Redistricting

Redistricting
State-by-state procedures
Congressional district demographics
Majority-minority districts
See the above video for a primer on redistricting policy in the United States.

Redistricting is the process by which new congressional and state legislative district boundaries are drawn. All United States representatives and state legislators are elected from political divisions called districts. United States Senators are not elected by districts, but by the states at large. District lines are redrawn every 10 years following completion of the United States Census. The federal government stipulates that districts must have nearly equal populations and must not discriminate on the basis of race or ethnicity. ^[1]

Redistricting is a fiercely contested issue, primarily due to gerrymandering, the practice of drawing district lines to favor one political party, individual or constituency over another. Two areas of contention include the following:

Competitiveness: Political parties or incumbents sometimes draw district lines for their benefit at the expense of proportionality and fair representation. Some argue that this practice contributes to the present lack of competitive elections. Uncompetitive elections can in turn discourage participation.^[2]

Race and ethnicity: District lines sometimes minimize the influence of minority voters by disproportionately consolidating them within single districts or splitting them across several districts. These practices are examples of "packing" and "cracking," respectively.^[2][3][4][5]

In most states, the legislatures are primarily responsible for redistricting. Reformers argue that partisan legislators are incapable of establishing fair district lines because they have a vested interest in the outcome. Instead, reformers advocate using different redistricting processes, including independent commissions. Others maintain that alternative processes are less accountable to voters and are subject to partisan abuse.

Federal law stipulates that all districts, whether congressional or state legislative, must meet two primary criteria:

1. Equal population: According to All About Redistricting, federal law "requires that each district have about the same population: each federal district within a state must have about the same number of people [and] each state district within a state must have about the same number of people." Specific standards for determining whether populations are sufficiently equal vary for congressional and state legislative districts. See below for further details.^[1]
2. Race and ethnicity: Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 states that district lines must not dilute the voting power of racial or ethnic minority groups. This provision "applies whether the denial is intentional, or an unintended end result. Courts essentially test whether the way that districts are drawn takes decisive political power away from a cohesive minority bloc otherwise at risk for discrimination."^[1]

State requirements

In addition to the federal criteria noted above, individual states may impose additional requirements on redistricting. Common state-level redistricting criteria are listed below. Typically, these requirements are quite flexible.

1. Contiguity refers to the principle that all areas within a district should be "physically adjacent." A total of 49 states require that districts of at least one state legislative chamber be contiguous. A total of 23 states require that congressional districts meet contiguity requirements.^[1][6]
2. Compactness refers to the general principle that "the distance between all parts of a district" ought to be minimized. The United States Supreme Court has "construed compactness to indicate that residents have some sort of cultural cohesion in common." A total of 37 states "require their legislative districts to be reasonably compact." A total of 18 states impose similar requirements for congressional districts.^[1][6]
3. A community of interest is a "group of people in a geographical area, such as a specific region or neighborhood, who have common political, social or economic interests." A total of 24 states require that the maintenance of communities of interest be considered in the drawing of state legislative districts. A total of 13 states impose similar requirements for congressional districts.^[1][6]
4. A total of 42 states require that state legislative district lines be drawn to account for political boundaries (e.g., the limits of counties, cities and towns). A total of 19 states require that similar considerations be made in the drawing of congressional districts.^[1][6]

Congressional redistricting

According to Article 1, Section 4, of the United States Constitution, the states and their legislatures have primary authority in determining the "times, places and manner" of federal congressional elections. Congress may also pass laws regulating congressional elections. Section 4 vests the authority to regulate congressional elections with the legislative branches of the states and the federal government and not with the executive or judicial branches.^[7][8]

“	The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.[9]	”
—United States Constitution

Article 1, Section 2, of the United States Constitution stipulates that congressional representatives be apportioned to the states on the basis of population. There are 435 seats in the United States House of Representatives. Each state is allotted a portion of these seats based on the size of its population relative to the other states. Consequently, a state may gain seats in the House if its population grows, or lose seats if its population decreases, relative to populations in other states. In 1964, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Wesberry v. Sanders that the populations of House districts must be equal "as nearly as practicable."^[10][11][1]

The equal population requirement for congressional districts is strict. According to All About Redistricting, "any district with more or fewer people than the average (also known as the 'ideal' population), must be specifically justified by a consistent state policy. And even consistent policies that cause a 1 percent spread from largest to smallest district will likely be unconstitutional."^[1]

State legislative redistricting

In the early years of the republic, district lines often coincided with the borders of cities, towns, counties and groups thereof. This approach to apportionment became increasingly problematic as the nation's population grew and shifted.

