Studies & Comments 9
Klaus Lange (ed.)

Security in South Asia: Conventional and Unconventional Factors of Destabilization

Studies & Comments 9
Klaus Lange (ed.)

Security in South Asia:
Conventional and Unconventional
Factors of Destabilization

Contents

Introduction

Klaus Lange

The publication at hand contains selected papers presented at an international conference organized by the Academy of Politics and Current Affairs of the Hanns Seidel Foundation which took place in Wildbad Kreuth on 16-18 June 2009.

The subject of the conference was "Security in South Asia: Conventional and Unconventional Factors of Destabilization".

The significance of South Asia in terms of security aspects is usually underrated in Europe, particularly when that geographical area is viewed in a global context. It is also often overlooked that South Asia holds a dominant position among the growth regions of the world. Moreover, South Asia commands an incomparable historical and cultural "sounding board" with the potential to resonate far beyond regional boundaries.

With the Indian subcontinent as its centre, South Asia is at the same time saddled with manifold risks to its stability, risks which cover a broad spectrum ranging from extreme social polarization and religious antagonisms, through to numerous forms of terrorism. When the situation is subjected to closer scrutiny, the impression arises that the governments of the region are often so overtaxed when it comes to containing the current risks to their security and stability that any prognosis of the future development of South Asia must be accompanied by numerous question marks. Moreover, it has to be taken into account that South Asia constitutes a system of interdependence and so there is little justification for compartmentalized research which focuses on individual states in isolation from each other.

Today South Asia is one of the key regions where the question of global development as a whole will be decided. This issue, with all its accompanying risks and opportunities, makes it imperative as well as appropriate to direct a searchlight on the regional security of South Asia.

The contents of this publication do not claim to provide comprehensive coverage of all the risks to stability in South Asia. The topics here discussed do, however, constitute thematic poles around which any future systematic analysis would have to be structured: it can hardly be disputed that India and its problems of stability would have to be considered an essential and central subject, as would the entire interconnected complex of the Pakistan-Afghan problem.

At the same time it would also make sense to take another look at the phenomenon of global terrorism, this time from the vantage point of recent developments since 9/11. Finally, any attempt to calculate or predict the future prospects for stability in South Asia must in the long term take into account the Chinese factor.

This publication will have more than fulfilled its purpose if it results in drawing more attention to a region, the importance of which is in inverse proportion to the notice it currently receives.

Indien – Perspektiven und Risiken
seiner Stabilität und Sicherheit

Hans-Georg Wieck

1. Die Fragestellung

Indien fällt bei der Bewältigung oder Eindämmung der internationalen Bedrohungen ein erhebliches Maß an Verantwortung und Gewicht zu, auch wenn das Land in vielen Fällen nicht in erster Linie oder ausschließlich betroffen ist.

Die Verantwortung für die Bewältigung der inneren Bedrohungen liegt bei den Akteuren der demokratischen Kräfte und der staatlichen Institutionen im Lande selbst.

Die innere und äußere Sicherheit und die politische Stabilität Indiens angesichts unübersehbarer, zum Teil existenzieller Risiken hängen meines Erachtens daher vor allem von folgenden Punkten ab:

– von der Glaubwürdigkeit und Zukunftsfähigkeit der indischen Demokratie,

– von der Handlungsfähigkeit ihrer staatlichen Institutionen und

– von der Antwort auf die Frage, in welcher geostrategischen Konstellation das Land seine äußere Sicherheit sucht und findet.

2. Die Antworten

Die Wahlen vom Mai 2009 – Renaissance von Demokratie und Handlungsfähigkeit?

1. Die Ergebnisse der indischen Parlamentswahlen vom 16. Mai 2009 sind im Lande und weltweit mit Erleichterung aufgenommen worden und haben die Erwartung stabiler Mehrheitsverhältnisse für die fünfjährige Regierungsperiode aufkommen lassen – nicht ohne gute Gründe.

Die Kongress-Partei verfügt nun über 206 Sitze und stellt in der von ihr angeführten United Progressive Alliance mit 262 Sitzen die größte Partei. Andere Parlamentsgruppen haben sich der Regierungskoalition angeschlossen. Diese verfügt nun insgesamt über 330 Sitze im indischen Parlament (Lok Sabha).

Die Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, nationalhinduistische Partei) eroberte bei den Wahlen 116 Sitze. Insgesamt verfügt die von der BJP angeführte National Democratic Alliance über 159 Sitze.

Überraschend schlecht hat das linke Wahlbündnis Third Front mit insgesamt nur 79 Sitzen im indischen Parlament abgeschnitten.

2. Der überzeugende Sieg der Kongress-Koalition (United Progressive Alliance), zu dem gewiss auch die massiven Hilfsprogramme für die ländliche Bevölkerung beigetragen haben, hat denjenigen politischen Kräften im Lande Auftrieb gegeben, die von der Notwendigkeit überzeugt sind, den Staat nicht nur nach den Regeln der Verfassung als säkularen Staat zu führen und zu gestalten, sondern auch pro-aktiv den politisch organisierten Kräften zu begegnen, die staatliche Institutionen zu Brutstätten religiöser Eiferer und Intoleranz, vor allem hinduistischer Natur, werden lassen wollen oder die den Staat im Wege eines militanten islamischen Fundamentalismus untergraben wollen.

Diese Gefahren bestehen und können nur im Wege politischen Dialogs, politischer Vision und in Konfliktfällen durch die Urteile unabhängiger Gerichte gebannt werden. Die beiden großen Parteien haben auf diesem Felde in der Vergangenheit gesündigt.

3. "Good Governance" hat jetzt wieder eine Chance. "Good Governance" ist der Schlüssel zur Bewältigung der Glaubwürdigkeitskrise der indischen Demokratie

Der Wahlsieg der Kongress-Partei wird von vielen Beobachtern nicht nur als eine Bestätigung des Ministerpräsidenten Manmohan Singh, der ein ausgewiesener und erfahrener Fachmann für alle finanz- und wirtschaftspolitischen Fragen ist, angesehen. Sonja Gandhi, die Parteivorsitzende und der "spiritus rector" der Regierungspolitik, und Manmohan Singh müssen nun nicht mehr ihre Energie im Ringen mit den Kommunisten verschleißen, die ja die Manmohan Singh-Regierung von außen stützten und somit tolerierten, aber Schlüsselentscheidungen ver- und behinderten.

Der Erfolg der Kongress-Partei ist vor allem auf den Umstand zurückzuführen, dass, einer Abstimmung in der Familie folgend, mit Rahul Gandhi der landesweit gehegte Mythos der positiven Rolle der Nehru-Gandhi-Familie für das Wohl und Wehe Indiens erneut Gestalt angenommen hat. Rahul ist der Hoffnungsträger der Nation, vor allem der Jugend.

In Uttar Pradesch gelang es ihm, einen eindrucksvollen Wahlsieg einzufahren. Er führte demokratische Wahlen in der Jugendorganisation dieses Bundesstaates ein. Rahul Gandhi ist einer der zwölf Generalsekretäre der Kongress-Partei und hat die Jugendarbeit übernommen. Die Verjüngung der Parteikader ist im Gange und lässt Hoffnung aufkommen, nicht nur in der Partei, sondern auch im Lande.

Rahul Gandhi hat die Jugend des Landes aufgerufen, sich für dieses Land zu engagieren (Kennedy-Komplex). Dieser Appell ist glaubwürdig. Er wurde in Uttar Pradesch sehr kräftig von seiner Charisma ausstrahlenden Schwester Priyanka Gandhi Vadra unterstützt. Die Verjüngung der Führungskräfte ist angesichts der gegenwärtig die Macht verwaltenden Altenriege unerlässlich, die sowohl in der Regierung als auch in der Opposition immer noch dominant ist. Für diese Verjüngung steht Rahul Gandhi – und mit ihm auch die Sehnsucht nach Visionen für die Zukunft, wie es bei seinem Vater Rajiv der Fall gewesen war.

Rahul Gandhi selbst weiß um den Vorwurf der Korruption, der auf der Kongress-Partei und seinem Vater lastet, und um den Mangel an partei-interner Demokratie. Analog zu sozialdemokratischen Vorstellungen setzt er sich für ein sozial abgesichertes Wirtschaftswachstum ("inclusive economic growth") ein.

4. Kongress-Partei und BJP haben im letzten Jahrzehnt die Kraft und Anziehungskraft verloren, aufstrebende, auf Mitgestaltung drängende politische Gruppierungen, vor allem aus den sozial schwachen Teilen der Bevölkerung, an sich zu binden. Diese aufstrebenden Kräfte der Dalits und Adivasis erobern seit Jahren mit eigenen Parteigründungen politische Positionen in den Bundesländern und sind als Koalitionspartner der beiden großen Parteistrukturen schwierige Partner.

Kongress-Partei und BJP konnten in Jahre 2004 und 2009 nur 48,97% bzw. 48,67% der Stimmen im ganzen Land auf sich vereinen – also jeweils nur fast die Hälfte, aber eben nicht mehr. Das reicht nicht für landesweit auftretende nationale Parteien.

5. Zu erinnern ist auch daran, dass der Führer der BJP, L.K. Advani, der im Dezember 1992 als führender BJP-Politiker die Verantwortung für den Sturm auf die Moschee

in Ayodhya trug, in den Augen großer Teile der Öffentlichkeit für das Konzept eines entsäkularisierten Staates steht. Das ist eine lebensgefährliche Perspektive für den multi-ethischen und multi-religiösen Staat Indien. Als Nachfolger im Vorsitz der BJP wird der Ministerpräsident von Gujerat, Narendra Modi, gehandelt, der Mann, dem die Verantwortung für die hinduistischen Racheakte an der muslimischen Bevölkerung nach einem Muslim-Angriff gegen einen Eisenbahnzug mit hinduistischen Pilgern im Jahre 2002 zur Last gelegt wird.

Der säkulare Staat sieht sich demnach weiterhin einer großen Herausforderung durch das von erheblichen Bevölkerungsteilen unterstützte Hindutwa Konzept für Indien ausgesetzt. Der Staat muss in allen "kommunalen" Fragen Toleranz, Dialog und Gewaltlosigkeit sowie die Unparteilichkeit der staatlichen Organe und der Gerichte durchsetzen – in den Dörfern, in denen Brahmanen und Grundbesitzer über Dalits und Adivasis herrschen, ebenso wie bei der Quotenregelung, um die soziale Integration der traditionell ausgegrenzten Bürger (250 Millionen Menschen) zu erreichen.

6. Das Wahlergebnis vom 16. Mai 2009 ist eine Chance, gibt Hoffnung auf einen Neuanfang, um die gegenwärtig stattfindende schrittweise Aushöhlung der staatsbürgerlichen Dimension der Verfassungsordnung und der politischen Kultur des Landes zu bremsen und zu korrigieren.

"Gewalt und Gewaltfreiheit in Südasien", hat vor kurzem anlässlich seiner Berufung der junge Indologe Werner Wessler an der Universität Bonn zum Thema seiner Antrittsvorlesung gemacht. In der Begründung für die Wahl des Themas führt er aus: "Frieden und Stabilität der einzelnen Staaten wie auch der Region Südasien als ganzer entscheiden sich an der Frage, ob es gelingt, die tief eingewurzelten multi- und interkulturellen Erfahrungen der Menschen

in einen kritisch-reflexiven Modernitätsdiskurs einzubinden. Dies hatte schon Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948) mit seiner Programmschrift 'Hind Swaraj' angestrebt, die vor hundert Jahren (1909) erschien. Gandhis Klassiker des Antikolonialismus und der gewaltfreien Aktion entstand keineswegs auf einer Insel der Seligen, sondern in der komplizierten tagespolitischen Gemengelage und vor dem Hintergrund einer Geschichte Südasiens, deren Blutspur nicht weniger überwältigend ist als die von anderen Weltregionen."

Die Dimension dieser Aufgabe ist unvorstellbar groß.

7. Angesichts des hohen Ansehens der als Verfassungsorgan verankerten Wahlkommission wird auch in diesem Jahr mit guten Gründen von einer im Ganzen fairen und freien Wahl in Indien gesprochen. Aber der Vorwurf und die Vermutung von finanzieller Korruption wird immer wieder erhoben und in Einzelfällen nachgewiesen. Nach den Erhebungen von Transparency International nimmt Indien den Rang 85 in der Rangfolge der 185 Staaten und Gesellschaften ein, die untersucht werden – also eine Position in der Mitte der Gesamtliste. China steht etwas besser da – auf Position 72.

In den Analysen des Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2008 nimmt Indien im Status-Index (Mittelwert bei Politischer Transformation und Wirtschaftlicher Transformation) die Position 24 (von 119 Ländern) und beim Management Index (Bewertung der Managementleistung der politischen Entscheidungsträger) die Position 32 ein.

Das sind beachtliche Positionen für einen Staat von der Größe und der Komplexität Indiens. China kann in keinem dieser Indices glänzen.

Der "Freedom House Index 2008" ordnet Indien unter den freien Ländern ein. Das hat der Freedom House Index nicht immer getan!

8. Auf das Engste mit dem Erfordernis der Glaubwürdigkeit und Stabilität der Demokratie sowie der Handlungsfähigkeit der staatlichen Institutionen ist die Ernsthaftigkeit und Effizienz der staatlichen Politik zur Überwindung der strukturellen Armut (25% der Bevölkerung) und des Analphabetentums (mehr als 40% der Bevölkerung) verbunden. Dabei ist nicht nur die soziale und menschenrechtliche Dimension von Bedeutung, sondern auch die Lebensfähigkeit der Megastädte in Indien selbst, die Gefahr laufen, von den ständig wachsenden Slums in eine existenzielle Krise gerissen zu werden, da sie den Nährboden für Epidemien und Pandemien und vielleicht auch einmal für gewaltsame soziale Unruhen darstellen.

Die geostrategische Einbettung Indiens

Die regionale Sicherheitslage Indiens ist heute von der inneren Schwäche, ja Labilität seiner Nachbarn im SAARC-Rahmen geprägt. Der indische Politikwissenschaftler Amitabh Mattoo charakterisierte die Lage mit den Worten, dass Indien in der Nachbarschaft gescheiterter Staaten lebe – mit anderen Worten: Indien gleicht einer Insel in einem Meer von Gewalt:

–   Auf Sri Lanka wurde jetzt erst ein 25 Jahre während Bürgerkrieg mit fast 100.000 Opfern beendet.

–   In Birma herrscht die älteste Militärdiktatur der Welt.

–   Nepal ist gekennzeichnet von Bürgerkrieg und Systemwechsel mit der Perspektive weiterer Unruhen.

–   Pakistan, Bangladesch und Afghanistan sind von der Gefahr einer islamischen Revolution bzw. Talibanisierung bedroht, die auch Teile der islamischen Bevölkerung in Indien erfassen könnte. Im afghanisch-pakistanischen Grenzgebiet arbeiten US- und Pakistan-

Streitkräfte im Kampf gegen Talibane und Al Qaida-Zellen zusammen. Indien stellt das tatsächliche Engagement Pakistans in diesen existenziellen Fragen in Frage. Indien hat sein finanzielles und politisches Engagement in Afghanistan verstärkt. Die Lage in Pakistan/ Afghanistan ist kritisch, nicht zuletzt wegen der Gefahr, dass pakistanische Nuklearwaffen in die Hände und unter die Kontrolle der Talibane kommen könnten.

Das gesamte Umfeld Indiens, also der gesamte benachbarte SAARC-Raum, ist von internen Unsicherheiten und Instabilitäten gekennzeichnet. Das muss Indien zu verstärkten Anstrengungen veranlassen, im bilateralen Prozess zur inneren Stabilität dieser Länder beizutragen – eine der Quadratur des Kreises gleichende Aufgabe.

In dieser von Unsicherheiten und Gefahren bestimmten Lage bemüht sich Indien aus guten Gründen um einen "Modus vivendi" mit China, dem größten Handelspartner Indiens. Gleiches versuchte vor mehr als 50 Jahren in einer idealistischen Vision auch Jawaharlal Nehru. Er scheiterte damals, wie er nach der chinesischen Invasion im Nordosten Indiens im Jahre 1962 bekennen musste.

Bestehen heute bessere Aussichten auf Erfolg? Das lässt sich nicht mit Bestimmtheit sagen. Aber der Versuch muss auf jeden Fall unternommen werden.

Indien ist aber auch bereit und interessiert, über die schon mit den USA auf dem Gebiet der friedlichen Nutzung der Nukleartechnologie und der rüstungspolitischen Zusammenarbeit getroffenen Vereinbarungen mit den USA hinaus eine internationale Funktion bei der Sicherung des Seeverkehrs im Indischen Ozean und der angrenzenden Seewege (Golf von Aden, Straße von Malakka) zu übernehmen und entsprechende Vereinbarungen mit den USA zu treffen.

Die Zusammenarbeit mit den USA soll auch der Sicherung indischer Interessen bei US-Engagements in den benachbarten Staaten, vor allem im Raum Afghanistan/ Pakistan, dienen. Den USA werden wohl auf der Basis der Gegenseitigkeit gewisse Stationierungsrechte in indischen Häfen eingeräumt werden. Der Vertrag liegt bereits seit zwei Jahren unterschriftsreif vor. Die Seeüberwachung wird eine gemeinsame Aufgabe werden. Die Seewege durch den Indischen Ozen und die angrenzenden Seegebiete, über die zwei Drittel der weltweit stattfindenden Öltransporte und ein Drittel des globalen Containerverkehrs gehen, werden derzeit vor allem durch Piraterie gefährdet, könnten aber in genuin internationalen Spannungen auch anderen Bedrohungen ausgesetzt werden. Auch sucht Indien wie die USA eine generelle Überwachungskapazität aufzubauen – nicht zuletzt wegen der aufkommenden chinesischen Marinepräsenz im Indischen Ozean. Gleichzeitig will Indien Vereinbarungen mit den Anrainerstaaten des Indischen Ozeans einbeziehen.

Die Zusammenarbeit mit den USA ist in Indien nicht unumstritten. Angesichts der instabilen politischen und sicherheitspolitischen Lage in der Region muss Indien aber eine stabile, auch strategisch relevante Zusammenarbeit mit dem benachbarten China und mit den USA – allerdings mit unterschiedlichen Schwerpunkten – suchen.

Vor diesem regionalen Hintergrund der Sicherheitsklage Indiens verbietet sich allerdings eine geostrategische, implizit gegen China gerichtete strategische Zusammenarbeit mit den USA, also eine gegen China gerichtete Allianz mit den USA.

Eine andere, vor allem von Moskau und zum Teil von Beijing geförderte geostrategische Vorstellung, nämlich engste Zusammenarbeit zwischen Indien, China und der Russischen Föderation anzustreben – und zwar implizit mit einer anti-amerikanischen Perspektive – dürfte heute in Indien kaum auf Gegenliebe stoßen. Allerdings gibt es durchaus dahin gehende Vorstellungen einiger indischer Politiker und Sachverständiger.

Indien nimmt jedoch wie andere Staaten in Asien auch als Beobachter an der Schanghai-Gruppe teil.

3.   Schlussfolgerungen

Sicherheit und Stabilität Indiens sind also im Lande wie auf der internationalen Bühne erheblichen Gefahren und Risiken ausgesetzt: zum einen durch den hinduistischen und den islamischen Fundamentalismus im Lande selbst und zum anderen durch den inneren Zerfall der benachbarten Staaten mit der Folge möglicher grenzüberschreitender gewaltsamer Konflikte mit internationalen Auswirkungen.

