

The Japanisation Policy for the Chamorros of Guam, 1941–1944

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ON 10 DECEMBER 1941, SOON AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF THE PACIFIC WAR, THE JAPANESE Army's Southern Sea Detachment (*Nankai Shitai*) commanded by Major General Tomitato Horii and the Navy's South Seas Detachment of the 4th Fleet (*Nan'yo Shitai*) invaded Guam. The Imperial Navy and Army Joint Headquarters announced that their forces had secured the island on the 12th. Guam was placed under the military administration of the 54th Defence Guard Force in accordance with the military administration policy and other policies promulgated for the newly acquired territories in Asia and the Pacific. These policies included the 'Enforcement Points of Administration in the Occupied Areas in the South' (*Nan'yo Senryochi Gyosei Jisshi Yoryo*) of 20 November 1941, and the 'Outline for the Management of the Military Administration in the Occupied Areas' (*Senryochi Gunsei Shori Yoko*) of 14 March 1942.

These policies together clarify three goals of the Japanese military administration for its occupied areas. The first concerned enforcement and maintenance of peace and order. The second regarded the rapid acquisition of natural resources for the establishment of a national defence system. Establishment of military self-sufficiency in the occupied areas was the third goal. To achieve these goals and gain the co-operation of the occupied populace, Japan enforced its Japanisation policy.¹ In the case of Guam, the only US territory with a sizeable indigenous population taken by the Japanese military administration at the beginning of the Pacific War, the *Minseibu* (Department of Civil Affairs) under the supervision of the commander of the 54th Defence Guard Force was responsible for governing the Chamorro people.²

¹ Generally, terms which are similar in meaning to '*Nihonka*' (Japanisation) are '*Doka*' (assimilation), '*Nihonteki narumono heno sekkin*' (approaching or being something like Japanese), '*Nihonjinka*' (make people like the people of the Japanese nation), '*Kominka*' (make people like the Emperor's subjects). These terms had different shades of meaning depending on in which years the term was used or how the policy was emphasised. Thus, there were no clear definitions. The use of '*Doka*' would indicate that there was a tendency that people accepted being connected to the Japanese society. On the other hand, '*Nihonka*' or '*Nihonjinka*' would mean the people concerned approached being like the majority of Japanese people. The nuance of these terms expressed a more positive attitude than '*Doka*'. '*Nihonteki narumono heno sekkin*' meant approaching to being something like Japanese. This term stood on a middle level between '*Doka*' and '*Nihonka*'. '*Kominka*' expresses an ideal or exemplary tendency of a people for being part of Japan. Such people had a clear intention to become members of the Emperor's nation. '*Kominka*' came into general use after the Japan-China War of 1937.

² Besides Guam, Wake Island was occupied by the Japanese military on 23 Dec. 1941. Kiska and Attu, both islands in the Aleutian Islands, were occupied in June 1942. The Japanese military did not establish administrations on any of these islands. Manila, in the Philippines was occupied on 2 Jan. 1942. Japan established a military administration there under the 14th Army from the same date to 14 Oct. 1943. The Philippines had been a Commonwealth of the US since 1935. Japan approved its independence on 14 Oct. 1943.

This article examines the major features of the Japanisation policy for ruling Chamorros during the Japanese military occupation of Guam mainly in the light of letters written by a Japanese teacher, Kiyoshi Nakahashi,³ who taught on Guam from September 1942 until American forces re-occupied the island in July 1944.⁴

Background of the Japanisation Policy

The Japanese idea of assimilating and absorbing other races into a single culture can be traced in Japan's history. Since the Yamato Court brought Japan under a single authority in the fourth century, the conquered races from Asia were assimilated into the central authority under common rule. During the establishment of the Meiji modern state, Japan increased its consciousness of nation building and transformed itself from a nation composed of races with the same origin or spirit to one political nation-state under a single authority. The acquisition of the Ryukyu Islands in 1897 and the promulgation of the Protection Law of 1899 regarding the former aborigines in Hokkaido are examples of this ethnic assimilation.

As a result of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, Japan assumed political control of a number of Chinese races and the Chosen (Korean) race, although these races had a high degree of cultural individuality and long traditions. Japan instituted a colonial policy of assimilation toward these people because of their racial similarity and common practices such as the practice of Confucianism and the use of Chinese characters. It was believed that 'each race could not by itself build an Imperial nation through their separate effort', so 'that the superior race should conquer and rule them'.⁵ In accordance with this belief in the missionising and civilising of Asian peoples, and a feeling of superiority, the Japanisation policy took various forms, and became Japan's universal policy toward other racial groups in Asia.

Achievement of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, the main purpose of the Great East Asia War, would extend the experience of Japan's history of ruling other races. This vision was clarified by the Second Kono Cabinet's fundamental concept of the 'Basic Principle of National Policy' (*Kihon Kokusaku Yoko*) dated 1 August 1940. This principle stated that Japan's national policy was to establish world peace based on Japan's great spirit of Universal Brotherhood (*Hakko Ichiu*). The formation of a new political bloc, which would include the countries of Asia, was therefore necessary. The centre of this bloc would be a strong unit consisting of Japan, Manchuria, and China. The Japanese government recognised the importance of establishing a national defence system called the

³ At Nakahashi's request, his letters, diary, and notes are in the private possession of the author of this article.

⁴ This description of the Japanisation policy instituted during the military occupation of Guam is the first such examination to appear in either the English or Japanese language literature. Other writers such as Paul H. Clyde (*Japan's Pacific Mandate*, New York 1935), Mark R. Peattie (*Nan'yo: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885–1945*, Honolulu 1988), David C. Purcell ('The economics of exploitation: the Japanese in the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Islands, 1915–1940', *Journal of Pacific History*, 11 (1967), 189–211), and Donald R. Shuster ('State Shinto in Micronesia during Japanese rule, 1914–1945', *Pacific Studies*, 5:2 (1982), 20–43) concentrated on Japan's mandated islands and did not include any treatment in their studies of Japan's 31-month military occupation of Guam.

⁵ Satoh Tadashi, *Genron Shin-Nihon no Taisho to Kyoiku Hoshin* [Opinion for New Japan and Educational Policy], *Zoku Gendaishi Shiryo* 8, *Kyoiku* 1 [Reference on the Present History, vol. 8, Education No. 1] (Tokyo 1994), 413.