“	As the country's population grew, it did not grow equally, and some towns and counties grew much larger than others. Some jurisdictions kept pace with changing population, shifting the number of representatives assigned to each district, or reconfiguring district lines; others did not. Sometimes, districts stayed the same despite population shifts because of an underlying philosophy: several state Senate systems were modeled after the federal Senate, with representation for counties as such rather than the population therein. Sometimes, districts stayed the same because of political advantage or neglect[.][9]	”
—All About Redistricting[12]

In the mid-1960s, the United States Supreme Court issued a series of rulings that addressed this issue. In Reynolds v. Sims, the court ruled that "the Equal Protection Clause [of the United States Constitution] demands no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of all races." According to All About Redistricting, "it has become accepted that a [redistricting] plan will be constitutionally suspect if the largest and smallest districts are more than 10 percent apart."^[1]

Gerrymandering

Professor Justin Levitt of Loyola University noted that "American attempts to tailor district lines for political gain stretch back to the country's very origin."^[2]

“	Patrick Henry, who opposed the new Constitution, tried to draw district lines to deny a seat in the first Congress to James Madison, the Constitution's primary author. Henry ensured that Madison's district was drawn to include counties politically opposed to Madison. The attempt failed, and Madison was elected -- but the American gerrymander had begun.[9]	”
—All About Redistricting[2]

In 1812, Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry signed into law a state senate district map. The map "consolidated the Federalist Party vote in a few districts and thus gave disproportionate representation to Democratic-Republicans." The word "gerrymander" was coined by The Boston Gazette to describe the district.^[13][14]

Today, the term describes the practice of drawing district lines to favor one political party, individual or constituency over another. It is primarily because of gerrymandering that redistricting remains a hotly contested issue. SCOTUSblog summarizes the issue as follows:

“	When Republicans are in power, they craft districts in their favor, and the Democrats do exactly the same when they hold power. As a result, fewer districts are actually competitive at election time. The Supreme Court has been asked several times to put some limits on 'partisan gerrymandering,' but has refused each time.[9]	”
—SCOTUSblog[15]

See also: State-by-state redistricting procedures

State legislatures

In 37 states, legislatures are primarily responsible for drawing congressional district lines. Seven states have only one congressional district each; as such, congressional redistricting is not necessary in these states. State legislative redistricting is primarily the province of state legislatures in 37 states.^[16]

In these states, the legislatures typically adopt district lines by a simple majority vote in each chamber. A state's governor may usually veto the legislature's redistricting plan. Two states, Connecticut and Maine, require two-thirds majorities in each chamber in order to approve district lines. Five states, including Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, Mississippi and North Carolina, set electoral boundaries by joint resolution. In these states, the governor cannot veto the legislature's decision.^[16]

The table below lists the states in which legislatures have primary authority over congressional and state legislative district lines.

States in which state legislatures have primary redistricting authority
State	Congressional districts	State legislative districts
Alabama
Arkansas
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Source: All About Redistricting, "Who draws the lines?" accessed March 25, 2015

Advisory commissions

Several states employ advisory commissions to assist in the drawing of congressional and state legislative district lines. These commissions may make recommendations to their respective state legislatures, but the legislatures are not necessarily required to adhere to these recommendations.^[16]

Backup commissions and procedures

Seven states utilize backup commissions and other procedures to establish state legislative district lines in the event that the state legislatures are unable to agree on redistricting plans. These include Connecticut, Maryland, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas and Illinois. Indiana and Connecticut employ similar methods for congressional district lines.^[16]

Backup commissions and processes differ from state to state. The basic procedures are as follows:^[16][17]

1. In Maryland, the governor's preferred plan is enacted if the state legislature fails to adopt new state legislative districts.
2. In Oregon, the secretary of state draws state legislative district lines in the event of legislative gridlock.
3. In Connecticut and Illinois, backup commissions comprise members appointed by leaders of the state legislatures.
4. In Mississippi and Texas, backup commissions comprise statewide elected officials.
5. In Oklahoma, the backup commission comprises the governor, the lieutenant governor and members of the legislature's majority party (selected by legislative leaders).

