SPECIAL ISSUE ON THE HISTORY OF ESTONIA

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Foreword

The first issue of the historical culture magazine *Tuna* saw the light of day ten years ago, in December 1998. The late 1980s and early 1990s had been a time of great upheaval and change in Eastern Europe; by the end of the 1990s, the time had come to start analyzing the significance of what had taken place. For the first time in half a century, it became possible to access many of the archival materials previously restricted by the occupying authorities in Estonia, and this clearly provided an impetus for the archives to initiate the publication of the historical culture magazine *Tuna*. Indeed, the English reader may find the Estonian-language name of this historical culture magazine rather odd – something more appropriate to a discussion of fishing. In Estonian, however, the word "*tuna*" implies the past, and therefore we offer "Past" as the English equivalent of our magazine's name. Besides, both provide us with a four-letter title. At the time the magazine was given its name, the editorial staff could not yet imagine that an issue of the magazine might some day be published in English.

By the time the new magazine began publication, Estonian society was ready to initiate an honest analysis of its past. Although at first it seemed that the publication of archival documents hitherto sealed by the occupying authorities should be a priority, the new magazine did not limit itself, by far, to shedding light only upon the recent past. From its start, the magazine undertook to provide a broader base for the discussion of Estonia's history, and began publishing not only archival documents but also articles on current historical philosophy and theory. The creators of the magazine were sincere in the declaration they made on the first page: "*Tuna* speaks of Estonia, but what is Estonia? Estonia is hopelessly intertwined with the history of all of Europe, especially its neighboring states. Therefore, *Tuna* will tell of others as well, and do so from the first issue onward." To ensure adherence to these principles, an authoritative council was created comprising not only Estonian historians, but also scholars from the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, and Sweden. The topics under discussion are not limited by national or temporal boundaries. Topics include world history from the Sumerians and ancient Egyptians through the critical periods in Central and Eastern Europe during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Naturally, due to the nature of our authors and readers, research of Estonia's own history is of primary importance; this is particularly true for the events of the last century, which was a particularly multifaceted and complex century for the Estonian people. We have had to re-assess many things over the past decades, and it goes without saying that not everyone comprehends the events in Estonia's recent past in the same way. And how, then, must we formulate our thoughts about of the rest of the world? Through its membership in trans-European and trans-Atlantic organizations, Estonia is more open to the world than ever before. And so we decided to make the writings of the best Estonian historical scholars available to those who do not read Estonian, and for whom the brief English-language summaries at the end of each issue are inadequate. Our first special edition was published in Russian in 2006. This was done because Estonian and Russian history have been connected for a long time, and besides, the recent occupations have left behind a large number of Russian-speaking people in Estonia who are unaware of many historical events, or whose knowledge of events has been acquired from one side's limited viewpoint.

And yet, the articles in the Russian-language issue of *Tuna* were not directed solely at the Russian reader, nor did they endeavor to explain only onepoint of view. The issue contained

a selection of scholarly articles that had appeared in the magazine on various periods in Estonian history, with emphasis on no particular period.

The same principles apply to this English-language edition. Our plan to publish an English-language issue was actually born at the same time as the idea to publish the Russian-language issue. However, the English-language issue in no way duplicates the Russian-language issue; the articles, as well as several points of emphasis, are different. Naturally, it does not represent a general overview of Estonian history that devotes equal space to discussions of all periods and all events. Rather, the magazine's first English-language compilation represents an overview of the works and analyses of several Estonian historians studying different historical periods. In subsequent issues of this kind, which we indeed hope will be forthcoming, it would certainly make sense to publish special editions dealing with specific historical periods.

Broadly speaking, the magazine is divided into three sections; the first focuses on the history of the Estonian region from the first millennium until the middle of the last millennium time (the Russian-Livonian War). The second section deals primarily with Estonia as part of the Russian Empire. Only the first article of this section discusses the period immediately preceding the Great Northern War and Estonia's fall under Russian rule.

The last section is devoted to an era particularly important to Estonians: the 20th century, the time when Estonia became an independent country. This section includes articles on Estonia's actions, as well as the Soviet occupation that halted the nation's independent development for fifty years. Whereas the first article in this section discusses the attempts made to prevent the establishment of an independent Estonian state, the last article tells of the mechanisms used to keep Estonia under Moscow's control.

In summary, this issue provides a very brief bird's-eye view of the last thousand years of Estonian history.

Although every author in this issue has written a number of substantial articles, only one of each author's articles has been selected. Naturally, the number of authors deserving publication is much greater than we could possibly fit between the covers of a single issue. We also want to point out that the authors' age differences span more than half a century between the youngest and the oldest. Alongside those who received their historical education in Estonia, we include scholars who acquired their education in the United States, Great Britain and Sweden. Many of the authors have worked, some briefly, some extensively, in Western universities.

In addition to materials published in the magazine *Tuna*, this compilation also includes articles from the proceedings of the Estonian Historical Archives, in hopes of providing a more comprehensive overview.

Although a large number of original documents have been published alongside articles over the years in the Estonian-language *Tuna*, such original documents are incompatible with the format of the present issue. We do, however, make an exception for photographic documentation, particularly because photographs represent more than a mere decorative element; they contain essential information about various historical eras.

Since *Tuna* is a scholarly magazine, this compilation is meant primarily for our colleagues throughout the world, as well as for all others who wish to discover Estonia and to understand Estonians' current endeavors and fears through understanding the past of this people and country.

Pleasant reading!

Ott Raun

Editor-in-Chief of the historical-culture magazine *Tuna*

Millennium Breakthrough. North goes West

Ivar Leimus

"Let us be Estonians, but also become Europeans!" cried Gustav Suits nearly a century ago. "We have always belonged in Europe!" announced President Lennart Meri at the new national awakening. Rhetoric notwithstanding, the president was right. Estonia's intellectual and material culture is fully European, albeit with a strong dose of the spirit of the clever old barnkeeper. This is not a legacy of the socialist era, but something deep in our very roots, ingrained in our psyche in the manor barns and the old sauna. But before that, before our convoluted history forced Estonians to steal from the granary of their master or the forests of the crown – how were things back then? Was the manner in which the brave men of Saaremaa plundered Denmark and Sweden European or Asiatic? How were we viewed by the Germans who baptized our forefathers?

As Robert Bartlett so vividly describes in his excellent book,[1] the borderlands were transformed into Europe by a complex expansion – ecclesiastic, aristocratic-military and economic. The native populations of today's Latvia and Estonia, which together comprised Livonia, were baptized in the late 12th and early 13th century. At the same time, the land was conquered by the Danish king and the German bishops, who imported the feudal system and its relationships to Livonia and used it to establish small European-style states. All this is well known, thanks to chronicles and other written sources that begin shedding light on conditions in Livonia from the late 12th century onward. Thus, in the religious and even social sense, Estonia was Europeanized in the first decades of the 13th century.

Things were a little different on the economic scene. It is true that the conquest established the feudal system of manufacturing and taxation in our land. But commercial relationships between Estonians and their neighbors had already been in place for a long time. To avoid reaching too far into the past, let us limit ourselves, for the purposes of this article, to the Viking Age and the subsequent Late Iron Age, i.e. the 9th–12th centuries, which is traditionally considered to be the end of our ancient era. There are almost no written records of this era; however, the ancient finds that are still occasionally being discovered give testimony of the activities during that time. For the most part, these are not actually items discovered during archaeological excavations, which typically unearth treasures of local origin, with the exception of a few weapons. Much more information is revealed to us by our silver hoards – the *crème de la crème* of ancient Estonian prosperity[2].

Such hidden treasures are not found only in Estonia, but all around the Baltic Sea – in the Scandinavian countries, particularly Sweden, in great numbers in Russia

[1] **Robert Bartlett**, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change 950–1350* (Princeton, 1993).

[2] Gold is extremely rare and exceptional in the northern countries. One Viking-Age gold coin has been found in Estonia; six have been found in Sweden.

and Poland, but also in Finland, Latvia, and elsewhere. During the Viking Age, an economic system based on weighed currency reigned in these countries, meaning that silver was not counted out by pieces, but rather weighed. Thus, a coin as well as a piece of necklace or a flattened silver bead were equally legitimate as legal tender. And for this reason, ancient coin hoards sometimes include jewelry or larger chunks of precious metals in the form of hoops or bars. The hidden treasures of that time usually include only a few isolated items of jewelry, too few to allow any conclusions to be drawn. Most of those pieces originate from local tribes or close neighbors.[3] Besides, archaeologists know full well the difficulties presented by attribution and dating of unearthed artifacts. It is altogether a different story with discovered coins, which contain a myriad of information in the truest sense of the word. Here we are dealing primarily with foreign money, since the science of coin stamping in the countries concerned was either in its infancy or altogether nonexistent.

A large number of these coins have been found in the Baltic region – estimates approximate nearly half a million! However, we must acknowledge that the silver that has not only survived to the present time, but has also been discovered and recorded, most certainly represents only a minute fraction of the silver that was in use at one time. American scientist Giles Carter has proposed a formula according to which the coins found and recorded represent only about 1/2000 of the total silver imports.[4] Thus, the total number of coins that were brought to the Baltic region in the Viking Age may approach one billion! During the Viking Age, two types of coins were in use here – the eastern dirham weighing an average of 3 grams, and the Western European deniers weighing two or three times less. Even if we consider this index to be too pessimistic by an entire order of magnitude, it still means that hundreds of tons of silver must have reached these countries. According to economic principle, an influx of money into a country signifies its positive trade balance with the country exporting the money. The quantities of precious metals mentioned here indicate that the (long-distance) trade of the Baltic region must have been unusually lively and abundant. Therefore, we can say that these regions had extremely close economic ties to their trade partners. All that is left is to investigate when and with which countries they conducted their business.

Today's numismatists generally agree that the flow of coin silver to this area began around 800 A.D. Around that time, the first pots of money were buried in Old Ladoga and Poland-Prussia, a little later in Gotland and other areas. Even in Estonia, the enterprising men of Rõuge began trapping beavers and selling their pelts to foreign countries in the early 9th century. In exchange, they received shiny silver spangles, of which some managed to fall out of a ragged pocket to later delight the archaeologists digging at the Rõuge fortress in the 1950s. Little wonder, because these were dirhams that originated from a faraway Arabian caliphate, minted in the capital of the renowned ruler Harun ar-Rashid, a town then known as Madinat as-Salam (today's infamous city of Baghdad). Mixed in with them were coins from other caliphates

[3] E.g. **Evald Tõnisson**, "Eesti aardeleiud 9.–13. sajandist" [Archaeological finds of valuables from the 9th–13th century in Estonia], in H. Moora, ed., *Muistsed kalmed ja aarded [Ancient burial mounds and hoards]. Arheoloogiline kogumik 2* (Tallinn, 1962), pp. 207–236; *Eesti esiajalugu [Estonian prehistory]* (Tallinn, 1982), pp. 358–360; **Birgitta Hårdh**, *Silver in the Viking Age: A Regional-Economic Study. Acta Archaeologica Lundensia, series in 8°, 25* (Stockholm, 1996), pp. 78–83; **Wladyslaw Duczko**, Birka V. The filigree and granulation work of the Viking period: An analysis of the material from Björkö (Stockholm, 1985), pp. 111–112.

[4] **Thomas S. Noonan**, "Dirham exports to the Baltic in the Viking Age: some preliminary observations," in Kenneth Jonsson, Brita Malmer, eds., *Sigtuna Papers: Proceedings of the Sigtuna Symposium on Viking-Age Coinage 1–4 June 1989. Commentationes de nummis saeculorum IX–XI in Suecia repertis. Nova series* 6 (Stockholm–London, 1990), p. 255 et seq.

in other Oriental centers.[5] It is important to emphasize that the hoards of that time in Russia as well as all the Baltic Sea countries consisted only of Arabian money.

The location of these hoards on the map reveals that two primary trade routes were used at that time. In those days, most travel took place over water, although occasionally, the boats/ships would have to be dragged across dry land. The most famous route, recorded in Nestor's Chronicle as the route "from the Varyags to the Greeks" began at the Baltic Sea, proceeded to the major towns of northwestern Russia, from there across land and water to the Don and particularly the Dnepr River, and along these rivers to the Black Sea. Beyond the sea lay Byzantium and the Islamic world. From the start, a significant role was played by "Mother Volga" which was reachable from the Baltic Sea across ancient Russian centers and the expansive regions inhabited by our kindred Finnic peoples, and which finally flowed into the Caspian Sea. Beyond that lay the expanse of the Orient.

In the 9th century, relatively little of the valuable white metal reached the distant Northern lands. For instance, only three noteworthy coin hoards of that time have been found in Estonia.[6] A significantly greater number of finds have been made in other regions, and yet their numbers are still meager when compared to those originating from the next century.[7] Then, the origins as well as the volume of silver exports started to change. And still, the coins were, without exception, of Eastern origin. At the end of the 9th century, coins minted in Northern Africa and particularly Mesopotamia were joined and even replaced by silver coins struck in Central Asia, primarily Samarkand and ash-Shash (today's Tashkent), and somewhat later, also in Bukhara. At that time, it was the land of the Samanids, ruled by emirs who were actually independent of the caliphs sitting in Baghdad. Nobody can estimate the total amount of money that flowed from the Samanid capitals to the west and north, but today, certainly more than one hundred thousand coins of this silver hoard have been found primarily in Russia, Sweden and Poland, as well as elsewhere in the weighed-currency commerce region.[8] Estonia's largest treasure of Eastern silver, a hoard hidden around the mid-10th century in Saue, may initially have included up to ten kilograms of the precious metal in the shape of coins, money-rings and neck-rings. We know of other such hoards, although most ancient coins have met their end in a silversmith's crucible. In Estonia, we currently know of more than 40 hoards consisting mainly or exclusively of Arabian coins. And yet, there are hundreds of such known hoards in Gotland.

European chronicles tell us of the Vikings' merciless westward campaigns of plunder, to the land of the Franks, and to England. Of the tons of silver they purportedly received as ransom, only a handful of coins have been found in the Northern countries,[9] an amount that pales in comparison to the vast wealth that came from the Orient. The difference is about a thousandfold! The West was certainly poorer than the East at that time, but

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[5] **Ivar Leimus**, **Mauri Kiudsoo**, "Koprad ja hõbe" [Beavers and silver], *Tuna* 4 (2004), pp. 31–47.

[6] **Ivar Leimus**, *Sylloge of Islamic coins 710/1 – 1013/4 AD: Estonian public collections. Thesaurus Historiae* 2 (Tallinn, 2007), nos 2–4; **Ivar Leimus**, "Finds of Kufic coins in Estonia. Preliminary observations," *Wiadamości Numizmatyczne* 2 (178) (2004), p. 160, tab. 1.

[7] See also **Thomas S. Noonan**, "The Vikings in the East: Coins and Commerce," in Björn Ambrosiani, Helen Clarke, eds., *Developments Around the Baltic and the North Sea in the Viking Age. The Twelfth Viking Congress. Birka Studies* 3 (Stockholm, 1994), pp. 223, 227.

[8] **Noonan**, "Dirham exports to the Baltic in the Viking Age," p. 255; **Noonan**, "The Vikings in the East," pp. 223–224.

[9] **Kolbjørn Skaare**, "Die karolingischen Münzfunde in Skandinavien und der Schatzfund von Hon," *Hamburger Beiträge zur Numismatik* 20 (1966), p. 393; **Kenneth Jonsson**, "The routes for the importation of German and English coins to the Northern Lands in the Viking Age," in Bernd Kluge, ed., *Fernhandel und Geldwirtschaft: Beiträge zum deutschen Münzwesen in sächsischer und salischer Zeit: Ergebnisse des Dannenberg-Kolloquiums 1990* (Sigmaringen, 1993), pp. 206–207.

not to that degree. What happened to the treasures plundered from the Franks; why are there almost no traces left? This topic has been discussed repeatedly, with unconvincing conclusions. Numismatists and some archaeologists now tend to believe that: 1) information recorded in the chronicles may be greatly exaggerated and tendentious, 2) the money plundered from the West was spent right there on site, and 3) trade, rather than looting raids, was the main means of acquiring foreign silver money.[10]

The latter version is most likely since we cannot possibly presume any use of force by the Varyags in the Arabian caliphate, the origin of a significantly large quantity of the silver. In those times, men of Slavic, Norman, and (why not?) Finnic origin could be found in Baghdad, primarily as mercenaries and harem-guarding slaves. The pay was not bad – a common soldier could earn 80 dirhams in a month, with officers naturally earning much more;[11] however, it is hardly believable that this is the source of the wealth of silver found in the lands along the Baltic Sea. White-skinned Northern peoples held more or less similar positions in Byzantium as well, but coins from Constantinople are quite rare in the Baltic hoards, with the exception of a few extraordinary finds.[12] Besides, the Turkic-speaking Bulgars (not to be confused with today's Bulgarians-Slavs) living on the banks of the Volga embraced Islam in the early 10th century. From this point onward, and probably even earlier, travelers of other faiths were no longer given passage to areas farther east, including the silver-rich land of the Samanids. It is exactly this Central Asian money that makes up the vast majority of coins found in the hoards of our own country and those of our neighbors.

We do not know specifically how commerce was conducted at that time. However, we do know that Islamic countries began refusing entry to infidels in the 10th century, and transactions had to be concluded in Volga-Bulgar towns. Here, Finno-Ugric Veps and Scandinavian and Slavonic Rus (*saqaliba*) merchants met with their Muslim or Bulgar colleagues to exchange the goods they had brought with them for silver dirhams.[13] Gardizi, a scholar working in the land of the Ghaznavides, tells us the following about commerce in the Bulgar region on the mid-Volga River: "They break apart the dirhams and use each piece. Later, they give the dirhams to the Rus and the *saqaliba*, because those people will not sell their goods for anything else but minted dirhams."[14] Although Gardizi's work "Adornment of Narratives" was written in the mid-11th century, it also describes events and circumstances of earlier times.

Arabian chroniclers of that period also mention a variety of products that were being sent eastward from the North and West, primarily pelts and slaves, but also honey and wax.[15] The most detailed list can perhaps be found in Arabian geographer al-Mukaddasi's

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[10] Estonian-language review: **Ivar Leimus**, "Viikingid — röövlid või kaupmehed?" [The Vikings – robbers or traders?], *Tuna* 1 (2006), pp. 17–29.

[11] **М. Н. Федоров**, "Ещё о покупательной способности дирхема и динара в Средней Азии и сопредельных с нею странах в IX–XII вв.," *Советская археология* 2 (1972), p. 75.

[12] E.g. the hoard from Võlla which could contain up to 300 Byzantine miliaresia, see **Arkadi Molvõgin**, *Die Funde westeuropäischer Münzen des 10. bis 12. Jahrhunderts in Estland. Numismatische Studien 10* (Hamburg, 1994), no. 8; about Sweden: **Inger Hammarberg**, **Brita Malmer**, **Torun Zachrisson**, *Byzantine Coins found in Sweden. Commentationes de nummis saeculorum IX–XI in Suecia repertis. Nova series* 2 (Stockholm–London, 1989).

[13] **А. Л. Монгайт**, "Абу Хамид ал-Гарнати и его путешествие в русские земли в 1150–1153 гг.," *История СССР* 1 (1959), p. 173; **Андрей П. Ковалевский**, *Книга Ахмеда Ибн-Фадлана о его путешествии на Волгу в 921–922 гг.: статьи, переводы и комментарии* (Харьков, 1956), pp. 143–146.

[14] **Василий В. Бартольд**, "Отчет о поездке в Среднюю Азию с научной целью 1893–1894 гг.," in *Сочинения* 4 (Москва, 1966), p. 58.

[15] **Владислав П. Даркевич**, *Художественный металл Востока VIII–XIII вв.: Произведения Восточной торевтики на территории Европейской части СССР и Зауралья* (Москва, 1976), p. 148; **Joachim Herrmann**, "Slawen und Wikinger in der Frühgeschichte der Ostseevölker," in *Wikinger und Slawen* (Berlin, 1982), pp. 126–140.

work of 985–986: "The Best Organization of Knowledge of the Regions". According to him, the pelts of sables, gray squirrels, martens, corsac foxes, beavers, rabbits and deer, as well as wax, arrows, poplar bark, hats, isinglass, fish teeth and beaver musk (an afrodisiac!), ambergis, processed pelts, honey, hazelnuts, falcons, swords, chain mail, birch bark, *saqaliba* slaves, sheep and carpets were hauled from Volga-Bulgar to Horezm and distributed there.[16] It is apparent that most of the listed goods had been brought from the North and West to the Bulgars, who served as middlemen. We will leave some items, particularly foodstuffs, out of this discussion. For instance, honey was not particularly expensive. In the 11th century, one dinar[17] could buy 100 mans, or 60–80 kg, of honey[18] in Western Iran, meaning that 4-6 kg of the sweet stuff could be purchased for one dirham.

The slave trade was widespread in the East (as it was in the West), and the price of a living labor-saving device was quite high, usually between 100–500 dirhams. Some were glad to pay several thousand dirhams or even more for a beautiful young female dancer.[19] However, shorter distances must have been preferred for the transport of slaves, for this was a commodity that could spoil on a longer journey. The trip from Bulgar to Horezm was expected to take three months.[20] This was an ancient highway, downstream along the Volga and the Caspian Sea. It was also a great distance from the far northern lands to Bulgar on the Volga, along rough terrain. Still, in the 10th century, slaves were being sold, for instance, in Prague, and then transported to Oriental markets.[21]

Oriental peoples undoubtedly had a high regard for Western swords, which the Rus traders were already supplying for them in 9th century, according to ibn Hurdadbih.[22] Although the best sword blades of the Franks were hewn along the Rhine, the weapons took their final form on the shores of the Baltic Sea, with a remarkable number taking shape in the forges of Estonian blacksmiths.[23] Unfortunately, we have no information on the price of these swords in the Orient; however, a good weapon cost around 100 deniers (about 40 dirhams) in the West around 1000 B.C. But only Allah knows how extensive the sale of European weapons to Islamic fighters may have been.

Particularly noteworthy in Eastern European imports is the volume of furs. On the other hand – furs were not particularly expensive. A squirrel pelt cost a Slav no more than one dirham.[24] A pine marten pelt cost about the same.[25] However, the farther the final destination, the higher the transport costs and the greater the risks. According

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[16] **Абу-Абдаллах ал-Мукаддаси**, "Наилучшее распределение для познания стран. Ахсан ат-такасим фи ма'рифат ал-акалим," trans. С. Волин, *Материалы по истории туркмен и Туркмении,* vol. 1 (Москва, 1939), p. 325.

[17] One dinar — an Arabic gold coin weighing 4.23 g — equaled 15 dirhams during the period under discussion (10th century).

[18] **Федоров**, "Ещё о покупательной способности дирхема и динара в Средней Азии и сопредельных с нею странах в IX–XII вв.," p. 77.

[19] Ibid., p. 78.

[20] **Даркевич**, *Художественный металл Востока VIII–XIII вв.,* p. 149.

[21] **Ibrahim Ibn Jakub**, [Reisebericht], in Georg Jacob, ed., *Arabische Berichte von Gesandten an germanische Fürstenhöfe aus dem 9. und 10. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 1927).

[22] **Василий В. Бартольд**, "Арабские известия о русах," in *Сочинения* 2:1 (Москва, 1963), pp. 825–826.

[23] For information on the numerous smiths in 11th century Estonia, see **Kristina Creutz**, *Tension and tradition: A study of Late Iron Age spearheads around the Baltic Sea. Theses and papers in archaeology. New series, A* 8 (Stockholm, 2003), particularly pp. 166–200.

[24] Повесть временных лет, here and henceforth D. S. Likhachev's translation on the Internet. В год 6367 *[859]*... *А хазары брали с полян, и с северян, и с вятичей* ***по серебряной монете*** *и* ***по белке*** *от дыма.* Interpreting this written segment is not as easy as it may seem. It remains unclear whether a household had to pay a squirrel pelt as well as money, or only one of the two. Either way, the price of a pelt seems to have equaled one silver coin. At that time, the only possible silver coin could have been an Arabian dirham.

[25] **Herrmann**, "Slawen und Wikinger in der Frühgeschichte der Ostseevölker," p. 106.

to Gardizi (1st half of the 11th century), the Rus and *saqaliba* merchants charged twice as much for a pine marten pelt in Volga-Bulgar than they did at home.[26] The same prices, more or less, must have been in effect during the immediately preceding era as well. Furs were valued much more highly in the Orient, and trade with this commodity could bring in profits of more than 1000%.[27] Since the Northern traders conducted their business with the East primarily in the capitals of the Khazars and Volga-Bulgars, we must take the relatively low prices that were charged there into account when calculating the volume of trade in furs and pelts. If we now recall the vast numbers of coins that reached the shores of the Baltic Sea from the Orient, we realize that hundreds of millions of fur-bearing animals must have sacrificed their pelts to the market, even assuming that the proportion of pelts within the total volume of trade was relatively small.

At the time, one dirham was an Eastern artisan's average daily salary. A bathhouse attendant could earn two or three times as much. More qualified professions, for instance teaching, merited significantly higher pay. Since the daily minimum for subsistence was about half a dirham,[28] a hard-working man, living frugally, could save hundreds of silver coins each year. Thus, the pots of gold and silver in Oriental tales may not be merely the objects of the storyteller's fantasy. The East enjoyed noteworthy purchasing power. Therefore, the seemingly incredible numbers of exported coins mentioned above may actually be well founded in fact. If we assume that East-West trade volume averaged one million dirhams a year, this would equal three thousand silver coins each day. Thus, it is not as improbable as it might seem at first glance.

For the uninitiated, each dirham bears the name of the ruler who emitted it, and the place and time of its minting. This provides historians with an unparalleled opportunity to date hoards of Arabian coins down to the year, and to do so in conditions where written sources on the early history or the Northern lands are all but nonexistent. Nestor's Chronicle does tell us a few things, as do the Scandinavian sagas, but these were not recorded in writing until much later. Even the Arabian authors are not particularly credible because they spent most of their time copying from each other, writing about their own affairs and not ours.

What do the coins minted in the faraway East tell us? Let us take a closer look at their occurrence in various weighed-currency lands. It becomes clear that the picture is far from uniform, despite apparent similarities. The heyday of Arabian coin materials in Gotland was clearly in the late 9th century – early 10th century between 890–920/930.[29] Even before mid-century, especially after 955, the flow of Eastern silver (from both the Samanids as well as other dynasties) to Gotland diminished abruptly.[30]

A certain small and brief increase in Eastern coin exports to Gotland occurred at the very end of the 10th century and early 11th century; however, this was now the money of completely different ruling clans – the Buyids, Hamdanids, the Uqailids, the Marwanids

[26] **Бартольд**, "Отчет о поездке в Среднюю Азию с научной целью 1893–1894 гг.," p. 58; **Б. Н. Заходер**, Каспийский свод сведений о Восточной Европе, text in the Internet: http://gumilevica.kulichki.net/Rest/rest0102.htm (accessed 27/11/08). However, since only isolated information exists about prices, they may have undergone some fluctuation over time.

[27] **Herrmann**, "Slawen und Wikinger in der Frühgeschichte der Ostseevölker," p. 106.

[28] **Федоров**, "Ещё о покупательной способности дирхема и динара в Средней Азии и сопредельных с нею странах в IX–XII вв.," pp. 73–74.

[29] E.g. **Thomas S. Noonan**, "Why did dirham imports into tenth-century Sweden decline?," in *Festskrift till Lars O. Lagerqvist. Numismatiska Meddelanden* 37 (Stockholm, 1989), pp. 295–301, here particularly pp. 296–297; **Noonan**, "The Vikings in the East," pp. 232–233.

[30] **Johan Landgren**, "Från Samarqand till Stora Sojdeby," (Uppsats i påbyggnadskurs i arkeologi vid Stocksolms Universitet, Numismatiska forskningsgruppen, 1998), pp. 7–8.

– primarily from Iraq, Horasan and Persia. A similar situation, albeit with some peculiarities, existed on the Swedish mainland.[31] The youngest Kufic coin found in Sweden bears the date 403 (=1012/3).[32]

However, coins minted in Western Europe, mainly Germany, had begun appearing beside the Arabian money some time earlier.[33] A particularly massive invasion of deniers into Sweden began during the rule of Emperor Otto III (983–1002), continuing well into the 11th century. In the final decade of the 10th century, numerous Anglo-Saxon pennies joined the German coins.[34] Correspondingly, dirhams almost completely dominated coin use in Gotland into the 970s, when the tide of Western European coins began rolling in, displacing the dirham almost completely within two decades.[35] Most of the Kufic money had also been driven out of Skåne by the 990s, although here a notably greater role was played by Northern semi-bracteates, apparently minted in Hedeby.[36]



Isolated Western coins found their way into Danish hoards as early as the mid-10th century.[37] The newest dirhams found in Denmark originate no later than 960–970.[38] By the 980s, the dirhams disappear from circulation, and the hoards from this time onward consist almost exclusively of European coins.[39] Only on the island of Bornholm do we know of a few later finds that include a notable amount of dirhams; the youngest find

[31] **Landgren**, "Från Samarqand till Stora Sojdeby," pp. 11–12.
[32] **Chr. Kilger**, "Myntfund och den vikingatida silverhandeln," *Myntningen i Sverige 995–1995. Numismatiska Meddelanden* 40 (Stockholm,1995), p. 32.
[33] **Stanisław Suchodolski**, "Die erste Welle der westeuropäischen Münzen im Ostseeraum," in Jonsson, Malmer, eds., *Sigtuna papers,* pp. 320–321.
[34] **Kenneth Jonsson**, *Viking-Age hoards and late Anglo-Saxon coins: A study in honour of Bror Emil Hildebrand's Anglosachsiska mynt* (Stockholm, 1987), p. 10.
[35] *Corpus nummorum saeculorum IX–XI qui in Suecia reperti sunt. 1, Gotland, Akebäck–Atlingbo* (Stockholm, 1975); *1, Gotland, 2, Bäl–Buttle* (Stockholm, 1977); *1, Gotland, 3, Dalhem–Etelhem* (Stockholm, 1982); *1, Gotland, 4, Fardhem–Fröjel* (Stockholm, 1982); see also **Kenneth Jonsson**, "The import of German coins to Denmark and Sweden c. 920–990," in Jonsson, Malmer, eds., *Sigtuna Papers,* 1990, pp. 139–143.
[36] **Cecilia von Heijne**, *Särpräglat: Vikingatida och tidigmedeltida myntfynd från Danmark, Skåne, Blekinge och Halland (ca 800–1130). Stockholm Sudies in Archaeology* 31 (Stockholm, 2004), 71–72, 159, diagr.
[37] **Jonsson**, "The import of German coins to Denmark and Sweden c. 920–990," pp. 139–141.
[38] **Anne Kromann**, "The latest Kufic coin finds from Denmark," in Jonsson, Malmer, eds., *Sigtuna papers,* p. 186.
[39] **von Heijne**, *Särpräglat,* pp. 71, 159, diagr.

dates from the year 1001.[40] The proportion of the European coins (which are just starting to circulate) in Danish finds is generally similar to that in Swedish finds.[41] Naturally, we see a significantly greater number of Hedeby semi-bracteates in circulation here.[42]



The known quantity of coins is much smaller in Finland. Actually, only a couple of finds are suitable for statistical analysis. Most of the coins of the Åsgårda hoard (tpq. 958/9) originate from the 910s; in the Emkarby hoard (tpq. 954/5), from the 930s.[43] Although German and English deniers do not appear in the finds of this area until around 1000, their proportion is surprisingly great from the very beginning.[44] This would allow us to believe that Finland established close ties with the West from the very beginning.

The money market of Poland and Eastern Germany, inhabited at that time by Western Slavic peoples, was dominated by Arabian coins until the mid-10th century. After that, their relative importance began to diminish. Most Arabian coins found in Poland are dated no later than 980, with the exception of some very isolated later specimens.[45] At the same time, by the mid-10th century, and in even greater numbers between 960–980, European money made its way into Poland.[46] We know of a great number of coin hoards in Greater Poland that include

[40] **Kromann**, "The latest Kufic coin finds from Denmark," p. 186; **von Heijne**, *Särpräglat,* p. 159, diagr., finds 5.35, 5.74.

[41] **Suchodolski**, "Die erste Welle der westeuropäischen Münzen im Ostseeraum," p. 320; **Jonsson**, "The import of German coins to Denmark and Sweden c. 920–990," p. 142.

[42] **von Heijne**, *Särpräglat,* p. 71.

[43] **Tuukka Talvio,** *Coins and coin finds in Finland AD 800–1200. Suomen Muinasismuistoyhdistys, ISKOS* 12 (Helsinki, 2002), p. 46.

[44] **Talvio**, *Coins and coin finds in Finland AD 800–1200,* p. 52, diagr. 1.

[45] **A. Bartczak**, "The early medieval silver hoard of Ciechanów in the light of Oriental coins," *Wiadomości Numizmatyczne* 1–2 (1996), pp. 50–51; **Marian Haisig, Ryszard Kiersnowski, Janusz Reyman**, *Wczesnośredniowieczne skarby srebrne z Małopolski, Śląska, Warmii i Mazur* (Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków, 1966), pp. 117–118.

[46] **Suchodolski**, "Die erste Welle der westeuropäischen Münzen im Ostseeraum," p. 320; **Peter Ilisch**, "Zum Schatzfund von Turwia in Grosspolen," in *Moneta medievalis. Studia numizmaticzne i historyczne ofiarowane Profesorowi Prof. Stanisławowi Suchodolskiemu w 65. rocznicę urodzin* (Warszawa, 2002), pp. 81–87.

large quantities of Western European coins from this time period.[47] At the turn of the millennium, deniers had achieved complete domination among the coins circulating there.[48] The same is true for Pommerania, which saw the arrival of German coins in the 970s and 980s,[49] after which they began to predominate.[50] In the hoards of 980-1000 Polabia, only a few Arabian coins remained.[51] In Masovia, they dominated coin use until the 970s,[52] when they were overtaken by Western deniers.[53] German coins had already dominated in Silesia from the 970s and 980s.[54] Therefore, Western European money had not only become naturalized in Scandinavia, Poland, and East Germany by the first millennium, but had also completely pushed aside the Arabian silver coins.

Eastern coins predominate in Russian finds until much later. Their importation continued unabated for nearly the entire 10th century.[55] This is particularly evident from the makeup of from the Denisy (Pereyaslav) hoard, which includes numerous Samanid and Buyyid coins from the 980s.[56] Only then did the flow of Oriental riches to Russia begin to diminish. The small revival noted in Gotland around the turn of the millennium was even less significant in Russia. Even so, despite the fact that the latest Kufic coins found in Russia were minted in 405 by the Hijra calendar (=1014/5 AD),[57] dirhams predominate in Russian finds from the turn of the millennium as well as a few later pe-

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[47] **Jacek Slaski, Stanieslaw Tabaczyński**, *Wczesnośredniowieczne skarby srebrne Wielkopolski* (Warszawa-Wrocław, 1959), no. 136 (Turew, tpq 955), 97 (Poznan, tpq 961), 86 (Obrzycko, tpq. 969), 118 (Sieroszewice, tpq. 976), 148 (Zalesie, tpq. 976), 132 (Trzebawie, tpq 983). The dates have been corrected according to P. Ilisch: **Ilisch**, "Zum Schatzfund von Turwia in Grosspolen."

[48] The following finds: Murczyn, Olobok II, Stepocin, Wielkopolska I, Olobok I, Gnjezno III, Jarocin, Starczanowo, Stroszki, Kąty, Ulejno *tpq*. 999–1006; ibid., no. 81, 88, 26, 41, 123, 127, 46, 138.

[49] **Teresa Kiersnowscy, Ryszard Kiersnowscy**, *Wczesnośredniowieczne skarby srebrne z Pomorza* (Warszawa-Wrocław, 1959), no. 174 (Światki II–III, tpq. 973), 198 (Widuchowa, tpq. 974?), 1 (Alexanderhof, tpq. 983), 113 (Niederlandin, tpq. 983), 142 (Rybice, tpq. 983), 152 (Slowianki, tpq. 983), 126 (Polczyn-Zdroje, tpq. 985), 153 (Slupsk I, tpq. 985).

[50] See also ibid., no. 105 (Moskorze, tpq. 991), 100 (Mierzeszyn, tpqq. 994), 13 (Bogucino, tpq. 995), 53 (Gralewo, tpq. 996), 197 (Wicimice, tpq. 996), 150 (Skowarcz, tpq. 1002), 31 (Gdansk-Okolica II, tpq. 1004), 77 (Kopytkowo, tpq. 1004).

[51] **Ryszard Kiersnowski**, *Wczesnośredniowieczne skarby srebre z Połabia* (Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków, 1964), no. 128 (Paretz, tpq. 965), no. 98 (Lebus, tpq. 991), 100 (Leetze, tpq. 983), 151 (Ragow, tpq. 1002), aneks F (Klein Roscharden, tpq. 996).

[52] **Anatol Gupieniec, Teresa Kiersnowscy, Ryszard Kiersnowscy**, *Wczesnośredniowieczne skarby srebrne z Polski środkowej, Mazowsza i Podlasia* (Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków, 1965), no. 57 (Maurzyce-Ruszków, tpq. 971); **Stanisław Suchodolski**, "Die erste Welle der westeuropäischen Münzen im 10. Jh. in Masowien und Mittelpolen," in *Commentationes numismaticae 1988. Festgabe für Gert und Vera Hatz zum 4. Januar dargebracht* (Hamburg, 1988), pp. 64–67 (Ciechanów, tpq. 974).

[53] **Gupieniec, Kiersnowscy, Kiersnowscy**, *Wczesnośredniowieczne skarby srebrne z Polski środkowej, Mazowsza i Podlasia,* no. 14 (Cekanowo, tpq. 1002), 19 (Dobra, tpq. 1009).

[54] **Andrzej Bartczak, Barbara Butent-Stefaniak**, "Skarb monet z X wieku z miejzscowości Lasowice, woj. Opolskie," *Wiadomości Numizmatyczne*, 1–2 (1997), pp. 61–63.

[55] **Z. B. Richard Vasmer**, "Der Münzfund von Peuth," *Beiträge zur Kunde Estlands* 12 (Reval 1927), p. 89; **Noonan**, "Why did dirham imports into tenth-century Sweden decline?," p. 300; **Павел Н. Петров, В. А. Калинин**, "Клады куфических дирхемов," in *Древности Поволжья и других регионов, вып. III, Нумизматический сборник,* 2 (Нижний Новгород, 2000), pp. 204–206; **Алексей В. Фомин**, "Древнерусские денежно-монетные рынки в 70-80-х годах X в.," in *Древнейшие государства Восточной Европы, 1992–1993* (Москва, 1995), pp. 63–73.

[56] **Р. Р. Фасмер**, "Куфические монеты Переяславского клада," in *Известия Императорской Археологической Комиссии,* вып. 51 (Petrograd, 1914).

[57] With one exception, a Gaznavide dirham from the 1030s (**А.С. Беляков, С.А. Янина**, "Колодезский клад куфических и западноевропейских серебряных монет 60-х годов XI в." in *Труды Государственного Исторического музея,* vol. 49, *Нумизматический сборник* 5, 2 (Москва, 1977), pp. 10–99, no. 542).

riods, thanks to the long-lived massive accumulation of Oriental silver.[58] Deniers did not drive out the dirhams until the middle of the 11th century.



It is logical to presume the similar changes in the contents of coin hoards, i.e. in the orientation of foreign trade, must also have occurred in Estonia. Truly, when we now look at the composition of our finds, we see that Arabian coins are distributed rather regularly from the 890s to the 940s. This is followed by a sudden decrease in their numbers, and then a small increase around the first millennium.[59] This phenomenon was noted, as we recall, on Gotland as well, with Uqailid, Marwanid, and to a lesser degree Qarakhanid dynasty coins predominating in both cases. To some extent, some older Abbasid, Buyid, and Hamdanid dirhams arrived along with them, almost all of them originating from the Tigris river basin. It is notable that although the total number of Arabian coins found on Gotland exceeds that of the finds in Estonia, the coins of the later dynasties named above are present in more or less equal numbers. Particularly few of these much later Kufic coins have been found in Poland. The situation is no more joyous in Russia. Therefore, it seems that it was mainly the Estonians who were maintaining direct ties to the Islamic world, primarily Mesopotamia, at the very end of the 10th and even the very beginning of the 11th century.[60] The newest Kufic coin found in Estonia bears the date 404 by the Hijra calendar (=1013/4 AD).

If we now compare the presence of Eastern and Western coins in Estonian hoards, we see that Arabian coins, despite the marked weakening of their influx volume, were completely dominant until the 980s and 990s. Only one find, the Kumna hoard (tpq. 965), constitutes an exception with its German, Bohemian and Hedeby deniers.[61] Not until the

[58] **В. М. Потин**, "Топография находок западноевропейских монет X–XIII вв. на территории Древней Руси," in *Труды Годсударственного Эрмитажа,* vol. 9, *Нумизматика* 3 (Ленинград, 1967), no. 175 (Старый Дедин), 195 (Новый Двор), 198 (Свирстрой II), 209 (Старая Ладога III), 222 (Денисы), 280 (Васьково), 284 (Поречье), 303 (Ложголово), 306 (Стражевичи I–II), 380 (Собачьи Горбы). The authenticity of the composition of this hoard has been called into question by **Richard Vasmer**, "Ein neuer Münzfund des elften Jahrhunderts in estnischem Privatbesitz," in *Õpetatud Eesti Seltsi Aastaraamat. Sitzungsberichte der Gelehrten Estnischen Gesellschaft 1934* (Tartu, 1936), pp. 194–195.

[59] **Leimus**, "Finds of Kufic coins in Estonia. Preliminary observations," p. 158, figure 4–5.

[60] **Ivar Leimus**, *Die letzte Welle des orientalischen Münzsilbers im Norden*. In publication.

[61] **Molvõgin**, *Die Funde westeuropäischer Münzen des 10. bis 12. Jahrhunderts in Estland,* no. 1.

very end of the millennium did Western coins begin to play a significant part in Estonian finds. However, until the second decade of the 11th century, Arabian money retained a certain relative importance beside Western European deniers in Estonian commerce.



Therefore, the content of Estonia's hoards lies temporally somewhere between Poland-Scandinavia and Russia. Our forefathers turned their gaze toward Europe around the year 1000. Our transition from Oriental silver to Western coinage took a couple of decades, just as it did elsewhere. This occurred somewhat later in Estonia than in our western neighbors, but earlier than in our eastern neighbors. However, we are not dealing with an "automatic" intermediate stage between East and West, because the hoards of each land have their own particular characteristics. And yet we must not forget that even Russia, particularly its northwestern and western regions, was also turning to face the West.

Consequently, the same processes occurred throughout this broad area of the world with small variances in timing. The flow of silver that began around 800 into Russia and the countries bordering the Baltic continued unabated until about the mid-10th century. This means that the economic relations of the Northern lands were conducted almost entirely with the Orient during the time in question. From the West, there came only a small amount of glass and ceramics, with the occasional weapon and decorative item.[62] The value of these items can in no way compete with the riches originating in the Orient. Besides, I have discussed only coins in this article. Other goods were acquired from Asia as well, such as artistically worked metal[63] and luxury items.

It took only a few decades, first in Sweden and Denmark, then Poland, then Estonia, and finally in Russia, for contacts with the East to weaken, abruptly in some areas, gradually in others, to finally and completely cease by about 1015. Although an explanation of this phenomenon has long been sought, researchers have not yet agreed on the reason that it happened. There are several possibilities. First, a decrease in Central Asian silver production and exhaustion of their mines – in other words, and Eastern silver crisis.[64] Unfor-

[62] E.g. **Holger Arbman,** *Schweden und das Karolingische Reich: Studien zu den Handelsverbindungen des 9. Jahrhunderts. Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademiens Handlingar 43 (*Stockholm, 1937).

[63] For details, see **Даркевич**, *Художественный металл Востока VIII–XIII вв.*

[64] E.g. **Валентин Л. Янин**, *Денежно-весовые системы русского средневековья. Домонгольский период* (Москва, 1956), pp. 128, 132.

tunately, we have no specific information that would confirm this theory, and besides, there are indications that no silver crisis existed in the Orient at that time.[65] Besides, Central Asia was not the only Eastern region to mine silver. Indeed, the Samanid emir Mansur had great difficulty in paying his military in the 950s,[66] but as we already indicated, silver imports to Sweden declined even before that. Second, political events such as Sviatoslav's military campaigns in the 960s, which defeated the Khazars, destroyed Bulgar and severed the ancient trade routes,[67] or the unrest in Russia after his death.[68] But we can refute even this possibility with the counterclaim based on the silver imports to Sweden. Besides, the position of the Bulgars became stronger as a result, at least for a time.[69] Third, there was the rerouting of the trade routes due to the destruction of the Samanid state and resulting change of trade structure in Asia, i.e. in the area of the origin of coin silver itself.[70] But the Gaznavid and Qarakhanid dynasties did not swallow the Samanids until the 990s, half a century after the influx of Eastern coins had diminished. Fourth, the decrease in the silver content of Arabian money, which actually did occur in the mid-10th century.[71] But as we have seen, the transport of coin silver into Russia continued for decades after that. Were the Slavs simply more doltish than the Vikings, willing enough to accept junk money?[72] This explanation seems a bit chauvinistic. Besides, Russia was ruled by the Varangians, i.e. Vikings that had come from Scandinavia. Fifth, the exponentially increasing needs of Eastern Slavic society, which used up all their imported silver.[73] In this case, the economic position of the Russians' forefathers would been so strong that it would have allowed them to monopolize all the Eastern trade and completely turn their backs to the West. However, since exactly the opposite took place just a short time later, this theory is hardly credible. Sixth, some time around 940, ties between Russia and Sweden may have slackened.[74] This would actually explain the differences between the contents of Russian and Swedish hoards; however, we would have to find out why this happened, and we would still be missing the answer to the main question regarding the disruption of ties to the Orient.

Any single explanation is probably inadequate, since circumstances were affected by a whole intermingled bundle of reasons. Let us leave this problem unsolved for now, and simply recognize that after ruling absolutely for several centuries, Oriental silver disappeared from the entire weighed-currency region within the space of a few decades. However, this did not mean that Eastern trade came to a standstill, but it did suffer a significant ebb. The Volga region's trade with Central Asia did not attain new vigor until the second half of the 12th century and early 13th century, in political and economic conditions that had changed considerably.[75]

Of course, nature abhors a vacuum. West-

[65] **Alfred E. Lieber**, "Did a 'silver crisis' in central Asia affect the flow of Islamic coins into Scandinavia and Eastern Europe?" in Jonsson, Malmer, eds., *Sigtuna papers,* pp. 207–212.

[66] **Vasmer**, "Ein neuer Münzfund des elften Jahrhunderts in estnischem Privatbesitz," p. 196.

[67] Ibid., p. 197.

[68] **Richard Vasmer**, *Ein im Dorfe Staryi Dedin in Weissrussland gemachter Fund kufischer Münzen. Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademiens Handlingar* 40:2 (Stockholm, 1929), p. 28.

[69] **Lieber**, "Did a 'silver crisis' in central Asia affect the flow of Islamic coins into Scandinavia and Eastern Europe?" p. 210.

[70] **Даркевич**, *Художественный металл Востока VIII–XIII вв.,* pp. 149–150; **Lieber**, "Did a 'silver crisis' in central Asia affect the flow of Islamic coins into Scandinavia and Eastern Europe?" p. 210.

[71] However, this was not particularly significant; see **Е.А. Давидович**, "Денежное обращение в Мавераннахре при Саманидах," in *Нумизматика и Эпиграфика*, vol. 6 (Москва, 1966), pp. 132–144.

[72] See also **Landgren**, "Från Samarqand till Stora Sojdeby," pp. 20–21.

[73] **Янин**, *Денежно-весовые системы русского средневековья,* p. 132.

[74] **Noonan**, "Why did dirham imports into tenth-century Sweden decline," p. 300.

[75] **Даркевич**, *Художественный металл Востока VIII–XIII вв.,* p. 160.

ern European deniers came into circulation instead of dirhams. Silver of European origin displaced the Eastern version of this precious metal with surprising speed. Naturally, the decisive turn got its start in the westernmost weighed-currency lands – Denmark and Poland – in the 970s. They also made swift inroads into Sweden and Gotland. By the end of the first millennium, all these regions were firmly linked to Western Europe. A little later, by about 1015, the orientation of economic relations changed fundamentally in Estonia, and in the following decades, in Russia as well.

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We will now discuss Western European numismatic issues in more detail. Here let us note that in the second half of the 11th century, the import of silver from the West began to diminish as well, ending almost everywhere by the end of the 11th century and early 12th century.[76] The quantity of found Western European deniers is no smaller than the quantity of found Arabian dirhams. Actually, by the early 1990s, finds along the Baltic coast had recorded more than 266,000 German and nearly 61,000 English pennies,[77] in addition to lesser amounts of money from other countries. Their numbers have certainly increased by now. According to Bernd Kluge's estimates, Germany alone could have exported about 250 million coins or 375 tons of silver.[78] Keeping in mind that Arabian coins reached our region mostly in the 10th century and European coins in the 11th century, the period of their import was about equal. Because the dirham weighed, on the average, nearly three times more than a denier, the volume of silver imports into weighed-currency lands remained more or less unchanged, in the broadest of terms. Thus, the export capacity of the land receiving the silver remained approximately the same. This is also true for Estonia, where finds of nearly 5,000 Arabian and about 13,000 Western European coins have been registered.[79]

Of course, it was not only precious metal that moved from West to East. Archaeologists claim that most of the sword blades in Eastern Europe in the 8th to the 11th century originated in the West, from the Rhine River region. Archeological materials are certainly much harder to date than coins. But it is not impossible. Good material for comparison is offered by Mati Mandel's statistics on the sword blades found in Estonia. According to him, of the items that are even approximately datable, seven originate from the turn of the 8th–9th century, and twelve from the second half of the 10th or first half of the 11th century. The rest of the centuries and half-centuries can claim one or two blades each.[80] A. Kirpichnikov has also ascertained that most of the renowned VLFBERTH-swords appeared in Northern and Eastern Europe in the middle and latter half of the

[76] **Arkadi Molvõgin**, "Die letzte Welle des westeuropäischen Münzsilbers der späten Wikingerzeit in Estland (1100–1158)," in Bernd Kluge, ed., *Fernhandel und Geldwirtschaft: Beiträge zum deutschen Münzwesen in sächsischer und salischer Zeit: Ergebnisse des Dannenberg-Kolluquiums 1990* (Sigmaringen, 1993), pp. 287–293; **Gert Hatz**, *Handel und Verkehr zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und Schweden in der späten Wikingerzeit: Die deutschen Münzen des 10. und 11. Jahrhunderts in Schweden* (Lund, 1974), pp. 47–51; **Gert Hatz, Vera Hatz**, *Die deutschen Münzen des Fundes von Burge I, Ksp. Lummelunda, Gotland (tpq 1143): Ein Beitrag zur ostfälischen Münzgeschichte. Commentationes de nummis saeculorum IX–XI in Suecia repertis. Nova series* 16 (Stockholm, 2001).

[77] **Jonsson**, "The routes for the importation of German and English coins to the Northern Lands in the Viking Age," p. 207.

[78] **Bernd Kluge**, "OTTO REX/OTTO IMP. Zur Bestandsaufnahme der ottonischen Münzprägung," in Bernd Schneidmüller, Stefan Weinfurter, eds., *Ottonische Neuanfänge: Symposion zur Ausstellung "Otto der Grosse, Magdeburg und Europa"* (Mainz, 2001), p. 86. Kluge bases his calculation on a slightly different index than the Americans, assuming that the number of coins recorded equals about one-thousandth of the total import.

[79] **Molvõgin**, *Die Funde westeuropäischer Münzen des 10. bis 12. Jahrhunderts in Estland,* pp. 579–581.

[80] **Mati Mandel**, "Eesti 8.–13. sajandi mõõkade tüpoloogiast ja dateerimisest" [Typology and dating of swords of 8th-13th century Estonia] in Lembit Jaanits, Valter Lang, eds., *Arheoloogiline kogumik. Muinasaja teadus* 1 (Tallinn, 1991), pp. 104–108.

10th century.[81] This information is uniquely correlated to the abundance of Arabian coins – the fewer the number of Eastern coins, the larger the number of Western swords, and vice versa. Particularly noteworthy is the most sword-rich period around the turn of the first millennium. Once again – the less interaction with the East, the more trade with the West.

There are two possible explanations for the change in economic orientation. First, the barbarian money-weighers were seeking new opportunities to quench their insatiable thirst for silver, and were finding them primarily in Germany. This was undoubtedly driven by Germany's first discovery of the Rammelsberg deposits in the Harz mountains and the start of mining around 968.[82] The Rammelsberg deposits, with their 28 million tons of ore, were the largest in the world at that time. To meet the demand, the Saxons began diligently mining silver and minting it into coins. They minted so-called Saxon pennies on a particularly large scale; these were silver spangles marked with barbaric stripes, on which the name of Otto is only rarely legible. They were minted in Magdeburg, where the local archbishop in 968 was granted the minting rights that had previously belonged to the local Moritz monastery.[83] However, apparently as a result of the Slavic uprising that began in 983, Magdeburg once again became a border town, and the Saxon coin-production center was transferred to the Harz mountains, where a whole series of mints began striking pennies with the names of the child king Otto III and his grandmother, the actual ruler of Germany, Queen Adelheid.[84] Tens of thousands of these coins have been discovered almost without exception outside their country of origin, in the weighed-currency regions we already know. This fact seems to verify the existence of active relations between the Northern peoples and the Germans. However, according to this script, the Vikings and Slavs would have been the initiators of Western-oriented relations, with the German mountain industry and mining actually serving to quench the savages' hunger for wealth.

However, we can also view the situation from a different perspective. Europe was just discovering a new world at that time. Robert Bartlett dates the expansion of Europe at about 950; according to Robert I. Moore, Europe's first revolution began around 970.[85] However, since Europe could expand only eastward, it was a time that could be characterized by the notorious slogan "*Drang nach Osten*." Under the imperial staff of Europe's

[81] **А.Н. Кирпичников**, *Древнерусское оружие*, vol. 1. *Мечи и сабли* IX–XIII вв. *Археология СССР. Свод археологических источников* E 1–36 (Москва–Ленинград, 1966), p. 38.

[82] E.g. Gert Hatz, Vera Hatz, Ulrich Zwicker, eds., *Otto-Adelheid-Pfennige: Untersuchungen zu Münzen des 10./11. Jahrhunderts. Commentationes de nummis saeculorum IX–XI in Suecia repertis. Nova series* 7 (Stockholm, 1991), pp. 12–13.

[83] For information about coinage in Magdeburg and in Saxony overall during the Ottonian era, see **Bernd Kluge**, *Deutsche Münzgeschichte von der späten Karolingerzeit bis zum Ende der Salier (ca 900 bis 1125)* (Sigmaringen, 1991), p. 27; **Bernd Kluge**, "Sachsenpfennige und Otto-Adelheid-Pfennige. Anfänge und Dimensionen der Münzprägung in Magdeburg und Sachsen zur Zeit der Ottonen," in Matthias Puhle, ed., *Otto der Grosse. Magdeburg und Europa,* vol. 1 (Mainz, 2001), pp. 417–426; **Kluge**, "OTTO REX/OTTO IMP," pp. 85–112.

[84] There is a great wealth of literature about the Otto and Adelheid pennies. Among the most substantial discussions are: **Vera Hatz**, "Zur Frage der Otto-Adelheid-Pfennige. Versuch einer Systematisierung auf Grund des schwedischen Fundmaterials," *Commentationes de nummis saeculorum IX–XI in Suecia repertis, Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien Handlingar, Antikvariska Serien* 9 (Stockholm, 1961), pp. 107–144; **Bernd Kluge**, "Überlegungen zu den Otto-Adelheid-Pfennigen. Stempelkritische Untersuchungen der Typen Hatz II (Dbg. 1166, 1170) und AMEN (Dbg. 1171)," in Jonsson, Malmer, eds., *Sigtuna papers,* pp. 371–378; Hatz, Vera Hatz, Ulrich Zwicker, eds., *Otto-Adelheid-Pfennige*; **Jonas Rundberg**, "Otto-Adelheid-Pfennige. Ett försök till revidering av en omdebatterad tysk myntgrupp från vikingatiden," (C-uppsats i Arkeologi, höstterminen 2000); **Kluge**, "Sachsenpfennige und Otto-Adelheid-Pfennige," particularly pp. 423–424.

[85] **Bartlett**, *The Making of Europe*; **Robert I. Moore**, *The first European Revolution c. 970–1215* (Oxford, 2000); for a broader and comparative discussion of the topic, see Jóhann Páll Árnason, Björn Wittrock, eds., *Eurasian Transformations, Tenth to Thirteenth Centuries: Crystallizations, Divergences, Renaissances. Medieval Encounters* 10 (Leiden, 2004).

most powerful rulers, the Ottonians, Germany's borders expanded remarkably, extending eastward all the way to the Oder. It saw the emergence of a new political construction, the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation (still called *imperium Francorum* at that time), centered in Saxony. Otto I spent more time there than in all his other regions. Little wonder – he himself was of Saxon descent. Perhaps it is not coincidental that as the Emperor began utilizing the Rammelsberg deposits in 968, he also succeeded in finally making Magdeburg the archdiocese "for all Slavic peoples on the other side of the Elbe and Saale, who have recently accepted the faith of God, or who must yet be converted."[86] Magdeburg became one of the country's most important cities. It was here that Otto the Great founded a cathedral and palatinate; it was here that he was buried. Mauritius, patron of the monastery and archdiocese, defender of the eastward expansion, became the country's most important saint.

Magdeburg's influence extended far beyond Germany's borders. Polish king Mieszko I submitted to baptism in 965, and soon thereafter, the first Polish bishop was ordained: Jordanus (968–982), who became the suffragan of Magdeburg in 970.[87] The German influence was tangible in the life of the Polish church during the time of the next bishop, Unger, as well. Not until 1000 did Poland get its own archdiocese directly under the Holy See, but even this was founded by the German Emperor Otto III.[88] Poland was already covered by a dense ecclesiastical network.[89] In western Slavic areas, the Sees of Meissen, Merseburg, and Zeitz, established for the Sorbs in addition to the Brandenburg and Havel archdioceses established earlier, were brought under Magdeburg.[90]

It was also Otto the Great's initiative to Christianize the Scandinavian countries. A distribution of labor was created among the leaders of the German Eastern mission – since Magdeburg was responsible for converting the Slavs, then the *ius missionis* in Scandinavia would be the responsibility of Hamburg-Bremen.[91] At Otto I's initiative and Pope Agapetus II's (946–955) approval, the Northern lands were brought under the Bremen-Hamburg archdiocese in 948; the archdiocese was also granted the right to ordain Danish bishops.[92] This privilege defined the destiny of the mission in the Northern lands for more than a century. Although the events of 948 could be considered mainly declaratory,[93] the same is certainly not true of subsequent events. As is written on the Great Jellinge Stone, King

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[86] Quote: **Bartlett**, *The Making of Europe*, p. 8.

[87] **Jerzy Strzelczyk**, "Die Christianisierung Polens im Lichte der schriftlichen Quellen," in Alfried Wieczorek, Hans-Martin Hinz, eds., *Europas Mitte um 1000*, vol. 1 (Stuttgart, 2000), pp. 487–489; http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06590b.htm (accessed 1/12/08).

[88] **Jerzy Strzelczyk**, "Das Treffen in Gnesen und die Gründung des Erzbistums Gnesen," in Wieczorek, Hinz, eds., *Europas Mitte um 1000,* pp. 494–497.

[89] **Zofia Kurnatowska**, "Die Christianisierung Polens im Lichte der archäologischen Quellen," in Wieczorek, Hinz, eds., *Europas Mitte um 1000,* pp. 490–493.

[90] For the most recent discussions of the situation during that time in Saxony, and specifically in Magdeburg, see different articles in the collections: Bernd Schneidmüller, Stefan Weinfurter, eds., *Ottonische Neuanfänge: Symposion zur Ausstellung "Otto der Grosse, Magdeburg und Europa"* (Mainz, 2001); Matthias Puhle, ed., *Otto der Grosse. Magdeburg und Europa,* vol. 1–2 (Mainz, 2001). An earlier academic summary, e.g. *Deutsche Geschichte,* vol. 1, Horst Bartel, Joachim Hermann, eds., *Von den Anfängen bis zur Ausbildung des Feudalismus Mitte des 11. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 1982), p. 372 et seq.

[91] **Lutz E. v. Padberg**, "Festigung und Ausbau des lateinischcen Christentums: Die ottonische Mission bei den Westslawen un Ungarn," in Wieczorek, Hinz, eds., *Europas Mitte um 1000,* p. 673.

[92] *Adamus Gesta Hammaburgensis ecclesiae pontificum,* lib. 2, cap. 3–4. J. A. Hellström (**Jan Arvid Hellström**, *Vägar till Sveriges kristnande* (Stockholm, 1996), pp. 117, 120) does doubt this, and prefers to link these events with the events of the Harald Bluetooth era. In his opinion, the earliest bishops to arrive in Denmark came from England. However, this mission drive remained very weak, producing no significant results.

[93] E.g. **Peter Sawyer**, "The process of Scandinavian Christianization in the tenth and eleventh centuries," in Birgit Sawyer, Peter Sawyer, Ian Wood, eds., *The Christianization of Scandinavia* (Alingsås, 1987), pp. 78–79.

Harald Blåtand (Bluetooth) (ca. 935/940–985) Christianized the Danes in about 965.[94] Since Harald had also become a vassal of Emperor Otto the Great, it goes without saying that Harald was Christianized by the German bishop Poppo.[95] His ties to Hamburg-Bremen are not clear, but it is notable that it was at the request of the Hamburg-Bremen archbishop Adeldag (937–988) that Emperor Otto I released the churches of Schleswig, Ribe and Åarhus in their Danish possessions of all monetary obligations and ordered the subjects living in these areas to serve only the bishops and to obey the church bailiffs.[96] The Odense diocese is also mentioned in Otto III's trustee government diploma of 988.[97] King Svend Tveskaeg (Fork-Beard) (985–1014) did try to break loose from German influence by contributing to English priests (to be discussed later). Despite his attempts, Danish bishops instated Adaldag, who was later canonized, and the Danish church remained under the sphere of influence of Bremen-Hamburg, at least officially.[98] This continued even throughout the rule of pro-England King Knud (Cnut) the Great (1018–1035), although the Germans were forced to engage in armed intervention in the 1020s to ensure that Bremen-Hamburg would prevail.[99] We cannot exclude the possibility that Knud actually supported German clerics in England.[100] Some manner of ties between Denmark and Germany are indicated also by the marriage of Knud's infant daughter Gunhild to the infant son of the German emperor.[101] The warmest relations of all existed between the Danish royal court and the Bremen See during the time of Archbishop Adalbert (1043–1072) and King Svend Estridsen (1047–1075). In 1047 and 1053, the popes granted Archbishop Adalbert and his successors the privilege of being legate and vicar to the Northern lands along with the right to ordain bishops.[102] Bremen gave the order to instate nine new bishops in Denmark.[103] The king himself was Adam of Bremen's main informer.[104]

At the end of the 10th century, the activity of Hamburg-Bremen gained vigor in Sweden as well.[105] Although we find no confirmation

[94] **Morten Warkind**, "Religionsmøde og trosskifte," in Niels Lund, ed., *Norden og Europa i vikingatid og tidlig middelalder* (København, 1994), pp. 164–165, 174. H. Janson has indicated that the Danes were Christian long before that, but in some different kind of way, and Harald made them Christians *perfecte*; see **Henrik Janson**, "Nordens kristnande och Skytiens undergång," in Henrik Janson, ed., *Från Bysans till Norden: Östliga kyrkoinfluensar under vikingatid och tidig medeltid* (Skellefteå, 2005), pp. 174–175. However, the extent of this Christianity is unknown.

[95] *Die Sachsengeschichte des Widukind von Korvei,* 5. Aufl., neu bearb. von Paul Hirsch (Hannover, 1935), pp. 140–141. We are not sure who this Poppo is; perhaps the Bishop of Würzburg, Poppo II (961–984).

[96] *Regesta Imperii. 2, Sächsisches Haus: 919–1024: Die Regesten des Kaiserreichs unter Heinrich I. und Otto I. 919–973* (Innsbruck, 1893), no. 395.

[97] **Tore S. Nyberg**, *Die Kirche in Skandinavien: Mitteleuropäischer und englischer Einfluss im 11. und 12. Jahrhundert: Anfänge der Domkapitel Børglum und Odense in Dänmark. Beiträge zur Geschichte und Quellenkunde des Mittelalters* 10 (Sigmaringen, 1986), p. 114.

[98] **Saxo Grammaticus**, *Gesta danorum,* lib. 10, cap. 11.5; see also *Adamus Gesta Hammaburgensis ecclesiae pontificum,* 2.23, 2.55; **Birgit Sawyer**, "Scandinavian conversion Histories,"in Sawyer, Sawyer, Wood, eds., *The Christianization of Scandinavia,* p. 91; **W. Bakken**, "English Influences in the Church in Scandinavia Before 1066," Oct 2000. http://members.aol.com/bakken1/angsax/scanchrch.htm (accessed 2007).

[99] **Niels Lund**, "Fra vikingeriger til stater. Træk af Skandinaviens politiske udvikling 700–1200," in Lund, ed., *Norden og Europa i vikingatid og tidlig middelalder,* p. 25; Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, vol. 39, pp. 323–324; **Lesley Abrams**, "The Anglo-Saxons and the Christianization of Scandinavia," *Anglo-Saxon England* 24 (Cambridge, 1995), p. 227.

[100] **Abrams**, "The Anglo-Saxons and the Christianization of Scandinavia," p. 228.

[101] **Lund**, "Fra vikingeriger til stater. Træk af Skandinaviens politiske udvikling 700–1200," p. 25; see also **Saxo Grammaticus,** *Gesta Danorum,* 10.17.

[102] **Abrams**, "The Anglo-Saxons and the Christianization of Scandinavia," pp. 231–232.

[103] **Hellström**, *Vägar till Sveriges kristnande,* p. 123.

[104] *Adamus Gesta Hammaburgensis ecclesiae pontificum,* 1.48.

[105] **Carl Fredrik Hallencreutz**, *När Sverige blev europeiskt: Till frågan om Sveriges kristnande* (Stockholm, 1993), pp. 38, 47.

of this in other sources, Adam of Bremen tells us that Archbishop Adeldag ordained the first Swedish bishop Odinkar even before 990.[106] King Erik Segersäll was baptized in Denmark, which was under the Bremen church at that time.[107] Bremen Archbishop Unwan (1013–1029), at King Olof Skötkonung's (ca. 994–1021/1022) request, instated the first diocese bishop Thurgot (Thurgaut) in Skara (Sweden),[108] and according to Saxo Grammaticus, some German may have actually Christianized the king himself.[109] Another source also points toward Germany. As missionary Bruno of Querfurt wrote to German king Heinrich II in 1008, his envoy had succeeded in baptizing the Swedish prince (*senior Suigiorum*).[110] Danish historiography is of the opinion that the initiative for the summoning of Hamburg-Bremen bishops came from Olof Skötkonung to counterbalance the pro-English orientation that was prevalent in Denmark at the time,[111] but apparently, the Germans themselves had no objection to the action.

The influence of the German church seems to have temporarily weakened here before the mid-11th century, since Thurgot's successor Gottschalk did not bother even to travel to the far Northern lands from Lüneburg.[112] The contentious cleric Osmund (more about him later) took advantage of the vacuum; although educated in Bremen, he had begun quarreling with the German church, and had himself appointed King Edmund's bishop by the independent Polish (Gniezno) church. This state of affairs irritated Hamburg-Bremen's new energetic archbishop Adalbert, who dispatched Adalward to serve as the new bishop at Skara; however, Osmund refused to recognize him.[113] At any rate, this episode was short-lived, and the next Bishop of Skara (Adalward the Elder, † ca. 1066) was appointed by Bremen. Adalward the Younger († before 1072) finally became the man to take the bishop's see from Skara to the capital Sigtuna, but he was summoned back to Bremen.[114] From this time onward, the bishops appointed in Bremen no longer cared to travel to the barbaric Northern lands, preferring to stay home.[115] Although the legal superiority of the Hamburg-Bremen church in Scandinavia during this period is incontestable, the initial era of religious conversion was nearing its end.[116] The situation in Germany and in all of Europe had changed. The rivalry between Anno, the

[106] *Adamus Gesta Hammaburgensis ecclesiae pontificum,* 2.23; **Hallencreutz**, *När Sverige blev europeiskt,* p. 48.

[107] **Hallencreutz**, *När Sverige blev europeiskt,* p. 49.

[108] *Adamus Gesta Hammaburgensis ecclesiae pontificum,* 2.56–57; **Hallencreutz**, *När Sverige blev europeiskt,* p. 51.

[109] **Saxo Grammaticus**, *Gesta Danorum,* 10.11.6 (refers to him as Unno, who, however, was archbishop much earlier, i.e. 916–936: *Utrum autem idem rex ab eo an a Bremensium pontifice Unnone sacrorum usum disciplinamque perceperit, parum comperi*. Apparently, Saxo or rather, his informant, confused the two similar-sounding names, intending to refer to "Unwan"). Still, Saxo is undecided whether the man who converted the people to Christianity may have actually been the Norwegian bishop Bernhard from England. According to later Swedish legends, Olof Skötkonung was baptized by an Englishman, and Norwegian king Olaf Tryggvesson was baptized by the court bishop Sigurd (Siegfried). This claim has now been disproven; see **Hellström**, *Vägar till Sveriges kristnande,* pp. 15–40. The ordination of Thurgot indicates Hamburg-Bremen instead.

[110] **Hellström**, *Vägar till Sveriges kristnande,* p. 122. Here we must call attention to the title *senior*, which seems to be rather inadequate for a king, but which may have been appropriate when referring to an Estonian elder of the early 13th century. Perhaps the missionary dispatched by Bruno baptized a local Swedish noble. Of course, only if the Swedes were refered to as *Suigiorum* at all.

[111] **Lund**, "Fra vikingeriger til stater. Træk af Skandinaviens politiske udvikling 700–1200," p. 22.

[112] **Hallencreutz**, *När Sverige blev europeiskt,* p. 54.

[113] *Adamus Gesta Hammaburgensis ecclesiae pontificum,* 3.14; Svenskt biografiskt lexikon. 13. Stockholm, 1950, p. 49; **Hallencreutz**, *När Sverige blev europeiskt,* pp. 35–37; **Abrams**, "The Anglo-Saxons and the Christianization of Scandinavia," p. 235.

[114] **Hallencreutz**, *När Sverige blev europeiskt,* pp. 55–56. J. A. Hellström (**Hellström**, *Vägar till Sveriges kristnande,* p. 148) believes that the two Adalwards are actually one and the same person.

[115] **Sawyer**, "The process of Scandinavian Christianization in the tenth and eleventh centuries," p. 93; **Abrams**, "The Anglo-Saxons and the Christianization of Scandinavia,"pp. 236–237.

[116] **Hellström**, *Vägar till Sveriges kristnande,* p. 124.

Archbishop of Colngne, and the policies of the papal curia, which defended the rights of the church (*libertas ecclesiae*) against the emperor in the Investiture Conflict, ruined Hamburg-Bremen's plans to establish a patriarchate in the Northern lands.[117]

Adam remains completely silent about one region of Scandinavia: the Baltic region's most important trade center of that time, the hoard-rich island of Gotland, which the power of the Bremen church apparently failed to reach. Swedish researchers have explained this stunning fact with the particular headstrong and independent character of the islanders, brought about by their great wealth, and have referred to the "Gutasaga," which tells us the following: "Although the Gotlanders were pagans, they sailed with their goods to all countries, whether baptized or pagan. There, the merchants saw the Christian customs practiced in Christian lands. Some allowed themselves to be baptized there, and brought Christian priests to Gotland." Erland Lagerlöf, on the basis of some 12th-century Byzantine-style murals in a few Gotland churches, believes that priests were brought in from the East,[118] but other researchers take a firmly opposing stance.[119] Ingmar Jansson considers the Eastern flavor of certain items and certain characteristics of Swedish burial customs, particularly in Gotland, to instead be an expression of the cultural unity of the Vikings in a broad region that included Scandinavia as well as their area of settlements in Russia.[120] A specifically planned Byzantine (or Kiev–Novgorod) church mission in Scandinavia is considered to be highly unlikely, although the relations of the Northern peoples with the East – in the personal, economic and also cultural sphere – were undoubtedly lively during the Viking era and early Middle Ages. Besides, the saga we refer to here was not recorded in writing until the 13th century. However, there is absolutely no information on when the summoning of the priests mentioned in the text took place. Considering Gotland's traditional trade relations with Germany that had been in place since the end of the 10th century, the priests may indeed have come from the West.

At times, the interests of the Germans extended beyond Scandinavia into the expanses of Russia. Arabian authors tell us that at some time around 300 or 333 by the Hijra calendar (912/913 A.D. or 944/945 A.D., respectively), the Rus (Varangians) had accepted Christianity, apparently from the Byzantine Empire (where the Varangian bands that had surrounded Constantinople were already baptized in 860). Perhaps these were the same men who swore allegiance to the next Kiev-Byzantine treaty in the Christian manner in the Elias Church of Kiev in 944.[121] Unfortunately, "this [Christianity] dulled their swords" and they dispatched four men to Horezm to become Muslims with the help of the shah.[122] But subsequently, princess Olga (baptized as Helena/Jelena), herself baptized in Constantinople,[123] requested a bishop and priests for her subjects from the German king Otto I in 959. In 960, Bremen archbishop Adaldag, already known to our readers, consecrated the Saint Alban monk Libutius as the bishop of the Ruges

[117] **Sawyer,** "The process of Scandinavian Christianization in the tenth and eleventh centuries," p. 95; **Hallencreutz**, *När Sverige blev europeiskt,* pp. 67–75.

[118] **Erland Lagerlöf**, "Gotland och Bysans. Östligt inflytande under vikingatid och tidig medeltid," in Janson, ed., *Från Bysans till Norden,* pp. 139–152.

[119] E.g. **Bertil Nilsson**, "Förekom det bysantiska influenser i tidig svensk kyrkohistoria?" in Janson, ed., *Från Bysans till Norden,* pp. 22–24, 30.

[120] **Ingmar Jansson**, "Situationen i Norden och Österuropa för 1000 år sedan," in Janson, ed., *Från Bysans till Norden,* pp. 37–95.

[121] **Elena Melnikova**, "Varangians and the Advance of Christianity to Rus in the Ninth and Tenth Centuries," in Janson, ed., *Från Bysans till Norden,* pp. 102–103, 109–110.

[122] **Б.Н. Заходер**, *Каспийский свод сведений о Восточной Европе,* 1. *Поволжье и Хорасан,* http://gumilevica.kulichki.net/Rest/rest0101.htm (accessed 2/12/08).

[123] See **Melnikova**, "Varangians and the Advance of Christianity to Rus in the Ninth and Tenth Centuries," pp. 114–119.

(Rus?); the bishop died shortly thereafter. The monk Adalbert of the Saint Maximinus monastery in Trier was dispatched to replace him, but his mission failed as well. In 962, Adalbert returned to Germany, becoming the first Archbishop of Magdeburg in 968.[124]

Russo-German relations gained new vigor around the first millennium. As Nestor's famous diary tell us, German missionaries again went to the Kievan prince Vladimir in 986. Some sources tell us that Norwegian king Olav Tryggveson played a role in the conversion of Vladimir, but the truth of this is highly doubtful.[125] However, the closest neighbors of the Russians were quite influential at that time – the Bulgars, the Kazars, and Byzantium, all engaged in mutual competition for Slavic souls.[126] Vladimir was most entranced by the glory of the Constantinople church services and the charms of the emperor's sister Anna (or rather, the political capital to be gained by marrying her).[127] In 988/989, Vladimir accepted Christianity from the Byzantium. However, some time passed before Russia became an Orthodox country. Around the turn of the first millennium, Rome and Kiev exchanged legations quite frequently, for instance in the years 991, 994, 1000 and 1001. This was probably due to a plan by Emperor Otto III and Pope Silvester II to create an extensive Catholic Roman federation.[128] Some time between 1005 and 1007, the missionary Brun of Querfurt, while staying in Hungary, took a trip to Russia and the Pechenegs, where he ordained a bishop.[129] Kiev did not receive metropolitan rights until 1034.

Written records cast somewhat less light on the competing English mission, which might be considered equally important in Scandinavia.[130] The main author, Adam of Bremen, writing against the backdrop of his own position and interests, is silent about the English mission or mentions it reluctantly, as a rule. If we disregard the ordination of English bishops by the mythical King Gorm before 948, apparently Svein Fork-Beard was the

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[124] http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01127b.htm; **Padberg**, "Festigung und Ausbau des lateinischcen Christentums," p. 673; **Melnikova**, "Varangians and the Advance of Christianity to Rus in the Ninth and Tenth Centuries,"p. 118.

[125] **Tatjana N. Jackson**, "The role of Olafr Tryggvason in the conversion of Russia," in Magnus Rindal, ed., *Three Studies on Vikings and Cristianization. KULTs skriftserie* 28, *Religionsskiftet* 1 (Oslo, 1994).

[126] *Повесть временных лет, "В год 6494 (986). Пришли болгары магометанской веры ... Потом пришли иноземцы из Рима и сказали: "Пришли мы, посланные папой", и обратились к Владимиру ... Сказал же Владимир немцам: "Идите, откуда пришли, ибо отцы наши не приняли этого". Услышав об этом, пришли хазарские евреи ..."* The dialogs are thought to be later fabrications, although the representatives' visit is generally thought to be real. By that time, Italy was already under the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation; Pope John XV (XVI) was a good friend of Germany's female rulers: Adelheid, widow of Otto I, and Theophano, widow of Otto II.

[127] *Повесть временных лет, "В год 6495 (987). ... Услышав об этом, патриарх повелел созвать клир, сотворил по обычаю праздничную службу, и кадила взожгли, и устроили пение и хоры. И пошел с русскими в церковь, и поставили их на лучшем месте, показав им церковную красоту, пение и службу архиерейскую, предстояние дьяконов и рассказав им о служении Богу своему. Они же были в восхищении ..."*
"*В 6496 (988) году... И рады были цари, услышав это, и упросили сестру свою, именем Анну, и послали к Владимиру, говоря: "Крестись, и тогда пошлем сестру свою к тебе". Ответил же Владимир: "Пусть пришедшие с сестрою вашею и крестят меня"."* The price for the emperor's sister was Vladimir's military assistance to Basileios II against the rebel Bardas Phokas. **William E. Watson**, "Ibn al-Athīr's Accounts of the Rūs: A Commentary and Translation," *Canadian/American Slavic Studies* 35 (2001).

[128] **Petr P. Toločko,** "Rom und Byzanz in der Kiever Rus' im 10.–11. Jahrhundert," in Michael Müller-Wille, ed., *Rom und Byzanz im Norden. Mission und Glaubenswechsel im Ostseeraum während des 8.–14. Jahrhunderts. Internationale Fachkonferenz der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft in Verbindung mit der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz. Kiel, 18.–25. September 1994,* 2 (Stuttgart, 1999), pp. 240–243.

[129] **Brygida Kürbis**, "Purpureae passionis aureus finis. Brun von Querfurt und die Fünf Märtyrerbrüder," in Wieczorek, Hinz, eds., *Europas Mitte um 1000,* p. 520.

[130] E.g. **Sawyer**, "The process of Scandinavian Christianization in the tenth and eleventh centuries,"pp. 105–107; **Hellström**, *Vägar till Sveriges kristnande,* pp. 129–157; **Bakken**, English Influences in the Church in Scandinavia Before 1066.

first ruler of Denmark to bring English priests into his country.[131] The Englishman Godebald became Bishop of Skåne (991–1021). But it was Knud the Great, king of Denmark and England, who reoriented the Danish church decisively toward the English church, which was managed by Alnoth, Archbishop of Canterbury. He sent the English Bernhard to Skåne, Gerbrand to Själland, and Reginberf to Fyn. A particularly powerful English mission was apparently operating in Odense.[132] Additionally, there is reason to believe that Knud wished to make Roskilde an archdiocese under Canterbury.[133] As mentioned above, only the intervention of the Germans succeeded in stifling this plan. The English influence was strong in the Danish church until the collapse of the North Sea empire by the end of the rule of King Hardeknud (1042). After this time, ecclesiastic power in Denmark once again belonged to Hamburg-Bremen and Archbishop Adalbert. However, this did not mean that the English mission perished. Henrik, the English Bishop of Lund, worked in that position until his death; English canons and monks continued their work as well.[134] According to Saxo, one Englishman, the Bishop of Roskilde Vilhelm (†1074), retained his position during the reign of King Svend Estridsen,[135] although other sources indicate that this position was filled by the former canon of the Hamburg-Bremen archbishop Adalbert.[136]

There are notably fewer written records about Sweden, and even most of these make up part of the 13th century strata of revised sources that are noteworthy for their anti-German sentiment.[137] Two English missionaries recognized by name, Sigfrid and Eskil, did not stir up any negative emotions in the generally neutral Adam of Bremen, which leads us to believe that they recognized the mission rights of the Germans and operated within that framework.[138] Besides, Sigfrid is given quite a mythical personality, while Adam does not mention Eskil at all. Still, we know that English missionaries from Norway and Denmark also preached in Sweden during the early 11th century.[139] Even the hotly disputed Osmund represents a link which may have temporarily promoted the English mission in Sweden, according to the *Liber Eliensis*.[140] Some archaeological finds and art history legacy give stronger indication of English influence.[141] The runic stones in particular tell us of Swedes who worked, were baptized, or died in England. Often, they were in the

[131] *Adamus Gesta Hammaburgensis ecclesiae pontificum,* 2.41; **Hellström**, *Vägar till Sveriges kristnande,* p. 141; **Bakken**, English Influences in the Church in Scandinavia Before 1066.

[132] **Hellström**, *Vägar till Sveriges kristnande,* pp. 141–142.

[133] **Lund**, "Fra vikingeriger til stater. Træk af Skandinaviens politiske udvikling 700–1200," p. 25.

[134] **Hellström**, *Vägar till Sveriges kristnande,* pp. 154–155.

[135] **Saxo Grammaticus**, *Gesta Danorum,* 11.2.

[136] *Dansk biografisk Lexikon,* vol. 18 (Kjøbenhavn, 1904), pp. 588–589.

[137] **Hellström**, *Vägar till Sveriges kristnande,* pp. 144–149.

[138] **Hallencreutz**, *När Sverige blev europeiskt,* p. 58.

[139] **Abrams**, "The Anglo-Saxons and the Christianization of Scandinavia," pp. 232–233.

[140] *Svenskt biografiskt lexikon,* vol. 2 (Stockholm, 1920), p. 378; **Hellström**, *Vägar till Sveriges kristnande,* pp. 149–152. Osmund's putative English origin is based upon a definition *Osmund de Sueðeda regione* found in the annals of the Ely monastery, penned at the end of the 12th century, in which *Sueðeda* is identified with Sweden. In J. A. Hellström's opinion (**Hellström**, *Vägar till Sveriges kristnande,* pp. 151–152), this is not certain, particularly because this written form for Sweden exists in only this single source. His suspicions seem to be founded, particularly because the place name Southwark, for instance, was abbreviated during the 11th century as *SVÐE, SVÐIEP, SVÐGE,* etc. (See **Bror Emil Hildebrand**, *Anglosachsiska mynt i Svenska kongliga myntkabinettet funna i Sveriges jord* (Stockholm, 1881), pp. 144–145, 299–300). It may even be likely that *Sueðeda* refers to a location in England, and Osmund, buried at Ely, had nothing at all to do with Sweden. However, if this is true, blaming the anti-German behavior of the Swedish Osmund on the competition of the English church is unfounded. According to what we know about Osmund, we may easily be dealing with a self-appointed adventurer.

[141] **Sawyer**, "The process of Scandinavian Christianization in the tenth and eleventh centuries," pp. 106–107; **Jörn Staecker**, "Bremen – Canterbury – Kiev – Konstaninopel? Auf Spurensuche nach Missionierenden und Missionierten in Altdänmark und Schweden," in Müller-Wille, ed., *Rom und Byzanz im Norden*, pp. 62–65.

service of the Danish king Knud the Great,[142] making Swedish contacts with England seem natural enough during his reign. Evidence of the English influence is shown by the culture of British saints prevalent in Scandinavia, including Sweden,[143] but it is extremely difficult to date this with any accuracy. Still, there is proof of the martyrdom of the English monk Wulfred in Sweden around 1030.[144]

The English orientation of the Scandinavian mission was disrupted at least temporarily in 1066, when the Norman William I conquered England and the rulers of the Northern lands returned to the bosom of the Hamburg-Bremen church.[145] The setback did not last long. Within the intensifying Investiture Conflict, the popes serving after about 1075 began supporting the Scandinavian rulers against the Germans' power grabs.[146] Once again, there are reports of the martyrdom of English clerics in Sweden in the 1080s.[147] In about 1086, the English Benedictine Hubald became Bishop of Odense, and in 1095–1096, 12 monks were dispatched to Odense from Evesham, at the request of King Erik Ejegod and the consent of William II.[148] The decisive transition took place in 1103/1104, when, as a result of Erik Ejegod's visit to Rome, the papal legate Cardinal Alberich selected Lund as the new Danish archdiocese center, and the local bishop Asger (Adzer), friend of Anselm of Canterbury, was given the right of wearing the pallium. From this time onward, Swedish dioceses were under the jurisdiction of Lund, until the establishment of the Uppsala archdiocese in 1164. In this way, the Northern church was released of its dependency on Hamburg-Bremen.[149]

There was a third component that marched to the same beat as the ecclesiastical and political expansion of Europe – economics. The expanding Western civilization was developing an ever greater need to consume more and more of the products that had at one time been transported to the markets of Baghdad, Bulgar, and Bukhara – wax for the ever-expanding network of churches and monasteries, animal furs and skins for the multiplying and increasingly wealthy elite. These were products that the peoples living on the shores of the Baltic Sea and the expanses of Russia had at one time offered for sale. This is not simply an assumption. A certain correlation between the areas from which missionary activity originated and the areas from which coins were exported is demonstrable. As described earlier, the secular and ecclesiastical power of Germany was directed very actively from Magdeburg in the direction of the Western Slavs, particularly after 968. Accordingly, the Saxon pennies from Magdeburg make up a large part of the early German coins found in Poland, next to the Bohemian and Bavarian deniers.[150] Denmark too became an early focus of German missionary work, although Christianity struggled to establish a firm footing there, suffering tremendous setbacks along the way. Even in Denmark, the Saxon pennies were quite prevalent beside the Hedeby semi-bracteates.[151] However, from the same period, extremely few Saxon pennies have been found in Sweden, with the exception of Skåne, which then belonged to Denmark. Instead, Sweden experienced a massive influx

[142] **Hallencreutz**, *När Sverige blev europeiskt,* pp. 38–41.
[143] **Hellström**, *Vägar till Sveriges kristnande,* pp. 152–154.
[144] **Abrams**, "The Anglo-Saxons and the Christianization of Scandinavia," p. 234.
[145] **Hellström**, *Vägar till Sveriges kristnande* p. 155; **Bakken**, English Influences in the Church in Scandinavia Before 1066.
[146] Abrams, "The Anglo-Saxons and the Christianization of Scandinavia," pp. 237–238.
[147] Ibid., p. 234.
[148] Ibid., pp. 238–239.
[149] Ibid., p. 238; http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09433a.htm (accessed 3/12/08).
[150] **Suchodolski**, "Die erste Welle der westeuropäischen Münzen im Ostseeraum," pp. 320–322; **Ryszard Kiersnowski**, *Pieniądz kruszowy w Polsce wczesnośredniowiecznej* (Warszawa, 1960), pp. 196–197; **Kluge**, "OTTO REX/OTTO IMP," p. 102.
[151] **Jonsson**, "The import of German coins to Denmark and Sweden c. 920–990," p. 142.

of later coins, the Otto-Adelheid deniers.[152]

Let us recall that Magdeburg lost its status as the center of coin minting due to the Slavic uprising of 983. Thus, the influx of greater quantities of German silver into Sweden began somewhat later than its flow into Poland and Denmark – a fact we discovered earlier while analyzing the proportions of Eastern and Western coins in various hoards. At this time, Danish silver imports also switched from Saxon pennies to Otto-Adelheid deniers,[153] which were also found with increasing frequency in Poland, although Saxon pennies still predominated.[154] At the same time, the Hamburg-Bremen archdiocese began showing a greater and more persistent interest in Denmark and Sweden. This was not necessarily coincidental. Apparently, it happened when the Slavic uprising severed trade between Germany and the peoples to the east.[155] The Teutons were then forced to acquire their forest products from Scandinavia, a region conveniently under the management of the church fathers of Bremen.

Tangentially – in light of these facts, is it too bold to assume that the most powerful princes of the Northern European church initiated the production of the Saxons' main export of that era – the Otto-Adelheid pennies? Indeed, Archbishop Adaldag worked as Otto I's secretary and accompanied him on his trip to Italy (961–965), perhaps even serving as the Italian vice-chancellor. In 965, Otto I granted the Hamburg-Bremen archdiocese the Bremen minting rights.[156] The fact that 8-year-old Otto III himself traveled to Wildeshausen near Bremen in 988 and gave the Bremen church three historical documents[157] lets us assume that Adaldag got along well with Adelheid, widow of Otto I and grandmother of Otto III. Archbishop Unwan expanded the power of the Hamburg-Bremen church over the Viking kings mainly with the help of elaborate gifts[158] – which may indeed have included coin silver.

German silver exports withered around the mid-11th century.[159] As we recall, the Teutons' enthusiasm for missions, which had burned so hotly, cooled at exactly the same time, never to regain its original fervor. A certain increase in the influx of coins, perhaps as a response to the increasing activity of British missions, occurred in the 1080s, before it finally died out for good.

As with the Eastern orientation of mission work, the British also lagged several decades behind the Saxons in their economic activity. The massive flow of Anglo-Saxon pennies into Scandinavia, first and foremost into Denmark, and then almost immediately to the rest of Scandinavia, began in the latter half of the 990s,[160] during the time of King Svein Fork-Beard, who had established the English mission in the land. It bears mentioning that the earliest type of English coin to appear in great quantities in Northern hoards, the *Crux* (ca. 991–997),[161] served as the example for the first domestic coins of the kings of all three Scandinavian countries.[162] Even later, Scandinavian coin masters took their design ideas mainly from English coins.[163]

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[152] **Kluge**, "OTTO REX/OTTO IMP," pp. 102–103.
[153] **von Heijne**, *Särpräglat,* pp. 134–138.
[154] **Kluge**, "OTTO REX/OTTO IMP," p. 103.
[155] **Kluge**, "Sachsenpfennige und Otto-Adelheid-Pfennige," p. 423.
[156] **Kluge**, *Deutsche Münzgeschichte von der späten Karolingerzeit bis zum Ende der Salier,* p. 27.
[157] *Allgemeine deutsche Biographie,* vol. 1, pp. 72–73.
[158] *Allgemeine deutsche Biographie,* vol. 39, pp. 323–324.
[159] **Jonsson**, "The routes for the importation of German and English coins to the Northern Lands in the Viking Age," p. 206, diagr. 1.
[160] **Jonsson**, *Viking-Age hoards and late Anglo-Saxon coins,* pp. 10, 11, 14, 19–32.
[161] **Jonsson**, "The routes for the importation of German and English coins to the Northern Lands in the Viking Age," p. 215.
[162] **Brita Malmer**, "Från Olof till Anund. Ur sigtunamyntninges historia," in Ulf Nordlind, Kenneth Jonsson, Ian Wiséhn, eds., *Myntningen i Sverige 995–1995. Numismatiska meddelanden* 40 (Stockholm, 1995), p. 10.
[163] E.g. J. Steen Jensen, ed., Tusindtallets Danske Mønter fra Den konglige Mønt- og Medaillesamling: Danish coins from the 11th century in The Royal Collection of Coins and Medals (Munksgaard, 1995); **Brita Malmer**, *The Anglo-Scandinavian Coinage c. 995–1020. Commentationes de nummis saeculorum IX–XI in Suecia repertis. Nova series* 9 (Stockholm, 1997).

Why anyone would copy a certain type of coin is a question unto itself. Of course, it may have been a manifestation of political preference, but we must not exclude other reasons. First of all, we must consider the poor form and dull design prevalent in German coins. The predominant German coin type during that time, the Otto-Adelheid denier, had a cross on the obverse bearing the letters ODDO (or somewhat less frequently, OTTO) within the angles formed by the cross, and the reverse showed a schematic image of a church (*Holzkirche*). The cross and church are the most widespread design elements of German coins around the first millennium, to which later were added images of rulers and saints, and several types of architectural structures. But one should stress that the design of German coins from the late 10th c. onwards (starting with Emperor Otto II (973–983)) was quite uniform for decades and an attempt to create a national coinage has been supposed.[164] The question is, however, whether the design of the German coins could not have yet another, international meaning too. Paradoxally, these were coins meant for export which bear exclusively Christian symbols. Perhaps they were meant as missionary tools spreading all over the pagan peoples that had to be converted and subjected to the power of the German church.

However, the full image on German coins is rarely visible or recognizable on any coin. In contrast, the Anglo-Saxon pennies are, as a rule, neatly stamped, with the obverse always decorated with the bust of a king, and the reverse with some modification of a cross. The Anglo-Saxon coins of that time are visually of much higher quality than the Germans coins. That inspired trust. The Northern barbarians tested the British coin silver with their teeth and sharp tools much less frequently than the sloppily minted German coins. Of all German coins, the Otto-Adelheid pennies were the most suspect, for some reason.[165] Additionally, the minting of coins in England was centralized, and only one type of coin was emitted from this mint for a period of several years, while the design of German coins exhibited tremendous fluctuations depending on the time and place they were minted. This means that during the massive influx of English coin silver into the Northern lands, the Anglo-Saxon unified pennies represented the most plentiful and highly valued group of coins next to the Otto-Adelheid deniers among the money circulating in this region. Perhaps it is only natural that the example of such coins would be adopted for the countries' own money.

It is usually claimed that the intensity of the influx of Anglo-Saxon money to the shores of the Baltic Sea remained constant until the early 1030s, when it experienced a sudden decline. According to the Stockholm professor of numismatics, Kenneth Jonsson, the larger hoards containing Anglo-Saxon coins tell us a slightly different story. The vigorous introductory period (which, when we consider the fact that it did not begin until 996, must have been at least 50% more dramatic than shown in Diagram 1 below) was followed by a nadir beginning in 1003, which was not overcome until the 1020s, during the time of Knud, king of both Denmark and England and great friend of the English church. English silver exports to the Northern lands remained at a stable level to the end of the reign of English king Harold I (1035–1040), quickly falling to a marginal level thereafter.[166] After that time, it was mainly German coins that came to the Northern lands, although the import of these coins, in absolute numbers, also diminished. However, there is one exception. The influx of Norman coins en-

[164] **Kenneth Jonsson**, "Coin circulation in Viking-Age Germany," in Stanisław Suchodolski, Mateusz Bogucki, eds., *Money Circulation in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and Modern Times: Time, Range, Intensity. International Symposium of the 50th anniversary of Wiadomości Numizmatyczne, Warsaw, 13-14 October 2006*. (Warszawa–Kraków, 2007), pp. 114–121.

[165] **Ivar Leimus**, "Probemarken auf den Münzen der wikingerzeitlichen Schatzfunde Estlands," in Jonsson, Malmer, eds., *Sigtuna papers,* pp. 201–205.

[166] See also **Jonsson**, "The routes for the importation of German and English coins to the Northern Lands in the Viking Age," p. 215, figure 10.

joyed a certain upswing in the late 11th and early 12th century,[167] when we see an invigoration of the English mission in the Northern lands. This is particularly evident in the Estonian and Gotland hoards, since Denmark, for the most part, was already using its own money.



Diagram 2 offers us a somewhat different picture. We must take into consideration that the import of Western coins to Scandinavia diminished exponentially during the second half of the 11th century, and therefore the diagram does not reflect only the new coins that entered circulation, but the total amount of money in use at that time. For this reason, the more subtle nuances in the intensity of English coin imports are not evident here. However, we can look at the contents of the hoards in various areas. In the Baltic region's most wealthy region of Gotland, the first part of the 11th century apparently saw such a tremendous influx of silver that there was plenty to last into the second half of the century.[168] Additionally, it seems that money was used on this island somewhat differently than it was in Denmark and mainland Sweden, where coins, once they were buried, usually stayed there. The money needs of the Baltic Sea's most important international trade center of Gotland must have been notably greater, since older hoards had to be brought back into circulation to satisfy the need. If we exclude Gotland, the makeup of the total money mass in Denmark and mainland Sweden were rather similar. The abrupt increase in the proportion of English money in the 990s, more lively in Denmark, somewhat more sluggish in Sweden, underwent a rapid decline in the 1040s and 1050s as the influx slowed. A certain re-invigoration is noticeable in the late 11th and early 12th century. Despite differences in the details, it is certainly evident that the general trends in the countries being studied are quite similar.