New Order in Greater Asia (*Dai Toa Shinchitsujo*).⁶ Therefore, as envisioned by Prime Minister Hideki Tojo in a speech delivered to the 79th National Diet session held on 21 January 1942, the ‘work of establishing the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere would take place within a huge region with the co-operation of the races of those areas’.⁷ Tojo emphasised the importance of mutual consent and trust between Asian peoples and Japan.

Further, according to Tojo’s speech, Japan regarded the peoples in the occupied areas as being exploited and down-trodden. For the Japanese, ‘these newly occupied areas were limited in their resources and had been severely exploited by both the United States and Britain for the past one hundred years’. Therefore, their cultural development was ‘immensely arrested’. For these people to liberate themselves from a hated colonial legacy, they needed to have a ‘mother body’ which was capable of promoting their growth. This ‘mother body’ would be Japan.⁸ Both Germany and Italy recognised and respected Japan’s leadership in the establishment of the New Asian Order through the Tripartite Treaty between Germany, Italy and Japan of 1940.⁹ Japan intended to assume the leadership in uniting the Asian peoples of different languages, cultures and races. It was therefore important to have these peoples, as constituent members of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere, come to understand Japan’s expectations. This was a necessary condition for the Japanisation of the occupied peoples. The Japanisation policy was viewed as a means of bringing about the unification of races and cultures in Asia, and it would be an attempt to achieve political, economic and racial unification with Japan and obedience to Japan.

Over 40 letters from Kiyoshi Nakahashi, a Japanese teacher on Guam originally sent from the First Palau National Elementary School, reveal details of Japan’s culture change process as enacted among the Chamorros.¹⁰ Nakahashi wrote that the Chamorros were ‘a population too small in size to be called one race. They were too devastated to be called one tribe’.¹¹ Rather than hard work, ‘young Chamorro ladies idle their time away, polishing their nails red and

⁶ Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Senso Gen’in Kenkyubu, *Taiheiyō Senso eno Michi 6: Nanpō Shūshutsu* [*Process toward the Pacific War 6: Expansion to the South*] (Tokyo 1963), 167.

⁷ Nan’yō Dantai Rengokai, *Dai Nan’yō Nenkan 2* [*Great South Sea Yearbook*, Vol. 2] (Tokyo 1943), 364.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 364.

⁹ John W. Hall, *Japan: From Prehistory to Modern Times* (New York 1979), 344.

¹⁰ Nakahashi Kiyoshi (1913–), a former Japanese teacher at the South Seas Bureau National Elementary School at Palau from 1938, was assigned to a teaching position with the *Minseibu* (Department of Civil Affairs) on Guam in May 1942. He arrived on Guam in Sept. 1942. He taught at the *Shōkyū Kōkumin Gakko* (Junior National School for Chamorros) in *Akashi* (Agana), *Tomioka* (Tamuning-Harmon) and *Umata* (Umatac). After the reorganisation of the *Minseibu* in Mar. 1943, he was assigned responsibility for Chamorros in *Hanuta* (Banrigada) village until the US landing. As a civilian he was detained in early Jan. 1945. Nakahashi saved over 40 letters which were written between May 1942 and early 1944 on Palau, and mainly on Guam. Most of this correspondence was addressed to his wife and some to his relatives in Japan. Since many of the letters were sent using the military postal service, dates were not written on them, but one can work out the dates by carefully studying their contents. Because many of the letters were not censored by the *Minseibu*, we can understand Nakahashi’s candid beliefs and ideology concerning Chamorro education. Nakahashi also wrote a diary and notes while in the civilian camp on Guam set up by the American military after the war.

¹¹ Nakahashi, letter, 17 Dec. 1942.

putting on makeup'. The Chamorros, he wrote, 'do not have an outlook on the world and are not a national polity except for a few particular examples'.¹² 'Chamorros who could not receive the protection from a nation-state and could not rely on the trust of such a state' could be 'saved by the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in the South'.¹³ The Chamorros were 'a people who were destined for inclusion into Japan's 100 million-people nation' in addition to the 'Ainu race'.¹⁴

The Ainu race, the aboriginal people of Japan, were seen as '*Kyudojin*' (formerly indigenous) by the Japanese government. Given the assumption that they 'were not spiritually well-developed', schooling had to be decreased from five to four years. Also, the age for entering school was changed from six to seven years old, according to the 1916 Education Regulation.¹⁵ Dr Tetsujiro Inoue, an authority on Oriental Philosophy, wrote 'it would be difficult to assimilate the Koreans who had, comparatively speaking, a developed culture. However, it would not be difficult for the Ainu race to be assimilated, considering their level of culture and their ability.'

The Japanisation policy with respect to the Chamorro people on Guam was assumed to be easy to implement because the authorities believed it was the destiny of the Chamorros as an isolated race. Such a position was readily taken because of the claims made for success with the Ainu people.

Japanisation and Schooling

The most aggressive method for implementing the Japanisation policy on Guam was through schooling. The Japanese language, particularly, was given prime importance. The reasons for this were to make the Japanese language the common language in the region of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere; and, with this communication tool, 'to make the people understand the Japanese spirit and culture and to re-awaken an awareness of the common identity (cultural roots) of the Asian races, and have them co-operate for the establishment of a Greater East Asian culture'.¹⁶ The Japanese language was considered the best and most fundamental method for organising the Asian peoples.

On Guam, 15 elementary schools were opened on 15 January 1942, one month after the occupation, by sailors of the 54th Defence Guard Force. In September 1942, Japanese teachers of the South Seas Bureau in Palau, Saipan and Tinian were called to Guam. These teachers taught the Japanese language to Chamorro students seven to 15 years of age for 10 hours per week in the 19 *Shokyu Kokumin Gakko* (Junior National Schools). From January 1943, the *Seinendan* (Young People's Association) for young Chamorros, 15–30 years old, spent a total of six hours per week, two hours each over three days, in Japanese language instruction conducted by the Japanese teachers. Further, beginning in October 1942, selected Chamorro

¹² Nakahashi, letter, Rainy Season, 1943.

¹³ Nakahashi, letter, 10 Dec. 1942.

¹⁴ Nakahashi, letter, 17 Dec. 1942.

¹⁵ Shintani Ko, *Ainu Minzoku Teikoshi: Ainu Kyowakoku en Tido* [A History of Ainu Resistance: Quickening of the Republic of Ainu, *San'ichi Shobo* (Tokyo 1982), 197.