Im Inneren braucht Indien eine Renaissance des säkularen und demokratisch verfassten integrativen Staates und eine sozial verankerte Wirtschaftsentwicklung.

Auf der internationalen Bühne braucht Indien eine stabile Beziehung mit China und mit den USA – mit jeweils unterschiedlichen Schwerpunkten, jedoch ohne gegen den einen oder den anderen Partner gerichtete Allianzen.

Vor diesem Hintergrund muss Indien selbst auf bilateralem Wege zur Stabilität in den benachbarten SAARC-Staaten pro-aktiv beitragen.

Terrorism: difficulties faced by national governments and the international community in countering the threat

Michael Chandler

1. Introduction

Tragically, some of the issues raised in this paper have been made on a number of previous occasions. I have talked about these difficulties in presentations and in my book "Countering terrorism: can we meet the threat of global violence?" The points are reflected in the reports submitted to the UN Security Council by the Monitoring Group which I had the privilege to chair from 2001 to 2004.

The word "tragically" is used quite intentionally because time and again we see a distinct lack of progress in both national and international efforts to counter the threat. Some of the difficulties will be touched upon and the paper will also explore other reasons for this lack of progress: they are usually perceptions – often ill-founded ones – due to an inability to know and understand that most fundamental aspect of dealing with terrorism, namely the threat.

This paper deals primarily with countries in South Asia: those with a direct interest in the region and others which have influence with the regional actors. The paper also concentrates on the importance of this area, with respect to the most overt international terrorist threat, a fact highlighted in the latest report to the UN Security Council of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team: "…When the Team last reported, in March 2008, the critical importance of the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan in terms of the threat from the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other associated groups … was already apparent. Since then it has become even more so. Although there are threats elsewhere, there is no other area of the world where the success of counter-terrorism measures will mean more, and their failure have greater consequences, than in South Asia …"[1]

2. Pakistan and South Asian security

The geopolitical location of Pakistan is pivotal to the broader security situation in the South Asia region. Currently it is experiencing its own insurgency from the Pakistan Taliban. At the same time the Taliban are conducting an insurgency inside Afghanistan, using the areas of Pakistan as a safe haven and a springboard for these operations. The long-running sore of the disputed region in Kashmir or Jammu and Kashmir also remains unresolved after many decades, providing grounds for tension between Pakistan and India. Attacks inside India by militants and extremists are a regular occurrence. Despite India having a plethora of domestic terrorist or insurgent groups,[2] whenever there is a major terrorist attack, such as the attacks on the Bombay/Mumbai hotels, railway station and Jewish Centre, Pakistan is immediately accused even before the dust has settled. As it happens, in this case there was a connection and the event was enough for tensions between the two countries to be raised yet again. However, in many other cases it is other disparate groups, often non-Muslim ones that prove in the end to be responsible for terrorist atrocities in India.

The proximity of the Middle East and Iran are also key to the security situation. Many

of the "foreign fighters" associated with Al-Qaida who went to Iraq to wage jihad against the US and its coalition allies have moved into the Pakistan border regions and joined the Taliban fighting in Afghanistan – their so-called cause in Iraq having lost impetus. Also, their presence in Iraq has become no longer acceptable to the majority of Iraqis, even many of the Sunni alongside of whom they were fighting.

In addition, the seat of Islam and the Arabian peninsula are, by modern standards of travel and influence, but a stone's throw away. Saudi Arabia had played a significant supporting role, through Pakistan, to the mujahideen in their ousting of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and along with Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates maintained close ties with the Taliban movement in Afghanistan in its attempts to "Islamize" the country between 1994 and 2001. On the sidelines is a resurgent Russia and a rapidly developing China, presenting a new flavour to the former Great Game that was played out in the late 19th century by the major powers of the day.

But just how pivotal is the situation in Pakistan was emphasized by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the UN Security Council in their Report of 13 May 2009, in which the team went on to state that: "While they have not developed unified plans or objectives, the Taliban groups in Pakistan continue to test the limits of their power. The outcome of their struggle with the authorities in Pakistan, which has now extended well beyond the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, is crucial to the future of Al-Qaida, whose presence in the border area relies on their support. The Team has not been able to verify reports of the Pakistan Taliban planning attacks outside the country, but if the link with Al-Qaida becomes stronger, it is possible that a new energy may infuse the global threat from terrorism."

Recent events in Pakistan have brought this statement into even sharper focus. For a long time Pakistan was obliged for very good domestic reasons to walk a tightrope between responding to requests from the USA to deal much more robustly with the Taliban and Al-Qaida (who are one and the same to US domestic audiences) and acquiescing to a large Muslim population. Significant numbers of Pakistani Muslims have a greater empathy towards the Taliban, on account of them being fellow Pashtuns and Muslims, than towards the 'infidel' USA, which had seemingly abandoned them and over 2.5 million Afghan refugees after the Soviet Army had been ousted from Afghanistan in 1989. Now the tables have been turned, and quite dramatically at that.

The reality of Islamist extremism is four-square on Pakistan's front door. There was the protracted engagement between Pakistan's security forces and Islamist militants at the Red Mosque; a variety of serious governmental and security-related issues in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP); and conflict in some of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and in Waziristan which border Afghanistan and in which the Taliban and Al-Qaida have unimpeded freedom of movement and sanctuary based on a life-long established culture of 'hospitality to the traveller'. But the worst of these issues relates to events in the Swat Valley. This case is of crucial importance to a democratic Pakistan, in that the country has found itself embroiled in a major insurgency. Some may argue that it brought it on itself by not being in a position to recognize and deal robustly with the threat.

3.   Terrorism as a tactic

The key point is that "terrorism" per se is a tactic utilized by militants and extremists and not just Islamist militants and extremists (although they are the primary threat in

this discussion) in attempting to achieve their goals. But a careful assessment of how, why and where militant groups associated with Al-Qaida and/or the Taliban are carrying out terrorist attacks has revealed that a number of countries are actually experiencing or facing insurgency and the terrorists then become insurgents, which is a more accurate description.

By definition, for example according to Princeton University's lexical database, an insurgency is "an organized rebellion aimed at overthrowing a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict".[3]

This is somewhat at odds with the definition of terrorism, a problem that still exists for a small number of countries despite realistic attempts by the United Nations to obtain a consensus in 2005 with the following definition: "any action … that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act".

Although most UN member states accept this definition, a small number of Arab countries and Iran do not agree with it. The dissenters have always wanted an amendment that recognizes the activities of Israel against the Palestinians as "acts of terrorism" and naturally there are key players on the world scene who in turn will not accept this approach. Why? Because in the first instance it is the Palestinians that resorted to acts of terrorism, not just directly against Israel, but to make their point they took their "acts of terrorism" to many other countries, with aircraft hijackings, attacks on airports, against diplomats and even the Olympic Games in Munich 1972. Here again we see terrorism being used as a tactic to try and achieve a political end, in this case so far without success.

However, the most important point in this discussion is knowing with what you are dealing. In Iraq, the US-lead coalition soon realized that the attacks against them were coming primarily from Iraqis inside Iraq, in the form of guerilla warfare, and that it was an insurgency that had to be understood and tackled as such. Terrorist groups were involved, but then so were significant numbers of the indigenous folk.

4. Continuing mistrust between India and Pakistan, and Afghanistan and Pakistan

The mistrust between India and Pakistan is deeply rooted in the problems of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan feels that it went a long way on this issue while General Pervez Musharraf was President and that India has failed to reciprocate. India for her part considers that Pakistan still does not do enough to reduce the threat to India from Islamist militants based in Pakistan.

In relation to its current military operation in the Swat Valley, Pakistan will say that it is now tackling the Taliban head-on. However, this has only been possible because Pakistan is now a democracy and not a military dictatorship. The country has an independent judiciary and proudly boasts a lively and dynamic free press and media: there are now over 50 independent television stations in Pakistan. The Pakistan Armed Forces are now seen as under democratic control. A 'cross-party' consensus has been achieved in the parliament that non-state actors will not be tolerated within the country's borders, especially when they challenge the legitimate authority of the elected government.

But it is not an easy task. The Pakistan Armed Forces have to a large extent been organized for conventional warfare and not asymmetric warfare. The US also learnt the

difference at great cost after it invaded Iraq in 2003 and then found itself fighting on two fronts, Iraq and Afghanistan. The UK found the adjustment less of a problem, perhaps because it had far more experience over past decades of conducting low-intensity operations around the world. In fact in the early days of the so-called invasion of Iraq in March 2003, British units in and around Basra in south-east Iraq applied the well-established practices of "hearts and minds" in an effort to convince the local population that they, the UK Forces, really were there to rid the country of tyrannical rule. Pakistani Army officers have revealed in conversations that they know the size of the task. It does not require a military genius to see what a daunting challenge faces the Pakistan Armed Forces. Simply the terrain of the Swat Valley presents enormous difficulties for counter-insurgency operations. Within the Pakistan army there are officers who know the importance of reaching out to the population, who know the importance of "hearts and minds".

The reason why the Pakistan Armed Forces have been organized on conventional lines is that the main threat to the country was always perceived to be India. This particular threat was also the explanation for Pakistan's sympathy and support for the Taliban. In addition to being Pashtun, like the majority of the tribes that occupy Pakistan's eastern border regions with Afghanistan, southern Afghanistan was seen as providing Pakistan with "strategic depth" in the event of an Indian invasion. Even if a little ambivalent, well-informed Pakistanis will tell you now that India is not a threat. If that is the case, then it should now be possible to start reorganizing, re-equipping and re-training at least a significant proportion of the Pakistan Armed Forces for asymmetric operations. The success of such a reorganization will, however, depend on how far the threat to the country is appreciated and understood. That is a fundamental and crucial aspect of countering terrorism.

5. The importance of understanding the threat

Having a clear understanding of the threat is fundamental to being able to effectively counter it. If the threat is not understood then it is not possible to develop the appropriate strategy and tactics to counter the threat and decide on the correct resources to achieve the goals defined by the strategy that is adopted. Understanding the threat demands political will and this is an important ingredient that is missing time and again from the counter-terrorism efforts of the international community.

Despite the outward sympathy that most countries and states expressed to the USA in response to the 9/11 attacks in the USA, it soon became apparent that many countries had reservations concerning the implementation of measures called for unanimously by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII resolutions. Specifically, Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001 ("Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts") and all relevant resolutions, starting with Resolution 1267 in 1999 concerning sanctions against Al-Qaida and the Taliban, their supporters and sympathizers have presented many governments with dilemmas. This process has improved with time, but it continues to be hampered by interpretation of the Listing versus "due process". This is invariably a national problem and even when countries have upheld sanctions measures against listed individuals and entities, other august bodies have upheld the appeal of the individuals – the different attempts of Yussef al-Qadi (a.k.a. al-Kadi) are just one such case in point. This has proved counterproductive in the international effort to counter terrorism and has only encouraged weaker governments not to fully implement the required sanctions measures.

Another reason for these less than compliant attitudes has been revulsion on the part

of many people to the so-called "global war on terror". The use of this phrase, the Global War on Terror (GWOT), to define the threat as perceived by the Bush Administration was unfortunate. Notwithstanding the fact that Osama bin Laden "declared war" against the Jews, the 'crusaders' (USA) and their Allies, the use of this phrase proved to be counterproductive and repugnant to many countries which were initially supportive following the 9/11 attacks in the US. Most prefer to speak about "combating transnational terrorism", if in fact the term "terrorism" is to be used at all. The key point is that terrorism per se is a tactic utilized by militants, in this case Islamist militants, in attempting to achieve their goals. It is not possible to wage war against a tactic.

This brings us back to the question as to whether the "Global War on Terror" in South Asia can ever be won. This would appear to be a non-question. Whatever the nature of the particular threat with which we are faced collectively, it has to be dealt with effectively. But wars are something that has to be won. This would infer a victory and a foe who has been vanquished. And so in this case to call it a war is incorrect. What remains the single most important fact is that the threat must be appreciated and understood in order for the campaign to be successful. The threat in the case of the Taliban, whether in Pakistan or in Afghanistan, and their Al-Qaida associates, is that they are staging an insurgency.

This is particularly relevant in the case of Pakistan, because the Taliban are intent on changing the legal basis of the state in which they live as well as trying to under-

mine the legitimacy of the government. These insurgents are using terror as one of their tactics, both against the villagers whose hospitality they have demanded and against what they perceive to be legitimate targets, whether police stations, politicians, hotels or mosques.

6. Conclusion

It is fundamental for national governments and the international community to understand the threat if the right strategy, tactics and resources are to be deployed, even when this carries cost implications and means that the local armed forces may have to be retrained.

"Hearts and minds" are an important part of an effective counter-insurgency campaign. It is crucial to harness the will of the population against the insurgents or, sometimes, to persuade the insurgents of the futility of their perceived cause, ideology or even plain simple criminal behaviour. It is often the case that terrorist acts are murder and mayhem, nothing more than crimes committed against people and property.

The final significant pillar of countering insurgency is intelligence – sound, accurate, timely intelligence to enable the "forces of good" to triumph over the "forces of evil". This is also another reason why developing the "hearts and minds" aspect of the campaign is so important, because when the civilian population is supportive of the security forces then it is much more inclined to provide information which in turn becomes essential intelligence.

Notes

[1]   See paragraph 4 of UN Security Council document S/2009/245 dated 13 May 2009. The Team's report of March 2008 is document S/2008/324.

[2]   See www.satp.org – India terrorist groups.

[3]   See http://wordnet.princeton.edu.

Naxalite ideology, strategy and tactics

Vinod Anand

Left-wing extremism (LWE) is one of the three ideological streams in India which have employed terror tactics in varying degrees, the other two being Islamism and ethnicity-based movements in India. Also known as Maoism or Naxalism, LWE is based on the belief that terrorism is the only viable strategy for revolutionary movements on behalf of the weak in the Third World, among others in countries such as Malaysia or Vietnam. It had surfaced in Europe and elsewhere, especially since the late 1950s. The Red Army Faction in West Germany (also known as the Baader-Meinhof Group), the Red Army Faction of Japan, the Weathermen and Black Panthers in the USA, the Tupamaros of Uruguay and several other left-extremist terrorist groups sprang up during the 1960s in different parts of the world at the same time as the Naxalites and Maoists in India.

LWE or Naxalism as it is called in India took its roots from a village called Naxalbari in West Bengal. The movement was started in 1967 by an extremist break-away faction of the CPM, the Communist Party of India (Marxist). This extremist faction had a fairly extensive following among the tea-garden labourers of the peasantry in the area. In order to address their grievances, Naxalites resorted to violence in accordance with their ideology of a peoples' revolutionary movement. By 2004 there were several Naxalite/Maoist groups operating in different parts of the country and adhering to a radical and extremist ideology. That same year in a very significant development two of the major groups – the Peoples' War Group, operating in Andhra Pradesh, and the Maoist Communist Centre in Bihar and adjoining areas – merged to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist). Since then, the CPI (Maoist) has been seen as the most active and strident front of Naxalism in the country.

It is an accepted fact that Naxalites typically operate in the vacuum created by the functional inadequacy of field-level governance structures, they espouse local demands, and take advantage of the prevalent dissatisfaction and feelings of perceived neglect and injustice among the under-privileged and remote segments of the population. Simultaneously, systematic efforts are made by them to prevent the execution and implementation of development projects, to deliberately target critical infrastructure like railways, roads, power and telecommunications, and to try and create an environment, through violence and terror, where the governance structures at field levels are shown as being ineffective.[1]

Assessing the root causes of Naxalism, a Planning Commission document outlines eight reasons for the growth of the resistance movement: sale and transfer of tribal land to other people; indebtedness resulting in the sale of land for inconsequential amounts; eviction of tribals by non-tribal people or government authorities; conversion of land from community ownership to individual ownership; treatment of tribal people as encroachers on forest land, depriving them of their traditional source of livelihood; failure to give title deeds for government land distributed to tribal people; developments that disturb the environment in tribal areas and force indigenous people to move out; and large-scale displacement because of development projects such as multi-purpose irrigation projects, power plants, mining projects and urbanization.[2]

India's political leadership is confronted with the challenge Naxalism poses to internal stability and economic development. There is also a wide degree of recognition in the polity that it is not merely a law enforcement problem but the phenomenon has its root causes in socio-economic deprivation. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has observed that: "In many areas, the phenomenon of Naxalism is directly related to underdevelopment. It is not a coincidence that it is the tribal areas that are the main battleground of left-wing extremism today. Large swathes of tribal territory have become the hunting ground of left-wing extremists. Exploitation, artificially depressed wages, iniquitous socio-political circumstances, inadequate employment opportunities, lack of access to resources, underdeveloped agriculture, geographical isolation, lack of land reforms – all contribute significantly to the growth of the Naxalite movement".

After taking over the reins a second time, he further observed in June 2009 that if LWE continued to flourish in areas which have natural resources of minerals, the climate for investment would certainly be affected. He resolved to implement a two-pronged approach to tackle Naxalism by ensuring the development of regions breeding LWE while maintaining law and order.

According to several estimates, a total of 170 districts and 14 states are afflicted with the menace of 'red terror'; some to a lesser, others to a greater degree (see Figure 1 for map of the Naxal-affected areas). Lately, there has also been a resurgence of Naxalism in three tribal districts of West Bengal where the incidence of Naxalism had declined in recent years. From January to the first week of June 2009 alone, there were over 900 incidents of red terror resulting in the death of 123 Naxals and 155 security forces personnel (see Figure 2 detailing fatality figures).

Figure 1: **Naxal-affected areas**

The casualties have been evidently more than the violence-related casualties either in Jammu and Kashmir or in the North East. In the recent past there has been a concentration of violent incidents and casualties mainly in some districts of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand and, to some extent, in parts of Bihar and Orissa. According to the 2008 report of the Ministry of Home Affairs, these four states together accounted for 80% of all incidents of Naxal violence in the last three years.

Furthermore, the new government in its action plan for the next 100 days and beyond has included eliminating Naxalism as one of its prime objectives. Statistical evidence provides support to the Prime Minister's recent assertion that Naxalism is the greatest threat to security in India. Institutionalization of Naxalism across Central India is expected to challenge the state over the next decade or more.

Figure 2

Naxal violence: fatality figures

Data up to June 9, 2009

States	Civilian	Security Forces	Naxal	Total
Andhra Pradesh	5	0	7	12
Bihar	12	18	13	43
Jharkhand	28	24	33	85
Karnataka	0	0	0	0
Chhattisgarh	39	56	45	140
Maharashtra	5	34	15	54
Orissa	15	18	10	43
West Bengal	18	5	0	23
Uttar Pradesh	0	0	0	0
Tamil Nadu	0	0	0	0
Total*	**122**	**155**	**123**	**400**

Note: compiled from news reports and provisional.

