–86 1993–present	110 (82–86); 25–30 (93–)	1,300	monitoring Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai
Commonwealth Military Training Team–Uganda	CMTTU	Uganda	1982–84	6	24	training govern-ment forces
UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group	UNIIMOG	Iran/Iraq	1988–90	15	60	military obser-vers (only in Iran)
UN Border Relief Operation	UNBRO	Thai/ Cambodian border	1989–93	2 police	2	law and order creation; training police

Appendix 1 (*cont*.)

Name of Operation	Acronym	Theatre	Dates of Australian Involve-ment	Approx. average or maximum no. of Austs involved at any one time	Estimated total no. of Australians in mission	Main role of Australians
UN Transition Assistance Group	UNTAG	Namibia	1989–90	300	650	engineering support; supervision of elections
UN Mine Clearance Training Team	UNMCTT	Afghanistan Pakistan	1989–93	6–13	92	mine clearance – instructing refugees and planning operations
Maritime Interception Force	MIF	Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea	1990–2003	up to 3 ships; 600+ personnel in 1990, 2001–03	2,400	enforcing UN-imposed sanc-tions on Iraq (to end invasion of Kuwait, prevent further conflict)
Operation Habitat		Kurdistan (northern Iraq)	1991	75	75	delivering humanitarian aid
UN Special Commission	UNSCOM	Iraq	1991–99	10–30+ per year	135	inspections, monitoring and destruction of Iraqi chemical, biological and nuclear weap-ons capabilities
UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	MINURSO	Western Sahara	1991–94	45	225	communications
UN Advance Mis-sion in Cambodia	UNAMIC	Cambodia	1991–92	65	65	communications

Appendix 1 (*cont.*)

Name of Operation	Acronym	Theatre	Dates of Australian Involvement	Approx. average or maximum no. of Austs involved at any one time	Estimated total no. of Australians in mission	Main role of Australians
UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia	UNTAC	Cambodia	1992–93	600	1,250	communications transport, assisting the election and maintaining law and order
UN Operation in Somalia	UNOSOM I	Somalia	1992–93	30	30	movement control unit
Unified Task Force	UNITAF	Somalia	1992–93	1,366	1,366	protecting delivery of humanitarian aid
UN Protection Force	UNPROFOR	former Yugoslavia	1992	4	60	military observers and liaison
UN Operation in Somalia II	UNOSOM II	Somalia	1993–95	50	200	movement control unit, HQ staff, police
Cambodia Mine Action Centre	CMAC	Cambodia	1994–98	8	45	deminers
UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda	UNAMIR	Rwanda	1994–95	308	612	medical personnel (115), infantry protection
UN Operation in Mozambique	ONUMOZ	Mozambique	1994	18	36	police, deminers
South Pacific Peace-Keeping Force	SPPKF	Bougainville	1994	648	648	force commander; logistic and other support
Multinational Force	MNF	Haiti	1994–95	31	31	police monitors
UN Accelerated Demining Program	ADP	Mozambique	1994–2002	4	31	demining advice, training, coordination

Appendix 1 (*cont.*)

Name of Operation	Acronym	Theatre	Dates of Australian Involve-ment	Approx. average or maximum no. of Austs involved at any one time	Estimated total no. of Australians in mission	Main role of Australians
UN Verification Mission in Guatemala	MINUGUA	Guatemala	1997	1	1	observer
Stabilisation Force	SFOR	former Yugoslavia	1996–2004	6	204	officers attached to British forces
Truce Monitoring Group	TMG	Bougainville	1997–98	120	230	monitoring ceasefire, facilitating peace process
Peace Monitoring Group	PMG	Bougainville	1998–2003	260	2,100	monitoring ceasefire, facilitating peace process
UN Mission in East Timor	UNAMET	East Timor	1999	50 police, 6 military	62	facilitating referendum
International Force East Timor	INTERFET	East Timor	1999–2000	5,500	19,576	establishing peace and security, facili-tating humani-tarian aid and reconstruction
UN Transitional Administration in East Timor	UNTAET	East Timor	2000–02	1,650	7,500	maintaining security, facilitating reconstruction, police
International Peace Monitoring Team	IPMT	Solomon Islands	2000–02	35	140	monitoring peace process
UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	UNMEE	Ethiopia/ Eritrea	2001–05	2	16	staff officers