¹⁶ Nan'yo Dantai Rengokai, *Dai Nan'yo Nenkan* 2, 921.

men and women 14–27 years old were trained to be teachers at the *Rinji Kyoicho Yoseijo* (Temporary Assistant Teachers' Training School). They were under 24-hour supervision by the Japanese language staff and lived in their own dormitory. Self-study at the dormitory for six months was considered important, and the curriculum included not only conversational Japanese but the reading and writing of more than 500 Chinese characters at the fourth-year level. Moral education, music and exercise were also part of the school's curriculum.¹⁷

In contrast to the above, in Indonesia, which had been occupied by Japan in March 1942, the first Japanese language school for training teachers was established as late as 28 June 1942. In this school, six Japanese soldiers taught 2,000 Japanese words to 70 Indonesian teachers two hours per day for four months. In Jakarta, selected Indonesian teachers were trained for only three months beginning in June 1942. After training, the first group of teachers, who were essentially publicity agents for the Japanese military administration, went to the *Kokumin Gakko* (National Schools). On Java, the Japanese language classes were offered for only five hours per week, on the average, for all grades. In high school, seven and a half hours per week of Japanese were taught.¹⁸ In the Philippines, schools were re-opened on 1 June 1942. The Japanese language classes became mandatory in both elementary and secondary schools beginning in January 1943, but the period of instruction totalled only one hour and 40 minutes per week.¹⁹

The Japanese language education on Guam was more exhaustive in terms of the beginning date, number of classes per week, and rate of expansion than in the other occupied areas. In fact, as of February 1944, out of 23,915 Chamorros, there were 3,805 Junior National School students and 41 students in the teachers' training school who were learning the Japanese language.²⁰ Adding adult Chamorros in the *Seinendan* to the totals, a fairly large percentage of Chamorros were studying the Japanese language compared to other occupied areas.

The reason for expanding Japanese language education on Guam was because the island was designated as a 'permanent possession' of Japan according to the 'Outline for the Management of Military Administration in the Occupied Areas' (*Senryochi Gunsei Shori Yoko*) of 14 March 1942. Furthermore, the Japanese authorities concluded that Guam was not an area where independence or even political participation was likely. Because of the small size of both the island and its

¹⁷ The islanders in the *Kogakko Honka* (three year Regular Course of the Public School) in the South Sea Islands used a six volume series of Japanese language textbooks containing a total of 162 Chinese characters (*Kanji*) until Mar. 1937. After the textbooks were revised by the government, a total of 483 Chinese characters were taught for three years of schooling. Nan'yo Gunto Kyouikukai, *Nan'yo Gunto Kyoikushi* [*History of Education in the South Sea Islands*] (Palau 1938), 281.

¹⁸ Satoh Masanori, 'Indonesia ni okeru Nihon Gunsei no Gengo Seisaku 2' [The Language Education under the Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia, 2], *The Pacific Society* (Apr. 1980), 159.

¹⁹ Tani Yasuyo, 'Nihongun Senryoka no Philippines ni okeru Nihongo Kyoiku: Sampaquita o toshite' [Japanese Language Education in the Philippines during the Japanese Military Occupation: Referring to *Sampaquita*], *The Pacific Society*, 22:3–4 (1999), 10.

²⁰ Sanbo Honbu, 'Ohmiyato Heiyo Chishi Shiryo' [Reference on Strategic Topography on Ohmiyato], unpub. report (Tokyo 1944), 38.

population, the delivery of Japanese language education to a wide age-range of the Chamorro people was regarded as easy and desirable.²¹

Additionally, 23 Japanese teachers were sent from the South Seas Bureau of the Japanese mandate. They were well experienced in islander education, and introduced the same instructional methods, compulsory attendance, and language education to Guam's Chamorros.²² In the case of Umatac, a southern village of Guam, one teacher, Kiyoshi Nakahashi, served as teacher, principal, worker and *Seinendan* leader. He taught more than 300 students divided into three groups for seven and a half hours per day assisted by one Chamorro interpreter.²³

According to teacher Kiyoshi Nakahashi, 'The reason for the great effort to teach and spread the Japanese language was for the Japanisation of the occupied peoples'. The basic notion was that 'fresh words and speech are the best tools for planting Japanese thought into the people'.²⁴ He explained in one of his letters that language use was the best method for ideological communication. Therefore the Japanese teachers who spoke the language devoted themselves not only to language instruction but also repeatedly made efforts to 'touch the Chamorros' heartstrings' by showing their 'one hand, one foot, one eye, one attitude' ideology to the Chamorro youth as a concrete symbol of the 'Japanese fine character and individuality'.²⁵ Such Japanisation was 'not exploiting the Chamorro', but was intended 'to actively awaken the Chamorro mind's eye to some aspects of East-Asia and the Orient'. It was never 'to oppress the people' and never for 'spiritual exploitation of the race'.²⁶

In the Chamorro *Shokyu Kokumin Gakko* (Junior National School), only the Japanese language was taught. Other subjects such as arithmetic, science, social studies or history were not taught because the mastery of the Japanese language was considered to be fundamentally important as the first step in Japanisation during the occupation period. However, besides language instruction, school ceremonies which centred on Japan's Emperor, the nation state, history, and war events were also given great importance. As there were previous examples of such ceremonies promulgated by the *Nan'yocho Kogakko Kisoku* (Regulation for Public Schools of the South Seas Bureau) of 1922 in the South Sea Islands, Chamorros on Guam also attended school ceremonies on national holidays, such as *Kigensetsu* (Anniversary of the Emperor Jinmu's Accession), *Tenchosetsu* (Emperor's Birthday) and New Year's Day. Chamorro students learned to sing '*Kimigayo*' (the Imperial Reign), the Japanese national anthem, and other Japanese songs. On such occasions, the school principal's speech emphasised the loyal and patriotic sentiment and selfless devotion to Japan which was taken from the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890. This document had an absolutely central role in Japan's schools. The speech on the

²¹ Waseda Daigaku Ohkuma Kinen Shakai Kagaku Kenkyujo, *Indonesia ni okeru Nihon Gunsei no Kenkyu* [*Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia*] (Tokyo 1959), 542, 559.

²² Nan'yo Gunto Kyoikukai, *Nan'yo Gunto Kyoikashi*, 693–4.

²³ Nakahashi, letter, Dec. 1942. Because of the shortage of Japanese teachers, the wives of Japanese civilians who had attended women's high schools in Japan were assigned to teach at the *Kokumin Gakko* (National School for Japanese Children) and the *Rinji Kyoinho Yoseijo* (Temporary Assistant Teacher Training School for Chamorros).

²⁴ Nakahashi, letter, Dec. 1942.

²⁵ Nakahashi, letter, June 1943.