[167] **Arkadi Molvõgin**, "Normannische Fundmünzen in Estland und anderen Ostseeländern," in Jonsson, Malmer, eds., *Sigtuna papers,* pp. 241–249; **Jonsson**, "The routes for the importation of German and English coins to the Northern Lands in the Viking Age," p. 230, figure 19.

[168] See **Jonsson**, "The routes for the importation of German and English coins to the Northern Lands in the Viking Age," p. 206, figure 1.



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To summarize the relationship between trade and missions: The Germans were the first to turn their gaze toward the East in the 960s, spreading Christianity to their pagan neighbors from Magdeburg. At the same time, Saxon pennies, minted in Magdeburg, started flowing into Poland and Denmark. The great uprising of the Western Slavs in 983 helped diminish the importance of Magdeburg while increasing that of the Hamburg–Bremen archdiocese, which was the source of Scandinavia-oriented missions. In the hoards found along the Baltic coast, Otto and Adelheid deniers predominate (initially, alongside Arabian coins). In the mid-990s, the English awakened, sending a powerful tide of British priests and coin silver to the shores of the Baltic Sea. It is likely that this prompted a German response, the expulsion of some of the English missions, and a corresponding drop in coin exports in the early 11th century. But the personal union of Denmark and England in the time of Knud the Great restored the Anglo-Saxon position, and an unbroken stream of English silver began flowing into Scandinavia until the end of the great state of the North Sea region around 1040. The Anglo-Saxon mission as well the accompanying influx of coins diminished at that time. German mission work was also characterized by misunderstandings in the middle and third quarter of the 11th century, and the withdrawal of Hamburg-Bremen from Sweden. Despite the fact that the legal superiority of the Hamburg-Bremen church persisted and even became fixed in Scandinavia, the influx of German coin silver diminished abruptly. In Denmark, foreign coins were being replaced by domestic currency,[169] while Sweden began to use its old reserves.[170] Perhaps this was due to the fact that local ecclesiastical structures were becoming established, negating the earlier need for an active mis-

[169] **von Heijne**, *Särpräglat,* pp. 141–152.

[170] **Bernd Kluge**, "Bemerkungen zur Struktur der Funde europäischer Münzen des 10. und 11. Jahrhunderts im Ostseegebiet," *Zeitschrift für Archäologie* 12 (Berlin, 1978), p. 183.

sion. The final small enlivening of British eastward-oriented ecclesiasticism is evident at the end of the 11th century, accompanied by increases in silver exports from Britain. In an apparent response, the influx of German coins increased as well. However, Lund became an independent archdiocese in the early 12th century, and the Scandinavian church began living its own life. The influx of foreign silver ceased. It continued only briefly in Gotland, but came to a complete halt by the 1140s. Thus, the Western Christian and economic expansion developed hand-in-hand. It is not important whether this was coincidental or mutually causal; the phenomenon itself is the important thing.

Did a similar chain of events also take place Estonia? As we saw earlier, Western silver reached Estonia a little later than it reached Gotland. For this reason, we know of only a few isolated early Saxon pennies in Estonia, and finds of older Otto-Adelheid deniers are almost as rare. Such coins are found in only four hoards of the end of the 10th century, but in about ten hoards originating from the first quarter of the 11th century. After that, the Otto-Adelheid deniers are the most widespread coins in ancient Estonian hoards. About a thousand have been found.[171] It seems that Estonia's relations with the Saxons were, for the some part, direct – otherwise, the large proportion of their coins in Estonian hoards would be difficult to explain.

Even the first Anglo-Saxon pennies found their way into Estonia before the turn of the millennium, but not until the Vaabina hoard (tpq. 1012/3) were they found in notable quantity, exceeding German deniers.[172] However, this is an exception. In any of our typical hoards, the proportion of German coins exceeds that of English coins by several times, as a rule. Therefore we have reason to believe that Anglo-Saxon money arrived in Estonia not by a direct route, but thanks to dealings with the Scandinavian lands, primarily Gotland. But this is not true in every case. The large proportion of Anglo-Norman pennies in Estonian finds of the late 11th century and early 12th century, in contrast to neighboring countries, forces us to assume that we had direct contacts with the British as well.[173] Estonia's peculiarity among its neighboring countries lies in its 12th century hoards, which include new English coins until the 1170s and indicate continuing direct ties with England.[174] In this context, it bears remembering that British ecclesiastics were conspicuously active in Sweden and elsewhere in Scandinavia during the 12th century.[175] Not until the 1180s and 1190s did the Saxons

[171] **Molvõgin**, *Die Funde westeuropäischer Münzen des 10. bis 12. Jahrhunderts in Estland,* nos. 1.30, 2.418, 3.10, 6.52; **Vera Hatz**, "Die Otto-Adelheid-Pfennige in den Münzfunden Estlands," in Ivar Leimus, ed., *Studia Numismatica: Festschrift: Arkadi Molvõgin 65* (Tallinn, 1995), pp. 49–53; **Ivar Leimus,** "*Crux*, Köln Häv. 34/67 und Otto-Adelheid-Pfennige. Ihr Vorkommen in den Funden aus dem Ende des 10. Jh.," in Carmen Alfaro, Carmen Marcos, Paloma Otero, eds., *XIII Congreso Internacional de Numismática, Madrid 2003: Actas: Proceedings: Actes* (Madrid, 2005), 1205–1215.

[172] **Molvõgin**, *Die Funde westeuropäischer Münzen des 10. bis 12. Jahrhunderts in Estland,* no. 14. The hoard included 101 English and only 41 German coins, but this is an exception.

[173] **Molvõgin**, "Die letzte Welle des westeuropäischen Münzsilbers der späten Wikingerzeit in Estland (1100–1158)," p. 293.

[174] **Molvõgin**, "Normannische Fundmünzen in Estland und anderen Ostseeländern," pp. 241–249; **Arkadi Molvõgin, Ivar Leimus**, "A unique hoard from Estonia," in Ivar Leimus, ed., *Studia Numismatica: Festschrift: Arkadi Molvõgin 65,* pp. 103–125; **Arkadi Molvõgin,** "Padiküla aarde mündid" [Coins from the Padiküla Hoard], in Ivar Leimus, ed., *Studia numismatica II: Festschrift: Mihhail Nemirovitš-Dantšenko 80* (Tallinn, 2001); Bernd Kluge, Bernard Weisser, eds., *XII. Internationaler Numismatischer Kongress, Berlin 1997: Akten – Proceedings – Actes* vol. 2, (Berlin, 2000), p. 181; **Gareth Williams**, "A Hoard from Estonia in the British Museum," – Kluge, Weisser, eds., *XII. Internationaler Numismatischer Kongress,* pp. 986–989; **Ivar Leimus**, "Muraste mündiaare — unikaalne brakteaatide leid 12. sajandi keskelt" [The Muraste coin hoard – an unique find of bracteates from the mid-12th century] in Arvi Haak, Erki Russow, Andres Tvauri, eds., *Linnusest ja linnast: Uurimusi Vilma Trummali auks [About hillfort and town: Studies in honour of Vilma Trummal]. Muinasaja teadus* 14 (Tallinn–Tartu, 2004), pp. 149–156.

[175] **Abrams**, "The Anglo-Saxons and the Christianization of Scandinavia," pp. 242–243.

reach the shores of Livonia once more.[176]

Does this mean that the West, starting with Hamburg-Bremen and later the English church, was interested in Estonia as early as the 11th century, at the same time that the orientation of our economic relations was changing? We must be careful of the conclusions we draw. Adam of Bremen, for instance, did not know any more about Estonia than to say that it was an island near Courland populated by raging pagans that worship dragons and purchase physically perfect human beings from the merchants to sacrifice to their gods.[177] However, Adam had never even heard of Finland either, unless we take seriously the theory that Finland is the place that Adam called "Womenland" – perhaps our own Naissaar (Women's island in English). Nevertheless, numerous Christian pendants found in the graves of Finnish merchants indicate that Christianity may have first landed on Finland's shores as early as the 11th century.[178] And, in comparison to Estonia, Finland is much poorer in the amount of foreign silver imported from the West.[179] Researchers of our northern neighbors link this first wave of Christianity with primsignation (Lat. *prima signatio*), i.e. being marked with the sign of the cross, which actually gave an unbaptized merchant the right to conduct business with Christians as well as pagans.[180] It is not known whether and to what extent this custom had spread. It is hard to believe that foreign Christians would have refused to conduct profitable business with pagans simply because they were unbaptized. Neither the Older Rhymed Chronicle nor the Chronicles of Henrik mention any primsignation in their descriptions of the German merchants' first contacts with the pagan Livonians.[181] However, those sources do indicate that trade relations were indeed accompanied by missions. Meinhard himself arrived in Livonia under the protection of the trade peace agreement.[182]

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[176] **Ivar Leimus**, "Millal ja kust tuli saksa kaupmees Liivimaale? [When and from where did the German merchant come to Livonia?]," *Akadeemia* 8 (2002), p. 1598. Developments were somewhat different in Latvia, where coin finds ceased as early as the 1070s–1080s (see **Татьяна М. Берга**, *Монеты в археологических памятниках Латвии IX–XII вв.* (Riga, 1988, p. 48). Thus, silver hoards are lacking in Latvia from the time when happy days came to Estonia. The reason may have been Estonia's economic competitiveness. As evident from numismatic sources, Latvian, or rather Livonian Westward contacts were not restored until around 1180, at the initiative of the Saxons.

[177] *Adamus Gesta Hammaburgensis ecclesiae pontificum,* Despriptio insularum aquilonis, cap. 17: "*Praeterea recitatum est nobis, alias plures insulas in eo ponto esse, quarum una grandis Aestland dicitur, non minor illa de qua prius diximus. Nam et ipsi Deum christianorum prorsus ignorant, dracones adorant cum volucribus, quibus etiam litant vivos homines, quos a mercatoribus emunt, diligenter omnino probatos, ne maculam in corpore habeant, pro qua refutari dicuntur a draconibus."* ("Furthermore, it has been reported that this sea contains many more islands, of which a large on is called Estonia, not smaller than the one that we just described [Courland]. Because the people there know nothing of the Christian God, they worship dragons and winged creatures, to whom they sacrifice living people purchased from merchants, looking them over carefully to make sure their bodies have no flaws, because, it is said, the dragons would reject them if they did.")

[178] **Paula Purhonen**, *Kristinuskon saapumisesta Suomeen. Suomen Muinaismuistoyhdistyksen Aikakauskirja* 106 (Helsinki, 1998), pp. 112–114.

[179] see also **Talvio**, *Coins and coin finds in Finland AD 800–1200*.

[180] E.g. **Sawyer**, "The process of Scandinavian Christianization in the tenth and eleventh centuries,"p. 68; **Purhonen**, *Kristinuskon saapumisesta Suomeen,* p. 150; Egils saga Skalla-Grimssonar: "*Konungur bað Þórólf og þá bræður, að þeir skyldu láta* ***prímsignast****, því að það var þá mikill siður, bæði með* ***kaupmönnum*** *og þeim mönnum, er á mála gengu með kristnum mönnum, því að þeir menn, er prímsignaðir voru, höfðu allt samneyti við kristna menn og svo heiðna, en höfðu það að átrúnaði, er þeim var skapfelldast."* ("King [English Aethelstan (924–939)] asked Thórólf and his brother to let themselves be primsigned, because at that time, this was generally customary for those merchants and their men who were paid their salaries by Christian elders. Because those men who were primsigned could freely associate with both Christians and pagans, while keeping the faith that they preferred.") http://www.snerpa.is/net/isl/egils.htm (accessed 3/12/08). However, this is the only source with such content (another source, Anskar's biography mentions only Christian death in this connection), describing conditions in the early 10th century, although it was written in the 13th century.

[181] *Liivimaa vanem riimkroonika [The Older Livonian Rhymed Chronicle]* (Tallinn, 2003), p. 21, verses 140–200.

[182] **Leimus**, "Millal ja kust tuli saksa kaupmees Liivimaale," p. 1598.

Let us bring one more analogy for comparison. We know that Estonia has the greatest abundance of Western coins of all the Baltic region. However, hoards of Western European coins are almost completely missing in the very lair of European paganism, Lithuania[183] – a phenomenon that historians have yet to explain with any conviction. Furthermore, abundant Arabian coins have been found in Lithuania, although still less than in Estonia and Latvia.[184] Perhaps the Lithuanians did not allow the bringers of the Christian faith to cross their threshold; perhaps the Cross and money did indeed travel hand-in-hand, also in Estonia?

In summary, the basic question is: Which side took the initiative that brought tons of silver into weighed-currency lands? While the Varangians, Slavs, and Finno-Ugric peoples initiated relations with the East, then, on the other hand, the Saxons (and why not also the Anglo-Saxons) seem to have been actively interested in the products of the Northern lands later. It was an interest based upon a developing economy and emergent statehood, expressed in the flow of millions of coins to the shores of the Baltic Sea. It was an interest which the Christian mission probably supported (or actually drove). Perhaps it is here that we can find the reason that the gaze of our forefathers was pulled with ever greater frequency toward the West one thousand years ago.

So, was it the expanding Western civilization that succeeded in capturing the profitable markets of the East and North? Should we seek the reasons for the discontinuation of our Eastern relations from the West, rather than from the East? The advantage of Europe as compared to the Orient was undoubtedly its geographic proximity. It was much more convenient to sail along the Elbe, Weser and Rhine Rivers or the eastern coast of England to the North Sea and from there to the Baltic Sea (and vice versa) than to drag barges across the expanses of Russia. The necessary foundation for the West's relations with what is today Eastern and Northern Europe was provided by the Rammelsberg silver mines, supported by the weapons industry. Of course, the reason for the weakening of the East's competitiveness may be sought in some of the other reasons described above, but none of them alone would have been sufficient to cause the downturn.

Thus, the analysis of coin hoards shows us that the greater part of today's Europe – Poland, parts of eastern Germany, Scandinavia and Finland, the Baltic countries, the western part of Russia – has not always been linked with the West, but rather the East. An orientation toward the East was prevalent throughout this wide area through the 9th and most of the 10th century. The European orientation did not begin to dominate here until the second half of the 10th century and early 11th century. What occurred was perhaps Northern Europe's most successful economic change of the whole millennium, accompanied at least in some of the countries by the spread of Western Christianity. In most lands, the conversion was permanent. Therefore, we integrated into Europe a good deal earlier than has commonly been believed – fully two centuries before the forcible takeover of Estonia. The details of the manner in which this first contact took place, and whether it had any social consequences, is the job of another, future study.

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[183] **Ona Kuncienė**, "Prekybiniai ryšiai IX–XIII amžiais," in *Lietuvos gyventojų prekybiniai ryšiai* (Vilnius, 1972), pp. 222, 251–254; **Z. Duksa**, "Pinigai ir jų apyvarta," in Regina Kulikauskienė, ed., *Lietuvių materialinė kultūra IX–XIII amžiuje,* vol. 2 (Vilnius, 1981), pp. 96–97.

[184] **Kuncienė**, "Prekybiniai ryšiai IX–XIII amžais," pp. 174–178; **Duksa**, "Pinigai ir jų apyvarta," pp. 91–96.

When did the Dominicans Arrive in Tallinn?

Marek Tamm

Introduction

It is difficult to overestimate the significance of the Order of Preachers in the history of Estonia's Christianization.* It was the first religious order to establish a permanent foothold on the territory of Estonia and spent centuries conducting its mission work among the local population.[1] The territory of Estonia is linked to the Dominicans by another important matter: before his death, the founder of the order, Saint Dominic (c. 1170–1221) wished to conduct a mission to the land of the Estonians. Although we have no specific information about the religious expedition that was planned in 1221, more recent studies allow us to regard the existence of this plan to be highly likely.[2] Previous historiographic tradition has credited Dominic with plans to get involved with the baptism of the peoples on the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea as early as 1207 and/or 1217,[3] but these claims have been rather convincingly refuted by now.[4]

A single preserved source text provides most of the evidence for Dominic's plans to set out on a mission crusade to the land of the Estonians. It is the letter from Pope Honorius III of May 6, 1221 to the Danish King Valdemar II, in which he suggests enlisting the help of the Dominican friars in converting the pagans.[5] In addition to the

* A few discussions of the history of the Dominicans in Tallinn have been written since the publication of the Estonian-language version of this article in 2001. I have tried to include them in my references; I have made no changes to the main text.

[1] Some of my earlier articles include more detailed discussions of the role of the Dominicans in the Christianization of Estonia: **Marek Tamm,** "Culture ecclésiastique et culture folklorique dans la Livonie médiévale. Echos des *exempla* dans les contes populaires estoniens," *Études finno-ougriennes* 28 (Paris, 1996), pp. 18–46; **Marek Tamm**, "Exempla and Folklore: Popular Preaching in Medieval Estonia and Finland," *Studies in Folklore and Popular Religion* 3 (Tartu, 1999), pp. 169–183.

[2] **Simon Tugwell**, "Notes on the life of St. Dominic," *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* LXVIII (1998), pp. 72–83.

[3] This claim has been promoted mainly by the renowned Dominican historian Marie-Humbert Vicaire. See **Marie-Humbert Vicaire**, *Histoire de saint Dominique*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1982), pp. 142–149. See also **Jarl Gallén**, *La Province de Dacie de l'Ordre des Frères Prêcheurs. I. Histoire générale jusqu'au Grande Schisme* (Helsingfors, 1946), pp. 196–216; **Jarl Gallén**, "Les voyages de S. Dominique au Danemark. Essai de datation," in Raymundus Creytens, Pius Künzle, eds., *Xenia medii aevi historiam illustrantia oblata Thomae Kaeppeli O.P.*, (Roma, 1978), pp. 73–84. Following Vicaire's example, K. Elm ascribes the same plans to Dominic in his article: **Kaspar Elm**, "Christi Cultores et novelle Ecclesie plantatores. Der Anteil der Mönche, Kanoniker und Mendikanten an der Chrstianisierung der Liven und dem Aufbau der Kirche von Livland," in *Gli inizi del cristianesimo in Livonia–Lettonia. Pontificio Comitato di Scienza Storiche, Atti e Documenti* 1 (Città del Vaticano, 1989), pp. 162–163.

[4] **Tugwell**, "Notes on the life of St. Dominic," (1998), pp. 47–66.

[5] **Tugwell**, "Notes on the life of St. Dominic," (1998), p. 75: *Cum dilecti filii fratres predicatores ex pio quem ipsis dominus inspirauit affectu ad partes tuas accedant ut nomen euangelizant domini nostri Ihesu Christi gentibus et Christi ministrent fidelibus pabulum uerbi dei, eos regali mansuetudini duximus propensius commendandos*.

pope's missive, information has been preserved about Dominic's own concurrent letter to Valdemar II as well as the Archbishop of Lund, Andreas Sunesen. Unfortunately, the letter itself no longer exists, but the letter likely includes Dominic's discussion of his intention to personally participate in the planned missionary expedition against the pagans.[6] Considering the fact that Valdemar II had organized a great crusade to northern Estonia in 1219, and that the Danes had been actively baptizing the Estonians in the early 1220s, it is extremely likely that they were hoping for the assistance of the Dominicans and St. Dominic in the Christianization of Estonian lands.[7]

Two other pieces of evidence provide indirect proof of the planned missionary expedition and Dominic's wish to participate personally. Dominic requested a personal letter of recommendation from Pope Honorius III on March 29, 1221, which he most probably hoped to use during his new mission crusade.[8] We find more evidence of Dominic's wishes in the decisions of the Second General Chapter of the Order of Preachers held June 1221 in Bologna. At Dominic's initiative, the Chapter decided in favor of expanding the Order and made plans for the dispatch of friars to various parts of the world.[9]

However, Dominic's plans never came to fruition; they were cut short by the death of the order's founder on August 6, 1221. The first Preachers did not arrive in the land of the Estonians until years later, and at the initiative of a later papal legate – William, Bishop of Modena.

The weighty role of William of Modena as an inspirer and supporter of the Dominican mission in Livonia and Estonia is evident from many independent sources. William's interest in the Order of Preachers is far from incidental. From the 1210s onward, William was active in the Roman Curia, in which he was made papal vice-chancellor at the end of 1219 or beginning of 1220.[10] It was in the papal Curia that the future legate met St. Dominic, during the latter's visit to Rome (1216–1217).[11] According to evidence in two Dominican sources of that time, William and Dominic soon found common ground.[12] The *Cronica prior* of Dominican friar Gérard de Frachet clearly describes William as "a very good friend of the Order [of Preachers]

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[6] This letter is mentioned by the anonymous *Historia Ordinis Praedicatorum in Dacia* (c. 1261, see below): *Anno autem domini 1221 celebratur secundum concilium generale Bononie a beato Dominico. Huic concilio interfuit dictus Salomon et de eodem misit eum beatus Dominic ad Waldemarum regem Dacie et Andream archiepiscopum Lundensem cum litteris domini pape et suis.* **Simon Tugwell**, "Notes on the life of St. Dominic," *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum*, vol. LXVI (1996), p. 163.

[7] I have described the Danish crusade in more detail in the article: **Marek Tamm**, "Le rôle des missionnaires nordiques dans la christianisation de l'Estonie," in Marc Auchet, Annie Bourguignon, eds., *Aspects d'une dynamique régionale: les pays nordiques dans le contexte de la Baltique* (Nancy, 2001), pp. 121–132. See also **Peter P. Rebane**, "Denmark and the Baltic Crusade, 1150–1227," (PhD dissertation, Michigan State University, 1969); **Peter P. Rebane**, "Denmark, the Papacy and the Christianization of Estonia," in *Gli inizi del cristianesimo in Livonia-Lettonia*, pp. 171–201; **Johan H. Lind, Carsten Selch Jensen, Kurt Villads Jensen, Ane L. Bysted**, *Danske korstog: Krig og mission i Østersøen*, København, 2004.

[8] **Tugwell**, "Notes on the life of St. Dominic," (1998), pp. 73–74.

[9] *Ibidem*, pp. 79–81.

[10] The most detailed account of the activities of William of Modena can be found in the book: **Gustav Adolf Donner**, *Kardinal Wilhelm von Sabina: Bishof von Modena 1222–1234: Päbstlicher Legar in den nordischen Ländern (†1251)* (Helsingfors, 1929). More recent information about William's activities in the papal Curia are presented in the book: **Agostino Paravicini Bagliani**, *Cardinali di Curia e 'familiae' cardinalizie dal 1227 al 1254*, vol. 1 (Padova, 1972), pp. 188–190.

[11] See **Vladimir J. Koudelka**, "Notes sur le cartulaire de S. Dominique," *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum*, vol. 28 (1958), pp. 97–100; **Tugwell**, "Notes on the life of St. Dominic," (1998), p. 65, which was not available to me. See also **Donner**, *Kardinal Wilhelm von Sabina*, p. 15.

[12] **Bartolomeo da Trento**, *Epilogus de vita sancti Dominici* [ca. 1245], Ed. B. Altaner, *Der hl. Dominikus, Untersuchungen und Texte* (Breslau, 1922), p. 235; **Gérard de Frachet**, *Cronica prior* [ca. 1260], ed. B. M. Reichert, in *Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum Historica*, vol. I (Louvain, 1896), p. 334.

and the blessed Dominic."[13] G. A. Donner has therefore assumed that it was Dominic who aroused William of Modena's interest in converting the pagans of the European north.[14] Simon Tugwell, however, considers this conclusion to be highly unlikely, finding the opposite to be more logical: that it was William, with his sights already set on Prussia, who drew Dominic's attention to the vast pagan lands in the north.[15]

The assistance that William of Modena provided for the establishment of Dominican convents in Prussia and Livonia was truly significant.[16] At his initiative, several convents were established in Prussia: Danzig in 1227, Kulm in 1233, and Elbing in 1238.[17] Source texts include direct references to William's role in founding the Riga convent in 1234.[18] His contribution to the founding of the Order of Preachers in Tallinn is referred to in a single available source, which will be analyzed in this paper.

Source text

Information about the arrival of the Dominicans in Tallinn can be gleaned from only a single available source, which has been preserved as a document copied from copies many times over. It is an anonymous written work about the early history of the Order of Preachers in Dacia Province,[19] apparently compiled in 1261.[20] We have no indication of who the author might be. Based upon the chronicler's very detailed description of the Tallinn convent's founding, including a list of the names of all 12 friars, Danish historian Jarl Gallén presumes that the author must have had close ties to the Tallinn Dominicans.[21] Bjørn Halvorsen has more recently hypothesized that the compiler of the chronicle might be the Friar Daniel mentioned in the text itself, the convent's first prior, who drew the first part of his chronicle from some previous manuscript and/or oral tradition.[22]

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[13] **de Frachet**, *Cronica prior*, p. 334: *amicissimus ordinis et beati Dominici ab initio familiaritate cum eo in curia pape contracta*.

[14] **Donner**, *Kardinal Wilhelm von Sabina,* p. 17.

[15] **Tugwell**, "Notes on the life of St. Dominic," (1998), p. 66.

[16] For general information on the rapid spread of the Dominican order throughout Eastern and Northern Europe, see **Jerzy Kłoczowski**, "The Mendicant Orders between the Baltic and Adriatic Seas in the Middle Ages," in *La Pologne au XVe siècle. Congrès internationale des sciences historiques à Bucarest* (Wrocław, 1980), pp. 95–110; **Jerzy Kłoczowski**, "Les ordres mendiants en Europe de Centre-Est et du Nord," in *L'Eglise et le peuple chrétien dans les pays de l'Europe du Centre-est et du Nord (XIVe–XVe siècles)* (Rome, 1990), pp. 187–200.

[17] **Gertrud von Walther-Wittenheim**, *Die Dominikaner in Livland im Mittelalter: Die Natio Livoniae. Institutum Historicum FF. Praedicatorum Romae ad S. Sabinae. Dissertationes Historicae,* fasc. IX (Roma, 1938), p. 6. Unfortunately, **G. A. Donner** (Donner, *Kardinal Wilhelm von Sabina*) does not dwell very long on William's contribution to the expansion of the Dominican Order (on the founding of the Tallinn Convent, see pp. 146–147).

[18] **von Walther-Wittenheim**, *Die Dominikaner in Livland im Mittelalter*, Anhang I, p. 135.

[19] Order of Preachers was divided into a number of semi-autonomous provinces, where the Nordic province of *Dacia* counted three Scandinavian kingdoms and their various duchies, e.g. Finland and north-western Estonia. In the Middle Ages, the term "Dacia" (Lat. *Dacia*) mainly denoted Danish areas. The origins of this error are not known, but its roots probably extend back into the Early Middle Ages. See **Serban Papacostea**, "Dakien, Daker," in *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, vol. 4 (München und Zürich, 1989).

[20] This date has been proposed by S. Tugwell, based upon the fact that the document names only the first three prior-provincials of Dacia Province. Since the third prior-provincial, Absalon, died in 1261, it is likely that the document in question was penned immediately after Absalon's death, before any new prior-provincial had been selected. See **Tugwell**, "Notes on the life of St. Dominic," (1996), p. 161. See also **Gallén**, *La province de Dacie*, p. 3.

[21] **Gallén**, *La Province de Dacie*, p. 2.

[22] **Bjørn Halvorsen**, "Les origines de l'Ordre des Frères Prêcheurs dans la Province de Dacie," text of a paper given at the conference dedicated to the 750th anniversary of St. Catherine's Convent in Tallinn on November 22, 1996, p. 7 (manuscript in author's possession). See also **Bjørn Halvorsen**, *Dominikus - En europeers liv på 1200-tallet* (Oslo, 2002).

The chronicle is clearly divided into three sections. The first tells of the Dominicans' arrival in the northern lands and of the establishment of the first convent in Lund. The second section provides a review of the Order's first three prior-provincials of Dacia province, and the third gives an account of the founding and re-founding of the Dominican convent in Tallinn.

The only manuscript of this chronicle was preserved in the old library of Copenhagen University until 1728, when it was destroyed by fire. The flames consumed not only the manuscript, but its later transcription, authored by the Danish royal archivist Thomas Bartholin (1659–1690). In a stroke of luck, a copy of Bartholin's transcription, in unidentified handwriting, was found among a collection of documents belonging to Jacob Langebek (1710–1775), first publisher of *Scriptores Rerum Danicarum Medii Aevi*. This copy was first published in 1783 by Peter Frederik Suhm (1728–1798) in Volume 5 of *Scriptores Rerum Danicarum Medii Aevi*, who entitled the document *Historia Ordinis Praedicatorum in Dania 1216–1246*.[23] When Martin Clarentius Gertz (1844–1919) wanted to publish a new edition of the copy in Suhm's possession, he was unable to find it. However, Gertz was able to use a retelling by Hans Svaning (c. 1500–1584) of the manuscript that perished in the fire. Although he now had a second-hand and imprecise account, Gertz felt it unnecessary to take this into consideration, and published Suhm's previous edition once more, unfortunately adding a number of his own misleading parenthetic clauses.[24] Of the supplementary materials found after publication of Gertz's edition, the most noteworthy is the *Scandia Illustrata* of Johannes Messenius (1579/80–1636); its second volume (1621, published in Stockholm in 1700) includes a summary of the destroyed medieval manuscript.

The value of transcriptions and summaries available to historians today is diminished by the fact that they are not based on the original manuscript, but rather a copy that probably originated in the fourteenth century. We can make this assumption based on the preserved notes of Bartholin's secretary Árni Magnússon (1663–1730) regarding this manuscript.[25] Therefore, when studying the early history of the Tallinn Dominican convent, we are forced to rely on the copy of a copy of a copy, which naturally does not enable us to draw any definitive conclusions.

Until recently, historians have rather unanimously relied on Gertz's misleading edition. It was not until 1995 that Bjørn Halvorsen made an attempt to publish a new edition of *Historia* based upon P. F. Suhm's publication of 1783, adding a few corrections of his own. Halvorsen also supplied that edition of the chronicle with a French translation and detailed commentary.[26]

A new version based upon all existing transcriptions and retellings was published between 1996–1998 in the periodical *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* by the Dominican friar Simon Tugwell, director of the Roman *Instituto Storico Domenicano*. Tugwell published his edition in several sections; the segment concerning the founding of the Tallinn Dominican convent appeared in the journal's 1998 issue. A reproduction of it can be found in the appendix to this article.[27] I am basing this study primarily on Tugwell's version and his interpretation, adding the English-language translation of the segment

[23] *Scriptores Rerum Danicarum Medii Aevi*, vol. V (Hauniae, 1784), p. 501.

[24] *Scriptores Historiae Danicae Minores*, vol. II, 1 (Copenhagen, 1918–1920), pp. 370–374.

[25] **Tugwell**, "Notes on the life of St. Dominic," (1996), p. 161. See also **Gallén**, *La Province de Dacie*, p. 3.

[26] **Bjørn Halvorsen**, "Aux origines de l'Ordre des Prêcheurs dans les pays nordiques", *Mémoire dominicain*, 6 (1995), pp. 249–265.

[27] **Tugwell**, "Notes on the life of St. Dominic," (1998), pp. 111–112. This version was also adopted by Halvorsen, *Dominikus - En europeers liv på 1200-tallet*, pp. 218–222. Jonny G. G. Jakobsen published his edition of *Historia* along with its translation into Danish on the Internet in 2007; see **Jonny G. G. Jakobsen**, "Historia ordinis predicatorum in Dacia," http://www.jggj.dk/HOPD.htm (accessed 5/12/2008).

of text that deals with the founding of the Tallinn convent, along with my own critical review of previous historiography.

Translation of *Historia*

History of the Order of Preachers in Dacia 1216–1246[28]

The friars founded the Tallinn convent twice. First, at the request of the King of Denmark, the illustrious lord and ruler Valdemar, who subjugated the Estonians to his rule with the sword. The friars were dispatched to the great fortress of Tallinn in the year of our Lord 1229 [1239?], where they built church and other convent buildings on the north side of the fortress by the moat. This all took place under the guidance of the venerable father, lord William, the Bishop of Modena, who was at that time the pontiff's nuncio and legate on the Danish and Swedish territories. And since the Estonians are coarse and uncultivated in their exercise of religion, with a tendency and inclination to the miserable rituals of infidelity, they are cruel and savage toward ecclesiastics, because they killed the first bishop along with his clerics; thus the friars, of whom a few stayed in place, had to return to the convents from which they came.

The second time, friars from various convents were dispatched with the decision of the Ribe Provincial Chapter of 1246; their names are as follows: friar Brotherus and friar Johannes Woxmoth of the Lund convent, friar Aaron de Randrus and friar Petrus Hartbo of the Viborg convent, friar Michael de Horsnes and friar Angelus of the Århus convent, the Germans friar Engelbertus and friar Johannes of the Roskilde convent, and friar Johannes of the Västerås convent, friar Astolphus of the Skänninge convent, and friar Daniel of the Visby convent. This friar Daniel had been the first prior in the fortress, and a regular prelate among the friars.[29]

Discussion

When dealing with *Historia*, separate consideration must be given to three main sets of problems: the year in which the Dominican friars came to Tallinn, the initial location of the convent church and buildings, and the reason and date of the friars' departure. Historiographic tradition until this time has been relatively unanimous with regard to the first two problems: 1229 is accepted as the year of the convent's founding, and the convent is thought to have been located at the site of the current St. Mary's Cathedral. There is more disagreement on the topic of the forced departure of the friars. However, it has been generally agreed from G. von Walther-Wittenheim onward that the Dominicans left after the bloody conflict that erupted between the vassals and the Brothers of the Sword in 1233.

In this article, I will address the first and last problem in more detail. Since no new archaeological data has become available, we must hold with prior conclusions about the location of the Dominicans' convent building. It has been found that the Dominicans' first church once stood where St. Mary's Cathedral stands today, and that the side walls of the Cathedral's choir loft still include remnants of the old priory church (the side

[28] Tiina Kala has translated this text into Estonian for the magazine *Kiriku Elu* 1 [160], (1997), pp. 28–29. A newer translated segment can be found in her article: **Tiina Kala**, "Tallinna tekkeloo peegeldumine kirjalikes allikates" [Reflections of the Creation of Tallinn in Written Sources], in *Keskus, tagamaa, ääreala. Uurimusi asustushierarhia ja võimukeskuste kujunemisest Eestis [Center, Hinterland, Borderlands. Studies on the Development of Settlement Hierarchy and Centers of Power in Estonia]* (Tallinn-Tartu, 2002), p. 397.

[29] It is not impossible to interpret the last sentence differently: "This Brother Daniel was the first prior in the fortress and a regular prelate among the friars" (*Iste frater Daniel in castro fuit primus prior et prelatus ordinarius inter fratres*). Tiina Kala directed my attention to this possible interpretation. Special emphasis on the fortress (*castrum*) does seem to imply that Daniel was already carrying out the duties of prior during the first mission expedition to Tallinn (with which all the historiography to date concurs).

walls of the choir loft, and a small part of the southern and western walls, which were later expanded).[30]

The Founding of the Tallinn Convent

As stated above, *Historia*'s claim that the Dominicans first arrived in Tallinn in 1229 has enjoyed relatively unanimous acceptance. This date was unquestioningly accepted by the first scholars of the history of the Tallinn Dominicans[31]; it was confirmed by G. von Walther-Wittenheim[32], and with the support of various arguments has been embraced in even the most recent writings of foreign and domestic authors.[33]

It is highly problematical to reconcile 1229 as the date of this event with the supremacy of the Brothers of the Sword in Tallinn between 1227 and 1238. How could it be that the Order of the Brothers of the Sword, who had forcibly seized power from the Danes in the summer of 1227 and expelled many Danish clerics from the town[34] now agreed to let Danish Dominican friars settle on Castle Hill at the behest of the Danish king (as emphasized in *Historia*), a mere two years after seizing power from the Danes?

Many different and downright contradictory explanations for this situation have emerged through the years. The search for an explanation is made even more difficult by historiography's firmly established acceptance of the assumption that it was the Brothers of the Sword who drove the Dominicans out of Castle Hill a few years later (1233). Earlier Baltic German historical studies did not dwell on this dilemma, limiting their description of the event with the simple statement that it was the Brothers of the Sword who drove the Dominicans out of town (without asking why the Dominicans had been allowed onto Castle Hill in the first place).[35] In 1938, von Walther-Wittenheim proposed his own explanation, postulating that the Danes continued to maintain a presence on Castle Hill even af-

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[30] **Gotthard von Hansen**, *Die Kirchen und ehemaligen Klöster Revals*, Reval, 1873, p. 64; **Eugen von Nottbeck, Wilhelm Neumann**, *Geschichte und Kunstdenkmäler der Stadt Reval*, vol. 2 (Reval, 1904), p. 124; **Sten Karling,** *Zur Baugeschichte der Domkirche zu Tallinn* (Tartu, 1937), p. 238; **Villem Raam**, "Die Domkirche zu Tallinn und ihre baugeschichtliche Bedeutung," *Konsthistorisk Tidskrift* 3/4 (1967), pp. 74–77.

[31] See, for instance, **von Hansen**, *Die Kirchen und ehemaligen Klöster Revals*, p. 64; **La Baronne de Wedel-Jarlsberg**, *Une Page de l'Histoire des Frères-Prêcheurs: La Province de Dacia (Danemark, Suède et Norvège)* (Rome-Tournai, 1899), p. 135; **von Nottbeck, Neumann**, *Geschichte und Kunstdenkmäler*, vol. 2, p. 124; **Berthold Altaner**, *Die Dominikanermissionen des 13. Jahrhunderts. Forschungen zur Geschihcte der kirchlichen Unionen und der Mohammedaner- und Heidenmission des Mittelalters* (Habelschwert, 1924), p. 189; **Ernst Kühnert**, "Das Dominikanerkloster zu Reval", *Beiträge zur Kunde Estlands* 12 (1925), pp. 7, 11.

[32] **von Walther-Wittenheim**, *Die Dominikaner in Livland im Mittelalter*, pp. 8–12.

[33] See, for instance, **Elm**, "Christi Cultores et novelle Ecclesie plantatores," p. 163; **Christoph T. Maier**, *Preaching the Crusades: Mendicant Friars and the Cross in the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 47, ref. 84; **Halvorsen**, "Aux origines de l'Ordre des Prêcheurs," p. 263 (with some hesitation, referring to Gallén's alternative explanation); **Halvorsen**, "Les origines de l'Ordre des Frères Prêcheurs dans la Province de Dacie," pp. 22–23. Among Estonian historians, Tiina Kala and Anneli Randla, who have studied Dominican history in the most detail, also concur with the traditionally accepted date. See e.g. **Tiina Kala**, *Ristikiriku tulek Eestisse. Näituse kataloog [The Arrival of the Christian Church in Estonia. Exhibit Catalog]* (Tallinn, 1997), pp. 29–30; **Tiina Kala**, "Vana-Liivimaa ja ristiusustamine" [Old Livonia and Christianization], in S. Rutiku, R. Staats, eds., *Estland, Lettland und Westlisches Christentum: Estnish-Deutsche Beiträge zur baltischen Geschichte* (Kiel, 1998), p. 51; **Anneli Randla**, "Dominiiklased Vana-Liivimaal: linnastumisest ja arhitektuurist" [Dominicans in Old Livonia: On Urbanization and Architecture], in *Kunstiteaduslikke uurimusi*, vol. 9 (Tallinn, 1998), pp. 8–9; **Anneli Randla**, "The Architecture of the Mendicant Orders in Northern Europe. A Comparative Study of Scotland, the Northern Netherlands and Livonia," (PhD dissertation, Cambridge, 1998, vol. 1), pp. 85–86, 92, 227.

[34] See ref. 39.

[35] See, for instance, **Gotthard von Hansen**, *Die Kirchen und ehemaligen Klöster Revals*, Dritte vermehrte Auflage (Reval, 1885), p. 115; **von Nottbeck, Neumann**, *Geschichte und Kunstdenkmäler*, vol. 2, p. 124.

ter the transfer of power, and that significant conflict between the Danes and the Brothers of the Sword did not erupt until 1233, when the papal vice-legate Baldwin of Alna tried to bring Castle Hill under the pope's authority, resulting in a battle between the Brothers and the pope's vassals.[36] Others have later referred to this same explanation, emphasizing that only part of Castle Hill was under the direct control of the Brothers of the Sword.[37]

In contrast, German historian Friedrich Benninghoven sees an affirmation of the peaceful and positive relations between the Brothers of the Sword and the Danish clergy in the Dominican's settlement on Castle Hill in 1229.[38] However, this claim is entirely incompatible with the Sword Brothers' expressions of antagonism against Wescelin, the Danish Bishop of Tallinn and other Danish clergy after the Order of the Brothers of the Sword established its authority in the town.[39]

The first to cast doubt on the year 1229 was Danish Dominican historian Jarl Gallén in his study of the history of the Order of Preachers in Dacia Province, published in 1946. Gallén considers it highly unlikely that the Dominicans landed after 1227, when the Brothers of the Sword had already taken possession of the town. Thus, in Gallén's opinion, the Dominicans would have had to arrive in Tallinn before 1227. He assumes that William of Modena might have taken the necessary steps toward the establishment of a Dominican convent even during his first trip to Livonia and Estonia in 1225–1226.[40]

However, there are many facts that contradict Gallén's assumptions. First, it is very surprising that William's plans are not mentioned at all by the chronicler Henry of Livonia, who otherwise describes the first trip of the papal legate in detail.[41] Second, it is hardly credible that the Lund Dominican convent, just established around 1223, would have been able to organize the founding of a daughter convent in such a faraway region a mere couple of years later. And finally, we must remember that *Historia* associates the founding of the convent with a "small fortress" (*castrum minus*), which undoubtedly refers to the stone fortress founded by

[36] **von Walther-Wittenheim**, *Die Dominikaner in Livland im Mittelalter*, pp. 9–11. Walther-Wittenheim's interpretation has also been adopted in later Estonian historical writings, see for instance **Elfriede Tool-Marran**, *Tallinna Dominiiklaste klooster [The Dominican Convent in Tallinn]* (Tallinn, 1971), pp. 18–19, and the works of T. Kala and A. Randla referenced above.

[37] See, for instance **Kala**, *Ristikiriku tulek Eestisse*, p. 30.

[38] **Friedrich Benninghoven**, *Der Orden der Schwertbrüder: Fratres Milicie Christi de Livonia* (Cologne, Graz, 1965), p. 250.

[39] Our chief source on the seizure of power in Tallinn by the Order of the Knights of the Sword and the persecution of Danish clergy is the Citation of Pope Gregory IX against Nicholas, the Bishop of Riga, and the Order of the Knights of the Sword, dated November 20, 1234, which lists dozens of acts of injustice and violence in Livonia and Estonia, including hostile actions by the Order of the Knights of the Sword in Tallinn. The Citation was most likely written based upon information received from Baldwin of Alna, the papal vice-legate of that time. See **Hermann Hildebrand**, *Livonica, vornämlich aus dem 13. Jahrhundert, im Vatikanischen Archiv* (Reval, 1887), no. 21, § 14–17, pp. 42–43. It must be noted that most probably the Brothers of the Sword did not actually expel Wescelin, the Bishop of Tallinn, from the town, but simply prohibited him from returning. Sources indicate that Wescelin was in Riga in March 1226 (Friedrich Georg von Bunge, ed., *Liv-, Esth- und Curländisches Urkundenbuch* [=*LECUB*], vol. 1 (Reval, 1853), no. 81, col. 97) and in Heisterbach in January and February of 1227 (see **Friedrich Georg von Bunge**, *Livland, die Wiege der Deutschen Weihbishöfe* (Leipzig, 1875), p. 34). We have no information about him in subsequent years. We see in the February 3, 1232 letter from Pope Gregory IX to Baldwin of Alna that Tallinn was among the places in which the bishop's chair was vacant or the bishop was away from his domain (*vacant vel eorum episcopi [s]unt absentes*) at that time; see *LECUB*, vol. 1, no. 118, col. 155. Not until September 1240 did Danish king Valdemar II appoint Torchill to succeed Bishop Wescelin (*LECUB*, vol. 1, no. 166, col. 215).

[40] **Gallén**, *La Province de Dacie*, pp. 46–47.

[41] *Heinrici Chronicon Livoniae*, XXIX, 2–8; XXX, 1–2, ed. Leonid Arbusow, Albert Bauer, *Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum ex Monumentis Germaniae Historicis separatim editi* (Hannover, 1955).

the Brothers of the Sword between 1227 and 1229.[42]

A new attempt to shed light on the arrival of the Dominicans in Tallinn was recently made by Simon Tugwell; using historical and source-critical arguments he concludes that the Dominicans most probably did not arrive in Tallinn in 1229, but in 1239.[43] Tugwell finds it highly conceivable that in the process of copying and re-copying the *Historia*, the founding date of *MCCXXXIX* recorded in the original manuscript was at some point miscopied as *MCCXXIX*. If this is the case, the arrival of the Dominicans would fall into a much more logical historical context, coinciding with the re-establishment of Danish superiority in Tallinn (1238)[44] and the second period of William of Modena's service as legate in Livonia and the surrounding regions. Also, Tugwell refutes a possible counterclaim that enough time had passed from Valdemar II's military expedition of 1219, prominently described in *Historia*, to make such emphasis on the event seem logical. Actually, the Danish conquest of 1219 remains a pertinent event, because the Bull that Pope Honorius III issued (October 9, 1218) for this military campaign, which allowed Denmark to keep all the territories that they conquered[45], became Valdemar II's main legal argument for demanding the return of northern Estonian territories from the Order of the Brothers of the Sword (since 1237, the Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order). According to Tugwell's explanation, the Dominicans established themselves Tallinn in 1239, and immediately began missionary work among the native population in the surrounding areas (and not limiting themselves to residents of the town). After encountering the resistance of the local population, most of the friars felt it wiser to return home after a year or two.

Departure of the Dominicans from Tallinn

If we accept Tugwell's hypothesis, which states that the Dominicans arrived in Tallinn in 1239, it is irreconcilable with the hitherto existing description of the forced departure of the preaching friars from Castle Hill. Traditionally, historians have seen the hand of the Brothers of the Sword in the flight of the Dominicans. Earlier historiography saw no need to expound on the background of the conflict between the Order of Preachers and the Order of Brothers, but since the work of von Walther-Wittenheim, the forced flight of the Dominicans has been associated with the bloody conflict between the Brothers of the Sword and the vassals supporting the papal legate, Baldwin of Alna. The only (albeit serious flaw) in this inherently logical conclusion is the fact that it lacks support from any sources: our only informant on the departure of the Dominicans, i.e. the anonymous author of *Historia*, clearly states that the Dominicans returned to their homeland to escape the brutality and savagery of the Estonians, with no mention of any role that may have been

[42] Pope Gregory IX's previously mentioned Citation of November 20, 1234 mentions the fortress established by the Brothers of the Sword (**Hildebrand**, *Livonica*, no. 21, § 15, pp. 42–43). In the last quarter of the 14th century, Hermann Wartberge writes of the "little fortress" established by the Brothers of the Sword in his "Livonian Chronicle", see *Hermanni de Wartberge Chronicon Livoniae,* ed. Ernst Streheke, *Separatabdruck aus dem zweiten Bande der Scriptores Rerum Prussicarum* (Leipzig, 1863), p. 21.

[43] **Tugwell**, "Notes on the life of St. Dominic," (1998), pp. 112–116. More recently, the likelihood of this theory has been supported by Tiina Kala; see **Kala**, "Tallinna tekkeloo peegeldumine kirjalikes allikates," p. 397; **Tiina Kala**, "Vend Lucas, dominiiklane" [Brother Lucas, Dominican], in T. Kala, J. Kreem, A. Mänd, *Kümme keskaegset tallinlast [Ten from Medieval Tallinn]* (Tallinn, 2006), p. 183.

[44] According to the Treaty of Stensby entered into by Danish king Valdemar II and the Livonian Order Master Hermann Balke on June 7, 1238, Tallinn, along with Revala, Harju, Viru and Järva, were returned to Denmark, with the latter region finally being relinquished to the Order of the Brothers of the Sword. Three Dominican friars are among the witnesses to the signing of the treaty. See *LECUB*, vol. 1, no. 160, col. 205–208.

[45] *LECUB*, vol. 3 (Reval, 1857), no. 46a.

played by the Brothers of the Sword.[46]

There is another problem involved with the Dominicans' departure. Namely, the text of *Historia* has traditionally been interpreted as stating that the primary reason for the friars' departure was the murder of the "first bishop" (*primus episcopus*). In his new edition of *Historia*, Simon Tugwell justifiably calls our attention to the vagueness in this segment of text, especially as it concerns the connection between the departure of the Dominicans and the murder of the "first bishop." Previous editors of *Historia* have seen a direct relationship between these two events. And yet, this is historically very questionable, because the "first bishop" referred to here could only be Theoderic, Bishop of Estonia, who met his unfortunate end at the hands of the Estonians during the Danish military campaign of 1219, probably killed after being mistaken for Valdemar II.[47] Therefore, it is more likely that the anonymous chronicler is mentioning the murder of Theoderic as an example of the Estonians' "brutality and savagery against ecclesiastics" rather than as a direct cause of the friars' departure.

Based upon this hypothesis, Tugwell corrects the *Historia*'s version by Suhm[48] that was based on Hans Svaning's transcription. Tugwell restores verb *erant* to follow the word *crudeles* in line 10, and replacing the unnecessary conjunction *unde* (a possible transcription error) in line 12 with *inde* in the new interpretation and changing the punctuation, which allows the entire segment to be interpreted as follows: the main sentence begins with the words *Sed quia*; *crudeles erant* introduces the subordinate clause, which in turn is followed by the parenthetic clause *nam primum…*, after which the main sentence continues with the words *inde redire*.[49] In this form, the sentence is logical and easy to understand, and tells us that the murder of the bishop is nothing more than a graphic reference to a (past) evidence of the Estonian savagery that drove the Dominicans to leave.

Following Tugwell's argument, it would thus be logical to remain true to the evidence found in *Historia* and to attribute the flight of the Dominicans to the resistance of the native population. Although we have no specific information about any concerted actions or savagery by the Estonians during the period in question (1239–1240), it is highly likely that the Dominican mission found itself up against the recalcitrance of the people living in the region around Tallinn (the "savagery and cruelty" of the Estonians as described in the *Historia* can be considered an exaggeration characteristic of medieval chronicles), because the population was unaccustomed to this strange and foreign way of missionizing, and furthermore, many undoubtedly still remembered the Danish crusade in 1219 and the battle of Tallinn.

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[46] Tiina Kala has assumed that "we may also be dealing with an inadequate description in the chronicles, and the Estonians may have simply participated on the side of the Brothers of the Sword at the battle between the vassals and the Brothers of the Sword." See **Tiina Kala**, "Vana-Liivimaa neofüüdid ja nende naabrid katoliiklike ristiusustajate pilgu läbi" [Neophytes of Old Livonia and Their Neighbors Through the Eyes of the Christianizers], *Kleio. Ajaloo ajakiri* 2 (20) (1997), p. 4. This is a fully plausible explanation which is, however, based on assumptions that can be neither confirmed nor denied. Considering the political context of that time, it seems unlikely that the Estonians would take the side of the Brothers of the Sword in conflict.

[47] *Heinrici Chronicon Livoniae*, XXIII, 2. See also **Tugwell**, "Notes on the life of St. Dominic," (1998), pp. 115–116. (**von Walther-Wittenheim**, *Die Dominikaner in Livland im Mittelalter*, p. 9) searches in vain for information about a bishop killed in 1233, which would confirm his hypothesis about the departure of the Dominicans as a result of the conflict between the Order of the Brothers of the Sword and the vassals.

[48] To support a better understanding of the following analysis, the section of Suhm's version under discussion is given here: *Sed quia Estones in operibus fidei rudest et inculti ad miserabiles ritus infidelitatis proni et proclivi, crudeles contra personas Ecclesiasticas atque saevi. Nam primum Episcopum cum suis Clericis occiderunt, unde redire fratres ad conventus, de quibus assumpti fuerant, paucis remanentibus, sunt compulsi.* See *Scriptores rerum danicarum medii aevi*, p. 501.

[49] **Tugwell**, "Notes on the life of St. Dominic," (1998), pp. 114–115.

Summary

Regardless of whether we prefer 1229 or 1239 as the year in which the Dominicans arrived in Tallinn, it is unequivocally clear that the first mission of the Order of Preachers on Estonian territory failed, and the friars did not succeed in establishing a firm footing in Estonia until after the new dispatch decision issued by the Ribe Provincial Chapter in 1246. Concurring with Jarl Gallén's assumption, it is likely that the Dominicans did not arrive in Tallinn until a few years later, i.e. around 1248.[50] The friars established themselves at Castle Hill once again, and if we believe *Historia*, it is possible that they were greeted by a few companions from their order who had been left behind from the previous time. However, this is not very likely, since the chronicler lists the names of 12 friars, the minimum number required for the establishment of a convent, indicating that they were not anticipating any assistance to be waiting for them on site. It is highly likely that the Dominicans moved into their former site on Castle Hill; a permanent convent building was not established in the lower town until probably between 1262 and 1264.[51]

If we accept the founding year proposed by Simon Tugwell (1239), it does mean that we must relinquish the honor of having Tallinn as the location of the first Dominican convent to Riga, where a convent for the Order of Preachers was established at William of Modena's initiative in 1234, as mentioned earlier.[52] This, however, does not in any way diminish the significance of the Dominican mission of the subsequent centuries in Tallinn and other regions of Estonia.[53]

Appendix

Historia Ordinis Praedicatorum in Dania. Ed. S. Tugwell, "Notes on the life of St. Dominic," *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum*, Vol. LXVIII, 1998, pp. 111–112.

Conuentus Reualiensis per fratres duabus uicibus est receptus. Primo ad petitionis instantiam illustris principis domini Waldemari, regis Daciae, qui per gladium Estones suo ducatui subiugauerat, missi sunt fratres ad maius castrum Reualiense anno Domini MCCXX<X>IX, ubi meta fossata ad aquilonem castri minoris ecclesiam ac alias domos monasterii construxerunt. Hec omnia

[50] **Gallén**, *La Province de Dacie*, p. 51. See also **Halvorsen**, "Aux origines de l'Ordre des Prêcheurs," p. 263.

[51] This assumption is based upon confirmation of two royal privileges. When Queen Margaret approved the Dominicans' right to their site and the use of pastures and grasslands in 1262, she does not specify the town as the location of the friars, and makes no mention at all of convent buildings (*LECUB*, vol. 1, no. 370, col. 472–473). In King Erik's approval of privileges in 1264, this time not directed only to Castle Hill, makes direct mention of the Domincan convent (*claustrum*), which may have just then been newly founded (*LECUB*, vol. 1, no. 382, col. 486). See **von Walther-Wittenheim**, *Die Dominikaner in Livland im Mittelalter*, pp. 10–11.

[52] See ref. 18. It must be noted that the year of the founding of the Riga convent is not 100% certain, since a slightly later source, a list of Dominican convents in the Province of Saxony, notes the date of the Riga convent's founding as 1244. However, this is contradicted by the fact that sources mention the presence of the Dominicans in Riga as early as 1238. See **von Walther-Wittenheim**, *Die Dominikaner in Livland im Mittelalter*, pp. 7–8, ref. 13.

[53] On Estonian territory before the Reformation, the Dominicans succeeded in establishing their convents not only in Tallinn, but also in Tartu (ca. 1300) and Narva (ca. 1520); plans for the construction of a convent in Pärnu fell through due to resistance from town authorities. See **von Walther-Wittenheim**, *Die Dominikaner in Livland im Mittelalter*, pp. 10 ff; **Tamm**, "Culture ecclésiastique et culture folklorique," pp. 46–47; **Randla**, "The Architecture of the Mendicant Orders in Northern Europe," pp. 85–92.

facta sunt de consilio uenerabilis patris domini Williami Mutinensis episcopi, tunc temporis in partibus Dacie et Suecie summi pontificis nuncii et legati. Sed quia Estones in operibus fidei rudes et inculti, ad miserabiles ritus infidelitatis proni et procliui, crudeles erant contra personas ecclesiasticas atque seui, nam primum episcopum cum suis clericis occiderunt, inde redire fratres ad conuentus de quibus assumpti fuerant, paucis remanentibus, sunt compulsi.

Secundo anno Domini MCCXLVI missi sunt fratres de diuersis conuentibus in Reualiam per capitulum prouinciale Ripis celebratum, quorum hec sunt nomina: frater Brotherus et frater Iohannes Woxmoth de conuentu Lundensi, frater Aaron de Randrus et frater Petrus Hartbo de conuentu Wibergensi, frater Michael de Horsnes et frater Angelus de conuentu Arosiensi, frater Engelbertus et frater Iohannes Theo<to>nici de conuentu Roschildensi, frater Paulus de conuentu Siktunensi, et frater Iohannes de conuentu Insulensi, frater Astolphus de conuentu Skeniensi, et frater Daniel de conuentu Wisbycensi. Ister frater Daniel in Castro fuit primus prior et prelatus ordinarius inter fratres.

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The Orthodox Monastery in Tartu during the Livonian War*

Anti Selart

One of the means that Russian tsar Ivan IV (Groznyi) (1533–1584) used to reinforce Russian superiority in the Livonian territories conquered during the Livonian War (1558–1582/83) was the founding of Orthodox churches and monasteries. For instance, after the Russian conquest of a number of towns and fortresses during the great 1577 Russian military campaign on the territory of today's Latvia, the tsar ordered the immediate construction of churches – four in Koknese, two in Aizkraukle, and one in other castles, corresponding to the significance of each fortress – and dispatched clerics from Pskov and Novgorod to serve in them.[1] Churches or at least chapels were established in each Russian stronghold, and also in the rural areas of some of Russia's former frontier regions. For the most part, they satisfied the needs of Moscow's troops and pomeshchiki, a very transient element, since soldiers were frequently relocated from one fortress to another. In all likelihood, a true Russian church organization with local roots could develop only in the larger centers that remained under Russian domination long enough to allow the establishment of a more or less permanent Russian civilian population. Naturally, one such town was the "capital" of Russia's Livonian conquests: the city of Tartu, which was governed by Moscow for more than twenty years (1558–1582).

As is generally known, Tartu had two Russian churches during the Middle Ages. By 1438, Tartu, a Hanseatic town and residence of the Catholic bishop, was the site of the St. George's Church of the Novgorod merchants and the St. Nicholas's Church of the Pskov merchants. Textual sources refer to the northeastern and northern sections of this medieval town, where these churches were located, as the "Russian District," since the Russian merchants would stay at the homes of Tartu citizens in those areas. As the 15th century dawned and Grand Duchy of Moscow, which had taken control of Pskov and Novgorod, began representing an ever greater military threat to Livonia, St. George's Church was abandoned for some reason; the Church of St. Nicholas fell victim to the iconoclasm of the Reformation that raged in Tartu, rendering it unusable for the Russians.[2] When

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[1] **Norbert Angermann,** *Studien zur Livlandpolitik Ivan Groznyjs* (Marburg/Lahn, 1972), pp 53–65; **Адриан А. Селин,** "Московское церковное строительство в Ливонии XVI в.," in В. В. Седов, ed., *Археология и история Пскова и Псковской земли: Материалы научного семинара за 2000 г.* (Псков, 2001), pp. 242–247, here p. 243; **М. Мильчик, Д. Петров,** "Когда в Ивангороде построена Никольская церковь?" in М. И. Мильчик, ed., *Крепость Ивангород: Новые открытия* (С.-Петербург, 1997), pp. 164–176, here p. 172.

the Russians seized Tartu in 1558, they began holding Orthodox church services in the town right away. Both the Tallinn chronicler Balthasar Russow (†1600) and the Lithuanian military commander Aleksander Połubiński (†1607/1608) wrote of Russian monasteries existing in Tartu during the Livonian War. In the more comprehensive version of his chronicle, Russow told of Swedish soldiers and squads from Tallinn burning "the large foreburg of Tartu, which was a great disorderly collection of Russian dwellings, churches, cloisters, noblemen's houses, storage sheds and shacks. They slew and burned many Russians along with the women and children and seized and carried off mighty spoils"[3] in early June of 1578. Prince Połubiński came to Tartu in September of 1577 as a prisoner in the retinue of Ivan Groznyi. According to the prince, the tsar was welcomed by the "bishop, monks, and priests with crosses"[4] as all the church bells tolled. This reference to monasteries, monks, and suburban churches is only in general terms, and does not let us draw conclusions about their patron saints, the exact location of the buildings, or the date of their founding.

However, this information has not been completely lost. Russia's Pskov Museum (*Псковский государственный объединенный историко-архитектурный и художественный музей-заповедник*) preserves two church bells cast in the 16th century; their inscriptions indicate that they were made for an Orthodox monastery located in Tartu. The bells were brought to Pskov in 1962 from the village of Ozera in the Gdov district on the eastern shores of Peipsi Lake. At the end of the 15th century, when numerous monasteries were being established in the region around Pskov, Hilarion the Pious († 1476), student of the renowned Saint Evfrosin of Pskov († 1481), founded the Monastery of The Protection of the Mother of God (*Покров Богородицы*) in Kobyl'e county by the Zheltsa River. This area was devastated during the Livonian War, with even the monastery destroyed as the forces of Poland's King Stefan Batory surrounded Pskov in 1581 and scoured the region to meet their needs for vast quantities of food for the soldiers and fodder for the horses. When the Russians, in accordance with the 1582 Jam Zapolski Peace Treaty, relinquished Tartu to Polish forces, an order from the tsar sent the monks who left Tartu to Ozera to restore the monastery. It was Nikandr, the igumen (head of the monastery) of the Tartu Resurrection (Воскресение Христова) monastery and his monks who took along the two large bells of their former Tartu monastery.[5] Only a few years later, the monks had succeeded in constructing thirteen monk cells, a church, a dining hall, and a bakery workshop in Ozera. They had a couple dozen cows and nearly as many horses – although less than a tenth of the monastery's lands were inhabited. The rest of the villages and farmsteads had been reduced to an

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[2] **Kaur Alttoa,** "Das *Russische Ende* im mittelalterlichen Dorpat (Tartu)," *Steinbrücke. Estnische Historische Zeitschrift* 1 (1998), pp. 31–42. See also **Anti Selart,** "Der Dorpater Priestermärtyrer Isidor und die Geschichte Alt-Livlands im 15. Jahrhundert," *Ostkirchliche Studien* 48 (1999), pp. 144–162; **Norbert Angermann,** "Zum Handel zwischen Dorpat/Tartu und Pleskau/Pskov im frühen 17. Jahrhundert," *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 122 (2004), pp. 175–189, here p. 177; **Anti Selart,** "Orthodox churches in medieval Livonia," in Alan V. Murray, ed., The Clash of Cultures on the Medieval Baltic Frontier (Farnham, 2009).

[3] *Wisconsin Baltic Studies* 2, *The Chronicle of Balthasar Russow. A Forthright Rebuttal* by Elert Kruse. *Errors and Mistakes of Balthasar Russow* by Heinrich Tisenhausen (Madison, 1988), p. 196 [114b]; see also **Якоб Ульфельдт,** *Путешествие в Россию. Studia historica* (Москва, 2002), pp. 174, 209.

[4] "Донесение князя Александра Полубенского" in П. С. Уварова, ed., *Труды X Археологического съезда в Риге 1896,* vol. 3 (Москва, 1900), pp. 117–138, here p. 127.

[5] **Селин,** "Московское церковное строительство," pp. 244–245. See also **М. И. Зуев,** "Колокола псковского мастера Логина Семенова," in М. А. Кузьменко, ed., *Земля Псковская, древняя и современная: Тезисы докладов к научно-практической конференции* (Псков, 1991), pp. 28–32, here p. 31; **М. И. Зуев,** "Неизвестный русский монастырь XVI в. в Юрьеве (Дерпте)," *Археология и история Пскова и Псковской земли, 1992: Материалы семинара* (Псков, 1992), p. 45.

overgrown wasteland.[6] The little monastery with its two wooden churches was dissolved in 1764; the remaining church was used as a village church.[7] The Ozera monastery bells, carried to this site from Tartu, are today at the museum in Pskov, and despite their brevity, the inscriptions they bear represent a rare and important source of Tartu history during the Livonian War.

The height of the larger bell is 102 cm and its diameter 87 cm, the dimensions of the smaller one are 94 cm and 79 cm, respectively.[8] The bells are known to make up a set because they bear a matching inscription. It begins on the larger bell: "With the grace of God and His most pure Mother [and] the help of the sacred and life-giving Trinity the second day of the month of June in the year 1570 these bells were cast for the Resurrection Church on the Hill of Babylon in Tartu during the reign of Orthodox and Christ-loving Grand Prince Ivan Vasil'evich, tsar of all Russia, and the time of the high-born sons of the tsar Ivan and Fedor, glory be to God the Creator, amen" and continues on the smaller bell: "And during the time of Archbishop Pimen of Novgorod the Great and Pskov and the time of Tartu voivode Iakov Andreevich Saltykov and the time of d'iaks Shemeta Aleksandrov Shchelepin and Melentii Ivanov and the time of igumen Feodosii and the time of Priest Iona and the time of treasurer Iurii and the time of majordomo Kasian and the time of Father Superiors Galasei and Feodosii Tveriankin and Avraam, and prepared by the master Login."[9] The fact that the name of the Tartu voivode was found on one of the bells was already published at the beginning of the 20th century.[10] The list of dignitaries on the bells is remarkably long.[11]

Pskov regional historian Mikhail Zuev has hypothesized that the casting of the bells grew out of Ivan IV's penance after his raids on Novgorod and Pskov.[12] This is quite likely when we consider the date of the casting – June 1570. Accusing the people (particularly the clergy) of Novgorod and Pskov with treason, he and his oprichniki launched a military campaign against Novgorod in December 1569. The pillaging of the town began on January 2 of the new year. After the bloodbath and devastation, the Grand Prince left Novgorod for Pskov

[6] **Н. Н. Масленникова,** "Псковская земля," in Александр Л. Шапиро, ed., *Аграрная история северо-запада России XVI века: Север. Псков: Общие итоги развития северо-запада* (Ленинград, 1978), pp. 87–112, here p. 104; Е. Б. Французова, "О степени распространенности общежительных монастырей в Псковской земле XVI века", in И. К. Лабутина et al., ed., Археология и история Пскова и Псковской земли. Семинар имени академика В. В. Седова. Материалы LIII заседания (Псков, 2008), pp. 139–152, here p. 146.

[7] **И. В. Половинкин,** "Покровский Озерский монастырь на иконе XVII в.," in В. В. Седов, ed., *Археология и история Пскова и Псковской земли, 1992*, pp. 45–48; **Зуев,** "Неизвестный русский монастырь," p. 45. See also **А. Васильев,** "Городок Кобыла и Кобылинский уезд," in *Сборник Псковского общества краеведения. Познай свой край,* vol. 4 (Псков, 1929), pp. 43–53.

[8] **Т. Б. Шаскина, В. А. Галибин,** "Памятники древнерусского колокольного литья (результаты химико-аналитического исследования)," *Советская Археология* 4 (1986), pp. 236–242, here pp. 238–239 no. 20–21.

[9] **Зуев,** "Колокола," pp. 28–30. see also **Зуев,** "Неизвестный русский монастырь," p. 45.

[10] **П. Покрышкин,** "Церкви псковкого типа XVI стол. по восточному побережью Чудского озера и на р. Нарове," in *Известия Императорской Археологической коммиссии*, vol. 22 (С.-Петербург, 1907), pp. 1–37, here p. 37. For a description of the bells, see also **И. И. Плешанова,** "Колокола псковских литейщиков XVI-начала XVII в.," in Б. В. Раушенбах, ed., *Колокола: История и современность* (Москва, 1985), pp. 104–119, here pp. 114–115; **К. М. Плоткин,** "Псковский край. История VII–XVII вв.," in Е. П. Матвеев, *"Богатырская застава земли Русской": Псков: Памятники истории, культуры, архитектуры,* vol. 1 (Москва, 2003), pp. 28–80, here p. 78.

[11] See also **А. М. Лебедев,** "Колокольня Псковского Троицкого собора," in В. В. Седов, ed., *Археология и история Пскова и Псковской земли, 1994: Материалы научного семинара* (Псков, 1995), pp. 21–29; **В. В. Седов,** "Колокол мастера Прокофия Григорьева в Камно," in Седов, ed., *Археология и история Пскова и Псковской земли, 1994,* pp. 49–52. See also **И. А. Шалина,** "Псковские звонницы и колокольни XVI в.," in Седов, ed., *Археология и история Пскова и Псковской земли, 1994,* pp. 11–12.

[12] **Зуев,** "Колокола," p. 30.

on February 13.[13] Part of the population of Pskov had already been deported. This took place because a small band of Lithuanians had captured the fortress of Izborsk in early 1569; once the Russians recaptured it, the stronghold's Russian officials were declared traitors and executed. Some of the d'iaks in the Moscow's Livonian fortresses near Izborsk were also executed.[14] In March 1569, a portion of Pskov's population was banished to central Russia.[15] The tsar and his oprichniki reached Pskov around February 19, 1570, but the repressions imposed on this town were notably more moderate than the ones inflicted on Novgorod. Only a few dozen of Pskov's nobles and officials were executed; those killed included igumen Kornilii of the Pskov-Pechery monastery (February 20) and many other clerics whom the tsar and his retinue regarded as traitors. During his two weeks in Pskov, the tsar had the property, icons, crosses, books, sacred vessels and bells of the Pihkva monasteries removed. Apparently, the Pskov-Pechery monastery itself, which is located some distance outside of Pskov, was not damaged.[16] Soon regretting the violence of his campaign to Novgorod and Pskov, Ivan decided to build two mighty churches at his residence in Aleksandrov, about one hundred kilometers northeast of Moscow. By plundering some churches and giving their property to others, he felt he was taking sacred items from traitors and donating them to a church that was loyal to the faith and to the tsar, because by accusing Archbishop Pimen and his clergy of having treacherous ties to the Catholic Poles and Lithuanians, he was also accusing them of betraying the Orthodox faith.[17] In this context, it is entirely plausible that the bells of Tartu were cast as a pious donation to the monastery located in a land where the Orthodox faith had not yet spread. The tsar himself may have ordered the bells;[18] Pskov's renowned foundry master Login Semenov had been known to fill several of the

[13] **Andreas Kappeler,** "Die letzten Opričninajahre (1569–1571) im Lichte dreier zeitgenössischer deutscher Broschüren," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 19 (1971), pp. 1–30, here pp. 15–17; **Руслан Г. Скрынников,** *Трагедия Новгорода* (Москва, 1994), pp. 83–95; **Борис Н. Флоря,** *Иван Грозный* (Москва, 1999), *Жизнь замечательных людей,* vol. 766, pp. 233–243; **А. Л. Хорошкевич,** "'Измена' Пимена и поход Ивана Грозного на Новгород," in А. А. Гиппиус, ed., *Великий Новгород в истории средневековой Европы: К 70-летию Валентина Лаврентьевича Янина* (Москва, 1999), pp. 225–231; **А. А. Зимин,** *Опричнина: Памятники русской исторической мысли* (Москва, 2001), pp. 187–191.

[14] **Heinrich von Staden,** *Aufzeichnungen über den Moskauer Staat*, ed. Fritz T. Epstein, *Abhandlungen aus dem Gebiet der Auslandskunde* 34 (Hamburg, 1964), pp. 44–45.

[15] **Скрынников,** *Трагедия Новгорода,* p. 77; **В. А. Колобков,** *Митрополит Филипп и становление московского самодержавия: Опричнина Ивана Грознаго* (Санкт-Петербург, 2004), pp. 350–370.

[16] А. Насонов, ed., *Псковские летописи,* vol. 1 (Москва, Ленинград, 1941), pp. 115–116; А. И. Малеин, ed., trans., *Новое известие о России времени Ивана Грозного: 'Сказание' Альберта Шлихтинга* (Ленинград, 1934), p. 32; **Christa Proksch,** "Die Aufzeichnungen Albert Schlichtings über Ivan Groznyj als historische Quelle" (Ph. D. diss, Erlangen, 1952), pp. 66–67; **Александр Гваньини,** *Описание Московии,* ed. Г. Г. Козлова (Москва, 1997), p. 118; **А. Каппелер, Р. Г. Скрынников,** "Забытый источник о России эпохи Ивана Грозного," *Отечественная История* 1 (1999), pp. 132–144, here pp. 136–137; **N. Andreyev,** "The Pskov-Pechery Monastery in the 16th Century," *The Slavonic and East European Review 32* (1953–1954), pp. 318–343, here pp. 337–338; **Kappeler,** "Die letzten Opričninajahre," pp. 17–19; **Скрынников,** *Трагедия Новгорода*, pp. 96–98; **Флоря,** *Иван Грозный,* pp. 244–246; **N. Andreyev,** "Was the Pskov-Pechery Monastery a Citadel of the Non-Possessors?" *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 17 (1969), pp. 481–493, here pp. 486–488; **Julia Prinz-aus der Wiesche,** *Die Russisch-Orthodoxe Kirche im mittelalterlichen Pskov, Schriften zur Geistesgeschichte des östlichen Europa* 28 (Wiesbaden, 2004), pp. 214–226.

[17] "Zar' Iwan der Grausame. Sendschreiben an Gotthard Kettler, Herzog zu Kurland und Semgallen, von Johann Taube und Elert Kruse 1572," in Gustav Ewers, Moritz von Engelhardt, eds., *Beiträge zur Kenntniß Rußlands und seiner Geschichte,* vol. 1, 1. *Sammlung Russischer Geschichte,* vol. 10, 1 (Dorpat, 1816), pp. 185–238, here pp. 222–224; М. Г. Рогинский, trans., "Послание Иоганна Таубе и Элерта Крузе," *Русский исторический журнал* 8 (1922), pp. 8–59, here pp. 50–51; **Флоря,** *Иван Грозный*, p. 239.

[18] **Зуев,** "Неизвестный русский монастырь," p. 44.

tsar's orders. We know that master Login cast bells for the Kolpino Island church and the Pskov-Pechory monastery in the 1550s, a well as for the Pskov Kremlin in 1572 and 1574, probably to replace the bells that had been hauled away from that site in 1570.[19] Many new bells were also put into place in Novgorod in 1571–1572.[20]

The inscriptions on the bells list the monastery's leaders – igumen, majordomo, fathers superior,[21] and priest. The thirteen monk cells erected by the monks of the Tartu Resurrection Monastery in Ozero, Pskov Region, within a few years may have approximated the size of the Tartu monastery. For its time, it was a medium-sized monastery; a monastery with more monks that most of the other Pskov region monasteries of that time.[22] The monastery also had to own parcels of land; these would logically be located in the vicinity of Tartu. The monastery had to have its own church, monk cells, bell tower, storehouses, communal dining hall, and maintenance buildings. They were probably wooden structures built within a short period of time after the founding of the monastery between 1558 and 1570.[23]

The Tartu voivode mentioned on the bell, Iakov Saltykov, was a member of an old Russian noble family. He served as voivode in several locations during the 1540s, was appointed okol'nichii in 1549–1550, and became a boyar in 1562. In 1568, he was dispatched to rule Tartu. Tartu was the main administrative centre of Moscow's Livonian territories, with several voivodes serving there simultaneously. Iakov Saltykov stood at the top of that hierarchy. Around 1570, the second voivode was Prince Timofei Ivanovich Dolgorukii-Obolenskii, and the third voivode was Prince Danila Borisovich Priimkov-Rostovskii. Boyar Iakov Saltykov died in 1571, and Prince Vasilii Iur'evich Golitsyn was appointed as Tartu's new voivode.[24]

However, instead of the names of the second and third voivodes, the bell bears the names of lower-ranking officials, specifically d'iaks, who played an essential role in the management in peacetime as well as acquisition of supplies in wartime. Whereas each Russian stronghold in Livonia usually included one d'iak, Tartu, as a main center, had several. During Boyar Iakov Saltykov's time, they were Shemet Semen Aleksandrov Shchelepin and Melentii Ivanov. The former had served in official capacity in Bezhetsk in the 1540s, holding an official position in Tartu from 1562–1564 and 1568–1569, thus serving for quite a long time. Shchelepin's name was associated with Tartu in February 1563, when Ivan IV's armies captured Polotsk, and the tsar ordered prayers of gratitude to be offered throughout his land. This order was also sent to Tartu, where Shchelepin was serving as d'iak. The city was to ring its church bells, and all the burgomasters and aldermen were to pray for the tsar.[25]

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[19] **И. И. Василев,** "Археологический указатель г. Пскова и его окрестностй (с рисунками и планами)," *Записки Императорского Русского археологического общества*, vol. 10, part 1–2 (1899), pp. 211–308, here pp. 244–245; **И. И. Плешанова,** "О зверином орнаменте псковских колоколов и керамид," in В. Н. Лазарев, ed., *Древнерусское искусство: Художественная культура Пскова* (Москва: 1968), pp. 204–219, here pp. 208–210; see also *Псково-Печерский вестник 1473–2001: К 500-летию со дня рождения прпмч. Корнилия* (Печоры, 2001), pp. 90–93.

[20] *Владимирский летописец: Новгородская вторая (архивская) летопись,* М. И. Тихомиров, ed., *Полное собрание русских летописей*, vol. 30 (Москва, 1965), pp. 161, 193.

[21] See **Н. И. Серебрянский,** "Очерки по истории Псковского монашества," in *Чтения в Императорском Обществе Истории и Древностей Российских при Московском университете,* vols 226–227 (Москва, 1908), pp. 473–482.

[22] See also **Макарий (Булгаков),** *История русской церкви*, vol. 4, part 1 (Москва, 1996), pp. 237, 511; **Серебрянский,** "Очерки," pp. 470–471.

[23] See also **Зуев,** "Неизвестный русский монастырь," p. 45.

[24] **Степан Б. Веселовский,** *Исследования по истории класса служилых землевладельцев* (Москва, 1969), pp. 202–203; **Angermann,** *Studien,* pp. 108–109.

In 1562, Melentii Ivanov was in the land of the Meshchera and took part in the military campaign to take Polotsk; in 1563-1564, he was a member of the tsar's Crimean legation. Sources record his presence in Tartu beginning in 1568–1569.[26]

As we know, Tartu was the seat of the Orthodox bishop during the Livonian War. The history of the Russian Tartu diocese has been studied in the greatest detail by the German historian Norbert Angermann, who concluded that the Livonian War-era Orthodox Diocese of Tartu was not established until 1570, and its first bishop was Kornilii, not to be confused with the Pskov-Pechery igumen Kornilii, who was killed that same year. Bishop Kornilii served at his post at least until 1575–1576; in 1578 we hear of a Bishop Savva, and in 1579–1580, there appeared a second bishop named Kornilii, who probably left the city along with the Muscovite forces in 1582.[27] Before the founding of the local diocese, Livonia belonged to the Novgorod and Pskov Archdiocese. Pimen, the Archbishop of Novgorod, having recently enjoyed the favor of Ivan IV (since 1552), was a target of the tsar's hatred at the time the bells were cast, and was sent to a Moscow prison in shame in January 1570. However, he was not removed from his position until the Church Council of July 1570, after which the former archbishop was sent to a monastery near Tula, where he died in September 1571. The new Novgorod Archbishop Leonid was appointed to his post at the end of that same year. In accordance with the formula requiring the listing of the reigning bishop on the bells of Tartu, the name of Archbishop Pimen was inscribed because Tartu apparently did not yet have its own bishop. This supports Norbert Angermann's theory about the year in which this Orthodox diocese was established. According to the Novgorod chronicle, the newly appointed Bishop Kornilii of Tartu arrived in Novgorod in the evening of October 14, 1570 and stayed at the St. George's monastery, apparently on his first trip from Moscow to Tartu.[28] In 1571, an Evangelical pastor from Kuressaare mentioned in his sermon the recent appointment of the Russian bishop of Tartu.[29] Reports originating in August 1572 tell us that Bishop Kornilii, travelling with his icons, went from Tartu to Novgorod, meeting with the tsar, who happened to be in Novgorod at that time. He continued on to Moscow in the tsar's retinue.[30] The bishop resided in the Cathedral Hill fortress formerly belonging to the Catholic bishops.[31]

Tartu was the Russians' most important administrative and military centre in Livonia. Despite war, devastation, destruction and deportation of the local population, Tartu

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[25] П. И. Иванов, ed., *Местничество. Русский исторический сборник, издаваемый Обществом истории и древностей Российских*, vol. 2 (Москва, 1838), pp. 1–438, here p. 71, see also p. 72; *Летописный сборник, именуемый Патриаршей или Никоновской летописью: (продолжение). Полное собрание русских летописей,* vol. 13 (Москва, 2000), pp. 363, 383; **Степан Б. Веселовский,** *Дьяки и подьячие XV–XVII вв.* (Москва, 1975), pp. 587–588.

[26] *Летописный сборник, именуемый Патриаршей или Никоновской летописью,* pp. 371, 382; **Angermann,** *Studien,* pp. 43–44; **Веселовский,** *Дьяки,* p. 209.

[27] **Norbert Angermann,** "Zur Geschichte des orthodoxen Bistums Dorpat," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 14 (1966), pp. 232–242. see also **Titus Christiani,** "Martin Kuiwleha und Herzog Magnus von Holstein," in *Sitzungsberichte der Gelehrten Estnischen Gesellschaft 1912–1920* (Dorpat, 1921), pp. 21–80, here pp. 76–80. **С. И. Сметанина,** "Записи XVI–XVII веков на рукописях Е. Е. Егорова," in *Археографический ежегодник за 1963 год* (Москва, 1964), pp. 358–396, here p. 361, no.13.

[28] *Владимирский летописец,* p. 160.

[29] **A. Bergengrün,** "Ein merkwürdiges Kirchengebet, gehalten zu Arensburg am 4. Mai 1571," in *Sitzungsberichte der Gesellschaft für Geschichte und Altertumskunde der Ostseeprovinzen Russlands aus dem Jahre 1898* (Riga, 1899), pp. 141–143, here p. 143.

[30] *Владимирский летописец,* p. 194.

[31] "Rejnholdi Hejdensteinii de bello Moscovito commentariorum libri VI," in Adalbertus de Starczewski, ed., *Historiae ruthenicae scriptores exteri saeculi XVI*, vol. 2 (Berolini, Petropoli, 1842), pp. 85–186, here p. 172.

also maintained its civilian significance.[32] It saw the development of a local "Russian life" with a structure and institutions that were probably influenced most strongly by the example of Pskov.[33] According to contemporary chronicler Reinhold Heidenstein, the Russians proclaimed at the Jam Zapolski peace talks that specifically Tartu and Vastseliina[34] were now sites of their faith.[35] We can assume that the organization of the life of Tartu's Russian congregations during the Livonian War also followed Pskov's example.[36]

Information about other Orthodox churches in wartime Tartu is even more scarce than that about the Resurrection Monastery. We know that Balthasar Russow, who mentions Tartu's Orthodox churches in his chronicles, had never been to Tartu or seen this Russian outpost with his own eyes. However, his general reports are confirmed by other sources. Immediately after the Russians gained control of Tartu in 1558, they started holding services in their "own church" – probably in the former St. Nicholas Church attended by Pskovians – and the Russian military commander Prince Petr Shuiskii left the fortress to come down into the town twice every day to attend the services. At Shuiskii's orders, the town hall bells and one of the fortress bells were removed and hung in front of the Russian church. The Russians also began building a new church.[37] Later, the Russian bishops may have used the former fortress chapel as their church; during the Polish era (i.e. after 1582), the formerly Dominican Church of Mary Magdalene has been referred to as the Russian church.[38] The Russian churches in Tartu were built on the northern banks of the Emajõgi River, giving rise to a Russian suburb in the time of Russian rule, 1558-1582.[39] A preserved codex, once located in Tartu, is the manuscript of works by St. Basil the Great, which contains a note stating that

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[32] See **Norbert Angermann,** "Dorpat/Tartu als Handelszentrum in der Zeit des Livländischen Krieges (1558–1582)," in Rainer Hering, Rainer Nicolaysen, eds., *Lebendige Sozialgeschichte: Gedenkschrift für Peter Borowsky* (Wiesbaden, 2003), pp. 543–550.

[33] See also **Andres Tvauri,** "Liivi sõja aegne Vene keraamika Eesti linnustes ja linnades" [Russian Ceramics in Estonian Fortresses and Towns During the Livonian War], in Arvi Haak, Erki Russow, Andres Tvauri, eds., *Linnusest ja linnast: Uurimusi Vilma Trummali auks [About Hillfort and Town: Studies in Honour of Vilma Trummal]. Muinasaja teadus* 14 (Tallinn, Tartu, 2004), pp. 395–419.

[34] See **Oleg Roslavlev,** *Kirchspiel Neuhausen*. *Siedlungsgeschichte des Estenlandes*, vol. 3 ([München], 1976).

[35] "Rejnholdi Hejdensteini de bello moscovitico commentariorum libri VI," p. 168; "Antonius Possevinus, de Moscovia," *Historiae ruthenicae scriptores exteri saeculi XVI*, pp. 275–366, here p. 364.

[36] **T. В. Круглова,** "Институт церковных старост в Пскове," in В. В. Седов, ed., А*рхеология и история Пскова и Псковской земли, 1989: Тезисы докладов научно-практической конференции* (Псков, 1990), pp. 13–14; **Б. Н. Харлашов,** "О роли погостов в крестьянской общине XIV–XVI вв.," in Седов, ed., *Археология и история Пскова и Псковской земли, 1994,* p. 48; **Петр С. Стефанович,** *Приход и приходское духовенство в России в XVI–XVII веках* (Москва, 2002), pp. 271–278; **А. А. Селин,** "Церковный причт Новгородского и Ладожского уездов Водской пятины в XVI – первой половине XVIII в.," in Д. А. Мачинский, ed., *Ладога и религиозное сознание: Третие чтения памяти Анны Мачинской* (Санкт-Петербург, 1997), pp. 73–77; **Prinz-aus der Wiesche,** *Die Russisch-Orthodoxe Kirche,* pp. 121–139. See also **С. В. Юшков,** *Очерки из истории приходской жизни на Севере России в XV–XVII вв. Летопись занятии Императорской Археографической Коммиссии за 1913 год*, vol. 26 (С.-Петербург, 1914), pp. 90–109; **Серебрянский,** "Очерки," p. 471.

[37] **K. von Busse,** "Die Einnahme der Stadt Dorpat im Jahre 1558 und die damit verbundenen Ereignisse," *Mittheilungen aus dem Gebiete der Geschichte Liv-, Ehst- und Kurlands,* vol. 1 (1840), pp. 450–552, here p. 483. See also **Wilhelm Thrämer,** "Geschichtlicher Nachweis der zwölf Kirchen des alten Dorpat," *Verhandlungen der gelehrten Estnischen Gesellschaft zu Dorpat*, vol. 3, part 2 (Dorpat, 1856), pp. 23–40, here p. 31.

[38] **R. Hausmann,** "Die Monstranz des Hans Ryssenberg in der K. Ermitage zu St. Petersburg," *Mittheilungen aus dem Gebiete der Geschichte Liv-, Est- und Kurlands,* vol. 17 (1900), pp. 165–212, here pp. 197–209; **Angermann,** *Studien,* pp. 55–56. See also **А. Будилович,** "О русском Юрьеве старого времени, в связи с житием священномученика Исидора и с ним сопострадавших 72 юрьевских мучеников, " in *Сборник Учено-Литературного Общества при Императорском Юрьевском Университете.* vol. 4 (1901), pp. 75–144, here pp. 103–106. **Thrämer,** "Geschichtlicher Nachweis," pp. 31–32.

[39] **Alttoa,** "Das *Russische Ende*," pp. 33–35.

in the time of Bishop Kornilii, 1575–1576, the Tartu monk Efim donated the codex to the Church of the Transfiguration of Jesus (*Преображение Господне*), which would imply that a church of that name existed in Tartu.[40] The property of the Church of St. Paraskeva (*Параскева-Пятница*), which once stood in Tartu, was kept at a monastery in Izborsk in the 1580s.[41] Of course, some of these churches mentioned in the sources with different names may have actually been one and the same.

It is very difficult to draw conclusions regarding the location of these churches. St. Nicholas Church, brought into use again during the Middle Ages and the Livonian War,[42] was located between today's Rüütli and Magasini Streets, near St. John's Church; St. George's Church stood on the territory of today's University Botanical Gardens. During the period of Russian rule, a Russian church or churches could be found in the suburb on the northern banks of the Emajõgi.[43] In Russian-language town descriptions of that time, medieval church and monastery buildings are mentioned as landmarks, however.[44] Fragments of Russian ceramic grave markers that are quite similar to the grave markers in the Pskov-Pechory Monastery[45] have been found in the Tartu Cathedral (in excavations of the southern tower and southern vestibule), providing evidence that the Cathedral was also used for the burial of Russians during the Livonian War.[46] These must have been people of high social standing, the only ones who would merit a personalized grave marker. For the most part, it was the pomeshchiki (lower-ranking gentry) of Pskov and Novgorod – as well as Livonia – who were buried by the Pskov-Pechory Monastery during the Livonian War. Undoubtedly, local pomeshchiki were also buried in the crumbling Tartu Cathedral as well. Despite the destruction it suffered in the war, the Cathedral continued to enjoy a certain authority.

The inscription on the bells formerly of the Tartu monastery reads that the Resurrection Monastery stood on the "Hill of Babylon" (Вавилонская гора). This toponym is otherwise unknown in Tartu and its environs. Even before the Livonian War, the hill currently known as Narva Hill was called Russian Hill, as it stood at the start of the highway running through Narva to Russia.[47] As late as the early 18th century, a Russian cemetery stood on what is now Lille Hill, which was known as Dung Hill (*Mistberg*) in earlier times, or St. Anthony's Hill, after the medieval chapel and cemetery.[48] The name

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[40] **Сметанина,** "Записи XVI–XVII веков," p. 361, no. 13.

[41] **Е. Б. Французова,** ed., *Города России XVI века: Материалы писцовых описаний* (Москва, 2002), p. 182; **Е. Б. Французова,** "Деисусные чины в храмах Псковской земли XVI в.: местные особенности и общенациональные тенденции (по данным письменных источников)," *Вестник церковной истории* 4 (2006), pp. 122–141, here p. 131.

[42] **Vello Helk,** *Die Jesuiten in Dorpat 1583–1625: Ein Vorposten der Gegenreformation in Nordosteuropa* (Odense, 1977), p. 47.

[43] See also **Thrämer,** "Geschichtlicher Nachweis," p. 31; **Helk,** *Die Jesuiten in Dorpat,* p. 47.

[44] Иванов, ed., *Местничество,* pp. 68–71.

[45] **И. И. Плешанова,** "Керамические надгробные плиты Псково-Печерского монастыря," *Нумизматика и Эпиграфика* 6 (1996), pp. 149–206.

[46] **Heiki Valk,** "Tartu Toomkiriku kalmistust and ümbruskonna varasemast asustusest" [On the Tartu Cathedral Cemetery and the Early Settlement of the Surrounding Region], in Heiki Valk, ed., *Tartu arheoloogiast ja vanemast ehitusloost [On the Archaeology and Older History of Construction in Tartu]. Tartu Ülikooli arheoloogia kabineti toimetised*, vol. 8 (Tartu, 1995), pp. 59–80, here pp. 67, 77.

[47] *Russenberch*: **Johannes Renner,** *Livländische Historien, 1556–1561, zum ersten Mal nach der Urschrift ed. P. Karstedt. Veröffentlichungen der Stadtbibliothek Lübeck, Neue Reihe,* vol. 2 (Lübeck, 1953), p. 33; **Uno Hermann,** "Tähtsamad Tartu mäenimed" [Important Hill Names in Tartu], *Keel ja Kirjandus* 8 (1965), pp. 631–633, here p. 631.

[48] **Hermann,** "Tähtsamad Tartu mäenimed," pp. 632–633; **Kaur Alttoa,** "Kahest Antoniuse kabelist and ühest sealoost" [On Two St. Anthony's Chapels and a Pig Story] *Kleio. Teaduslik-populaarne ajaloo almanahh* 2 (1989), pp. 22–28, here pp. 22–23; **Alttoa,** "Das *Russische Ende*," p. 35.

"Hill of Babylon" is highly meaningful, but we do not know who gave this name to the site of the monastery. Was the toponym in existence before the Russian conquest, or did it come into being at a later time? Russian sources dating from the Livonian War have recorded a number place names borrowed from non-German languages, even if the Russians also knew the German-language name. Often, the Russians preferred (most likely out of ignorance) the name used by the common folk of Livonia over even the existing Old Russian name, an indication of the role of Estonian and Latvian as languages of communication in Livonia. "Babylon" may refer to the Whore of Babylon. On one hand, this name given by the Russians might reflect the fall of Tartu as a bastion of Catholic and Lutheran heresy, on the other, the Lutheran preacher from Kuressaare, Joachimus Balck, compared Grand Prince Ivan IV himself to the Whore of Babylon in 1571 for appointing an Orthodox bishop for Tartu.[49] Furthermore, the Hill of Babylon might be linked to Babylonian captivity (a persecution of Orthodox believers?) and Babylonian confusion, and, by transfer of meaning by the 17th to 18th century, the Russian term for labyrinth.[50] Finally, we might simply be dealing with the modified form of a homophonic German or Estonian word.

Most of the region's Russian population left after Tartu was handed over to the Poles in 1582. All the property from the churches and monastery or monasteries was removed to the east.[51] Church bells originating in Livonia[52] were later found at many sites within Russia. Of course, their removal (or purchase by the Russians[53]) is not necessarily related to the events of the Livonian War. Some Russian churches constructed in Tartu during the Livonian War apparently stood unused in the Polish era; others were demolished for con-

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[49] **Bergengrün,** "Ein merkwürdiges Kirchengebet," p. 143.

[50] *Словарь русского языка XVIII века,* vol. 2 (Ленинград, 1985), p. 195. See also **Б. А. Рыбаков,** "Архитектурная математика древнерусских зодчих," *Советская Археология* 1 (1957), pp. 83–112, here p. 88.

[51] "Acta in conventum legatorum Stephani, regis Poloniae et Joannis Basilii, magni Moscoviae ducis 1581," *Historiae ruthenicae scriptores exteri saeculi XVI*, pp. 45–84, here pp. 60, 68–69, 73; "Псковский Печерский монастырь в 1586 году," in *Старина и новизна: Исторический сборник, издаваемый при Обществе ревнителей русского исторического просвещения в память Императора Александра III,* vol. 7 (1904), pp. 255–272, here pp. 259–261; Николай Н. Улащик, ed., *Хроники: Литовская и Жмойтская, и Быховца. Летописи: баркулабовская, Аверки и Панцырного. Полное собрание русских летописей,* vol. 32 (Москва: 1975), p. 125; **Hausmann,** "Die Monstranz," pp. 202–203; **Angermann,** "Zur Geschichte des orthodoxen Bistums Dorpat," pp. 237–238.

[52] **Макарий (Миролюбов),** *Памятники церковных древностей в Нижегородской губерний. Записки Императорского Археологического общества*, vol. 10 (Санктпетербург, 1857), p. 384; **L. Meyer,** "Über eine aus Dorpat stammende Kirchenglocke im Petscherski-Kloster bei Nischni-Nowgorod," in *Sitzungsberichte der gelehrten estnischen Gesellschaft zu Dorpat 1880* (Dorpat, 1881), p. 98; **P. Campe,** "Die Kirchenglocken Lettlands von ältester Zeit an bis zum Jahre 1860 und ihre Giesser," in *Latvijas Universitātes Raksti. Architektūras Fakultātes serija,* vol. 1 (1930), pp. 1–223, here p. 77, no. 8; "Псковский Печерский монастырь в 1586 году," pp. 267–268; **von Staden,** *Aufzeichnungen,* pp. 64–65. See also on the Removal of the Bells from Pskov-Pechory Monastery to the Orthodox Churches Established in Livonia: "Псковский Печерский монастырь в 1586 году," p. 271; **Селин,** "Московское церковное строительство," p. 243. See also **K. M. Kowalski,** "Die Glocken aus den Gießereien des Ostseeraumes in Riga und Lettland (im Lichte der Sammlung von Paul Campe)," in Ilgvars Misāns, Horst Wernicke, eds., *Riga und der Ostseeraum: Von der Gründung 1201 bis in die Frühe Neuzeit. Tagungen zur Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung,* vol. 22 (Marburg, 2005), pp. 463–486.

