The law of unintended consequences

The low-density cold war that recently started between two pivotal nations in the Middle East is likely to intensify in the foreseeable future. Throw away all the previous strategic maps of the region. Open rivalry between Israel and Turkey might have major implications for both countries, and also other players in the region, first and foremost the United States.

Things did not come to this point out of the blue. Changing attitudes in both Israel and Turkey paved the way. The Olmert government’s decision to storm Gaza viciously in late 2008 while Turks were enthusiastically working to help them broker a peace deal with Syria infuriated Ankara. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s infamous “one minute” rebuke to Shimon Peres at Davos was reciprocated by the “low chair” humiliation of Oğuz Çelikkol, Turkey’s ambassador to Israel. Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition government almost completely shut its doors to international advice, including that emanating from Ankara, on its controversial policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians.

Turkey had its change of government earlier, in 2002, with the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) led by Erdoğan taking over. In the Israeli-Turkish relations context, the changes in Turkey have been more profound. It is no secret that Turkey’s current ruling party’s leadership and core electoral base have traditionally cared about the plight of the Palestinians. However it would be too simplistic to explain Turkey’s assertive stance on some of the Israeli government’s policies through the AK Party’s ideology alone. Thanks to the media revolution, a thriving civil society, increased economic stability, improvements in education and other democratic trends, the Turkish public has overall been more involved in foreign affairs in the last decade. In particular, the dramatic footage of Israel’s Gaza incursion depicting human tragedy has been largely instrumental in influencing Turkish public opinion to the detriment of Israel and its main ally, the US. From left to right, conservatives to liberals, Turks have been united in their “humanitarian” stance. Hence public demand is one of the main reasons why the Erdoğan government has made ending the blockade in Gaza a signature foreign policy goal.

Increasingly confident and visibly nostalgic about the Ottoman role as a major world power,Turks certainly want and like for their government to have more say in the international arena. The Erdoğan government’s ambitious and dynamic foreign policy fits and represents those needs. They traveled all over the world, set the bar higher and higher, and finally secured temporary membership at the United Nations Security Council, declaring they would tackle injustices in the world. In this spirit, Ankara is playing the devil’s advocate in the Iran nuclear crisis. In addition to the economic loss in the event of sanctions or a war, they complain that Tehran does not get fair treatment from the West. They point out the lack of concern about Israel’s suspected nuclear program, whereas there is a big fuss about Iran’s highly scrutinized activities.

Turkey’s soft approach to Iran has further infuriated the Israelis because they consider the Tehran regime to be their most dangerous enemy in the region. Interestingly, some Sunni Arab regimes, who feel threatened by Shiite Iran, privately join Israel in their criticism of Turkey. The problem for them is that Turkey has won the hearts of the Middle East man on the street. Erdoğan may be more popular than many of the local rulers. And this public support alone will ensure Ankara stays in the game for a long time and plays it by its own rules rather than being a subordinate power. This will challenge and eventually change the Middle East equation. It is official that Turkey has a chair at the table now, at the expense of Israel if not the US.

Turkey and Israel might hurt each other while playing hardball. Israel has the ability to make Turkey suffer in the West, especially in the US. Turkey can make life increasingly difficult for Israel in the region. Iran would be the foremost strategic beneficiary of such a scenario. Therefore it is not in the interest of the US to let this happen. The problem is that the Obama administration has relatively limited leverage over the current leaderships in Turkey and Israel. Ankara does not bow to American pressure on getting tougher on Iran. The Israeli government is not enthusiastic about US efforts to revive the Middle East peace process. But still, the US is the best equipped to be a moderator that both countries would accept.

The international consensus on the need for Israel to ease conditions in Gaza was only bolstered in the aftermath of the flotilla incident. Israel justifiably gets the most blame for employing disproportionate force and collective punishment in its fight against terror. Washington is said to have begun to review its own policy about the blockade and urge Israel to change its policy. The road to a comprehensive resolution to Palestinian-Israeli conflict starts in Gaza. A significant improvement in the Gaza situation would be a win for Ankara and might secure the AK Party another term in the 2011 general elections. I am sure that was not among the Israeli government’s intentions. The law of unintended consequences is certainly at work.