²⁶ Nakahashi, letter, 12 Jan. 1943.

meaning and celebration of a particular holiday and the vision of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere encouraged the internal Japanisation of Chamorros. Nakahashi described his speech to the Chamorro students on the First Anniversary of the Great East Asia War, 10 December 1942: ‘They are Japan’s new brothers, part of a nation which Japan governs permanently’.²⁷ According to Nakahashi’s letters, school ceremonies and the principal’s speeches covered morals, important historical events, and civic instruction, which were not only taught at the schools on Guam, but were emphasised in the Japanese language textbooks compiled by the Japanese government and the South Sea Islands administration.

The purpose of molding the occupied areas into a people ‘something like Japanese’ was to expunge the remaining American influence from Guam and from all the Chamorros. The ‘Outline for the Management of Military Administration in the Occupied Areas’ (*Senryochi Gunsei Shori Yoko*) of 14 March 1942 recommended ‘taking advantage of Japan’s war-making power and the local people’s feeling against the former administration as a way of overcoming European educational influence’.²⁸

From this perspective, the Japanisation policy took place ‘rapidly’ and ‘aggressively’ at the beginning of schooling under the Japanese. After late 1942 or early 1943, some months after the Japanese teachers were sent to Guam, it became obvious that the teachers ‘were at a loss concerning what to do with the Chamorros’, though they had improved in their use of the Japanese language.²⁹ It was concluded that the reason was Americanisation. Because Chamorros ‘did not study their own language, but English during the forty year period of American administration’, it was presumed that ‘only American liberalism, the permeability of which was rapid, was absorbed by the Chamorros’.³⁰ Such Americanisation was seen as ‘egoistic, individualistic, and enjoyment-oriented’.³¹ Therefore, the Japanisation of the Chamorro people was recognised as being difficult. From the beginning of 1943, ‘it often happened that their [Chamorro] liberalistic and individualistic orientation was allowed’.³² Consequently, the Chamorro Japanisation policy had to be revised from ‘Japanisation’ to ‘bringing them [the Chamorro] close to being something like the Japanese’ — an approximation.³³

With this realisation, the following changes were made: ‘not to tenaciously teach the Chamorro the essence of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere’ but ‘to promote the islanders’ proper understanding of Japan and increase their affection for Japan’, and finally ‘to have the Chamorro people recognise their duty as one of the races in the Greater East-Asia Co-prosperity Sphere’.³⁴ In regard to such people, it was decided that an effort should be made to ‘uncover the Chamorros’

²⁷ Nakahashi, letter, 10 Dec. 1942.

²⁸ *Senryochi Gunsei Shori Yoko* (Outline for the Management of Military Administration in the Occupied Areas), Kanbo Mimitsu No. 3167, 14 Mar. 1942.

²⁹ Nakahashi, letter, 17 Dec. 1942.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Nakahashi, letter, Jan. 1943.

³² Nakahashi, letter, 12 Jan. 1943.

³³ Nakahashi, letter, July 1943.

³⁴ Nakahashi, letter, Jan. 1943.

sleeping spirit and provide a light for awakening their racial ideology'. This would be an 'opportunity for rooting out the lingering American influence from the Chamorros' thoughts'.³⁵ The teachers' strict instruction and the propagandisation of Japanese thinking to Chamorros were relaxed. On the basis of Japan's 30-year experience with islander education in the South Sea Islands, it was concluded that 'it would take 20 or 30 years to have the Chamorros understand Japan's idea'.³⁶ With these realisations, the Japanisation policy was revised, recognising that the initial objectives were too ambitious and the revised efforts should be conducted over the long term.

As another obstacle to the Japanisation process, Nakahashi mentioned the Chamorros' 'blind religious mind' as a reason for their lack of enthusiasm, especially for political motivation. It was, he wrote, an unavoidable circumstance that 'this racial minority, considered as a fifth class people, sought a spiritual world as their place for humanistic and peaceful living'. However, they seemed 'not to have any definite view toward their religion, and not to fully understand the moral justice of their beliefs'. Nakahashi asked, 'What will ever be nested in the minds of the Chamorros who go to church every Sunday in formal dress?'³⁷ Nakahashi realised the difficulties inherent in developing Chamorro awareness, an ideology, and movement for racial unity and political independence which could become nationalism.³⁸ The longer history of Christianisation on Guam than in the South Sea Islands mandate made the Japanese recognise the difficulty of replacing religion with a political ideology and the figure of Jesus with that of the Japanese Emperor. Rather, the Japanese administration on Guam had to take advantage of the Chamorros' attachment to religion to secure peace and order on the island by inviting Japanese Catholic priests to Guam.

Japanisation and the War Situation

The greatest influence on the Japanisation policy as this was carried out by the civil administrators, especially the Japanese teachers in the *Minseibu* (Department of Civil Affairs), was Japan's war situation both on and beyond the island. With the reconsideration of Chamorro Japanisation, a change of policy in schooling from rapid to gradual Japanisation was contemplated by the Japanese teachers. However, Japan's war situation did not allow them to carry out this change.

On 31 December 1942, the Imperial Headquarters decided to withdraw Japan's military forces from Guadalcanal. With this withdrawal on 1 February 1943, Japan faced a deteriorating situation for all its military forces. Since Japan needed Chamorro labour immediately, the Japanisation effort was neatly separated into internal Japanisation and external Japanisation. Because of the immediate need for food supplies and military self-sufficiency, internal Japanisation, according to which Chamorros had to understand Japan's national ideology, was set aside.

³⁵ Nakahashi, letter, 12 Jan. 1943.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Nakahashi, letter, Apr. or May 1943.

³⁸ Nakahashi, letter, Fall 1943.