[53] In the 17th century in the Northern Russia there were in a great number old and new bells purchased from the Western Europe, see **О. В. Овсянников, М. Э. Ясински,** "'Немецкие' колокола на Архангельском Севере," in А. Н. Кирпичников et al. (eds). *Памятники старины. Концепции. Открытия. Версии: Памяти Василия Д. Белецкого 1919–1997,* vol. 2 (Санкт-Петербург, Псков, 1997), pp. 101–106. See also **von Staden,** *Aufzeichnungen*, pp. 37, 64, 132.

[54] "Protocoll der Catholischen Kirchenvisitation in Livland vom Jahre 1613," *Archiv für die Geschichte Liv-, Esth- und Curlands,* vol. 1 (1842), pp. 23–77, here p. 34.

struction materials or firewood. They were probably wooden structures, and were not mentioned again in subsequent records.[54] In many places throughout Livonia the church buildings erected by the Russians remained standing for some time;[55] in Vastseliina, the fortress actually continued paying the salary of the Russian clergy at least through the first decade of the Polish era.[56] The *Reussische Gasthoff* (Russian Market),[57] established during the Livonian War, remained standing in a suburb of Tartu, where a Russian merchants' chapel also stood in the 1580s.[58] Tartu fell under Russian control again during the Russo-Swedish War in 1656–1661.[59]

[55] E.g. Jan Jakubowski, Józef Kordzikowski, eds., *Polska XVI wieku pod względem geograficzno-statystycznym,* vol. 13: *Inflanty,* part 1. *Źródła dziejowe,* vol. 24/1 (Warszawa, 1915), pp. 71, 73, 174.

[56] Oleg Roslavlev, ed., *Polnische Akten I, 1582–1591. Hefte zur Landeskunde Estlands,* vol. 5 (München, 1970), pp. 8, 16, 24, see also p. 35. See also: "Protocoll der Catholischen Kirchenvisitation," p. 33; *Liivimaa 1638. a. maarevisjon. Eesti asustusala I: kaguosa [The 1638 Livonian Land Revision. Populated Areas of Estonia I: Southeast]. ENSV Riigi Keskarhiivi Tartu osakonna Toimetused,* vol. 1 (7) (Tartu, 1941), p. 161.

[57] **Norbert Angermann,** "Zum Handel der livländischen Städte mit Pleskau im späten 16. Jahrhundert," in Christina Deggim, Silke Urbanski, eds., *Hamburg und Nordeuropa: Studien zur Stadt- und Regionalgeschichte: Festschrift für Gerhard Theuerkauf zum 70. Geburtstag. Veröffentlichungen des Hamburger Arbeitskreises für Regionalgeschichte,* vol. 20 (Münster, 2004), pp. 11–20, here p. 16; **Норберт Ангерманн,** "Торговля Пскова с Ганзой и Ливонскими городами во второй половине XVI в.," in В. В. Седов, ed., *Псков в российской и европейской истории: (к 1100-летию первого летописного упоминания),* vol. 1 (Москва, 2003), pp. 305–309, here p. 307.

[58] The transfer of the St. Nicholas Church to Russian merchants also was discussed in the early 17th century. See **Angermann,** "Zum Handel zwischen Dorpat/Tartu und Pleskau/Pskov im frühen 17. Jahrhundert," pp. 176–177.

[59] **Norbert Angermann,** "Die russische Herrschaft im östlichen und mittleren Livland 1654–1667," Bernhart Jähnig, Klaus Militzer, eds., *Aus der Geschichte Alt-Livlands: Festschrift für Heinz von zur Mühlen zum 90. Geburtstag. Schriften der Baltischen Historischen Kommission,* vol. 12 (Münster, 2004), pp. 351–367.

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Twenty-five personal letters of the members of the Gordon family are preserved in the Tallinn City Archives. Most of them are written by Patrick Gordon, the rest by his children and other relatives. According to the letters one can assume that William Gordon who had been in service in Tallinn mediated letters sent from Moscow to the relatives living elsewhere (e.g. in England, in Scotland). Part of the letters presumably reached Tallinn and got behind here after William Gordon had been transfered to a new position. The letters kept in Tallinn City Archives have been discussed in the article: *P. Dukes*. *Patrick Gordon and His Family Circle: Some Unpublished Letters* // *Scottish Slavonic Review*. 1988. No. 10.

Tallinn City Archives, f. 230 (Archive of the Tallinn Magistracy), n. 1, s. BB 37

A letter from Patrick Gordon in Moscow to his relative, infantry captain William Gordon in Tallinn on February 19, 1692.
Patrick Gordon (1635–1699) was a soldier of Scottish descent whose military career in the Russian Army during the time of Alexei Mikhailovich and Peter I flourished with his rise from the rank of major to general, during which time he also served as personal advisor to Peter I. His diary (*Diary* 1635–1667) has been translated into many languages. Gordon's character has also found a place in the writings George Byron, specifically in his poem *Epistle to Mr. Murray*.


1691

Dear Brother 26

My kynd respects to you, this good occasion
offering I thought it the least of my duties
to salute you by it with alyne I doe not
doubt bot Father has acquanted you of the
death of my dear husband who parted from
this lyfe on the 14 of may this year haveing
lived togither only 7½ monthes and in place
of that loss has blessed me with a sonne
called after his Father Daniell Craufurd born
on the 9 of July 1691 wherfor I am left
a poor widdow with a fatherles child bot yet
I put my trust in almighty God who
I hope will not leave me In the meantym lett me have
I hope that when you writ to Father you which be a
comfort to
present comfortless no
more bot hoping you will not forget
me who rests

Mosco the 4 Dear brother
of ..ber 1691 your loving sister
Mary Gordon

A letter from Patrick Gordon's daughter Mary Gordon in Moscow to her brother John Gordon in Scotland. January 22, 1692.

The English-language "weather observations diary" contains data on wind direction and on ships leaving from and arriving in Tallinn Harbor, as well as occasional notes on events that had occurred in the city. An entry made on January 17, 1791 says: *We heart that Mr. Jürgens* [alderman] *was to be married to one of Mr Pastor Hartmans´s servant maids.* A notation on the weather on January 19 reads: *Fresh breeze and much snow*. The weather turned even colder by the end of January.

Tallinn City Archives, f. 230 (Archive of the Tallinn Magistracy), n. 1, s. BO 16



Weather observations diary (anonymous). July 1, 1790 – August 21, 1791.

Postal Relations Between Riga and Moscow in the Second Half of the 17th Century[1]

Enn Küng

A propaganda text translated from Swedish to German and published in 1701 included the description of a letter from someone living in the Hague to his friend in Frankfurt. The introduction to this publication included Russia's reasons for breaking its peace pact with Sweden, as described by Andrei Matvejev, the Russian envoy to the Hague. The Russian complaints were followed by a thorough list of Swedish counterarguments.[2]

There were four reasons given in all, and in order of importance, they were as follows: when Tsar Peter I and his large entourage had traveled through Riga to Germany and Holland in 1697, he had not been welcomed with sufficient pomp and pageantry in Riga, his delegation had been forced to purchase food at remarkably high prices, they had been held behind locked doors like prisoners and were not allowed to leave their quarters to move freely about the city, and finally, when the delegation wished to cross the Daugava River upon their departure, the Swedish side had failed to acquire sufficiently comfortable vessels for them, and furthermore, they had been charged unfairly high transport fees for the few vessels that were provided; second, a few years earlier, some Livonian peasants had attacked a Russian envoy [Prokofij Voznicyn – E. K.] as he was returning from Turkey, stopping his baggage carriages and stealing every last item; third, the Moscow postmaster had accused the Riga postmaster of unfairness and demanded his removal from office, but the Swedish side had not complied; fourth, there were issues of debt claims made by Russian merchants against Swedish citizens.

As of 1700/1701, these constituted the Russian side's pretexts[3] for starting a war which history knows as the Northern War. At first, the Russian envoy Matvejev had asked the Dutch to mediate the resolution of these complaints, to which the Swedish side agreed. However, before any resolution could be sought for the misunderstandings, the tsar declared war on Sweden. Matvejev

[1] This article has been prepared within the framework of the Estonian Science Foundation Research Project ETF6945.

[2] Ein Schreiben, so Aus dem Haag, An einen Freund in Franckfurt, abgelassen, In welchem Die Ursachen Des Reußischen Friede-Bruchs mit Sweden, Wie sie, von dem in dem Haag residirenden Reußischen Minister sind vorgetragen, Nebst dererselben Gründlichen Wiederlegung, begriffen sind. Aus dem Swedischen ins Teutsche übersezet. Im Jahr 1701.

[3] Russia's four pretexts for launching a war against Sweden have been described by the chronicler Chr. Kelch: **Christian Kelch,** *Liefländische Historia: Continuation 1690 bis 1707: nach der Originalhandschrift zum Druck gegeben* (Dorpat, 1875), pp. 129–133. For information on Russian propaganda justifying the Northern War, see, for instance: **Pärtel Piirimäe,** "Russia, The Turks and Europe: Legitimations of War and the Formation of European Identity in the Early Modern Period," *Journal of Early Modern History* 11 (1–2) (2007), p. 81.

justified their breach of the peace by claiming that the Swedish side, despite Russia's complaints, had failed to implement any measures to remedy the situation.[4]

These Russian accusations were hardly new to the Swedish authorities. Resolutions to Russian complaints had been actively sought since early 1698 at the level of the Swedish central government as well as the local, Livonian governor-general level, although nobody knew then that a misunderstanding that seemed trivial at first glance could have far-reaching consequences.

The Russians first brought up these complaints within the framework of their bilateral diplomatic relations at the Swedish-Russian talks in Moscow in the latter half of 1699, at which the Swedish delegation was instructed to get Moscow's reaffirmation of the current bilateral peace treaty after the ascension of a new ruler to the throne in Stockholm. The Kärde Peace Treaty, signed in 1661, which regulated nearly all relations between Sweden and Russia, had last been revised at talks in Stockholm in 1683 and in Moscow in 1684, after tsars Peter and Ivan had come to power.

Before reaffirming the peace treaty, it was customary for both sides to discuss any complaints that had arisen in the interim, and to seek resolution of these conflicts. Thus, at the 1699 talks, the Russian side brought up its grievances against Livonian Governor-General Erik Dahlbergh, who had allegedly provided such an indifferent reception for the Russian delegation in 1697. They also brought up the case of the robbery of Russian envoy P. Voznicyn. The Russians also accused the Riga postal director of allegedly intercepting and reading foreign letters. As we know, the Russians' complaints doomed the reaffirmation of the peace treaty to failure, since the Swedish delegation had neither instructions nor authorization to respond to their grievances. On top of everything else, the tsar did not even perform the traditional kissing of the cross.[5]

Although historiography usually presents Russia's desire to satisfy geopolitical and trade policy needs by extending its grip to the shores of the Baltic Sea as its justification for laying the groundwork for the Northern War and attacking Sweden, some of Russia's reproaches to Sweden have also been mentioned, with the improper treatment of the tsar and his delegation in Riga first and foremost among these grievances. It is understandable that this alleged insult to the tsar caused tension between the two countries. The "insult at Riga" [6] is typically mentioned in biographies of Peter the Great as well as descriptions of events leading up to the Northern War, but the rest of the Russian grievances have been touched upon only in passing, and have not been considered particularly important.[7] So, for instance, Latvian historian Georg Jenš, referring to the propaganda publication of 1701, has ascertained the existence of conflicts between the postmasters of Riga and Moscow in the late 17th century, although he has not gone into detail about the nature of these conflicts. However,

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[4] **Alvin Isberg,** "Erik Dahlbergh och tsar Peters västeuropeiska resa," *Svio-Estonica* 16 (1962), p. 53.

[5] **Георг В. Форстен,** "Сношения Швеции и России во второй половине XVII в. (1648–1700)," *Журнал Министерства Народного Просвещения* CCCXXV, (сентябрь 1899), pp. 80–90.

[6] **Alexander Bergengrün**, *Die grosse moskowitische Ambassade von 1697 in Livland* (Riga 1892); **S. Svensson,** "Czar Peters motiv för kriget mot Sveriga," *Historisk tidskrift* (1931); **Isberg,** "Erik Dahlbergh och tsar Peters västeuropeiska resa," pp. 52–72; **Валерий Возгрин,** *Россия и европейские страны в годы Северной войны: история дипломатических отношений в 1697–1710 гг.* (Ленинград, 1986), pp. 63–65, 70; **Николай Павленко,** *Петр Великий* (Москва, 1994), pp. 64–65; **Margus Laidre,** *Lõpu võidukas algus: Karl XII Eesti- ja Liivimaal 1700–1701 [The Victorious Beginning of the End: Karl XII in Estonia and Livonia 1700–1701]* (Tartu, 1995), pp. 110–115; **Герман Карпов,** *Великое посольство Петра I* (Калининград, 1997), pp. 30–34; **Lindsey Hughes,** *Peter the Great: A Biography* (New Haven, 2002); **А. Г. Гуськов,** *Великое посольство Петра I и Северная война: Россия и Финляндия: проблемы взаимовосприятия. XVII–XX вв.* (Москва, 2006), pp. 135–147.

[7] E.g. **Bergengrün,** *Die grosse moskowitische Ambassade*; **Isberg,** "Erik Dahlbergh och tsar Peters västeuropeiska resa."

G. Jenš has provided an overview of Riga's role as intermediary of the mail between Moscow and Western Europe.[8] More than half a century later, Latvian postal historian Pārsla Pētersone has compiled a comprehensive description of postal relations between Riga and Moscow,[9] though relying heavily on the Russian postal history writings of Jenš as well as the Soviet Russian authors Marija Vitaševskaja[10] and Aleksandr Vigilev.[11] Neither of these last two authors has touched upon the postal conflict between the Riga and Moscow postmasters in the final years of the 17th century.

In the historiographic scheme, the most notable summaries of the rise of Russian postal service in the 1660s and the processes of its development in the latter half of the 17th century are the ones by I. Kozlovskij[12] and in some aspects, Erik Amburger.[13] Also noteworthy is Stepan Šamin's brief discussion of Russian postal history of the 17th century.[14]

In this article, we will first take a closer look at the establishment of postal communication between Moscow and Riga in the 1660s and its development through the 17th century, and then focus on the conflicts that arose between the postmasters of the two countries, including the postal conflict that erupted on the eve of the Northern War.

Moscow's postmasters of the second half of the 17th century and establishment of the postal route toward Riga

In the first half of the 17th century, there was no regular mail service between Sweden and Russia. Couriers would travel from one country to the other when necessary, and merchants and drivers (travelling on business) would also carry letters destined for the neighboring country. Discussions on the need for regular postal service began in the 1630s and 1640s in connection with the intensifying diplomatic and trade relations between Russian and Sweden. A connective route from Riga to Pskov was being considered as early as the first half of the 1630s, when attempts were made to establish a national postal service that would include a network of postal routes and stations.[15]

As postmasters were assigned to the towns in Livonia and Estonia,[16] the establishment of regular postal traffic with the Russian commercial centers of Moscow, Jaroslavl, Pskov and Novgorod were also being considered. In 1646, the Tallinn Castle Court Assessor Philip Crusius explained to the Swedish government the necessity of establishing a permanent system of correspondence with Russia. This was to not only ensure that business could be conducted successfully, but also to enable Sweden to acquire information about what was happening

[8] **Georg Jensch,** "Das Postwesen in Livland zur Swedenzeit," in *Sitzungsberichte der Gesellschaft für Geschichte und Altertumskunde zu Riga* (Riga, 1934), pp. 6–7.

[9] **Pārsla Pētersone,** "Entstehung und Modernisierung der Post- und Verkehrsverbindungen im Baltikum im 17. Jahrhundert," *Acta Baltica: Liber Annalis Instituti Baltici* 35 (1997), pp. 210–212; **Pārsla Pētersone,** "Riga als bedeutender Knotenpunkt im Swedischen Post- und Verkehrssystem des 17. Jahrhunderts," in *Symposium zur Postgeschichten Lettlands: Riga 11. August 2001,* pp. 8–9.

[10] **Мария Виташевская,** *Старинная русская почта* (Москва, 1962).

[11] **Александр Вигилев,** *История отечественной почты* (Москва, 1990). This book was first published in two parts, in 1977 and 1979.

[12] **И. П. Козловский, Андрей Виниус,** *Сотрудник Петра Великого (1641–1717)* (СПб, 1911); **И. П. Козловский,** *Первые почты и первые почтмейстеры в Московском государстве,* vol. 1 (Варшава, 1913).

[13] **Erik Amburger,** *Die Familie Marselis: Studien zur russischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (Giessen, 1957), pp. 154–165.

[14] **Степан Шамин,** „Письма, грамотки, куранты," *Родина: Российский исторический иллюстрированный журнал* 12 (2001), pp. 10–15.

[15] **Ragnar Liljedahl,** *Svensk förvaltning i Livland 1617–1634* (Uppsala, 1933), p. 373.

[16] **Enn Küng,** "Kullerposti ja reisijateveo sisseseadmine Eesti- ja Liivimaal 17. sajandi esimesel poolel" [Establishment of courier mail and conveyance of passengers in Estonia and Livonia during the first half of the 17th century], in Enn Küng, ed., *Läänemere provintside arenguperspektiivid Rootsi suurriigis 16./17. sajandil [Outlook for development in the Baltic provinces within the great Swedish state in the 16th and 17th centuries]. Eesti Ajalooarhiivi toimetised* 8 (15) (Tartu, 2002), pp. 205–238.

in Russia. Since it was customary for Russian authorities to intercept foreign correspondence at the border and open it at Moscow's Ambassadorial Office, Crusius proposed that all the letters going from Sweden to Russia should be brought into the hands of the Narva postmaster, who would then forward them to Sweden's Moscow resident Adolf Ebers.[17] A similar proposal for the advancement of postal relations with Russia was presented by Commissar Johann de Rodes in 1653. In his opinion, it was extremely important that commercial information should reach Swedish merchants more quickly than the merchants of Holland, England, and other countries. Therefore, de Rodes felt that the Western European letters transiting Estonia, Ingria, and Livonia into Russia should, together with the letters sent by local town merchants, be directed to the Narva post office, where the local postmaster would collect them and dispatch them all at once by courier every two weeks, first to the Swedish trade yard in Novgorod, and from there to the Swedish trade yard in Moscow. The mail would also move in the opposite direction along the same route. De Rodes felt that the regular conveyance of mail should be established by making the necessary arrangements quietly and secretly. He regarded the current custom of using travelers and drivers as letter carriers to be slow and unreliable. According to his calculations, regular postal service would cost about 500 state thalers a year, which would be collected with postal tariffs. Just like Crusius, de Rodes considered not only the interests of the merchants, but he also recognized Sweden's need to acquire continuous information about developments inside Russia.[18]

The principle of the free movement of official mail was first fixed in the Vallisaari Truce of December 20, 1658 (§20)[19] and the subsequent Kärde Peace Treaty (§17)[20]of July 21, 1661. According to both agreements, the mail between the Swedish governor-generals and the Russian voivodes was to move unimpeded, letters could not be intercepted en route, and unauthorized persons were certainly not allowed to read any of the correspondence.

Jan van Sweeden

While the first steps toward establishing regular postal communications for domestic as well as Western European mail were being taken in Sweden in the 1620s and 1630s,[21] Russia did not undertake similar reforms until the 1660s. Previously, the Yam courier system had served to carry Russian courier-delivered mail, but during the wars between Sweden and Poland in the mid-17th century, Russia realized its acute lack of information about the international situation. May 18, 1655 is considered to be the birth date of the Russian foreign postal service. On that date, at the proposal of Afanasy Ordin-Nashchokin,[22] still serving as the Pskov voivode, the Secret Affairs Office signed an agreement with Dutchman Jan van Sweeden for the establishment of cross-border postal communications.[23] J. van Sweeden took upon himself the duty of acquiring foreign newspapers and carrying letters with his own people and horses,

[17] Ph. von Krusenstiern's memorandum to Queen Christina, Tallinn, December 29, 1646, Uppsala universitetsbibliotek, handskriftsavdelning, manuskriptsamlingen, L. vol. 161.

[18] Excerpt of J. de Rodes's memorial, submitted to the Royal Chancellery on November 4, 1653, in Artur Attman, ed., E*konomiska förbindelser mellan Sverige och Ryssland under 1600-talet, vol. 1, Dokument ur svenska arkiv* (Stockholm 1978), pp. 127–128.

[19] *Полное собрание законв Российской имперіи*, vol. 1 (СПб, 1830), no. 240, p. 476.

[20] Ibid., no. 301, pp. 543–544.

[21] **Teodor Holm,** *Sveriges allmänna postväsen: Ett försök till svensk posthistoria, vol. 1, (1620–1642)* (Stockholm, 1906), pp. 76–78, 82–93; **Catrine Arvidsson,** "Postvägen via Markaryd och Markaryds postkontor," in *Postryttaren. Årsbok för Postmuseum* (2002), pp. 11–22.

[22] Russian historiography regards Ordin-Nashchokin to be the founder of the Russian Postal Service: **Виташевская,** *Старинная русская почта,* pp. 47–50; **Вигилев,** *История отечественной почты,* pp. 98–102.

[23] **Шамин,** "Письма, грамотки, куранты," p. 12.

receiving a one-time payment of 500 rubles and 500 sable furs for his services.[24]

Van Sweeden's mail traveled from Moscow through Pskov to Vastseliina, where Livonian postmaster Jacob Becker's postal riders would receive it and take it to Riga by way of Valga. They also carried personal correspondence along with official government mail. From Riga, the mail was sent on to Memel (Klaipeda), where it met up with the Brandenburg mails.[25]

In that same year of 1665, Becker's son-in-law Statius Stein approached the Swedish central authorities with a request to establish a separate postal service (*secrete posten*) from Moscow to Vastseliina, and onward to Riga and Courland. Karl XI's trustee government initially adopted a wait-and-see attitude, leaving the decision on this matter to local Livonian Governor-General Bengt Oxenstierna.[26] The fate of Stein's postal initiative is unknown.

Neither did van Sweeden's work in setting up postal routes to neighboring countries proceed as planned. Russia's ongoing war with Poland rendered the postal route through Courland unreliable. Not until after Russia and Poland concluded the Truce of Andrussovo on January 30, 1667 was it possible for van Sweeden to engage more actively with the issues of the conveyance of mail. The treaty signed by Russia and Poland on December 14, 1667 in Moscow included an agreement to establish a postal route (Article 6) which crossed the border by Mignovič and was to serve primarily the correspondence between the two governments.[27]

The Marselis family

However, the Moscow authorities were no longer satisfied with van Sweeden's activities. They allegedly did not trust him since they were unable to keep an eye on the contents of his mail bags. For this reason, Ordin-Nashchokin, who had risen to the position of Head of the Ambassadorial Office in 1667, took the reorganization of foreign postal traffic as one of his first duties in 1667, and in 1667/68 decided to add another postal route into Western Europe, namely through Smolensk-Vilnius-Königsberg, as an alternate to the Riga route. On May 25, 1668 he placed its operation into the hands of the Dane Leonhard Marselis, whom the state considered a more trustworthy man. Marselis was a foreign big industrialist living in Russia with his family. In the interests of gaining control over conveyance of the mail, Marselis surrendered his right to state support.[28]

The existence of a well-operating postal service between Riga and Courland was essential for the government authorities in Moscow. In the spring and summer of 1668, Ordin-Nashchokin himself was in Courland on diplomatic assignment, during which he continually corresponded with the tsar in Moscow. Marselis was also very well acquainted with the highways running to Riga and the situation there as well as in Mitau. He stayed in Riga in March of 1665 before traveling on to Germany and Denmark. At that time, Marselis aroused Livonian Governor-General Bengt Oxenstierna's mistrust, particularly because of his all too close relationship with Ordin-Nashchokin.[29]

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[24] **Amburger,** *Die Familie Marselis,* p. 155. It is noted here that J. van Sweeden received 1,200 rubles from the Russian government to organize the conveyance of mail: **Шамин,** "Письма, грамотки, куранты," p. 12.

[25] **Виташевская,** *Старинная русская почта,* pp. 47–50; **Вигилев,** *История отечественной почты,* pp. 98–102; **Шамин,** "Письма, грамотки, куранты," p. 12.

[26] The December 19, 1665 resolution of Karl XI's trustee government regarding the memorandum of Statius Stein, §3, Estonian Historical Archives (= EAA) 278-1-V:11.

[27] **Amburger,** *Die Familie Marselis,* p. 155.

[28] **Amburger,** *Die Familie Marselis,* p. 156; **Вигилев,** История отечественной почты, p. 103; **Татьяна Опарина**. Иноземцы в России XVI–XVII вв. Москва, 2007, см. 42–43.

[29] Livonian Governor-General Bengt Oxenstierna to the trustee government of Karl XI on March 13 and 17, and April 22, 1665, Latvian State Historical Archives (= LVVA) 7349-1-93. The same source informs us that there were suspicions in Riga at the turn of the year 1664/1665 in Riga that the Pskov voivode Ordin-Nashchokin was receiving secret information about local conditions from someone in Livonia.

In the summer of 1668, L. Marselis traveled to Riga and Courland once more, this time to organize the conveyance of international mail. According to E. Amburger, he entered into an agreement with the Riga postmaster, thus laying the foundation for the establishment of a direct connection between Riga and Pskov.[30] The author of this article has not succeeded in finding this agreement. However, even if such an agreement was entered into, it was perhaps nothing more than a private, presumably verbal agreement between the Riga and Moscow postmasters that could not possibly have received the approval of the Swedish government. Namely, more than a year later, on December 22, 1669, the trustee government of Karl XI issued a resolution to Livonian Governor-General Clas Totti which dealt with the routing of Russian mail to Riga through Pechory. It was in Sweden's interest to have the mail carried between these two cities, or at least to the state border, by Swedish rather than Russian mail carriers. However, another part of the resolution mentions nothing further than the establishment of mail service from Riga to Russia as well as Poland. Postal communications with Russia were deemed essential first and foremost for the promotion of trade.[31] As we see below, Marselis entered into an agreement with Rittmeister Thomas Robertson that same year (1668) regarding the conveyance of mail from Riga to Vastseliina during his trip to Livonia. It is likely that this agreement was also verbal.

Having returned to Moscow from Riga, Marselis drafted Russia's Postal Rules on August 21, 1668. They stated that the mail of government offices should be conveyed free of charge, but that private correspondence would be charged by weight. Letters were conveyed in sealed sacks by the horseback couriers of the Jam service. Couriers were to ride with sealed sacks on specified days even if there was no mail. The following mail sacks were to be used: 1) a sack inscribed "Riga" for mail going to Riga; 2) a sack inscribed "Valga" for mail going to Tartu, Tallinn and Narva; 3) a sack inscribed "Novgorod" for domestic mail to Novgorod; and 4) sacks bearing the inscription of the respective government office for government mail to Moscow. Personal letters were to be handed over to the Ambassadorial Office in Moscow. Postal tariffs were as follows: 1) incoming foreign mail – 2 *altyns* 4 *dengas* for one *lot* (about half an ounce); 2) incoming Novgorod mail – 6 *dengas*; 3) mail traveling the Moscow-Riga and Pskov-Riga line – 2 *altyns*; 4) mail traveling the Moscow-Tallinn, Narva, Tartu and Valmiera line, as also between these towns and Pskov – 2 *altyns*. Mail from Pskov to Moscow was tariff-free. Remittances of money from foreign countries were taxed in Pskov at a rate of 2% per 100 florins, and 3% per 100 thalers. Half the tariffs stayed in the hands of the postal officials, whereas the other half went into Marselis's treasury.[32]

In 1669, Marselis also began utilizing the Vilnius postal route. An official was appointed to Mignoviči already in August 1668. On March 4, 1669, upon receiving instructions from Ordin-Nashchokin, Marselis signed an agreement with the postmaster in Vilnius. Subsequently, the mail traveled once a week from Moscow to Riga and Vilnius, and returned by the same route.[33]

Marselis's postal service was characterized by regularity, its connection with the Russian governmental apparatus, and certainly by a stricter control over the content of letters, since nobody could any longer bypass Marselis when sending personal letters out of the country. And yet, foreign merchants tried to do just that, bypassing Marselis also when they sent money. Furthermore, Marselis had reason to complain about van Sweeden's nephew and successor Hermann Löfken, who,

[30] **Amburger,** *Die Familie Marselis,* p. 156.
[31] Swedish State Archives (= RA) Livonica II, vol. 503.
[32] **Amburger,** *Die Familie Marselis,* p. 156. A. Vigilev has dated the same document August 11, 1668: **Вигилев,** *История отечественной почты,* p. 104.
[33] **Amburger,** *Die Familie Marselis,* p. 157.

resting upon van Sweeden's privilege, continued to convey the mail for some time.[34]

By the end of the 1660s, Riga did become Russia's most important channel of communication with Europe. In addition to regular letters, Marselis had to supply the Russian authorities with Western European newspapers. This meant that each year Moscow was receiving more than two dozen titles of German, Dutch, French, Polish, Italian and Swedish newspapers.[35]

The birth of the Moscow-Riga postal service was also being watched by the Swedish envoys in Moscow. Sweden's resident in Moscow, Johan von Lillienthal, wrote on July 4, 1665 to Karl XI's trustee government about van Sweeden's plan to initiate contact with Riga Postmaster-General Becker, with the tsar's consent, to establish postal communications. Lillienthal, who felt that the existence of steady postal communications was necessary above all for the trade relations between the two countries, had also discussed the matter with van Sweeden. He started by investigating the security of postal traffic, fearing that the Russian side was confiscating as well as opening letters. Naturally, the newly appointed Russian postmaster denied any possibility of such a thing. Lillienthal felt that a contract would help to prevent misunderstandings. He also stated that he would continue to use merchants or couriers for the dispatch of his most important letters to Sweden, in spite of the agreement.[36]

The next Swedish resident in Moscow, Adolf Ebersköld, informed the trustee government that Marselis had been appointed to lead the Russian postal service on August 8, 1668. The envoy was forced to admit that letters which were still being dispatched outside of Marselis's postal system had been intercepted and removed along their way.[37] In his subsequent reports to Stockholm, Ebersköld mentioned Marselis's plan to exchange letters with Riga once a week, and to establish postal communications with Poland by way of Smolensk.[38]

Johan Philip Kilburger provides a good overview of the work of the Moscow Post Office on the postal tracts to Sweden and Poland in his 1674 review of Russian trade. He writes:

... on Tuesday evening, the mail goes out to Novgorod, Pskov, Riga, etc. Between Moscow and Riga, the mail takes 9–11 days; the delivery of one zolotnik or 1/3 lots costs 6 kopecks to Novgorod, 8 to Pskov, and 10 to Riga. The mail returns to Moscow on Thursday.

The Polish mail through Vilnius goes out Wednesday night, carrying letters to everywhere in the Roman state; those sent through Königsberg travel on to Hamburg, and continue from there to Berlin, and each zolotnik costs 25 kopecks. This mail is en route for 21 days, or two days less than the route through

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[34] Ibid.

[35] **Виташевская,** *Старинная русская почта,* pp. 50–58; **Вигилев,** История отечественной почты, pp. 103–107. For more detail about the transport of Western European newspapers to Russia: **Vladimir I. Simonov,** "Deutsche Zeitungen des 17. Jahrhunderts im Zentralen Staatsarchiv für alte Akten (CGADA), Moskau," in *Gutenberg-Jahrbuch* (1979), pp. 210–220; **Ingrid Maier,** Newspaper Translations in Seventeenth-Century Muscovy. About the Sources, Topics and Periodicity of Kuranty 'Made in Stockholm' (1649)," in Per Ambrosiani, ed., *Explorare necesse est: Hyllningsskrift till Barbro Nilsson. Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis. Stockholm Slavic Studies* 28 (Stockholm, 2002), pp. 181–190; **Ingrid Maier,** "Die Übersetzungen westeuropäischer Zeitungen am Moskauer Gesandtschaftsamt von 1660 bis 1670. Zur ersten Ausgabe der Vesti-Kuranty mit Paralleltexten," in Birgitta Englund Dimitrova, Alexander Pereswetoff-Morath, eds., *Swedish Contributions to the thirteenth International Congress of Slavists, Ljubljana, 15–21 August 2003. Slavica Lundensia Supplementa* 2 (Lund, 2003), pp. 51–74; **Ingrid Maier,** "Presseberichte am Zarenhof im 17. Jahrhundert. Ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte der gedruckten Zeitung in Russland," in *Jahrbuch für Kommunikationsgeschichte* 6 (2004), pp. 103–129.

[36] RA Muscovitica, vol. 82.

[37] RA Muscovitica, vol. 83.

[38] From A. Eberskiöld in Moscow to Karl XI's trustee government on September 1 and October 20, 1668, RA Muscovitica, vol. 83.

Riga to Hamburg. This mail returns to Moscow on Wednesday morning.

There is no regular mail delivery between Novgorod and Narva. And yet, there are opportunities for sending mail between these two points nearly every week throughout the year.

As soon as the mail arrives in Moscow, the parcels must be taken to the castle Ambassadorial Office to be opened; this guarantees that no civilian will learn of what is going on inside and outside the country before the royal court does; above all, by undertaking to hand all letters over to the Chancellor-General, everyone can avoid becoming the subject of suspicion for having correspondence that is banned and damaging to the state.

By mail, they receive printed and written newspapers and notices from Holland, Hamburg, Königsberg and other places, in as timely and correct a manner as we do here in Sweden; these must always be translated into Russian and read to the tsar.[39]

In the 1670s, postal traffic between Riga and Moscow became routine. Even the death of L. Marselis in 1670 brought about no substantial changes. His father Peter Marselis conveyed the mail in his place, without ever being clearly instated into the postal service or having his prior postal privilege expanded. However, P. Marselis did not serve in this position very long. In 1671, the Marselis family's patron Ordin-Nashchokin fell into disgrace, causing the people connected to him to lose their positions, including P. Marselis, who was actually arrested on December 1, 1671 for a period of several months. At that time, an official of the Ambassadorial Office (*Posolsky Prikaz*), Andreas Winius, was performing postmaster's duties. After his release from prison, P. Marselis continued to handle the Russian mail until his death in the summer of 1672. Management of the Russian postal system then fell into the hands of Peter Marselis, Junior, who was confirmed to the position of postmaster on October 22, 1672. A few years later, on August 7, 1675, P. Marselis, Junior also died, after which the Marselis family lost their management of the postal service.[40]

The acting Governor-General of Livonia, Fabian von Fersen, received a notice stating that P. Marselis Senior had been removed from his position of managing the postal service at the end of 1671 and replaced by A. Winius; the notice was accompanied by a petition, namely, that Elisabeth Perbandt, the widow of deceased Rittmeister Thomas Robertson, was submitting a complaint. She claimed that L. Marselis had entered into a contract with the Rittmeister in 1668 regarding the conveyance of mail from Riga to Vastseliina for 200 state thalers a year. After her husband's death, the widow, claiming to have kept six horses for this very purpose, continued to carry the mail. The Riga postmaster Becker had given the mail destined for Russia to the Perbandt postal riders in Riga, and after his death, his widow continued doing the same. The contract had been accepted in 1671 by A. Winius; however, Major Magnus Wilhelm von Budberg, ignoring all valid agreements, arbitrarily took over the conveyance of mail from Perbandt. The widow was dissatisfied with her loss of the postal business, and sent several appeals to von Fersen.[41]

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[39] Mercatura Ruthenica oder kurtzer Unterricht von den Reußischen Commercien wie nemblich selbige Ao: 1674 mit auß- und eingehenden Waaren durch gantz Moscovien getrieben worden /../ zusammen getragen von Johan Philip Kilburger, Kungliga biblioteket, Handskriftssektionen, Stockholm, vol. D. 1415.

[40] **Amburger,** *Die Familie Marselis,* pp. 158–160; 161–165.

[41] From Elisabeth Perbandt to the acting Livonian Governor-General F. von Fersen, filed by the Chancellery on April 19 and May 3, 1672, EAA 278-1-XVI:18c/1; 278-1-XVI:18d/1. We can assume that Perbandt did not succeed in restoring his authority, since in the 1687/1688 postal audit materials for Estonia and Livonia mention that the mail is being transported on the Riga-Tartu route by Commandant Budberg's widow and her sons: **Enn Küng,** "'...mugavamaid teid, kui nüüd linnade vahel tarvitatakse, on vaevalt leida...' Postirevisjon Eesti- ja Liivimaal 1687.–1688. aastal" ['...we can hardly find more convenient routes than those now in use between towns...' Postal audits in Estonia and Livonia in 1687–1688], *Tuna* 4 (2005), p. 31.

Andreas and Mathias Winius

On December 4, 1675, Andreas Winius (1641–1717), the Ambassadorial Office's interpreter and son of a Dutch merchant, was appointed to the post of Russian postmaster. The influence of the latter in Russian government circles was significantly greater than that of the postmasters that preceded him. Starting out as a simple interpreter, he rose to join the duma *d'yaks* and enjoyed the favor of Peter the Great. In addition to serving as the postmaster of Moscow, he has secured a place in Russian history as Peter's geography, technology and military affairs advisor, as well as Chief of the Drugstore, Siberian, and Artillery Chancellries (*Prikazy*). These duties did not allow A. Winius to devote all his efforts to the work of postmaster, and therefore, his son Mathias Winius was appointed to this position on October 18, 1693. A. Winius stayed on as curator of the postal service. The Winiuses were involved with the Russian postal system until 1703, when, having lost faith in the tsar's eyes, were forced to abandon all their official posts.[42]

After taking on the position of postmaster, A. Winius renewed the postal delivery agreement with Margareta Giese, the widow of Riga's former postal director J. Becker (who died in 1672).[43] The precise date of the agreement is unclear from archival sources, but the contract entered into effect on January 1, 1676 simultaneously in Riga and Moscow.[44] According to the contract, A. Winius promised to pay M. Giese an annual fee of 290 albertusthalers for the conveyance of mail. In turn, M. Giese promised to convey the Russian mail to the Swedish-Russian border at the appropriate time for the exchange of mail sacks. Giese also undertook to send two copies of a German newspaper (*eine Teutsche Advies*)[45] to Russia, with one copy being free of charge, and the other costing 6 state thalers to be paid by Winius. An important point in the agreement stated that if anything happened to the mail in the region for which Giese was responsible, she would be obligated to conduct an investigation. Russian letters transported between Riga and Pechory were free of postal tariffs. However, tariffs had to be paid for letters transported from Riga to Memel and other western regions.

Thus, Riga continued to be the most important channel of Moscow's postal communication with Western Europe. Smolensk and Vilnius were the main avenues of communication with Poland. Conveyance of mail to Vilnius ceased for some time in 1679, allegedly because of some epidemic disease raging in Poland. In the summer of 1681, letters gradually began to flow into Vilnius once more. This postal route was favored by Vassili Golicyn, who had risen to the position of Head of the Ambassadorial Office in 1683. With the extension of the Andrussovo Truce in May 1685, a new postal delivery agreement was entered into by the postmaster of Moscow and Vilnius in December of that same year.[46]

The Riga-Moscow postal conflict in the mid-1680s

The Riga-Moscow mail service operated routinely until 1684, when the first serious conflict erupted between the postmasters

[42] See the biographical information on A. Winius: **И. П. Козловский,** "Андрей Виниус," in *Советская историческая энциклопедия,* vol. 3 (Москва, 1963), pp. 490–491; **Вигилев,** *История отечественной почты*, pp. 131–133.

[43] **Jensch,** "Das Postwesen in Livland zur Swedenzeit," pp. 8–9.

[44] RA Livonica II, vol. 503.

[45] It is likely that by *German newspaper*, they meant the Königsberg newspaper that was popular in Riga: "*Königs. Donnerstags (Sonntags) Ordinari Post-Zeitung*": **Endel Annus,** "Die im Baltikum bis 1710 erschienenen Zeitungen," in Aleksander Loit, Helmut Piirimäe, eds., *Die Schwedischen Ostseeprovinzen Estland und Livland im 16.–18. Jahrhundert. Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis. Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia* 11, (Uppsala, 1993), p. 425. A. Winius's grievance of October 15, 1684 also mentions the Königsberg newspaper.

[46] **Виташевская,** *Старинная русская почта,* p. 71; **Вигилев,** *История отечественной почты*, p. 111.

of Moscow and Riga. As we see in Winius's formal complaint dated October 15, 1684 in Moscow, the Rigan party had started demanding 300 state thalers instead of 290 in June 1677, in spite of their agreement. Giese justified the additional fee by stating that she needed to pay the postal clerk. The charging of this additional fee until 1681 was, however, compensated to some extent. Also, Winius had not received the agreed newspapers from Riga, and furthermore, Giese had overestimated the weight of Königsberg postal parcels and charged unjustifiably high postal tariffs for letters. More serious were the accusations of seizure and opening of postal parcels. Because of this, 1,000 ducats being sent by the Rigan alderman Sedens to Moscow languished in the Riga Post Office for four weeks. The money was to go to Winius himself. Winius was further enraged by the fact that neither Giese nor Stein found any cause to investigate the situation. According to the Moscow postmaster, these disagreements had caused postal traffic between Riga and Pskov to come to a halt. This caused great harm and confusion for the Russian side. Seeking a way out of this situation, Winius signed a new postal delivery agreement with the Tartu postmaster Andreas Max. Winius had informed Giese of the contract that was to enter into force on January 1, 1685. At the same time, a notice had already arrived in Moscow stating that the Riga postmaster was planning to strip Max of his "position and honor", prompting Max to ask Winius to annul their contract.[47]

In a letter of January 23, 1685, the voivode of Pskov informed Livonian Governor-General Christer Horn of the changes that Winius had made and the contract he had entered into with the Tartu postmaster Max. This letter also included the main reasons for these actions: Riga had demanded a fee higher than that which had been agreed for the conveyance of mail and had failed to deliver the obligatory newspapers.[48]

These accusations were serious, prompting Russian tsars Peter and Ivan to send Stockholm a letter about this issue. This was most likely the reason that Karl XI ordered Governor-General Horn to form a commission, led by Horn himself, to investigate the case on March 10, 1685. The king referred to Winius's basic accusations. However, the Moscow postmaster as well as the tsars had let Stockholm know that they now wished to direct Russian mail through Lithuania instead of Riga, as well as through the postal system of the Duke of Courland, which was in the process of establishing its center in Mitau. The planned Courland postal service seriously irritated the king, because it flew in the face of previous agreements. The king felt that the redirection of the postal route would cause great damage to the state, and Horn was to do his utmost to prevent this from happening. Karl XI also said that he failed to understand how the Riga postmistress Giese had managed to enter into an contract with Winius while bypassing His Royal Highness, the Chancellery Collegium, and the Livonian governor-general. Since the mail was an element of the royal regalia and was subject to the Chancellery Collegium's control, the king felt that the Riga postmistress had acted independently in her own self-interest. Taking this into account, the Commission had to familiarize itself with the workings of the entire Riga Post Office and investigate its receipts and expenditures. Furthermore, the Commission was to investigate how the Tartu postmaster Max had become involved in the postal service. Allegedly, after the death of his father who had the same name, Max had begun managing the postal services without authorization and without having taken the proper oath.[49]

[47] RA Livonica II, vol. 503.

[48] EAA 278-1-XVI:15d.

[49] RA Livonica II, vol. 503. In addition to the Governor-general of Livonia Chr. Horn, the Commission included, among others, Oberst Christian Thumb von Weingarten, Secretary Michel von Strohkirchi, District Magistrate Caspar von Ceumern and Assessor Didrich von Dunte.

Horn informed postmaster Stein of the order creating a commission to investigate the postal conflict and the work of the Riga Post Office as early as March 20. He also obligated Stein to submit a report on the actual status, wages paid, maintenance of postal horses, and postal taxes of the Livonian postal service.[50] Upon completing its work, the commission produced an investigative report on May 8, 1685;[51] however, Horn did not forward this analysis to His Royal Highness in Stockholm until almost a year later, on March 27, 1686.[52]

Among the investigative commission's materials is preserved a copy of the postal delivery agreement concluded between Winius and Max some time in the fall of 1684.[53] According to this agreement, Winius promised to pay 200 state thalers a year, or the same value in ducats or Russian silver kopecks to Tartu postmaster Max for conveyance of mail between Pechory and Riga. The money was to be paid out twice a year (Art. 1). Max, in turn, undertook to deliver postal parcels to Pechory once a week, regardless of their content. The mail was to leave Riga on Thursday afternoon at two, and arrive in Tartu by three o'clock on Saturday, leaving Tartu at four that same afternoon and arriving in Pechory by 12 noon, to continue its journey to Pskov an hour later. Mail sacks were checked in Pechory to make sure they were sealed (Art. 2). By midday Sunday, mail from Moscow, Novgorod and Pskov had also arrived in Pechory, also leaving an hour later for Livonia, to arrive in Tartu at 10 on Monday morning, and in Riga at 10 on Wednesday morning. The mail was transferred at a specific place in Pechory (Art. 3). The mail between Russia and commercial towns in Estonia and Livonia, and the personal correspondence between the Russian tsar and the Swedish king were free of postal tariffs. For Russian letters and parcels from elsewhere in Livonia, as well as for letters and parcels being transported between Königsberg and Memel, the Tartu postmaster had the right to charge a predetermined fee. A list describing the dispatch was to be included in each mail sack. Letters originating from various places had to be bound separately, and the pack was to be labeled with their origin, whether something additional was being sent, etc. The Russian side, in turn, confirmed the arrival of the letters in Moscow every Wednesday, as well as the proper condition of the seals on parcels, etc. (Art. 4, 5, 8 and 9). Postmaster Max also undertook to send two copies of a Königsberg or Danzig newspaper to Moscow free of charge, as well as two Riga newspapers[54] (Art. 6).

In discussing this contract, we must remember that Winius wanted Max to take over the conveyance of mail between Riga and Pechory. Max, in turn, was interested in having the mails move through the Tartu Post Office. It meant a steady income for Max, as well as control over the movement of the mail. For the mail, it meant a significant logistical change. We know that Max was not only the Tartu postmaster, but also head of the town's merchant guild, and from 1682 to 1685, even an alderman.[55] In his positions as a high town official, Max could envision Tartu's role as something more than a mere agent for the delivery of Russian mail. Namely, Tartu had argued with Riga for decades over the direction of trade routes, wanting the Rigans to travel to Russia by way of Tartu rather than Vastseliina,

[50] EAA 278-1-VI:25/4.
[51] RA Livonica II, vol. 503.
[52] RA Livonica II, vol. 87.
[53] RA Livonica II, vol. 503.
[54] The newspaper "Rigische Novellen" had been published in Riga since 1681: **Annus,** "Die im Baltikum bis 1710 erschienenen Zeitungen," p. 425.
[55] Robert Arthur von Lemm, ed., *Dorpater Ratslinie 1319–1889 und das Dorpater Stadtamt 1878–1918 Ratspersonen, Beamte und Angestellte des Rats und des Stadtamts von Dorpat von 1319–1918 in chronol. und alphabet. Ordnung* (Marburg, 1960), p. 99.

Aluksne[56] or Sangaste. Thus, when entering into the postal contract in 1684, Max hoped that the mail riders coming into Tartu would be followed by Russian merchants and even Rigans.

S. Stein, who had managed the Riga Post Office together with M. Giese, saw the postal conflict with Winius in an altogether different light. In his January 8, 1685 report to Chancellery President Bengt Oxenstierna, Stein accused the Duke of Courland of being the main instigator of the conflict by "wanting to draw Moscow's mail in his own direction." He also saw Courland's interests behind the agreement between Winius and Max. Stein accused Max of bypassing the Riga Post Office by signing the contract and ignoring the fact that he should actually be subordinate to Stein, the postmaster. Stein said that he had invited Max to Riga and annulled his contract.[57] But in his letter of March 17, 1685 to Governor-General Horn, Stein described these misunderstandings as a plot against himself, arising at the instigation of Alderman Sedens and from the casting of a negative light on the work of the Riga Post Office in reports to Winius. Stein too wanted a thorough investigation of this conflict. Namely, he was convinced that Moscow's postmaster was not the only one who wished to use the postal service of the Duke of Courland, but that the citizens of Riga who were bypassing the Riga Post Office and sending and receiving their letters and parcels by way of Mitau wanted to use the Courland service as well. Stein also submitted this grievance directly to the Riga town government.[58]

The Duke of Courland was indeed involved in this conflict. We must remember that it was not only the Russian mail, but the bulk of the local Livonian and Estonian correspondence that moved to Western Europe from Riga through Mitau (Jelgava) to Memel and Königsberg.[59] Swedish authorities had entered into several agreements with the Duke of Courland for passage through Courland.[60] These remained in effect for as long as the duchy lacked its own postal service. Furthermore, the Duke of Courland himself had unavoidably used the services of the Riga mail riders. But in the first half of the 1680s, Courland tried to break free of its dependence on Swedish postal system, with Duke Friedrich Kasimir establishing his own postal organization in 1685. The Riga postal riders now found their freedom of movement obstructed in every possible way. Riga mail traffic could no longer move with regularity.[61]

Not only did they form an investigative commission, but Swedish authorities also endeavored to discuss the postal conflict with the Russian side in early spring of 1685 during the scheduled Russian-Swedish border negotiations in Vasknarva. The Swedish delegation's instructions thus included an item[62] obligating the delegates to find a solution to the postmasters' conflict (Sections 20, 21). As described in the instructions, Winius had accused Stein of opening parcels being conveyed into Russia and of overcharging

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[56] See, for instance, **Arnold Soom,** *Die Politik Swedens bezüglich des Russischen Transithandels über die estnischen Städte in den Jahren 1636–1656* (Tartu, 1940), pp. 60–72; Raimo Pullat, ed., *Tartu ajalugu* (Tallinn, 1980), *Õpetatud Eesti Seltsi Toimetused* 32, pp. 82–85.

[57] EAA 278-1-XI:1.

[58] EAA 278-1-XVI:31f.

[59] For more details on the relative importance of mail destined for Western Europe for the work of the Riga Post Office as of 1688, see: **Küng,** "...mugavamaid teid, kui nüüd linnade vahel tarvitatakse, on vaevalt leida," pp. 23–25, tables 1 and 2.

[60] The transit of mail and passengers through Courland was guaranteed by sections of the 1647 Swedish-Courland neutrality agreement and the 1660 Oliwa Peace Treaty with Poland. In 1668, Duke Jakob again gave assurances that Swedish postal riders had freedom of movement: **Jensch,** "Das Postwesen in Livland zur Swedenzeit," pp. 4–6; **Pētersone,** "Entstehung und Modernisierung der Post- und Verkehrsverbindungen," p. 212.

[61] **Jensch,** "Das Postwesen in Livland zur Swedenzeit," p. 5.

[62] The Swedish delegation's instructions of March 30, 1685 for the Vasknarva border negotiations, RA Muscovitica, vol. 572.

the postal horses on the line between Riga and the border (in the text: Meeksi[63]) with fees higher than set forth in the agreement. Furthermore, Stein had demanded postal tariffs on letters. It was the duty of the Swedish delegation to tell the Russian side that henceforth, Russian letters would move through Livonia tariff-free or under softened conditions of the current agreement. Sweden generally supported free conveyance of mail, since the state was already paying the Riga postmaster a fee for maintaining the postal horses. However, a condition of this courtesy was that Russian letters must be transported only between Riga and Meeksi, and would not pass through Mitau to Lithuania and into Russia. At the same time, the postal tariffs on those letters mailed by Swedish subjects to Moscow and letters coming from Moscow back to Livonia were to be lowered.

Was the conflict of the postmasters of these neighboring states discussed at the Vasknarva border negotiations? We do not know the answer to this question. Although we know of no new Russian grievances from the latter half of 1685, the postal conflict found no final resolution. In mid-January of 1686, Horn asked the Swedish resident in Moscow, Christoffer von Kochen, to assure Winius that the Riga postmaster Stein had absolutely no intentions of interfering with Russian mail and had done nothing to cause such interference to take place.[64]

The situation took another complicated turn in late February of 1686, when Horn received a letter from the Pskov voivode, who demanded that the Governor-General should order the Tartu postmaster Max to adhere to the contract he had signed with Winius. Writing to Karl XI about this issue, Horn recalled that Max, by signing the contract, had bypassed the Governor-General as well as the Riga Main Post Office and had attempted to redirect the mail along a different route than the traditional Vastseliina road. In his response to the Pskov voivode, Horn said that postal routes could not be changed without the order of the king, and asked Karl XI for his opinion.[65] At nearly the same time, Horn received the Chancellery Collegium's recommendation not to change the current postage rates, since they did not believe that Winius would direct the Russian mail to Vilnius. Still, the Collegium knew of the interference with Swedish mail in Courland, which essentially obstructed the movement of Russian mail as well.[66]

As already mentioned, Livonian Governor-General Horn submitted the final report on the conflict between the postmasters of Moscow and Riga to the king nearly a whole year later, on March 27, 1686. He based his own report on the investigative commission's report which had been completed in May 1685. The commission had questioned Stein and Max, as well as other involved parties, and had gathered numerous documents.[67]

According to Horn's final report, one of Winius's main complaints pertained to the Königsberg newspapers which Stein had stopped forwarding to Moscow. As the reason for this, however, the Governor-General brought up Karl XI's own ban on bringing Königsberg newspapers into the country, since they had "brought improper and evident falsehoods against the Swedish crown,"[68] and his order to henceforth print newspapers in Riga. The Swedish side's hope that Winius would be satisfied with Rigan news went unfulfilled. Winius demanded Königsberg

[63] A village by Vastseliina.

[64] From Chr. Horn to Chr. von Koch, Riga, January 14, 1686, LVVA 7349-1-39.

[65] From the Pskov voivode to Chr. Horn on February 26, 1686; Chr. Horn's reply to the voivode on March 6, 1686, and from Christian Horn in Riga to Karl XI on March 11, 1686, RA Muscovitica, vol. 87.

[66] From the Chancellery Collegium in Stockholm to Chr. Horn, March 23, 1686, LVVA 7349-1-163.

[67] The protocol compiled as a result of their work along with its addenda can be found in: RA Livonica II, vol. 503.

[68] For more details about the ban on bringing Königsberg newspapers to Riga, see: **Arend Buchholtz,** *Geschichte der Buchdruckerkunst in Riga, 1588–1888* (Riga, 1890), pp. 165–166.

newspapers, and the sending of two copies was now restarted. In the opinion of the commission and Horn, if Winius wanted compensation for the time during which newspapers were not being transported to Moscow, then he should be compensated.[69]

Another, separate topic was the imposition of higher tariffs on Russian mail in Livonia, which Horn agreed to stop, and to compensate Winius for the losses incurred, if necessary.[70] However, Winius's accusation regarding the opening of postal parcels in Riga was a more serious one. Horn denied some of the accusations of cutting open mail sacks, but the Governor-General admitted that sacks containing undeclared money (ducats) had indeed been opened for inspection. However, this accusation could not be laid at the feet of the Riga Post Office. Horn felt that it would be better for the postal system if it were not burdened with money, since it provided fertile ground for fraud, errors and conflict. Besides, earlier agreements had not addressed the sending of money by mail.[71]

Naturally, Horn also addressed Winius's wish to start conveying Russian mail through Tartu instead of Riga. The Governor-General stated that Winius's contract with Max was invalid and had never actually entered into force. Horn, the Commission, and Stein felt that Max did not have the right to enter into such a contract. And yet, they did not wish to punish Max, because they felt that Winius might interpret this as an affront to himself, as if Max had been punished for entering into an agreement with Winius. Horn also thereby denounced as incorrect the assumption that the postal route going through Tartu was shorter.[72]

Overall, Horn found that Winius's complaints about the work of the Riga Post Office were exaggerated; he also felt that the large compensation demand was unfair, although they were prepared to pay Winius some amount of compensation.

And yet, it is evident from Horn's subsequent letters to Stockholm that Winius indeed directed the Russian mail to Tartu. In his letter to the king on March 29, 1686, the Governor-General stated that at least initially, they should close their eyes to Winius's correspondence with the Tartu postmaster; it was something they must not interfere with, lest the Moscow postmaster begin implementing countermeasures. There were also those who felt that sending Russian mail to Tartu would be logistically more beneficial for the Swedish overseas provinces. Letters coming from Riga, Tallinn, and Narva could be collected in Tartu. Sweden's resident in Moscow, von Kochen, was one who agreed with this policy. Naturally, the Riga postmaster Stein opposed this view, believing that the historical mail route from Riga through Vastseliina to Pechory and on to Pskov was the only possible option. Letters from Riga going directly to Vastseliina arrived, in his estimation, at their destination a few days earlier than those going through Tartu.[73]

The postal delivery agreement of 1686

The conflict that erupted between the Riga and Moscow postmasters in 1684 gradually abated during the first half of 1686. As frequently inferred in the Swedish side's assessment, they did not believe that Winius would direct the mail to Memel through Lithuania. In the summer of 1686, the postmasters entered into negotiations which resulted in the birth of a new postal delivery agreement on

[69] From Chr. Horn in Riga to Karl X, March 27, 1686, RA Livonica II, vol. 87.

[70] In one of his subsequent letters, Horn noted that Winius had become angry with Stein because of his demand for money. From Chr. Horn in Riga to Karl XI, March 29, 1686, RA Livonica II, vol. 87.

[71] From Chr. Horn in Riga to Karl XI, March 27, 1686, RA Livonica II, vol. 87. The sending of ducats to Russia was a common problem, since "Western" merchants brought more goods out of Russia than they sent into Russia. An export-import balance was achieved by sending precious metals and money into Russia.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid.

August 12. It was signed by Winius, now with the title of Moscow Postmaster-General, and Giese, representing the Riga Main Post Office. The treaty was signed in Riga.[74]

To what did they agree? They firmly stated that all previous misunderstandings and differences of opinion would be eliminated with the new agreement. Previous claims for payment were erased. With the signing of the new agreement, the 1677 agreement was declared terminated (§1). A new postal routine was framed. Namely, Winius undertook to pay the Riga postal director Giese an annual fee of 290 state thalers, as previously, for the horseback conveyance of mail between Riga and Pechory, and to prepay half the amount (§2). Giese had to transport the letters, parcels, etc. coming from Königsberg through Courland into Riga and out of Riga along the same route, twice a week – on Tuesday and Saturday (§3). For the "German mail" on the postal route between Memel and Riga, the Riga Post Office would receive 9 groschen for each *lot* (§6). However, Giese was not allowed to charge any postal tariffs on letters and parcels transported between Riga and Pechory (§5). Also, Giese was to send two copies of Königsberg newspapers (*Avisen*) to Moscow each week free of charge (§7). The correspondence between Their Royal Majesties of both countries was also to be transported free of charge. (§9). The Riga postmaster was obligated to inform Winius in Moscow each time that a Russian mail delivery was received (§5).[75]

Once a week, on Thursday afternoon, Giese would add the letters and parcels that were to be sent from Riga to Moscow, Novgorod and Pskov, to the Moscow mail sack, seal it, and deliver it to the post office at the Pechory monastery by early morning or afternoon on Sunday. Letters from Moscow, Novgorod and Pskov arrived in Pechory on that same day, upon which mail sacks were exchanged. In following this precise schedule, the only legitimate excuse for lateness was the seasonal disrepair of the roads in spring and fall (§3). The postal rider leaving Pechory on Sunday had to arrive in Riga with his letters by Wednesday, so that they could be transported on to Königsberg on Thursday. According to the agreement, the mail was to take seven days from Riga to Pechory, and vice versa (§4).[76]

The new contract entered into force on September 1, 1686 and remained in force until Russia declared war on Sweden in 1700. Over the next ten years, the postal relations between Russia and Sweden suffered no misunderstandings of a magnitude requiring resolution by their highest government authorities. However, the 1685/1686 postal conflict was one reason why the Chancellery Collegium dispatched Inspector Johan Lange to audit the organization of mail delivery in the overseas provinces of Estonia and Livonia in 1687/88.[77] Lange's instructions included the duty of investigating the conflict between the postmasters of Riga and Moscow. But even Lange was able to inform Stockholm in 1688 that all misunderstandings had been resolved, and the mail was once again being transported from Riga to Pechory by way of Vastseliina.[78]

Misunderstandings in the late 1690s

In the final years of the 17th century, Andreas Winius was still in control of the Russian postal system, although the everyday work of running postal affairs was officially

[74] RA Chancellery Collegium, G II f : 1.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid.
[77] On November 15, 1687, the Chancellery Collegium informed the Livonian Governor-General J. J. Hastfer of J. Lange's arrival in Estonia and Livonia, LVVA 7349-1-163; J. J. Hastfer informed S. Stein in Riga of this on January 18, 1688, EAA 278-1-IV:27a/1.
[78] J. Lange's report of March 18, 1688, § 13; ibid. J. Lange's letter from Riga to the Livonian Governor-General J. J. Hastfer on January 31, 1688, RA Chancellery Collegium, G II f: 1.

in the hands of his son Mathias Winius, who is referred to in documents as the Chief Postal Director. Margareta Giese had died in Livonia in 1688, and was succeeded in her position as postal director by Statius Stein, who was removed from this post by a decision of the Chancellery Collegium in December 1691. The Riga harbor customs chief Gerdt Grön was appointed acting Postal Director in 1692, and its permanent Director in 1693.[79]

After the 1686 agreement, Swedish-Russian postal traffic operated without any major failures. Only one noteworthy problem prompted complaints by Swedish diplomats residing in Russian cities: the Russian side was demanding that letters being sent out of Russia were to be brought to the post office unsealed, and if they were not, then the letters would be opened and read anyway.[80] However, we cannot claim that this practice was characteristic of Russia alone. Swedish authorities would also read and censor letters if necessary. Also, authorities would occasionally restrict the sending of mail to one region or another.

In the spring of 1697, relations between the two countries took a sudden downturn: preceding the departure of Peter I's "grand embassy" from Moscow to Western Europe, Russia stopped sending mail to foreign countries for several weeks to prevent news of the tsar's participation in this trip from leaking out.[81] Swedish authorities played along with the Russians and completely ignored the fact that the tsar had arrived in Riga. Peter I was allegedly so offended at the poor reception that he began planning his revenge.[82] Keeping this in mind, we can understand why Moscow began using even the tiniest misunderstandings between Sweden and Russia to its own advantage. And so, in the fall of 1697, a new conflict erupted in the postal relations of the two neighbors.

The reasons for this subsequent conflict become evident from the accusations leveled against Riga Postal Director Grön by A. Winius, who had begun representing his son, the Russian Chief Postal Director. Winius sent one of his most comprehensive letters to Dahlbergh on April 29, 1698.[83] In it, he claims to have submitted a complaint to the Governor-General about Grön nine months earlier, on August 6, 1697. Winius described the latter's behavior toward his son as being "very unpleasant." Namely, Grön had sent slanderous letters to Winius's son, had behaved inexcusably with the "honest merchants" Hinrich Hintze and Peter Offking in Riga, and had involved interpreter Gustav Soldan in the misunderstandings. Furthermore, Grön demanded more money for conveyance of the mail than he was entitled to, and was intercepting postal parcels in Riga, causing great delays in the delivery of the letters being sent to Moscow by merchants and members of the tsar's enormous entourage. In Winius's assessment, Grön's actions had destroyed the mail delivery system between Riga and Pskov. Winius added that he had just recently found out from the Swedish envoy in Moscow, Commissar Kniper, that Dahlbergh had forwarded his grievances to the Chancellery Collegium in Stockholm in the fall of 1697 and had also replied to Winius in a letter mailed at the Riga Post Office; however, Winius had never received the letter.[84] Kniper had also told Winius that although Dahlbergh demanded restitution for damages from Grön,

[79] **Jensch,** "Das Postwesen in Livland zur Swedenzeit," p. 9; see some biographical information on Gerdt Grön (Groen) and his family: Erik Grill, ed., *Svenskt boigrafiskt Lexikon*, vol 17 (Stockholm, 1967–1969), p. 333.

[80] See, for instance, Commissar T. Kniper's letters from Moscow to E. Dahlbergh on January 15 and 23, and March 12 and July 16, 1697, RA Livonica II, vol. 94.

[81] **Isberg,** "Erik Dahlbergh och tsar Peters västeuropeiska resa," p. 55.

[82] **Isberg,** "Erik Dahlbergh och tsar Peters västeuropeiska resa," p. 54.

[83] LVVA 7349-2-99.

[84] On August 6, 1698, Dahlbergh informed the Chancellery Collegium of A. Winius's claim that he did not receive the Governor-General's letter of September 21, 1697 until June 27, 1698, and that the letter had been opened in the interim. Dahlbergh assured him that he let the Governor-General's secretary Michael Segebade seal the letter and that it was send directly to Commissar Kniper, LVVA 7349-1-70.

he had wanted the Russian side to send him a documented summary of the disagreement. In compliance with this request, Winius had given Kniper the requested memorandum along with copies of Grön's bills, letters, and other documents on March 1, 1698. Winius concluded his message with the demand that Grön should be punished, and the losses suffered by his son indemnified. Furthermore, Grön was to be removed from his post and replaced with a new postmaster who must be pressed for better cooperation with the Russian postal system. We will return to the accusations leveled by Winius later.

Dahlbergh himself was in Stockholm at that time, and Winius's letter of April 29 along with the sealed packet of documents did not reach him until June 9, 1698. Dahlbergh forwarded the packet to the Chancellery Collegium that same day.[85] After reviewing Winius's materials for nearly two months, the Collegium informed Karl XII about the situation on August 2. They assured the king that the dissension between Winius and Grön was permanent, that the Russian side wanted Grön to be removed from his post, and if the Swedish side failed to execute any changes, the Russian postal system would be forced to re-route its mail to Memel and Königsberg through Lithuania.[86] To supplement the Russian materials, Riga would also have to submit its synopsis of the conflict. Thus, on July 5, the Chancellery Collegium demanded that Dahlbergh investigate all aspects of the conflict.[87] On July 11, Dahlbergh forwarded this order to Soop.[88]

Without waiting for the results of the investigations from Riga, Peter I sent a letter[89] to Karl XII demanding that Grön be punished. This complicated the Chancellery Collegium's situation. Since they did not have the results of the investigation from Riga, they did not know what to do: should they comply with the tsar's wishes and remove Grön, or should they wait? Finally, they decided in favor of Grön's temporary removal and his replacement with someone from the Stockholm Post Office. The Collegium hoped that this action would satisfy the tsar. However, Karl XII added a conflicting note to the Chancellery Collegium's letter of August 2 in his own hand: "the temporary dismissal of Grön is not right; first, we must investigate and then make a decision; in the interim, we can tell the tsar that the king will let the accusations against Grön be investigated, and if he is guilty, he will be prosecuted, and if he is not guilty, there is no cause to remove him."[90]

We now return to the accusations made by A. Winius. Livonian Governor Soop had explained some of the details of the disagreement to Dahlbergh in early 1698. On January 18 in Riga, he wrote that "just recently" a conflict had erupted between Postal Director Grön on one side and two Riga merchants, Hintze and Offking, on the other. Grön had intercepted some postal parcels sent to them from Narva and Moscow, and refused to hand them over until the merchants came to the Post Office and had the parcels opened in their presence to see whether they contained anything damaging to the interests of the Swedish state. The merchants refused to follow the order, claiming that such actions contradicted good practice and the free flow of trade. Hintze and Offking, hoping for assistance, contacted Governor Soop, who was unable to help them, stating that the postal system was subordinate to the Chancellery Collegium. Finally, the merchants had gone to the post office and stood by while their parcels were opened. Among the parcels

[85] LVVA 7349-1-70.
[86] RA Kanslikollegiets skrivelser till Kungl. Maj:t, vol. 2.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid.
[89] The author has failed to find the letter referred to here, although it may have been written some time in June 1698, since E. Dahlbergh informed E. Soop on August 20 that he had received the translation of the tsar's letter from the Chancellery Collegium, and had sent it to Riga to be reviewed, LVVA 7349-1-70.
[90] RA Kanslikollegiets skrivelser till Kungl. Maj:t, vol. 2.

was a package from the Moscow postmaster M. Winius. Hintze and Offking were convinced that they had suffered damages. Grön justified his behavior by citing royal resolutions and postal instructions and orders requiring the collection of state tariffs on postal parcels.[91]

It is unclear exactly when the incident with Hintze and Offking took place. At any rate, this irritated the Moscow postmaster, and Kniper, the Swedish resident in Moscow, informed Livonian authorities of this fact in his reports of January 21 and 28. Relying on Kniper's information, Soop wrote to Dahlbergh on February 16 to tell him that he had summoned the Riga merchants and the interpreter Soldan and warned them not to damage the interests of the king.[92]

A week later, on February 24, Soop wrote to Kniper in Moscow, pointing out Grön's reassurances that he did indeed want to get along with the tsar's postmaster. Soop advised Kniper to explain to the Winiuses that this was nothing but a misunderstanding that should be put aside. As a gesture of reconciliation, the postmasters had to write to each other. Soop promised to convince Grön to do so. Soop also expressed his opinion that "perhaps in this conflict there are other interested parties wishing to derail the postal service."[93] It is unclear from the letter whom Soop had in mind.

Some time in July 1698, Governor Soop called together an investigative commission in Riga.[94] On August 8, he told Dahlbergh that the commission had questioned Grön and forwarded his statements to Winius. The commission also wished to question a representative of the Winiuses, but nobody came to Riga.[95] It is also known that the commission approached Andreas Carling, accountant of the Livonian Economic Office, asking him to review and check the postal invoices of both parties to the conflict.[96]

It is possible that the commission did not investigate the matter as expeditiously as Stockholm had expected. On August 20, Dahlbergh asked Soop to hurry up with the investigation.[97] On October 14, the Chancellery Collegium reminded Dahlbergh that they were still awaiting results of the investigation from Riga. The Governor-General was forced to admit to the Collegium that the investigation was dragging on, and promised to start taking care of the matter himself once he returned to Riga.[98] On December 20, Karl XII himself demanded that Dahlbergh accelerate the commission's work. The need for a final report was exacerbated by the fact that Stockholm was preparing to send a delegation to Moscow and wanted it to take the results of the investigation along with them.[99] Actually, the commission had completed its work by mid-December. Thus, Dahlbergh was able to send assurances one day after the king's letter had arrived in Riga that the commission's findings and additional documentation had already been dispatched from Riga to Stock-

[91] EAA 278-1-IV:36/1. Dahlbergh forwarded Soop's letter of January 18 to the Chancellery Collegium on February 26, LVVA 7349-1-70.

[92] EAA 278-1-IV:36/2.

[93] LVVA 7349-1-50. On March 17, Soop assured Dahlberg that he had sent a conciliatory letter to Russia in which he invited the Russians to a joint resolution of their problems (ibid.).

[94] Head Camerier Petter Palich, Assessors Hammerschmidt and Benesch, and Chief Inspector Järmerstädt were appointed to the Commission. It soon became clear that the assessors were not located in Riga, and that Järmerstädt was ill; Palich also was unable to participate in the Commission. In their place, Soop appointed Assessors Welcken and Gebhardt and Licensing Board Director Rysedt. From Livonian Governor E. Soop in Riga to Oberst Lieutenant Hellmersen, July 29; to E. Dahlbergh on August 1 and to T. Kniper on August 4, 1698, LVVA 7349-1-113.

[95] LVVA 7349-1-50.

[96] From E. Soop in Riga to kammerhärra Andreas Carling on September 2, 1698, LVVA 7349-1-113.

[97] LVVA 7349-1-70.

[98] From E. Dahlbergh in Riga to the Chancellery Collegium on December 15, 1698, LVVA 7349-1-70.

[99] From Karl XII to E. Dahlbergh on December 20, 1698, LVVA 7349-1-147.

holm on December 15.[100] The author of this article has not succeeded in finding the text of this final report.

In early 1699, Stockholm was busy preparing for the dispatch of its delegation to Russia. The delegates' instructions were finalized on February 1, 1699, and they included the issue of the organization of mail delivery between Sweden and Russia.[101] Namely, Sweden was seeking opportunities for intensifying postal communications between the two countries. According to the 24th listed instruction, the Swedish delegation was to propose the establishment of regular postal communications between Narva and Novgorod in addition to the Riga-Pechory route. It was not the first time that Swedish representatives had presented this proposition to the Russians. During the 1684 discussions in Moscow, postal communications between Narva and Novgorod had been discussed, but without result. The expansion of trade relations had been the goal of the Swedes in 1684 as it was in 1699. Since they assumed that the conflict between Grön and Winius would be brought up during the discussion of this issue, the envoys were to tell the Russian side that as soon as Karl XII received the results of the investigation, he would decide whether or not to punish the Riga postmaster. The sluggishness of the commission's work was to be blamed on Dahlbergh's extended stay in Stockholm.[102]

The documents of the Riga investigative commission reached the capital during the first part of February 1699. The materials were not immediately handed over to the delegation, since the Collegium as well as the king wanted to review them first. However, in its letter of February 15 to the delegation, the Collegium stated that the Winiuses had the right to seek compensation for the overcharges of tariffs, for an amount calculated at 15 state thalers and 1 groschen. They also found that the delegation should take the investigative documents along to Moscow to allow the Winiuses to review them. Every attempt had to be made to show the Russian side Sweden's willingness to resolve problems.[103] The investigation materials were dispatched to catch up with the delegation, which received the documents in Narva in mid-April.[104]

While the Swedish diplomats were given the materials from the Riga investigative commission (the contents of which we do not know) on the issue of the postal conflict, the Russian negotiators, led by President of the Ambassadorial Office, Boyar Fjodor Golovin, asked the Chief Postal Director Mathias Winius to compile a list of the Russian side's grievances.[105] It was on the basis of these grievances that the Ambassadorial Office formulated the Russian side's demands. Therefore, it makes sense to acquaint ourselves with the memorandum of M. Winius in more detail. Besides, it provides us with additional information on the routines of the Riga-Moscow postal relations as well as the postal conflict.

By way of introduction, M. Winius's summary introduced the Riga-Moscow postal agreement of 1686. In accepting the position of postmaster, G. Grön had promised to abide by the agreement, but had soon started working against it. According to the agreement, the Riga Postal Service was to receive an annual fee of 290 albertusthalers from Russia for conveyance of mail between Pechory and Riga, plus 300-400 state thalers in annual postal tariffs for letters conveyed between

[100] From E. Dahlbergh in Riga to Karl XII on January 18, 1699, RA Livonica II, vol. 95.

[101] The Swedish delegation was led by the Court Chancellor Johan Bergenhjelm, Wiborg Land Counselor Anders Lindehjelm and the Stockholm Royal Court Assessor Samuel Göthe.

[102] The Swedish delegation's instructions of February 1, 1699 for the negotiations in Moscow, § 24, RA Muscovitica, vol. 121. See also the proposals of the Narva merchants to the Swedish delegation of May 25, 1699, EAA 1646-1-2415.

[103] To the Swedish delegation traveling to Russia, Stockholm, February 15, 1699, RA Muscovitica, vol. 121.

[104] Ibid. The delegation received the February 15, 1699 letter of the Chancellery Collegium referred to here in Narva on April 13, 1699.

[105] RA Muscovitica, vol. 118. M. Winius's memorandum was probably composed some time during the summer of 1699.

Riga and Memel. Since the necessary albertusthalers were not always available in Russia, they would send Riga an amount of ducats that was calculated according to the current exchange rate. Instead of applying the correct exchange rate, Grön devalued the ducats. Since Winius had no other partners to the agreement in Riga, he was forced to accept the unfair exchange rate. However, to cut his losses, he had started sending money to two Riga merchants, H. Hintze and P. Offking,[106] so that they could use it to pay Grön as well as the Memel postmaster. As soon as Grön found out about this arrangement, he began interfering with the work of these men, and had them followed and harassed.

Next, M. Winius accused Grön of failing to investigate the disappearance of two tubs of caviar at the border. One tub had been sent by Winius to Hintze and Offking as a gesture of friendship. In late 1697 and early 1698, Grön had also intercepted some packets of letters, had left letters arriving in Riga from Moscow lying around, ordered parcels and letters opened in his presence, and refused to accept parcels bound for Moscow by falsely claiming that the mail had already been dispatched. Because of this, Winius and his contacts had been forced to hire couriers in Riga. According to one of the most serious complaints, Grön had not only interfered with the correspondence of foreign and domestic merchants, but had held on to a parcel (weighing 53 *lots*) that had been brought in by the tsar's envoys to be mailed to Moscow, for an entire week. Grön had lied by claiming that there was no more room in the Moscow mail sack, and that he had been forced to place the parcel into the Pskov mailbag. Actually, the parcel sat in Riga for eight days, after which Grön sent it on to Moscow without an apology of any kind. A. Winius wrote to Dahlbergh about this state of affairs, upon which Dahlbergh wrote his reply, but Grön failed to dispatch the Governor-General's letter for nine months, keeping and opening it instead. The next more serious accusation involved an incident that occurred in early 1699, when the tsar had mailed a packet of letters to his envoys at the negotiations in Turkey. The wrapper of the packet bore the address of the Memel postmaster, but it was also covered with another wrapper with a note to Grön, asking him to convey the packet from Riga to Memel as quickly as possible. Grön had failed to read the note and sent the packet directly to Memel. The Memel Post Office saw that the wrapper was addressed to Riga and sent it back. This time, Grön opened the wrapper and the note, and again dispatched the packet to Memel. Thus, the packet took two weeks longer to reach its destination than the regular mail delivery would have taken.

M. Winius concluded his grievance letter with a demand for compensation in the amount 200 albertusthalers from Grön, and the dismissal of Grön from his position. Otherwise, the mail would henceforth be dispatched by way of Vilnius and Königsberg instead of Riga.[107] As we see below, these two demands and the threat were to become the starting point of the Russian negotiators in their discussions with the Swedish side.

Discussion of the postal conflict in Moscow

The Swedish Royal Chancellery Collegium corresponded with the delegation regarding the postmasters' conflict for months thereafter. On June 6, 1699, it informed the envoys of the order that Swedish Chief Postal Director Samuel Åkerhjelm gave to Grön, telling him to strike a compromise with the Winiuses and to try to end the conflict. Also, upon scrutinizing the 1686 agreement between the Moscow and Riga postmasters, the Collegium pronounced it a private agreement which neither the Governor-General nor the Chancellery Collegium had ever ratified. We know that this kind of official government stance was nothing new. King Karl XI had claimed the same to be true

[106] M. Winius refers to Hintze and Offking as Russian citizens.
[107] RA Muscovitica, vol. 118.

about the 1676 agreement in 1685. And yet, a year later, when the postal conflict of that time subsided, nobody criticized the agreement any more. Now, the Collegium found that the very basis of the conveyance of mail – its financing – must be changed, and the 290 state thaler annual fee should be replaced by postage (*porto*). Besides, inexpensive postal tariffs would earn greater amounts for the postal treasury than a fixed annual fee. As an example, they described the postal practices of the Kur-Brandenburg postal system through Prussia and Trans-Pomerania. The Collegium, however, did not believe that the Winiuses would agree to the new system they were proposing. Besides, they thought that the Russian Postal Service wanted to discontinue using the services of the Riga Post Office and to establish their own office in Riga. Sweden could not allow the latter. All this had to be discussed with the Winiuses without forcing the new system upon them. The delegation was to put out feelers regarding the conveyance of mail between Narva and Novgorod, already noted in the instructions, and to discuss whether it would not be more convenient to send the mail between Pechory and Riga through Tartu, since the postmaster there had assured them that the Tartu route was shorter than that through Vastseliina.[108]

The Swedish delegation's reply to the Collegium is dated August 16 in Moscow. In it, they were forced to admit that Riga postmaster Grön had not made the slightest effort to smooth things over with the Winiuses, although he would have had plenty of time to do so. The delegation had not believed that Grön's wish to reconcile was sincere, since he had sent them a letter on May 12 in which he justified his actions and laid the blame for all misunderstandings first at the feet of M. Winius, and then at the feet of the interpreter Soldan. Grön had also not asked the delegation to convey any kind of explanations to Moscow. Furthermore, upon reviewing the Riga investigation report materials, the delegation found that Grön had been unfriendly in his dealings with the Moscow Post Office, and had failed to make the necessary adjustments to his work. The delegation also reported that a few days prior they had been visited by A. Winius, who repeated his grievances regarding Grön and his desire to receive actual compensation for damages. A. Winius stated that he had not told the tsar about the postal conflict yet (this claim is not credible - E. K.), and that in order to receive the compensation, he was willing to help the delegation succeed in their efforts to resolve postal as well as other issues while in Moscow. The Swedish delegation, in turn, had said that they would await Karl XII's decision regarding the postal conflict. As long as the disagreement remained unresolved, they were unwilling to present their proposals about the Riga-Pechory and Narva-Novgorod postal routes.[109]

One day later, on August 17, the delegation informed Karl XII of the visit by A. Winius, "who assured us of his good will and was happy that we had come ..." After that, the discussion had centered upon Winius's conflict with Postmaster Grön, the request for compensation, and the status of the investigation in Sweden. They also told the king that Grön had not yet contacted the Winiuses or attempted any reconciliation. With Winius, the delegation had also discussed the role played in the Riga-Moscow postal conflicts by the interpreter Soldan, whom Grön accused of trying to take over Riga postmaster's position. Winius had not denied that he would be glad to see Soldan in charge of the Riga Post Office, although the man was not ready to assume the role. In conclusion, the delegation felt that since Winius was highly respected in his important posts in the Russian state apparatus and also by Peter I, they must seek opportunities to satisfy his demands, since otherwise the Russian-Swedish postal service might undergo a change that was not benefi-

[108] RA Muscovitica, vol. 121.

[109] RA Muscovitica, vol. 121. The delegation wrote the same to the Chancellery Collegium on September 12 and 27, 1699.

cial to Sweden. Their main concern was the issue of postal routes.[110]

In its letter to the king, the delegation probably tried to drop hints about the importance of making a final decision without asking for it outright. Less than a week later, on August 23, they approached the king once more about the same issues. Namely, on that day, A. Winius had sent his messenger to the Swedish negotiators and demanded a reply regarding the payment of compensation. The messenger had also presented a demand to have Grön removed from office and replaced with someone else; otherwise, the Russian mail would be routed through Lithuania. The delegation could only reply that they had written to the king about the Russian side's demands and were awaiting a reply.[111] The Russian side began applying pressure tactics. On August 31, they informed the king that A. Winius would have someone remind the Swedish embassy every day of the necessity of reaching a final decision regarding Grön.[112]

The king's decision kept everyone waiting. On October 26, the Swedish and Russian delegations held their fourth session of negotiations, a conference during which the Swedish representatives officially proposed the establishment of a Narva-Novgorod postal route. In response, the Russian negotiators brought up the problems of the Swedish-Russian postal communications, including M. Winius's grievances regarding Grön. They informed the Swedes that A. Winius had told the tsar about this issue and attached the possibility of re-routing their postal routes through Vilnius to a compensation claim in the amount of 200 state thalers and the demand to dismiss Grön. On October 30, A. Winius visited the Swedish delegation once again. The latter had no other alternative but to ask the king directly for his decision regarding Grön. They dared to advise the king that if Grön retained his post, Winius would shun any communications with him and would direct his mail through Vilnius and Königsberg.[113] Because the king's decision had still not arrived, the fifth session of negotiations, held on November 2, was also a failure.[114]

The Swedish delegation remained in Moscow until early December 1699 without achieving most of the results desired by Sweden. On the way home, in Wiborg on January 9, 1700, they prepared a report on their mission. Upon reaching the issue of the creation of a possible postal route between Narva and Novgorod, they admitted that "it is not only likely that postal communications between Narva and Novgorod will be declined, but there is also the danger that the mail that has been moving from Moscow to Riga will be re-routed through Vilnius and Königsberg, which will do a significant disservice to the interests of R.M. ..."[115]

The resolution reached by the Swedish side about the Grön issue did not please the Winiuses – Grön remained at his post. And a new misunderstanding arose in addition to the postmasters' conflict at the end of 1699, which, as mentioned before, became one of the Russian side's pretexts for starting a war. Namely, the Russian emissary P. Voznicyn, returning from the Russian-Turkish peace talks, passed through Livonia in May 1699; Dahlbergh organized a particularly grand reception for him in Riga. However, Voznicyn

[110] RA Muscovitica, vol. 118. On the same date, the Swedish delegation sent a similar letter also to E. Dahlbergh in Riga, RA Muscovitica, vol. 118.

[111] RA Muscovitica, vol. 118. A similar letter was also sent to E. Dahlbergh, RA Muscovitica, vol. 119. According tot he Swedish Embassy records, the courier was A. Winius's son-in-law Aleksei Ivanovich (ibid.). On August 25, the delegation told Winius that they had forwarded his positions once again to the king as well as the Chancellery Collegium, RA Muscovitica, vol. 118.

[112] RA Muscovitica, vol. 118. A letter with the same content was also sent to E. Dahlbergh and the Ingrian Governor-General Philip Vinhagen.

[113] **Форстен,** "Сношения Швеции и России," p. 86; from the Swedish delegation in Moscow to Karl XII, November 1, 1699, RA Muscovitica, vol. 118. See also Swedish Embassy records: RA Muscovitica, vol. 119.

[114] RA Muscovitica, vol. 119.

[115] Excerpt of the Swedish Embassy's report from Wiborg to Karl XII, January 2, 1700, RA Muscovitica, vol. 121.

lost his valuables during his trip. A subsequent investigation revealed that some peasant drivers had robbed his baggage carriage. The criminals were sentenced to death and executed. The emissary's things were sent in sealed boxes to Vastseliina, where they remained for some time, despite Dahlbergh's repeated reminders to send them to their destination. The Russian side never did take them away before the war broke out.[116]

Dahlbergh was forced to revisit the issue of the postal service in early 1700. On January 11, 1700, he formed a new investigative commission in response to the Russians' subsequent accusations against Grön. This time, the Russian postmaster complained that he had recently received a letter from the Riga Post Office from Major General Georg Karl von Carlowitz; the envelope contained nothing but a blank sheet of paper and was sealed with a questionable seal. As proof of the complaint, the envelope and its contents were sent to Dahlbergh.[117] The results of the investigative commission's work are not known. It is possible that it never reached a conclusion, because the Northern War broke out exactly one month later, and Dahlbergh, as Governor-General of Livonia, had to lead the defense of Riga against Saxon forces.

Returning to the propaganda publication mentioned at the beginning of this article, we read in the third item pertaining to the start of the Northern War that the Russian side accused the Riga postmaster of unfairness and demanded his removal from office. In response, Sweden found that Grön was not guilty of anything, and there was no reason to dismiss him from his position as Postal Director.[118]

In summary, we may conclude that the roots of this conflict originated elsewhere than the postal delivery system. The alleged insult suffered by Peter I in Riga provided enough motive for him to justify war. To add injuries beyond the poor treatment of his entourage, he had to seek out conflicts in the areas in which Russia and its neighboring state maintained necessary contacts. Thus, Russian officials were more than happy to take advantage of incidents involving a Russian envoy passing through Livonia and reciprocal debt claims of merchants, but also real or imagined misunderstandings in postal communications in order to inflame hostilities. The curators of the postal service, the father and son Winius, enjoyed Tsar Peter's favor at that time. On the eve of the Northern War, A. Winius was receiving confidential personal letters from the tsar. Peter I was mentally preparing for war with Sweden, and the Winiuses were undoubtedly aware of this. Alvin Isberg has pointedly named the end of the 17th century as a period of "cold war" in Swedish-Russian relations.[119] Whether all levels of Swedish officialdom realized this is a different matter. Sweden's official policy toward Russia was conciliatory and compliant, and for the sake of sustaining good relations, this spirit was implemented for the organization of mail delivery as well.

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[116] **Bergengrün**, *Die grosse moskowitische Ambassade,* pp. 57–66, 88; **Isberg,** "Erik Dahlbergh och tsar Peters västeuropeiska resa," pp. 70–71. See also E. Dahlbergh's letters to the Swedish resident in Moscow T. Kniper on January 3 and 10, 1700, EAA 278-1-IV:38a; LVVA, 7349-1-52.

[117] From E. Dahlberg to investigative commission members District Magistrate von Swanenberg, Assistant Magistrate Bevern and Assistant Magistrate Hammerschmidt in Riga, January 11, 1700, LVVA 7349-1-52, pp. 68–69.

[118] Ein Schreiben, so Aus dem Haag, An einen Freund in Franckfurt.

[119] **Isberg,** "Erik Dahlbergh och tsar Peters västeuropeiska resa," p. 72.

The Book Trade in Tallinn During the Century of Enlightenment*

Indrek Jürjo

Until the 19th century, the earliest history of the book in the Baltic lands progressed largely within the framework of the history of the book in Germany. Most of the books distributed in the Baltic provinces were printed in German. Even the publication and sale of Estonian-language church and practical literature was in the hands of the Baltic Germans, who had direct links to the book market in Germany as well as the customs of book sales and publication that were practiced there.

Thus, let us begin our discussion of the history of the book trade in 18th-century Tallinn with a brief excursion into the history of the book trade in Germany, which German book historians divide into three eras.[1] The typical representative of the earliest days of book trade between 1450 and 1564 is the printer-publisher, such as the Basel printer Johann Froben, who not only printed the works of Erasmus of Rotterdam, but also distributed them himself at fairs and on sales trips across all of Europe. In subsequent eras, printers no longer dealt with the publication and sale of books. Whereas printers belonged to a guild requiring specific conditions for admission and adherence to certain working rules, bookselling and publishing were a "free" enterprise in which anyone could engage.

The following lengthy period, from 1564 to 1764, is represented by the publisher-merchant, who exchanged the books produced by his publishing house for the products of other publishers at book fairs, thereby acquiring a broader assortment of titles for his bookstore. This "piece-for-piece" book exchange was unique to Germany's book trade, brought about by the disunion of Germany and the great variations and fluctuations in monetary exchange rates, which forced the adoption of barter in preference to net trade. During this period, each book merchant had to serve as producer as well as distributor, to be peddler, publisher, and sometimes printer, all in one.[2] This system, which ignored the quality of books being exchanged, promoted the spread of low-quality literature.

The third era began in 1764, when at the

* This article has already been published in German: "Der Buchhandel in Reval im 18. Jahrhundert," *Nordost-Archiv,* N.F., Bd. 7, 1 (1998), pp. 139–172. The Estonian-language version has been slightly modified and supplemented.

[1] From here onward, I base my discussion on the thorough treatment by Helmuth Kiesel and Paul Münch: **Helmuth Kiesel, Paul Münch,** *Gesellschaft und Literatur im 18. Jahrhundert: Voraussetzungen und Entstehung des literarischen Markts in Deutschland* (München, 1977), pp. 123–132; the standard work by Johann Goldfriedrich is still indispensable for the study of book history during the Age of Enlightenment in Germany: Johann Goldfriedrich, ed., *Geschichte des Deutschen Buchhandels,* vol. 2: *Vom Westfälischen Frieden bis zum Beginn der klassischen Litteraturperiode (1648–1740)* (Leipzig, 1908), vol. 3: *Vom Beginn der klassischen Litteraturperiode bis zum Beginn der Fremdherrschaft (1740–1804)* (Leipzig, 1909).

[2] See also **Reinhard Wittmann,** "Soziale und ökonomische Voraussetzungen des Buch- und Verlagswesens in der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts," in Herbert G. Gopfert, Gerard Kozielek, Reinhard Wittmann, eds., *Buch- und Verlagswesen im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert: Beiträge zur Geschicte der Kommunikation in Mittel- und Osteuropa* (Belin, 1977), p. 6.

initiative of the Leipzig publishers and book merchants, the antiquated barter system was abandoned in favor of net and commission trade, since the barter system had already begun to harm the economic interests of the culturally more highly developed Northern Germany.

Naturally, these eras are not as sharply defined in the history of the book trade in the Baltic provinces (one of the border regions of Germany's cultural space) as they were in the cultural centers of Germany. However, even here, the first printers also served as the first book merchants. In 1591, the famous Riga printer Nicolai Mollin was granted a bookselling privilege.[3] The first printers in Tallinn, Christoph Reusner and Heinrich Westphal, mostly printed official publications. They did not introduce themselves as publishers, and thus were not particularly interested in distributing books.[4] Not until the Tallinn Gymnasium's third printer, Adolph Simon, did anyone seriously attempt to distribute books. However, Simon immediately found himself in conflict with the Tallinn bookbinders Severin Thomas and Hinrich von Jürgky, who considered bookselling their exclusive right. Even in the smaller and middle-sized towns of Germany, selling books was a sideline of bookbinders in the 16th and 17th centuries. The purchasing public tended to favor the bookbinders' products anyway, because unlike the printer, the bookbinder provided the book in its finished form.[5] The conflict would be resolved by the town council, which drew firm lines between the separate aspects of bookselling in Tallinn in 1665. The printer and bookbinder retained equal rights to the selling of loose quires and unbound books, but only bookbinders could trade in bound books. In 1672, Simon succeeded in obtaining a privilege from the Swedish custodial government, which allowed him to keep a public bookstore with bound as well as unbound books. However, the town council took the side of the bookbinders and refused to approve the privilege, and the flames of the printer's old conflict with the bookbinders were fanned once again. Simon entered into an agreement with a third bookbinder in Tallinn, Joachim Weiss the Younger, who had not been a party to the trial, and in whose store Simon planned to begin selling his books. Since Simon continued marketing his bound books in Tallinn as well as other Estonian towns, the bookbinder Thomas, who had brought the lawsuit against him, had no recourse but to buy up all of Simon's bound books. These 700 books were religious works and schoolbooks.[6]

Simon's court case with the bookbinders never did succeed in establishing any clear borders within the legal relationships that existed among the booksellers because similar clashes also erupted between Simon's successor Christoph Brendeken and the bookbinder-publisher Christian Trapp.[7] Fortunately, the Estonian and Livonian book market of the Swedish Era was vitalized by Tartu University, which acquired its books from the booksellers of Tallinn and Riga. In 1702, the bookseller Nöller opened a separate branch shop near the university in Pärnu.[8] However, no professional booksellers emerged in Livonia during the Swedish Era.

The development of the Baltic region's cultural life was thrust back by decades by the heavy losses inflicted by the Northern War and the accompanying plague, the catastrophic effects of which were comparable to

[3] See **Arend Buchholtz,** *Geschichte der Buchdruckerkunst in Riga, 1588–1888* (Riga, 1890).

[4] See **Friedrich Puksov,** *Eesti raamatu arengulugu: Seoses kirja ja raamatu üldise arenemisega [History of the Development of the Estonian Book. On the General Development of Writing and the Book]* (Tallinn, 1933), pp. 55–58.

[5] See **Hellmuth Helwig,** *Das deutsche Buchbinder-Handwerk: Handwerks- und Kulturgeschichte*, vol. 2 (Stuttgart, 1965), pp. 116–137.

[6] See **Friedrich Puksov,** "Raamatukauplemise oludest Tallinnas XVII sajandi keskel" [On the Conditions of Bookselling in the mid-XVII Century in Tallinn], *Ajalooline Ajakiri* 1 (1937), pp. 1–11.

[7] **Puksov,** *Eesti raamatu arengulugu,* p. 124.

[8] **Friedrich Puksov,** "Raamatukauplemisest rootsi ajal Tartus ja Pärnus, eriti akadeemia raamatukauplejaist" [On the Book Trade in Tartu and Pärnu during the Swedish Era, Particularly About Academy Book Merchants], *Ajalooline Ajakiri* 2 (1932), pp. 97–98.

the consequences of the Thirty Years' War in Germany. The joining of Estonia and Livonia to Russia meant that Tallinn was relegated to the position of a humble provincial town in the shadow of St. Petersburg, which enjoyed the favors of the central authorities. The stagnation of Tallinn is vividly illustrated by the fact that throughout the 18th century, the town's population did not manage to grow beyond its 1708 level (9,801 residents).[9] However, the traditional cultural ties between the Baltic provinces and Germany were not disrupted by the Baltics' annexation to Russia, since the 1710 capitulation allowed the Knight Guilds and towns to preserve the dominance of German language and law, as well as the Lutheran confession in the region. In the period before the age of national enlightenment, the Russian central authorities also did not yet make any efforts to join the Baltic provinces to Russia administratively and culturally. First and foremost through the book trade, the Baltic lands were members of the northeastern European cultural communication system, which was noteworthy for its particular liveliness in the latter half of the 18th century.[10]

Printers held a modest place in the Tallinn book trade of the 18th century. Their bookselling was basically limited to the products of their own printing shop. Printers probably played a more significant role in supplying peasants with practical literature, which generated decent profits thanks to the large number of issues published in the Estonian language.

In 1716, Adolph Simon's son-in-law Johan Köhler became owner of the Tallinn Gymnasium printing shop. In the difficult circumstances of the post-Northern War years, he was unable to defend the privilege granted to his predecessor by the Swedish authorities for the publishing of the particularly profitable Estonian-language home and church books.[11] The Estonian Provincial Consistory's Estonian Book Publishing Fund, established in 1721, began publishing Estonian-language church literature. However, the printing of home and church books as well as five or six thousand copies of the Bible, which itself comprised dozens of quires per volume, proved a very profitable endeavor for Johann Köhler and his son Jacob Johann Köhler, who took over the printing shop in 1736.