2008

States	Civilian	Security Forces	Naxal	Total
Andhra Pradesh	28	1	37	66
Bihar	35	21	15	71
Jharkhand	74	39	50	153
Karnataka	3	1	3	7
Chhattisgarh	35	67	66	168
Maharashtra	2	5	7	14
Orissa	24	76	32	132
West Bengal	19	4	1	24
Uttar Pradesh	0	0	2	2
Tamil Nadu	0	0	1	1
Total	**210**	**214**	**214**	**638**

2007

States	Civilian	Security Forces	Naxal	Total
Andhra Pradesh	24	4	45	73
Bihar	23	21	5	49
Jharkhand	69	6	45	120
Karnataka	1	1	6	8
Chhattisgarh	95	182	73	350
Maharashtra	9	2	8	19
Orissa	13	2	8	23
West Bengal	6	0	1	7
Uttar Pradesh	0	0	1	1
Total	**240**	**218**	**192**	**650**

2006

States	Civilian	Security Forces	Naxal	Total
Andhra Pradesh	18	7	127	152
Bihar	16	5	19	40
Jharkhand	18	47	29	94
Karnataka	0	0	1	1
Chhattisgarh	189	55	117	361
Maharashtra	13	3	33	49
Orissa	3	4	16	23
West Bengal	9	7	4	20
Uttar Pradesh	0	0	2	2
Total	**266**	**128**	**348**	**742**

1. Naxalism: ideology-oriented terrorism

What is the ideology of LWE and what is its genesis in India? The movement started almost 40 years ago by the charismatic personality Charu Mazumdar may have lost its intellectual and ideological moorings because of the way it has become criminalized and yet it has now spread to around 170 districts all over the country. Its ideological base has diminished and it now includes many lumpen elements. But it also seems to have some support from deprived and alienated sections of the population. The movement had its origins in the small village of Naxalbari in West Bengal where on the basis of the 'land-to-tiller' programme of the state government, the poor peasants and landless labour who expected to get only a third of the produce (let alone some land) were denied their just dues. From a small incident in Naxalbari in May 1967 which

was ruthlessly suppressed by the police, the movement based on Charu Mazumdar's ideas of agrarian revolution has now become a force of worrisome proportions. The Prime Minister has repeatedly referred to it as the biggest threat to internal security.

Charu Mazumdar was greatly influenced by Maoist ideology and wanted to bring about an armed revolution based on the ideology and methods of the Chinese Communists which had led them to victory in China. In fact, during the height of the Cultural Revolution in China, the People's Daily described the uprising in May 1967 as "a peal of spring thunder". He authored a series of articles in the mid-sixties which formed the basis of Naxalism and were referred to as the "Historic Eight Documents". He and his party, the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) i.e. the CPI-ML, had running fights with the Communist Party government of West Bengal on ideology

and methods to implement his revolutionary ideas. A respected figure in the Naxalite movement, his death in a police station in July 1972 led to a temporary collapse of central authority. There was continued pressure to curb Naxal activities during 1975 when a state of emergency was declared by Indira Gandhi. Meanwhile, there were many splits and mergers within the Naxalite groupings and left-wing parties.

After the 2004 merger of the two major Maoist parties – the People's War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) – into the CPI(M), a document titled "Party Programme" was issued which contains the ideological basis of the merged entity. The document is replete with the erstwhile diatribes and jargon of the Maoist brand of communism reminiscent of Maoist China. Some of the important aspects of Maoist ideology, thought processes and precepts are given in the following paragraphs.

The Party Programme document avers that "The domination and control of the imperialist finance capital in every sphere of our life – economic, political, military and cultural – continued to increase further and further. Actually, the imperialists control the key sectors of the Indian economy and even the administration ... Recently, the stranglehold of imperialist finance capital over agricultural sector also continued to tighten along with other sectors because of WTO and imperialist globalization ... Hence, India continues to be a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country under the neo-colonial form of imperialist indirect rule, exploitation and control".[3]

According to the Maoists, globalization is a war on the people and it is the ideology of market fundamentalists. Market fundamentalists are destroying everything the nation had possessed and preserved for centuries. Further, they consider the Indian bureaucratic class to be one of the chief instruments for imperialist exploitation and control over

India. Thousands of big imperialist multinational corporations (MNCs) and transnational corporations (TNCs) have been allowed to operate. Through these policies imperialism is increasingly moving towards trampling so-called sovereignty underfoot, in the neo-colonial manner of semi-colonial countries. Maoists further expound that there are four major contradictions in their country, namely:

1. Contradiction between imperialism and the Indian people;

2. Contradiction between feudalism and the broad masses of the people;

3. Contradiction between capital and labour;

4. Contradiction among the ruling classes.

The first two of these four major contradictions are basic contradictions. These two contradictions have to be resolved during the current stage of the new democratic revolution, and they also play the major or dominant role in chalking out the overall strategy for the current stage of the Indian revolution.[4]

Further, Maoists consider the caste system to be a specific form of social oppression and exploitation affecting the oppressed castes of the country. Most adivasis (aborigines/tribals) are in the process of developing as nationalities and the overwhelming majority of them are the most suppressed and repressed sections of Indian society. Maoists envision that the new democratic revolution will smash this imperialist and feudal ideology and culture and will establish the new democratic culture and socialist ideology. And this is how they will do it: "For this it will be necessary to smash the state machinery and all other centres of power of the ruling classes thoroughly and build up the democratic power of the people based on a worker-peasant alliance. In this way, our revolution will follow the path of the Chinese Revolution".

In addition the Maoists also consider urban struggles to be very important, particularly those of the working class. Their long-term objective is to capture the big cities, the 'fortresses of the enemy'. During the last phase of the so-called New Democratic Revolution, Maoists aim to build a four-class united front comprising all these classes – the working class, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie – under the leadership of the working class based on a worker-peasant alliance. The ultimate objective is to promote and establish "Socialism and Communism on a world scale" in India. Victory in revolution is to be achieved through a three-pronged strategy (termed the three 'magic weapons'):[5]

1. A strong revolutionary party based on Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as its guiding ideological basis in all matters;

2. A strong and well-disciplined people's army under the leadership of such a party. The people's army will primarily be built through the armed agrarian revolution and from among the landless poor peasants, agricultural labourers and the working class;

3. A united front of all revolutionary classes under the leadership of the proletariat based on the worker-peasant alliance and on the general programme of the people's democratic revolution. This united front will be built in the course of advancing the armed struggle and for the seizure of political power through armed struggle.

In essence, the basic pillars of the Maoist ideology are the annihilation of class enemies, and violence as the means of securing its goals. Recently, Koteshwar Rao alias Kishanji, the deputy leader of India's CPI (Maoist), observed that "the Islamic upsurge should not be opposed as it is basically anti-US and anti-imperialist in nature. We, therefore, want it to grow". He also took pride in the fact that he had personally ordered the attack on the West Bengal Chief

Minister in November 2008 which did not succeed because at several places mice had chewed up the cable connected to the improvised explosive device (IED).[6] Earlier, the ideologues of CPI (Maoist) have considered the Islamic upsurge as a progressive anti-imperialist force in the contemporary world. In their view it is wrong to describe the struggle that is going on in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestinian territory, Kashmir, Chechnya, and several other countries as a struggle by Islamic fundamentalists or as a "clash of civilizations". In essence, Maoist ideology avers that all these are national liberation wars notwithstanding the role of Islamic fundamentalists in these struggles.

2. Strategy and tactics

In order to put their ideology into practice, Naxalites have been following the basic tenet of Mao that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun". In their Congress held in 2007 they resolved to intensify and extend the "people's war" to all fronts by taking the guerrilla war to a higher level of mobile warfare in areas where it had already reached an advanced stage and to expand their areas of armed struggle to as many states as possible.

An important element of this strategy was the use of targeted violence to oppose the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) which were considered to be "neo-colonial enclaves on Indian territory". According to Maoist precepts, SEZs are not only seizing the fertile farmlands of the peasants but are transforming the entire country into special zones for the unhindered ruthless exploitation and control by imperialists and the big business houses. It is ironical that in order to promote its economic growth the Indian government had emulated this idea from the land of Mao where such radical ideology has long been discarded. And that is why there has been a spate of violent protests in Singhur and

Nandigram in West Bengal and at other places in states where SEZs are being established or land is being acquired for big projects and MNCs. This is particularly so in West Bengal, Jharkhand, Orissa and Chhattisgarh.

Economic targets were identified as the main focus of the organization in the February 2007 Congress of the Maoists: "The 300 planned SEZs (Special Economic Zones) are all set to create de facto foreign enclaves within our country by grabbing lakhs of acres of prime agricultural land by the foreign and local sharks. The Unity Congress of the CPI (Maoist) calls on the people to resist the seizure of their lands and houses and beat back the demolition hordes by whatever means possible".[7] This strategy was fostered in various ways with reports of involvement of Naxal workers in rioting in West Bengal's Special Economic Zone (SEZ). The Naxals had tried to justify their opposition to SEZs by describing the concept of an economic zone as a modern version of the old 'zamindari' system. The minutes of the Congress meeting show the Maoists planned to arm locals where SEZs were proposed. The Annual Report of the Central Military Commission of CPI (Maoist) had outlined the plan to disrupt several proposed infrastructure projects, steel plants and mining projects. They also planned to transform their current 'guerrilla' units into 'mobile wings' capable of striking in various parts of the country and then disappearing.[8]

As part of the shift to increased mobile warfare, they have launched operations against security units by deploying major forces of 200 to 300 guerrillas. This has led to heavy casualties, economic disruption and large-scale destruction. Some areas of Orissa, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh illustrate the first stages of this phase of mobile warfare. Government buildings and infrastructure such as jails, police stations and railway stations have been targeted. Attacks on railways have been classified by the railway authorities as catastrophic node failures which have destroyed the station, office, railway line or cable. There are many more disruptive node failures which do not lead to substantial damage and hence go largely unreported.[9]

For instance, Naxals continued their strategy of targeting jails by damaging on 28 January 2008 a jail under construction in Orissa. Bihar has seen ten incidents of jail-break in 2007 in different jails throughout the state, including at Beur, Motihari and Sasaram. The Naxals have found railway infrastructure a lucrative target. Thus, the East Central division of Indian Railways which covers the states of Bihar, Jharkhand and West Bengal has reported a rising trend of Naxal attacks on railways. The statistics of the last three years indicate that there has been an almost hundred percent increase in attacks on vital infrastructure.

Furthermore, the focus on economic warfare serves two purposes: it keeps development beyond the reach of the common man and increases the Naxals' access to finance through extortion and ransom. On the macro level, a Hindustan Times report quoting the Indian Defence Yearbook claimed that Naxalites in Jharkhand earned an annual levy of 3.2 billion rupees or 10 percent of the state's total revenue in a year. The malaise is particularly rampant in Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, West Bengal, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh. Given that most of these states are rich in minerals, the Naxals impose a levy on businesses, transporters and contractors including those collecting tendu leaves, an industry which is the main source of agricultural income for the poor. Rs 70,000 per annum are charged from coal firms and Rs 25,000 per annum from transporters. Political parties are also known to pay Naxalite protection money. The salary paid to Naxals is said to be Rs 1,000 to Rs 3,000 per month, with an insurance cover of Rs 1.25 lakh if they die in encounters. Home Ministry figures suggest Naxalites

have a strength of 10,000 guerrillas and a large number of modern arms and equipment.

Since 2008 there have been increasing signs that the Maoists would continue to focus on economic targets, given the upsurge in investment in the mineral-rich states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. According to government sources in 2007, Chhattisgarh had succeeded in garnering Rs 107,899 crore (1 crore is equal to 10 million rupees) of new investment.[10] It is apparent that the Maoists want to target this investment particularly since local aspirations remain unfulfilled, given that development is taking place only in terms of the extraction of iron ore and other minerals without any tangible transfer of benefits to the local population.

In order to realize their goals of expanding their struggle to new areas, the Maoists have attempted to draw new states like Jammu and Kashmir, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh and Meghalaya into their fold. These are prosperous areas with large-scale growth and development where contracting can attract heavy levies for the Naxals. Karnataka is emerging as another area of concern. The once peaceful Malnad region is wracked with the threat of Naxalism. Regional, zonal and state committees targeting urban cities and towns are reportedly being set up. Two principal industrial belts have been reportedly identified for urban mobilization – Bhilai-Ranchi-Dhanbad-Kolkata and Mumbai-Pune-Surat-Ahmedabad.[11]

The destruction of economic infrastructure serves a dual purpose, that of obliterating state authority and threatening companies with extortion. In October 2008 Maoists set fire to the tower of Airtel, a private telecom company, in the Dhotawa area of Katkamsandi in Bihar. Maoists had targeted this telecom company as the management had refused to pay them a levy of Rs 1 lakh over the previous two years. They blasted high-tension power lines in Bastar in June 2008, which led to an eleven-day power outage in six districts that affected mining operations and the movement of ore from Bailadilla mines. The National Mineral Development Corporation is reported to have incurred a loss of Rs 9 crore a day. Days after the 'Bastar blackout', the Maoists blew up the control station of a mini hydel power generation unit at Sileru in the Donkarai area of East Godavari District.[12]

As part of their larger strategy, Maoists also enforce economic blockades, some of which are inspired by a series of strikes (called "chakka jams" – traffic blockades – in local parlance) organized by the Maoist party in Nepal. Naxals have carried out blockades on several occasions; recently at the end of April 2009 in Latehar. On such occasions train services across the states have been adversely affected. While major incidents were avoided, some of the blockades have not been without their share of bloodshed. Maoists struck at two places late June 2008, holding up traffic on national highways 33 in Jharkhand, and 42 in Orissa. Such blockades cripple economic activities, especially in the transport sector. With businessmen having low confidence in the law enforcement agencies, they usually think it prudent to withdraw trucks and other commercial vehicles.[13]

According to the Maoists' list of targets, projects identified by the Naxals on their hit list include the bauxite mining project of the Jindals group in Visakhapatnam, the Polavaram irrigation project, steel plants proposed by Tata Steel, Essar and Jindals steel group companies in Chhattisgarh, the Centre's proposed railway line in the Rajhara-Raighat-Jagdalpur sector, Posco's steel plants (under construction) in Orissa, power plants proposed by Reliance in Uttar Pradesh and the Kosi irrigation project in northern Bihar.[14]

The rural sector is also not being ignored. Pamphlets pasted in villages carried a warning addressed to tribals in Bastar to stop all farming activities in the region. The Naxals have instructed peasants to join the struggle instead of supporting private and public sector companies which were said to be harming the economy. Peasants who resisted have been brutally killed.

Moreover, the Naxalites seem to be repeating some of their tactics from the 1969-72 period of attacks on political opponents, in addition to attacking the police. For instance, in West Bengal they have started targeting specific CPM (the current ruling party in West Bengal) functionaries at local levels where such local leaders were mobilizing support against the Naxalites. Their targets are not confined to the familiar Naxalite-affected districts of West Midnapore, Purulia and Bankura. During 2005-08, a number of CPM party functionaries were attacked and killed in the districts of Nadia, Burdwan, Birbhum, Murshidabad, etc. where the Naxalites were known to be present in the 1970s. It shows that they have been regrouping in some of the areas where they had earlier influence in 1969-72. This trend is likely to extend to other areas also. Another element of Naxalite strategy has been to disrupt elections so as to stall the democratic process, especially in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and Bihar.[15] During the polls in April 2009 a number of attacks were carried out to discourage the common people in Naxal-affected areas, especially by taking advantage of the thinning out of security forces for the national elections. The objective again was to show the erosion of the government's authority and the consolidation and enlargement of their own control and influence amongst the populace. As a perception management exercise they had earlier warned the people to boycott the polls.

Meanwhile the Maoists developed some expertise in the use of landmines and impro-vised explosive devices (IEDs) which caused very significant casualties among police and other security personnel. The IEDs have been increasingly used by the Naxalites in well-planned attacks on even high-security personalities in addition to other targets like police stations and police vehicles. On a rough estimate and in what is quite a disturbing phenomenon, the Naxalites have so far caused nearly 100 landmine explosions every year, with considerable loss of life of state security personnel and police.

There has been an increasing militarization and simultaneous acquisition of sophisticated firearms and ammunitions by the Naxalites. Their arsenal now boasts of self-loading rifles (SLRs), AK series of rifles and INSAS rifles. It is believed that currently the Maoists have also gained access to the technology of fabricating rockets and rocket launchers. A government report estimates that there are 9000-10,000 armed cadres with access to about 6,500 firearms and in addition there may be further 40,000 full-time cadres.[16]

Naxalites have also been able to establish a basis in the Dandakaranya forest, spanning Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Orissa and parts of Maharashtra. This area which is also known as Abuj Mand is a 10,000 square kilometre zone of unexplored forest with a meagre population of 20,000 and hardly any surface communications. This area is the size of a small country such as Israel or Belgium. Law enforcement agencies have hardly entered this area. It is fast becoming a firm base for the Maoists and its central location facilitates the launching of operations, provision of training as well as rest and recuperation. Training camps in the area are spread across three to four square kilometres and even concrete bunkers have been found there. The central government in concert with the respective state governments has announced its intention to carry out operations against the Maoists in this area after the 2009 monsoons.[17]

3. Government counter-strategy

The real key to fighting the Naxalites is reliable and timely intelligence. Thus, effective integration of strategic and tactical intelligence and information at police station level is of vital importance. The approach of the governments at both central and state level is based on the triple pillars of strengthening the police forces, promoting development and improving the socio-economic conditions of the affected areas through a number of schemes.

In March 2006, the then Union Home Minister outlined a 14-point strategy to deal with the Naxal problem. Conceding that Naxalism was not merely a law and order problem, the government was to address this menace simultaneously and in a holistic manner in the areas of political security, development and public perception management. A collective and coordinated approach, improved police response and no dialogue with the Naxalites unless they agreed to give up violence and arms were some of the points stressed in the strategy document. Faster socio-economic development, distribution of the land to the poor and speedy implementation of land reforms, restoration of government machinery, restoration of people's faith in the government and efficient use of mass media to highlight the futility of Naxal violence and loss of life and property were other key areas of attention in the government's strategy paper. However, when strategy is often articulated without being implemented it starts to acquire the status of mere rhetoric and repeated platitudes.

There have been attempts to overcome the difficulties of coordination and adopting a unified approach by different state governments and the centre by setting up an 'Empowered Group' of Ministers headed by the Home Minister and tasked with closely monitoring the spread of the Naxal movement, reviewing special measures to be taken and improvement of inter-state coordination in an exchange of intelligence, personnel and any other kind of assistance. A Standing Committee of Chief Ministers of concerned states under the chairmanship of the Union Home Minister has been established to work out a coordinated policy and specific measures to deal with the Naxalite problem on the political, security and development fronts.

An inter-ministerial group has also been formed to review and coordinate the work being done to provide livelihood and amenities to the deprived population. The ministries of rural development, environment and forests, Panchayati Raj and the Planning Commission have their representatives on the committee, with the main objective of bringing the alienated people into the mainstream.

Development and security have been merged under the aegis of the Naxal Management Division in the Union Home Ministry. It monitors the Naxal situation and counter-measures being taken by the affected states with the objective of improving ground-level policing and development response in accordance with the location-specific action plans formulated or to be formulated by the affected states. It also reviews whether the various development schemes of the ministries and departments for the Naxal-affected areas are being properly implemented and if the funds released under such schemes are being optimally utilized.

The government had also started a Backward Districts Initiative in 2003-2004 under which 55 of the worst-affected districts were to receive considerable funds over a period of three years. But for numerous bureaucratic reasons there have been problems in the utilization of these funds. This not only highlights the apathy of the state governments but also their inability to implement governmental strategy. Weak govern-

ance, political expediency and unwilling-ness or reluctance of the police to enter forested areas and strongholds of Naxals also impedes the development activities. Similar conditions prevail in other states.

Furthermore, since the Naxal problem is directly related to the tribal and forested areas, the government has been also making efforts on the legislation front in the direction of recognizing the right of forest-dwellers to forest produce. Another important area on which central government has been pushing the states is the introduction of land reform. This remains a political issue and various states have implemented land reforms with mixed success. The states which have effectively implemented land reforms, for instance West Bengal and Kerala, have witnessed a significant decline of Naxalism.

