Copyright � 2000 by George Modelski
EVOLUTION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY
George Modelski
����������������������������������� Start by proposing, without further discussion, that to-day�s students of economics pay less than full attention to three problem areas:
1. the very long-range analysis of the world economy;
2. the all-pervasive role of innovation, and
3. the links between the economy, and politics, society, and culture.
����������������������������������� In this paper I set out to contribute to the exploration of these expansive questions in a systematic manner.�� The manner is systematic because it is grounded in an evolutionary perspective.�� In particular, after setting out the essentials of that perspective, I go on to
1. sketch out a long term perspective on economic history;
2. highlight the role of innovation in that process; and
3. sketch out the links between economics and politics at the global level
in the millennium just past.
�I.�� Evolution of the world economy
����������������������� The principal assignment for this article is to trace long-term patterns in the evolution of economic and political structures.��� Particular interest focuses on the modern era, and the interactions, in that time span, of these two sets of processes.�� But to put such large-scale developments in context, it is necessary to clarify the nature of this evolutionary approach, and the broad outlines of the evolution of the world economy over the long span of what we know as history.
����������������������� The approach adopted here is best described as �evolutionary� because it centers on the problem of understanding social change as the product of learning processes involving the mechanisms of innovation, selection, cooperation, and reinforcement.�� It seeks to clarify how and why the economic organization of the human species has reached the degree of complexity and productivity it exhibits to-day, and how and why the world political system exhibits the degree of global reach and effectiveness it has today, and how both of these sets of structures might change over the foreseeable future.��
����������������������� The distinctive characteristic of this approach is its �human species� focus, that is, its conception of social evolution as a set of continuing and inter-linked processes of change involving the entire human species.�� It might be contrasted, in the first instance, with accounts that place the emphasis on the �evolution� of individual societies and on the question �why do societies differ, and how do they change over time�,� questions that have preoccupied many social scientists attracted by evolutionary theories.�� By contrast, the present approach adopts a species approach, and focuses on the world as a whole.
��������� Among evolutionary approaches the present is, furthermore,� an institutional one,� in the traditions of Thorstein Veblen,� Friedrich von Hayek, and Douglass North;� in that respect it needs to be contrasted with biopolitical studies that emphasize above all else the role of the genetics and the biological endowment.�� An institutional approach� allows us to portray social and organizational systems as products of Darwinian search and selection that constitute multi-layered, nested learning processes moved forward by innovators.�� That in turn shows that such social evolutionary analysis does not ignore individual or social actors, for it does indeed single out for special attention the agents of innovation, inventors and innovative organizations, and societies that offer evolutionary potential.�� But the focus remains on institutional change for the human species, and at the global level in particular.
����������������������� The features of the evolutionary approach might be seen more clearly when contrasted with the standard �rational choice� paradigm of neoclassical economics.�� Table 1 singles out four such characteristic features and compares them for the two perspectives.�� It makes it clear that each have their own place, and domain of maximum effectiveness, and that in important respects they might indeed be regarded as complementary;�� but it also makes plain that an evolutionary approach is the one that is best suited for problems of analyzing patterns of long-range change.�� That is so because such an approach naturally inclines toward a long-term perspective;�� it focuses in on structural transformations rather than on equilibrium states;� it does not require the postulate of rationality and it sees collective choice processes as resulting from trial and error search and selection procedures.�� Best of all, it gets away from a purely instrumental rationality and allows for ends to be seen to be changeable, and for constraints to be altered as the result of evolutionary processes.