Politician commissions

Politician commissions, composed of elected or appointed members, have primary responsibility for congressional redistricting in two states, Hawaii and New Jersey. Such commissions draw state legislative district lines in seven states: Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio and Pennsylvania.^[16]

Independent commissions

Independent commissions draw the lines for both state legislative and congressional districts in six states: Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana and Washington. Specific membership requirements for these commissions vary from state to state. Generally speaking, however, these commissions do not include legislators or other elected officials.^[16]

Evenwel v. Abbott

See also: Evenwel v. Abbott

Evenwel v. Abbott was a case decided by the United States Supreme Court in 2016. At issue was the constitutionality of state legislative districts in Texas. The plaintiffs, Sue Evenwel and Edward Pfenninger, argued that district populations ought to take into account only the number of registered or eligible voters residing within those districts. Total population counts have typically been used for redistricting purposes. Total population tallies include non-voting residents, such as illegal immigrants, prisoners and children. The plaintiffs alleged that this tabulation method dilutes the voting power of citizens residing in districts that are home to smaller concentrations of non-voting residents. Oral arguments took place on December 8, 2015.^{[18][19][20][21]}

The court ruled 8-0 on April 4, 2016, that a state or locality can use total population counts for redistricting purposes.According to the court's majority opinion, penned by Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "What constitutional history and our prior decisions strongly suggest, settled practice confirms. Adopting voter-eligible apportionment as constitutional command would upset a well-functioning approach to districting that all 50 states and countless local jurisdictions have followed for decades, even centuries. Appellants have shown no reason for the court to disturb this longstanding use of total population."^{[20][22][23][24]}

Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission

See also: Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission

Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission was a case before the United States Supreme Court. At issue was the constitutionality of the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, which was established by state constitutional amendment in 2000. According to Article 1, Section 4, of the United States Constitution, "the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof." The state legislature argued that the use of the word "legislature" in this context is literal; therefore, only a state legislature may draw congressional district lines. Meanwhile, the commission contended that the word "legislature" ought to be interpreted more broadly to mean "the legislative powers of the state," including voter initiatives and referenda.^[19][25]

On June 29, 2015, the United States Supreme Court ruled 5-4 in favor of the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. The court ruled that "redistricting is a legislative function, to be performed in accordance with the state's prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include the referendum and the governor's veto."^[24][26]

The states have enacted a variety of redistricting reforms intended to make the process less partisan and more fair. According to The Washington Post, six states employed independent commissions to conduct congressional redistricting as of June 2015: Arizona, California, Idaho, Washington, Montana and Alaska. Had the court ruled in favor of the Arizona State Legislature in this case, independent redistricting commissions in these states might have been affected. Furthermore, according to the Brennan Center for Justice, the court's ruling could have impacted a broad assortment of voter-initiated state election laws.^{[27][18][28][29]}

HR 2173

On April 30, 2015, Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-California) introduced HR 2173. If enacted, HR 2173 would require the use of independent commissions in setting congressional district boundaries. This requirement would apply to all states with more than one seat in the United States House of Representatives. The composition of these commissions would be as follows:^[30]

1. Four commissioners would belong to the state's largest political party.
2. Four commissioners would belong to the state's second-largest political party.
3. Four members would not be affiliated with either the largest or second-largest political parties. From this group, a commission chair would be appointed.

The legislation would prohibit the commission from taking into account voting history, party registration information, or incumbent residency.^[30]

HR 2173 was referred to the Judiciary Committee of the United States House of Representatives. As of May 18, 2015, the bill had 29 cosponsors, all of whom were Democrats. To access the full text of HR 2173, click here.^[31]

There are conflicting opinions regarding the correlation between partisan gerrymandering and electoral competitiveness. Some critics contend that the dominant redistricting methods result in a lack of competitive elections. Jennifer Clark, a political science professor at the University of Houston, said, "The redistricting process has important consequences for voters. In some states, incumbent legislators work together to protect their own seats, which produces less competition in the political system. Voters may feel as though they do not have a meaningful alternative to the incumbent legislator. Legislators who lack competition in their districts have less incentive to adhere to their constituents’ opinions."^[32]

Some question the impact of redistricting on electoral competitiveness. Emory University professor Alan Abramowitz and Ph.D. students Brad Alexander and Matthew Gunning wrote the following in 2006:^[33]

“	[Some] studies have concluded that redistricting has a neutral or positive effect on competition. This is not surprising because partisans drawing district lines face a fundamental tension between incumbent protection and maximizing their party's electoral potential. More often than not, the only way to shift marginal districts toward the party is to cut the safety margins of incumbents by moving reliable partisans out of their districts. For this reason, it is often the case that partisan redistricting has the effect of reducing the safety of incumbents, thereby making elections more competitive.[9]	”
—Alan Abramowitz, Brad Alexander and Matthew Gunning

The individuals involved in redistricting must balance the desire for increased competitiveness with other principles that might conflict with that goal, such as compactness, contiguity, and maintaining communities of interest. For instance, it may at times be impossible to draw a competitive district that is both compact and preserves communities of interest.

