Another ride with ‘holocoaster’?

What he meant, obviously, was the revolving big wheel at the fun fair. As if it wasn’t enough to confuse the Ferris wheel with the roller coaster, he had invented a new word. As with all his other innocent mistakes, we all laughed. Given the painful, stressful and at times even fearful journey of Turkish-American relations in 2010, a roller coaster, or perhaps in my son’s words, “holocoaster,” would be a good way to describe it.

Among last year’s most dramatic turns on the US-Turkey holocoaster were the following events: Ankara decided to temporarily recall Ambassador Namık Tan in March to protest the approval by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs of Resolution 252 on the “Armenian Genocide”; in May, Turkey declared a uranium swap deal with Iran and voted against Iran sanctions at the UN Security Council in June, angering many Washingtonians; and Senator Sam Brownback put a hold on Ambassador Francis Ricciardone in August, leaving his designated Ankara post vacant until President Obama made a recess appointment in December.

Clearly, Turkey was among the nations that most disappointed Washington last year. And perhaps only second to Israel, US ranked among the top unpopular nations in Turkey. A Pew Global Attitudes Project survey in 2010 revealed that only 17 percent of Turks have a positive opinion of the US. Even President Obama’s initial image boost suffered a huge blow. According to the Transatlantic Trends 2010 survey by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, in his second year as president, Obama’s personal approval rating in Turkey dropped to 28 percent from 50 percent.

In 2010 the most definitive issue in the course of US-Turkish government relations has been how to deal with Iran. I believe that’s going to be the case in year 2011 as well. No matter what Turkey and US do for each other in other areas such as Afghanistan, Iraq, counterterrorism and so forth, Iran will remain the main issue. And unfortunately, there is not much reason to be optimistic.

The quarrel between the US and Iran will most probably escalate, given both governments’ uncompromising attitudes and the US presidential elections in two years. Ankara, which is also preparing for general elections in June, certainly does not want any further serious tension in the region. It was no accident that Ankara insisted Iran should not be singled out as a threat in NATO’s Lisbon summit declarations. I’m sure they will resist harder in the event of Iran being treated as a threat. One must also realize how contentious the missile defense project is in Turkey, despite the initial Turkish green light in Lisbon. The Erdoğan government will make sure none of its components are placed in Turkey before the elections, given the extremely negative attitude by the opposition and overall public.

Turkey’s dramatically deteriorated relations with Israel, another important negative influence on Ankara-Washington ties, don’t seem to be getting any better. Despite some well-intended efforts, a meaningful compromise is extremely difficult for both sides politically. Even if the ongoing tension about the Mavi Marmara incident is somewhat reduced, Israel and Turkey will not be on the same page about Iran, which I see as one of the main underlying factors in Tel Aviv’s deep grudge with Ankara. Turkey, on the other hand, will continue to get frustrated and angered by the Israeli government’s lack of interest in a comprehensive Middle East peace process.

So, are we destined for another holocoaster this year? I would be more optimistic if there wasn’t an ongoing cultural clash between the foreign policy establishments of Turkey and the US. That’s the main reason why so far no decision to enhance official dialogue has proven effective enough. Where were the “Structured Dialogue” mechanisms when Ankara and Washington made grave communication errors en route to a uranium swap deal?

Cultural clashes typically make it very difficult to hear what the other side is actually saying. Vision is limited, as if in foggy weather conditions. When foreign policy people cannot see things clearly enough, they tend to get frustrated. Frustration leads to speculation, instigating further suspicion. The level of suspiciousness on the American front vis-à-vis Ankara can clearly be seen in the WikiLeaks cables. Had there been a WikiLeaks-type incident in Turkey, I’m sure we would observe a similar distrust on the part of many Turkish diplomats as well.

Essentially, what I mean by cultural clash is the my-way-or-the-highway attitude of Washington confronted with an I-can-do-it-all-alone attitude prevalent in Ankara. Both approaches are unsustainable, but I’m afraid they are not going away any time soon. Many people in Washington may theoretically acknowledge the US cannot rule the world alone, but practice adjusts to the facts on the ground only slowly. And Turkey, as an emerging power, acts like an ambitious and idealist young man that has high hopes for itself and the world. This course will most probably continue unless it hits a big rock.

I don’t want that rock to be the US. And I don’t want Americans to see Turks as a roadblock. But one does not need an astrological chart to guess that the holocoaster will be the norm, not the exception, in US-Turkish relations during this and perhaps following years.