Only external Japanisation, which was, essentially, labour co-operation, was the goal. Chamorros were required to demonstrate a will to work, and to accept the 'motto of Asian races', which was the 'will to fight to the death'.³⁹ As an example, for the purpose of thoroughly understanding the state of affairs and commandeering labour, young Chamorro men and women in each village between 15 and 30 years of age, as we have seen, were organised into groups called the *Seinendan* (Young People's Associations) led by a Japanese teacher. In both school and the *Seinendan*, Nakahashi encouraged the Chamorros to generate and develop their peculiar racial spirit called 'Chamorro *Damashii*' (Chamorro spirit), corresponding to 'Yamato *Damashii*' (Japanese spirit).⁴⁰

After March 1943, the worsening war situation forced more changes. Because of a shortage of goods in Japan and attacks on Japanese transport ships, which originally were scheduled once every six months, Guam's food supply deteriorated. 'It was as if time was reversed by a decade to a point when the people could obtain food only with hard work.' Strenuous efforts at food production thus became necessary for both the Japanese and Chamorros. As a result, according to Nakahashi, the 'Chamorros' mind has been greatly changing though we could not say it is 180 degrees changed [a Copernican change]'. When Nakahashi saw tufted ears of rice, which had been planted and harvested by Chamorros in rice fields developed on Japanese orders, he wrote with deep emotion, 'This island and its people have become Asian. At last, they have adopted the Asian character.'⁴¹ Chamorros were said to be people who were 'originally lazy and hated hard work'.⁴² But now, Nakahashi wrote, 'there is a great value in a grain of rice because Chamorros have created it with their own hands. Chamorros show enthusiasm to do something in spite of their lispng words.' He concluded, 'the day when Chamorro attitudes and customs will be improved and hardly recognised from the past is coming soon'.⁴³ Accordingly, it could be concluded that the birth of the Japanised Chamorro would be from the Chamorro spirit of hard work and devotion to Japan. However, Nakahashi did not carefully explain the reason for Chamorro efficiency as labourers, whether this resulted from force and food shortages, or from an understanding of the Japanese spirit and culture and the Greater East-Asia Co-prosperity Sphere idea.

The second phase of co-operation by Chamorros during the war began when the Imperial Conference promulgated the 'Fundamental Principle for Political Leadership in Greater East Asia' (*Daitoa Seiryaku Shido Taiko*) on 31 May 1943. According to this principle, the plan to strengthen wartime co-operation between Japan and the Asian peoples would be put into effect by early November 1943.⁴⁴ With the implementation of this plan, schooling and food production activities on Guam

³⁹ Nakahashi, letter, 12 Jan. 1943.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Nakahashi, letter, Mar. 1943.

⁴² Rikusenshi Kenkyu Fukuyukai, *Rikusenshi-shu 14: Dai Niji Sekai Taisen-shi Guam-to Sakusen* [Land Battle History No. 14: History of the World War II Guam Operation] (Tokyo 1970), 538.

⁴³ Nakahashi, letter, Mar. 1943.

⁴⁴ Boeicho Boei Kenkyujo Senshibu, *Shiryoshu Nanpo no Gunsei* [Materials for the Military Administration in the South] (Tokyo 1985), 27.

became ‘Spartan-like and with hardships’ which had to be accepted. About June 1943, Nakahashi believed in making a further effort to ‘bring the Chamorro’s racial consciousness back to its peculiar spirit of diligence as it originally was’. Furthermore, one of Nakahashi’s letters used the term ‘*Kominka*’ for the first time instead of ‘*Nihonka*’ of the Japanisation effort.⁴⁵ According to Professor Shoji Yamada of Sophia University, ‘*Kominka*’ implied that an effort would be made ‘to deprive an oppressed race of its cultural identity, and to have the ideology of the Emperor system infiltrate into that race’s daily life and, as a result, their internal obedience will be gained’.⁴⁶ This ‘internal obedience’ is not equivalent to the voluntary acceptance of Japanisation by the Chamorros, but, rather, would be a means to force Chamorros to ‘create the motivational power for winning the spiritual war’.⁴⁷

In mid-September 1943, Japan’s imperial headquarters further directed some major changes in her military operations. The ‘*Zettai Kokubo Ken*’ (the absolutely maintained national defence area), including the Marianas, Truk and Palau, was designated. The Army and Navy were directed to emphasise and strengthen air power in that area. In late October 1943, the 4th Navy Construction Forces’ 2nd Corps, or *Setsueitai* (Navy Construction Company), landed on Guam. The group began construction of the Sumay airfield in early November, and of the Tiyan airfield in late February 1944. Besides supplying labourers for the 54th Navy Defence Force, Chamorro men, women, and children were called on to provide workers for airfield construction. This emergency effort was to include family members of the *Minseibu* (Department of Civil Affairs) and Nan’yo Kohatsu Company employees.⁴⁸ This hard physical work under the burning sun generated further negative feelings among Chamorros, who perceived their emergency efforts as simply obedience to Japan, rather than national co-operation.

According to Nakahashi’s letters written during this period, he believed himself to be ‘a pacification officer who complies with the great wishes of the Emperor’. However, he could not help seeing a divergence between the reality and ideal in the attempts to Japanese the Chamorros.⁴⁹ In November 1943, Nakahashi concluded that Chamorro agricultural work should ‘above all things, make the people on this island feel the gratification of living from the sweat of their work. The people who lived mainly for consumption will recognise fulfilment when they forget everything except work, and can get food (which grew among all things in the universe) as a reward for their honest sweat and labour’.⁵⁰ At the same time, teacher Nakahashi questioned himself about the basic idea of civil administration. His belief derived from his recognition that the ‘governing and pacification of other races should be, after all, the fruit of a relationship between people and people’. He also wrote, ‘Japanese philanthropy and sincerity will attract any foreign race. The

⁴⁵ Nakahashi, letter, June 1943.

⁴⁶ Yamada Shoji, *Shokuminchi* [Colonies], *Iwanami Kōza, Nihon Tsushi, Vol. 18: Kindai* [Iwanami Institute, Japanese History, Vol. 18: Modern Period] (Tokyo 1994), 74.

⁴⁷ Nakahashi, letter, 12 Jan. 1943.

⁴⁸ Personal Interview with Koshimuta Yoriko, 23 Sept. 1999, Kumamoto, Japan, and Toraji Tanaka, 20 Feb. 2000, Guam.

⁴⁹ Nakahashi, letter, Fall 1943.

⁵⁰ Nakahashi, letter, late Nov. 1943.

strong relationship, resting on confidence, would not be destroyed by any menace of persecution.⁵¹ Such a relation of trust also meant, he believed, that the Chamorros had imbibed the Japanese spirit. The ‘menace of persecution’ did not mean, of course, resisting enemy power, but Nakahashi would consider brutal treatment of Chamorros by the *Setsueitai* and other military as actions against Chamorros which were completely unacceptable to him.