Still, the printer sold very few of the books he published directly to the buyer. The main booksellers also worked as bookbinders, who bound the products delivered to them by the printer. The bookbinders were vitally interested in Estonian-language mass literature, since it was generally their most profitable commodity. However, Köhler was a rather lethargic printer, and the bookbinders filed a complaint against him for dawdling with the printing of ecclesiastical literature and primers in 1745. A shortage of Estonian-language sacred literature on the book market in the winter, which was the best season for selling books to the peasants, diminished the bookbinders' profits ("Nahrung").[12] In many cases, literature was passed to peasants by pastors, to whom the bookbinders sold bulk consignments at a reduced rate.[13]

In the 18th century, Tallinn's printers also issued calendars, which best satisfied the peasants' conservative reading habits with their predictable structure and novel content.[14]

Köhler's much more energetic successor in

[9] See **Csaba Janos Kenéz,** "Bevölkerungsentwicklung und Sozialstruktur Revals 1754–1796," *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung* 30 (1981), pp. 481–493.

[10] See **Heinz Ischreyt,** "Buchhandel und Buchhändler im nordosteuropäischen Kommunikationssystem (1762–1797)," in Giles Barber, Bernhard Fabian, eds., *Buch und Buchhandel in Europa im achtzehnten Jahrhundert / The Book and the Book Trade in Eighteenth-Century Europe* (Hamburg, 1981), pp. 249–269.

[11] See **Friedrich Puksoo,** "Jacob Johann Köhler: Esimese eesti piibli trükkal" [Jacob Johann Köhler, Printer of the First Estonian Bible], in *Vana Tallinn,* vol. 4 (Tallinn, 1939), pp. 5–34.

[12] **Puksoo,** "Jacob Johann Köhler," pp. 22–24.

[13] **Puksoo,** "Jacob Johann Köhler," p. 33.

[14] See also **Kaja Noodla,** "Eesti raamatu lugeja XVIII sajandi lõpul ja XIX sajandi algul" [The Reader of the Estonian Book in the Late 18th and Early 19th Century], in *Paar sammukest eesti kirjanduse uurimise teed [A Few Small Steps Along the Study of Estonian Literature],* vol. 11 (Tallinn, 1986), pp. 8–30, here: pp. 13–14.

the printing field, Axel Heinrich Lindfors, succeeded in regaining the Swedish-era privileges after years of litigation. In 1778, a Senate ukase decreed the publication of home and church books to be the domain of the printer, and the Consistory was fined for having usurped this right for the last half a century.[15]

After Catherine II's ukase of January 15, 1783, which allowed the establishment of private printing shops throughout Russia, Tallinn gained another printing shop in addition to the gymnasium printing shop which had been the only one up until now. By 1786, Martin Christoph Iversen, the son of the local bookbinder, and Johann Sigmund Fehmer of Mecklenburg, had established a private printing shop on Castle Hill.[16] The printing shop, which moved from Castle Hill to the lower town in 1788, operated until the banning of private printing shops in 1796 during the reactionary reign of Emperor Paul I. Iversen and Fehmer did print and publish Estonian-language literature, but it was only of marginal importance in the Tallinn book trade.

During the first half of the 18th century, it was the bookbinders who played the most significant role in the book trade. During this period, 8 bookbinders were registered as citizens of Tallinn.[17] The most active of these was Christian Trapp, who had peddled books back in the Swedish era, and Johann Gellern, who had become a citizen in 1713. Gellern became the most active distributor of books during the first half of the century. In 1721, the town council granted him a 10-year bookselling privilege. Substantiating their granting of the bookstore permit to Gellern, the town council refers to the hardships suffered by local literati, young students, and other friends of books after 1710, when they had been forced to order books from abroad at great expense and with great difficulty.[18] The basic commodities of the bookbinders were calendars and practical religious literature, primarily hymnals and prayer books. However, Gellern's stores also contained more pretentious intellectual riches, as evidenced by the bookstore's catalog manuscript which was compiled in 1746 and included 464 titles (the total number of volumes was significantly greater).[19] Apparently it is no coincidence that Gellern was also the commission agent of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences in Tallinn.[20]

Gellern offered Tallinn readers a large selection of the masterpieces of his era. The early Era of Enlightenment is represented by the French original as well as the German translation of Pierre Bayle's "Historical and Critical Dictionary" that dismantled the theological view of the world, Fontenelle's "Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds," Fénelon's "Adventures of Telemachos," a selection of Leibniz's philosophical works, and a large number of the 18th-century German school

[15] See **Tiiu Reimo,** "Tallinna linna ja gümnaasiumi trükikoja kirjastustegevus 18. sajandi II poolel — 19. sajandi I veerandil" [The Publishing Activities of the Tallinn City and Gymnasium Printing Shop in the Second Half of the 18th Century and the First Half of the 19th Century] in *Eesti Akadeemilise Raamatukogu aastaraamat 1996* (Tallinn, 1997), pp. 125–148. Court case documents that are interesting from the standpoint of book history were published by Lindfors himself in 1774: *Acten in Sachen des Kayserl. ehstnischen Provincial-Consistorii, und des Herrn Rathsverwandten Axel Heinrich Lindfors, in väterlicher Vormundschaft seines Sohnes gleichen Namens. Betreffend den der hiesigen Kayserl. privilegirten Buchdruckerey zustehenden Verlag des ehstnischen Hand- oder Gesangbuchs* (Reval, 1774).

[16] See **Friedrich Puksoo,** "Tallinna esimesed eratrükikojad XVIII sajandi lõpul ja XIX sajandi esimesel poolel" [Tallinn's First Private Printing Shops in the Late 18th and Early 19th Century] in *Vana Tallinn,* vol. 3 (Tallinn, 1938), pp. 5–23.

[17] See *Beiträge zur Kunde Estlands,* vol. 19, Georg Adelheim, ed. *Das Revaler Bürgerbuch 1710–1786* (Reval, 1934).

[18] Tallinn City Archives (= TLA) 230-9-I-38, pp. 126–127.

[19] Catalogus derer Bücher so zu bekommen in Reval bey Johann Gellern 1746, TLA 230-1-451. A manuscript of a similar catalog of 1748, which lists 448 works, can be found in the *Baltica* section of the Academy of Sciences Library. Friedrich Puksov claims that a catalog printed by Gellern was published in 1746, listing 1,400 works: **Puksov,** *Eesti raamatu arengulugu,* p. 130. This is apparently an error. Gellern's bookstore has also been analyzed by **Tiiu Reimo,** "Book Trade in Tallinn in the 18th century," *Tallinna Pedagoogikaülikooli toimetised. A, Humaniora,* 16. (1999), pp. 47–48.

[20] **Puksov,** *Eesti raamatu arengulugu,* p. 130.

philosopher Christian Wolff's works as well as books discussing his philosophy. German literature and literary criticism were represented by the works of Johann Christoph Gottsched, the cultivator of classicism, and by "Critische Dichtkunst," the definitive work of Johann Jakob Breitinger, the Swiss art theoretician who opposed him. Gellern actively supplied the population of Tallinn with the newest German literature: his catalog already included Christian Fürchtegott Gellert's "Fables and Tales;" its first volume was being published at the time that the catalog was being compiled.

Gellern also sold works dedicated to history, politics, and law, as well as biographies, dictionaries, and ancient literature. He offered a large selection of schoolbooks, primarily Jan Komensky's "Orbis pictus" and the works of the popular textbook author Hübner. Theological and devotional titles make up only 17% of the works listed in Gellern's catalog, but if we consider the reading habits of that time, we can assume that the total sales of these books represented a larger proportion. A customer could purchase many kinds of Bibles, including an Estonian-language Bible, and hymnals. Another book that undoubtedly enjoyed high sales was *Vier Bücher vom wahren Christenthum*, the devotional work by the immensely popular pre-pietist Johann Arndt that had been translated into nearly all the European languages. Other works available for purchase were a book by August Hermann Francke and a book by Count Nikolaus Ludwig Zinzendorf, representative of the pietism and the Moravian Brethren who had already had such an effect on the Baltic region.

The prices for the books in Gellern's bookstores ranged from a 25-kopeck booklet on Kabbalah to Bayle's 30-ruble French Dictionary. For the Estonian reader, the cheaper Estonian-language Bible was already expensive enough, at 1 ruble 25 kopecks, slightly more expensive than Komensky's work (1.20). Most of the reading matter being offered was German-language literature. There were 43 French-language books and 36 Latin books. The relative dearth of Latin-language texts was due to the scarcity of intelligentsia: even in the book markets of Germany, university and non-university towns were clearly distinguishable at that time, with non-university towns producing about twice as few Latin texts as the university towns.[21]

The revolutionary processes that began taking place in Germany's cultural life around the middle of the Century of Enlightenment also left their mark on the book trade. During this time, a revolution occurred in the reading habits of the broader public, a process aptly named the "Reading Revolution" by sociologist Rolf Engelsing.[22] The number of readers increased significantly, driving the replacement of intensively repetitive reading matter, represented by a few books that mostly comprised practical religious literature, with a wide variety and great quantity of reading matter, corresponding more closely to the reading habits of present times. Readers' constant demand for new writings stimulated a boom in the book market, accompanied by the gradual disappearance of the traditional barter style of trade, and its replacement with monetary relations and a competition-based net trade. Leipzig became the definitive center of the German book trade,[23] and the book traders of the Baltic region followed its example.

In a sense, the mid-18th century signifies the beginning of a new era in the Baltic provinces as well. The lands had managed to recover from the destructive consequences of the Northern War. Manor lords, wealthy from their vodka sales to Russia, started

[21] Goldfriedrich, ed., *Geschichte des Deutschen Buchhandels,* vol. 2, p. 391.

[22] **Rolf Engelsing,** "Die Perioden der Lesergeschichte in der Neuzeit," in **Rolf Engelsing,** *Zur Sozialgeschichte deutscher Mittel- und Unterschichten* (Göttingen, 1973), pp. 11–154, 283–292; see also **Jaanus Vaiksoo,** "Lugemine valgustusajal" [Reading in the Age of Enlightenment], *Vikerkaar* 11/12 (1999), pp. 150–159.

[23] See **Hazel Rosenstrauch,** "Leipzig als 'Centralplatz' des deutschen Buchhandels," in Wolfgang Martens, ed., *Leipzig Aufklärung und Bürgerlichkeit* (Heidelberg, 1990), pp. 103–124.

building grand manor houses. The luxurious lifestyle and a certain refinement of customs and greater interest in culture appealed to other levels of Baltic German society as well. Naturally, the increase in the manor lords' purchasing power affected the local book market. In fact, the Baltic nobility joined the Hungarian nobility in becoming one of the most significant purchasers of German belles-lettres outside Germany.[24]

Although the numbers of more demanding readers could not have been very large in Estonia, the growth of the reading public made the establishment of the first true bookstore in Tallinn possible. Tallinn's first professional bookseller came directly from Germany's bookselling center of Leipzig. The Seven Years' War raging in Germany had forced him to move to Estonia. On November 19, 1759, Johann Jacob Illig submitted his application to the Tallinn town council for a permit to open his bookstore in town. In the application he placed great emphasis on his skills and opportunities as a professional bookseller from Leipzig. He pledged to serve the friends of books in urban as well as rural areas, promising to sell them books at reasonable prices, since he planned to order his literature direct from Leipzig, without the brokerage of a third party. Illig asked for a year of probation, and if his book business succeeded, he promised to move to Tallinn permanently and apply for the rights of a Tallinn Bürger.[25] On December 6, 1759, the Tallinn city council approved Illig's application, and although he had asked for a year of probation and had not yet decided whether he would stay in Tallinn, Illig was granted the status of Bürger of Tallinn on December 10, 1759.[26]

Illig's doubts about settling in Tallinn permanently may have been caused by his conflict with the local bookbinders, who were annoyed that Illig had started publishing and selling schoolbooks and practical religious literature. By doing so, he was threatening the bookbinders' traditional sources of revenue. The bookbinders accused Illig of reaping nearly a 50% profit from his sales of hymnals, driving the cost of the hymnals very high (1 ruble). Not until then, on March 11, 1768, did Illig promise in his appeal to the town council "to finally settle here and develop a complete book trade for the benefit of those who love written works and the sciences, especially the gentlemen scholars of all faculties and the young people who study."[27] Illig attempted to push aside the bookbinders and applied to the town council for a bookselling privilege, claiming that nowhere else in the world do bookbinders have the right to involve themselves in bookselling. In Illig's opinion, the only reasonable exception was the bookbinder Johann Gellern, who had been given the bookselling privilege by the town council in 1721, since no other book trade existed in Tallinn at that time. Illig was prepared to make concessions to the bookbinders' guild, allowing them to peddle primers and small catechisms. He also obligated himself to take the business interests of the local bookbinders into account, and to keep his book prices only slightly higher than that at the Leipzig book fairs.[28]

Unfortunately, there are few sources that shed any light on Illig's activities as bookseller. On October 15, 1761, Illig placed an ad in the Riga advertising paper *Rigasche Anzeigen* saying that he had published a bookstore catalog free of charge to interested parties, and offered several expensive major works for sale. The most costly of these was the 68-volume "Great Universal Lexicon of All Arts and Sciences," costing 136 rubles. The regularly published catalogs of Illig's bookstore have unfortunately been lost, forcing us to depend on the advertising paper *Revalische Wöchentliche Nachrichten*, which began publication in 1772, for descriptions of his bookstore. Illig was also the founder of

[24] **Wittmann,** "Soziale und ökonomische Voraussetzungen," p. 25.
[25] TLA 230-9-I-38, pp. 88–89, 106.
[26] Adelheim, ed. *Das Revaler Bürgerbuch*, p. 81.
[27] TLA 230-9-I-38, p. 123.
[28] TLA 230-9-I-38, pp. 124–125.

the advertising paper and its first publisher, meaning that this active bookseller was also responsible for reviving the journalism that had been interrupted by the Northern War in Estonia half a century ago.

Of course, Illig used the columns of his advertising paper to advertise the printed matter in his own store. We learn that his bookstore offered titles encompassing many scientific fields. History and geography were the most plentifully represented. There was also lots of applied literature on veterinary science, military science, horticulture, beer brewing, child raising, etc. Many kinds of dictionaries and lexicons enjoyed a prominent standing. Illig also offered novels, plays, and sheet music for sale. Among the broader readership, the calendars and the almanacs that were now becoming so popular were probably good sellers. Of course, German-language literature was dominant; however, Illig's bookstore included French and English titles as well.

Apparently, Illig's business was quite successful. On November 28, 1783, he wrote to the town council of his plans to build a stone house on Pikk Street across from the Great Guild Building for his own dwelling.[29] He was a respected man in Tallinn, as proven by his election to the position of *Rittmeister* and Elder of the Blackheads' Brotherhood.[30] Illig donated hundreds of books to the Brotherhood's "Night Society" club.

A major event in the Baltics' relationship with the written word and its cultural life as a whole was the arrival of this region's most renowned publisher and bookseller of all times, Johann Friedrich Hartknoch. With keen business sense, Hartknoch realized the untapped potential of the northeastern European book market. After a two-year interim stay in Mitau, he established his famous book company in Riga in 1765.[31] In addition to his publishing activities, Hartknoch established the first modern bookstore in the Baltic lands, which did business throughout Germany and also had large numbers of clients in St. Petersburg and Moscow. In 1770, when Hartknoch was holding negotiations with the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences regarding the distribution of its printed works, he could proudly state that he had trade relations not only with German, but also with French, Dutch, Swiss, English, and Italian booksellers.[32]

Of course, Estonia also lay within the sphere of influence of Riga's high-quality bookstore. Starting in 1779, Hartknoch's commission agent in Tallinn was the Cathedral School professor Carl Ludwig Carpov, who sold catalogs of the Riga bookstore.[33] Evidently, Hartknoch began distributing books in Estonia as soon as he settled in Riga. In his advertisements he confidently mentioned that his bookstore required no special introduction to the residents of Tallinn, thanks to their many years of experience with his services. From this, we can assume that the Riga bookseller had already established a steady clientele in Tallinn.

In 1779, another competitor emerged for Illig – the book company of Albrecht and Co. on Castle Hill. The background of the individuals who established this company has not yet been ascertained with any certainty. Friedrich Puksoo claims that the company's founder was the Rakvere bookbinder C. Albrecht.[34] Tiiu Reimo provides somewhat more detailed information, giving his name as August David Albrecht (?-1791).[35] However, it is most likely

[29] TLA 230-9-I-38, p. 211.

[30] Friedrich Amelung, Georg Wrangell, eds., *Geschichte der Revaler Schwarzhäupter: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des deutschen Kaufmanns im Osten* (Reval, 1930), pp. 323–326.

[31] The best overview of Hartknoch's activities is given by Henryk Rietz: **Henryk Rietz,** "Johann Friedrich Hartknoch 1740–1789," in Eduard Winter, Günther Jarosch, eds., *Wegbereiter der deutsch-slawischen Wechselseitigkeit* (Berlin, 1983), pp. 89–99.

[32] **А. А. Заицева,** "Книготорговая деятельность Гарткнохов и Петербургская Академия наук" *Latvijas PSR Zinātņu Akadēmijas Vēstis* 4 (1990), pp. 45–52, here: p. 46.

[33] *Revalische Wöchentliche Nachrichten* 10 (1779).

[34] **Puksov,** *Eesti raamatu arengulugu*, pp. 133, 139.

[35] **Reimo,** "Book Trade in Tallinn," p. 51.

that the Albrecht and Co. publishing house was established by the German popular writer Johann Friedrich Ernst Albrecht (1752-1816), who had studied medicine in Erfurt and then came to Tallinn in 1776 as Count Manteuffel's family physician. His poetry-loving wife Sophie Albrecht-Baumer (1757-1840), later renowned in Germany as an actress, undoubtedly had some influence in this matter.[36]

Albrecht and Co. promised to establish a "selected collection of books in German, and particularly French, as well as English and Italian printed materials" for the people of Tallinn.[37] As did many other booksellers, Albrecht promised low prices and the quick and proper filling of orders. Interestingly, he stated that he had no doubts regarding the success of this business, since he was convinced of the existence of many book friends and their good taste. We will not try to determine whether this was an attempt to entice future customers or a realistic assessment of the state of the book market.

Unlike the bookbinders, Albrecht and Illig both regularly visited the Leipzig Book Fair. German historians have classified them as belonging among the highest ranks of booksellers.[38] It helped them to keep Estonia's readers supplied with the newest products of the German book market. This is evident from the Albrecht Company's preserved 72-page fair selection catalog, which lists the products of the Leipzig and Frankfurt book fairs in alphabetical order.[39] Unfortunately, it does not give a comprehensive overview of the assortment in Albrecht's bookstore. His book warehouse catalog has apparently not been preserved.

Both Albrecht and Illig also engaged in publishing. To some extent, this was due to the persistence of barter trade in Germany. However, fair catalog data examined by Gustav Schwetschke indicates that Illig is mentioned only in the 1766 and 1768 catalogs, with a total of only three German-language titles.[40] These data are apparently incomplete, because Illig published several school textbooks in Tallinn; however, they probably never made it to the Leipzig fair. Albrecht is prominent in the field of publishing, having published at least 56 books: in 1779, he offered 10 books from his publishing house for sale in Leipzig, 15 books in 1780, 14 books in 1781, 9 books in 1782, and 8 books in 1783.[41] In 1776-1778, Tallinn dweller August Wagner[42] introduced a total of four German-language books at the Leipzig Book Fair. Undoubtedly, the Tallinn booksellers were unable to compete with Hartknoch's famous publishing house as far as the number and quality of published works. Hartknoch published works by Kant and Herder, and the number of books he published far exceeded those of his colleagues in Estonia. The Mitau bookseller Hinz was also an active publisher, selling 74 titles produced by his publishing house in Leipzig between 1772 and 1781.[43]

We get a picture of the products of Albrecht's publishing house by perusing the

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[36] See **Aarne Vinkel,** *Kirjandus, aeg, inimene: Uurimusi ja artikleid [Literature, Time, the Person. Studies and Articles]* (Tallinn, 1970), pp. 42–49.

[37] *Revalische Wöchentliche Nachrichten* 11 (1779).

[38] **Wittmann,** "Soziale und ökonomische Voraussetzungen," pp. 14, 16.

[39] *Verzeichniß der Bücher, welche aus der Frankfurter und Leipziger Ostermesse vom Jahr 1780. angeschaft und nebst vielen andern um billige Preise zu haben sind, bey Albrecht und Compagnie* (Reval, 1780). This copy is preserved in the *Baltica* section of the Estonian Academic Library.

[40] **Gustav Schwetschke,** *Codex nundinarius Germaniae literatae continuatus: der Meß-Jahrbücher des Deutschen Buchhandels. Fortsetzung, die Jahre 1766 bis einschließlich 1846 umfassend* (Halle, 1877; reprinted Nieuwkoop, 1963), pp. 245, 249.

[41] **Schwetschke,** *Codex nundinarius Germaniae literatae continuatus*, pp. 271, 273, 275, 277, 279.

[42] **Schwetschke,** *Codex nundinarius Germaniae literatae continuatus*, pp. 266, 267, 269.

[43] **Schwetschke,** *Codex nundinarius Germaniae literatae continuatus*, pp. 255, 257, 259, 261, 263, 265, 267, 269, 271, 273, 275; see also **Heinz Ischreyt, Jakob Friedrich Hinz,** "Ein vergessener Buchhändler und Verleger in Mitau," *Nordost-Archiv* 5, 22/23 (1972), pp. 3–14.

Leipzig Book Fair catalogs.[44] His greatest literary achievement was the publication of the works of Jean Jacques Rousseau "Philosophische Werke" in three volumes, translated and compiled by J.F.E. Albrecht, containing the renowned enlightener's most important philosophical and political works.[45] The title page of the first volume, published in 1779, notes the place of publication as "Tallinn and Rakvere, by Albrecht and Compagnie," whereas the following volumes, published in 1781 and 1782, give it as "Tallinn and Leipzig." Apparently, Albrecht and Co. was hoping for successful sales in Germany, instead of restricting himself solely to the limited Baltic book market. The translator refers to this in his foreword to the first volume of the collected works. He says: "Up until now, only a few of Rousseau's works have been translated. This gave me the idea of making the actual philosophical works of France's only great writer available to the German public as a publication of collected works."

Albrecht and Co. also published a popular scientific work entitled "Philosophy in Pleasant Attire, in Dialogs and Stories," a few masonic works, theological literature, James Cook's travelogues in German and French translation, a book about the Tartarstan, historical biographies, some natural science works, and entertaining stories and plays. The content of those books produced by Albrecht's publishing house that were directed at Germany's book market had little to do with Estonia. The only exceptions were "Esthländische poetische Blumenlese" (Anthology of Estonian Poetic Flowers) in 1779 and 1780, which includes a few Estonian-language poems, and Johann von Brevern's analysis of Estonia's financial situation "Vom Verfalle des Credits in Ehstland" (On the Decline of Credit in Estonia, 1780).

However, Albrecht's company did not succeed in gaining a firm footing in Tallinn. Apparently, the business did not even start up well, because on July 11, 1782, Albrecht's company announced the opening of its bookstore and stocks of new books for a second time, which implied that the business had been discontinued for a while. After 1783, advertisements for the Albrecht Company disappeared from newspaper columns, which leads us to assume that the company had closed its doors in Tallinn. Albrecht and his wife moved to Erfurt, leaving behind the debts that resulted from their unsuccessful business in Estonia. The Tartu man of letters, Friedrich Gotthilf Findeisen, refers to this several years later in his magazine.[46]

During the last years of his life, Illig, who died in 1788, apparently withdrew from active dealings in the book trade. On March 1, 1786, while Illig was still living, the 25-year-old merchant Christian von Glehn announced the opening of a new book and art store on Lai Street. In his advertisement, Glehn assessed the conditions of the book trade in Estonia in very negative terms, claiming that prices were extremely high, and that despite the high costs, anyone ordering printed matter had to wait for months for it to arrive. In the same ad, he expressed confidence that everyone would be convinced of his low book prices upon perusing the catalog that was now being printed.[47] Setting up the bookstore took time, because at the end of the year, Glehn apologized for occasionally not having a book that the public was asking for, and he promised to fully stock his book warehouse by the spring of the following year.[48] In spring 1787, the newspapers

[44] *Allgemeines Verzeichniß derer Bücher, welche in der Frankfurter und Leipziger Ostermesse des 1780 Jahres entweder ganz neu gedruckt, oder sonst verbessert, wieder aufgelegt worden sind, auch inskünftige noch herauskommen sollen. Leipzig, bey M.G.Weidmanns Erben und Reich.* The works of Albrecht's publishing house have been mentioned also in the 1780 Michaelmas fair and the 1781 and 1782 fair catalogs.

[45] See **Vinkel,** *Kirjandus, aeg, inimene,* pp. 42–43.

[46] *Lesebuch für Ehst- und Livland*, Stück 1 (Oberpahlen, 1787), pp. 42–43; see also **Vinkel,** *Kirjandus, aeg, inimene*, p. 48.

[47] *Revalische Wöchentliche Nachrichten* 10 (1786).

[48] *Revalische Wöchentliche Nachrichten* 49 (1786).

announced the publication of the Glehn bookstore's new catalog (price: 10 kopecks).[49]

We are given a peek into Glehn's bookstore with the catalog that was published in 1789, listing 3,926 titles.[50] The books are listed according to topic in 19 different categories, which makes navigating the catalog easier. Glehn's classification criteria are somewhat unclear to today's book historians, but are interesting as indicators of his intellectual level and attitudes as a bookseller. The most diffuse category is philosophy, which includes, in addition to actual philosophy, works with moralistic, satirical, and freemasonic content. This category might be generally called the category of enlightenment literature, and in the spirit of the times, the proportion of these books was highest in relation to all other categories – 14.9%. Biographies, stories, and novels make up 13.4%; history, geography, statistics, topography and travelogues – 8.7%; medicine – 8.3%; educational and youth literature, language textbooks and dictionaries – 7.6%; French-language literature – 6.4%; theology, ecclesiastical history and devotional works – 62%; plays – 6.1%; natural history, physics, chemistry and alchemy – 4.6%; poetry – 4%; classic authors and mythology – 3.5%; mathematics, navigation, architecture and Kabbalah (!) – 2.9%; literary science, criticism and esthetics – 2.6%; economics, agriculture, animal husbandry, horticulture and forestry – 2.6%; law and finance – 2%; business, handicrafts, art, and cookbooks – 2%; sheet music – 2%; military affairs and engineering – 1.4%; miscellaneous periodicals – 0.7% (26 editions).

The selection of books is of high quality, because nearly all the intellectual greats of the Age of Enlightenment (Voltaire, Montesquieu, Diderot, Rousseau, Condillac, Helvétius, Hume, Leibniz, Lessing, Herder, Wieland, Kant, Goethe, etc.) are represented in Glehn's catalog, not to mention many highly regarded but lesser known authors of the 18th century. Most of the books for sale had been published in the previous two decades. This reflected the overall trend in the Age of Enlightenment, which saw a marked rise in the proportion of recent literature in the book trade.[51]

If we compare this to Gellern's catalog, we note the abrupt decline in the relative importance of religious literature. This too reflects overall changes in the European mentality of the last third of the 18th century – a process of secularization and the spread of a lukewarm attitude toward religion. Indeed, many contemporaries describe religiousness as being in short supply in Tallinn during the late 18th century.[52] Most of the available theological literature consisted of works by representatives of the Rationalist Enlightenment (Lessing, Less, and Bahrdt). Devotional literature bestsellers such as Arndt's *Wahres Christentum* had now disappeared altogether.

In the catalog, we also find a notice saying that Glehn is the commission agent for Amsterdam's Hummel sheet music store. Tallinn music lovers could now acquire the best of European sheet music. In addition to books, Glehn also sold art objects (copper engravings, oil paintings, busts, vases, etc.), for which one could obtain a separate catalog.

In addition to being a bookseller, Glehn also dabbled in publishing. He was the publisher of the three first volumes of August Kotzebue's monthly *Für Geist und Herz* and

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[49] *Revalische Wöchentliche Nachrichten* 12 (1786).

[50] *Verzeichniß von Büchern, Musikalien, Landcharten und Kupferstichen, welche in der Buchhandlung in Reval, um beygestzte Preise gegen baare Bezahlung zu haben sind* (Reval, 1789, 318 pp.). The only known copy is preserved in the Tartu University Library.

[51] **Ernst Weber,** "Sortimentskataloge des 18. Jahrhunderts als literatur- und buchhandelsgeschichtliche Quellen," in Reinhard Wittmann, ed., *Bücherkataloge als buchgeschichtliche Quellen in der frühen Neuzeit. Wolfenbütteler Schriften zur Geschichte des Buchwesens* vol. 10 (Wiesbaden, 1985), p. 223.

[52] See **Fritz Valjavec,** *Geschichte der abendländischen Aufklärung* (Wien, München, 1961), pp. 169–172. Poor church attendance in Tallinn and the decline of the prestige of the religious lifestyle are pointed out by **Johann Christoph Petri,** *Briefe über Reval, nebst Nachrichten von Esth- und Liefland* (Deutschland, 1800), p. 101, and **Elisabeth Hoffmann,** *Bilder aus Revals Vergangenheit* (Reval, 1912), p. 17.

the two first volumes of the first edition of Kotzebue's collected works (1787–1788), which came out in Leipzig at the same time. It is very likely that Kotzebue, who lived in Tallinn at that time, was himself an associate of Glehn's bookselling business.[53]

Despite the relatively large selection of literature, Glehn's bookstore failed to satisfy the demands of his more pretentious contemporaries. The Tallinn correspondent of the *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* is extremely critical, saying: "There is only one book and art store in this town. However, it is not among the more noteworthy ones, and it is highly doubtful that it will ever achieve this status, because due to lack of money, its turnover is not great, and it lacks books by its own publishing house."[54] Of course, some more demanding readers who compared Glehn's bookstore with the larger bookstores in Germany might have considered Tallinn's bookstore to be quite inadequate.[55] However, the criticism of Glehn's bookstore seems to be hypercritical, since the book warehouse of the famous Berlin publisher and bookseller Friedrich Nicolai, for instance, was not much larger than that of the bookstore in Tallinn, which had just recently opened its doors. The 1787 catalog of Nicolai's bookstore listed a total of 5,492 titles, separated into 24 categories.[56] The format of Nicolai's catalog is similar to Glehn's; perhaps the Tallinn bookseller had used the Berlin bookstore as his example.

Unfortunately, the pessimistic prognosis pronounced by the unknown correspondent about the low turnover of books in Estonia proved to be prophetic, because by the time the article appeared, Glehn had already abandoned his bookselling business and relinquished it to Peter Gottlieb Bornwasser in early 1790.[57] The low volume of sales in the small Estonian book market may indeed have proven fateful for Glehn. His attempts to accumulate an extensive stock of books plunged him into financial difficulties. Besides, the book trade was not first among Glehn's business activities. In addition to the bookstore, he owned a leather factory and a mill, both of which he sold a few years after dissolving his bookselling business.[58]

Glehn's successor Peter Gottlieb Bornwasser had previously worked in his brother Johann Christian's silk shop as an assistant. After his brother's death, he applied to the town council for Bürger rights and permission to keep operating the silk shop. In his application, Bornwasser mentions that he had also studied the book trade for four years with the merchant Wilhelm Cassel in St. Petersburg.[59] It remains unclear exactly when Bornwasser turned his sights from the silk shop toward the book trade. According to Friedrich Puksoo, Bornwasser had even earlier worked as a shop assistant in the bookstore of Illig and Glehn.[60] In 1785, even before Glehn established his book and art store, Bornwasser had

[53] **Henning von Wistinghausen,** "Die Kotzebue-Zeit in Reval im Spiegel des Romans 'Dorothee und ihr Dichter' von Theophile von Bodisco," in Ott-Heinrich Elias, ed., *Aufklärung in den baltischen Provinzen Russlands: Ideologie und soziale Wirklichkeit* (Köln, Weimar, Wien, 1996), pp. 280–281.

[54] *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, Intelligenzblatt* 81 (1790), col. 660.

[55] In comparison, we must note that the catalogs of some bookstores in Germany contained tens of thousands of titles. Goldfriedrich, ed., *Geschichte des Deutschen Buchhandels,* vol. 3, pp. 541–542.

[56] See **Paul Raabe,** "Zum Bild des Verlagswesens in Deutschland in der Spätaufklärung: Dargestellt an Hand von Friedrich Nicolais Lagerkatalog von 1787," in Reinhard Wittmann, Bertold Hack, eds., *Buchhandel und Literatur: Festschrift für Herbert G. Göpfert zum 75. Geburtstag am 22. September 1982* (Wiesbaden, 1982), pp. 129–153.

[57] *Revalische Wöchentliche Nachrichten* 2 (1790).

[58] At the start of the 19th century, Glehn settled in Paide, where he died on November 12, 1832. **von Wistinghausen,** "Die Kotzebue-Zeit in Reval," p. 287; *Lexikon des gesamten Buchwesens*, Bd. 3, Lfg. 19 (Stuttgart, 1990), pp. 186–187 (Paul Kaegbein).

[59] TLA 230-9-I-17, pp. 54–55, 76–77. Bornwasser, who hailed from Tartumaa, was registered in the Tallinn Citizens' Register on June 23, 1782. Georg Adelheim, ed., *Das Revaler Bürgerbuch 1710–1786* (Reval, 1934), p. 121.

[60] **Puksov,** *Eesti raamatu arengulugu*, p. 139.

already been selling books independently and managing a lending library.[61]

Bornwasser's bookstore achieved stability and remained in business until its owner's death on March 25, 1824. Immediately after taking over Glehn's book warehouse, Bornwasser began energetically designing his own bookselling business, promising his readers that he would order new titles from Germany and St. Petersburg.[62] In the following years, the newspaper repeatedly listed the titles of books available from Bornwasser, who also offered readers catalogs of his titles. Unfortunately, only the 1803 catalog has been preserved,[63] but from this, we can still draw conclusions about the activity of the bookstore during the last decade of the 18th century.[64] The catalog lists 3,090 titles, but it also notes that the books remaining from Glehn's bookstore are still available. Therefore, Bornwasser may have had a total of nearly 5,000 to 6,000 titles. The picture is similar to that of the Glehn bookstore. Most notable is the increase in the percentage of schoolbooks and children's books (13%), which apparently were the easiest to sell. Among the philosophical literature, secondary works dealing with the philosophy of Kant are notably plentiful. Bornwasser was undoubtedly taking the tastes of the local philosophy lovers into account. One of them may have been the Tallinn gymnasium professor Ernst August Wilhelm Hörschelmann, who published a speech recognizing and yet polemicizing with Kant.[65]

Bornwasser too was primarily a book merchant. However, he did engage in some publishing. For instance, he collected advance orders for the publication of an alphabetized collection of Russian laws, and published a legal dictionary translated from Russian.[66] In 1794, Bornwasser collected advance orders for the publication of the first Estonian-language play "Ramma Josepi Jubilei, üks römo ja öppetusse mäng, ühhes jones" written by the renowned teacher Friedrich Gustav Arvelius. However, this endeavor failed, and the manuscript, so valuable from the standpoint of cultural history, was never printed and is apparently lost forever. One might presume that it failed to go to print because of inadequate advance orders.[67] The Tallinn advertising paper of March 6, 1794 laments this very fact. However, the deciding factor was actually the April 25, 1794 ban by Estonia's civil governor Heinrich Johann von Wrangell, who turned a deaf ear to even Arvelius's explanations of the enlightening purpose of the play.[68] All of Tallinn's book merchants – Illig, Glehn, and Bornwasser – as well as the bookbinders Dienes and Boldt also kept lending libraries with which they earned income to supplement that of their bookstores, thereby creating reading opportunities for even those city dwellers with limited purchasing power.[69]

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[61] *Revalische Wöchentliche Nachrichten* 2 (1785).

[62] *Revalische Wöchentliche Nachrichten* 2 (1790).

[63] *Verzeichniß der Bücher, welche nebst vielen andern, in der Buchhandlung von Peter Gottlieb Bornwasser in Reval um bygesetzte Preise zu haben sind. Nach Classen geordnet* (Reval, 1803), 273 pp., price 40 kopecks. A copy is preserved in the *Baltica* section of the Estonian Academic Library.

[64] Johann Christoph Petri, who knew the cultural conditions in Estonia at the end of the 18th century well, highlights the excellent selection of literature in Bornwasser's bookstore, most of which was ordered from Germany. *Allgemeiner Litterarischer Anzeiger* (1801), column 1070.

[65] *Geständnisse und Wünsche, die Kantische Philosophie betreffend. Ein Programma, von Ernst August Wilhelm Hörschelmann, der Philosophie Doctor und Professor* (Reval, 1789).

[66] *Revalische Wöchentliche Nachrichten* 47 (1791); 25 (1792).

[67] See also **Hans Treumann,** *Vanemast raamatukultuuriloost [On the Early Cultural History of the Book]* (Tallinn, 1977), p. 67.

[68] **Reimo,** "Book Trade in Tallinn," p. 51.

[69] See **Indrek Jürjo,** "Lesegesellschaften in den baltischen Provinzen im Zeitalter der Aufklärung. Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Lesegesellschaft von Hupel in Oberpahlen," vol. 1, *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung* 39 (1990), p. 550–555.

The genuine book merchants had not yet succeeded in pushing the bookbinders out of the book market. In 1766, the Tallinn bookbinders united into their own guild (*Buchbinderamt*). The establishment of the guild is justified in the approved guild charter by a rise in the numbers of bookbinders; however, one actual reason for the establishment of the guild may have been the bookbinders' dispute with Illig. Article 20 of the guild's charter (*skra*), based to a great extent on that of the Riga bookbinders, sets forth the bookbinders' right to engage in the book trade: "Since the book trade is not yet firmly established here, and until more book merchants who can provide adequately for both town and country have settled here, the bookbinders shall retain the freedom to sell both bound and unbound books. If, however, the numbers of book merchants should increase in this area, the Venerable Town Council retains the right to make changes corresponding to local conditions."[70]

The Tallinn magistrate never actually took any initiative in this dispute, and the professional book merchants and bookbinders continued to work as competitors in the Tallinn book trade. The abundance of bookbinders during that time came about due to the custom of the German book trade to fling books onto the market unbound. The stitching and binding of books before their sale was not to become common until the end of the 18th century.[71]

However, most Tallinn bookbinders were not active booksellers. Among the Tallinn bookbinders, the most noteworthy sellers were Gottlieb Wilhelm Boldt and Johann Gerhard Dienes, who both began selling books in the early 1780s. They regularly distributed their sales catalogs and published extensive lists of new titles in Tallinn advertising papers. The selection of titles offered by the bookbinders was also varied: in addition to the recreational reading that was now enjoying mass distribution, the lists included scientific titles as well as valuable belles-lettres. None of Dienes's or Boldt's catalogs have been preserved, but the lists compiled by the censors of Paul I give us a comprehensive picture of the bookbinders' warehouse.

Dienes's book warehouse together with the lending library contained 471 works, usually one copy of each.[72] There were multiple copies of some more popular works or agricultural handbooks. The selection was not as representative as that in Glehn's bookstore but provided people with the opportunity to purchase educational, practical, as well as recreational reading.

The last third of the 18th century saw the birth of children's literature in Germany as a separate literary genre. From its very beginning the publication of great quantities of new textbooks and readers for children and young people represented not only an educational undertaking, but a business endeavor as well.[73] Dienes was the first in Tallinn to set up a special Christmas sale of children's and young people's literature.[74] During the following years, booksellers in Tallinn made it a common custom to offer books as Christmas gifts for children. Christmas sales of children's books also reflected the gradually emerging modern vision of the child as a creature requiring special emotional and mental shaping, with the vision taking its final form with emphasis on education during the Enlightenment. Dozens of recreational and educational children's books were offered for sale as gifts. Of these, we may call special attention to the numerous works of Campe that promoted a natural upbringing, the moralizing children's magazine *Kinderfreund* by Rochow, and the masterpiece *Elementarwerk* by Basedow, a central figure of philanthropism.

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[70] TLA 190-2-477, p. 19.

[71] Goldfriedrich, ed., *Geschichte des Deutschen Buchhandels,* 3, pp. 341–342.

[72] Estonian Historical Archives (= EAA) 29-7-21, p. 38–53.

[73] See **Wolfgang Promies,** "Kinderliteratur im späten 18. Jahrhundert," *Hansers Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Literatur vom 16. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* 3/2 (München/Wien, 1980), pp. 765–831, 924–938.

[74] *Revalische Wöchentliche Nachrichten* 49, 50 (1791).

Boldt's book warehouse contained a total of 486 titles.[75] These included schoolbooks, popular literature, and practical handbooks for everyday living. Boldt's book warehouse also included a number of older titles that remained from the first half of the century. His successor Johann Samuel Boldt Jr. had only several dozen books.[76] We get an idea of bookbinder Johann Quirinus Rabe's property from an auction list compiled after his death.[77] It lists a total of 499 titles, most of which are schoolbooks, language textbooks and grammar books. The proportion of quality literature is also considerable.

Although the bookbinders also carried literature for the more educated and demanding reader, they made most of their money from the sale of the most sought-after school and practical religious books and calendars. According to the censor who prepared the report on the contents of the book warehouses of both Boldts, most of the books were "Bibles, collections of sermons, hymnals and catechisms, and primers for Protestant congregations and schools, some in German, some in Estonian."[78] Although the number of Estonian-language titles was small (Dienes's warehouse contained only 12 titles), these books sold quite well, taking into account that a large number of copies were printed of each one. According to the correspondent of the *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* quoted above, purchasers of Estonian-language literature made up the largest group of buyers.

Estonian-language books were also sold in peasant shops, which the peasants tended to favor because there they could buy books as well as other goods they needed for farming.[79] Books were also sold to the peasants by all kinds of traveling salesmen, who peddled popular literature in rural as well as urban areas. Up until the first half of the 19th century, these colporteurs made a great contribution to the dissemination of popular reading materials in Germany's out-of-the-way provinces that had no printing shops or bookstores whatsoever. Book historians did not begin to value the cultural contribution of the colporteurs until much later; the Enlightenment-Era population and booksellers held the colporteurs in contempt.[80] Undisguised contempt is also evident in the complaint submitted by the Riga printer Samuel Lorenz Frölich to the town council in 1783, in which he asks the authorities to implement the strictest measures against these traveling peddlers who, without a bookselling privilege, distributed their printed matter in towns and manors throughout Livonia.[81]

In the 18th century, the relative importance of Russian-language books in the book trade of the Baltic region, which lay within the German cultural space, was almost nil. The catalogs of the Glehn and Bornwasser bookstores contain no Russian-language titles at all. However, isolated notices about the sale of Russian-language books could be found in newspaper columns, as in the case of a private individual selling Russian dictionaries and mathematics textbooks.[82] On January 28, 1790, Dienes announced that he had the newest Russian-language titles from several scientific fields, and was also accepting orders for Russian titles. A few times, someone offered St. Petersburg calendars for sale.

The minimal proportion of Russian-language titles in the Tallinn book trade testifies to the low cultural level of the Russian population in Estonia (3,366 persons in 1782,

[75] EAA 29-7-21, pp. 70–79.
[76] Ibid., pp. 80–82.
[77] *Verzeichniß von Büchern, welche in den Rabschen Sterbhause für billige Preise zu haben sind* (Reval, 1781).
[78] EAA 29-7-21, p. 23v.
[79] **Puksov,** *Eesti raamatu arengulugu*, p. 135.
[80] **Rudolf Schenda,** *Volk ohne Buch: Studien zur Sozialgeschichte der populären Lesestoffe 1770–1910* (Frankfurt am Main, 1970), p. 267.
[81] **Buchholtz,** *Geschichte der Buchdruckerkunst in Riga,* pp. 190–191.
[82] *Revalische Wöchentliche Nachrichten* 21 (1787).

according to official data).[83] This fact also demonstrates the unwavering position of superiority of the German language in the cultural life of the Baltic provinces, a position that remained unswayed by efforts to increase the importance of the Russian language during the period of the so-called regency in 1783–1796. Although some aspects of the s-called regency government represented a prelude to the Russification that began a century later, we cannot speak of any German-Russian national conflict during this period preceding the Estonian national awakening. The situation was quite the opposite. During the Age of Enlightenment, a heightened Russian patriotism prevailed in the Baltic provinces. Also, the bookstore catalogs give us no cause to speak of any lack of interest in Russia, because the catalogs include large numbers of Russian-themed books, i.e. books dealing with Russia in other languages as well as German translations of Russian authors.

The residents of Tallinn could also acquire books through several other channels. Even though they could turn to the book merchants to order books not currently locally available, many customers preferred to order printed matter directly from Germany. During the first half of the 18th century, when Pietism was exerting a strong influence in Estonia, readers ordered large quantities of religious literature directly from Halle. The pastor of Tallinn's Cathedral, Albert Anton Vierorth, repeatedly sent lists of recommended titles to Halle in order to more widely disseminate pietistic reading materials and the pietistic spirit in Estonia.[84] In mid-century, Pastor Johann Georg Tideböhl and the Cathedral School teacher Johann Gottlob Ludwig were two individuals who ordered books from Halle most zealously. The latter brokered the orders of one local book merchant, whose name is unfortunately not mentioned, to the Halle Orphanage publishing house.[85] The books were usually transported by land from Halle to Lübeck, and from Lübeck to Tallinn by sea. Some of the religious literature received from Halle was then sent from Tallinn to pastors in rural areas. This was how Johann Georg Holm, a pastor in Karja, Saaremaa, regularly received mission literature printed in Halle,[86] as did the Ruhnu pastor Johann Reuter, at Tideböhl's intermediation. Pastor Reuter suffered from a particularly severe intellectual isolation, which he described in a letter to Halle lamenting his fate on the "Patmos-like island of Ruhnu."[87]

Tallinn continued placing orders for literature from the Halle Orphanage bookstore into the second half of the 18th century, after the heyday of Pietism had long passed. Reinhold Johann Winkler, who placed frequent orders for books, was now interested in enlightening literature above all (such as Basedow's *Elementarwerk* and the works of rationalist theologians Michaelis and Jerusalem). In a letter of May 20, 1788, Winkler wrote that he had previously ordered literature from Halle by way of the bookbinder Boldt, but now placed high hopes on the new Glehn bookstore, recently established in Tallinn, and would stop ordering any more books, at least for the time being.[88]

From the Tallinn censor's monthly reports to the Livonian civil governor in 1799 and 1800, we read that many Tallinn residents (pharmacists Burchardt and Fick, the merchant Hambeck, the companies Frese et Sohn

[83] *Revalische Wöchentliche Nachrichten* 33 (1782).

[84] Berliner Staatsbibliothek, Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Nachlaß Francke, Kartong 28, p. 362.

[85] Ibid., pp. 160–161.

[86] On March 15, 1749, J. G. Holm thanks Gotthilf August Franche for the literature that he received by way of Tallinn (der 64ten Continuation der Ost-Indischen Nachrichten), Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt in Halle (Saale), Abteilung Archiv der Franckischen Stiftungen, C. 381, Brief 41.

[87] On October 29, 1748, Tideböhl writes to Halle that before the ice road develops, there is little opportunity for transporting parcels of books to the island of Ruhnu, Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt in Halle (Saale), Abteilung Archiv der Franckischen Stiftungen, D 381, Brief 29. Reuter's letters to Gotthilf August Francke can be found under the same call number.

[88] Staatsbibliothek Berlin, Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Nachlaß Francke, Kartong 28, p. 463.

and Clayhills et Sohn) had received large parcels of books from foreign countries.[89] Private individuals repeatedly offered their own books for sale in the Tallinn newspapers. Book auctions were held. At Superintendent Gotthard Johann Jaeger's auction, 1,015 books of predominantly theological content were auctioned for charity.[90] Even a shipping accident provided an opportunity for acquiring printed works at a reduced price. In 1787, an auction was held in Tallinn for French-language books rescued from a French ship; even a catalog was printed listing the books to be auctioned.[91]

In Germany's book history, the period between 1770 and 1810 was the heyday of discounted advance orders and subscriptions to published books. In the case of discounted advance orders, the reader prepaid for the book or magazine he was ordering; in the case of subscriptions, he pledged to purchase the publication he was ordering at a later time. This allowed the publisher to predict the profitability of his product. In both cases, the people that ordered their publications ahead of time received a discount off the store price.

This opportunity for acquiring literature was gladly used in the borderlands of the German cultural and linguistic sphere, where people felt a need for intensive communication with the metropolises of literary life and wished to express their solidarity with other members of the "Republique des lettres." Particularly notable is the high participation of the Baltic provinces, particularly Courland, in literary endeavors of this kind.[92] The Baltics vigorously supported Klopstock's initiative to make the literati independent of book merchants and publishers; this was promoted by Klopstock in his 1774 work "Die deutsche Gelehrtenrepublik" ("The German Republic of Letters").[93] For potential buyers, it was undoubtedly flattering to imagine oneself a member of a famous writer's selected circle of readers.[94] Thus, the number of people ordering printed matter in advance was disproportionately high in the borderlands of the German cultural region. In a list of subscribers published in the book we find the names of 30 Tallinn residents (mainly literati and nobility, including women).[95] Indeed, Tallinn was rather conservatively represented in Klopstock's endeavor, if we consider that tiny Mitau provided 140 subscribers, Riga 48, and that many small Baltic towns also supported the renowned German poet's endeavor. For Klopstock himself, the publication proved to be profitable, thanks to the large number of subscribers. However, the rather ponderous content of his "Republic of Letters" later proved to be a disappointment to his readers.

There were many other active literary subscription agents in Tallinn, such as the aforementioned Cathedral School professor Carpov and the gymnasium professor Ernst August Wilhelm Hörschelmann, who collected orders for the products of Germany's book market. There is no doubt that Carpov found subscribers for Rousseau's 24-volume collected works[96] and Voltaire's French-language collected works in 80 volumes,[97] since they were surprisingly inexpensive. One volume of Rousseau's works cost 30 kopecks, while one volume of Voltaire's works cost 40 kopecks.

The purchasing opportunities for readers in various social groups depended greatly on the price of the book. The reading boom of the second half of the 18th century was accompanied by a significant increase in book

[89] Latvijas Valsts Vēstures Arhīvs, 1-1-158, pp. 28–47.
[90] *Revalische Wöchentliche Nachrichten* 11 (1793).
[91] *Revalische Wöchentliche Nachrichten* 8 (1787).
[92] **Reinhard Wittmann,** *Buchmarkt und Lektüre im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert: Beiträge zum literarischen Leben 1750–1880* (Tübingen, 1982), p. 65.
[93] See also Goldfriedrich, ed., *Geschichte des Deutschen Buchhandels,* vol. 3, pp. 139–149.
[94] See also **Kiesel, Münch,** *Gesellschaft und Literatur,* p. 151.
[95] **Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock,** *Die deutsche Gelehrtenrepublik,* vol. 1 (Hamburg, 1774), pp. 58–59.
[96] *Revalische Wöchentliche Nachrichten* 7 (1782).
[97] *Revalische Wöchentliche Nachrichten* 41 (1784).

prices. According to Hupel, book prices in the Baltics were about 8 percent higher because of transportation costs.[98]

By perusing the catalogs of both Glehn's and Bornwasser's bookstores, we get an idea of the prices of the reading materials they offered. Prices ranged from 10-kopeck booklets to luxury volumes costing tens of rubles. Here are some examples of prices of world literary masterpieces and Baltic Enlightenment literature in the bookstores of Glehn and Bornwasser: Herder's "Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind" in two volumes cost 2 rubles and 15 kopecks, Beccaria's "On Crime and Punishments" – 1 ruble and 90 kopecks, Montesquieu's 4-volume "The Spirit of Laws" – 6 rubles, Rousseau's 4-volume "New Heloïse" – 5 rubles and 50 kopecks, Goethe's "The Sorrows of Young Werther" – 65 kopecks, Merkel's "The Latvians" – 2 rubles and 70 kopecks, Petri's three-volume "Estonia and the Estonians" – 9 rubles and 30 kopecks. Unlike today, recreational literature was not significantly cheaper than scientific literature.

The most avid book buyers in Estonia were perhaps nobles, literati, and merchants. We have already mentioned the increase in the nobility's purchasing power during the second half of the century. The income of merchants varied greatly, but books were easily affordable for the more prosperous merchants. The steadiest clientele of booksellers in the Baltic provinces were well-paid intellectuals, among whom pastors were most notable with their particularly high income.[99] The income of artisans in the Baltic region was also higher than that of their counterparts in Germany; even a journeyman's income allowed him to accumulate a modest library, if he wished to do so.[100] However, artisans generally kept to their traditional limited reading habits.

Professor Hörschelmann notes in his feigned correspondence "Briefe über Reval" that quite a few of Tallinn's noble and bourgeois homes contained a well-stocked and tastefully selected library.[101] Certainly some of the private libraries may have been quite well-stocked for their time. For instance, Superintendent Joachim Friedrich Hartmann owned 1,616 titles, most with theological and philosophical content.[102] The estate property lists of Tallinn residents give proof of the fact that opportunities for purchasing books were not left unused, and libraries of various sizes could be found in many homes. The lists of book titles included in estate property lists have recently been studied by Raimo Pullat, whose statistical summaries serve to verify the generalizations stated above: i.e. from the mid-18th century onward, the number of books in the homes of Tallinn increased rapidly, and the proportion of religious literature decreased, overtaken by secular literature. As expected, more books could be found in the homes of the literati, town council members, and merchants; the libraries of artisans were smaller, dominated by religious and practical functional literature.[103] Similar trends have been noted in the homes

[98] See "Wegen der Bücher-Preise in Livland," *Nordische Miscellaneen* 11–12 (1786), pp. 448–452.

[99] Abundant information on the income and living standards of Baltic literati can be found in: **Heinrich Bosse,** "Die Einkünfte der kurländischen Literaten am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts," *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung* 35 (1986), pp. 516–594.

[100] A journeyman bricklayer's daily pay in Tallinn in 1787 was 45 kopecks, a journeyman cabinetmaker's was 36 kopecks. **Otto-Heinrich Elias,** *Reval in der Reformpolitik Katharinas II: Die Statthalterschafttzeit 1783–1796* (Bonn, Bad Godesberg, 1987), p. 158.

[101] *Revalsche Wöchentliche Nachrichten* 12 (1782). The most interesting letters from a cultural history standpoint were later published again by **Claus von Hoerschelmann,** "Revaler Briefe 1781/1782," *Baltische Hefte* 11 (1965), pp. 134–149.

[102] *Verzeichniß der hinterlassenen Bibliothek des weiland Herrn Superintendenten J. F. Hartmann* (Reval, 1809).

[103] **Raimo Pullat,** "Buch und Leser im Reval des 18. Jahrhunderts," in Elias, ed., *Aufklärung in den baltischen Provinzen Russlands*, pp. 229–253. The article, which is based on data from 167 property inventories, represents the intermediate stage of a larger study in which Pullat promises to present new qualitative results based upon quantitative materials. The tables dealing with the books found in Tallinn property inventories, which are based upon a fragmentary and only partially used source, are of dubious value. Pullat's calculations ▸

of Tartu at the turn of the 18th-19th century by Kaja Noodla, who has studied book lists in the estate property lists of Tartu.[104]

Finally, let us also look at censorship, which played an important and often inhibiting role in the book trade. In Germany of the 17th and 18th century, there were three main criteria for censorship: the defense of the interests of the state, religious considerations, and "good manners." In the 17th and early 18th century, theological censorship held first place, because secular authorities saw religion as a factor that served to stabilize the system. Since the politicized openness of the brochure and newspaper wars of the following centuries had not yet emerged, political censorship was far less important, and the pressure of political censorship on the printed word of that day was not yet tangible.[105]

There were great regional variations in censorship policy due to the territorial and confessional fragmentation of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation.[106] A certain uniformity was imposed on censorship policy by the imperial censorship regulations, on which the censorship instructions sent to local sovereigns were based, and by censorship committees at the Frankfurt and Leipzig book fairs, which managed to cause plenty of problems for authors and publishers into the 18th century. The severity of censorship during the Age of Absolutism depended greatly on the ruler's world view. In Prussia, the regime of the military "soldier-king" Friedrich Wilhelm I was followed by the pro-Enlightenment regime of Friedrich II from 1740 to 1786, which was particularly liberal regarding religious literature. Fortunately, a more broad-minded censorship prevailed in Saxony and other regions of northern Germany, toward which the Baltic book market was oriented. In southern Germany, particularly Bavaria, censorship was stricter and did not start to weaken until it began feeling the influence of the reforms brought about by enlightened absolutism. The most tolerant were the censorship policies of Emperor Joseph II in Austria (1780-1790), granting nearly total freedom of the press. The French Revolution bought about a reaction and new limits to freedom of the press throughout Germany.

The development of censorship is usually in direct correlation to the overall development of literature and the printed word. Thus, Russian censorship of the 18th century was still in its embryonic phase, and an institutionalized censorship policy was not fully developed until the rule of Alexander I.[107] The censorship policy in the tsarist empire of the 18th century was limited to isolated restrictive interventions. During the period of palace revolutions, books dealing with the overthrown rulers and their

show that the number of books in Tallinn homes decreased suddenly in the last quarter of the 18th century when compared to the previous quarter – 2,583 books to 1,004 books (p. 240). However, Pullat gives neither explanations nor comments on this peculiar phenomenon of cultural decline, which makes it seem as if the distribution of books in Tallinn was undergoing a trend completely opposite from that of the increasing publication of books throughout Europe. The lists of books, still few in quantity in the homes of Tallinn merchants during the first half of the 18th century, are also found in the lists of property inventory of Tallinn German merchants as compiled by Raimo Pullat. See Raimo Pullat, ed., *Die Nachlaßverzeichnisse der deutschen Kaufleute in Tallinn, 1702–1750* (Tallinn, 1997).

[104] See also **Kaja Noodla,** "Raamat Tartu kodudes XVIII sajandi lõpul ja XIX sajandi algul" [The Book in the Homes of Tartu at the End of the 18th Century and Beginning of the 19th Century], *Keel ja Kirjandus* (1980), pp. 547–555.

[105] Goldfriedrich, ed., *Geschichte des Deutschen Buchhandels,* vol. 2, p. 461.

[106] For the state of censorship in Germany during the 18th century, see Goldfriedrich, ed., *Geschichte des Deutschen Buchhandels,* vol. 3, pp. 343–434; **Kiesel, Münch,** *Gesellschaft und Literatur*, pp. 104–123; **Dieter Breuer,** *Geschichte der literarischen Zensur in Deutschland* (Heidelberg, 1982), pp. 86–145.

[107] For a summary of the state of censorship in Russia during the 18th century, see **W. Gesemann,** "Grundzüge der russischen Zensur im 18. Jahrhundert," in Herbert G. Göpfert, Heinz Iscreyt, eds., *Buch- und Verlagswesen im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert: Beiträge zur Geschicte der Kommunikation in Mittel- und Osteuropa* (Berlin, 1977), pp. 60–77; **Gary Marker,** *Publishing, Printing, and the Origins of Intellectual Life in Russia, 1700–1800* (Princeton, 1985), pp. 212–232.

favorites were banned. Even the Estonian provincial government, on April 26, 1743, approved Empress Elizabeth's ukase calling for the gathering and burning of the biographies of Biron, Münnich and Ostermann that had been printed in Germany.[108] Immediately after ascending to the throne, Catherine II banned all books printed in foreign countries about her deposed husband Peter III. However, these instructions were not strictly followed, and all the books described above were available to readers in Estonia.[109]

Generally, the cultural policies of Catherine II were book-friendly, which is confirmed by the extreme scarcity of archival materials on censorship during her rule. With her ukase of January 15, 1783, Catherine II permitted the free establishment of private printing shops. The printing shops had only to register with the police department, which also had the authority to pre-censor books.[110] Customs duties were not levied on books importied into Russia during the rule of Catherine II.

There was no well-defined system for locally printed literature in Tallinn during the 18th century. Swedish law was still in effect, according to which persons designated by the city were responsible for censoring printing shops. According to a 1726 decision by the gymnasiarch collegium, secular literature was to be checked by that year's gymnasium rector, books with religious content were reviewed by the gymnasium's professor of theology, and calendars and almanacs were censored by the mathematics professor, who did not answer to the town, but to a general provincial body.[111] All works submitted from outside Tallinn or even by the residents of Castle Hill came under the oversight of the Estonian Consistory. In 1741, the Consistory appointed the Tallinn Cathedral chief pastor Christoph Friedrich Mickwitz to the post of chief censor, with pastor Anton Thor Helle as the censor of Estonian-language literature, and rector Calixtus as the censor of Swedish-language books. In 1750, Johann, Georg Tideböhl, chief pastor of the Cathedral, became the censor.[112]

In the 1780s, Catherine II's mistrust of the activities of Moscow's Novikov publishing house deepened; it was publishing large quantities of translated masonic literature. At the Empress' orders, the Synod checked all the publications in Russia's bookstores and printing shops in 1787 to find any reading matter that might run contrary to Orthodox dogmas.[113] However, this campaign probably did not affect the Baltic provinces at all.

At times, the loose censorship conditions in the Baltic provinces differed cardinally from those in the country from which the literature was imported. When the reactionary Prussian king Friedrich Wilhelm II, in contrast to his free-thinking predecessor Frederick the Great, enacted a strict regime of censorship, Hartknoch was forced to break his business ties with his Berlin commission agent in 1794 and have his books sent to him by way of Lübeck.[114]

The French Revolution and the fear of the spread of revolutionary ideas tightened censorship throughout Europe. This fear was also well-founded in Tallinn, because books on the French Revolution were frequently offered for sale through the advertising paper. Bornwasser offered readers many different treatments of the Revolution, includ-

[108] **Tiiu Reimo,** "Tsensuurist Eestis XVIII sajandil" [On Censorship in Estonia During the 18th Century], *Keel ja Kirjandus* (1997), p. 606.

[109] Books about Peter II printed in Germany were read without fear of repression by Hupel's book society in Põltsamaa. **Indrek Jürjo,** "Lesegesellschaften in den baltischen Provinzen im Zeitalter der Aufklärung. Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Lesegesellschaft von Hupel in Oberpahlen," vol. 2, *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung* 40 (1991), pp. 38–39.

[110] **Reimo,** "Tsensuurist Eestis,", p. 608.

[111] **Puksoo,** "Jacob Johann Köhler," p. 12.

[112] Ibid., p. 13.

[113] **Marker,** *Publishing, Printing, and the Origins of Intellectual Life,* pp. 221–222.

[114] Goldfriedrich, ed., *Geschichte des Deutschen Buchhandels,* vol. 3, p. 416.

ing Joachim Christoph Friedrich Schulz's "History of the Great French Revolution," which enjoyed widespread popularity in Germany.[115] The bookbinders were no less energetic than Bornwasser in introducing the French Revolution to readers: Dienes advertised a book on the French war theater,[116] Boldt Sr. and Campe offered the revolution-affirming "Briefe aus Paris" and the letters of Mirabeau,[117] Boldt Jr. introduced an ode to the slain Marat composed by a German from St. Petersburg.[118] The public advertising of these books in the newspaper shows that nobody even imagined fearing any repression by the authorities during the first years of the French Revolution.[119]

The situation that had been so beneficial to the book trade changed abruptly with the censorship regulations enacted in the last year of Catherine II's rule. These regulations became extremely strict during the reign of Paul I. From December 1795, the literature printed in Tallinn and being brought into Tallinn was censored by Estonia's *Comissarium fisci* Reinhold v. Richter, who was officially confirmed as censor in 1799.[120] In actuality, Richter was fully subordinate to the Riga censorship office, which had the authority to oversee the printing and importation of books in all the Baltic provinces. All foreign literature arriving through the ports of Tallinn, Jelgava (Mitau) and Palanga were to be sent to the Riga censorship office to be checked. The activities of the Riga censors during the reign of Paul I provided another shining example of how highly educated censors could be much more dangerous to a culture than the poorly educated policemen of Catherine II's time who had formal authority to monitor the printed word. Both the Riga censorship offices' factual leader, civil censor Fjodor Tumanski, as well as the "educated" censor Pjotr Inohotsev, had studied at Göttingen University. The Riga censorship office's secretary and later Tallinn censor Johann von Bellingshausen became renowned for his German translations of Russian literature. And still, the Riga censorship office exceeded even the capital's censors with its strictness.[121] From 1797 to 1799, the censors of Moscow, St. Petersburg, Odessa and Radziwillow banned the importation of a total of 87 books; the overzealous Tumanski and his agents succeeded in banning 552 titles.[122] Tumanski succeeded in ruining Hartknoch's famous bookstore with his interception of book deliveries, causing him such great financial losses that Hartknoch Jr. was forced to close down his bookstore in Riga and move to Leipzig in the spring of 1798.[123]

What guaranteed the greatest ruin for the book merchants was not the banning of literature imported from abroad (the proportion of the printed matter intercepted by the censors was not that great at first), but the unbearable slowness of the censorship officials as they looked through the shipments. It rendered the Baltic book merchants' normal accounting with their suppliers in Germany impossible. It caused an equal amount of suffering for the Tallinn colleagues of the Riga book merchants. In September 1797, Bornwasser was forced to complain to His Imperial Highness' Council on Censorship Matters that his books had been languishing in the Riga censorship office for four months "without any decision being made." Bornwasser requested

[115] *Revalische Wöchentliche Nachrichten* 6, 27, 37 (1790).
[116] *Revalische Wöchentliche Nachrichten* 31 (1793).
[117] *Revalische Wöchentliche Nachrichten* 26, 94 (1792).
[118] *Revalische Wöchentliche Nachrichten* 46 (1793).
[119] See **Indrek Jürjo,** "Prantsuse revolutsiooni mõjust ja retseptsioonist Baltimaadel" [On the Effect and Reception of the French Revolution in the Baltic Lands], *Akadeemia* 4 (1989), pp. 825–849.
[120] Latvijas Valsts Vēstures Arhīvs, 1-1-158, p. 1–1p.
[121] See **В. В. Сиповский**, "Из прошлого русской цензуры," *Русская Старина* (1899), 4, pp. 161–175, 5, pp. 345–453; **В. А. Сомов**, "Цензура иностранных изданий в Риге в конце XVIII в.," L*atvijas PSR Zinātņu Akadēmijas Vēstis* 4 (1990), pp. 53–58.
[122] **Marker,** *Publishing, Printing, and the Origins of Intellectual Life,* p. 231.
[123] **M. Lācis,** "Baltijas ievērojamākā izdevniecība XVIII gs.," *Latvijas PSR Zinātņu Akadēmijas Vēstis* 8 (1974), p. 87.

that the censors, overwhelmed by the work of sorting through an avalanche of books coming from abroad, should allow "typical books" to pass through without censorship: Bibles, catechisms, grammar books, dictionaries, etc.[124]

Germany's liberal magazine *Allgemeiner Litterarischer Anzeiger* sharply condemned Russia's censorship policy, opening its columns to criticisms by numerous correspondents in St. Petersburg and the Baltics, who for obvious reasons wished to remain anonymous.[125] The articles deal primarily with conditions in St. Petersburg and Riga, although they include occasional descriptions of the situation in Tallinn. A letter composed in January 1799 mentions a "von B," who returned from a trip with a number of art books, all of which were intercepted by Tallinn customs officials. In response to his complaints, the customs officials agreed to send the books on to Riga, and in the correspondent's opinion, there was no hope of the books being released to their owner for the rest of the century. Only in this liberal German magazine could a Livonian correspondent express his opinions so sharply, penning personal attacks against the monarch, and wishing for the return of the "Golden Age" of his predecessor, Catherine II.[126] The arbitrariness and absurdity of Paul I's censorship policies aroused the correspondent's anti-Russian sentiments, which were generally uncharacteristic of the Age of Enlightenment, and caused him to contrast Russia, now sinking into darkness, with the free and enlightened Germany. This unknown Livonian (who points out that all the Riga censors are Russian) seemed to be saying a symbolic good-bye to Germany: "Live well, you fine German men who have provided us with intellectual nourishment. Continue teaching and entertaining your free compatriots, and sympathize with that land in the North which your light and warmth may no longer reach in the future!!"[127]

The continued hardening of censorship policies harmed the Tallinn book merchants as well. On January 22, 1798, Tallinn received a notice from the Riga censorship office listing 142 banned titles or authors.[128] Tallinn's five booksellers (Bornwasser, Dienes, Berggren, Boldt Sr. and Boldt Jr.) had to sign it, attesting that they had familiarized themselves with the list. The list included books about the French Revolution as well as books that had been published in France during the Revolution, all of Wieland's and Diderot's works, two titles by Thomas Paine, Goethe's "Wilhelm Meister," books published in other countries about Russia, and apparently out of moral considerations, knight and ghost stories. Ten days later, they received a new order banning the importation of works by Voltaire. Another two weeks later, the book merchants were ordered to submit the catalogs of their book warehouses to the censor.[129] On April 6, 1799, Estonia's civilian governor received an order from Riga to inspect bookstores and libraries for banned literature.[130] If any were found, the banned titles were to be confiscated, even from private citizens, who would then have to report on the origin of the publications. Fortunately for the residents of Estonia, inspection of libraries was assigned to the educated and liberal-minded chief pastor of the Cathedral, Philipp Christian Moier, who, as verified by a "traveling Livonian," went

[124] See **Сомов**, "Цензура иностранных изданий", pp. 55, 57–58.

[125] The editorial board of the magazine writes in its introduction to the series of articles on the state of censorship in Russia: "In the sad state of affairs that exists today in Russia, which seems to be becoming a literary *terra clausa* for Germany, we are all the more pleased to pass on these interesting excerpts from letters sent to us by our various correspondents in St. Petersburg..." *Allgemeiner Litterarischer Anzeiger* (1798), columns 1321–1322.

[126] *Allgemeiner Litterarischer Anzeiger* (1799), column 548.

[127] Ibid., column 549.

[128] TLA 230-11-965, pp. 2–5.

[129] Ibid., pp. 7, 9.

[130] EAA 29-7-21 pp. 1, 1v.

from house to house under the pretext of checking for banned titles but instead warned other literati about the banned titles and did not confiscate a single book.[131]

A year later, on May 23, 1800, the police departments of Estonia received the Livonian civilian governor's order regarding the banning and sealing off of bookstores and lending libraries.[132] The book trade had ground to an almost complete halt now, because in April of that same year, Paul I had banned the importation of all printed matter into Russia. Actually, a small number of books remained accessible: 105 of Dienes's 789 titles, and 82 of Boldt Senior's 486 titles. Classical literature, school and religious literature, and most Estonian-language literature also remained available.

However, this dismal situation in Estonian cultural life did not last long, because a group of conspirators murdered Paul I in March 1801, and the new young emperor Alexander I announced the return to Catherine II's liberal cultural policies. Tallinn soon restored its cultural contacts with Germany as well as its relatively undisturbed association with the written word. The tone of the Baltic correspondents of the *Allgemeiner Litterarischer Anzeiger* changed almost diametrically. In his letter of October 3, 1801, the magazine's Tallinn correspondent paints a very promising picture of the revitalization of the book trade and reading societies, and the tide of uncensored periodicals that would now begin flowing in from Germany: "As regards book trade and censorship, people are feeling less restricted than they were a mere 6 months ago. Many reading societies that had operated for years, but which were forced into silence and withdrawal for the last 3 years, are being reestablished and started up once again. Large orders are being sent to Leipzig bookstores by way of the Bornwasser bookstore here. ... soon, soon we will also be able to read the unemasculated *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* again."[133] In the 1803 Bornwasser bookstore catalog, we can once again find works about revolutionary France, to which a number of books about Napoléon Bonaparte have been added. This is a clear sign of the significant loosening of censorship. However, it was not realized at first that censorship had in fact become firmly institutionalized during the reign of Alexander I, and its strictness or liberality would henceforth depend on the political situation and the ruler's personal attitudes.

During the first decades of the 19th century, Bornwasser continued to work as a book merchant, and the book trade in Tallinn underwent no particularly significant changes. A new invigoration of Tallinn's Baltic German book trade and publishing occurred with the establishment of Georg Arnold Eggers's bookstore in 1820. The bookstore was taken over by Franz Ferdinand Kluge and Carl Constantin Ströhm in 1835, who raised the quality of this book company to a new level.[134] The second half of the century saw a transformation of the state of Tallinn's book trade, this time due to a rapid expansion of the market for books in Estonian, and the growing prominence of Estonian booksellers, publishers and printers.

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[131] *Allgemeiner Litterarischer Anzeiger* (1799), column 1689.
[132] EAA 29-7-21, pp. 21, 21v.
[133] *Allgemeiner Litterarischer Anzeiger* (1801), columns 1577–1578.
[134] See **Endel Aule,** "Kluge ja Ströhmi raamatukaupluse ajaloost" [On the History of the Kluge and Ströhm Bookstore], *Keel ja Kirjandus* 3 (1970), pp. 41–44, 163–169.

Credit Relations in the Paternalistic Rhetoric of Baltic German Landlords

Marten Seppel

The literature of agrarian history has long discussed the significance of credit relations in agricultural production.[1] Without a doubt, credit was the main mechanism available to peasants for coping with shortages of basic foodstuffs and obtaining farming resources in difficult times in the Baltic provinces as well. Under the prevailing manorial economy in Livland and Estland, the manor remained the peasant's main source of credit until the beginning of the 19th century. As a matter of fact, the serfdom relationship even guaranteed the peasantry some degree of credit from the manor. Social expectations, as well as later normative expectations, obligated the manor to extend subsidizing credit to its peasant serfs. Another difference between the Baltic manor's loans and the rural credit relations in Western Europe was the fact that the manor did not have to worry about guarantees (pawns, guarantors) as the lord of the manor had enough power to ensure repayment.

It must be emphasized that landlords had no normative or social obligation of any kind to give or contribute the necessary grain to distressed peasant serfs for free; they were obligated only to lend it. Even in the times of most severe famine, government authorities obligated the landlords to do nothing more than give peasants advance loans. The state also allowed landlords to charge interest on subsidy loans of bread and seed grain. By the end of the 17th century, the legal interest rate for loans of grain was one-sixth or 16.6 percent and this rate remained in effect until the second half of the 19th century.[2]

However, the credit extended by landlords to peasants served also an important ideological function. The nobility made full use of the circumstances before the authorities, arguing that they helped and supported their peasants. Already from the second half of the 16th century, there is a well-known response given by Livonian nobles to Polish commissar Stanislaus

[1] See **W. A. Boelcke,** "Zur Entwicklung des bäuerlichen Kreditwesens in Württemberg vom späten Mittelalter bis Anfang des 17. Jahrhunderts," *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik* 176 (1964), pp. 319–358; **Antoni Mączak,** "Money and society in Poland and Lithuania in the 16th and 17th centuries," *The Journal of European Economic History* 5 (1976), p. 94; **B. A. Holderness,** "Credit in English rural society before the nineteenth century, with special reference to the period 1650–1720," *The Agricultural History Review* 24 (1976), pp. 97–109; **Michael R. Weisser,** "Rural crisis and rural credit in XVIIth-century Castile," *The Journal of European Economic History* 16, 2 (1987), pp. 297–313; **Bjørn Poulsen,** "'Alle myne rent': Bondekredit i 15–16-tallet," *Historisk tidsskrift*, 90 (1990), pp. 247–275; **W. A. Boelcke,** "Der Agrarkredit in deutschen Terriorialstaaten vom Mittelalter bis Anfang des 18. Jahrhunderts," in M. North, ed., *Kredit im spätmittelalterlichen und frühneuzeitlihen Europa. Quellen und Darstellungen zur Hansischen Gescichte,* vol. 37 (Köln und Wien, 1991), pp. 193–216; **John Walter,** "Subsistence Strategies, Social Economy and the Politics of Subsistence in Early Modern England," in A. Häkkinen, ed., *Just a Sack of Potatoes? Crisis Experiences in European Societies, Past and Present. Studia Historica*, vol. 44 (Helsinki, 1992), pp. 68–69.

[2] *Das liv- und esthländische Privatrecht, wissenschaftlich dargestellt von Dr. Fr. G. v. Bunge, 2. sehr vermehrte und verbesserte Auflage, Erster Theil* (Reval, 1847), p. 453.

Pękosławski's proposal regarding better treatment of the peasants, where the nobles asserted that "most manor lords always accommodate the wishes of their peasants as much as possible and have helped them with oxen, horses, and other necessities'.[3] A similar situation occurred in Saaremaa during the second half of the 18th century, when the Livonian governor-general G. v. Browne began looking into the economic status of the peasants on private manors, whereupon the anxious Saaremaa nobility responded with a similar statement, saying that peasants pay dues as set forth in the *wacka-books* (the rolls of peasant households' land-holdings and dues), and even if they are sometimes taxed at a higher rate, there is nothing impermissible about it, since the landlord provides his peasants with buildings, harnesses, seeds, and the grain they need for subsistence.[4]

The landlords clearly regarded the distribution of bread and seed grain loans to the peasants as paternalistic care. The provision of credit to the peasants meshed well with the Baltic-German nobility's paternalistic way of thinking, which imagined their relationship with their peasants to be analogous to that of a father with his children.[5] According to the paternalistic rhetoric, serfdom was good for the peasants, because the security provided by the lord neutralized any of the negatives of serfdom. In their own defense, noblemen claimed that everyone spoke of the peasants' high dues, while nobody ever mentioned the tremendous expenses and obligations which the landowners and lords of manors bore in the name of their peasantry. In this way, the ideologist for the nobility Georg Friedrich von Fircks regarded the preservation of serfdom to be absolutely necessary, because it certainly did not deepen anyone's misfortune. In cases of need, the peasant could always trustingly approach his master, from whom he could expect assistance, reassurance, and support, and in exchange for this kind of "paternal care', he would joyfully take on any work and toil. According to Fircks, one could substantiate this by asking a few simple questions: who supports the peasant and gives him bread when his crops fail and he is left with nothing? Does this not represent a loss for the manor lord, who must feed his peasants all year from his manor's grain reserves? If one thinks of everything that the landlord must give his peasants every year, is all this not as if in payment for the peasant's services? Noblemen wrote laws requiring manor lords to help their peasants in times of trouble, and obligated themselves to abide by this requirement.[6]

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[3] **Christian Kelch,** *Liefländische Historia, oder Kurtze Beschreibung der Denckwürdigsten Kriegs- und Friedens-Geschichte Esth- Lief- und Lettlandes* (Reval, 1695), pp. 420–421.

[4] **Evald Blumfeldt,** "Saaremaa revisjoni- ja reguleerimistööd 1765–1828" [Land Revisions and Regulations in Saaremaa 1765–1828], in *Õpetatud Eesti Seltsi Toimetused* 30, *Litterarum Societas Esthonika 1838–1938: Liber saecularis* (Tartu, 1938), pp. 97–98.

[5] Generally, the paternalistic arguments of the Baltic German nobility were similar to the statements of the landowners in Prussia or in the slave states of the United States. See **Robert M. Berdahl,** "Paternalism, Serfdom, and Emancipation in Prussia," in Erich Angermann, Marie-Luise Frings, eds., *Oceans apart? Comparing Germany and the United States: Studies in Commemoration of the 150th Anniversary of the Birth of Carl Schurz* (Stuttgart, 1981), pp. 29–44; **Robert M. Berdahl,** "Preußischer Adel: Paternalismus als Herrschaftssystem," in Hans-Jürgen Puhle, Hans-Ulrich Wehler eds., *Preußen im Rückblick. Geschichte und Gesellschaft,* Sonderheft 6 (Göttingen, 1980), pp. 122–145; **Peter Kolchin,** *Unfree Labor: American Slavery and Russian Serfdom* (Cambridge, 1987); **Heinrich Kaak,** "Vermittelte, selbsttätige und maternale Herrschaft: Formen gutsherrlicher Durchsetzung, Behauptung und Gestaltung in Quilitz-Friedland (Lebus/Oberbarnim) im 18. Jahrhundert," in Jan Peters, Barbara Krug-Richter, Martina Schattkowsky, eds., *Konflikt und Kontrolle in Gutsherrschaftsgesellschaften: Über Resistenz- und Herrschaftsverhalten in ländlichen Sozialgebilden der Frühen Neuzeit* (Göttingen, 1995), pp. 113–117.

[6] **Georg Friedrich von Fircks,** *Die Letten in Kurland oder: Vertheidigung meines Vaterlandes gegen die Angriffe von G. Merkel in dessen Letten: Kurlands Edlen gewidmet* (Leipzig, 1804), pp. 155, 160–161, 168–171, 229; **Hermann Friedrich Tiebe,** *Lief- und Esthlands Ehrenrettung gegen Herrn Merkel und Petri* (Halle, 1804), p. 67; **Hermann Friedrich Tiebe,** *Nachtrag zu Lief- und Esthlands Ehrenrettung oder die Todten Lieflands stehen gegen Herrn Merkel auf* (Halle, 1805), p. 16; **Wilhelm Christian Friebe,** "Etwas über Leibeigenschaft und Freiheit, sonderlich in Hinsicht auf Liefland," *Nordische Miscellaneen* 15/17 (1788), p. 759.

This article takes a closer look at these fundamental positions found in the paternalistic rhetoric used by the Baltic German nobility to weave a defensive shroud around the credit relations between the manor and the peasants. Over the last couple of decades, historical literature has begun to increasingly focus on the social and cultural aspects of credit relations, since credit has often served more than just an economic purpose in society.[7] This article attempts to show that the paternalistic argument with which the Baltic nobility described their credit relationships with the peasantry was nothing more than self-justifying rhetoric, and the actual effect of the paternalistic attitude on agrarian relations and the peasants' subsistence problems was not very significant.[8]

The idea of "paternalistic serfdom' was the most important ideological construct used by the Baltic German nobility in their justification of serfdom. The nobles became ever more insistent with their paternalistic arguments, particularly from the second half of the 18th century onward. Paternalism was a suitable justification for subordinating the peasantry, since it emphasized the concept of mutual dependency in which both sides had their own particular rights and obligations. Since a paternalistic relationship existed between lord and peasant, serfdom, according to the nobility, was by definition mutually beneficial to both sides. Paternalistic rhetoric painted a picture of the landlord who selflessly cares for his peasants, and whose fatherly role demands tremendous expense and denial of economic self-interest. According to the paternalistic idea, peasants had to be supported, guided, and protected. The landlords, as fathers, gazed at their suffering peasants with good will and sympathy, trying to diminish their misery, ease their hunger, help the sick, and teach the ignorant. Thanks to the landlord, the Livonian peasant could live a wholly carefree life, since the landlord was obliged to take care of him under any circumstances.[9]

Central to the paternalistic defense was the claim that serfdom provided the peasant with a guarantee of subsistence; this claim represents the foundation upon which the landed nobility set itself up as the passionate caretaker of the peasants' welfare.[10] One of the most noted Baltic German apologists for serfdom, H. Fr. Tiebe, stated with deep conviction that "the Latvian serf enjoys the privilege of always being assured that his most urgent physical needs will be met, which is of

[7] See **Jürgen Schlumbohm,** "Zur Einführung," in Jürgen Schlumbohm, ed., *Soziale Praxis des Kredits 16.-20. Jahrhundert. Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission für Niedersachsen und Bremen* 238 (Hannover, 2007), pp. 7–14.

[8] See also **Edgar Melton,** "The Decline of Prussian *Gutsherrschaft* and the Rise of the Junker as Rural Patron, 1750–1806," *German History* 12 (1994), pp. 339–340; **Edgar Melton,** "Gutsherrschaft im ostelbischen Deutschland und in Rußland: Eine vergleichende Analyse," in Jan Peters, Axel Lubinski, eds., *Gutsherrschaftsgesellschaften im europäischen Vergleich* (Berlin, 1997), p. 33; **Jan Klußmann,** "Leibeigenschaft im frühneuzeitlichen Schleswig-Holstein: Rechtliche Entwicklung, öffentlicher Diskurs und bäuerliche Perspektive," in Jan Klußmann, ed., *Leibeigenschaft: Bäuerliche Unfreiheit in der frühen Neuzeit* (Köln-Weimar-Wien, 2003), pp. 238–240.

[9] See X.Y.Z. Bemerkungen über den Aufsatz, die Verbesserung des Bauernstandes betreffend, in Nr. 17 u. 18 der Inländischen Blätter, in Jegor von Sievers, ed., *Zur Geschichte der Bauernfreiheit in Livland: Wiederabdruck einer Reihe von Flugschriften und Zeitungsartikeln aus den Jahren 1817–1818* (Riga, 1878), p. 189; **Mati Laur, Priit Pirsko,** "Die Aufhebung der adligen Bevormundung in Liv- und Estland. Eine Besonderheit der Bauernbefreiung im Russischen Reich," in Horst Wernicke, ed., *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Ostseeraumes. Greifswalder Historische Studien* 4 (Hamburg, 2002), pp. 104–105.

[10] For more about this in 18th-century Russia, see **Roger Bartlett,** "Defences of Serfdom in Eighteenth-Century Russia," in Maria Di Salvo, Lindsey Hughes, eds., *A Window on Russia: Papers from the V International Conference of the Study Group on Eighteenth-Century Russia* (Rooma, 1996), pp. 70–71; **Michelle Lamarche Marrese,** "Liberty Postponed: Princess Dashkova and the Defense of Serfdom," in Sue Ann Prince, ed., *The Princess and the Patriot: Ekaterina Dashkova, Benjamin Franklin, and the Age of Enlightenment. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, vol. 96 (Philadelphia, 2006), pp. 23–38.

primary importance for this class of people. If he is stricken by crop failure, his lord will support and feed him, if his house burns down, the lord will let a new one be built, if his livestock should perish, the lord will give him new stock, if he has insufficient fodder, the lord will support him, if he falls ill, the lord will have him treated. In short, he is always cared for, as children are cared for by their father."[11] This rhetoric was also presented to the peasant audience. In the first Estonian-language weekly *Lühhike öppetus* ("A Brief Instruction") published in 1767, the peasants were asked: "Is it not for your benefit that you have the lords on the manor, because if you did not have them, then tell me, whom could you turn to for help in times of want?'[12]

According to the beliefs of the nobility, the carefree life of the peasants existed only thanks to the ties of serfdom that bound them to the lords who had to ensure every facet of their subsistence. Thus, serfdom should have offered the peasants the protection which free peasants did not enjoy.[13] When senator I. Zacharow, sent to survey the situation in Estland, asked the *Ritterschaft* (knighthood) what should be done to help the free peasants living in the villages, the nobles replied that the lords of the manor were not obliged to assist in the subsistence of freemen in any way, "since freemen themselves have no obligations towards the lords of the manor". However, any of these freemen could freely choose to become a peasant serf (*Landbauer zu werden*), to take on the obligations of a tenant farmer, and then enjoy the advantages of this group of people (*die Vortheile derselben zu genießen*), i.e. to take out a subsidy loan from the manor.[14]

Giving supporting loans to the peasants was the nobility's best justification for their domination.[15] The nobility saw the lord's sacrifice as twofold: first, he could not sell all his grain but was forced to store a significant part of his harvest to have grain available to lend to the peasants in the spring, and second, he did not receive repayment of all the subsidy loans given to the peasants in a timely manner unless he was willing to engage in "inhuman" attacks.[16] The landlords made a great show of pointing out the times when the grain for the peasants' subsidy loans did not originate from the manor's granary, but had been procured with "their own money".[17] If such "sacrifices" were indeed made by the lords of the manor, there is no reason to doubt that these acts was grandly announced to the peasants as well. In 1732, the leaseholder of the crown manors of Randen and Walguta demanded deep gratitude from the peasants, reminding them that he had purchased, for their subsistence, 600 bushels of rye from Riga 14–15 years ago, in 1717 and 1718, and had paid a high price for each bushel, "of which all the

[11] **Tiebe,** *Nachtrag zu Lief- und Esthlands Ehrenrettung,* pp. 69, 73.

[12] *Lühhike öppetus mis sees monned head rohhud täeda antakse [A Brief Instruction, which tells you about some good medicines], [...],* Faximile print, introduction by J. Peegel (Tallinn, 1976), p. 103 (No. 27); see also ibid. p. 112.

[13] **Tiebe,** *Nachtrag zu Lief- und Esthlands Ehrenrettung,* pp. 15–16; **von Fircks,** *Die Letten in Kurland,* pp. 7–8, 70–71, 100, 160–162, 168–171, 229; see also *Veröffentlichungen des Max Planck-Instituts für Geschichte*, 58, **Claudia Ulbrich,** *Leibherrschaft am Oberrhein im Spätmittelalter* (Göttingen, 1979), p. 300; **Klußmann,** "Leibeigenschaft," p. 239.

[14] From the head of the knighthood of Estland v. Üxküll to senator Zacharow, 16?.04.1808, Estonian Historical Archives (=EAA) 29-1-411, f. 27v–28; **Юхан Кахк,** *Крестьянское движение и крестьянский вопрос в Эстонии в конце XVIII и в первой четверти XIX века* (Tallinn, 1962), p. 282.

[15] See also **Jan Klußmann,** *Lebenswelten und Identitäten adliger Gutsuntertanen: Das Beispiel des östlichen Schleswig-Holstein im 18. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt, 2002), p. 127.

[16] As explained in G. J. Wrangel's unaddressed and undated letter, 1820, EAA 39-1-644.

[17] See, e.g., from the leaseholder of Pujat J. Fr. v. Schwanwede to the governor-general of Livland, Jan. 22, 1697, EAA 278-1-XVI-43a, ff. 27–28v; Extract auß dem Nömmenhoffschen Immissions Protocoll, Apr. 17, 1699, EAA 278-1-XVI-42a, f. 161–161v; Minutes of the Inquisition in Torgel, Oct. 26, 1699, EAA 278-1-XVI-44e, ff. 23–24; Schuldbuch von denen Saggadschen Bauren, so in den Jahren Brod und Saat vorgestreckt, Oct. 2,1743, EAA 1324-1-202; from Captain Westenryk to the county magistrate of East Jerwen, May 31, 1802, EAA 30-1-6937.

peasantry was well aware".[18] Repeatedly, the nobility insisted that the peasants should be grateful for the help in the form of subsidy loans.[19] Peasants were generally considered ungrateful,[20] although it was assumed that one can not expect such supposedly coarse people to have any virtuous qualities.[21]

In the diet of Estland in 1809, the nobility stated its conviction that the peasantry could find support and assistance from the manor "at the first indication of need" in times of want.[22] For instance, a Livonian placard of 1784 called upon all landlords to rush "humanely" to the aid of peasants among whom they could see bread shortages, and to eliminate these shortages to the best of their ability.[23] However, sources clearly indicate that the lords of the manor were rather passive about making credit available to their peasantry. A peasant needing credit had to approach the lord always himself, or in extreme cases, to send someone to ask for help. The lords did not consider it their obligation to notice whether any of their peasants were in need or to take the initiative in helping them. First, the lord had to receive the peasant's request for aid,[24] and even then, the lord might deny his request for credit.[25]

The nobility justified taking interest on subsidy loans to peasants with simple economic arguments: first, they allegedly had to rein in the peasants' wantonness, and by making them mindful of the interest, the nobility was preventing them from taking loans beyond their means. The second justification was based on market economics. In the spring, when peasants tended to take subsidy loan, the grain is always at least one-sixth more expensive than in the autumn, when he must pay it back. The interest was thus meant to offset the manor's losses arising from this price difference. Third, some lords explained that the one-sixth interest had to be taken because the grain given out by the manor was winnowed and very clean, whereas the grain repaid by the peasants was of lesser quality. And finally, the landlords of private manors did not fail to bring up one more argument: the taking of interest was also typical for the subsidy loans given on the crown manors, completely regulated by the laws.[26]

It is true that taking interest on peasant

[18] From B. v. Campenhausen to the Livonian economic governor, Sept. 23, 1732, EAA 567-3-51, ff. 76v–77.

[19] In 1699, a letter of defense from the Torgel manor leaseholder with its admonitions was read to the peasants summoned to the inquisition: "die Bauren nicht befugt gewesen wären einiger mahßen sich zu beschweren, sondern vielmehr Uhrsach hätten schuldigen Danck abzustatten, vor die in den verstrichenen bösen Jahren genoßene Verpflegung, da dieselbe nicht nur außm Hofe mit Brodt und Saat versorget, sondern auch nicht eine Henne von ihnen genommen worden," EAA 278-1-XVI-44e, ff. 23–24; see also EAA 567-3-51, ff. 76v–77.

[20] See, e.g. **Indrek Jürjo,** "Ludwig August krahv Mellin kui talurahva sõber and estofiil" [Ludwig August Count Mellin as Friend of the Peasantry and Estophile], *Tuna* 4 (2003), pp. 52–53, 62, 65–66.

[21] *Noch Einiges über die Bauernangelegenheiten in Liefland: Mit einer Schlussbemerkung von Ludwig August Graf Mellin* (Riga, 1824), pp. 91–92.

[22] Minutes of the diet of Estland, March 3, 1809, EAA 854-2-688, p. 128.

[23] *Livländische Gouvernements-Regierungs-Patente, Gesammelt und nach Herrn General-Superintendenten Dr. Sonntag chronologischen Verzeichnisse geordnet v. C. F. W. Goldmann,* placard no. 2277, March 21, 1784.

[24] E.g. from Captain Westenryk to the county magistrate of East Jerwen, May 31, 1802, EAA 30-1-6937; the county magistrate of East Jerwen to the provincial government of Estland, Apr. 24, 1805, EAA 30-1-6862; records of the Maholm parish court, Nov. 12, 1808, EAA 30-1-6870, f. 141–141v.

[25] E.g. resolution of the provincial government of Estland, June 28, 1805, EAA 30-1-6864, f. 1; from the parish magistrate of Dorpat, Ecks and Kamby to the Livonian provincial government, June 11, 1807, Latvian State Historical Archives (=LVVA) 4-1-15003, f. 6v; Pro Memoria, betreffend den unter die Bauerschaft im Ehstländischen Gouvernement stattfindenden Brodmangel, Apr. 25, 1808, EAA 291-1-2653, ff. 15, 19v; Akte in Untersuchungssachen wegen eines unter dem Gute Woibifer vor Hunger gestorbenen Bauernkindes, 1809, EAA 863-1-3916, f. 8–8p; **Кахк,** *Крестьянское движение*, pp. 87–88.

[26] Complaint letter from a Strikenhof peasant to the Livonian governor-general, Oct. 6, 1696, EAA 278-1-XVI:41g, ff. 299–300v; Baur Vorschuß Berechnung von Saggad fürs Jahr 1789, EAA 1324-1-209; **Tiebe,** *Nachtrag zu Lief- und Esthlands Ehrenrettung,* pp. 111–112, 156–157; [**A. W. Hupel**], "Nachricht von der Stiftung eines nachahmungswürdigen Leihe-Magazins, auf einem liefländischen adelichen Hof," *Nordische Miscellaneen* 13/14 (1787), p. 480.

loans was not customary all manors, and the landlords who did not require interest payments proclaimed this fact proudly.[27] Both the nobility as well as the peasantry regarded the distribution of interest-free advance loans to be a much more generous act of assistance than the granting of high-interest loans.[28] In 1784, P. Fr. Körber wrote about the high interest payments that some landlords imposed on their peasants, which draged the peasants ever deeper into debt and forced them to work and toil without ever coming out ahead in the autumn. Körber considered those lords who demanded a return of the same amount of grain in the autumn as they had lent to their peasants in the spring to be most praiseworthy. In his opinion, it was with this action that the lords fulfilled their fatherly duties, since "each hereditary landlord must look upon his subjects as his children, and to support them as best he can".[29] However, even in the case of interest-free loans, the paternalistic argument describing the carefree life of the serf is meaningless, because the manor's subsidy loans were still nothing more than credit which the peasant used to mitigate his shortages between two harvests, and which he had to repay in full.

The advance loans distributed by the manor were not only meant to help the peasants, but were to benefit the manor as well. Sources refer repeatedly to advance loans made to peasants as "necessary" or "inevitable".[30] The landlord had to assist and support his peasants, because it was not in his interests to see them starve to death. As explained in 1697 by the leaseholder of Lais: "If the peasant was given nothing, he would have starved to death, and the manor lands would become empty and unpopulated".[31]

And so the nobility itself asserted that "out of love for one's fellow man as well as for one's own interests" a landlord could not let the peasantry suffer from shortages.[32] The landlords implemented this logic in their arguments whenever they were accused of failing to support the peasantry. This was also the official argument of the knighthoods.[33] When the head of the knighthood of Estland von Üxküll reported to senator Zacharow in 1808 about the famine ravaging some manors, he wished to call the senator's attention to this line of reasoning: "Can we truly believe that a lord of the manor who will lose capital with a person's death would choose to suffer this kind of loss instead of incurring expenses, which, no matter how great, cannot be compared to this loss?"[34] In 1808, the parish court of Viru-Nigula investigated complaints submitted against the leaseholder of Vasta manor, according to which he had not provided adequate assistance to the cottagers in the form of subsidy loans. The court concluded that "there is no reasonable cause to believe" that the leaseholder in question "as a reasonable man and knowledgeable manor lord (*Oekonom*)" should, without reason, refuse to give his peasantry adequate subsidy loans, which would be "to his own economic detriment".[35]

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[27] See, e.g., report on the dues of the Fehtenhof peasants, July 20, 1805, EAA 567-2-30, f. 9; report on the dues of the Mäxhof peasants, 1805?, EAA 1411-1-29, f. 6; report on the dues of the Kaster manor peasants, 1805, EAA 1411-1-31, f. 3v; report on the dues of the Palla manor peasants, July 12, 1805, EAA 567-2-140, f. 9.