Appendix 1 (*cont.*)

Name of Operation	Acronym	Theatre	Dates of Australian Involvement	Approx. average or maximum no. of Austs involved at any one time	Estimated total no. of Australians in mission	Main role of Australians
International Military Advisory and Training Team	IMATT	Sierra Leone	2001–03	2	17	military observers
UN Mission of Support in East Timor	UNMISET	East Timor	2002–05		3,200	maintaining security, facilitating reconstruction
UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission	UNMOVIC	Iraq	2002–03	about 5	5	weapons inspections
UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	UNAMA	Afghanistan	2003–present	1	4	liaison officer
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands	RAMSI	Solomon Islands	2003–present	1650	5,000	police, civilians, military providing security and logistics
UN Mission in the Sudan	UNMIS	Sudan	2005–present	25	116	observers, logistics, air movement controllers
UN Office in Timor-Leste	UNOTIL	Timor-Leste	2005–06	4	16	military advisors
International Security Force	ISF	Timor-Leste	2006–present	850	3,200	security support for UNMIT and for East Timorese govt.
UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	UNMIT	Timor-Leste	2006–present	4 ADF, 50 police	150	police, liaison officers

Source: Horner, Londey and Bou, *Australian Peacekeeping*, pp. 273–80.

Appendix 2. Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation

The Prime Ministers of Japan and Australia,

Affirming that the strategic partnership between Japan and Australia is based on democratic values, a commitment to human rights, freedom and the rule of law, as well as shared security interests, mutual respect, trust and deep friendship;

Committing to the continuing development of their strategic partnership to reflect shared values and interests;

Recalling their on-going beneficial cooperation on regional and global security challenges, including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and human security concerns such as disaster relief and pandemics, as well as their contributions to regional peace and stability;

Recognising that the future security and prosperity of both Japan and Australia is linked to the secure future of the Asia-Pacific region and beyond;

Affirming their common purpose in working together, and with other countries through such fora as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the East Asia Summit (EAS), to achieve the objective of a prosperous, open and secure Asia-Pacific region, and recognising that strengthened bilateral security cooperation will make a significant contribution in this context;

Committing to increasing practical cooperation between the defence forces and other security related agencies of Japan and Australia, including through strengthening the regular and constructive exchange of views and assessments of security developments in areas of common interest;

Committing to working together, and with others, to respond to new security challenges and threats, as they arise;

Affirming the common strategic interests and security benefits embodied in their respective alliance relationships with the United States, and committing to strengthening trilateral cooperation, including through practical collaboration among the foreign affairs, defence and other related agencies of all three countries, as well as through the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and recognising that strengthened bilateral cooperation will be conducive to the enhancement of trilateral cooperation;

Desiring to create a comprehensive framework for the enhancement of security cooperation between Japan and Australia;

Have decided as follows:

Strengthening Cooperation

Japan and Australia will strengthen their cooperation and consultation on issues of common strategic interest in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. This includes cooperation for a peaceful resolution of issues related to North Korea, including its nuclear development, ballistic missile activities, and humanitarian issues including the abduction issue. Japan and Australia also recognise the threat to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond posed by terrorism and will further strengthen cooperation to address this threat.

Japan and Australia will also strengthen their cooperation through the United Nations and other international and regional organisations and fora through activities such as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. Japan and Australia will work towards the reform of the United Nations, including the realization of Japan's permanent membership of the Security Council.

The cooperation will be conducted in accordance with laws and regulations of each country.