In March 1944, the Guam *Minseibu* (Department of Civil Affairs) was absorbed into Captain Yutaka Sugimoto’s Ohmiya Branch of the 5th Navy Construction Force and was, therefore, under full and direct military orders and control. Japanese Army troops also landed continuously on Guam throughout March 1944. Schools for Chamorros in each village were closed, which meant the ending of the Japanisation process via schooling. The Japanese teachers were assigned to serve as village chiefs for the Chamorros. Instead of teaching, they conducted investigations of matters including a population census, food conditions, supply of Chamorro labourers to the military, and the patrol and control of night lights, by means of a police station in each village. In May 1944, the *Kaikontai* (Agriculture Development Unit), the main purpose of which was food production, landed on Guam. *Kaikontai* leaders opened their farms in each village. Many of the Chamorro women and children of the *Joshi Seinendan* (Young Women’s Association) were sent to the *Kaikontai* farms as labourers.⁵² However, Nakahashi wrote that the *Kaikontai*’s attitude toward the Chamorros ‘bordered upon madness’. He wondered with some shame ‘whether they [the *Kaikontai*] have at least a portion of character as Japanese’. While Nakahashi ‘worked as hard as possible to achieve his mission as a civil administrator with his power and authority’, his effort was limited since he was under military control. Nakahashi could only empathise, ‘the Chamorros are humans just as we are. During serious food shortages, they came and worked hard at the airfield construction though they were forced to do so.’⁵³ The war situation now included the brutality of the *Setsueitai* and the *Kaikontai* and thereby interfered with and jeopardised the Japanese teacher’s Japanisation work.

After the US landing on 21 July 1944, Nakahashi hid in Guam’s jungle for six months. In January 1945 he became a ‘captured person’ and was held in a US civilian camp; he felt ‘I don’t exist any longer without my country’.⁵⁴ He wrote of ‘civil administration’ as being, according to his personal experience, like a mother body of the Japanisation policy. First, ‘civil administration’ should legitimately be founded when the administrators trust the people. Only then can the act of governing begin. When the Japanese, especially the military, suspected spy activities and a pro-American attitude on the part of some Chamorros before the US landing, Nakahashi wrote, ‘when an administration begins doubting its people, it is already corrupt as a civil authority’. Secondly, he opposed the military idea of ‘no

⁵¹ Nakahashi, letter, Fall 1943.

⁵² Kimura Tomio, *Ōiso Takunan Renseisho kara Ohmiyato* [From Takunan Renseisho to Guam], and *Kyū Takunan Renseisho Seito no Guam-to deno Kōdo Gaikyo* [Takunan Renseisho Students on Guam], *Takunan Banri Hato No. 2*, Takunan Renseisho Jimukyoku (Shizuoka, Japan 1988).

⁵³ Nakahashi, Personal Diary, early 1945.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

choice of methods in order to win the war'. The civil administrator shall protect absolutely 'the right of the civil administration' in any situation. Thirdly, 'our fundamental purpose for education and pacification shall be the islanders' eternal happiness', and 'it is needless to say that the fundamental reason of the war shall be for the happiness and benefit of the Asian races'.⁵⁵ In short, 'civil affairs' should be purely devoted to the people's benefit in terms of trust, justice, and purpose.

The attempt to realise the ideal version of the Japanisation policy by the civil administrators had a short trial of only a few months, from October until December 1942. Even though the civil administration by the Japanese was to have been 'ideal', it was, after all, an occupation by a dogmatic invader and for Japanese profit. The occupation was heavily influenced by the concept of a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Since its beginning, Japan identified the Chamorros as a race incapable of political self-determination. Japan also did not give any powers of discretion to its administrators. Further, the Japanese were concerned about Chamorro identity, especially for individuals who had lived under 40 years of American administration and enjoyed economically a more advanced life style than Japan had at that time. The Japanese also regarded the Chamorros as equal to the islanders in their mandate who had experienced 30 years of Japanese administration and its influence. The Japanese were forced to unify these people, ignoring their historical, cultural and political differences. As a Japanese teacher, Nakahashi devoted his efforts to realising the Chamorro people's happiness as he understood it and this had meaning for him. The Japanese civil administrators, especially the teachers, who devoted themselves to their country, were also products of Japan's policy of regarding citizens as the 'Emperor's subjects'.

Meaning of the Japanisation Policy

The people in the occupied areas were required to understand that the 'Japanese spirit' and 'Japanese culture' were key elements of the Japanisation policy.⁵⁶ These were phrases commonly used to describe Japan's military administration in the south. However, it was not clear what the people would be after they mastered these meanings as the final goal of the occupying authority. Therefore, in order to understand the ideal result of the Japanisation of the Chamorros, it is useful to examine the educational arrangements for Guam, the South Seas Bureau (*Nan'yochō*), which sent Japanese teachers to Guam, and the Government-General of Chosen (*Chosen Sotokufu*), whose colonial policy was to be a model for other Japanese colonies.

In September 1942, the *Rinji Kyoinho Yoseijo* (Temporary Assistant Teachers Training School) was newly established as the highest level of school education for Japanisation on Guam. The students were selected from among excellent young Chamorros in each village. After six to eight months' training, they were sent to each Junior National School to assist the Japanese teachers. Regarding this effort,

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Nan'yo Dantai Rengokai, *Dai Nan'yo Nenkan* 2, 920.

Nakahashi wrote that ‘the training of Chamorro assistant teachers will be more important than the instruction we are doing at the elementary school, and more attention should be paid to this training’.⁵⁷ Therefore, the Assistant Teachers’ Training School should be studied carefully as a means for understanding the model method for creating the Japanised Chamorro. The school can be seen as a short-course training institution for Chamorro pacification officers.

The school’s goal can be summarised in the following ‘Oath’ to the Emperor (*Seishi*) which students were required to repeat every morning at school.⁵⁸

1. On my oath, we shall be good Japanese.
2. On my oath, we shall study hard.
3. On my oath, we shall work hard.

This ‘Oath’ was composed by Principal Kisaku Takenaka, originally from the First National Elementary School of Palau (*Palau Daiichi Kokumin Gakko*), and also the head of education in the *Minseibu* (Department of Civil Affairs). It was based on the ‘Oath’ used at the Islanders’ Public School (*Kogakko*) of the South Seas Bureau (*Nan’yocho*).⁵⁹ In order to understand the policy of the Special Assistant Teachers’ Training School on Guam, it is necessary to examine the *Kogakko* ‘Oath’, the model for the Guam ‘Oath’, especially what is meant by a ‘good Japanese’, what it means to ‘study hard’ and what it is that they ‘work hard’ for.