[28] See also **William Chester Jordan,** *The Great Famine: Northern Europe in the Early Fourteenth Century* (Princeton, 1996), pp. 110–111.

[29] [**Peter Friedrich Körber**], "Ueber die jährliche Hungersnoth der lief- und ehstländischen Bauern," *Nordische Miscellaneen* 8 (1784), pp. 77–78.

[30] E.g. *des Guthes Pauren wieder auffzuhelffen unumbgänglich zu des Guthes selbst eigenem besten vorzuschießen getrieben worden*: EAA 278-1-XVI:9, f. 64v (Decision of the Riga county court, 1661).

[31] From N. v. Vettern to the Livonian governor-general, Aug. 31, 1697, LVVA 7349-1-223, p. 629.

[32] E.g. [Kurländischer] Landtagsschluß vom 18ten März 1808, Tartu University Library, Est. A-568.

[33] See, e.g., the knighthood of Estland to Empress Catherina, Aug. 12?, 1762, EAA 854-2-667, pp. 220–224; from C. A. v. Stackelberg to Empress Catherina, June 23, 1789, EAA 30-1-6854, f. 1v–2.

[34] From the head of the knighthood of Estland v. Üxküll to senator Zacharow, Apr. 19, 1808, EAA 29-1-411, f. 32.

[35] Records of the Maholm parish court, Nov. 12, 1808, EAA 30-1-6870, f. 144–144v.

However, these assertions of the nobility did not harmonize with the reality of the repeated famines suffered by the peasants of Livland and Estland (with a large number of starvation deaths, as those which occurred in 1696–1697, 1741–1742, 1786–1788 and 1807–1808), and the fact that the poverty of a portion of the peasantry worsened even during normal years. Naturally, the nobility did not see itself to blame in any way for the peasants' famines and poverty. Quite the opposite: the peasantry itself was to blame for its carelessness, lack of diligence, and fondness for alcohol, and the nobility continued to consider itself the peasants' only protector and supporter, to whom the peasants could turn in times of misery and crop failure. In response to accusations that the peasants remained in want despite the subsidy loans given out by the manor, the nobility replied: "One can accuse a lord or leaseholder only if he allows his people to suffer from a lack of proper, appropriate, and just advance loans and necessary subsidies, and not if the peasants drive themselves wantonly and ungratefully into misery and despair with their own orderlessness and debauchery," as the leaseholder of Vasta manor claimed in his own defense.[36]

The landlords justified their hesitation at distributing subsidy loans to the peasants with the assertion that the latter had no desire to repay the loans properly. Or in the words of the head of the knighthood of Estland von Üxküll in 1808: would the manor lords even be able to "grant their peasants a generous advance loan every year, and particularly in years of crop failure, when prices are high, when the peasants have no desire to repay him".[37] In June 1807, during the great famine, von Budberg, the parish magistrate of Dorpat, Ecks and Kamby, wrote to the provincial government of Livland saying that whenever the peasantry suffered from lack of bread, the shortage was eliminated thanks to the "great sacrifices" of the manors. For this purpose, the lords had been forced to enter into grain purchase agreements with Russian merchants "at unheard-of prices", or up to 5.50 rubles for a bushel of rye. All the manors, with a few exceptions, had purportedly tried to supply their peasantry with bread and seed grain to the best of their ability. However, with that, the rhetoric of the parish magistrate stops short. He continues by asking the provincial government to issue an official decree to the peasantry, ordering them in the strictest terms and under threat of public fines to pay back all their debts to the manors. Budberg was convinced that if the peasants failed to pay back their subsidy loans during the upcoming autumn, "whether willfully or because of hereditary wantonness", then only a very few lords of the manors would be able to provide for their subsistence next spring. The public decree requested by Budberg was also to be announced to the peasants from the church pulpit, making the peasantry realize that their current bread shortage was due "solely to the fact that they had repaid very poorly last autumn". This statement was substantiated by the fact that there were no shortages in those districts where the peasants had properly discharged all their duties to the manor.[38]

The belief that it was possible to help the peasantry in hard times by extending credit was actually a generally accepted conviction, shared by the landed nobility, the clergy, and the government authorities. The peasants themselves referred to the manor loans as "assistance", although, when they approached the manor for grain in the spring, they were asking for nothing

[36] Ibid., f. 142–142v.

[37] EAA 29-1-411, f. 32v; see also **Körber**, "Ueber die jährliche," p. 84; [**Otto Huhn**], *Statistisch-Medizinische Bruchstücke der Kirchspiele Livlands* (1802), LVVA 6810-1-50, ff. 57, 58v.

[38] From the parish magistrate of Dorpat, Ecks and Kamby to the Livonian provincial government, June 11, 1807, LVVA 4-1-15003, f. 3–3v.

other than an advance.[39] When Otto Huhn, a doctor in Riga, sent out a questionnaire to all Livonian pastors in the early 19th century, asking how peasants in need were being helped in situations of bread shortages and illness, most of the pastors throughout the province responded by writing that every spring the manor supports the peasants by lending them the grain they lack, and in cases of illness, the manor provides them with free medicine. From the responses sent to Huhn it is abundantly clear that all the pastors generally shared the same firm conviction that subsidy loans helped the peasantry in times of need. The manors' practice of providing these subsidy loans was emphasized as a noble deed.[40] Echoing the paternalistic ideology, a good number of the pastors assured him that with the manors' help the peasantry was protected against any kind of want, "even in cases of crop failure".[41]

It is noteworthy how few voices rose to draw attention to the situation that the miserable poverty of the peasantry was caused, among other factors, precisely by the fact that the subsidy loans were actually tremendously draining.[42] The peasant could find himself in significant debt even before spring field works, and by harvest time the debts of that year could become so great that he was essentially paying away the grain he would need for half a year of his own consumption. With the addition of interest, the peasant realized that acquiring the grain he needed to last him until the next harvest right then, in the autumn, would be to his advantage. J. G. Eisen referred to the same problem in 1756; he realized that the peasant's inability to build up grain reserves for himself was caused precisely by this constant cycle of debt.[43] The pastor of Koddafer held a similar opinion, saying that despite the manors' supporting loans, eliminating all shortages remained an impossible task.[44] Only a few pastors criticized the prevalent mechanisms of assisting the peasants. The pastor of Roop noted that the manors' subsidy loans were not always adequate, and besides, they were draining the peasants, because the peasants had to repay them in the autumn and thus entered into an inescapable cycle of debt.[45] The pastor of Pernau agreed, noting that although the manor provides for the subsistence of the peasant in the spring, it calls in its debts from the peasant in the autumn: "and thus he remains ever poor".[46]

In 1813, H. A. v. Bock also criticized the subsidy loan system. According to Bock, subsidies distributed as subsidy loans helped no one, since they are nothing but plain and simple loans that only add to the debt of the peasant. Anyone wanting to take on a debt or repay it must produce a surplus, but the Livonian peasant, as a rule, harvested only as much as he consumed. In these circumstances, the peasant keeps paying old debts, since he is forced to keep borrowing or living in debt in order to acquire the main staple of his diet, causing a new gap, even if no new dis-

[39] This is also evident from the petitions of the peasants, e.g.: "... unsere Herrschafft unsz mit Brodt und Saht, bisz wiers im Herbst wieder bezahlen können, behülfflich sein möge": **Otto Liiv,** *Suur näljaaeg Eestis 1695–1697. Lisa: valimik dokumente suurest näljaajast [Die grosse Hungersnot in Estland 1695–1697. Anhang: Auswahl von Dokumenten aus der Zeit der Hungersnot]* (Tartu, 1938), doc. no. 100; similar to peasants' petitions to the governor-general of Estland, 1696, EAA 1-2-570, ff. 36–37, 74–75v.

[40] E.g. the pastor of Lasdohn in 1802: *Da Magazine existiren und der Hof Vorschuß, so leidet auch der Bauer im Frühjahr keinen Mangel*: **Huhn,** *Statistisch-Medizinische,* f. 33; see also ibid., f. 33v (Sesswegen).

[41] **Huhn,** *Statistisch-Medizinische,* f. 7v (Sunzel), f. 8–8v (Lemburg), f. 38–38v (Luhde).

[42] See, e.g., **Körber,** "Ueber die jährliche," pp. 77–78.

[43] **Johann Georg Eisen,** *Ausgewählte Schriften: deutsche Volksaufklärung und Leibeigenschaft im Russischen Reich,* ed. Roger Bartlett, Erich Donnert (Marburg, 1998), p. 142.

[44] **Huhn,** *Statistisch-Medizinische,* f. 34v (Pebalg), f. 48 (Koddafer).

[45] **Huhn,** *Statistisch-Medizinische,* f. 23 (Roop).

[46] **Huhn,** *Statistisch-Medizinische,* f. 59v (Pernau-St.Elisabeth).

aster strikes.[47] Bock theorized that the peasant in distress may eventually be forced to borrow grain earlier and earlier in the spring of every year to match his steadily increasing obligations in the autumn of every year, since his debt just keeps rising. It becomes progressively greater until finally he is forced to relinquish his entire harvest in the autumn in order to immediately start borrowing it back as food grain for himself.[48]

A very popular saying went: with the abolition of serfdom, the peasants are declared adults.[49] G. v. Rennenkampff, the landlord of Helmet, explained: with the abolition of serfdom, the peasants are given independence, which erases the landlord's obligations of responsibility and guardianship. Just like every free person, the freed Estonian and Latvian must hereafter make his own decisions regarding where and how he will live and how he will take care of himself. Much as an adult son leaves his father's home, the Estonians and Latvians left the guardianship of their former lords to decide their future themselves. And still, the peasant is not fully pushed away from his lord or the assistance he can provide. Like a dutiful and good son, he remains dear to his father's heart even when he has left his father's home; in this manner, the freed peasants can avail themselves of the lords' empathy and generosity, although they no longer have the right to ask for it.[50] Indeed, with the laws that abolished serfdom in 1816–1819 the Baltic nobility declared that the peasantry would henceforth lose its right to request subsidy loans from the lords of the manor.[51]

Of course, the paternalistic attitude of the nobility did not vanish with the abolition of serfdom. However, forceful paternalistic rhetoric in the Baltic German written word was hereafter evident primarily in historical writings and memoirs, and not so much in discussions of current social and political affairs. Criticism of paternalistic rhetoric began to appear more frequently in the literature on current affairs. It was pointed out that comparing the former oppressive relationships of serfdom to patriarchal ties was nothing more than an embellishment of actual circumstances and a concealment of flaws in the system.[52]

One must concur with the latter statement. Paternalistic rhetoric frequently emphasized the lord's selfless caring for his peasantry. Fulfilling his paternal role required great expense and denial of economic rationality. In actuality, playing the role of the caring father suited the manor lord only up to the point that it coincided with his

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[47] **Heinrich August von Bock,** *Etwas über Land-Magazine überhaupt und die Liefländischen insbesondere* (Pernau, 1813), pp. 9–10.

[48] **von Bock,** *Etwas über Land-Magazine*, pp. 12–15. A similar line of reasoning was also presented in 1845 by C. F. v. Hueck, as he sought reasons for the deepening poverty of the peasants: "manche Bauern im Herbste ihre ganze Kornerndte ins Magazin brachte, und doch noch nicht die alte Schuld tilgen konnten, vom Januar an aber wieder nur von geliehenem Getreide lebten": **Carl Ferdinand von Hueck,** *Das Gut Munnalas in Ehstland, und meine Bewirthschaftung desselben in den Jahren 1838 bis 1845* (Reval, 1845), pp. 31–32.

[49] E.g. **Georg Benedict von Engelhardt,** *Einige Worte an Kurlands Bauern über die wichtigsten in den Allerhöchst bestätigten Kurländischen Bauerverordnungen enthaltenen Bestimmungen* (Mitau, 1818), p. 11.

[50] **G. v. Rennenkampff,** *Ueber die bevorstehende Freiheit der Ehsten und Letten* (Dorpat, 1820), pp. 13–15.

[51] "VIII. Von Bekanntmachung dieser Verordnung an, sind die Gutsbesitzer aller Verantwortlichkeit wegen der dem Bauer obliegenden öffentlichen Abgaben und Leistungen, sie mögen ihn persönlich oder als Nutznießer der Gutsherrlichen Ländereien betreffen, so wie von der Verpflichtung zu unterstützenden Vorschüßen entledigt": *Журнал законодательства на 1819 год. Gesetz-Sammlung für das Jahr 1819: Auf Allerhöchsten Befehl von der Reichs-Gesetzcommission herausgegeben. Erstes Buch, Zweite Abtheilung, Monat März, enthaltend die Liefländische Bauer-Verordnung* (St. Peterburg, 1820), p. 20; **Engelhardt,** *Einige Worte,* p. 11.

[52] **Ernst von Rechenberg-Linten,** "Ueber die Bauerverhältnisse (für Curland) in der Oeconomie, in Beziehung auf die frühere Leibeigenschaft und die Entwickelung des Bauernzustandes nach Aufhebung derselben," *Das Inland* 11, 1 (1846), p. 4; *Der Ehste und sein Herr: Zur Beleuchtung der öconomischen Lage und des Zustandes der Bauern in Ehstland* (Berlin, 1861), pp. 26–28.

economic interests or the obligations placed upon him by the government. In spite of all this, the paternalistic attitude of the nobility cannot be regarded as solely ideological or contrived. Without doubt, the attitude of the landed nobility toward the peasant serfs was sincerely paternalistic in the sense that the peasant was viewed as a childishly stupid and untamed individual who was incapable of rational thought and did not understand what was best for him. It is evident from the nobles' statements and proposals that they, in principle, accepted their obligation to support the peasant serfs with credit and viewed this as their duty. Thus, in the most limited sense, the paternalistic relationship of serfdom did offer the peasant the landlord's realization that he must make subsidizing credit available to the peasant, and thus the peasant serfs were usually ensured the opportunity of acquiring credit if they needed it. However, the nobility's description of the carefree life that serfdom provided for the peasant was nothing more than a rhetorical image. Paternalistic arguments were based on reality to the extent that peasants in need were given grain; however, the rhetoric of the landed nobility attempted to paint these loans as personal assistance to the peasants which the landlord provided at his own expense in lean times. The paternalistic defense aimed to justify and defend the position of the nobility, but in reality, it served to diminish neither social stresses nor the poverty of the peasants. Any references to a feeling of security and a carefree life, the favorite topics of the nobility, are lacking in the stories of the peasantry. Paternalism was not as essential in agrarian relations as the nobility would have liked to imagine.

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The Estonian Engagement with Modernity: The Role of Young-Estonia in the Diversification of Political and Social Thought

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The debate over the development and formation of modernity remains a central focus in scholarship in history and the social sciences. How did the West, as the initiator of the process, and then other parts of the world arrive at where they are today? How far back into the past should one go in search of the origins of modernity? Should we acknowledge an "age of modernity" that is now global or is it more appropriate to speak of "multiple modernities" in recognition of the divergent paths taken by various civilizations or regions in the world?[1] Although the concept of modernization, which refers to the nature of the path by which modernity is reached, has had its critics, especially with regard to early claims for the universal validity of the Western model, it has survived in a more nuanced and sophisticated form that increasingly recognizes the multiplicity of outcomes that have occurred.[2] As typically presented, modernization refers to the socioeconomic (e.g., industrialization, urbanization), political (e.g., democratization and mass participation), and intellectual (e.g., secularization, rise of mass literacy) transformations that began in Western Europe by the late eighteenth century, although their roots include the cumulative impact of key developments in earlier centuries such as the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Scientific Revolution. Modernity also implies a new cultural code, i.e., a transformed set of values, well summarized by Alberto Martinelli: "Rationalism, individualism/subjectivity, utilitarianism, the incessant quest for knowledge, innovation and discovery, the constitution of the self as an autonomous subject, the refusal of limits, the principles of liberty and equality of rights and opportunities."[3]

In the Estonian case modernization began gradually in the second half of the nineteenth century, hindered by the fear of change among the tsarist authorities and the continuing traditionalism of Baltic society.[4] Nevertheless, the process gathered increasing momentum, especially by the last decade of the nineteenth century as industrial expansion took off. The age of modern politics in Estonia was ush-

[1] See, for example, two recent special issues of *Daedalus*: "Early Modernities," 38, no. 3 (1998) and "Multiple Modernities," 129, no. 1 (2000).

[2] **Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Wolfgang Schluchter,** "Introduction: Paths to Early Modernities–A Comparative View," *Daedalus*, 38, no. 3 (1998), pp. 2–4.

[3] **Alberto Martinelli,** *Global Modernization: Rethinking the Project of Modernity* (London, 2005), p. 19.

[4] For two recent works that deal, respectively, with the early Estonian national movement and the process of social modernization in a *Ständestaat*, see **Mart Laar,** *Äratajad: Rahvuslik ärkamisaeg Eestis 19. sajandil ja selle kandjad [The awakeners: The national awakening period in Estonia in the 19th century and its supporters]* (Tartu, 2005) and **Ea Jansen,** *Eestlane muutuvas ajas: Seisusühiskonnast kodanikuühiskonda [The Estonian in changing times: From estate society to civil society]* (Tartu, 2007).

ered in by the Revolution of 1905, as seen, for example, in the establishment of the first legal political party in the northern half of the Baltic Provinces as well as unprecedented participation in political and social debate by much of the population.[5] The revolutionary year also coincided with the appearance of the first literary album of the Young-Estonia (*Noor-Eesti*) cultural movement, although publication was delayed for about a year by the tsarist censors. Under the still repressive, but weakening Russian empire the early years of the twentieth century provided a unique opportunity for an Estonian engagement with modernity in which the Young-Estonia activists played a crucial role. In contrast to its predecessors and contemporary rivals the Young-Estonia movement stressed the principle of art for art's sake and rejected any notion of a utilitarian role for culture. Above all, it sought to broaden and deepen the basis for Estonian culture. Most famously, Gustav Suits, the movement's principal ideologist, formulated the fundamental aim already in 1905: "More culture! This is the first condition for all emancipating ideals and goals. More European culture! Let's be Estonians, but let's also become Europeans!"[6] This striking call to action effectively launched a sharp debate–or "culture war"–on Estonia's future among the traditional elites, the Young-Estonia modernists, and the rising social democrats–the latter under powerful Marxist influence.[7]

Although the Young-Estonia activists never wavered from their focus on a cultural mission, they could not ignore the rapid socioeconomic modernization taking place nor the political issues raised by the continued existence of an obsolescent and incompetent tsarist regime. Already in 1910, Suits used the term "modernization" (*moderniseerimine*) to describe the beginning mental transformation taking place in Estonia, and he linked this change to the parallel process of economic "Europeanization" (*europaseerimine*), i.e., the increasing application of modern technology to raise output.[8] Although these concerns remained a secondary consideration for Young-Estonia, a distinctive orientation in political and social thought is clearly visible in several of its publications in the decade following 1905. While also noting the role of various minor voices in the discussion, this article will mainly focus on (1) Gustav Suits, who–along with his leading role in cultural matters–was the most important ideologist in political and social affairs, and (2) the views expressed in *Vaba Sõna* (*The Free Word*, 1914–1916), a journal sponsored by Young-Estonia that became fully engaged in the contemporary political and social debates. It should be noted that the Young-Estonians were certainly not united in their views, but the ideological position of those who stood more toward the right side of the political spectrum–such as Johannes Aavik and Villem Grünthal-Ridala–was clearly in the minority.[9]

A number of factors and social processes came together by the end of the nineteenth century to lay the basis for the appearance of the Young-Estonia movement with its overriding goal of creating a specifically *Estonian* form of cultural modernism. The cumulative effect of significant advances in transportation and communication fostered a greater awareness of the external world, especially Western Europe, and also tied the traditional Estonian areas of Estland and northern Livland closer together, helping to create a

[5] For background on the Revolution of 1905 in Estonia and the most far-reaching example of political mobilization during that year, see **Toivo U. Raun,** "The All-Estonian Congress in Tartu, November 1905: A Reassessment," *Journal of Baltic Studies* 38 (2007), pp. 383–400.

[6] **Aino Kallas,** *Noor-Eesti: Näopildid ja sihtjooned [Young-Estonia: Portraits and guiding principles]* (Tartu, 1921), pp. 10–11; **Toomas Karjahärm,** "Eurooplus, eestlus ja 'Noor-Eesti'" [Europeanism, Estonianness and "Young-Estonia"], *Akadeemia* 6 (1994), p. 1801; "Noorte püüded" [Youthful aspirations], *Noor-Eesti* I album (1905), p. 17.

[7] On this point, see **Toivo U. Raun,** "Culture Wars in Estonia at the Beginning of the 20th Century," *Acta Historica Tallinnensia* 4 (2000), pp. 49–58.

[8] **Gustav Suits,** "Toimetuse poolt" [From the editorial board], *Noor-Eesti* 1 (1910), p. 3.

[9] **Toomas Karjahärm, Väino Sirk,** *Eesti haritlaskonna kujunemine ja ideed 1850–1917 [The formation and ideas of the Estonian intelligentsia 1850–1917]* (Tallinn, 1997), p. 270.

larger and more dynamic public sphere. The noteworthy numerical expansion of journalistic titles and the lively debates occasioned by the appearance of radical newspapers such as *Teataja* (*The Herald*) and *Uudised* (*The News*) clearly illustrated these trends.[10] Particularly important was the complex and even paradoxical impact of the failed attempt at cultural Russification that began in the mid-1880s. The introduction of Russian as the language of instruction at all levels of education did not lead to denationalization of the Estonians. In fact, the clumsy efforts at Russification proved counterproductive, and by forcibly bringing the issue of cultural identity to the forefront, most likely sped up the process of formation of an Estonian national identity for many, including the members of the Young-Estonia generation born in the 1880s. Russification also created a new cultural pluralism, a Russo-German *Kulturkampf*, in the Baltic region that helped to emancipate the Estonians from Baltic German cultural hegemony and encouraged them to look elsewhere for cultural models. Finally, it is no accident that as knowledge of German declined on the heels of Russification, Estonian increasingly became the language of communication among ethnic Estonian intellectuals by the end of the 1890s and the first years of the twentieth century.[11] The Russian language simply did not have the prestige or the social basis in the Baltic region to replace German as the dominant *Kultursprache*.

The emergence of Young-Estonia also reflected crucial changes wrought by social modernization as a more diverse and complex society developed in the Baltic Provinces. The growth of urbanization and the prominent Estonian role in this process was especially noteworthy. The increasing urban concentration can be seen from the following figures on the proportion of ethnic Estonians in the two largest cities in Estland and northern Livland in the period 1881–1913:[12]

	1881	**1897**	**1913**
Tallinn	53.8	62.7	71.6
Tartu	55.4	68.6	73.3

The same process of Estonianization was also taking in place in other northern Baltic cities, and it was accompanied by increasing social differentiation, ranging from a new wealthy bourgeoisie to a struggling, but rapidly expanding working class. Closely related to the enrichment of the more prosperous elements of the population was the striking upswing in the number of Estonian secondary school and university students after the turn of the century. The census of 1897 indicated that only 3,427 Estonians (ten years of age and older) in the provinces of Estland and Livland had obtained an education above the elementary level, but within two decades – by 1916–1917– ethnic Estonians accounted for about 7,000 of the secondary school students in the northern Baltic region or a little more than half of the total number (13,000).[13] Explosive growth was also evident at the university level, from about 200 students in 1900 to some 1,000 by 1915, although in this case more than half were enrolled at institutions of higher learning outside of Estland and northern Livland.[14] This significant expansion marked the first appearance of a critical mass

[10] Svennik Høyer, Epp Lauk, Peeter Vihalemm, eds., *Towards a Civic Society: The Baltic Media's Long Road to Freedom* (Tartu, 1993), pp. 329–330.

[11] **Raun,** "Culture Wars," pp. 52–53; **Kallas,** *Noor-Eesti*, p. 13–14.

[12] **Hugo Reiman,** "Asustamistihedus ja rahvaarvu muutumine Eestis" [Population density and change in Estonia], *Eesti Statistika* 173 (1936), p. 191; **Raimo Pullat,** *Eesti linnad ja linlased XVIII sajandi lõpust 1917. aastani [Estonian cities and urban dwellers from the end of the 18th century until 1917]* (Tallinn, 1972), p. 60.

[13] Николай Тройницкий, ed., Первая всеобщая перепись населения Российской Империи, 1897 г., 89 vols. (С.-Петербург, 1899–1905), vol. 21, pp. 100, 103; vol. 49, pp. 56, 59; **Toivo U. Raun,** *Estonia and the Estonians*, updated 2nd ed. (Stanford, Calif., 2001), pp. 93–94.

[14] **Toomas Karjahärm,** "Eesti rahvusliku haritlaskonna kujunemisest möödunud sajandi lõpul ja praeguse algul" [The formation of the Estonian national intelligentsia at the end of the last century and the start of the current one], *Keel ja Kirjandus* 10 (1973), p. 628.

of educated individuals among the Estonian population. In contrast to the sense of isolation that had often plagued educated Estonians in the past these new cohorts gained confidence from their larger numbers and felt a growing sense of intellectual community.[15]

It is certainly not a coincidence that the name of the Young-Estonia movement specifically focused on the pivotal role of youth and suggested a turning away from, not to say a rebellion against, the older generation. Although all societies, to a greater or lesser degree, have generational issues, in the Estonian case they appeared with particular sharpness at the start of the twentieth century. The generation born in the 1880s was separated from its predecessors not only by the usual age factor, but also by the more modernized and urban environment it grew up in as well as its contrasting reaction and adaptation to the state's Russification policies. Mannheim suggests that the age at which an individual's worldview begins to take shape is about seventeen, and the world in which Estonian students in the upper grades of secondary schools found themselves around 1900 was very different, as noted above, from that of fifteen or twenty years earlier.[16] The previous, smaller generations of educated Estonians emerged in a more rural world dominated by German language and culture as one moved up the educational ladder. These older Estonian intellectuals had an especially difficult time adjusting to the Russification era because they were effectively too old to learn Russian well and to adapt to an entirely different cultural milieu. Many suffered from a kind of intellectual shell shock. In contrast, the new generation that spawned Young-Estonia grew up in a Russified educational system, but one with a much larger Estonian presence, and its members readily adapted to the new situation with limited trauma.[17]

For the youth who emerged on the scene at the beginning of the twentieth century the older generation was regarded as stunted in its development at the intellectual level of the national awakening of the 1860s and 1870s, as Friedebert Tuglas argued, and seemed incapable of any further initiative. In the manifesto that opened the first Young-Estonia album in 1905 Gustav Suits expressed the youthful enthusiasm that had already bubbled to the surface and laid down the gauntlet to the older generation, accusing it of cynicism, opportunism, intolerance, and lack of action. He called for a new activism animated by the principle of *jeunesse oblige*, although he did hold out an olive branch to those who were young in spirit, whatever their age.[18] This opposition between young and old became a major theme in the public debate on Young-Estonia and its role in Estonian life during the following decade. In 1915 Hans Kruus reiterated the positive role of youthful activism as a kind of motor of historical progress. In his view the generation gap in Estonia had proved to be unbridgeable, and as had been the case in other social movements in Europe, it was up to the younger generation to provide the energy and agitation for effecting any substantial change. Kruus's position was seconded by Johan Jans, who also stressed the lack of communication and understanding between generations, a result of the vast disparity between their formative intellectual experiences.[19]

With this background let us turn to an analysis of Young-Estonia's modernizing political and social thought. An overarch-

[15] **Friedebert Tuglas,** *Mälestused [Memoirs]* (Tallinn, 1960), p. 141.

[16] **Karl Mannheim,** "The Problem of Generations," in **Karl Mannheim,** *Essays in the Sociology of Knowledge* (London, 1952), p. 300.

[17] **Friedebert Tuglas,** "Moodsa kirjanduse algus Eestis" [The beginning of the modern literature in Estonia], in Daniel Palgi, ed., *Raamatu osa Eesti arengus [The role of the book in Estonia's development]* (Tartu, 1935), p. 277.

[18] **Tuglas,** "Moodsa kirjanduse algus," p. 284; **Friedebert Tuglas,** "Noor-Eesti 1903–1905" [Young-Estonia 1903–1905], in *Kümme aastat: Noor-Eesti 1905–1915 [Ten years: Young-Estonia 1905–1915]* (Tartu, 1918), p. 16; "Noorte püüded," pp. 7–9, 1–15, 17, 19.

[19] **Bernhard Linde,** "Noored ja vanad" [The young and the old], *Noor-Eesti* 3 (1910), pp. 215–222; **Hans Kruus,** "Noorus ja vanadus" [Youth and old age], *Vaba Sõna* 10, 11 (1915), pp. 267–272.; **Johan Jans,** "Individualism ja meie avalik elu" [Individualism and our public life], *Vaba Sõna* 3 (1916), p. 59.

ing theme, most powerfully expressed by Gustav Suits, but echoed by many members of the movement, was the fundamental desire for emancipation, both of society and of the individual. In *Sihid ja vaated* (*Goals and Views*), published in 1906 in the wake of the Revolution of 1905 under the freer conditions prevailing in Finland, Suits made social and individual liberation the central focus of his book, stressing the crucial need for political, social, and cultural freedom in Estonian and Baltic society.[20] Assessing the situation three decades later in the mid-1930s, he expressed this theme as the younger generation's desire to emancipate itself from the confining bounds of a constricted past, to move beyond the narrow-mindedness and limited horizons of "German-Russian provincialism," and to promote political liberation.[21] Through increasing contact with the main tenets of nineteenth-century Western thought, Suits and his colleagues absorbed key concepts such as the idea of progress and the emancipation of the human spirit. They then dared to apply these notions to the Estonian case, seeking "to make the impossible possible," as Suits put it, in spite of the warnings and objections of the older generation that their youthful dreams were utopian. In 1915 in an assessment of the role of Young-Estonia during the previous decade, the testimony of Friedebert Tuglas and Hans Kruus confirmed the powerfully mobilizing and liberating impact of Suits's call in 1905 for breaking down the barriers to Europe and the broadening of Estonia's intellectual horizons. In Tuglas's view Suits lacked the qualities typically found in a leader such as initiative, drive, and ambition, but the originality of his personality and thought compensated for the absence of these traits.[22]

With regard to Estonia's socioeconomic development and scenarios for the future, the thinkers associated with Young-Estonia enthusiastically welcomed the phenomenon of urbanization, one of the key social transformations associated with the process of modernization . Indeed the city – and the large urban conglomerate in particular – was idealized as the center of all future human progress, especially in such key aspects as economic development, technological innovation, educational advance, and cultural achievement. In contrast, the rural areas were seen as facing an inevitable decline in their economic importance, and as industrialization expanded and urbanization continued, they would also shrink demographically. Young-Estonia's anti-rural stance clearly reflected its origins among urban youth. The reigning social and cultural model that Young-Estonia's city-oriented modernism sought to replace was based on agrarian dominance and the leading role of the sturdy yeoman farmer. For Tuglas and other Young-Estonians the cultural trends associated with the rural world, such as village realism in literature, had exhausted themselves and had nothing more to offer in an artistic sense.[23] Furthermore, the West European model of development, which Young-Estonia increasingly appealed to, suggested that massive urbanization was the inevitable wave of the future, even for those regions of the continent that currently lagged behind. For the generation of Young-Estonia the powerful attraction of the newly arrived ideology of socialism with its strong urban orientation, including Marx's dictum on the "idiocy of rural life," should also not be discounted.

Tuglas, in particular, sang the praises of the modern city and claimed, not without a touch of hyperbole, that it would eventually revolutionize all societies. In his view a "civilized [*intelligentlik*] urban culture" with a new psychology and lifestyle was in the process of

[20] **Gustav Suits,** *Sihid ja vaated [Goals and views]* (Helsinki, 1906), pp. 1, 4–8.

[21] **Gustav Suits,** "Nimemärk" [Signature], *Tänapäev,* 9 (1935), p. 336.

[22] Quotation from **Gustav Suits,** "Lõpusõna" [Closing remarks], *Noor-Eesti* 5/6 (1910–1911), 637; **Suits,** *Sihid ja vaated*, p. 25; **Tuglas,** "Noor-Eesti 1903–1905," p. 17–19; **Hans Kruus,** "***," in *Kümme aastat: Noor-Eesti 1905–1915,* pp. 36–37.

[23] **Friedebert Tuglas,** "Kirjanduslik stiil" [Literary style], *Noor-Eesti* 4 (1912), pp. 95, 97; **Eduard Juhanson,** "Maa, rahvas ja linn" [The countryside, the people and the city], *Vaba Sõna* 1 (1914), p. 16.

birth, increasingly assimilating international influences and becoming more cosmopolitan. This new urban culture would be so potent, e.g., in the press, education, and political life, that it would simply overwhelm the weakened traditional rural culture and bring about a "mental urbanization" of the countryside and a new level of integration in society. Diehard elements in the agrarian sector would be frustrated and unhappy, but powerless to resist. This transformation, however, was only beginning in Estonia, for, as Tuglas put it, "we are only theoretical Europeans" since the Estonian lands had no large cities and had not actually participated in creating the European value system associated with the coming of urban culture.[24] Using a more sober tone, Eduard Juhanson also found the city to be the central location for all aspects of modernization and development. He rejected various common criticisms of urban life as superficial or simply wrong. Mortality rates in West European cities were not unusually high, fertility was not especially low, and the alleged immorality of urban life was unfairly exaggerated. Thus, there were no convincing arguments against Estonians moving to the cities in their homeland. In fact, Juhanson asserted, it was absolutely vital for Estonians to continue urbanizing in large numbers because the city had become the crucial battleground for economic, political, and cultural hegemony in the homeland. If the Estonians did not fill the cities, other peoples would because new jobs and opportunities were there for the taking. In contrast to Tuglas, Juhanson did not view the urban-rural relationship as necessarily antagonistic. The two sectors could and should work together for the common good of the Estonian people.[25]

The Revolution of 1905 raised the bar with regard to political aspirations throughout the Russian empire. During the fall of the revolutionary year – at the height of the movement for change – all Estonian political forces agreed that the only acceptable solution to the crisis of legitimacy in the Russian state was complete democratization at all levels. Partly as a reaction to the tsarist regime's failure to make any timely and significant concessions, the demand for universal suffrage escalated to include both men and women.[26] Nevertheless, the central government managed to survive the upheaval and was only forced to make minor accommodations such as the establishment of the relatively powerless State Duma, elected by indirect and unequal male suffrage. Following Prime Minister Stolypin's unilateral changes in the electoral system in June 1907 the Duma franchise became even more restrictive. During the ensuing years of reaction, as the sweeping changes envisaged in 1905 seemed increasingly unlikely to transpire, some Estonian politicians proved willing to countenance political compromise as a step in the right direction, e.g., the jointly sponsored plan in 1915 by Konstantin Päts and the Estland Ritterschaft for limited reform of that province's local governmental structure. The project called for parity of representation for large and small property owners and renters in the Estland diet, but was turned down by the tsarist authorities.[27]

In the post-1905 years the Young-Estonia group rejected such political compromise with the tsarist authorities and the Baltic German elites as opportunism, and its members remained committed to Suits's earlier call for fundamental political liberation. Writing in the first half of 1915 (but published only in 1918 because of the chaotic wartime conditions), Peeter Ruubel suggested that "radical democracy" should be Young-Estonia's goal. While recognizing that the movement's main

[24] **Tuglas,** "Kirjanduslik stiil," pp. 95–97.

[25] **Juhanson,** "Maa, rahvas ja linn," pp. 17–21.

[26] See, for example, **Raun,** "All-Estonian Congress," pp. 391–392.

[27] **Toomas Karjahärm, Sirje Kivimäe,** "Maaomavalitsusküsimus Eesti ühiskondlikus liikumises kodanlik-demokraatlike revolutsioonide ajajärgul" [The question of local self-government in the Estonian social movement during the era of bourgeois-democratic revolutions], *Eesti NSV Teaduste Akadeemia Toimetised: Ühiskonnateadused*, 29 (1980), pp. 336–337.

focus was in the cultural realm, he argued that Young-Estonia was already large enough to accommodate a political wing. He even raised the possibility of establishing an independent political group or perhaps associating the movement with an already existing party. To be sure, nothing came of this idea, but the establishment of the *Vaba Sõna* journal in 1914 clearly reflected Young-Estonia's desire to have a strong voice in contemporary political debates.[28] In the pages of *Vaba Sõna* Jüri Vilms subjected the 1915 Estland local government reform project to a trenchant critique. Above all, he viewed the right to vote under this plan as a serious breach of democratic principles since it was restricted by property qualifications and the division of the electorate into unequal curiae. Although the Estland project could be seen as an improvement on the Russian zemstvo institutions in terms of franchise and jurisdiction, the level of reform was far too limited to be acceptable. To buttress his argument Vilms evoked examples from the experience of the smaller nationalities in the Habsburg empire and asserted that opportunistic betrayal of one's principles for the achievement of minor improvements was counterproductive and actually contributed to the political demoralization of the nation, as had been the Estonian experience in the two decades before 1905 during the Russification era. Small-numbered peoples like the Estonians could only achieve political success through long years of principled and committed struggle for their ideals.[29]

Where does the mainstream of the Young-Estonia movement fit on the post-1905 Estonian political spectrum? Already in 1906, Suits staked out a mediating position between Jaan Tõnisson's Estonian Progressive People's Party (EPPP – *Eesti Rahvameelne Eduerakond*), which advocated a moderate national liberalism, and the social democrats, associated after 1905 with the all-Russian revolutionary party that gradually split into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. On the one hand, like most of his colleagues in the Young-Estonia group, Suits rejected Tõnisson's brand of traditionalist, rural-oriented nationalism as backward-looking and obsolete. Being an ethnic Estonian had no higher moral value for Suits, but merely reflected, he said, his heritage and mother tongue. What was needed in his view was a modernized form of nationalism that would move beyond useless abstract evocations of the homeland and focus instead on concrete steps to raise the economic and cultural level of the Estonian people. On the other hand, although recognizing the historical importance of Marxism for its role in mobilizing the masses of the population, he also voiced strong criticism of this form of socialism as one-sided and dogmatic. Not only did the ideology focus much too narrowly on the industrial proletariat and the overriding principle of class struggle, but it also ignored or misunderstood the national question, the role of the individual in history, and the independent part played by culture in society.[30]

In place of Tõnisson's dated brand of nationalism and rigid forms of socialism, Suits called for a synthesis of individualism and a flexible, revisionist socialism, reflecting his overriding concern with both individual and social emancipation. In view of the literary and cultural focus of the Young-Estonia movement it is not surprising that Suits placed such stress on the liberation of the individual. He expressed this need for individual emancipation on two levels. In the first place, the stifling social conditions that prevailed throughout the Russian empire kept people in subservience and prevented them from realizing their human and creative potential. In the second place, the prescriptive moralism (Est. *kõlblus*) of traditional Estonian nationalism restricted the right of the individual to exercise freedom of conscience and belief. With regard to socialism Suits noted that an open-minded approach to this ideology, such as August Bebel's,

[28] **Peeter Ruubel,** "Noor-Eesti ja poliitika," in *Kümme aastat: Noor-Eesti 1905–1915*, pp. 56–57, 61.
[29] **Jüri Vilms,** "Maaomavalitsuse uuenduskatsed Eestis" [Attempts at reform of local self-government in Estonia], *Vaba Sõna* 9 (1915), pp, 243–246; 12 (1915), pp. 321–323.
[30] **Suits,** *Sihid ja vaated*, pp. 54–55, 58–60.

viewed nationalism and internationalism as complementary rather than conflicting. As each nation advances socioeconomically and intellectually, it becomes increasingly capable of contributing to the mosaic of worldwide development and culture.[31] A decade later Peeter Ruubel and Hans Kruus confirmed the powerful impact of Suits's *Sihid ja vaated* on the younger members of the expanding Estonian intelligentsia. At first glance for many, individualism and socialism seemed difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile, but as the argument gradually sank in during the years following 1905, "socialist individualism," as Kruus called it, became increasingly attractive as an ideological orientation for a substantial portion of the younger generation.[32]

By the eve of the First World War and especially with the launching of *Vaba Sõna*, the leading voices in the Young-Estonia movement became increasingly conscious of their role as representatives of a greatly expanded and more educated Estonian intelligentsia. In part, the Young-Estonians were responding to critiques from both the right and the left which depicted them, on the one hand, as naive and immature followers of inappropriate foreign cultural models or, on the other hand, as bourgeois aesthetes living in an ivory tower far removed from the grim realities of the life experienced by the masses of the population. Thus, there appeared a clearly perceived need to justify the existence of a culturally focused movement that was open to charges of elitism and to rebut the argument that its members lacked a social consciousness or conscience. In the debate that emerged, two slightly different definitions of the term "intelligentsia" were offered by Bernhard Linde and Peeter Ruubel. In a lecture delivered in Tartu in 1912 (later published in the fifth Young-Estonia album) and in an early issue of *Vaba Sõna*, Linde argued that the intelligentsia was not a social class in the usual sense, but rather a distinctive social grouping that stood between classes since its members could come from any traditional social order–and certainly not only from the richer elements of society. Although it lacked a firm socioeconomic basis since its members came from various social different levels, Linde noted, the intelligentsia stood out because of its unique openness to new ideas and its critical approach to knowledge and society.[33] In contrast, basing his position partly on the German social democrat Karl Kautsky, Ruubel viewed the intelligentsia as a regular social stratum, but one organized on an ideological basis and a product of the increased social differentiation brought about by the capitalist system. Ruubel recognized a strong ethical component in all European intelligentsias, and because of at least some similarities in conditions, he drew special attention to the experience of the Russian intelligentsia as an explanatory model for the Estonian one. If anything, however, the latter situation was historically more challenging because of centuries of Baltic German domination and the arrested social development in the Estonian case.[34]

In addition to claiming a respectable and significant role for the intelligentsia in public life, the Young-Estonia movement increasingly felt the need to speak out on the evolution of Baltic society. In their opening statement in the first issue of *Vaba Sõna* in 1914, the editors adopted a Marxist framework for explaining the current state of affairs. The Estonian lands, they noted, had finally reached the historical stage of capitalism, and they identified the working class[35] as the social vanguard and driv-

[31] **Suits,** *Sihid ja vaated*, pp. 49–52, 56, 58–60.

[32] **Ruubel,** "Noor-Eesti ja poliitika," pp. 51–54; **Kruus,** "***," pp. 36–38.

[33] **Bernhard Linde,** "Eesti intelligents" [The Estonian intelligentsia], *Noor-Eesti* V album (1915), pp. 201–202; **Bernhard Linde,** "'Noor-Eesti' ja politilised rühmitused" [Young-Estonia and political groupings], *Vaba Sõna* 3 (1914), pp. 82–83.

[34] **Peeter Ruubel,** "Intelligentlikust liikumisest meil" [On the rise of our intelligentsia], *Vaba Sõna* 1 (1914), pp. 21–23, 25.

[35] From the context it is clear that what is being referred to here is the *urban* working class, although it is not specifically identified as such.

ing force whose historical mission was to free humanity from the "chains" of this economic system. The stated goal of *Vaba Sõna* was "to acquaint the broad masses [*laiemad rahvahulgad*] of the population, especially the workers, with contemporary cultural problems and new trends in scholarship, literature, and art." Only with this knowledge would the working class be able to win the class struggle against its opponents and carry out its appointed task of transforming society. The strength of socialism as an ideological force would inevitably grow in the Baltic region, but the specific form it would take in the Estonian case would necessarily be adapted to local conditions. Despite this strongly expressed sympathy for socialism, the editors declined to associate the journal with any existing political party.[36]

In the next issue of *Vaba Sõna* Gustav Suits offered a less rosy view of socialism, similar to his perspective in *Sihid ja vaated* eight years earlier, in a letter addressed to *Kiir* (*The Ray*), the organ of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party organizations in Estonia. His immediate concern was an editorial in *Kiir* that lumped him and Young-Estonia together with Tõnisson's Estonian Progressive People's Party as bourgeois enemies of the working class, a view to which he strongly objected. Like Linde and Ruubel, Suits saw the Young-Estonia group as members of a separate category of the intelligentsia rather than as part of the traditional bourgeoisie. He also suggested that, ideologically, the majority of Young-Estonia favored "radical liberalism" [*käre vabameelsus*], accepting many of the fundamentals of socialism, but rejecting the view that class interests determine everything, especially with regard to cultural matters.[37] In short, by 1914 at least some members of Young-Estonia espoused an expanded mission that included helping to educate and mobilize the Estonian working class in the struggle for social and political modernization. Whether Estonian intellectuals could actually communicate with Estonian workers and find a common language, however, remained an open question.

One of the key issues raised during the Revolution of 1905 in the multiethnic Russian empire was the "national question" [*rahvusküsimus*]. At the height of the movement for change in November 1905, both wings of the All-Estonian Congress called for the establishment of substantial cultural and political autonomy, but aside from limited concessions in the educational realm, none of the more far-reaching demands of 1905 were realized as the tsarist regime regained its balance. The nationalities question thus remained unresolved during the ensuing years of reaction. In *Vaba Sõna* Jüri Vilms revisited the issue, suggesting that the views of the Estonian Progressive People's Party and the hard-line social democrats were both unacceptable. On the one hand, he termed EPPP's backward-looking and static position, based solely on the peasant and the rural world, "reactionary" because it refused to take into account the socioeconomic and cultural modernization taking place in Estonian society. On the other hand, he strongly rejected the disdainful view of some social democrats with regard to Estonian culture, as if crucial cultural issues, e.g., education in the mother tongue, were somehow only "bourgeois" concerns. According to Vilms, the main reason for this narrowminded approach was the strong formative influence of Russian social democracy on the Estonian one. In the Russian case the "national question" did not appear because Russian workers were not culturally oppressed, and a tendency to disregard this issue was unthinkingly adopted by some non-Russian social democrats in the empire as well. Otto Bauer, the leading Austrian social democratic theoretician whom Vilms approvingly cites, called this attitude the "naive cosmopolitanism" of large nationalities who dominate in a given state.[38]

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[36] "Toimetuse poolt" [From the editorial board], *Vaba Sõna* 1 (1914), pp. 3–4.

[37] **Gustav Suits,** "Kiri 'Kiirele'" [A letter to "Kiir"], *Vaba Sõna* 2 (1914), pp. 57–58, 60, 62.

[38] **Jüri Vilms,** "Eesti naiivne kosmopolitanism ja rahvuslus" [Estonian naive cosmopolitanism and nationalism], *Vaba Sõna* 1 (1915), pp. 11–16. Vilms was clearly familiar with the first edition of Bauer's *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*, published in 1907.

In contrast to the view propounded by Tõnisson's party, Vilms argued that the social differentiation effected by modernization resulted in the deepening and broadening of any national culture rather than constituting a threat to its very existence. In the Estonian case the recent emergence of a much larger intelligentsia and expanded urban social groups was a highly enriching factor in promoting cultural advance. For those on the left he suggested looking west, rather than east, for models. In particular, the experience of the neighboring Habsburg empire – with a higher level of development and an even more multiethnic composition than the Russian empire – offered considerable food for thought with regard to the nationality question. Already for several decades the Austrian social democrats had wrestled with this issue. The only viable solution they could envision for Austria-Hungary was a decentralized, federal state in which each major nationality had complete national autonomy. Such an arrangement, Vilms asserted, would best promote national self-realization and was also the only acceptable end result in the Russian case.[39] In a rejoinder to Vilms, Eduard Laaman argued that the danger from the left was not so much in a naive form of cosmopolitanism as in a superficial emphasis on the class nature of all cultural expression. He also noted that the debate on national culture was very much alive in 1905 among the social democrats in Estonia–witness the division into the so-called centralists and federalists–but the nearly complete eclipse of the latter in the post-revolutionary repression had prevented any resolution of the issue.[40] Hans Kruus also joined the debate, pointing out that Western social democrats had long since recognized that no contradiction existed between the principle of cultural self-determination for individual nations and the goals of international socialism. The form of culture, he said, would always be national and in essence neutral. The real struggle was over the question of content.[41]

Although it failed in its ultimate goal, the Revolution of 1905 raised the serious possibility of sweeping political, socioeconomic, and cultural change in the Russian empire. Estonians of all political persuasions supported some form of transformation of the existing system, but they differed markedly on the means by which it should be brought about. At the All-Estonian Congress in November 1905, the moderate Bürgermusse wing advocated an evolutionary and non-violent approach while the radical Aula wing called for the use of revolutionary means to overthrow the tsar. In addition, the moderates adopted a local or Baltic perspective on the possibility of change while the radicals viewed the Estonian case as inevitably linked to – and indeed dependent on – all-Russian developments.[42] Following the restoration of the authority of the tsarist regime the crucial question became what means would be most effective for bringing about the desired change over what appeared to be the long haul. In several articles in *Vaba Sõna* in late 1915 and early 1916, Hans Kruus addressed this issue by, first of all, attacking Tõnisson's position on the Estonian role in the larger questions of Russian state politics. Both before and after 1905, as editor of the first Estonian daily newspaper, *Postimees* (*The Courier*), Tõnisson consistently argued that it would be dangerous for a small-numbered people like the Estonians to become involved in matters of high politics in the Russian empire. In fact, he said, the precise form of the political system in Russia was immaterial for

[39] **Vilms,** "Eesti naiivne kosmopolitanism," pp. 11, 17–18; **Jüri Vilms,** "Eesti rahvuspoliitika" [Estonian national policy], *Vaba Sõna* 5 (1915), pp. 131, 133–134.

[40] The centralists accepted the view that the goal of revolutionary success would best be served by a single, all-Russian social democratic party while the federalists argued that each major nationality in the Russian empire could and should have its own separate socialist party.

[41] **Eduard Laaman,** "Rahvuspoliitika rahvameelses eeskavas" [National policy in the popular program], *Vaba Sõna* 3/4 (1915), p. 65–69; **Hans Kruus,** "Sotsialism ja rahvusküsimus" [Socialism and the national question], *Vaba Sõna* 6 (1915), pp. 171–174.

[42] **Raun,** "The All-Estonian Congress," p. 393.

the Estonians. What really mattered was to be able to advance culturally and economically. Kruus found this approach shortsighted and counterproductive because it encouraged passivity and waiting for concessions from the authorities, which in all likelihood would never come without pressure from below. The only workable strategy for securing the Estonian future was activism and struggle, focusing especially on the political mobilization of the broad masses of the population.[43]

Kruus also offered an analysis of the challenge of formulating an Estonian "foreign policy" in the context of the multiethnic Russian empire. Democratic advances in all-Russian politics and national self-determination, he argued, went hand in hand; gains in one area would naturally bring progress for the other as well. Especially important was the need for every nationality in the empire to support each other's national aspirations. Kruus pointed out that there were over thirty nationalities whose numbers ranged from about 200,000 to 1 ½ million in the Russian state, together constituting at least 17 percent of the total population. Adding the medium-sized peoples, numbering between 3 and 8 million and comprising about 22 percent of the total, to the previous group, one reached a total of nearly 40 percent of the empire's population who had much in common and were natural allies in the struggle for change. Thus, the challenge of transforming the Russian state demanded participation not only by the larger nationalities, but by the smaller ones as well. In the Estonian case Kruus rightly noted that the political dividing line regarding participation in all-Russian affairs was between the EPPP, on the one hand, and the radicals and social democrats, on the other. The latter two groups viewed all-Russian involvement as an absolute necessity. He also suggested that no Estonian political grouping had yet developed a clear "foreign policy" orientation, and one of the first tasks for the immediate future should be to educate Russian public opinion about the Estonian situation and clear up the misunderstandings that prevailed.[44]

Although World War I did not resonate very strongly in the pages of *Vaba Sõna*, it did have a powerful impact on the thinking of the Young-Estonia group. Most strikingly, Gustav Suits came to grips with the horrific impact of the all-European war in an essay in the fifth Young-Estonia album in 1915. Although the ostensible impulse for this article was the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the Young-Estonia movement, Suits focused almost entirely on the devastating consequences of total war, stressing that there could not be two more contradictory concepts than "European war" and "European culture." Indeed, he said, "the European cultural ideal seems to have perished in fire, blood, and smoke." The contrast between pre-1914 Europe, when the crippled, the feeble, and the mentally ill were attentively cared for, and wartime, when the youth of Europe in its best years was continually mowed down by cannons and machine guns, was simply overwhelming. Instead of creating values the European war was destroying them. Who, asked Suits, was to blame for the bankruptcy of European civilization that permitted this tragedy to happen? He singled out three guilty parties in particular: the Christian church, which allied itself with the various national imperialisms; the socialists, who failed to demonstrate international solidarity and stand up to militarism at home; and the intellectuals, too many of whom placed themselves in the service of national chauvinism.[45]

In this situation the tenth anniversary of Young-Estonia was not, as might be expected, an occasion for much celebration, but was instead filled with bitterness and irony. The illustrious model of European culture that

[43] **Hans Kruus,** "Meie rahvuslased 'sirbi ja saha taga'" [Our nationalists behind the sickle and the plough], *Vaba Sõna* 9 (1915), pp. 248–250.

[44] **Hans Kruus,** "Venemaa väikerahvaste poliitilised ülesanded" [The political tasks of the small-numbered peoples of Russia], *Vaba Sõna* 1/2 (1916), pp. 2–5; **Hans Kruus,** "Eesti ühiskondlik mõte 1915. aastal" [Estonian social thought in 1915], *Vaba Sõna* 12 (1915), p. 317.

[45] **Gustav Suits,** "1905–1915," *Noor-Eesti* V album (1915), pp. 5–9.

the Young-Estonians had sought to emulate during the preceding decade collapsed under the weight of fratricidal conflict. Inspired and exhilarated by Suits's famous slogan, launched in 1905, the members of the Young-Estonia movement had tried their best to become Europeans while also remaining Estonians. After August 1914, however, the ironic reality was that many more Estonians quickly "became Europeans" by being drafted into military service in a murderous all-European war. Nevertheless, for all its horrors, said Suits, the war was a temporary phenomenon, and just as each spring brought a renewal of life, the bases of human culture would survive even this catastrophe and begin to advance once again. Europe would emerge chastened from the conflict, and its political map would likely change. In a prescient statement he predicted that the First World War would speed up the "process of self-determination for individuals and groups," clearly implying that the European empires would not survive the civil war in which they were engaged. In this view he was seconded by Jüri Vilms, who argued that the war had greatly heightened interest in the national question and forced each nationality in Europe to focus on defining its future goals.[46]

In any assessment of the views expressed in publications from the late tsarist period the issue of censorship needs to be addressed. With regard to what could actually appear in print, there is little question that the post-1905 era witnessed a considerable improvement over the situation that had prevailed in previous decades. Despite the continuing bureaucratic demands of the censors, the abolition of precensorship in 1905–1906 made life easier for authors and editors, and most importantly, the mushrooming size of printing operations in the Russian empire meant that the tiny enforcement staff could not hope to deal in any thorough way with the tasks that it confronted.[47] In his memoirs Hans Kruus, who served as editor of *Vaba Sõna* in late 1915 and early 1916, affords some insight into relations with the censorship regime, which in these years was ostensibly more stringent because of heightened wartime concerns. The local military censor, a Russian who knew very little Estonian, was dependent on his Estonian secretary for any serious understanding of the manuscripts submitted for approval. In this situation it appears that the Russian censor's main goal was to act as a referee between various Estonian factions in the press since his ability to rule on questions of substance was strictly limited.[48]

In the battle with the censors, authors and editors often resorted to "Aesopian language" – the language of suggested and hinted meanings – in order to communicate with readers. Kruus provides one example of this approach in an article in 1914 on Prussia's policy toward the Polish population in the German empire. It is a strong condemnation of Germanization as harmful, useless, and counterproductive.[49] Any intelligent reader would have understood that the parallels with Russification were obvious, but Kruus could not have dealt directly with the situation in the Russian empire in such a piece. In addition, the editor or author might place a series of dots at the end, say, of a given article to indicate that something had been left out. It was also possible to refer to the restrictions imposed by the censorship regime by using a euphemism. For example, Kruus suggested that Estonian social thought had not progressed very far during 1915 because of "unavoidable obstacles," and in another instance he noted that he could not offer a detailed analysis of the Revolution of 1905 for "'external reasons.'"[50] In short, tsar-

[46] **Suits,** "1905–1915," pp. 11–14, quotation on p. 14; **Vilms,** "Eesti rahvuspoliitika," p. 136.

[47] **Benjamin Rigberg,** "The Efficacy of Tsarist Censorship Operations, 1894–1917," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 14 (1966), pp. 327–328, 343.

[48] **Hans Kruus,** "Ajakirja 'Vaba Sõna' toimetamas" [Editing the journal "Vaba Sõna"], *Keel ja Kirjandus* 5 (1970), pp. 298–299.

[49] **Hans Kruus,** "Preisimaa poolavaenuline poliitika" [Prussia's anti-Polish policy], *Vaba Sõna* 7/8 (1914), pp. 218–219.

[50] **Rigberg,** "The Efficacy of Tsarist Censorship Operations," p. 337; **Kruus,** "Ajakirja 'Vaba Sõna' toimetamas," p. 299; **Kruus,** "Eesti ühiskondlik mõte," p. 319; **Kruus,** "Venemaa väikerahvaste poliitilised ülesanded," p. 4.

ist censorship constituted a major nuisance for publishing intellectuals, but there is little indication that it was able to prevent the substance of ideas from circulating in the Estonian public sphere in the waning years of the Russian empire.[51] Although the arguments presented were not as sharply focused or as fully supported with factual detail as they might have been had a free press existed, the main points raised in the public debate did reach a growing audience.

In conclusion, although Young-Estonia remained faithful to its primary focus on cultural modernism, it also significantly broadened the Estonian engagement with modernity by diversifying and enriching the public debate on political and social affairs that took place during the final years of the tsarist era. As a newly formed modernizing intellectual elite, the Young-Estonia activists were a product of their times, and their orientation in political and social thought clearly reflected the birth of the movement during the defining experience of revolution in 1905 when sweeping change seemed increasingly possible. Led by their chief ideologist, Gustav Suits, the great majority of the Young-Estonians who took a stand on political and social issues advocated a number of key values and trends associated with modernity, including personal and social emancipation, a ringing defense of individualism, open-mindedness in the quest for knowledge, radical democratization, urbanization, and social differentiation and mobility. Particularly important was their rejection of a dogmatic approach to political and social affairs, one that had burdened thinking on both the right and the left before the arrival of Young-Estonia.

Ideologically, most Young-Estonia activists stood very close to the most powerful liberation movement of the day, Marxist socialism, sharing its strong urban orientation and much of its social analysis, but they remained critical of its dogmatic aspects and its failure to recognize the key creative role of the individual in history. Young-Estonia also sought to carve out a niche for itself in a rapidly modernizing society as members of a new intelligentsia category which undertook the daunting mission of educating the masses of the population and bringing high culture to them. Impractical and utopian at best, this goal remained unrealized in view of the huge – and growing – gap between the cultural elite and the rank and file of society. In the waning years of tsarist rule Suits and his colleagues saw World War I as a catalyst for change that would bring self-determination to fruition in the form of full national autonomy in a decentralized and democratized Russian state, but before the fall of the tsarist regime political independence was not considered a feasible goal. As children of 1905, the Young-Estonians also believed in an activist approach to bringing about change and the clear necessity of involvement in all-Russian affairs. Although the Estonians were a small-numbered nationality, in alliance with others it was felt that they could play a constructive role in any future transformation of the Russian state.

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[51] This interpretation of tsarist censorship is supported in the following contemporary source: **Johannes Aavik,** "Rahvuslik tunne Eestis" [National consciousness in Estonia], *Eesti Üliõpilaste Seltsi Album* 9 (1915), p. 29, and it is also the conclusion drawn in an important article covering the last two decades of the nineteenth century: **Ea Jansen,** "Tsaristlik tsensuur ja eesti ajakirjandus venestamisajal (1880.–1890. aastad)" [Tsarist censorship and Estonian journalism in the Russification era (1880s–1890s)], *Tuna* 2 (2000), p. 60.

British King George V arrives at the Tallinn roadstead aboard his yacht in 1908. Photo by A. Vannas. EFA 0-28071

A delegation from the British Fleet at a reception given by Konstantin Päts on December 12, 1918 in Tallinn. Seated, from left: Admiral E.A. Sinclair, K. Päts, J. Laidoner. Photo by P. Parikas. EFA 0-158901

Unloading of military supplies from the British ship *Hollywood* during the War of Independence in 1919. Photo by P. Parikas. EFA A-288-46

Distribution of foodstuffs arriving from America at the food kitchen of the Estonian Union for Child Welfare in Tallinn in 1919. Photo by P. Parikas. EFA 0-52166

U.S. Captain Kranz riding from Tallinn to the front line with an artillery unit during the War of Independence in 1919. Photo by P. Parikas. EFA A-288-53

Attitudes and Activities of the Baltic German Knighthoods During Estonia's Move Toward Independence 1918–1920

Aleksander Loit

Although the Republic of Estonia was born in advantageous international circumstances, it would never have come into being without the efforts and purposeful actions of the Estonians themselves. By the start of the 20th century, the ancient Estonian people, thanks to the national movement that arose in the 1860s, had developed into a modern nation that was ripe for the establishment of its own independent state. The War of Independence, 1918–1920, heralded Estonia's final separation from Russia and the culmination of its road to independent statehood.

However, no new state is fully independent until it has received complete recognition within the international family of nations. The young Republic of Estonia had to work hard to achieve this goal and to overcome the widespread doubts, particularly among the great powers, that it would truly be able to endure as an independent state. This was particularly challenging in the great post-World War I reorganization of international politics, with the great powers lacking sufficient time to actively deal with the problems of smaller countries or with these problems coming into diametric opposition to the great powers' own interests. In addition, Estonian foreign legations had to wage a bitter battle against certain groups who denied the independent Republic of Estonia outright and who engaged in heated schemes to protect their own interests, particularly before the Western great powers. These groups were the Russian Whites (supporters of the collapsing tsarist regime) and the Baltic Germans.

The associations of Baltic German nobility, or knighthoods (*Ritterschaften)* – two separate corporations for the former provinces of Estland and Livland – were legal organizations in public law until the abolition of the estate privilege system in the Republic of Estonia in 1920, and thus the most important political organs of the Baltic Germans. Although there were differing opinions among the Baltic Germans themselves as well as the knighthoods, the vast majority of the nobility's leadership remained sharply critical of the Estonia's status as a republic as well as the politics of the Estonian government until the very end.

The events that shaped the political background of the following story have been discussed rather exhaustively in many publications.[1] The same applies to the activities of the Baltic German groups specifically

[1] **Ants Piip,** *Tormine aasta: Ülevaade Eesti välispoliitika esiajast 1917.–1918. aastal dokumentides ja mälestusis [The Stormy Year: Review of Early Estonian Foreign Policy 1917–1918 in Documents and Memoirs]* (Tartu, 1934); **Eduard Laaman,** *Eesti iseseisvuse sünd [The Birth of Estonian Independence]* (Tartu, 1936); **August Rei,** *Mälestusi tormiselt teelt [Recollections of a Stormy Path]* (Stockholm, 1961); **Artur Mägi,** *Das Staatsleben Estlands* ▸

between the years 1917–1920; a number of studies and memoirs have been published on this topic.[2] This article attempts to provide a glimpse into the greater political context within which certain interest groups concocted their own plans for the future of the Estonian state after the collapse of Tsarist Russia. The following account will attempt to cast light on certain aspects of the Baltic German knighthood's attitudes toward the establishment of an independent Republic of Estonia, primarily on the basis of previously unused sources from the Foreign Ministry archives of Sweden, Great Britain and the United States. To help the reader better understand the issue in question, the first section will provide a brief summary of the tangle of military and international political events occurring at that time.

The major political consequences of World War I, when Europe's three powerful empires – Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary – collapsed, had a direct effect on Estonia's destiny. The February Revolution of 1918 in Russia saw the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a republican order. The rather moderate revolutionaries of that time managed to stay in power for only a few months, since the Bolsheviks seized power in their October coup of that same year to create Soviet Russia. A civil war followed in 1918–1922 between the Bolshevik-led government and military units loyal to the tsar. Estonia could not depend on the latter, as proponents of an indivisible Russia, to support Estonia's endeavor to establish an independent Estonian state. Bolshevik power was established in Estonia as well, but it was short-lived, enduring from October 1917 to February 1918. In the course of ongoing military conflict between Germany and Soviet Russia, German forces drove the Bolshevik government out of Estonia and established their own military regime. However, the German occupation lasted only from February to November of 1918, when German forces left Estonia because of the revolution in Germany and the signing of the truce.

As power over Estonia shuffled from hand to hand, and taking advantage of the confusion in Russia, Estonian national circles began organizing Estonia's detachment from Russia. In April 1917, the local self-government body – the Provisional Land Council of the Estonian Province (*Maapäev*, or Estonian Diet) was created, which now united all of Estonia into one national province and served as the ruling body until the convening of the Constituent Assembly. On November 15, 1917, the Estonian Diet declared itself the highest power in Estonia, and on February 24, 1918, proclaimed Estonia's Independence. Subsequently, Estonia was forced to defend its fledgling state in the War of Independence (1918–1920) against two enemies, Soviet Russia and the Baltic German *Landeswehr*. Estonia's detachment from Russia was finalized with the signing of the Tartu Peace Treaty in February 1920, which extended the Republic of Estonia its first *de iure* recognition from a foreign country – Soviet Russia.

▸ *während seiner Selbstständigkeit, 1: Das Regierungssystem* (Uppsala, 1967); **Evald Uustalu,** "Die Staatsgründung Estlands," in Jürgen von Hehn, Hans von Rimscha, Hellmuth Weiss, eds., *Von den baltischen Provinzen zu den baltischen Staaten: Beiträge zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Republiken Estland und Lettland 1917–1918* (Marburg/Lahn, 1971), pp. 275–292; **Evald Uustalu,** "Estlands Weg zum Friedensschluss mit Sovet-Russland und zur internationalen Anerkennung," in Jürgen von Hehn, Hans von Rimscha, Hellmuth Weiss, eds., *Von den baltischen Provinzen zu den baltischen Staaten: Beiträge zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Republiken Estland und Lettland 1918–1920* (Marburg/Lahn, 1977), pp. 409–419; *Revolutsioon, kodusõda ja välisriikide interventsioon Eestis (1917–1920) [Revolution, Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Estonia (1917–1920)]*, vol. 1–2 (Tallinn, 1977, 1982).

[2] The most thorough work on this topic is **Arved von Taube,** "Die baltisch-deutsche Führungsschicht und die Loslösung Livlands und Estlands von Russland 1916–1918"; "Von Brest-Litovsk bis Libau: Die baltisch-deutsche Führungsschicht und die Mächte in den Jahren 1918/1919," in Jürgen von Hehn, Hans von Rimscha, Hellmuth Weiss, eds., *Von den baltischen Provinzen zu den baltischen Staaten: Beiträge zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Republiken Estland und Lettland* (Marburg/Lahn, 1971, 1977); see also **Rüdiger von der Golz,** *Meine Sendung in Finnland und im Baltikum* (Leipzig, 1920); **Eduard von Stackelberg-Sutlem,** *Ein Leben im baltischen Kampf* (München, 1927); **Eduard von Dellingshausen,** *Im Dienste der Heimat! Erinnerungen* (Stuttgart, 1930).

In January 1918, the Land Council had already dispatched a diplomatic delegation to Stockholm to seek the recognition of the Western European great powers for the Republic of Estonia. In May 1918, England, France and Italy extended their *de facto* recognition to the Estonian Land Council, although these same countries did not recognize the Republic of Estonia *de iure* until January 1921, after the Paris Peace Conference. Estonia was admitted as a member to the League of Nations in September of that same year.[3]

As Estonian politicians were actively pursuing the establishment of the Republic of Estonia, Baltic German groups were also intensifying their efforts to chart the future of their own ethnic group. These two political drives collided in full frontal conflict from the very start, mainly because of differing views of Estonia's future national status and structure. Rapid transfers of political power in the Baltic lands between 1917 and 1920 forced the Baltic German circles to weigh several options. They excluded two alternatives from the start, namely, membership in the socialist state of Soviet Russia, and existence as an ethnic group of degraded social status within the Republic of Estonia. The associations of Baltic German nobility would have preferred to see the Baltic states enjoying conditions of far-reaching autonomy within some great power – as it had for centuries under Sweden and Tsarist Russia. This would guarantee the Baltic Germans a leading position in the country's political, economic, social and cultural life.

Under these options, the Baltic Germans would have preferred national ties with Germany, either directly under the German Empire, or in some type of union with the Kingdom of Prussia. These opportunities vanished when Kaiser Wilhelm II recognized the independence of Estonia and Latvia on September 22, 1918, and war and revolution drove Germany into total collapse. Continued submission to Russia within the framework of a special Baltic arrangement was also conceivable for the nobility, but only if the tsarist regime was restored. To this end, Baltic Germans co-operated with the Russian White armies as well as with efforts to establish a new democratic order in Russia. However, given the state of affairs, the primary goal of the Baltic German nobility was the creation of an independent Baltic duchy, governed by some duke who had abdicated his position in Germany.

Baltic German policies were represented first and foremost by the associations of nobility, the knighthoods. Many other organizations and semi-institutional organs of power were also working toward the same end, although in different social sectors, but still with the common goal of protecting the interests of the Baltic German ethnic group. The primary goal of their activities inevitably brought them into sharp conflict with the Estonian and Latvian national circles that were working to establish independent states.

At the initiative of Baltic Germans living in Germany, the organization German People's Guard (*Deutscher Volksschutz*) was founded in the autumn of 1914 – immediately after the start of World War I. It was given the duty of monitoring, in cooperation with Finnish activists, German politicoeconomic interests in the Baltic lands and Finland, and to inform the German public of the situation in these countries. As a kind of sister organization to the Baltic Trust Council (*Deutscher Volksschutz*, the *Baltischer Vertrauensrat*), comprising primarily local Baltic Germans, was created in Berlin that same year. A central figure in this group was Theodor Schiemann, the former Tallinn town archivist, later a professor of Eastern European history at Berlin University and personal advisor on Eastern European issues to Kaiser Wilhelm II; during the German occupation in 1918, Schiemann served as curator of Tartu University.[4] The Trust Council's newspaper, *Stimmen aus dem Osten,* enthusi-

[3] **Piip,** *Tormine aasta*; **Laaman,** *Eesti iseseisvuse sünd*; **Uustalu,** "Die Staatsgründung Estlands"; **Uustalu,** "Estlands Weg zum Friedensschluss."

[4] *Eesti biograafiline leksikon [Estonian Biographical Lexicon]*, vol. 2, 3 (Tartu, 1928), p. 454.

astically advocated the annexation of the Baltic States to Germany. Later the council dealt primarily with issues of compensation for the nobles' estates that had been nationalized by Estonian land reform.[5]

The Baltic Delegation (*Baltische Delegation*) and its arm, the Baltic Press Center (*Baltische Pressestelle*) were active in Stockholm from 1917 to 1920; these were organizations whose main goal was to protect the interests of the manor lords who had fled the Baltics to Sweden. The delegation had close ties to the *Baltische Vertrauensrat* in Berlin and also to Germany's diplomatic embassies in Western European countries. The Press Center provided the foreign press with accounts of the situation in the Baltics – from a point of view beneficial to the Baltic Germans.[6] In autumn 1917, a special Trust Council (*Vertrauensrat*) was created in Tallinn, comprised of ethnic German town dwellers, to maintain communications with Germany and make preparations for the arrival of the German Army in Estonia. In addition to the Council, other organizations representing Baltic German interests were also operating in 1918 and 1919: the Baltic German National Committee in Riga (*Baltischer Nationalausschuss*), the Center for Mercenary Recruitment in Germany (*Anwerbungsstelle Baltenland*), and the Baltic Aid Committee in Scandinavia (*Baltischer Hilfsausschuss*).[7]

However, the organization that became the most important Baltic German organ of power was the United Baltic Land Council (*Der Vereinigte Landesrat für Livland, Estland, Ösel und Riga*). After the German Army occupied the Baltic States, there arose the need for a civilian authority that could claim to represent the entire Baltic German population in some fashion and would thus enjoy a greater political legitimacy. April 1918 saw the creation of the Land Council, in which the associations of Baltic German nobility were willing to share their political representative power with other estates of society – the clergy, citizens of the town, and even peasants. This willingness was dictated by the need to demonstrate "democratization" of Baltic society to the outside world, in the hopes of obtaining international recognition for the Land Council. Rural municipality elders had been invited to join the Land Council as Estonian representatives; they refused the invitation as a form of public protest, saying that the legitimate representative of the Estonian people was the Estonian Diet (*Maanõukogu)*. Some German-minded Estonian urban residents and clergy did join the Germans' United Baltic Land Council, prompting people to call the *Landesrat* by a different name – *Landesverrat* (Land council of Betrayers).[8]

Finally, we must mention the short-lived but authoritative Baltic Regency Council (*Baltischer Regentschaftsrat*), which was formed in October 1918 as a provisional government for the Baltic Duchy that was now being adumbrated. The Council's main duties were the creation of its own military forces (*Landeswehr*) and the formulation of grand plans for German colonization of the Baltics. As Germany collapsed amid war and revolution, causing plans for a Baltic Duchy to be crossed off the political agenda, the Council quickly lost its significance.[9]

The activities of the Baltic German circles on behalf of their ethnic group included an essential component: the dissemination of self-favoring propaganda in other countries.

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[5] Baltischer Vertrauensrat 1914–1940. The archives were still in the *Zentrales Staatsarhiv* in Potsdam, East Germany, in the 1980s.

[6] Baltische Delegation und Pressestelle Stockholm 1917–1920. Zentrales Staatsarchiv, Potsdam.

[7] **Edgar Mattisen,** *Tartu rahu: Monograafia [The Peace Treaty of Tartu: A Monograph]* (Tallinn, 1988), p. 154.

[8] "Entstehung und Zusammensetzung des Vereinigten Landesrates für Livland, Estland, Ösel und Riga." Addendum to a letter dated Oct. 30, 1918 to the Swedish Foreign Minister J. Hellner, signed by H. von Stryk "Plenipotentiary of the United Country-Council of Livonia, Esthonia, Oesel and Riga," Swedish State Archives, Foreign Ministry Archives UD 1902, 6 A 38, vol. 287. The preceding summary is based mainly on the following works: **Piip,** *Tormine aasta;* **Laaman,** *Eesti iseseisvuse sünd;* **Rei,** *Mälestusi tormiselt teelt;* **von Taube,** "Die deutsch-baltische Führungsschicht" and "Von Brest-Litovsk bis Libau."

[9] **Laaman,** *Eesti iseseisvuse sünd*.

Many prominent figures of the aristocracy took active part in this endeavor.

For example, a prominent role was played by Baron Eduard von Dellingshausen (1863–1939), owner of the entailed estates of Aaspere and Sauste in Virumaa. Dellingshausen was the Land Councillor of the Estland Knighthood and Captain of this corporation (*Ritterschaftshauptmann*) from 1902 to 1918, as well as being chairman of the United Baltic Provincial Assembly (*Landesrat*) and the Baltic Regency Council (*Regentschaftsrat*). He was a passionate supporter of the Baltic German ethnic group. The interests of this group would be satisfied by bringing the German Army onto Baltic soil, with the ultimate goal of establishing a Baltic duchy. Dellingshausen communicated very frequently with German government circles, also serving as the head of a delegation of the Estland and Livland Knighthoods and Livonian Baltic German nobility during a visit to Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1918. As the German occupation ended, Dellingshausen sought cooperation with Estonian national circles, albeit unsuccessfully, because the Estonians found unacceptable his proposals, which sought to preserve the hegemony of the Baltic Germans. After the birth of the Republic of Estonia, he left Estonia in 1918 to live in Germany. Even there, he continued his fight against the Republic of Estonia, becoming involved in the 1919 underground movement in Copenhagen, where Russian supporters of the tsar, along with Baltic Germans, planned to overthrow the Republic of Estonia and the Republic of Latvia with the help of Danish volunteers and to transform these states into an independent or autonomous Baltic duchy.[10]

Another high-ranking Baltic German noble who fought energetically alongside Dellingshausen for the interests of the Baltic Knighthoods and the Baltic German ethnic group as a whole was the owner of the entailed estate of Audru in Pärnumaa, Baron Adolph Pilar von Pilchau (1851–1925). He was responsible for the military suppression of the 1905 peasant uprising. Later, he became the Land Councillor of the Livland Knighthood, and from 1908 to 1920 served as the head (*Landmarschall*) of the Livonian Diet, as well as a leading figure in the United Baltic Provincial Assembly and the Baltic Regency Council. In these positions, Pilar von Pilchau was active in forming his own armies and preparing the colonization of the Baltic states with large numbers of German colonists. The Baltic German councils that he led completely ignored the Estonian Diet's decision regarding supreme authority in Estonia and the proclamation of Estonian independence.[11]

The actions of Dellingshausen and Pilar von Pilchau were successfully furthered by the owner of the estates of Pada, Kabala and Haansalu in Virumaa, Baron Alfred von Schilling (1861–1922). Schilling served as Land Councillor of the Estland Knighthood for a long time and was a member of all the major Baltic German Councils. He was active as the foreign representative of the Estland Knighthood in Germany, Finland and Sweden. From 1917 to 1918, Schilling played an important role as an opponent of Estonia's drive toward independence and a supporter of the interests of the Baltic German nobility, whose goal was the creation of a Baltic federation ruled by Baltic Germans.[12]

However, among all the previously mentioned fighters on behalf of the interests of the Baltic German nobility, the most energetic of all was undoubtedly the owner of the entailed estates of Voltveti and Kärsu in Pärnumaa, Heinrich von Stryk (1873–1938), nicknamed "the new Patkul." He actually held no powerful position in the Livland Knighthood except

[10] *Eesti biograafiline leksikon,* p. 71–72; *Deutschbaltisches biographisches Lexikon, 1710–1960* (Köln-Wien, 1970), p. 162; **Piip,** *Tormine aasta;* **Laaman,** *Eesti iseseisvuse sünd;* **von Taube,** "Die baltisch-deutsche Führungsschicht" and "Von Brest-Litovsk bis Libau."

[11] *Eesti biograafiline leksikon,* p. 381–382; *Deutschbaltisches biographisches Lexikon,* p. 591; **von Taube,** "Die baltisch-deutsche Führungsschicht" and "Von Brest-Litovsk bis Libau"; **Mattisen,** *Tartu rahu,* p. 152.

[12] *Deutschbaltisches biographisches Lexikon,* p. 678–679; **Piip,** *Tormine aasta*; **Laaman,** *Eesti iseseisvuse sünd*; **von Taube,** "Die baltisch-deutsche Führungsschicht" and "Von Brest-Litovsk bis Libau."

for a short stint as Land Marshal; however, he worked as an official, and at times unofficial representative of the nobility in Germany and Sweden. Living abroad for most of the time after 1916, he worked with particular diligence to disseminate Baltic German propaganda in the West to government circles in Europe and the United States.[13]

The "Stryk affair" proved tremendously damaging to the political activities of the manor lord of Voltvet. When Stryk arrived in Liepaja from Stockholm on February 18, 1919, the Latvian police, apparently working from an anonymous tip, made a thorough search of his baggage, discovering extremely compromising documents in the process. They found evidence of a plan to overthrow Latvia's legal government under Ulmanis with the help of the *Landeswehr* and volunteer Swedish military units. Stryk and a number of other members of Baltic nobility were deeply involved in the scheme. The goal of the coup was to send the Baltic *Landeswehr* against Estonia after the Bolsheviks were driven out, and to replace the newly created Republics of Estonia and Latvia with a neutral greater Baltic state, the existence of which would be internationally guaranteed and in some kind of national federation with Sweden. Stryk himself was planning to serve as the leader of this state, in a position somewhat reminiscent of the medieval master of an order (*Der baltische Heermeister Excellenz von Stryk*). Latvian authorities decided to arrest Stryk, but he succeeded in fleeing before they could do so.[14] After the Liepaja incident, Stryk's position suffered an overall decline in Baltic German noble circles as well as in the eyes of Western European diplomats, although he did continue his political activism in Germany and Sweden. Later, many Baltic Germans who had returned to Germany to escape the war, the Republic of Estonia, and land reform, returned to independent Estonia. The road back to his homeland was blocked for Stryk, now declared an enemy of the state by the Estonians. He died in Neubrandenburg, Germany in 1938.[15]

Finally, we must also mention the Count of Raikküla, philosopher Hermann Keyserling (1880–1946). Although he did not play the most central of roles in this story, his role was remarkable enough to merit a brief description. Keyserling was cosmopolitan and liberal, and a strong critic of conservative German nationalism. This led to such sharp conflicts with his Baltic German peers that he was threatened with expulsion from the associations of Baltic German nobility. Still, this did not prevent him from representing the interests of the Baltic German nobility in British and French government circles, with whom he enjoyed close ties. Even though he recommended co-operation with Estonian politicians, his goal was not a Republic of Estonia, but a united Baltic State (*gesamtbaltischer Staat*) that would encompass the entire region. Keyserling agitated vehemently against Estonian land reform, making him a person of suspicion for the Estonian authorities, and was even briefly detained because of his articles against the Republic of Estonia in the British press. He left Estonia in 1918 and lived abroad thereafter.[16]

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[13] *Deutschbaltisches biographisches Lexikon,* p. 780; **Piip,** *Tormine aasta,* pp. 172–179; **Laaman,** *Eesti iseseisvuse sünd*; **von Taube,** "Die baltisch-deutsche Führungsschicht" and "Von Brest-Litovsk bis Libau."

[14] **von der Golz,** *Meine Sendung in Finnland und im Baltikum;* **Laaman,** *Eesti iseseisvuse sünd;* **von Taube,** "Von Brest-Litovsk bis Libau"; **Hans von Rimscha,** "Die Episode Niedra" in von Hehn, von Rimscha, Weiss, *Von den baltischen Provinzen zu den baltischen Staaten: Beiträge zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Republiken Estland und Lettland: 1918–1920,* pp. 237–326.

[15] **von Taube,** "Die baltisch-deutsche Führungsschicht" and "Von Brest-Litovsk bis Libau."

[16] *Deutscbaltisches biographisches Lexikon,* p. 377–378; **von Taube,** "Die baltisch-deutsche Führungsschicht" and "Von Brest-Litovsk bis Libau"; **W. Lenz jun.,** "Graf Hermann Keyserlings Bemühungen um Englands Beistand in den Jahren 1919/1920," *Jahrbuch des baltischen Deutschtums* 21 (1973), pp. 69–75; **Jaan Undusk,** "Eesti kui Belgia: Viimne baltlane Hermann Keyserling" [Estonia as Belgium: The Last Balt, Hermann Keyserling], *Tuna* 2 (2003), pp. 48–78; **Henning von Wistinghausen,** "Krahv Hermann Keyserlingi konflikt eestimaalastest rahvuskaaslastega 1917–1918" [Count Hermann Keyserling's Conflict with his Compatriots in Estonia], *Tuna* 3 (2004), pp. 52–64 and 4 (2004), pp. 66–81.

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The opposition of Baltic German Knighthoods to the fledgling Republic of Estonia was evident primarily in three conflict-producing issues: the form of government, land reform, and in the opinion of the nobility, the Estonian leadership's lack of professionalism and the political immaturity and their supposed lack of trust among Estonian people. At various times Baltic German circles proposed various alternatives for the national status of the Baltic lands.

The idea of uniting the Baltic lands with Germany crystallized in the 1870s during bitter disputes between Baltic German Constitutionalists and Russian Panslavists, which was particularly evident in the disagreements between Tartu University professor Carl Schirren and Russian public figure Juri Samarin regarding Baltic autonomy (*Baltische Sonderstellung*). Baltic German circles saw danger in the encroaching policies of Russification as well as the spread of the idea of a national government among the Estonians and Latvians, which would endanger the Baltic Germans' dominant social standing. The only solution was some kind of union of the Baltic lands with Germany. Some influential circles in Germany were interested in annexing the Baltic lands to Germany, but this idea was not approved by Chancellor Bismarck, whose guiding principle in foreign relations centered on good-neighborly relations with Russia. Later, after Bismarck's retirement, Germany's political relationship with Russia grew tense. This new foreign policy trend was supported with particular enthusiasm by the Baltic Germans living in Germany; some of them had close ties to the highest echelons of German government.

As early as the eve of World War I, German ruling circles discussed the possibility of conquering the Baltic lands. Conquest would be followed by annexation of the Baltic lands to Germany. These plans were inspired not only by political motives, but also economic, social and demographic considerations. For instance, according to the calculations of the large landowners' agricultural center in Estonia, the agricultural production of the Baltic lands could satisfy most of Germany's consumption needs. To this end, they planned to colonize the Baltics with a few million German peasants.[17]

In addition to the plans of German government circles to conquer the Baltic lands they themselves began preparing for secession from Russia. A special impetus was provided by the February Revolution in Russia, which threatened unfortunate consequences for Baltic Germans. Namely, the Russian Provisional Government eliminated the estate-based self-government system in the Baltics in the summer of 1917, transferring power to the local Estonian and Latvian governments instead. The situation of the Baltic Germans became even worse during the brief rule of the Bolsheviks, during which the noble manor lords were declared outlaws. In contrast, the period of German occupation turned out to be the pinnacle of the power of Baltic German circles, particularly for the associations of Baltic German nobility. The supreme command of the German forces in Baltics recognized the Knighthoods as the legal representatives of the Baltic lands. In turn, the nobility did not recognize the Estonian Diet as Estonia's highest authority.[18]

As early as the spring of 1917, when German forces had only partially occupied the Baltic lands, the Trust Council created by the Baltic German began preparing for the annexation of Estland and Livland to Germany. The Bolshevik seizure of power in the autumn of that same year intensified the Baltic Germans' efforts to achieve a union with

[17] **August Traat,** "Saksa imperialistide ja balti mõisnike kolonisaatorlikest plaanidest Eestis 1918. aastal" [The Colonizer-like Plans of German Imperialists and Baltic Manor Lords in Estonia in 1918], *Eesti NSV Teaduste Akadeemia Toimetised: Ühiskonnateaduste seeria* (1957), pp. 301–320; **von Taube,** "Von Brest-Litovsk bis Libau."

[18] **Piip,** *Tormine aasta,* pp. 42–55; **Laaman,** *Eesti iseseisvuse sünd,* pp. 68–75; **von Taube,** "Die deutsch-baltische Führungsschicht."

Germany on a state level. When the Knighthoods, in December of 1917, declared the secession of Estland and Livland from Russia, the decision explicitly included a plan to annex the Baltic lands to Germany. Naturally, the Baltic German nobility could not decide on the actual form of union of their own volition. A strict, direct subordination would not have been in their best interests, which would be better served by a personal union or annexation to Germany as an independent part of the Kingdom of Prussia, which would allow the Baltic lands to preserve their traditional autonomous status.

And yet, the Knighthoods knew full well that the achievement of the plans they had initiated for annexing these areas to Germany presumed the support of the greater population, and not just that of the nobility. It is against this backdrop that we must view the December 23, 1917 open report of seventy Riga Baltic German societies and associations, with its extraordinarily pessimistic description of the general misery and the danger of annihilation of Baltic German culture, and its claim that the only escape from this hopeless situation would be the annexation of the Baltic states to Germany. In addition, large-scale campaigns were conducted to collect signatures from the population – even from Estonians – to a call for annexation of the Baltic states to Germany. The action enjoyed very limited success.[19]

A central figure among those representing the Knighthoods on the issues of Baltic national status and political structure was Heinrich von Stryk. From the beginning, he was among the most energetic supporters of the idea of annexing the Baltic lands to Germany. As early as the winter of 1916–1917, a special delegation of the Knighthoods led by Stryk was sent to Germany to explore the possibility of dispatching the German Army into the Baltics. This mission and the plan to join the Baltic lands to Germany were the focus of Stryk's activities for the next several years. To this end, he maintained constant contact with German government organs through both correspondence and personal meetings. Also, the official declaration of the Baltic Knighthoods of January 3, 1918 regarding the secession of the Baltic lands from Russia was edited by Stryk.

The Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918 dealt a tremendous blow to Baltic Germans, because it did not provide for the unification of the Baltic lands with Germany, but merely the placement of the region under German police authority, until the issue of its national status could be finally resolved with a general peace treaty. The Estland and Livland Knighthoods reacted to this at their April 1918 joint Provincial Assembly session in Riga, where they approved a decision to send a written appeal to Kaiser Wilhelm II, asking Germany to take the Baltic lands under its protective wing and annex them in personal union to the Prussian king as a permanent part of Germany. The appeal was to be delivered to the Kaiser personally by a special delegation. Stryk played an important role in the Baltic German Land Council as well as the delegation of Knighthoods.[20]

However, in the summer and fall of 1918, Stryk changed his focus. Going against most of the leaders of the Knighthoods, who continued to see the annexation of the Baltic lands to Germany as the only possible solution to the issue of their national status, Stryk launched a new project with the goal of forming a unified independent Baltic state. There were two reasons for his change of heart. First, the ever deepening democratization of the government in Germany could endanger the nobility's leading role in the Baltic lands, since this role was founded on a social order that was based on class privilege. Additionally, Stryk,

[19] **Piip,** *Tormine aasta,* p. 47–48; **Laaman,** *Eesti iseseisvuse sünd;* **von Taube,** "Die deutsch-baltische Führungsschicht"; **W. Lenz sen.,** "Eine Kundgebung deutscher Vereine in Riga am 23.12.1917," *Jahrbuch des baltischen Deutschtums* 21 (1973), pp. 61–67.

[20] **von Taube,** "Die deutsch-baltische Führungsschicht" and "Von Brest-Litovsk bis Libau."

a man who knew the situation in Germany very well, had already foreseen the inevitable defeat of the German Empire in the World War, which would thwart the annexation of the Baltic states to Germany. Since the issue of the national status of the Baltic lands would be brought up and resolved at the upcoming general peace conference, the Western allies would certainly have a weighty say in the matter. England was one country that would never agree to let Germany annex the Baltic lands.

The final blow to the planned Prussian-Baltic personal union was dealt by the German government's public criticism of this project in September 1918, which came hand-in-hand with the Kaiser's recognition of Estonian and Livonian independence and the Estonian Diet as the highest authority in the land, despite the fact that the Baltic Regency Council had officially appealed to the German government not to do so.[21] This event deepened the Baltic nobility's critical opinion of Germany. The issue became particularly topical with the departure of German occupation forces from the Baltics in autumn 1918, when the political vacuum began endangering the Baltic German ethnic group's social position and physical security. Stryk immediately entered negotiations with German ruling circles on keeping the German Army deployed in the Baltics. He took a rather inflexible stance at these negotiations, threatening to subvert the German government in the face of the communist threat by revealing an appeal to the entire world ("*Hilferuf an die Welt*"), unless it came to the aid of the Baltic Germans. The threat was never carried out, since the German Empire collapsed a few weeks later as revolution swept the country.[22]

During this process, Stryk presented the nobility with an ultimatum asking for unlimited authority in the creation of an independent unified Baltic state. The United Baltic Land Council granted him the authority to serve as the "Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Baltic Lands" in November 1918. Stryk planned the new state as a duchy – now under Mecklenburg Duke Adolf Friedrich – since the privileged position of the nobility could be guaranteed only under a monarchal system of government. With his authority, Stryk now began attempting to establish relations even with the Western Allies, seeking their recognition of the planned Baltic Duchy. However, these attempts failed when he was rebuffed by the British as well as the French, and the Estonian political circles from whom Stryk was now attempting to mobilize support categorically rejected any kind of co-operation with him or the Baltic Regency Council. Stryk would not be deterred, now turning to seek assistance from Sweden.[23]

On October 22, 1918, the Swedish embassy in Berlin sent a notice to the Swedish Foreign Ministry saying that "the Livland Land Marshal Heinrich von Stryk" was coming to Stockholm, requesting an audience with the Swedish foreign minister and planning to contact representatives of the *Entente* states as well. In Stryk's opinion, the purpose of his meeting was the need to discuss the issue of the national status and organization of the Baltic lands in the face of the Communist threat. Sweden had now risen to a prominent position in Stryk's plans. In the power vacuum created by the collapse of Tsarist Russia, Stryk realized the necessity of returning to the capitulation documents of 1710 and the Uusikaupunki (Nystad) Peace Treaty of 1721, with which Sweden relinquished Estland and Livland to Russia. Sweden would thus be an important participant in the creation of the Baltics' future national order.[24]

A few weeks later, Stryk personally handed over a note with this suggestion to Swedish Foreign Minister Johannes Hellner in Stockholm. In its introductory segment, he described the latest general developments in the Baltic states, mentioning only the Knigt-

[21] **Piip,** *Tormine aasta;* **Laaman,** *Eesti iseseisvuse sünd;* **von Taube,** "Von Brest-Litovsk bis Libau."
[22] **von Taube,** "Von Brest-Litovsk bis Libau," p. 151–152.
[23] **Piip,** *Tormine aasta;* **Laaman,** *Eesti iseseisvuse sünd;* **von Taube,** "Von Brest-Litovsk bis Libau."
[24] From the Swedish Embassy in Berlin to the Swedish Foreign Ministry Oct. 22, 1918, Swedish State Archives, Foreign Ministry Archives UD 1902, 6 A 38, vol. 287.

hoods and their agencies as organizers of public authority. Unabashedly, he assures them that conditions are ripe for the various ethnic groups to unite under the leadership of the nobles' Land Council to establish a new order. Stryk asked the Swedish government, in co-operation with the British government, to recognize the nobility's united Land Council as the highest political authority in the Baltic lands, and to support the new order in the Baltics within the international family of nations by providing its guardianship.[25]

Stryk provided a detailed description of his plan for the new order in the Baltic lands in his lengthy memorandum of January 6, 1919, which he submitted to Foreign Minister Hellner in his own name a few days later.[26] Stryk began by explaining the historical background of the prevailing chaos, seeing the "aggressive nationalistic chauvinism" of the Estonians and Latvians as the main reason for the intense domestic discord. To save the entire region from total anarchy, the various national groups would have to start co-operating in the construction of social order. Stryk regarded Switzerland as the model of national domestic order, where different nationalities are allowed to manage their own domestic affairs. To this end, the Baltic states were to be divided into six cantons: Estonia, Northern Livland, Southern Livland, Saaremaa Island, Courland and the city of Riga and its environs. Each canton would have its own parliament in which different nationalities would be proportionally represented. Additionally, a national parliament would be formed to provide for common needs and to manage the entire Baltic region. This new national construct would have a common system of measurement and a common currency, and the inviolability of private property would be assured by law. General military service would be replaced by a professional paid army and a nationwide gendarmerie. Additionally, Stryk's memorandum includes outlines for an entire list of specific proposals for administrative and electoral procedures, organization of the judiciary, tax, and educational system. Despite the fact that the social order designed by Stryk for the new Baltic State was based upon formal proportionalism and equality among the various ethnic groups, the leading role was still assigned to Baltic Germans. Stryk insists that Kerensky's government made a tremendous mistake in handing political power over to the local Baltic governments, which were influenced by the values of supposedly uneducated Estonian and Latvian masses, whereas Baltic Germans made up 85% of the intelligentsia and comprised that stratum of society which had ruled the Baltic states up to this time, and which was the only one able to guarantee order in the current chaotic situation.

On the issue of the national status of the Baltic lands, Stryk categorically rejected all speculation regarding their annexation to Germany/Prussia and insisted that his belief was the prevailing one among Baltic Germans. The Western states allegedly had been led to believe that the opposite was true, thanks to inadequate information. However, Stryk could also envision a federative union of the Baltic lands with Russia, but only if a democratic order prevailed there. More precisely, Stryk defined the Baltic lands as a potential "tribute state" for Russia. In this case, Russia would represent the Baltics politically in international relations, but in trade relations the Baltic lands would establish direct ties with foreign markets. The domestic administration and social order of the Baltic lands would be fully autonomous. They would have their own national flag and would not be obligated to send Russia any troops in case of war. Stryk's discussion of the union of the Baltic lands with Russia was at least partially based on the fact

[25] **von Dellingshausen,** *Im Dienste der Heimat,* p. 346.