Table 1:�� Rational choice and evolutionary approaches
compared
Characteristic features |
Rational choice |
Evolutionary |
Perspective� (time horizon) |
Short-term |
Long-term |
Focus of
explanation |
Decisions, equilibrium |
Institutions, transitions |
Choice process |
Rational maximization |
Trial and error search and selection |
Ends-means schema |
Given constraints and preferences, choice of means |
Both constraints and preferences are variable |
The world economy
����������������������� World history is conventionally regarded as comprising the ancient, classical, and modern eras;� the first two, of about two millennia each, and the last, the modern, taking up the last millennium, as shown in Table 2 below.� Together, these three categories yield a basic grid against which long-term trends might be appraised in more detail.�� But they might also be seen as presenting such history as a continuing process, as successive phases in the evolution of the social organization of the human species and it is within that grid that the world economy assumes shape.��
����������������������� Table 2:�� Evolution of the world economy
From about (yr) |
Era |
World Economy Process |
|
|
Command Economy |
BC� 3400����
|
Ancient |
I.���� Bronze |
����� 2300 |
|
II.��� |
����� 1200 |
Classical |
|
����� 100 |
|
IV.� Silk Roads |
|
|
Market Economy |
AD�� 930����������� |
Modern |
V.�� Market Systems |
����� 1850 |
|
VI.� World Market |
����������������������� That is why economic history, too,� might be seen as a process of such continuity, as proposed by John Hicks.�� Within the overall framework of the ancient, classical, and modern eras unfolds world economic organization, over millennia-long periods marking major institutional innovations.�� These innovations fall into two broad categories, supply-side, concerning broad productive and construction undertakings, and demand-side, relating to distributive, commercial, and trading aspects, such that millennial (supply-side) periods of production achievements might be seen to alternate with (demand-side) periods , of similar length, of trade networking that bring about a� diffusion of technology and wealth.
����������������������� The
ancient era is commonly also known as the Bronze Age because it is that new
alloy that is characteristic of the�
material culture of that time, especially in Mesopotamia.�� The tools, weapons, and art objects
fashioned of that material were keys to the development of irrigation
agriculture, public works, water and land transportation, and warfare.�� But within the ancient era, two periods
might then be distinguished:�� the
launching of bronze metallurgy, centered on
��
��������The classical era, after
1200 BC, opens with the age of Iron, as the innovation that makes possible yet
greater strides in agriculture, and weaponry, and produces rapid population
growth in, and the urbanization of,
����������������������� These four periods might be said to have instituted and comprised the command economy as the paradigmatic institutional arrangement for the world economic system.�� The command economy is an economic system in which the great instruments of production are publicly owned, either by the temple or the state, and in which basic economic decisions on investment, production, and exchange, are centrally controlled.�� That is not to say that the pre-modern period saw no individual property or private transactions but only that the differentiation between economic and political functions was weak, and that the great projects of investment or long-distance trade were strongly dominated by public concerns.
����������������������� John Hicks has argued that the central tendency of economic history has been the movement from command to market economy.� The larger an economy, the more difficult, if not wholly impossible. it is to coordinate economic (and political) activities from one central point.�� That is why in a general sense and over the very long run, the command economy is unstable, and tends toward �decline�;���� the market economy is, in comparison, more resilient and therefore more likely to prevail.�� But that is not to say that in the short run, central direction might not yield better results for certain limited purposes, and in particular at times of major warfare, when a large share of economic output is directed to the one goal of achieving military victory.�� In the 20th century, the global war period of World Wars I and II saw the resurgence of such planning on all sides.�� That is why the rise of the market economy has hardly been a smooth or straight-line process.
������������������� In the temporal dimension, this great evolutionary transition from command to market is represented (in Table 2), over the last millennium, by periods V and VI, named those of Market System, and World Market.�� �Markets Systems� stands for the �invention� of reliable markets� serving productive centers on a national or regional basis.�� According to William McNeill, this first occurred in China, in the Sung period, between 1000 and 1200;�� it was followed by the trading system of the Italian Renaissance that organized the western end of the Silk Roads;� it reached high gear with the rise of a �West Europe with a global reach� after 1500, and culminated in what we call the �Industrial Revolution� in England after 1700.�� �World Market� is the second phase in this story, whose central feature, after 1850, is increasing globalization of economic activities, and the progressive extension of the reach of world markets to more and more segments of the world economy.�� There is no reason to believe that this process is about to end anytime soon;�� more probably this drastic and unprecedented transformation of the way humanity earns its living is likely to remain the salient feature of the world economy for a� long time to come.
����������������������� In long perspective, the transition from command to market has been a gradual one, spanning centuries.�� The factor mediating this transition was the rise of the Silk Roads, in period IV, to which reference was made earlier, and is illustrated in Table 3.�� This transcontinental system of transportation and communication formed the backbone of the economy of the �Old World� until about 1500, well into the �Market System� period, and the industrial and commercial activities upon which it thrived did in fact help to stimulate the growth of markets in the several areas it did traverse, even though at other times political interventions would for long periods block and immobilize entire segments of those routes.
