Tragedy of the Kurdish negotiation process

The current ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) electoral success in 2002 brought a momentous change to Turkish politics mainly through European Union accession reforms. However, democratization packages that advanced individual liberties did not prevent Öcalan from ordering the PKK to resume armed struggle in 2004.  What does this story tell us about the current negotiation process? Will the negotiation process fail?

Let's be clear. The negotiation process still stands a chance -- although slim. The AKP government's “yes but not enough” democratization package and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's historic Diyarbakir visit attempted to boost the negotiation process.  The upcoming local and presidential elections, however, will force the AKP and the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) to compete for votes in southeastern Turkey, where a new Islamist political party, the Free Cause Party (Hüda-Par) might steal their votes.  Although the AKP has successfully challenged the BDP in the ballot box in the last three elections, its electoral success has never been the coffin of the Kurdish political movement. This is so because Öcalan realized the AKP's electoral power in Kurdish strongholds and responded to the government's development projects through the public use of religion, attempting to change negative perceptions about the Kurdish movement. More profoundly, Öcalan's decision to resume the fight also allowed the PKK, as an organization that faces political dilemmas nowadays, to survive and maintain its cohesiveness. Competition for votes in Kurdish provinces might trigger conflicts between the AKP and BDP, and the use of provocative language might jeopardize the limited progress made in the peace negotiations. Although it is difficult to predict how things will unfold in the next few months, the negotiation process and electoral politics will shape each other.

Although the elections will significantly affect the future of the negotiation process, there is a more profound problem that puzzles observers: the recruitment of fighters. Some newspapers report that the PKK has recruited hundreds of new rebels or rebels-to-be since May, and it did not necessarily withdraw all of its rebels from Turkey, which actually was used as a justification for the delay in the introduction of the AKP government's democratization package. Armament is not unilateral given the fact that the Turkish state continues to recruit village guards and build military stations in strategic points to improve its control in mountainous and border regions. These incidents are actually reminiscent of the PKK's unilateral cease-fire between 1999 and 2004. It is true that the resolution of armed conflict might rest on shaky foundations because of various factors including distrust, spoilers, greed and grievances, but the parallels between two cease-fires point to a lack of verification mechanisms and misuse of cease-fires. Despite Prime Minister Erdoğan's and Öcalan's calls for caution and elimination of provocation, a return to armed conflict should not be surprising.

In an attempt to avoid the outbreak of violence, which will have electoral costs especially in Kurdish provinces, the AKP might accelerate the implementation of reforms proposed in the latest democratization package since it is now clear that symbolic gestures do not have the expected impact on the civil society. However, it is also ironic that political parties such as the BDP, which complained about the 10 percent election threshold, have not pushed the AKP to implement one of the three electoral system proposals. Of course, the implementation of such reforms is not going to satisfy the Kurds, but the introduction of a new democratization packages that specifically address Kurds is highly unlikely and will depend on the progress made on the negotiation table behind closed doors.

The latest option actually shows that the AKP might prefer to manage the Kurdish question in the near future and continue to resolve it after the local elections. It is difficult to speculate as to whether this tactic will work or not, but the party that takes arms up first will be seen responsible for the continuation of the Kurdish conflict and might lose votes.