In 2011, James Cottrill, a professor of political science at Santa Clara University, published a study of the effect of "non-legislative approaches" to redistricting on the competitiveness of congressional elections. Cottrill found that "particular types of [non-legislative approaches] encourage the appearance in congressional elections of experienced and well-financed challengers." Cottrill cautioned, however, that non-legislative approaches "contribute neither to decreased vote percentages when incumbents win elections nor to a greater probability of their defeat."^[34]

“	Voters, however, might still regard non-legislative redistricting as advantageous despite its limited and conditional connection to some common indicators of competition. Given the negative relationship between legislative redistricting and the probability of an experienced challenger emerging, citizens might regard a NLA as a better option. There may even be a significant, although intangible, value to eliminating the perception of corruption that often accompanies legislative redistricting.[9]	”
—James Cottrill[34]

Congress

See also: Margin of victory analysis for the 2014 congressional elections

In 2014, Ballotpedia analyzed the margins of victory in all 435 contests for the United States House of Representatives. Ballotpedia found that the average margin of victory was 35.8 percent, compared to 31.8 percent in 2012. An election is deemed competitive if it was won by a margin of victory of 5 percent or less. A total of 318 elections (73 percent of all House elections) were won by margins of victory of 20 percent or more. Only 26 elections (6 percent of the total) were won by margins of victory of 5 percent or less. See the table below for further details.

Note: The data below are provided only for informational purposes. It should be noted that there are conflicting opinions regarding the correlation between redistricting and competitiveness. A variety of factors at the local, state and federal levels can impact electoral competitiveness.

Electoral margins of victory in 2014 United States House of Representatives elections
Party	0%-5%	5%-10%	10%-20%	20% or more
Democratic	15	15	32	126
Republican	11	8	36	192
Totals	26	23	68	318

State legislatures

See also: Margin of victory in state legislative elections

In 2014, Ballotpedia conducted a study of competitive districts in 44 state legislative chambers between 2010 and 2012. Ballotpedia found that there were 61 fewer competitive general election contests in 2012 than in 2010. Of the 44 chambers studied, 25 experienced a net loss in the number of competitive elections. A total of 17 experienced a net increase. In total, 16.2 percent of the 3,842 legislative contests studied saw competitive general elections in 2010. In 2012, only 14.6 percent of the contests studied saw competitive general elections. An election was considered competitive if it was won by a margin of victory of 5 percent or less. An election was considered mildly competitive if it was won by a margin of victory between 5 and 10 percent. For more information regarding this report, including methodology, click here.

Note: These data are provided only for informational purposes. It should be noted that there are conflicting opinions regarding the correlation between redistricting and competitiveness. A variety of factors at the local, state and federal levels can impact electoral competitiveness.

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 mandates that electoral district lines cannot be drawn in such a manner as to "improperly dilute minorities' voting power."

“	No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.[9]	”
—Voting Rights Act of 1965[35]

States and other political subdivisions may create majority-minority districts in order to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. A majority-minority district is a district in which minority groups comprise a majority of the district's total population.^[3][4][5]

Proponents of majority-minority districts maintain that these districts are a necessary hindrance to the practice of cracking. Cracking occurs when a constituency is divided between several districts in order to prevent it from achieving a majority in any one district. In addition, supporters argue that the drawing of majority-minority districts has resulted in an increased number of minority representatives in state legislatures and Congress.^[3][4][5]

Some critics, meanwhile, contend that the establishment of majority-minority districts results in "packing." Packing occurs when a constituency or voting group is placed within a single district, thereby minimizing its influence in other districts. Because minority groups tend to vote Democratic, critics argue that majority-minority districts ultimately present an unfair advantage to Republicans by consolidating Democratic votes into a smaller number of districts.^[3][4][5]

“	The drawing of majority-minority districts not only elected more minorities, it also had the effect of bleeding minority voters out of all the surrounding districts. Given that minority voters were the most reliably Democratic voters, that made all of the neighboring districts more Republican.[9]	”
—The Atlantic[4]

This section displays the most recent stories in a Google news search for the term "Redistricting"

• State-by-state redistricting procedures
• State legislative and congressional redistricting after the 2010 census
• Margin of victory in state legislative elections before and after the 2010 census
• Margin of victory analysis for the 2014 congressional elections

• All About Redistricting
• National Conference of State Legislatures, "Redistricting Process"
• FairVote, "Redistricting"
• The Redistricting Game

Additional reading

• Brennan Center for Justice, "A Citizen's Guide to Redistricting," July 1, 2008

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