����������� Table
3:�� �Evolution of the Silk Roads 100 BC to 1500 AD
Period |
Major linkages |
Anchor cities |
K-waves |
|
|
|
|
IV: Silk Roads |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
-100 - 250 |
Silk via |
|
|
200 - 500 |
|
|
|
500 - 650 |
|
Constantinole, Changan |
|
750 - 1000 |
Abbasids develop |
|
|
|
|
|
|
V.� Market Systems |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
930 - 1125 |
Northern Song via |
|
K1-2 |
1150-1250 |
Southern Song |
Cairo,-Hangzhou |
K3-4 |
1250-1350 |
Mongols restore northern route |
|
K5-6 |
1350 - 1500 |
Mamluks, |
|
K7-8 |
�����������������������
Overall, the Silk Roads reveal the
central portions of the world economy to be a living, pulsating thing, even if the
volume of transactions, or the speed of interactions, might have been low by
to-day�s more exacting standards.�� Table
3 shows how the intensity of activity along that central artery alternated in a
fairly regular manner between the northern and the southern routes, , and in a way that correlated with surges of activity in
II.�� Global economic evolution, and innovation
����������������������� This has been so far, in broad strokes, a sketch of the evolution of the world economy as marked by major institutional changes, and above all, viewed as a fundamental transition from command to market economy.�� It covers the entire historical experience with world economic systems, from the very inception of the possibility of such arrangements, inherent even in the pre-historical trading linkages of maybe six or seven thousand years ago, right up to the contemporary experience of an increasingly globalized economy.
����������������������� The next question is:� how did the process work itself out at global organizational level?�� That is, what were the organizational structures that mediated and orchestrated these changes such that a movement toward greater economic interdependence might in fact be observed?�� An answer is suggested in Table 4.��
����������������������� Table
4:� Organizational
evolution in the global economy
From about |
Phases |
Centered on |
|
V. Breakthrough to market systems |
|
|
|
��������� 930 |
Song move to national market |
|
Experiments |
������� 1190 |
Nautical-Commercial revolution |
|
Clusters |
������� 1430 |
Oceanic trading |
Atlantic |
Critical mass |
������� 1640 |
Industrial take-off |
|
Pay-off |
VI.� World Market |
|
|
|
������� 1850 |
Information Economy |
|
Experiments |
������� 2080 |
|
|
Clusters |
����������������������� Table 4 above shows the main outlines of the organizational evolution that has moved the world economy toward market solutions, in this case with emphasis on the global level (that is, in respect of long-distance and inter-continental trade, and the activities of leading industrial sectors).�� Organizational evolution concerns the setting within which innovation occurs and without which it is unlikely.�� It includes the creation of markets, new types of enterprises and communication systems, the background of political security, and the launching of new productive facilities.
����������������������� As
noted in Table 3 above� China had been,
for over a millennium, an anchor of the Silk Road system, and as such, a major
participant in the then world trading system, exporting silk, (an early
innovation whose secrets were for a long time very well� guarded), and importing i.a.
jade from Central, and spices from Southeast Asia.�� It is therefore not altogether surprising
that about the year 1000 under the Sung
����������� It was Italian enterprise that
helped to launch
���������� Interestingly, though broadly
speaking, these great organizational waves have been reflected quite closely in
the long-term movements in English prices of consumables since about 1200.��� A series first constructed by Sir Henry
Phelps-Brown and Sheila Hopkins, and recently interpreted by David Hackett
Fischer, reveals four great �price revolutions� (each a period of rapidly
rising prices):�� the medieval one
(1200-1350);� the 16th century
(1475-1650), the 18th century one (1729-1812-5), and the 20th
century one (1896-2000?).�� They could
equally well be called the Italian,
����������� Both the organizational sequence, and the price data, make it plain that� global economic development� is to be seen as an evolutionary series of path-breaking innovations by a number of organizational centers, rather than a matter of a sudden� and unprecedented and miraculous �revolution� in the British Isles of the 18th and 19th centuries.
K-waves as surges of
innovation
����������������������� What drives global economic evolution, the process depicted in Table 4?