Japan and Australia will deepen and expand their bilateral cooperation in the areas of security and defence cooperation with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of their combined contribution to regional and international peace and security, as well as human security.

Areas of Cooperation

The scope of security cooperation between Japan and Australia will include, but not be limited to the following:

(i) law enforcement on combating transnational crime, including trafficking in illegal narcotics and precursors, people smuggling and trafficking, counterfeiting currency and arms smuggling;
(ii) border security;
(iii) counter-terrorism;
(iv) disarmament and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;
(v) peace operations;
(vi) exchange of strategic assessments and related information;
(vii) maritime and aviation security;
(viii) humanitarian relief operations, including disaster relief;
(ix) contingency planning, including for pandemics.

As part of the above-mentioned cooperation, Japan and Australia will, as appropriate, strengthen practical cooperation between their respective defence forces and other security related agencies, including through:

(i) exchange of personnel;

(ii) joint exercises and training to further increase effectiveness of cooperation, including in the area of humanitarian relief operations;

(iii) coordinated activities including those in the areas of law enforcement, peace operations, and regional capacity building.

Implementation

Japan and Australia will develop an action plan with specific measures to advance security cooperation in the above areas.

Japan and Australia will further strengthen the strategic dialogue between their Foreign Ministers, on an annual basis.

Japan and Australia will build on their dialogue between Defence Ministers, on an annual basis.

Japan and Australia will enhance joint Foreign and Defence Ministry dialogue, including through the establishment of a regular Ministerial dialogue.

Signed at Tokyo this 13th day of March, 2007

SHINZO ABE	JOHN HOWARD
Prime Minister of Japan	Prime Minister of Australia

Appendix 3. Major elements of the updated Action Plan to implement the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation

December 2009

1. Strengthening cooperation on issues of common strategic interest

(1) Enhance policy coordination on security issues in the Asia Pacific region and beyond

(2) Exchange information and coordinate policy with respect to issues related to North Korea, such as the abduction, nuclear, and missile issues

(3) Enhance bilateral cooperation in the trilateral framework with the United States and in other multilateral frameworks including any existing and future regional security groupings

(4) Cooperate in APEC, the East Asia Summit, the ARF, and, on Australia taking up its membership, the Asia-Europe Meeting and continue regional discussions on the future of the region.

(5) Cooperate closely on Pacific Islands issues

2. United Nations reform

(1) Continue dialogue and cooperation on UN Reform, including actively pursuing early realisation of Japan's permanent membership of the UN Security Council

(2) Exchange views on UN Security Council priorities and issues

3. Security and defence cooperation

(1) Work towards an agreement on mutual logistics support

(2) Conduct following activities in accordance with the current Memorandum on Defence Cooperation:

- (a) annual Ministerial meetings
- (b) high level exchange
- (c) working level exchange
- (d) unit-to-unit exchange
- (e) technical exchange
- (f) information exchange
- (g) cooperation in international peace cooperation activities
- (h) enhancement of bilateral defence cooperation in such frameworks as Japan-Australia-US trilateral framework and the ARF
- (i) development of an annual calendar of cooperation and exchange activities
- (j) others

(3) Conduct discussions on North Asian Security in the framework of the Australia-Japan 1.5 Track Dialogue

(4) Enhance bilateral strategic discussions and exchanges, including in the context of the Trilateral Security and Defence Cooperation Forum

(5) Enhance exchange of views on human security

4. Law enforcement

(1) Enhance the cooperative relationship between the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and Japan's National Police Agency (NPA)

(2) Exchange information relating to illicit drugs, including drug precursor chemicals

(3) Continue regular dialogue to coordinate regional aid strategies on trans-boundary threats in the region

(4) Hold regular Customs Cooperation Meeting to consolidate cooperation

(5) Enhance cooperation to combat money laundering

(6) Cooperate to progress discussions on the Arms Trade Treaty initiative

5. Border Security

(1) Explore possibilities for bilateral cooperation in the area of border security