Funds under the Police Modernization Scheme have been given to the states to modernize their police force in terms of modern weaponry, latest communication equipment, improvement of mobility and other infrastructure including provision for additional protection and fortification of vulnerable police stations in Naxal areas. The states are also being supplied with mine-protected vehicles to counter the landmine and IED attacks. However, the Naxals have devised new means of defeating mine-protected vehicles by placing an extraordinary amount of explosive charge in the IEDs, as for example in Chhattisgarh.

By the December 2008 yearend review of the Naxal situation, the government had put into effect a number of measures to counter the growing menace of left-wing extremism. In response to continued violence in 2009 the new UPA government is chalking out a 100-day action plan for all ministries and departments.[18] The stress would be on reorienting and fine-tuning its response to Naxal violence. Improving ground-level policing and acceleration of development plans would be the two important prongs of the new plan in addition to many other elements. Even though Multi-Agency Centres have been established and operationalized, the fact remains that Naxals are exploiting the lack of intelligence and coordination among the government agencies and the police. However, in her outline of the current government's resolve to meet the challenge of terrorism President Pratibha Patil has stated that a National Counter Terrorism Centre would be established to coordinate multi-agency centres (MACs), operations, intelligence and anti-terror measures at the national level.[19] The aim is to ensure that "the centralized agency for collection and collation of intelligence would be strengthened to ensure effective intelligence sharing and processing ... Enhanced information and intelligence sharing on a real-time basis would be made possible by the creation of a net-centric information command structure". Meanwhile, a succession of Naxal attacks in the second week of June 2009 has highlighted many flaws in the functioning of the intelligence agencies and security forces, including their training, arms and tactics. These further underscore the urgent need to implement the measures suggested.

Additional Central Paramilitary Forces have been deployed on a long-term basis to quell the Naxal violence and in the wake of the Mumbai terror attack of 26 November 2008. Up to 135,000 personnel are to be recruited in a phased manner. A special counter-insurgency force of central paramilitary forces designated COBRA is also being raised to counter Naxal violence. India Reserve battalions have been sanctioned in Naxal-affected states not only to strengthen the security apparatus but also to wean away youth from rebel activity by providing them with gainful employment. Even as the action plan for the anti-Maoist offensive is being finalized, the Ministry of Home Affairs is working to significantly strengthen both infrastructure and the arsenal to counter Naxal forces. The forthcoming budget

will see a major increase in allocation for this purpose.

There are also plans to set up three to four specialized anti-Maoist centres at strategic locations – mainly at inter-state borders – each equipped with about five helicopters. The centres would be manned by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and pilots from the Border Security Force (BSF), Army and Air Force. The government has even approved the use of Indian Air Force assets like unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for reconnaissance and gathering of intelligence in Naxal-affected areas. An auxiliary force of ex-servicemen drawn from the Naxal-affected areas is also being formed to carry out duties such as detecting mines and explosive devices laid by Naxalites.

Training the police force is another aspect which has been receiving greater attention in states like Andhra Pradesh and Chattisgarh which are providing special training to counter the well-trained and motivated Naxal guerrillas and fighters. Chattisgarh started a Counter-Terrorism and Jungle Warfare College in Kanker three years ago where police are given rigorous training in guerrilla warfare and trainees live in the open in the dense jungles of Bastar and learn to live off the land. Training is modelled on the Army's Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School at Vairengte in Mizoram. Other states have started sending their police personnel to the college for training.

Even if all of the above were to happen, one of the weakest areas has been the lack of a coordinated approach by political parties to the scourge of Naxalism. The events in June 2009 in the case of the Maoist resurgence in the Lalgarh area of West Midnapore district in West Bengal were a classic example of political expediency, lack of coordination between various agencies, frictions between the centre and state governments especially when both are of different hues, the sorry state of training and equipment especially of the state police forces, and above all a lack of unified political will in dealing with a menace that has been declared the single largest threat to the security of India. One stark lesson which emerged from the Lalgarh crisis was that while political parties may play their opportunistic games in other arenas, in the realm of national security this is the equivalent of playing with fire. Those in responsible positions are duty-bound to uphold the rule of law. The only beneficiaries of political one-upmanship are those who are fighting against the state. In such a murky game, political leadership ends up becoming an unintended abettor of the outlaws.

4. Concluding observations

If there is one lesson to be learned from history, it is that economic and social development cannot take place in an environment of insecurity. Security and development are intimately related as development cannot proceed without security, and lack of development becomes a cause for alienation of the people and leads to insecurity. Further, the abrogation of the government's own responsibility for governance, as in the case of the situation in the Dandakaranya forests (Abuj Mand) where rebels are almost running their own parallel government, further erodes the authority of government and the faith of people in the government. In addition, the Naxals gain respectability, strength and revenue resources to perpetuate their vested interests.[20]

Furthermore, movements such as the anti-Naxalite Salwa Judum may appear to be attractive on the face of it, and yet the people involved in such movements become isolated and sitting targets for the Maoists.[21] Such people require the protection of the police and in the case of this particular movement, 45,000 to 50,000 people have been displaced to become refugees in their own land, thereby further complicating the situation.

Lack of political will to implement land reforms, political expediency and sheer inertia in utilizing allotted funds for development as well as a disjointed approach to the problems of the populace still remain the main causes promoting

Naxalism. Although the government with its long experience of tackling insurgency has come up with a good strategy to deal with Naxalism, it is at the implementation level where concerted efforts are still needed.

Notes

[1]   The Ministry of Home Affairs in its Annual Report for 2007-08 has accepted these as reasons for the expanding influence of the Naxalites.

[2]   http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/stories/ 20071116501502400.htm

[3]   Maoist document titled "Party Programme" issued after the merger of the two main factions into CPI (Maoist), www.satp.org

[4]   Ibid.

[5]   Ibid.

[6]   "We support Islamic terrorism", interview of Second-in-Command of CPI (Maoist) in: The Hindustan Times, 10.6.2009.

[7]   Maoist document titled "Call of the Unity Congress-9th Congress of the CPI (Maoist)", http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/ documents/papers/callofunity.htm

[8]   "From CRZ to SEZ: Naxal Reins of Terror", in: Jharkhand News, 23-30.4.2007, http://news. jharkhand.org.in/2007_04_01_archive.html

[9]   Bhonsle, Rahul: Editor South Asia Security Trends, February 2008.

[10]   Media release by Chhattisgarh Government, in: The Hindustan Times, 27.6.2007.

[11]   Asian Age report quoted in South Asia Security Trends, November 2007.

[12]   K. Srinivas Reddy: Maoists call for a blockade, in: The Hindu, 22.6.2007, http://www.hindu. com/2007/06/22/stories/2007062250581300.htm

[13]   Bhonsle, Rahul: Editor South Asia Security Trends, July 2007.

[14]   Col. Rahul K. Bhonsle: Naxal Economic Warfare Strategy, 7.7.2007; Online magazine Boloji.com: http://www.boloji.com/opinion/0366.htm

[15]   Jain, Bharti: Centre readies plan to flush out Maoists after monsoon, in: The Economic Times, 11.6.2009.

[16]   Second Administrative Reforms Commission, Eighth Report, titled: Combatting Terrorism: Protecting by Righteousness, a Government of India publication, June 2008.

[17]   Jain, Bharti: Centre readies plan to flush out Maoists after monsoons, in: The Economic Times, 11.6.2009.

[18]   Kumar, Vinay: Naxal attacks: Centre rushes high-level team to Jharkhand – Home Ministry reorienting strategy, in: The Hindu, 14.6.2009.

[19]   Government promises action, not just tough talk, on error, in: The Economic Times, 5.6.2009.

[20]   See Kishanji's (Deputy Leader of the Maoists) interview in The Hindustan Times of 10.6.2009 where he states that most of the leadership is alive and safe in Dandakaranya camps, and with their mass base intact they would recover their influence in Andhra Pradesh where it has waned in recent years.

[21]   Strictures have been passed against the movement and the government by the Supreme Court; See also: Why still prop Salwa judum, activists ask CM, in: The Hindu, 10.6.2009.

Islamic terrorism in India:
organizations, tentacles and networks

Animesh Roul

For decades now, India has been facing various forms and waves of terrorist violence ranging from separatist and ethnic terrorism to ideological and religion-driven terrorism. With the emergence of new and hybrid terror organizations and conglomerates, there has been a sea change in the nature of terror tactics, technology and the way terror tentacles and networks have spread in the hinterlands of India and beyond.

India battles terror violence in three major geographical zones: Jammu and Kashmir (jihadi separatist, cross-border terrorism), Northeastern States (separatists, ethno-Islamist, cross-border terrorism) and Central-Eastern States (Left-wing Extremism/Naxalism). However, since the 13 December 2001 terror attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi that marked the beginning of this century, the country has been experiencing serious menaces from Islamic terrorist groupings that have infiltrated into India mostly from neighbouring countries with the sole objective of perpetrating the so-called Islamic jihad. With the expansion of terror bases and sleeper cells across the country, these terror groups are increasing their activities in the urban centres of India, targeting strategic infrastructures and financial lifelines of the country in order to cripple it.

Before the December 1992 demolition of Babri Masjid, a mosque in Ayodhya in the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, terrorism in India was to some extent synonymous with the Khalistan movement in Punjab which was separatist in nature. Subsequently, Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism emerged as a proxy war strategy which later developed into a systematic terrorist movement against India.

This paper focuses on Islamic terrorism in India, with particular attention to the major groups operating and perpetrating violence in the country and their operational and logistical linkages with each other.

At least two sets of players are involved in terrorism in India. The first set comprises Pakistani and Bangladesh-based terror groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami (HuJI). The second set is composed of a network of disgruntled Muslim youth, students and criminal elements which largely work as a support system, e.g. the Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). Past research has shown that a small section of India's Muslims – now called home-grown jihadists – has taken to terrorism and has acquired international links in recent times. Terrorism among Indian Muslims appears to have originated following the Babri Mosque demolition in 1992. Since then, the potential for home-grown terrorism has grown extensively throughout the country and was further aggravated by the 2002 Gujarat communal riots.

In recent times, JeM and LeT along with the HuJI-Bangladesh are collectively utilizing India's porous eastern border for anti-India activities by establishing 'surrogate bases' in neighbouring Bangladesh, Nepal and in the Middle East for the movement of trained cadres and finances for their operations. These groups are recruiting Indian youths, sending them to Pakistan for training and re-inducting them via Bangladesh to carry out terrorist attacks in India's heartland. Many recent terror strikes like the serial blasts in Delhi, twin blasts in Varanasi, mosque and market blasts in Hyderabad and

the Mumbai carnage are the results of the collective efforts of these groups.

The Union Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of India has noted in its Annual Reports that involvement by JeM, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Bangladesh-based HuJI has been observed in most of the terror strikes in the country. And the recent emergence of Indian Mujahideen (IM) as a home-grown, indigenous jihadi organization with active support from all Pakistan-based terror groups has created new fears in the Indian security establishment. Most disturbingly, these groups have been using their sleeper cells to carry out urban and mass casualty attacks.

1. Major terror organizations operating in India

1.1 Lashkar-e-Taiba

Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) is the most deadly Pakistan-based terror organization that has been perpetrating the maximum number of attacks in India's heartland. Apart from its traditional area of operation in Jammu and Kashmir, the group has spread its tentacles from Western Gujarat to the eastern border of Manipur and West Bengal, and from the southern state of Kerala to Jammu and Kashmir in the North.

The LeT is the military wing of the erstwhile religious organization, Markaz Da'wat wa'l Irshad (MDI), which later changed its name into Jama'at-ud-Da'wah (JuD) following the 9/11 events in the USA when the Lashkar group was banned and declared a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States. Hafiz Muhammad Saeed is the chief of Lashkar-e-Taiba. Some of the prominent LeT operatives are Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, Yahiya Mujahid (spokesman), Abdullah Muntazer Gaznavi (media handler) and Abu Hamza.

LeT's presence in J&K was first detected after many Pakistani and Afghan mercenaries infiltrated across the Line of Control (LoC) in tandem with the Islami Inquilabi Mahaz, a terrorist group then active in the Poonch district of J&K in the early 1990s. However, the first ever attack was reported in August 1992 when LeT militants killed nearly 19 Indian Army soldiers in J&K.[1] At a meeting held at Tehran in 1993, the LeT had forged an understanding with the Jammu and Kashmir People's Conference (JKPC) and Al Barq. This paved the way for their joint operation and mission in J&K.

The JUD/LeT and their leaderships are affiliated to the Ahle Hadith school of thought, a reformist Islamic movement.[2] The objectives of LeT are to establish Nizam-e-Mustafa (God's government) in the world and the merger of J&K with Pakistan. At the behest of Pakistan's ISI, it later added anti-India goals: to destabilize India and impede its economy. LeT has introduced fidayeen missions (suicide tactic used by terrorists) in Jammu and Kashmir and has intermittently struck in India's heartlands with its tactics of indiscriminate shooting and grenade attacks.

Pakistan's July 2009 dossier admitted for the first time that the LeT carried out the 26 November 2008 multiple Mumbai attacks. The dossier named senior LeT operative Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi as the mastermind. Among many of its signature acts, LeT operatives carried out the October 2005 serial bomb explosions in Delhi and the December 2005 attack on the Indian Institute of Science campus in Bangalore. With a penchant for attacking security forces, especially the paramilitary Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), LeT carried out an audacious attack on a CRPF recruitment centre in Rampur, Uttar Pradesh, on 1 January 2008.[3] This New Year's Day attack on the CRPF recruitment centre was considered to be the dress rehearsal for the Mumbai mayhem later that year, and it came just over a month after the November 2007 multiple blasts in court

premises in three major cities of Uttar Pradesh: Lucknow, Faizabad and Varanasi.[4]

1.2 Jaish-e-Mohammed

Jaish-e-Mohammed (Army of the Prophet) is a Pakistani-based terrorist grouping mainly active in Jammu and Kashmir in its initial phase, but later collaborating with LeT for terror acts beyond J&K. Maulana Masood Azhar is the supreme leader of JeM which is a splinter group of Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami (HuJI), an Islamic organization that was formed in the early 1980s to fight the war against the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan. JeM's leader Maulana Masood Azhar was a member of HuJI before he established his own organization on 31 January 2000 in Karachi in Pakistan.[5] Before that, Azhar was one of the three jailed terrorists released from prison in India in December 1999 in exchange for hostages in the hijacked Indian Airlines Flight IC-814.[6]

In common with other J&K-centric organizations, this group believes in the secession of the state with the ultimate aim of merger with Pakistan and the destabilization of India. The group claims that each of its offices in Pakistan would serve as schools of jihad. Most of the Jaish-e-Mohammed terror acts are fidayeen (suicide terrorist) attacks in which terrorists of the organization storm a high-security target, including security forces' bases, camps and convoys before they are killed by retaliatory action.

The unit is closely linked through the Binoria madrassa in Karachi with the former Taliban regime of Afghanistan and its protégé Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaida network. The JeM is also reported to have links with Sunni terrorist groups operating in Pakistan such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). Supporters are mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris, but also include Afghans and Arab veterans of the Afghan war. Its activity

has been expanded to many other parts of the country, including the Indian Parliament attack on 13 December 2001. Prior to this, JeM had perpetrated a similar kind of suicide operation in storming the J&K Legislative Assembly in October 2001 and killing nearly 35 persons, including 10 security force personnel.

1.3 Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami

Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami, the 'Movement of Islamic Holy War', has emerged as the largest international Sunni Islamic jihadi organization created in and by Pakistan after the Lashkar-e-Taiba. It is broadly based in two countries as HuJI-Pakistan and HuJI-Bangladesh (HuJI-B), whereby the latter is more potent than the former. HuJI-B cadres are active in India and they are mostly infiltrated from India's eastern corridors. The organization has perpetrated attacks in collaboration with other Pakistani-based groups such as JeM, LeT and home-grown radicals from the Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). HuJI has existed in the subcontinent since the early 1980s with active support from Pakistan-based Deobandi religious bodies, including the Jamaat-ul-Ulema-e-Islami (JuI), and most recently it has set up Indian units in Uttar Pradesh. It also has bases in Rajasthan, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh.

With direct logistical help from LeT, JeM and SIMI, HuJI has coordinated many attacks in India in the recent past including the March 2006 Sankatmochan Temple blast in Varanasi. HuJI's involvement in the May 2007 twin blasts in Hyderabad and in the serial bomb blasts of May 2008 in Jaipur came to light during the investigations.

HuJI defined itself as the second line of defense for every Muslim.[7] Its initial objective was to organize relief camps for the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan war. Afterwards, it began to recruit and train

mujahideen with support from ISI and grew as a terrorist grouping. Since it has different units in different countries, it has multiple objectives and activities. HuJI contingents operating in Pakistan or Jammu and Kashmir initially focused on liberating J&K, but its current mobilization outside J&K demonstrates its present strategy to spread terrorism across the country and destabilize India with support from the proscribed Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), ISI and other Islamist extremists.

Apart from having a base in Bangladesh, Pakistan, J&K and some other pockets in India, by 2005 the group had spread its tentacles to almost 24 countries, including Chechnya, Fiji, Iran, Ireland, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and parts of Africa and the Middle East.[8] In March 2008, the US blacklisted Harakat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) for attacks in India and other countries, as a "global terrorist organization".[9]

1.4 Indian Mujahideen

Indian Mujahideen (IM) has emerged as a well-organized jihadi terrorist group in India, claiming responsibility for a number of terror attacks perpetrated in various urban centres of India during 2007-2008. Even though the exact moment of IM's formation is not known, the recent arrest of a number of IM operatives has revealed its possible existence and involvement in terror strikes in India as far back as late October 2005. The name "Indian Mujahideen" was reportedly conceived at a terrorist conclave attended by top leaders of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami (HuJI) in Pakistani-administered Kashmir in early May 2008.

IM came into the open for the first time in November 2007, when simultaneous bomb blasts targeted lawyers in court premises in three Uttar Pradesh cities: Varanasi, Faizabad and Lucknow. IM described the attacks as "Islamic raids" and justified them as revenge against lawyers who had allegedly assaulted a couple of Jaish-e-Muhammad terrorist suspects. IM also alleged that the lawyers had refused to take cases involving other alleged terrorists, including suspected HuJI leader and Phulpur-based Islamic cleric Muhammad Waliullah, the alleged mastermind of the March 2006 Sankatmochan temple blasts in Varanasi.

Basically, members of IM are mainly drawn from proscribed organizations such as the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), the Pakistan-based LeT and the Bangladesh-based HuJI. IM's email statements indicate their ties with SIMI when they put forward demands for the release of SIMI cadres under detention or serving jail terms. However, the newly emerged IM continues to deny any connection with Pakistan, Bangladesh, or any of their agencies (e.g. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI] and Bangladesh's Directorate General of Forces Intelligence [DGFI]). It also denies any links with terrorist groups such as LeT and HuJI.