It is the thesis of �Leading sectors and World Powers:� The Co-evolution of Global Economics and Politics� by George Modelski and William R. Thompson, that global economic evolution of the millennium just past has been driven by a succession of K-waves.���
����������������������� What are K-waves?�� They may be defined as �processes of rise and decline of leading sectors� or,� as paradigm shifts in the global economy.�� K-waves are surges of innovation that create new sectors either of industry or commerce.�� These sectors are initially of local and national significance but ultimately impact the entire global economy.�� A classical example is the rise of the cotton textile industry in the second half of the 18th century on the basis of innovative techniques in spinning and weaving� and the organization of factory production around steam engines that became a leading sector of the British economy� and through exports, both of its products, and of its technology, a leading industrial sector of world-wide impact, the foundation of what at the end of the 19th century came to be described as the Industrial Revolution.
����������������������� The term K-wave is short for Kondratieff wave.�� That latter term, coined by Joseph Schumpeter (writing in 1939) was intended to honor the fact that the first to draw attention in a sustained manner to this important characteristic of the modern world economy was Nikolai Kondratieff (1892-1938), a leading Russian economist writing in the 1920s.�� For a recent translation of his work on this topic see Kondratieff (1984);� a full commentary in the light of more recent work may be found in Van Duijn (1983).� Well received in the 1930s, but neglected in the 1950s and 1960s, Kondratieff�s arguments found once again greater resonance in the 1980s and 1990s.
����������������������� Some basic features of K-waves are quite widely agreed.�� The first is their period, generally seen to last between 50 and 60 years.�� These are figures derived in the first place from empirical observations, going back to long-range studies of both price and output series.�� More recently the emphasis has been on sectoral output and growth, and on international perspectives.�� In a more general context, the period of the K-wave might also be seen to be related to generational turn-over.�� A generation period is usually reckoned as the time required for a generation to replace itself, some 25 to 30 years.�� A K-wave would then be made up of two generation-long phases.�� Indeed, looking again at the empirical record, two phases can usually be discerned, a take-off phase that launches the innovations, but needs to contend with alternative paradigms, in a context where earlier leading sectors have lost their edge and are in decline;� and a high-growth phase, in which the new paradigm prevails and, for a while at least (again, for a generation) occupies center stage, brings prosperity, and leads the world economy.�� Most recently, the� period from say 1972 to 2000 might be regarded as the take-off for the information industries, and from 2000 to say 2020-30 as its high-growth phase (see Table 5)..
Table 5:�� K-waves: the sequence of global leading
sectors
K-wave |
From about |
Leading sector |
Major innovation |
K1 |
�930 |
Printing, paper |
Learning society,� book printing |
|
�990 |
National market formation |
North-south market unification |
K3 |
1060 |
Fiscal/administrative framework |
Monetization, paper money |
K4 |
1120 |
Maritime trade expansion |
Compass, large junks |
|
|
|
|
K5 |
1190 |
Champagne fairs |
European market organized |
K6 |
1250 |
|
Innovations from |
K7 |
1310 |
Venetian galley fleets |
New markets in |
K8 |
1350 |
Pepper trade |
Alexandria-connection institutionalized |
|
|
|
|
K9 |
1430 |
|
�Discovery� of African trade |
K10 |
1494 |
Indian spices |
Operating oceanic route |
K11 |
1540 |
Atlantic, Baltic trades |
American silver |
K12 |
1580 |
Asian trade |
Dutch East Indies Co. VOC |
|
|
|
|
K13 |
1640 |
Amerasian trade |
Plantations |
K14 |
1688 |
Amerasian trade |
Tobacco |
K15 |
1740 |
Cotton, iron |
Factory production |
K16 |
1792 |
Steam, rail |
New forms of transport |
|
|
|
|
K17 |
1850 |
Electrics, chemicals,steel |
Invention of invention |
K18 |
1914 |
Electronics, autos, aerospace |
New products |
K19 |
1972 |
Information industries |
Computers |
K-20 |
2026 |
|
|
����������������������� The substantive content of a K-wave is given by the set of innovations that it launches.�� Table 5 lists a dating scheme for K-waves of the modern world economy, starting with developments in Sung China just over a millennium ago, and tentatively shows for each K-wave the innovations that constitute successive paradigm shifts.