(2) Implement the Airline Liaison Officer initiative

6. Counter-terrorism

(1) Strengthen bilateral cooperation among counter-terrorism officials

(2) Participate in the next trilateral counter-terrorism talks

(3) Jointly contribute to building up the capacity of developing countries in the area of port security and border control

(4) Share research, best practice, open source materials and technological solutions on counter-radicalisation activities

(5) Make Joint Efforts to strengthen CBRN terrorism prevention measures in developing countries

(6) Cooperate to enhance the capacity of developing countries to identify and interdict cash couriers and bulk cash smugglers

7. Disarmament and counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destructions and their means of delivery

(1) Hold annually the Australia-Japan Bilateral Disarmament and Non-proliferation Talks

(2) Cooperate to promote the PSI in the region.

(3) Cooperate on counter-proliferation outreach efforts, including considering holding Chemical Weapons Convention implementation workshops

(4) Promote the exchange of information relating to imports and exports of concern

(5) Cooperate in the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty review process.

(6) Promote international discussion taking into account the findings of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in the lead-up to the NPT Review Conference.

8. Peace Operations

(1) NPA to attend AFP's International Deployment Group pre-deployment training

(2) Explore further opportunities for Cooperation with Japan's Program for Human Resource Development in Asia for Peacebuilding

(3) Co-host a symposium on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation to develop proposals for cooperation

(4) Cooperate in support of the work of RAMSI

(5) Encourage linkages between Australian and Japanese organisations for the study of peacekeeping, including the new Asia-Pacific Civil Military Centre of Excellence

9. Exchange of strategic assessments and related information

(1) Continue negotiations on a bilateral agreement on classified information sharing and security.

(2) Enhance the exchange of strategic assessments and related information through regular meetings between relevant agencies

10. Maritime and aviation security

(1) Hold a bilateral dialogue on transport security.

(2) Australia Customs and Japan Coast Guard to meet to discuss joint exercises, personnel exchange, and training opportunities

(3) Explore ways jointly to assist East Timor in strengthening its maritime security

(4) Explore ways to cooperate in regional and global anti-piracy efforts

11. Humanitarian relief operations, including disaster relief

(1) Consult closely on regional disaster response issues and identify areas for cooperation, particularly in disaster response and risk reduction

(2) Jointly strengthen the capacity of the UN to support regional disaster response and disaster management

12. Forthcoming dialogues

(1) Japan-Australia Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations

(2) Foreign Ministers meeting

(3) Defence Ministers meeting

(4) Official's pol-mil dialogue

(5) Official's Defence Policy Talks

(6) Official's Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Talks

(7) Customs Cooperation Meeting

(8) Senior Officials Talks on East Asia

Appendix 4. Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement

Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning reciprocal provision of supplies and services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force

The Government of Japan and the Government of Australia (hereinafter referred to as the "Parties"),

Recognizing that the establishment of a framework between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force concerning reciprocal provision of supplies and services in the field of logistic support (hereinafter referred to as the "supplies and services") will promote close cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force,

Understanding that the establishment of the abovementioned framework will promote more efficient performance of the respective roles of the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force in the field of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, humanitarian international relief operations and other operations, and will actively contribute to the effort led by the United Nations toward international peace,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. The purpose of this Agreement is to establish basic terms and conditions for the reciprocal provision of supplies and services, between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force, necessary for the following activities:

   a. exercises and training with participation by both of the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force;

   b. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, humanitarian international relief operations, or operations to cope with large scale disasters in the territory of either Party or a third country;

   c. transportation of nationals of either Party or others, if appropriate, for their evacuation from overseas in case of exigencies of the situation;

   d. communication and coordination or other routine activities (including visits of ships or aircraft of the forces of either Party to facilities in the territory of the other Party), with the exception of exercises and training conducted unilaterally by the forces of either Party.

2. This Agreement sets forth a framework for the provision of supplies and services on the basis of the principle of reciprocity.