The ‘Oath’ of the *Kogakko* of the *Nan’yocho* is as follows:

- First, we shall be splendid Japanese nationals.
 Second, we shall be the Emperor’s children.
 Third, we shall be faithful to our Emperor.⁶⁰

This ‘Oath’ used at the *Kogakko* in the South Seas Bureau is revealing of the educational policy implemented with respect to the islanders in the South Sea Islands after the beginning of the Japan–China War of 1937. *Kogakko* students were required to repeat this oath every morning. Comparing the two oaths, the islanders in Japan’s mandate had been Japanised and had reached the ideal as ‘Emperor’s children’, while the Chamorros on Guam were only at the beginning stages of being Japanised. Though the Chamorros were compelled by the oath to work hard, the islanders in the South Sea Islands were persuaded by a gentler expression, ‘faithful’ to the Imperial favour. However, it is true that both of these oaths were based on the ‘Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890’ which formed the spiritual and political foundation for modern Japan’s educational policy. The development of knowledge, achievement of morality, and contribution to the public benefit were important concepts in the ‘Imperial Rescript on Education’.

The relationship between Japan’s state and nation was symbolised and taught to the islanders in the South Sea Islands through the term ‘Imperial favour’ (*Ko’on*).

⁵⁷ Nakahashi, letter, June 1943.

⁵⁸ Francisca Franques, pers. comm., 20 Sept. 1997.

⁵⁹ Nakahashi, pers. comm., 2 July 1999.

⁶⁰ Oshiro Teiken, *Otto no Ayunda Michi [My Husband’s Life]* (Okinawa 1983); and Wakako Higuchi, ‘Micronesians and the Pacific War: The Palauans’, in ‘An Oral Historiography of the Japanese Administration in Palau. Final Report’, submitted to the Japan Foundation, Micronesia Area Research Center, University of Guam (Guam 1986), 25.

Article I of the 'Rules for Islander Schools in the South Seas Islands' (*Nan'yo Gunto Tomin Gakko Kisoku Nan'yo Gunto Minsei Rei No. 1*) promulgated on 15 June 1918 under the Navy Civil Administration stated the following: 'the main principle of islander education shall be (1) to have them bask in Imperial favour, (2) to give moral education through the Japanese language, and (3) to provide knowledge and skills necessary for life.'⁶¹

After the mandate system was established in the South Sea Islands in 1921, and the administration was transferred from the Imperial Navy to the civilian South Seas Bureau (*Nan'yochō*), the term 'Imperial favour' was deleted in the *Nan'yochō* Order No. 12, 'Rules for Islanders' Public Schools in the South Seas Bureau' (*Nan'yochō Kogakko Kisoku*) of 1 April 1922. The reason given by the South Seas Bureau was that the meaning of the phrase, 'to bask in the Imperial favour' was interpreted as having the same meaning as 'moral education'.⁶² Also, the Japanese government probably paid careful attention to the observations on its work made by the Mandate Commission of the League of Nations, especially since the islands were an international mandate, albeit under Japan's administration, rather than a Japanese territory. However, the principle 'to bask in Imperial favour' was a basic and consistent element of islander education in the South Sea Islands throughout the Japanese administration period, even though there were differences between the radical, moderate and gradual approaches.⁶³

In early 1937, the restrictions on armaments for maintaining defence in the Pacific were removed with the abandonment of the Washington Disarmament Treaty. Furthermore, Japan ended its co-operation with the League of Nations in 1938. Thereafter, the 'basking in Imperial favour' principle was pushed to the forefront of educational policy, then called '*Kominka*'. '*Kominka*' meant 'to separate or to discriminate people in Japan's colonies as different races from the Japanese and to rule them as the Emperor's children'.⁶⁴ The school oath was a good example of the nature of '*Kominka*' education. Teiichi Domoto, Head of the Interior Department of the South Seas Bureau, Palau, clearly stated Japan's basic idea concerning education in the South Sea Islands: 'It is to bask in immeasurable Imperial favour, and to improve the islanders' character to be part of an Imperial nation, and to encourage the islanders' spirit of favouring work'.⁶⁵

With this background, the meaning of the 'Oath' of the Assistant Teachers' Training School on Guam can be understood as the following: the Chamorro people who entered under the authority of the Emperor's nation became people who should receive Imperial favour. Therefore, the Chamorro people, in turn, had to show their loyalty to the Emperor. In order to realise this relationship, the Chamorro people had to develop their knowledge and morality as 'good Japanese'.

⁶¹ Nan'yo Gunto Kyoikukai, *Nan'yo Gunto Kyōikushi* [History of Education in the South Sea Islands] (Palau 1938), 173.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 642.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 173.

⁶⁴ Harada Masakatsu, *Showa no Rekishi* [History of the Showa Period] (Tokyo n.d.), and Wakako Higuchi, 'Japan's Assimilation Policy in Micronesia, 1914–1945', unpub. MS, Micronesian Area Research Center Library, University of Guam (Guam 1994), 24–5.

⁶⁵ Nan'yo Dantai Rengokai, *Dai Nan'yo Nenkan*, 855.

Further, they had to contribute their efforts through work to advance the prosperity of the Emperor's nation.

The '*Kokoku Shinmin no Seishi*' (Oath to be a Subject of the Empire of Japan) that was used by the Government-General of Chosen (*Chosen Sotokufu*) in Korea beginning in October 1937 also helps clarify the policy of the Japanisation of the Chamorros. Many colonial administrative policies promulgated by the Government-General of Chosen were considered to be models for other Japanese colonies, including the mandated islands in the South Seas. The 'Oath' in the South Sea Islands was written on the model of the oath used in Korea. Because the islanders traditionally did not use Chinese characters, the content of their oath was simplified and easier expressions were used. But the similarity between the oath for the South Sea Islanders and the oath used in Korea is striking.⁶⁶ The oath used in Korea was promulgated in order to strengthen wartime control soon after the start of the Japan-China War in July 1937. After the oath was implemented, the Government-General of Chosen amended the Educational Order for Korea (*Chosen Kyoiku Rei*) in March 1938. This action enforced the educational unification of the Japanese and Koreans, which combined the school curriculum for the establishment of the Imperial nation. The oath prepared by the Government-General of Chosen had two versions: one was for school children, and the other was for students in higher schools and adults. The oath for children was as follows.⁶⁷

1. We shall be the subjects of the great Emperor of Japan.
2. We shall be joint-heartedly faithful to His Majesty.
3. We shall become a splendid and strong nation with endurance and training.