����������������������� The conception of innovation guiding this listing is Schumpeterian.�� In a classic formulation first articulated in 1911, Joseph Schumpeter proposed that economic development is the product of enterpreneurial innovation of the following types:� launching new products;� pioneering new methods of production;� opening new markets;� creating new sources of raw materials;� and introducing new forms of business organization.�� Table 5 shows that K-waves have been produced by all of these.��
����������������������� What is more, the list in Table 5 shows the individual K-waves as arrayed into groups of four.�� This grouping reflects the fact that individual paradigm shifts, however powerful they might be in and of themselves, such as that to railroads, do not stand alone but �stand on the shoulders of others�. and, in their turn, serve as launching pads for new endeavors.�� That is how K-waves 9-12, in Table 5, after 1430, might be seen as adding up to the establishment of an �oceanic trading� system in Table 4;� in effect, a change in the organization of the global economy.
�����������������������
����������������������� Table
5:� K-waves:
the sequence of leading sectors�� is,
in effect, a �short history of the global economy�.�� It also is a dating scheme
for K-waves.�� It shows them for the
entire time span of the modern era, that is at greater
length than some other studies.���
Analysts who do not focus on long-term s are often content to notice the
last five well-known pulses, including the most recent one focussed on
information industries.�� Students of
economic history including Joseph Schumpeter, and Fernand
Braudel have proposed pushing the analysis back to
the early modern period.�� Starting it
with rise of the Sung market economy recognizes the role of
��������� It remains an open question, though, �whether �leading sector� innovation waves of this length, of some 50-60 years, can also be discerned in pre-modern economies.�� The earlier account of the Silk Roads as having mediated the transition from �command� to �market� economies (in Table 3) did point to a regular alternation between northern and southern routes even before what we now call the modern era.�� But our data are at present insufficient for tracing economic fluctuations, and the rise and decline of leading sectors, in those earlier times.��
����������������������� The agents of innovation driving the K-waves are clusters of enterpreneurs: in individual or family firms, companies, or more recently, multinational corporations.�� In earlier periods it is hard or impossible to identify such individuals whose deeds� have been recorded with less assiduity than those of kings or military heroes.� Such families as the Grimaldi or the Spinola led much of Genoese activity;�� South German merchant houses such as the Fugger or the Welsers, cooperated with the King of Portugal (and his Casa da India) in organizing and financing the crucial voyages to the East.�� It was the advent of the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) in 1600 that not only put the organization of Asian trade on a solid footing but it also served as a potent model of corporate management, superior by an entire order of magnitude� to the organization that the King of Portugal put together a century earlier.�
���������� By the mid-19th century
the innovations can be clearly linked to individual enterpreneurs
and their companies:� e.g. the
locomotive, and the
����������������������� An
essential dimension of innovation, and of waves of
innovation is location.�� This is not
merely a matter of geography:� innovative
activity tends to be localized within particular regions of a country, as
textiles were in
����������������������� Data brought together by Modelski and Thompson (1996) in Tables 6.11,6.12,6.13 make plain these two crucial characteristics of K-waves:�� surges of innovation have their origin in one national economy, and then diffuse more widely, at first to other major economies, and ultimately world-wide.�� Secondly,� K-waves are not the automatic property of the largest countries or the wealthiest economies;� they occur in certain specific conditions that favor innovation.�� It is, of course, the case, that hosting a K-wave greatly adds to the value of the output of an economy, for a period of at least� two generations, and therefore greatly adds to its �size�.��� But size alone does not place an economy into the vanguard of economic evolution.
����������������������� The
Modelski-Thompson data on national shares for key
products of K-waves 15-18 show that
����������������������� This
reiterates the central point that over the experience of the modern economy for
the past millennium, K-wave animated leading sectors have invariably originated
in one well-organized national economy linked to a wider network, and then
diffused from there.�� That happened in
the early (Sung)
����������������������� The
association of major innovations and specific location might once again be
illustrated in Table 6:�� The Clustering of Major Innovations.�� An independently compiled list of 160 major
innovations over the best part of the 19th and 20th
centuries shows that in K16, the plurality of such advances in industrial
competitiveness occurred in Britain (44 per cent), followed by the United
States.�� In the next two K-waves, the
(Table 6 about here)
Table 6:�� Clustering of major innovations, (K16-K18).
K-wave���� (data for) |
Total of major innovations |
Originating in (percentage shares) |
Examples |
K16�������� (1811-1849) |
18 |
|
Steam locomotive Vulcanized rubber |
K17�������� (1850-1914) |
67 |
|
Telephone Electric dynamo |
K18�������� (1915-1971) |
75 |
� |
Microprocessor Jet airplane |
Derived from list of major innovations in Van Duijn (1983:176-9).
