Iran's unstoppable rise in the Middle East

Easing the sanctions will free up $7 billion of Iran's economy. The nuclear aspect of the deal has been discussed extensively in the Turkish and international press. I will therefore confine my comments to a less-debated aspect of the deal, namely on its impacts on the strategic balance in the Middle East.

$7 billion may not be a big amount for the Iranian economy, but it will allow Iran to import materials to further develop its oil industry. More oil exports mean more foreign currency income for Iran. Furthermore, it is only a preliminary agreement; if the parties are satisfied with its implementation after a period of six months, then the détente will continue. It may increase mutual trust between Iran and the international community, with the possible exception of Israel and Saudi Arabia. This will make Iran a more important player in the Middle East. It will increase its prestige among the Shia population in Bahrain and in the oil-rich eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia. This is a nightmare scenario for Saudi Arabia.

From a diplomatic standpoint, the deal means the recognition by the international community of Iran's right to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. This recognition is important because the attitude of the P5+1 had previously been tantamount to the denial of this right.

It remains to be seen how the process will unfold. There may be minor accidents along the road (or flat tires) as things go on, but both sides have vested interests in keeping the process on track. The most important aspect of the agreement is that it makes Iran a partner of the West in general and of the US in particular in managing this process.

Iran is likely to become US partner in other areas as well.

First, Iran has already filled the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. Both the US and Iran perceive Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's policy as the appropriate one for the preservation of the territorial integrity of Iraq. They may cooperate in the future in their support for Maliki.

Second, if the US puts into action a policy of reducing its military presence in the Gulf area, the most likely candidate to fill this vacuum will again be Iran. The US will probably not help Iran fill this vacuum, but cooperation between the two may continue in various forms.

Third, the US regards at present what it calls “Sunni extremism” as a major security threat coming out of the Middle East. Iran may offer to cooperate in order to contain such terrorism.

This cooperation is not likely to be a substitute for Turkey's role as an ally and partner of the US in the Middle East because it will take time for Iran to move from a position of calling the US “the Great Satan” to one of full mutual confidence with the US. It will also take time for the US to forget entirely the attack on the US Embassy in Tehran in which Iranian activists kept 52 American Embassy staff members hostage for 444 days from 1979-81.

Fourth, the US seems to have come to the conclusion that the present regime in Syria is less harmful to US interests than any variation of a Salafi-dominated regime that would be likely to come to power if the current regime falls. Even if the US and Iran do not see eye-to-eye on the Syrian crisis, the US may need the help of a country like Iran to reach out to Syria because of Iran's strong relations with the Syrian regime.

Will Iran be able to establish a strong presence in a post-crisis Syria? If we recall that Iran was able to fill the vacuum created by the US withdrawal from Iraq at a time when the US and Iran were not on the best of terms, then this scenario should not seem any less realistic than that one was given that their relations are better now.

In conclusion, if everything goes as Iran wishes, then the unstoppable rise of the country as a major player in the Middle East may have already started.