3. The request, provision, receipt, and settlement of supplies and services under this Agreement shall be carried out by the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and by the Australian Defence Force.

Article II

1. When either Party requests, under this Agreement, the other Party to provide supplies and services necessary for the activities which are set forth in sub-paragraph 1 a. to d. of Article I, and are conducted by the Self-Defense Forces of Japan or the Australian Defence Force, the other Party, within its competence, may provide the supplies and services requested.

2. The supplies and services related to the following categories may be provided under this Article: food; water; billeting; transportation (including airlift); petroleum, oils, and lubricants; clothing; communications; medical services; base support; storage; use of facilities; training services; spare parts and components; repair and maintenance; and airport and seaport services.
The supplies and services related to each category are specified in the Annex.

3. Paragraph 2 of this Article shall not be interpreted as to include the provision of weapons or ammunition by the Self-Defense Forces of Japan or the Australian Defence Force.

4. The provision of supplies and services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force shall be conducted pursuant to the laws and regulations of the respective countries.

Article III

1. The use of supplies and services provided under this Agreement shall be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The Party that receives supplies and services under this Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "receiving Party") shall not transfer those supplies and services, either temporarily or permanently, by any means to those outside of the forces of the receiving Party, without prior written consent of the Party who provides them (hereinafter referred to as the "providing Party").

Article IV

1. The settlement procedures for provision of supplies under this Agreement shall be as follows:
   a. The receiving Party shall, subject to subparagraph b., return the supplies in question in a condition and manner which is satisfactory to the providing Party.
   b. If the supplies provided are consumable or the receiving Party cannot return the supplies in

question in a condition and manner which is satisfactory to the providing Party, the receiving Party shall, subject to sub-paragraph c., return supplies of the same type and in the same quality and quantity in a condition and manner which is satisfactory to the providing Party.

c. If the receiving Party cannot return the supplies of the same type and in the same quality and quantity as the supplies provided in a condition and manner which is satisfactory to the providing Party, the receiving Party shall reimburse in the currency specified by the providing Party.

2. In case of the settlement for provision of services under this Agreement, the services provided shall be reimbursed in the currency specified by the providing Party or settled by the provision of services of the same type and equivalent value.

The manner of the settlement shall be agreed between the Parties prior to the provision of the services.

3. Internal duties or taxes shall not be charged by either Party for supplies and services provided under this Agreement to the extent permitted by the laws of the respective countries.

Article V

1. The reciprocal provision of supplies and services under this Agreement shall be carried out in accordance with the Procedural Arrangement, as may be modified, which is subordinate to this Agreement and which shall specify procedures and supplementary details of terms and conditions to implement this Agreement. The Procedural Arrangement shall be made between the competent authorities of the Parties.

2. The price of the supplies and the services reimbursed in accordance with paragraph 1 c. and paragraph 2 of Article IV shall be determined pursuant to the relevant provisions set forth in the Procedural Arrangement.

Article VI

1. The provisions of this Agreement shall not apply to any activities conducted by the Australian Defence Force acting as a member of the United Nations Forces under the Agreement Regarding the Status of the United Nations Forces in Japan signed on February 19, 1954.

2. The Parties shall closely consult with each other regarding the implementation of this Agreement.

3. Any matter relating to the interpretation or application of this Agreement and the Procedural Arrangement shall be resolved solely through consultation between the Parties.

4. The competent authorities of the Parties shall settle disputes that may arise concerning the implementation of this Agreement in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Procedural Arrangement.

5. Where a dispute cannot be settled under the provisions of paragraph 4 of this Article, the dispute shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of this Article.

Article VII

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date upon which the Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that their respective internal procedures necessary to give effect to this Agreement have been completed. This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of ten years, and shall thereafter be automatically extended for successive periods of ten years each, unless either Party notifies the other of its intention in writing to terminate this Agreement more than six months before the end of each period of ten years.

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party may terminate this Agreement at any time by giving one year written notice to the other Party.