����������������������� The localization of K-waves, and their initial close association with a particular national economy, means that national leading sectors translate rather smoothly into global economic leadership.�� The successful launching of new industries of global impact confers high standing on an entire economic system.�� It means new high-growth industries,� products and services meeting a world-wide demand, and consequently prosperity, and added wealth.� But does it also automatically confer political leadership in international affairs,� does it directly lead to global leadership?
����������������������� �Global leadership is here understood as the
exercise of a role that has been� central to world politics in the last
millennium.�� This world power role has
evolved from early experiments in
����������������������� In the experience of the modern era, the rise and decline of leading sectors - discussed above- is paralleled quite closely by the rise and decline of world powers exercising global leadership.�� We have seen that the first is a process driving economic transformation.�� The latter, too, is an evolutionary process,�� This �co-evolution of global economics and politics� is shown in Table 7.�� Just as K-waves can be numbered consecutively for the entire modern period, so can successive long cycles (LCs), and the powers associated with them.
Table 7 shows that global economic leadership - that is earned by innovation - has consistently gone hand-in-hand with global political leadership - that has been the chief carrier of political innovation, including new forms of world organization.�� But the relationship has not been an automatic but a mutually interdependent one:� with the economic line of enterprise being supportive of, and supported by, political initiatives.�� What precisely has been the pattern of that relationship?
Table 7:�� The Co-evolution of Global Economics and
Politics
About |
K-waves (global leading sectors) |
Long cycles (world powers after 1500) |
�930 |
K1�� Printing and paper |
LC1�� Northern Sung |
�990 |
|
|
1060 |
K3�� Fiscal framework |
LC2�� Southern Sung |
1120 |
K4�� Maritime trade |
|
1190 |
K5�� |
LC3�� |
1250 |
K6�� |
|
1300 |
K7�� Galley fleets |
LC4�� |
1360 |
K8�� Pepper |
|
1430 |
K9�� |
LC5�� |
1492 |
K10� Indian spices |
|
1540 |
K11� |
LC6�� |
1580 |
K12� Asian trade (VOC) |
|
1640 |
K13� Amerasian trade |
LC8�� |
1688 |
K14� Amerasian trade |
|
1740 |
K15� Cotton, iron |
LC9�� |
1792 |
K16� Steam, rail |
|
1850 |
K17� Electrics, chemicals, steel |
LC10� |
1914 |
K18� Autos, air, electronics |
|
1972 |
K19� Information industries |
|
�����������������������
����������������������� Most prominently, the basic relation has been of the form 2:1.�� For each pair of K-waves in the global economy we can observe one cycle of global politics, that is one term of political leadership at the global level.�� The first of the pair of K-waves lays down the economic base of prosperity, and affluence; and upon that base, a political position can be erected.�� Once the political structure is in place - and in the past this been the work of a world power acting as an agent of innovation after a prolonged, generation-long period of global wars -� the� second K-wave is ready to go into high gear.��
����������������������� To give an example:� the economic transformation wrought by K-17 (steel, chemistry, electric power) put the United States, by 1914, in the top-rank of industrial powers, and created the basis for a powerful �arsenal of democracy�� that proved of decisive significance in the period of World Wars I and II (1914-1945), not only in iron and steel, and electric power but also in telephones and wireless communications..�� The second K-wave (K-18), that took off after 1914, moved into high gear after 1945, when a new political order was firmly put in place;� that wave achieved a peak in 1973.���� That is how one such long political cycle might be thought of as two K-waves� in between which is sandwiched a period of major political disturbance, the evolutionary selection process of macrodecision that in the past half-millennium took the form of a global war.��
����������������������� This means that economic and political evolution at the global level are closely related, at the basic level of agents of innovation, and that the relation is a mutually supportive one.�� It is also closely synchronized (because oscillators tend to synchronize) , as is apparent from the table on co-evolution.�� The synchronization is facilitated by the fact that the same nation-state is the locus both of surges of economic innovation, and of political initiatives that are at the heart of new forms of world order.
