A festering case

Since Jan. 19, 2007, when Hrant Dink was gunned down in front of the Agos newspaper offices in İstanbul's Şişli district, his family and friends have been waiting for the truth to emerge. When in January of last year the court sentenced main defendant Yasin Hayal and several associates for their role in Dink's murder while rejecting the notion of a broader conspiracy, the flawed ruling triggered strong reactions in Turkey and abroad. The investigation had revealed that various security officials knew about a plot to kill the Agos editor but had failed to take steps to prevent it.

If the first court decision suggested determination to ignore all signs pointing to a wider conspiracy, the Supreme Court of Appeals' ruling, overturning the verdict, makes even less sense because while it acknowledges that an “organization” was involved, it rejects the notion that it was acting for political reasons. The Supreme Court of Appeals sees instead a mafia-like criminal group. This conclusion begs the question of what would motivate such an organization to kill someone like Hrant Dink.

The ruling seems to be an attempt to find a middle road: It acknowledges that there was a conspiracy, requires higher sentences for some of the defendants and the reopening of the investigation into the role of others who were acquitted; however, it turns a blind eye to the possible involvement of security officials, who remain protected by their immunity and were not called to testify in court.

The court's unwillingness to acknowledge political motives in this case stands in stark contrast with the zeal demonstrated by prosecutors when dealing with demonstrators or students expressing their opposition to government policies: Even when there is little evidence of such links, protesters are often accused of being members of an illegal organization and charged under anti-terrorism laws.

Dink's family and friends have been waiting for light to be shed on a process that started with Dink being charged with “insulting Turkishness” and ended when a 17-year-old hitman murdered him in broad daylight in 2007.

The case is not just significant for Dink's relatives. From the onset, it was perceived as a test of Turkey's ability to turn a new page and to challenge a nationalist ideology, usually attributed to the military and Kemalist institutions, which viewed non-Muslims as second-class citizens or even threats to the nation.

Nothing in the judicial investigation into the Dink murder so far suggests that such a turning point has been reached. In fact, several of the security officials who, according to the Dink family lawyers, knew that plans were being made to target Dink but did nothing to protect him have been promoted by the current government. Muammer Güler, who was İstanbul's governor at the time, is now the interior minister. One of the Supreme Court of Appeals judges who upheld the verdict that condemned Dink for “insulting Turkishness,” thus making him an open target, was named Turkey's first ombudsman last November. And, just a couple of weeks ago, the Trabzon police commissioner who had hired one of the Dink trial suspects, Erhan Tuncel, as an intelligence officer was named head of Turkey's Police Intelligence Bureau.

When the İstanbul court rendered its verdict last year, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan pledged that “the Hrant Dink case will not be lost in the dark corridors of Ankara.” The Supreme Court of Appeals has now overturned the ruling, but unless the next judges get a chance to hear state officials currently protected by their immunity, the truth is likely to remain hidden in a bureaucratic fog.