The Indian Mujahideen has been trying to garner support from India's teeming Muslim population, often by raising indigenous issues in its manifestos. Since the Uttar Pradesh court attacks, IM, as a home-grown jihadi unit, has claimed responsibility for at least four major terror strikes in 2008 that targeted civilians. Each attack came with prior emails to the media citing a list of anti-Muslim atrocities in the country. The group justifies the violence by tagging the terror campaign as the "rise of Jihad" and the revenge of "Gujarat".[10]

The top leaders have been identified as Riyaz Bhatkal, Abdul Subhan Qureshi Amir Reza, Iqbal Bhatkal, Muhammad Khalid, Shahzad Ahmed, and Ariz Khan. The most surprising revelation has been the many IT professionals found to be involved in IM's

activities, including wealthy professionals Asghar Peerbhoy, Salman Kadar Shaikhand, and Asif Bashiruddin Shaikh, who have played pivotal roles in generating funds for the organization and planning attacks.[11]

The Indian Mujahideen has four wings, each wing having a distinct responsibility for spreading terror in India with the active assistance of LeT:[12] Shahabuddin Ghouri Brigade which is headed by Amir Raza and largely responsible for planning and executing attacks in southern India.

The Muhammad Ghaznavi Brigade is responsible for planning and executing terror strikes in northern India and Shaheed-al-Zarqawi Brigade is responsible for targeting political and other important personalities of the country as well as organizing suicide attacks. IM has a media wing which is headquartered in Pune, Maharashtra. The wing is responsible for email and print media communications and press releases of manifestos before or after the blasts.

The arrest of IM cadres from different locations demonstrates the geographical spread of a terror network that now spans the length and breadth of India – possibly even extending into neighbouring states.

1.5 Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)

SIMI was founded in 1977 at the University of Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh, as a radical student organization. The interlinked triad of the ummah, caliphate and jihad determined SIMI's postures and activities in the country thereafter – the group's logo includes a Quran, an AK-47 assault rifle and a globe. SIMI started as a united platform for Muslim students and youth in the country, with the objective of restoring the caliphate to bring about the unity of the ummah by rejecting the concept of nationalism, secularism and

democracy. The group's aim was to establish Dar-ul-Islam (land of Islam) by using violence, if necessary, to convert non-Muslims.

In the early 1990s, SIMI activists were indoctrinated by Pakistan's ISI and travelled far and wide to garner support. The grouping convened an Ikhwanul (Muslim Brotherhood) conference in Kanpur city in October 1999 which was attended by around 20,000 people including Sheikh Yaseen (Hamas), Qazi Hussain Ahmed (JI, Pakistan) and the imam of the Al-Aqsa mosque. In 2001, SIMI again convened a mass conclave in Mumbai, especially for Muslim youths. It was here that SIMI urged fellow Indian Muslims to launch an armed jihad in India with the establishment of an Islamic caliphate as the goal. The SIMI network is actively involved in conversion in the southwestern states of India.

Kashmir-centric Pakistani terrorist groups like Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad have had strong logistical and operational ties with SIMI. In late 2002, Maharashtra police seized as many as 30 compact discs containing speeches of Maulana Masood Azhar, chief of Jaish-e-Muhammad, along with clippings of communal riots in Gujarat from SIMI offices in Aurangabad. Also, SIMI's pro-Taliban stance in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the group's anti-US demonstrations in Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat and Rajasthan, and SIMI's glorification of Osama bin Laden as the ultimate "jihadi" prompted the Indian government to impose a ban on the group in 2001.[13]

After the government proscription, SIMI operated closely with the Hyderabad-based Tehreek Tahaffuz-e-Shair-e-Islam and the radical Islamic vigilante unit, the Darsgah Jihad-o-Shahadat ("Institute for Holy War and Martyrdom") which has countrywide centres teaching self-defense to Muslim youths, and aims to make the Quran the constitution of

India.[14] SIMI also operated through the Islamic Youth Front in Kerala and the Tamil Nadu Muslim Munnetra Kazhagam.

Intelligence agencies have established SIMI's involvement in major terrorist strikes in India and believe that the organization has created the country's first home-grown terror network called the Indian Mujahideen (IM). SIMI attempts to indoctrinate youths by convincing them to fight for Islam. To accomplish this goal, SIMI uses provocative audio and video clippings which selectively depict the atrocities committed against Muslims from Gujarat to Kashmir and from Bosnia to Afghanistan.

Having originally started as a student movement, SIMI has in due course become a major radical Islamist movement with a strong presence in most of the northern and southern states of India. SIMI, along with other militant groups, has jointly carried out many terrorist acts including the 13 September 2008 serial blasts in Delhi and multiple explosions in Ahmadabad and Jaipur as well as blasts in the Uttar Pradesh courts in the recent past.

SIMI has operational ties with many foreign militant student groups, including the Saudi Arabian Jamayyatul Ansar (JA), whose membership comprises former SIMI activists and expatriate Indian Muslims.

2.   Ties and tentacles

The previous section has described terror networks, the occasionally symbiotic relations among terror groups operating in the region, and their geographical distribution. Relying on recent investigations into various terrorists events, this section looks more closely into the intricate ties between LeT and other terror groupings and how their terror tentacles have been spreading in the region and beyond.

For the past few years terrorist units have been trying to increase their geographical span by operating in southern and western parts of the Indian states Goa, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu. In fact, there are reports of terrorist groups poised to infiltrate into the country through the coastlines and island provinces of Indian southern territories. For instance, the LeT has already established a Marine Jihad Unit to operate against India.[15] Besides the usual routes of intrusion in Jammu and Kashmir, LeT has managed to build alternate routes through the porous borders of Nepal and Bangladesh as well while establishing bases in the Gulf countries. Investigating agencies have now confirmed that LeT is working on a new strategy which involves using Dubai as the centre of planning for future strikes against India. Past and ongoing terror investigations suggest the Gulf countries have been major hubs for LeT terrorists, and many terrorist plots against India are now hatched outside Pakistan's territory. The recent arrest and interrogation of a top LeT operative and close confidant of Hafiz Saeed revealed the future terror plans in the country. Md Umer Madni who was arrested in the capital Delhi had been in touch with LeT's Hafiz Saeed since 2000 and was involved in "talent scouting" for the Lashkar-e-Taiba in India.[16] Madni is also the LeT commander in Nepal. He confessed to having travelled far and wide inside the country and also in neighbouring Nepal and Bangladesh with the purpose of jihadi recruitment, fund-raising activities, and sending youths to terror training camps in Pakistan-Administered Kashmir. He had claimed to know terror masterminds Sabahuddin and Fahim Ansari who were arrested and accused of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks.

The recent spurt of terror activities by the LeT in India is directly linked to contributions from the Gulf-based cells that have planned and financed most of the group's operations. The LeT's Gulf-based networks are becoming the lifeline for LeT/JuD operations

in Pakistan and India. Investigations by India's intelligence agencies into the 2008 urban attack uncovered ties to many Gulf countries, especially the financial networks in Muscat, Oman. At least four LeT operatives handled India operations from Gulf cities such as Muscat and Sharjah. They are identified as Wali, Muslim Basheer, Sarfaraz Nawaz and Abu Haroon. These four are believed to be of Pakistani origin and to have been deputed in the Gulf to raise funds and monitor operations planned for India. While Wali was involved in fundraising activities and was responsible for coordinating with SIMI and IM militants in India, Muslim Basheer, based in Muscat, was the chief coordinator for the LeT in the Gulf. Funds for terrorist operations were raised by Wali, who provided the money for the blasts and who sent youths from the southwestern state of Kerala to Pakistan-Administered Kashmir (PAK) for terrorist training.[17]

Investigating agencies identified Abu Haroon, a travel agent in Muscat, as the operative who facilitated the movement of money to India from the Gulf region through hawala channels. Abu Haroon also coordinated between the Lashkar leadership in Pakistan and India. The fourth terrorist, Sarfaraz Nawaz, another LeT man from Muscat and a former SIMI leader was brought from Muscat to India recently in an extraordinary rendition by India's external intelligence agency in early 2009. Also, three other terrorists involved in the July 2008 Bangalore serial blasts and other incidents have been identified as Saleem and Jaheed from Bangladesh (hawala operators) and Ali Abdul Azeez Hooti of Oman, the chief terrorist financier.

The Gulf's increasing ties to terrorism resurfaced when investigations into the November 2008 Mumbai carnage tracked a similar pattern involving Gulf-based financiers and Lashkar coordinators. The role of Aziz Hooti as one of the financiers in this connection is currently under investigation. Hooti, the Oman-based businessman and key Lashkar operative there, was in touch with LeT's Fahim Ansari just before the November 2008 carnage in Mumbai. According to the information shared between Oman and Indian police, Aziz Hooti could have had direct ties to the Mumbai attackers. It is now believed in investigating circles that both Aziz Hooti and Nawaz played vital roles in financing terrorist activities in India, especially in providing funds for Indians undergoing jihadi training in the PAK region.

Nawaz's interrogation has revealed many facts about Lashkar's plans in southern India. According to his statement, he and Ummer Haji, an IM cadre and key figure in the terror network in south India, had hatched a plan to carry out serial bomb blasts in Chennai and Bangalore. However, Lashkar's Chennai plot was dropped by Wali due to funding issues. Haji is the man who sent Kerala youths to Muzaffarabad in Kashmir for training. Aziz Hooti was also involved in the Bangalore plan while the terrorist triumvirate (Wali, Nawaz and Hooti) met in Sharjah in early 2008. Nawaz's statement also sheds some light on Lashkar's operational strategy in southern India.

The beginning of 2009 was marked by a crackdown by Islamabad on the LeT and other Pakistan-based terror groups in which LeT came under severe pressure from the Pakistan administration to de-escalate its jihadi agenda against India. Despite the crackdown and the detention and subsequent release of LeT leaders in Pakistan, the LeT is reportedly once again looking to strike India by plotting against its vital installations and infrastructure.

3. Conclusion

It can be argued that in India the Kashmir-centric cross-border terrorism fuelled by Islamabad's territorial ambition and proxy war strategy has recently become fodder for Islamic extremists to spread their tentacles

beyond Jammu and Kashmir. Although the Federal government has proscribed numerous organizations for their anti-India activities, many are still flourishing with political and religious patronage from across the borders. Groupings like HuJI, LeT, Jaish and Hizb are still targeting India and getting all their support from Pakistan's ISI and its Bangladeshi counterpart, Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), who have formed a deadly alliance against India. It must be noted that most of these above-mentioned terrorist groups are members of Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front and have vowed to fight for the Muslim ummah (the community of believers). India has been experiencing cross-border terrorism from its eastern frontier too. The territory of Bangladesh has been used as a safe haven for various militant groups operating in India's northeastern states and elsewhere. There is clear evidence that the growing Islamization of northeast India has been facilitated by Pakistan's ISI and spurred by political instability in bordering Bangladesh. The extremely violent United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) is now in the grips of ISI and DGFI along with Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA). Also, the recent arrest of a Lashkar-e-Taiba operative, Mufti Obaidullah, revealed the spreading networks of LeT in neighbouring Bangladesh. Obaidullah who is originally from India's West Bengal state told his interrogators that his task was to organize jihad in Bangladesh in cooperation with HuJI[18] and Bangladesh-based Jam'atul Mujahedin of Bangladesh (JMB) operatives.

It can be argued that Indian Muslims are susceptible to the global jihadi agenda and the worldwide Islamist call for a Muslim caliphate. However, there is a difference of opinion about the current growth of the homegrown jihadi threat in India. One section of scholars which includes the political elites (secular parties like the Samajwadi Party, Congress and other pro-Muslim regional parties) hold that Indian Muslims are quite immune to the global jihadist movement, and that the call for the same from Bin Laden, Al-Qaida or LeT does not impact Indian Muslims.

Another school of thought argues that this mindset of the Indian Muslim is fast eroding and that the last couple of decades have witnessed many Indian youths falling prey to jihadist thought and its agenda, perhaps as a result of concerted efforts from Pakistan and Gulf-based agencies.

This discourse notwithstanding, there do exist minuscule but strong jihadi elements which often raise the issue of J&K, the Gujarat pogrom and the Babri Mosque demolition in the context of global as well as Indian Muslim suffering. They are now also backed by pro-Muslim human rights activists and anti-violence NGOs and political or religious groupings. Since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, the Ministry of Home Affairs has accepted that terrorist groups including LeT and JeM have found support among disgruntled elements within India.

India cannot remain in permanent denial that there is no involvement of Indian-born Muslims in international terror events: they have been implicated in incidents like the UK terror plots, and include terrorist suspects such as Dhiren Barot, Haroon Aswat, and Kafeel Ahmed. India figures intermittently in the jihad propaganda of Al-Qaida and LeT. Al Qaeda's Adam Yahiye Gadahn and the group's deputy commander Ayman al-Zawahiri have made calls in many videos for attacks against India. Masood Azhar and Hafeez Saeed constantly target India in their regular preaching and often directly brainwash youths to unleash jihad against India.

The radicalized – read Talibanized – neighbours of India have also had an indirect impact on the mindset of Indian Muslims and made them less tolerant towards other religions and society at large.

This is the current reality in India: there is a new phase of Islamic extremism emerging in the country, with home-grown jihadists raising their heads and major terror groupings choosing to combine forces and opt for a collective execution of terror plans.

Notes

[1] Rana, Muhammed Amir: Gateway to Terrorism, New Millennium Publication, London 2003, p.347.

[2] The Ahle Hadith (also Ahle Hadees) has been influential in the subcontinent with active ties with Saudi Wahhabis and strong diaspora links. Literally meaning the "People of the Tradition of the Prophet", Ahle Hadith is called non-conformist by rival Islamic movements, mostly because the movement does not conform to any of the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence or the commentaries and legal opinions based on them.

[3] UP: Terror attack on CRPF camp, 8 killed, in: Rediff.com, 1.1.2008.

[4] Terror strikes Uttar Pradesh; 15 killed in six blasts, in: Zee News, 23.11.2007.

[5] Rana, Muhammed Amir: Gateway to Terrorism, New Millennium Publication, London 2003, p.202.

[6] For a detailed timeline of this high-profile hijacking and hostage crisis, see URL<http://www.indianembassy.org/archive/IC_814.htm#The Chronology of Events

[7] With a pan-Islamic world view and strong international linkages, HuJI aims to fight for all Muslims. For one of the earliest publications on HuJI and its motto, see Ahmed Khaled: The biggest militia we know nothing about, in: Friday Times, 20.5.2002.

[8] Singh, Khurshchev: HuJI after the death of its India chief, IDSA Strategic Comments, New Delhi, 13.2.2008.

[9] US designates HuJI as global terrorist organization, in: Hindustan Times, 7.3.2008.

[10] The Rise of Jihad, Revenge of Gujarat: in: Outlook India, 29.7.2008.

[11] Roul, Animesh: India's Home-Grown Jihadi Threat: A Profile of the Indian Mujahideen, in: Terrorism Monitor (Jamestown Foundation), Volume 7, Issue 4, 3.3.2009.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Roul, Animesh: Students Islamic Movement of India: A Profile, in: Terrorism Monitor (Jamestown Foundation) Volume 4, Issue 7, 6.4.2006.

[14] Despite ban, SIMI worked through front outfits, in: Times of India, 29.3.2008.

[15] Lashkar militants began killing spree in high seas, in: Daily Excelsior, 30.11.2008.

[16] LeT militant Omar Madni remanded, in: The Hindu, 2.6.2009.

[17] For a detailed report, see: Roul, Animesh, Lashkar-e-Taiba's Financial Network Targets India from the Gulf States, in: Terrorism Monitor, Volume 7, Issue 19, 2.7.2009.

[18] Huji's Hannan, Lashkar's Obaidullah old friends, in: Daily Star (Dhaka), 23.7.2009.

Der pakistanisch-afghanische Problemverbund

Hein G. Kiessling

Im April 2008 betreute ich im Auftrag des ISB-Büros der KAS eine Woche lang neun afghanische Universitätsprofessoren in Islamabad und in Peschawar. Fünf der Professoren waren Paschtunen, vier von ihnen zugleich die Rektoren großer Universitäten ihres Landes. Bei ihren Begegnungen mit pakistanischen Kollegen und Studenten der Universitäten von Karachi, Islamabad und Peshawar wurden sie primär mit drei Fragen konfrontiert:

1. Wann sorgt ihr dafür, dass die neuen ausländischen Okkupanten Afghanistan verlassen?

2. Wann werden die indischen Generalkonsulate in Afghanistan geschlossen?

3. Wann erkennt Kabul die Durand-Line endlich offiziell an?

Die Antwort der afghanischen Besucher war eindeutig. Sie verneinten die Anwesenheit ausländischer Okkupanten in ihrem Lande und verwiesen darauf, dass Pakistan wie Indien vier Generalkonsulate in Afghanistan habe. In Sachen Durand-Linie war die Antwort der Afghanen besonders deutlich. Diese sei Afghanistan 1893 in einer Periode seiner Schwäche aufgezwungen worden, sie sei für einen Zeitraum von 100 Jahren konzipiert gewesen und diese seien vorüber. Eine Anerkennung dieser Grenze würde eine soziale Spaltung und Schwächung des paschtunischen Volkes bedeuten, die nicht akzeptabel seien.

Die Lehrer und Studenten der Universitäten von Karachi, Islamabad und Peshawar zeigten sich von den klaren Aussagen sichtlich irritiert. Für das 1947 geborene Pakistan, das seinerseits die Kashmir-Frage seit über 60 Jahren auf dem Feuer hält, stellt die Durand-Linie eine endgültige Grenze dar. In Kabul aber hält man sich in der Grenzfrage weiterhin bedeckt. Man weiß, dass man am Status quo derzeit nichts ändern kann, versucht aber, die Türen für künftige Möglichkeiten offen zu halten. Bei einem Auseinanderbrechen Pakistans würde Kabul hier mit Sicherheit Ansprüche geltend machen.

1. Die 70er-Jahre

Die Nichtanerkennung der Durand-Grenze durch Afghanistan führte bereits in den frühen 70er-Jahren zu Spannungen zwischen beiden Ländern. Im Oktober 1972 führte die Unzufriedenheit der Marri-, Mengal- und Bizenjo-Stämme in Balochistan über die Politik der federalen Regierung zu Unruhen, die sich bis 1974 hinzogen. Die Balochen fühlten sich damals wie um die Reichtümer ihres Landes betrogen. Sezessionistische Forderungen waren an der Tagesordnung. Der damalige Premierminister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto sah sich genötigt, die Regierung in Quetta abzusetzen und, wie vor drei Jahren beispielsweise Musharraf, die Armee zur Beruhigung der Lage einzusetzen. Der Schah von Persien half damals mit der Entsendung von Hubschraubern und Piloten, er fürchtete ein Übergreifen der Rebellion auf die von Balochen bewohnten Landesteile im Osten seines Reiches. Folgerichtig kam es hier denn auch zu einer ersten Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem pakistanischen Geheimdienst ISI und dem iranischen SAVAK. Von Seiten Afghanistans aber kam Hilfe für die rebellierenden Stämme, hier war Kabuls Geheimdienst KHAD großzügig tätig. Nach der Niederschlagung des Aufstandes ging der gesamte Tribe der Marris, deren Führung sich zu sozialistischen Pa-

rolen und Zielen bekannte, für fast 20 Jahre ins Exil nach Afghanistan. Ein Teil von ihnen wurde dort von KHAD zu Untergrundkämpfern ausgebildet und verübte in den 70er und 80er-Jahren Sabotageakte in Pakistan, vornehmlich in ihrer alten Heimat Balochistan, wobei Gas- und Elektrizitätsleitungen und -stationen bevorzugte Ziele waren. Der Marri-Tribe kehrte aufgrund einer Amnestie erst 1991 nach Balochistan zurück. Ihrer alten Siedlungsräume verlustig, hausen sie bis heute in Lagern in der Umgebung von Quetta.