����������������������� The left-hand column of Table 7, with its sequence of leading powers, may also be read as a �short history of evolutionary global politics�.�� It shows the results of a process whereby world politics is subject to a regular selection process that produces leadership (world powers, etc) for the solution of global problems.�� That process is strongly motivated by the relationship of challengers to receding and ascendant global powers in the democratic lineage, together with their allies.�� Out of that competition that at its strongest took the form of global wars, arise innovations (mutations) in world political arrangements:� both military, in the form of new formations and weapon systems, and political, such as diplomacy, alliances, world organizations, and arms control regimes (cooperation).�� Such innovations characterize the eras of world order association with the respective world powers (reinforcement).�� The entire process has governed a steady increase in the scale and complexity of world politics over the entire millennium� (see also Modelski 1996).
����������������������� The K-wave-global leadership relationship is empirically grounded, and may be documented both quantitatively and qualitatively for most of the modern era.�� Table 8 summarizes some key empirical evidence for the period since 1500.
Table 8:�� K-waves
and the attainment of global leadership
First K-wave peak (observed) |
World power |
Occasions for global leadership |
Sea power threshold attained |
Second K-wave peak (observed) |
1480s |
|
1494,1499 |
1510 |
1500s/1530s |
1560s |
|
1601,1608 |
1610 |
1620s |
1670s |
|
1689,1701 |
1715 |
1710s |
1780s |
|
1793, 1815 |
1810 |
1830s |
1870s/1900s |
|
1917,1941 |
1945 |
1960s |
After Modelski and Thompson, Table 7.3.
����������� In Table 8:
K-waves and the attainment of global leadership� the interaction of economics and
politics may be systematically observed over a long time span.�� The first column reports the results of a
series of observations of leading sector growth rates in Portugal, the Dutch
Republic, Britain, and the United States, and records the years of peak rates
(for data and methods see Modelski and Thompson 1996,
Chapter 6).�� In each case, the observed
peak anticipates the �occasions for global leadership�, most of which are
linked to, or are occasioned by, global wars.��
The first date for
����������������������� Column
4 of Table 8 is a reminder that economic power is not all that matters.�� A crucial element in fighting, and gaining
victory in all the five global wars covered here has been sea power.�� Those attaining, or coming close to, a
monopoly share of capital ships (ships of the line earlier, battleships,
carriers, and� missile
submarines more recently) are those having won, or those likely to win,� global wars;�
the year of attainment of the naval threshold (more than 50 per cent of
the world total of such ships) marks the conclusion of major conflicts�� (World sea power distributions are
documented in Modelski and Thompson 1988)..�� The final column shows the peak years of the
second K-wave, as observed, and unsurprisingly it is i.a.
the 1960s for the
IV.�� The Information Economy
����������������������� At the close of the millennium, at this time of writing, the most prominent feature of the economy, and its leading sector, appears to be information, marking this undoubtedly as the information age, and with computers and communications as its most essential elements.��
����������������������� Those
taking a longer perspective adopted in this article will not be surprised, and
will recognize the contemporary prominence of information industries as the
breakthrough phase of an �Information Economy� that has been in the making
since the mid-19th century (see Table 4).�� First came the telegraph, initially linked
to railroads;� then
two cable lines successfully crossed the
����������������������� Expert observers have been aware since the 1970s that the world economy was ready to spawn new leading sectors.�� Those who coined the term of �new socio-technical paradigm� correctly anticipated that the focus of these new developments would be the information industries.�� It is interesting to note that this was the opinion not just of American experts.�� British students of innovation such as Christopher Freeman, drew their analyses along similar lines.�� The (then) Soviet experts, too, expected major breakthroughs in computers and microelectronics.�� Japanese electronics companies, followed by South Korean and Taiwanese concerns,� invested heavily in semiconductor etc. manufacturing facilities.�� In other words, it was hardly a secret that information technologies would be the sources of future growth.� Yet the basic shape of the information revolution resembles that of earlier leading sector surges:� a nuclues of high growth in one national economy, in this case the American, followed by gradual diffusion world-wide.
����������������������� The information industries mattered not just because they produce valuable equipment, such as computers.�� Their impact is felt throughout the economy because via innovative software these products enter into a wide-range of production processes, and an even wider range of services, and it is services in particular that are coming to comprise an increasingly large proportion of the output of modern economies.�� Table 11.2 in Modelski and Thompson (1996) illustrates how broad and deep that impact has become.�� Four years� since the publication of that book, the Internet and the World Wide Web, not listed in that table, already have become other major features of the infomation landscape, and of the economy as a whole.