3. This Agreement may be amended by written agreement between the Parties.

4. Notwithstanding the termination of this Agreement, the provisions of Article III, IV, V and paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of Article VI shall remain in force in respect of the reciprocal provision of supplies and services conducted under this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE in duplicate, in the Japanese and English languages, both equally authentic, at Tokyo, this nineteenth day of May, two thousand ten.

For the Government of Japan:
岡田克也
[Okada, Katsuya]

For the Government of Australia:
John Faulkner

Category	
Food	food, provision of meals, cooking utensils, and the like
Water	water, water supply, equipment necessary for water supply, and the like
Billeting	use of billeting and bathing facilities, beddings, and the like
Transportation (including airlift)	transportation of persons and goods, transport equipment, and the like
Petroleum, oils, and lubricants	petroleum, oils, and lubricants, refueling, equipment necessary for refueling, and the like
Clothing	clothing, mending of clothing, and the like
Communications	use of communication facilities, communication services, communication equipment, and the like
Medical services	medical treatment, medical equipment, and the like
Base support	collection and disposal of waste, laundry, electric supply, environmental services, decontamination equipment and services, and the like
Storage	temporary storage in warehouse or refrigerated storehouse, and the like
Use of facilities	temporary use of buildings, facilities, and land, and the like
Training services	dispatch of instructors, materials for educational and training purposes, consumables for training purposes, and the like
Spare parts and Components	spare parts and components of military aircraft, vehicles, and ships, and the like
Repair and Maintenance	repair and maintenance, equipment for repair and maintenance, and the like
Airport and seaport services	services for arrival and departure of aircraft and ships, loading and unloading, and the like

Appendix 5. Australian Federal Police International Peace Support Deployments, 1964-2007

Host country	Designation	Activities	Duration
Cyprus	UNFICYP	Maintain buffer zone	1964-present
Namibia	UNTAG	Election monitoring	1989
Thailand-Cambodia border	UNBRO	Assistance with security and displaced persons	1989-93
Cambodia	UNTAC	Police presence and patrols	1992-93
	CCJAP(III)	Criminal justice advisor	2007-present
Somalia	UNOSOM II	Advice on police training	1993-95
Mozambique	ONUMOZ	Election monitoring	1994
Haiti	Multinational Force - Haiti	Advice on interim police force	1994-95
South Africa	UNOMSA	Election monitoring	1994
Bougainville	TMG	Truce monitoring	1997-98
	PMG	Peace monitoring	1998-2000
Papua New Guinea	ECP	Train and advise police	2004-05
Vanuatu	DCP	Train and advise police	1998
	VPFCBP	Police force capacity building	2006-present
East Timor	UNAMET, UNTAET, UNMISET	Assistance in the lead-up to East Timor independence	1999-2005
	TLPDP	Capacity development of police	2004-present
	Operation Serene / UNMIT	Regional intervention assistance to Timor-Leste in restoring law and order; transitioning to UN police, border security	2006
Solomon Islands	IPMT	Monitoring of peace and removal of weapons from the community	2000-02
	RAMSI	Inline operational and administrative positions evolving to advisory status	2003-present
Nauru	—	Capacity development of the Nauru Police Force	2004-present
Jordan	JIPTC	Training of Iraqi Police Service	2004-06
Tonga	Operation Tokoni	Support to Tonga Police postconflict to re-estalish law and order and assist in investigations	2006-07
Sudan	UNMIS	Development of police capability	2006-present

Source: Tim Dahlstrom and James Steedman, 'Full Spectrum Policing', in Horner, Londey and Bou, *Australian Peacekeeping*, p. 143.