Auch Murtaza Bhutto, der nach dem Hängen seines Vaters die Terrororganisation Al Murtaza gründet hatte, ging für einige Zeit nach Afghanistan, wo ihm und seinen Leuten Unterschlupf und Hilfe gewährt wurde. Al Murtaza machte danach mit Attentaten und blutigen Flugzeugenführungen von sich reden, in den 80er-Jahren verfehlte ein Kommando zweimal nur knapp das Ziel eines erfolgreichen Attentats auf den damaligen Präsidenten Zia-ul-Haq. Da sich in Afghanistan KGB und KHAD der Exil-Belutschen angenommen hatten, sah man sich in Pakistan unter Zugzwang. Mit dem Ziel, afghanischen Unruhestiftern unter den Paschtunen im Grenzland zuvorzukommen, stellte der ISI auf Anweisung von Bhutto eine 5.000 Mann starke afghanische Guerillatruppe auf, die in Nordwestprovinz (NWFP) ausgebildet wurde. Unter ihren ersten Absolventen waren Leute wie Hekmatyar, Rabbani und Masood, deren Namen in den 90er-Jahren weltweit bekannt wurden.

Als Folge der Ereignisse in Belutschistan wurde 1973 im ISI zudem ein "Special Operation Bureau" geschaffen, das zur Wiege des legendären Afghanistan Bureau's der 80er-Jahre werden sollte. Chef dieses Büros war Colonel Syed Raza Ali, der über seinen Auftrag schrieb: "Ich sollte eine Organisation aufbauen und leiten, die gebraucht wurde, um die Regierung über die vielfältigen Facetten der Bekämpfung von Aufständen in Pakistan, die ausgemerzt werden mussten, zu beraten und die Aktivitäten von unterschiedlichen Stellen der Staatsmacht zu koordinieren. So fing alles an. Die erste Phase des Krieges in Afghanistan hatte begonnen."

Genauer gesagt, die Zeit der ISI-Aktionen im Nachbarland Afghanistan hatte begonnen. Eine erste große Operation war 1975 die Initiierung eines Aufstandes im Pansheer-Tal, der zwar fehlschlug, Kabul aber zu der Erkenntnis verhalf, die pakistanische Karte nicht zu überreizen. Raza Ali berichtet, wie der ISI auf Leute wie Hekmatyar, Rabbani, Khalis und Masood aufmerksam geworden war und diese für seine Zwecke nutzte:

"Diese Individuen hatten einen gewissen Einfluss auf verschiedene Kollegs und Universitäten in Afghanistan, besonders in Kabul. Ihre konservativ-religiöse Orientierung und ihre Opposition zur kommunistischen Herrschaft hatte sie in einen Konflikt mit der Regierung gebracht … Sie überquerten regelmäßig die Grenze von und nach Afghanistan, wo sie einen Aufstand organisierten, der im Pasheer-Tal stattfand. Dieses Ereignis weckte Daud aus seinem Schlummer, ließ ihn umgänglicher werden und den Ernst der Lage erkennen. Er begann, sein Verhältnis zu Pakistan zu verbessern. Von da an rückten die Realpolitik und die Diplomatie in den Vordergrund. Daud ließ sich dazu herab, sich mit dem Thema der Durand-Linie zu beschäftigen und damit aufzuhören, Terroristen über die pakistanisch-afghanische Grenze nach Pakistan zu infiltrieren."

In der Folge kam es zu Kontakten zwischen den Regierungen beider Länder, PM Bhutto legte einmal auf einer Auslandsreise einen kurzen Zwischenstopp in Kabul ein und traf sich mit dem afghanischen PM Daud. Es wurde ein Treffen beider in Pakistan vereinbart, wo alle bilateralen Probleme besprochen und gelöst werden sollten. Das Treffen kam nie zustande, Daud wurde 1978 von kommunistisch-linksgerichteten Offizieren ermordet und Bhutto bekanntlich

als Regierungschef 1977 von Zia gestürzt, der ihn inhaftieren, verurteilen und hängen ließ. Das Problem der seit 1893 existenten Durand-Line blieb somit ungelöst.

2. Die 80er-Jahre

Der Einmarsch sowjetischer Truppen im Dezember 1979 eröffnete ein neues Kapitel in den afghanisch-pakistanischen Beziehungen. Die ersten Reaktionen hierauf in Rawalpindi waren Beklemmung bis Furcht. Lassen wir hier noch einmal den ISI-Brigadier Raza Ali zu Worte kommen:

"Irgendwann in der ersten Januarhälfte 1980 wurde eine Konferenz auf höchster Ebene abgehalten, um die Lage, die durch die sowjetische Invasion entstanden war, genauer zu betrachten … Der Präsident (auch der COAS) und der Außenminister und jeder, der zählte, nahmen daran teil … Der erste Redner sagte, dass die Sowjets gekommen waren, um zu bleiben. Sie sind eine Supermacht, sie haben noch nie ein Land verlassen, das sie besetzt haben. Es ist nur eine Frage der Zeit, bis sie an unserer Grenze sein werden, sagte ein anderer Redner … und so ging die Debatte immer weiter … Die Sowjets werden sich mit ihren Panzern einfach einen Weg bahnen. Die zerlumpten Gruppen von schlecht ausgerüsteten, unorganisierten Banden der afghanischen Mudschaheddin mit schlechter Disziplin werden der sowjetischen Besatzung keinen Widerstand leisten können. Das Spiel ist aus. Wir müssen unsere Politik in Hinsicht auf Afghanistan neu konzipieren, sagte einer der Redner, auf den andere mit ähnlichen Botschaften folgten."

Präsident Zia-ul-Haq und sein damaliger ISI-Chef Generalleutnant Akhtar Rahmen aber hatten den neuen Stellenwert, den Pakistan in den Augen der strategischen Planer in Washington nun hatte, schnell erkannt. Es begann die heute in großen Zügen

bekannte Kooperation zwischen CIA und ISI im Spiel um Afghanistan der 80er-Jahre. Hier nur einige Eckdaten:

Die USA und Saudi-Arabien zahlten jeweils ca. 2,5 Milliarden US$, hinzu kamen noch einmal etliche Hundert Millionen Dollar als Spenden privater Geber aus der islamischen Welt. Insgesamt wurden so für den Kampf in Afghanistan in den 80er-Jahren rd. 6 Mrd. US$ aufgebracht. Der ISI nahm dabei die Rolle eines "sole agents" im Verhältnis zu den Mudschaheddin ein und es versteht sich von selbst, dass dabei ein Teil des Geldes bereits in Pakistan hängen blieb. Immerhin, am Ende der 80er-Jahre waren die sowjetischen Truppen geschlagen und aus Afghanistan abgezogen, eine illustre Liste pakistanischer Militärs hatte schmucke Häuser und gepolsterte Bankkonten daheim wie im Ausland, und der ISI war von einem relativ kleinen und schlecht ausgerüsteten Geheimdienst zu einem der effektivsten und besten Nachrichtendienste zumindest in Asien geworden. Und das Selbstbewusstsein pakistanischer Militärs und Politiker wie auch der afghanischen Mudschaheddin-Führer war gewaltig gestiegen, geboren war die Überzeugung der "we are second to no one" und der bis heute existierende Glaube, dass man primär derjenige war, der die Supermacht Sowjetunion zum Zusammenbruch gebracht hatte.

Geerbt hatte Pakistan im Zusammenhang mit dem Afghanistan-Unternehmen der 80er-Jahre aber auch ein Problem, das bis heute weiter existiert. Das Land hat heute ca. 4,6 Millionen Drogenabhängige. Die Führer der zerlumpten, schlecht ausgerüsteten und unorganisierten Gruppen der Mudschaheddin waren zu einem Großteil zu gut organisierten Drogendealern geworden, die sie, so weit sie noch leben, bis heute noch sind. Neben ihnen gibt es heute weitere mächtige afghanische wie pakistanische Drogenhändler und andere, die am Drogenfluss finanziell mit verdienen. Afghanistan produziert heute über 4.000 Tonnen Opium

im Jahr, das in Afghanistan selbst, in Pakistan und in der Türkei vorwiegend zu Heroin verarbeitet wird und danach den Weg weiter nach Westen findet. Die Hauptwege dieses Drogenflusses führen bis heute von Afghanistan entweder direkt über den Iran in die Türkei oder aber über pakistanisches Territorium, über seine Flugplätze, Häfen und die Makran-Küste nach dorthin.

Geblieben ist Pakistan aber auch ein, wenn man so will, "positiver" Aspekt, es existiert eine auf Schwarzgeld basierende Schatten-Ökonomie, die nach Meinung internationaler Experten zumindest genauso bedeutend wie die offizielle Wirtschaft und ein wesentlicher Grund dafür ist, dass das Land in der Vergangenheit trotz zeitweiliger Zahlungsunfähigkeit wirtschaftlich nicht zusammenbrach. Verschiedene pakistanische Regierungen brachten denn auch Verordnungen und Gesetze "as good economic measures to boost economic progress" auf den Weg, die den Zufluss von Schwarzgeld und damit auch das Reinwaschen von Drogengeldern erleichterten. Und ein Financial Bill von 2008, angenommen vom Parlament (NA) am 22. Juni 2008, ermöglicht das Hereinbringen von Geld ohne jedwede Nachprüfung seiner Herkunft, sofern 2% Abgabe an das Government bezahlt werden.

Großteilen der Welt, vornehmlich des Westens, ist zudem ein Erbe aus dem Afghanistan-Unternehmen der 80er-Jahre geblieben, das bis heute weiterlebt und Wirkungen entfaltet. Rund 60.000 Jehadis, vornehmlich aus arabischen Ländern, aber auch aus anderen Teilen der islamischen Welt kommend, waren in Camps in Afghanistan und Pakistan ausgebildet worden. Afghanistan wurde so, und das gilt bis heute, zum "… largest consumer and indeed laboratory for Pakistan's jihad factory. Afghanistan also provided inspiration to the radical Islamists and enabled them to refine the tactics of their deadly trade and then replicate the experience in battle-grounds around the world." [1]

3. Die 90er-Jahre und die Situation bis heute

Wenn man die internationale Berichterstattung über Afghanistan ab Mitte der 90er-Jahre liest, wird man immer wieder auf die Aussage stoßen, die dort ab April 1994 in Erscheinung getretenen Taliban seien ein Geschöpf des pakistanischen Geheimdienstes "Inter Services Intelligence" gewesen. Diese Behauptung ist falsch, in Wirklichkeit war man im ISI-Hauptquartier am Aabpara Markt in Islamabad bis zum Herbst 1994 bzgl. des Kampfwertes der Taliban und damit deren Nützlichkeit für Pakistan eher skeptisch. Eine Mehrheit der im ISI mit Afghanistan beschäftigten Offiziere favorisierte 1994 eine weitere Zusammenarbeit mit Gulbadin Hekmatyar und seiner "Hezb-e-Islami", mit denen man in den 80er-Jahren in Afghanistan so erfolgreich gegen die Armee Moskaus gekämpft hatte.

Erst Ende 1994 kam es zu ersten offiziellen Kontakten zwischen den Taliban und dem ISI, nachdem die neuen Gotteskrieger am 3. November 1994 in die strategisch wichtige südafghanische Stadt Kandahar einmarschiert waren. Im ISI begann ein Umdenken in Richtung einer Abkehr von Hekmatyar und einer künftigen Kooperation mit den Taliban. Im November 1994 kam eine Taliban Delegation erstmals zum ISI nach Islamabad, geführt von Mulla Rabani, der damaligen Nummer 2 der Taliban und deren späteren Außenminister. In der Erinnerung des damaligen ISI Chefs Generalleutnant Javed Ashraf Qazi, der später unter Musharraf Pakistans Minister für Bildung war, lautete der Tenor der ersten Taliban-Bitten an den ISI wie folgt: "Don't help the Mujahedeen Commanders anymore, stay out, be neutral. We don't want weapon or money from you, but don't stop food and oil supply to us which we will pay with our own money." Nun wurden die Grundlagen einer künftigen Zusammenarbeit besprochen und ab Beginn 1995 wurde der ISI zum mächtigen Mentor der afghanischen Taliban, eine Partnerschaft,

die erst in der Folge der Ereignisse vom 11. September ein dramatisches Ende fand.

Wenn somit der ISI nicht der Vater der Taliban war, stellt sich die Frage, wer der wirkliche Geburtshelfer war. Tatsächlich war es die von 1993 bis 1996 im Amt befindliche zweite Regierung von Benazir Bhutto, die aus wirtschafts-strategischen Gründen sichere Transportwege nach Zentralasien und Westchina suchte und dabei die Taliban schuf. In Zentralasien sah und sieht Islamabad bis heute für sich ein großes Handelspotenzial, dort sah man Öl, Gas, Erze, Baumwolle etc. Hier erhofft man für sich einen Markt und für seine Kaufleute und Ingenieure neue Tätigkeitsfelder. Pakistan offeriert den zentralasiatischen Staaten und China die kürzesten Routen zu den blauen Wassern des Roten Meeres und des Indischen Ozeans. Das Problem ist nur, dass diese Wege immer über Afghanistan führen. Eine nördliche Route führt von Peshawar über Kabul, den Hindukush (Salang Tunnel), Mazar-e-Sharif nach Tirmez und Taschkent in Usbekistan. Eine südliche Route von Quetta über Kandahar und Herat nach Ashkabat in Turkmenistan. Zwar gibt es, von China in den 60er-Jahren gebaut, mit dem Karakorum Highway auch eine direkte Verbindung zwischen China und Pakistan über den 4960 m hoch gelegenen Kunjerab-Pass, der zur alten Seidenstraßen-Stadt Kashgar führt, diese Hochgebirgs-straße allein aber ist unzureichend. Ihre wirtschaftliche Tragfähigkeit ist begrenzt, zudem ist sie im Kriegsfall leicht zu blockieren. Daher also das Interesse Pakistans und auch Chinas, siehe den Neubau des Tiefseehafens Gwadar in Balochistan, an den über Afghanistan führenden Routen.

Ein zweiter Grund für Pakistans Engagement im Nachbarland Afghanistan ist das Wunschdenken seiner Militärs nach strategischer Tiefe. Als im Jahre 1991 der damalige Armeechef General Aslam Beg vor dem National Defence College, der Militäruniversität des Landes, sein Projekt "strategic depth" vorstellte, erhielt er von den anwesenden Offizieren lang andauernden Beifall. Pakistan fürchtet, in einem Krieg mit Indien nicht genügend tiefen Ausweich- und Rückzugsraum zu haben und sucht diesen in einer Allianz mit Afghanistan und möglichst auch dem Iran. Hier wird auch deutlich, warum man in Pakistan seit dem Abzug der Armee Moskaus darauf drängt, an der Spitze Afghanistans wieder Paschtunen zu sehen, mit denen man solche Pläne leichter zu verwirklichen glaubt. Experten halten dies allerdings für einen Irrglauben, da viele Paschtunen eher an ein Groß-Pastunistan glauben als an eine künftige staatliche Einheit Pakistans.

Im Übrigen steht Pakistan mit seinen strategischen Interessen beim Nachbarn nicht allein. Hamid Karzai verschweigt das Tun anderer Mitspieler, wenn er sich über die Einmischung Islamabads in die inneren Angelegenheiten seines Landes beklagt. Als solche weiteren Mitspieler wären neben den USA auch der Iran, Russland, Saudi-Arabien, China und Indien zu nennen. Die Absichten der USA sind deutlich, sie wollen von Afghanistan aus den Iran isolieren, Pakistan an seiner Westgrenze beobachten und kontrollieren, über Afghanistan für sich selbst Zugang nach Zentralasien haben und Russland und China den Zugang nach Afghanistan und Pakistan erschweren.

Der Iran

Der Iran will die amerikanische Umklammerung aufbrechen, will den Abzug der USA aus Afghanistan, dem Irak und aus dem ganzen Mittleren Osten. Alle Möglichkeiten, die Pläne der USA zu torpedieren, werden in Verfolgung dieser Ziele von Teheran genutzt. Ergo mischt der Iran verdeckt auch in Afghanistan weiter mit. In Abkehr seiner Politik der 90er-Jahre, als er Ahmed Shah Masood gegen die Taliban von Mullah Omar unterstützte, lieferte Teheran verdeckt ab 2003 Waffen an die neu-

en Taliban. Der Iran bietet sich zudem mit seinen bereits voll ausgebauten Straßen- und Eisenbahnverbindungen, seinen Pipelines und Tiefwasser-Häfen auch als wirtschaftliches Transitland mit Wegen an, die kaum länger sind als die pakistanischen Routen. Der Iran steht damit auch in wirtschaftlicher Konkurrenz zu Pakistan. Zudem ist der Iran bemüht, in Kabul keine von Paschtunen dominierte Regierung zum Zuge kommen zu lassen. Über eine dortige Regierung, die proportional gerecht alle Volksteile umfasst, will er den eigenen kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Einfluss in Afghanistan, zumindest aber in Herat und den Provinzen im Westen des Landes, schützen und erhalten.

Russland

Russland ist derzeit erfolgreich dabei, in seinem Hinterhof Zentralasien verlorenen Boden zurückzugewinnen und die Amerikaner von dort wieder hinaus zu drängen. Diese Pläne schließen den amerikanischen Abzug aus Afghanistan ein, ergo spielt Moskau verdeckt weiterhin dort in nicht unbeträchtlichem Maße weiter mit. Es waren russische Schmuggler, die als Erste ab 2003 neue Waffen nach Afghanistan brachten. Moskau hat im Land am Hindukusch nicht unbeträchtliche wirtschaftliche Interessen. Es war immer bemüht, geplante Gas- und Ölpipelines von Zentralasien über Afghanistan und Pakistan zur Arabischen See zu verhindern. Sollten diese Pipelines künftig dennoch zustande kommen, ist von dem Bemühen Moskaus auszugehen, an entsprechenden Kuratorien zumindest beteiligt zu sein, um so Einfluss zu haben und mitzuverdienen.

China

China hat in Afghanistan neben seinem schon erwähnten Suchen nach sicheren Routen von Westchina zum Indischen Ozean auch das Interesse, das Land nicht wieder zum

Ausbildungs- und Ruheraum uighurischer Rebellen werden zu lassen. Peking hat aber auch enorme wirtschaftliche Interessen in Afghanistan selbst. Dort gibt es Uranerze, an denen es interessiert ist. Im "Jalrez-Tal in Sana", nur 100 km südlich von Kabul gelegen und heute als ein von Taliban kontrolliertes Gebiet geltend, befinden sich bei "Aynak" mit 240 Millionen Tonnen zudem die nach heutigen Erkenntnissen zweitgrößten Kupfererzlager der Welt. Der Bedarf an Kupfer wird steigen, für Experten ist der Zeitpunkt absehbar, an dem Kupfer weltweit zur Mangelware wird. Für die Lagerstätten bei Aynak hat vor einigen Monaten die Staatsfirma "China Metallurgical Construction Corp." gegen sechsfache Konkurrenz, darunter die amerikanische "Phelps Doge Corp.", die Ausbeutungsrechte bekommen, ein weiterer Fakt für das Interesse und Engagement Pekings an Afghanistan. Wir haben somit heute hier die etwas absonderliche Situation, dass NATO-Truppen in Afghanistan unter hohen Kosten auch zur Absicherung chinesischer Wirtschaftsinteressen beitragen und Peking hierfür dem Westen später kaum einen Bonus einräumen wird.