����������������������� Computer
technology has now been around for several decades, since the 1960s, and some
economists have wondered why it was that the important investments� represented by such equipment did not
appear to show results in the statistics of productivity for the
����������������������� Toward
the end of the decade many economists were coming around to his position.�� While spending on information technology was
rising, comprising about one-half of the cost of all new business equipment� so,
too,� was growth in productivity.�� Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan
himself endorsed the role of information industries in spurring growth when he
said that the United States may be �experiencing a structural shift similar to
those that have visited our economy from time to time in our past� due to
innovations built around computers that have made businesses to operate more
efficiently.� (New York Times,
����������������������� As shown for earlier K-waves, a crucial question concerns the location of the K19 process.�� We also know that awareness of the importance of information technology has been widespread,� among specialists and among business leaders, for the previous two-three decades.�� Computers certainly have already spread world-wide.�� Is it still the case that the new technologies are centered in one economy, and why is that so?
����������������������� On
the evidence of the three decades 1970-2000 the locus of K19 information
industries has substantially been the
����������������������� But
the PC itself was rapidly becoming a �mere� commodity and attention soon
focussed on two key components:� on
microprocessors, seen as the heart of the computer, and on software.�� In the 1990s, American producers controlled
over 90 per cent of the market in microprocessors.�� Intel alone virtually monopolized the field
but in 1999 came under attack from low-end producers (see Table 9).��� In software, it was Microsoft that was
installing up to 90 per cent of the world�s operating systems, and one half of
its applications (and then coming under pressure from government
regulators)��� Later in� the 1990s. moreover,
the Internet emerged with astonishing rapidity, approaching 2000 with a
user-base of the World Wide Web of some 100 million (Table 10).�� One half of these users were to be found in
the
Table� 9:� �World microprocessor market shares
Company |
HQ location |
������������������ 1991 |
Marketshare 1993 |
������������������� 1997*(4Q) |
����������������� 1998*(4Q) |
Intel |
|
53.2 |
74.1 |
87.1 |
75.7 |
Motorola |
|
12.3 |
�8 |
|
|
Advanced Micro
Devices |
|
�5.1 |
�5.8 |
�6.6 |
15.6 |
|
|
�3.6 |
|
|
|
NEC |
|
�3.5 |
|
|
|
Table 10:� �World Wide Web users
(million)
|
1997 (actual) |
1999 (est) |
2001 (est) |
Worldwide |
�� 68.6 |
�� 97.2 |
� 222.7 |
Unites States |
�� 38.7 |
�� 51.5 |
� 106.8 |
��������� US share % |
��������������� 56 |
��������������� 53 |
�������������� 47 |
�����������������������
The reasons for the American focus of
information industries are not really surprising.��
V. Some Implications for World Politics
����������� In the light of our earlier analysis� (see also Modelski and Thompson 1999),� what are the broader implications of these considerations for the future world politics in particular?
�������� In the first place, if the
����������������������� Second, the information revolution now underway, and yet to run its full course,� bodes well for the continued spread of democracy in the world.�� The information industries depend upon open societies, but they also strengthen them, and make them work better, because democracies feed upon good information.�� In 1900, just over 10 per cent of the world�s population lived in democracies;� by 2000, that proportion had risen to 50 per cent.� At that rate, the world might be expected to be substantially democratic by the end of the 21st century.�� That is good news, and raises the prospects for the success of cooperative arrangements world wide in the coming century.�� .��
����������������������� Finally, in the experience of the past, a pair of K-waves sandwiched a longish period of major warfare.�� Are global wars to be expected in the transition from K19 to K20, that may be anticipated maybe for the 2030s, and that is also likely to yield the usual economic strains?�� The information revolution, and the rising salience of a democratic community make it likely that such an outcome is avoidable, even if a period of major tensions and political discomfort is quite likely in two-three decades time.�� And the role of global leadership will evolve too, to include an increasing role for democratic world organization.
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Paper repared for the session on
�Social Dynamics and the Encyclopedia of Human Ecology:
A Kenneth Boulding Retrospective�
sponsored by the Association for the Study of the Grants Economy and
the International Society for the Intercommunication of New Ideas
at the annual meeting of the Allied Social Science Associations and
the American Economic Association,