When Iranian-Canadian journalist Maziar Bahari was imprisoned during the 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement, his interrogators demanded not only that he admit to being a CIA agent but that Zarif—who had been sidelined by then hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad after serving as Iran’s UN ambassador—had ties “to Western intelligence agencies.” By formally accusing Zarif of espionage, hardliners could have ended his career once and for all.
Six months have passed since the Trump administration unilaterally pulled out of the nuclear agreement, and nearly a month since the US re-imposed secondary sanctions on Iran’s oil and financial sectors. Under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran agreed to curb its nuclear activities and to allow for a stricter international inspections regime. In return, all nuclear-related sanctions against Iran were supposed to be removed to facilitate the country’s re-engagement with the international economy.
Having that been said, the industry sector appears to bear the highest potential for raising economic output compared to other sectors following a downward trajectory.
As announced, the new wave of US secondary sanctions came into force on November 5. This came after unsuccessful efforts by Europe to dissuade President Donald Trump from unilaterally quitting the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and despite efforts to persuade European countries to retain their trade with Iran through a so-called blocking statute and a Special Purpose Vehicle.
From the start of his administration, President Donald Trump has insisted that he can coerce Iran into reaching a “better deal” than the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that would also address Tehran’s military intervention and support of proxies in the Arab world as well as its ballistic missile program. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has gone further, issuing a dozen demands that resemble an ultimatum calling for capitulation rather than preconditions for negotiations. This much is clear: The Trump administration has decided to wage economic war on Iran to try to bring it to heel.
The Atlantic Council’s Future of Iran Initiative detailed these mechanisms in a new issue brief, How Iran Will Cope with US Sanctions, co-authored by Holly Dagres, a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center, and Barbara Slavin, director of the Future of Iran Initiative. The report highlights a number of ways Iran has used in the past to circumvent previous sanctions and is using again. Among them are relying on neighboring countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Turkey, putting oil on tankers that mask their national identity, creating front companies and using barter trade. Iran is also looking forward to the European Union (EU) creating a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to facilitate commerce with the EU and other nations.
These announcements are part of a “maximum pressure” strategy laid out by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. But these demands leave policymakers with three questions: what counts as an Iranian militia; how do we force these militias out of Syria and what happens next; and what are the likely consequences of such a venture.
According to the US Treasury Department, “over 700 [new] persons [and entities] have been designated or identified and added” to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List.
It hurt whenever people mocked me, “Girls know nothing about football, they just love footballers.” But nothing could stop me and many other Iranian girls from following sports in the newspapers and football matches on television.
At the time of the October 1983 attack, I served as the Marine Corps Senate liaison in the Russell Senate Office Building. The tragedy began several weeks of intense work to try to understand what had happened, and to respond to the deep concerns of senators, their staffs and the public at large regarding the welfare of the Marines and their families. The country’s pain, which intensified as the magnitude of the losses became clear, remains undiminished to this day.