List of Interviews

Canberra, 1 March 2010

- Professor David Horner, Australian National University
- Emeritus Professor Paul Dibb, Australian National University, former Deputy Secretary of the Department of Defence

Canberra and Queanbeyan, 2 March

- Mr Warren King, Director of Japan Section, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; and Mr John Quinn, Assistant Secretary, Strategic Issues and Intelligence Branch, International Security Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
- MAJGEN (Retd) Peter Abigail, Executive Director of Australian Strategic Policy Institute
- Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence
  Dr Jim Rolfe, Dr Moreen Dee, Mr Gregory Takats, LEUT Barbara Butler

Canberra, 3 March

- Dr Stephen Bullard, Australian War Memorial
- Mr William Nagy, Director of United Nations Commitments and Support, Department of Defence; Dr Simone Alesich, Policy Officer, North and South Asia, Department of Defence; and Mr Brett White, Assistant Director of Africa, United Nations and Peacekeeping, Department of Defence
- Mr Ben Coleman, Assistant Secretary for Strategic Policy, Department of Defence; and Mr Greg Raymond, Director of Strategic Policy Guidance, Department of Defence

Sydney, 4 March

- MAJGEN (Retd) Tim Ford, former Chief Military Adviser in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at UN Headquarters
- Mr Andrew Shearer, Lowy Institute for International Policy

RAAF Williamtown, 5 March

- LTCOL Stephen Cross, Deputy Commander, ADF Peace Operations Training Centre

Washington, D.C., 26 March

- Dr David Kilcullen, counterinsurgency expert, retired Australian Army lieutenant colonel

New York, 29 March

- Dr Elsina Wainwright, Senior Fellow, Center on International Cooperation, New York University
- Professor Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Columbia University; former UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations

・Mr David Haeri, Chief of Best Practices Unit, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 30 March

・U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute
COL Stephen Smith; COL John Bessler; Professor William Flavin; Professor Raymond Millen; COL Bryan Groves; COL Matthew Russell; Ms Karen Finkenbinder; LTC Hiroaki Takano, JGSDF

Washington, D.C., 31 March

・Mr.Dell L. Dailey, PAE Corporation, former US Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism for the Department of State, retired US Army lieutenant general
・Dr William Durch, The Henry L. Stimson Center

Washington, D.C., 1 April

・Professor Joseph J. Collins, National War College, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations
・Mr Robert Perito, Director of Center for Security Sector Governance, United States Institute of Peace

Washington, D.C., 2 April

・Ms Beth Ellen Cole, Director of Intergovernmental Affairs, United States Institute of Peace
・Dr Nora Bensahel, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation
・Ambassador James Dobbins, RAND Corporation
・Dr Janine Davidson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans

Photographs of Interviews

Canberra, 1 March 2010

Professor David Horner, Australian National University

Emeritus Professor Paul Dibb, Australian National University, former Deputy Secretary of the Department of Defence

Canberra, 2 March

MAJGEN (Retd) Peter Abigail, Executive Director of Australian Strategic Policy Institute

Queanbeyan, 2 March

Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence

Canberra, 3 March

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Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 30 March

U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute

Washington, D.C., 31 March

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Dr William Durch, The Henry L. Stimson Center; in rear of photo at R, Ms Ellen Laipson, President and CEO, The Henry L. Stimson Center



Washington, D.C., 1 April

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

Ambassador James Dobbins, RAND Corporation



Not photographed due to their circumstances:
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 2 March: Mr Warren King, Director of Japan Section, and Mr John Quinn, Assistant Secretary, Strategic Issues and Intelligence Branch, International Security Division
Department of Defence, Canberra, 3 March: Mr Ben Coleman, Assistant Secretary for Strategic Policy; Mr Greg Raymond, Director of Strategic Policy Guidance; Mr William Nagy, Director of United Nations Commitments and Support; Dr Simone Alesich, Policy Officer, North and South Asia; Mr Brett White, Assistant Director of Africa, United Nations and Peacekeeping
US Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 2 April: Dr Janine Davidson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans

Strategic Research Institute of International Change research team
From L to R, Kazuhisa Ogawa, President; Takayuki Nishi, Senior Research Fellow; Kazuki Watanabe, Senior Research Fellow

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