In Korea under Japan's colonial rule, the people were considered to be Japanese nationals. Thus, there was greater pressure on them to be the Emperor's subjects than on the people of Guam, which was occupied by the military, or on the islanders in the mandated South Sea Islands. Accordingly, the oath used in Korea shows more clearly the ideal figure of an 'Emperor's subject'. The Koreans' '*Kokoku Shinmin no Seishi*' included three educational policies of the Government-General of Chosen: *Kokutai Meicho* (clarification of the fundamental concept of national policy); *Naisen Ittai* (unification of Japan and Korea); and *Ninku Tanren* (endurance and training of body and spirit).⁶⁸ According to Pak Kyong Shuk, a Korean historian, the goal of *Kokutai Meicho* was to have the Korean people become part of Japan's national body headed by the living God Emperor through unity of the ruler and the ruled; unity through loyalty, filial piety, and the unbroken line of Emperors. *Naisen Ittai* was the spirit of trust and love between the Japanese and Koreans who could never be separated in their historical relationship. It also meant the spirit of devotion to Japan and a recognition of the sacrifices made by both peoples. The *Ninku Tanren* policy was to have the people endure any trials in life through

⁶⁶ Wakako Higuchi, 'Japan's Colonial Policy in the South Seas Islands: A Comparative Perspective', unpub. MS, Micronesian Area Research Center Library, University of Guam (Guam 1994), 19.

⁶⁷ Pak Kyong Shuk, *Nihon Teikoku Shugi no Chosen Shihai 2* [*Colonial Rule of Korea under Japanese Imperialism*, Vol. 2] (Tokyo 1973), 60.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 61.

self-devotion to Japan and a completeness of purpose. Pak described the three relationships of *Kokutai Meicho* and *Naisen Ittai* as incorporating the consciousness that 'we are subjects of the Emperor'. The policy of *Ninku Tanren* was to guarantee the status of Koreans as subjects of the Emperor.⁶⁹

In short, the Japanisation policy that Japan attempted to put in place during its occupation of Guam was intended to place Chamorros in the same group as the other races ruled by Japan. The purpose was to mobilise Chamorros as a labour and fighting force for carrying out national policies. In the South Sea Islands, the Japanisation policy for the islanders was conceptualised as a 'remodelling' of the islander to be a 'human who is able to work'.⁷⁰ In fact, during the Pacific War, especially, on Saipan, Palau and Ponape, islander men were drafted by the Japanese military and fought with the Japanese in the front lines in New Guinea and Indonesia. This brought the islanders great honour and was a clear result of 30 years of Japan's administration.⁷¹

Although Japanese schooling was at the centre of Japan's Japanisation or assimilation efforts, it was in place on Guam for only 18 months. Schooling by professional Japanese teachers began in September 1942. But in December 1942 the state of the war worsened dramatically for Japan. This means that the efforts at Japanisation led by the Japanese civilian administrators under comparatively stable social conditions lasted only for a few months out of the entire 30-month occupation period.

Though this experiment was too short to produce results, two points deserve attention. First, the basic purpose of the Japanisation of the Chamorro people was to eliminate all influences implanted by the American administration. The Japanese recognised the pervasiveness of the 40-year legacy of American social, educational and economic influence. The political-social dynamics required that the Japanese language replace English, and the Japanese spirit and work ethic overturn American ideals of democracy and rationalism. Furthermore, Chamorros were required to share with the Japanese hostile feelings toward the Americans. The Japanese approach did not consider the educational and social Americanisation that had taken place amongst Guam's Chamorros but it required of them acceptance of a single way — the Japanese way. In reaction, the Chamorros came to see Japanese rule as oppressive.

The second key goal of the Japanisation of the Chamorros was to elevate them to the level of Japanisation which the islanders in the Japanese mandate had achieved during 28 years of Japanese rule. For that purpose, the schooling and educational methods and experiences of the South Seas Bureau were introduced to Guam. Chamorros from Saipan who had been well Japanised were employed on Guam and reportedly enjoyed working for the Japanese authority as school and village interpreters and police aides. However, because of this experience, Guam's

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 62, 67.

⁷⁰ Nan'yo Gunto Kyouikukai, *Nan'yo Gunto Kyouikushi*, 113.

⁷¹ Wakako Higuchi, 'Micronesian Warrior', *Islander, Pacific Daily News*, Guam, July 1984.

Chamorros came to believe that being ruled under such an arrangement was unacceptable because Japan was less advanced as a country than the US.⁷²

Consequently, the first efforts encouraged the Chamorros of Guam to be more strongly and clearly pro-American. Later efforts resulted in heightened anti-Japanese and anti-Saipanese feelings. On 10 August 1944, after the US had recaptured Guam from Japan, six important Chamorro leaders sent a letter to Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Fleet. This letter reveals the strong feelings Chamorros developed during the Japanese occupation: 'What kept us throughout the thirty-two months of Japanese oppression was our determined reliance upon our mother country's power, sense of justice, and national brotherhood'.⁷³

The Japanisation policy introduced in the occupied areas was a typical example of Japanese military rule, but it did not bear any fruit on Guam. One important but unanticipated result, however, was the creation among the Chamorros of a stronger pro-American feeling and political identity in the immediate post-war years. This also generated some anti-Japanese sentiment and Chamorro resistance to Japanese influence which, in turn, engendered a Chamorro identity as Guamanian in contrast to the Chamorros of Saipan, the Saipanese (a term derived from 'Japanese').⁷⁴ The Japanisation policy could be understood as the occupiers' experiment in social-political change which the Chamorros endured before entering a second period of American naval rule from 1945 to 1950.

ABSTRACT

This article examines the major features of the Japanisation policy used to rule the Chamorro people of Guam during the 31-month Japanese military occupation of the island. The efforts at Japanisation were viewed as a means of bringing about the unification of the races and cultures of Asia and attempted to achieve political, economic and racial unification with Japan and obedience to Japan. The most aggressive method for implementing the Japanisation policy on Guam was through schooling. However, the worsening conditions of the war forced schools to close in early 1944, and this led to the introduction of harsher methods of social change via agriculture and airfield labour battalions. The Japanisation policy that Japan attempted to put in place during its occupation of Guam was intended to put Chamorros in the same group as the other races ruled by Japan. The policy was a typical example of Japanese military rule, but it did not bear any fruit on Guam because of the short period of military presence and the pervasiveness of 40 years of American influence.

⁷² Gloria Celis, pers. comm., 6 June 1994.

⁷³ Letter from J.B. Leon Guerrero, F.P. Camacho, Pedro Martinez, Agueda Johnston, Jose Manibusan, and Jose Roberto to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of US Pacific Fleet Pacific Ocean Areas, and Military Governor of Guam, Guam, 10 Aug. 1944, in Don A. Farrell, *The Pictorial History of Guam: Liberation—1944* (Guam 1984), 181.

⁷⁴ Pedro C. Sanchez, *Guam: the History of Our Island* (Guam 1987), 264.