[26] Memorandum zur Lage im baltischen Gebiet vom 6. Januar 1919, Swedish State Archives, Foreign Ministry Archives UD 1902, 6 A 38, vol. 287. The cover page of the document bears the logo of "Baltische Landesvertretung" and includes a pencil notation in Swedish: "Forwarded to Estonian and Latvian representatives, but not yet to Clive and Morris." Clive was the British *chargé d´affaires* at the Stockholm embassy, and Morris was the U.S. ambassador in Stockholm. See also **von Taube,** "Von Brest-Litovsk bis Libau."

that one group of Baltic Germans supported this option ("*die russisch orientierten Balten*" – "Russia-oriented Balts"); a number of Baltic German officers had served in Judenich's army. Through their representatives at the Paris peace conference, this group was in contact with the Russian White politicians, who were very critical of Stryk's plan, which in their opinion did not take Russia's national interests sufficiently to heart.[27]

No notes remain of Foreign Minister Hellner's possible discussions with Stryk on the issues raised in the memorandum, neither is there any evidence of a written response to Stryk. However, Hellner has introduced and commented on Stryk's proposals to some extent in his long circular of February 3, 1919 addressed to all Swedish ambassadors in Europe, Washington, Tokyo and even Buenos Aires.[28] However, the circular focuses on describing the activities of Estonian national circles in creating an independent republic, giving separate mention to the application by Estonia's foreign delegation of February 4, 1918 for Swedish recognition of Estonia's Provisional Government. Foreign Minister Hellner explained Sweden's official stance to the embassies as follows: although Sweden is unable to extend formal recognition at the moment, it is prepared to enter into *de facto* relations with Estonia. Thus, the country of Estonia achieved initial recognition from Sweden as well as the great Western states, whereas the associations of Baltic German nobility represented by Stryk were recognized by no one but the German occupation government in the Baltics.

By autumn of 1919 it had become clear to the Baltic German nobility that any hope for support from the Western great powers for the creation of a united Baltic State (*Baltischer Gesamtstaat*) in place of the Republic of Estonia and the Republic of Latvia had vanished. And yet, some of the large Baltic landowners continued to fight for their interests, although most of them were now in exile and inclined to simply oppose Estonia's land reform. Again, Stryk stood at the front line of these activists. In the spring of 1920, when Soviet Russia had recognized Estonian independence with the Tartu Peace Treaty, and before the Western great powers had extended *de iure* recognition to the Republic of Estonia, Stryk was once again zealously at work in Stockholm to save whatever he could of his Baltic project, or to at least ensure that the Baltic political power structure would not consist of the Republic of Estonia and the Republic of Latvia.

By this time, Stryk's plans regarding Baltic national status had changed again, or rather, adapted to the circumstances. Now his goal was the annexation of the Baltic states to Sweden. In April 1920, Stryk submitted a number of proposals and their accompanying annexes to Sweden's new Foreign Minister Erik Palmstierna. In addition, he sent separate letters to the Swedish king, government, and commander of the general staff. It is interesting to note under whose mandate Stryk claimed to be operating. It is worth mentioning that he no longer presented himself as a representative of the Baltic Knighthoods, as he always had in the past, since by this time, the associations had lost their public status under law, which Sweden knew full well. Instead, Stryk claimed to be acting at the behest of "numerous political friends from Baltic bourgeois circles," and in other places, "on behalf of the country's bourgeoisie." Stryk insisted that he could not identify the members of the group of political friends under whose mandate he was acting, because it would place their existence in actual physical danger, since most of them live "under the dominion of the Estonian terrorists" ("*im Machtbereich der estnischen Terroristen*"; NB! – April 1920). Allegedly, it was not possible to conduct elections of delegates and collection of mandates, since most Baltic Germans had allegedly been sent into exile throughout the

[27] **von Taube,** "Von Brest-Litovsk bis Libau."

[28] Sveriges ställning till den baltiska frågan [The Swedish Position on the issue of the Baltic Lands], Foreign Ministry's circular to Swedish embassies, Swedish State Archives, Foreign Ministry Archives UD 1902, 6 A 38, vol. 287.

world. For this purpose, on behalf of moral justice, Stryk had taken it upon himself to present these positions and wishes on behalf of his compatriots.[29] Stryk's various proposals to the Swedish authorities contain a number of subtopics that converge into one general appeal for help, with the wording of each appeal adapted to the specific addressee.

Stryk always begins by painting a picture of the current situation in Estonia, using broad brush strokes of only black. The general situation is allegedly hopeless and bleak. He claims a great deficit of foods and everyday essential commodities. Health and other social services are nonexistent. The government allegedly cannot and will not improve conditions. A general economic and moral decay is rampant throughout the country. The life of the Baltic German ethnic group has been rendered particularly impossible. Baltic German property has been stolen by the Land Reform Law. Among the population, bitter conflicts abound that interfere with the work of building the state. Civil rights are allegedly threatened with total collapse – instead of personal freedoms, members of the Baltic German minority are forced into exile; instead of recognizing the principles of private property, the government is forcibly expropriating personal property. He also claims that instead of cultural development, all educational opportunities are in decline. Boundless intolerance has replaced ethnic tolerance. Instead of enforcing civic morality, a corrupt and unscrupulous bureaucracy is enticing its people into immorality. As a consequence of flawed economic management, productivity in all areas has all but vanished, making the further existence of this state impossible. The government's policies have allegedly thrust the entire country into misery, and if no help arrives by the eleventh hour, then anarchy and Communism will have free rein. This was Stryk's final conclusion.[30]

Using this scene of horror as his backdrop, Stryk told the Swedish authorities the details of his wishes and hopes for aid to the Baltic lands. Some of the requests for aid were very general, others quite detailed. In his letter to the king of Sweden, Stryk describes the reigning lawless situation in the Baltics, setting it up in contrast to the glorious, highly cultured social order that King Gustav Adolf had established during the Swedish reign. In his appeal, he expressed hope that the terror reigning in the Baltics could be defeated if His Majesty would grant them proper culture and the blessings of Swedish civilization ("*uns teilnehmen lassen an den Segnungen schwedischer Civilisation*").[31] Stryk was appealing for the king's general moral support without submitting any specific request, which is understandable due to the limits of the Swedish king's political power.

In his appeal to the Commander of the Swedish General Staff, Stryk's request for assistance is noticeably more formal. First, he refers to Sweden's grand tradition of being the defender of reformation and freedom of conscience, for which the Swedish Army has fought bravely and gloriously. Stryk hopes that the Swedish Army would now be prepared to defend civilization, culture and moral values in the Baltic states against the Soviet Russian threat from the east. He promises all manner of assistance from Baltic Germans to the Swedish Army. Younger military men who have acquired military experience in the *Landeswehr* and speak the local languages and are familiar with local conditions could serve the Swedish Army as interpreters and guides; higher-ranking soldiers could fulfill military administrative duties. Stryk also hopes that Swedish diplomats can convince the international political forum that Sweden's military intervention in the Baltic lands does not signify any kind of

[29] Swedish State Archives, Foreign Ministry Archives, Striderna i Östeuropa IV UD 1920, HP 1438.

[30] From Stryk to Foreign Minister Erik Palmstierna on April 22, 1920, with an annex entitled "Die Lage in Livland, Estland und der Insel Ösel im April 1920," Swedish State Archives, Foreign Ministry Archives UD 1920, HP 1438.

[31] From Stryk to the king of Sweden on April 22, 1920, Swedish State Archives, Foreign Ministry Archives UD 1920, HP 1438.

territorial conquest, but rather the assurance of the preservation of cultural and idealistic values, and the blocking of the anarchy, misery and Bolshevism spreading westward from Russia.[32]

The most weighty of Stryk's appeals to the Swedish authorities was, as could be expected, directed to the Swedish government. In it, Stryk explicitly states the ultimate goal of his plans – the placement of the Baltic countries under Swedish rule. Stryk outlines the planned united Swedish-Baltic state in eighteen points that deal with everything from determination of constitutional positions to the establishment of local administrative structures in the Baltic lands.[33]

First, Stryk asserts that the sovereign right over the Baltic lands, given to Tsarist Russia by the 1721 Peace Treaty of Uusikaupunki, should be returned to Sweden since Tsarist Russia has ceased to exist. This region must encompass all those lands that belonged to the Swedish crown in 1710. The peoples of the Baltic countries desire a strong royal authority centered in Stockholm and administered by the Swedish government. The diplomatic and consular legations will be placed under the respective Swedish organs of power. The central authority in the Baltics would be in the hands of a royal regent, and governors for the various provinces would be appointed by the king. Once the members of the League of Nations recognize Sweden's administrative mandate in the Baltics, the rights and functions of Estonia's and Latvia's current "provisional governments" must end – they will be transferred to the Swedish government. Baltic civil law has its historical origins in Low German, Roman and Swedish land law. It would be practical to adapt the local civil law to current Swedish law. Judges in the Baltic countries should be appointed by royal decree. Only Swedish currency should be legal tender in the Baltics. It would be necessary to declare the Gulf of Finland a neutral zone in which the Swedish Navy would be responsible for maintaining peace and order.

On the domestic order of the Baltic lands, Stryk feels that Baltic legations should be created at the royal government in Stockholm to inform and advise on issues of a local nature. Legations should be selected from among all the larger ethnic groups – Estonians, Latvians, Balts (i.e. Baltic Germans), Swedes and Jews, but not Russians. For the discussion of certain issues with foreign powers, the Swedish government can summon Baltic representatives to provide necessary information, if needed. The former provinces of Estland and Livland should stand as separate administrative districts, and Saaremaa should retain its previous special status. Advisory corporations should be elected to serve the various state administrative units. The status of Russian as the national language (in place since 1888) should be abolished and replaced with Swedish, also introducing opportunities for the teaching of Swedish in schools. At the same time, cultural and linguistic autonomy should be established for all ethnic groups in the Baltic lands. No ethnic group may be sacrificed to the interests of another ethnic group's economic, social, and cultural aspirations. This can be successfully guaranteed with the creation of local self-government bodies. Finally, Stryk presents the issue nearest and dearest to his heart: that the system of class privilege would be preserved by corporations – primarily, of course, the Baltic German Knighthoods – even if they are not granted any special political rights.

As he was carrying out his campaign in Stockholm in April 1920, Stryk was also forwarding copies of his appeals to the diplomatic representations of the United States and France to the Swedish Foreign Ministry.

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[32] From Stryk to the Commander of the Swedish General Staff, undated (April 1920), Swedish State Archives, Foreign Ministry Archives UD 1920, HP 1438.

[33] From Stryk to Foreign Minister Erik Palmstierna on April 22, 1920, undated annex "Zur Information der Königlichen Regierung über die Wünsche und Hoffnungen der Livländer, Estländer und Bewohner Ösels," Swedish State Archives, Foreign Ministry Archives UD 1920, HP 1438.

He describes the difficult economic situation and injustice in the Baltics, where people long for the return of the old Swedish times, which he describes in glowing, positive terms. For this reason, Stryk appeals to the U.S. and French governments to persuade the League of Nations to allow the re-incorporation of the Baltic lands into Sweden. Stryk praises the United States for never trusting the political maturity and economic viability of the Republic of Estonia, and thereby refraining from recognizing this provisional phenomenon ("*diesem Provisorium ihre Zustimmung versagt*"). Thus, the U.S. has assessed the situation more correctly than, for instance, England. In his appeal to France, Stryk flatters this country by saying that the "syndicate of Baltic forest owners" has decided to lend its assistance to post-war restoration work being carried out in France.[34]

As an experienced political tactician, Stryk knew full well that he could not simply state all his endeavors and wishes, but had to present them in terms that were palatable to the Swedes. One prevalent topic in all of Stryk's writings is his recollection of the good old Swedish times, when Sweden decisively protected the Baltic lands and Protestantism from the conquest-hungry Orthodox Russia and Catholic Poland. With deep gratitude, he recalls Gustav Adolf and Queen Kristina, at whose initiative a series of fundamental reforms were carried out, and an order established that would endure for centuries. Wisely, Stryk neglects to mention King Karl XI's great move to nationalize the nobles' estates, an action that caused extremely bitter conflicts between the nobility of the Baltic lands and the Swedish royal monarchy.[35]

Stryk continues his discussion by admitting that one question will naturally arise: how will the reinstatement of Swedish rule in the Baltics benefit the Swedish people? He lists three shortcomings that are hampering Sweden's own development. First, dependency on food imports, particularly grain; second, lack of employment opportunities for Swedish intellectuals; third, a dearth of markets for Swedish industrial products. All these shortcomings could be essentially overcome with the integration of the Baltic lands into the Swedish state and economy. This issue had an additional political-strategic aspect: the Baltic countries, as part of the Swedish state, could effectively block the westward spread of Communism, which presented a significant threat to Sweden.

However, Stryk's weightiest arguments in favor of Sweden extending its power into the Baltic lands were economic in nature. In the incorporation of the Baltic lands, he foresaw the significant expansion of the Swedish trade and labor market, with Russian trade achieving an important role. Stryk was also optimistic about opportunities for obtaining loans from large Swedish and American banks for investment in the Baltics. This would also strengthen the unity of Swedish and Baltic interests. One particularly notable idea launched by Stryk was the colonization of the sparsely populated areas of the Baltic lands with Swedish peasants. For this purpose, 30% of the farmland of large landowners would be set aside, not from each manor separately, but larger conjoining areas would be selected at the mutual agreement of the manor lords to total 30% of all the farmland in the Baltics. Large settlements of Swedish colonists would be established here. It is not known how much of a mandate Stryk had been given by the Baltic German manor lords for the presentation of such a proposition, but their approval seems inconceivable. Perhaps Stryk was basing his plan on the expropriation of manor lands already in progress in Estonia?

However, in his grand plans for bringing the Baltic lands under Swedish rule Stryk recognized one serious problem, i.e. the poten-

[34] From Stryk to the U.S. State Department and the French ambassador in Stockholm, undated copies (April 1920), Swedish State Archives, Foreign Ministry Archives UD 1920. HP 1438.

[35] From Stryk to Foreign Minister Erik Palmstierna on April 22, 1920, Swedish State Archives, Foreign Ministry Archives UD 1920, HP 1438.

tial jealousy and opposition of neighboring states to Swedish territorial expansion. Taking this into consideration, he strung a few elements into his plan that would prevent international complications. Namely, Stryk also offered other countries the opportunity to participate in his Baltic lands project. For instance, he was prepared to relinquish to Norway the city of Riga, which was to become a free city as a Norwegian protectorate. Denmark would be given Viru County with its large forest preserves, and also the towns of Rakvere and Narva with their convenient trade routes into Russia. The Dutch would receive Liepaja and Ventspils to use for their trade. But Tallinn, as well as Pärnu, Haapsalu and Kuressaare – each with excellent harbors – and the rest of the country would stay under direct Swedish control. Thus, all possible interested parties would receive some compensation as co-partners in the new Swedish-ruled Baltic national formation. Moreover, such a resolution would create a strong international center of interests and power that would certainly stifle Russia's aggressive plans against the Baltics.[36]

Stryk's energetic activities in Stockholm in April 1920 apparently failed to elicit any response from Swedish authorities. At least, no copies of any letters to Stryk have been preserved in the Foreign Ministry archives. On the contrary, one of the letters he submitted to the Foreign Ministry bears a penciled note: "We do not need to express our opinion on this."

Each time adapting to the changing international situation, Stryk kept changing his final objective regarding the national status of the Baltic lands. His initial plan included the incorporation of the Baltic lands into the German empire, followed by a version that foresaw annexation to Germany in personal union with the Kingdom of Prussia. Next, Stryk supported the idea of a Baltic duchy ruled by a Mecklenburg prince, while simultaneously considering the possibility of forming a "Baltic tribute state" within Russia, if imperial unitary Russia could be reshaped into a federative state with national subdivisions. Then, Stryk devoted particular attention to the possibility of forming an independent, unified Baltic state according to the Swiss model. His final plan remained the placement of the Baltics under Swedish rule. With the unsuccessful campaign in Stockholm in April 1920, Stryk's efforts to resolve the issue of the Baltics' national status came to an end, and he left the political arena for good. It should be noted that in all of Stryk's activities described above, the main emphasis seemed to be on Estonia, rather than the Baltic lands as a whole.

It is worth mentioning here that the idea of re-uniting Estonia with Sweden was a live issue in quite a few different political circles at that time. During World War I, a determined ideological-political movement arose in Sweden, advocating an active Swedish foreign policy. These so-called activists, primarily from the conservative wing, demanded "the courageous joining of forces with Germany in the war against Russia." The activists envisioned the liberation of Finland and Estonia from Russian rule and their integration into some greater Nordic federation led by Sweden; the strategic border with Russia was to be restored as it existed during Gustav Adolf's time, bringing Estonia under Swedish rule once more. The work of these activists was the final expression of Sweden's 200-year-old revanchist plans regarding Russia.

After the February Revolution in Russia, the Estonian Diet, the newly created Estonian self-government body, discussed the issue of Estonia's future, stating worriedly that it would be hard for Estonia to defend itself as an independent state, once Russia and Germany recovered from the war and revolution and re-activated their earlier interest in the Baltic lands. Jaan Tõnisson, leading Estonian politican during the creation of the republic of Estonia, proposed the formation of a unified Estonian-Swedish state in such a situation. An Estonian foreign delegation submitted this idea to the Swedish authorities in 1918, but the

[36] Stryk's letters to Swedish authorities in April 1920, see reference nos. 29–35.

proposition was not well received by them.

The idea of the creation of a joint Estonian and Swedish state also came from another rather unexpected source. During World War I, "Estonia's national lone fighter" Aleksander Kesküla contrived all manner of plans for Estonia's future. He enjoyed close ties with high-level leaders of many governments and international movements, such as the German General Staff, Lenin's Bolsheviks, and Swedish Archbishop Nathan Söderblom, who was a key figure in the worldwide ecumenical movement. Since Kesküla's plans excluded any kind of national association with Russia and Germany, and since he also had no faith in Estonia's ability to survive as an independent state, he was left with the alternative of a united Swedish-Estonian state, and by extension, the dream of a common Nordic Federation to counterbalance Russia and Germany.[37] The plan of bringing Estonia under Swedish rule was apparently rather attractive to many circles. However, the Swedish activists, Estonian politicians, Aleksander Kesküla and Stryk never engaged in any co-operation or joint endeavors because the differences between the basic intentions of the interested parties were too great.

In addition to Stryk, another active figure of the Baltic nobility deserves mention, a man who also was concerned about the future of the Baltic lands' national status and organization – Hermann von Keyserling, the Count of Raikküla. In his opinion, the Estonians and Latvians lacked the maturity and experience for leading an independent state, and therefore, the only possible solution was to establish a common Baltic State ("*ein gesamtbaltischer Staat*") in place of several nation states. This new state, which would represent a connecting link between the Teutonic and Slavic worlds, could be created on the multiethnic Belgian model, providing favorable conditions for the creation a new Baltic nationality made up of Estonians, Latvians, Germans and Russians. This plan would also finally put an end to conflicts between the different ethnic groups. However, the Baltic Germans, as the highest-ranked ethnic group, should formally retain their superior position in this new state.[38] Since this was the idea of one isolated thinker, an idea that lacked a foothold in broader political circles, it never got got off the ground.

All the various proposals emerging from Baltic German circles on the national status of the Baltic lands included one common fundamental principle: anything but independent Estonian and Latvian republics, and preservation of Baltic German political and cultural superiority to the greatest extent possible.

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In addition to the Baltics' national status, there was another burning issue that set the Baltic German nobility on a collision course with officials of the Republic of Estonia – land reform. The Estonian Land Reform Law, which the Constituent Assembly approved on October 10, 1919 and which was the basis for the expropriation of the manors of the old nobility, aroused great bitterness among the Baltic German nobility. Land reform did not remain merely a domestic issue, but became a serious problem in the Estonian Republic's foreign relations sphere, thanks to the diligent efforts of the Baltic German nobility. Baron Stryk was one of the most active fighters on this front as well. In the numerous propagandistic proposals and detailed

[37] **Aleksander Loit,** "Das Baltikum in der Aussenpolitik Schwedens im 18.–20. Jahrhundert: Eine Übersicht" in Norbert Angermann, Michael Garleff und Wilhelm Lenz, eds., *Ostseeprovinzen, Baltische Staaten und das Nationale: Festschrift für Gert Pistohlkors zum 70. Geburtstag* (Münster, 2005), p. 84–85; **Aleksander Loit,** "Relationen mellan Estland och Sverige 1918–1940: En översikt," in *Eesti Teadusliku Seltsi Rootsis aastaraamat* [Annals of the Estonian Scientific Society in Sweden] 13 (Stockholm, 2006); K. Jaanson has recently written a series of articles about Kesküla: *Looming* 7 (1990), *Akadeemia* 9 (2000), and *Tuna* 1 (2003); 1 (2004) and 1, 4 (2005).

[38] **Laaman,** *Eesti iseseisvuse sünd,* p. 506–507; **Lenz jun.,** "Graf Hermann Keyserlings Bemühungen um Englands Beistand"; **von Taube,** "Von Brest-Litovsk bis Libau"; **Undusk,** "Eesti kui Belgia."

annexes describing the application of the Land Reform Law which he sent to foreign embassies, Stryk describes the misery that had now befallen the owners of expropriated large estates.

His criticism targeted the legitimacy of land reform, its illegality from the nobles' point of view, its blatant violation of the principles of inviolability of private property. The Baltic German nobility claimed that Estonia had broken its promise to the British government not to expropriate the estates of the Baltic German nobility, a particularly aggravating circumstance. Besides, the Land Reform Law did not prescribe any compensation for the estates, and not until much later, under international pressure, did Estonia's government decide to extend some compensation, which was well below the market price. Its critics also condemned the fact that nationalization of the estates affected only the members of the Baltic German ethnic group; however, this claim was not entirely true, since citizens of other states were also affected.

The aristocracy also directed their criticisms at the purportedly negative economic consequences of land reform. They claimed that the reforms were directly damaging to agricultural development, since the smoothly operating large farms were being fragmented into uneconomical "dwarf farms" ("*Zwergwirtschaften*"). Additionally, land in Saaremaa had been given to co-operatives that were allegedly bringing an end to individual management and paving the way for Communism. Forests were allegedly being devastated by widespread wasteful exploitation. Furthermore, not only estates, but also rural cultural centers were being destroyed. Stryk does not dispute the need for establishment of a national land fund, but he feels that it should be done by having the state purchase land for sale on the open real estate market instead of confiscating large farms.[39]

Stryk was instrumental in forwarding the Baltic German nobility's complaints about Estonian land reform to foreign legations. There were also other individuals from aristocratic circles who waged active propaganda campaigns against land reform in the international arena. A few examples follow.

On November 20, 1919, one of the leading figures of the Estland Knigthood, Baron Alfred von Schilling, sent a letter to the U.S. president Thomas Woodrow Wilson. He starts by referring approvingly to the president's peace program and particularly emphasizing the need to guarantee the existence and property of national minorities. This applies particularly to Estonia, where the Baltic German national group has been ruined by the expropriation of their estates, despite the fact that this ethnic group was the first to decisively step into the battle against Bolshevism together with Judenich's army. Schilling's son was one of those who fell in battle. Protecting the inviolability of private property is a crucial issue not only for his compatriots, says Schilling, but for the entire world, threatened with the spread of Bolshevism. The intervention of great powers can reverse these developments, thereby also indirectly mitigating the catastrophic consequences of Estonian land reform. To give his appeal more weight, Schilling has embellished his signature with the following titles: "ancien Président du Conseil du Pays d´Estonie, ancien Membre du Conseil de l´Empire de Russie, ancien Deputé de la Douma de l´Empire."[40]

On January 6, 1920, Schilling sent a similar letter to Marshal Ferdinand Foch at the Paris Peace Conference General Secretariat, where he once again drew attention to the disastrous consequences of Estonian land reform and warned him that the ever greater jeopardization of private property was threatening the entire bourgeois order and all bour-

[39] Stryk's letters to Swedish authorities in April 1920. See reference nos. 26 and 29–35.

[40] National Archives, Washington D.C, Records of the Department of State relating to internal affairs of Estonia 1910–1944, Decimal File 860 i, M 1170, Roll 4.

[41] Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office FO 371/3611.

geois social strata in the West.[41]

Count Keyserling was also sharply critical of Estonian land reform, forwarding his criticisms to Western politicians and publishing articles in the Western press. Keyserling was a personal friend of British Foreign Minister Arthur James Balfour, sending him reports of the problems caused by land reform and passing on the criticisms leveled by the Baltic German nobility. As an example of the disastrous consequences of land expropriation, he describes his own situation: he had lost all the capital he had invested in soil improvement, and this had brought about "the economic murder of our entire extended family."[42] In the British press, Keyserling explained the nature and outcome of land reform in detail, demanding that the Estonians should be forced to recognize the principle of inviolability of private property, which would eliminate "all Bolshevik experiments" for ever.[43]

Not only the leaders of the associations of Baltic German nobility, but also typical Baltic German manor lords did not shrink from protesting against Estonian land reform to high officials of Western states, nor asking these officials to exert their influence for the immediate repeal of the Land Reform Law. For instance, the Baroness Mary Ann Knorring of Kadavere Manor in Livonia, in a letter to British Foreign Minister Balfour on December 19, 1919, writes passionately and dazzlingly of the misfortune that has befallen her family. During the chaotic post-war years, the situation in the Republic of Estonia has become even worse. Under the Land Reform Law, the baroness lost her estate, for which she blamed the Republic of Estonia, its government, its politicians, and even the Estonian people. For this reason, the baroness asks Foreign Minister Balfour to use his influential position to help "a mother, in her desperate situation, to get back what was taken from her, and to help her family find their way back to the secure home of their forebears." The baroness also claims to be descended from a British line – "from a strong British family – Knorring."[44]

The Baltic German manor lords' opposition to Estonian land reform did not cease with the passage and application of the Land Reform Law, but lasted for years. However, they now focused their defensive battle toward receiving compensation for expropriated estates and the size of this compensation. The Compensation Law approved by the Estonian parliament (*Riigikogu*) in 1926 failed to satisfy the manor owners whose lands had been expropriated. Instead, it caused great concern, angry protests, and the sending of numerous petitions to foreign recipients throughout the world. One group of German citizens of Baltic German descent organized into a group called *The Union of the Former State Owners*, headquartered in the Baltic Trust Council in Berlin and having close ties with German government circles. The compensation issue was discussed at the League of Nations in 1926 and 1927, as the representatives of the nobility of the Baltic lands had succeeded in placing the issue on the agenda. A particularly energetic defender of the interests of Baltic German manor lords in this arena was Baron Alphons Heyking, a former diplomat of Tsarist Russia and its Consul General in London from 1908 to 1919, himself of Baltic German origin.[45] The opinions of the Western great powers about Estonian land reform were of

[42] From H. Keyserling to A. J. Balfour on May 10, 1919, July 1, 1920 (with annex: "Relation of the Baltic Party in the Sitting of the Estonian Constituent Assembly of June 29th 1920") and Aug. 22, 1920, Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office FO 371/3611 and 608/185.

[43] "The Baltic Problem," *Westminster Gazette,* June 18, 1919; "Esthonia's Future — The Land Question," *The Daily Telegraph,* Sept. 17, 1919; **Laaman,** *Eesti iseseisvuse sünd,* p. 631; **Rei,** *Mälestusi tormiselt teelt,* p. 259; **von Taube,** "Von Brest-Litovsk bis Libau," pp. 222, 233; **Undusk,** "Eesti kui Belgia," p. 59.

[44] Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office FO 371/3611.

[45] *Baltisches biographisches Lexikon,* p. 316–317; **Vahur Made, "**Eesti ja Rahvasteliit 1918–1925" [Estonia and the League of Nations] in Jüri Ant, ed., *Kaks algust: Eesti Vabariik — 1920. ja 1990. aastad [Two Beginnings: The Republic of Estonia in the 1920s and 1990s]. Ad Fontes,* vol. 3 (Tallinn, 1998), pp. 46–72.

great importance. Western powers embraced the principle of inviolability of private property. Therefore, American, French and English government circles, realizing that certain conflicts existed between this great principle and the practical needs of Estonian land reform, demanded that the reforms be adapted to bring them into line with president Wilson's 14th point. This demand for accommodation was linked to the full diplomatic *de iure* recognition of the Republic of Estonia.[46]

It is important to realize that England's official stance toward the Republic of Estonia and its land reform was notably more positive than that held by the U.S. and France. Many British politicians and some British journalists realized the necessity of land reform. One motive for this positive support may indeed have been England's desire to diminish German influence in the Baltics. The official English stance regarding Estonian land reform can be characterized by a note on the British Foreign Ministry's official cover letter regarding the appeal of Baron Schilling to Marshal Foch: "This appeal by a Baltic Baron to Marshal Foch against the Estonian Land reform is not a matter upon which the Allies can property interfere, even if they desired to do so. The Estonians must be allowed to decide their own agrarian policy."[47] It is clear that the issue of land reform in the Baltics was being followed with great interest internationally; this is evident also from the official correspondence of the great powers with their diplomatic embassies in Tallinn and Riga.[48]

Finally, it is worthwhile remembering in this context that differences of opinion on expropriation of estates existed among Estonian politicians as well. The Land Reform Law was approved by the Constituent Assembly by a majority of Labor Party and Social Democratic votes, while the conservative Farmers' Union, led by Päts, voted against it, and Tõnisson's National Liberal Party abstained.

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In its struggle to support a Baltic duchy and oppose the Republic of Estonia and its land reform, the Baltic German nobility sent foreign countries its propaganda, which contained extremely negative descriptions and appraisals of the Republic of Estonia, its government and policies, as well as the Estonian people themselves. The efforts of the master of Voltvet Manor, Baron Stryk, were particularly prominent in this campaign of slander. One of the typical methods he used to discredit the Estonian state, its institutions and politicians, and thus challenge their competence and legitimacy as well as damage their reputation, was to refer to them with the pejorative addition of "so-called" – "the so-called Constituent Assembly," "the so-called land reform," "the so-called Estonian intellectuals." The names "Republic of Estonia" and "Republic of Latvia" were actually never used in the dispatches going from the Baltic German Knighthoods to Western embassies, because the nobility refused to recognize these states. Instead, they referred to Estland and Livland, in which the highest public authority was the United Baltic Land Council, created by the nobles themselves. On those rare occasions when the Republic of Estonia is mentioned, it is always given the additional title of "dwarf state" ("*Zwergstaat*") or "provisional trial area" ("*provisorisches Versuchsgebiet*"). Also, the name "War of Independence" is never used, but rather referred to as the war against Com-

[46] **Mattisen,** *Tartu rahu*, pp. 259–265.

[47] Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office FO 371/3611.

[48] From the U.S. ambassador in Riga, F. W. B. Coleman, to the U.S. State Department on March 12, 1926, National Archives, Washington D.C., Departement of State 860 i 52/4; from U.S. Consul in Tallinn, Harry E. Carlson, to the U.S. State Department on Nov. 10, 1926 and Sept. 4, 1928, Department of State 860 i 52/6 and 52/16 (Annex: "Possible basis for Estonian Reply to the Balt Baron Land Reform Complaint to the League of Nations"); U.S. Consul in Tallinn, Harry E. Carlson, to the U.S. Department of State on Dec. 14, 1928, Department of State 860 i 52/23 (Annex: "German claims for Estonian Land Reform indemnification").

munist Russia, fought by the Baltic Germans' *Landeswehr*, together with Judenich's Northwestern Army and Finnish volunteers – and "a small number of Estonians."

According to all the Baltic German missives, the overall situation of economic, legal, health, and other public services in Estonia was catastrophic. The Estonian government and officials were to blame. A few examples follow.

Government policies allegedly mock all concepts of justice and morality. The worst kind of economic mismanagement is taking place, and the situation in Estonia is comparable to that in Armenia. The entire country has been thrust into misery, which is opening the door to anarchy and Communism. Terror allegedly reigns in Estonia. National leaders have enticed the population into depravity and disdain for the law. The false teachings of Communism have united with national chauvinism, and the governing authorities have driven the land into moral and economic decay. The government comprises a small band of Estonian chauvinist-Communist terrorists. The officialdom that regularly inflicts terror in conjunction with a small band of Communists can be characterized by indecency, dilettantism, heartlessness and pervasive corruption.

The social democrat Rei, chairman of the Constituent Assembly, is said to be "actually the Communist Rei." Päts's government is portrayed as "semi-Bolshevik." Even Commander-in-Chief Laidoner is a Bolshevik, and the Estonian Labor Party is "basically Bolshevik." Land reform mocks every concept of justice. It has brought about the creation of a large number of economically unjustifiable "dwarf farms." Land reform is characterized as "*cette loi monstreuse,*" "*cette desastreuse loi agraire,*" "is not to be distinguished from Bolshevism," "the greed of the Red rule" and "such a robbery." Nor are the Estonian people spared any invective: the Estonians are incapable of defending and governing their own state, "they are good friends of Bolshevism, the enemy of humankind," "the so-called Estonian intellectuals support Asiatic Bolshevism," "the chauvinistic irritation of the Estonians" and "the false teachings of Communism are linked with national chauvinism."[49]

To one of the letters he sent to the Swedish Foreign Minister Palmstierna, Stryk added a copy of a 12-page report on the situation in Estonia in April 1920. The report had been written by a Dane whose identity Stryk fails to reveal, but whom he refers to as an "impartial expert." Actually, the report on Estonia is as negative as Stryk's own opinions. The Dane states that Estonia suffers from a tremendous lack of educated and politically experienced people. Why else could a man like Tõnisson become Prime Minister? The Dane describes him as a vain and insatiably ambitious and power-hungry person. Parliament members include hardly anyone suitable for introducing to outsiders; the full list of "semi-educated Estonians" ("*halbkultivierten Esten*") includes at best only Päts, Poska, Olesk, and Piip at best. The bloated bureaucracy is allegedly corrupt through and through. The difference between Estonian governmental circles and Russian Bolshevism is only a small matter of degree. An effectively operating Bolshevism reigns in Estonia, and Tõnisson's government is described as "government Bolshevism" ("*Regierungs-Bolschewismus*"). Land reform is an insanely chauvinistic act, and giving the uneducated Estonian people the right to vote is a fatal error. In the long run, the preservation of Estonian independence is completely unthinkable, claims the Dane.[50]

These circumstances give cause to take a separate look at Keyserling's attitude toward the Republic of Estonia, its policies, and Estonians in general. The first reason is be-

[49] Documentation can be found in reference nos. 26, 29–35 and 40–44.

[50] From Stryk to Foreign Minister Palmstierna on May 14, 1920, Annex: "Bericht über meine Reise in den früheren russischen Ostseeprovinzen," April 1920 (unsigned), Swedish State Archives, Foreign Ministry Archives UD 1920, HP 1438.

cause in contrast to his compeers, Keyserling promoted active co-operation with Estonian politicians, and the second reason is because of the highly positive assessment given to Keyserling by Estonia's contemporary cultural history.[51] We have already mentioned Keyserling's desire to resolve the issue of the national status of the Baltic lands with the creation of a Pan-Baltic conglomerate state, following the example of Belgium. Keyserling lacked faith in the Estonian republic's ability to survive, and even more important – as a matter of principle, he vehemently opposed the creation of small nation-states. Furthermore, he was sharply critical of the young Republic of Estonia in its early form. Because the country lacked a class of people that could support the state, the entire Baltic region should be placed under international control. According to him, the government leaders and politicians of that time were, for the most part, naïve lawyers with an inclination toward socialism. Estonia's Labor party was allegedly basically Bolshevist. "Nothing is more characteristic of Estonia than the fact that the spirit of Leninism is apparent in its organization of government in the form of a semi-Prussian militarism."[52]

Keyserling is also extremely pessimistic about the Estonians' ability to establish the solid political foundation required by any well-functioning state. The uneducated Estonian masses had never ruled themselves, and in his opinion, were unprepared to do so now; the people have no knowledge of economics, nor do they understand the propositions and laws to which they give their consent, and they are prepared to engage in all manner of frightening experiments. Estonians stand very close to Bolshevism, and lack respect for private property and individual rights. A vast majority of Estonians support moderate Bolshevism as the only political system they find directly attractive. And yet, Keyserling suggests co-operating with the Estonians, but on Baltic German terms. In contrast to the Estonians' inability to establish and govern their own state, Keyserling brings forth the efficiency of the Baltic Germans, which would be a determining factor in the Baltic union he was planning; after all, Baltic Germans made up 85% of the entire region's intelligentsia. In this new state, the Baltic Germans would hold a position of superiority – they would mold leaders and representatives born from their own kind; they would become the "actual spine" of this new Baltic nation, and the Baltic German nobility would be the "first embodiment of the spirit of the Baltic nation."[53]

In the 1920s, the idea of democracy was already deeply rooted, at least in Europe, finding practical application in new constitutions and the organization of national life. Looking at these opinions of Keyserling's, it is evident that the otherwise progressive great thinker had missed the boat. His position on the dominant status of the Baltic German minority – 5% of the Estonian population – in his Pan-Baltic dream state which would preserve the status of nobility is sadly disconnected from the democratic mindset. It seems

[51] **Undusk,** "Eesti kui Belgia," pp. 48–71; **Jaan Undusk,** "Keyserling 2003: Mõtteid rahvusvahelise sümpoosioni järel" [Keyserling 2003: Thoughts Following the International Symposium], *Tuna* 1 (2004), pp. 141–150; **von Wistinghausen,** "Krahv Hermann Keyserlingi konflikt eestimaalastest rahvuskaaslastega 1917–1918"; H. Keyserling's "Travels in India" have also been translated into Estonian: **Alexander Staël von Holstein, Hermann von Keyserling,** *India-reisid. Loomingu Raamatukogu* 9/10 (1991).

[52] **Hermann von Keyserling** (under the pseudonym **Yrjö Lemminkäinen**), "Die politische Bedeutung von Estland: Das Verhältnis zum Bolschewismus," *Neue Freie Presse* (Vienna), Jan. 8, 1921. Quote as translated by Undusk in "Eesti kui Belgia," p. 73.

[53] Keyserling's articles in the *Westminster Gazette,* June 18, 1919, *The Daily Telegraph,* Sept. 17, 1919, and *Neue Freie Presse,* January 8, 1921 (see footnotes no. 43 and 52); from Keyserling to Balfour, May 10, 1919 (see footnote no. 42); **Laaman,** *Eesti iseseisvuse sünd,* p. 197, 506–507, 631–632; **Lenz jun.,** "Graf Hermann Keyserlings Bemühungen um Englands Beistand"; **von Taube,** "Von Brest-Litovsk bis Libau," pp. 116, 233–234. See also Keyserling's memoirs: **Hermann von Keyserling,** *Reise durch die Zeit, 1: Ursprünge und Entfaltungen* (Innsbruck, 1948).

that Keyserling lacks not only an understanding of the opportunities and premises for the development of an Estonian state, but even a desire to understand that Estonia's new national and public life could no longer be built on a foundation of obsolete social structures and social relationships. This world-savvy traveler and renowned thinker, a cosmopolitan and liberal, showed that he was inwardly still hopelessly shackled to his noble heritage. The grand principles of this enlightened aristocrat impacted with a crash against the vital needs of a nation of supposed bumpkins wanting to better their lives. The legal aspect of conservative barons now stood in confrontation with the social aspect of a people winning their freedom.

For this reason, Jaan Undusk's attempt to save Keyserling's honor ("*Ehrenrettung*") should give us pause. Criticizing the opinions that historians and the Estonian police of that time had about Keyserling, Undusk writes that "at any rate, it is today no longer appropriate to simply state that Keyserling had 'a hostile inclination toward the Republic of Estonia' and 'engaged in anti-Estonian propaganda in the British press'."[54] Must we not actually do the opposite? It would today no longer be appropriate to suppress and smooth over Keyserling's documented skepticism, if not altogether openly negative attitude toward the Estonians' struggle for independence. He gave the Republic of Estonia a failing grade in theory as well as in practice. The national republic of Estonia was dramatically different from Keyserling's Belgian model. It is impossible to support two diametrically opposite alternatives at once. Consequently, if he is not for, then he is against. Keyserling had no faith in the Estonian people as the citizens of a civilized country.

If we minimize the Baltic German nobility's and Keyserling's critical attitudes and active efforts to oppose the Republic of Estonia, we are guilty of revising history, as well as of gross disrespect for the Estonian politicians and diplomats of that time, who worked in extremely difficult circumstances to mold Estonia into an equal partner within the international family of nations. Keyserling's work as a philosopher is certainly deserving of accolades. But in the end, his political and social convictions and actions certainly do not give Estonians any reason to bow and scrape before him. Even Wilhelm Lenz Jr., a historian from a well-known family of Baltic German intellectuals, acknowledges that that the ultimate goal of Keyserling's Baltic activities was still nothing more than the protection of the interests of a specific social class.[55]

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Of course, the anti-Estonian activities of the Baltic Germans in the government circles of other countries did not go unnoticed by the Estonian politicians and diplomats. For this reason, in addition to their work of generally enlightening the world about Estonia's problems, they had to issue constant protests against the false information and the straight-out slander spread by the Baltic Germans. The fact that Estonia's diplomatic relations had not yet been fully established, and that limited financial resources limited the number of Estonian representatives in foreign lands, and that these representatives often lacked a diplomatic education, was cause for worry. To make things even more difficult, the foreign politicians, diplomats and higher officials included a large number of persons of noble birth who were sympathetic to their compeers in the Baltic lands. Despite these obstacles, Estonia's diplomatic legations succeeded in actively parrying the attacks directed at Estonia.

In the spring of 1918, the Estonian government and Estonian Diet sent the German government and State Chancellor two letters sharply protesting the Baltic German nobility's arbitrary claim to the highest authority within

[54] **Undusk,** "Eesti kui Belgia," p. 49–50.
[55] **Lenz jun,** "Graf Hermann Keyserlings Bemühungen um Englands Beistand," p. 73.

Estonia and representation of the Estonian people, and their plans to unite the Baltic lands with Germany.[56] On September 24, 1918, German Vice Chancellor von Payer submitted a report in the Imperial Diet Committee containing certain "intentions" regarding Estonia. The Estonian diplomatic representation responded by issuing a French-language protest – for the benefit of the international community – which included the following points: Germany had not yet withdrawn its military units from the Baltic lands, in accordance with the Brest-Litovsk armistice, and was to do so immediately; German Army units were supporting the Baltic German *Landeswehr* against the government of Estonia; Germany must abandon its plans to annex the Baltic lands as vassal states; all Estonians arrested by the German Army on political grounds were to be released immediately, and Estonia was to be allowed to form its own military forces.[57]

In a personal letter to British Foreign Minister Balfour on November 5, 1918, a member of Estonia's foreign legation, Ants Piip, rebuts various accusations by the Baltic Germans regarding Estonian policies, and specifically condemns the Baltic German Land Council's plan to organize elections of Baltic representatives, which all of Estonia's political parties had decided to boycott.[58]

The Estonian Special Delegation Abroad made a number of appeals to representatives of Western states protesting the descriptions given by Baltic German circles of the situation in Estonia and rebutting the falsehoods they contained. In a letter to one of the British Labor Party's leading figures, Ramsay Macdonald, the delegation asks him to inform the "British workmen" on the actual situation in Estonia, about which anti-Estonian forces were spreading distortions, claiming the existence of a Bolshevist order in the country.[59]

The Special Delegation submitted a sharp protest against Stryk's propaganda, particularly condemning Stryk's insult of the Estonian government, wich Stryk had characterized as the semi-Bolshevik government of Päts. Copies of the protest were also forwarded to the Foreign Ministries of Great Britain and France.[60]

The Latvians also protested energetically against the propaganda directed at the Western states by the Baltic Germans. The Information Office of the Latvian Provisional Government in Stockholm reacted vehemently in some Swedish newspapers, apparently in response to negative descriptions of the situation in Latvia, inspired by Stryk. The Office appealed to the Swedish public with its report "The Baltic Barons and Their Practices," which refuted the false information published in the newspapers and also exposed Stryk's plot to overthrow the legitimate Latvian government.[61] Keyserling's idea of one multinational Baltic state patterned after Belgium, which he published in *The Westminster Gazette*, immediately garnered a sharp polemical response in the same paper from the Latvian ambassador in London, who asserted that no matter how Keyserling structured his planned state, all the actual power would still remain in the hands of the Baltic barons.[62]

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[56] Both letters, "An die deutsche Reichsregierung" March 21, 1918 and "Deutscher Reichskanzler, Kopie Staatssekretär des Auswärtigen" April 17, 1918 are published in: *Pour l´Esthonie indépendente: Recueil des documents diplomatiques publié par La Délegation Esthonienne* (Copenhagen, MCMXVIII), pp. 20–26.

[57] "Protestation," Copenhagen Oct. 5, 1918, signed by J. Tõnisson, K. Menning, M. Martna and E. Virgo, Swedish State Archives, Foreign Ministry Archives UD 1902, 6 A 38, vol. 287.

[58] **Piip,** *Tormine aasta,* p. 328.

[59] Estonia's Special Delegation: An open letter to Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, Dec. 3, 1918, Swedish State Archives, Foreign Ministry Archives UD 1902 6 A 38, vol. 287.

[60] From the Estonian Special Delegation to the Swedish Foreign Minister on Dec. 7, 1918, Swedish State Archives, Foreign Ministry Archives UD 1902 6 A 38, vol 287.

[61] "De baltiska baronerna och deras praktik," ERA 1621-1-173, p. 119–122.

[62] *The Westminster Gazette,* June 18, 1919; **Lenz jun.,** "Graf Hermann Keyserlings Bemühungen um Englands Beistand," p. 71.

It is hard to ascertain exactly how effective these protests were, but their significance lies in the fact that the Western states now had an opposing viewpoint to the Baltic German version on which to base their stance. The anti-Estonian and anti-Latvian propaganda emanating from the Baltic German Knighthoods was not being sent only to governmental bodies of foreign states, but also business circles and social organizations. A good example of the latter is the Swedish Red Cross.

During the War of Independence, Estonia received a substantial amount of humanitarian aid from foreign countries, primarily from the U.S. Red Cross. However, the Red Cross in Sweden was a peculiar case. In early 1919, Estonian authorities requested the gift of an ambulance from the Swedish Red Cross. The request was denied many times. Gustav Suits, director of the Estonian Information Office in Stockholm at that time, was involved with this endeavor. Suits was extremely critical of the Swedish Red Cross management, "before whose magnates he was forced to bow."[63]

The reservations of the Swedish Red Cross about providing aid to Estonia can be explained mainly by the fact that the organization's management was dominated by members of the conservative upper class, many of them aristocrats who were deeply influenced by the Baltic Germans' anti-Estonia propaganda. The Estonian Special Delegation in Stockholm knew this full well, informing the Estonian Embassy in Paris with the following note: "The Swedish Red Cross finally gave us official notice that it will extend no aid to Estonia, although it has a fund totaling 100,000 crowns, which they had not been able to use up during their previous campaign to assist Finland. This decision is, of course, dependent to a certain extent on the mistrust and the blatantly untruthful information that our barons are most painstakingly and cold-heartedly disseminating against our endeavors in the local official circles, with whom they have long-running ties."[64]

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There is one interesting question for our contemplation: what effect did the Baltic Germans' anti-Estonian campaigns have on the official circles of the Western great powers? The Baltic German nobility placed its hopes primarily on the United States and France, who took a more critical stance regarding the establishment of an independent Estonian state than England.[65] United States official policy tried to dissuade the Estonians from the utopian idea of independence ("unrealistic dream"), suggesting instead that they join the democratic Russia of the future, in which, however, the Baltic Germans would continue to enjoy a dominant status – at least that is what the nobility hoped. A logical outcome of this Baltic policy was the much later *de iure* recognition of the new Baltic republics by the United States, compared to other Western states.[66]

It was in France's interest to preserve a modernized Tsarist Russia – mostly to ensure the repayment of the huge loans it had extended to Russia – and therefore, France stood against the division of Russia into independent nation-states. One of the most specific expressions of this policy was the sharp

[63] **Gustav Suits,** "Päevaraamat 1919" [Diary 1919], *Tulimuld* 1 (1977), p. 14–15.

[64] From the Estonian Special Delegation in Stockholm to the Estonian embassy in Paris on April 8, 1919, ERA 1587, Estonian embassy in Stockholm 1918–1940; **Laaman,** *Eesti iseseisvuse sünd;* **Aleksander Loit,** "Välismaa humanitaarabi Eestile Vabadussõja ajal 1919–1922" [Foreign Humanitarian Aid to Estonia During the War of Independence 1919–1922], *Acta Historica Tallinnensia* 6 (2002), p. 70–83.

[65] E. Anderson has discussed the general attitude of the Western states regarding the Baltic republics. Die baltische Frage und die internationale Politik der Allierten und Assozierten Mächte bis zum November 1918 and 1918–1921. *Von den baltischen Provinzen zu den baltischen Staaten 1917–1918*, pp. 255–259 and *Von den baltischen Provinzen zu den baltischen Staaten 1918–1920,* pp. 329–333, 348–356, 371–377.

[66] **Laaman,** *Eesti iseseisvuse sünd,* p. 323.

protest made by General Etivant, the French representative in the Baltic region, against the Estonian government, which refused to help the Russian White Army, but instead took the weapons of the disintegrating army of Judenich that was retreating into Estonia. For this, the French general blamed the Estonian Army Commander-in-Chief Laidoner, calling him a "Bolshevik."[67]

England's primary interest in the Baltics was the lessening of German influence. This was the reason for England's reserved official stance regarding the Baltic German issue. It also had another effect – a certain good will toward the Estonians' national endeavors. This was clearly expressed in meetings of Estonian representatives with English politicians and diplomats.[68]

One place in which England's official stance toward the Baltic Germans, generally called "the Baltic barons," becomes evident is an English report from occupation-era Tallinn to the Foreign Ministry in London in the fall of 1918. First of all, the report describes the violent abuse of power by the German Army "which is supported by the Baltic barons and other local pan-German elements." This is followed by a brief characterization of the Baltic Germans: "By this treacherous conduct of the Baltic German element, and especially by barons such as Baron Pilar von Pilchau, Dellingshausen, von Stryk, Bevern etc., who from loyal Tzarist subjects changed at once to loyal subjects of the Revolutionary Government, then with least possible delay became humble and loyal subjects of Kaiser Wilhelm and who now, after the fall of the Prussian crown, will create an aristocratic Baltic state, intending in this way to abolish the absolutely necessary agrarian reform, to distribute the vast estates to people desiring land as smallholders, this conduct, it is believed, will certainly aggravate even the most cold-blooded Estonian element." Estonians are characterized here as committed opponents of Germany and Baltic Germans. The accusation leveled by the Baltic Germans claiming that Estonians are revolutionaries is incorrect. "The Estonians are a very calm race" and they are only fighting for their own freedom. For this reason, providing the Estonian Army with weapons is the most urgent task of the British Navy.[69]

Most of the Baltic German memorandums and appeals directed toward foreign countries were addressed to the Swedish authorities. However, there is no evidence of responses or any other kind of reaction to these missives. There are also no records of any oral discussions between representatives of the Baltic nobility and Swedish officials, although Stryk had requested this numerous times. Instead, the Swedish Foreign Ministry gave copies of Stryk's documents to the Estonian and Latvian representatives in Stockholm for their perusal. This indicates that Sweden had official relations with the legitimate institutions of Estonia and Latvia, but not with the Baltic German Knighthoods.[70]

It is certain that the position of Western great powers regarding Estonia's independence and land reform was formulated on the basis of their own interests, and not, in the final analysis influence of the Baltic German nobility's propaganda. The Western states never entered into official talks with representatives of the nobility. At yet, we cannot dismiss the fact that these appeals of the

[67] **Laaman,** *Eesti iseseisvuse sünd,* p. 677; **Rei,** *Mälestusi tormiselt teelt,* p. 260.

[68] From A. J. Balfour to E. Virgo, A. Piip and K. Pusta on May 3, 1918, Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office FO 71866/W 38; **Piip,** *Tormine aasta,* pp. 247–254, 340–342; **Laaman,** *Eesti iseseisvuse sünd,* p. 341–342; **von Taube,** "Von Brest-Litovsk bis Libau," p. 217.

[69] Confidential report "Serious situation in Estonia," undated (fall of 1918), Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office FO 371, vol. 3344; Memorandum of British Consul General in Tallinn, V. H. C. Bosanquet, to Earl Curzon on Nov. 1, 1919, Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office FO 419, vol. 1.

[70] Stryk's "Memorandum" Jan. 10, 1919, Swedish State Archives, Foreign Ministry Archives UD 1902, 6 A 38, vol. 287.

nobility had a certain indirect and psychological influence on international policy. It annoyed Estonian politicians and diplomats most when they were forced to constantly defend against false accusations which claimed that Estonia's state, government and people had a Bolshevist mindset. The accusers tried to prove this with references to land reform, claiming that it was incompatible with the principle of inviolability of private property – a cornerstone of Western democracy. Finally, however, the young Baltic republics succeeded in defending their land reforms in the international forum. Incidentally, land reforms were being initiated in a large number of other countries as well, although they were not as radical as those in Estonia and Latvia. We might pose the ironic question: To what extent did the Baltic German manor lords honor the principle of the inviolability of the private property of their peasant serfs during their centuries of serfdom? Historical development, just like absolute justice, can never be reduced to lofty principles, which are always formulated by those who will benefit from them.

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In place of a summary – some food for thought.

This article has given additional information about events that are already well known in general terms, i.e. the opposition of the Baltic German aristocracy to the creation and land reforms of the Republic of Estonia. And yet, we must recognize that by far not all Baltic Germans, and even not all noble-blooded manor owners shared the negative views about the Republic of Estonia propagated by the aristocratic activists. One good example is the Livland Land Marshal (*Ritterschaftshauptmann*) Otto von Lilienfeld, who had close ties with Estonian politicians, supported the Republic of Estonia, and was surprisingly accommodating of land reform.[71] A large segment of the Baltic German urban bourgeoisie and intellectual community felt solidarity with the Republic of Estonia, and many participated in the War of Independence. They even had their own armed unit, the Baltic Regiment (*Das Baltenregiment*), of whom many were awarded the Estonian Cross of Freedom, such as the regiment commander Colonel Constantin von Weiss, Medical Major General Werner von Zoege, Rear Admiral Hermann Salza and Colonel Arthur Buxhoevden.[72] Nevertheless is important to remember that the elite of the Baltic German Knighthoods represented Baltic German ideology within their own group as well as outside of it, and that there existed no organized opposition to this elite group among the Baltic Germans themselves.

Nothing can change the fact that for centuries, the greatest and most antagonistic conflict within Estonia's feudal society had existed between noble Baltic German manor lords and Estonian peasant serfs. The antagonism was most evident in the legal, economic, and social sectors. The emergence of the ancient Estonian people as a modern nation that began in the mid-19th century and progressed exponentially in the early 20th century brought these antagonisms to the political surface. With Estonia's achievement of independence, these old antagonisms were expressed most sharply in the conflict between the Baltic Knighthoods and the builders of the Republic of Estonia. With the consolidation of the republic, a process of equalization took place in these relations – the status of the Baltic Germans became lower as that of the Estonians became higher. In 1920, Estonia abolished social rank as an institutionalized factor in public law,

[71] **von Taube,** "Von Brest-Litovsk bis Libau," pp. 181–182, 206–207, 229–230.

[72] **Wilhelm von Wrangell,** *Geschichte des Baltenregiments: Das Deutschtum Estlands im Kampfe gegen den Bolschewismus 1918–1920* (Hannover, 1958); *Eesti Vabadusristi kavalerid [Recipients of the Estonian Cross of Freedom]* (Tallinn, 1935); **Mattisen,** *Tartu rahu,* p. 153.

thereby removing, the foundation permitting the Knighthoods activities in this sphere. Instead, the Baltic German ethnic group was granted special status with the adoption of the Cultural Autonomy Law in 1925. The mass relocation of Baltic Germans to Germany in 1939 and 1940 physically and finally eliminated all preconditions for any continuing conflicts.

Of course, times change and now this is all in the past. But we are now in a new present. Particularly after Estonia succeeded in breaking loose from Soviet occupation, a mutual *rapprochement* is taking place between Baltic Germans and their descendants living abroad and the Estonians, primarily in the fields of science, culture, and fine arts. Joint scientific projects, conferences, symposia, exhibits, concerts, guest performances and joint publications have been organized. In 2002, a large-scale anniversary celebration took place in Estonia, including a historical conference and exhibit in honor of the 750th anniversary of the Estland Knighthood. The Estonian president, ex-president, and archbishop participated.[73] The impetus for these elemental campaigns seems to be a recurring theme, i.e. the search for and definition of our common history and culture, the process of Estonian and Baltic German acculturation into a common culture. All this is certainly a very welcome mission, of great importance to cultural historians.

However, it is important to make sure that this "reconciliation movement" is not swallowed up within a fluffy generic pillow of good will in which centuries of antagonism are erased from historical consciousness. There has never existed, and will never exist, a society without internal antagonisms. The basic nature of a society is not dependent solely on its structure, but at least as much on its dynamics, which are defined primarily by the internal antagonisms of the society. The antagonisms between various interest groups dependent on each other, contingent upon each other, form a unit, a unit of opposites. Therefore, in the study of Estonia's common culture, the perspective of conflicts is a much sharper tool that the perspective of consensus, which does not shine any significant light on crucial social antagonisms and processes. The mild-mannered tend to obstruct our view.

This is not meant to fan the flames of old hostilities. This article's critical descriptions of the actions of the Baltic Knighthoods representatives are ultimately meant to serve the purpose of explaining the difficulties faced by the founders of the Republic of Estonia in acquiring international recognition for their state, and not for the purpose of condemning people long dead. In order to better understand the common culture of Estonia, we must tolerate opposing opinions and evaluations. And therefore, Estonians and Baltic Germans should work together – let us be glad to walk side by side, but let us not necessarily march to the same drummer.

Incidentally, the fear of conflict is not something that exists only in Estonia's current historiographical relations with Baltic Germans, but also seems to characterize our wrestling match with the problems of Estonian history. As in politics, so also in science, the slogan of "together in perfect harmony" is not the best guide.

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[73] **Peep Pillak,** "Eestimaa rüütelkond 750" [Estlands Knighthood 750], *Tuna* 1 (2003), pp. 151–153.

Konstantin Päts's Relations with the Tallinn Soviet Embassy and Trade Representation in the Late 1920s and Early 1930s[1]

Jaak Valge

Konstantin Päts is one of Estonia's most prominent politicians. He was a leading participant in all the major events of Estonia's first period of independence, such as the achievement of independence in 1918, the coup d'etat in 1934, and the loss of independence in 1939/40. Therefore, Päts's prior relations with the foreign power to which Estonia later surrendered without resistance is significant for Estonian history as a whole.

Basic points of view in previous studies

Päts's relations with the Soviet embassy and trade representatives in the late 1920s and early 1930s, a time during which they were particularly intense and multifaceted, have been researched and discussed by Magnus Ilmjärv, Zenonas Butkus and Oleg Ken, and Alexander Rupasov on the basis of Russian source materials. The points of view held by these authors differ significantly.

Ken and Rupasov have touched upon this topic in an article about relations between the Soviet Union and the Baltic states during the period between the two World Wars, and also in a book discussing Soviet policy toward its western neighbors in the light of decisions of the All-Union Communist (Bolshevik) Party Central Committee Politburo.[2] In their article they state that "one of the leaders of the Agrarians and many-time Estonian head of state Konstantin Päts was not ashamed to accept remuneration as a legal consultant for the Soviet state for a number of years."[3] They have not substantiated this claim with documentary references. They allege that this occurred during the first half of the 1920s, within a time frame during which such activity would have been extremely implausible. However, in their book they claim that Päts

[1] This research has been done under the Estonian Science Foundation grant no. 6079, the Estonian Ministry of Education and Science directed topic no. 0132703s05 and the National Archives research project "Domestic Policy of the Republic of Estonia in the 1930s."

[2] **Олег Кен, Александр Рупасов,** *Политбюро ЦК ВКП(б) и отношения СССР с западными соседними государствами (конец 1920–1930-х гг): Проблемы, документы, опыт комментарии. Часть I, Декабрь 1928 – июнь 1934 г.* (Sankt-Peterburg, 2000); **Олег Кен**, **Александр Рупасов**, "Москва и страны Балтии: опыт взаимоотношении, 1917–1939 гг.," in *Страны Балтии и Россия: общества и государства,* Вып. 5 (Москва, 2002).

[3] **Кен**, **Рупасов**, "Москва и страны Балтии," p. 230.

worked unofficially as a legal consultant of the Soviet trade representation and helped pass the Estonian-Soviet trade agreement in the Estonian Parliament in 1929, and that in 1930 Soviet ambassador Adolf Petrovsky regarded Päts as a supporter of Estonian-Soviet *rapprochement* and the only prominent Estonian politician on whose support they could rely.[4] However, Ken and Rupasov finally conclude that the Soviet Union's Baltic policies had failed, and that it was mainly due to the coincidence of foreign policy conditions that it finally managed to achieve power over these states.[5] Thus, they do not consider Päts's close ties to the Soviet embassy and his work as a legal consultant to be very important in Estonian-Soviet relations as a whole.

However Lithuanian historian Zenonas Butkus in his article argues that the Soviet Union's policies in the Baltic states were not only vigorous, but also multifaceted and very successful. In his opinion, the Soviet Union succeeded in involving Estonia's most influential political figure, Konstantin Päts, in the protection of its interests and in helping it conduct crucial activities in service of its interests during the latter half of the 1920s and the early 1930s, such as repeatedly thwarting the Estonian-Latvian customs union and pushing an Estonian-Soviet trade agreement through the Estonian parliament. Butkus claims that Päts had been secretly employed as a legal consultant by a petroleum syndicate that paid him an honorarium as well as a salary. However, Butkus also does not regard this as being particularly significant. He sees Päts's activities in the petroleum syndicate as part of the whole package of his lobbying activities. In summary, Butkus notes that Päts, as well as Augustinas Voldemaras and Antanas Smetona, remained loyal to their countries.[6]

Magnus Ilmjärv considers the influence of the Soviet Union on Konstantin Päts to have been even stronger.[7] In contrast to Butkus, Ilmjärv has processed copious volumes of source materials, but his main focus has been on documents preserved in Soviet institutions, above all the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. According to his reconstruction of events, Päts had a very close relationship with the Soviet embassy beginning as early as 1924. The establishment of the Estonia-Russia Chamber of Commerce in 1923 gave Päts a legal basis for relations with the Soviet embassy and trade legation, and the Chamber of Commerce itself, "the joint endeavor of Päts and Renning," as Ilmjärv calls it, allegedly became an office through which the Soviets could acquire economic and political information, with Päts and his confidant Rudolf-Kaarel Renning serving as this center's main informers. In addition to the information that Päts and Renning were

[4] **Кен**, **Рупасов**, *Политбюро ЦК ВКП(б) и отношения СССР с западными соседними государствами,* pp. 156, 169, 207.

[5] **Кен**, **Рупасов**, "Москва и страны Балтии," pp. 251–252.

[6] **Zenonas Butkus,** "N. Liidu intriigid Balti riikides (1920–1940)" [The Soviet Union's Intrigues in the Baltic States (1920–1940)], *Akadeemia* 11, 12 (1999), pp. 2295–2297, 2534. Butkus has not used a single previous study on this topic. His source materials come exclusively from the Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation. His poor knowledge of the subject is indicated by his copious errors and inaccuracies. For instance, Butkus stubbornly persists in calling Rudolf Renning, a key player in Butkus's configuration, Aleksander Renning, who was a different individual altogether.

[7] **Magnus Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine: Eesti, Läti ja Leedu välispoliitilise orientatsiooni kujunemine ja isesisvuse kaotus: 1920. aastate keskpaigast anneksioonini [Silent Submission — Estonian-language edition]* (Tallinn, 2004). In addition to this book, Ilmjärv has dealt with this topic in a series published in the newspaper *Postimees* in September 1999, as well as the article: **Magnus Ilmjärv,** "Konstantin Päts ja Nõukogude Liidu Tallinna saatkond: aastad 1925–1934" [Konstantin Päts and the Soviet Embassy in Tallinn: 1925–1934], *Acta Historica Tallinensia* 3, (1999); and the English-language book: **Magnus Ilmjärv,** *Silent Submission: Formation of Foreign Policy of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis. Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia* 24 (2004). His basic stance is identical in each of these publications. Unless there are significant differences in key issues, this article refers to the Estonian-language edition of this book as the latest and most comprehensive of all the discussions listed above.

allegedly passing on to the Soviets, Päts was coaxing political developments in a direction favorable to the Soviet Union. Ilmjärv claims that Päts attempted to unseat Karl Robert Pusta (the Estonian Foreign Minister deemed unsuitable by the Soviets), coaxed the guarantee agreement negotiations onto the track desired by the Soviet Union, and tried to organize Jaan Lattik's visit to Moscow in 1930. Päts, along with Rudolf Renning, had allegedly approached the Soviets with the proposal to start publishing a magazine in which he planned to promote Estonian and Latvian economic relations with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, he had purportedly attempted to deliver rights to the use of Narva Falls hydroelectric power to the German company of Siemens Schukert Werke, and influenced the resolution of many court cases in a way that satisfied the Soviet Union. Together with Renning, he had supposedly come upon the idea to construct an Estonian-Soviet saltpeter factory in Virumaa that would use the energy from the Narva Hydroelectric power plant. Ilmjärv alleges that as the delegation's leader at the Estonian-Soviet trade negotiations Päts had secretly worked against the commission he was leading. Whatever the members of the Estonian delegation discussed among themselves was allegedly passed on by Päts by way of Renning to the Soviet delegate Adolf Petrovsky. As a result of the activities of Renning and Päts, the trade agreement proved detrimental to Estonia.[8] Unlike Butkus, Ken, and Rupasov, Ilmjärv sees Päts's "involvement" in Soviet petroleum issues as a scheme with its roots in Moscow, approved by the Politburo itself. The fact that Päts accepted dollars is, in Ilmjärv's eyes, "a true triumph for Moscow" as he states the following: "....the recruitment of even the colonel of a foreign state was considered an important event in Moscow, and this was reported immediately to Stalin himself."[9] Furthermore, Ilmjärv finds Pavel Sudoplatov's claim that Päts was being monetarily supported by the Soviet Union until the end of the Republic of Estonia is not something pulled out of thin air: the Soviets were placing orders with the Tallinn Shipping Company, in which Päts had an interest. In the English-language edition of his book, Ilmjärv writes that Päts was allegedly the major stockholder.[10]

The treatments by Ilmjärv and Butkus stand in sharp contrast to those of Rupasov and Ken. However, there are differences in the positions of Ilmjärv and Butkus as well. Unlike Butkus, Ilmjärv has called special attention to the issue of the use of Narva Falls power plant, the so-called petroleum syndicate affair, the claim that Päts had betrayed Estonian positions to the Soviets at trade negotiations, and that the Soviets had financed Päts by way of the Tallinn Shipping Company, as proof of Päts's pro-Soviet activities. Whereas Butkus emphasized that Päts remained loyal to his country, Ilmjärv does not even touch upon this question, allowing the context of his writings to leave the impression that Päts was something more than simply a Soviet lobbyist.

The purpose of this study is to ascertain the closeness of Päts's relations with the Soviet Union in the latter half of the 1920s and the early 1930s, and whether Moscow could have used these ties to entice, inspire, force, or convince Päts to make decisions which he otherwise would not willingly have made. For this purpose, I have used correspondence between Soviet diplomats and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (PCFA), materials of the Soviet trade representation, and documents of the Soviet foreign espionage residency in Tallinn, which are preserved, respectively, in the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AFPRF), the Russian State Archive of Economy (RSAE) and the Party Archive Branch of the Estonian State Archives (ESAF). Additionally, I have used documents of Estonian institutions, pe-

[8] **Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* pp. 33–78.
[9] **Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* pp. 89, 93, 95.
[10] **Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* p. 96–98; **Ilmjärv,** *Silent Submission,* pp. 60, 99.

riodical literature of that time, and foreign trade statistics preserved in the Estonian State Archives (ERA).

Päts, the Chamber of Commerce and Rudolf Renning

Butkus and, particularly, Ilmjärv cite excerpts of numerous reports made by Soviet diplomats about the opinions expressed by Päts that would seem to prove Päts's special friendship with the Soviet Union or something even greater – his dependence on the Soviet Union.

In the interwar period neither the Estonian elite nor the rest of Europe boycotted the Soviet embassies or trade legations. Soviet diplomats, like all the rest of the diplomatic corps, engaged in very active relations with Estonian politicians and businessmen in Estonia. Naturally, this trusting relationship was mutual. However, since Estonian politicians did not write up reports of these meetings, we are now able to read the statements of only one side. When reading these reports today, we must remember that Soviet diplomats recorded slanted accounts of their discussions because it was to their personal benefit to show their superiors what capable and active communicators they were, and how skilled they were in winning the trust of the local political elite.

The Soviets' relations with Estonian socialist leaders were particularly close. Ambassador Fyodor Raskolnikov frequently spent time with August Rei, Aleksander Oinas, Alma Ostra-Oinas and Karl Ast, and of course, the conversation often revolved around politics. Päts communicated with Soviet diplomats less frequently and less confidentially than the socialist leaders did.

At that time, a large segment of the Estonian political and business elite continued to imagine Russia as an enormous fairy-tale market, where one could easily get burned, but where one could also score a grand slam with clever business tactics and accumulate a vast amount of money. The Soviet Union represented an economic unit more than one hundred times greater than Estonia, and just a few orders from the Soviet Union of a size barely noticeable in that enormous land could set the wheels of Estonia's economy turning vigorously and bring instant wealth to an enterprising man. Indeed, this had already happened in the early 1920s, when Estonia became the mediator between Russia and Western Europe after the signing of the Tartu Peace Treaty. Päts considered the development of the Estonian bourgeoisie to be very important, feeling that "the Estonian nation will not be able to maintain its independence unless it has its own wealthy class."[11]

Thus, if a small country like Estonia succeeded in winning access to the Soviet market while remaining politically independent, the success would provide a powerful impetus for Estonia's economic development. Unlike Finland, where the proportion of the Russian market was only about one third even before independence, Estonia's close economic ties with Russia hailed back to tsarist times; fully nine tenths of Estonian exports had gone eastward. Therefore, Estonia's achievement of independence was economically much more painful than Finland's, making the wish of our economic circles to restore the previous trade relations that much stronger. In the 1920s Russia lacked very many goods that Estonia was able to offer. Some politicians and economists in Estonia as well as elsewhere in the West predicted the liberalization of the Russian economy and its opening to free foreign trade.

In the 1920s, Konstantin Päts was one of the most influential proponents of closer Estonian-Soviet economic ties. Päts made no secret of his thoughts on the potential significance of the Eastern market for Estonia, speaking and writing profusely on this topic, doing so for as long as there was still hope that the Russian market might open its doors wider to Estonian goods, i.e. until the early 1930s.

[11] "Eduard Laamani päevik 1922–1940" [Eduard Laaman's diary 1922–1940], 7, *Akadeemia* 1 (2004), p. 196.

The registration application for the Estonian-Russian Chamber of Commerce was submitted by Rudolf Renning, Madis Jaakson and Konrad Mauritz on June 21, 1923, and the Chamber was registered on July 2, 1923.[12] The founding meeting took place on July 20, 1923.[13] The Chamber of Commerce was established to promote and invigorate Estonian-Russian trade relations, with the involvement of the representatives of 17 major businesses, particularly those who were interested in the Russian market. An Estonian economics magazine noted that "the Estonian-Russian Chamber of Commerce is without question a necessity."[14] In the summer of that same year (1923), an Estonian-Polish Chamber of Commerce was founded as well. The leaders of the Estonian-Russian Chamber of Commerce were appointed at the board meeting on July 31: Chairman Rudolf Renning, and Vice-Chairmen R. Uritam and (at the invitation of the Soviet side) Professor Volkov. The board met half a dozen times that year without achieving a breakthrough in Estonian-Soviet trade relations. A year later, the chief editorial writer of Estonia's economic magazine admitted that the main function of the Estonian-Russian Chamber of Commerce might be limited to obtaining information about Russian markets.[15]

Although Professor Volkov took part in the Chamber's activities, the Soviet trade representation (Torgpredstvo) in Estonia initially adopted an official wait-and-see attitude regarding the activities of the Chamber of Commerce. Renning was perhaps the most active lobbyist for encouraging greater participation by the Russians. On November 19, 1923, the Soviet interagency commission for preparation of trade agreements decided that those state and economic organizations with representations in Estonia could indeed participate in the Chamber's work. The Chamber was to limit itself to exchange of information and stimulation of trade, without fulfilling any diplomatic or political functions. A commission was elected to rework the bylaws.[16] The issue was further discussed by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade.

The Russians did not make an official request for the reorganization of the Chamber of Commerce until 1924. Professor Volkov (the representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade) and Shevtsov (the Soviet trade representative in Estonia) went to see Estonian Finance Minister Otto Strandman, who accepted the Russians' proposals for changes in the bylaws and organized the passing of the respective decision in the Estonian

[12] Estonian-Russian Chamber of Commerce registration application, June 21, 1923, ERA 14-11-48, p. 7.

[13] Ilmjärv states that the founders of the Chamber of Commerce claimed that it was established at the initiative of Estonian citizens, but that the actual initiative had come from Moscow, which also drew up the bylaws. Allegedly, Renning was repeatedly summoned to Leningrad and Moscow for discussions. On July 14, 1924, the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, Leonid Krassin, gave the order to subsidize the newly created Chamber of Commerce with 1.2 million marks: **Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* pp. 33–34. Ilmjärv's claim that the initiative for the creation of the Chamber of Commerce originated in Moscow has not been substantiated by documentary evidence. Actually, the Estonian-Russian Chamber of Commerce had already been established when the interagency commission for the preparation of Soviet trade agreements discussed the participation of Soviet government and economic organizations on Nov. 19, 1923: Minutes of the interagency commission for the preparation of Soviet trade agreements, Nov. 19, 1923, RSAE 413-5-1083, p. 86. Sources indicate that the Soviet Union did not finance the Chamber of Commerce at all in 1923, but helped finance it with 195,000 marks in 1924, as the Estonian side provided 336,000 marks: From the Estonian-Soviet Chamber of Commerce to the Soviet trade representation, Oct. 27, 1927, AFPRF 0154-12-24-3, p. 21.

[14] "Homo politicus. Eesti-Vene kaubanduskoja tuleviku kohta" [Homo politicus. On the Future of the Estonian-Russian Chamber of Commerce], *Eesti Majandus* 24 (1923), p. 392.

[15] "Eesti-Vene kaubanduskoda" [The Estonian-Russian Chamber of Commerce], *Eesti Majandus* 24 (1923), p. 380; "Homo politicus. Riikidevahelised kaubanduskojad" [Homo politicus. International Chambers of Commerce], *Eesti Majandus* 15 (1924), p. 265–266.

[16] Minutes of the interagency commission for the preparation of Soviet trade agreements, Nov. 19, 1923, RSAE 413-5-1083, p. 86.

government.[17] More than one hundred people attended the general meeting of the Chamber of Commerce on October 15, at which the new bylaws were approved. The opening remarks were made by Finance Minister Strandman. The Estonian side elected 12 persons to the Chamber of Commerce board, including Päts, Renning, Mihkel Pung and Joakim Puhk; the Soviet side selected representatives of the Soviet trade representation and the economic organizations Tsenrosoyuz, Dobroflot and Neftesindikat. At the board meeting of October 17, Konstantin Päts was elected chairman, with the vice-chairmen (or deputy chairmen) being Renning and Professor Volkov.[18] The duties of the Chamber remained the vitalization and development of reciprocal economic relations. For this purpose, the Chamber was to engage in permanent information exchange with economic-industrial and other organizations in Estonia and Russia, and to gather, analyze, and publish statistical materials and economic reviews of trade between Estonia and Russia, to take part in conferences, negotiations, and other functions at which issues of developing closer economic ties between Russia and Estonia were discussed, to keep correspondents in Estonia and Russia, etc.[19] In an article describing his work in the Chamber of Commerce, Renning expressed the opinion that "of course, we cannot hope that trade with Russia will open up right away and that our earnings will jump immediately /.../. If, within certain limits, we can make our way into the Eastern markets, it would strengthen our posture and have a positive effect on our competition for Western markets as well."[20] After its reorganization, Finance Minister Strandmann became honorary chairman of the Chamber of Commerce; he was known for his stance that Estonia's natural markets were in the West, not in the East.

Thus, the creation of the Chamber of Commerce and Päts's acceptance of the position of chairman of its board were entirely logical.[21] Päts continued to believe that Estonia could indeed find success in the Russian market. However, it is also very likely that in actively promoting the work of the Chamber of Commerce, he hoped to guarantee his own proximity to potential orders. Therefore, his motives were probably the improvement of his own political reputation as well as his complex financial situation. A breakthrough in Estonian-Soviet economic relations would have been beneficial to him as a politician. Päts stayed on as the Chairman of the Board of the Estonian-Soviet Chamber of Commerce until 1931, when he became State Elder (head of state). He was succeeded by the renowned economic figure and politician Leo Sepp. Päts also left his position as member of the Chamber's board.[22] Päts had already hinted that he wanted to surrender his position as chairman.

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[17] From Shevtsov to Avanesov, Oct. 5, 1924, RSAE 413-2-1855, p. 55; "Eduard Laamani päevik 2," *Akadeemia* 8 (2003), p. 1777.

[18] "Eesti-Vene kaubanduskoja juhatus moodustatud" [The Estonian-Russian Chamber of Commerce has been Formed], *Eesti Majandus* 42 (1924), p. 761. Relying on a letter of Soviet envoy Mikhail Kobetski, Ilmjärv claims that the Estonian government had viewed "the creation of the Chamber as a completely incomprehensible endeavor" (**Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* p. 38). Even for no other reason than the fact that five Estonian government ministers as well as representatives of the various fractions of the *Riigikogu* were present at the general meeting in question, at which the Chamber was reorganized (RSAE 413-2-1883, p. 62), this claim is hardly plausible.

[19] "Eesti-Vene kaubanduskoda reorganiseerimisel" [The Estonian-Russian Chamber of Commerce to be Reorganized], *Päevaleht,* Aug. 10, 1924. In early 1926, the Chamber was renamed the Estonian-Soviet Chamber of Commerce.

[20] **R. Renning,** "Eesti-Vene kaubanduskoda" [The Estonian-Russian Chamber of Commerce], *Päevaleht,* Oct. 16, 1924.

[21] Ilmjärv's claim that the Chamber of Commerce was created and Päts was selected as its chairman because Päts needed a legal justification for his relations with the Soviet embassy and trade representation (**Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* p. 38), is not particularly convincing.

[22] "Eesti-Vene kaubanduskoda pidas koosolekut" [The Estonian-Russian Chamber of Commerce held a meeting], *Kaja*, Dec. 28, 1931.

This may have been because he had lost hope for a breakthrough in Estonian-Soviet trade relations.

Additionally, Päts served as chairman of the Tallinn Stock Exchange Committee from 1925 to 1931, and was a founder of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, serving as its council chairman from 1925 to 1929. While holding these official positions, he was obligated to deal with employees of the Soviet embassy and trade representation; because the procurement of Russian orders for Estonian businesses depended on these people, regardless of Päts's own personal business interests. The lively relations between the Chamber of Commerce and the Soviet embassy and trade representation were no secret.[23]

Ilmjärv presents the fact that the Soviet side also participated in subsidizing the Chamber of Commerce as if this were proof that the Chamber served as a Soviet information-gathering center. Soviet financial support for the Chamber of Commerce was no secret; quite the contrary, the Soviets spoke and wrote about it copiously in every possible public forum as proof of their friendship. However, Ilmjärv has neglected to note that the Estonian side also supported the Chamber of Commerce. It not only supported it, but did so with greater amounts of money than the Soviet side.[24]

The initiative for the establishment of the Chamber came from Estonia, which also clearly took the initiative in its work. This gives us reason to regard the Chamber primarily as a lobbying instrument for Estonian businessmen and the Estonian state for the purpose of procuring commercial orders from the Russian market. It is possible that the Chamber became particularly important to the Soviets after the attempted coup d'etat of December 1, 1924 as they hoped to (re)establish ties with Estonian society. If this were indeed true, the importance did not last long at all. It would be very hard to see anything in the work of the Estonian-Soviet Chamber of Commerce that compromises Päts, nor does the fact that it was partially financed by the Soviet Union

[23] Butkus notes that Päts and Soviet ambassador Petrovsky met only on rare occasions because of conspiratorial reasons; they succeeded in hiding Päts's ties with the embassy (also keeping in mind the so-called petroleum syndicate affair discussed below), and Päts remained uncompromised. He feels that Renning was useful to the Soviet embassy and Päts in keeping their ties secret (**Butkus,** "N. Liidu intriigid Balti riikides," pp. 2296–2297). Ilmjärv calls Renning Päts's confidant who served as the "permanent liaison with the Soviet embassy" (**Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* p. 38). This creates the impression that these relations were extremely secretive. That is not the case. Nobody would have been surprised at Päts's frequent meetings with the Soviet ambassador; however, it is natural that Renning, Päts's deputy, took care of less important business. In no way were the activities of the Chamber somehow quasi-legal. Chamber of Commerce meetings were attended by Estonia's Ministers of Commerce and Industry, Roads, and Finance, as well as the president of the Bank of Estonia, other high government officials, influential journalists, and others.

[24] In November 1924, Renning asked Moscow for 510,000 marks to cover "miscellaneous expenses." In 1927 the Chamber of Commerce had allegedly received 420,000 marks from Moscow (**Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* p. 39). In the October 27, 1927 inquiry sent by the Chamber of Commerce to the Soviet trade representative, we see that the Soviet Union did not finance the Chamber at all in 1923, whereas the Estonian side financed it with 95,000 marks; in 1924, the Estonian side supported the Chamber to the tune of 336,000 marks, with the Soviet side contributing 195,000 marks; in 1925, the Estonians provided 505,000 marks and the Soviets gave 325,000 marks; in 1926, Estonia gave 880,000, and the Soviets 185,000 marks; in 1927 (until October), the Estonian side provided 525,000 marks and the Soviet side 205,000 marks. In total, the Estonians financed the Chamber of Commerce with 2.8 million marks between 1923 and 1928, and the Soviets provided funds of 1.6 million marks (AFPRF 0154-12-24-3, p. 21). It is extremely unlikely that the Chamber of Commerce would have included false numbers in its inquiry to the Soviet trade representation. Elsewhere, Ilmjärv notes that the Chamber of Commerce bylaws do not include any reference to the fact that the financial resources of the Chamber might also come from contributions by the Soviet government (**Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* p. 39). In the bylaws approved by the Chamber's general meeting on October 15, 1924 and registered in the Tallinn-Haapsalu Court of Justice on November 22, other sources of financing included government support, miscellaneous income, and membership dues (ESA 14-11-48, 13p). Legally, the financing of the Chamber by the governments of Estonia and the Soviet Union was absolutely proper.

indicate that Päts was in any way dependent on the Soviet Union.

Even though Soviet ambassador Raskolnikov called Renning a stooge or henchman of Päts, he referred to him as the "*spiritus movens* of the Chamber of Commerce" during ceremonial occasions. The relationship of this "secretive confidant," as Ilmjärv calls him in his article in *Postimees*, with the Soviet embassy in the latter half of the 1920s and early 1930s was undoubtedly very close. However, he was far from being secretive. On the contrary, Renning was an excellent communicator who knew all of Estonia's top political figures. From the end of 1924, he was employed by the Soviet trade representation. The Soviet trade representative Shevtsov noted in his letter to the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, Leonid Krasin, that he had paid Renning 110 thousand marks for organizing the work of the Chamber of Commerce, since Renning had been supporting the Chamber of Commerce at his own expense, and had improved trade relations between Estonia and the Soviet Union. He proposed to start paying Renning, initially until January 1, a salary of 20 thousand Estonian marks per month.[25] In the 1920s, the Soviet trade representation was financially quite unrestricted. Apparently, Renning continued to work for the trade representation until the early 1930s. Allegations of his access to sensitive information and his ability to provide the Soviets with information damaging to the Republic of Estonia are not particularly credible. His relations with the Soviet embassy and trade representation were known to all. It is evident from the reports of Soviet diplomats that Renning enjoyed sharing rumors and gossip, and even the Russians often found his stories hard to believe.

At any rate, in the early 1930s, the trade representation and embassy did not regard Renning and his information very highly, nor did they particularly trust him. Ambassador Raskolnikov wrote to Moscow in May 1930, to Boris Stomonyakov, the official in charge of Baltic issues in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs Committee: "...The issue of monthly payments to Renning are also still up in the air; Comrade Smirnov had promised these payments from Torgpredstvo funds in exchange for economic information, to the tune of 100 dollars. Renning is very insulted by the long delay. We certainly cannot lose him, although he is undoubtedly a double informant, working for both sides – the Estonians and us."[26] In June 1930, Raskolnikov wrote at greater length about Renning: "... Despite all his unpleasant characteristics, the strongest of which are moral uncertainty and love of money, he is still a useful thread that connects us to the outside world, as well as a useful source of information. Naturally, we cannot even speak of trusting him. We must continue to remember that he is not only a stranger, but also a double informant. Therefore, we must not give him assignments in which he will represent us. When he talks to me of forming a petroleum joint-stock company, then in spite of his familiarity, it is clear to me that he does not represent the Soviet side, but the Estonian side, and even as he presents himself in the role of a neutral and honest broker, he is actually not defending our interests, but those of the Estonian industrialists." Finally, Raskolnikov assured the official that the embassy had no intimate relations with Renning.[27] Stomonyakov replied that he had not suggested to Raskolnikov to sever relations with him completely. "However, his almost daily visits to the embassy and his involvement in activities that affect our relations with Estonia are inadvisable and dangerous, since you yourself have provided such a negative characterization of him."[28] From the diary of one of Estonia's leading journalists and opinion leaders, Eduard Laaman (a relative of Renning), we learn, that Renning did indeed

[25] From Shevtsov to Krasin, Oct. 18, 1924, RSAE 413-2-1883, p. 61.
[26] From Raskolnikov to Stomonyakov, May 10, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-1, p. 28.
[27] From Raskolnikov to Stomonyakov, June 21, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-1, p. 40.
[28] From Stomonyakov to Raskolnikov, July 7, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-2, p. 32.

generously share information with Estonian politicians and businessmen as well.[29]

In January 1932, the Soviets cut off their payments to Renning. Renning complained to Päts who purportedly said that not even lackeys were treated this poorly, receiving at least their holiday pay before being let go. In March, Renning did approach the ambassador to ask for at least a holiday pay of 200 dollars if the restoration of his "subsidy" was indeed not possible. Raskolnikov suggested that Renning come to an agreement with trade representative Gustav Klinger about exactly what kind of economic information he needed, and then ask for the restoration of his "subsidy," perhaps at a lower rate.[30]

Starting in 1931, when Päts withdrew from his position as chairman of the board of the Estonian-Soviet Chamber of Commerce, he no longer received Renning quite as often. In early 1932, this somewhat simple but sincere friend of Russia was stricken with yet another problem. In February 1932, the Estonian Police summoned him for questioning to explain why he had allowed a "Get Acquainted with the Soviet Union" circle to meet in his apartment. Renning was upset, and told Raskolnikov that he had called Ado Anderkopp, Minister of Justice and Home Affairs, who had not had time to address the situation. Later, Renning was sure that he would get no more than an administrative reprimand.[31]

In April 1934, Stomonyakov wrote scornfully to the new Soviet ambassador to Estonia, Aleksei Ustinov: "As far as Reining's proposal to build an electrical power station in Narva, then it is urgent that you realize that Reining approaches nearly every new ambassador and trade representative with this proposition, which is of no significance to us whatsoever."[32] But that summer, Renning showed up again with some new proposals and sought to introduce the lawyer Kromel to the ambassador. Ustinov refused to meet with him.[33] Ustinov's diary entries describing his meetings with Renning exude weariness.

In the second half of the 1930s, Renning apparently focused most of his energies on representing Soviet publishers in Estonia. In this capacity, he once again attempted to conduct business with the Soviet embassy in 1939. On June 30 of that year, Ambassador Kuzma Nikitin wrote that "some Renning fellow," manager of a bookstore selling Soviet books, had made an appointment to see him. At this meeting, Renning spoke of his ties with the Russian monarchists and offered to arrange a meeting with them. Thereupon Nikitin told him that their meeting was over, and asked not to be bothered with such things any more.[34] After World War II, Renning lived in exile. At any rate, Renning's interest in Russia seemed to be sincere. Even as an exile in 1960, his unchanged feelings were easily recognizable, although now he adapted his opinions to the new circumstances: in our fight for freedom, we must reorient ourselves from a Western orientation to an Eastern orientation; we must seek friends among our enemies; we must have normal relations with our Great Russian neighbor of 130 million, etc.[35]

In any case, all this does not in the least indicate that Renning was the embassy's reliable informant and representative of Soviet inter-

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[29] "Eduard Laamani päevik 2, 3, 5," *Akadeemia* 8, 9, 11 (2003), pp. 1788, 2023, 2025, 2520, 2529.

[30] Raskolnikov's diary, Feb. 17, 1932; March 10, 1932, AFPRF 0154-25-37-26, pp. 10, 12.

[31] Raskolnikov's diary, Feb. 11, 1932, AFPRF 0154-25-37-26, p. 9. Ilmjärv has assumed that one reason for discontinuing the use of Renning's services was the illegal "Getting Acquainted with Russia" circle which was disbanded by the Political Police (**Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* p. 159). Raskolnikov's diary includes not one word about this.

[32] From Stomonyakov to Ustinov, April 15, 1934, AFPRF 0154-27-38-2, p. 41.

[33] Ustinov's diary, July 2, 1934, AFPRF 0154-27-39-7, p. 44.

[34] Nikitin's diary, June 30, 1939, AFPRF 06-1-20-229, pp. 160–162.

[35] **Aleksander Milits, Rudolf Renning,** "Vene vabadusliikumine and Vene-Eesti suhted" [The Russian Freedom Movement and Russian-Estonian Relations], in *Vaba Eesti tähistel. Valimik tsensuurivaba eesti mõttelugu aastaist 1948–64 [At the Milestones of Free Estonia. A Selection of Uncensored History of Estonian Thought from 1948–64]* (Tallinn, 2000), pp. 119–120. Reprinted in *Vaba Eestlane* 5 (1960).

ests. Renning was not a Soviet agent; however, the Soviet embassy on the one side, and Päts and other Estonian politicians and businessmen on the other side used him as an information line. Through him, the Soviet embassy heard tales of Estonian politics and economic information (hardly any more than what one could read in the papers); through him, Estonians kept up-to-date with Soviet political positions and business opportunities in the Soviet Union. When meeting with Soviet diplomats, Renning would always first ask for any news. He probably truly regarded himself as a go-between for Estonia and the Soviet Union, true to his position at the Estonian-Soviet Chamber of Commerce. There is no doubt that Päts was also well familiar with all aspects of Renning's activities, meaning that he knew exactly how confidentially he could speak to Renning.

Existing information provides no foundation for claiming that the Soviets received any kind of valuable information by way of the Estonian-Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Rudolf Renning, certainly none that damaged the Estonian state. Not one source confirms that there was anything compromising for Päts in these relationships, or anything that would have had to be kept secret from Estonian authorities, as Ilmjärv and Butkus seem to believe. It is true that the Estonian-Soviet Chamber of Commerce allowed the Soviets to establish ties with Estonian politicians and businessmen. However, these ties would not have remained unestablished, even without the existence of the Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber of Commerce was a lobbying instrument of Estonian politicians and businessmen. It was a time during which there was still hope that the Russian market might open up. And if the Soviet economic model had turned out to be an open one, we would now be heaping glowing praise on the foresight of Päts and Renning for constructing a good trampoline that helped us jump into the Eastern market.

Päts's alleged pro-Soviet lobby

Let us analyze allegations of Päts's motives for acting in the interests of the Soviet Union, as presented by Ilmjärv and Butkus. Ilmjärv claims that Päts began attempting to unseat Foreign Minister Karl Robert Pusta at the Soviets' request in 1924, hoping thereby to torpedo plans for the creation of a great Baltic union.[36]

Ilmjärv quotes a letter written by the Soviet ambassador at that time, Adolf Petrovsky, on January 25, 1925. In it, the ambassador claims that because the Soviet Union "is dissatisfied with Pusta /.../ influential circles have decided to oust him. The issue has already been decided, but it will take a little time. I have been asked not to apply any pressure at this time to avoid creating the impression that he was removed from office at our demand." Ilmjärv further alleges, without providing documentary references: "However, the correspondence between the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the embassy indicates that Päts was the driving force in the ousting of Pusta. Moscow was grateful that the plan to form a great Baltic union was defeated by forces inside Estonia."[37]

Pusta did not leave his position as Foreign Minister until October 1925. Heino Arumäe, who has dealt with Pusta's tenure as Foreign Minister in more detail, notes that Soviet diplomats promoted Moscow's positions among Tallinn industrialists and large businessmen. However, Arumäe write although "economic circles encouraged the anti-Pusta campaign and helped overthrow the Foreign Minister, these circumstances are by far not the only nor the most decisive reason for the minister's departure."[38] According to Laaman, the politicians plotting against Pusta included Otto Strandman, Ado Anderkopp, Johan Laidoner, Päts and Hans Rebane. This group comprised a majority of

[36] **Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* pp. 44–46.
[37] Ibid, p. 46.
[38] **Heino Arumäe,** "Karl Robert Pusta välisministrina 1924–25" [Karl Robert Pusta as Foreign Minister 1924–25], *Acta Historica Tallinensia* 1 (1997), p. 147.

the key foreign policy figures in Estonia at that time. Pusta did not have an easy personality, and it is little wonder that he had conflicts with other politicians, particularly those with an ego equal in size to his own – such as the *Riigikogu* Foreign Affairs Commission chairman Laidoner. Laidoner already wanted Pusta's departure in January 1925.[39] In his memoirs, the Estonian Foreign Ministry official Oskar Öpik claims that Pusta was actually dethroned by Laidoner.[40] However, Päts also probably played a role. On the subject of anti-Pusta activities, Päts did assure Laaman that "I am not involved," which Laaman apparently did not fully believe (noting that Päts was smiling irritatedly). But Päts also stated that "We cannot replace our ministers at Russia's request." Petrovsky had also told Laaman that he had asked Päts to exert his influence in the matter of Pusta's departure. Laaman told Pusta himself about this.[41] This gives us reason to believe that Päts was indeed scheming against Pusta, but we can in no way assert that he was doing this against his will and only at Moscow's request, or that he was the driving force in Pusta's removal. There is even less basis for claiming that the anti-Pusta activities were directed against the great Baltic union, and that the plans for the Baltic union failed specifically because of Pusta's departure.

According to Ilmjärv, Petrovsky said that Päts, in order to procure commercial orders from the Soviet Union, had promised in 1926 to launch a campaign to promote the signing of a guarantee agreement without involving an impartial court of arbitration. In September, Ambassador Petrovsky had submitted an ultimative demand to enter into the guarantee agreement without an arbitration clause.[42] This "campaign" either never got off the ground or was a total failure, because the agreement remained unsigned in 1926 as well as for the next five years, due to disagreement between the parties on the issue of arbitration.[43] It is true that the non-aggression treaty was signed in a form suitable to the Soviet Union, but that did not occur until 1932, after it had become evident that the League of Nations was unable to provide actual guarantees under the new circumstances, and France, Poland, Latvia and Finland had withdrawn their demand for arbitration in their non-aggression treaties with the Soviet Union; Finland had done so in hopes of acquiring economic advantages.[44] There is no information that would indicate that Päts had engaged in pro-Soviet lobbying that was damaging to Estonia.

Zenonas Butkus claims that Päts, inspired by the Soviets, repeatedly thwarted Estonian-Latvian negotiations for the establishment of a customs union. As the leader of the Estonian delegation at these negotiations, Päts would be capable of dragging them out. As proof of Päts's "thwarting activities," he quotes Petrovsky's report of February 2, 1928: "Päts must travel to Riga and discuss the issue of the union with the Latvians. But he does not want to go, and is doing everything to avoid it. Perhaps he will eventually go, but even then, he will obviously try to drag things out. The negotiations will not be successful in the near future. /.../ Indeed, the Latvians are actively pursuing results, and therefore we must decisively thwart their efforts in Riga."[45] Actually, that visit by the Estonian delegation to Riga in early February was

[39] "Eduard Laamani päevik 3," *Akadeemia* 9 (2003), pp. 2023, 2046.

[40] **Oskar Mamers,** *Kahe sõja vahel [Between Two Wars]* (Stockholm, 1957), pp. 117–118.