Indien

Was Indiens Rolle in Afghanistan betrifft, gibt es in Pakistan unter Militärs und Politikern, unter Professoren, Studenten und Journalisten eine regelrechte Phobie. Die Militärs glauben, Indien habe mit 5.000 vornehmlich als Bauarbeiter getarnten Männern bereits das Skelett einer ganzen Division im Norden Afghanistans stationiert. Es sei in der Lage, diese Anzahl schnell auf 50.000 Mann, d.h. auf Stärke eines Korps, zu erhöhen. Die Politiker sprechen von 4.000 Spionen, die als Ärzte Ingenieure, Wissenschaftler und Unternehmer getarnt seien. Die Anzahl der vier indischen Konsulate im Lande wird als ungerechtfertigt gesehen, sie seien mit Angehörigen von R&AW überbesetzt und in Wirklichkeit

Ausgangspunkte für den von Indien unterstützten Untergrundkampf einer sog. "Balochistan Liberation Army" in Balochistan.

Tatsächlich ist es Neu-Delhi nach dem 11. September gelungen, seine aus der Zeit des Kalten Krieges stammenden guten Beziehungen zu Kabul wieder aufzunehmen. Es hat beträchtliche Hilfs- und Wiederaufbauleistungen erbracht, über 100 Omnibusse geliefert sowie Straßen und Hospitäler gebaut. Dies geschieht mit Sicherheit nicht nur in edler Art und Weise, denn Indien verfährt nach dem Motto, der Feind meines Feindes ist mein Freund. In Neu-Delhi konnte man durchaus hören, Islamabad sorgt für Unruhen an unserer Nordgrenze, sprich Kaschmir, also kümmern wir uns um Pakistans Westgrenze.

Saudi-Arabien

Auch Saudi-Arabien gehört zu den Spielern im heutigen "great game" um Afghanistan. Ein nicht unbeträchtlicher Teil der heute in Afghanistan kämpfenden Taliban kommt aus Saudi-Arabien. Dabei kann es Riad nicht nur um die Unterstützung der dortigen wahabitischen Glaubensbrüder gehen. Es ist auch darum bemüht, an seinen Grenzen keine unfreundlichen Nachbarn zu haben. Hier sei zudem der pikante Hinweis gestattet, dass es in Saudi-Arabien 100 km nördlich und 500 km südlich von Riad moderne Raketensilos und Abschussanlagen gibt, in denen heute Raketen neuester pakistanischer Bauart lagern. Die Bestückung solcher Raketen mit konventionellen Sprengköpfen macht wenig Sinn. Ergo kann von einer engen Kooperation zwischen Pakistan und Saudi-Arabien auch in Afghanistan ausgegangen werden. Man kann zudem von saudischen Wirtschaftsinteressen in Afghanistan ausgehen. Sollten einst Pipelines von Turkmenistan zur Arabischen See gebaut werden, dürfte Riad, wie im Übrigen auch Moskau, darum bemüht sein, den entsprechenden Konsortien anzugehören.

Pakistan

Was Pakistans Interessen in Afghanistan angeht, wird es weiterhin danach trachten, in Kabul eine gegenüber Pakistan kooperative, mehrheitlich von Paschtunen geführte Regierung im Sattel zu wissen. Im Hintergrund stehen dabei die bereits dargelegten Interessen des Landes nach sicheren Durchgangsrouten von und nach Zentralasien, von denen es sich große wirtschaftliche Impulse verspricht. Zudem ist das Streben der Militärs nach "strategic depth" weiterhin existent. Pakistan will, und wer kann es ihm verdenken, im Westen eine sichere, anerkannte Grenze haben. Auch wenn die Präsidenten Hamid Karzai und Asif Zardari kürzlich in Washington einträchtig neben dem US-Präsidenten Obama standen, das Verhältnis zwischen ihren beiden Ländern wird noch lange von Misstrauen geprägt sein. Nichts zeigt das deutlicher als der Umstand, dass von einem zwischen Karzai und Zardari in Washington unterzeichneten Memorandum, das Indien einen Wirtschaftskorridor von der Wagha-Grenzstation bei Lahore über den Khyber-Pass nach Afghanistan einräumt, inzwischen nichts weiter zu hören ist. Hier dürften die Militärs ihre Bedenken angemeldet und auf die Bremse getreten haben. In Pakistan ging man seit April 2009 davon aus, dass Hamid Karzai mangels personellen Alternativen eine weitere Amtszeit als Präsident Afghanistans vor sich haben wird. Man weiß, dass Karzai gegenüber Indien freundlichere Gefühle hegt als gegenüber Pakistan. Die Militärs in den Hauptquartieren von Armee und ISI werden daher die Afghanistan-Politik ihrer Regierung weiterhin genau beobachten und notfalls ihr Veto anmelden.

In den Musharraf-Jahren hatten afghanische Taliban (Mullah Omar und Shura) und die zu al-Qaeda gehörenden, aus verschiedenen Ländern stammenden islamistischen Kämpfer Schlupfwinkel vornehmlich in Balochistan und FATA gefunden. Ihre pakistanischen Gesinnungsgenossen und ISI-Leute halfen ihnen, sich neu zu formieren und

auszurüsten. Zusammen mit pakistanischen Taliban und Jehadis sickerten sie dann wieder nach Afghanistan ein und trugen zusammen mit dortigen militanten Gruppen zur zunehmend fragiler werdenden Sicherheitslage bei. Die an der Grenze postierten 100.000 pakistanischen Soldaten schauten dabei weisungsgemäß weg. Das Musharraf-Regime betrieb so ein Doppelspiel. Es nahm zum einen am internationalen Kampf gegen den Terror teil, wo es sowohl Erfolge errang wie selbst Opfer trug. Zugleich aber trug es zur Instabilität im Nachbarland bei und versuchte so seine strategischen Interessen zu schützen. Auch heute sind ein Teil der Militanten in Afghanistan Ausländer. Nach Mullah Mehmoud, einem Taliban-Commander im Golestan-Distrikt in der Helmand-Provinz, sollen es 60% sein, wobei die meisten aus Saudi-Arabien und der pakistanischen Provinz Punjab kommen sollen.[2]

An dieser Stelle sei der Hinweis gestattet, dass die im Westen verbreitete Vorstellung, nach der die Madressen (Islamic Seminaries) des Landes die Hauptgeburtsstätten der pakistanischen Jihadi-Kultur seien, nicht richtig ist. Einige bekannte Madressen spielen ohne Zweifel hierbei eine Rolle, die überwiegende Zahl der Jehadis aber kommt, wie eine Studie des Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in Islamabad zeigt, aus dem Punjab. Und das in Karachi erscheinende politische Monatsmagazin Herald schrieb: "It is a fact of life that for every militant thrown out by a madrassa, there are dozens who never went anywhere near a religious seminary. Instead, they were just plain criminals before they chose to elevate themselves to the status of jihadis. Talking of a crackdown on madrassas may make eminent sense to the West but it offers very little in terms of actually getting a handle on the problem".[3]

In Pakistan unterschätzten die Generäle über die letzten Jahre zwei Dinge. Zum einen den zunehmenden Herrschaftsanspruch der islamischen Militanten in Pakistan selbst. Bei einer Lagebeurteilung im Frühjahr 2009 mussten sie feststellen, dass die Regierung nur noch 38% und die Taliban bereits 24% von NWFP kontrollierten. In weiteren 24% von NWFP waren die Taliban zumindest permanent anwesend. Noch schlimmer aber war, dass sich für 47% von Punjab die Gefahr höherer Aktivitäten der Taliban abzeichnete. Bei den Generälen setzte sich daher die Einsicht durch, dass die Taliban die Grenze des aus taktischen und strategischen Gründen bisher Tolerierten überschritten hatten und man zeigen musste, wer Herr im Hause ist. Zum anderen wurde im GHQ wie beim ISI der Wille der USA unterschätzt, in Afghanistan nicht ein ähnliches Debakel hinnehmen zu müssen, wie es Moskau beschieden gewesen war.

Das Ergebnis ist das gegenwärtige Vorgehen pakistanischer Militärs in Swat, in anderen Teilen von NWFP und in FATA. Der Ausgang dieser Unternehmen ist noch ungewiss. Fraglich ist weiterhin, ob die Strategen in Rawalpindi und Islamabad ihre bisherige Afghanistanpolitik in wesentlichen Zügen ändern werden und ob in Kabul ein in seinem Amt bestätigter Hamid Karzai und seine neue Regierung ein entspanntes und kooperatives Verhältnis zum Nachbarn Pakistan finden werden. Im April 2009 kam eine afghanisch-pakistanische, aus Parlamentariern und politischen Spitzenbeamten bestehende Besuchergruppe auf Einladung des Auswärtigen Amtes nach Berlin. In ihren Ausführungen sprachen Afghanen wie Pakistaner mehrfach von einer stattfindenden neuen Annäherung zwischen beiden Staaten. Bleibt abzuwarten, ob diesen Worten Taten folgen werden.

Anmerkungen

[1] Sushant, Sareen: The Jihad Factory, New Delhi 2005.

[2] Siehe Daily Times, 15.6.2009.
[3] Siehe Herald, Oktober 2003.

Stability in South Asia: a view from China

Liping Xia

1. Introduction

There are three distinct factors which have a significant influence on stability and security in South Asia. The first concerns relations between external major powers and South Asian regional powers. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union supported India, and the United States and China supported Pakistan. Both sides were engaged in a struggle against each other. Since the end of the Cold War, major powers including China and the US have shared some common interests in the security field of South Asia. They would like to see peace and stability in the region. It is not in their national interests to use one country against another in South Asia. Neither is it in their national interests to struggle against each other for their strategic position in South Asia. However, some politicians in the US still want to use India to balance China.

The second factor concerns relations between India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan fought three wars against each other during the Cold War period. In May 1998, both conducted nuclear tests. Since 2005 relations between India and Pakistan have improved to some extent, and this has helped to reduce the possibility of armed conflict, including nuclear exchanges, between the two countries.

The third factor relates to non-governmental organizations. In South Asia, especially in India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, the terrorist organization Al-Qaida and extremist groups such as the Taliban have become a serious threat to national governments. Other non-governmental entities such as warlords in Afghanistan have also had a serious negative impact on national governments.

2. The China-India security relationship

The China-India security relationship has gone through three major phases: friendship (from 1949 to the end of the 1950s); opposition (from the early 1960s to the late 1990s) whereby the progress made between India and China since 1988 was marred by tension again between the two sides caused by India's nuclear tests in May 1998. And finally, strategic partnership from 2005 onwards.

Since the then Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji visited India in January 2002 and subsequently Indian Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China in June 2003, both countries have made considerable progress in their political, economic and security relations. After experiences akin to a long and winding road, China-India relations have entered a new stage characterized by maturity. Both China and India are the largest developing countries, and their total population is one-third of the world's population. In order for the two countries to accomplish their economic and social sustainable development it is therefore critically important to maintain peace, stability and prosperity in Asia as well as in the world. At the same time, both countries are rising powers in international affairs and each other's neighbours of considerable size, so they are obliged to view China-India relations from a strategic perspective and to make every effort to establish a mutually constructive and cooperative long-term relationship. Both China and India have civilizations of long standing and a unique history of their own. The two countries are peace-loving and their friendly exchanges go back to ancient times. Furthermore, both

countries are initiators of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and share the same major objectives of realizing their economic and social modernization. So they are able to overcome the difficulties and obstacles in their relationship. During the visits of Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji to India in 2002 and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee to China in 2003, both countries agreed to strengthen their "long-term constructive partnership", an objective which was put forward by the leaders of the two countries during the visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin to India in 1996.

During the visit to India by Chinese Premier Wen Jibao in April 2005, both countries agreed to develop their cooperative partnership into a strategic cooperative partnership. Development of trade and diplomatic links between the two nations is in the interests of both, and contributes to regional and world peace and stability. During the visit, the two governments inked an agreement on the political guiding principles to solve the border issue. This was the first political document to be signed by the two countries since 1981 when both countries had started negotiations to settle border disputes. According to the agreement, "the differences on the boundary question should not be allowed to affect the overall development of bilateral relations" and "the two sides will resolve the boundary question through peaceful and friendly consultations. Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means". India and China will "make meaningful and mutually acceptable adjustments to their respective positions on the boundary question, so as to arrive at a package settlement to the boundary question". Furthermore, "the boundary settlement must be final, covering all sectors of the China-India boundary". Bilateral "strategic and reasonable interests, and the principle of mutual and equal security" will be kept in mind while arriving at a final settlement. The Sino-Indian border has remained tranquil with no confrontation since 1993.

3.   China's new policy towards neighbouring countries

There is a new aspect in China's current foreign strategy and security policy. Among others, it includes the concept of a period of important strategic opportunity, and safeguarding the common interests of all mankind. The foreign strategy and security policy pursued by the new Chinese leadership can be analyzed according to the theories of international relations, including interdependence theory, international regime theory, geo-economic theory, and cooperation for win-win theory. In fact, China has developed those theories into a new rationale. There are internal factors and external factors affecting China's international role. With the integration of China into international economic and political mechanisms, China will continue its responsible role as a major power in international affairs in the next twenty years.

At present, China has put its relationships with major powers as the first priority of its foreign strategy; its relationships with neighbouring countries as critically important to its foreign strategy; and its relationships with developing countries as the foundation of its foreign strategy. India is a rising major power in Asia, a neighbouring country with China, and one of the biggest developing countries. So China has placed great importance on its relationship with India.

The first two decades of the 21st century are a period of important strategic opportunity for China. During this period China will focus its attention on an all-out effort to build an affluent society. The objectives of China's modernization programme are to quadruple the GDP of 2000 by 2020, and to become a mid-level developed country by 2050. In order to achieve these objectives, China needs long-term peace and a stable international security environment which will further its economic development.

4. China's new concepts of foreign strategy

In the 21st century there are the three major historical tasks for China: to propel the modernization drive; to achieve national reunification; and to safeguard world peace and promote common development.[1] In order to accomplish the three major historical tasks, China has some new concepts for its foreign strategy.

4.1 Safeguarding common interests

Firstly, China recognizes the necessity to go along with the tide of history and to safeguard the common interests of all humanity. Due to the development of economic globalization, the common interests of all mankind have become evident. China is ready to work with the international community to boost global multi-polarization, promote the harmonious coexistence of diverse forces, and maintain stability in the international community. China will continue to improve and develop relations with the developed countries. Proceeding from the fundamental interests of all countries concerned, China will broaden the converging points of common interests and properly settle differences on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, notwithstanding the differences in social systems and ideologies. China has been cooperating with the United States and other countries in anti-terror projects and in dealing with regional security problems, such as the North Korean nuclear crisis.

4.2 Mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination

Secondly, China stresses a new concept of security which features mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination. Since the end of the Cold War, China has greatly changed its security concepts in accordance with the new international situation and the interests of the Chinese people as well as mankind's need to seek peace and development. It is China's view that to obtain lasting peace, it is imperative to abandon the Cold War mentality, cultivate a new concept of security and seek a new way to safeguard peace. China holds that countries should trust one another, work together to maintain security and to resolve disputes through dialogue and cooperation, and should not resort to the use or threat of force. It has been proved that the new concepts of security are in keeping with current trends and have great vitality.

China holds that the core of the new security concept should be mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination.[2] The new security concept should also be the guideline to resolve disputes in international security.[3] On 7 October 2003, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stressed: "It is China's existing guideline to advance the vigorous development, peace and stability in Asia. It is an important part of China's development strategy to maintain good relationships with neighbours, make them secure and help them to become rich".

"To maintain good relationships with neighbours" means that China will carry forward the Chinese philosophy of "making close and friendly relations with neighbours", so that they can cooperatively establish a stable and harmonious structure of relationships between China and its neighbours under the principle of living in harmony with surrounding countries. "To make neighbours secure" means that China will vigorously maintain regional peace and stability, and persist in improving mutual trust through dialogue and cooperation and in resolving disputes though peaceful negotiations, so as to construct a peaceful and stable regional environment for the development of Asia." To help neighbours to become rich" means that China will strengthen cooperation of mutual benefit with its neighbours, and will

deepen regional and sub-regional cooperation in order to realize common development with other Asian countries.

4.3 The China-India strategic cooperative partnership

Thirdly, China will strengthen the China-India strategic cooperative partnership through mutual trust and a win-win concept. The two countries should look on their mutual relations from a strategic perspective, and with long-term views. Both should recognize the long-term and fundamental common interests between them. They should continue to use the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as the guidelines to guide China-India relations. The two countries should resolve their border disputes in a spirit of mutual coordination as well as mutual understanding and accommodation through negotiations. The China-India agreement on political guiding principles on solving the border issue will help the special representatives of the two governments negotiate territorial claims as experts delineate the boundary on a map and on the ground.

The two countries should further strengthen the dialogue on strategic and security issues between them. They should further enhance defense exchanges and confidence-building measures between the two militaries so as to improve mutual trust. They should also increase mutual economic and trade cooperation so as to strengthen the foundation of the China-India relationship.

5. Terrorism as one of the major threats to South Asia

Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the 9/11 events, the system of international relations has been undergoing transformation from one of balance of power in international anarchy to a new one mainly characterized by mutual interde-

pendence between countries. This transformation will go through a long-term transition period during which there will many complex struggles, on a path that will be tortuous. Terrorism has become one of the major threats to mankind and the international community during this transformation of the international relations system.

5.1 Non-traditional security threats

The impact of non-traditional security threats on international relations has been rapidly increasing. Non-traditional security threats can also be described as global problems, transnational problems or low politics problems. They include terrorism, environmental pollution, global warming, population explosion, drug trafficking, international crime, HIV/AIDS. Non-traditional security threats have two major characteristics: they are present everywhere in the world and as such concern all mankind; and they threaten the existence and development of all human beings.

Security problems can be transformed into non-traditional security problems, and non-traditional security problems can lead to traditional armed conflicts. Furthermore, traditional security threats and non-traditional security threats can be interwoven with each other and mutate from one to the other. For example, weapons of mass destruction are traditional security problems. However, if terrorists have such weapons, this becomes a non-traditional security threat and a transnational problem. Another example is that cross-boundary attacks by terrorists are non-traditional security threats, which may lead to traditional armed conflicts.

As a result of the large-scale Cold War arms race between the two superpowers, the United States and the former Soviet Union; of long-term exploitation and ignorance towards developing nations by developed nations; and as a result of human greed, non-

traditional security threats have increased in recent years and have more and more impact. That has greatly increased the common interests of all countries in the world, and made countries more inclined to cooperate in order to deal with and resolve those problems. With the growing impact of non-traditional security threats on international relations and the growth of common interests between countries, it is necessary for countries, especially the major powers, to resolve disputes between them through consultation and coordination, and to cooperate to deal with non-traditional security threats.

5.2 The role of non-state elements

Terrorism as one of the non-state elements is being increasingly implicated in international relations. Non-state actors include terrorist organizations, transnational companies, non-governmental organizations, multilateral organizations. In recent years, non-state actors have become important actors in international relations. Some non-state actors now have even the same amount of capital and means as states do. There are large transnational companies which have more capital than medium-sized or small states. In international society, there are many kinds of non-governmental organizations which play a spectacular role in international relations and international politics. Since the end of the Cold War, terrorist organizations and their actions have developed and become the new threat to human society. The 9/11 incident is the most glaring example. Although terrorism has been around for ages, global terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon. Transnational and multiethnic, it is international in scope, with terrorists representing all walks of life, poor to rich, third world to first world, illiterate to educated. Ironically, the same mechanisms that have fuelled economic globalization have also enabled terrorism on a global scale. Those non-state actors have a very significant impact on international relations.

