Toward a crisis in Turkish-American relations?

Governments generally exaggerate their successes. Let them do this so long as there is an achievement delivered. Exaggerating successes will not harm anyone.

The problem that I see in the management of the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) foreign policy is something else: Foreign policy is used to cover up failures at home and divert the attention of people away from domestic political crises. Both cases of utilization lead to tension, confrontation and conflict in Turkey's relations with the governments and other actors abroad.

This year, on two occasions, the AKP government chose to turn a domestic issue into an international one. These are the Gezi protests of the summer and the current corruption scandal, both of which were explained by the government as being plots of “dark international forces” that are determined to finish off the ruling party by inciting domestic political crises. Once a mindset of conspiracy becomes operative, criminalizing the dissenting voices at home by depicting them as the lackeys of foreigners becomes inevitable. A conspiracy-based approach to social and legal issues paves the way for authoritarianization.

This is the reason why the government gets more authoritarian with each large-scale domestic crisis. It does not know how to respond to social opposition and legal-moral charges of corruption allegations. What it knows and does well is the "securitization" of politics, or making politics security-based, as an effective means to silence dissenting voices and suppress the challengers.

Frequent references to international conspiracies by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself are necessary and adequate for the act of securitization. Here, Israel comes up as a handy “dark force with collaborators at home.” But the US?

Over the weekend Erdoğan spoke in Samsun, linking the disclosure of corruption cases to the plots of “dark forces,” pointing his fingers this time to the US and its ambassador in Ankara.

He said: “These recent days, very strangely, ambassadors get involved in some provocative acts. I call on them from here: Do your job. If you leave your area of duty, this could extend into our government's area of jurisdiction. We do not have to keep you [Francis Ricciardone] in our country."

Following Erdoğan's remarks, the pro-government media demanded that Ambassador Ricciardone should be declared persona non grata.

After the exceptional reception of Erdoğan in Washington by the US administration back in May, and given the need to work together with the Americans on the Syrian crisis, the emerging row with the US does not make much sense.

Accused by Ankara of interfering in its domestic affairs, the US administration in its public statements has not commented on the corruption scandal and the proceeding political crisis in Turkey. Instead, once asked, the spokespersons of the US administration displayed disinterest in Turkish politics. They have hardly even referred to the principles of democracy or market economy, which are supposed to be the shared basis of the model partnership between the two states.

But Washington distancing itself from Turkey's current political and legal crisis has not prevented the eruption of a crisis between the two countries. Because this crisis is not about Turkish-American relations but, to a large extent, it is about the way in which Erdoğan has decided to govern the corruption scandal. Such a mini-crisis enables him to divert the attention of the people at home away from corruption allegations to an artificial foreign policy crisis. Moreover, linking the corruption disclosure to the US serves to discredit anyone involved in the corruption investigation as the “men of the US,” and silences the dissenting voices who demand a proper due process. It is also expected that a challenging public stand against the US will be popular among Erdoğan's Islamist followers.

But the question is that securitization of politics may not be effective as a tool to silence the people when it comes to the issue of corruption, and that the AKP voters are not only composed of Islamists, but also of burgeoning middle class and traditional center-right people who highly value stability.