[41] "Eduard Laamani päevik 3," *Akadeemia* 9 (2003), p. 2028, 2031.

[42] **Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* pp. 47–48.

[43] **Ago Pajur,** "Eesti Vabariigi diplomaatiline tegevus Eesti ja NSV Liidu vahelise mittekallaletungilepingu sõlmimisel" [The Diplomatic Activity of the Republic of Estonia at the Signing of the Non-Aggression Treaty between Estonia and the Soviet Union], (Master's thesis manuscript at the Tartu University Library, Tartu, 1991), pp. 113–132.

[44] Ibid, pp. 170–175; 222–224.

[45] **Butkus,** "N. Liidu intriigid Balti riikides," p. 2297.

postponed at the Latvians' request,[46] and Päts was neither the leader or a member of that delegation. Its members were Finance Minister Anton Teetsov, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Schmidt, and Director of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry Hurt.[47] The idea of the customs union had been dealt a serious blow back in 1927, but not by Päts and not even by Estonia. Namely, the Latvian left-center government of Margers Skujenieks had signed a trade agreement that included a sweeping customs tariffs section with the Soviet Union in 1927. According to the agreement, the Soviet Union undertook to purchase, for a considerable amount of money, a variety of goods, particularly industrial products, each year from Latvia for a period of five years, and Latvia immediately lowered customs tariffs for Soviet petroleum products, grain, and other goods. These reductions that Latvia granted to Soviet goods reduced these customs fees to less than the common customs tariffs planned for the Estonian-Latvian joint endeavor. In the event of an Estonian-Latvian customs union, which meant the uniformity of customs tariffs and abandonment of reciprocal customs fees, Estonia would have had to grant the same reduction in customs fees to Soviet goods, and unlike Latvia, this would not have provided any benefit whatsoever to Estonia.[48] Thus, it seems that Päts's "thwarting activities," undertaken at the wish of the Soviets, took place only in the self-serving reports of the Soviet ambassador and not in reality.

Ilmjärv claims that another important action in which Moscow took advantage of Päts was the use of the Narva Falls power plant. The Soviet Union firmly opposed British, French, and American investments in Narva. Moscow felt that the only possibly acceptable concessionaire might be the German company of Siemens Schukert Werke. Päts and Renning allegedly agreed to act according to Petrovsky's request, promising to convince other politicians to follow Soviet wishes. Ilmjärv alleges that Päts and Renning also received a considerable amount of money from Siemens Schukert Werke to influence the negotiations in their favor.[49] Thus, if we believe Ilmjärv, Päts was behaving like a corrupt PR genius: at the request of the Soviet embassy, he was agitating in favor of Siemens Schukert Werke, and was also taking bribes from Siemens Schukert Werke for the same activity. (This allegation originates from Herman Kromel's 1940 handwritten confession to the NKVD, and Ilmjärv neglects to note or is unaware of the complete unreliability of this source). Oddly enough, this plan did not come to fruition, despite all the purported efforts. The Russians as well as other parties changed their minds repeatedly, and the entire project descended into confusion. The government finally granted the option over all Estonian peat bogs and hydropower sources over 300 HP to the English company Standard Industrial Trust, i.e. it did exactly the opposite of that which Päts had agitated for at the Soviets' request and had supposedly even accepted bribes to guarantee, according to Ilmjärv's allegations. This happened in February 1931, when the State Elder was none other than Konstantin

[46] Minutes of the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Republic of Estonia, Feb. 1, 1928, ERA 80-3-407, p. 104.

[47] "Välisminister ei sõida Riiga" [The Foreign Minister is not traveling to Riga], *Kaja,* Feb. 5, 1928; "Neljapäeval sõidetakse Riiga" [They will depart for Riga on Thursday], *Kaja*, Feb. 11, 1928.

[48] **Edgar Anderson,** "The USSR Trades with Latvia: The Treaty of 1927," in *Slavic Review,* vol. 21, 2 (1962), pp. 296–321; **Jaak Valge,** "Kas Eesti majandussuhete ümberorienteerumine oli vältimatu?" [Was the Reorientation of Estonian Economic Relations Inevitable?] in "Eesti Vabariigi ja Nõukogude Liidu kaubandussuhted 1920. aastatel ja Eesti integreerumisest Euroopa majandusse" [Economic Relations between the Republic of Estonia and the Soviet Union in the 1920s and Estonia's Integration into the European Economy], (Master's thesis manuscript at the Tartu University Library, Tartu, 1992), pp. 29–30. Butkus himself mentions elsewhere that it was specifically the Soviet-Latvian 1927 trade agreement that dealt the planned customs union a "downright fatal blow." **Butkus,** "N. Liidu intriigid Balti riikides," p. 2533.

[49] **Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* p. 77.

Päts himself.[50] It is true, however, that the deepening economic crisis caused even this concession to fall through.

Ilmjärv alleges the existence of another joint project of Päts and the Soviets involving Narva Falls. Ilmjärv claims that "in the course of their conversations, Päts, Renning, and the Soviet ambassador came up with a new idea in March 1930." Päts proposed the construction of an Estonian-Soviet saltpeter factory that would use the energy from the Narva hydroelectric power plant in Virumaa. Without referring to any sources, Ilmjärv states that the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs immediately gave Päts's plan the green light. "They felt that the political influence this generated would counterbalance the economic inexpediency of the scheme. Negotiations were started with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and other institutions to carry out this plan. On May 3, 1929, the Politburo passed a decision that approved a plan to supply 30,000 cubic meters of Soviet lumber annually for 20 to 30 years to the business being established in Narva."[51] It is rather difficult to comprehend how the Politburo could vote in support of Päts's plan in May 1929 when Päts himself did not propose this idea until March 1930. Actually, that Politburo decision was in approval of a decision by the meeting of the Soviet Council of People's Commissars and the Labor and Defense Council to offer Estonia a long-term contract for lumber supply, if a hydroelectric power plant were indeed built in Narva, and if it had enough spare energy to power a large factory. If a hydroelectric power plant were indeed constructed in Narva, the Soviets were interested in investing in it, to keep out other potential investors – the British, French, and Germans.[52] There is no indication in any sources that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade gave Päts's plan the green light for political reasons. On the contrary: this allegation is false. Stomonyakov rejected the idea immediately, writing to Raskolnikov on April 17, 1930: "The project proposed by Renning and Päts to build a factory for the production of artificial saltpeter is not in the least bit serious. There is no point in our spending hard currency on something like this, when we ourselves possess all the capabilities for building similar factories within the USSR."[53]

Ilmjärv further alleges that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, hoping to draw in "certain individuals" from Estonia and Latvia, decided to support a suggestion by Päts and Renning to start publishing a magazine that promoted Estonian-Soviet trade relations. Butkus claims that the magazine, to be edited by Päts, was indeed established in Tallinn and an annual payment of 10 thousand dollars provided for this purpose, but that the Soviets suddenly realized that it would be extremely imprudent to have Päts openly advocating a pro-Soviet stance, and decided to publish the magazine in Riga instead, in order to distance it from Päts.[54] However, sources indicate something completely different. Stomonyakov wrote to Raskolnikov on April 17, 1930: "The issue brought up by the embassy regarding publication of a magazine in the Baltics was postponed indefinitely many months ago. I feel that the present time is inopportune for bringing up this subject because of currency issues."[55] It is rather amusing to imagine that the Soviets were forced to apply the brakes to Päts to prevent him from publicizing his "pro-Soviet stance." Although Päts had plenty of channels for expressing his positions, he never used them to express pro-

[50] "Standard Industrial Trustile anti optsioon" [Standard Industrial Trust Was Given an Option], *Päevaleht*, Feb. 28, 1931.

[51] **Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* p. 78.

[52] **Кен**, **Рупасов**, *Политбюро ЦК ВКП(б) и отношения СССР с западными соседними государствами,* pp. 154–155.

[53] From Stomonyakov to Raskolnikov, April 17, 1931, AFPRF 0154-22-30-2, pp. 20–21.

[54] **Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* pp. 40–41; **Butkus,** "N. Liidu intriigid Balti riikides," pp. 2296–2297.

[55] From Stomonyakov to Raskolnikov, April 17, 1931, AFPRF 0154-22-30-2, pp. 13–14.

Soviet propaganda. It is not hard to guess why – he simply did not hold these opinions. The Soviets were not unaware of this. Even in the speech he gave at the Chamber of Commerce banquet in honor of Petrovsky's departure, Päts declared that he was a right-winger and Petrovsky's ideological opposite.[56]

Ilmjärv alleges that Päts attempted to organize a visit by Foreign Minister Jaan Lattik to Moscow in 1930.[57] From Petrovsky's report to Stomonyakov on February 9, 1930, it is indeed evident that Päts promised Petrovsky that he would speak to Lattik and Strandman and send a reply that same day or the next. Petrovsky writes that although Päts was ill, he received Petrovsky, listened to him attentively, and approved his suggestion. On the following day, he informed Petrovsky through Renning that "my proposal has been forwarded to Lattik, and the government may already be discussing it."[58] Thus, Päts simply told the Soviets that he had forwarded their proposal, nothing more nor nothing less.

Nothing came of Lattik's travel plans. However, Ilmjärv writes: "And yet, Päts was unable to fulfill Moscow's wishes. His lobby was unsuccessful this time."[59] This allegation is false. Ilmjärv is either unaware, or has neglected to mention, that Päts actually made no effort in this regard. Stomonyakov wrote to Raskolnikov on April 17, 1930: "The issue of Lattik's trip must be considered fully exhausted. We were astonished to hear that even Päts spoke out against this trip, despite the fact that he had initially approved of Comrade Petrovsky's 'private proposal'."[60]

Ilmjärv claims that Päts influenced the outcome of many court cases to the benefit of the Soviets, but writes of only one – the case of Jakob Pärtsel. Indeed, Raskolnikov's diary entry of October 25, 1932 mentions that Päts had happened to run into Supreme Court Chairman Parts in the hallway, and had told him that his was an important case and to pay close attention to it.[61] This was 1932, when Estonia was in great need of commercial orders from foreign countries. The Soviet Union had linked its commercial orders to the outcome of this court case. Pärtsel was a speculator who had gotten into a dispute with Soviet Russia's trade representative Isidor Gukovsky in 1920 over a large delivery. However, Ilmjärv neglects to mention a fact that is present in this same diary: in the Pärtsel case, many of Estonia's top politicians expressed their support of the Soviet Union. For instance, Raskolnikov addressed the issue of Pärtsel in his discussions with Karl Einbund and Jaan Teemant. Einbund (whom the Soviets regarded as fiercely anti-Soviet) was in total agreement with Raskolnikov and also convinced Teemant to agree with his position. Minister of Justice and Home Affairs Ado Anderkopp told Raskolnikov that he had attempted to expedite the Pärtsel case and also "to reach a resolution favorable to the Soviet Union, to prevent some miscreant from ruining our relations with the USSR." Not to mention the Socialist Party leaders Aleksander Oinas, Karl Ast and August Rei, who later stated that it was their party which made great contributions to the resolution of the Pärtsel case.[62]

Ilmjärv levels very serious accusations against Päts in connection with the signing of the Estonian-Soviet trade agreement. According to Ilmjärv, "the naiveté of the Socialists and the economic interests of a certain group that included Päts" were behind the signing of the trade agreement. He alleges that one goal of the Soviet side in these trade negotiations was to "satisfy Päts's economic interests and persuade him to continue his cooperation. To this end, the Soviet side was

[56] Buravtsev's diary, Jan. 17, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-6, p. 24.
[57] **Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* p. 51–53.
[58] From Petrovsky to Stomonyakov, Feb. 9, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-1, p. 14.
[59] **Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* p. 53.
[60] From Stomonyakov to Raskolnikov, April 17, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-2, pp. 20–21.
[61] Raskolnikov's diary, Oct. 25, 1932, AFPRF 0154-25-37-26, p. 71.
[62] Raskolnikov's diary of October-November 1932, AFPRF 0154-25-37-26, pp. 32, 59, 75, 77.

prepared to conduct transactions that were disadvantageous to the Soviet Union." Ilmjärv continues: "Päts, as leader of the negotiations, was secretly working against the very commission whose chairman he was. Whatever the Estonian delegation members discussed among themselves was passed on by Päts to Renning to Petrovsky."[63] It remains rather unclear why the Soviet side was prepared to engage in disadvantageous transactions to satisfy Päts's personal economic interests, when Päts was already working against the commission that he chaired, or – why did Päts have to work against the commission he chaired (and thus against himself), when the Soviet side was already prepared to conduct disadvantageous transactions for the benefit of his personal economic interests?

A commission to analyze Estonian-Soviet economic relations had been formed in March 1928, during the government of Jaan Tõnisson. As Hans Rebane noted at the *Riigikogu* Foreign Affairs Commission on March 15, 1929, economic circles from the very start were not expecting the agreement to be very beneficial, although they did feel that signing the agreement might be politically and psychologically advantageous.[64] The government of August Rei, which came into power in December 1928, had approved entering into negotiations and had formed a commission chaired by Konstantin Päts, with members taken from among the participants at the Tartu Peace Conference between Estonia and Soviet Russia – Professor Ants Piip, Karl Virma, and Max Hurt.

Ilmjärv claims that the trade agreement issue gave rise to heated arguments in the *Riigikogu* Finance Commission. Joakim Puhk allegedly demanded that the government pursue banning domestic trade transactions by the Soviet trade representation before ratifying the agreement unless Estonian businessmen were given the opportunity to trade freely with the Soviet Union. Hasselblatt agreed with Puhk. The Estonian delegation chairman Päts was called in to save the day. Päts, Lattik and Rei managed to assure the commission that signing the agreement would serve Estonian interests. Butkus also describes this story vividly. "... During the ratification process of the Estonian-Soviet trade agreement, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry representative, who was first to speak in the Estonian parliament, criticized the agreement bitterly, and called on the government not to approve it. Realizing the danger, Soviet diplomats quickly summoned K. Päts, who happened to be at his farm near Tallinn. Rushing to the parliament building, he requested permission to speak and argued against the Chamber representative, defending the agreement, and perhaps thereby guaranteeing its ratification."[65] Anybody who knows anything about the situation in Estonia will find it hard to imagine how some Soviet agent who had secretly infiltrated the *Riigikogu* Finance Commission could telephone or run to the embassy (*Attention! The agreement so beneficial to us is in danger! Summon Päts!*), upon which Soviet diplomats contact Päts at his farm in Kose-Lükati. Päts (who is not a member of the Finance Commission) throws on his hat and arrives at the Commission session as it is still going on, just in the nick of time, and is allowed to enter as a non-member of this body, in order to reroute the discussion onto a track favorable to the Soviets once again.

The minutes of the *Riigikogu* Finance Commission session of July 25, 1929, at which the agreement was discussed, do not reflect any such peculiar scene. There was little drama at the meeting. As the session began, chairman Jaan Soots said that Joakim Puhk, Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, had requested the floor. After that, Commission members Verner Hasselblatt and Ludvig Kuris suggested that the representative of the Council of Banks be allowed

[63] **Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* pp. 64, 67.
[64] Minutes of the Foreign Affairs Commission meeting, March 15, 1929, ERA 80-3-407, pp. 15–16.
[65] **Butkus,** "N. Liidu intriigid Balti riikides," p. 2297; **Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* p. 69.

to speak, and Economics Minister Johannes Zimmermann said that since organization representatives were being given the floor, then the Estonian-Russian Chamber of Commerce representatives should also be allowed to speak. With a majority of votes, the Commission decided to also invite other experts to the meeting to comment on the situation. Puhk was not against ratification of the agreement in principle, but he felt that there was no rush, and that before ratification, they must demand guarantees from Russia that it would fulfill its promise and stop domestic commercial activity within Estonia. Hasselblatt felt that all details of the agreement must be weighed before its ratification. In opposition, Hans Martinson, Karl Ast and Foreign Minister Jaan Lattik thought that the agreement should be ratified quickly. After that, Päts provided some insight into the background of the agreement, noting: "The agreement will not worsen our situation, nor will it improve it; it will, however, allow reasonable relations between two neighboring states. That is undoubtedly the best point of the agreement. When entering into this agreement, we demanded that the trade reports which the Russians provide to our government must be correct and proper. Moscow did indeed promise that their trade reports here would be correct and proper." Council of Banks representative Klaus Scheel said that the Council of Banks had not taken a stance, and therefore had nothing to say. A skeptical Hasselblatt was next to speak, and then Mihkel Pung praised the agreement. The draft agreement was passed unanimously by the Commission.[66] At the plenary session of the *Riigikogu*, only Hasselblatt and Herman Sumberg expressed reservations about the agreement, although they too approved of the ratification. Päts did not speak at all at the parliamentary plenary session.[67] It is likely that both Ilmjärv and Butkus base their claims on one and the same report by Petrovsky, in which he writes how Päts, after being summoned by the Soviet embassy, defended the trade agreement in parliament with a lion's ferocity. However, this is nothing more than the man boasting of his achievement to his superiors in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, who knew nothing of the situation in Estonia; his boasts are naïvely or deliberately repeated by Ilmjärv and Butkus.

In describing the agreement, Ilmjärv writes that Estonia abandoned those economic advantages that Soviet Russia had promised in Tartu. Ilmjärv links the worsening of Estonia's trade balance with the Soviet Union and the decrease of the flow of Russian goods through Estonia over the next few years to the unsuccessful trade agreement. And Ilmjärv claims that Päts and Renning were to blame for the agreement taking the path that it did.[68] This is a extremely serious accusation indeed.

It is true that the agreement did not stimulate Estonian exports to Russia, and Estonia even considered rescinding the agreement in 1932.[69] Indeed, there were circles in Estonia who felt that the negotiations should address the economic issues agreed to in the Tartu Peace Treaty but never fulfilled. Undoubtedly, this would have been possible. However, these issues (forest concessions, the property of persons opting for change of nationality, etc.) had already been brought up repeatedly without any results, and it was also clear that bringing up these issues during trade agreement negotiations might be disruptive instead of beneficial. Although the Russians did want this trade agreement for foreign policy pur-

[66] Minutes of the *Riigikogu* Finance Affairs Commission, July 25, 1929, ERA 80-4-339, pp. 9–12; "Eesti-Vene kaubaleping tuleb täna ratifitseerimisele" [The Estonian-Russian Trade Agreement Will Be Ratified Today], *Vaba Maa*, July 26, 1929.

[67] *Riigikogu IV koosseis: täielikud protokollid. I istungjärk 1. koosolekust 2. juulil 6. koosolekuni 26. juulil 1929* [Members of the IV *Riigikogu*. 1929. Complete minutes. Session I] (Tallinn, 1929), pp. 48–51, 60, 61.

[68] **Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* p. 70–71.

[69] "Eesti – N. Vene kaubandusleping öeldakse üles" [The Estonian–Soviet Russian Trade Agreement Will Be Rescinded], *Vaba Maa,* Aug. 17, 1932.

poses, they did not want it badly enough, i.e. they were not prepared to make any concession whatsoever, and Päts was undoubtedly well aware of this.

The allegations that entry into the trade agreement caused the previous, more beneficial situation achieved with the Tartu Peace Treaty to lose its validity, and that the decline in commerce in the early 1930s resulted from the trade agreement framed by Päts and Renning, are certainly unfounded. The trade agreement did not provide any kind of positive breakthrough for Estonia; it changed the existing situation very little. Estonia never expected any miracles to come from this agreement. Since the Soviet Union enjoyed a foreign trade monopoly, Estonian exports into the Soviet Union were dependent on the Soviet Union's good will, unless Estonia wanted to enter an agreement that set a specific volume of goods, as Latvia had done in 1927. However, by 1929, as Estonia was getting ready to sign the agreement, a majority of politicians as well as the *Riigikogu* Foreign Affairs Commission were cautious about such a quota agreement, and the subject of a quota agreement was never broached. If it had wished, the Soviet Union could have purchased more – or conversely, fewer – Estonian goods before as well as after signing the trade agreement, and Estonian exports into the Soviet Union fluctuated very strongly before the trade agreement as well as after it.

During the post-agreement period, in the early 1930s, when forced industrialization had begun in the Soviet Union and all finances, particularly all hard currency, were being concentrated on this effort, it is possible to detect two conflicting motives in Soviet trade policy. On the one hand, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs wanted to expand commercial ties and thus achieve warmer political relations; on the other hand, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, along with the Soviet economic bodies subordinate to it, including trade representations in foreign lands, wanted to save hard currency, i.e. to purchase less and sell more. Efforts by the embassy and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to order more goods from Estonia ran up against the resistance of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade. On July 27, 1930, Stomonyakov wrote to Raskolnikov that he had unfortunately not succeeded in budging the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade on the issue of invigorating Soviet-Estonian trade relations. "Referring to the diminishing of imports this year overall, and the ban on placing orders in next year's import plan, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade informs us that it cannot place commercial orders with Estonia until after October of this year. We will continue making an effort, but we must recognize that success is unlikely."[70] He continued discussing the same topic on August 17: "The state of economic relations with Estonia disturbs both me and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. I am planning to take up this issue soon in all seriousness with Comrade Mikoyan, since the factor that should be helping us with political *rapprochement* in this country is clearly beginning to destroy even those political relationships that we have succeeded in creating over the last two years."[71] At the end of the year, on December 17, 1930, Stomonyakov's letter to Raskolnikov was more resigned: "We are still struggling – unfortunately, with inadequate success – to draw special attention to the development of our economic relations with Estonia. In the next few days, I will send another detailed letter to Comrade Rosengoltz and will also try to speak to him personally."[72] Even Raskolnikov was starting to give up, telling Stomonyakov on December 20, 1930: "I am sure to face extraordinary difficulties in procuring orders from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade for a small country such as Estonia,

[70] From Stomonyakov to Raskolnikov, June 27, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-2, p. 37
[71] From Stomonyakov to Raskolnikov, Aug. 17, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-2, p. 41.
[72] From Stomonyakov to Raskolnikov, Dec. 17, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-2, p. 60.

and therefore I am quite reticent in my discussions with the Estonians."[73]

Thus, it is extremely unlikely that a different kind of trade agreement would have succeeded in changing any facet of these relations. Päts won nothing, and Estonia lost nothing from this trade agreement. There is no evidence that Päts achieved any personal gain from the agreement, which, according to Ilmjärv, was one of the Russians' goals. The allegation that Päts had spoken with the leader of the Soviet delegation behind everyone's back, even if it were proven to be true, is not convincing evidence of any perfidy by Päts. The tactic of delegation leaders deciding some issues privately among themselves is not uncommon; it was also used by the leader of the Estonian delegation, Jaan Poska, at the Tartu Peace Conference with Soviet Russia.

Päts and the Soviet petroleum syndicate

In the 1920s, no one in Estonia regarded trade relations with the Soviet Union to be normal, particularly because of the small volume of trade. Even the volume and type of that small segment of Estonia's exports that headed eastward fluctuated year by year. The goods that the Soviet Union exported to Estonia also varied. This was due to fluctuations in the Soviet Union's economic policy and economic situation. In the latter half of the 1920s and particularly the early 1930s, Moscow's need for foreign hard currency to carry out its ambitious industrialization plans was increasing steadily. The Soviets could acquire hard currency by keeping their exports greater than their imports. Thanks to its monopoly on foreign trade, the Soviet government could purchase whatever and however much it wanted. However, businesses of other countries had no access to the Soviet market, and if they wanted to sell goods to Russia, they had to do so through the local trade representations (Torgpredstvo).

Soviet exports to foreign countries were organized by the resident trade representations that usually sold the goods to local wholesalers. Thus, the Soviet Union's situation in the Estonian market was better in all aspects than Estonia's situation in the Russian market. Nothing could be done to change it. Furthermore, in the second half of 1926, Estonian businessmen were becoming sharply annoyed by the Soviet trade representation's apparent desire to bypass the local wholesalers and handle retail sales itself. The Soviet Union established warehouses in Tallinn, Narva and Irboska.[74] In 1926, the Soviet petroleum syndicate (Neftesindikat)[75] was registered in the Estonian Ministry of Commerce and Industry as a foreign joint-stock company.[76] Gas stations were established in Tallinn and later in Pärnu. In 1926, a lively controversy erupted in the Estonian press over the activities of the petroleum syndicate. The company had neglected to pay Estonia its taxes on net profits, claiming that petroleum sales were not profitable. Joakim Puhk, the strongest opponent of Soviet retail trade, said this claim was ridiculous, because the petroleum syndicate, as a state-run entity, could write its own invoices.[77]

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[73] From Raskolnikov to Stomonyakov, Dec. 20, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-1, p. 24.

[74] Letter from the Nationwide Merchants' Agency to the State Elder, Nov. 30, 1926, ERA 891-1-184, pp. 68–71.

[75] The All-Russian Petroleum Syndicate (Neftesindikat), subordinate to the People's Higher Economic Council (VSNH) Fuel Head Office, was created on July 1, 1922 to replace the previous Neftetorg. Neftesindikat was the only organization to market petroleum products in the Soviet domestic market, and unlike its predecessor, was also granted the monopoly rights for the sale of petroleum products to the foreign market. A decision of the People's Higher Economic Council of November 30, 1929 created the All-Union Association of Oil and Gasoline Industry (Soyuzneft) from Neftesindikat and the oil industry trusts that had previously been subordinate to this council. On October 8, 1931, Soyuzneft became the People's Higher Economic Council Fuel Head Office Oil Section.

[76] State Herald Annex 1926-71.

[77] "Kas Venemaa Eesti turgu vallutamas" [Is Russia Conquering the Estonian Market], *Vaba Maa*, Oct. 17, 1926.

Under international law, the issue was complex as well as new, because no country had ever existed on another country's territory as a legal business entity. Päts undoubtedly knew of the problem from the start because as the chairman of the Estonian-Soviet Chamber of Commerce and chairman of the Council of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, he had been obligated to seek solutions for such problems. This could not have been easy for Estonia; submitting an official protest made little sense, since the Soviet Union could bring up precedents in other countries. Here it must be emphasized that mixed joint-stock companies for the sale of Soviet petroleum products had been established in many countries, including Britain and the vehemently anti-Soviet Poland.

Therefore, one possible solution for a situation that was annoying everybody was the establishment of a mixed joint-stock company. Estonia would get rid of retail sales by the government institution of another country (the Soviet petroleum syndicate), the Soviet embassy and trade representation would get rid of annoying accusations, and the Soviet petroleum syndicate could perhaps sell more of its products (petroleum, heavy fuel oil, gasoline and kerosene). On March 12, 1928, a meeting of the founders of mixed joint-stock companies was held in Tallinn. The meeting was chaired by Soviet trade representative Smirnov, and the Soviet side included representatives of the petroleum syndicate and Torgpredstvo. The Estonian side included August Kuusik and August Keller. The meeting resulted in a draft agreement, according to which a mixed joint-stock company for marketing Soviet petroleum products was to be established on the basis of the Estonian Law on Joint-Stock Companies. The founding capital was to be 100 thousand Estonian kroons, with 51% of the shares belonging to the petroleum syndicate and 49% to the Estonian group. The petroleum syndicate was to lease all its tanks, gasoline stations, warehouses, etc. to the mixed joint-stock company. There were two possibilities for the sale of petroleum products: according to the first, the petroleum syndicate was to sell the products to the mixed joint-stock company on a four-month credit plan; if no price agreement was reached, the petroleum products would be given to the mixed joint-stock company to sell for a commission of 10%. The fact that the Estonian-Soviet Chamber of Commerce had been involved with this agreement from the start is evidenced by item 11 of the agreement, which established that if the parties were unable to agree on who should act as chairman of the mixed joint-stock company, the chairman would be appointed by the Estonian-Soviet Chamber of Commerce.[78] However, for reasons unknown, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade did not approve the draft, and the waiting dragged on. The Soviet Union did not expand its domestic trade in Estonia, and at some point (probably after the signing of the trade agreement in 1929), it gradually dismantled its existing retail sales infrastructure in Estonia.

At an unknown time, apparently in 1929, either Päts or the Soviets came up with the idea of Päts's personal participation in the work of the mixed joint-stock company as a legal consultant. As a politician and the chairman of the Estonian-Soviet Chamber of Commerce, Päts may have been motivated to participate in the creation of the mixed joint-stock company by the opportunity to achieve a breakthrough in Estonian-Soviet trade relations; however, the fact that Päts may have been motivated by Soviet money cannot be excluded.

The motives of the Soviet side were also multifaceted, and in some aspects, even contradictory. The primary strategic goal of Soviet economic institutions dealing with foreign trade was to support industrialization.[79] Torgpredstvo and Soyuzneft bosses assessed their employees first and foremost according to

[78] Draft bylaws of the mixed joint-stock company, March 12, 1928, AFPRF 054-12-24-3, pp. 27–28.

[79] **Glen Alden Smith,** *Soviet Foreign Trade. Organization, Operation and Policy, 1918–1971* (New York, London, 1973), p. 45.

how many petroleum products they succeeded in selling. The petroleum syndicate was indeed motivated to draw Estonian politicians and opinion leaders into the mixed joint-stock company, especially if these ties might allow them to sell more gasoline, kerosene, heavy fuel oil and petroleum under more beneficial terms. However, the sale of a few hundred tons of petroleum products to the Estonian market was far from an issue of paramount importance for the management of a mammoth enterprise like Soyuzneft, which was involved with technological development, geological research, and all other kinds of issues relating to petroleum production. Working to help the petroleum syndicate, the embassy and the PCFA wanted to intensify ties with influential Estonian public figures and perhaps even assure their dependency with the help of Soyuzneft's financial resources. However, Soyuzneft as well as the trade representation had a much freer hand with financial resources than the PCFA or the embassy.[80]

The differing motivations caused delays in decision-making and created mutual friction between the Soviet institutions. Decisions were also delayed because of the constant reforming of the institutions dealing with foreign trade and the Soviets' general incompetence with management. Of course, if Moscow had considered the "involvement" of Päts to be a crucial goal that promised great benefits in the long run, and if compromising him would have been considered truly achievable, a consensus would have rapidly been achieved with the help of the highest organs in Moscow (the Politburo), and the funds provided immediately. However, the negotiations on the establishment of the mixed joint-stock company had already begun in 1928.[81] In February 1930, Päts asked Renning to tell the embassy that in his opinion, discussion of the issue had stretched out long enough, and since he had agreed to involve his name with the endeavor by consenting to serve as the new joint-stock company's legal consultant, he would like to see some progress as soon as possible. "Otherwise, he will consider himself released from these obligations."[82]

Joakim Puhk's participation in the upcoming mixed joint-stock company was discussed in late 1929. In early January 1930, ambassador Petrovsky convinced the trade representative Smirnov that such a move was necessary.[83] On January 7, 1930, Stomonyakov wrote to Petrovsky, saying that the PCFA feels that the plan to involve Puhk is rather interesting, since Puhk had "caused such great damage in the past to Estonian-Soviet relations," and that the issue of Päts had been decided at a meeting with Comrade Hinchuk.[84] "The petroleum syndicate indicated its willingness to employ Päts as a legal consultant. Now Comrade Smirnov is left with the duty of making sure this decision is carried out."[85]

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[80] For instance, on November 14, 1930, the embassy's 1st Secretary Mikhail Buravtsev wrote in his diary: "Moscow is not sending money. There is no credit. We must ask for another loan from the business executives in order to pay the workers. The petroleum syndicate will give us no more, since we owe it more than two,000 kroons for the house. The financial situation of our house is catastrophic. We must soon acquire new telephones, but lack the funds to do so." AFPRF 0154-22-30-6, p. 177.

[81] Ilmjärv alleges that negotiations on involving Päts in the work of the petroleum syndicate went on for all of 1929. (**Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* p. 85). Päts's "involvement" was not, however, a separate issue in these negotiations, but was discussed only in relation to sales of oil products.

[82] Buravtsev's diary, Feb. 20,1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-6, p. 27.

[83] Petrovsky's diary, Jan. 6, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-6, p. 3.

[84] Lev Hinchuk was the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade.

[85] From Stomonyakov to Petrovsky, Jan. 7, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-2, pp. 1–2. Referring to this document, Ilmjärv writes: "As the documents show, officials of the People's Commissariats of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade held a joint meeting on the topic of involving Päts and paying him remunerations in early January 1930." He continues: "Of course, the issue had already been approved by the Politburo" (**Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* p. 89). Ilmjärv provides no reference for the alleged Politburo decision, so extremely crucial for this issue. He could not provide it anyway. There is no such decision among all the decisions of the Politburo, see **Кен**, **Рупасов**, *Политбюро ЦК ВКП(б) и отношения СССР с западными соседними государствами,* pp. 128–168.

However, things now got stuck behind the PCFA. Namely, Stomonyakov told the Tallinn embassy's 1st Secretary Mikhail Buravtsev on February 17: "As a rule, we take a negative stance toward the formation of any kind of mixed joint-stock companies, either industrial or commercial. Exceptions are possible only for particularly important political reasons. There are no such reasons in Estonia, and therefore I am asking you not to allow yourself to be drawn into any negotiations or conversations about mixed joint-stock companies with Renning."[86] Stomonyakov did not consider the "involvement" of Puhk and Päts to be an important political reason, and was happy to forget the whole idea.

However, in Soyuzneft, things were moving along according to the earlier agreement. On February 27, Buravtsev found out that Kashitsin, Soyuzneft's representative in Riga, had gotten his board's consent for the formation of a mixed joint-stock company.[87] Stomonyakov grabbed hold of the idea once again. On March 27, he informed the new ambassador Raskolnikov, who had just arrived in Tallinn, of what the petroleum syndicate had told them, i.e. the issue of inviting Päts was still not resolved because Päts himself was uncomfortable with the idea of serving as consultant for one of the petroleum syndicate's departments. Because of this, they must await the creation of a Soviet-Estonian mixed joint-stock company, being negotiated by Comrade Kashitsin. "The petroleum syndicate informed me that it has appropriated funds for this, and now we are simply waiting for Comrade Kashitsin."[88] Thus, Päts's "involvement," or actually employment as the legal consultant for a mixed joint-stock company, was not decided by the Politburo or even the PCFA, but the board of Soyuzneft, evidently for economic reasons above all else.

On the March 9 meeting in the embassy, Kashitsin, who had traveled from Riga to Tallinn, assured them that he had been instructed to appropriate funds with which to persuade Päts to work as legal consultant. The following steps were decided at the meeting: to expedite the formation of the mixed joint-stock company; to make sure that Puhk's company was recruited into it; to persuade Päts to join the newly created joint-stock company as a legal consultant. Up until the time the mixed joint-stock company is formed in another two to three months, Päts should be paid for his consultations for the local petroleum syndicate; it was recommended that Kashitsin visit Kuusik, Puhk and Päts to discuss organizational issues with them. After the presentation of credentials and the conducting of official visits, Raskolnikov would meet with Päts himself and finalize their agreement on all petroleum-related issues and particularly on his work.[89]

On March 11, 1930, Kashitsin visited Päts and Nihtig (manager of Puhk's ETK – Central Association of Estonian Consumers), and informed Raskolnikov and Buravtsev of his visits immediately. Kashitsin did not place any particular emphasis on the agreement with Päts, but spoke of the outcome of all his discussions as if they were of equal importance. He asked Päts to serve as legal consultant on issues concerning the establishment of the mixed joint-stock petroleum company, offering Päts a salary of 4,000 dollars a year until the mixed joint-stock company was formally registered. Päts was allegedly pleased and agreed to do the work. Päts informed Kashitsin that Kuusik was on the verge of bankruptcy, and that Nihtig was also "hanging by a thread." Nihtig made his own suggestions regarding who should be taken on as participants in the mixed joint-stock company. Raskolnikov remarked that with the exception of the former government minister Leo Sepp, who was a political figure, the suggested persons were of little interest. "However, Sepp will not be joining us." And Raskolnikov felt that a staff like

[86] From Stomonyakov to Buravtsev, Jan. 17, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-2, p. 10.
[87] Buravtsev's diary, Feb. 27, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-6, p. 54.
[88] From Stomonyakov to Raskolnikov, March 27, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-2, pp. 13–14.
[89] Raskolnikov's diary, March 9, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-6, p. 62.

that would leave Nihtig to manage the whole thing. "Naturally, Päts and Puhk were negative about the Nihtig plan." To counterbalance this, Puhk come up with and submit his own mixed joint-stock company proposal.[90]

Apparently, Päts began receiving remuneration in March 1930. Raskolnikov wrote in June 1930: "Renning has very close ties to Päts, who considers Renning to be a reliable friend, and he not only instructs him to negotiate with us, but also trusts him to fetch his pay."[91] Päts was receiving remuneration of 4,000 dollars a year, or 330 dollars a month, a hefty amount at that time. However, it was natural for Soviet foreign trade organizations to operate with significant sums. Even Ilmjärv admits that in 1929, the Soviets were planning to pay the chairman or vice-chairman of the mixed joint-stock company (who they assumed, at that time, would be the director of Silva, August Kuusik) 500 dollars a month.[92]

On March 27, Stomonyakov told Raskolnikov that the creation of a joint-stock petroleum company in Estonia would probably be approved. "As far as Puhk is concerned, involving him in our work might be quite desirable. But we must make sure that his cooperation will end his displays of hostility."[93] Raskolnikov, in turn, noted in his diary on March 28, as he touched upon petroleum-related issues, that he had visited Puhk, who said that Kashitsin's plan needs to be reworked. He would like to sell the petroleum products for a percentage commission, and with a guarantee of receiving a specific minimum annual profit; the determination of pricing policy would be left to the petroleum syndicate. On May 5, Puhk informed the ambassador that he was prepared to serve as the petroleum syndicate's chief representative and to renounce his positions as representative of other companies. However, he could guarantee the sale of a certain volume of petroleum products only if he himself could set the prices. On May 10, Kashitsin was again summoned by the Tallinn embassy to participate in a meeting during which Raskolnikov once again emphasized that "from the standpoint of our policy, we must enter into an agreement with Puhk in order to neutralize him." Raskolnikov suggested that this be done without insulting ETK and by discussing the matter with Nihtig, Renning and Puhk.[94]

Soyuzneft held the thick end of the stick in the formation of the mixed joint-stock company; it saw these dealings from a business perspective above all. Stomonyakov's tone also changed. On June 17, he informed Raskolnikov: "Since the petroleum syndicate shows no desire to change its methods of conducting trade, and thinks there is no need to do so, the embassy does not need to do anything to change the existing order – i.e. transforming the petroleum syndicate department into a mixed joint-stock company. The whole issue has given rise to an unhealthy situation. Renning must be excluded from any negotiations. It seems to us that even Nihtig, who is involved with us through ETK, is of no interest to us as an independent counteragent. As reported to me by the department, it became evident at the meeting at which you, as well as Comrade Dedya[95] and petroleum export representatives were present, that of all the persons whose cooperation would be most desirable, Puhk is at the top. Unfortunately, the position that Puhk has taken is entirely unacceptable. In spite of our wish to oblige Puhk in every way, we cannot do this at the expense of our economic interests. At the negotiations, it became clear that the most acceptable combination for us would be to have Puhk's company link itself to the Estonian company of Kuhlmann, which is our counteragent for gasoline sales in the

[90] Buravtsev's diary, March 11, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-6, p. 45; Raskolnikov's diary, March 11, 1930, ATPRF 0154-22-30-6, p. 61.
[91] From Raskolnikov to Stomonyakov, June 21, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-1, p. 40.
[92] **Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* p. 84.
[93] From Stomonyakov to Raskolnikov, March 27, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-2, p. 16.
[94] Raskolnikov's diary, March 28, 1930; May 5, 1930; May 10, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-6, pp. 66, 91, 95.
[95] Andrei Dedya was Smirnov's successor as Soviet trade representative in Estonia.

non-cooperative sector. Comrade Dedya assumed that he might be able to put this combination in place, and we are waiting for the outcome of his efforts. The main issue, which will remain open for us at this time, is finding a way to pay P. his salary legally. Since both parties have been satisfied with the situation up to this point, we must wait and try to find an acceptable solution without having to reorganize the petroleum syndicate department. I request your suggestions on this issue."[96] Thus, the petroleum syndicate did not wish to continue doing business with Puhk under the conditions that he set forth, and the issue of the mixed joint-stock company remained mired. Soyuzneft was passive too. On August 17, Stomonyakov wrote to Raskolnikov: "Unfortunately, trade representative Comrade Dedya, who has been, as I now find out, in Moscow for two weeks already, has not found it necessary to show himself at the PCFA offices and give us the information that you obligated him to provide. He has also failed to show up at the petroleum syndicate to push the issue of the petroleum joint-stock company in one direction or the other, once and for all....Today I spoke with Comrade Lomov[97], who will give me a final answer in a couple of days."[98]

On October 1, Stomonyakov gave Buravtsev a lengthy summary of the petroleum issue. "For the last year or even longer, we have had to work at organizing a mixed joint-stock company in Estonia for the sale of petroleum products; however, despite long-term correspondence with Revel [Tallinn] and negotiations with Soyuzneft and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, the issue has not been resolved and is actually even more muddled than it was a year ago. To a great extent, this has happened because the embassy failed to fully comprehend the issue, instead drawing its conclusions from the opinions of the Soyuzneft representative who had traveled to Revel, from the trade representation, and partially from the opinions of the interested Estonians (Päts, Puhk, Renning) instead. In the question of the mixed joint-stock company, the issue of most interest from the political perspective is Päts's participation in the company. Based upon the embassy's information, we at one time assumed that Päts was satisfied with his appointment to the position of the trade representation's legal consultant on petroleum issues; however, after we made the decision in principle to appoint him, we found out – first, that Päts had been appointed legal consultant for the establishment of a mixed joint-stock company, and second, that he was hurrying along the creation of this mixed joint-stock company because he was uncomfortable serving as the trade representation's legal consultant. At the same time, Soyuzneft and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade decided during their negotiations in early September that the creation of a mixed joint-stock company in Estonia was inadvisable. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade offered us the option to appeal to higher authorities, in case we were dissatisfied with this decision. However, we can ask neither higher authorities nor even Soyuzneft and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade to have the mixed joint-stock company established with the involvement of Puhk, because the latter's participation would be truly detrimental from a business standpoint. Soyuzneft has decisively asserted that the creation of a mixed joint-stock company cannot possibly result in an expansion of our petroleum sales on the Estonian market, which is already saturated with these products to approximately 60%. Based upon this statistic, we must acknowledge the validity of Soyuzneft's opposition to Puhk's participation in the mixed joint-stock company... For the reasons given, I do not find it possible to present myself as a supporter of the formation of a mixed joint-stock company that involves Puhk, and I feel that we can escape this situation either by having the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade find some kind of opportunity for keep-

[96] From Stomonyakov to Raskolnikov, June 17, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-2, pp. 29–30.
[97] Lomov was Chairman of the Board of Soyuzneft.
[98] From Stomonyakov to Raskolnikov, Aug. 17, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-2, p. 42.

ing Puhk[99] as an unpublicized petroleum-issues consultant for the trade representation, or by establishing a fictitious mixed joint-stock company whose entire capital belongs to us and which would formally include the 'pair' of Estonians who will not cost us much. Before suggesting one or the other escape route to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, I must have a final assessment of Päts's own feelings and intentions. I suggest that you meet with him personally (without Renning's presence or any kind of participation whatsoever) and talk to him sincerely about our petroleum issues. Tell him that the issue has been discussed in detail, and that Soyuzneft now finds it impractical to form a mixed joint-stock company in which Puhk will participate, but on the other hand, we would under any circumstances want to keep Päts in his role as consultant on petroleum issues. Taking these things into account, you wanted to discuss the situation with him personally and to find out how his status as legal consultant should be formalized to make it most acceptable to him. Naturally, it would be most practical if he, Päts, would simply become the trade representation's legal consultant on petroleum issues. If Päts says that this makes his uncomfortable because of political considerations, then tell him that in your personal opinion, the fact that Päts is serving as the trade representations's permanent legal consultant need not be made public. If Päts categorically states that he cannot serve as the trade representation's legal consultant under any circumstances, then, emphasizing that this is only your own personal idea, ask him if it might be possible to organize a joint-stock company that would be a mixed joint-stock company only formally, with its capital actually belonging to Soviet organizations. If such a joint-stock company can be formed without great expense, then you could personally propose it to Soyuzneft, although, of course, you are not convinced that Soyuzneft will accept this kind of solution to the issue. Your entire conversation must have a personal and intimate tone."[100] It is evident that nothing had gone according to PCFA's wishes, and now PCFA decided to offer Päts the opportunity of serving as the trade representation's unpublicized legal consultant or to create a fictitious mixed joint-stock company, if Päts so wished.

At 11 o'clock on October 7, Buravtsev made his way to a meeting with Päts, having first discussed with Dedya the issues to be touched upon during his conversation. He met with Päts for an hour and a half, engaging in lively discussion on a number of different topics. However, the discussion did not proceed according to the plan prescribed by Stomonyakov. Buravtsev told Päts the establishment of a mixed joint-stock company in Estonia was meeting strong opposition in Soyuzneft circles, and expressed his regret that this had been going on for a number of years and was still an undecided issue. In Buratsev's words, Päts tried "constantly to emphasize his lack of interest in petroleum issues, expressing the opinions of Joakim Puhk when these issues were touched upon," describing Puhk's role in economic activities, and recommending him as a person interested in the development of economic relations between Estonia and the Soviet Union. Päts stated that Puhk had not expressed any desire to chair the mixed joint-stock company, and that he would not ask the Soviet Union to give him a monopoly on marketing rights to Soviet petroleum products. He only wanted to be given the opportunity to market Soyuzneft's products on an equal footing with other clients. At that, Buravtsev said that their conversation was personal, and that he would inform Moscow of Päts's opinions. Päts reacted negatively to the idea of organizing a joint-stock company with 100% Soviet capital and a management that would include Estonians. "He said that Puhk would never agree to such a combination, and that there was no political or economic value in involving other business figures. /.../ To end the conversation, I asked Päts to discuss with Pung (who is a relative of Päts)

[99] Stomonyakov probably meant Päts, not Puhk.
[100] From Stomonyakov to Buravtsev, Oct. 1, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-2, pp. 52–55.

whether he would serve as an attorney for the trade representation's legal cases. These issues will soon be heard in court. After that, I asked Päts how he would feel if we asked him to consult at the trade representation occasionally. Päts agreed gladly to provide legal assistance to our trade representation, and also to convince Pung to agree to participate in the trade representation's court cases."[101] Thus, Buravtsev did not even propose to Päts to begin serving as an "unpublicized" consultant on petroleum issues for Torgpredstvo, i.e. he failed to make the proposition that, according to Stomonyakov's instructions, he was to make before ever bringing up the subject of a fictitious mixed joint-stock company. It is possible that the tone of the conversation did not allow Buravtsev to do so. It is evident that Päts energetically supported Puhk's participation in the sale of Soviet petroleum products – exactly the thing that the Soviets were trying to prevent. Päts unequivocally rejected the idea of participating in a fictitious mixed joint-stock company, but agreed to "provide legal assistance to the trade representation." Nowhere in this conversation were the terms "secret" or "unpublicized" used.

On October 19, Stomonyakov's deputy Mikhail Karsky wrote to Buravtsev: "The outcome of your discussion with Päts on the issue of a petroleum joint-stock is fully satisfactory for us. Since the invitation to serve as consultant has been formalized in a manner completely satisfactory to both sides, there is no point in asking Soyuzneft to establish a mixed joint-stock company. Therefore we informed Soyuzneft that it could begin entering into new agreements with its clients. Soyuzneft plans to expand its work with the ETK; however, we did point out that it would be advisable to enter into a petroleum sales agreement with Puhk that places him on an equal footing with other companies. It is particularly recommended to actually sign such a contract with Puhk. Then, the whole issue of marketing our petroleum products will be much better regulated."[102] On October 22, Buravtsev wrote to the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Nikolai Krestinsky: "The issue of a mixed joint-stock petroleum company, as can be seen in the notes of my conversation with Päts (pages 1-2 of my diary) and my subsequent discussion with Renning, can now be considered closed. The only thing left of this entire issue is the minor question of whether to include Puhk among the clients of Soyuzneft's local office."[103]

By the end of 1930, the Soviets did manage to reach an agreement with Puhk. From

[101] Buravtsev's diary, Oct. 7, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-6, pp. 154–155.

[102] From Karsky to Buravtsev, Oct. 19, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-2, pp. 56–57.

[103] From Buravtsev to Krestinski, Oct. 22, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-1, p. 70. This document is key in Ilmjärv's construction of Päts's "involvement." (In the Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Buravtsev's letter to Krestinski of October 22, 1930 is preserved under reference AFPRF 0154-22-30-1, not Buravtsev's letter to Stomonyakov of October 22, as Ilmjärv claims.). Based upon this particular document, he claims: "The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs then informed the Tallinn embassy that despite the fact that the People's Commissariat for Foreign and Domestic Trade had reached an agreement on creating a mixed joint-stock company, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs does not submit the issue to the Politburo for its final approval. They plainly stated that there is no purpose in creating a mixed joint-stock company and sharing the profits. They emphasized that the entire endeavor had been undertaken only for the purpose of involving Päts. In order to assure that Puhk would limit his anti-Soviet feelings and to satisfy his lust for money, they decided to include him in the oil syndicate's list of clients, i.e. to allow him to sell a certain amount of Soviet patroleum on the Estonian market" (**Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* p. 93). However, in this document — Buravtsev's letter of October 22, 1930 — there is not a syllable of information that would indicate that "the entire endeavor had been undertaken only for the purpose of involving Päts." There is also no information to indicate that the PCFA did not submit the agreed mixed joint-stock company issue to the Politburo for its final approval. Another document — Stomonyakov's letter to Buravtsev on October 1, referred to above — shows that the situation was quite the opposite: that negotiations between the PCFA, Soyuzneft and officials of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade resulted in a decision by early September that the creation of a mixed joint-stock company in Estonia was inadvisable, and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade told the PCFA that if it was dissatisfied with this decision, it could appeal the decision to higher ▸

the November 11 entry in Buravtsev's diary, we see that negotiations were held as before with ETK and Puhk, and that a contract for the sale of 200 tons would be signed with Puhk.[104]

On November 18, 1930, Raskolnikov wrote in his diary: "Päts expressed his complete satisfaction with the negotiations between Soyuzneft's local office and Puhk. Comrade Dedya told Päts of Puhk's potential outlook for marketing our gasoline. In reference to Päts's personal issue, Comrade Dedya agreed that sections dealing with the bonuses would be included in the trade representation contracts with Puhk. Päts agreed that it was indeed more convenient to formalize all these things in the large contracts between Puhk and the trade representation, rather than within the smaller contract which Puhk will soon sign with the Soyuzneft local office." However, Raskolnikov wrote on December 12, 1930: "Renning showed up. He cautiously discussed the question of Päts's remuneration, whereby Päts doggedly insisted on receiving his money through Puhk. Päts trusts Puhk completely and feels that a bonus will link him more closely to us. By cautioning Renning, I was cautioning Päts as well, against excessively trusting Puhk, and agreeing that the current situation is improper, I offered to find another way."[105]

The last known information regarding Päts's remuneration originated from February 21, 1931. Päts had already become State Elder (on February 12). Raskolnikov wrote to Stomonyakov that Päts, already serving as State Elder, sent someone to fetch his pay. "Comrade Dedya paid him for not only February, but also for March. Pung, as you can see from the diary, wanted the position as attorney for the trade representation."[106] It is not known whether this meant that Pung became Päts's successor as the trade representation's legal consultant in April 1931. There is also a hint in the diary of Voldemar Kures that leads us to believe that Mihkel Pung was henceforth the legal consultant for the trade representation.[107]

Although there is no specific information showing that the payment of remunerations to Päts had been discontinued, the payment of February 21 is probably the last payment.[108]

authorities. PCFA decided not to do so. This means that the idea of establishing a mixed joint-stock company was rejected by Soyuzneft and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade. PCFA had no opportunity to bring up this topic again. Ilmjärv also alleges, in order to inflate the importance of the petroleum affair and Päts's "involvement," that the political elite of the Soviet Union — Stalin, Litvinov, Mikoyan, Ordzhonikidze, Menzhinsky and Yagoda — were kept constantly informed of developments in the establishment of the mixed joint-stock company (**Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* p. 95). However, Ilmjärv provides no evidence for this. There were as many copies made of Stomonyakov's letters, which dealt with the establishment of the joint-stock company and other issues related to the sale of petroleum products, as of other letters sent to his embassy.

104 Buravtsev's diary, Nov. 11, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-6, p. 177.

105 Raskolnikov's diary, Nov. 18, 1930; Dec. 12, 1930, AFPRF 0154-22-30-6, pp. 169, 183.

106 From Raskolnikov to Stomonyakov, Feb. 21, 1931, AFPRF 09-6-54-59, p. 4. Thanks to Alexander Rupasov for a copy of the document. Ilmjärv has verified Päts's last remuneration as occurring on December 12, 1930 (**Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* p. 91).

107 **Voldemar Kures,** *Seitsme lukuga suletud raamat [A Book Sealed With Seven Locks]*, vol. I (Tartu, 2006), p. 411.

108 Logically, details of Päts's remuneration and the selling of Soviet petroleum products should be sought among the documents of Soyuzneft (RSAE Fund 2309) or the People's Higher Economic Council Fuel Head Office Oil Section (RSAE Fund 7735). Unfortunately, a large part of the documentation of these organizations was destroyed in 1972–1973, including those documents dealing with the sale of Soviet petroleum products to foreign countries. (See preface to the list of the All-Union Association of Oil and Gasoline Industry — Soyuzneft — and the preface to the list of the People's Higher Economic Council Fuel Head Office Oil Section in the RSAE). Preserved trade representation documents also do not include any information on the financing of Päts, probably because the export of Soviet petroleum products was centralized and the number of employees of trade representations was cut. Details of this information can most likely be found in the Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. This author wishes succeeding researchers patience and luck, but above all, a change in political circumstances that would see the Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation fully opened to historians.

Logically, if the payments had continued, the correspondence would include some indications of that. The likely discontinuation of payments is supported by the fact that the sale of Soviet petroleum products in Estonia, i.e. the very plan for which Päts was placed on the Soyuzneft payroll, failed utterly.

Was Päts blackmailable and was he serving Soviet interests?

The whole business which resulted in Päts being paid by Soyuzneft to serve as its legal consultant for the year was very typical of the Soviets and characteristic of their meager management capabilities: proposals, co-ordination, new proposals, drawing out of the whole affair, lack of information, a return to previous proposals, etc. It is clear that the attempt to establish a mixed joint-stock company in Estonia and the organization of subsequent petroleum product sales was not some high-level affair designed for the "recruitment" of Päts, in which the Politburo was calling the shots. The highest level of political decision-making in this case lay with a member of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (Stomonyakov), who had so little power that he was forced to take advantage of Soyuzneft's financial resources. The payment of Päts was not discussed as a separate issue or goal in any of the embassy's and PCFA's correspondence, being mentioned only in connection with petroleum issues.[109]

Providing legal advice for the establishment of a mixed joint-stock company, i.e. Päts's activity up until October 7, 1930, was not particularly compromising to Päts as a member of the *Riigikogu*. Many or even most of the lawyers in the Estonian *Riigikogu* at that time continued their private practice. The situation changed somewhat beginning on October 7, 1930, when Päts consented to serve as the legal consultant of the Soviet trade representation. However, even providing legal consultation for the trade representation of another state was not unequivocally compromising. But as of February 12, 1931, when Päts became State Elder, it clearly became an issue of a conflict of interests, according to present-day legal standards. This situation most likely lasted from February 12, 1931 to the end of March 1931 and meant that Päts could potentially use his position as State Elder to provide favors to the Soviet trade representation. We see from Raskolnikov's letter, quoted above, that someone did fetch Päts's February and March salary, but the possibility that Päts returned the money for the latter half of February and the month of March cannot be excluded, although this is not likely.

Although the concept of conflict of interests was unfamiliar in the legal world of that time, and the fact that Päts worked as a legal consultant while serving as State Elder was not illegal at that time, the fact that Päts received a salary from Torgpredstvo while serving as State Elder was undeniably politically compromising for him. If the public had found out about it, a scandal would certainly have ensued. And if the League of Veterans of the War of Independence had known this in 1934, they would undoubtedly have taken advantage of it in their election campaign against Päts.

But all this still does not mean that the Soviets could have been able to blackmail Päts, or even that there would have been any

[109] Ilmjärv's allegation of Päts's "involvement," comparing it to recruitment into working on behalf of another state's intelligence apparatus, is thus entirely inappropriate; the Soviets never even attempted any recruitment. Ilmjärv also claims that many memoranda of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs "truly assessed the involvement of Päts and his retention as a legal consultant as a great victory" (**Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* p. 95); however, instead of referring to these many memorandums, he refers to the above-mentioned letter from Stomonyakov's deputy Karsky to the embassy's First Secretary Buravtsev on October 19, 1930. This letter says nothing about Päts being "involved" in some kind of compromising affair, or being "involved" in any other kind of affair whatsoever. There is also no mention of the PCFA assessing Päts's "retention as a legal consultant as a great victory."

advantage to compromising him. It is very hard to believe that the shrewd and experienced Päts, a renowned political manipulator, would suddenly lose all his previous political instinct and start laying land mines in the path of his own future political career. He must have been convinced that the Soviets were unable to compromise and blackmail him. He might have been inclined to believe this because of the Soviets' low level of organizational skills, and the fact that there was no other politician at that level in Estonia in whose favor the Soviets would have needed to compromise him.

There is not a single note in Soviet documents that would indicate that Päts had any kind of special relationship with Moscow because of these petroleum issues. Quite the contrary, documents indicate that he continued to communicate with embassy and trade representation officials, all the while emphasizing his positions and his independence and keeping his distance. For instance, Stomonyakov wrote to Raskolnikov on April 16, 1931: "It is indisputable that Päts's rise to power did not change the main direction of Estonian foreign policy, which favors closer ties with Poland and the formation of a Baltic union under Polish sponsorship" (i.e. exactly that to which the Soviets were most opposed). And on May 26, Stomonyakov admitted a certain worsening of relations with the Päts government.[110] After that, as an authoritarian ruler in 1935-36, Päts oriented himself ever more strongly toward Germany, and his policies became ever more disagreeable to Moscow. However, there are no indications that Moscow tried to exert any kind of pressure on him. If Päts's dealings with the Soviet trade representation had included any elements of doing favors, Päts might have reminded the NKVD of this fact during his interrogations by this agency in 1940 and 1941, when such a fact would have counted in his favor. No proof exists that anything like this took place.

Another strong argument in favor of the stance that Päts did not fear being compromised by the Soviets and did not work in their interests is the total catastrophe that befell Soviet petroleum product sales. The reason for the sudden decline in opportunities for gasoline imports from the Soviet Union was an increase in customs duties, imposed in July 1930 by none other than the Päts government. Gasoline import duties had been about 6 cents per kilogram from the end of 1924 to July 1931. The customs duty increase raised it to 10 cents. Additionally, road use fees were raised from 5 cents to 15 cents for foreign gasoline and to 7 cents for domestic gasoline in December 1931, during the Päts administration.[111] This arrangement placed foreign gasoline in a difficult competitive situation on the Estonian market. Still, the import of petroleum gasoline was necessary, because it had to be mixed with Estonia's own oil shale gasoline. However, the change that followed the increase in duties and tariffs was extensive: whereas 9,100 tons of gasoline had been imported in 1930 (including 3,200 tons from the Soviet Union) and 7,194 tons had been imported in 1931 (including 2,414 tons from the Soviet Union), the volume of gasoline imported in 1932 was only 1,571 tons (including the Soviet Union's share of 1,098 tons), increasing somewhat over the next few years, but never again attaining anything close to the levels of 1930 and 1931.[112] The reason

[110] From Stomonyakov to Raskolnikov, April 16 and May 26, 1931, AFPRF 09-6-54-56, 24, 36.

[111] State Herald 1931, pp. 33, 1277.

[112] **Jaak Valge,** "Riikliku põlevkivitööstuse majandamistingimused ja -tulemused 1920. ja 1930. aastatel" [Economic Conditions and Outcomes of the State Oil Shale Industry in the 1920s and 1930s], *Akadeemia* 7, 8 (1995), pp. 1727–1727; 1929–1930; *Eesti Majandus. Väliskaubandus 1931 [The Estonian Economy. Foreign Trade 1931]* (Tallinn, 1932), pp. 68–69; *Eesti Majandus. Väliskaubandus 1932 [The Estonian Economy. Foreign Trade 1932]* (Tallinn, 1933), pp. 66–67; *Eesti Majandus. Väliskaubandus 1933 [The Estonian Economy. Foreign Trade 1933]* (Tallinn, 1934), p. 62; *Eesti Majandus. Väliskaubandus 1934 [The Estonian Economy. Foreign Trade 1934]* (Tallinn, 1936), pp. 65–66; *Eesti Majandus. Väliskaubandus 1935 [The Estonian Economy. Foreign Trade 1935]* (Tallinn, 1935), p. 58.

for this was the great preferential treatment given to domestic gasoline on the Estonian market as a result of customs tariff and fees policies implemented during the time that Konstantin Päts headed the government.

The conditions for the importation of Soviet gasoline had worsened abruptly in the summer of 1931, and the importation of Russian petroleum, heavy fuel oil and kerosene was dealt a serious blow in the summer of 1932. Because of the properties of Estonia's oil shale oil, it could replace the imported petroleum and heavy fuel oil, but its production costs were higher. Since 1924, the customs duty for petroleum had been 10 kroons per ton, but on June 14, 1932 (during the Jaan Teemant administration), the minimum customs tariff was raised to 20 kroons on petroleum and to 40 kroons on heavy fuel oil. With the prices of that time, this meant the increase of customs duties to more than one-fourth of the import cost, which practically ended the importation of petroleum into Estonia: whereas about 2 to 3 thousand tons of petroleum had been imported into Estonia each year between 1927 and 1932, this amount fell to 91 tons in 1933 (including 8 tons from the Soviet Union). Oil shale oil forced petroleum out of the market. Later, when the domestic oil shale industry could no longer provide enough fuel for all Estonia's businesses, petroleum imports increased once again.[113] The importation of Soviet kerosene decreased threefold in 1933 over the previous year. The decrease in heavy fuel oil imports was smaller. In 1930, Estonia had imported 1.8 million kroons of Soviet petroleum products (petroleum, heavy fuel oil, gasoline, kerosene), but this indicator fell to 1.2 million kroons in 1931 and to 0.4 million kroons in 1932.[114] Thus, the importation of Soviet petroleum products decreased more than fourfold between 1930 and 1932 as a result of the actions of the Päts and Teemant governments, which, when we take into account the years-long negotiations for the purpose of facilitating the sale of petroleum products and the money paid to Päts, created a situation which must certainly have been very irritating for the Soviets.

The "financing" of Päts through the Tallinn Shipping Company

Ilmjärv seeks evidence from an allegation penned in the memoirs of Pavel Sudoplatov for the crowning glory of proof of Päts's dependency on the Soviet Union. Namely, Soviet foreign espionage agent Sudoplatov says that a most impressive cooperation had been arranged by resident V. Yakovlev in Estonia. "Although President Konstantin Päts did not sign the recruitment commitment for collaboration with the GPU in 1930, we supported him financially up until 1940." Sudoplatov is attempting to prove that the seizure of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union cannot be considered annexation: allegedly, an understanding on the deployment of Soviet troops, creation of new governments, and other issues was reached so quickly because the leaders of the Baltic states were secretly collaborating with the Soviet Union.[115] First of all, we must note that the memoirs of Soviet foreign espionage officer Pavel Sudoplatov are considered notoriously unreliable among Russian as well as Western European researchers. He gives details on this as well as other subjects that he clearly could not have known anything about. Until 1932, Sudoplatov was working in Ukraine, and until 1938, in various positions completely unrelated to Baltic issues. No information exists about any resident V. Yakovlev organizing

[113] **Valge,** "Riikliku põlevkivitööstuse majandamistingimused ja -tulemused 1920. ja 1930. aastatel," pp. 1725–1726.

[114] *Eesti Majandus. Väliskaubandus 1931*, pp. 68–69; *Eesti Majandus. Väliskaubandus 1932*, pp. 66–67; *Eesti Majandus. Väliskaubandus 1933*, p. 62.

[115] **Павел Судоплатов,** *Разные дни тайной войны и дипломатии: 1941 год* (Москва, 2001), pp. 112, 114.

the sale of petroleum products in Estonia.[116] Soviet foreign espionage reports on Estonia reflect no activities with Päts. Therefore, there is no reason to take the allegation brought forth in Sudoplatov's memoirs very seriously.

However, Ilmjärv insists that "Sudoplatov's allegation has not been taken out of thin air" and brings up the economic ties between the Tallinn Shipping Company and the Soviet Union. Namely, in 1933, the Soviet Union had begun chartering ships from the Tallinn Shipping Company. Ilmjärv writes that "...it is futile to seek Päts's name in the minutes of meetings held in the 1930s. However, we can disregard that. Päts was a shareholder in the Tallinn Shipping Company up until the moment that the Soviet Union nationalized that company in 1940." In the English-language edition of his book, Ilmjärv states, attempting to substantiate this same allegation, that Päts was the main or major shareholder of the Tallinn Shipping Company.[117] This, again, is a very serious accusation.

Ilmjärv makes his claim based upon a list of shareholders compiled during the German occupation. The source cited by Ilmjärv shows us that Päts did indeed own shares of the Tallinn Shipping Company in 1940 – a grand total of 3 shares! The main shareholders of the Tallinn Shipping Company were Arthur Hüüs (1,476 shares) and Heinrich Neuhaus (1,039 shares).[118] Päts's portion of the dividend shares was extremely small. Besides, the Soviet Union was not the only client of the Tallinn Shipping Company. It goes without saying that the allegation that Konstantin Päts was being supported by the Soviets through the Tallinn Shipping Company merits no further comment.

IN SUMMARY

There is no doubt that Päts's ties to the Soviet embassy and trade representation were close, although not as close and trusting as those of the Estonian socialist leaders. Documents preserved in the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation provide a thorough, albeit one-sided picture of these ties. Soviet diplomats characteristically overestimated Soviet economic and political influence and vilified their country of residence and its politicians. Their suspicion that politicians of "capitalist countries" were clearly extremely self-serving and corrupt, was widespread, becoming altogether paranoid after 1937-38. Comparison of information gleaned from Estonian and Soviet sources reveals that Soviet embassy diplomats, when reporting on their contacts, were clearly inflating the results of their lobbying among Estonian politicians. Historians Butkus and Ilmjärv have taken a typically uncritical approach to information presented in documents of Soviet agencies. Like the Soviets, Ilmjärv also typically considers Estonian politicians to have been bribable, and he passes on unfounded rumors regarding these allegations.

Existing information provides no foundation for allegations that the activities of the Estonian-Soviet Chamber of Commerce were somehow detrimental to Estonia. The Chamber of Commerce was a lobbying instrument for Estonian politicians and businessmen at a time when the potential of the opening of the Russian market to Estonian goods was still rather considerable. Upon closer analysis, not a single project for which Ilmjärv and Butkus allege that Päts engaged in lobbying at the demand and in the interests of the Soviet Un-

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[116] Ilmjärv errs in passing on Sudoplatov's information by claiming that this is Alexander Yakovlev (DOB 1899), who was exposed in Finland in 1932 as a Soviet spy. (**Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* p. 95). Sudoplatov does not write about Aleksander Yakovlev, but rather V. Yakovlev. Sudoplatov is probably referring to Vasili Yakovlev, DOB March 15, 1899, with whom he may indeed have had contact in the late 1930s and thereafter. However, in 1930, that Vasili Yakovlev was not yet working in foreign espionage. (Russian foreign espionage homepage http://svr.gov.ru/history/yak.html, accessed 17/04/2007).

[117] **Ilmjärv,** *Hääletu alistumine,* pp. 96, 98; **Ilmjärv,** *Silent Submission,* pp. 60, 99.

[118] Lists of shareholders, ERA R-985-1-65, p. 143; R-985-1-68, p. 96; R-985-1-65, p. 285.

ion has been substantiated. As a politician, Päts simply wished to maintain good relations with the Soviets and to procure commercial orders for Estonia from the Soviet Union, without forgetting his own business interests. Nowhere is there any indication that his activities damaged Estonian interests. In some cases (such as the summoning of Foreign Minister Lattik to Moscow), even the Soviet diplomats realized that Päts was actually working against them.

From March 1930 to March 1931, Päts received remuneration from the Soviet petroleum syndicate Soyuzneft; from March to October, he was compensated for legal consultation services for the creation of a mixed joint-stock company, and then for the trade representation. The last known payment was made to Päts on February 21, 1931, for February and March of that year. Ilmjärv's claim that that the petroleum affair was coordinated by the Politburo and the reorganization of sales of petroleum products was undertaken only for the purpose of "involving" Päts has proven to be entirely wrong. Propositions to Päts to participate in selling Soviet petroleum products and to counsel the trade representation were decided by Stomonyakov, a committee member of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and the board of Soyuzneft, not the Politburo. Documents show that the offers made to Päts were always discussed in relation to the sale of petroleum products, not as a separate political issue. First and foremost, they were hoping to use Päts's connections to promote the sale of Soviet petroleum products on the Estonian market. Another aim of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was to intensify Päts's political ties with the Soviet embassy in Tallinn.

Could Moscow have taken advantage of the situation to force Päts to do something that he himself would not have wanted to do? It would certainly have been difficult to compromise him for receiving remunerations during the time he was a member of the Riigikogu. Many or even most lawyers who were members of the Riigikogu were keeping a private practice, usually a law practice on the side. Receiving remunerations as a legal consultant to the Soviet trade representation during his time as State Elder in February and March 1931, although not actually legally improper, could have been politically compromising for Päts. We do not know whether Moscow realized this. At any rate, they did not try to compromise or blackmail Päts, and it is highly likely that Päts did not fear this anyway. The sale of Soviet petroleum products in Estonia proved a complete fiasco, which shows that Päts did not represent the Soviet trade representation or Soyuzneft to Estonia's detriment. Also, there is no doubt that Ilmjärv and the Estonian mass media are mistaken in labeling these contacts as "a true triumph for Moscow." Moscow's minimal interest in the matter is indicated by how sluggishly they took care of business and the low bureaucratic level at which it was done. Later Soviet diplomatic correspondence and intelligence information about Päts contain not the slightest indication of any such collaboration with Moscow that could be used against him. Thus, the money Päts received from Soyuzneft through the trade representation for his consultation services was entirely wasted as it yielded neither monetary nor political profit. This may also have been due to political circumstances in Estonia at that time: the Soviets did not have a top politician in Estonia for whose "benefit" they might compromise Päts, and Päts was undoubtedly aware of this.

Päts's contemporaries knew, as do current historians, of his eastern-oriented business interests and contacts. However, the work of Butkus and especially Ilmjärv is valuable because it has brought to light the wealth of Soviet source materials on this topic and demonstrated the closeness of these ties. Without question, Ilmjärv must be recognized for bringing up the topic of Päts and the petroleum syndicate. However, Butkus's approach to these sources has been one-sided and uncritical, and lacking in awareness of their context. Ilmjärv, in addition to his evident bias, has also distorted quotes from key

documents (see also *Tuna* No. 2, 2007, "Konstantin Päts, March 12, and Moscow").

Ilmjärv's allegation that Moscow financed Päts until the end of Estonian independence through the Tallinn Shipping Company is also ridiculous. His overall presentation and the recent portrayal in the Estonian mass media of Päts as a Soviet dependent and servant of Soviet interests in the latter half of the 1920s and the early 1930s is unfounded. Turtola's claim that "Päts's activities were restricted by the fear that Moscow might reveal his involvement" also has little credibility. This statement was made on the basis of Ilmjärv's misleading information that distorts the motives and essence of the "involvement." Instead, we must concur with Oleg Ken and Alexander Rupasov, who do not see any great political significance in Päts's activities with Soviet petroleum product sales, and also with Zenonas Butkus's overall conclusion that Päts remained loyal to his country. Päts's relations with the embassy and trade representation did not make him an agent, a marionette, a traitor, a collaborationist or a cheat, as opined by the Estonian mass media in its discussions of Ilmjärv's claims. Indeed, these relationships rather characterize Päts as a shrewd and opportunistic politician who succeeded in using Moscow to further his own business interests.

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Colonel Nosworthy of the British General Headquarters on a tour of the Baltic states in 1924. Seated, from left: Major General J. Unt, General Consul Montgomery Grool, O. Amberg (Minister of War), Colonel Nosworthy, Lieutenant General J. Laidoner, Major Godden, O. Strandmann (Minister of Finance), J. Kornel (Member of the Riigikogu). Standing, from left: Captain Mollin, Naval Captain J. Herm, Colonel J. Tõrvand, Major General P. Lill, Colonel J. Rink, Ministry of Finance Department Chief J. Markus, Captain A. Landsberg.
EFA 0-40 682

General N. Reek (Estonian Minister of War) with his assistant General P. Lill, and, Major Stuart Cox (representative of the British Army) at the military school's summer training in 1928. EFA 0-52068

British Ambassador J. Addison and J. Leppik with representative of the British Defense Forces, Major H. Lloyd, in the courtyard of Toompea Castle in Tallinn on the day of the presentation of his credentials, April 18, 1928. EFA 0-40706

British Ambassador J. Addison, in front of Toompea Castle for the presentation of his credentials to the State Elder after reviewing the troops. Behind him is Chief of Protocol J. Leppik. April 18, 1928. EFA 0-40 703

British Ambassador Knachbull Hugson leaving Toompea Castle after presenting his credentials to State Elder Strandmann. 1930, Tallinn. Photo by A. Kalm. EFA 0-27 581

U.S. Ambassador J. Murray presents his credentials to State Elder K. Päts. January 4, 1934. EFA 5-157

J. Laidoner with Estonian Ambassador A. Schmidt and his wife at coronation festivities for George VI in London on May 12, 1937. EFA 0-27470



Reception given by State Elder J. Tõnisson. From left: J. Leppik (Chief of Protocol), Stewart Cox (British military representative), J. Addison, J. Tõnisson, Foreign Minister H. Rebane, and Captain Schiller. May 10, 1937, Tallinn. EFA 0-39881

Lord Plymouth, British Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, arrives in Estonia by way of Ülemiste Airport. From left, A. Schmidt (Estonian Ambassador in London), W.H. Gallienne (British charge d`affaires in Tallinn), Lord Plymouth's secretary, Lord Plymouth, and K. Selter (Minister of Economics). EFA 0-27593

The visit of Lord Plymouth, British Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to Estonia. Attendees of the dinner held in Lord Plymouth's honor. From left: J. Müller (Minister of Justice), W.H. Gallienne (British charge d`affairs in Tallinn), O. Kask (Minister of Social Affairs), A. Schmidt (Estonian Ambassador in London), N.Talts (Minister of Agriculture), A. Rei (Deputy Foreign Minister), J. Laidoner (Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces), K. Selter (Minister of Economics), Tallinna tehnikaülikooli rektor P. Kogermann (Rector of Tallinn Technical University), Lord Plymouth, and in the background A. Jürima (State Economic Council President) June 4, 1937 in Tallinn. Photo by A. Kalm. EFA 0-27664

Former U.S. president Herbert Hoover (second from left) admiring medieval artifacts from the Tallinn Town Hall collection before signing the Town Hall guest book. First from right is mayor of Tallinn, J. Soots. 1938. Photo by A. Kalm.
EFA 0-27806

Moscow's Institutional and Nomenclatural Control Mechanisms in the Estonian SSR during the Post-War Years*

Tõnu Tannberg

Within the "fraternal family" of the republics of the Soviet Union, the leadership of the Estonian SSR had limited freedom of action. Even the union republic's buttress of power, the ECP (Estonian Communist Party), was not an independent institution, but merely an appendage and underling of the All-Union Communist (Bolshevik) Party (CPSU(b)). The leaders of the union republic always had to take Moscow's directives and guidelines into consideration. Local initiative was not welcomed; nearly all such attempts were neutralized and could even prompt repressions. Moscow used many different methods and institutions to keep the union republics under control and the local leaders in line. Control over the areas conquered in 1939–1940 was crucial during the initial period of Sovietization. This control was initiated during the first year of Soviet rule (1940–1941), and continued even more vigorously in the autumn of 1944, when the Red Army conquered Estonia once more. This last year of the war and subsequent years through the early 1950s represented the period during which Soviet power structures took root in the Estonian SSR as well as the other Baltic union republics – Latvia and Lithuania.

Problem statement, historiography and sources

During the war, central control over the regions had weakened and ideological pressure on society was eased in order to more easily draw the various nations into the struggle against the enemy. The Kremlin's ruling elite understood full well that the mobilization of only the Russian people would be inadequate; that the circumstances of war required temporary concessions to the other nations within the USSR in order to draw them into the struggle against Germany. This meant that national military units would have to be permitted once more (they had been abolished in 1938) and that mechanisms of ideological pressure would have to be toned down, which in turn allowed a rise in the national self-awareness of these other nationalities. In early 1944, the decision to create People's Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and Defense was approved.[1] The lead-

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[1] Establishment of the People's Commissariat for Union Republic Foreign Affairs and the People's Commissariat for Defense was decided at the CPSU(b) CC plenum of January 1944, which was the only Party forum conducted at that level during wartime. CPSU(b) CC Plenum stenogram, Jan. 27, 1944, Исторический архив 1 (1992), pp. 61–65. These decisions were then accepted by the USSR Supreme Soviet (Feb. 1, 1944) and the respective authorities in the union republics. For the role of the Estonian SSR, see **Raimo Pullat**, **Vladimir Sergejev**, **Karl Siilivask**, **Erni Silvet**, **Lev Šišov**, **Eerik-Juhan Truuväli**, *Oktoobrirevolutsioonist arenenud sotsialismi põhiseaduseni Eestis [From the October Revolution to a Developed Socialist Constitution in Estonia]* (Tallinn, 1981), p. 107.

ers of the union republics used this step to expand the union republics' authority, unaware of the actual rationale behind the decision: an attempt to achieve a majority in the fledgling United Nations Organization.

British journalist Alexander Werth has aptly named the easing of ideological pressure the "national NEP"[2] which allowed, for instance, a grand wartime celebration of the St. George's Night uprising in 1943 and other "nationalistic" events.[3] Inspired by such opportunities, the Estonian SSR leadership proposed the establishment of the Order of Lembitu,[4] tried to make Hans Kruus the USSR Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs[5] and even attempted to form the union republic's own military force – the Estonian Red Army – during the following year.[6] Many similar "nationalistic" initiatives were born during that period, none of which saw the light of day.

Of course, in the circumstances of that time, the establishment of an order named after the hero of a small nation, or the creation of a separate union republic military force was out of the question; and naturally, Hans Kruus was not a suitable candidate for deputy to Vyacheslav Molotov, the USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. By that time – i.e. 1944 – the Kremlin's ruling elite had begun a gradual intensification of ideological pressure, which included nipping any and all "evidence of nationalism" in the bud. Since the situation at the front clearly favored the Red Army, the Kremlin no longer needed to make any concessions on national issues, and the so-called "national NEP" was brought to an abrupt end. As early as January-February of 1944, at Stalin's instigation, *Ukraine in Flames*, the "nationalist" film by Ukrainian director Aleksandr Dovzhenko, was publicly condemned in the harshest of terms.[7] The fight against nationalism became one of the most important goals of ideological work. The same line was continued in May and June of 1944 by a meeting of historians at the CPSU(b) Central Committee.[8] They approved many Party decisions that revealed "flaws" in the treatment of the earlier history of these nations.[9]

By the autumn of 1944, the issue of reining in the three Baltic states ranked high on the Kremlin's agenda. The CPSU(b) Central Committee Organizational Bureau (Orgburo) took up "the Baltic question"[10] in October and late November 1944, approving decisions on the "shortcomings and errors" in the work of the union republics' Party organiza-

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[2] **Александр Верт**, *Россия в войне 1941–1945,* Вып. 1 (Москва, 1965), p. 247.

[3] See **Hans Kruus**, *Koos oma rahva ajalooga Suures Isamaasõjas [With the History of One's Nation in the Great Patriotic War]* (Tallinn, 1971).

[4] Letter of N. Karotamm, J. Vares and O. Sepre to J. Stalin, June 20, 1944, ERA R-1-4-5-83, pp. 75–83. See **Tõnu Tannberg**, "Lembitu ordeni asutamist peame … üsna tähtsaks" [We consider the establishment of the Order of Lembitu to be ... very important], *Eesti Ekspress,* Aug. 11, 2004.

[5] N. Karotamm's letter to V. Molotov, Oct. 12, 1943, RGASPI 82-2-388, pp. 34–37.

[6] The issue of creating a union republic's own military force was put on the agenda along with the establishment of the Union Republic People's Commissariat for Defense. Karotamm stated in his letter to Stalin that "it would be advisable to have an Estonian Red Army in the future," meaning three rifle divisions, one tank brigade or division, an air regiment-brigade and an artillery regiment-brigade. See Karotamm's letter to Stalin, Aug. 23, 1944, ERAF 1-1-864, pp. 158–159.

[7] **Serhy Yekelchuk**, *Stalin's Empire of Memory: Russian-Ukrainan Relations in the Soviet Historical Imagination* (Toronto, Buffalo, London, 2004), pp. 54–56.

[8] Стенограмма совещания по вопросам истории СССР в ЦК ВКП(б) в 1944 г., *Вопросы истории* (1996), 2, pp. 55–86; 3, pp. 82–112; 4, pp. 65–93; 5, pp. 77–106; 7, pp. 70–87; 9, pp. 47–77. See also **David Brandenberger,** *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931–1956* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 128–132.

[9] The steering of Tatarstan's history onto its "proper" track was on the agenda in summer 1944. The CPSU(b) CC decision approved on Aug. 9, 1944 "On the Situation of Mass-Political and Ideological Work and the Measures to Improve Them in the Tatar Party Organizations" represented a guideline for other union republics as well, suggesting they refrain from "idealizing" the history of their region. **Геннадий Бордюгов, Владимир Бухараев,** "Национальная историческая мысль в условиях советского времени," in *Национальные истории в советском и постсоветских государствах* (Москва, 1999), pp. 39–40.

tions, stressing that the struggle against "bourgeois natsionalism" was to be their primary responsibility.[11] These decisions represent essential milestones in the shaping of the political climate of all three Soviet Baltic republics in the years that followed. The decisions were essentially explicit instructions for the union republic leadership, and in a broader sense, the supporting documents for the Sovietization of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The leaders of the Soviet Baltic republics at that time treated these documents as such.[12] At the same time, a broader plan of measures was established to ensure the successful inauguration of the Sovietization process, and even more importantly, the implementation of the control mechanisms crucial to Moscow.

In the period we are dealing with, i.e. 1944–1953, Moscow's control and assistance meant the following, above all, for all three Baltic union republics:

- the creation of special institutions – the CPSU(b) Central Committee's Union Republic Bureaus;
- the dispatch of "advisors" from the center to each union republic (2nd Secretary of the Party Central Committee, representatives of All-Union government agencies);
- engagement of the *nomenklatura* to carry out control functions;
- approval of decisions pertaining to the union republics;
- the presence of the occupying army;
- activities of the security agencies;
- regular reporting (constant "self-analysis" through reports such as the annual Central Committee reports);
- use of information (denunciations) obtained from "vigilant" citizens .

The goal of this article is not to give a detailed description of all of Moscow's control mechanisms listed above, but to provide a closer analysis of the CPSU(b) Central Committee's Estonian Bureau, the institution of the C(b)PE Central Commitee 2nd Secretary, and the role of the *nomenklatura* in the power relationship between the center and the union republic. Thus, the purpose of this article is to discuss Moscow's institutional and Nomenclatural contol over the union republic from 1944 to 1953, using the Estonian SSR as the primary example, giving some consideration to Union-wide developments and events in Latvia and Lithuania, and also including some events in the Moldavian SSR. This issue has been dealt with very little in the historical literature published to date.

Soviet-era historical literature was rather reserved in its references to the union republic Bureaus; however, it did not completely suppress the fact that this extension of Moscow's authority did indeed exist. The first Soviet-style general histories of the Estonian SSR, edited by Gustav Naan, contain no mention of the creation of the CPSU(b) Central Committee's Estonian Bureau. The 1952 edition does include a separate sub-chapter on the struggle against bourgeois nationalism, which focuses primarily on the 1950 March Plenum, but fails to mention when this great struggle began and the role of the CPSU(b) CC Estonian Bureau in this struggle.[13] The 1957 reprint[14] also fails to mention the Bureau, as does Volume III of the History of the Estonian SSR, published

[10] The author of this article is preparing a separate study on the "Baltic question" on the Kremlin's agenda in the latter half of 1944.

[11] See, *inter alia* CPSU(b) CC Orgburo decision "On the Shortcomings and Duties of the Estonian SSR Party Organization's Political Work," Oct. 30, 1944, RGASPI 17-117-459, pp. 1–4. A similar decision was approved for the Lithuanian SSR on Nov. 1, see text of decision RGASPI 17-117-460, pp. 8–11, and for the Latvian SSR on Nov. 3, RGASPI 17-117-464, pp. 16–18.

[12] Nikolai Karotamm also began his 1950 letter of contrition to Stalin by admitting that the guidelines of Oct. 30, 1944 had not yet been met. See Karotamm's letter to Stalin, Feb. 17, 1950, ERAF 1-46-6, p. 1.

[13] Gustav Naan, ed., *Eesti NSV ajalugu: (kõige vanemast ajast tänapäevani) [History of the Estonian SSR: (From the Earliest Times until Today)]* (Tallinn, 1952), pp. 443–444.

[14] Gustav Naan, ed., *Eesti NSV ajalugu: (kõige vanemast ajast tänapäevani) [History of the Estonian SSR: (From the Earliest Times until Today)]*, 2. edition (Tallinn, 1957), p. 577.

in 1971.[15] On the other hand, a review of the history of the Estonian Communist Party published in 1972 is no longer silent about the CPSU(b) CC Orgburo's October 30, 1944 decision "On the Shortcomings and Tasks of the Estonian SSR Party Organization's Political Work" and notes that this decision, along with many others, laid the framework for the "improvement of the ECP's work of Party policy and ideology."[16] It also includes guidelines which the decision outlined for intensifying the struggle against bourgeois nationalism, fostering ideological work, and directing cultural life onto a specific track.[17] It also mentions the creation of the CPSU(b) CC Estonian Bureau on November 11 for the purpose of "providing continuous practical assistance" to the union republic leadership.[18] No relationship is indicated between the establishment of the Estonian Bureau and the October 30 decision, nor is there any mention of the other measures that accompanied the implementation of this decision.

The official historical position of the CPSU is repeated in the collection *Eesti rahvas Suures Isamaasõjas* ("The Estonian People in the Great Patriotic War")[19] and in a brief survey of the history of the Estonian Communist Party published in 1983.[20] Aleksander Panksejev, then a leading Party historian and shaper of Party history in the Estonian SSR, states in reference to the Estonian Bureau that this "unique institution of management helped the CPSU(b) Central Committee maintain contact with the republic's Party organization and provide direct guidance for its work."[21] He considers the creation of this Bureau to be "fully justified" in the circumstances of that time.[22] The identity of the EC(b)P Central Committee 2nd Secretary is given in most of the history books and studies published on this topic during that time; however, no information is given about the background of the institution. Thus, we must recognize that Soviet-era Estonian historical literature provides us with a very one-sided, skewed view of the October 30, 1944 decision and the measures that were implemented as a result of it.

The situation began to change during the second half of the 1980s, when the *perestroika* era saw the inclusion of more accurate information, replacing the omissions and falsifications within historical accounts. The first to draw significant attention to the events of the 1940s was Kalev Tammistu, who revealed the behind-the-scenes action at the 1950 March Plenum, basing his reports on archival materials that had just become publicly available. He provided a more thorough account of the CPSU(b) CC Organizational Bureau's decision of October 30, 1944 and the subsequent measures that had such an impact on the Estonian SSR.[23] Since the restoration of Estonian independence, the establishment and activities of the CPSU(b) CC Estonian

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[15] Viktor Maamägi, chief and managing editor, *Eesti NSV ajalugu. III köide: 1917. aasta märtsist kuni 50-ndate aastate alguseni [History of the Estonian SSR. Vol. 3.: From March 1917 to the Beginning of the 1950s]* (Tallinn, 1971).

[16] *Ülevaade Eestimaa Kommunistliku Partei ajaloost. 3. osa: (juuli 1940–1958. aasta) [Review of Estonian Communist Party History. Vol. 3.: (July 1940–1958)]* (Tallinn 1972), p. 213.

[17] *Ülevaade Eestimaa Kommunistliku Partei ajaloost*, pp. 215, 282. This includes a reference to the discussion at the ECP CC Plenum of August 1946 on the fulfillment of the October 30, 1944 decision in the union republic.

[18] *Ülevaade Eestimaa Kommunistliku Partei ajaloost*, p. 191.

[19] Leonid Lentsman, editor-in-chief, *Eesti rahvas Nõukogude Liidu Suures Isamaasõjas 1941–1945. 2. köide: Eesti rahvas võitluses Nõukogudemaa täieliku vabastamise ja sõja võiduka lõpuleviimise eest aastail 1944–1945 [The Estonian People in the Great Patriotic War. Vol. 2.: The Estonian People in the Fight for the Complete Liberation of the Soviet Land and the Victorious End to the War in 1944–1945]* (Tallinn, 1977), p. 446.

[20] Aleksander Panksejev, ed., *Lühiülevaade Eestimaa Kommunistliku Partei ajaloost [A Brief Review of Estonian Communist Party History]* (Tallinn, 1983), p. 123.

[21] **Aleksander Panksejev**, *Suure heitluse aastail: eesti rahvas Nõukogude Liidu Suures Isamaasõjas aastail 1941–1945 [During the Years of the Great Struggle: The Estonian People in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941–1945]* Tallinn, 1975, p. 94.

[22] **Panksejev,** *Suure heitluse aastail*, p. 94.

[23] **Kalev Tammistu,** "Tasalülitamine" [Assimilation] 5, *Õhtuleht*, May 3, 1989.

Bureau has been studied in dissertations on that topic alone[24] as well as in summary works[25] in much more detail than before. Particular attention is given to the institution of the 2nd Secretary.[26] Special mention must be given to Kaljo-Olev Veskimägi's book on the activities of the EC(b)P CC Bureau, which includes a lengthy description of the activities of the CPSU(b) CC Estonian Bureau.[27]

All these recent discussions are based more or less on materials from the State Archives (formerly Party Archives), although the Bureau's own documents, located in Moscow at the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), have remained unused. The materials in that archive have been most extensively used for research on this particular topic by Yelena Zubkova, whose studies have dealt expertly with the post-war Sovietization process in the Baltic states and the CPSU(b) Central Committee Estonian Bureau's role in the process.[28] David Feest has also used some of the Estonian Bureau documents in his detailed study of post-war collectivization in the Estonian SSR.[29] Significant studies on the Latvian and Lithuanian Bureas by Geoffrey Swain[30] and Vytatutas Tininis[31] also deserve mention. The Soviet-era *nomenklatura* still remains to be investigated. Of the studies completed to date, the most notable is the thesis by Hiljar Tammela[32] and the book by Olev Liivik.[33]

Most of the sources for this article are previously unused documents from the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI) and the Estonian State Archives (ERA/ERAF). Of the published archival sources, a collection of documents dealing with the relationships between the CPSU(b)/CPSU CC with local organizations[34] has been extremely useful; new studies on the post-war period in the USSR[35] and several high-quality

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[24] Enn Tarvel, ed., *Eestimaa Kommunistliku Partei Keskkomitee organisatsiooniline struktuur 1940–1991 [The Organizational Structure of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee 1940–1991]* (Tallinn, 2002), pp. 39–41; **Olaf Kuuli,** *Sotsialistid ja kommunistid Eestis 1917–1991 [Socialists and Communists in Estonia 1917–1991]* (Tallinn, 1999), p. 90.

[25] Ago Pajur, Tõnu Tannberg, eds., *Eesti ajalugu. VI: Vabadussõjast taasiseseisvumiseni [History of Estonia. VI: From the War of Independence to Restoration of Independence]* (Tartu, 2005), pp. 268–267.

[26] Olev Liivik, Enn Tarvel, eds., *Kõrgemad võimu vahendajad ENSV-s: Eestimaa Kommunistliku Partei Keskkomitee sekretärid 1940–1990 [Intermediaries of the Higher Authorities in the ESSR: Secretaries of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee 1940–1990]* (Tallinn, 2000), pp. 24–26, 30–31, 74–75.

[27] **Kaljo-Olev Veskimägi,** *Kuidas valitseti Eesti NSV-d: Eestimaa Kommunistliku Partei Keskkomitee büroo 162 etteastumist 1944–1956 vahemängude ja sissejuhatusega [How the Estonian SSR was Governed: 162 Speeches by the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau 1944–1956 with Interludes and Introductions]* (Tallinn, 2005), pp. 100–104.

[28] **Елена Зубкова,** "Советский фактор в Балтийском регионе: Кадровая политика как механизм советизации (1944–1947 гг)" in *Сталин. Сталинизм. Советское общество: Сборник статей* (Москва, 2000), pp. 194–211; **Елена Зубкова,** "Москва и Балтия: Механизмы советизации Латвии, Литвы и Эстонии в 1944–1953 годах," in *Труды Института российской истории,* Вып. 4 (Москва, 2004), pp. 266–283.

[29] **David Feest,** *Zwangskollektivierung im Baltikum: Die Sowjetisierung des estnischen Dorfes 1944–1953* (Köln, Weimar, Wien, 2007).

[30] **Geoffrey Swain,** "'Cleaning up Soviet Latvia'. The Bureau for Latvia (Latburo), 1944–1947," in Olaf Mertelsmann, ed., *The Sovetization of the Baltic States, 1940–1956* (Tartu, 2003), pp. 63–84.

[31] **Vytatutas Tininis,** *Komunistinio režimo nuskialtimai Lietuvoje 1944–1953*, vol 1 (Vilnius, 2003), p. 98.

[32] **Hiljar Tammela,** "Eesti NSV nomenklatuur (1944–1953)" [The *Nomenklatura* of the Estonian SSR] (Bachelor's thesis, mentor T. Tannberg, Tartu University, 2005).

[33] **Olev Liivik**, *Eestimaa Kommunistliku Partei Keskkomitee aparaat 1945–1953 [The Apparatus of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee 1945–1953]* (Tartu, 2006), pp. 56–57.

[34] *ЦК ВКП(б) и региональные партийные комитеты. 1945–1953* (Москва, 2004).

[35] **Yoram Gorlizki, Oleg Khlevniuk,** *Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953* (Oxford, 2004); **Рудолф Пихоя,** *Москва. Кремль. Власть: Сорок лет после войны, 1945–1985* (Москва, 2007); **Елена Зубкова,** *Послевоенное советское общество: Политика и повседневность, 1945–1953* **(**Москва, 2000); **Александр Данилов, Александр Пыжиков,** *Рождение сверхдержавы: СССР в первые послевоенные годы* (Москва, 2001); **Юрий Жуков,** *Сталин: Тайны власти* (Москва, 2005).

reference works[36] have also proven valuable.

The Union Republic Bureau as an agency of control

After the "liberation" of the Baltics in 1944, Moscow needed a supplemental institution that would oversee Sovietization in all three Soviet Baltic republics. Moscow could not place its full trust in the union republic leadership. Besides, it had to enact policies, the likes of which the local authorities had never encountered. Therefore, Moscow felt that the union republic's leadership needed additional "practical" guidance.

In November-December 1944, CPSU(b) Central Committee Bureaus were established for all three Baltic union republics to begin carrying out control and assistance functions. These were rather unique institutions in the Communist Party structure of that time, because none of the Party's normative documents included any description of the creation of Party organizations such as these. Officially, the CPSU(b) CC Estonian and Lithuanian Bureaus were established by a Politburo decision of November 11, and the Latvian Bureau by a Politburo decision of December 29, 1944.[37] The establishment of these Bureaus represented a measure supporting the Sovietization of the Baltics, a topic discussed at the CPSU(b) Central Committee Organizational Bureau in late October and early November 1944. As a result, separate decisions on "shortcomings and errors," which we have already touched upon, were also approved. The Latvian Bureau was established at the end of December – later than the Estonian and Lithuanian Bureaus – primarily due to war-related events taking place on Latvian territory, and not because any skillful tactics of the Latvian leadership of that time succeeded in postponing the establishment of this institution by Moscow. The latter claim has been defended by K.O. Veskimägi, thus implying that Nikolai Karotamm was a coward, in this context.[38] If, however, we review the union republics' "self-analysis" that preceded the approval of the CPSU(b) CC Orgburo decision, we see that the tone of Karotamm's report to Moscow was quite reserved.[39] However, the Latvian SSR Party boss Jānis Kalnbērziņš told the Kremlin that the Latvians could not manage Sovietization on their own and would need the "assistance of the cadre."[40]

Regarding the Politburo's November 11, 1944 decision to create the CPSU(b) CC Estonian Bureau, Nikolai Karotamm told attendees at the EC(b)P CC Plenum of early December 1944: "In addition, the CPSU(b) Politburo decided on November 11 of this year to establish a five-member CPSU(b) CC Bureau in Estonia."[41] Nikolai Shatalin, a

[36] **Юрий Горячев,** *Центральный комитет КПСС, ВКП(б), РКП(б), РСДРП(б): Историко-биографический справочник* (Москва, 2005); **Сергей Гарнюк,** "Совет Народных Комиссаров СССР. Совет Министров СССР. Кабинет Министров СССР 1923–1991," in *Энциклопедический справочник* (Москва, 1999); **Владимир Ивкин,** *Государственная власть СССР, высшие органы власти и управления и их руководители 1923–1991: Историко-биографический справочник* (Москва, 1999); **Никита Петров, Константин Скоркин,** *Кто руководил НКВД 1934–1941: Справочник* (Москва, 1999).