6. Anti-terror war launched by the United States

In line with the military concept of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the Administration of George W. Bush which assumed power in January 2001 intended to strengthen the absolute superiority of the US military, to realize absolute security for the United States, and to further consolidate its leadership in the world through making use of US high-tech military superiority.

The 9/11 incident was the first time since it had become a superpower that the United States suffered such a heavy loss from an external attack on the American mainland. Under those circumstances, the United States regarded anti-terrorism as the highest priority of its national security strategy and began the anti-terror war. At the same time, the Pentagon began to make significant readjustments to its defense strategy.

One important characteristic of the readjustment of US defense strategy is to stress that the US military should shift from a "threats-based approach" to a "capabilities-based" approach. The Pentagon holds that concept since it reflects the fact that the United States cannot know with confidence what nation, combination of nations, or non-state actor will pose threats to vital US interests or those of US allies and friends decades from now. So the Bush Administration has given up the guideline of military strategy to "prepare for winning two major theatre wars" and has asked US forces to have military capabilities to deal with different situations in this century. Another important characteristic of the readjustment of US defense strategy is the proposal of the strategic concept of "pre-emptive attacks". In the Nuclear Posture Review report presented by the Pentagon in January 2001, the US Department of Defense even holds that nuclear weapons can be used to attack targets which are able to sustain attacks by conventional weapons.

The third important characteristic of the re-adjustment of US defense strategy is to regard homeland security as the foundation of US defense strategy. In order to win the war on terror and to develop future capabilities, the Pentagon is speeding up the development of high-tech weapons, including Missile Defense, weapons to be used in space, capabilities for persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement. However, the new US defense strategy still has a lot of the Cold War mentality. For example, in the annual defense report to the US President and Congress put forward by US DoD in August 2002, the Pentagon claims that a military competitor with a significant source base may appear in Asia in the future. In order to deal with this, the United States will take some measures to strengthen its military presence in East Asia, including among others deployment of another aircraft carrier, and submarines with cruise missiles.

The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 11 September 2001 marked the beginning of a new era in the fight against global terrorism. US President George W. Bush declared war against terrorism, dictating a strategic shift of the US from diplomatic and police action to war. On 7 October 2001, the United States launched military attacks against the Taliban and Al-Qaida in Afghanistan. U.S forces defeated them, but have still not captured Osama bin Laden. Al-Qaida remnants still exist.

In 2003, following its 2002 release of the National Security Strategy, the US published the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and National Strategy for Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, in order to flesh out its new national security strategy aimed at counter-terrorism, non-proliferation and homeland security. As the first step in carrying out the new strategy, the US waged a preemptive war against Iraq in March 2003 on grounds that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. With no

WMDs found in Iraq, the US and the UK had to face increasing suspicions about their rationale for the war. Although there was a general election in Iraq in January 2005, there have been frequent attacks from both terrorists and anti-American resistance against both US forces and Iraqi police, officials and civilians. Many terrorists have come to Iraq from all over the world and are using Iraq as their training centre. Furthermore, terrorists also struck Western targets in Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, Russia, Morocco, Egypt, Pakistan, London, and so on.

In May 2003, the US launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), expressing its readiness to carry out sea or air interceptions with willing allies against ships and aircraft suspected of transporting nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their components. PSI received support from Australia, Japan, the European countries, and some other countries.

7. China's policy towards terrorism and the war on terror

7.1 International cooperation against terrorism.

China has been actively participating in international cooperation against terrorism. During the Anti-terrorism Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the UN Security Council held on 20 January 2003, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan put forward a four-point proposal for extending the war on terror. First, with peace and security for all mankind as the central theme of counter-terrorism, efforts should be made to cultivate a new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation and to resolve or mitigate such regional hotspots as the Middle East and Iraq. Second, with universal development and common prosperity as the foundation of counter-terrorism, efforts should be made to promote the economic development of all

countries, to narrow the wealth gap and attain the development goals laid down by the UN Millennium Summit. Third, with closer communication among and integration of different civilizations as the safeguard of counter-terrorism, efforts should be made to promote understanding and tolerance among diverse civilizations and cultures. Fourth, with stronger exchange and cooperation as the key to counter-terrorism, efforts should be made to give scope to the leading role of the UN and help developing countries build up their capacity in compliance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.[4]

7.2 The role of the UN

China has supported the leading role played by the United Nations and its Security Council in counter-terrorism and opposing terrorism in all its forms and manifestation. China has actively taken part in counter-terrorism discussions at the UN and its Security Council. China voted in favour of Security Council Resolutions 1456, 1465 and 1561 on counter-terrorism, and worked earnestly with the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the Council.

7.3 Opposition to all forms of terrorism

China opposes all forms of terrorism. China's position also includes: a comprehensive approach to address both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism, enhanced capacity-building of developing countries against terrorism, and rejection of double standards and the simplistic practice of linking terrorism with specific countries, ethnicities and religions. China also holds that the fight against the East Turkistan terrorist forces was part and parcel of the worldwide campaign against terror, and China stood ready to step up its cooperation with the relevant countries on this front in the interest of regional peace and stability.

7.4 Regional cooperation against terrorism

China has continued to take an active part in regional or sub-regional cooperation against terrorism. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has developed into an important mechanism to promote regional security, stability and development. In 2003, China participated in joint military exercises under the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a move that significantly deterred the terrorist forces operating at home and abroad. In September 2003, the Foreign Ministers of six member countries of the SCO signed the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism and the Agreement Between the SCO Member Countries Concerning the Regional Counter-Terrorism Agency. In 2003, the Chinese side also participated in the meeting of the attorney-general and the first meeting of the Council of the Regional Counter-Terrorism Agency of the SCO, playing an important role in guiding and strengthening the cooperation of the organization. In January 2004, the SCO Secretariat and the SCO Regional Counter-Terrorism Agency were formally inaugurated in Beijing and Tashkent respectively. In June 2004, during the Summit Meeting of the SCO in Tashkent, leaders of member countries of the SCO signed the Agreement on cooperation against the illegal transportation of narcotic drugs, mind-altering drugs and their component materials. The SCO also established a mechanism of regular meetings of Secretaries of National Security Councils of member countries, so they can strengthen their security cooperation.

In September 2004, the Chinese Ambassador to Portugal Ma Enhan as the representative of the SCO attended the second meeting of the OSCE in Lisbon on preventing and combating terrorism. Ambassador Ma briefed the meeting on the principled positions of the SCO on preventing and combating terrorism and the concrete actions it had taken, and ex-

changed views with the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe and other international organizations on anti-terrorism cooperation.

7.5 Bilateral cooperation against terrorism

China has continued to deepen bilateral cooperation against terrorism with the relevant countries. In 2004, China held the fourth counter-terrorism consultation with the US and the third consultation of the China-US working group on financial anti-terrorism. In July 2003, the customs authorities of China and the US signed the bilateral declaration on the principles of Container Security Initiatives (CSI) cooperation and the annexes in Beijing, which opened a new area of China-US cooperation against terrorism. In addition, China held the third counter-terrorism dialogue with India and conducted counter-terrorism consultation with Germany in 2003.

Following the signing of the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism (or the Shanghai Convention for short) by the Foreign Ministers of six member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in September 2003, China began to negotiate and conclude bilateral agreements on combating terrorism, separatism and extremism (or "agreement against the three forces" for short) with other member states of SCO in an effort to implement the Shanghai Convention, build a network of legal cooperation against the three forces and foster closer cooperation within the SCO. The China-Tajikistan agreement against the three forces and that between China and Uzbekistan were signed on 2 and 4 September 2003 respectively. The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) of China ratified the China-Kazakhstan and China-Kyrgyzstan agreements against the three forces on 26 and 27 August 2003 respectively. The agreement between China and Kazakhstan on the issue entered into force on 3 July 2003.

In order to help the Afghan people rebuild the country after the war, China has taken an active part in Afghanistan's post-war reconstruction. The Chinese Government seriously honoured its January 2002 pledge of US$ 150 million aid. During the visit of Afghanistan's Vice-President Nimatullah Shahrani to China in May 2003, China announced its provision of a US$ 15 million grant to Afghanistan and US$ 1 million cash to the Afghan Reconstruction Fund. In August 2003, the Chinese side officially handed over its donation of 80,000 pieces of office appliances to the Afghan Transitional Government. By now, the construction of the Chinese-assisted Republic Hospital in Kabul and the preliminary preparations for the Parwan Irrigation Project have been completed. In addition, China made vigorous efforts to expand its mutually beneficial economic cooperation and trade with Afghanistan in telecommunications, building materials, electrical appliances, and other fields.

China is also helping the Iraqi people reconstruct the country after the Iraq War. In October 2003, Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Shen Guofang led a delegation to the Conference of Donating Countries for Iraqi Reconstruction held by the United Nations in Madrid, Spain. During the conference, the Chinese Government announced that China would provide US$ 25 million worth of humanitarian aid to Iraq for its reconstruction. In 2004, the Chinese Government declared that it would provide training to attorneys for Iraq.

8.   Strengthening international cooperation against terrorism

8.1 The leading role of the UN

It is important to find a way to facilitate the leading role of the UN and its Security Council in the international cooperation against terrorism. The United Nations has been playing an important role in the anti-

terror campaign. Almost all countries have commended the important role of the United Nations in coordinating international counter-terrorism cooperation, and have spoken highly of the work of the Security Council Terrorism Committee. Most countries emphasized that international counter-terrorism operations must comply with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and other norms of international law, and efforts should be made to address both symptoms and root causes of terrorism. On the definition of terrorism, the Islamic and non-aligned countries continued to underscore the justice and legitimacy of national liberation movements against foreign occupation and to call for sanctions against acts of state terrorism according to the relevant conventions and international law.

Under the framework of the UN, the discussions of the Sixth Committee on the Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, the Draft Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convocation of a high-level conference on preventing and combating terrorism have been continuing, but have made little progress. The delegations remained divided on the major outstanding issues, such as the definition of terrorism, the scope of application of the conventions, the legitimacy of the use of nuclear weapons by a state, the activities of armed forces, and the relations between the comprehensive and sectoral conventions. The Chinese delegation expressed its support for India's drafting of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and Russia's drafting of a Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and believed that the draft conventions, once adopted, add to the international legal framework on counter-terrorism.

8.2 Multilateral cooperation

Multilateral cooperation in the anti-terror campaign should be enhanced. The common

interests and cooperation between countries towards non-traditional security threats, including terrorism, environmental pollution, drug trafficking, transnational crimes, HIV/AIDS, SARS, bird flu, and so on, have been increasing, so that they will seek to resolve traditional security problems more through dialogue and negotiations. The main objectives of most countries will be the development of their economy, society, science and technology. The mutual interdependence and cooperation between major powers will continue to increase, so they will make great efforts to avoid armed conflicts between them. The process of establishing and developing international and regional mechanisms of security cooperation and dialogue will continue, so that in many regions and sub-regions, co-existing multi-level, multi-channel and multi-type mechanisms of security can be formed. Those international, regional and sub-regional mechanisms of security cooperation will become the important parts of the future system of international relations mainly characterized by mutual interdependence between countries.

Cooperation between major powers has been increasing, but competition among them has been more complicated. Since the 9/11 events, the US has regarded the war against terrorism as the highest priority on its agenda. In order to realize the goal of anti-terrorism, it has to strengthen cooperation with other powers, including China, and hopes to have stable Sino-US relations.

8.3 A new concept of security

At present there is competition between the new security concepts and the Cold War mentality. On the one hand, some new security concepts including cooperative security, coordinated security, and common security have been put forward. On the other hand, the Cold War mentality of "zero sum games" theory, balance of power, geopolitics, still exists. In many countries there is a

the struggle between new security concepts and the Cold War mentality. If countries, especially major powers, can see the world through new security concepts and cooperate to deal with non-traditional security threats such as terrorism they can have a win-win or a win-win-win situation between them. Otherwise, they will all lose.

In order to effectively counter terrorism, countries should abandon the Cold War mentality and adopt some new concepts about global security. This would include the concept of "mutual security". During the Cold War, the concept of "zero sum game" had played a crucial role in international politics. After the end of the Cold War, countries should accept the concept of "mutual security" because of the changed situation. We should oppose any country which builds its own absolute security upon the insecurity of others. According to the concept, nuclear powers, especially two nuclear superpowers, should speed up their process of nuclear disarmament.

The new concept of security would also include the concept of cooperation. At present, all countries are facing many common problems or transnational problems, such as terrorism, environmental problems, greenhouse effect, drug trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and so on. They should make common efforts and cooperate to deal with the challenges. Especially, they should pay more attention to nuclear non-proliferation, because nuclear proliferation is still hanging like the sword of Damocles above mankind and has never ceased to threaten the survival of humanity.

The emphasis should be changed from emphasis on military security to emphasis on comprehensive security. Although after the end of the Cold War, geopolitical, military security and ideological factors still play an important role that cannot be ignored, economic factors are becoming far more relevant in international politics. So all coun-

tries should make the greatest effort to seek settlement of differences and disputes among nations through peaceful means.

9. A possible alliance of the United States, Japan, Australia and India

A number of security specialists have concluded that the United States, Japan, Australia and India are well on their way to forming a military alliance, the heart of which represents a NATO-styled organization in Asia. Evidence to this effect can be induced from the naval wargames recently held in the Bay of Bengal. The atmospherics originating from the leadership of the said countries also suggest a new alliance of sorts. US Vice-President Richard B. Cheney on a recent visit to Japan contended that the United States, Japan and Australia should establish trilateral defense relations. Former Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo put forward a proposal that the United States, Japan, Australia and India should form an alliance based on "common values". In May 2007 the foreign ministers of the four countries held a meeting in Manila and decided to proceed with the decision to stage the Malabar series of naval exercises., The United States, Japan and Australia held their first strategic dialogue in Sydney on 8 September 2007, right in the middle of the same exercises.

These more recent developments have coincided with a rise in regionalization trends in East Asia over the last decade or so. This expansion has lead to more economic and security-related interdependence between countries in the region, underpinning the pillars of regional security and stability. With this regionalism, the scope of security has been enlarged to encompass not only military issues, but also those related to politics, economics, finance, science and technology, culture, and so on.

The common interests of countries in the region have greatly increased, and interde-

pendence best defines the many relationships between them. Military means present less of an option in East Asia and are no longer sufficient to deal with the variety of security challenges that are envisioned over the horizon. Such a state of affairs will necessitate the development of new means and concepts to maintain stability and peace. These new developments require a move away from the traditional concepts of national security to a more comprehensive and cooperative approach.

During recent years, regional institutions of economic and security cooperation and dialogue have made significant progress in East Asia. These include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3), the East Asian Summit (EAS), ASEAN Plus One (ASEAN+1), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the six-party talks on North Korean nuclear issues, and so on. These regional institutions are playing an increasingly important role in the economic and security fields in Asia. However, the amount of traction a potential multilateral alliance based on "common values" or a concert of democracies in Asia is likely to have is limited, and likely to have a very negative impact on regional security.

Firstly, such an alliance would inevitably divide the region. Since the end of the Cold War, the trend of regional economic integration has grown rapidly and represents a highly successful means by which to maintain regional stability. Although the United Nations system that grew out of the Second World War should be reformed, the current international system based on sovereign states remains a fundamental pillar that should not be overridden by military alliances that presuppose a superiority of sorts. If a concert of democracy is established, the world as well as the East Asian region will be split two ways, with conflict dominating

the landscape instead of cooperation. International terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaida will likely relish such an eventuality.

Secondly, the development of a "gang of democracies" will reek of discrimination, especially when juxtaposed against many developing countries. This will inevitably undermine the concept of sovereignty, at least according to the principles of the UN Charter. It will produce more failed or failing states, which will become hothouses for terrorists.

Thirdly, the development of any democratic axis will slow down the process of modernization and democracy within developing countries. With many developing countries suffering from the pains associated with democratization, it is likely to take a considerably long time before such countries develop their own systems of democracy that resonate according to their own situation.

Regardless of the implications of this alliance of democracies, the Malabar 2007 naval exercises have sent a message to China. The area where the naval exercises were held is of strategic importance for China, representing the critical sea lanes through which half of its imported oil transits. In addition, some Chinese security analysts are concerned that the four countries, namely the United States, India, Japan and Australia, have indeed formed a multilateral alliance that ultimately works to restrict China.

In June 2007, China had issued a démarche to India, the US, Japan and Australia in which it sought details about their four-nation meeting, termed a Quadrilateral Initiative. India and Australia moved to quickly assure Beijing that security and defense issues did not form part of that meeting's agenda. On 23 August 2007, slightly over a week before the Malabar 2007 naval exercises, Admiral Timothy J. Keating, Commander of the US Pacific Command,

declared that the exercises were conducted not to isolate China or to push it into a corner. He reiterated that he was interested in engaging China and would seek to avoid any misunderstanding. Most Chinese would like to believe what the Admiral said. However, the US should understand that the proof of the pudding has not been made apparent to China. In recent years, China has held that traditional concepts of security were outmoded and that new concepts were necessary. Thus China advocated the "New Security Concepts" which regard mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and coordination as its raison d'état.

The "New Security Concepts" should become the theoretic foundation for establishing the regional security architecture in the 21st century. China would like to accelerate mutual trust through dialogue and to spur common security initiatives through cooperation with the US and other countries. China understands that the only way to ensure the integrity of its sea lanes in the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca is to cooperate with the US and other countries – the purpose of which is to build a harmonious and stable Asia-Pacific region which is based on mutual trust and benefit for the common interests of all countries in the region.

Notes

[1]   Documents of the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China [Zhongguo Gongchandang Dishiliuci Quanguodabiao Dahui Wenjian Huibian], Beijing, China: Foreign Language press, 2002, p.2.

[2]   China's Document about the Position of the New Security Concept [Zhongguo Guanyu Xin Anquanguan Lichang De Wenjian], put forward by the Chinese Delegation at the meeting of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), held in Seri Begawan, the capital of Brunei, on 31.7.2002 Beijing, China: People's Daily, 2.8.2002, p.3.

[3]   Chinese Ambassador of Disarmament Hu Xiaodi's Speech at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, on 7.2.2002, Beijing, China: People's Daily, 3.2.2002.

[4]   Department of Policy Planning of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic China, China's Foreign Affairs: 2004 Edition, World Affairs Press, Beijing, May 2004, pp.340-341.

List of authors

Anand, Vinod

Brig. Gen. (ret.), Centre for Strategic Studies & Simulation; Senior Fellow at United Service Institution of India, New Delhi

Chandler, Michael

International Consultant on Terrorism and Security, Freiburg/Elbe

Kiessling, Hein G., Dr.

Consultant on Pakistan, political scientist, Munich

Lange, Klaus, Prof. Dr.

Desk of International Security, Academy for Politics and Current Affairs, Hanns Seidel Foundation, Munich

Roul, Animesh

Executive Director, Society for the Study of Peace & Conflict, New Delhi

Wieck, Hans-Georg, Dr.

Ambassador (ret.), Berlin

Xia, Liping, Prof.

Dean and Professor of School of Political Science & International Relations, Tongji University, Shanghai; General-Secretary of Shanghai Institute for International Strategic Studies (SIISS)

"Studies & Comments"

In print copies of the Studies & Comments series can be ordered free of charge from the website of the Hanns Seidel Foundation or by telephone: +49-89-1258-263. The series is also available in PDF format on www.hss.de/mediathek/publikationen.html