The argument is that President Mohammed Morsi had lost everyone's support, and there was no way to get rid of him other than inviting a military coup. President Morsi certainly did not enjoy universal approval, but, in addition to all arguments refuting the "democracy through coup" delusion, the claim that a clear majority were against him is questionable. A PEW Poll (May 2013) showed views of Egyptians towards Morsi were: 53 percent favorable, 43 percent unfavorable. That is considerably higher than President Barack Obama and all EU leaders' approval ratings. Interestingly, his approval ratings were higher than all opposition leaders, his disapproval ratings lower than theirs.
Similarly for the demonized Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the argument claims that the coup was a response to an overwhelming popular rejection of the MB (and for some a conviction that they had to be pushed out of politics -- if not from existence altogether -- for Egypt's sake, as expressed in some disturbing chants celebrating their downfall such as "tonight, tonight, Ikhwaan no longer tonight!"). However, the same poll shows that views of the MB were 63 percent favorable, 36 percent unfavorable. That is indeed lower than the 75 percent who had favorable views of the MB in 2011, but for a movement in power, particularly after a revolution, the drop is certainly not surprising. Their experience in power has certainly had good and bad judgments. My aim, in highlighting these statistics is not to claim that President Morsi and the MB are faultless; we all know that is untrue. But their mistakes are political misjudgments, not crimes for which they should be excluded and persecuted, and should be addressed at the ballot box. Those who use "unpopularity" to justify the abortion of the democratic process and the invitation of a military coup should be worried in case that argument is used against them in the future. That applies to the opposition National Salvation Front (NSF) leaders whose approval ratings, according to the same survey, were not stellar, and, notably, below the man they wished to depose by coup (47 percent had unfavorable views of Hamdeen Sabbahi and 54 percent had unfavorable views of Mohamed Elbaradei) while we know it is certainly easier to be popular in opposition than it is in power.
Many academics and politicians who are not sympathetic to the MB, but are committed to democratic principles, had repeatedly argued that the experience of Islamists in power would lead to the erosion of their popularity, creating a better balance in the political scene. That hypothesis was sadly left untested by the suspension of the natural political process to test the MB's popularity in the next elections. This does not only deprive academics and observers from testing their theories, but more dangerously deprives Egyptians of the hard-won chance to exercise their right of holding their elected leaders accountable through the ballot box. This has dealt a fatal blow to belief in democratic means as the right means for expressing resentment and for political change. The grave consequences are already before our eyes, and I sincerely pray -- against all odds and all historical precedents -- that the elected president and constitutional order are restored and the democratic process is urgently resumed to avoid further disastrous consequences for Egypt.