[37] *ЦК ВКП(б) и региональные партийные комитеты*, p. 23.

[38] **Veskimägi,** *Kuidas valitseti Eesti NSV-d*, p. 103.

[39] Karotamm's review of the EC(b)P CC's activities, Oct. 24, 1944, RGASPI 17-117-459, pp. 6–58.

[40] Kalnbērziņš's letter to G. Malenkov, Nov. 2, 1944, RGASPI 11-117-464, p. 21.

[41] Karotamm's speech at the EC(b)P CC Plenum, Dec. 1, 1944, ERAF 1-4-104, p. 10. We must remember that we are dealing with a rather poorly done stenogram; its quality is perhaps best described by a notation made by the ESSR People's Commissar for Education at that time, Jüri Nuut, at the end of the text of his speech, after making numerous corrections. J. Nuut wrote on Dec. 11, 1944: "The typewritten text of the 'stenogram' is completely jumbled, especially in the second half, containing nonsensical heaps of works, and in some cases, statements that are directly the opposite of what I actually said. I categorically state that I have never spouted such nonsense from the Presidium rostrum. I have tried to correct this text to correspond, more or less, to what I actually said". ERAF 1-4-105, p. 81. Many speakers (incl. Hans Kruus) had apparently handed in the text of their own speech for insertion into the stenogram. Karotamm has not corrected this stenogram.

rather important figure in the Kremlin at that time, was named chairman of the Bureau. He was closely associated with Georgy Malenkov, a member of Stalin's entourage, who actually managed all-Union cadre policy from the latter half of the 1930s onward. Shatalin was Malenkov's right hand in this work. He was uncontestably one of the leading apparatchiks in the all-Union Central Committee. The dispatch of such a high functionary to work in Estonia at the end of 1944 was a result of the Kremlin's internal power struggles.[42] Malenkov's position was weakening at that time, and his opponents took advantage of the situation, exiling Shatalin, one of Malenkov's closest assistants, to Estonia for the purpose of managing its Sovietization. On December 29, 1944, Shatalin also became chief of the Latvian Bureau.[43] Mikhail Suslov was dispatched to lead the Lithuanian Bureau; historical literature contains speculation that he was "presumably the supervisor of the leader of the other two Baltic Bureaus."[44] This was most certainly not the case. At that time, Shatalin was a much more important figure, and Mikhail Suslov's rise to the position of the empire's influential guardian of ideology still lay ahead of him.[45] Suslov was sent to Lithuania from his position as the Chairman of the Stavropol Territorial Committee.[46] Under his direction, the Lithuanian Bureau held its first session on December 21, 1944.[47]

Nikolai Shatalin stayed on as the head of the Estonian Bureau until being summoned back to Moscow in 1946,[48] when Georgy Perov became the new head of the Bureau.[49] He too was quite a significant figure in the Kremlin's corridors of power. Trained as an economist, Perov was a leading Party worker in Leningrad in the latter part of the 1930s, after which he worked briefly at the Party Control Commission and the State Bank; in 1943–1944 he served as Deputy Chairman of the Russian SFSR Council of People's Commissars.[50] At the end of 1944, Perov was appointed to the position of deputy to the CPSU(b) CC Estonian Bureau Chairman Nikolai Shatalin. During Perov's time, Viktor Jefremov became

[42] **Жуков,** *Сталин: Тайны власти*, p. 274–276.

[43] or more details on the creation of the CPSU(b) CC Latvian Bureau and the actions of Nikolai Shatalin, see **Swain,** "Cleaning up Soviet Latvia," pp. 63–84.

[44] **Romuald J. Misiunas, Rein Taagepera,** *Balti riigid: Sõlteaastad 1940–1990 [The Baltic States: Years of Dependence 1940–1990]* (Tallinn, 1997), p. 82.

[45] For more on M. Suslov's time in Lithuania, see **Donald O'Sullivan,** "Reconstruction and Repression – the role of M. A. Suslov in Lithuania, 1944–1946," in *Forum für Osteuropäische Ideen- und Zeitgeschichte* 1, (2000), pp. 175–208.

[46] **Жуков,** *Сталин: Тайны власти*, p. 275.

[47] **Tininis,** *Komunistinio režimo nuskialtimai Lietuvoje 1944–1953*, p. 98.

[48] After leaving the position of CPSU(b) CC Estonian and Latvia Bureau chairman, Shatalin became a member of the Orgburo and First Deputy to the CC Cadre Department Chairman. In 1947, he was named editor-in-chief of the magazine Партийная жизнь, and in 1950, chief of the CC Planning-Finance Trade Department. After Stalin's death, Shatalin served two years as Secretary of the CPSU CC. After that, he served briefly as First Secretary of the Primorje Krai Committee (1955–1956), Deputy of the Ministry of State Control (1956–1957) and member of the USSR Council of Ministers Soviet Control Committee (1957–1960). He retired in 1960, and died in 1984. See his biography at **Горячев,** *Центральный комитет КПСС, ВКП(б), РКП(б), РСДРП(б),* p. 424; **Константин Залесский,** *Империя Сталина: Биографический энциклопедический словарь* (Москва, 2000), p. 487.

[49] K.-O. Veskimägi's claim that Perov became Bureau Chairman as early as the end of 1944, when Shatalin went to Riga, is incorrect, **Veskimägi**, *Kuidas valitseti Eesti NSV-d*, p. 102.

[50] After leaving Estonia, G. Perov (1905–1979) worked as Secretary of the USSR Council of Ministers' Council for Kolkhoz Affairs (1947–1948), and then as Vice-Chairman of the State Planning Committee (1948–1955, 1957–1958), Vice Chairman of State Economic Commission (1955–1957), First Vice-Chairman of the State Planning Committee and Chairman of the Price Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau (1959–1962). He served in the last two positions as Minister. He retired in 1962 and died in 1979. See his biography at: **Гарнюк**, "Совет Народных Комиссаров СССР. Совет Министров СССР. Кабинет Министров СССР," p. 396; **Ивкин,** *Государственная власть СССР,* pp. 468–469; Tarvel, ed., *Eestimaa Kommunistliku Partei Keskkomitee organisatsiooniline struktuur 1940–1991*, p. 40, ref. 47.

Vice-Chairman of the Estonian Bureau. After Shatalin was summoned back to Moscow, a new Chairman was appointed to the Latvian Bureau – Vasily Ryazanov, who had initially (1944–1945) been a highly placed employee of the Estonian Bureau; in 1945 he became Shatalin's successor in the Latvian Bureau.[51] After the elimination of the Latvian Bureau, Ryazanov became an CPSU(b) CC instructor assigned to deal with the Baltic union republics. Some time later, he was keeping a controlling eye on Estonia, which will be discussed further below.[52] After Mikhail Suslov was called back, Vasily Shcherbakov took over the Lithuanian Bureau.[53]

In addition to the members sent from Moscow, the Bureau included representatives of the union republic's Communist Party and executive authority: EC(b)P CC First Secretary Nikolai Karotamm and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Arnold Veimer.[54] The Bureau's membership included, as essential functionaries, representatives of the security agencies (NKVD/NKGB). Initially, Nikolai Sazykin (Nov. 22, 1944–Sept. 14, 1945) served in this position in Estonia, followed by Nikolai Gorlinsky (Sept. 1945–May 1947).[55] The appointment of comrades who were highly regarded in the central apparatus of the security agencies to positions in the Bureau was a clear sign that Estonia was something more than an insignificant area of secondary importance for Moscow. There is no doubt that they hoped to take advantage of the previous experience of Sazykin and Gorlinsky for the Sovietization of Estonia. Sazykin had served as the People's Commissar for Security in the Moldavian SSR in the summer of 1941, when he managed the mass deportations. During the war he served first as Head of the Special Branch of the Southern Front, after which he became the Chairman of the 3rd Section of the USSR People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD).

In Estonia's case, Gorlinski's experience as the Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs in the Ukrainian SSR from 1938 to 1940 was certainly of great value. After that time, Gorlinsky was transferred to the central security apparatus. Sazykin and Gorlinsky were both confidants of Lavrenty Beria. After Stalin's death in 1953, they became directors of central departments of the re-unified Ministry of Internal Affairs.[56] However, before that, Gorlinsky managed to serve briefly (from February to April 1949) as the Lithuanian SSR Minister of Security and to carry out the March deportations in Lithuania. After that, he went on to serve as head of the Leningrad security apparatus.

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[51] *ЦК ВКП(б) и региональные партийные комитеты*, p. 451.

[52] V. Ryazanov was CPSU(b) CC inspector from 1947 to 1948. From there, he went on to become Deputy to the USSR Minister of Cinematograpy (1948–1953), and subsequently Deputy Chairman and Chairman of the Cultural Ministry's State Committee for Cinematography (1953–1954) and also Chief of that Ministry's Cadre Department (1954–1957). He worked briefly as editor of the magazine Киномеханик, and then served as Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers' Council for Religious Affairs until retirement in 1966.

[53] **Tininis,** *Komunistinio režimo nuskialtimai Lietuvoje 1944–1953*, p. 98.

[54] According to the EC(b)P CC December 1944 Plenum stenogram, Karotamm said that the Bureau "is made up of the following comrades from the CPSU(b): Shatulin, Perov, Sosylkin, and ESSR comrades Karotamm and Veimer". Apparently, the stenographer was at first having difficulty remembering the correct spelling of the names of the "Moscow comrades". See Karotamm's speech at the EC(b)P CC Plenum, Dec. 1, 1944, ERAF 1-4-104, p. 10.

[55] See their biographies **Петров, Скоркин,** *Кто руководил НКВД 1934–1941*, pp. 372–373; **Залесский,** *Империя Сталина*, pp. 122–123, 402–403.

[56] The fall of L. Beria naturally had a profound effect on the careers of those closest to him. Sazykin was relieved of his position in the security apparatus in 1954, and had to earn a living in the Ministry of Medium Machine Manufacture. He died in Moscow in 1985. N. Gorlinski had been briefly relieved of duty in the security apparatus as early as 1951, but was dismissed again in 1953 with charges that he had abused his position and stolen state property; his role in the carrying out of the "Leningrad Affair" did not go unnoticed. He was stripped of his military rank in 1954 and thrown out of the Party the following year; in 1964, his rank of lieutenant colonel was restored to him. Gorlisnki died in 1965.

Gorlinsky was also a key participant in the "Leningrad Affair."[57] The Latvian Bureau's security representative Aleksei Babkin also had previous experience as a Minister, having worked from 1940 to 1943 as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs and Security in the Kazakh SSR. From 1944 to 1945 he served as head of the NKGB in Chelyabinsk oblast. Babkin was the Latvian Bureau's security apparatus representative from March 1945 to April 1946.[58]

The representatives of the security agencies were responsible for managing locally the suffocation of resistance movements and the "purging" of "hostile elements" from society. Broadly stated, the Bureaus' security representatives were to keep an eye on everything going on in society. It was also their duty to keep an eye on the activities of the union republics' leadership and leaders of the Bureaus, and to forward the pertinent information directly to Moscow. An excellent example is the activity of the CPSU(b) CC Lithuanian Bureau security representative Ivan Tkachenko,[59] who personally[60] informed Lavrenty Beria of the situation within the leadership of the Lithuanian SSR in June 1945. His report included how dutifully each employee came to work, and more importantly, how sluggishly and reluctantly any person fought against "anti-Soviet elements." He also mentioned the fact that the leadership of the union republic had held meetings behind closed doors, failing to invite their "Russian comrades," particularly the Lithuanian Communist (Bolshevik) Party Second Secretary Aleksandr Issachenko.[61] I. Tkachenko did not neglect to note that even the Lithuanian Bureau chief Mikhail Suslov "worked little," and could often be seen "reading literature" during working hours; and what's more, he had spent most of his time in Moscow and had made only one or two trips to the counties.[62] Still, the basic task of the Bureaus' security apparatus representatives was the management and co-ordination of the fight against the resistance movement.

Not only the official members of the Bureau, but many other Bureau employees as well, played important roles. On one hand, they served as regular technical staff (translators, typists, etc.), and yet they also had a good deal of responsibility, with significant involvement in substantial issues as they analyzed collected information, prepared memoranda, participated in meetings of the representative organizations of the Party and executive authorities, met with local residents, etc. They were actually the assistants of the Bureau chairman and his deputy. Between 1944 and 1947, more than 30 persons were involved with the Estonian Bureau[63]

The representatives of the union republic Bureaus participated actively in the sessions of the Central Committee Bureaus of the local Party Central Committee. During the active lifetime of the CPSU(b) CC Estonian Bureau (from December 1944 to March 1947), 233 EC(b)P CC Bureau sessions were held, and only 10 of them took place without the presence of a Moscow Bureau representative. According to Kaljo-Olev Veskimägi's calcula-

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[57] Thus, it is not hyperbolic to link the Leningrad "Great Purge" to the "Estonian Affair" — the 1950 March Plenum.

[58] **Петров, Скоркин,** *Кто руководил НКВД 1934–1941*, p. 97.

[59] Suslov had brought Tkachenko along from Stavropol, where the latter had served as that krai's security chief.

[60] The information sent to Moscow was actually marked "Top Secret" to which was added "Personal".

[61] Special note from CPSU(b) CC Lithuanian Bureau NKGB ja NKVD representative Tkachenko to Beria, June 19, 1945, in *ЛУБЯНКА: Сталин и НКВД-НКГБ-ГУКР «Смерш», 1939 – март 1946* (Москва, 2006), pp. 528–532.

[62] Special note from CPSU(b) CC Lithuanian Bureau NKGB ja NKVD representative Tkachenko to Beria, June 19, 1945, in *ЛУБЯНКА: Сталин и НКВД-НКГБ-ГУКР «Смерш»*, p. 532. I. Tkatšenko tegevuse kohta vt lisaks: Arvydas Anušauskas, ed., *Lietuva 1940–1990: Okupuotos Lietuvos istorija* (Vilnius, 2005), pp. 272–274, 283, 305, 350.

[63] **Veskimägi,** *Kuidas valitseti Eesti NSV-d*, p. 102.

tions, at least 12 all-Union Bureau employees took part in the sessions of the EC(b)P CC Bureau during this period. The Bureau's first chairman, Shatalin, attended sessions at the end of 1944, after which he made his way to Riga to lead the CPSU(b) CC Latvian Bureau as well; in the following year (1945), he was present only twice. In contrast, his deputy and subsequent chairman of the Bureau, Georgy Perov, attended 92 times. The next most active attendees of EC(b)P CC Bureau sessions were Viktor Jefremov (89), Feodor Kaloshin (24), N. Gorlinsky (13) and Nikolai Sutoksky (9).[64]

The union republic Bureaus had to report to the CPSU(b) Central Committee, whose directives and instructions were to be received and implemented by the local authorities. Frequently, the more important issues were discussed first by the CPSU(b) CC Estonian Bureau, and only then by the EC(b)P CC Bureau. And yet, the CPSU(b) CC Estonian Bureau was not a redundant insitution of the EC(b)P CC Bureau, because the all-Union Bureau naturally did not discuss all issues. If the all-Union Bureau's representatives did not like a decision or inquiry that the union republic's leadership had sent to Moscow, they would review that decision. For instance, the CPSU(b) CC Estonian Bureau declared at its June 5, 1945 session that the letter from Nikolai Karotamm to the USSR People's Commissar for Internal Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov, in which the Estonian Party leader proposed the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Estonian SSR and Sweden, was out of line. Karotamm was convinced that opening an Estonian SSR embassy in Sweden would help ease the repatriation of Estonian exiles. The Estonian Bureau of the CPSU(b) CC declared that sending this letter was a mistake, since the Bureau's approval had not been sought.[65]

Karotamm described the role of the Bureau in the speech (which we have already referred to) he made at the EC(b)P CC December Plenum: "The duty of this bureau is to lead the Estonian Communist (Bolshevik) Party in performing all the tasks that stand before it, to help improve all its operations, to fix mistakes, to overcome all the shortcomings that have become evident in its work, and to raise all its work to the necessary Bolshevik level."[66] At the meeting of November 6, 1944, after his return from Moscow, Latvian Party leader J. Kalnbērziņš spoke much more openly about circumstances leading up to the creation of the union republic Bureaus. He told attendees that according to Malenkov, the Bureau had been created to assist the Latvian union republic's leadership in transforming Latvia into a union republic according to the Soviet model, adding: "If we cannot do this, they will find others whose hands do not tremble."[67] The new Bureau was to start implementing this resolute course of action. The circumstances leading up to the creation of the Lithuanian Bureau was explained by Suslov at the late-December Plenum of the Lithuanian Communist (Bolshevik) Party Central Committee. Moscow's emissary justified the creation of this separate Bureau by stating that the local Party organization and its workers were too young and inexperienced to carry out the "particularly great and complicated" duties faced by their union republic. For this reason, a union republic Bureau had to be established in the CPSU(b) CC, to assist the local Party organization, educate its local workers, and strengthen Party organizations. Suslov did not deny that the union republic Bureau was a "temporary organzation," also referring to the earlier practice of implementing such institutions (Trans-Caucasian Bu-

[64] **Veskimägi,** *Kuidas valitseti Eesti NSV-d*, p. 112. In the latter part of November 1944, the entire Moscow trio was present at the Bureau: Shatalin, Perov and Sazykin; later, they would come alone. See Tõnu Tannberg, ed., *EKP KK büroo istungite regestid. I: 1940–1954 [ECP CC Bureau session records. Vol. 1: 1940–1954]* (Tartu, 2006), pp. 72–76.

[65] See **Hilda Sabbo,** *Võimatu vaikida [Impossible to Remain Silent]*, vol 3 (Tallinn, 1998), p. 730.

[66] Nikolai Karotamm's speech at the EC(b)P CC Plenum on Dec. 1, 1944, ERAF 1-4-104, p. 10.

[67] **Swain,** "Cleaning up Soviet Latvia," p. 65.

reau, Caucasian Bureau) to shore up Soviet power.[68]

Nikolai Shatalin's first public address to the Estonian SSR Party elite in early December 1944 is notable. Right at the beginning of his speech the high Moscow emissary stated that "true Soviet order" must be established in Estonia very soon. He admitted that althought Soviet power existed on the territory of the Estonian SSR in all its manifestations, it was not yet fully "consolidated." He added that Soviet power came to Estonia in 1940–1941 "in a somewhat different fashion," by which he meant that a "thorough deconstruction of the bourgeois order" had not then taken place. In 1941, Estonia retained much of its "bourgeois" character, which was then strengthened by the Germans, who also added "fascist elements" to it.

In Shatalin's opinion, there were people in the Estonian SSR, particularly "bourgeois nationalists," who were working against the establishment of the new order. He claimed that there were plenty of people within the union republic's leadership who felt that the new order can be established "without affecting anyone, without entering into conflict with anyone," due to the unique nature of the Estonians. The Moscow emissary thought this was a highly erroneous assumption. There are many who felt that too much emphasis was being placed on intensifying the fight against "bourgeois nationalists," because nothing significant would happen in Estonia. That is incorrect, he said. One had to "keep one's ears open" to one's enemies. In Shatalin's opinion, strengthening of the cadre and "purging" were very important tasks.[69]

Thus, the emissary from Moscow provided a rather clear definition of the work to be done. Moscow's guidelines were understood full well by Hans Kruus, who was convinced that "In the great construction program of Soviet Estonia, the political, ideological, and emotional shaping of the individual, of our entire society, stands among the most important issues." According to Kruus, needed was "a new person that was free of the bourgeois order, but particularly free of the bonds of the toxic prejudices instilled and spread by fascism." In Kruus's opinion, the "poisonous weed" within Estonia was "bourgeois nationalism," the struggle against which the CPSU(b) CC had declared to be "a primary task." That task was to be taken very seriously. He called on everyone by saying: "We must scrub and scrub. […] In 1944, we must join in the work of scrubbing. However, our scrubbing is not merely symbolic, but actually of a very practical nature." "We are faced with the task of scrubbing our society spritually clean of the filth of fascism and bourgeois nationalism."[70]

This shows how the union republic Bureaus were special institutions of power with actual authority over all aspects of governance in the union republics. Generally, the basic tasks of the bureaus in the three Baltic states were as follows:

- assisting in the implementation of the Soviet power apparatus and recruiting the necessary staff;
- introduction of the socialist economic model, primarily the execution of land reform and the creation of conditions favorable to collectivization, and the development of large-scale industry;
- suppressing the resistance movement and "purging hostile elements" from society;
- muzzling society's intellectual life to bring it into line with the unionwide model;
- exercising control over the union republics' leadership and keeping the center informed of their activities.

To put it simply: the task of the bureaus was to set an effective Sovietization process into motion and implement it as quickly as

[68] M. Suslov's remarks at the Lithuanian C(b)P CC Plenum on Dec. 30, 1944, in **Tininis,** *Komunistinio režimo nuskialtimai Lietuvoje 1944–1953*, pp. 261–262.
[69] Shatalin's remarks at the EC(b)P CC plenum, Dec. 2, 1944, ERAF 1-4-107, pp. 152–157.
[70] Kruus's remarks at the EC(b)P CC plenum, Dec. 2, 1944, ERAF 1-4-107, pp. 32–37.

possible, allowing only a short period of time to pass before its irreversibility could be ensured.

The leaders of the union republics regarded the Bureau, a Moscow power institution, with a great deal of suspicion, because they understood full well that they were dealing with an agency of control. And yet, no significant conflicts erupted between the union republic leadership and the Bureau. It seems that Karotamm ja Shatalin found a common language in many issues pertaining to the management of the union republic. Shatalin interfered little in the governance of the Estonian SSR. He maintained this stance in Latvia as well. Overall, the Lithuanian Bureau chairman Suslov also chose minimal involvement. In a report sent to Moscow, he stated that relations with local leaders had been rather "cool" at first, with the Lithuanian SSR Party chief Antanas Sniečkus asking him pointedly: "Are our 'Russian comrades' now going to be playing the lead role in our union republic?" Some time later, when it became clear that the local leadership would not be shoved into the background, relations normalized. Vasily Ryazanov notified Moscow that he had decided not to conduct all-Union Bureau meetings early on,[71] to avoid arousing distrust in the local leadership. Thus, Ryazanov could state that all the Bureau's suggestions were being considered, and all the necessary decisions were made "with the hands of the Latvian C(b)P CC and the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers."[72]

Georgy Perov's leadership style was completely different. During his tenure the Estonian Bureau met constantly, discussing even the most minor issues. Perov felt it was his duty to write out many more orders than the others did. For instance, a decision was approved obligating the leadership of the union republic to participate at mass events. In 1946, the Bureau discussed the issue of the Estonian language magazine *Mood* ("Style") – as one incident in the fight against "local nationalism" waged by Perov and his confederates from Moscow. Some attentive sentinels of ideology had noticed a blue-black-and-white color combination on the pages of this periodical fashion review, which led to a discussion of the content of the publication. Aleksander Kelberg spoke at the 1950 March Plenum about the circumstances leading up to the attention being directed at the magazine. Turning to ideology secretary Eduard Päll, Kelberg said: "When I left the military in 1946 and served as director of the EC(b)P Central Committee's Press Section, a magazine issued by the Institute for Applied Art was placed on my desk. The magazine was decked with the colors of the former bourgeois flag and had no artistic value whatsoever. Oversteppping the bounds of my authority, I prohibited the printing of this magazine. This precipitated a madman's dance; Adamson-Eric rushed in, filed a complaint with Karotamm; a council was convened. You read me Comrade Karotamm's letter regarding this magazine 15 minutes before the meeting. It said that people who know nothing about art should not be allowed to interfere with such things, and that the management of such issues should be left to those involved, and you suggested that I keep my mouth shut during the meeting. I said that if the prestige of the EC(b)P CC First Secretary demands it, I will be silent, although my opinion will not change. Comrade Buzulukov (representative of the CPSU(b) CC) and Comrade Käbin took part in the Central Committee discussions. They condemned the magazine, and thanks to Comrade Perov's involvement, we succeeded in destroying the typeset proofs of this magazine and preventing its publication; it had an intended circulation of 50,000."[73]

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[71] During its first one and a half years, the CPSU(b) CC Latvian bureau held only one meeting.

[72] **Зубкова,** "Советский фактор в Балтийском регионе," pp. 194–211; **Е. Зубкова**. "Москва и Балтия," pp. 266–283.

[73] Kelberg's remarks at the EC(b)P CC VIII Plenum, 1950, *Akadeemia* 5 (1999), pp. 1089–1990. Also see **Kalev Tammistu,** "Tasalülitamine" [Assimilation] 29, *Õhtuleht,* June 12, 1989; **Uno Liivaku**. *Eesti raamatu lugu [The Story of the Estonian Book]* (Tallinn, 1995), pp. 221–222.

There are more details to be found about Kelberg's story in the CPSU(b) Central Committee's Estonian Bureau documents, in which we read that Buzulukov had informed Perov about the nature of the problem on July 4, 1946, telling him that the publication of the *Mood* fashion review in its existing form could be considered a demonstration by reactionary forces. They mention that the periodical fashion review contains not only the blue-black-and-white color combination, but also the colors of the flag of Nazi Germany. Perov added a note to the letter saying that the issue must be discussed at the Bureau's July 31 meeting.[74] However, the discussion mentioned by Kelberg took place on July 8 at Päll's office, attended by Central Committee employees, Johannes Semper, Adamson-Eric and "invited women."[75] The group declared the magazine to be of poor artistic quality, accusing the fashion review of simply copying old German and French magazines. The most important experts were the "invited women" – female technical employees of the propaganda department – who gave their "unbiased" evaluation of the magazine: "This is like a gob of spit into a Soviet woman's face."[76] At the end of the deliberations, according to Buzulukov, Päll had informed the attendees of Karotamm's stance; he had also declared the magazine to be of poor quality and that publication of such an issue was out of the question. As a result, the fashion magazine was confiscated and destroyed. At the end of his speech, Buzulukov brought forth his own proposition: to finally compile an album that truly would deserve the attention of Soviet woman.[77] In its decision recorded in the meeting minutes, the CPSU(b) Central Committee's Estonian Bureau declared that use of the blue-black-and-white color combination was pandering to "the bourgeois nationalist feelings of the enemies of Soviet power."[78]

Lithuanian bureau chairman Vasily Shcherbakov was a more pretentious and ambitious character than his predecessor Mikhail Suslov, unabashedly regarding himself to be the actual leader of the union republic and making no attempt to take local circumstances into account.[79]

In Moscow's eyes, the Baltic union republic Bureaus had fulfilled their purpose by the spring of 1947. The issue was first discussed by the Orgburo on March 19, 1947; this was followed by the March 24 Politburo decision that abolished the union republic bureaus in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This decision states that "taking into account the work that has already been done for the purpose of strengthening the leadership of the Party, the councils and the managers of the economic sphere," the Bureaus have completed their tasks, and now these functions may be carried out directly by the union republics' Communist Party Central Committees.[80] Panksejev pointed out that the Estonian Bureau was eliminated at a time when "the union republic's Party organization has acquired the necessary leadership experience."[81] In the broadest sense, this was a sign of Moscow's conviction that the foundation for the new power had now been laid: the transition period of the Sovietization process was over, and the Kremlin could now trust the local leaders and local power apparatus.

Termination of the Bureaus' activity in the spring of 1947 was not incidental; it may have been timed to coincide with elections for the union republics' Supreme Soviets,

[74] N. Buzulukov to G. Perov, July 4, 1946, RGASPI 598-1-7, p. 86.
[75] N. Buzulukov to G. Perov, July 8, 1946, RGASPI 598-1-7, p. 87.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.
[78] **Зубкова,** "Советский фактор в Балтийском регионе," p. 199.
[79] **Tininis**, *Komunistinio režimo nuskialtimai Lietuvoje 1944–1953*, p. 101.
[80] CPSU(b) CC Politburo decision of March 24, 1947, in *ЦК ВКП(б) и региональные партийные комитеты*, p. 23.
[81] **Panksejev,** *Suure heitluse aastail*, p. 94. There is no mention of the year in which the Estonian Bureau was disbanded.

which took place in February of that same year, and which were considered to be an essential step in the formal legitimization of the new authority. In the first year of Soviet rule (1940–1941), no genuine elections were held except for National Representative Assembly (*Riigivolikogu*) elections; local elections were not held at all. For this reason, the issue of elections was raised immediately after the end of the war. New elections had to take place across the entire territory of the USSR. Although elections were conducted in most of the Soviet republics by 1947, elections of local Soviets did not take place in the Baltic union republics until the beginning of 1948.[82]

Since the elections took place without major incident, it was evident that Moscow felt increasingly sure that the situation "on site" was being well controlled by the union republic leadership. Since the elections were important for the "legitimization" of Sovietization and Soviet power, the authorities made every effort prepare them thoroughly. Post-war elections were important from a propaganda aspect as well: they were to prove to the local population and to the world that Soviet power was firmly established in the recently occupied lands. During the post-war local governing council elections in 1948, the propaganda machine went so far as to send trains (on both narrow- and broad-gauge railways) to locations throughout Estonia. They were also prepared for possible incidents, particularly during the Supreme Soviet elections in 1947. Military units were dispatched to guard most polling places;[83] among the guards was the future USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal Dmitry Yazov.[84]

The deputies of the second Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet were elected in February 1947. A total of 100 deputies were elected, with official results showing "only" 96.17% of the votes in favor of the candidates, with 99.33% of all eligible voters casting their ballots.[85] In the USSR Supreme Soviet elections that same year, even more opposing votes were counted. According to official reports (which naturally did not reflect actual data) at that time, the percentage of opposing votes anywhere in the Soviet Union was greatest in Estonia – 5,6%. In the 1947 Supreme Soviet elections, official results showed that only 820,000 persons, i.e. 0.81% of all voters throughout the entire Soviet Union, had cast opposing ballots.

In the data which the security organs of that time compiled on public sentiments there are numerous reports on the reasons why some people failed to vote. On election day, agitators visited Tartu University professor of mathematics Jaan Sarve four times, but the professor informed them: "I am not against Soviet authority; it pays me well for the work that I do. My whole family has voted already, but I am not going to vote, because voting is voluntary." The Estonian SSR Ministry of State Security was left with no choice but to record in its special report: "Sarv did not bother to vote."[86] Security agencies preserved all "anti-Soviet" comments added to the ballots in detail; special note was taken of those polling stations in which the number of opposing ballots was "sufficiently noteworthy." The greatest number of opposing votes were noted in Pärnu and Harju Counties. For instance, 7,014 persons went to the polls in Pärnu county's 44th electoral district, casting 607 (8.6%) opposing votes, with 120 ballots (1.7%) declared invalid. In Harju county, where Arnold Kress was the candidate in the 24th district, 435 people voted, with 87 (20%)

[82] A discussion of elections from the Soviet perspective: **Eerik Truuväli**, *Valimisõigus ja valimised Eestis 1917–1980 [The Right to Vote and Elections in Estonia 1917–1980]*, vol. 2 (Tallinn, 1986).

[83] For more detail, see **Tiit Noormets,** "Kõik valimisringkonnad ja -jaoskonnad on kaetud valvega … Nõukogude valimised julgeolekudokumentide peeglis" [All Election Districts and Polling Places are Totally Under Guard ... Soviet Elections as Reflected in Security Agency Documents], *Tuna* 3 (2004), pp. 79–82.

[84] **Дмитрий Язов,** *Удары судбы* (Москва, 2002), p. 94.

[85] **Truuväli,** *Valimisõigus ja valimised Eestis 1917–1980*, p. 120.

[86] Special note from the ESSR Deputy Minister for Security Mihhailov to the Chairman of the ESSR Council of Ministers Arnold Veimer, Feb. 17, 1947, ERAF R-1-5-154, p. 195.

casting opposing ballots.[87] The situation was similar in other districts. Subsequently, of course, these data were "smoothed over" to give a general impression which the authorities deemed appropriate.

Let us emphasize once more: in the postwar years, smoothly run elections for the 1947 Supreme Soviet were particularly important for the Soviet authorities, especially within the territories occupied in 1939–1940, including the Baltic union republics. The elections were to give Soviet authority formal legal sanction. The leaders of the three Baltic union republics succeeded in performing this task, and therefore Moscow no longer needed a supplemental institution to keep them under control. After all, the union republic leaders had been told from the start that the Bureaus are temporary institutions; their continued existence would have been difficult to justify after the elections. Maintaining the status quo might have created tensions in the power relations between the center and the union republics. The spring 1948 local elections were no longer important in Moscow's eyes – they were now simply a formality.

After dissolution of the CPSU(b) Central Committee's Estonian Bureau, most people involved with the bureau left Estonia, but not all: Nikolai Sutoksky became an employee in the EC(b)P CC apparatus, and Nikolai Buzulukov pursued a brilliant career as a scientist, rising to the position of academician at the Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences.[88] He served as academician-secretary of the Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences from 1951 to 1953, but was forced to leave Estonia in 1955.[89] Most employees of the Latvian ja Lithuanian Bureau also left after the Bureaus were abolished. The Lithuanian Bureau representative Vasily Pisarev went on to become Deputy Chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers.[90]

The Kremlin did not show as much trust in the other recently annexed union republics as it did the Baltics in the spring of 1947. The analogous Moldavian Bureau, which had been established on March 13, 1945, was not eliminated at that time.[91] The creation of the Moldavian Bureau had been preceded by a discussion in the CPSU(b) CC Orgburo, and on February 28, 1945, a separate decision was approved: "The condition of political work being done among the populace in the Moldavian SSR and measures for its improvement."[92]

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[87] Ibid., p. 199.

[88] **Veskimägi,** *Kuidas valitseti Eesti NSV-d*, p. 184.

[89] Buzulukov had come to Estonia in 1946. After the elimination of the CPSU(b) CC Estonian Bureau, he worked at the Economics Institute of the Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences, preparing a doctoral dissertation on the collectivization of agriculture. In 1951, he became an Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences academic. In 1953, the ECP CC "discovered serious political errors" in his scientific works. Actually, his "conviction" stemmed from the fact that Buzulukov's studies included references to the speeches of Nikolai Karotamm, who had by then fallen into disfavor. This proved fateful for him: In 1953, Buzulukov lost his position at the Academy of Sciences, and a few years later, was forced to leave Estonia altogether. For more details, see **Olaf Kuuli**, *Stalini-aja võimukaader ja kultuurijuhid Eesti NSV-s (1940–1954) [The Stalin Era's Power Cadre and Cultural Leaders in the Estonian SSR (1940–1954)]* (Tallinn, 2007), p. 138. The Buzulukov incident is a vivid example of how Ivan Käbin operated and "carried out cadre policy".

[90] **Tininis,** *Komunistinio režimo nuskialtimai Lietuvoje 1944–1953*, p. 102.

[91] CPSU(b) CC Politburo decision of March 13, 1945, in *ЦК ВКП(б) и региональные партийные комитеты*, p. 40, ref. 2. This decision explicitly states that Moldavian leaders are obligated to carry out the decisions of the CC Bureau. As the Bureau's primary duties, it lists the strengthening of the union republic leadership, the increasing of their authority, an unrelenting struggle against "bourgois nationalism," the implementation of measures to restore the national economy, increasing the effectiveness of political work, and the training of Party and Soviet organization workers in the "Bolshevik spirit". For more on the activities of the CPSU(b) CC Moldavian Bureau, see **Валерий Пасат,** "Молдавия в годы Великой Отечественной войны (1941–1945)," in *Россия в XX веке: Война 1941–1945 годов: Современные подходы* (Москва, 2005), pp. 199–203.

[92] "CPSU(b) CC Moldavian Bureau report of April 1, 1945–Nov. 1, 1946," in **Валерий Пасат,** *Трудные страницы истории Молдовы 1940–1950-е гг.* (Москва, 1994), p. 237.

The Moldavian Bureau operated until 1949. Even after its dissolution, Moscow remained dissatisfied with the situation in Moldavia, and replaced the Bureau with a CPSU(b) CC deputy serving as go-between for Moscow and Kishnev.[93] The respective decision was approved in April 1949. Creation of this position was justified by stating the need to strengthen "ties between the CPSU(b) CC and the Moldavian Communist Party CC," ensure adequate and timely delivery of information, and strengthen contol over performance of Moscow's guidelines.[94] The Moldavian issue had already been discussed at the April 9 session, with the union republic leadership in attendance. At this session it was pointedly stated that the leaders of the union republic had failed to discover and eliminate "anti-Soviet elements" in a timely manner, had made mistakes in educating and assigning cadres, and had failed to condemn the works of several writers and historians that glorified feudal Moldavia and provided a skewed picture of the events of the Great Patriotic War.[95] Thus, the CPSU(b) CC Moldavian Bureau had failed to carry out its duties and was therefore dissolved. Now the new supervisor for Moscow would be the CPSU(b) CC deputy M. Turkin, who had been serving as a Central Committee inspector; he remained at this post until 1950.[96]

In the eyes of the Kremlin's ruling elite, use of the Bureaus had apparently been justified as Central Asia and Far East Bureaus were established in February 1949. Furthermore, this decision of the Politburo also approved a separate CPSU(b) CC Bureau statute, with provisions that had undoubtedly been in effect for the Latvian, Lithuanian ja Estonian Bureaus.[97] The Central Asia and Far East Bureaus did not operate for very long.[98] The institution of the CPSU(b) CC deputy was used to rein in the Uzbek SSR during this period;[99] however, no such post was created in the Baltic states after the war, although this had been done during the first year of Soviet rule.[100]

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[93] A clear sign of Moscow's dissatisfaction was the fact that The CPSU(b) CC Orgburo discussed the Moldavian Bureau report separately in October 1948, also approving a separate decision. See CPSU(b) CC Orgburo decision, Oct. 4, 1948, in **Пасат,** *Трудные страницы истории Молдовы*, pp. 321–327.

[94] CPSU(b) CC Politburo decision of April 24, 1949, in *ЦК ВКП(б) и региональные партийные комитеты*, pp. 38–39.

[95] *ЦК ВКП(б) и региональные партийные комитеты*, pp. 39–40, ref. 1.

[96] Ibid., p. 39.

[97] CPSU(b) CC Politburo decision of Feb. 10, 1949, in *ЦК ВКП(б) и региональные партийные комитеты*, pp. 36–37.

[98] This idea was revisited, to a limited extent, in the late 1950s, although in a different context and with different purposes in mind. The reason for this was a new process on the agenda — the "assimilation of nations" within the Soviet Union, an irreversible process, according to Khrushchev. This would gradually erase the need to have union republics at all, because the development of common economic zones would take precedence over national-territorial divisions. Therefore, the leadership style of the Party must also be reorganized. And so during the Khrushchev era, the CPSU CC Central Asian Bureau was established for Party control over the Central Asian union republics; an analogous Trans-Caucasian Bureau was established for Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The purpose for the creation of both bureaus was not to strengthen Moscow's control, but primarily for economic interests, i.e. the development of a common economic zone, thereby diminishing the ethnic-national status of the union republics. See **Абдурахман Авторханов,** *Империя Кремля* (Москва, 2002), pp. 280–282.

[99] CPSU(b) CC Politburo decision of March 28, 1949, in *ЦК ВКП(б) и региональные партийные комитеты*, pp. 37–38.

[100] The CPSU(b) CC officially confirmed its own representatives to their posts in the Baltic union republics (specifically, they were representatives of the CPSU(b) CC and Council of People's Commissars) at the Politburo on September 16, 1940. See *Советское руководство: Переписка 1928–1941 гг.* (Москва, 1999), p. 438, ref. 7. They were V. Botchkarev (in Estonia), N. Pozdnyakov (in Lithuania) and V. Dereviansky (in Latvia), who were referred to as fully authorized representatives of the USSR. The institutions of the union republic Bureau and the representative had similar functions; one indication of this is the fact that the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History has created a joint archival fund for them: *Российский государственный архив социально-политической истории. Краткий справочник. Справочно-информационные материалы к документальным и музейным фондам РГАСПИ,* Вып. 3 (Москва, 2004), p. 106. The same was done for the Moldavian SSR.

The institution of the 2nd Secretary of the EC(b)P CC – Moscow's on-site watchdog

The Party Central Committee's Second Secretary played an essential role in restraining and controlling the union republic leadership. Usually, Moscow adhered to the principle of selecting the union republic's Party leader from among the native population (with the exception of Belarus and Ukrainian SSR in the post-war years). The post-war CPSU(b) Central Committee Cadre Secretary Nikolai Kuznetsov explicitly stated that Moscow selects the Party secretaries for its Soviet republics very carefully.[101] There is no doubt that only a person enjoying Stalin's support could be named to this position: the career of any Party boss depended on the Great Leader. For Moscow, every union republic's Party leader was in fact the local ruler. In a memorandum sent to Georgy Malenkov in 1952, Nikolai Shatalin justifiably noted that the governing role of the First Secretary in each union republic was defined by his duties, which prescribed involvement in leading all facets of life, and included maintaining contact with security agencies.[102] Still, Moscow did not fully trust the union republics' Party leaders, and sent in a non-native Second Secretary to keep an eye on them. The union republic leadership had no input into the appointment of these Second Secretaries; all they could do was accept this person who was to become "Moscow's on-site watchdog."[103]

This system was fully established by the late 1930s at Josif Stalin's direction, with the Second Secretary's primary duties being, in the words of Abdurahman Avtorhanov, "distribution of cadres and the 'internationalization' of the Soviet republics."[104] Even those union republics from which a local Party leader (e.g. Kunayev, Rashidov, Mzhavanadze) was selected for the Kremlin's ruling elite – the Politburo – had to be content with the Second Secretary that Moscow sent them.[105] Even having a former KGB chief (e.g. Aliyev, Shevardnadze) as the union republic's Party leader was not enough – Moscow still needed the supplementary control provided by the Second Secretary.

Actually, Moscow did not stop at sending emissaries for only the Party apparatus; the same method was used to keep an eye on executive and legislative authorities. It was quite common to have a special emissary from Moscow serving as First Deputy to union republic government leaders. This principle was often applied to union republic KGB chiefs as well, and also commanders of military units stationed in the union republics. The emissary sent to work alongside these leaders was usually an authority or military man appointed from outside the union republic. Typically, the directors of all-Union enterprises were also appointed by Moscow.[106] After the war, an identical model of dispatching such so-called advisors was applied in the Eastern Bloc states that had come under Moscow's control.[107]

This process took place in the Estonian SSR and the other Baltic union republics as well; the Second Secretary, appointed by Moscow, fulfilled the functions of advisor and watchdog. The Second Secretary's general duties were the following:

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[101] **Николай Романовский,** *Лики сталинизма* (Москва, 1995), p. 132.

[102] Ibid.

[103] **Kuuli,** *Stalini-aja võimukaader*, p. 67.

[104] **Авторханов,** *Империя Кремля*, p. 272.

[105] It is true that Stalin would not let Moscow send a Second Secretary to to Georgia, Azerbaidjan, and Armenia. It was Khrushchev who initiated the practice in these union republics. The opposite took place in Ukraine and Belarus: during Stalin's time, no Party leaders were appointed from among the native population; this was allowed only after the death of the "Great Leader."

[106] **Авторханов,** *Империя Кремля,* p. 273.

[107] **Татьяна Волокитина, Галина Мурашко, Аьбина Носкова, Татьяна Покивайлова,** *Москва и Восточная Европа: Становление политических режимов советского типа (1949–1953): Очерки истории* (Москва, 2002), pp. 592–651.

– to keep an eye on the activities of the local leadership and keep Moscow appraised of what was going on in the union republic;
– to keep an eye on the union republic's cadre policy;
– to set oneself up as an active example by championing "the building of socialism" in all important aspects of life;
– to interpret the directives emanating from Moscow;
– when necessary, to hear all possible complaints, expressions of dissatisfaction, etc., and to inform Moscow thereof.

Between 1944 and 1953, three emissaries from Moscow served in the position of EC(b)P CC Second Secretary:

Table 1

EC(b)P CC 2nd Secretaries from 1944 to 1953

Name	Year of birth	Served as 2nd Secretary	Participation at EC(b)P CC Bureau sessions
Sergey Sazonov	1907	12/1944–07/1948	295 times
Georgy Kedrov	1907	10/1948–08/1949	80 times
Vasily Kosov	1910	07/1950–06/1953	184 times

Source: Kõrgema võimu vahendajad ENSV-s [Representatives of Higher Authority in the ESSR], pp. 24–26, 30–31, 74–75; **K-O. Veskimägi**. Kuidas valitseti Eesti NSV-d [How the Estonian SSR Was Governed], pp. 108–111.

As early as the first days of December 1944, the ECP CC Plenum appointed Sergei Sazonov to fill the post of Second Secretary; Nikolai Karotamm introduced him as a "comrade with great Party-political experience in Party organizations as well as economics, and this is exactly the kind of assistance our Party Central Committee needs at the current time, for organizational work as well as the resolution of economic problems."[108] Arnold Veimer supported Karotamm. After Sazonov had described his background to the Plenum participants, Veimer wasted no time in stating: "I, for one, am in favor of this appointment, making note of the fact that the assistance of Party comrades with extensive experience in positions of responsibility is most urgently needed at this difficult time of war."[109] Having said that, Veimer put Sazonov's nomination up for a vote, the results of which were in the stenogram: "No opposition, no abstentions."[110] Prior to the Central Committee Plenum, the issue of Sazonov's appointment had been discussed by the EC(b)P CC Bureau, which, of course, approved his candidacy. He took office on November 23. Subsequently, CPSU(b) CC Secretary Malenkov formalized the dispatch of Sazonov to the Estonian SSR on November 29.[111] Not only was he appointed to the post of Second Secretary, he was made a member of the CPSU(b) CC Estonian Bureau in August 1946. Sazonov was sent to Estonia from Moscow, where he had worked during wartime as Secretary of the CPSU Moscow City Committee and as Assistant Secretary for Industry. Sazonov stayed in Estonian until the summer of 1948, when he was promoted to the position of Head of the CPSU(b) CC

[108] Karotamm's remarks at the EC(b)P CC Plenum, Dec. 2, 1944, ERAF 1-4-104, p. 166.
[109] Veimer's remarks at the EC(b)P CC Plenum, Dec. 2, 1944, ERAF 1-4-104, p. 166.
[110] ERAF 1-4-104, p. 167.
[111] See Sazonov's biography in Liivik, Tarvel, eds., *Kõrgemad võimu vahendajad ENSV-s,* pp. 74–75.

Planning, Finance and Trade Department.[112]

After Sazonov left Estonia, the position of Second Secretary stood empty for nearly 9 months. In autumn 1949, the current Leningrad City Committee Cadre Secretary Georgy Kedrov was finally appointed to fill that post. His dispatch to Estonia had been confirmed by the CPSU(b) CC in Moscow in September 1948, and the EC(b)P CC Bureau approved the decision at its October 9 session. At the 5th Congress of the EC(b)P, held in December of that same year, Kedrov was elected to membership in the Central Committee, and then finally confirmed as Second Secretary at the post-Congress EC(b)P CC Plenum.[113] However, he was able to spend little time in Estonia, as he was recalled in connection with the "Leningrad Affair" the following year.[114]

Vasily Kosov became the new Second Secretary. As a CPSU(b) CC inspector he was actively engaged in making preparations for the March Plenum of 1950 and the replacement of the current members of the Estonian SSR government. Kosov was confirmed to the post of ECP CC Second Secretary in June 1950, and he stayed in Estonia for 3 years. Kosov was summoned back to Moscow in 1953, when Lavrenty Beria began implementing his "new national policy" for the outer regions, which supported the promotion of native workers to a greater extent than had previously been done. From this time onward, Moscow would accept a native Estonian for the post of Second Secretary. In June 1953 the position was filled by Leonid Lentsman, who served until 1964. The Kremlin accepted his successor Artur Vader as well, who held the position until 1970. After this time, however, Moscow restored its superior right to appoint Second Secretary. Konstantin Lebedev was dispatched to Estonia in 1971. He helped Moscow manage the Estonian SSR until 1982. He was followed by two more Second Secretaries: Aleksandr Kudriatsev (1982–1985) and George Aljyshin (1985–1990).

Clearly, the principles of the Soviet system could preclude service in some official positions because of one's nationality. There was a very distinct line between those nationalities represented in the upper levels of the power hierarchy and those who were not. During the post-war years, not one of the Baltic union republic leaders belonged to the Kremlin power elite. The highest level they achieved was membership in the CPSU(b) Central Committee. Despite the official rhetoric, which glorified every aspect of the USSR's multinationality, only members of selected nationalities ever achieved membership in the upper echelons of power. Naturally, the leading positions were all filled by Russians, and other nationalities were not represented nearly as predominantly at the apex of the power pyramid.

All throughout the existence of Soviet power, the Party's power pyramid (Politburo, Secretariat and Orgburo) included a total of 229 persons.[115] This group was the power elite within the Soviet single-party state, and it included representatives of 22 nationalities, including 147 (64%) Russians. The proportion of other nationalities was as follows: Ukrainians 18 (7.9%), Jews 12 (5.2%), Belarussians and Latvians 8 each (3.5%), Georgians 6 (2.6%), Armenians and Uzbeks 4 (1.7%), Azerbaijans 3 (1.3%), Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Moldavians, Germans, Poles, Estonians 2 each (0.9%), and Bulgarians, Lithuanians, Ossetians, Tadjiks, Tatars, Turkmens and Finns 1 representative each (0.4%).[116] However, we

[112] Sazonov remained at this post until 1950, after which he served briefly as CPSU(b) CC inspector (1950–1951), and in 1951 began working in the USSR Council of Ministers' Central Statistical Administration (as Deputy Head from 1955 to 1976). See Liivik, Tarvel, eds., *Kõrgemad võimu vahendajad ENSV-s*, p. 75.

[113] Liivik, Tarvel, eds., *Kõrgemad võimu vahendajad ENSV-s*, p. 25.

[114] For more on the "Leningrad Affair" and G. Kedrov, see **Benjamin Tromly,** "The Leningrad Affair and Soviet Patronage Politics, 1949–1950," *Europe-Asia Studies* 5, (2004), pp. 707–729.

[115] **Анатолий Чернев,** *229 кремлеских вождей: Политбюро, Оргбюро, Секретариат ЦК Коммунистической партии в лицах и цифрах: Справочник* (Москва, 1996).

[116] See **Анатолий Чернев,** "Национальный состав высшей партийно-государственной элиты СССР," in *Трагедия великой державы: Национальный вопрос и распад Советского Союза* (Москва, 2005), pp. 578–587.

must remember that the last great expansion of the Party's higher institutions of power took place at the CPSU XXVIII Congress in 1990, when all Party leaders of all the union republics automatically became members of the Politburo. By this time, however, the CPSU was a receding force in the political arena. Before 1990, representatives of only 15 nationalities had sat on the Politburo, with Estonians and Lithuanians among those who had been excluded.[117]

We can thus assert that the "chosen" nationalities in the USSR, besides the Russians, were the Ukrainians, Belorussians, Jews (before World War II), Latvians, Georgians, Armenians, Uzbeks and Azerbaijanis, with the other nationalities playing a rather insignificant role. Such a division was certainly not coincidental, but rather an application of the principle of *numerus clausus*, which was not recorded in a single Party document.

As we look back at the post-war years, it is evident that the Baltic union republics did not enjoy an equal standing. In 1941, the leaders of the Lithuanian ja Latvian SSR Antanas Sniečkus and Jānis Kalnbērziņš had been selected to candidate membership in the CPSU(b) Central Committee (as was Karl Säre, who was not erased from the membership rolls of the Central Committee until 1944).[118] However, Estonia's new Party boss Nikolai Karotamm was not nominated for CC membership, and it was not until 1952 that Ivan Käbin achieved membership in the Central Committee.[119] There is no doubt that Karotamm's position was the weakest of all the Baltic union republic leaders at that time. One reason may certainly have been the effect of the Säre incident on Stalin's opinions of Karotamm,[120] who did not become the official leader of the Estonian SSR until the autumn of 1944. The delay in the appointment of Karotamm was a clear expression of a lack of confidence by Moscow. This situation has been referred to by Daniil Rudnev, who writes in his memoirs: "It remained incomprehensible to me and to many others why Karotamm was still the Central Committee Second Secretary at the end of September 1944. It undoubtedly upset him too, and naturally he sought clarification of how these circumstances had come about." Rudnev is convinced that "a significant role was played by Stalin's distrustfulness, his prejudices against the old Estonian communists, among whom there were quite a few 'enemies of the people'."[121] That is undoubtedly the case.[122]

It seemed that Stalin's doubts were somewhat assuaged by his meeting with Karotamm in August 1944. Historical literature has as yet not made any mention of this meeting. The journal of visitors to the "Great Leader's" Kremlin office records at least two visits by Karotamm: in August 1944 and January 1949. Both meetings had very important outcomes: "frontier adjustments" at the August 1944 meeting, and discussions on collectivization and preparations for deportation in

[117] In 1990, two new members were added to the CPSU CC Politburo: the "independent" ECP representative Enn-Arno Sillari and "night party member" Lembit Annus.

[118] **Горячев,** *Центральный комитет КПСС, ВКП(б), РКП(б), РСДРП(б)*, pp. 26–27.

[119] At the same time, A. Sniečkus ja J. Kalnbērziņš were promoted from CC candidate-member to candidate. Also, the chairmen of the Baltic union republics' Councils of Ministers M. Gedvilas, A. Müürisepp ja V. Lācis, and the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR Justas Paleckis were selected to CC candidate-membership. Thus, by the end of Stalin's rule, the Lithuanian SSR was the most well-represented in Moscow: it had Party, executive, and legislative leaders in the CC. The situation was similar in 1956: The Chariman of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers was now Motiejus Shumauskas.

[120] It is highly likely that Nikolai Karotamm became ECP CC 2nd Secretary in August 1940 specifically because of Karl Säre: **Kuuli,** *Stalini-aja võimukaader*, p. 33.

[121] **Daniil Rudnev,** "Esimene sekretär: Meenutusi Nikolai Karotammest" [The 1st Secretary: Remembering Nikolai Karotamm], *Eesti Kommunist* 4, (1988), p. 69.

[122] Edgar Tõnurist also discusses Stalin's distrust of Baltic union republic leaders. See: **Edgar Tõnurist,** "Traagiliste sündmuste aasta" [A Year of Tragic Events], in Ene Hion, ed, *Ausalt ja avameelselt EKP Keskkomitee VIII pleenumist, Karotammest ja Käbinist, hinge harimatusest [With Honesty and Frankness about the ECP CC VIII Plenum, about Karotamm and Käbin, about Intellectual Ignorance]* (Tallinn, 1989), p. 52.

January 1949. After the August 1944 meeting, the Kremlin gave the green light for the promotion of Karotamm to the position of First Secretary of the EC(b)P CC. Notes written by Karotamm on the second visit have been preserved. That meeting took place on January 18, 1949, when the Kremlin had summoned the Party leaders of all three Baltic union republics to Moscow (as it had also done in 1944).[123]

Since Karotamm's position was not very strong in the Kremlin, he certainly had to pay careful attention to Moscow's apppointee in Estonia, the Second Secretary, who was to teach him the "ins and outs" of a Party leader's work. It has been said about Karotamm that he acquired his Party work "experience" very quickly after the war, with the emissaries from Moscow playing a significant role in his achievement. Rudnev says that Karotamm's acqisition of "experience in Party work" was "greatly supported […] by his comrades from the CPSU(b) Central Committee Estonian Bureau: N. Shatalin and G. Perov, and particularly by the ECP Central Committee Second Secretary S. Sazonov, who came to our republic in early December 1944" and who "assisted our First Secretary very tactfully."[124]

Taking the circumstances of the Stalin era into account, Sazonov ja Kedrov, who had been dispatched to assist Karotamm, were rather reserved characters who did not call any particular attention to their role as superiors. Karotamm succeeded in developing a relatively conflict-free relationship with them. This is particularly true of the relationship between Sazonov and Karotamm. A number of accounts have characterized their relationship as one of "total mutual understanding and friendship," though this apparently is an exaggeration.[125] Sazonov himself confirmed the pleasantness of his relationship with Karotamm, saying that after his arrival in Estonia, "I did whatever I could to ensure that we would work in an atmosphere of mutual understanding, and it seems to me that N. G. [Karotamm] realized how I was trying to go about things, and tried to respond in kind. At ECP Central Committee Bureau meetings, plenums, formal gatherings, on the grandstand during crowded processions, song festivals, etc., we were usually together and very friendly toward each other, not just for show, but with real sincerity."[126]

Sazonov had high regard for Karotamm as leader of the union republic, but never kept his opinion to himself whenever he felt that mistakes had been made, naturally transmitting his concerns about the "missteps" to Moscow as well. Karotamm's relationship with Kedrov turned out to be rather similar. Kosov's position was quite different from that of the previous 2nd Secretaries: he had participated actively in preparations for the "Estonian Affair," and was to start setting Estonia on its new course after the replacement of the Estonian SSR leadership. And although he, together with Ivan Käbin, had made preparations for the removal of Karotamm, the Käbin-Kosov team never developed the kind of mutual understanding that Karotamm had had with Sazonov and Kedrov. We must keep in mind that the primary duty of all three men was to serve as "Moscow's on-site watchdog."

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[123] Karotamm's notes on his discussion with Stalin, Jan. 19, 1949, ERAF-9607-1-302, pp. 1–3. Karotamm's notes include the following comment: "We spent the most time discussing the *kulak* issue. At first, Com. St. said that your % of collectivization is small, that it may be too early to eliminate the *kulaks*, it should first reach 30–40%. During the course of our discussion, he made sure several times whether we actually feel this way, or are we merely spouting words […] . We assured him that we truly felt this way. I added that the CC Bureau also felt that we should start by sending away the most hostile *kulak* elements. But — that would not resolve the issue. Finally, St. said — let's send them away. But it must be done quickly to avoid giving the villages time to become too nervous".

[124] **Rudnev,** "Esimene sekretär," p. 72.

[125] Ibid.

[126] Quoted in K. Tammistu's article: **Kalev Tammistu**, "Tasalülitamine" [Assimilation] 9, *Õhtuleht,* May 105, 1989.

The *nomenklatura* as a control mechanism

The Stalinist slogan "cadres decides everything"[127] was not a meaningless phrase, but an explicit principle of action: the leadership and control of Soviet society must take place by way of the workers. From the start, Soviet authorities placed great significance on the selection of political labor force for the various departments, and within a short time, certain principles were established for this process that essentially remained in place until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Control over the political labor force was particularly important in the areas occupied by the USSR in 1939 and 1940, because the officials and employees whose work would now support the new authority were yet to be trained in these regions. In the case of the Estonian SSR, the post-war years were particularly crucial, when the scarcity of suitable people was an acute issue indeed. It was during the post-war years that the *nomenklatura* system was implemented in the Estonian SSR; the system had already been established in the USSR in the 1920s.

The heart of Soviet society's political system was political power, enforced by the Communist Party. "Soviet power" was acutally the power of the Party, meaning the Party apparatus. The Party-centered power structure was established in stages. An important milestone along this way was reached in 1919, when the central working organizations of the Party's Central Committee (the Politburo, the Organizational Bureau [Orgburo], and the Secretariat) were established at the VIII Congress of the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party [RCP(B)].[128] The "Department of Files and Appointments" (what would be called a personnel department today) established at the Central Committee laid the foundation for consolidating all cadre policy under Party control until the establishment of the *nomenklatura* system. This took its final form by 1925–1926, when the RCP(B) Central Committee Orgburo adopted the "Procedure for Selection and Appointment of Employees" statute and approved the first list of the most important positions – the *nomenklatura* – which had now been developed.[129] From this time onward, it became customary to divide the *nomenklatura* into two branches: the basic *nomenklatura*, approved by the Politburo, and the registration-and-control (reserve) *nomenklatura*, which required approval by the Party.[130]

Thus, the *nomenklatura* became one of the most essential elements of the exercise of political power – governance – in the USSR; in other words, the Party apparatus created a unique system of governing based on the principle of *nomenklatura*, which meant:

– the Party worker and government official was obligated to the Party organization

[127] Stalin said this for the first time on May 4, 1935 at a reception held at the Kremlin for graduates of the military academies. See **Владимир Невежин,** *„Если завтра в поход…": Подготовка к войне и идеологическая пропаганда в 30-х – 40-х годах* (Москва, 2007), p. 103.

[128] For more detailed information see **Thomas Henry Rigby,** "Staffing USSR Incorporated: The Origins of the Nomenklatura System," *Soviet Studies* 4, (1988), pp. 523–537.

[129] Since the study of the devlopment of the Nomenclatural system in the USSR is not the purpose of this article, I am providing a few more pertinent sources on this topic in addition to the study by T.H. Rigby referenced above: **Татьяна Коржихина, Юрий Фигатнер,** "Советская номенклатура: Становление, механизмы действия," *Вопросы истории* 7, (1993), pp. 25–38; **Михайл Зеленов,** "Рождение партийной номенклатуры," *Вопросы истории* 2, (2005), pp. 3–8; **Б. Павлов,** "Становление контроля партийной номенклатуры над правоохранительной системой в 1921–1925 годах," *Вопросы истории* 1, (2004), pp. 32–50; **Виктор Мохов,** *Региональная политическая элита России (1945–1991 гг.)* (Пермь, 2003); **Moshe Lewin,** "Rebuilding the Soviet Nomenklatura 1945–1948," *Cahiers du Monde russe* 44/2–3, (2003), pp. 219–251; **Bohdan Harasymiw,** "Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party's Leadership Recruitment System," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 2, (1969), pp. 493–512; **Evan Mawdsley, Stephen White,** *The Soviet Elite from Lenin to Gorbachev: The Central Committee and its Members 1917–1991* (Oxford, New York, 2000).

[130] **Олег Хлевнюк,** "Система центр-регионы в 1930–1950-е годы," *Cahiers du Monde russe* 44/2–3, (2003), p. 255.

that appointed him;
- the Party or government official could not be dismissed from office without the consent of the Party organization that appointed him or the consent of a higher authority;
- various methods of pressure could be exerted on the members of the *nomenklatura* (all possible variations of "purging", terror, political accusations, etc.).[131]

The functioning of the nomenclatural principle in society meant that appointment to even the least important positions in the various power structures required the compulsory approval of Party organizations. The procedures for approval depended on the importance of the position and its location within the power structure. Each Party institution, from the CPSU(b) CC Politburo and Secretariat all the way through the municipal and district committees, had its list of prescribed positions. These positions could be filled only at the approval of and in concordance with that Party institution at that level.[132]

This list of the most important positions at the various levels of power was, in the narrowest sense, the *nomenklatura*. In a broader sense, *nomenklatura* has been used to refer to all the persons who filled these positions. These individuals can be called, with some exceptions, the political elite of Soviet society. Nomenclatural governance required rigid centralization. Officials appointed on the basis of the principle of *nomenklatura* were responsible only to the higher Party organization that appointed them. Due to the absence of democratic selection mechanisms in the USSR, these officials were in no way dependent on their subordinates. Nomenclatural governance precluded multi-candidate elections, making Soviet-style standard elections nothing more than an umbrella for Nomenclatural governance.

The *nomenklatura* included its own internal hierarchy, which included a disproportionate number of all manner of Party and Soviet governing apparatus employees, i.e. people who kept an eye on everyone else and organized every possible kind of campaign in society. A central figure of the *nomenklatura* was the ideological worker. The *nomenklatura* also included the managers (directors, chairmen) of manufacturing entities and members of the power structures and intelligentsia. The actual goal of the *nomenklatura* was to capture all aspects of life in its "net," thus ensuring control over all of society.

The *nomenklatura* consisted of many levels in Soviet society. The All-Union or RCP(B)/CPSU(b)/CPSU Central Committee *nomenklatura* also included the leaders of the Soviet republics. The second level comprised the *nomenklatura* at the local level – oblasts, krais, union republics – in which further lower levels were distinguishable. Thus, the *nomenklatura* also served as a means of structuring society which ensured the broadest possible domination. This method proved successful in a totalitarian society.[133]

Nomenclatural governance had a significant effect on the power relations between the center and the regions.[134] As a result, a system of special "patron" (in Party lingo – "curator") and "client" relationships emerged, i.e. the indebtedness of each official to the authorities that appointed him to his post. Such "patron-client" relations developed at all levels of power, including, naturally, the highest reaches of the USSR governing elite during

[131] **Рудолф Пихоя,** "Эволюция системы власти и управления в СССР и России во второй половине XX в.: От Советов и КПСС к Президенту и Думе," *Восточноевропейские исследования* 1, (2005), pp. 12–26.

[132] **Пихоя,** *Москва. Кремль. Власть,* pp. 34–35.

[133] **Мохов,** *Региональная политическая элита России (1945–1991 гг.)*, p. 38.

[134] Oleg Hlevnjuk has expertly analyzed the power relationships between the center and the regions. **Олег Хлевнюк,** "Советские региональные руководители: Политизация номенклатуры," in *Куда идет Россия? Кризис институционных систем: Век, десятилетие, год* (Москва, 1999), pp. 97–100; **Хлевнюк,** "Система центр-регионы в 1930–1950-е годы," pp. 253–267. See also E. A. Rees, ed., *Centre-Local Relations in the Stalinist State 1928–1941* (Basingstock, 2002).

that time. The most vivid example is the circle of those closest to Stalin; other groupings formed in the Kremlin's highest corridors of power according to the same pattern (the Lev Trotsky team, the Leningrad group, the Sergei Kirov–Sergo Ordzhonikidze–Anastas Mikoyan Caucasia group, etc.). Naturally, these groups did not stand idly by the power struggles that bred political accusations,[135] attacks on their opponents' positions of power, or the destruction of their opponents. Various methods were used to achieve these goals; all too often they did not shy away from physical elimination of their opponents. The fall or ostracism of a "patron" did not bode well for his "clients."

Many such "patron-client" relations existed within the power relationships between the center and the union republics; i.e. most union republic leaders had their own "patron(s)" in Moscow to protected them or stand up for them whenever necessary. Any local official with a "patron" in Moscow would most certainly have an easier time of defending his opinions, making deals to acquire resources for his union republic, etc. The historical literature to date has described the good relationship between the Estonian SSR Party boss Nikolai Karotamm and Andrei Zhdanov. Clearly, the "patron" and "client" relationship worked in this case, and there is no doubt that with Zhdanov's death in 1948 Karotamm lost a vital supporter. Karotamm lacked close ties with the other Kremlin leaders. His relationship with Zhdanov, however, had existed since the 1940 June Coup. Perhaps the fact that both men shared Leningrad background is of more than secondary importance.

The attitute of the center toward the regional elite – the rulers of the oblasts, krais and union republics – was also important. During Stalin's rule, the regional elite never managed to consolidate into a stable, confidently powerful, and to any extent autonomous political group in society. One reason for this was Moscow's determined policy to keep the regional elite under strict control and to purposely limit its power. Another important factor was the "Great Leader's" own suspicious attitude toward local authorities, which guaranteed that any possible attempts at independent action would be nipped in the bud.

Of course, we must also take into account the weakness of local authorities and the power struggles in which various groups attempted to smash the local leaders currently in power. Sooner or later, the leaders would seek help from Moscow, who usually stepped in and favored one side over another. It would usually support the group in power and help destroy the opponents. Repressions were particularly effective. Repressions to rein in the *nomenklatura*, "purging" and intimidation were used effectively throughout the existence of the USSR. The kinds and extent of repressions varied at different times, but in principle, they were applied repeatedly and effectively. Moscow also took advantage of such situations to place their "own men" in positions of power. A good example of this is the promotion of Lavrenty Beria to the position of Transcaucasian Party leader in the 1930s.

In addition to repressions, which culminated in the 1930s with the Great Terror (which might be considered a kind of cadre revolution), one way to control local officials was to constantly transfer them from one job to the next. By the beginning of 1939, more than half the "national" Communist Party secretaries had been at their posts for only a short time, and more than 90% were between 26 and 40 years of age. Thus, by the end of the 1930s, a new generation of leaders had come to power, owing their careers first and foremost to Stalin. The same policy persisted in the post-war years, although the cadre changes were less extensive than the ones made in the 1930s. However, the status of the regional elite in society remained precarious.

Whenever the Kremlin suspected a league

[135] Recall that accusations of "leaning" either right or left, "military-fascist conspiracy," "cosmopolitanism," "bourgeois nationalism," etc. have surfaced at various times throughout the history of the USSR.

between local power holders and their counterparts in Moscow, or saw evidence of any national "separatism," it could implement farther-reaching repressions to keep the regional elite in line. The most important example of this is undoubtedly the "Leningrad Affair," which is loosely connected to the 1950 "purge" in Estonia with all its preludes and postludes. We can thus view the March Plenum of 1950 as a Nomenclatural purge and concur with Yelena Zubkova's claim that this was a "sample purge," meant to intimidate the elite of the other outer regions.[136] It is worth remembering that the "Estonian Affair" was not the only purge undertaken on a regional level. In 1946, the CPSU(b) CC Politburo approved a new decision about "shortcomings and errors" in the Lithuanian SSR, resulting in a rather extensive replacement of employees.[137] "Purges" were also carried out in krais and oblasts.[138]

Alongside repressions, another method that proved quite effective in the post-war years was the constant reassignment of employees, a method initiated in Moscow. However, it affected oblast and krai leaders more than those of the union republics. According to the information that Georgy Malenkov sent to Stalin in March 1950, the situation by that time was as follows: of 106 union republic, oblast ja krai committee secretaries, only 20 had been at their posts for more than five years (18.8%); 47 (44.3%) had served at their positions for 1–3 years.[139] Much as it had been in the late 1930s, the careers and in many cases, the very lives of the regional-level power elite depended quite directly on Stalin's attitudes and opinions.

Despite the fact that regional leaders had not changed their conduct to any great extent, the post-war years are not comparable to the 1930s. What had changed was the attitude of the Kremlin toward these leaders and their activities. The relative loosening of the Kremlin's grip was undoubtedly due to the Soviet regime's feeling of security and most certainly due to the changes that had taken place in the composition of the regional elite. This was a new generation that had come to power thanks to Stalin, and it was therefore unwaveringly loyal to the ruling regime and its leader. Stalin himself trusted this generation a good deal more than he had trusted the pre-war authorities. It might actually be fair to say that the Soviet officials of that time were in the service of the "Great Leader." However, in these circumstances, the concept of *nomenklatura* itself was first and foremost the method by which officials were promoted to fill the most important positions and the way in which these positions were controlled. This, in turn, was the reason for the large number of Nomenclatural positions during the final years of Stalin's rule.[140]

The war had a profound effect on the evolution of the *nomenklatura*. Centralization had diminished significantly during the war because special wartime circumstances required quick and effective action, making it impossible to adhere to all the prescribed principles for seeking approval, etc. Consequently, Nomenclatural rule underwent some changes during the war. It was a clear sign of danger for the Kremlin's ruling elite, primarily for Josef Stalin, and one of his primary post-war goals became the restoration of

[136] For more detailed information see: **Елена Зубкова,** "Феномен "местого национализма. Эстонское дело" 1949–1952 годов в контексте советизации Балтии," *Отечественная история* 3, (2001), pp. 89–102; **Jelena Subkowa,** "Kaderpolitik und Säuberungen in der KPdSU (1945–1953)," in Hermann Weber, Ulrich Mählert, eds., *Terror. Stalinistische Parteisäuberungen 1936–1953* (Paderborn, München, Wien, Zürich, 1998), pp. 187–236; **Tõnu Tannberg,** "1950. aasta märtsipleenumi eel- ja järellugu. "Eesti süüasi" (1949–1952) Moskvast vaadatuna" [Before and After the March 1950 Plenum of the ECP. The "Estonian Affair" (1949–1952) from Moscow's Perspective], *Tuna* 3, (2001), pp. 120–125; *Eesti ajalugu VI. Vabadussõjast taasiseseisvumiseni*, p. 281.

[137] For more details see the article by Y. Zubkova.

[138] There are numerous similar examples to be found in *ЦК ВКП(б) и региональные партийные комитеты*, pp. 167–318.

[139] Most (80.5%) of this younger generation born of terror had joined the Party after 1923.

[140] **Хлевнюк**, "Система центр-регионы в 1930–1950-е годы," pp. 253–267.

rigid centralization, essentially equivalent to rule by the *nomenklatura*.[141] It was also necessary to tighten the central authority's grip on the people involved in the power structure at various levels. During the war, the central authorities' control over nominations to positions of power had weakened significantly, and the increasing influence of economic leaders and the diminishing importance of Party leaders in society were a thorn in Moscow's side.

The year 1946 saw the approval of many decisions that strengthened Party contol over the state apparatus. An essential part was played by cadre policy, as carried out by CPSU(b) CC Cadre Department under its new leader, Central Committee Secretary Nikolai Kuznetsov. His greedily ambitious aspiration was to change the CPSU(b) CC Cadre Department into an agency that would co-ordinate all the most important appointments within the Party as well as other areas of government.[142] After Kuznetsov became chief of the CPSU(b) CC Cadre Department in April 1946, the Department began revising the existing *nomenklatura* list. The main purpose for the revision was the strengthening of the Party organizations' control over society.

On October 5, 1946, the CPSU(b) CC Orgburo discussed the issue of "the *nomenklatura* of the positions in the CPSU(b) CC" and approved the list of positions submitted by the Cadre Department that would require approval by the CPSU(b) CC. One of the guidelines included in the decision was crucial: the Cadre Department was to ensure "daily and effective control" over selection of the proper people, and to discover and prevent, in a timely manner, any mistakes made in the selection of workers by the Party organizations as well as any agencies. All Party organizations, ministries and agencies were obligated to submit reasoned proposals regarding the persons nominated to Nomenclatural positions, including "objective characterizations," to the CPSU(b) Central Committee. Also, "necessary materials" "characterizing CC Nomenclatural employees on the basis of the results of their activities" were to be submitted to the CPSU(b) CC regarding the people already serving in Nomenclatural positions.

A detailed procedure was established describing who could nominate candidates to fill the Nomenclatural positions and how this was to be done. In the case of positions of executive authority, the candidate was to be nominated by the corresponding minister for cadre affairs or his deputy. In union republic ministries and agencies, approval had to be sought from the union republic's Party Committee. To fill positions within the Party apparatus, it goes without saying that the approval of the oblast, krai or union republic Party Committee would be needed. These levels were obligated to submit their *nomenklatura* lists to the CC Cadre Department within two months. The Cadre Department was given the responsibility of confirming the *nomenklatura*s of all the oblasts, krais, union republics, ministries and agencies by January 1, 1947. At the same time, the Cadre Department had to distribute lists of all-Union Nomenclatural positions, already compiled in Moscow, to the corresponding governmental levels.[143] The new *nomenklatura* list confirmed in 1946 listed 42,784 positions, of which nearly 70% comprised the so-called regional elite.[144]

Naturally, all-Union changes did not leave the Estonian SSR untouched; the issue of the *nomenklatura* had actually been brought up as early as the first year of Soviet rule.

The Estonian Communist Party played only a small role in the occupation of Estonia in 1940. After seizure of power, the construction of the new Soviet power apparatus was

[141] **Пихоя,** *Москва. Кремль. Власть,* pp. 34–35.

[142] For more details, see **Елена Зубкова,** "Советский режим в послевоенные годы. Новации и консерватизм (1945–1953)," in *Россия в XX веке: Война 1941–1945 годов*, pp. 494–495.

[143] CPSU(b) CC Orgburo decision, Oct. 5, 1946, in *ЦК ВКП(б) и региональные партийные комитеты*, p. 54.

[144] For the structure of the 1946 *nomenklatura*, see **Мохов,** *Региональная политическая элита России (1945–1991 гг.)*, pp. 110–111.

begun according to the all-Union model; the Communist Party would be central to everything. In the autumn of 1940, the ECP was transformed into a regional organization of the All-Union Communist (Bolshevik) Party and called the Estonian Communist (Bolshevik) Party; the Estonian Party's structure would now be brought completely into line with that of the all-Union Party. In cadre policy, this meant the adoption of the principles of *nomenklatura* and recruitment into the *nomenklatura*. The first step in 1940 was the establishment of cadre files on the people serving in the most important positions; compilation of a comprehensive Nomenclatural list was started in the spring of the following year.

The list of positions that were essential in the eyes of the new authorities, i.e. the EC(b)P CC *nomenklatura*, was approved at the EC(b)P CC Bureau session held in May 1941. At the same time, lower-level, i.e. county and municipal Nomenclatural lists were being compiled.[145] In early July 1941, the EC(b)P Central Committee's *nomenklatura* list was sent to the CPSU(b) Central Committee in Moscow. This list has not been preserved in our archives. Wartime documents show that the CPSU(b) CC *nomenklatura* consisted of EC(b)P CC Secretaries, department heads, deputy chairmen of the most important departments, leaders of the special sector and financial-economic sector, and special sector cipher clerks.[146] In November 1944, the CPSU(b) CC Cadre Department sent Tallinn a list of positions in the Estonian SSR that were counted as part of the CPSU(b) CC *nomenklatura*. At the end of 1944 into the start of the following year, the list was amended many times. Actually, from the perspective of the *nomenklatura*, 1945 was its most critical year: that was the year in which an operational cadre accounting system was effectively brought into being, and a list of Nomenclatural positions, including those within the CPSU(b) CC *nomenklatura*, was put into place.

The workings of the system were far from smooth, if only because most employees within this *nomenklatura* had been appointed without a decision of the EC(b)P Central Committee Bureau. In the beginning of 1945, the EC(b)P CC *nomenklatura* comprised 1,349 positions, of which 1,074 or 79.6% were filled. The number of officials appointed by EC(b)P CC Bureau decision was small – 196 or 18.3%. On January 1, 1946, the *nomenklatura* consisted of 1,842 positions. The enlargement of the *nomenklatura* was due to the inclusion of the leaders of 24 newly established organizations.[147] By the beginning of 1946, 1,685 Nomenclatural positions (91.4%) had been filled. Details of these positions can be found in Table 2.

Table 2

EC(b)P Central Committee *Nomenklatura* **on January 1, 1946**

Nomenclatural domain	Position	Filled		Appointed to office by EC(b)P CC Bureau decision	
		Number	%	Number	%
Party	388	351	90.5	277	64.6
Komsomol organization	32	28	87.5	22	78.6
Executive authority	262	237	90.8	70	29

[145] Tarvel, ed. *Eestimaa Kommunistliku Partei Keskkomitee organisatsiooniline struktuur*, p. 105.
[146] See **Liivik,** *Eestimaa Kommunistliku Partei Keskkomitee aparaat*, pp. 56–57.
[147] EC(b)P CC Cadre Department Annual Report for 1945, ERAF 1-104-2, p. 5–6.

Security, judicial and procuracy	54	40	74.0	30	75.0
Planning and finance organizations	74	69	93.2	31	44.9
Trade	43	42	97.6	16	38.0
Industry, transportation & communications	335	321	92.2	81	25.2
Agriculture and agricultural products processing industry	213	199	93.4	42	21.1
Press and publishing	110	90	81.8	22	24.4
Intellectual life, health care, social organizations	207	191	92.2	82	42.9
TOTAL	**1842**	**1685**	**91.4**	**701**	**41.6**

Source: EC(b)P CC Cadre Department Annual Report for 1945. ERAF 1-104-2, l 5–6.

In 1946, 272 positions in the Estonian SSR were on the list of the all-Union, i.e. the CPSU(b) CC *nomenklatura*. By the end of the year, 263 or 96.7% of these positions had been filled. A large part of the all-Union *nomenklatura* in Estonia consisted of sovkhoz directors – 55 persons or 20.2%. The fact that not all the people belonging to the all-Union *nomenklatura* were Party members and that most of them were Estonians, is very significant: of 263 positions, 36 (13.7%) were filled by non-Party members, and 181 (68.8%) were filled by Estonians.[148] A more detailed summary of the people in the Estonian SSR belonging who were members of the all-Union *nomenklatura* is given in Table 3.

Table 3

Number of people in the Estonian SSR who were members of the CPSU(b) CC *nomenklatura*, their Party membership and nationality in 1946

Nomenclatural domain	Positions available/ filled	Party membership			Nationality		
		Members	Candi-dates	non-Party members	Estonians	Russians	Other
Party cadres	87/82	80	2	-	47	34	1
Industry, transportation, communications	24/24	19	2	3	13	6	5
"Special cadre"	47/47	45	2	-	25	22	-
Soviet, cultural and artistic cadre	59/55	53	2	-	43	10	2
Sovkhoz directors	55/55	11	11	33	53	2	-
TOTAL	**272/263**	**208**	**19**	**36**	**181**	**74**	**8**

Source: EC(b)P CC Cadre Department Annual Report for 1945. ERAF 1-104-2, l 5.

[148] EC(b)P CC Cadre Department Annual Report for 1945, ERAF 1-104-2, p. 5.

The new *nomenklatura* was put into place in the EC(b)P CC Bureau on September 9, 1946.[149] The list was amended according to guidelines coming from Moscow the following year. The EC(b)P CC Bureau decided to approve the "*nomenklatura* of EC(b)P CC positions submitted by the Cadre Department, amended in accordance with instructions from the CPSU(b) CC and comprising 1,514 positions within the main *nomenklatura* and 635 within the registered reserve *nomenklatura*." Precise rules were established for the union republic level as well; these were to be followed when filling the ranks of the *nomenklatura*.[150] Thus, the *nomenklatura* established for the Estonian SSR in 1947 comprised 2,149 official positions. Documents of the 1947 cadre registration sector show that the EC(b)P CC basic *nomenklatura* of that year initially included 1,513 positions, and the registration-and-control *nomenklatura* 635 positions, for a total of 2,148 positions; which included 258 jobs in the all-Union main *nomenklatura* and 31 in the registration-and-control *nomenklatura*.[151] The final list inadvertently omitted one position in the all-Union *nomenklatura*.

By 1953, the number of Nomenclatural positions had risen by 103 – to 2,252 positions. However, in the USSR as a whole, the numbers of the *nomenklatura* underwent harsh pruning in 1953: while the all-Union *nomenklatura* listed nearly 45,000 positions at the end of Stalin's rule, the new list approved in July 1953 listed only about 25,000 positions.[152] When looking at Estonia, it is important to remember that the union republic *nomenklatura* increased due to the Sovietization (raionization) of the administrative divisions, which brought about a great increase in the number of administrative units. A summary of the changes that took place in the Estonian SSR's *nomenklatura* during the years 1947–1953 are found in Table 4.

Table 4

Changes in the Estonian SSR's *nomenklatura* from 1947 to 1953

Year	Nomenclatural positions in the Estonian SSR	Incl. the number and proportion of positions in the CPSU(b)/CPSU CC	
		number	proportion (%)
1947	2149	288	13.4
1953	2252	116	5.2
Change: + / -	+103	–172	–8.2

Source: **Hiljar Tammela**. *Nomenklatura* of the Estonian SSR (1944–1953), pp. 15, 28.

Significant changes took place in the union republic *nomenklatura* during those years. The constant reassignment of people in Nomenclatural positions was characteristic of the post-war period. Boris Kumm, who had been relieved of his position as Minister of Security several months before, stated at the EC(b)P CC 8th Plenum of March 1950: "Let us look at cadre issues, for instance. How often have we attempted to patch up this tattered coat of the CC *nomenklatura*; at times, there is not enough to cover this spot, at other times, there is not enough to cover that spot; we affix our patches, we rear-

[149] Tannberg, ed., *EKP KK büroo istungite regestid*, p. 159.
[150] EC(b)P CC 1947 *nomenklatura*, ERAF 1-4-404, p. 85.
[151] **Liivik,** *Eestimaa Kommunistliku Partei Keskkomitee aparaat*, p. 61.
[152] **Хлевнюк,** "Система центр-регионы в 1930–1950-е годы," pp. 253–267.

range our patches, and still we hear nothing but a deafening din that says we do not have enough people."[153]

Within the *nomenklatura* itself, the number of positions in the ideological field increased. The main reason for this was the increase in the numbers of political workers at machine-tractor stations, but generally, it was also because the ideological sphere was being rendered ever more essential on the all-Union level (undoubtedly against the backdrop of the Cold War). The fact that the number of regional positions in the union republic *nomenklatura* – in Estonia's case, at the raion level – rose from 52% to 62% in this brief period is also characteristic. The main reasons for such changes were twofold: first, it indicated an increase in union-republic level control over the local level (with the greatest advantage being enjoyed by machine-tractor station workers, now with 414 positions instead of the previous 48),[154] and second, the change was brought about by the rearrangement of administrative divisions, as described above.[155]

Of the changes that took place in the ESSR *nomenklatura* between 1947 and 1953, one of the most important was the remarkable decrease of the relative number of positions on the all-Union *nomenklatura* list. If we compare the *nomenklatura* of 1947 and 1953, we see that the latter included far fewer positions for all manner of all-Union inspectors and controllers when compared to 1947 (See Table 4). This change is significant particularly when dealing with our topic: by 1953, the all-Union control exerted over the leadership of the union republic by way of the *nomenklatura* had loosened. Just like the elimination of the CPSU(b) CC union republic Bureaus, this action confirms that Moscow recognized the "independence" of the union republic leadership to be acceptable, and abandoned the program of "advising" that it had pursued so vigorously at the start. In the early 1950s, the balance of control had shifted downward – to the regional level –within the *nomenklatura* of the union republic itself.[156] A summary of the Estonian SSR *nomenklatura* in 1953 is given in Table 5.

Table 5

Nomenklatura **of the Estonian SSR in 1953**

ECP CC Departments "watching over" the *nomenklatura*	Nomenclatural positions				
	CPSU CC		ECP CC		Total
	Basic list	Registration list	Basic list	Registration list	
Party, labor union, Komsomol organizations	24	4	685	207	892
Propaganda and agitation	3	–	66	34	100

[153] Boris Kumm's speech at the EC(b)P CC VIII Plenum, 1950, *Akadeemia* 9, (1999), p. 2041. In the 1950s, the Nomenclatural membership became ever more unchanging, providing an essential ingredient for the stagnation of society. In the 1980s, the *nomenklatura* included 118 Central Committee apparatus workers, 492 district- and city committee authorities, 293 kolkhoz and sovhoz directors, 219 Executive Committee members, and 226 Party members. The *nomenklatura* included a total of 1,348 members. For more details, see **Jüri Ruus,** "Kommunistide osakaal Eesti eliidis demokraatiale ülemineku perioodil" [Relative Number of Communists in the Estonian Elite During the Period of Transition to Democracy], *Akadeemia* 4, 2002, pp. 691–719.

[154] For more on the political departments established at machine-tractor stations and their significance, see **Feest,** *Zwangskollektivierung im Baltikum*, pp. 453–455.

[155] **Tammela,** "The Estonian SSR *Nomenklatura* (1944–1953)," pp. 39–40.

[156] See ibid., pp. 39–40.

Science and culture	8	10	115	3	118
Women's affairs	–	–	1	1	2
Schools	2	–	22	4	26
Administrative and trade/finance organs	19	16	267	148	415
Agriculture	4	6	221	303	524
Industry and transportation	14	6	103	72	175
TOTAL	74	42	1480	722	2252

Source: *Nomenklatura* of the ECP CC, 13.08.1953. ERAF 1-4-1536, l 220–274.

Changes in the 1953 *nomenklatura* clearly show a change in the Kremlin's attitude toward the regional elite. Stalin died without naming a specific successor. This guaranteed a continuing power struggle on the domestic political arena of the USSR at least until the unequivocal emergence of a new leader. Those who strove for power at that time needed supporters to shore up their position, and they hoped to find them among the leaders of the oblasts, krais and union republics. Those in the Kremlin understood very clearly that governing in the "old style" was no longer possible. In order to win over the leaders of the union republics, they were even prepared to loosen central control over the regions. One man who curried favor from the union republics with particular enthusiasm in order to assure his position of power was Lavrenty Beria, whose "new national policy" helped the native employees in the union republics and raised the status of the union republics.[157]

The trimming of the *nomenklatura* in 1953 was a clear sign of Moscow's weakening control over the regions. The new list of Nomenclatural positions was prepared before Lavrenty Beria was dismissed from all his posts. Nikita Khrushchev submitted it to the CPSU CC Presidium for review on June 23, three days before the deposition of the "Marshal of Lubyanka." And yet there is no doubt that Beria played some role in the trimming of the *nomenklatura*. At his initiative, oblasts had been abolished in the smaller union republics, thereby decreasing the number of positions on the Nomenclatural lists. On July 16, 1953, the CPSU CC Presidium approved a new Nomenclatural list, which included 25,300 positions, of which nearly 11,400 were categorized under the registration-and-control *nomenklatura*.[158]

There were several reasons for the de-

[157] For more on Beria's "new national policy", see A. Яковлев, ed., *Лаврентий Берия, 1953: Стенограмма июльского пленума ЦК КПСС и другие документы* (Москва, 1999), pp. 46–52, 61–62; **Пихоя,** *Москва. Кремль. Власть*, pp. 241–246; **Тыну Таннберг,** "Новый курс Л. Берии по подавлению движения сопротивления в Прибалтике и Западной Украине весной 1953 года," in Тыну Таннберг, Отт Раун, eds., *Tuna. Спецвыпуск по истории Эстонии с 17 по 20 век*. (Тарту, Таллинн, 2006), pp. 192–210; **Tõnu Tannberg,** "'Lubjanka marssal' Nõukogude impeeriumi äärealasid reformimas: L. Beria rahvuspoliitika eesmärkidest ja tagajärgedest" [The Marshal of Lubyanka Reforming the Outer Regions of the Soviet Empire: The Goals and Consequences of Beria's National Policy], *Tuna* 3 (1999), pp. 22–37; 4 (1999) pp. 56–71; 1 (2000), pp. 42–52; **Tõnu Tannberg,** "Die Pläne Moskaus für Estland im Sommer 1953," in Olaf Mertelsmann, ed., *Vom Hitler-Stalin-Pakt bis zu Stalins Tod: Estland 1939–1953* (Hamburg, 2005), pp. 282–295; **Tõnu Tannberg,** "Die unbekannte Amnestie: Berijas Rehabilitierungspläne 1953 im Beispiel der Estnischen SSR," in Olaf Mertelsmann, ed., *Estland und Russland: Aspekte der Beziehungen beider Länder* (Hamburg, 2005), pp. 249–273; Memorandum of CPSU CC Department Head J. Gromov to the CPSU CC Presidium on the Situation in the Estonian SSR, RGANI 5-15-445, pp. 267–273.

[158] **Хлевнюк,** "Система центр-регионы в 1930–1950-е годы," p. 263.

cline in numbers of the *nomenklatura*. One was the re-organization of the state apparatus, which meant a significant decline in the number of bureaucrats; another was the trimming of regional *nomenklatura* lists.[159] In this way, Moscow knowingly loosened its control over the oblasts, krais, and union republics, resulting in a strengthening of the position of local leaders. This was a deliberate action by the central authorities – they hoped to shore up their own positions of power in this manner. This strategy was successful for a time, particularly for Nikita Khrushchev. Immediately after Stalin's death and throughout the 1950s, local leaders began to recognize their own influence in society. This became particularly evident in 1957, when an anti-Party group attempted to remove Khrushchev from power, but failed, thanks in part to the regional leaders who supported Khruschev. By this time, the all-Union *nomenklatura* had undergone an even greater reduction. A subsequent list of Nomenclatural positions had been approved on June 1, 1956, and it included 9,402 positions in the basic *nomenklatura* and 3,200 positions in the registration-and-control *nomenklatura*. Compared to the 1953 *nomenklatura*, this list was more than twice as short. The numbers of all-Union *nomenklatura* remained at this level until the late 1980s.[160] However, the 1950s were a time in which the elite of the regions were becoming more independent, a trend that the Kremlin could not longer prevent.[161] Thus, the change in direction that took place among the elite of the outer regions in 1953 proved fateful for the regime in the long run; it became particularly evident during the *perestroika* era, when this elite played a crucial role in the dismantling of the USSR.

Summary

After the re-occupation of the Baltic republics in 1944, control over these regions was placed high on the Kremlin's agenda. As early as October-November 1944, the Moscow CPSU(b) CC Organizational Bureau approved decisions pertaining to "shortcomings and errors" in the work of the Party organizations in all three Baltic union republics. These decisions actually became the fundamental documents of Sovietization for the post-war reorganization in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

These decisions established a complex system of control mechanisms, in which the Union Republic Bureaus, established by a decision of the CPSU(b) CC Politburo, initially played the most significant role. The Bureaus were to lead the Sovietization process in the union republics and serve as watchdogs of the leadership. Thus, the Union Republic Bureaus were extraordinary and provisional agencies of control and assistance, agencies whose guidelines and instructions the union republics' leaders were required to follow. The all-Union Bureaus operated until the spring of 1947, when Moscow decided that the local leadership was capable of constructing the "new order" on their own. The Union Republic Bureaus were also eliminated thanks in part to the 1947 Supreme Soviet elections, which Moscow saw as an essential milestone in the legitimization of Soviet authority in the Baltics.

Another important lever of Moscow's control over the union republics was the position of the Central Committee Second Secretary, which was also established at the end of 1944. The Second Secretary, dispatched from the center to the union republic, had to be the union republic Party leader's closest assistant or some kind of advisor, but also to serve as a watchdog over his activities and

[159] **Мохов,** *Региональная политическая элита России (1945–1991 гг.)*, p. 115.

[160] In 1958, the all-Union *nomenklatura* comprised 14,342 positions; by 1991, the Nomenclatural list included nearly 19,500 positions, whereas in August of the same year, it dropped to only 3,800. **Мохов,** *Региональная политическая элита России (1945–1991 гг.)*, p. 110.

[161] **Хлевнюк,** "Советские региональные руководители," pp. 97–100; **Хлевнюк,** "Система центр-регионы в 1930–1950-е годы," pp. 253–267.

a mediator and interpreter of the guidelines sent by Moscow. Until Stalin's death in 1953, the Second Secretary in all three Baltic union republics was a key figure in their Sovietization. After Stalin's death, during the "new national policy" initiated by Lavrenty Beria, Moscow abandoned its principle of unilaterally appointing a Second Secretary. This was a sign of the center loosening its control over the union republics.

During the post-war years, the *nomenklatura*, or list of most important positions for political power, played an essential role in the power relationship between the "center" and the union republics. The *nomenklatura* system had already been established in the USSR by the mid-1920s; however, in the Estonian SSR and the other Baltic union republics, this did not take place until after the war. The *nomenklatura* included Party and executive authorities as well as all the other most important positions, the filling of which requires the Party's approval or corroboration. Each Party organization, from the CPSU(b)/CPSU CC to the municipal and district committees, had a list of positions subject to approval or corroboration. Thus, the *nomenklatura* was a multi-level mechanism clearly designed for control by the political authorities. Moscow's Nomenclatural control over the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian SSR was particularly strong particularly during the post-war years, showing no loosening until after 1953.

Between 1944 and 1953, a system of central mechanisms of control over the union republics was developed in the Estonian SSR and the other Baltic union republics. The system implemented at that time was very helpful in Sovietizing the Baltics and in screening workers for the power apparatus and ascertaining those loyal to the new power. After the death of Stalin, the power relationships between the center and the union republics changed, and control over of the the outer regions loosened, but the control mechanisms established in the post-war years essentially remained in force, operating almost unchanged until the latter half of the 1980s.

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Arnold Rüütel, Estonian Supreme Council Chairman (at right), Brian Low, Ambassador of Great Britain (middle) and Lennart Meri, Estonian Foreign Minister at Kadrioru Palace on October 7, 1991.
EFA 0-147354

John Major, Prime Minister of Great Britain (at left) and Mart Laar, Prime Minister of the Republic of Estonia in Vilnius to discuss opportunities for economic cooperation between the Baltic states and Great Britain.
August 2, 1994.
Photo by A. Truuväärt.
EFA 0-174315

Douglas Hurd, Foreign Secretary of Great Britain (right front) during his visit to Tallinn's Old Town in 1994, accompanied by Estonian Foreign Minister Jüri Luik (rear left).
Photo by L. Michelson.
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